The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit

THE UNITED KINGDOM’S DEFENCE AFTER BREXIT Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, & Partnerships

EDITED BY Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary

The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit

Rob Johnson · Janne Haaland Matlary Editors

The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships

Editors Rob Johnson Changing Character of War Centre University of Oxford Oxford, UK

Janne Haaland Matlary Department of Political Science University of Oslo Oslo, Norway

ISBN 978-3-319-97168-1 ISBN 978-3-319-97169-8  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950558 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Greg Blatchford/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The United Kingdom Chief of the Defence Staff The military cooperation between the United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO in Europe is fundamental to the future of our Alliance as it approaches its 70th birthday. There is also no doubt that we live in an era of profound and far-reaching change. Few of these changes are in favour of those who support the rules-based international order. It is imperative that we develop a better understanding of the character of the changing international climate and of the opportunities that are emerging. New technologies will give us a chance to enhance our defence and security, but we also need to pay attention to how we organize ourselves, our systems, and the ways in which we sustain, maintain, and develop our cooperation. I am therefore delighted to see this volume, the product of academic and military collaboration, with views from across the Alliance, which explains where the challenges lie and how they are being approached. The United Kingdom is taking the lead in several aspects of Europe’s defence, and working closely with all our partners, to ensure that we can pursue our democratic way of life, free of threat, interference or attack, throughout this turbulent and uncertain era and beyond. London, UK

Sir Stuart Peach, GBE, KCB, ADC, DL Air Chief Marshal

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Preface

This book project grew out of our interest in military integration in Europe at a time when it faces both conventional risks as well as irregular threats. It is evident that Western states must cooperate in order to cope with rising defence costs and the implementation of new technologies. Interoperability is also a vital component of operational effectiveness. When there is cooperation, the overall strategic impact of the Western allies is enhanced significantly, especially for smaller states who find themselves confronted by larger, more aggressive neighbours. We therefore took particular interest in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a unique constellation of mostly NATO member states but with the full participation of Finland and Sweden. This British-led force structure is flexible and adjustable, it can deploy rapidly, and it can undertake any type of operation. With a small number of well-integrated armed forces, drawn from its participating nations, its ability to act quickly provides considerable strategic advantage. NATO is undoubtedly led by the United States, so our interest in Britain may seem surprising. There are several reasons for the emphasis of the volume. The first is that Britain has designed and developed the JEF at a time when crisis can escalate quickly. It is organized specifically to conduct fast-moving operations, including information warfare, as part of a longer British tradition in its posture of global response. Britain undoubtedly plays the leading role in Northern European defence and security, with its maritime interests in the North Atlantic and the freedom of the seas, its special relationship with the US and its close vii

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cooperation with France. Indeed, cooperation with France deepened in the 2010s and took the form of a joint brigade, combined air operations over Syria, and cooperation in maritime aviation. As its national strategy makes clear, Britain values and spearheads its partnerships and its coalitions. What was less clear was the impact of Brexit on its role. When added to the uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration’s foreign and security policy, and aggressive Russian posturing against NATO, we decided that it is time to re-examine the key role that Britain plays in European defence and security policy. That meant not only an examination of the British position, capability and intentions, but American and European views of their British allies. We are very grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for a research grant that allowed us to do this as well as to the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo for providing funds for language-editing. All Souls College, Oxford University, and the Norwegian Command and Staff College arranged and two workshops for the research group for which we thank these institutions. Oxford, UK Oslo, Norway May 2018

Rob Johnson Janne Haaland Matlary

Contents

1 Introduction 1 Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary Part I  Britain’s Partnerships 2

UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’ and ‘International by Design’ 33 Rob Johnson

3

The US–UK Special Relationship and the “Principled Realism” of the Trump Administration 59 Andrew A. Michta

4

‘You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore’: Anglo-American Security Relations in the Era of Brexit and Trump 75 Jeffrey H. Michaels

5

Franco-British Defence Co-operation in the Context of Brexit 103 Samuel B. H. Faure

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British-German Defence and Security Relations After Brexit: Quo Vadis, ‘Silent Alliance’? 127 Håkon Lunde Saxi

7

A Special Partnership? The EU’s Military Ambition and the Role of Britain 159 Janne Haaland Matlary

Part II  Britain’s Coalitions 8

Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends? 189 Tormod Heier

9

Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the Nordic-Baltic Region—Ways of British Leadership 215 Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson

10 The JEF as a Force Multiplier: The Example of Joint Amphibious Response in the Nordic-Baltic Theatre 245 Richard Cantrill and Eystein Lockwood Meyer

Notes

on

Contributors

Col. Richard Cantrill, O.B.E., M.C. is a Colonel in the Royal Marines, currently assigned dual hatted as Chief of Staff to the Commander UK Amphibious Forces and EU Operation Atalanta. His early career was focused on reconnaissance and mountain and cold weather warfare, and after assignments as Company Commander in Afghanistan and a Military Assistant, to DCDS Military Strategy and Operations, he served as the Commanding Officer of 42 Commando Royal Marines. He holds a Master’s degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London. Dr. Samuel B. H. Faure  is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Nuffield College at the University of Oxford. He is also an associate member at the Maison française d’Oxford (MFO), and a research associate at the SciencesPo’s Center for International Research (CERI) in Paris. His first book, entitled Défense européenne: émergence d’une culture stratégique commune (‘European Defence: The Emergence of a Common Strategic Culture’) has been published in 2016. He has also published in European Security, Politique européenne and St Antony’s International Review. Dr. Tormod Heier is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Oslo. He has previously served in the Norwegian Intelligence Service and in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, and has edited several books on Norwegian and European security and defence policy. xi

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Notes on Contributors

Dr. Rob Johnson is the Director of the Changing Character of War (CCW) Research Centre at the University of Oxford (www.ccw.ox.ac.uk). His primary research interests are in the history of strategy and war, and their contemporary applications, and he is prominent within professional military education across NATO. He is the author of The Great War and the Middle East (2016), The Afghan Way of War (2011), and co-editor of At the End of Military Intervention (2015) and the forthcoming Before Military Intervention (Palgrave, 2018), as well as several other works on strategy and armed conflicts in the Middle East, Asia and Europe. His leadership of CCW emphasizes the value of blending ideas, theory, and practice in current strategic and security policy, which is exemplified in this volume. Dr. Janne Haaland Matlary  is a Prof. Dr. Philos in international affairs at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo and adjunct professor at the Norwegian Command and Staff College. Her latest book is Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe Act Strategically? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). She was deputy foreign minister of Norway 1997–2000 and has published extensively as well as been a policy advisor to governments and international organizations. Eystein Lockwood Meyer is a Commander Senior Grade in the Royal Norwegian Navy, currently assigned as Faculty Advisor Maritime Operations at the Norwegian Command and Staff College. His previous assignments include several posts within the Norwegian Coastal Ranger Commando, several staff posts in ISAF PRT Meymaneh, Afghanistan, ISTAR manager in the Netherlands Maritime Force Amphibious Task Force, and Intelligence Officer in several staff posts in NATO Force Command Heidelberg. He is educated from the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy, the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, and holds a Master’s degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London. Jeffrey H. Michaels is a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College London. He has also held visiting research fellowships at the Oxford Changing Character of War Centre at Pembroke College and the Egmont Institute in Brussels. Earlier experience included working as a Research Associate in the Department of War Studies at King’s. Prior to joining academia, he worked for the US Defense Department and NATO.

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Dr. Andrew A. Michta  is the Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany. He is a regular contributor to The American Interest, a non-partisan journal devoted to the broad theme of “America in the world”. He is the author of several books on European Security and Transatlantic Relations. His most recent book with Paal Hilde, The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security was published by the University of Michigan Press in 2014. Joakim Erma Møller is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) in Oslo. Møller completed his Master’s Degree in Political Science at the University of Oslo in 2017, with a Master’s Thesis on Finland’s security policy following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At IFS, he is part of the research programme Security and Defence in Northern Europe, with a particular focus on cooperation between the Nordic countries. Dr. Magnus Petersson is a Professor of Modern History at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Between 1998 and 2008 he was Lecturer, Director of Studies, and Head of Research and Development at the Swedish Defence University. He has been a Visiting Scholar at Boston University, George Washington University, Johns Hopkins University, and Macquarie University. He has published widely on Nordic and Trans-Atlantic security and defence. Dr. Håkon Lunde Saxi  is a Senior Fellow with the Norwegian Defence University College (FHS) in Oslo. His research focuses on Northern European security, including Nordic, German and British defence policies. His recent publications include “British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept”. Defence Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 171–197.

List

Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3

of

Figures

Where should the amphibious force be employed? 250 Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in the Baltic Sea area 252 Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in Northern Norway 254

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List

Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 6.1

of

Tables

Detailed model of the UK’s two roles in defence co-operation with France Companies involved in building the Taranis and Neuron UCAV demonstrators The three main European arms projects under way British, French, and German military efforts compared, 2015

107 112 113 131

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary

When one looks back into European history, it is logical to pay more attention to the most significant turning points, rather than the longterm, almost imperceptible, incremental changes that occurred. It is easy to overlook the critical relationship in these apparently dichotomous forms of change, but they are inextricably linked. Equally, it is easy to miss the continuities that were not disrupted by those sudden incidents of history. The British referendum in 2016, where a majority of the population voted to leave the European Union, caused evident shock and confusion in the continent’s 27 member states. It appeared, at the time, to represent one of those pivotal moments in European history, producing dire warnings of similar separations by other nations. But the Brexit decision was the result of a much longer development, dating back to Britain’s membership of the EEC in the 1970s. The shock was the result of years of complacency among an elite that seemed to have forgotten, ignored, or deemed irrelevant, the views of working class voters. Educated figures expressed anxiety about the threat to liberal R. Johnson (*)  Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] J. H. Matlary  Blindern, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway email: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_1

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internationalism, and there were exaggerated references to Brexit as one of several challenges to the world’s international order, but while most commentators referred to economic consequences, far fewer examined the implications for the defence, security and integrity of Europe. Indeed, the EU and the UK initially assumed these would be unchanged. There was severe criticism when Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, seemed to suggest that defence and security would have to be taken into consideration in Brexit negotiations, a view widely interpreted as Britain trying to use security, especially counter-terrorism expertise, as a bargaining chip. This tells us much about the degree to which European defence had been taken for granted over the long sixty years’ peace. The developing concerns about defence and security occurred amidst four significant crises facing the European Union. The first was a wave of migration from Africa and the Middle East, driven in part by conflicts, but also by economic motives, which had elicited protests from European citizens about a lack of integration, threats to wage levels, housing shortages, cultural differences, and a rise in crime. The second crisis was the effect of the international banking crash of 2008, which had crystallised the fiscal crisis of indebted countries like Greece. The consequence for Athens was a severe austerity programme, limits on spending, and impositions by the European Central Bank that created deep resentment. The reason the Greek crisis had such resonance was that all European countries were affected to some degree and forced to curtail public spending, but in Britain it resurrected fears that member states of the EU could be coerced by directives from Brussels. The third crisis was the greater military assertiveness and rearmament of Russia, which annexed Crimea by force, deployed troops and armaments into eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region, engaged in cyber-attacks on European institutions, and made threatening rhetoric about its willingness to use force, including nuclear weapons, in defence of its national interests. Russian military modernisation appeared all the more threatening when, at the same time, European defence seemed to be in a parlous state, and where interoperability, once the significant achievement of NATO, appeared to have declined. The fourth crisis was the fractious relationship with Turkey, a country which linked the other factors together. Turkey had hoped to join the EU, but the protracted talks and conditions demanded by Brussels remained unresolved, and the migration crisis reversed Turkey’s previously weak negotiating stance: it was in a position to control

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the flow of migrants reaching Greece and the rest of the EU. Russian military intervention in Syria, and the shooting down of a Russian jet, caused some concern in Europe because of NATO commitments to Ankara, but within months, after a failed military coup, Turkey appeared to shift away from its Western NATO partners and towards Russia. The change was wrought by shared interests over Syria. Like the United States, Britain had an active air campaign over Syria to defeat the terror group, Daesh, and it sought to maintain close ties with Turkey. Britain plays a leading role in European defence and security, as evidenced its maritime and air commitments, its leading role in counter-terrorism and cyber security, in the Joint Expeditionary Force (which has a strong focus on northern and Eastern Europe), and its ­promotion of the Northern Group, a sub-stratum of NATO and its associated Scandinavian defence co-operation. But there have been a number of significant changes in British perceptions of European defence and security in recent years: Russia is increasingly regarded as a risk, even a threat to European integrity, and there are doubts about the level of American commitment to the defence of the European continent. The Nordic, Baltic, and Central European states are looking to Britain for leadership, but the impact of cuts makes the capability of Britain’s armed force look very uncertain. A succession of terrorist attacks in Britain and Europe has pushed political leaders towards a more overt counter-terrorism posture, despite the absence of any existential threat, rather than prioritising national defence. In addition, Britain is in the process of leaving the EU and this introduces uncertainty about formal cooperation in security and defence with European states. It raises the possibility that bilateral relationships and ad hoc coalitions will become increasingly important. It is often assumed Brexit will play a key role in determining Britain’s future leadership role in the continent’s security and defence, but it is not clear where the continuities will be maintained or the changes made. Alliances are, by their nature, multilateral arrangements, but, in effect, they represent a national interest for their signatories. Many assume that Britain will reduce its continental commitment as the EU seeks to increase its defence role, but it is just as likely that Britain’s position will continue unchanged or even be enhanced through its NATO membership, its close working relationship with France, and its leadership in capability. Britain is certain to put major emphasis on strengthening its role in the alliance and in its partnerships or coalitions as a consequence

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of leaving the EU, but the co-operative spirit on which the alliance depends could be affected. EU states may help and support each other in NATO and in other international organisations, something which is not uncommon, and it could be that Britain will reach some new understanding with the EU in this regard. Yet it may, of course, simply be that membership of the EU has little significance in European defence: what determines whether a state is a leading security and defence actor is its military-strategic culture, operational capability and spending capacity. Practical necessity may be more important than political alignment: states that train and deploy together—and fight together—will form partnerships and coalitions as a threat emerges. Consequently, political statements may not matter much unless reflected in real implementation in the operational dimension. Moreover, for the last sixty years, it has been NATO, led by the United States, not the EEC or EU, that has guaranteed the continent’s defence.

Brexit: Defence and Security in the Negotiations The significance of alliances, coalitions, defence and security in the Brexit negotiations was highly uncertain in 2017–2018: Whereas the British government envisaged a ‘win-win’ option by offering to collaborate with the EU in all matters relating to security and defence, the Brexit negotiations had not clarified the position on either side by 2018.1 The period between the declaration of Article 50 (the ‘exit clause’) in March 2017 and March 2018, a critical period of negotiations before the triggering of Brexit (March 2019) was marked by much dissension between the British and the EU leadership. The EU negotiators insisted that Britain should pay much more than an initial £20 billion offered by the British for the transition period. The EU insisted that EU citizens in Britain should be protected under the European Court of Justice, rather than British courts, a demand that caused incredulity in Britain, even amongst so-called ‘remainers’. In addition, the EU insisted that the border between the UK’s Northern Ireland and the EU’s Eire should be abolished, with a ‘hard’ frontier starting on the Irish Sea: this proposal was completely unacceptable to the United Kingdom, since it would deprive the country of its sovereignty over Northern Ireland, where the majority wish to remain under British jurisdiction. Indeed, the thirty years of ‘Troubles’ had been founded entirely on this issue—and the

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EU proposal seemed to raise the possibility of the ugly conflict starting all over again. Similar EU proposals to hand over Gibraltar to EU, and therefore satisfy Spanish interests, met with equal levels of ire in London. These issues were debated vigorously throughout 2017, and, as time passed, neither side appeared to have any breakthrough suggestions. The EU argued that businesses would leave Britain because of the uncertainty of market access to the EU and less favourable market rules in Britain, but there was no capital flight from the City of London, and Britain attracted more investment after 2016 partly through a lower pound sterling and partly through the prospect of more open trade outside of the EU’s customs regime. It was obvious that market actors wanted predictability and that the EU calculated that it could benefit from prolongation of the pre-negotiations. As with Greece, it believed the member state would buckle and concede, but, by 2018, the improving British economy did not make the British government inclined to make concessions. The main driving force for the British government was the Prime Minister’s political survival: inclined to compromise, May was confronted by deeply divided Cabinet colleagues, and a strong lobby of ‘Brexiteers’. The Florence speech by Theresa May in late September 2017 was conciliatory towards the EU, arguing for a gradual Brexit and offering funding for a transition period. The reactions in Brussels were quite negative. The EU wanted to create maximum uncertainty about market rules for market actors in Britain—to draw businesses away from the United Kingdom—but it was surprising that the EU should ‘stonewall’ in this manner as it self-evidently needed Britain, not only as a market, but as a net contributor to the EU in financial terms, and, even more clearly, in security and defence. However, while Britain appealed for a commonsense and practical approach to the exit negotiations, the EU seemed satisfied with procrastination and hoped that a weakened British government would reach a final concessionary arrangement. Due to the time factor, Britain was under considerable pressure to agree with the EU on its terms in order to get started with the actual negotiations about the future relationship in trade and services. It offered an unknown amount of money (above the much-publicized £20 billion), gave guarantees for European citizens in Britain, seemed to accept the possibility that the European Court of Justice would continue to exert legal supremacy in the UK, and appeared to offer an ‘open’ Northern Ireland border. Under these terms, it was thus agreed, in late December 2017, that trade negotiations could start.2

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Yet the troubles for the British government were not over, for at this stage it became of critical importance to determine which trade model Britain would want. Essentially there were two options: the ‘Norwegian model’, whereby the state would have access to the internal market and pay for this, yet remain, in effect, a ‘passive member’ of the EU (not having any say over legislation but having to adapt to whatever the EU decided). The other option was a regular, third-party trade agreement, often referred to as the ‘Canadian model.’ The British position remained very unclear. The referendum implied that a ‘Norwegian solution’ of passive membership was untenable, and Britain assumed that, as a major power in Europe, it could expect different terms than Norway. This would mean that the EU would agree to a mutually-beneficial solution. But it would not accept the supremacy of the European Court of Justice or free movement of persons, two key items concerning Brexit. The EU, on its side, argued that the internal market is a ‘package’ which cannot be unwrapped—one is either fully part of the internal market or not at all. This sounds logical, but there is no rule that a market must consist of four elements—goods, services, labour, and finance. One may, of course, agree trade in goods and not in labour, to mention one option, and all negotiations necessarily reflect the power of the stakeholders. EU trade relationships with Canada and the US, for example, did not demand the same compliance. However, since Britain was so divided over Brexit and appeared to have no agreed strategy for it, it was very easy for the EU to exploit the situation. There was major political disagreement in Britain about the way forward, with an active lobby hoping to reverse Brexit altogether. One of the activists in this regard was the former Prime Minister Tony Blair, but interestingly, his influence was counter-productive since, in the opinion of the majority of British citizens, Blair was associated with dishonesty over the Iraq War in 2003. The desire of George Soros, the financier ‘who broke the Bank of England’ in the 2008 banking crash, to fund a campaign for a reversal of Brexit, met with an equally hostile reaction. The position of Prime Minister May nevertheless remained increasingly precarious and it was unclear whether the Labour opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, would perhaps allow for a return to the EU, changing his mind opportunistically in order to benefit from a possible national election that could result from an unexpected defeat of the government. All these factors of uncertainty in British politics amounted to a major weakening of its national negotiating position. A lack of clarity allowed the EU to capitalize in the short term.

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The EU’s position, however, seemed likely to be counter-productive, and had all the hallmarks of a zero-sum game. Europe as a whole would be weakened if Britain was weakened, and the economy on both sides could be damaged by long-term disagreements over trade. It was therefore surprising that the EU leadership continued to negotiate in such a hard-line fashion, favouring an almost punitive approach, instead of seeking a ‘win-win’ solution. Where there could be a detrimental long-term effect on business and trade interests, there is also, as we shall see in this volume, severe implications for security and defence. While Theresa May spoke of a ‘deep and special’ future relationship with the EU, and while Poland and the Nordic states applauded continuing British participation in European defence, France put doubt on any future British leadership in EU missions, and wanted to keep the British in a bi-lateral posture for its own interests. Small European states, enjoying the complacent luxury of defence paid for by other, larger states, like Britain, saw opportunities to capitalize. For example Cyprus argued that Britain should be kept out of EU security missions lest it give Turkey an opportunity to argue that it too could enjoy a ‘partial’ membership of the EU. Guy Verhofstadt, the former Belgian Prime Minister and a leading figure in the European Parliament, was another severe critic of Brexit but Belgium is hardly a major power in defence terms, and was a country itself held accountable for its failure to tackle terrorism and Islamist extremism in Brussels which led to multiple attacks in 2015–2016. It is not only the EU’s own long-term interest to have a rich and ­stable—and friendly—Britain, which suggested a different EU negotiating strategy, but it was also the likely alternatives to the governing party’s ethos that were not in the EU’s interest. From a strategic perspective one would conclude that the EU should have sought an early ‘soft’ Brexit and presented it as a victory for the British administration and the EU. However, no such intelligent design seemed to be forthcoming from Brussels, and the stalemate in negotiations in 2018 implied the greatest of uncertainty about the final settlement or any transition after 2019. This book examines the role of Britain in the context of security and defence in light of Brexit, and the implications for its relationship with its closest strategic partners in the United States and Europe. Limits on the available space in this work preclude a fuller examination of the global relationships that Britain regards as important, and which may, or may not, flourish as a result of Brexit, including those of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and other members of the Commonwealth.

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The book is written at the very earliest stages of the debate. It is far too early to conclude how the Brexit negotiations, or the results for defence and security, will look in ten or twenty years’ time. The talks between the UK and the EU to date have been characterized by enormous uncertainty, and it seems likely that many issues will remain unresolved or contested for some time. There are, however, some incontrovertible elements to consider. Britain is a major power in security and defence in Europe, possessing an independent nuclear deterrent, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with a global military reach, a wealthy economy, and a global political ambition. We therefore ask: How will Brexit affect this status? And how will other major changes in international ­politics play a role, such as Russian revisionism and the changes wrought by the Trump administration? How will Brexit affect British perspectives on its alliance commitments and its traditional preferences for coalitions? The EU seeks to develop what it calls an ambitious ‘defence union’ and Britain has signaled a strong interest in participating in all aspects of this as well as in all EU foreign policy. The EU needs Britain. But this neat relationship has other implications: How does France act and think with regard to the bilateral defence partnership with Britain post-Brexit? Does France seek to ‘replace’ Britain with its own ‘special relationship’ with the US as it emerges as the major defence actor in the EU? How do the Americans think about these changes? Is defence and security policy really determined by threats, capability, and risk willingness, i.e. by strategic cultures instead of top-down political strategy, so that shifting constellations with regard to the EU do not really matter? If so, we could not expect Brexit to matter at all because in security and defence it is fighting capability and common strategic culture that count, not political declarations. Yet this remains a hypothesis, a conjecture, guiding the investigation in the following chapters.

How Is Britain’s Defence Role Changing? A Look at Recent History Despite the serious problems it faced in the 2010s, the European leaders continued to espouse confidence, at least publicly, about their position. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, continued to insist on certain conditions with Turkey and its member states, and pushed on with negotiations over a single European armed force, an EU foreign minister, closer integration of laws and finance,

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and greater authority for the European Commission leadership. Fears of a European super-state grew in Britain, although its level of integration in the EU was already very well advanced, a legacy of a succession of treaties and decisions dating back to the 1970s. The British public were divided on the issue of their relationship with Brussels, with the minority in favour of a European, liberal identity, and the majority concerned about unchecked immigration, the supremacy of European law, a diluted representation to Europe and the loss of an independent identity. Despite subsequent arguments over economic and customs arrangements, the British continued to share the European view of defence and security. For the generation that emerged from the Second World War, the prevailing concept which bridged a number of ideologies was a faith in human social advancement. There was a strong desire to leave behind the catastrophic mass killing of the first half of the twentieth century, and there was considerable optimism in the establishment of the United Nations Organisation, its charters on human rights, its agendas on ­preventing wars of aggression, and its efforts to tackle global i­nequality. The was a willingness in Western Europe to establish economic cooperation to facilitate progress, a movement that Britain joined in 1973. Despite the Cold War, which threatened complete destruction, the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) indicated that, when led by the United States, Western Europe could co-operate on vital defence issues. Article V epitomised the commitment to each other: an attack on one member of the alliance would be considered an attack on them all. Nevertheless, the unifying European project was not a smooth one. Those that joined the European Economic Community (EEC) saw their membership as the means to improve their trade and service industries. Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister of the 1980s, made it very clear that economic co-operation was welcome, but she would not accept any infringement of national sovereignty. When European leaders pressed ahead with the creation of a European political union, beyond an ‘economic community’, subsequent British MPs were either reluctant partners or tended to downplay the importance of the relationship with Europe in the hope of avoiding popular protest.3 Prime Minister John Major failed to convince his Conservative colleagues of the merits of the European ERM (exchange rate mechanism) and other measures, and his tenure was ended after bitter party in-fighting over Europe. His successor, Tony Blair (Labour), took a strongly pro-EU line, but,

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characteristically, he failed to consult the public or colleagues on his policy decisions, and signed measures of closer union with Brussels without consent. His Chancellor of the Exchequer, and his successor as Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (Labour), was staunch in his approach that, unless the British and European economies met five economic conditions, he would not accept the Euro as British currency, but he remained pro-EU in office without standing for election and therefore did not have public backing. At the time, disagreements over Britain’s participation in the war in Iraq created further distance between the public, the pro-EU political leadership, and the European member states. The Conservatives returned to power, initially in coalition with the Liberal-Democrats, under David Cameron. His approach was to influence European decision-making from within, a line that Blair and other Prime Ministers had taken before him. But simmering criticism from backbench MPs about the creeping regulation and jurisdiction of European law, and the growing popularity of Nigel Farage, a straight-talking sceptic of the EU who appealed to the media and much of the public, forced Cameron to announce that, for the first time since 1973, Britain would have a referendum on Europe. The vote would be a simple ‘in-out’ one, which critics believed did not capture the complexity of the issues. Cameron made a series of visits to European leaders, particularly the European Commission, to secure a favourable deal on which the referendum could be based. The EU believed this was little more than a stunt to acquire concessions, and they argued that they had the entirety of the membership to consider. Cameron returned to the UK with no more than window-dressing, and the British public were unimpressed. Indeed, in many ways it reinforced their view that Europe was not prepared to grant any concessions at all and would insist on further centralisation. Cameron lost the referendum and resigned. Theresa May, who took over, presented the article 50 letter to signal Britain’s departure, and the date was set for final exit in March 2019. The result immediately raised the question of Britain’s relationship with Europe in terms of defence and security. After 1945, Britain had been committed to the defence of Europe and was second only to the United States in terms of military power. British armed forces were deployed in West Germany, Norway and the North Atlantic as part of NATO. Britain’s nuclear weaponry, in its air force and the Royal Navy, its global bases, and its position on the UN Security Council, added to its status as a significant world power. Throughout the Cold War,

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despite the evident threat of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, the ‘delicate balance of terror’ was sustained without war in Europe. Nuclear deterrence maintained the peace, and Britain was at the heart of European defence. Nevertheless, Britain and Europe were forced to reinvest in sizeable conventional forces because the first use of a nuclear strike was politically unthinkable and raised too high a risk. The Soviet Union also imagined the seriousness of the nuclear battlefield and looked to an integrated conventional and nuclear defence to deter the West, and sought proxies to undermine and offset Western hegemony in the world. Britain maintained an army corps, with air and armoured assets in northern Germany, and developed the capability to send maritime, air and amphibious forces to other threatened parts of Europe and the world. In the 1990s, the long absence of war in Europe led some thinkers to believe that state wars were in decline. Their cost, risk, and unsatisfactory outcomes were evidently not producing results and policy-­makers were seeking alternatives. Mary Kaldor’s seminal work on New Wars, where she argued that globalisation was producing low-intensity conflicts of identity, replacing conventional war, was popular, as was the work of Steven Pinker, whose Angels of Our Better Nature offered statistical proof of a long-term decline in armed conflict.4 These ideas were seized upon because they seemed to explain the post-Cold War era, one which seemed unfamiliar and uncertain. The deductions after the Cold War were also based on the European experience of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia. Europeans were convinced that the relatively peaceful conclusion to communism had proven that war, as the solution to unjust and authoritarian systems, was obsolete. When Yugoslavia broke up, there was considerably more violence, but this was only in part associated with state on state warfare. The conflict was instead characterised by fighting between local groups, defined by religion, ethnicity and nationalism. General Sir Rupert Smith, who had commanded a peacekeeping contingent there, associated the conflict with post-modernism in an influential work entitled The Utility of Force.5 He argued that clearly defined inter-state war had been replaced with opaque ‘war amongst the people’. Smith and others believed Britain had a distinct understanding of how to conduct peace-enforcement missions like those in the Balkans because of its experience of military counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland and a long-standing ethos of using the ‘minimum necessary

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force’ to keep the peace. The conclusion of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo conflict was widely regarded as a success by NATO, although the EU leadership, forgetting the decisive contribution of American military power, believed that it had been the architect of peace in the Balkans. Either way, the success in ending the Balkans conflict was regarded as a significant and positive turning point in European affairs. The ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks of 2001 were regarded as another profound shift for Britain, Europe, and the West. NATO invoked Article V for the first time, although the administration in Washington seemed likely to act unilaterally. Tony Blair believed he was instrumental in persuading the United States to bring together a coalition of powers to fight trans-national terrorism and to intervene in the states that harboured international terrorist groups. Blair, an advocate of multilateralism who was eager to remain close to the United States and the EU, saw himself as ‘the bridge to Europe’ for the Americans. This was a conceited view, since the United States already enjoyed good relations with the EU and the individual European states. But there were concerns about US–European relations from 2001: when US and British forces made the initial offensive into Afghanistan to root out Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of ‘9/11’, there were no European contingents. Later, when the multi-national mission known as International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) was established, and European states sent varying forces to distinctly demarcated portions of Afghanistan, the command and control of the United States in Kabul became much more complicated. Privately, American officers admitted that while they needed the Coalition for political reasons, many of the European contingents were too small to be of much value and there was frustration with their lack of co-ordination and inter-operability. In contrast, the British and the Canadians sent larger forces to southern Afghanistan in 2006, the heartland of Al Qaeda’s former allies, the Taliban. While some European forces languished in secure northern and western parts of Afghanistan, the British and Canadians found themselves engaged in the most serious fighting since the Korean War or the Falklands. While the German government claimed it could not send its troops on a mission that risked combat because this would contravene the spirit of its postwar constitution, and Italian forces seemed content to ignore the violence occurring in its area of responsibility in Herat, the British felt that the Europeans lacked the will to confront serious threats and risks. This difference of perception attracted relatively little attention

1 INTRODUCTION 

13

at the time, but contributed to the general sense of disagreement over commitments to defence between Britain and Europe. When the United States announced its ‘global war on terror’ policy, critics argued that it was difficult to wage war on a concept, and that more achievable ends ought to be identified, with a range of approaches that utilised more levers of national power than just the military instrument. The EU Defence Review of 2003 emphasised the role of funding over force. The Common Security and Defence Policy (2018) seemed only to contemplate a future involving peace-keeping, conflict prevention and state stabilisation.6 The Europeans grew critical of the United States for its large-scale occupation of Afghanistan, on the assumption that the future would consist of counter-terrorism missions, involving precise fires, intelligence-led operations and the periodic combination of local auxiliaries, Special Forces, and air power. The administration of George W. Bush had more extensive ambitions. Bush and his colleagues and partners, including Tony Blair, believed that, in the spirit of ‘democratic peace theory’, the removal of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of democracy would end the conditions which gave rise to terrorist groups. At the same time, investigations into failed or failing states seemed to indicate that the swift establishment of democracy, rather than protracted nation-building or aid packages, would deny safe havens to terrorist organisations.7 Bush announced that certain regimes needed to be dealt with for sponsoring terror or potentially offering Weapons of Mass Destruction to terrorist groups. These included Iran, North Korea, Libya and Iraq. Bush did not include Pakistan, a long-term sponsor of militant Islamic groups, as it was a US ally. Nor did he mention Saudi Arabia, another ally, even though some members of Al Qaeda were Saudis and the movement drew its inspiration from the most austere branch of Salafi Wahabism. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, supported by Tony Blair, created a significant rift with Europe. What became evident soon after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq was that there was a requirement to stabilise the states with large numbers of ground forces so that they could be handed back to the local populations with representative governments. By the 2010s European critics were arguing that the American led-counter-insurgency campaign they were engaged in was an operational technique, not a strategy with a clear end-state, while the Bush and Obama administrations argued that the Europeans needed to make a greater commitment to the global war

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on terror.8 Britain remained close to the United States, maintaining its commitment in Afghanistan, although Gordon Brown’s premature military evacuation of Basra, at a time when the Americans were trying to surge forces into Iraq, caused considerable dismay in Washington. Relations between Britain and America were damaged, although their military co-operation and intelligence-sharing stayed intact. Worse, public opinion in Britain had turned against the Labour government over the Iraq War, and there was growing disapproval of America. It had become clear that Blair’s haste to remain in Washington’s favour had led to dishonesty towards parliament. As the subsequent Iraq Enquiry made clear, Blair had not disclosed Bush’s intentions towards Iraq, the ambiguity of the intelligence assessments, or the legal risks of the invasion. Blair had not obtained a specific mandate from the UN for military intervention, but relied on more general UNSCR approval for action. Bush and Blair had little faith in further weapon inspections, which the Europeans favoured. As a result, British public opinion was divided between anti-American and anti-European approaches to defence and security. What the British really wanted was a more independent line in foreign policy. This was reflected in elements of popular culture. In the film Love Actually (2003), there is a portrayal of the British Prime Minister surprising the US President at a press conference with the announcement that, from that point on, Britain would be pursuing an independent foreign policy without the approval of the United States. This reflected a widely-held desire amongst the British public in light of Blair’s apparently obsequious behaviour towards George W. Bush. The legacy of the Iraq War was profound in Britain, and it seemed less likely there would be public or political support for armed intervention around the world, alongside the United States. Under Obama, there was a distinct turn in the United States towards technological modernisation and major shifts in geo-politics. There was a determination to develop new high-tech’ capabilities in air, sea and land warfare which would overmatch any rival state. The United States announced a ‘pivot to Asia’, specifically East Asia, to focus on a possible future challenge from China, rather than Al Qaeda and its Jihadist confederates in the Middle East. That refocus was to some extent interrupted by the emergence of Da’esh, or ‘Islamic State’, a movement which offered an absurdly optimistic idea of rebuilding an eighth century caliphate, imposing a draconian version of Sharia law and declaring war on all non-Muslims, ‘heretics’ and ‘apostates’. The only reason for

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15

taking them seriously was their initial success in winning over disgruntled Sunnis who had been repressed by Shia or Allewite minorities in Iraq and Syria, and their ambition to wage an unrelenting campaign of mass casualty terrorism around the world. Their high-profile torture and murder of their enemies and the threat they posed to the government of Iraq compelled the Americans and Britain to offer air cover and to develop a ‘train, advise and assist’ mission to support Iraqi forces. These developments compelled the British and their NATO partners to maintain a balanced force, that is, armed forces that could respond both to high-tech’ state enemies and low-tech’ non-state irregular warfare, and the hybrid threats that lay between them. After the long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, with sustained air operations over these theatres, and over Libya and Syria, there were concerns about how to configure the armed forces for new challenges when European economies were in recession. Despite the pledges of the NATO summit to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence, most European countries were far below that figure. New equipment spending, training and personnel costs tended to absorb the budgets in their entirety. Britain’s maintenance of its nuclear deterrent added further costs. Despite forecasts of more challenging future conflicts and a less favourable geopolitical environment for the West, political leaders in Britain and Europe were still focussed on short term political difficulties in the 2010s. Long term planning in Britain was concerned with infrastructure development, such as high-speed rail links, housing and e-commerce. In defence and security, the overriding political consideration was the management of risk and anxiety about ‘lawfare’, that is, the likelihood that political decisions in defence and security would incur legal penalties. There was particular anger in Britain over the attempted prosecution of military personnel who had served in Iraq, the so-called Iraq Historic Allegations Team, especially when all the cases brought by the notorious human rights lawyer, Phil Shiner, collapsed and were proven to be spurious.9 Political leaders were also aware that, in the 2017 Iraq Enquiry, Tony Blair had been accused, although never charged formally, with deliberately misleading parliament.10 More extreme critics argued that Blair’s actions constituted war crimes, although, more accurately, the charge would have been crimes against peace. The effect of these legal issues was to create a more cautious political leadership in Britain, which manifest itself in heated exchanges in the House of Commons over action against the terrorist movement Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

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In purely technological terms, Britain and other Western countries currently enjoy some distinct advantages. The Western world leads in precise munitions, remote systems (especially in the air), surveillance tools, and automation leading to artificial intelligence, all of which will enable it to prevail against a range of threats and adversaries. The search for further technological solutions fits with the Western experience of war, and investment in research, experimentation and development is a wise policy. There were concerns in the early twenty-first century that rivals were catching up with the West. The United States led development, leaving the British and Europeans with a dilemma about how to equip its much smaller and less well-resourced armed forces. Nevertheless, a technological edge, however fleeting, can create operational and strategic opportunities, so niche investments were the favoured solution. New technologies, particularly in computing and coding, have had a significant impact on British and NATO defence communications, command and control, surveillance, sensor-to-fires speeds and accuracy, operations in depth, and logistics, not as separated technological tools, but rather as a more enhanced, integrated system. The expectation is that these recent technologies and techniques will lower risks to personnel and better guarantee results. Nevertheless, Western defence literature assumes better weapon systems in the hands of its enemies, and a pervasive, hostile information environment. This latter concern takes four forms: one, the development of cyber and electro-magnetic activities (CEMA); two, information effects; three, strategic communications in a democratised and contested information domain; and, four, the arms race of encryption and decryption promised by big data and quantum computing. The problem for the West today is that its open society and inadequate security in the electronic environment has left it open to political manipulation, espionage, and compromise. It is now widely known that Russia generates troll factories and bots to create division and influence in Europe. Moscow’s remote direction is notorious, despite frequent denials.11 The second aspect, the information environment, presents its own problems. The ubiquitous coverage of 24-hour, global news and the democratised and unregulated social media sphere means that every military and political action is subject not only to intense scrutiny but often deliberate misrepresentation. The result is a greater oscillation in public opinion, and a fast flow of ‘stories’ which ignore or doubt official

1 INTRODUCTION 

17

statements. Attempts to conduct long term investigations are left behind by the haste for the latest ‘breaking news’. Since it possible to manipulate text, imagery and video footage, to create entirely false material, to the uninitiated, appears convincing, then a secondary problem of ‘fake news’ also becomes clear. There are now information operation thresholds, where a certain number of casualties or destruction, once opposed in the media, has the potential to dissuade political leaders and consequently halt military operations. The implication of this development is that adversaries will target Western public sentiments, domestic infrastructure and civilian populations in order to turn a government’s policy. Here the West is vulnerable: attempts to protect the public can be interpreted as an infringement of liberties they have grown used to in decades of peace.12 It will take a profound shock to alter the agenda. The third element which creates anxiety in the Western defence sector is in the closely-related realm of strategic communications and ‘narratives’. No entity can expect to control a narrative, but generating sensational and unverified claims to reach a large audience seems far easier than in previous decades. Audiences are far more diverse and globalised than in the past, and their news feeds are instantaneous. The successful information operation cannot expect to release a formal communique and expect adherence to it. Instead, military and political actors have to be co-ordinated, their messaging synchronised with actions, and the packets of information have to be rapid and fragmentary, seeking to tilt, escalate, defuse, and shape for short periods of time. British and European defence authorities have investigated the phenomenon, but it was unclear which agencies, civil or military, would take the lead. In the UK, strategic communications were, in essence, in a civil, political realm, while tactical information operations remained in the military sphere. The fourth element is the struggle between encryption and decryption. Privacy debates in the West have highlighted the public challenges, but in the military, intelligence and political world there was a continuous effort to protect the secrecy of one’s own systems and penetrate the adversary. The notion of quantum computing suggests that, in time, nothing could remain encrypted. Concealment is much harder with electronic signatures, but its total elimination does not seem likely. New technologies and systems are likely to evolve, to obscure, distort, and deny access for short periods. The result of all these developments is the evolution of the multi-domain battle concept in the United States, and its equivalents in Britain and Europe.

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At the strategic level, Britain and its allies and partners have been confronted by a different geo-political context than that which existed at the end of the Cold War. The assertiveness of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea has given cause for concern in the West, and the more strident policy announcements of President Donald Trump reflected, among other things, the American concern about the erosion of their global hegemony. The consequence of greater unilateralism, including that of the United States, has been the weakening of international institutions and the rules-based order which has been of tremendous benefit to the West and to global commerce. It seems very likely that, when international organisations and norms appeared diminished, the promotion of national interests or bilateralism seem yet even more attractive. Britain and Europe calculate that they must defend themselves in a less certain, more unstable world. While the Europeans looked to develop their own EU-centred defence apparatus, Britain still looked primarily to the United States. To maintain its cohesion with the rest of NATO, however, it expressed enthusiasm for the Northern Group and for a leading role in the Joint Expeditionary Force. Overall, European defence seemed far weaker in the 2010s than it had been in the 1980s, and yet the general sense was that the world was becoming less secure which would demand greater attention to defence and increase the likelihood of military obligations to allies and partners. In this volume, therefore, we examine the changing relationship between Britain, its allies and partners, and the perspectives of the British and Europeans on defence, collective security and the national challenges.

Outline of the Chapters The Part I of the book, entitled Britain’s Partnerships, deals with Britain’s various defence relationships—the special relationship with the US, the partnership with France, and other nations. But first we present British strategic thinking and policy: In Chapter 2, Rob Johnson argues that we should not exaggerate the effect of Brexit, which is a political decision over sovereignty, on Britain’s commitment to European defence. While significant for the economies of Britain and Europe, it will have less impact in the long term on the long-standing defence and security cooperation that both sides need.

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19

Britain’s strategy has sought consistently to protect its constitution, commerce and the global commons; it has sought to avoid major, costly wars; prevent isolation; avert an energy crisis; and deny the European continent to a hostile power. Its priority has been to remain close to the United States, although it will work with coalition partners for the preservation of the international system constructed after 1945 and it was a staunch defender of Europe throughout the Cold War. None of these priorities necessarily means membership of the European Union, which would explain its strategic ambivalence to Brussels and the EU. The ultimate priority for the UK is to protect its national interests, and for that it must remain closely aligned to the United States. Since 2003, Britain has faced significant challenges in its relationship with the United States, in its defence capability in an era of austerity, and in defining the appropriate defence posture against a range of threats across the globe. Johnson explores these issues from the British perspective, showing how, despite several serious setbacks, it remains committed to the US, NATO, and its regional role. Indeed, there are signs that, because of the disputes with the EU, Britain’s relationships in defence and security, not least in northern Europe, have, in fact, grown stronger. In Chapter 3 Andrew Michta discusses The US–UK Special Relationship and the “Principled Realism” of the Trump Administration. Today there is a growing realization in Washington that the established institutional formulae framing America’s core alliances have reached an inflexion point, whereby they need a new strategy for how Washington works with its allies and partners. Following the election of Trump, the United States is in the process of redefining how it interacts with the world— both in terms of how it frames its security and defence policies. The “principled realism” articulated in the NSS puts a premium on real military contributions, and, while eschewing crass transactionalism, seeks to awaken among the allies a new appreciation that US policy will demand more than declaratory statements from them. In a departure from the last administration’s approach, the usable military capabilities brought by allies and partners are fast becoming the new prism through which the US administration thinks about its core relationships. The United Kingdom, together with Germany (as it begins to think seriously about rebuilding its military capability) and Poland (which has committed to double it’s the size of its military), is poised to become the lynchpin of an emerging strategic triad in Europe. Deepening relationships

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with likeminded European powers are the hallmark of America’s new strategic posture. This chapter examines the principles of the emerging American security strategy in the Trump era, focusing on what partnered states bring to the table. It pays special attention to the role of the United Kingdom as Europe’s quintessential naval power, seeking to identify what steps London needs to take to deepen its historical ties with Washington in the future. In Chapter 4 Jeffrey Michaels presents an analysis of the AngloAmerican relationship as it evolved after Trump was elected President. Ahead of the Brexit vote, numerous commentators speculated about the negative impact this would have on the US–UK “special relationship”, projecting a decline of London’s influence if Britain left the EU. In the aftermath of the vote, and particularly with the election of Donald Trump, the context for discussing security relations between the two countries has shifted considerably. This was due to the fallout both events have had for the two governments, both internally and externally. This chapter examines this change in perspective by focusing on three areas. Firstly, the pre-Brexit assumptions of commentators on the “special relationship” and US and UK foreign policy experts more generally is discussed. Secondly, the views of President Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May, with respect to the relationship, are examined. These include their personal interactions and relevant policy priorities since they took office, seeking to shed light on the commentary of “special relationship watchers” during this period. Finally, the current state of the more long-standing bureaucratic relationships, the so-called ‘deep state’ links, especially in the defence and intelligence fields, is highlighted and contrasted with the day-to-day priorities of the political leadership. In Chapter 5 Samuel Faure examines the French–British relationship. The politics of France’s defence co-operation, involving various allies within different politico-institutional frameworks at different scales of international public action (bilateral, minilateral, multilateral), can be called ‘flexilateralism’. The ‘flexilateral’ politics of France in Europe questions the future of the strategic partnership with the United Kingdom in the context of the Brexit negotiations. This chapter demonstrates that Brexit could generate a two-fold effect on Franco-British defence cooperation: On the one hand, it is likely that Brexit would have only a limited effect on military policy because the Franco-British bilateral cooperation is not in competition with other types of European collaboration. On the other hand, Brexit’s effect on industrial defence policy

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would be more marked from 2020 onwards in the event of a “hard Brexit”. The Franco-British partnership in this respect would be sidelined in favour of co-operation with Germany and associations with variable combinations of partners within the EU. As a result, the UK would retain a leading role in military policy and would be simultaneously confined to a supporting role in industrial policy. This variation can be explained by the structure of interdependence relations linking defence actors in Europe: a ‘closed configuration’ in military policy, an ‘open configuration’ in industrial policy. In Chapter 6 Håkon Saxi examines the Anglo-German relationship, which, while not regarded as one that is as prominent or as formal as say the American, French or Scandinavian partnerships, is nonetheless one that plays an important role in Britain’s links to the rest of Europe. While devoid of the great symbolism and institutionalisation which characterises post-World War II Anglo-American or Franco-German relations, there has traditionally been little tension or discord between London and Berlin on issues of defence and security. Indeed, security relations have been characterised as generally successful, if quiet and barely publicised, and a pragmatic cooperation. Today, as counter-terrorism demands more inter-state co-operation, the UK and German are both important security partners in Europe. In defence matters too, the economic potential of Germany and Britain make them equally vital in Europe. They have a mutual interest in working together to adapt NATO to address two new challenges, namely, a resurgent and revisionist Russia in the east, and unregulated migration and terrorism to the south. This partnership in NATO will, in all likelihood, continue, irrespective of Brexit. However, Brexit will, according to Saxi, diminish the UKs stature and influence. If EU defence cooperation deepens as a result of Brexit, Germany and the UK will drift further apart. On the other hand, outside of Europe, the UK is, and will remain, a far more assertive security actor than Germany. Compared to the UK, Germany’s expeditionary military capabilities are extremely limited, and its strategic and military cultures are timid. This will continue to place limits on Anglo-German security and defence cooperation beyond the continent of Europe. In Chapter 7 Janne Matlary examines the role of security and defence policy in the EU. The EU has the ambition of developing more common security and defence policy, even a defence union, and has taken some steps towards establishing common procurement policy and creating a strategic culture. The theme of this chapter is whether this development

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will affect Britain’s role after Brexit. The major part of the analysis is devoted to whether these EU ambitions is likely to result in a common defence policy of any kind. EU policy statements are surprisingly ambitious given the fact that neither the battle groups nor the procurement agenda have any substance. Matlary concludes that, although EU political rhetoric speaks confidently about strategy and defence union, there is little material in these narratives. The EU’s role will most likely be in the area of defence industrial policy, a ‘bottom-up’ pragmatic policy aimed at saving money and integrating military capacities wherever possible. This will not lead to a supra-national defence policy, however, although France’s interests with regard to the EU in the defence field will surely remain decisive. In Part II, Britain’s Coalitions, we examine the Northern Group and the JEF: In Chapter 9 Møller and Petersson examine Britain’s leading role in Northern European defence by analysing how the two non-aligned states Sweden and Finland seek closeness to Britain. The chapter analyses how the two countries have gradually become more involved in NATO and other Western partnerships for security political cooperation. The interaction between Finland, Sweden and NATO has largely been uncontroversial all the time NATO retained its “out-of-area”-focus. However, increasing Russian belligerence after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014, and threatening Russian rhetoric, the question has been what kind of role non-aligned Finland and Sweden can have in the Western defence of the Nordic-Baltic Region against a revisionist Russia. The decisions indicate the extent to which nations can choose their security arrangements freely, and have far these aspirations have to be tempered by the desire not to deliberately antagonise a neighbouring power that objects. The two countries new “enhanced opportunities”—a role in NATO, their host nation agreements with the Alliance, bilateral agreements with the UK (and the US, Germany and Poland), and agreements on participation in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force are thus central elements in our discussion. In Chapter 8 Heier analyses the coalition of NATO-states that has formed around Britain in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Northern Group. Having invited the Netherlands, Demark, Norway, the three Baltic states, as well as Sweden and Finland into the force, JEF has been labelled “a Force of Friends”. JEF has thus made Britain’s force structure more “international by design”. But what are the motives for

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joining JEF, as seen from a UK and partner-state perspective? The analysis is conducted through the lenses of ‘structure’ and ‘process’. Britain’s motive for JEF may be “gap-filling” because partner-states are needed to increase resilience and responsiveness in a crisis. Partner-states’ motive is “networking”. A modest military contribution allows dependent clients access to decision makers inside a leading power in Europe; this is crucial in the event of a crisis with Russia. Based on extensive interviews and document analysis, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter supports these hypotheses. The conclusion is that Britain builds a JEF where stakeholders participate for different reasons. Increased reliance on partnerships nevertheless presents a dilemma for Britain’s leadership role in Europe. Her Majesty’s forces may become more sustainable through pooling of partner-state forces, but partner-states’ dependency is likely to increase, which again may increase the risks of obligation to a sovereign state which it is not in Britain’s interests to risk a war for. Chapter 10, written by military professionals Cantrill and Meyer, investigates how military integration between Britain and smaller states in the Nordic-Baltic area in one area—amphibious forces—leads to force multiplication and strategic advantage vis-à-vis a possible threat posed by Russia. It shows the rationale for such cooperation in terms of military utility and explains how it can be strengthened, offering an in-depth case study of UK-Dutch amphibious force operations in the High North. The case illustrates how an integrated force like JEF results in strategic advantage that would not accrue from individual national capacities. The chapter is a timely one, as Britain’s defence establishment calls for the retention of an amphibious capability against a Treasury set on further budgetary savings.

Conclusions A state’s strategy should be judged by its enduring behaviour, not its statements and narratives. States that train together, with appropriate spending and capability, and which operate together, are more likely to prove resilient when tested. By contrast, public announcements and speeches mean very little, not least as they change with each administration. Defence and security cooperation is a far more practical issue, which rises above mere statements of cooperation. It would therefore be wise to judge British defence cooperation by its deeds rather than its statements.

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UK national interests, foreign policy and strategic requirements are remarkably consistent, and have almost no dependence on the ideological aspirations of the EU, which explains the British ambivalence to European political agendas. Britain has a global orientation, is one of the two leading military powers of Europe, and a critical ally of the United States, so its interests are world-wide and not purely continental. It also shares many European values and is an important economic contributor to Europe. Its proximity and its common interests with Europe make it an important partner, long after the Brexit imbroglio is forgotten. The Trump administration in Washington set a far more exclusive set of parameters on European co-operation than previous presidents. President Trump expects the Europeans to make significant contributions to their own defence and, strikingly, make statements of appreciation of US protective security. Trump insists on better military capabilities and regards Britain, Germany, France and Poland as the most significant players. The United States is particularly interested in maintaining its close alliance with Britain in the European and Middle East theatres: the Americans regard Britain as their primary partner in these regions. While there was some disappointment at the very small contribution made by the British in the operations against ISIS, the link remained intact. In other parts of the world, the Americas, Africa and Pacific, the Americans do not see the British as a major player, although its moral backing gives the United States greater legitimacy in its actions. This is also true of France, currently a close partner of the Americans, which gives it greater influence in the UN Security Council. The chapters in this volume contain within them key insights into the national and collective implications of Brexit and the important continuities, beneficial and detrimental, in European defence and security. Amongst the most significant findings we assess the following to be particularly noteworthy: The last few decades have shaped the relationship between Britain, the United States and its European partners. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, NATO remained intact and the bond between the British and the Americans had survived a number of crises and disagreements. Brexit represented a culmination of political spats which were a European responsibility, and occurred at a confluence of other crises, in fiscal arrangements, economic underperformance, low productivity, migration and widespread disapproval of the ideological call for ‘ever-closer union’.

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The UK and the European states need each other in defence, security and in economic security. Short term decisions and disputes are counter-productive and can damage cooperation. Brexit is likely to continue to play out over many years, and the long-term impact on defence and security is unclear. What is certain, however, is that a stronger EU defence role necessitates British participation. Only France and Britain are global and strategic actors in Europe, and any realisation of a ‘defence union’ based on ‘autonomous military capacity’—the terminology used by the EU leadership—has to include Britain’s close links to the United States, its willingness to take risks, and its military capacities. Germany continues to be reluctant to lead military operations and will not risk war-fighting, particularly not in the Middle East and North Africa region, so France would be left alone as a military actor in an imaginary EU defence union. Smaller capable states would contribute— perhaps Denmark and the Netherlands—but this would not add up to a fully-capable defence union, such as the United States. Poland, the other major state with a military culture in the EU, would, like Britain, ­prefer to work for American and therefore NATO primacy. It is only elements in France and Germany which would like to develop an ambitious defence role for the EU. What Brussels does not appreciate is that even France prefers NATO and the US, according to the French strategic review of November 2017. This review articulates the conditions for military cooperation, putting clear priority on those relevant military actors that will accept risk. In effect, this rules out Germany and means that both the partnership with Britain as well as that with the US take precedence over an EU coalition of states. France would prefer an EU with teeth, acting as a pole in the state system which can deter, coerce, and do war-­fighting. This is a consistent strategic interest since de Gaulle. When PESCO ended with 26 states as signatories, France was disappointed, and the effects are discussed in Faure’s and Matlary’s chapters in this volume. The French hope that the EDF and PESCO will result in a much better security industrial policy and they prefer a strong institutional basis for such a policy, because the market approach based on voluntarism does not work. But the most they can achieve in this field is close-knit industrial cooperation with some common European military capacities. Such an integrated procurement policy would not, however, produce a strategic and military culture amongst the states taking part. Thus, the EU is incapable of creating a defence union capable of deterring and

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war-fighting. France instead pursues industrial policy in defence in the work in the EU, and much can be improved through more dirigiste policy in this field. The situation for France and the EU underscores the idea that that war-fighting is only possible with willing and capable states. The EU may claim to be able to command a significant budget, but France does not confuse defence and procurement as Brussels does: these are two very different types of policy. Using force in deterrence, coercion, and war-fighting presupposes a military culture in the actors involved, and the EU lacks that set of criteria. It is the United States that continues to dominate European defence capability. The American leadership of NATO is likely to stop any attempt to duplicate its defence role and is certain to advocate Britain’s continued importance in the Alliance. Defence secretary James Mattis demanded a clarification from the EU at the Munich security conference on 15 February 2018, asking pointedly what was meant by ‘defence union’ and ‘autonomous military capacity’.13 Central EU states will never accept any weakening of NATO—such as Poland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, but, crucially, neither will France. EU attempts to develop a defence role are therefore limited by these states and would in all events need British participation, leaving Britain with a kind of ‘veto’ power over this. In conclusion, the EU is not likely to develop a defence role in strategic policy terms—even less so without Britain—and NATO will remain the primary international organisation in this field in the West. Furthermore, if NATO persists with Article V as the ‘glue’ that keeps it together, we see an increasing role for partnerships and coalitions within and beyond NATO. In this book we analyse the British partnership with the US, with France, but also Britain’s leading role in the JEF and the Northern Group. The British partnership with France continues, and the importance of this bilateral relationship is also clear: the fact that the British ambassador to Paris at the time, Sir Peter Ricketts, contributed le livre blanc of 2013 testifies to the close relationship between the two countries. The British “special relationship” with the US is also set to continue because Washington regards Britain as its key ally in Europe. It has also been the historic practice that the US will work with anybody when they need to. Thus, whilst the American preference has always been to work with the UK on defence matters, and there is a prevailing image of the

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UK as the most likely partner (in terms of size of commitment) on operations relative to any other country, this will still be recognized as being context specific. For instance, there is no expectation on the part of the US Pacific Command that the UK will be a major partner, or any sort of partner for that matter, in any conflict dealing with China or North Korea. The expectation is mainly limited to Middle East and European operations, perhaps with some peripheral cooperation on Africa. As for Europe, the US and UK share more similar views on the Russian threat probably than the US and Germany do. Moreover, in this period of uncertainty and turbulence there is little motivation on either side for any radical changes in the special relationship—so no serious realignments away from Britain are likely. Instead, for quite separate reasons the US will alter its relationships with some other countries, which is to say they will increase or decrease levels of cooperation, but none of these other relationships can possibly compare with the US/UK relationship which is deeply ingrained and interdependent. Moreover, though some Americans perceive that the UK is becoming weaker, there is no fundamental re-assessment of the strength of the relationship taking place in Washington. The leading role that Britain plays in the JEF and the Northern Group has increased in importance, and its is significant that Sweden and Finland have joined both. The UK has been a leading security actor in the Nordic-Baltic region since 2016, encouraging and including Finland and Sweden in a range of military activities without binding them into mutual security guarantees. The current setting is fundamentally different than during the Cold War, when Finland and Sweden were neutral with ill-defined roles in the event of a crisis. Now their roles in Western strategic thinking are much more similar and important, as they are seen as key assets in the region. With its diplomatic skills and initiatives, Britain has contributed to the current situation in important ways, and nothing indicates that this will stop in the foreseeable future. JEF represents a coalition inside NATO, involving several members in its order of battle. As such, it is the foremost example of the trend towards regional, state-to-state arrangements in defence matters—be it several states, as a coalition, or a partnership of two states. Russia is seen as a ‘Northern Europe’ problem, and the states of the North therefore cooperate to deal with it. The axis of Washington-London-the Nordics/Baltics/Poland is a real one: not only is Britain the key European ally of the US, but also has close partnerships with Norway, Denmark, and Poland. The US is

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of pivotal importance in deterring Russia in the Baltics and Poland, (but sees its role as providing that defence presence across the entire eastern sphere of continental Europe) and works in close cooperation with European allies. In terms of strategic defence policy today, the US is the primary partner, while France is the key strategic actor in the Maghreb and the Sahel, and in northern Europe and the High North, Britain is the key state. It is, like France, backed by the US in its role, but it is the ‘lead power’ in the area. Neither Brussels’ condemnation of Brexit nor political turbulence in the Trump administration will change this fundamental strategic reality.

Notes







1. ‘EU and UK Seek Quick Deal on Defence and Security’, The Financial Times, 5 February 2018. 2. See the Politico guide at https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-bill-politico-policy-guides-eu-uk-negotiations/ (Accessed February 2018). 3. See FO 30/1048, April 1971, The National Archives, Kew. 4. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1999, reprintd 2012); Mary Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars,’ Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 (March 7, 2013); Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011). 5. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Allen Lane, 2005). 6. The Common Security and Defence Policy, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en (Accessed February 2018). 7.  Jonathan di John, ‘Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature’, London School of Economics and Politics, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008 at www. gsdrc.org/document-library/conceptualising-the-causes-and-consequences-of-failed-states-a-critical-review-of-the-literature/ (Accessed December 2017). 8. See, for example, ‘Obama Says Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan’, 28 February 2008, Reuters, at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-politics-obama-afghanistan/obama-says-europe-must-do-more-in-afghanistan-idUKN2861811220080229 (Accessed January 2018). 9. ‘Iraq War Claims Unit to Be Shut Down, Says UK Defence Secretary’, The Guardian, 27 February 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/feb/10/iraq-war-claims-unit-to-be-shut-down-says-uk-defence-secretary (Accessed January 2018).

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10. Report of the Iraq Enquiry, 12 vols, https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry (Accessed February 2018). 11. J. Kirchik, The End of Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); R. Coalson, ‘Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s Plan for Ukraine’, Huffington Post, 2 November 2014. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-coalson/valery-gerasimov-putinukraine_b_5748480. html (Accessed January 2018). 12.  S. Bowles and S. Polanía-Reyes, ‘Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?’, Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2012): 368–425. 13.  ‘Amerika fordert von EU Klarstellung zur Verteidigungsunion’, Frankfurter allegemeine Zeitung, 15 February 2018.

PART I

Britain’s Partnerships

CHAPTER 2

UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’ and ‘International by Design’ Rob Johnson

The EU referendum of 2016 was a landmark in Britain’s foreign r­ elations. The decision to remain in or exit from the European Union caused a great deal of debate in the United Kingdom about its spending and austerity, economic policy, immigration, and identity. The result, where a majority voted in favour of leaving the EU, created uncertainty about the future. In Europe, many believed the British, who been awkward partners at best (in the sense that they had never been part of the Schengen agreement, the Euro currency or subscribers to the federal ‘ever-closer union’), were perhaps not serious about departure. Nevertheless, from a defence and security perspective, the European states were no longer clear about Britain’s commitment to European defence. The paradox was that the two previous UK defence reviews (2010 and 2015) had referred to an ‘age of uncertainty’.1 This was, in fact, a reference to anticipated state failures in Africa and Asia rather than Britain’s status with regard to Europe. The paradox was that, despite the claim that Britain was entering an age of uncertainty, its strategic review seemed quite confident about the strength of the UK’s position and the R. Johnson (*)  Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_2

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nature of the emerging threats. As a result, there had been much more clarity about the values with which Britain identified, including its ­determination to be a member of dependable member of alliances and coalitions. The British believed they could continue to influence the globe, being prepared to intervene, militarily if necessary, to uphold international humanitarian law and the ‘rules-based’ system exemplified by institutions such as the UN, Commonwealth, World Trade Organisation, and G20 group. They would do so, according to the defence reviews, as a member of multiple partnerships. The only situation in which Britain anticipated independent action was in defence of its overseas territories, like the Falklands. Nevertheless, the sense that the Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya interventions of 2001–2014 had not been successful, and even disastrous, pervaded the government and armed forces.2 Public perceptions were even worse, as it was widely-held that the former Prime Minister Tony Blair had deliberately misled parliament and the people over the first two conflicts, and had been willing to negotiate with the leaders of Libya and Syria, namely Gadhafi and Assad, both of whom proved themselves to be murderous dictators. The result was that, although the UK’s armed forces were still postured for ‘expeditionary’ and global intervention, the willingness to do so had largely evaporated. The first parliamentary vote on intervention against Syria in 2013, when the government in Damascus was engaged in much more egregious crimes against civilians than had occurred in Libya, resulted in a government defeat and the decision not to take action. A subsequent vote in 2016, once the Syrian regime had evidently attacked the civilian population with a variety of munitions, and when Daesh, the so-called Islamic State movement, had emerged to threaten both the Syrian and the Iraqi people, led to sustained air operations. There were recriminations against the Labour opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, for opposing an evident humanitarian operation despite the obvious grounds for doing so.3 The situation in Syria had worsened because of the failure to intervene in 2013. After the Brexit referendum of 2016, confusion reigned in Europe about Britain’s defence posture. While leaving the EU, the UK sent a contingent to the ‘enhanced forward presence’ of the Baltic States and Poland. Indeed, the British commanded the brigade in Estonia, established a ‘Standing Joint Force Headquarters’ with embedded European units in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), and encouraged greater emphasis on the ‘Northern Group’ coalition of the Scandinavian

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countries, including Sweden (a non-NATO state). The UK prime ­minister, Theresa May, spoke of ‘Global Britain’, looking outwards to world commerce and cooperation, while maintaining ‘a deep and special partnership’ with the European Union.4 It looked as if the British were asserting that leaving the EU did not mean leaving Europe and that its role in NATO would be emphasised more strongly. Critics nevertheless noted that there seemed to be multiple contradictions. If the British defence policy was ‘international by design’, as it claimed, how did London explain ‘Brexit’? Did the British mean they were staunch members of NATO, and therefore committed to defending Europe, but unwilling to work with any EU security mission? For the United States, there were also concerns. The British had declared themselves the strongest allies of America and joined the US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they had abandoned southern Iraq prematurely in 2006 and had been unable, on their own, to resolve the conflict in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province in 2009.5 The British were also engaged in building aircraft carriers in 2016–2017, but concurrently were discussing further defence cuts, particularly in the Royal Marines and their amphibious capability. The Americans were therefore also confused by their British allies. The Iraq War of 2003–2009 had an undeniably negative impact on British policy-making. The Iraq Enquiry, the 2.6 million-word report published in 2017, had, amongst its many findings, revealed an absence of strategic education in the UK’s decision-makers of 2003–2006. One former Defence Minister had admitted that there was too much optimism, and mistakes were made, some wilfully, by members of the government of the day. The conclusion, he confessed, was that: ‘we should have asked more questions’.6 Cross government co-operation had been lacking and civil–military relations had been marred by misunderstandings. The enquiry therefore made a number of recommendations, and Britain established a National Security Council (NSC) to assist with the development of a whole-of-government approach to making strategy. For the operational decisions, the Cabinet (and in emergencies, COBRA) is still supreme, but the NSC, with a permanent National Security Advisor, brings together the Chief of the Defence Staff, the heads of the intelligence services and selected Cabinet members to examine the most important concerns. NSC subcommittees manage specific issues, and encourage whole-of-government solutions. The British government also retains its systems of checks and balances, with

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a parliamentary select committees for defence, intelligence, and procurement, with periodic reviews (such as the NSCR of 2017), and parliamentary debates. While full scale enquiries, like Lord Chilcott’s on Iraq, are rare, their existence demonstrates that it is subsequently far harder to make strategy without a robust discussion or scrutiny in the British system and certainly this will be the case going forward. This chapter examines the British view of their defence policy, the influences on that policy, and the ways in which they justify themselves. It provides a guide to the key question posed repeatedly in 2016–2017: what is Britain’s defence policy in an era of Brexit?

National Interests Strategy (or policy, as it is styled by those who fear the military implications of the term strategy) starts with the identification of national interests, which are enduring in nature and not the product of short term political statements. Strategy can be discerned by long term behaviour in respect of these national interests more reliably than what is written about national values and aspirations in defence reviews. The primary national interest is to protect the United Kingdom, its citizens, its constitution and system of government. It is also about the promotion of commerce and the protection of national wealth. But the less often stated, but self-evident priority concerning foreign affairs and defence, is to remain close to, and protected by, the United States. A second unstated, but characteristic, element of national interests is the pragmatic judgement to adapt to changing geo-political and economic circumstances. This sort of gradualism has been the long-term hallmark of the British in domestic affairs too, but that does not mean they are not prepared to act on principle. Indeed, the third element of their national strategy is their desire to uphold the international rules-based order, since history indicates that the alternatives are far more detrimental to British interests. There are a number of influences on British strategy, primarily from the past, which are not always stated clearly but nevertheless exist. The first of these is the desire to avoid major, costly wars. The sheer losses and destruction of the two world wars, including the eclipse of the pound sterling as the world’s currency and the reduction of Britain’s share of global commerce, is something the British are eager to avoid a repetition of. The second historical legacy is to avoid isolation. In 1940, Britain was the sole power left fighting Nazism and Fascism,

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which placed it in a damaging existential conflict. In 1956, Britain was again isolated by the Suez Crisis (although strictly it had French backing, the critical factor was the hostility of the United States). The spectre of Suez, which brought down the British government and affected the British currency severely, continues to affect British decision-makers. The third legacy is an anxiety about energy security, which for many years was offset by the abundance of North Sea oil and gas. In 1973, the ‘energy crisis’, which put the British on a limited ‘three-day week’, underscored the need to maintain good relations with the Arab world or diversify the nation’s energy supplies. The fourth legacy is the desire to avoid the domination of the neighbouring continent of Europe by a single hostile power (historically, France or Germany). Each of these elements has a profound influence without always being articulated by Britain’s political leaders, but they act as a moral constraint on British strategic planning. In terms of ‘ways’, the British tend to adopt certain methods for the fulfilment of their strategy and defence policy. The first line of defence is diplomacy. The British attach considerable prestige to their diplomatic corps and regard negotiation, ‘jaw-jaw’, as Winston Churchill put it, as far more preferable than ‘war-war’. From a defence perspective, the British have usually favoured maritime (and now air) containment. There is a preference for an indirect strategy too, although this is based partly on the myth created by Basil Liddell-Hart after the First World War, since, contrary to his thesis, Britain did not always seek to get continental European powers to fight while it sought a peripheral and indirect route to victory. Indeed, British forces have necessarily been expeditionary, since the British occupy islands, but that has not prevented them from engaging in direct operations against a continental enemy since the seventeenth century. The British have, however, sought coalitions to augment their land power strength. They have also sought to develop an early warning system so as to convert their national wealth, though mobilisation, into war material as and when required. Finally, Britain has invariably made use of local partners around the world to project its power and influence. Today, it promotes defence diplomacy, advisory and assistance missions or makes use of selected military forces to make direct interventions against an enemy. In essence, Britain’s enduring strategic behaviour means that it will serve its national interests; seek to remain close to the United States; protect its constitution, commerce and the global commons; and work with coalition partners for the preservation of the international system.

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None of these priorities necessarily means membership of the European Union, which would explain its strategic ambivalence to the EU compared with, say, a country like the Netherlands, which regards its EU membership as fundamental. Yet, the bridge between Britain’s national interests and Europe is NATO. American leadership of that alliance determines Britain’s membership, which also explains why the notion of an EU armed force evokes hostility even amongst those who advocate membership of NATO. The idea that an ‘EU Army’ would be led by Eurocrats rather than the United States seems absurd to the British. They hope, instead, that the EU might potentially provide the ‘soft power’ tools to augment NATO’s ‘hard power’ options.

Unfulfilled Expectations In many ways, the British cannot fulfil the values and expectations they set out for themselves in their defence reviews. In the early 2000s, the Labour government emphasised its desire to align Britain’s foreign policy with the ‘millennium goals’ of eradicating poverty in the Global South, but, despite its generous aid budget, the scale of the problem and international trade restrictions made this unlikely. The Labour Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, had claimed that Britain would pursue an ‘ethical foreign policy’ and immediately ran into a diplomatic storm with Israel when he argued in favour of a Palestinian state and border revisions.7 Britain’s aspiration to see a preservation of the international-rules based system to preserve the status quo seems increasingly unlikely given the desire by Russia and China to assert themselves as global powers and change the world order in their favour. Above all, the decision in 2003 to invade Iraq in order to eradicate a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme and democratise the Middle East turned out to be an ill-considered strategy. The WMD programme was practically non-existent, the intelligence was deliberately manipulated to justify intervention, and the invasion created chaotic destabilisation. Curiously, when democratising movements emerged in 2011, during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, Britain only intervened in Libya, as part of a reluctant coalition. The subsequent empowerment of local militias and the collapse of authority led to protracted violence there and a flood of refugees into Europe.

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The British claim to prioritise their relationship with the United States has also been problematic.8 The decision to pull out of Iraq, just as the Americans were trying to orchestrate a surge of forces into the country, has already been mentioned. But the United Kingdom presence in Afghanistan too was very small after 2014 and it has not run any of the ‘Train, Advise and Assist’ missions, although it does support the Afghan National Army Officers Academy. British defence cuts through 2010– 2015 also caused some concerns in the United States, although the relationship with President Obama could not be described as ‘close’ or truly ‘Special’. Despite the efforts of Prime Minister Theresa May to establish a better working relationship with President Donald Trump in 2016, the public outcry against him in Britain meant that an official state visit was postponed.9 The claim to be ‘international by design’ in defence policy has raised more questions than it has answered. The phrase implied that small nations might look to internationalise any dispute in order to obtain Britain’s, and, by extension, America’s backing. This was certainly the view in Scandinavia and the Baltic states in 2017.10 The key question was about Britain’s capability: how could it possibly manage all its global commitments if more than one was challenged at the same time? Naval personnel questioned the ability of Britain to ‘do another Falklands’ if it had no operational aircraft carriers and was speculating about the abolition of Royal Marine assault ships.11 There were other considerations here too however. One was the evident power of ‘anti-access, area denial’ (A2AD) weapons, from new generations of anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles to cyber disruption, which has shrunk distances and made operations against well-armed adversaries infinitely more hazardous than counter-insurgency missions in Afghanistan. To add to the challenges, there were shortages of personnel to sustain manning requirements, which is a common problem in peacetime. If Britain was more dependent on its NATO allies, then the most worrying development was the steady decline in spending on defence across Europe (as a percentage of gross domestic product). The message this had conveyed to the United States was that the Europeans did not consider defence to be a priority, which, naturally, led the Americans to wonder whether they too should continue their vast expenditure on behalf of Europeans or whether reductions should be made. President Trump intended to provoke the Europeans by speculating by Twitter whether NATO was perhaps obsolete, a view he later retracted.12

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It caused a storm of protest, but an agreement had been concluded at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 that each nation should commit to a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence, with the majority on new equipment for modernisation.13 Critics argued that, although Britain was one of the few countries to meet its target, it had included all defence spending in the figure. Nevertheless, the UK construction of aircraft carriers at least fulfilled the requirement to prioritise new equipment. Despite this catalogue of unfulfilled expectations, the United Kingdom had made some progress and by 2018 possessed defence assets that certainly exceeded those of other European states, including Germany, which had a larger economy. The British established the National Cyber Security Centre to augment the excellent work of its Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). They created the Joint Forces Command co-located with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) which was responsible for managing operations, and acted as the link between forces in theatre and the Ministry of Defence in London. The Joint Forces Command established expeditionary forces and deployable headquarters, but also exercised British forces in joint missions, and engaged with coalition partners. The British started to set up experimental forces too, to practice the integration of new technologies and see where practices needed to change. There was a stronger emphasis on the ‘comprehensive approach’ in all the endeavours of the armed forces, that is to say, a ‘whole of government’ arrangement where different government ministries sent personnel to advise, co-operate and sometimes direct defence activities. There was a corresponding invitation to the private sector and to academics to assist in the ­development of ideas and processes in defence and security. Yet, inconsistencies and contradictions remained. Of the two major parties, the Conservatives tend to value defence and argue in favour of a robust strategy, and yet they will always prioritise the economy, and, as a result, have presided over several rounds of cuts since the end of the Cold War. By contrast, the Labour party’s leadership in 2017 was clearly antagonistic towards defence. The Labour leader was a long-standing member of the ‘Stop the War’ coalition and a Marxist who had championed the IRA and other terrorist organisations against the British armed forces in the 1980s and 1990s.14 He and his colleagues had made public statements on wanting to reduce severely the size and role of the army, navy and air force, with the complete abolition of the domestic intelligence service known as MI5.15 The former head of the British Secret

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Intelligence Service stated that Mr. Corbyn was unfit to govern as he represented a security risk to the United Kingdom.16 American and European allies would certainly be dismayed if any of Labour’s radical reforms were put into practice. They would mark the end of Britain’s global influence and its claim to be a significant actor in world affairs. Indeed, such reforms would lead to a complete change in British foreign and defence policy and fundamentally alter the nature of its strategy, national interests and its status. The immediate concern would be in the reduction of Britain’s capability.

Capability Capability can be measured in a number of ways, but the three most significant are decision-making; budget; and the forces’ strength in terms of arms, equipment and readiness. Each of these areas is taken in turn to assess Britain’s current capability and its near-future prospects. Britain’s recent record of decision-making in defence has been far from exemplary. The Iraq Enquiry, published in 2017, revealed a poor grasp of the design and execution of strategy. British governments have been guilty of a degree of complacency, perhaps because of a long period without major conflicts. One government minister claimed, in October 2017, that the armed forces had all that they currently required to meet existing threats, but off the record conversations across all three services revealed a list of problems and concerns which seemed to indicate that, while Britain could manage low intensity terrorism, was far from ready to participate in a major conflict against a near-peer adversary. In ­decision-making, there was further concern that some MPs, especially the Labour opposition, were vehemently opposed to the United States and to NATO. Yet there were concerns about the Conservative government too. The former Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osbourne, had championed close economic ties with China which appeared to prioritise trade deals over security, and the Prime Minister Theresa May was forced to halt Chinese bidding for the construction of a UK nuclear power station at Hinkley Point because of suspicions about espionage.17 A far more extensive concern about successive governments, regardless of party, has been the prevalence of ‘politically-correct’ statements over hard choices. Fearful of negative media coverage, governments have been accused of concealing defence problems, ‘spin-doctoring’ stories and championing popular causes regardless of their military merit. It was depressing to

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hear defence personnel championing LGBTI issues or ‘family-friendly’ employment conditions over military effectiveness. One former Royal Marine officer noted that his brigade did not accept the blind, deaf or physically-disabled, or those with extreme political beliefs, simply because of the missions they were asked to perform.18 Armed forces are not there to represent the profile of a nation. They are designed for war. Much has been written on recent government decision-making, but one example highlights the problems. In 2014, Russian troops, without identification, seized control of Crimea, part of the sovereign state of Ukraine, and annexed the territory illegally after a rigged referendum. The issue caused considerable concern in Britain, evoking memories of the 1930s and highlighting how far Vladimir Putin was prepared to go in terms of strategic risk to fulfil his objectives. Interestingly, a Franco-German delegation made direct appeals to Moscow, while the EU debated the issue. The British government issued its condemnation, called for the expulsion of Russia from the G8 and boycotted the Russian Olympics at Sochi, but there was no maritime response in the region.19 Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the former Defence Minister, believed: ‘On the basis of the measures announced so far by both the US and the EU, on visa controls and asset freezes internationally, I say with great sadness that is a pathetic and feeble response that does not match the seriousness which those implementing these responses have themselves acknowledged we face at the present time.’20 Sir William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, nevertheless believed that a concerted EU and UN action would convert Russian military success in Crimea into a zero-sum game, as its international position was weakened.21 Subsequently, there were sanctions against the Russian government, and an ‘enhanced forward presence’, a deterrent force in the Baltic states, was agreed by NATO. The United Kingdom despatched ships to the Baltic Sea, and troops to Estonia and Poland. The reaction fitted with a longer pattern of antagonised relations which included the Russian seizure of Pristina airport during the Bosnia conflict in 1999, the murder of Alexander Litvinenko by the Russian secret service using radioactive poison in London in 2006, repeated attempts at Russian military violations of UK airspace, and the bombing of aid convoys and civilians in Syria in 2015–2016.22 The British responses to these issues has been to agree on the renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent, the robust RAF response to Russian aircraft closing on UK air space, and frequent diplomatic protests.

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The second area of capability is in budgeting for defence. Britain has been consistent in committing 2.2% of its GDP to defence, which represents £34 billion per annum of which £17.8 billion is for new equipment, or, put another way, £178 billion over the decade 2016–2026.23 This is the equivalent of £532 per person in the United Kingdom per year. As a benchmark, the UK economy is worth $2.9 trillion per annum of which 15% comes from the financial services of the City of London. For the purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that UK defence spending is far higher in absolute terms and in proportion to that of Germany, which spends less of defence despite its larger economy. This is the cause of some resentment in both the United Kingdom and the United States which believes Germany makes convenient use of its constitution and its history to avoid shouldering expensive defence commitments. As a whole, NATO has called for 20% of all spending to be on modernising equipment, and the UK leads on European arms and equipment expenditure. This leads us to the third area of capability, namely forces, arms, equipment and readiness. The British are resolute about the nature of Article 5 of NATO, and believe that, given its significance, Britain should ensure it is the last resort option. As a result, British forces are configured for ‘rapid reaction’, with its Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF), and provide a ‘trip wire’ defence posture in eastern and northern Europe. The UK is, like other NATO nations, acutely aware of the challenges of hybrid warfare or nuclear coercion by Russia. Early warning, rapid reaction and information warfare manoeuvre are now established aspects of the British defence systems. Britain is a leading nation in cyber defence and enjoys close relations with Estonia, which possesses the NATO Centre of Excellence in this field. Britain’s concerns are that some other European nations do not take the threats posed by Russia very seriously, or perhaps use British, American and French military power as the excuse not to have to spend more of their own resources on defence. The result is a British concern about European inter-­operability, commitment, and spending. This has made the Brexit debate all the more bitter for the British public. The majority feel that their sacrifices in the Second World War and the Cold War have been forgotten, and while the Europeans complain about the UK not paying more for the ‘divorce bill’ to leave the EU, the British point to their cemeteries on the continent as proof that they have paid enough.

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Each of the UK armed services has a strong case for future enhancement as far as defence requirements are concerned. The Royal Navy argues that, since most of the country’s needs come by sea and it is the navy that projects power and influence globally, it should take priority. Currently, at the time of writing, the Royal Navy possesses 77 vessels, which is a significant reduction on the 1980s where it could deploy 120 ships. It also seems far smaller than Russia, which can count 280 ships in its forces.24 Moreover, of the British ships, only 18 can be categorised as principal vessels, including the two new aircraft carriers. The Royal Navy can, however, provide a variety of options, which other European fleets cannot. The UK can offer constabulary missions against piracy, drugs and smuggling with new Offshore Patrol Vessels. In surveillance and submarine detection it has invested in 9 Boeing P8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. It has a warfighting capability, with its own integral maritime air force, anti-submarine capacity and mine warfare component. It has set a course to introduce the Type 26 Global Combat Ships. Its logistics fleet means it can sustain itself at sea, while the continuous at sea nuclear deterrent (CASND) provides the fundamental mainstay of UK defence. The RAF maintain that all conflicts are dependent on air power, and the air force is able to offer the versatility of strike, lift and surveillance on a home defence and expeditionary footing. The RAF has had a significant footprint at the CENTCOM air operations cell in Qatar for missions over the Middle East, the Gulf and Afghanistan, and it has gained considerable experience in precision operations over the last two decades. It is to be equipped with the F35 strike fighters, a total of 138 aircraft of this type, and the latest lift aircraft to maintain its leading edge, and Advanced High Altitude surveillance aircraft, with over 20 Protector armed remotely piloted aircraft. The RAF will establish 2 additional Typhoon squadrons and an additional F35 squadron to augment its strength in 2018. However, it is also noteworthy how small the RAF has become since the end of the Cold War. The British Army is keen to assert that, in the final reckoning, wars are decided on land, and that, as operations between 2001 and 2014 indicated, conflicts are invariably conducted amongst populations where close engagement is required at ground level. The army is also a flexible organisation, able to turn its hand to peace-keeping, humanitarian relief and warfighting in any terrain, with all its integral enablers of command, surveillance, fires and logistics. The British Army has been reconfigured to provide a deployable division (3 Div) and a second division (1 Div)

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that will be able to conduct persistent engagement (through ‘specialised infantry battalions’) or follow up the deployed divisions’ operations. The army also complement modern joint operations with an airmobile brigade (alongside an amphibious commando brigade), an ISR brigade (conducting surveillance) and an amorphous information operations formation known as 77 Brigade. An extra £2 billion was also committed to Special Forces’ equipment. The debates within the armed forces themselves are to some extent unchanged from previous generations. Military professionals continually assess what type of forces they need, that is, the degree of specialism or the extent to which they should maintain a ‘balanced force’ able to conduct any type of operation under all conditions. Military officers and their civilian counterparts in MOD also reassess the skill sets they need, how to develop their manpower and the performance of equipment. Ministry officials work closely with the UK defence industry to ascertain what research and development direction to take. At the command level, there has been much debate about the systems of control, the degree of centralisation or delegation and the requirements of the ‘information age’.

Continuing Challenges There are a number of challenges which continue to affect the United Kingdom’s defence and security.25 The most pressing and visible is the means with which to protect the public from acts of terrorism, not least because it is not possible to offer a 100% guarantee of safety. The homegrown nature of the terrorist threat also makes domestic surveillance and privacy a contested issue, while sustaining public vigilance, a vital part of the country’s defence, is difficult. On the other hand, the effects of terrorist attacks, excepting the victims and their families, tend to be shortlived. Unlike France and Belgium, the British have not committed their army to the streets of major cities. Transport systems recover quickly, financial losses are replaced and the British public, who are familiar with such attacks since the 1970s by Irish terrorists, exhibit a phlegmatic defiance of the perpetrators. The widespread popularity of the pre- Second World War slogan ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ in the 2000s is an indicator of the public mood and emulates the expression from that era that ‘Britain Can Take It’. That is not to diminish the existence of panic and fear during incidents, or defeatism among certain quarters of the

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population, but it is remarkable that the British public tend to reach for icons of defiance and resistance, like Winston Churchill’s rhetoric, when they are confronted by threats of this nature. A second challenge is the interconnectedness of the globe, particularly when it comes to the supply chain of sensitive information and technologies. The private sector undoubtedly plays a key role in the ­ development of defence and security technologies, from the software of detection and cyber penetration to the development of platforms of surveillance in space. Private security contractors and military companies are seen as a necessary element in state stabilisation and logistical support to Western forces. The squeeze on available government resources, particularly after the economic crisis of 2008, has added to this pressure to engage with and subcontract to the private sector for a range of defence needs, from estates to research. Maintaining the operational security of future developments will certainly be more challenging for Britain, and, like many Western countries, it expects that it will possess a leading technological edge only for a short period even though new breakthroughs will occur thick and fast over the next few decades. A third challenge is the development of Britain’s next generation of nuclear capability. The Dreadnaught class of submarine will be equipped with the new generation of nuclear weapons but the costs will be prohibitive unless the UK can spread the costs and set aside approximately £1 billion a year for their introduction. Here the European Union’s insistence on continued payments by Britain through Brexit reveals Brussels’ rather short-term view of the United Kingdom: wanting bills paid on its own terms for European integration projects, rather than its strategic sense of enabling Britain to commit to future nuclear defence costs for the continent. Europeanists would argue that Britain needs to pay for pledges already made, but there is no doubt that the EU wanted the UK to pay for forthcoming projects too, including infrastructural development. The British argument was that, as one of the largest contributors to European defence, in contrast to many EU member states, it already had paid its share. Another, fourth, challenge relating to expenditure and defence is that of the UK’s reserve forces. To reduce costs, the Ministry of Defence had announced that part time volunteer forces would be more closely integrated into the regulars, and, in the event of conflict, these reserves would augment the deployed formations. A Reserve Forces Act in 1996 had provided for reserves that were ‘high-readiness’ and which could be

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brought onto the operational tours of Iraq and Afghanistan. Reservists did so from all three services. The problem was that the Reserves were not able to maintain the high levels of training efficiency that the regulars could manage, and the high turnover of personnel tended to reinforce the repetition of basic proficiency levels, even though some had gained valuable operational experience. Moreover, in the future, a major conflict would require most of the Reserves to be maintained in the United Kingdom in home defence and internal security roles, leaving the regulars with the shortfall they had anticipated. The fifth challenge is the constant uncertainty of the type of war one will be expected to fight. While tactical experiences for sailors, airmen, marines and soldiers are invariably similar, the operational and strategic requirements over the last three decades have been radically different. Technological developments can only provide part of the solution. The British forces undoubtedly enjoyed a technological superiority over the Taliban of Afghanistan and Jaish al Mahdi of Iraq, for example, but this did not make it any easier for the British to conclude the ­conflicts in Helmand and Basra satisfactorily. The British, in common with their NATO allies, have struggled to determine their military posture towards cyber attacks, hybrid warfare and proxy wars. Herein lay another issue, namely, the extent to which the European defence systems are integrated, from the legislation required in the event of conflict, to decision-making about the hybrid threats and what constitutes grounds for an allied military response. To this one might also add the track record of conventional deterrence, which has hardly been exemplary, although, admittedly the methodology for measuring what has been deterred is far from clear.

The Domains for UK Strategy The UK has to address threats and opportunities in a number of domains in the present and the near future. These fall into the categories of geo-strategic changes, homeland security, persistent foreign engagement, information warfare, economic warfare, coercive diplomacy with hybrid operations, urban warfighting, and chemical-biological-radiological threats. The geostrategic environment has undoubtedly started to shift since 2000. The United States remains the pre-eminent superpower globally, but the economic take-off of China has created a significant challenge for

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the Americans, not only in terms of Chinese aspirations to take part in global affairs but also in the Chinese view of the exclusive sovereignty of the South and East China Seas. The first test of Chinese power politics in this new era is likely to be over the handling of North Korea, a close ally of Beijing, but also in its ability to manage diplomacy with its regional neighbours, all of whom view the Chinese claims to world power status with suspicion. The United Kingdom is not immune from the rivalry of America and China, seeing commercial opportunities with the latter but clearly unwilling to forego its strategic relationship with the former. It finds itself in a better position than Australia, which has commercial dependencies on China but which remains an American ally. The same is true of the British view of the central and eastern European states, which are dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and consequently reluctant to criticise Moscow. Given this European temptation to give way to Russia, it is not hard to see why the British would be reluctant to remain beholden to the EU’s foreign policy. There are significant opportunities for the United Kingdom amongst the emerging states of the world. Alongside its close relationship with the Commonwealth countries, Britain may well be an important partner of a new Atlantic regionalism, which would include the United States, Canada, Brazil and Nigeria, as well as other countries. Moreover e-commerce, which Britain champions, may well overcome many of the geographical restrictions of the past, gradually prising open the authoritarian states of Russia and China regardless of their attempts to prevent it. The economic liberalism which the United Kingdom has championed in London could prove to be a much more successful model of global influence for the future. The British will certainly face ongoing disputes with Europe postBrexit, with the most likely issues being, not European defence, but the status of Gibraltar, military bases on Cyprus, fishing zones and access to them, agricultural products, financial sector rivalries, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. It is likely these will be resolved through the normal course of political dialogue and diplomacy, much as they have been in the last 40 years. There has been anxiety over the Northern Ireland border, with the majority of the province hoping to keep a soft boundary for the sake of lucrative commerce and a guarantee of peace between antagonised communities. The British government made it clear that it would preserve the open borders arrangement but it could not accept the EU proposal that a hard border be asserted

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on the Irish Sea coast, which would effectively wrest Northern Ireland from UK sovereignty and put it under the control of the EU. Loyalists in Northern Ireland, already angered by a seemingly endless stream of political concessions to republicans and nationalists, refused to accept the EU argument and their position in the British parliament (where their alliance with the governing Conservative Party gave it a majority it would otherwise lack) made this a ‘red line’ for the UK government. Homeland security is, however, a quite different matter. The economy of the early twenty-first century replicated many of the problems which had existed in previous centuries, and had generated its own forms of unrest. The blending of overseas security issues and those at home, largely through large diaspora populations in Britain, produced terrorism informed and driven by events far from Britain’s shores. This threat implied greater security co-operation across the world, not just with Europe, not least because most of the epicentres of conflict lay in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Another implication was a need for greater national resilience, in terms of countering extremist ideology that sought to divide the British people, but also in terms of critical national infrastructure (CNI). The establishment of cyber security as an integral part of UK defence and security reflected the sheer financial cost of cyber crime but also the catastrophic potential of sustained DDOS attacks and viral infections to CNI and the UK economy. That said, there was pragmatic recognition that not every attack could be stopped. Other aspects of resilience, which lie outside the scope of this chapter, are being addressed as a government-private sector partnerships, including defence of space assets, communications and transport. Resilience is the ability to recover from and continue to function during attacks. One reason for the UK investment in more diverse energy sources is its concern not to be dependent on single vulnerable sources of supply, such as oil or gas from the Middle East. As an island nation, the UK recognised the need for persistent foreign engagement long before the phrase entered the defence lexicon. Keeping enemies at arm’s length was the role of the navy and the air force, but the UK’s global interests mean that it cannot afford to look only to the protection of its immediate borders. Fighting at home is damaging and unattractive to policy makers so defence is projected forward, across the continent of Europe, through its regional allies in the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, South Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific. This means that Britain’s partners can anticipate a forward posture from the

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United Kingdom over the next ten years at least, but probably far longer, as it constitutes an integral part of its strategic culture. Information warfare has given the British some cause for concern. Both state and non-state actors that oppose Britain have made use of social media to promote negative, divisive and contrary narratives. At times, the British response has been rather inadequate and slow. The problems lie in being reactive, insisting on a singular narrative, and, naturally, an adherence to the truth in a world of relativist representations. The free press and unregulated social media-sphere mean that every government and military decision is scrutinised and challenged. Yet, what the British authorities had not anticipated was the exploitation of media systems. Russia infamously created bots to generate mass in the social media space and to feed the mainstream media with fake stories or multiple narratives, including denials of attacks that were well-documented in eastern Ukraine and in Syria. China, North Korea and Iran have all used espionage and control of their own media to propagate certain ideas, including anti-British rhetoric. But the least expected manipulation of the media was the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) fiasco within the UK during and after the Iraq War. Phil Shiner, a socialist human rights lawyer, attempted to exploit the British government’s willingness to pay compensation to any victims of British military aggression by encouraging false allegations. The result was that millions of pounds of public money was lost to nefarious cases, not a single one of which produced a conviction. Shiner was eventually struck off and the investigations closed in 2017 but many commentators asked why Shiner and his colleagues had not been challenged sooner.26 The British armed forces are eager to explain their actions and intentions but they do not always get a fair hearing from the media and there is too much restriction on what can be reported. The result is a vacuum of information that, given the pressure of time and urgent demands of 24-hour news cycles, the media are keen to fill with their own ‘analysis’ and interpretation. At the start of the Iraq War, the Daily Mirror claimed it was ‘hoaxed’ when its published stories of vile abuse and atrocity stories, supposedly perpetrated by British troops, turned out to be false.27 The paper was nevertheless so eager for a negative scoop against the government, it was fully prepared to accept the story it had apparently been given. The abuses were invented. But where the mainstream media can be held to account, the social media world seems free of the need for fact checking, and there have been frequent allegations that it has facilitated terrorist messaging and extremist recruiting.

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In the operational setting, information warfare is part of a domain the British are taking far more seriously. As noted before, 77 Brigade has been set up to counter enemy propaganda. The methods are classified but some idea of operations can be gleaned from comparable forces. Although the sources are unknown and verification is difficult, there is some evidence to suggest that Iraqi hackers known as Daeshgram, have been using ISIS hashtags and narratives to subvert the extremists’ messaging and misleading them.28 The enhanced capabilities of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms, especially unmanned systems known in Britain as RPAS (Remotely-Piloted Air Systems), has given British forces much greater access and clarity on enemy formations, and this has enabled more precise operations, in both kinetic and informational terms. The conflict environment has compelled the British to adopt a more comprehensive approach, using all the instruments of national power, to conduct its strategy and policy. Information and action have to be synchronised to maximise their effect. It was evident in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria that insurgents were eager to blame Western air strikes for the deaths they themselves had carried out. Arranging the victims bodies and then taking photographs was one method, but Daesh would also ­co-locate their defences with civilian ‘human shields’ so that, if attacked, they could blame the losses on Britain or its allies. Civilian casualties is such a sensitive subject in Britain’s recent operations that Daesh, and other enemies, believe that, if a threshold of civilian deaths is reached, the British will simply conclude their operations altogether. This is an aspect of ‘fourth generation warfare’, targeting public and political beliefs to effect a change in policy on the battlefield. Hybrid warfare is another aspect of this ‘fourth generation’ challenge. While deterrence and the threat of escalation might help in some cases, the purpose of a hybrid warfare attack is to assert a line of policy without triggering a full military response. The ambiguity of the situation is designed to create doubt, and is usually accompanied by a media storm designed to create division and paralysis. Exploiting the British media’s desire for sensational stories is relatively easy, while the speed with which stories are generated leaves less time for fact-checking. The solution is to create systems of early warning, hence the new British formations, and to present a rapid, unified response, which in turn explains the British whole-of-government working generated from the 2010s. Yet British counter-hybrid strategy is about compelling the enemy to make a choice: to continue with hybrid operations and face severe consequences, or to

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desist from the method because it no longer produces results. It is for this reason that cyber resilience, in the UK and NATO may make DDOS attacks less effective in the future, although attempts to cyber penetration and mass propaganda may still appear in their current form. One domain that it is thought will create significant problems for British defence in the future is in urban terrorism and insurgency. Lying at the boundary of civil policing and military effort, major city unrest would cause major difficulties for government and yet it would be relatively easy to generate protests and to accompanying violence as the means to discredit the authorities. In many respects, Britain is the best equipped of any Western country to manage the problem, given the 30 years’ experience it had with the terrorist ‘Troubles’ of Northern Ireland. The final domain of threat is the chemical-biological-radiological. The murder of Alexander Litvinenko on British soil by the Russian secret service and the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in 2018 with Novichok nerve agent, accompanied by a campaign of denial and obfuscation by Moscow, indicated that Britain would have to consider a range of defence measures to protect its citizens and critical infrastructure from Russian sabotage, or further use of chemical attacks.

Conclusions and a Look Ahead The British will, on current planning, maintain their defence posture and express their willingness to operate around the globe. Their maritime commitments are clear and this will determine their deployments for some time to come. The two aircraft carriers and their carrier groups will mean that Britain will possess the ability to project air power and this capacity will not be limited only to the European theatre. The high north, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean will remain the priority waters but the close American relationship means that the UK could find its carriers on missions in the Indian Ocean and Pacific too. The British aspiration to continue to play a global role is not limited to the carrier deployments, but currently applies to its CASND submarines, and is set to continue. The British economy, particularly its financial sector, is also configured to global rather than European trading, so its postBrexit transition to a world-wide setting is easy to imagine even if, as some argue, Britain is taken more seriously in this role because of its status within the EU. Regardless of the European connections, the UK is

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a member of the P5 at the UN Security Council and a nuclear power. The other means of UK defence reinforces its international outlook. The creation of deployable army divisions, its airmobile and amphibious capabilities, and its expeditionary air force give it a lift, surveillance and strike capacity that equals that of France and outmatches any other European power. The most unexpected development for Britain was the aggressive posture of Russia. Around 2008, the exact date is uncertain, the Russian authorities commenced a concerted campaign to divide and demoralise the Western states through the instruments of information warfare. Through their programmes of ‘psycho-linguistics’ and ‘zombification’, the intention was to intimidate, confuse, and thus paralyse the West. ‘Regime change’ was the objective where possible, since the Russians firmly believed this had been the aim of the West against the Russian government and its ‘satellites’. These information operations, though specific media channels, cyber activities, and widespread manipulation of social media, sought to achieve effects without recourse to physical actions, although Russia continued to make physical threats to increase levels of intimidation and coercion. The recklessness of their policies led to interference in the American elections, assassinations in Ukraine, indiscriminate bombing campaigns in Syria and the Donbass region, and the military invasion of Crimea in contravention of international law. For the British, the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive material and then the attempted assassination of Alexei Skirpal and his daughter with Novichok nerve agent (a material originating in Russia), which killed one British citizen, were landmarks in the deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations. Internationally, the British expulsion of Russian diplomats was emulated voluntarily by many nations, demonstrating the unity of the Western bloc. Russia, commanding no equivalent international support, was isolated. For the purposes of this volume, it is interesting to reflect that the EU endorsed the British decision.29 The challenge going forward will be Britain’s relationship with Europe post-Brexit. In 2016, there was considerable controversy in British politics and society about the result of the referendum, the future economy, immigration, the powers of the European Court of Justice, the ‘divorce bill’ payments to secure a trade deal, the nature of the Irish border and the rights of ex-patriates in the UK and Europe. The British were suspicious of certain threats, including the warnings of what was labelled ‘project fear’, namely that there would be an

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immediate economic and financial crisis (in fact, the UK economy grew above expected levels in FY 2016–2017) and an exodus of talent and business (there wasn’t in 2016–2018). There was more tangible concern about the formation of a European armed force under EU command, because it was unclear whether this would include or exclude Britain, and, crucially, the United States. After the Brexit controversy has passed, Britain will be like Canada to Europe. It will share the same values, it will engage in the missions around the world, it will be essentially an Atlantic power but with a trade and defence relationship with Europe, and, above all, it will be closer to the United States, perhaps not geographically like Canada, but certainly in terms of a defence relationship. The British exit from the European Union, a political decision over its sovereignty, while significant for its foreign policy potentially, will have less impact in the long term on the UK’s view of European defence and security. British governments have always believed the fate of the continent is in the national interest. It is therefore hard to imagine Britain ending its link to European defence unless, for other reasons, the EU turns its back on the relationship with the United States. If there was a straight choice, the UK would side with the Americans over the Europeans, but since the choice is unlikely to be that stark, British governments will certainly seek to cooperate with both the US and the European powers of NATO, and to influence both. The British require allies for a viable defence of the UK, but they are more akin to Canada, and, post-Brexit, they should be regarded this way by both their allies and their rivals.

Notes







1. The National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_ NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf (Accessed December 2017). 2.  See, for example, Ben Farmer, ‘Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Were a “Failure” Costing £29bn’, 28 May 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ uknews/defence/10859545/Wars-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-were-afailure-costing-29bn.html (Accessed December 2017). 3. Critics. 4. Lancaster House Speech, ‘The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM Speech’, 17 January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech (Accessed October 2017).

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5. Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (London: Hurst & Co., 2015), p. 116ff. 6. Desmond Browne, ‘The Political–Military Relationship on Operations’, in Bailey, Strachan, and Iron (eds), British Generals and Blair’s Wars (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 273. 7.  ‘Netanyahu Angrily Cancels Dinner with Visiting Briton’, New York Times, 18 March 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/18/ world/netanyahu-angrily-cancels-dinner-with-visiting-briton.html (Accessed December 2017). 8. See the chapter by Dr. Jeff Michaels in this volume. 9. See, for example, ‘Donald Trump Hits Back at Theresa May After Re-tweeting British Far-Right Group’s Anti-Muslim Videos’, The Telegraph, 30 November 2017,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/29/trump-sharedmuslim-crimes-videos-tweeted-british-far-right/ (Accessed December 2017). 10. Authors interviews in Sweden (July 2017); Finland (November 2017); Norway (November 2017) and with the Baltic representatives in Poland (November 2017). 11.  ‘Royal Navy Could Lose “Beach-Landing” Ships in Next Round of Defence Cuts’, The Telegraph, 6 October 2017, http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/2017/10/06/royalnavy-could-lose-beach-landing-shipsnext-round-defence/ (Accessed December 2017). 12. ‘Trump on NATO: “I Said It Was Obsolete. It’s No Longer Obsolete”’, The Washington Post, 12 April 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-politics/wp/2017/04/12/trump-on-nato-i-said-it-was-obsolete-itsno-longer-obsolete/?utm_term=.2df496fe3ebe (Accessed December 2017). 13. For details of the Wales Summit, see https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/nato-summit-wales-cymru-2014 (Accessed December 2017). 14.  ‘Jeremy Corbyn, Friend to Hamas, Iran and Extremists’, The Telegraph, 18 July 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ labour/11749043/Andrew-Gilligan-Jeremy-Corbyn-friend-to-HamasIran-and-extremists.html (Accessed December 2017); The left wing press were equally unimpressed: ‘Labour’s Defence Policy in Chaos After Jeremy Corbyn Deleted Key Trident Pledge’, 27 September 2016, http://www. mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/labours-defence-policy-chaos-after-8919570 (Accessed December 2017); Vernon Coker, the Shadow Defence Secretary, would only advocate: ‘Britain Has a Leading Role to Play in Keeping Peace’ in a statement with a contradictory title, http://labourlist.org/2014/03/ labour-has-an-ambitious-and-realistic-vision-for-uk-defence/ (Accessed December 2017); Labour’s Defence Review aspirations, but not a policy, can be found at https://www.scribd.com/doc/295585960/Labour-sDefence-Policy-Review (Accessed December 2017).

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15. ‘John McDonnell Signed Letter Calling for MI5 and Armed Police to Be Disbanded’, Daily Telegraph, 19 November 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/12005431/John-McDonnell-signedletter-calling-for-MI5-and-armed-police-to-be-disbanded.html (Accessed December 2017). 16.  Sir Richard Dearlove, ‘Jeremy Corbyn Is a Danger to This Nation. At MI6, Which I Once Led, He Wouldn’t Clear the Security Vetting’, The Daily Telegraph, 7 June 2017, http://www.teleg r a p h . c o . u k / n e w s / 2 0 1 7 / 0 6 / 0 7 / j e r e m y - c o r b y n - d a n g e r- n a tion-mi6-led-wouldnt-clear-security-vetting/ (Accessed December 2017). 17. ‘Security Fears Over China Nuclear Power Deal’, 16 October 2015, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34549478 (Accessed December 2017). 18.  Lt-Col Ewen Southerby-Tailyour, November 2017; see also, Mark Time, ‘Royal Marines Training Is Gruelling, but It Must Remain So’, The Telegraph, 1 June 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/thinking-man/11643558/Royal-Marines-training-is-gruelling-but-it-mustremain-so.html (Accessed December 2017). 19.  Nicholas Watt, ‘Ukraine: UK to Push for Tougher Sanctions Against Russia Over Crimea’, The Guardian, 18 March 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/ukraine-uk-push-sanctions-russiacrimea (Accessed November 2017). 20. Ibid. 21.  ‘Ukraine: UK to Push for Tougher Sanctions Against Russia Over Crimea’, The Guardian, 18 March 2014, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/mar/18/ukraine-uk-push-sanctions-russia-crimea (Accessed December 2017). 22.  On the Pristina Incident, see Mike Jackson, ‘Command of Kosovo 1999’, in Jonathan Bailey, Hew Strachan, and Richard Iron (eds), Britain’s Generals in Blair’s Wars (London: Ashgate, 2013). On the Litvinenko case, see the public enquiry at the UK National Archives, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160613090305/ https://www.litvinenkoinquiry.org/ (Accessed November 2017). The bombing of one aid convoy was reported by John Borger and Spencer Akerman of The Guardian on 21 September 2016 at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/20/un-aid-convoy-attack-syria-usrussia (Accessed November 2017). Compelling evidence of Russian missile debris was provided by observers of the Syrian Red Crescent at https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/09/22/russianbomb-remains-recovered-syrian-red-crescent-aid-convoy-attack/ (Accessed November 2017).

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23. ‘Defence Budget Increases for the First Time in Six Years’, 1 April 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-budget-increases-forthe-first-time-in-six-years (Accessed October 2017). 24. For the scale and types of vessels in the Royal Navy, see https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships (Accessed December 2017). 25. Julian Lindley-French, ‘Could Britain Respond Strategically to Russian Aggression’, in Janne Haaland Matlary and Tormod Heier (eds), Ukraine and Beyond: Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 112. 26.  The British Government’s closure of IHAT at https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/ihat-to-close-at-the-end-of-june (Accessed November 2017); Owen Bowcott, ‘Phil Shiner: Iraq Human Rights Lawyer Struck Off Over Misconduct’, The Guardian, 2 February 2017, https://www. theguardian.com/law/2017/feb/02/iraq-human-rights-lawyer-phil-shiner-disqualified-for-professional-misconduct (Accessed November 2017). 27. The Daily Mirror, 15 May 2004, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/ uk-news/sorry-we-were-hoaxed-539838 (Accessed November 2017) 28. Tom Cheshire, ‘Meet Daeshgram’, Sky News, 20 November 2017. 29. Countries which supported the UK and expelled Russian diplomats: USA, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Albania, Hungary, Netherlands, Ukraine, Australia. Countries in the EU which did not: Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, Luxembourg.

CHAPTER 3

The US–UK Special Relationship and the “Principled Realism” of the Trump Administration Andrew A. Michta

The election of Donald Trump as the United States’ 45th President shook up traditional assumptions about how America conceptualizes its national security priorities and its relationships with its allies. While many speculated about how far the campaign rhetoric would reflect the reality of the new American administration, two years into the Trump presidency it is now apparent that, contrary to initial apprehension in Europe’s capitals, Washington continues to put a premium on working with allies and partners. The new US national security team has refocused on cross-domain state-on-state competition, while making equitable burden-sharing in NATO its key priority. On defense spending the message from Washington has been that business as usual, i.e., Europe’s unwillingness to properly resource its defense, will no longer suffice. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s expectation that Europe step up on defense spending is about more than exhorting allies

A. A. Michta (*)  George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_3

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to signal their political intent, but rather part of a larger strategic reconfiguration of how America works with Europe to bring about equitable burden-sharing and reciprocity on defense. Washington is determined to rebuild the Army’s presence on the Continent, which by the end of the Obama administration had been reduced to thirty thousand soldiers and officers, with some sixty thousand US personnel in Europe when the Trump administration entered office. Faced with a resurgent Russia along NATO’s eastern flank, a gathering challenge in Asia from an increasingly geo-strategically assertive China, and the increasingly real possibility that North Korea would in fact field nuclear missiles capable of reaching North America, the United States wants NATO to once again serve as the premier provider of Western security. Hence the core message from the Trump administration to its allies has been that Europe needs to rearm, not as a symbol of political will or message of intent, but as a means to respond to growing threats both in Europe and across the globe. In addition, beneath the NATO umbrella, the Trump administration has paid special attention to US bilateral relations with allies, recognizing those who generate real contributions to common defense, while becoming increasingly vocal in its criticism of those allies who seem unable or unwilling to meet the NATO-agreed 2% of GDP defense spending targets and to field real capabilities. Here America’s “special relationship” with the United Kingdom is not just a function of a long-standing security relationship and close military-to-military cooperation, but it also depends on the willingness on the part of London to recognize that the United States will no longer accept the status quo when it comes to Europe’s continued reluctance to invest in defense. In a sense, the arrival of the Trump administration with its commitment to rebuilding America’s military, coming on the heels of Brexit, marks a moment of decision for the United Kingdom. London will either commit to sustained military modernization, and through its example lead other NATO allies to follow suit; or Europe’s inertia on defense that has been the norm over the past decade will continue with the attendant negative consequences for transatlantic relations. Today’s devolving geostrategic environment facing the United States in Europe requires a NATO buttressed by strong bilateral relationships across the Atlantic. Three countries could form a potential “strategic triad” for the Trump administration to anchor a workable NATO strategy going forward: the United Kingdom as the principal naval partner

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of the US and one of the few NATO allies capable of projecting power; Germany as the wealthiest and largest state providing strategic depth along both the eastern and southern axis and also potentially the provider of a powerful military (assuming the current downward trend on defense spending can be reversed); and Poland as the largest “frontier state” along the eastern flank that has the potential to provide both a large ground force and the requisite infrastructure to allow NATO to shift from deterrence to defense if necessary.1 As of this writing the jury is still out as to how these states will respond to the challenge of becoming the lynchpin strategic triad within NATO. Their domestic politics track in different directions, with the UK struggling to come to grips with the aftermath of the Brexit decision and Germany focused on saving the European federalist project, while Poland emphasizes its regained national sovereignty. They also represent different historical experiences and national traditions. Still, the geostrategic reconfiguration of Europe, with a resurgent Russia in the East, accelerating turmoil in MENA and the Balkans, and domestic political change in Turkey raising fundamental question about NATO’s evolution going forward, the importance of such a “strategic triad” for EuroAtlantic security will continue to grow. This chapter looks at US national security priorities and the concomitant efforts to work closely with its NATO allies and partners, while also challenging the status quo on defense spending. It then focuses on the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland as a potential “strategic triad” whose deepened bilateral relations with the US would enhance NATO’s effectiveness and address the current and future strategic priorities, with a special emphasis on the United Kingdom’s capabilities and role in terms of burden-sharing. It concludes by offering a way for the European allies to work with the US administration in the future.

The New US Strategy and the Wagers of Bilateralism In addition to the renewed emphasis on equitable burden-sharing, upon taking office the new US administration also undertook a reassessment of threats and priorities, which led it to conclude that state-on-state competition ought to be once again at the center of America’s strategy. The resultant new National Security Strategy2 and National Defense Strategy3 paint a significally different picture from that of the past 15 years. While the United States will remain committed to countering the Islamic

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jihadist threat and dealing with non-state actors—defeating ISIS was high on candidate Trump’s agenda—the new national security team has reviewed and modified the pattern established by the succession of post-9/11 US administrations. The Trump administration has moved away from the grand re-engineering projects that previously promised to “build states” and to establish democracy through regime change. Rather, while the new team remains committed to the core principles of democracy and American exceptionalism, it also prefers a realist view of the world. This “principled realism” of the early Trump administration has offered America’s allies an opportunity to reaffirm democratic principles while working together with Washington to rethink NATO’s priorities and reach a new consensus on what constitutes their shared threats. Such a consensus would combine NATO’s traditional Article 5 territorial defense function with the larger mission of countering jihadist terrorism not only as a struggle of values, but also as an expression of clearly defined geostrategic priorities. In a decisive departure from the past decade and a half of US national security priorities, the new approach identified China and Russia as its two principal peer competitors. The new National Defense Strategy, whose unclassified twelve-page summary was introduced in January 2018 by Defense Secretary James Mattis, confirmed the need to rebuild the US military to focus on state-on-state threats, while shifting attention in the Middle East away from nation-building to a much more modest and implementable strategic goal of preventing further deterioration and containing chaos. The principled realism of the Trump administration requires that Europe begin to think strategically and not merely reactively about common security, and that it—together with the United States and Canada—adapt NATO to the rapidly changing international security environment.4 At the core, this would require not just a general acrossthe-board European commitment to increase defense spending, but also a larger decision about which European allies would become the hub of a changing transatlantic security architecture, especially along NATO’s eastern and southern frontiers. To put it differently, America’s focus on the deterioration of NATO’s capabilities along its flanks—with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence providing essentially the initial tripwire in the East—implies that the United States would need to deepen its security relationships with key European allies to ensure that the larger objective to deter Russia, and if need be to defend Europe should deterrence

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fail, rests on a credible strategic design buttressed by credible forces. Another urgent problem for the alliance has been the ever-more complicated security situation along the Southern flank, both on account of the continued wars in the Middle East and the increasingly complex relationship between Turkey and a number of its NATO allies. Today the United States is in the process of reversing the defense spending reductions and force withdrawal from Europe that marked the eight years of the Obama administration. The Trump administration defense budget will allow for a dramatic increase in the capabilities of the US armed forces, including the rebuilding of US presence in Europe in order to shore up deterrence along the eastern flank and, should deterrence fail, provide a clear path to the defense of Europe. This will require close cooperation with the allies, and most of all political will across Europe to step up on defense. If NATO is to meet the task as it did in the past, today and going forward the United States will need its European allies to do their part. Notwithstanding the continual assertions of NATO’s unity and solidarity, the alliance does not seem to share the kind of threat consensus that kept the Euro-Atlantic alliance glued together during the Cold War. Rather, today European security is defined by the progressive regionalization of individual nations’ security optics, with countries along the Eastern flank viewing Russian military pressure and irredentism in Ukraine as the preeminent threats, while Southern and Western Europe look to the Mediterranean, the MENA region, and increasingly deeper into Africa where war, terrorism, and migration are now a clear and present danger for Europe, whose southern border is no longer along the Mediterranean but reaches deep into the Sahel. The continued fragmentation of how European NATO members define and prioritize threats presents a dilemma for Washington, for the United States remains the lynchpin of NATO and the core security provider for Europe, notwithstanding the reemergence in Europe of discussions about how to build a credible European defense capability, with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defense Fund (EDF) the latest yardsticks in this debate. Regardless of what the latest round of European defense initiatives will produce—and if history is any guide, a healthy dose of skepticism is warranted—NATO will remain the umbrella covering all of America and Europe for years to come, and American military power will remain indispensable to Europe’s security. Moreover, there seems to be a growing

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consensus in Washington that NATO’s institutions need to be buttressed by a series of deepened bilateral relations to undergird the Euro-Atlantic security system. To strengthen the transatlantic link, the United States needs to prioritize core relationships in Europe to reflect the distribution of threats across Europe. For starters, the core “European triad” of US strategic engagement should include London, Berlin, and Warsaw and it should also reach into France and Italy in the South and Norway in the North.

The United Kingdom The emphasis placed by the Trump administration on the fundamentals of defense budgeting has been decried by analysts and Europe’s policy community as a departure from established practice, with charges that Washington risks transforming the inherent reciprocity of NATO into a relationship that smacks of transactionalism. And yet the United States’ deepening concern about unequal burden sharing across the alliance is not new, nor limited to the Trump administration. In 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at a National Defense University session devoted to the New Strategic Concept, pointed out that only 5 of 28 NATO allies spent 2% of GDP on defense, and that “despite the need to spend more on vital equipment for ongoing missions, the alliance has been unwilling to fundamentally change how it sets priorities and allocates resources.”5 In a similar vein, during the second term of the Obama administration then Secretary of Defense Ash Carter pointed out in Berlin in 2015 that an alliance where the United States provided seventy percent of all defense spending could not be tolerated in the long run, for Congress would ultimately become the final arbiter on the skewed transatlantic relationship. As the Secretary put it, “the transatlantic relationship and transatlantic security is, as ever, a twosided affair.”6 The Trump administration’s redefinition of US national security priorities offers the United Kingdom an opportunity to both strengthen its relations with the United States, and to shape the larger redefinition of European security, provided London will be prepared to step up its financial commitment to defense. Indeed, already after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, London took several important initial steps to reassert itself as a serious military power. In addition to British investments in the Royal Navy—including the funding for two new aircraft carriers—British airpower saw the prospect of a considerable increase in capabilities,

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including the acquisition of F-35B fighters (with a target number of 138 F-35 aircraft) with the aim of ensuring that each aircraft carrier would have at least a squadron of stealthy aircraft by the time they were both fully operational in 2023.7 From the perspective of the US and NATO, this planned restoration of British military capabilities highlighted not just that London understood the strategic imperative of countering the growing threat from Russia, but more importantly that it understood the importance of carrier strike capability—an essential development from the vantage point of the United States and NATO contributions to allied power projection. However, the positive outcome of UK defense modernization is still a work in progress, and it is not yet certain how far it will go. The United Kingdom, which traditionally maintained 2.5% of GDP or above throughout the late 1990s and into the first decade of the 2000s, began to experience a precipitous decline in spending beginning in 2009, and as of 2011 has fallen below 2.5%.8 In fact, since the Great Recession of 2008 British defense spending has experienced a steady decline, breaking below 2.4% of GDP by 2016. This is a dramatic reduction when compared to the Cold War years when British defense spending remained largely constant, standing in the 1970s at between 5.4 and 5.5% of GDP, peaking in 1982 during the Falklands War at 5.95% of GDP when it reached percentage levels close to those of the United States. In the 1990s British defense spending dropped to about 3% of GDP, with 2.63% in 2003 and then a further decline that saw the British defense budget drop below 2.5% of GDP through the 2014. In fact, in 2016, two years after the Russian seizure of Crimea, some analysts argued that the government’s claim to have spent 2% of GDP on defense, for which it provided no specific budget details, required a “reality check.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London contended that since the UK’s GDP that year was higher than expected, the country’s defense spending as a percentage of its GDP actually dropped for the first time below the 2% NATO mandated ceiling, and that the United Kingdom in fact spent only 1.98% of GDP on defense.9 Even more disturbing data has been provided by UK Defence Expenditure, a House of Commons Library briefing paper published in February 2018. According to the brief, UK defense spending has been reduced over the past five years by about 1 billion pounds in real terms to 35.3 billion pounds in 2016/17; with the planned increase in defense allocations by 2020/21 UK defense spending is expected to be at 37.1

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billion pounds. The paper posited that despite these cuts the UK was one of only five NATO countries since 2010 to have met the 2% target.10 Regardless subsequent arguments over how the expenditures were counted, the fact that America’s principal European ally is either below the 2% margin and/or barely above it suggests that something fundamental has happened over the past decade to change how the British look at defense spending. Likewise, as of this writing there remains a considerable degree of uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of the Modernizing Defense Program (MDP).11 Time will tell whether MDP will mark a genuine step forward in rebuilding the UK’s defense capabilities, or if it will become a way to explain another round of defense cuts. As it exits the European Union, the United Kingdom will attempt to underscore and leverage its relations with the United States, including the countries’ close military cooperation. Britain’s current reinvestment in its military, most recently through the purchase of two new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers12 aligns well with the planned rearmament cycle in the United States. More importantly, London has historically shared with Washington the understanding that military power remains part of the full spectrum of statecraft, and that the ability to project power remains central to transatlantic security. Admittedly, the jury is still out on whether the National Security Capability Review13 will result in cuts to an already strained UK defense budget, or if the country will become a full-bore military partner of the United States in NATO. In the coming months, Washington’s continued engagement with London on defense issues may prove decisive for the future of the bilateral security relationship.

Germany The second, and arguably the most important, continental pillar of America’s strategic “European triad” would be Germany. However, Washington and Berlin do not quite see eye-to-eye on the key issue of defense spending, with Germany seemingly not yet politically ready to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Despite being Europe’s largest and most powerful economy, over the years Germany has reduced its military capabilities to the point that some have begun to question whether the Bundeswehr could actually deploy in sufficient numbers in a major state-on-state crisis, or even in a limited contingency. While Berlin has committed to increasing its defense spending in absolute terms to

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begin addressing the urgent need to recapitalize the Bundeswehr and to address readiness and maintenance shortfalls, it will not meet the 2% NATO target, with only 1.3% of GDP targeted for defense next year. Berlin plans to increase defense spending from €38.9 billion this year to €43.9 billion in 2022, which would constitute about a 13% increase. However, in light of IMF projections for German economic growth these numbers would put Germany at barely over 1% of GDP on defense. Given the projected growth of its economy, the German commitment to defense would actually mark a decline in percentage spending between 2020 and 2022.14 The German government’s decision to aim for the current marginal increase to 1.3% of GDP could in fact mark an inflection point in how the Trump administration looks at its bilateral security relations with Germany, especially given Berlin’s emphasis in recent months on the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its security. On the one hand, the country’s traditional commitment to the Adenauerian vision of Germany, and Europe as a whole, maintaining the essential US anchor remains strong; on the other hand, Berlin seems determined at least to explore what some in the German policy community term “strategic autonomy,” manifest in the European Union’s PESCO and other initiatives. As in the British case, the jury on Germany’s role in transatlantic security and its deeper bilateral security relationship with the United States is still out. For the first time since the Cold War, Berlin moved last year to reverse the progressive reductions in the size of the Bundeswehr, with the country again poised to expand its military by adding 20,000 ­soldiers—with the goal being a 200,000-strong army in 2024.15 In 2017 the German government also stood up a new Cyber and Information Space Command (CIR)16 and made a strong commitment to leveraging its partnership with industry, while also seeking closer cooperation on cyber within the alliance. These are important steps, but Germany needs to do more to rebuild its armed forces. While the German public remains polarized over the need to expand the country’s military, overall the government has begun to move to strengthen the armed forces, though some of its critics have questioned the speed of modernization and the level of commitment to defense spending. The larger issue that will impact on US–German relations and determine the extent to which Germany will deepen its security relations with the United States and its role in transatlantic security is how the Germans will come to see their role in Europe. It is precisely because

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Germany’s debate about national power is at an inflection point that Berlin and Washington need to engage in a strategic dialogue about Germany’s contribution to NATO’s capabilities, as well as the larger question of how Germany sees its national security priorities going forward. The issue of how much military capability Germany will bring to NATO is far from settled. A growing number of European analysts see Germany’s strategic choices as tracking increasingly towards a reformed and redefined EU federalist project, with the aforementioned “strategic autonomy” ever more the goal. However, contrary to the prevailing skepticism about Germany’s ability to make a contribution to NATO forces commensurate with the country’s economic might and its population, Berlin will likely continue to adapt its military posture to the rapidly shifting geostrategic landscape around it and beyond. As NATO remains the premier framework for Euro-Atlantic security Germany, a Central European great power faced with the pressure along Europe’s eastern and southern flanks, needs a strong security alliance with the United States. Conversely, for the United States a strong Germany in NATO is essential to transatlantic security. Hence, bringing about a greater alignment of US and German national security policy optics is as essential as it has ever been post-1945 both to ensure Germany’s security and European security writ large. As the main entry point into Europe for US military forces, Germany is essential to all US and NATO planning going forward. Hence, for both larger geostrategic and practical reasons, the US–German bilateral security relationship is central to NATO’s longterm viability and military effectiveness.

Poland Like the United Kingdom, Poland is one of five NATO countries that actually spend 2% of its GDP on national defense. Moreover, it has pledged to reach 2.5% of GDP on defense by 2030—a defense budget that at PLN 80 billion ($21.5 billion) would represent a doubling of its defense spending from current levels.17 Poland aims to provide a land power anchor for NATO’s eastern flank, with Warsaw intending— perhaps overly ambitiously—to increase its armed forces by another 100,000. More importantly from the vantage point of NATO and US strategy, Warsaw’s goal has been to induce Washington to replace the current “persistent rotational presence” of a US brigade combat team

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(BCT) with permanent US bases on Polish territory large enough to house up to a US Army division. Poland’s military modernization plans have been greeted with some criticism both at home and abroad, especially its new Territorial Defense Forces (WOT) concept to create a number of regionally-based infantry brigades, drawn from civilians volunteering for periodic training and exercises. Still, seen from Washington, the commitment demonstrated by the Poles to expand their military capability is an important variable for NATO strategy and planning, especially given how much the Bundeswehr has shrunk over the past decade. Warsaw took an important step in further deepening its relations with the United States when in March 2018 it selected the Patriot surface-to-air missile system for its Wisła AMD system, inking the country’s biggest weapons acquisition deal in its history.18 Poland’s 2017 Concept of Defense of the Republic of Poland seeks to maximize Poland’s ability to defend itself in the event of a Russian attack in order to give NATO forces enough time to assemble and come to the rescue. Although Poland’s military is unlikely to become self-sufficient, Warsaw’s efforts to provide meaningful capabilities which, in a crisis, could buy Washington and its allies time, attest to the importance for NATO’s posture along the eastern flank of a closer strategic partnership between Washington and Warsaw. In a sign that Poland’s goal of having permanent US military presence on its territory might actually have a chance of becoming reality, in late spring 2018 the US Senate Armed Services Committee called upon the “Secretary of Defense to report on the feasibility and advisability of permanently stationing a US Army BCT in Poland.”19

A Way Forward Today the United Kingdom and Poland remain deeply committed to their strategic relationship with the United States, and from that vantage point both London and Warsaw are poised to provide the essential pillars anchoring US European policy in areas that matter: in the case of the UK, the strategic transatlantic dimension of a (once more) growing British naval power; and in the Polish case, through its land power as the largest country on NATO’s eastern flank. As the dominant economic power in Europe sitting at the continent’s geostrategic crossroads, Germany is the indispensable part of the larger strategic design to

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keep NATO and transatlantic security robust going forward. Hence, a lot will depend on Berlin’s willingness to make the requisite investments in defense to become again the essential contributor to NATO’s military capabilities that it was during the Cold War. As threats to US security commitments in Asia grow, these allies’ capabilities will become an important part of Washington’s overall strategic calculus when it comes to the defense of Europe. The message from the Trump administration to the allies has been one of unequivocal insistence on the need to invest in defense and to translate those investments into real usable capabilities. The nascent strategic “European triad” discussed above, if done right, could be an important first step in revitalizing NATO, establishing a solid foundation for US bilateral engagement with Europe which in turn would strengthen NATO and reinforce the overall military capabilities of the alliance. The next step for Washington would be to buttress the triad through enhanced security engagement with the states bracketing the larger NATO space—Norway, France, and Italy—with the latter two being key to NATO’s southern flank (especially as Turkey’s domestic politics remains in flux) and Norway serving as the critical entry point for the High North. The US–UK relationship has been traditionally considered the core of America’s Euro-Atlantic strategy, and in the aftermath of Brexit it will be even more important to the security of the United Kingdom and to the viability of NATO. Going forward, the United States remains the core provider of global security and stability, the principal stakeholder in the liberal international order, and the ultimate guarantor of peace in Europe. However, these established assumptions cannot be taken for granted anymore; instead they need to be endowed with a renewed (and real) sense of shared threat perceptions across the Atlantic, as well as tangible financial commitments. Today there is a growing realization in Washington that the established institutional formulae framing America’s core alliances need to be imbued with new commitments across the alliance, and that NATO needs to be reformed. There is also an urgent need to rebuild NATO’s logistics in order to make the current deterrence by trip wire along the eastern flank into a credible strategic formula. The shockwaves delivered by the election of Donald J. Trump as the country’s 45th President continue to reverberate both at home and abroad. Most importantly, America’s new “Jacksonian moment” means

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that the US administration needs to ensure that the electorate sees the tangible value of alliances and security partnerships. The “principled realism” articulated in the NSS, which puts a premium on real military contributions and seeks to awaken among the allies a new appreciation that US policy going forward means that Washington expects more from the allies than declaratory statements of support. In a departure from the last administration’s approach, the usable military capabilities brought by allies and partners are fast becoming the new prism through which the United States thinks about its core relationships. The arrival of a new US administration presents the United Kingdom both with a challenge and an opportunity to become the key strategic partner of the United States in an era in which state-on-state conflict has once again emerged as the principal strategic consideration. The United Kingdom, together with a Germany that has begun to think seriously about rebuilding its military capability and a Poland committed to continuing to increase its defense spending and ultimately to doubling the size of its military, is poised to become the lynchpin of an emerging strategic triad in Europe. As Washington gears up to confront the surge of threats in Asia, MENA and along the Northeastern flank of NATO, deepening relationships with likeminded European powers is fast becoming the hallmark of America’s new strategic posture. For the United Kingdom, the re-investment in its navy and its power projection capability will remain essential to this new relationship with the United States, for the United Kingdom is uniquely positioned by history and its own national culture to be America’s key partner in maintaining its global commitments, the more so as France assumes an ever-greater role in securing NATO’s southern flank and, together with Italy, dealing with the deepening instability in Africa. The outcome of the current U.K. defense review will go a long way toward demonstrating whether London has fully grasped what the United States expects from its allies and its focus on what likeminded NATO member states should bring to the table. In this context, British naval, cyber and intelligence capabilities are going to be increasingly important to the alliance. As the Trump administration works with Europe’s governments, there are five larger strategic issues that the Europeans should address in order to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and deepen security cooperation with the United States. There needs to be a closer alignment of threat perceptions between the United States and Europe, with a shared

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Euro-Atlantic strategy on Russia, renewed seriousness on defense spending in Europe and an attendant willingness on the part of the European allies to look at military power as an essential part of statecraft as well as a larger awareness in Europe’s capitals that with the global challenges facing the United States, including in Asia, Europe needs to start thinking strategically about what its role would be if the US-China competition should one day lead to an all-out conflict.20 In this context, the Trump administration’s firm stance on burden sharing is not, as some observers have argued, an expression of Washington’s reluctance to assure the Europeans of its commitment to Article 5 and common defense, but rather a long-overdue corrective that in fact should have been agreed upon by NATO decades ago. Hence, if the core issue of Europe’s unequal contributions to allied defense were to be taken seriously on the continent, it could in fact constitute an opportunity to set the alliance aright at a time of considerable flux and deteriorated security environments along Europe’s eastern and southern flanks, as well as globally. The current European defense initiatives, including the CARD, the PESCO, and the EDF, are being greeted with a modicum of support by the US administration, but are unlikely to be seen in Washington as the kind of commitment to common defense the transatlantic community needs. NATO needs to reform but adjusting legacy institutions will only take the alliance so far. It is through enhanced US bilateral relationships with allies, and especially such key historical partners of the United States as the United Kingdom, that the alliance will restore its military capabilities, and with them, its ability to deter—and if need be to defend— against rising threats in the east and south. Today the United Kingdom is uniquely positioned to set the pace of change in NATO by leading on defense modernization in Europe and sending a strong message to Washington that the Europeans remain committed to NATO and to their core security relationship with the United States.

Notes

1. See Andrew A. Michta, “Re-anchoring NATO: The US Needs to Boost Bilateral Relations in Europe,” The American Interest, 12 February 2018. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/12/us-needs-boostbilateral-relationships-europe/.

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2. National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed 18 February 2018. 3. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https:// www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Accessed 21 February 2018. 4. For my initial assessment of the opportunity for NATO to leverage the change of US administration see Andrew A. Michta, A Common Threat Assessment for NATO? Carnegie Strategic Europe, 16 February 2017. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68017. Accessed 22 March 2018. 5. Secretary of Defense Speech: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, National Defense University, Washington, DC, Tuesday, 23 February 2010. http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423. Accessed 11 May 2018. 6. Ash Carter, Remarks at Atlantik Brücke: “US, Germany, & NATO Are Moving Forward Together,” Berlin, Germany, 22 June 2015. https:// www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606684/ remarks-at-atlantik-brcke-us-germany-nato-are-moving-forward-together/. Accessed 18 March 2018. 7.  “Britain Reasserts Itself as a Serious Military Power,” The Economist, 24 November 2015. 8. Paul Cornish, U.K. Hard Power: Strategic Ambivalence (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute, July 2014), p. 2. 9. “Reality Check: Is the UK Spending 2% of GDP on Defence?” BBC News, 14 February 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38971624. Accessed 14 March 2018. 10. Noel Dempsey, UK Defence Expenditure: Briefing Paper Number CPB 8175. London: House of Commons Library, 22 February 2018, p. 3. 11. See John Louth, The UK Modernising Defence Programme: “Get with the Programme’,” RUSI, 16 February 2018. https://rusi.org/commentary/ uk-modernising-defence-programme-‘get-programme’. Accessed 19 May 2018. 12. “Second Aircraft Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Named by Duchess of Rothesay,” BBC News, 8 September 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/ uk-scotland-41172440. Accessed 8 May 2018. 13. Corporate Report: National Security Capability Review (NSCR), 28 March 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-capability-review-nscr. Accessed 3 May 2018. 14.  Guy Chazan, “Germany to Miss Nato Defence Spending Pledge,” The Financial Times, 27 April 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/ 542495ae-4a28-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb. Accessed 3 May 2018.

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15. “Germany to Expand Bundeswehr to Almost 200,000 Troops,” Deutsche Welle, 21 February 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-expandbundeswehr-to-almost-200000-troops/a-37655018. Accessed 11 March 2018. 16. “German Army Launches New Cyber Command,” Deutsche Welle, 1 April 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/german-army-launches-new-cyber-command/a-38246517. Accessed 16 April 2018. 17. Lidia Kelly, “Poland Plans Trump-Era Defense Spending Splurge, Critics Say ‘Unrealistic’,” Reuters, 16 June 2017. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-nato-poland-defence/poland-plans-trump-era-defensespending-splurge-critics-say-unrealistic-idUSKBN1970Y6. Accessed 20 December 2017. 18. “Poland Signs $4.75bn Deal to Buy US Patriot Missiles,” BBC News, 28 March 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43574308. Accessed 3 April 2018. 19.  “John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,” United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 24 May 2018. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY19%20 NDAA%20Summary.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2018. 20. The concept of Europe’s five strategic priorities while working with the United States were first developed in my article “Five Priorities for Europe’s Transatlantic Strategy,” The American Interest, 22 September 2017. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/09/22/five-prioritieseuropes-transatlantic-strategy/.

Andrew A. Michta is the Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US Government.

CHAPTER 4

‘You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore’: Anglo-American Security Relations in the Era of Brexit and Trump Jeffrey H. Michaels

In a July 2017 interview with The Wall Street Journal, President Donald J. Trump uttered the words ‘you don’t hear the word Britain anymore’. As the interview transcript demonstrates, Trump was making a rather random semantic reference to mainstream use of the term ‘UK’ as opposed to ‘Britain’.1 Nevertheless, Trump’s words were repeated in a number of subsequent headlines in the British press and mockingly used to characterize the current state of US–UK relations in the era of Brexit and Trump. As one article in The Guardian put it: ‘Brexitbesieged Downing Street will presumably be hoping that Trump meant that the term “Britain” has lost out to “the UK” in common usage, rather than that the country itself has fallen into obscurity’.2 Despite the jesting quality of much of the commentary, a fundamental concern of British policymakers was highlighted, namely that Brexit had significantly reduced Britain’s ability to be a meaningful ally of the United States. On the other hand, it also reflected a related problem. Whilst Brexit had the J. H. Michaels (*)  King’s College, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_4

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effect of hampering Britain’s relations with its European partners, which it was widely assumed would naturally oblige London to ‘double down’ on its relations with Washington, this was likely to be more problematic than might otherwise be the case due to the unusual character of the Trump presidency. British concerns about the state of the US–UK ‘special relationship’, which are typically linked with Britain’s perceived position in the global hierarchy of influential states, are longstanding. Particularly since the end of World War II, they have been a regular feature of political debate, press commentary and academic enquiry.3 At numerous points the ‘special relationship’ has been declared ‘dead’ or ‘dying’, or in some cases, ‘revived’.4 Yet regardless of these diagnoses, the continued official use of the term ‘special relationship’ by both the British and American governments has remained a constant. In this sense, one can debate the degree of ‘specialness’ but cannot argue with the fact that the terminology continues to be important enough for officials in both countries not to alter it. Beyond this, attempting to ‘take the temperature’ of US–UK relations at any given moment in time, specifically in the field of security policy, has usually relied on an examination of random variables in isolation of one another.5 It is a rarity to find any academic study of the relationship that examines these variables simultaneously. Furthermore, it is essentially impossible to locate any study that attempts to offer a theoretical framework that can provide a more meaningful evaluation of the topic— ideally one that identifies the relevant variables to examine, provides appropriate historical background, and places this within a broader context of pertinent external issues that impact on the relationship, as well as comparing it with other forms of analyzing and characterizing interstate relations. For example, whereas it is relatively simple to identify two countries as ‘allies’ or ‘enemies’—ostensibly polar opposites—such characterizations obscure the degree to which the two countries agree on every issue or disagree on every issue, versus agree with some and disagree with others. In the case of US–UK relations, the historical record clearly highlights any number of instances where there have been agreements and disagreements at different levels simultaneously, for instance, where the leaders dislike each other yet bureaucratic relationships remain warm. How then to make sense of this? Although the ambition of this chapter is not to offer a comprehensive remedy to these shortcomings in the field of ‘special relationship’ studies, it is crucial to draw attention to

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them, as well as attempt to offer some potential insights that scholars and laypersons investigating this topic may find useful. Just as there have been numerous upheavals in the past decades both in international relations as well as in the domestic political situations of each country that have had an impact on bilateral security relations, the more recent ‘crises’ of the British vote to leave the European Union and the election of Trump, both occurring within a short space of time, would not only seem to require some analysis as a matter of course, but such an examination also provides an opportunity to showcase the necessity for a more rigorous approach to evaluating the ‘special relationship’. This chapter takes as its starting point the speculation of numerous commentators prior to the Brexit vote that leaving the EU would have a negative impact on the ‘special relationship’. In the aftermath of the vote, and looking ahead from the vantage point of 2018, the conclusion that British influence vis-à-vis the United States will decline might well be valid, but as argued here, assigning causation wholly to Brexit is insufficient and misguided, mainly for three reasons. In the first place, one needs to make a distinction between the expectations prior to Brexit about what this process would entail versus the reality after the Brexit vote with respect to the impact of the process on the UK Government, specifically its ability or inability to deal with the consequences, including the need to rethink many aspects and priorities of the country’s foreign policy. Also, with the election of Trump the context for discussing US–UK security relations has shifted considerably relative to discussing relations while Obama remained president, or to offer a counterfactual example, had Hillary Clinton been elected president. Finally, any analysis of the ‘current state’ of the relationship cannot ignore longer term trends, or at least developments that transcend the tenure in office of a political leader, especially those that are directly relevant to ties at the bureaucratic level, nor can one avoid addressing other external issues, such as shifts in the international system as well as the evolving character of security threats. As the following analysis will highlight, a holistic approach is essential. The question this chapter addresses is: Has any ‘meaningful change’ in the US–UK relationship actually occurred since the advent of Brexit and Trump? To answer this question necessitates defining what is meant by ‘meaningful change’ in this context. Though a subjective term, ‘meaningful change’ refers here to important shifts that occur within each of three areas: symbolism, leadership interactions, and bureaucratic ties.

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If radical shifts can be identified at all three levels, this would of course offer the most compelling evidence of ‘meaningful change’, whereas if a shift occurs only at one level this would not constitute meaningful change. More specifically, to take the subject of symbolism as an example, were US officials to stop referring to a ‘special relationship’, replacing it with some other term denoting a decline in status, this would constitute an important shift. And if this were combined with a deterioration in the personal relations between the US President and British Prime Minister, as well as a breakdown of bureaucratic ties, then the sum total of these shifts would constitute ‘meaningful change’. By contrast, if there was a poor personal relationship between the two leaders whilst the symbolism and bureaucratic ties remained static then it would be difficult to claim that any ‘meaningful change’ had occurred. This approach, though not very sophisticated, will hopefully still provide sufficient insight for our purposes here. Therefore to answer the question posed above, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the pre-Brexit preferences and assumptions of political leaders and commentators about the impact Brexit was likely to have on the ‘special relationship’. Next, recent developments in the symbolism and official terminology associated with the ‘special relationship’ will be analyzed for evidence of continuity versus change. The third section will examine the relevant views and personal interactions of President Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May. Finally, the more long-standing bureaucratic relationships will be highlighted and contrasted with the day-to-day priorities of the leadership. The chapter concludes that no meaningful changes in the ‘special relationship’ can be observed, and, ‘ceteris paribus’, nor are any imminent.

Pre-Brexit Preferences and Assumptions When seeking to establish the extent of continuity versus change in the ‘special relationship’ due to Brexit, especially the negative consequences that would result from it, a useful starting point is to examine the preBrexit vote assumptions of policymakers and analysts.6 It is also necessary to account for the differing positions of supporters and opponents of Brexit in both the UK and US. Generally speaking, the position of Brexit supporters was that the impact to US–UK relations would either be beneficial or not meaningfully different, on the assumption that Britain would be more prosperous, whereas opponents argued that Brexit would

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damage the ‘special relationship’. As the purpose of this chapter is to focus on the consequences of Brexit, the arguments of ‘leavers’ are therefore less important than those of ‘remainers’, and will receive less attention here. Brexit opponents made several arguments about why US–UK relations would be undermined. Firstly, they argued Brexit would reduce British influence in European affairs and diminish Britain’s status as a world power. Thus, any net loss in power and prestige would automatically reduce the UK’s standing in Washington. More generally, opponents on both sides of the Atlantic warned that Brexit would lead to a weakening of the international ‘liberal order’, and that given the strains it was already facing due to so many other pressures (the rise of China, the re-emergence of the Russia threat, ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and so forth), it was important not to ‘rock the boat’ further. Another argument was that without Britain in the EU, it would be unable to use its influence to ensure that it did not become a serious competitor to NATO. What is notable about these arguments is that, on the one hand they are abstract, and on the other hand, they do not suggest that the consequences of Brexit would go so far as to lead to the collapse of the ‘special relationship’. They are abstract in the sense that Brexit would contribute to making existing negative international trends that much worse albeit the degree to which it would have any meaningful impact would be difficult to gauge. Similarly, references to a loss in power and prestige have often been discussed in relation to any number of other issues, particularly defence cuts. And yet, just as UK defence spending has declined, more or less steadily since the end of World War II, the crucial question not discussed is: at what point would Britain lose enough power and prestige to deliver a ‘fatal blow’ to the ‘special relationship’? Of course, as this point has never been reached it is difficult to say. Yet it is precisely because this is unknown that claims about the negative impact of a specific policy decision, series of decisions, or general trend, should be treated with some circumspection. Under the Obama administration, the US policy preference was for Britain to remain in the EU. At one point Obama actually weighed into the pre-vote debate by stating that Britain would be at ‘the back of the queue’ with respect to a post-Brexit trade deal with the US.7 Hillary Clinton also indicated her opposition to Brexit.8 In stark contrast, Trump was highly supportive of Brexit, saying that Britain would be

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‘better off’.9 In theory, in the aftermath of the referendum, a US leadership that had previously opposed Brexit was more likely to maintain a negative outlook when dealing with the UK than a leadership that supported Brexit. Alternatively, had the Brexit referendum resulted in a vote to remain in the EU, but with Trump still being elected, this too might have undermined relations, in theory. These two counterfactuals help put the actual developments and their implications for US–UK relations into some perspective. Not only was the referendum decided in favour of Brexit, but only months later, the pro-Brexit Trump was elected. Again, in theory, this development might suggest US policy would take a more favourable turn with respect to the UK. As will be shown, two factors ensured that practice would differ somewhat from the theory. First, the Obama administration’s reaction to the Brexit vote was to provide reassurances that the ‘special relationship’ would be maintained rather than undermined. Second, Trump’s election had its own consequences for the ‘special relationship’ that have since probably overshadowed any Brexitrelated impact.

Symbolism On the surface, the symbols and terminology associated with the ‘special relationship’ would seem to have little direct relevance to US–UK security relations. However, if there is one aspect of the relationship that has remained both consistent since the end of World War II, and probably the most studied for evidence of change, it is this one. Given that fear of a decline in the relationship has often motivated British policymakers to compensate by accommodating American preferences, the symbolism and terminology constitute an important, if not the most important, structural variable (as opposed to common threat perceptions that are typically transitory anyway) motivating particular security-related actions. Leaving aside the fact that the US considers many of its other bilateral relationships as being ‘special’, including its ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Canada, Australia, and so forth, in none of these other relationships has the discursive emphasis on the term ‘special’ played such an important role. From the US perspective, the term ‘special relationship’ has long been recognized as probably the most important structural issue governing its relations with the United Kingdom and an instrumental necessity. Put another way, US policymakers appreciate that to abandon the

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term would have a negative effect on relations with the UK, and that especially in times where British collaboration is sought, that it is necessary to ‘play up’ both the terminology as well as the shared heritage in order to secure London’s support. One Obama administration political appointee attached to the State Department noted that the ‘special relationship’ was considered a ‘joke’ and yet official use of the term could not be abandoned.10 On the other hand, when US policymakers intend to signal their displeasure with the UK, whether to punish or motivate British behaviour, reference is typically invoked to the damage an action or lack of action will do to the ‘special relationship’. From the American side, officials have recognized they need to be careful not to push this too far. As the US Embassy in London noted in a 2009 cable back to Washington, ‘in the long run it is not in US interests to have the UK public concluding the relationship is weakening, on either side. The UK’s commitment of resources—financial, military, diplomatic—in support of US global priorities remains unparalleled’.11 Nevertheless, there have been some attempts by British policymakers to abandon the terminology.12 One of the most prominent examples of this in recent years was the 2010 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on US–UK relations which recommended that: use of the phrase ‘the special relationship’ in its historical sense, to describe the totality of the ever-evolving UKUS relationship, is potentially misleading, and we recommend that its use should be avoided. The overuse of the phrase by some politicians and many in the media serves simultaneously to de-value its meaning and to raise unrealistic expectations about the benefits the relationship can deliver to the UK.13

This recommendation received a great deal of scrutiny in the UK media, and as with earlier attempts to alter the terminology, it was unsuccessful in doing so.14 Similarly, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said in a January 2018 interview that he banned himself from using the phrase ‘special relationship’ because it sounds ‘a bit needy’.15 Nevertheless, apart from any personal ban on the phrase, it continued in circulation among British officials. Despite Obama’s opposition to Brexit, his first official response to the vote was to state: ‘we respect their decision. The special relationship … is enduring’.16 That Obama should make this reference is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it reflected the American preference for continuity as

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opposed to change in the relationship. Second, when placed in the context of Obama’s previous chequered history with the terminology and symbolism of US–UK relations, the referendum might have provided an opportunity to redefine it to reflect the loss of power and prestige that Britain was expected to suffer as a result. Instead, Obama chose to pass up this opportunity. When Obama came into office in 2009 there was a great deal of speculation that he would seek to downgrade the ‘special relationship’.17 His press secretary, Robert Gibbs, referred to a ‘special partnership’, leading one commentator to warn that in London ‘a quiet fear is calcifying’.18 According to another observer, use of the term ‘partner’ was a deliberate choice that was meant to signal Obama’s distinctive approach to foreign policy. Whereas Obama was a ‘transactional leader’, concerned with what benefits would derive from a foreign relationship, thereby preferring the term ‘partnership’, with its connotations of a business arrangement, he rejected the term ‘relationship’ as this implied a ‘marriage’ that survives ‘through thick and thin’. Evidence of the extent of British anxiety, and the concerns expressed by US officials about the negative implications of this anxiety, can be found in the cable referred to earlier that was drafted less than two months after Obama’s inauguration. The cable noted there had been: a stronger than usual outbreak of British political and media anxiety about the future of US-UK relations … debate … is louder than at any time since the fallout from the ‘passport-gate’ affair sent shivers through the UK chattering classes about the relationship between newly-elected President Clinton and Prime Minister John Major … This over-reading would often be humorous, if it were not so corrosive.19

This ‘over-reading’ was attributed to a community of commentators on, and analysts of, US–UK relations, both inside and outside government— a community that I have termed the ‘special relationship watchers’. Akin to Kremlinologists, these ‘watchers’ closely observe changes to the terminology and symbolism for signs of Washington’s approval or disapproval. To cite an example from this cable: Fears about the end of the special relationship were further fuelled by British over-reading of the new Administration’s initial statements. More than one HMG senior official asked embassy officers whether President

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Obama meant to signal in his inaugural address about US-UK relations by quoting Washington during the Revolutionary War, while the removal of the Churchill bust from the Oval Office consumed much UK newsprint … Secretary Clinton’s statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was similarly parsed and much was made of the fact that the UK was fourth in a recitation of US allies (and it was particularly painful to those British tea readers that Germany and France were named first).20

The fear that Britain was losing out in American affections to Germany and France has been an important theme in the UK discourse about the health of the ‘special relationship’. For example, Obama developed close links with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. And though Trump has had a more adversarial relationship with Merkel, his relationship with Emmanuel Macron has been relatively close. For instance, during the April 2018 US–UK–French missile strikes on Syria, France was seen to have upstaged Britain by firing more missiles, attributed in large part to the ‘bromance’ between Trump and Macron.21 Moreover, whereas Trump visited Paris to attend the 2017 Bastille Day ceremony, as well as visited several other European countries, he did not make a visit to Britain in his first year as president. Obama, by contrast, made Britain his first European stop, and Prime Minister Gordon Brown was ‘the first European leader to speak with the new President following his inauguration’, a fact that was released to the British press as it was perceived as significant for reasons of national pride and no doubt to compensate for the fact that it was the Japanese prime minister who was the first foreign leader to be invited to Obama’s White House.22 Regardless of any possible intention to downgrade the ‘special relationship’ to a ‘special partnership’, Obama remained faithful to the former term. Shortly after the inauguration, during Obama’s January 26, 2009 phone call with Brown, the new president mentioned looking ‘forward to continuing and strengthening the special relationship’. In the course of his two terms as president, in which he dealt with prime ministers Brown, David Cameron, and briefly with Theresa May, Obama made repeated public references to the ‘special relationship’. For instance, when Brown visited Washington in March 2009, Obama responded to reports of his downgrading US–UK ties by stating: ‘the special relationship … is one that is not just important to me, it’s important to the American people … So I think this notion that somehow there is any lessening of that special relationship is misguided’.23

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A month later in London he added, ‘The United States and the UK have stood together through thick and thin, war and peace, through hard times and prosperity, and we’ve always emerged stronger by standing together. So I’m pleased that my first meeting overseas as President is with Gordon Brown’.24 A year later when Cameron replaced Brown, Obama co-authored an op-ed in which they stated, ‘Ours is not just a special relationship, it is an essential relationship’. Even after the Brexit vote, both Obama and other administration officials continued to publicly emphasize the importance of the ‘special relationship’ to the US. Notably, US Defense Secretary Ash Carter stated: ‘even with all the change in the world, the inherent logic of our countries’ special relationship still stands. That was true the day before the Brexit vote and it’s true today after the Brexit vote’.25 Since his January 2017 inauguration, Trump has also made repeated references to the ‘special relationship’. Among the most notable of these were his January 2018 comments at a press conference in Davos when he stated: ‘we are very much joined at the hip when it comes to the military. We have the same ideas, the same ideals, and there’s nothing that would happen to you that we won’t be there to fight for you’.26 Indeed, even as president-elect, in a post-election phone call with Theresa May on November 10, 2016, they agreed that the US–UK relationship was very important and very special and Trump said he was ‘confident the “special relationship” would go from strength to strength’. May was also the first foreign leader to be invited to the White House. On the other hand, the November phone call with May followed Trump’s calls with the leaders of nine other countries (India, Japan, Australia, Egypt, South Korea, Ireland, Mexico, Israel and Turkey). As president-elect, Trump met with numerous foreign leaders, including the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and also met with former UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage, later tweeting that he would make a great UK ambassador to the US.27 As for the fate of the bust of Winston Churchill, Obama’s decision to remove it from the Oval Office and replace it with Martin Luther King Jr. created a great deal of controversy both in the British and American media. Eight years later, one of Trump’s first actions upon being inaugurated, reportedly at the behest of Farage, was to replace the bust of King with that of Churchill, an act that was widely interpreted as a signal that the new administration intended to strengthen US–UK ties.28

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Political Interactions Since World War II the image of British prime ministers and American presidents standing side-by-side has been a central one in the mythology of the ‘special relationship’. The most well-known of these images are the relationships between Churchill and Roosevelt, Macmillan and Kennedy, Thatcher and Reagan, and Blair and Bush. In their dealings with one another, contemporary British and American leaders will often make reference to this mythology denoting the close ties the two countries have historically enjoyed. For instance, Theresa May, prior to her first meeting with Donald Trump in January 2017, gave a speech in Philadelphia to leaders of the Republican Party. In the course of her remarks, she made five references to Ronald Reagan and four to Winston Churchill.29 In addition, Trump reportedly referred to May as ‘my Maggie’, and after watching the film The Darkest Hour, told her ‘You could be this generation’s Churchill’.30 That these sorts of references to the ‘high points’ of the ‘special relationship’ are invoked is unsurprising, but can be quite misleading. Beyond the relationships noted above, there were many other relationships that have received much less notice, including ones that have been known for their disagreeable aspects, such as Eisenhower and Eden, Nixon and Heath, Clinton and Major, and Brown and Bush.31 Regardless whether the relationships are generally viewed as positive or negative, a more historically accurate description would be to say these relationships were ‘mixed’. Roosevelt and Churchill had numerous disagreements as did Reagan and Thatcher. In none of these cases did relations between a Prime Minister and President deteriorate to the point where the ‘special relationship’ was fundamentally at risk. From a British perspective, perhaps the worst moment in Anglo-American relations was Eisenhower’s opposition to Eden’s Suez ‘adventure’ in 1956. Yet even during this tense period there was no suggestion that the close US–UK security ties would be completely ­undermined—among other things, despite the disagreement over Suez there remained a common approach to dealing with the Soviet threat that neither side was willing to abandon. This mixed record of British and American leadership interactions is important to keep in mind when attempting to evaluate these relationships in the post-Brexit period. The main focus of this section will therefore be on the Trump-May relationship rather than on Obama-Cameron or Obama-May as the former had existed since 2010 and the latter

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existed only for a matter of months before Obama left office. Perhaps more importantly, as there is a widespread recognition, including by leading political scientists, that Trump represents an ‘outlier’ president, this is a more useful case to study when seeking to determine continuity versus change.32 Building bridges with the new president was a key priority for May. As the UK Ambassador in Washington, Sir Kim Darroch, wrote in a memo, ‘The president-elect is above all an outsider and unknown quantity, whose campaign pronouncements may reveal his instincts, but will surely evolve and, particularly, be open to outside influence if itched right’.33 Weeks later, in an opinion piece published in the Washington Post, Darroch claimed: ‘In their phone calls so far, Trump and British Prime Minister Theresa May have made clear that the special relationship between Britain and the United States is stronger than ever. They will work together closely, building on the legacy of previous leaders such as President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’.34 One month afterwards, in her Philadelphia speech, May told Republican leaders, ‘as you renew your nation just as we renew ours—we have the opportunity—indeed the responsibility—to renew the special relationship for this new age’.35 The shift from previously anti-Trump rhetoric was immediately noticeable. For instance, Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, who had once referred to Trump as ‘clearly out of his mind’, quickly shifted to making praiseworthy remarks about the new president. Arguably May’s most important effort to strengthen relations with Trump was to offer him a state visit in the summer 2017. This decision was unusual as it broke the normal convention of waiting until a president’s second term before issuing an invitation. It also quickly turned into a public relations fiasco. Details of Trump’s demand for a grander state visit than had previously been arranged for a US president included golf at Balmoral with the Queen, a dinner at Blenheim palace, an address to both houses of parliament, and tea at Buckingham palace. The prospect of the visit provoked a number of calls for it to be cancelled and raised the prospect of large-scale protests. In reaction to this, Trump reportedly told May ‘When I know I’m going to get a better reception, I’ll come and not before’.36 Shortly thereafter, the state visit was postponed until the autumn and later downgraded to a ‘working visit’ in 2018.37 Trump would later avoid travelling to Britain on the occasion of the opening of the new US Embassy in London.38

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Like his position on so many other topics, Trump’s views of Britain range from his embracing it in general, to embracing its political right in particular, to making negative references about it that would have been unthinkable with any other president. His affinity for Britain appears to stem from his Scottish mother. As he stated in his first press conference with May, ‘my mother was born in Scotland, Stornoway, which is serious Scotland’. In a separate interview he said, ‘I love Britain. My mother was crazy about the Queen’.39 Trump maintained especially close links with the political right, most notably with Farage and has made numerous statements in support of Brexit, which he described as a ‘wonderful thing’.40 In November 2017, Trump went so far as to re-tweet anti-Muslim videos posted by the far right ‘Britain First’.41 This action drew a rebuke from May and threatened to further derail his visit to the UK.42 Earlier in his administration, Trump failed to publicly deny claims that Britain’s signals intelligence service, GCHQ, had wiretapped Trump Tower at the request of the Obama administration, despite being denied by US officials. It is important to note that it is precisely because of his ‘nonestablishment’ views on so many issues, as well as the atypical nature of the Trump presidency, that the British Government will hold similar views to those of the US bureaucracy, as well as large parts of the administration, but because of Trump’s personality, he will reject any views he disagrees with. This is reflected in two of the UK’s most important security priorities (not including other issues such as Trump’s travel ban and climate change) in 2017: strengthening NATO and retaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. May first discussed NATO with Trump in a November 29, 2016 phone call with him. The importance of this issue reflected concerns that Trump’s public disparagement of the Alliance during the election campaign indicated he intended to reduce the American commitment to it—a position that ran contrary not only to UK policy but also to mainstream American preferences. During her January 2017 visit to the White House, May stated that Trump had told her he was ‘100% behind NATO’ and that they were ‘united in our recognition of NATO as the bulwark of our collective defense’.43 This statement seemed to ring hollow months later when Trump delivered a speech at NATO HQ in which he deliberately failed to reiterate the American commitment to Article 5—despite his advisers placing this in his speech. In a later visit to Warsaw, Trump reversed his position and stated that the US would ‘stand firmly behind Article 5’.44

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The second major issue was Trump’s opposition to the Iran nuclear deal and his decision in October 2017 not to recertify it. During the election campaign he claimed on numerous occasions that the JCPOA was ‘the worst deal in the world’, although he was unclear whether he intended to unilaterally withdraw from the deal or attempt to renegotiate its terms.45 Trump’s decision to decertify the deal came after significant lobbying by British officials, most notably by Darroch, in support of the JCPOA.46 Only weeks earlier when they met in New York, Trump and May had devoted nearly half their discussion to Iran, and she also later used a phone call to convince him to recertify the JCPOA. Given that Trump’s own Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, had already stated publicly that Iran was in compliance with the terms of the agreement, it is probably unfair to claim Trump’s decision to decertify the deal demonstrated a decline in US–UK relations. When Trump’s own political appointees and bureaucracy were unable to influence the president’s decisions, one cannot expect a foreign government to be able to have more success—after all, the friendship of two countries, and specifically its leaders, has never been a guarantee of influence.47 In any event, following Trump’s decision, British officials switched their lobbying efforts on this issue away from the White House towards trying to persuade members of Congress to uphold the JCPOA.48

Bureaucratic Ties Amidst high points and low points in the relations between presidents and prime ministers, the close bureaucratic ties between the US and UK in the security field have remained a constant and have often been described as the substructure of the ‘special relationship’.49 Baylis and Wirtz describe this aspect of the relationship by referring to the ‘myriad bilateral committees, working groups, and liaison officers who coordinate common approaches to policy, procurement, research and development, and operations across an array of issues and programs’.50 And as one ‘senior MP’ explained to an American embassy official in 2009 in reaction to press coverage that called into question the future of the ‘special relationship’, ‘the people who really matter in all this, those who do the serious business, know that where it matters—over defence, security issues, intelligence-sharing—the relationship is deep, ongoing and abiding’.51 Precisely because of the permanency that characterizes bureaucratic relationships, they tend not to be affected by the day-to-day crises

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of international politics. To the extent significant change can be identified this usually occurs over the long term or in reaction to a major crisis. For our purposes here, Brexit and Trump’s election will be considered ‘major crises’, to be considered alongside several longer-term trends. In terms of the latter, there have been a number of trends that have affected US–UK bureaucratic ties, or at least the perception of these ties. Some of these emanate from developments in American priorities, others from shifting British priorities. For example, in the aftermath of the 2011 announcement of an American ‘pivot’ to Asia, there were increasing concerns that the US would de-emphasize its interest in European security affairs and downgrade its bureaucratic relationships with its European allies, to include the UK. These concerns were almost certainly overblown, especially given the lack of any major shifts in US defence commitments that might otherwise be associated with a ‘pivot’, or as later re-labelled, a ‘rebalancing’ to Asia. Moreover, the re-emergence of Russia as the ‘top threat’ following the 2014 Crimea annexation has had the effect of raising the profile of European security issues within Washington, to include increasing US military interaction with European allies.52 Two additional trends often discussed in relation to bilateral defence ties are the decline in UK military capabilities and the growing perception of an unwillingness to employ them. Both of these trends require some qualification. With respect to military capabilities, often referred to in the same breath as budget cuts, this has been an ongoing problem since the end of World War II, with American officials regularly complaining. To take one example, British defence cuts in the 1970s were strongly opposed by Washington—yet despite this opposition, cuts still occurred, the British military continued to provide significant military support to the US, and as close ties have existed in the decades since, clearly there was no permanent effect on the relationship.53 The same phenomenon is also observable in relation to American complaints about the quality of British military performance during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.54 Despite the relatively high level of British ­commitment—in both cases the UK provided the most military forces of any US ally—US officials were highly critical on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, there has been little interest on the part of the US or the UK to weaken these links. On the contrary, the American position has been to strengthen defence ties by putting pressure on the British government not to cut defence expenditure and to continue to request

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British military participation in ongoing operations. In November 2017, for instance, the head of US Army Europe, General Ben Hodges, publicly warned about the consequences of further defence cuts. In his words, if the UK was unable to ‘maintain and sustain the level of commitments it’s fulfilling right now, then I think it risks kind of going into a different sort of category’.55 What Hodges meant by ‘a different sort of category’ is unclear, but perhaps the most useful analogy might be the defence relationships the US maintains with Australia and Canada, both of whom possess considerably smaller defence establishments than the UK, yet have nonetheless retained close ties with the American military. The second trend relates to the unwillingness of Britain to continue to offer support to US military operations. This concern is typified by the Cameron government’s inability in 2013 to secure parliamentary approval for air strikes against Syria. Subsequent British military operations against the Islamic State, as well as the Assad regime in Syria, combined with its post-2014 deployments on NATO’s ‘eastern flank’, may have ameliorated this concern somewhat, although references to the 2013 analogy continue to be made. Since the Brexit vote and the election of Trump, there has been little immediate effect on military capabilities or the willingness to use them. Most discussion of the impact of Brexit on capabilities is limited to reduced UK defence expenditure due to lower tax revenue associated with a post-Brexit poor economic climate, the need for the UK Government to divert funds to pay a Brexit fee, and the poor exchange rate for Sterling.56 As of 2018, the implications of Brexit for defence expenditure remain speculative, with some reductions almost certain but no expectation of drastic cuts. A second Brexit-related impact has to do with the willingness to pursue additional military interventions in the immediate future. This impact is related to the so-called ‘bandwidth’ problem—i.e. with the UK Government so preoccupied by Brexit there is little interest in taking on any major new commitments. As for the impact of Trump, this has less to do with effects on military capabilities and more to do with other countries, including the UK, being willing to enter into military interventions alongside the United States during his presidency. This is perhaps best analogized to the ‘toxic’ effect of the Bush presidency. However, this concern requires contextualization. Even with the unpopularity of the Iraq war, many countries still contributed to US-led operations elsewhere, especially in Afghanistan, and following the fall of Baghdad, in Iraq itself. By contrast, not even the more

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‘acceptable’ Obama presidency was sufficient to persuade British policymakers to intervene in Syria in 2013. Additional bureaucratic ties that are relevant to this discussion are those having to do with intelligence and nuclear cooperation. The trend for the former, though difficult to gauge, is probably one of increasing cooperation rather than decreasing. Several arguments can be made to support this claim. In the first instance, as a result of the ‘war on terror’, intelligence relations grew ‘exponentially’.57 This is probably also reflected in the post-9/11 trend to increase funding for the intelligence services in both countries. Apart from the ever-present ‘terrorism’ threat, the re-emergence of Russia combined with growing fears of ‘cyber attacks’, is almost certain to result in continued high levels of intelligence expenditures as well as close intelligence ties. Historically, US–UK intelligence ties have remained close despite numerous scandals, ranging from the ‘Cambridge Five’ to the controversies surrounding the CIA’s rendition programme to the revelations of Edward Snowden. To the extent relations have been disrupted, these have been partial and short-term disruptions.58 As for nuclear cooperation, the British Government’s decision to renew Trident and the US Government’s decision to modernize its nuclear forces over the next 30 years has effectively confirmed further cooperation for the next generation. The only possible disruption to this might result from a Scottish independence vote combined with a decision to force UK nuclear submarines to leave their Scottish bases.59 Finally, judging by the rhetoric of senior British and American officials, bureaucratic ties have not been undermined by the ‘twin crises’ of Brexit and Trump. The following examples are worth citing as evidence of this. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told American Embassy staff in London that the ‘special relationship is ‘as special today as it has ever been. The ties between our two countries are very, very close … across all the really critical issues that we’re dealing with today, the UK and the leadership here have been just terrific for us’.60 US Defense Secretary James Mattis has made similarly positive comments. For instance, he has referred to Britain as an example to other states and emphasized that its ‘global leadership is needed today as much as at any time in history’.61 In a separate statement he said ‘The UK and US maintain an unmatched, enduring special relationship that is not an artificial or historical artefact. In fact, it’s a pathway for our future’.62 Mattis also referred to the British armed forces as ‘a treasure – a national treasure to the UK, but one we respect greatly’.63 British officials have reciprocated in their

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public statements. British Defence Secretary Michael Fallon stated, ‘Our defence relationship … is unprecedented in its depth and scope’ and referred to the UK policy of ‘enhancing our cooperation and investing more in our joint F-35 fast jet programme’.64 Fallon also addressed the impact of Brexit, stating that ‘we see Brexit as an opportunity not to step back from European defence but to step up to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security. In particular, we’re bolstering our bonds with NATO’.65 These and countless other examples of US and British officials praising US– UK defence relations during the post-Brexit vote period can be cited, whereas those that are critical of these relations are few and far between. Therefore, at least at the level of official rhetoric, no discernible negative impact on US–UK security ties can be observed—indeed if the rhetoric is reflective of actual policy then these ties may grow closer rather than moving further apart.

Conclusion In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the doyen of strategic studies in Britain, Sir Michael Howard, was asked in an interview about its effect on US–UK relations. He replied: ‘Ah, the special relationship … It was a necessary myth, a bit like Christianity. But now where do we go?’.66 As this chapter has argued, the answer to this question is: not much further beyond where we’ve always been. Having examined three central aspects of the US–UK ‘special relationship’—symbolism, political interactions and bureaucratic ties—set these within the context of the preBrexit assumptions about the impact of a Brexit vote on the relationship, and also accounted for the other most (if not more) significant political event, namely the election of Trump, this chapter concludes that no ‘meaningful change’ is observable. In each of the three categories it was possible to find evidence of both a strengthening and weakening of bilateral ties, yet there were no important shifts that stood out either individually much less collectively. This is not to suggest that the ‘special relationship’ won’t be abandoned at some future date, but instead to make the point that should this happen then Brexit will likely be one of a large number of underlying factors rather than an immediate cause. That being said, even if considered in isolation, it is almost certainly too early to tell how Brexit will affect US–UK security relations in the future because as of 2018, Britain remains a member of the EU.

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Assuming the break proceeds in 2019, or at some point thereafter, then Britain’s future is likely to follow one of three paths: decline, prosperity, or no major change. From an American perspective, the ideal would be for Britain to emerge from Brexit more prosperous and therefore able to make a greater security contribution. Even if unlikely, at least in the immediate term, this possibility cannot automatically be excluded. At the other end of the spectrum, Brexit could herald a significant British decline, with the UK having fewer and fewer resources to dedicate to a global policy, and therefore it would be a much less valuable ally. Unfortunately, it is difficult to speculate the extent of this decline. Would it, for instance, mean that Britain still dedicates more resources to defence and intelligence than other US allies, such as Australia and Canada, and therefore still maintains its primus inter pares position ­relative to other US allies within the ‘five eyes’ community, and with it, a legitimate claim of ‘specialness’? Without wishing to speculate too far, it is merely worth re-iterating that as of this writing, Britain is still in the early stages of Brexit. In the longer term, the impact on the ‘special relationship’ may be positive or negative depending on whether Britain prospers or declines. Meanwhile, as the evidence presented here demonstrates, the impact up to this point has not been significant, or to put it another way, it has not been inconsistent compared with other tenuous periods in the history of the relationship. This may be due to a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, as both British and American policymakers prefer to minimize any negative Brexit impact to ensure continuity in a period when they contending with a large number of other security challenges. It may also be the case that within a matter of months, Brexit was overtaken by Trump’s election. One can, of course, assume the ‘specialness’ of the relationship, and then to argue about matters of degree. This analytical approach has deliberately not been attempted here on the grounds that the large number of conflicting variables make it highly problematic, and as the history of the relationship indicates, positive or negative impressions are often held temporarily, often in response to specific events. Instead, the focus has remained centred on the underlying structure of the relationship and the extent to which the ‘twin crises’ of Brexit and Trump have had any substantive impact. When examined from this perspective, it can be concluded that neither crisis, alone or in combination, have thus far proved sufficient to alter the relationship, positively or negatively, in any fundamental way.

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Notes





1.  Josh Dawsey and Hadas Gold, ‘Full Transcript: Trump’s Wall Street Journal Interview’, Politico, August 1, 2017. Available at https://www. politico.eu/article/full-transcript-trumps-wall-street-journal-interview/. 2.  David Smith, ‘Trump Interview: Golf, Brexit and Why You Don’t Hear About Britain Any More’, The Guardian, August 2, 2017. Other examples include: Harry Cockburn, ‘Donald Trump Promises “Big and Exciting” Trade Deal with UK Because “You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore”’, The Independent, August 2, 2017; Barney Henderson, ‘Donald Trump Says He Wants to Be Very Involved with UK “Because You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore”’, The Telegraph, August 1, 2017. 3.  A few examples consulted in preparation of this chapter include: David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1985–1986, pp. 1–20; John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schäfer, eds. America’s “Special Relationships”: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance (London: Routledge, 2009); Alex Danchev, ‘On Specialness’, International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, 1996, pp. 737–750; Guy Arnold, America and Britain: Was There Ever a Special Relationship (London: Hurst, 2014). A useful overview of the literature is: David Hastings Dunn and Edward Avenell, ‘US–UK Special Relationship’, Oxford Bibliographies, September 28, 2016. Available at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0189.xml. Also useful are: House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: The Indispensable Ally? US, NATO and UK Defence Relations’, HC 387, October 10, 2017; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Government Foreign Policy Towards the United States: Eighth Report of Session 2013–2014’, HC 695, April 3, 2014. 4. For instance, see Dov S. Zakheim, ‘Whither the Special Relationship?’ Round Table, Vol. 85, No. 337, 1996, pp. 73–82. 5.  John Dumbrell, ‘The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21stCentury Temperature’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 11, 2009, pp. 64–78. 6.  See for instance: Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Charlotte Galpin, and Ben Rosamond, ‘Performing Brexit: How a Post-Brexit World Is Imagined Outside the United Kingdom’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2017, pp. 573–591; Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, ‘Special Relationship in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US–EU and US–UK Relationships’, International Affairs,

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Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016, pp. 547–567; Jeremy Ghez, Magdalena Kirchner, Michael Shurkin, Anna Knack, Alex Hall, and James Black, ‘Defence and Security After Brexit: A Snapshot of International Perspectives on the Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU’, RAND Europe, 2017. 7. Krishnadev Calamur, ‘Obama’s “Brexit” Plea’, The Atlantic, April 22, 2016. 8. Nicola Harley, ‘Hillary Clinton Warns Against Brexit Vote’, The Telegraph, April 23, 2016. 9. Sam Levin, ‘Donald Trump Backs Brexit, Saying UK Would be “Better Off” Without EU’, The Guardian, May 6, 2016. 10. Eleanor Hayward and Jack Doyle, ‘“Special Relationship” Was Seen as a Joke by US Diplomats, Claims Former Presidential Adviser’, The Daily Mail, October 9, 2017. 11. US Embassy London, Cable: ‘The British Ask, Is Our Special Relationship Still Special in Washington?’ February 9, 2009. Available at https:// wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LONDON348_a.html. 12.  For some earlier examples, see John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, ‘The US–UK “Special Military Relationship”: Resetting the Partnership’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2012, p. 253. 13. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Global Security: UK– US Relations Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 Report’, March 18, 2010. 14.  Steve Marsh, ‘“Global Security: US–UK Relations”: Lessons for the Special Relationship?’ Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2012, pp. 182–199. 15. Heather Stewart and Anushka Asthana, ‘Boris Johnson: “Let Us Have a Grown Up Conversation with Our American Friends”’, The Guardian, January 15, 2018. 16. The White House, ‘Statement by the President on the UK Referendum’, Office of the Press Secretary, June 24, 2016. 17.  Tim Shipman, ‘Will Barack Obama End Britain’s Special Relationship with America?’ The Times, February 28, 2009. 18. Ibid. 19. US Embassy London, 2009. 20. Ibid. 21. Jamie Dettmer, ‘Who Is America’s Best European Ally?’ Voice of America News, April 16, 2018. 22. US Embassy London, 2009. 23. Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom and an Exchange with Reporters, March 3, 2009. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85814. 24. The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom in London, England, April 1, 2009.

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25.  US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Carter at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government in Oxford, England’, September 7, 2016. 26. White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister May of the United Kingdom After Bilateral Meeting, Davos, Switzerland’, January 25, 2018. 27.  Nicky Woolf and Jessica Elgot, ‘Nigel Farage Would Be Great UK Ambassador to US, Says Donald Trump’, The Guardian, November 22, 2016. 28. Barney Henderson, ‘Winston Churchill Bust Set for Oval Office Return by Donald Trump’, The Telegraph, January 7, 2017. 29. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to the Republican Party Conference 2017’, January 26, 2017. 30. Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Exclusive: Donald Trump Told Theresa May She Could Become the New Churchill’, The Telegraph, January 24, 2018. 31.  David Hastings Dunn, ‘The Double Interregnum: UK–US Relations Beyond Blair and Bush’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008, pp. 1131–1143; John Dumbrell, ‘Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 179–207. 32.  Robert Jervis, ‘President Trump and IR Theory’, ISSF Policy Series, January 2, 2017. Available at https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/ discussions/159072/issf-policy-series-president-trump-and-ir-theory. 33. R yan Wilkinson, ‘Leaked Memo Reveals UK Planning to Exploit Donald Trump’s Inexperience’, The Independent, November 13, 2016. 34.  Kim Darroch, ‘After a Seismic Year, America and Britain Must Move Forward Together’, The Washington Post, December 27, 2016. 35. Prime Minister’s Office, January 26, 2017. 36. David Wooding, ‘Trump Cower’, The Sun, July 15, 2017. 37. Ben Riley-Smith and Kate McCann, ‘Donald Trump’s “Working Visit” to UK Dropped as Tensions with Theresa May Grow Over President’s Far-Right Retweets’, The Telegraph, December 1, 2017; Joe Murphy, ‘Donald Trump Set to Come to the UK Next Year—But It Won’t Be the Formal State Visit He Was Promised’, Evening Standard, October 11, 2017. 38. Stephen Castle and Austin Ramzy, ‘Trump Won’t Visit London to Open Embassy: His U.K. Critics Say He Got the Message’, The New York Times, January 12, 2018. 39. Ben Hoyle, ‘Trump Interview’, The Times, January 16, 2017. 40. Graham K. Wilson, ‘Brexit, Trump and the Special Relationship’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2017, pp. 543–557.

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41. James Blitz, ‘Trump’s Tweets Raise Fresh Brexit Questions’, Financial Times, November 30, 2017. 42.  Martin Pengelly and Rowena Mason, ‘Theresa May Rebukes Donald Trump Over Tube Bombing Tweets’, The Guardian, September 15, 2017. 43. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘PM Press Conference with US President Trump’, January 27, 2017. 44. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland, Krasiński Square, Warsaw, Poland’, Office of the Press Secretary, July 6, 2017. 45. James Landale, ‘What Do Trump’s Words on Iran Mean for US/UK Relations?’ BBC, October 13, 2017. 46. Patricia Zengerle, ‘European Ambassadors to US Back Iran Nuclear Pact’, Reuters, September 25, 2017. 47. In relation to this point, see Kelly McHugh, ‘Bush, Blair, and the War in Iraq: Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 125, No. 3, 2010, pp. 465–491. 48.  Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Visiting Washington to Reaffirm UK Commitment to the Iran Nuclear Deal’, November 8, 2017. 49.  Jay Jakub, ‘The Anglo‐American “Special Relationship” in the PostCold War World: Much More Than Meets the Eye”, Defense Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1995, pp. 318–321; Baylis and Wirtz, 2012; Steve Marsh, ‘The Anglo-American Defence Relationship’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 179–206. 50. Baylis and Wirtz, p. 253. 51. US Embassy London, 2009. 52.  For instance, funding for the European Reassurance Initiative which began during the Obama administration has been increasing every year since 2015—from $985 million in 2015 to $789 million in 2016 to $3.4 billion in 2017. In 2017, the Trump administration announced this figure would be supplemented by an additional $1.4 billion. 53. Thomas Robb, ‘The “Limit of What Is Tolerable”: British Defence Cuts and the “Special Relationship”, 1974–1976’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2011, pp. 321–337. 54. Patrick Porter, ‘Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2, 2010, pp. 355–375. 55. Cited in Jonathan Beale, ‘General Ben Hodges Warns Britain Over Armed Forces Cuts’, BBC, November 8, 2017. 56. Michael Savage, ‘PM’s Former Security Adviser Warns of Brexit Defence Cuts’, The Guardian, October 14, 2017.

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57. Adam Svendsen, ‘“Strained” Relations? Evaluating Contemporary AngloAmerican Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 208–224. 58. Anthony Zurcher, ‘Will Intelligence Leaks Sink US–UK Relationship’, BBC, May 25, 2017; Vikram Dodd, Ewen MacAskill, Rowena Mason, and Jessica Elgot, ‘UK Police Stop Passing Manchester Bombing Information to US Over Leaks’, The Guardian, May 25, 2017. 59. For an overview of nuclear cooperation, see Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish, US–UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2008. 60. US Department of State, ‘Rex W. Tillerson—Remarks to the Staff and Families of US Embassy London’, September 14, 2017. 61. Cited in: ‘Fallon and Mattis Discuss NATO Spending’, BBC, March 31, 2017. 62. US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Mattis and Secretary Williamson in London, UK’, November 10, 2017. 63. Ibid. 64. Cited in: Ewen MacAskill, ‘UK Defence Role Lies with US, Not EU Says Michael Fallon’, The Guardian, March 31, 2017. 65.  UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Secretary Reaffirms Leadership in NATO on Washington Trip’, July 7, 2017. 66. Howard cited in: Ian Buruma, ‘The End of the Anglo-American Order’, The New York Times Magazine, November 29, 2016.

Bibliography Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, Charlotte Galpin, and Ben Rosamond, ‘Performing Brexit: How a Post-Brexit World Is Imagined Outside the United Kingdom’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2017, pp. 573–591. Arnold, Guy, America and Britain: Was There Ever a Special Relationship (London: Hurst, 2014). Baylis, John, and James J. Wirtz, ‘The US–UK “Special Military Relationship”: Resetting the Partnership’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2012, pp. 253–262. Beale, Jonathan, ‘General Ben Hodges Warms Britain Over Armed Forces Cuts’, BBC, November 8, 2017. Blitz, James, ‘Trump’s Tweets Raise Fresh Brexit Questions’, Financial Times, November 30, 2017. Buruma, Ian, ‘The End of the Anglo-American Order’, The New York Times Magazine, November 29, 2016.

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Calamur, Krishnadev, ‘Obama’s “Brexit” Plea’, The Atlantic, April 22, 2016. Castle, Stephen, and Austin Ramzy, ‘Trump Won’t Visit London to Open Embassy: His U.K. Critics Say He Got the Message’, The New York Times, January 12, 2018. Cockburn, Harry, ‘Donald Trump Promises “Big and Exciting” Trade Deal with UK Because “You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore”’, The Independent, August 2, 2017. Danchev, Alex, ‘On Specialness’, International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, 1996, pp. 737–750. Darroch, Kim, ‘After a Seismic Year, America and Britain Must Move Forward Together’, The Washington Post, December 27, 2016. Dawsey, Josh, and Hadas Gold, ‘Full Transcript: Trump’s Wall Street Journal Interview’, Politico, August 1, 2017. Available at https://www.politico.eu/ article/full-transcript-trumps-wall-street-journal-interview/. Dettmer, Jamie, ‘Who Is America’s Best European Ally?’ Voice of America News, April 16, 2018. Dodd,Vikram, Ewen MacAskill, Rowena Mason, and Jessica Elgot, ‘UK Police Stop Passing Manchester Bombing Information to US Over Leaks’, The Guardian, May 25, 2017. Dumbrell, John, ‘The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 11, 2009, pp. 64–78. Dumbrell, John, ‘Personal Diplomacy: Relations Between Prime Ministers and Presidents’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 179–207. Dumbrell, John, and Axel R. Schäfer, eds. America’s “Special Relationships”: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance (London: Routledge, 2009). Dunn, David Hastings, “The Double Interregnum: UK–US Relations Beyond Blair and Bush”, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008, pp. 1131–1143. ‘Fallon and Mattis Discuss NATO Spending’, BBC, March 31, 2017. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Visiting Washington to Reaffirm UK Commitment to the Iran Nuclear Deal’, November 8, 2017. Ghez, Jeremy, Magdalena Kirchner, Michael Shurkin, Anna Knack, Alex Hall, and James Black, ‘Defence and Security After Brexit: A Snapshot of International Perspectives on the Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU’, RAND Europe, 2017. Harley, Nicola, ‘Hillary Clinton Warns Against Brexit Vote’, The Telegraph, April 23, 2016. Hayward, Eleanor, and Jack Doyle, ‘“Special Relationship” Was Seen as a Joke by US Diplomats, Claims Former Presidential Adviser’, The Daily Mail, October 9, 2017.

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Henderson, Barney, ‘Winston Churchill Bust Set for Oval Office Return by Donald Trump’, The Telegraph, January 7, 2017. Henderson, Barney, ‘Donald Trump Says He Wants to Be Very Involved with UK “Because You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore”’, The Telegraph, August 1, 2017. House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: The Indispensable Ally? US, NATO and UK Defence Relations’, HC 387, October 10, 2017. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Global Security: UK–US Relations Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 Report’, March 18, 2010. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Government Foreign Policy Towards the United States: Eighth Report of Session 2013–2014’, HC 695, April 3, 2014. Hoyle, Ben, ‘Trump Interview’, The Times, January 16, 2017. Jakub, Jay, ‘The Anglo‐American “Special Relationship” in the Post-Cold War World: Much More Than Meets the Eye’, Defense Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1995, pp. 318–321. Jervis, Robert, ‘President Trump and IR Theory’, ISSF Policy Series, January 2, 2017. Available at https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/ 159072/issf-policy-series-president-trump-and-ir-theory. Landale, James, ‘What Do Trump’s Words on Iran Mean for US/UK Relations?’ BBC, October 13, 2017. Levin, Sam, ‘Donald Trump Backs Brexit, Saying UK Would Be “Better Off” Without EU’, The Guardian, May 6, 2016. MacAskill, Ewen, ‘UK Defence Role Lies with US, Not EU Says Michael Fallon’, The Guardian, March 31, 2017. Mackby, Jenifer, and Paul Cornish, US–UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2008. Marsh, Steve, ‘“Global Security: US–UK Relations”: Lessons for the Special Relationship?’ Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2012, pp. 182–199. Marsh, Steve, ‘The Anglo-American Defence Relationship’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 179–207. McHugh, Kelly, ‘Bush, Blair, and the War in Iraq: Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 125, No. 3, 2010, pp. 465–491. Murphy, Joe, ‘Donald Trump Set to Come to the UK Next Year—But It Won’t Be the Formal State Visit He Was Promised’, Evening Standard, October 11, 2017. Oliver, Tim, and Michael John Williams, ‘Special Relationship in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US–EU and US–UK Relationships’, International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016, pp. 547–567.

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Pengelly, Martin, and Rowena Mason, ‘Theresa May Rebukes Donald Trump Over Tube Bombing Tweets’, The Guardian, September 15, 2017. Porter, Patrick, ‘Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2, 2010, 355–375. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to the Republican Party Conference 2017’, January 26, 2017. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘PM Press Conference with US President Trump’, January 27, 2017. Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom and an Exchange with Reporters, March 3, 2009. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85814. Reynolds, David, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1985–1986, pp. 1–20. Riley-Smith, Ben, ‘Exclusive: Donald Trump Told Theresa May She Could Become the New Churchill’, The Telegraph, January 24, 2018. Riley-Smith, Ben, and Kate McCann, ‘Donald Trump’s “Working Visit” to UK Dropped as Tensions with Theresa May Grow Over President’s Far-Right Retweets’, The Telegraph, December 1, 2017. Robb, Thomas, ‘The “Limit of What Is Tolerable”: British Defence Cuts and the “Special Relationship”, 1974–1976’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2011, pp. 321–337. Savage, Michael, ‘PM’s Former Security Adviser Warns of Brexit Defence Cuts’, The Guardian, October 14, 2017. Shipman, Tim, ‘Will Barack Obama End Britain’s Special Relationship with America?’ The Times, February 28, 2009. Smith, David, ‘Trump Interview: Golf, Brexit and Why You Don’t Hear About Britain Any More’, The Guardian, August 2, 2017. Stewart, Heather, and Anushka Asthana, ‘Boris Johnson: “Let Us Have a Grown Up Conversation with Our American Friends”’, The Guardian, January 15, 2018. Svendsen, Adam, ‘“Strained” Relations? Evaluating Contemporary AngloAmerican Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 208–240. The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom in London, England, April 1, 2009. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Secretary Reaffirms Leadership in NATO on Washington Trip’, July 7, 2017. US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Carter at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government in Oxford, England’, September 7, 2016.

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US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Mattis and Secretary Williamson in London, UK’, November 10, 2017. US Department of State, ‘Rex W. Tillerson—Remarks to the Staff and Families of US Embassy London’, September 14, 2017. US Embassy London, Cable: ‘The British Ask, Is Our Special Relationship Still Special in Washington?’ February 9, 2009. Available at https://wikileaks. org/plusd/cables/09LONDON348_a.html. The White House, ‘Statement by the President on the UK Referendum’, Office of the Press Secretary, June 24, 2016. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland, Krasiński Square, Warsaw, Poland, Office of the Press Secretary,’ July 6, 2017. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister May of the United Kingdom After Bilateral Meeting, Davos, Switzerland’, January 25, 2018. Wilkinson, Ryan, ‘Leaked Memo Reveals UK Planning to Exploit Donald Trump’s Inexperience’, The Independent, November 13, 2016. Wilson, Graham K., ‘Brexit, Trump and the Special Relationship’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2017, pp. 543–557. Wooding, David, ‘Trump Cower’, The Sun, July 15, 2017. Woolf, Nicky, and Jessica Elgot, ‘Nigel Farage Would Be Great UK Ambassador to US, Says Donald Trump’, The Guardian, November 22, 2016. Zakheim, Dov S., ‘Whither the Special Relationship?’ Round Table, Vol. 85, No. 337, 1996, pp. 73–82. Zengerle, Patricia, ‘European Ambassadors to US Back Iran Nuclear Pact’, Reuters, September 25, 2017. Zurcher, Anthony, ‘Will Intelligence Leaks Sink US–UK Relationship’, BBC, May 25, 2017.

CHAPTER 5

Franco-British Defence Co-operation in the Context of Brexit Samuel B. H. Faure

“Our goal of seeking closer co-operation with Germany as well as with those European countries that have the capacity and will to move forward, while also maintaining a solid bilateral relationship with the UK, should allow significant progress to be made”.1 Thus writes Florence Parly, the French minister for the armed forces, in the preface to the “Revue stratégique” [strategic review] drawn up at the request of France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, and published in October 2017. These words embody the head of state’s political philosophy, influenced by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, whose research assistant he once was. It can be summed up by the formula “et en même temps” [“and at the same time”], which occurred frequently in his speeches. Implementing France’s defence policy requires co-operation with the United Kingdom (UK) and at the same time with Germany— co-operation that is on a bilateral, and at the same time minilateral, and at the same time multilateral levels. This French politics, which brings together different allies (Germany, Spain, Italy, UK) within different institutional frameworks or “instruments”—the Lancaster House

S. B. H. Faure (*)  Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_5

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treaties, the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR), the European Union (EU)—and on different levels of public action (bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral) goes by the name of “flexilateralism”.2 The politics of flexilateralism in Europe is not a recent international phenomenon but is reinforced continuously from the 1990s. France’s “flexilateral” politics questions, in the context of the Brexit negotiations, the interplay between the allies taking part in them, and between the various levels on which that policy is implemented. The aim is to suggest what the future of the strategic partnership with the UK might be. Does France see defence co-operation with the UK as a major or a peripheral vehicle for France’s flexilateral politics compared to other types of European co-operation? And consequently, is it more likely that the UK will remain a primary ally of France, despite Brexit, or that it will be relegated to a “supporting role”? The high degree of unpredictability of the political negotiations between the UK and the EU, in an unstable international context (North Korea, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, 2018 Italian elections), suggests we should be cautious in forecasting the outcome (see Chapters 3 and 4).3 This chapter is divided into three sections. First, the theoretical explanation of the possibility of a dual role for the UK in the future of its strategic partnership with France is outlined. Second, the likely political status quo of its military “leading role” is demonstrated by a “closed” configuration. Third, the likely political shift of its industrial “supporting role” is explained through an “open” configuration.4 This shift would be driven by a “bottom-up” approach (economic motives) rather than a “top-down” one (strategic motives) (see Matlary and Johnson introduction).

Explaining the UK’s Dual Role in Its Partnership with France From London to Paris, the most widely held assumption among British and French political actors and experts in 2017–2018 is that Brexit would permanently weaken co-operation with the UK in most areas of the public sphere—such as culture, trade in goods and services, and higher education—but with the exception of defence (see Chapter 2). It is ­ thought Brexit would have a limited effect on Franco-British co-operation on defence policy for two reasons. First, the most strategic military involvements, such as “high-intensity” military operations, are not implemented at

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a multilateral level under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but under Franco-British co-operation at a bilateral level. Second, the UK and France are the only European states that possess nuclear weapons and are members of the United Nations security council.5 The UK’s withdrawal from the EU would not affect its military capacity and institutional resources, which enable it to be the leading military power in Europe. In this chapter, this supposition that the UK would remain a primary strategic ally of France because Brexit would not have a significant effect on Franco-British co-operation is qualified. It develops the argument that there is a distinction to be drawn between the effect of Brexit on the future of the partnership with the UK as regards military policy and industrial policy which constitute European defence co-operation, regardless of the allies that take part in that co-operation and the levels at which it is deployed. It is expected, the dominant theory runs, that the UK’s departure from the EU would have only a limited effect on military policy. Since it is not in competition with other types of European co-operation, the partnership with the UK would, it is believed, remain a major vehicle for the development of France’s flexilateral politics in Europe. On the other hand, it is likely that its effect on industrial policy would be more marked from 2020 onwards. The Franco-British partnership would be sidelined in favour of co-operation with Germany and associations with variable combinations of partners within the EU, which would necessarily become the determinant vehicles for formulating France’s flexilateral politics in Europe.6 The UK thus plays, in its future strategic partnership with France, two roles: a military “leading role” and, simultaneously, an industrial “supporting role”. The UK’s two roles, which embody the uncertain future of Franco-British defence co-operation, are revealed by the “relational” approach of France’s flexilateral politics—which consists of taking seriously the relations of interdependence that exist between the various (main) defence actors in Europe. This approach fits within the “practice turn” described by theories of international relations7 and European integration.8 The development of the UK’s strategic position in the context of Brexit, as envisaged by France, is determined by the interplay of different “practices”9 of European co-operation.10 These practices go to make up France’s flexilateral politics and are a result of the structure of the “configuration”11 formed by actors. The concept of a practice is that of a type of routinised action (iteration) that fits within a given social context, which leads a actor to

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“do something”12 (for example, to co-operate). A practice is generated by the aptitudes of the actor (internalised knowledge) and generates an effect on the world (performance): “[…] practices have causal power in the sense that they make other things happen. Practices are the generative force thanks to which society and politics take shape; they produce very concrete effects in and on the world”.13 France’s flexilateral politics in Europe is the result of four practices: (1) the practice of bilateral Franco-British co-operation, (2) the practice of bilateral Franco-German co-operation, (3) the practice of minilateral co-operation which fits within multiple political and institutional frameworks (for example, the Weimar Triangle and OCCAR), and (4) the practice of multilateral co-operation within the EU and NATO (see Chapters 7 and 9). The effect of these four practices varies, depending on the historical context and the public sphere in which they operate. One practice—FrancoBritish co-operation, for example—can strongly influence the formulation of flexilateralism in certain cases, and have only a marginal effect in others. In order to explain this variation in the effect of the practices European co-operation on the formulation of the politics of flexilateralism, the concept of configuration is called upon. The concept of configuration refers to an asymmetrical and fluid arrangement of relations of interdependence between a group of heterogeneous actors with unequal resources at their disposal.14 A configuration is not confined to a specific area of interdependences, but takes into account the relationships of mutual dependency between the state and the “economic sphere”,15 embodied here by the arms industry, on a national scale, and between states on an international scale.16 A configuration can therefore associate state actors (the British defence ministry) with industrial ones (BAE Systems), as well as actors on a national scale (the French minister of Armies) and international scale (the European Defence Agency). The aim is to identify the structure of the configuration that is most likely to favour (“open” configuration) or, on the contrary, to block (“closed” configuration), the effect of the practice of Franco-British co-operation on the formulation of France’s flexilateral politics in Europe. In order to do this, two indicators inspired by social network analysis are used. On the one hand, the degree of centrality of the British and French “nodes” represents actors: is the configuration slightly or strongly structured by the positions of the British and French nodes (or actors)? On the other hand, the degree of exclusivity of the “ties” between the British and French nodes represents their

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relationships: is the configuration structured exclusively or only partially by the tie of interdependence (or relationships) connecting the British and French nodes? The model of the “closed” configuration is characterised by a central position for the British and French nodes, which are connected by an exclusive tie of interdependence. By contrast, the model of the “open” configuration is defined by a position of the British and French nodes that may be central but whose tie is not exclusive. According to this relational approach to European co-operation, the UK could, in its strategic partnership with France, retain its military “leading role” and simultaneously be limited to an industrial “supporting role”, because these two public spheres of defence action are not shaped in the same way by the practices of European co-operation (Table 5.1). The Franco-British practice is only slightly in competition with the other European practices in the military sphere. On the other hand, the Franco-British practice faces strong competition from the other European practices in the industrial sphere. This variation in the effect of the Franco-British practice on military policy and industrial policy can be explained by two different configuration structures. In the case of military policy, the low level of competition between the Franco-British practice and the other European practices is explained by the “closed” structure of the configuration. The British and French nodes (governmental and industrial actors) occupy a central position and, moreover, are connected by an exclusive tie: no other tie (such as Germany, for example) occupies an analogous relational position. In the case of industrial policy, the competition between the Franco-British practice and the other European practices can be explained by the configuration’s “open” structure. The British and French nodes also occupy a central position. But their tie is not exclusive—it includes other European nodes. Table 5.1  Detailed model of the UK’s two roles in defence co-operation with France

Detailed model

Results

Degree of openness of the configuration structure Competition between practices of European co-operation Franco-British partnership UK role

Military policy

Industrial policy

–

+

–

+

Status quo “Leading role”

Change “Supporting role”

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Status Quo of the Military “Leading Role” by a “Closed” Configuration In the military policy, the UK is the sole European state, together with France, that possesses nuclear weapons, is a permanent member of the United Nations security council, and has a strategic culture that enables it to take part in a “high intensity” external operation.17 These political, military, and institutional resources confer on the UK and France a central relational position within the configuration of European actors that take part in military involvements constituting defence policy. Moreover, neither Germany, Norway, Poland, nor any other European state can count on these resources that are specific to defence policy. Consequently, the tie of interdependence linking the UK and France is an exclusive one. Structurally, France cannot initiate, in the sphere of defence policy, an analogous relationship with Germany, Norway, or Poland (see Chapter 6). The density of the relationship between the British and French nodes (or actors) is reinforced by the institutionalisation of the Lancaster House treaties, though this does not rule out sometimes difficult relations.18 This “closed” configuration explains the status quo of the Franco-British practice as the main vehicle for France’s flexilateral politics. This assumption seems reasonable, in the absence of any exogenous change. If Germany obtained a permanent seat on the United Nations security council, acquired a nuclear deterrent, or changed its strategic culture enough to enable it to conduct “high intensity” external operations with France (apart from an EU or NATO mission), this assumption could become invalid. However, none of these major changes seems a realistic prospect in the context of Brexit.19 As a consequence, the other European practices are not alternatives to the Franco-British practice. Most of the civil and military actors in the French defence ministry subscribe to the idea that they do not compete with, but rather complement, the Franco-British practice through a division of functions. Franco-British co-operation embodies the practice adapted for conducting military missions (warfare) and at the same time multilateral co-operation within the EU is the practice used to carry out peacekeeping missions.20 This analysis is not always shared by French political actors. Since his election in May 2017, France’s president, Emmanuel Macron has insisted on a strengthening of European defence. Following Angela Merkel’s re-election as German chancellor, on September 2017, Macron gave a talk at La Sorbonne University in Paris.

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In his “Initiative pour l’Europe”21 [“Initiative for Europe”] talk, the French president described defence as “the great challenge of our time” and at the same time as the “first key” for building a “European sovereignty”—that is, a “capacity for autonomous action by Europe, complementing NATO”. For the French head of state, reinforcing defence co-operation lies at the heart of the EU through the development of two instruments: the creation of a common strategic culture and a “multi-speed” defence policy. While the activation of these instruments could, in the medium term, consolidate the multilateral practice, the “closed” structure of the configuration makes it less likely to compete with the Franco-British practice. Firstly, the French president emphasised the difficulty of getting national strategic cultures to converge into a common strategic culture (“we will not be able to change that overnight”). However, he did not specify the methods for achieving this (“the European intervention ­initiative”), and repeated the institutionalist logic according to which creating common institutions (“a common intervention force, a common defence budget, and a common doctrine for action”) produces a higher degree of integration. But the effects of this institutionalist logic have already shown their limits in the defence sphere, which remains strongly shaped by the national actors.22 Beyond this, for the French president the EU’s differentiated politics in the defence sphere is through the implementation of the mechanism of “permanent structured co-operation” (PESCO).23 PESCO was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall ­establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43”24 (article 42.6 of the EU treaty, TEU). Article 1 of protocol 10 attached to the treaties explains that PESCO “shall be open to any Member State which undertakes […] proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency)”.25 On November 2017,26 PESCO was adopted by a joint notification signed by 23 EU Member States in Brussels.27 These included Poland28 but not

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the UK (which is leaving the EU), Denmark (which opted out of CSDP), Malta, Portugal, or Ireland. This notification is endorsed by a decision of the Foreign Affairs Council in December 2017. Ireland and Portugal join PESCO, which finally counts twenty-five states (see Chapter 7). However, two observations could be made about this decision. First, there has been a wait of almost a decade for this mechanism to be activated, even though the Lisbon Treaty provided for its immediate implementation.29 Second, almost all EU Member States take part in PESCO (meaning this is multilateralism)—far from the “hard core” of a few states (which would have been minilateralism) as envisaged by the French president.30 From a French perspective, this inclusive format for PESCO, backed by Germany, is not considered very effective at taking decisions, because certain states, such as Poland, could act as a “veto actor”.31 Indeed, PESCO decisions, taken within the council, must be unanimous (article 46.6 TUE), with the exception of the decision taken by qualified majority voting to allow a state to rejoin PESCO (article 46.3 TUE), to allow it to leave (article 46.5 TUE), or to be suspended (article 46.4 TUE). In all cases, qualified majority voting is not automatic within an institution (in the EU, and in the Council in particular) that is characterised by a strong culture of consensus. Seen from Paris, it is difficult therefore to see this decision as a “historic achievement”—the description given by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: the multilateral practice has prevailed over the minilateral practice. In the final analysis, reinforcement of the multilateral practice within the EU is not inconceivable. However, it is likely that the effects of this political change will not only take time, but also will not be in any greater competition with the Franco-British practice, because of the “closed” structure of the configuration in the military sphere. The UK should retain its military “leading role” in its strategic partnership with France.

An Industrial “Supporting Role” Through an “Open” Configuration The situation is different in the industrial sphere, because the structure of the configuration of European defence actors is not “closed”. The British and French nodes (governmental and industrial actors) are

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centrally positioned, but they are not the only ones. They do not have specific resources at their disposal that would set them apart from the German nodes (or actors)—with the exception of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this configuration does not represent only states as being in the military sphere: it also includes arms manufacturers which, by definition, broadens it. As for the tie of interdependence that connects the British and French actors (or nodes), it is not an exclusive one. Not only do the British and French nodes (or actors) maintain ties with other nodes, but the French actors (or nodes) are connected by denser ties to German actors than to British actors in several industrial sectors. This configuration is thus described as “open” for three main reasons. First, it is made up of more numerous, and heterogeneous, nodes than in the military sphere. Second, the British and French nodes are not the only ones to be situated at its centre. Third, the French nodes are more closely tied to the German nodes than to the British. This “open” configuration explains why the Franco-British practice is in competition with the other European practices. The high level of uncertainty generated by this competition suggests that there would probably be political change in the industrial sphere. Consequently, it is expected that the FrancoBritish practice would have a marginal impact on the development of France’s flexilateral politics from 2020 onwards. In the counterfactual situation of the UK getting a “good deal” (a “soft Brexit”), it is plausible that this assumption may be proved wrong.32 To validate it, the interplay of the various practices that generate France’s flexilateral politics in the industrial sphere is more crucial than in the military sphere. There are four types of practices that are shared between the French actors to respond to industrial involvement in defence in the context of Brexit: the Franco-British practice, the Franco-German practice, the minilateral practice, and the multilateral practice. The most convincing effect of the Franco-British practice, which was significantly strengthened from 2010 by the Lancaster House treaties, was the creation of the European company One MBDA in 2015. One MBDA is a joint subsidiary of Airbus (37.5%), BAE Systems (37.5%), and Leonardo (25%), and is an industry leader in the missile sector. The future of One MBDA is especially difficult to predict because the company embodies a minilateral partnership that straddles the Channel (Germany, UK, France, and Italy). Subsequently, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) unmanned air combat vehicle (UCAV) project was

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begun in 2014 (Table 5.3). In 2016, the UK and France decided to allocate a budget of EUR 2 billions to the construction of a joint demonstrator.33 At the governmental level, the project is run by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), part of the British defence ministry, and the French defence ministry’s Délégation générale de l’armement (DGA). On the industrial level, BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation are designated as the leading partners. The bilateral governance seen in the FCAS project is replicated in the area of engines (Rolls-Royce and Safran) and electrical components (Selex UK and Thales). However, the momentum of the FCAS project may be vulnerable because of its history. In the early 2010s, BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation simultaneously built two competing demonstrators: the British Taranis and the French Neuron.34 The Taranis programme brought together British and US companies, whereas the Neuron programme involved exclusively European companies (Table 5.2). Aside from the projects that were born of the Lancaster House treaties, the case of the Thales group’s industrial strategy involves competition between the Franco-British practice and the multilateral practice shared by the French industrial actors. Since 2000, Thales, a French company, has pursued a strategy of internationalisation, building up its industrial activities in a “multinational” manner. In Europe, its international presence is strongest in the UK. However, Thales has a presence in six other European countries (Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Portugal, and Spain), and its shareholder structure is French majority-owned: 26.4% of the share capital is held by the French state and 25.3% by Dassault Aviation. To sum up, these three cases—One Table 5.2  Companies involved in building the Taranis and Neuron UCAV demonstrators Companies

Taranis (UK)

American British Spanish French Greek Italian Swedish Swiss

GE Aviation BAE Systems, Qinetiq, Rolls-Royce

Neuron (France)

Airbus Defence and Space Dassault Aviation HAI Leonardo Saab Ruag

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Table 5.3  The three main European arms projects under waya Product

Project

Start

Practice

States

Companies (leading partners)

Combat drone

FCAS

2014

France, UK

MALE drone

RPAS

2016

Bilateral (Lancaster House treaties) Minilateral (OCCAR)

Combat aircraft

FrancoGerman

2018

Bilateral

France, Germany

BAE Systems, Dassault Aviation Airbus Defence and Space, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo Airbus Defence and Space and/ or Dassault Aviation

France, Germany, Italy, Spain

aFor a complete table: Alessandro Marrone, Olivier de France, et Daniele Fattibene, “Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and Investments”  (Paris, Rome: ELIAMEP, FOI, IAI, IRIS, PISM, RUSI, SWP, 2016)

MBDA, FCAS, and Thales—all ended in the same way as far as the development of France’s flexilateral politics in the industrial sphere is concerned: the Franco-British practice was consolidated from 2000 onwards, as was the minilateral practice. If the UK leaves the single market, France may have a preference for the minilateral practice over the bilateral practice, if it is forced to choose for political or budgetary reasons. This assumption finds an echo in the trajectory of the FrancoGerman, minilateral, and multilateral practices. Since the end of the 1990s, the Franco-German practice has been the main vehicle for France’s flexilateral politics in the defence industry.35 This bilateral practice has shaped the creation of Eurocopter, then EADS, and finally Airbus, the leading European company in the civil and military aeronautics field. Although three states have a stake (France 11.11%, Germany 11.09%, and Spain 4.18%), the French and Germans hold all management posts. More recently, there has been a rapprochement in the land-based defence systems segment between the French company Nexter and the German company Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, which had previously been competitors. The result has been

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the creation in 2015 of the Franco-German group KNDS, the leading European company in land-based weapons systems, in which France has a 50% stake and the German Bode-Wegmann family 50%. The main programmes in the military aeronautic sector in Europe since the 1990s, such as the A400M transport aircraft, the NH90 transport helicopter, and the Tiger attack helicopter, have been the result of the interplay between the Franco-German practice and the minilateral practice. Germany has taken part in all these European programmes, and Airbus has taken the role of leading partner. As for France, it does not figure on one programme—the Eurofighter Typhoon. Moreover, Spain has taken part in all the programmes mentioned, as has Italy, with the exception of the Tiger. Both these states are mentioned in the 2017 “Revue stratégique”, which deals with the interplay between the bilateral practice and the minilateral practice: “These two major bilateral relations in the defence sphere [Franco-British and Franco-German] must be complemented by France paying increased attention to its other European partners […] France also has with these two countries [Spain and Italy], which have significant military capability, industrial and arms industry co-operation (drones, frigates, the NH90, ground-to-air missiles, space, etc.) that is structurally important for us and for Europe”.36 For all that, we cannot overestimate the political effect of these industrial projects that are born of the Franco-German and minilateral practices. In this regard, it would be remembered that the UK took part in the A400 M and Eurofighter Typhoon programmes. On the other hand, 80% of European arms programmes were not the result of a co-operation practice—whether Franco-British, Franco-German, bilateral, or minilateral—but of the practice of self-sufficiency (meaning this is unilateralism).37 Beyond the industrial projects of the 1990s and 2000s, the years from 2010 saw the emergence, apart from the FCAS project mentioned above, of two large arms projects: the MALE RPAS (Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System) drone, and a future combat aircraft. The MALE RPAS drone project was born of the minilateral practice, and the Franco-German combat aircraft was the result of the bilateral practice.38 In both cases, the absence of the UK is noticeable (Table 5.3). The RPAS project of the MALE drone, covering intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, brought together Germany, Spain, France, and Italy within OCCAR. The Franco-German combat aircraft project was announced, to

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widespread surprise, by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, on July 2017 in Paris, during a bilateral meeting. There are three potential problems that could compromise this project, about which few details have been released. The first is military: the combat aircraft is a vehicle for France’s nuclear deterrent, but this does not apply to Germany. The French armed forces therefore have an operational need that is not shared by their German counterparts. The second problem is industrial: there is the prospect of a conflict between Dassault Aviation and Airbus Defence and Space over leadership of the project. Dassault Aviation showcases the technical expertise of its research department, gained through long experience in the field of combat aircraft. Meanwhile, the CEO of Airbus Defence and Space, Dirk Hoke, reminds the German government that most of the factories of the Airbus defence division are in Germany.39 If an agreement has been reached between Airbus and Dassault Aviation in April 2018, the difficulty of its implementation must not be underestimated.40 Finally, there is a political problem: Germany has an urgent capability need to replace its Tornado aircraft (by around 2025), which is not the case with France. This mismatch in political timescales led Chancellor Merkel, before the declaration of intent in July 2017, to contact the US companies Lockheed-Martin (which produces the F-35) and Boeing (which manufactures the F-18). Against this background, two assumptions could be put forward. If Germany decides, for military, industrial, or political reasons, to buy “off the shelf” combat aircraft from the US, this is likely to trigger a defiant reaction by France, which could abandon this project in favour of its partnership with the UK via the Franco-British drone project (FCAS). On the other hand, if Germany stays with the project in partnership with France, this decision would probably contribute to marginalising the UK’s industrial role. The cases of the Rafale combat aircraft and Tiger attack helicopter demonstrated that the support (that is to say taking a decision)41 or lack of it (a non-decision)42 on the part of the head of state or the government for a given option carries considerable weight. These co-operative European industrial projects should not be seen as isolated actions but, rather, as part of the same “process”,43 the result of different types of European practice, which determines France’s flexilateral politics. The dynamic at work is an interplay between the FrancoGerman and minilateral practices on the one hand, and on the other the multilateral practice that takes shape within the EU. The risk for the

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UK—more the British state than British companies which are strongly turned towards the American market—is that it would suffer the effects of the multilateral practice, which has produced three instruments for action in the public sphere since the end of the 2000s: the “defence package”, the European Defence Fund (EDF), and PESCO. Their goal is to consolidate what is commonly known as the “European Defence Technological and Industrial Base” (EDTIB).44 The “defence package” is the result of two directives that regulate the arms industry: the directive on intra-EU-transfers of defence-related products and the EU defence and security procurement directive.45 The aim of the “defence package”, which came into force in 2011, is to create an internal defence market by means of a “market-making”46 mechanism, that is, the liberalisation of national regulations. Moreover, the EDF, ratified in June 2017, aims to encourage Member States to conduct arms programmes through European co-operation, by financing research and development (R&D).47 To this end, the European Commission has allocated EUR 25 million in 2017, EUR 90 million in 2018, and the same sum again in 2019 to finance research. The EU’s plan is to bring its annual research budget up to EUR 500 million from 2020, making it the fourth largest in Europe after those of France, the UK, and Germany.48 This annual budget of EUR 500 million for research should be complemented by a budget of EUR 1 billion from 2020 (EUR 500 million from 2019) devoted to the industrial development of arms programmes.49 This fund would be used to co-finance, to the tune of 20%, the development phase of a c­ o-operative European project comprising at least three companies from two different Member States. A total of EUR 1.5 billion could therefore be allocated to the defence R&D budget—or almost 1% of the total EU budget.50 If this increase in the European defence budget were to be confirmed, it would be a radical change that could have major effects. Within the MALE RPAS drone project, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy want to be able to take advantage of the EDF.51 It is likely that the UK and British companies would not be able to take advantage of this fund.52 It would tend to favour the UK’s relegation to a “supporting” industrial role. The question regarding the UK’s status is, therefore: would it be considered a “third country”, in the same way as Canada, Japan or Norway, or would it secure special status in the future trade treaty it hopes to agree with the EU? As for PESCO, its effect is likely to be less limited in the industrial than in the military field, because the

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configuration that structures it is more “open” to interplay between types of European practice, including the multinational type. Despite the high degree of unpredictability of the political negotiations between the UK and the EU, this chapter brings two conclusions. First, the mainstream supposition that the UK would remain a leading strategic ally of France because Brexit would not have a significant effect on Franco-British co-operation has been qualified. In other words, Brexit matters for the future of Franco-British defence co-operation. Second, this chapter has argued that the lack of Brexit’s effect is more likely to happen in the domain of military policy than in the domain of industrial policy as regards Franco-British co-operation. As a result, Brexit might determine a dual role for the UK: a leading military role and at the same time a supporting industrial role. The industrial policy of Franco-British co-operation could be strongly impacted from 2020.

Notes





1. Italics added: Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017”, 2017. 2. Samuel B. H. Faure, “La ‘politique du flexilatéralisme’. Le cas de la politique française d’armement dans le contexte du Brexit”, Les Champs de Mars 30 (2018): 73–102. 3. Lawrence Freedman, “Brexit and the Law of Unintended Consequences”, Survival 58, no. 3 (2016): 7–12; Olivier de France et al., “The Impact of Brexit on the European Armament Industry”, Report (Paris: Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017); Matthew R. H. Uttley et Benedict Wilkinson, “Contingent Choices: The Future of United Kingdom Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the Post-Brexit Era”, Global Affairs 2, no. 5 (2017): 491–502; Alice Pannier, “The AngloFrench Defence Partnership After the ‘Brexit’ Vote: New Incentives and New Dilemmas”, Global Affairs 2, no. 5 (2017): 481–90. 4. I thank Janne Haaland Matlary and Rob Jonhson for their comments on the first draft of this chapter presented during a workshop which took place in Olso in November 2017. It also benefited from the remarks of Andy Smith, as well as Nicolas Fescharek, Miriam Hartlapp, Stefano Palestini and Thomas Risse at the research seminar (KFG) on “The Transformative Power of Europe” at the Berlin Free University where I exposed a second draft in January 2018. 5. Alice Pannier, “From One Exceptionalism to Another: France’s Strategic Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the PostCold War Era”, Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 475–504.

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6. François Heisbourg, “Brexit and European Security”, Survival 58, no. 3 (2016): 13–22. 7. Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 8.  Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 87–103. 9. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). 10. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Charlotte Galpin, and Ben Rosamond, “Performing Brexit: How a Post-Brexit World Is Imagined Outside the United Kingdom”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 3 (2017): 573–91. 11. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, 2nd edition (New York: WileyBlackwell, 2010). 12.  Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot,  “International Practices”, International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36. 13. Vincent Pouliot, “Practice Tracing”, in Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool, éd. par Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 237–59. 14. Norbert Elias, Qu’est-ce que la sociologie? Agora (Paris: Pocket, 1993); Norbert Elias, “Les pêcheurs dans le Maelström”, in Engagement et distanciation (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 69–174; Pierre Bourdieu, Sur l’État: Cours au Collège de France (1989–1992), Raisons d’agir (Paris: Le Seuil, 2012). 15. Norbert Elias, La dynamique de l’Occident, Agora (Paris: Pocket, 1975), 303. 16. Elias, “Les pêcheurs dans le Maelström”, 71, 140. 17. Point 197: Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017”. 18. Alice Pannier, “Understanding the Workings of Interstate Cooperation in Defence: An Exploration into Franco-British Cooperation After the Signing of the Lancaster House Treaty”, European Security 22, no. 4 (2013): 540–58. 19. Germany’s decision not to participate in the targeted strikes in Syria against Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons in April 2018 by the United States, France and the United Kingdom embodies the persistent gap in strategic culture https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/13/politics/trump-us-syria/ index.html [accessed 15 May 2018]. 20.  Anne Bazin and Charles Tenenbaum, éd., L’Union européenne et la paix (Paris: Presses de SciencesPo, 2017); Antoine Rayroux, L’Union européenne et le maintien de la paix en Afrique (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2017).

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21.  Emmanuel Macron, “Initiative for Europe. A Sovereign, United, Democratic Europe”, 26 septembre 2017, http://www.elysee.fr/assets/ Initiative-for-Europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-Europe-EmmanuelMacron.pdf [accessed 15 May 2018]. 22. Samuel B. H. Faure, “The Nation, the Profession and EU Institutions: Three Socialization Worlds of CSDP Actors”, Saint Antony’s International Review 12, no. 2 (2017): 190–206. 23. Sven Biscop, Differentiated Integration in Defence: A Plea for PESCO (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017); Sven Biscop, “European Defence: What’s in the CARDs for PESCO?” Security Policy Brief (Brussels: Egmont, 2017); Daniel Fiott, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry Tardy, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?” Chaillot Papers (Paris: EUISS, 2017). 24. European Union, “Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union” (2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX% 3A12008M042 [accessed 15 May 2018]. 25. European Union, “Protocol (No. 10) On Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union”  (2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX% 3A12008M%2FPRO%2F10 [accessed 15 May 2018]. 26. Two years to the day after the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan and ­several restaurant terraces in Paris that killed 130 people. On 15 November 2015, the mutual assistance clause was activated for the first time at France’s request (article 42.7 TEU). 27. EU Member States, “Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (2017), http://www.consilium. europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf [accessed 15 May 2018]. 28. The day after the signing of the joint notification, on 14 November 2017, Poland informed the other EU member states that it was requesting that PESCO should not lead to the creation of an integrated EU military command and headquarters. 29. “The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon” (italics added): European Union, “Protocol (No. 10) On Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union”. 30. Nick Witney, “EU Defence Efforts Miss the Open Goal Again”, ECFR (blog), 15 novembre 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ eu_defence_efforts_miss_the_open_goal_again [accessed 15 May 2018].

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31. Josef Janning, Christel Zunneberg, and Christoph Klavehn, “Exploring EU Coalitions” (London: ECFR, 2017); Frédéric Mauro and Federico Santopinto, La coopération structurée permanente: perspectives nationales et état d’avancement (Bruxelles: Parlement européen, 2017). 32. James Black et al., Defence and Security After Brexit. Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017). 33. Emmanuel Huberdeau, “FCAS: un budget franco-britannique de 2 milliards d’euros pour un prototype”, Air & Cosmos, 3 mars 2016, http:// www.air-cosmos.com/fcas-un-budget-franco-britannique-de-2-milliardsd-euros-pour-un-prototype-64921 [accessed 15 May 2018]. 34. This competition is reminiscent of the birth of the Eurofighter, Typhoon, and Rafale programmes at the start of the 1980s: Marc DeVore and Moritz Weiss,  “Who’s in the Cockpit? The Political Economy of Collaborative Aircraft Decisions”, Review of International Political Economy 21, no. 2 (2014): 497–533. 35. In the 2017 Strategic Review, it is significant that the footnote to point 196, specifying “all areas”  of Franco-German co-operation, refers exclusively to industrial projects: Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017”. 36. Points 199 et 200: Ministère des Armées. 37.  Guillaume De la Brosse,  “Deploying Financial Tools in Support of European Defence Cooperation”, Comment (Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017). 38. Italie, via a declaration from its army and air force chief of general staff, expressed its interest in this project: Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Le projet d’avion de combat franco-allemand finalement européen?” 11 novembre 2017, http://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/projet-d-avion-combat-franco-allemand-finalement-europeen-137613 [accessed 15 May 2018]. 39. Laurent Lagneau, “Airbus veut diriger le programme d’avion de combat franco-allemand”, Opex 360 (blog), 6 novembre 2017, http://www. opex360.com/2017/11/06/airbus-veut-diriger-le-programme-davionde-combat-franco-allemand/ [accessed 15 May 2018]. 40. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-43895648 [accessed 15 May 2018]. 41. Ulrich Krotz, Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory, and the Politics of Advanced Weapons Production (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 42. Samy Cohen, La défaite des généraux: le pouvoir politique et l’armée sous la Ve République (Paris: Fayard, 1994). 43. Elias, The Civilizing Process. 44. Matthew R. H. Uttley and Benedict Wilkinson, “A Spin of the Wheel? Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the Brexit Debates”, International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 569–86.

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45. Chantal Lavallée, “The European Commission’s Position in the Field of Security and Defence. An Unconventional Actor at a Meeting Point”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12, no. 4 (2011): 371–89; Catherine Hoeffler, “European Armament Co-operation and the Renewal of Industrial Policy Motive”, Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 3 (2012): 435–51; Michael Blauberger and Moritz Weiss, “If You Can’t Beat Me, Join Me! How the Commission Pushed and Pulled Member States into Legislating Defence Procurement”, Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 8 (2013): 1120–38; Julia Muravska, “The Institutionalisation of the European Defence Equipment Market” (LSE, 2014). 46. Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 47.  Vincenzo Camporini et al., “European Preference, Strategic Autonomy and European Defence Fund”, Report (Paris: Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017). 48.  Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, “EU Initiatives for Defence Industry: Breaking the Curse of the ‘juste retour’?” IISS (blog), 6 septembre 2017, https:// www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2017-edcc/september-0f6f/european-defence-31e8 [accessed 15 May 2018]. 49.  Nicole Koenig and Marie Walter-Franke,  “France and Germany: Spearheading a European Security and Defence Union?” Policy Paper (Berlin: Jacques Delors Institut, 2017). 50. Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, “L’Europe met 40 milliards pour la défense à partir de 2021? Halte au feu”, Bruxelles 2 (blog), 13 juin 2017, https:// www.bruxelles2.eu/2017/06/13/40-milliards-pour-la-defense-apres2021-halte-au-feu/ [accessed 15 May 2018]. 51. Justine Bocquet, “Drone MALE RPAS: le premier programme à bénéficier du fonds européen de la Défense?” Air & Cosmos, 31 juillet 2017, http://www.air-cosmos.com/drone-male-rpas-le-premier-programme-abeneficier-du-fonds-europeen-de-la-defense-98289. 52.  Olivier de France et al.,  “The Impact of Brexit on the European Armament Industry”, Report (Paris: Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017), 4.

Bibliography Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot. “International Practices”. International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration”. Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 87–103.

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Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, Charlotte Galpin, and Ben Rosamond. “Performing Brexit: How a Post-Brexit World Is Imagined Outside the United Kingdom”. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 3 (2017): 573–91. Bazin, Anne, and Charles Tenenbaum, éd. L’Union européenne et la paix. Paris: Presses de SciencesPo, 2017. Béraud-Sudreau, Lucie.  “EU Initiatives for Defence Industry: Breaking the Curse of the “juste retour”?” IISS (blog), 6 septembre 2017. https://www. iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2017-edcc/september-0f6f/ european-defence-31e8. Biscop, Sven. Differentiated Integration in Defence: A Plea for PESCO. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017. ———. “European Defence: What’s in the CARDs for PESCO?” Security Policy Brief. Brussels: Egmont, 2017. Black, James, Alex Hall, Kate Cox, Marta Kepe, and Erik Silfversten. Defence and Security After Brexit. Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2017. Blauberger, Michael, and Moritz Weiss. “If You Can’t Beat Me, Join Me! How the Commission Pushed and Pulled Member States into Legislating Defence Procurement”. Journal of European Public Policy 20, no. 8 (2013): 1120–38. Bocquet, Justine. “Drone MALE RPAS: le premier programme à bénéficier du fonds européen de la Défense?” Air & Cosmos, 31 juillet 2017. http://www. air-cosmos.com/drone-male-rpas-le-premier-programme-a-beneficier-dufonds-europeen-de-la-defense-98289. Bourdieu, Pierre. Sur l’État: Cours au Collège de France (1989–1992). Raisons d’agir. Paris: Le Seuil, 2012. ———. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. Camporini, Vincenzo, Keith Hartley, Jean-Pierre Maulny, and Dick Zandee. “European Preference, Strategic Autonomy and European Defence Fund”. Report. Paris: Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017. Cohen, Samy. La défaite des généraux: le pouvoir politique et l’armée sous la Ve République. Paris: Fayard, 1994. De la Brosse, Guillaume. “Deploying Financial Tools in Support of European Defence Cooperation”. Comment. Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017. DeVore, Marc, and Moritz Weiss. “Who’s in the Cockpit? The Political Economy of Collaborative Aircraft Decisions”. Review of International Political Economy 21, no. 2 (2014): 497–533. Elias, Norbert. La dynamique de l’Occident. Agora. Paris: Pocket, 1975. ———. “Les pêcheurs dans le Maelström”. In Engagement et distanciation, 69–174. Paris: Fayard, 1993.

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———. Qu’est-ce que la sociologie? Agora. Paris: Pocket, 1993. ———. The Civilizing Process. 2nd edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. EU Member States. “Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (2017). http://www.consilium.europa. eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf. European Union. “Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union” (2009). http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M042. ———. “Protocol (No. 10) On Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union” (2009). http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M%2FPRO%2F10. Faure, Samuel B. H. “La ‘politique du flexilatéralisme’. Le cas de la politique française d’armement dans le contexte du Brexit”. Les Champs de Mars 30 (2018): 73–102. ———. “The Nation, the Profession and EU Institutions: Three Socialization Worlds of CSDP Actors”. Saint Antony’s International Review 12, no. 2 (2017): 190–206. Fiott, Daniel, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry Tardy.  “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?” Chaillot Papers. Paris: EUISS, 2017. France, Olivier de, Bastian Giegerich, Alessandro Marrone, Jean-Pierre Maulny, and Trevor Taylor.  “The Impact of Brexit on the European Armament Industry”. Report. Paris: Armament Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017. Freedman, Lawrence.  “Brexit and the Law of Unintended Consequences”. Survival 58, no. 3 (2016): 7–12. Gros-Verheyde, Nicolas. “L’Europe met 40 milliards pour la défense à partir de 2021? Halte au feu”. Bruxelles 2 (blog), 13 juin 2017. https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2017/06/13/40-milliards-pour-la-defense-apres-2021-halte-aufeu/. Heisbourg, François. “Brexit and European Security”. Survival 58, no. 3 (2016): 13–22. Hoeffler, Catherine. “European Armament Co-operation and the Renewal of Industrial Policy Motive”. Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 3 (2012): 435–51. Huberdeau, Emmanuel. “FCAS: un budget franco-britannique de 2 milliards d’euros pour un prototype”. Air & Cosmos, 3 mars 2016. http://www. air-cosmos.com/fcas-un-budget-franco-britannique-de-2-milliards-d-eurospour-un-prototype-64921. Janning, Josef, Christel Zunneberg, and Christoph Klavehn.  “Exploring EU Coalitions”. London: ECFR, 2017.

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Koenig, Nicole, and Marie Walter-Franke. “France and Germany: Spearheading a European Security and Defence Union?” Policy Paper. Berlin: Jacques Delors Institut, 2017. Krotz, Ulrich. Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory, and the Politics of Advanced Weapons Production. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Lagneau, Laurent. “Airbus veut diriger le programme d’avion de combat franco-allemand”. Opex 360 (blog), 6 novembre 2017. http://www.opex360. com/2017/11/06/airbus-veut-diriger-le-programme-davion-de-combat-franco-allemand/. Lavallée, Chantal. “The European Commission’s Position in the Field of Security and Defence: An Unconventional Actor at a Meeting Point”. Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12, no. 4 (2011): 371–89. Macron, Emmanuel. “Initiative for Europe. A Sovereign, United, Democratic Europe”, 26 septembre 2017. http://www.elysee.fr/assets/Initiative-forEurope-a-sovereign-united-democratic-Europe-Emmanuel-Macron.pdf. Marrone, Alessandro, Olivier de France, and Daniele Fattibene. “Defence Budgets and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and Investments”. Paris, Rome: ELIAMEP, FOI, IAI, IRIS, PISM, RUSI, SWP, 2016. Mauro, Frédéric, and Federico Santopinto. La coopération structurée permanente: perspectives nationales et état d’avancement. Bruxelles: Parlement européen, 2017. Merchet, Jean-Dominique. “Le projet d’avion de combat franco-allemand finalement européen?” 11 novembre 2017. http://www.lopinion.fr/edition/ international/projet-d-avion-combat-franco-allemand-finalement-europeen-137613. Ministère des Armées. “Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale 2017”, 2017. Muravska, Julia. “The Institutionalisation of the European Defence Equipment Market”. Ph.D. Thesis, LSE, 2014. Pannier, Alice.  “From One Exceptionalism to Another: France’s Strategic Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the Post-Cold War Era”. Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 475–504. ———. “The Anglo-French Defence Partnership After the ‘Brexit’ Vote: New Incentives and New Dilemmas”. Global Affairs 2, no. 5 (2017): 481–90. ———. “Understanding the Workings of Interstate Cooperation in Defence: An Exploration into Franco-British Cooperation After the Signing of the Lancaster House Treaty”. European Security 22, no. 4 (2013): 540–58. Pouliot, Vincent. International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

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———.  “Practice Tracing”. In Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool, édité par Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 237–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Rayroux, Antoine. L’Union européenne et le maintien de la paix en Afrique. Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2017. Scharpf, Fritz. Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Uttley, Matthew R. H., and Benedict Wilkinson. “A Spin of the Wheel? Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the Brexit Debates”. International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 569–86. ———. “Contingent Choices: The Future of United Kindgom Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the Post-Brexit Era”. Global Affairs 2, no. 5 (2017): 491–502. Witney, Nick. “EU Defence Efforts Miss the Open Goal Again”. ECFR (blog), 15 novembre 2017. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_eu_defence_ efforts_miss_the_open_goal_again.

CHAPTER 6

British-German Defence and Security Relations After Brexit: Quo Vadis, ‘Silent Alliance’? Håkon Lunde Saxi

Among the key Atlanticist and European security partnerships, Anglo-German relations are rarely given pride of place. Relations between the two countries clearly lack the centrality of both countries’ relationships with the United States (US). The relationship is also devoid of the great historical symbolism and high-level institutionalisation that characterise the post-World War II Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ or FrancoGerman rapprochement. Nevertheless, there has traditionally been little tension or discord between London and Berlin on issues of military security. For much of the post-World War II era, security relations have been characterised by generally successful, but quiet and sparsely publicised, pragmatic cooperation on a range of issues. The British-German defence and security relationship has therefore famously been described as the ‘silent alliance’ (Die Stille Allianz).1 It accordingly came as no surprise that when the results of the Brexit referendum became clear on 24 June 2016, Chancellor Angela Merkel greeted the news that the United Kingdom (UK) would be leaving the European Union (EU) with genuine ‘deep regret’.2 H. L. Saxi (*)  The Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_6

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Today, the UK and Germany are important security partners in Europe, where they work closely together and with the rest of their NATO and EU partners. Their priority is adapting to the challenges posed by a resurgent and revisionist Russia in the east, and the pressure of unregulated migration, terrorism, and instability to the south. This partnership in Europe will most likely continue, irrespective of Brexit, driven by shared strategic interests. London and Berlin will remain committed to reassuring their allies and making NATO’s deterrence posture credible. Beyond Europe, the ‘silent alliance’ will remain of marginal importance, mainly because the UK is, and will remain, a far more assertive security actor than Germany. The vital Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ and the Anglo-French military partnership will therefore continue to carry more weight on the world stage beyond Europe than the less crucial Anglo-German partnership. The former relationships are built around these countries’ similarly assertive strategic cultures, as well as a deep mutual respect for each other’s expeditionary military capabilities and warfighting-oriented military culture. Germany, a far more careful and reluctant security actor, whose military capabilities and military culture appear more limited and timid by comparison, remains first and foremost a European power. This chapter will start by examining the German perspective on Brexit, arguing that Berlin’s first priority is to protect the cohesion of the EU, while building a privileged trading and security partnership with a post-Brexit UK comes second. It then goes on to examine why Germany, mainly due to its demographic and economic size, is of crucial importance for British, European, and transatlantic security. The extent to which the UK and Germany work together or side by side towards common objectives is then discussed with emphasis on two geographical areas: NATO’s eastern flank vis-à-vis Russia; and NATO’s southern flank vis-à-vis the Middle East and Northern Africa. The chapter ends with a discussion of the future of the ‘silent alliance’ after Brexit.

German Perspectives on Brexit: Dashed Hopes and Present Realities Among Brexit supporters in the UK (‘Brexiteers’) it was widely argued— once it became clear that the UK was in fact leaving the EU—that Germany would become Britain’s key ally in Brussels, particularly on

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crucial issues such as trade policy. Berlin, so the argument went, would push the EU to provide Britain with a satisfactory trade deal, since this would be in Germany’s own interest. The importance of AngloGerman trade in general, and Germany’s very large trade surplus with the UK in particular, would ensure German support for UK demands.3 On first examination, this argument appeared to have some merit. In 2015, the UK was Germany’s third most important export destination, after the US and France, absorbing more than 7% of German exports. Key German goods shipped to the UK were cars and industrial goods. Significantly, Germany ran a €51 billion trade surplus with the UK.4 There was also a similar sounding, if less prominent, argument related to security. Germany—sometimes exaggeratedly regarded as the quintessential ‘economic giant but political dwarf’5—was argued to be dependent on allies, essentially the US, UK, and France, for its security. Berlin would therefore not risk alienating a key ally who, alongside France, was considered one of only two serious defence actors in Western Europe. The UK could therefore use its considerable ‘security surplus’ to obtain concessions on trade and other issues during the Brexit negotiations.6 As it turned out, Brexiteers seem to have badly overestimated the economic importance of the UK to Germany—including to the vital German car industry.7 Far from being indispensable to Germany and the other EU member states, the UK–EU relationship was far more marked by British dependence on the latter. In 2016, the EU as a whole was the UK’s largest trading partner by far, absorbing 44% of British exports.8 Brexit supporters also underestimated the value that Germany places on maintaining the political, economic, and security cohesion of the EU. German political leaders consider the political and economic unity of the EU to be of paramount importance.9 Berlin’s priority on the issue of Brexit was neatly summarised in Chancellor Merkel’s frequently used phrase that there would be no ‘cherry-picking’ (Rosinenpickerei) by the UK. Before the German Bundestag, the Chancellor stressed that there had to be ‘palpable differences between those countries who want to be member of the European family and those who don’t’, and that ‘whoever wants to leave this family cannot expect to shed all its responsibilities but keep the privileges’.10 The subtext was clear: if Brexit resulted in a new ‘British model’ which was too attractive, other countries could chose to follow the UK, leading to a further unravelling of the EU.

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Brexiteers also overestimated the opportunities for overtly using security as a bargaining chip. German political leaders, including Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen, outright rejected the idea that the UK’s ‘security surplus’ provided it with a bargaining chip, arguing that cooperation on security and defence was in each county’s mutual interest.11 Prime Minister Theresa May’s implied threat when triggering Article 50, that intelligence sharing ‘in the fight against crime and terrorism’ might be weakened if no Brexit deal was secured, was widely regarded in Germany and elsewhere as both reckless and lacking in credibility.12

Germany’s Importance for British, European, and Transatlantic Security Irrespective of how the ongoing Brexit negotiations eventually conclude, Germany will remain a country of key importance to Britain, to its European allies and partners, and to the United States. This is mainly due to Germany’s considerable demographic and economic size, which generate both its great political power and military potential. Germany is NATO Europe and the EU’s most populous state and largest economy. Its military potential is thus larger than that of any other European NATO or EU state. Germany’s material powerbase is such that the country is sometimes identified as a ‘potential hegemon’ in Europe,13 and the preponderance of its economic power and political influence in the EU is only thinly masked by the ‘fiction of FrancoGerman equality’.14 Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had little doubt that the German Chancellor is ‘the most powerful leader in Europe’.15 At the same time, in the security and defence field, Germany punches considerably below its weight. Among the ‘Big Three’ (the UK, France, Germany) who collectively make up more than half of NATO Europe’s military spending, Germany contributes the least to the common security and defence efforts, both relatively and absolutely (see Table 6.1). Germany’s modest defence spending level is all the more noticeable due to the fact that not only is the German economy Europe’s largest, but, among the major NATO countries, Germany has also maintained the healthiest public finances in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.16

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Table 6.1  British, French, and German military efforts compared, 2015 Country

Population (million)

UK France Germany

64.4 66.8 80.7

GDP (trillion) $2.7 $2.8 $3.7

Defence spending (billion) $55.8 $49.9 $43.8

% of GDP Active troops 2.08 1.80 1.18

163,000 207,000 175,000

Source IISS, The Military Balance 2017 (London: Routledge, 2016), 110, 116, 170; NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2017 (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2018), 109–115

To add insult to injury, Germany has also been reluctant to deploy its military forces in harm’s way. During NATO’s decade-long intervention in Afghanistan, German forces were deployed with considerable geographical and operational ‘caveats’, limiting their usefulness. Furthermore, during the 2011 NATO-led military intervention in Libya, Berlin chose to abstain altogether.17 Low defence spending and reluctance to become involved in warfighting produced resentment towards Germany, for example in the US and UK.18 Many European and US leaders came to regard Germany’s military weakness as ‘NATO’s most significant problem’.19 By early 2012, some senior allied officials were labelling Germany a ‘lost nation’ for NATO,20 and German diplomats in Washington, DC considered that ‘the USA no longer [took Germany] seriously as a security policy player’.21 In June 2011, in an unusually blunt public speech in Brussels, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates warned that NATO risked turning into a ‘two-tiered alliance’, split between those members who did only ‘soft’ humanitarian missions and those conducting ‘hard’ combat missions. While not mentioning Germany by name, Gates criticised those nations ‘who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership…but don’t want to share the risks and the costs’. Should this continue, he warned, ‘future US political leaders…may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost’.22 The widespread calls for greater German involvement and leadership even came from countries that had historically been wary of German power, such as Poland. In November 2011, before the German Bundestag, the polish minister of foreign affairs declared that he now feared ‘German power less than … German inactivity’.23

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The UK was also among the countries strongly calling for Germany to do more on defence. Visiting Berlin in May 2012, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond argued that Germany had ‘probably a greater capacity than any other European NATO partner to contribute to short-term enhancement of the Alliance’s capabilities’.24 Hammond also called on German leaders to develop ‘the political will…to allow the projection of power, including military force, to confront threats to our security’.25 Germany’s efforts to repair and improve its international reputation as a reluctant and status quo-oriented power began in 2013, when Berlin proposed the so-called Framework Nations Concept within NATO. The initiative was presented a response to the dual challenge of waning resources and waxing security challenges, as well as a way for the European allies to assume more responsibility for their own security.26 The initiative was to be a highly visible German deliverable to the 2014 NATO summit.27 The proposal was widely welcomed within the transatlantic security community, particularly by the UK.28 At a NATO defence ministers meeting in October 2013, Hammond made it clear that the UK was enthusiastic, stating, ‘We very much support the initiative the Germans have proposed’.29 Moreover, the UK and others welcomed German leaders’ public announcement at the January 2014 Munich Security Conference that the country was now willing to ‘assume greater responsibility’ in the security field. Germany was now to make ‘a more substantial contribution’, both earlier and more decisively. From a German point of view, this statement was intended to dispel any erroneous notion that Germany was the ‘shirker in the international community’.30 Germany’s willingness and capability to deliver on the expectations created by these declarations were to be sorely tested by two major security policy crises in the following years. First, by Russian revisionism, as demonstrated in the Ukrainian crisis on NATOs eastern flank, and ­second, by political instability, uncontrolled migration, and transnational terrorism emanating from North Africa and the Middle East on Europe’s southern flank. Driven by a strong mutual interest to demonstrate NATO’s inviolability, the Anglo-German ‘silent alliance’ worked well on the eastern flank. While the two actors did not necessarily coordinate their efforts, working side-by-side rather than together, strong mutual interest nevertheless produced a more or less symmetrical response to Moscow’s challenge to the post-Cold War order in Europe. However,

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there was greater asymmetry in how London and Berlin responded on Europe’s southern flank. Both countries shared a mutual interest in stabilising the region, curbing uncontrolled migration, and combating international terrorist groups. However, Germany’s enduring ‘culture of restraint’ regarding the use of military force continued to place limits upon the country’s involvement in the region.31

Working Side by Side on NATO’s Eastern Flank The original concept of the ‘silent alliance’ referred primarily to the close, practical cooperation that developed between Britain and West Germany on NATO’s Central Front during the Cold War.32 Between the late 1950s and 1990 British and West German troops served literally side-by-side on the front line along the 1400 km long inner German border, their national corps and air groups covering their assigned slices of NATO’s interlocking ‘layer cake’ defence system.33 British defence policy document stressed the importance of this mission, arguing that ‘the forward defence of the Federal Republic of Germany is the ­forward defence of the United Kingdom itself’.34 For the British Army in ­particular Germany was pivotal. As one British general latter described the era: ‘The Army’s focus was on Germany … if you wanted a career, you rely had to go to Germany’.35 In the post-Cold War era ‘expeditionary’ or ‘out-of-area’ missions replaced ‘in-area’ collective defence as the strategic raison d’etre for most Western armed forces.36 ‘Deterrence’ became overtaken by ‘compellence’ in Western strategy. This shift removed much of the basis for close, day-to-day operational Anglo-German military cooperation. Germany’s political inhibitions about utilizing military force meant that British and German troops were rarely deployed alongside one another in expeditionary operations. France, which, like Britain, took pride in its military traditions, supplanted Germany as the UK’s most important European ally.37 In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review the UK’s security and defence relationship with the US and France were again highlighted as the key strategic partnerships. The UK simultaneously made the decision to withdraw its residual military presence from Germany—20,000 troops—by 2020 since there was ‘no longer any operational requirement for UK forces to be based there’.38 It seemed the end of an era in Anglo-German relations.

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Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and continuing military intervention in eastern Ukraine, caused both the UK and Germany to place renewed emphasis on reassuring their European allies and deterring Russia. In the UK, Russia’s behaviour was described as driving ‘the resurgence of state-based threats’.39 In Germany, Russian actions were seen as a key reason for the ongoing ‘renaissance of traditional power politics’ in and around Europe.40 There emerged a communality of interest between London and Berlin when it came to meeting Moscow’s challenge to the post-Cold War rules-based international order in Europe. The defence policy ‘pendulum’, which since 1990 had swung unidirectionally towards expeditionary missions beyond Europe, was now beginning to swing the other way. Following the Wales Summit in September 2014, and acting alongside and in close coordination with the US and the UK, Germany took on a leading role in implementing the ‘assurance and adaptation measures’ outlined in the Readiness Action Plan (RAP).41 A centrepiece of the RAP was the decision to ‘significantly enhance the responsiveness’ of the existing NATO Reponse Force (NRF) by developing a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The VJTF was to be able to reinforce threatened allies ‘within a few days’.42 Germany, alongside the Netherlands and Norway, now agreed to provide the interim VJTF in 2015. Germany was to provide 2700 out of the approximately 5000 troops for the brigade-sized force.43 The UK in turn, along with several smaller allies, agreed to provide the VJTF in 2017 pledging 3000 British troops.44 Both the UK and Germany also contributed to maintaining NATOs continued air, land, and maritime presence on the eastern front of the Alliance by substantially increasing their participation in exercises throughout Central Eastern Europe.45 The US, Germany, and the UK also sought to coordinate the allied efforts in the Baltic Sea region through the trilateral Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) Initiative.46 In part for domestic German reasons, these efforts had to be carried out in a measured and balanced manner. Chancellor Merkel’s Conservative CDU/CSU-led ‘grand coalition’ government also included the Social Democratic Party (SPD). SPD politicians, such as Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier, were strong adherents of the party’s tradition of trying to ease tensions with Moscow through dialogue and engagement—the so-called Ostpolitik.47 Opinion polls also found that a clear majority of the German public opposed using

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military force to defend its eastern allies against Russia.48 In June 2016, as NATO exercises were taking place in Poland and the Baltic states, Steinmeier publically cautioned against ‘further aggravating the situation by loud saber-rattling’. He instead called for more dialogue and cooperation with Russia.49 Coming about a year before federal elections were due to be held in Germany, such statements were ­ undoubtedly popular with voters. The German government therefore had to walk a fine line between ensuring European security and antagonizing the German public. In part for this reason, and in spite of Moscow’s belligerent actions, Chancellor Merkel insisted that the Alliance should continue to adhere to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In the document, NATO reiterated its earlier commitment to forswear the ‘permanent stationing of substantial combat forces’ in the new NATO member states. However, while ‘respecting the NATO-Russian act’ she argued that the alliance would ‘adopt a series of measures…that will improve the ability of NATO to react quickly in this region’.50 The Leitmotiv of Germany’s policy was along the lines of the 1967 Harmel Report, which by now had become part of Germany’s DNA: a dual-track policy of deterrence and defence, on the one hand, and détente and dialogue, on the other hand.51 Strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture was one of four ‘pillars’ in Berlin’s response to Moscow’s aggression. The other three were (non-military) support for Ukraine, punitive sanctions against Russia, and simultaneous attempts at engagement with Moscow.52 As part of this engagement, Germany took the lead in attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis. Since June 2014 the so-called Normandy format—consisting of Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia—was the focal point of international negotiations leading up to the Minsk ceasefire agreements. The high-level shuttle diplomacy placed Germany ­centre stage in world politics.53 This followed an already elevated leadership position in Europe in the wake of the European debt crisis.54 By way of contrast, at the time, the UK was perceived to be notoriously absent from the world stage. British confidence and resources were seen as having been sapped by unsuccessful expeditionary wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as by post-financial crisis austerity measures.55 However, the UK nevertheless stressed that it welcomed Germany’s ‘growing influence on international security’ in general, and its central role in managing the Ukrainian crisis in particular. London also made clear its aim of strengthening defence ties with Berlin, deeming Germany an ‘essential partner’.56

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While Germany quickly gained a prominent diplomatic role on the eastern flank, its military contributions were shakier. In order to contribute effectively to NATO’s deterrence posture, Germany’s armed forces— the Bundeswehr—had to be credible. However, the Ukrainian crisis soon revealed that years of post-Cold War underinvestment in defence had taken their toll. In terms of size, the Bundeswehr was more or less comparable to the British and French militaries; its main weapon systems were seen as modern and capable; and German soldiers were commonly described as ‘competent and disciplined’.57 Nevertheless, due to underfunding, the serviceability of its equipment and the readiness of its formations were highly deficient. In September 2014, a leaked report submitted to the German Bundestag revealed that much of the Bundeswehr’s equipment was in a disastrous state.58 Less than half its equipment was described as ‘operationally available’ (Einsatzbereit).59 While conditions were by no means perfect in the British or French armed forces, the widespread perception was that the Bundeswehr was in a state of severe disrepair. This impression was reinforced by reports of missions abroad being cancelled due to the grounding of aging aircraft, and deployed equipment only being kept working through ‘cannibalization’.60 Minister of Defence von der Leyen readily admitted that rectifying the problem would take years.61 Efforts to improve the state of the Bundeswehr, and redirect it towards collective defence missions in Europe, began soon after the Wales summit. In September 2014, Germany, together with Poland and Denmark, agreed to reinforce and upgrade the predominantly trilateral Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland. It was now to become a high readiness headquarters focused on NATO Article 5 collective defence missions in northeastern Europe. The six newly established NATO Force Integration Units (NIFUs) in the eastern member states were assigned to the HQ.62 In February 2015, Germany took another small but significant step. It was decided to reverse an earlier decision, made in 2011, that ground-combat units in Germany needed only possess 70% of their normal compliment of heavy weapons. It was also decided to return one of the Bundeswehr’s two inactive armoured battalions to active service.63 Overnight, 100 older Leopard 2 main battle tanks, which had been sold to the defence industry, were repurchased to be modernised and put back into service.64

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In 2016, Germany announced plans to increase defence spending year by year from 2016 to 2020. The funds were to be used for increasing troop numbers and modernising the Bundeswehr, with priority given to the German Army. This included planned increases in the number of armoured personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, and self-propelled howitzers possessed by the Army. The growth in active troop numbers was also significant; this was the first increase since the end of the Cold War.65 What these changes amounted to was made clear in a new White Paper, published in July 2016. While continuing to provide forces for international crisis management missions overseas, the Bundeswehr was now to ‘reorient itself towards its most comprehensive tasks, namely national and collective defence’.66 The election and inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the US during 2016–2017 added considerably to the pressure on Germany to contribute more toward Alliance burdens sharing, and, together with Brexit, created some uncertainty about old alliances. In May 2017, on the campaign trail before federal elections, Chancellor Merkel stated that ‘the times in which we could rely fully on other – they are somewhat over’.67 The sum total of Putin, Brexit and Trump was effective at giving defence a higher priority in Berlin. In 2016–2017, globally, only China increased real defence spending more than Germany.68 At the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, mutual interest again made the UK and Germany work side by side to meet the revisionist challenge from Russia. The Alliance announced its intention to further strengthen its deterrence and defence posture by establishing an enhanced forward presence (eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland by early 2017. One battalion-sized eFP battle group would be stationed in each of the countries. The UK and Germany offered to serve as framework nations for the eFP battle groups in Estonia and Lithuania respectively.69 By May 2017, the UK and Germany had each taken the lead in the deployment of 1000-strong combat-ready multinational armoured infantry battalions, supported by main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery, to their respective countries.70 These British and German troops made up a considerable proportion of the 4500 Alliance troops which now made up a tripwire along its eastern flank.71 German Minister of Defence von Der Leyen made it clear that the eFP battle groups send a ‘proportionate’ and ‘defensive’ but ‘also a clear signal that an attack on one [NATO] country means an attack on all 28 NATO countries’.72

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For Germany, the renewed emphasis on Alliance collective defence in Europe meant reverting to a more traditional role for the Bundeswehr, a role for which it appeared more suited and comfortable than expeditionary warfare missions. While the Bundeswehr had since 2003 been focused towards crisis management missions abroad,73 it had for most of its history prior to this provided the ‘the conventional cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence concept in…Europe’.74 Now the Bundeswehr again sought to occupy this role, assuming lead nation responsibility for providing ‘larger formations’—combat-capable German-led multinational divisions—to act as ‘follow-on forces’. Their primary task would be to act as second-wave reinforcements on the eastern flank for NATOs small eFP tripwire forces and first-waive reinforcements, such as the NRF.75 Due to its long history of contributing substantially to collective defence in the past, the Bundeswehr enjoyed widespread credibility within the alliance regarding its ability to successfully carry out such a function.76 However—as the Ukrainian crisis painfully revealed—after more than twenty-five years of gross underinvestment in defense and fifteen years of focusing on crisis management missions overseas, even the Bundeswehr now struggles to relearn and reacquire capabilities and skills it once mastered. A RAND study from 2017 argues that the German Army of today—but also the British Army—would be at pains to put together a single armored brigade within 30 days for a collective defence mission in the Baltic States.77 Given time, focus, and increased funding, this situation is likely to improve in the coming years.

Dissimilar and Unequal Allies on NATO’s Southern Flank As demonstrated above, since 2014 Britain and Germany have worked side by-side—but not necessarily together—towards meeting Russia’s revisionist challenge in the east, largely using symmetrical means to achieve similar ends. However, on NATO’s southern front, broadly similar objectives have not resulted in symmetrical responses. While the ‘Big Three’ have all worked to curb illegal migration, combat transnational terrorism, and stabilise Europe’s southern neighbourhood, Britain and France have been far more militarily active. While military forces have an obvious role on the eastern flank as a deterrence force, it is less obvious how they can be utilised to curb

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the flow of illegal migrants across the Mediterranean. Both the EU and NATO have nevertheless launched maritime operations to try to address the problem, known respectively as Operations Sophia and Sea Guardian. The key effort is towards targeting human trafficking in order to reduce migration. Germany and the UK have taken leading roles in promoting these police-like missions, providing naval ­vessels and political support for EU-NATO cooperation.78 The m ­ igration challenge is particularly salient in Berlin. Germany is the primary ­destination for asylum seekers in Europe, taking in close to half of the 1.3 million migrants who applied for asylum in the EU, Norway, and Switzerland in 2015.79 However, while Germany supported and pushed for the quasi police-like EU and NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean, it remained hesitant about more combative missions in the Middle East and Africa. The US-led anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition in the Middle East is a case in point. Following the battlefield successes of the so-called IS in Syria and Iraq during the summer of 2014, the US organised a military coalition to target IS and bolster anti-IS forces in those two countries. The UK and France promptly joined this international effort.80 By early 2017, the UK and France remained committed with more than 1000 troops to their respective operations, Shader and Chammal, including with combat aircraft, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, and airborne tankers. British and French pilots have flown 3–4000 sorties and carried out hundreds of airstrikes against IS targets. In 2015 and 2016 France also temporarily reinforced the coalition with its carrier strike group, led by the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle embarking 24 Rafael M combat aircraft. British and French ground troops have trained Iraqi and Syrian forces, sometimes mentoring them on the frontlines.81 Germany’s military involvement has been far more lacklustre. Hesitant to get involved in more combative operations, Berlin’s effort was initially limited to equipping and training local forces. The Bundeswehr deployed up to 150 military trainers to Iraq in 2014,82 and Germany also provided sufficient weaponry from the Bundeswehr’s stocks to equip a 4000-strong force of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters.83 The historic decision to provide arms to a conflict zone was controversial in Germany. ViceChancellor Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) characterised it as ‘the most difficult decision that I have had to make in my career’.84

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It took the November 2015 IS terrorist attack in Paris that left 130 people dead, as well as a French plea for German aid and the activation of the EU’s Article 42(7) mutual assistance clause, to bring about more direct German military involvement.85 The German Bundestag then mandated up to 1200 German troops for support missions. Tornado reconnaissance aircraft and A310 tanker aircraft would provide targeting data and aerial refuelling to the coalition from the Incirlik air base in Turkey. A German frigate would also act as an escort for the Charles de Gaulle in the Mediterranean as it carried out anti-IS airstrikes.86 Nevertheless, in early 2017, the German support forces acting as part of the anti-IS coalition numbered no more than 350 troops, six reconnaissance aircraft, and one aerial refuelling aircraft.87 German wariness about taking military action was again highlighted in April 2018. As punishment for the Syrian government’s recent use of chemical weapons, the US, France and Britain launched air and missile strikes against several Syrian targets. Chancellor Merkel supported the action by Germany’s allies as ‘necessary and appropriate’ and condemned the use of chemical weapons as ‘unacceptable’, but Germany nevertheless refused to take part in the strikes.88 German military involvement in Northern Africa and the Sahel proved equally circumspect. France has long led among the ‘Big Three’ in the stabilisation and anti-terrorist effort in this region. In January 2013, France intervened in Mali to prevent radical Islamist insurgents with links to transnational Islamic terrorists groups from seizing power.89 Paris argued that France was protecting Europe’s interests in the region by preventing it from turning ‘into a hotbed of international terrorism’.90 By early 2017, about 3500 French troops remain engaged in Operation Barkhane, the French anti-terrorism mission in the Sahel, supported by helicopters, combat aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Their main effort remains stabilising Mali. The strain on the French military from these operations and the domestic anti-terrorism mission was such that France could only muster a limited involvement in eFP.91 As in the Middle East, Germany was initially reluctant to become directly engaged militarily alongside its allies in Africa. Following the November 2015 attack, Germany agreed to become more involved, with Minister of Defence von Der Leyen arguing that Germany ‘will and must stand firmly by France’s side’. Germany already had about 200 military trainers as part of an EU mission in the country, but the Bundeswehr

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would now also deploy up to 650 troops as part of the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in order to relieve and reinforce French forces.92 In January 2017, this effort was enlarged to encompass up to 1000 UN troops, including attack and transport helicopters.93 Germany’s military involvement in Mali thus surpassed Afghanistan as the Bundeswehr’s largest foreign mission.94 The dissimilar involvement of Britain, Germany, and France in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Sahel, is partially explained by variations in interests. For years, both the UK and France have encouraged Germany to play a bigger military role outside Europe, but with limited results. Germany did not have the same post-colonial ties as the UK and France, nor the same strategic and economic interests. Berlin therefore remained wary about the risks and costs of being ‘entrapped’ into supporting British and French objectives.95 But Germany’s reluctance was to an even greater extent due to the country’s post-World War II ‘culture of military restraint’.96 A deep-seated ‘culture of antimilitarism’ continues to impair Germany’s use of military power in foreign policy.97 As a substitute for direct military interventions in the Middle East and Africa, the German government has since 2011 promoted an Enable & Enhance Initiative, both nationally and through the EU. The main idea is to enable local and regional actors to provide security and to stabilise fragile regions by providing education, training, and equipment.98 At one point labelled the ‘Merkel Doctrine’, the approach arguably also involved easing restrictions on exporting high-tech German weapons to partner countries in conflict regions.99 The UK’s 2010 defence review had a similar focus on non-operational capacity building (‘defence engagement’) in partner countries beyond Europe, but it also had a concurrent emphasis on using British forces to project military power and carry out overseas military intervention.100 Germany’s military reluctance is the key reason why—among its European allies—the UK today favours France over Germany as a partner outside Europe. As Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once put it: ‘the French were the only European country, apart from ourselves, with the stomach for a fight’.101 The 2010 Anglo-French Lancaster House Agreement was driven by the conviction that the two countries were ‘natural partners’102 since they were the only ‘European nations with the full range of military capabilities and the political will to protect our interests globally’.103 The UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security

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Review pointedly identifies the US and France, but not Germany, as allies ‘we would normally expect [our Armed Forces] to deploy with’.104 This speaks volumes of the limitations placed on any Anglo-German ‘silent alliance’ dealing with defence and security issues beyond Europe.

Conclusions The Anglo-German security partnership is an important one. Nevertheless, while it is growing in relative importance, in both countries it continues to come second to relations with the US and France.105 Brexit need not necessarily weaken the relationship, but if Brexit turns into an acrimonious divorce because of disagreements over money and trade, this will most likely also have consequences for security cooperation. However, even in a best-case scenario, both the UK and Germany seem likely to be damaged by Brexit. Therefore, from a German point of view, Brexit appears very much as an act of geopolitical vandalism and self-harm.106 As a ‘third country’ from March 2019 the UK seems destined to lose its place among the ‘Big Three’ at the heart of EU decision-making.107 It was suggestive that Chancellor Merkel’s immediate response to Brexit was to call a German, French, and Italian summit in Berlin.108 The UK will almost certainly maintain its position as part of NATO’s ‘Quad’,109 but it might lose influence and some important posts in NATO’s command structure.110 While the UK’s key operational military partnerships—with the US and France especially—will remain mostly unchanged, it seem likely that the UK will be relegated to a more reduced role in European military industrial cooperation.111 The departure of Eurosceptic Britain’s may in turn allow for more European integration, but is highly unlikely to result in a defence union with an ‘autonomous military capability’.112 It may also strengthen the Franco-German axis at the heart of the EU. Paradoxically, this need not be entirely in Germany’s interest. More Franco-German domination risks further alienating smaller neighbours that are already dissatisfied with a perceived German hegemony in the EU.113 Germany’s position on the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), launched in November 2017 to strengthen EU defense cooperation in the wake of Brexit and Trump, was typically to demand that it be as inclusive as possible so as not to alienate any member states.114

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The post-Cold War shift in NATO, from collective ‘in-area’ defense to expeditionary ‘out-of-area’ operations, critically weakened the basis for the ‘silent alliance’. Anglo-German defence relations were often characterised by mutual incomprehension and the lack of common ground during the years of expeditionary warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq.115 So how will the ‘silent alliance’ fare in a post-Brexit world? One the one hand, the 2014 Ukraine crisis, with its resulting reemphasis on collective defence and deterrence in Europe, has rekindled some of yesterday’s shared strategic focus in London and Berlin. This seems likely to endure after Brexit. It will again give Britain and Germany a common defense focus, making more room for increased military cooperation and more mutual strategic understanding. It is indicative that the National Security Capability Review, published in March 2018, again made clear the UK’s intention to deepen relations with Germany, ‘including on capabilities for our air and ground forces’.116 On the other hand, the differences in strategic and military culture, which led the UK and Germany to drift apart during the years of ‘strategic timeout’ from 1990 to 2014, persists. Even if Germany shares many of the strategic interests of the US, the UK and France, Berlin is much less willing and able to take part in expeditionary warfighting overseas. This is likely to continue to limit the scope of Anglo-German military cooperation beyond Europe.

Notes



1. Karl Kaiser and John Roper, eds., Die Stille Allianz: deutsch-britische Sicherheitskooperation (Bonn: Europa Union, 1987). The book was translated and published in English the following year, under the slightly different title British-German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Alliance (London: Jane’s, 1988). The term ‘silent alliance’ was coined in the 1980s, but was still being used day-to-day in the mid-1990s. See e.g. the interview with Peter Craine, British Embassy in Bonn, in WT, ‘Stille Allianz’, Wehrtechnik 27, no. 11 (November 1995): 18. 2. Caroline Copley, ‘Brexit Vote Marks a Watershed Moment for Europe: Merkel’, Reuters, 24 June 2016. 3.  David Davids, since July 2016 Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, was one Brexiteer who had argued that an amicable UK-German deal could be arrived at relatively quickly. Jon Stone, ‘Minister for Brexit David Davis Appeared Unaware of How EU Trade Deals Actually Work’, The Independent, 14 July 2016.

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4. Statistisches Bundesamt [German Federal Statistical Office], Statistisches Jahrbuch 2016 [Statistical Yearbook 2016] (Wiesbaden: German Federal Statistical Office, 2016), 415, 420. 5. The expression was frequently employed and popularized by Chancellor (1974–1982) Helmut Schmidt. Hartmut Palmer and Gerhard Spörl, ‘The Last of His Kind: What Helmut Schmidt Meant to Germany and the World’, Spiegel Online, 12 November 2015; See also Mark Allinson et al., Contemporary Germany: Essays and Texts on Politics, Economics & Society (London: Routledge, 2000), 147. 6. Malcolm Chalmers, UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit, RUSI Briefing Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute, January 2017), 4–5. 7.  David Hughes, ‘Brexit: German Business Warns May Its Priority Is to Protect Single Market, Not a Good Trade Deal with UK’, The Independent, 8 July 2017. 8. Matthew Ward, Statistics on UK-EU Trade, Briefing Paper Number 7851 (London: House of Commons Library, 17 August 2017). 9. Sophia Besch and Christian Odendahl, Berlin to the Rescue? A Closer Look at Germany’s Position on Brexit (London: The Centre for European Reform, 2017). 10.  SZ, ‘Merkel will keine “Rosinenpickerei” bei Brexit-Verhandlungen zulassen’ [Merkel Will Not Allow “Cherry Picking” in Brexit Negotiations], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 June 2016; Kate Connolly et al., ‘Angela Merkel: No Special Favours for UK over Single Market’, The Guardian, 28 June 2016. 11. BBC, ‘Security Is Not Brexit Bargaining Chip, Says German Defence Chief’. London: BBC, 31 March 2017; Stefan Wagstyl, ‘German Lawmakers Hit at May’s EU Security Stance in Brexit Talks’, Financial Times, 31 March 2017. 12. Ewen MacAskill, ‘Using Security as Brexit Bargaining Chip Is Reckless and Lacks Credibility’, The Guardian, 30 March 2017; Daniel Boffey, ‘UK Military “Must Not Be Used as Bargaining Chip” in Brexit Talks’, The Guardian, 1 April 2017. 13. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 392–393. 14. Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, 2 ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 348. 15. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (London: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 209. 16. ‘Healthy’ defined as having the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio. See Richard Dobbs et al., Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging (McKinsey Global Institute, February 2015), 106.

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17. Benjamin Schreer, ‘The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO and the Use of Force’, in NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will, ed. Janne Haaland Matlarty and Magnus Petersson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); On Libya, see Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Germany and the Intervention in Libya’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 6 (2013). 18. See the chapter on UK defence policy by Dr. Robert Johnson in this volume. 19. R. Nicholas Burns, Damon M. Wilson, and Jeff Lightfoot, Anchoring the Alliance (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2012), vi, 4–5. 20. Ibid., 4. 21. Ulrike Demmer and Christoph Schult, ‘Rache für Libyen’, Der Spiegel, 14 May 2012, 100. 22.  Robert M. Gates, ‘The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)’. Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gateson, 11 June, 2011 in Brussels, Belgium (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 11 June, 2011). 23. Radoslaw Sikorski, ‘Poland and the Future of the European Union’. Speech delivered to the German Bundestag, Berlin, on 28 November 2011 (Warsaw: Polish MFA, 28 November 2011). 24.  Philip Hammond, ‘Shared Security: Transforming Defence to Face the Future’. Speech delivered by Secretary of State for Defence at the British Embassy, Berlin (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2 May 2012). 25. Ibid. 26.  German Federal Ministry of Defence, Food for Thought. Framework Nations Concept (Berlin: German MoD, 2013). 27. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, The Framework Nations Concept, SWP Comments 52 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2014), 2. 28.  Håkon Lunde Saxi, ‘British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept’, Defence Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 185–187. 29.  EDD, ‘NATO/Ministerial: Germany Tables New Framework Nation Concept’, Europe Diplomacy & Defence: The Agence Europe Bulletin on ESDP and NATO, no. 647 (24 October 2013): 2. 30.  Joachim Gauck, ‘Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt: Anmerkungen zu Verantwortung, Normen und Bündnissen’ [Germany’s Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances]. Speech by Federal President Joachim Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security Conference, 31 January 2014, Munich (Berlin: Office of the Federal President).

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31.  Minister for Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel, ‘Peacekeeping Missions: Germany Can Now Play Its Part’, NATO Review 42, no. 5 (October 1994); See interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle in Matthias Nass, ‘Der Anti-Interventionist’, Die Zeit, 9 February 2013. 32. Alister Miskimmon and John Roper, ‘The Stille Allianz Revisited’, in Rethinking Germany and Europe: Democracy and Diplomacy in a SemiSovereign State, ed. Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, and Stephen Padgett (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188–191. 33. David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (London: Pimlico, 2001), 231–249, 295–301. 34.  Secretary of State for Defence, Cm. 101-I. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987 (London: HMSO, 1987), 29. 35. General (ret.) David Richards, Taking Command (London: Headline, 2014), 35. 36. See e.g. Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20–45. 37. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy from Shadow to Substance?’, in Policy-Making in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 467–487. 38. HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (London: TSO, October 2010), 28. 39. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom (London: TSO, November 2015), 18. 40.  German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: German MoD, 13 July 2016), 38. 41. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014 (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2015), 6. 42.  NATO Heads of State and Government, Wales Summit Declaration (Brussels: NATO, 2014), paragraph 8. 43. Claudia Major, NATO’s Strategic Adaptation: Germany Is the Backbone for the Alliance’s Military Reorganisation, SWP Comments 16 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2015), 2–3; Note that the the three countries had already been slated to provide the 2015 NATO Reponses Force (NRF) since 2013. 44.  Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon, ‘Additional UK Contributions to NATO Assurance and Deterrence Efforts’. Written Statement made on 24 June 2015 (London: House of Commons, 2015).

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45. Between 4–5000 British and German troops participated in exercised in Central Eastern Europe annually. Ben Farmer, ‘Britain Announces 1,000 More Troops for Eastern Europe Exercises’, The Telegraph, 16 January 2015; Reuters Staff, ʻVon der Leyen - 2016 üben 5000 Bundeswehr-Soldaten in Osteuropaʼ, Reuters, 14 April 2015. 46. Permanent Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, ‘Press Release: Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) Initiative’ (Brussels: German MFA, 10 February 2016). 47. See e.g. Allison Smale, ‘Germany’s Man in the Middle’, International New York Times, 20 November 2014. 48. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 10 June 2015), 5. 49. FAZ, ʻSteinmeier kritisiert Nato-Manöver in Osteuropa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 2016. 50.  Slk/Sb, ‘No Permanent NATO Troop Presence in Eastern Europe, Merkel Says’, Deutsche Welle, 3 September 2014. 51. German officials, such as NATO Ambassador Hans-Dieter Lucas, would mention the Harmel formula of ‘deterrence and dialog’ in nearly every public speech following the Wales Summit. 52. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘Save Our Trans-Atlantic Order’, The New York Times, 11 March 2015. 53.  The Economist, ‘German Foreign Policy: A Lurch onto the World Stage’, The Economist, 28 February 2015. 54. See e.g. Franz-Josef Meiers, Germany’s Role in the Euro Crisis: Berlin’s Quest for a More Perfect Monetary Union (Cham (ZG): Springer, 2015). Introduction: Europe’s Powerhouse. 55. The Economist, ‘Little Britain’, The Economist, 4 April 2015. 56. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom: 52–53. 57. Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General (ret.) Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), XXVIII. 58. An Air Force report also leaked in August 2014. See Peter Müller et al., ʻSchein und Seinʼ, Der Spiegel, 25 August 2014, 18–20. 59.  See e.g. FAZ, ʻBedingt abwehrbereit: Einsatzbereitschaft der Waffensysteme der Bundeswehrʼ, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 September 2014, Wirtschaft 17. 60.  Daniel Brössler and Nico Fried, ʻAusgedientʼ, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 September 2014; Der Spiegel, ‘Ramshackle Military at Odds with Global Aspirations’, Spiegel Online, 30 September 2014. 61. Quoted in Brössler and Fried, ʻAusgedientʼ.

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62. German Federal Ministry of Defence, Gemeinsame Erklärung der deutschen, dänischen und polnischen Verteidigungsminister zur Weiterentwicklung des Multinationalen Korps Nordost in Stettin (Berlin: German MoD, 4 September 2014); NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015 (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2016), 17. 63. The newly activated armored battalion would have 700 soldiers and be equipped with 44 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks. Der Spiegel, ʻBundeswehr: Von der Leyen setzt wieder auf Panzerʼ, Spiegel Online, 27 February 2015; Christoph Hickmann, ʻPanzer und Psychologie Die Regierung muss entscheiden, was die Armee können sollʼ, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 February 2015. 64. Deanne Corbett, ʻGermany To Buy Back Tanks Amid Russia Threatʼ, Defense News, 18 April 2015. 65. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017: 63, 72. 66.  German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr: 138. 67.  Alison Smale and Steven Erlanger, ‘Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump’, The New York Times, 28 May 2017. 68. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2018 (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 20. 69. NATO Heads of State and Government, Warsaw Summit Communiqué (Brussels: NATO, 9 July 2016), paragraph 40. 70. NATO, ʻFactsheet: NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presenceʼ (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, May 2017). 71. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2017 (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2018), 13–14. 72.  Quoted in Holger Romann. ʻHunderte Bundeswehrsoldaten nach Osteuropaʼ. Tagesschau.de, 2016. 73.  See German Federal Ministry of Defence, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung [Defence Policy Guidelines for the Area of Responsibility of the Federal Minister of Defence] [2003] (Berlin: German MoD, 21 May 2003). Part II, chapters 1 and 2. 74. Martin Rink, ʻDas Heer der Bundeswehr in Wandel 1950–2005ʼ, in Entschieden für Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955–2005, ed. KlausJürgen Bremm, Hans-Hubertaus Mack, and Martin Rink (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 2005), 147. 75.  Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe, Ambitious Framework Nation: Germany in Nato, SWP Comments 35 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017); the so-called Bühler-Paper from March 2017

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drew up these ambitions, which were made public by the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in April 2017. See Johannes Leithäuser and Marco Seliger, ‘Bis Zu Den Sternen’ [To the Stars], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 April 2017. 76. Franklin D. Kramer, NATO’s Framework Nations: Capabilities for an Unpredictable World (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 2014). 77. Michael Shurkin, The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017). 78. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2016: 52–53. 79. Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2 August 2016), 4–5. 80. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), 304–306. 81. The Military Balance 2017: 78–79, 83, 115, 174–175. 82.  The Federal Goverment, ʻBundeswehr to Continue Training the Peshmergaʼ (Berlin: The Federal Goverment, 26 January 2017). 83. Spencer Kimball, ʻGerman Weapons Deliveries to Iraq’s Kurdish Regionʼ. Berlin: Deutsche Welle, 1 September 2014. 84. DW, ʻGermany to Arm Kurdish Forces Fighting Islamic State in Iraqʼ. Berlin: Deutsche Welle, 31 August 2014. 85. BBC, ʻParis Attacks: What Happened on the Nightʼ. London: BBC, 9 December 2015. 86. German Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/9960 - Antrag der Bundesregierung (Bonn: German Bundestag, 13 October 2016). 87. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017: 119. 88.  Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and Ben Hubbard, ‘U.S., Britain and France Strike Syria Over Suspected Chemical Weapons Attack’, The New York Times, 13 April 2018; Reuters Staff, ‘Germany’s Merkel Backs Air Strikes on Syria as “Necessary and Appropriate”’, Reuters, 14 April 2018. 89. On Operation Serval, see e.g. Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014). 90. French Ministry of Defence, French White Paper: Defence and National Security (Paris: French MoD, 2013), 54. 91. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017: 79, 115–116.

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92. BBC, ʻGermany to Send 650 Soldiers to Maliʼ. London: BBC, 25 November 2015. 93. DW, ʻGerman Parliament Votes to Expand Military Presence in Maliʼ. Berlin: Deutsche Welle, 26 January 2017. 94.  Figures on the strength of deployed German troop contingents, 13 November 2017, accessed at https://www.bundeswehr.de [20 November 2017]. 95. Pierre Haroche, ʻInterdependence, Asymmetric Crises, and European Defence Cooperationʼ, European Security 26, no. 2 (2017): 14–20. 96. German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle, quoted in Nass, ʻDer Anti-Interventionistʼ. 97.  See e.g. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Anja DalgaardNielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). 98.  Originally known as the Ertüchtigungsinitiative, it was relabelled Enable & Enhance in 2013. See Jana Puglierin, Germany’s Enable & Enhance Initiative What Is It About? Security Policy Working Paper No. 1/2016 (Berlin: Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2016); Claudia Major, Christian Mölling, and Judith Vorrath, Train + Equip = Peace? SWP Comments 4 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015). 99. Konstantin von Hammerstein et al., ‘Die Merkel-Doktrin’, Der Spiegel, 3 December 2012. 100. HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. 101. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 819. 102.  UK Ministry of Defence, ‘UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation’. (London: UK MoD, 2010). 103. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom: 52. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., 51–52; German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr: 80. 106. Sophia Besch and Christian Odendahl, Berlin to the Rescue? 1, 10. 107. See e.g. Stefan Lehne, The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, July 2012), 3–5; Klaus Brummer, ed. The Big 3 and ESDP: France, Germany and

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the United Kingdom (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006); Note that in the late 1990s Rome was able to gain partial entry into the two circles, occasionally making it the so-called NATO Quint and the EU ‘Big Four’. See Catherine Gegout, ‘The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four–US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002). 108. Copley, ‘Brexit Vote Marks a Watershed Moment for Europe: Merkel’; Note that the EU institutions were also present, represented by the EU Council President, Donald Tusk. 109. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1998), 65–66; See also Sherard Cowper-Coles, Ever the Diplomat: Confessions of a Foreign Office Mandarin (London: Harper Press, 2013), 72. 110. Chalmers, UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit: 6. 111. See the chapter on Franco-British defence co-operation by Dr. Samuel B.H. Faure, as well as the chapter on the EUs military ambition by Professor Janne Haaland Matlary, in this volume. 112.  See the chapter on the EUs military ambition by Professor Janne Haaland Matlary in this volume. 113. Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union: 336–349. 114.  Jacopo Barigazzi, ‘Mogherini Hails “Historic” EU Defense Pact’. Brussels: Politico, 13 November 2017; Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, ‘Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?’, in Policy Brief No. 033 (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017), 2. 115. Alister Miskimmon and John Roper, ‘The Stille Allianz Revisited’, in Rethinking Germany and Europe: Democracy and Diplomacy in a Semisovereign State, ed. Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, and Stephen Padgett (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188–191. 116. HM Government, National Security Capability Review (London: TSO, 2018), 16.

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Romann, Holger. ‘Hunderte Bundeswehrsoldaten nach Osteuropa’. Tagesschau. de, 2016. Available online at https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/nato-zurussland-103.html [accessed 25 July 2017]. Saxi, Håkon Lunde. ‘British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept’. Defence Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 171–197. Schreer, Benjamin. ‘The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO and the Use of Force’. In NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will, edited by Janne Haaland Matlarty and Magnus Petersson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Secretary of State for Defence. Cm. 101-I. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987. London: HMSO, 1987. Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon). ‘Additional UK Contributions to NATO Assurance and Deterrence Efforts’. Written Statement made on 24 June 2015. London: House of Commons, 2015. Shurkin, Michael. France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. ———. The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. Sikorski, Radoslaw. ‘Poland and the Future of the European Union’. Speech delivered to the German Bundestag, Berlin, on 28 November 2011. Warsaw: Polish MFA, 28 November 2011. Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 10 June 2015. Slk/Sb. ‘No Permanent NATO Troop Presence in Eastern Europe, Merkel Says’. Deutsche Welle, 3 September 2014. Smale, Allison. ‘Germany’s Man in the Middle’. International New York Times, 20 November 2014. Smale, Alison, and Steven Erlanger. ‘Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Loking Past Trump’. The New York Times, 28 May 2017. Statistisches Bundesamt [German Federal Statistical Office]. Statistisches Jahrbuch 2016 [Statistical Yearbook 2016]. Wiesbaden: German Federal Statistical Office, 2016. Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. ‘Save Our Trans-Atlantic Order’. The New York Times, 11 March 2015. Stone, Jon. ‘Minister for Brexit David Davis Appeared Unaware of How EU Trade Deals Actually Work’. The Independent, 14 July 2016. SZ. ‘Merkel will keine “Rosinenpickerei” bei Brexit-Verhandlungen zulassen’ [Merkel Will Not Allow “Cherry Picking” in Brexit Negotiations]. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 June 2016.

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Thatcher, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. London: HarperCollins, 1995. The Economist. ‘German Foreign Policy: A Lurch onto the World Stage’. The Economist, 28 February 2015. ———. ‘Little Britain’. The Economist, 4 April 2015. The Federal German Goverment. ‘Bundeswehr to Continue Training the Peshmerga’. Berlin: The Federal German Goverment, 26 January 2017. Available online at https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/ 2017/01_en/2017-01-11-mandat-irak_en.html [accessed 19 April 2018]. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Military Balance 2015. London: Routledge for IISS, 2015. ———. The Military Balance 2017. London: Routledge for IISS, 2017. ———. The Military Balance 2018. London: Routledge for IISS, 2018. UK Ministry of Defence. ‘UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation’. London: UK MoD, 2010. Available online at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation [accessed 27 September 2016]. Wagstyl, Stefan. ‘German Lawmakers Hit at May’s EU Security Stance in Brexit Talks’. Financial Times, 31 March 2017. Ward, Matthew. Statistics on UK-EU Trade. Briefing Paper Number 7851. London: House of Commons Library, 17 August 2017. WT. ‘Stille Allianz’. Wehrtechnik 27, no. 11 (November 1995): 13–18.

CHAPTER 7

A Special Partnership? The EU’s Military Ambition and the Role of Britain Janne Haaland Matlary

The field of defence policy is one where only nation-states are responsible actors in the sense of owning military assets and risking the lives of their own citizens. The soldier is always serving a state, despite almost always being deployed under the auspices of NATO, the UN, or the EU or a coalition of states. It is noteworthy that in the age of the nation-state there has never been any supranational military force. Indeed, the very hallmark of state sovereignty is the famous Weberian monopoly on the powers of violence on the part of the state—the police on the inside of the state border, the military defending the border and the sovereignty of the state as such. States do not want to integrate their military capacities and thereby depend on others if they can avoid it because their military forces are This chapter (the discussion of EU policy and the discussion of France) contains some excerpts from my chapters on the EU, Britain, and France in my book Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe Act Strategically? Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, UK. J. H. Matlary (*)  Blindern, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_7

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the ultimate guarantor of the state’s sovereignty. When the UN was founded there was a plan for a UN intervention force which never saw the light of day because states refused to give up sovereignty over military power. The UN must always ask for national military contributions to the operations it mandates. Likewise, the EU does not own the battle-groups that are on rotation and they can only deploy with unanimous support although the decision rule in this area allows some states to go ahead and deploy when permission is granted, so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC). In NATO, nation-states make sovereign decisions on contributions although there are some common capacities, such as AWACS planes, HQs, as well as an integrated military command structure. However, the main rule is that the relevant actor in security and defence policy remains the state. There is still no political will to move beyond this level in forging supra-national actors that own and command military capacities. It is therefore not very likely that the EU will have its own autonomous military force or defence union, as it is called by EU leaders. As stated, not even NATO, the world’s foremost military alliance, has its own forces. However, also in the EU we may envisage some kind of pooled military force and a solidarity clause like that of art 5 in the Washington treaty—in fact, the EU’s Lisbon treaty has such a clause, art 42.6 which entails such an obligation. Given this, the expectation is that Brexit will not matter very much regarding the British leadership role in security and defence in Europe. One may assume that the loss of general political influence that leaving the EU entails will make Britain intensify its efforts to enhance its already impressive role in this policy field by increasing efforts to make NATO even more important and by stressing the key role of the so-called ‘special relationship’ with the US. This is normal and natural as a policy strategy in such a situation, known from e.g. the case of Norway when a referendum opted for “no” to membership in the EU in 1994. The Foreign Office then did everything within its reach to strengthen bilateral ties with major European capitals as well as enhance one’s role in other international organizations (IOs).1 In addition, for Britain the choice is always Atlantic, given that a choice between Europe and the US must be made, as Johnson points out in his chapter. Thus, a sound assumption is that post-Brexit Britain will seek to maximize its international influence in areas where it plays a vital role; in particular everything to do with security and defence. Paul Cornish argues

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that “While it is not clear at this stage how the UK’s key strategic partnerships might evolve, there are nevertheless several features of the UK strategic outlook that seem likely to endure. Security policy and defence policy will be ‘business as usual’ whenever possible”.2 He adds that the Defence Review’s dictum “International by design” had been become even more important than before and points to the ‘platform’ character of NATO, as a basis for coalitions of the like-interested, able, and willing as something that “the UK is now more willing to see”—“NATO as something of a holding company, allowing the development of, and participation in, ‘clubs within clubs’ such as the Northern Group.”, he wrote (my emphasis).3 Indeed, as Heier’s analysis brings out very clearly, the UK is systematicaløly designing such a ‘club’ consisting of likeminded states in Northerrn Europe, the JEF. The British thinking is that states that may fight together must train together and act in common command structures, especially given the need for rapid decision-making and reaction. The JEF is the foremost example of such coalition-based military force today, initiated and led by the British. The other main integrative partnership is the French–British brigade which has shared command. In the JEF, however, the British lead and spearhead the new type of military force that is necessitated by cost factors and rapid reaction imperatives. Thus, while NATO, the UN, and even the EU remain as key IOs for military force generation and deployment, the development is clearly in the direction of forces that are able to react quickly and do war-fighting in a seamless manner. Moreover, there is the major problem of decision-making that Heier discusses—can large IOs be relies upon to act quickly and adequately? The answer is a clear no—when 27 or 28 states or an often stalled UN Security Council must act, efficiency is not what one expects. For instance, Norwegian experts fear a stalled NATO council (NAC) in a given situation, as Heier outlines, and therefore seek military integration in structures where decisions on deployment will be made when needed. The interest in the JEF on the part of the smaller member states is motivated not only by versatile and rapidly deployable fighting power, but also by the need for timely decision-making, something which is also brought out in Petersson and Møller’s chapter on Sweden and Finland. It is also known that Poland and other states deliberately seek parnterships with the US, as ‘alliances inside the alliance’. I wish to underline this point: Even NATO is a platform for such coalitions of the willing, able, and like-minded today, as pointed out by Cornish. This implies that a serious EU role in defence will need to overcome what we can call the

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decision-making problem as well as generate rapid reaction forces that can deploy within days with war-fighting capacities. If this is not possible, states in the EU and NATO as well as outside will continue to develop coalitions to meet their security needs. Does the EU need Britain? Does Britain need the EU? These are the salient questions with regard to the role that Brexit may play for Britain’s defence role. With regard to the EU, there is a need for British intelligence, as Britain is a leading international actor in this field, both with regard to the US and the “Five Eyes”. The EU itself has no intelligence capacity. In addition, British military assets are essential to any major military operation in Europe. In a bargaining perspective, there are thus British advantages in the security and defence field that the EU must take into consideration in the negotiations. The major question that this chapter asks, is the following: Is Brexit likely to diminish Britain’s leading role in security and defence policy? Thus, we are not investigating whether this role will be enhanced, but the contrary. Moreover, we do not analyze the other possible question; viz. that Britain’s general economic situation may become so adversely affected by Brexit that this impacts on its ability to spend on defence. Whether Brexit will lead to major economic loss for Britain and whether this in turn will lead to major cuts to defence, remain at the speculative stage at the time of writing and will therefore not be dealt with in this chapter. Other factors that remain important yet without much empirical basis for assessment so far, are these: Will Brexit mean that France will become the key security and defence actor in Europe and therefore able to forge a ‘special relationship’ with the US as it can then offer ‘access’ to the EU? In order words, will France replace Britain as the key transatlantic actor? Moreover, will France regulate and indeed determine Britain’s access to the EU’s security and defence policy after Brexit? Or will France continue to be the closest ally of Britain in this field? All these questions revolve around the importance that EU membership has for the general balance of power in Europe. Our main concern in this chapter is the particular question of whether the EU plays a role in the security and defence sector is important enough to warrant a loss of influence for a member state that leaves the union. Phrased differently; does the EU play a serious role in security and defence today and/or it is likely to play such a role? The question

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about the significance of Brexit for Britain’s defence role depends on two factors: One, will the EU develop a serious actor role in hard military power, and second, will it want Britain to play a key role in its security and defence policy? Logically there is also the connection between these two questions: When Britain leaves and if it does not retain a major role in the EU’s security and defence designs, can the EU play any role in this field? In the following I first analyse the EU’s role in security and defence policy, paying special attention to its present defence plans. Thereafter I discuss the current state of affairs regarding Brexit and Britain’s defence role in this process, and finally I offer a conclusion.

The EU: Moving Towards a Defence Union? Some may ask whether the EU role in security and defence warrants much analytical attention since it has never been prominent. The answer to this is that there has been a renewed emphasis on the idea of a military capacity for the EU recently. Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker has called for defence union several times and also the French president and the German chancellor have supported such an idea. The EU has also published a strategic document.4 The reasons for a new and enhanced EU role in defence are cited to be terrorism, Russian revisionism, and a need to control borders because of illegal mass migration as well as terrorism. The Lisbon treaty opens up the possibility for such, and over the last two years EU leaders have developed policy proposals along these lines. The European Parliament (EP) has voted to install a defence union5 and Commission president Juncker has proposed three scenarios for a new defence policy, one of them a union; after having stated that “soft power is not enough” at a meeting in Prague in the summer of 2016. The backdrop to this rather dramatic turn-around is both the current crisis in the EU, inter alia due to Brexit; as well as the clear need for the EU to be able to deal with hard power policy issues. In his so-called State of the Union address in 2016 Commission President Juncker stated that: “Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military might of others. (…) For European defence to be strong, the European defence industry needs to innovate.” The Commission’s rapporteur adds: “With a worsening security situation in Europe’s neighbourhood and a strong economic case for greater cooperation on defence spending

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amongst EU countries, the Commission believes now is the time to make strides towards a Security and Defence Union.” The EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Mogherini stated that “Security and defence are priorities for the European Union because they are priorities for all our citizens. Since last year, we are stepping up our European defence to be more and more effective as a security provider within and beyond our borders, investing more resources, ­ building cooperation among member states and taking forward a closer cooperation with NATO. The world is changing rapidly around us and we have to tackle new challenges every day: as the European Union, we have taken the responsibility to address these challenges.”6 Despite this, fairly little has materialized beyond funds for common defence procurement projects and calls for a European army, yet the political ambition remains very high. At the beginning of November 2017 the so-called Pesco agreement materialised—Pesco referring to Permanent Structured Cooperation. This is the term used for the ­decision-making procedure on security and defence issues in the Lisbon treaty. The term was invented by the French and the British in 2003 when these two states launched the ‘autonomous military capacity of the EU’ which consisted primarily of some EU military capacity which could be deployed very quickly (the so-called battle groups), but also included the EDA (European Defence Agency) which was intended to ‘streamline’ EU states’ defence spending. The current PESCO has a wider membership and is more ambitious, but is designed as a new effort to make defence spending more rational. Prior to this the foreign ministers of the EU had agreed to reform and expand the common foreign and security policy (CSFP) at their meeting in November 2016 and they also adopted a fund for EU defence cooperation, the European Defence Fund (EDF). Defence Policy and Strategy vs. Industrial Security Policy The history of the EU is replete with calls for common defence and security policy. This has always been a French priority, aimed at making the EU a ‘pole’ in a multipolar system of states. Indeed it was the main strategy of general de Gaulle whereby Europe would become a serious international actor on the global scene and a great power, not dependent on the US. French policy priorities have always been clear and consistent in this field, and France remains the most important factor in

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determining the future of the EU’s role in security and defence, something I will substantiate in the discussion below. Beyond France few states have invested much in the EU in this field. The Nordics Finland and Sweden were interested in transcending their self-imposed neutrality through the development of the CFSP and partook more than willingly in the sharpest peace-keeping operations that came along. Germany had a similar interest in developing legitimacy for contributing to international operations, but only for as long as these were labeled ‘crisis management’. Norway had been a participant in all EU defence initatives, even in the battle groups which are under EU command. Norway wants to compensate for not being a member and therefore seeks to be a ‘constructive’ contributor to everything the EU does. But EU defence policy is hardly the correct label for the EU’s role. It is important to distinguish between “top-down” strategic security and defence policy, typically what a unitary state does and which allows for deterrence, coercion, and military surprise; and “bottom-up” crisis management and capacity building, which is what the EU can undertake in a gradual and piecemeal fashion. In other words, even if the EU speaks about ‘defence’ policy and ‘defence union, it does necessarily mean that it develops the corresponding type of strategic and military capability. This distinction is very important and Faure makes it in his chapter: the ability to act militarily as a strategic actor is what we usually associate with security and defence policy, and the EU as a large group of 29 member states (absent Britain, 28) consisting of some non-aligned and neutral states cannot act as one, in a decisive, surprising, and forceful manner as long as it needs to agree at 29 and have military contributions from various states in an ad hoc manner. The decision-making structure ‘permanent structured cooperation’ designed initially by the British and the French in 2003 was intended to remedy this problem, but even if two or more states were willing to conduct a military operation, they still needed to acceptance of the other EU member states to do so. To agree on capacities for crisis management, for research and development, for common capacities, and for crisis management operations of a softer kind is something very different from strategic military action. The latter today demands the ability to deter great powers like Russia. Thus, it makes sense to distinguish sharply between defence policy and strategy in the classical, strategic sense, and industrial security policy, which is what the EU has so far been undertaking.

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“So What Do They Contribute?”—Military Contributions Determine Political Influence A former Norwegian NATO ambassador told me the story of how he once sat between the US and the British NATO ambassadors, listening to Belgium’s ambassador who seemed to take the floor on every issue. After a while the American leant over to the British ambassador, saying: “So what do they contribute?”—In NATO as well as in coalitions of war-fighting states this is the only relevant question: do you bring risk-willing, relevant military contributions to the operation?— The Belgians seldom do and were therefore expected not to pretend to be a major actor in NATO by taking the floor on every issue. The point here is simply that security and defence policy is ‘revealing’ in a way that other policy fields are not because it is very clear who participate in war-fighting and who not. The states within the ‘willing and able’-category are few and well-known,7 and decisions on operations are always made in capitals, not by IOs. Industrial security policy, however, resembles ‘normal’ policy in that market rules play a role and that all Western states may cooperate in this area. Britain8 has traditionally resisted developing an EU security and defence policy, seeing it as a competitor to NATO, challenge to the US, and sometimes as a French strategic move against the US. However, in the later 90s Britain played a key role in developing what was called an ‘autonomous military capacity’ in the EU. The reason for this was the calculation that Britain could enhance its power in the EU by inserting security and defence into the union—as Britain would play a key role here, it could also ‘trade’ influence in this area for access to other areas. Whether this was empirically true we do not know, but the fact is that PM Blair believed that offering to play a constructive and leading role in security and defence in the EU would imply that Britain’s influence in other areas in the EU would increase.9 Thus, the main point was not that the EU should rival NATO in any way, but that security and defence could aid British policy standing in general at a time when it decided to remain outside of the monetary union. The result of this policy was the only tangible military asset that the EU has (but mostly has not used), viz. the battle groups.10 The implication is twofold: One, Britain was instrumental in making the only military capacity that the EU has ever had, viz. the battle groups; and two, this example shows that state action is key in this policy

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field. It was the direct result of British-French cooperation where they ‘added’ Germany afterwards.11 In NATO, the willing and able category basically consists of the US, Canada, France, Britain, the Dutch, the Danes, Poles, and Norwegians.12 Contributions to war-fighting operations equal influence in NATO.13 In a study of NATO’s bureaucracy Mayer concludes that “treaty-based international organizations do remain vital sources of legitimacy and valuable tools for coordinating multilateral operations. (This is) in agreement with Matlary who contends that post-cold war NATO has been transformed into a rather loose, yet useful and legitimacy-providing arena for risk-willing members and partners”.14 To this must be added that it is a general trend today that multilateral diplomacy carries less importance than just some years ago, spear-headed by Trump’s ‘transactional’ approach and the return of great power politics. The UN is side-lined in world politics—to such an extent that presidents of Russia, India, and China all elected not to address the UN General Assembly in 2017. As in the Cold War, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is largely incapacitated by vetoes. In sum, international cooperation, especially in the security and defence area, is increasingly bilateral or based on coalitions among likeminded states, outside or inside IOs. This makes it less likely that the EU will develop a defence union, despite its leaders’ insistence to the contrary. EU Policy Proposals As stated, at present we see a ‘push’ for defence union on the part of EU leaders. In terms of defence policy and strategy, the EU does not have ‘autonomous military capacity’, as it advocates the need for now. Yet such an autonomy was announced already in 1998, in the so-called St. Malo declaration by president Chirac and PM Blair (ref). In the EU, 13 battle groups were decided in a bilateral Anglo-French cooperation scheme, each with 1500 men and a deployment time of 6 days. They are multi­ national and operate on a rotational basis. However, when we look at the deployment of these battle groups, it came to a standstill in 2006 and after this time neither France nor Britain seemed willing to ‘use’ the EU as an arena for operations any longer. The battle groups are the closest the EU has ever come to such autonomous capacity, and the irony is that

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this very concept was a British idea to begin with. Britain and France decided among themselves that this type of rapid intervention force was ideal for the EU and proceeded to ‘sell’ the idea to the Germans in order for them to be included and their support to be had.15 Yet the battle groups have barely been deployed for all those years—about 15 years since their inception—and they can therefore not be deemed a success by any definition of the term. In fact, they must be deemed a failure. The national interests in not deploying them account for this: the Germans were politically unable to deploy the German battle group on rotation in 2006 when it would have been needed in DR Congo and France has to ‘rescue’ the Germans by executing the operation themselves under the pro forma command of the German HQ in Potsdam, thereby letting the Germans save face.16 PM Gordon Brown refused to use the battle groups when he came into office in 2006 because he was much more skeptical to the EU than his predecessor.17 Thus, the battle groups were designed by the major states Britain and France, getting the Germans onboard after the concept was fully developed.18 Yet the same states in turn decided not to use them, all of which underlines the intergovernmental character of serious military activity and that only France seems to have maintained a steady interest in the said ‘autonomous military capacity’ of the EU. However, the EU’s role may develop more in the industrial security field. The attempt to rationalise spending on defence in Europe is an old EU idea, stemming from the EDA that was also designed by France and Britain in 2003 but which has never amounted to very much, given its voluntary character. At the time there was a clear difference in policy between the two states; the French favouring a centralised mechanism that could impose military integration in R&D while the British saw EDA as kind of a market facilitator where actors could meet and look for ways to cooperate. What the current policy of a common defence fund may become depends on national interest, but also on the role of the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Commission can act against state aids, and has recently struck against three cases of such in the defence field (source). Defence markets are naturally highly national and highly political, and should the Commission be able to take on defence market actors in trying to force more market rules on them, it would amount to something of a revolution. On November 13th 23 member states of the EU signed a letter of intent to form PECSO.19 In December the same year this was adopted

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by the Council with 26 signatories. PESCO is intended as a binding commitment to spend more wisely on defence by also integrating military capacities. It is presented as something of a milestone by the Commission, but when we look at the details, this is less supra-national than what it appears to be, for national sovereignty is underlined in the Commission’s description of the policy.20 PECSO is defined as being about cooperating and investing more in defence: What we are offering is a platform for joining investments, joining projects and in this manner, overcoming the fragmentation that is characterizing currently especially the environment of defence industry in Europe. In this way, the European industrial framework in the sector of defence will be enormously enabled to play a major role globally, and the European Union would then be, I think, really a credible security provider globally.21

Thus, PECSO is not about operational military deployments but basically investigating whether European states can cooperate in procurement, maintenance, and industrial policy. It defines itself as binding but as said, underlines that capacities remain national and that sovereignty is not compromised.22 It is thus clear that although PESCO is to be a binding treaty it is not a supra-national mechanism. As underlined in the Commission’s text on PESCO, military capacities remain national and subject to national sovereignty. Thus, PESCO is like a stronger version of EDA with more commitment, but it is also similar to force registers in that states put their national capacities on lists that are made available to NATO, the UN, and perhaps the EU. PESCO is mainly intended to get ‘more bang for buck’ in defence spending and hopes to diminish the number of planes, tanks, etc. in Europe, the number of which is a major problem, especially at times of increasing cost. PESCO has been presented with much fanfare by the EU, but it really contains little that is new or more binding than the old EDA which was not a success. There are also similar processes in NATO where the Americans have tried to get the Europeans to spend more but also to spend more wisely on defence through common projects. The only new element of the EU’s ‘second coming’ in this field is the money: There will be an economic incentive in the new fund, EDF, which will co-finance new products and projects if three or more states agree to work together on common capacities. Funding for this is secured until

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2020 at present, but this fund is not part of the normal EU budget and will have to be included as a permanent item from this time onwards if it is to survive. Yet the funds may work as an incentive for military integration, so this is a new policy that may have real impact. PESCO is accompanied Co-ordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) which builds on former initiatives in this field, the Capability Development Mechanism of 1999 and the European Capability Action Programme (ECAP). As a commentator puts it, “those two initiatives fell by the wayside, largely because member states balked at the prospect of revealing gaps in their national defence capacities”.23 This is an indication of the importance of sovereignty in this field. The CARD will use the European Defence Agency (EDA) as the hub for annual reporting on defence gaps—if states decide to open up about this. In sum, the current EU process reminds the observer of similar processes around the turn of the century. At that time the main actors were France and Britain. At that time the two protagonists wanted military action capability and designed the battle groups as well as the EDA. Neither was a success. The battle groups were only used when France was willing to take the real lead and the real risk, sometimes along with the British. Operation Artemis in DR Congo in 2003 still stands as the sharpest operation in EU history, but it is also the only one. When a German battle group was on rotation some time later and there was a need for it in Kinshasa, the Germans did24 not want to deploy to Africa and France effectively took the lead. When Gordon Brown replaced Tony Blair there was no further interest in an active role in the CSFP. These examples show two things: One, the EU lacks a strategic-military culture, and two, without national will nothing happens at the sharp end. The ‘old’ EDA failed because member states were not willing to integrate if it meant giving up sovereignty. Here the British model was one of coordination as in a market place whereas the French was one of top-down management. Perhaps the new initiatives will fare better, but it does not bode well for them when we regard how difficult it is for NATO members—members of a military defence alliance—to procure wisely. In the NATO context there has been an ongoing process of finding solutions to the ‘critical mass’-problem for smaller states for many years, but even in NATO this has to be a bottom-up process, not a topdown one. Yet NATO does not offer co-financing like the new EU fund. The EDF is the innovative part of current EU proposals, and the only element that is really new. The battle groups still exist, but are not

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used—by 2018 12 years have passed since a battle group was deployed, and this is such a long time that the policy of retaining these expensive groups on rotation ought to be reviewed. The EDA has not amounted to much either. The PESCO treaty is really only a renewed effort to construct EDA, this time with money as an incentive. Perhaps this will work, but even if so, none of these initiatives amount to a ‘defence union’ They remain firmly within a ‘bottom-up’ policy, here dubbed ‘industrial’. The EU’s Global Strategy: Devoid of Serious Strategic Thinking In June 2016, the EU published its Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, its first strategic document since the 2003 European Security Strategy (EES). The fact that 13 years passed before the EU renewed its strategy document is significant because it shows that strategy is not important in the EU. By comparison, NATO’s strategic concepts are re-written with an interval of some few years and they are structured around security and defence issues. The EU documents in strategy deal with foreign policy in general terms although they also emphasize defence issues. But if strategy guided EU policy in any way, there would have been a need for regular strategy documents in the organization. Why, then, an EU strategy? The 2003 strategy was made in response to the situation after Nine Eleven, in solidarity with the US. The answer why there is now a need for another strategic document is that there are new risks and threats in and around Europe that set the political agenda: ‘The purpose, even the existence, of our Union is being questioned… Our wider union has become more unstable and more insecure…This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a strategy’.25 Russian revisionism, Islamic terrorism, and mass migration shocks. In terms of its style, the document is very general and very rhetorical, using phrases like ‘this is no time for global policemen or lone warriors’ in the preface. It reads more like a pep talk promoting the virtues of the EU than a precise analysis of the reasons why the EU should become a strategic actor. It is not a profound document in terms of strategic interaction and it hardly mentions adversaries and how they interact strategically with the EU or Europe. This document, like its predecessor 13 year back, is rather glib and superficial and not analytical. The ter, ‘strategy’ in this document refers to policy, not strategic interaction with enemies or adversaries; and the term is not primarily

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concerned with the use of force. High Representative Mogherini makes the claim that the EU needs ‘strategic autonomy’, but what this means is never defined or explained. The scope of the document is general foreign policy itself: the EU will promote a secure Europe, foster societal resilience (which is never defined) in states in the East and South, promote conflict resolution within all dimensions, develop a cooperative regional order around Europe and do the same for international governance. These five policy themes are called the EU’s ‘vision’, and the document goes on to say that in order to deliver on them, it must ‘invest in a credible, responsive, and joined-up Union’. Such terms are usually what politicians’ talks are full of, but one would expect a more serious and analytical exercise when the author is the European Commission which is based on expert knowledge. The strategic concepts in NATO are the results of political processes and are as such, deeply marked by political compromise, yet read as vastly superior to the EU strategy in terms of analytic clarity and cohesion. Exactly how the very general goals of the EU are to be reached is never presented in any credible way: there is no presentation of Ways, Ends, and Means to reach strategic goals. It is asserted that ‘the EU will…guarantee the security of its citizens and territory’ and enhance its defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy, and strategic communications’. Although the term ‘strategic autonomy’ is used several times in the document, it is not explained even if this is the very key to what exactly the EU’s ambition in this field is. In addition to ‘joining up’ with other IOs, the EU is also going to develop military capacity of its own: ‘NATO remains the primary framework for most member states [yet] European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO’. Here one recognizes that the battlegroups, the only existing autonomous EU capacity, face both ‘procedural, financial, and political obstacles’ to being deployed. The fact is that these groups have not been deployed since 2006, 13 years ago; as discussed above. In sum, this strategy document does not amount to a strategy.26 It is very superficial and styled as a pep-talk or perhaps, as some sort of public diplomacy. It is disconcerting that the EU, being such an important actor in foreign policy and the leading economic actor along with China and the US in the world, can produce such an unprofessional strategic document. I say this not because I think the EU will become a major

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strategic actor, but because it is dangerous if the EU allows itself to publish something like this in all seriousness, because this shows how very far the EU still is from being able to act according to the demands that strategy imposes. Compared to NATO’s strategic concepts, or its conclusions after the 2016 Warsaw summit, there is a world of difference in terms of precision and clarity, although all these documents are the result of diplomatic bargaining processes. The EU documents on strategy do not specify which military capabilities the EU needs or the decision-making procedure for deploying military force. There is no mention of deterrence or military coercion. The EU’s leadership—Commission President Juncker and foreign representative Mogherini—have repeatedly talked about the EU becoming a ‘strategic actor’, developing a ‘defence union’, and getting ‘autonomous military action capacity’. Yet it is as if the seriousness of these terms, what they imply, is unknown to these politicians. They never define their terms: what do they really mean by e.g. ‘autonomous capacity’? One or more brigades that can be deployed quickly? An airforce, missiles? Sea power? Something that rivals NATO, in which case we speak about vitally important changes in the transatlantic relationship? It is the more alarming that such concepts are thrown around with great ease by leaders in Europe when the latter do not seem to understand the complexity of directing and using military force. The US defence secretary James Mattis asked the EU for a clarification of what they meant at the Munich security conference in February 2018.27 He received no answer. In conclusion, the EU will not develop a defence union as the term is normally understood, and its understanding of what strategy entails is not what is normally understood by that term. The more disconcerting and confusing it is that its leadership invokes these terms increasingly. I also listed France as a state that would opt against an EU defence union that rivals NATO. This is of key importance, for France is the architect behind what happens in the EU in security and defence policy:

The French Joker in the Deck In November 2017 France published a major strategic document, the Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale.28

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On the EU’s role in security and defence, the review offers the following analysis: France wants to intensify the EU’s work in this field, but describes the need for ‘pragmatic’ progress on this issue, a term that means ‘whatever is possible’ when used in diplomacy.29 France is undoubtedly the leading actor in developing the EU’s role in the security and defence field, as it always has been. President de Gaulle wanted European autonomy in hard security, and present-day French strategy uses the same language, referring to ‘une autonomie stratégique européenne’30 (a European strategic autonomy—my translation). Importantly, being autonomous here does not mean rivalling NATO, which is described as the key element of European security’.31 Yet France placed some weight on the defence clause of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 42.6, which it invoked after the terrorist attacks on Paris on 13 November, 2015. This little-known article is, in its wording, more stringent in terms of alliance obligations than NATO’s Article 5 which plays the pre-eminent role in Western deterrence. It is remarkable that France invoked the former article and not the latter after it was attacked. The case is similar to the 9/11 attack on Manhattan which elicited NATO’s activation of Article 5 the next day; however, the French opted to invoke the EU article instead. The reason is probably that France wanted to underline the need for European solidarity in fighting terrorism which is not a NATO concern, but more of an EU issue, given that it deals with domestic policy to a great extent. France’s plans for the EU, as articulated in the review, are however basically ‘bottom-up’ and voluntary. But there is a keen insistence that the EU develop an autonomous strategic culture and the EU’s document on strategy, adopted in 2016, is recognized.32 In the French strategic review there is however no suggestion of an integrated defence union, a ‘top-down’ type of creation, but rather a pragmatic approach that allows for individual participation in projects. France does not want supra-nationality in EU defence, but rather, as we have seen, to preserve national strategic autonomy. At the same time, however, it wants much more streamlining of member states’ defence policies in order to create a common actor capability in the EU. It is clear that France is pursuing the old Gaullist vision of an EU that can act alone and take its own initiatives, but not rivalling NATO. In this understanding, EU common action is important; but in this review France outlines and describes various partnerships that it pursues and does not challenge the primacy of NATO. Moreover, it underlines that the special

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partnership with Britain is vitally important, as Britain is the only other European state with a nuclear deterrent, a permanent seat on the UNSC, a global scope, and global interests. Further, the US remains a vital link, and there are other partners as well. The key issue is the criterion of military cooperation that France cites: “Dans la nouvelle Europe qui se dessine, la France doit proposer des partenariats de défense ambitieux à ses partenaires, selon une logique différenciée, et en priorité aux pays européens volontaires et capables” [In the new Europe that is being drawn up, France can propose ambitious parternships with its partners according to a logic of differentiation, prioritizing European states that are willing and able] (my translation and emphasis).33 It is clear that France prefers to cooperate with states that bring strategic and military ability to the table along with interesting military capacities. This is also discussed in detail in Faure’s chapter in this book. In terms of military procurement, the EU programmes provide a useful format, and France has developed detailed policy regarding what can be integrated and shared and what must be kept under national control. This is impressive, as few other states, if any, have such a clear view of what sovereignty requires in this age of economic pressure for military integration. A chart depicting French ambitions for technological and industrial cooperation shows four different categories—areas that require sovereign control; areas that involve cooperation with other states; areas in which there is ‘mutual dependence’; and finally, areas that can be ­market-based—and classifies capabilities in all five domains of defence (land, air, sea, cyber, and space) into this matrix.34 From this analysis, it is very clear that the French place great value on autonomous strategic ability, both in terms of decision-making independence (from public opinion, parliament, and dependence on other states) and in terms of owning and controlling vital military capabilities. Moreover, France believes that their partners should match this strategic autonomy—be able to decide on the use of force quickly and for strategic reasons and have useful capabilities to bring to an operation. Thus, France is not for a rival defence union to NATO, but wants to make the Europeans into strategic actors that pay more for and integrate more in their defence structures. Everything that France stands for in this review is in conformity with British and American interests, unlike in the time of de Gaulle. Whether France will rival the British in vying for a ‘special relationship’ with the US, remains to be seen—and to be decided by the US, not by France.

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In sum, France holds the key to the development of an EU defence union and strategic role, but as we have seen, France distinguishes between defence as ‘bottom-up’ industrial policy and defence policy as strategic action. France intends the EU to act as a vehicle for more military integration and modernization and the EDF is the major means to this end. Unlike the Gaullist period, however, France today does not pursue an EU policy in defence at the expense of NATO and the US. Its requirements for operational military action are that partners are ‘willing and able’ which limits the choice of partners to the few states in Europe in this category. We can therefore conclude that France will continue to promote military integration in Europe in terms of more rational R&D and procurement systems, but not that it will seek to ‘beef up’ the battle groups in order to create an EU intervention force.

Germany and the East-Central Europeans Do Not Contribute to an EU Defence Union This is the more likely since its major partner in the EU, Germany, has made the unprecedented move of announcing that it will not reach the 2% GDP spending target in NATO.35 The defence minister Ursula von der Leyen frankly admits that “we reached a low point in our defence expenditure in 2015 with 1.1% of GDP…next year, in 2019, we will probably reach 1.3%”. The official aim of Germany now is to reach 1.5% in 2025.36 Germany spends about the same amount on defence as France—around 40 billion euroes per annum. This fact speaks volumes about the difference in strategic priorities between the two countries— Germany being the most populous and richest country in Europe while France struggles economically and has about half the population. Moreover, the operational readiness of the German armed forces is woefully inadequate: none of sic submarines is combat-ready, only 9 out of 15 frigates were, and only 95 out of 244 tanks could be deployed in battle, according to reports cited in The Times.37 As Saxi concludes in his chapter, the main explanation for the lack of priority put on defence in German politics remains “a deep-seated culture of anti-militarism (that) continues to impair Germany’s use of military power in foreign policy”.38 Thus, with regard to Germany, France does not have a likeminded ally in building an EU defence union in the sense usually attributed to this concept.

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Moreover, the member states in East-Central Europe are very wary of anything resembling a rivalry of NATO. Poland, the Baltics, and Romania are all extremely close to the US and rely on it for their ­security guarantee, and they forge as close bilateral ties with the US as ­possible. Both Poland and Romania are host nations for missile bases in the NATO ‘shield’, a controversial move with regard to Russian ­reactions. Also Denmark remains a very loyal ally of the US and will resist EU moves in defence not favoured by the EU. In sum, there is no political basis for a defence union in the EU today—much less so than in 2003 when Britain and France together launched the battle groups. Also, we can safely assume that the US will not allow any duplication of NATO, as indicated by defence secretary Mattis’ quest for clarification about EU plans mentioned above. Thus, we can conclude that the EU will not seek to replace NATO. Yet its leaders talk as if they want to do this, and the Lisbon treaty’s art 42.6 is in its formulation even more binding than NATO’s art 5. Yet no state relies on the 42.6 choice because there is no real security guarantee behind it. Were it not so, neither Sweden nor Finland would have sought NATO guarantees so eagerly, as discussed in Møller and Petersson’s chapter.

Criticism of Trump Does Not Lead to an EU Defence Role The anti-Trump sentiment in Europe is often assumed to result in a strong defence role for the EU. Chancellor Merkel certainly talks like this will happen, and the recent transatlantic disagreements over Iran and Jerusalem are serious indeed. European states agree among themselves on both issues—to retain the Iran agreement and to keep Tel Avis as Israel’s capital. Britain as well as France and Germany pleaded with Trump to keep to the policy line pursued on both these issues. These disagreements will however not result in a break between the US and Europe in security and defence policy. Europe and the US conduct ‘trade wars’ from time to time, as may be the case regarding Iran also, but these interest-based conflicts do not spill over to defence. The same is true for Middle East foreign policy interests: one may differ, but these issues are not of existential importance to neither side and certainly not to the Europeans that play no key role in the region compared to the US. Given the above, will Brexit matter for Britain’s defence role?

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Brexit Does Not Mean Exit? British Positions on EU Defence As discussed in the Introduction, the period after Brexit has been marked by much emotion and lack of appreciation for the democratic choice of the people, and perhaps also by general confusion on both sides of the Channel since this is the first time a member state leaves the EU. The exit-clause was activated by PM May in March 2017, and in the formal letter there was mention of the field of security and defence as one that may suffer as a result. A debate on this ensued in Britain: was this a veiled threat? Or an argument in negotiations, a tit-for-tat proposal? Should one point of how much the EU needs Britain at the outset of the process? After some time the British position seemed to have been reversed regarding this. The PM’s Lancaster House speech on January 17th, 2017, had emphasized the need for future cooperation also in the security and defence field, and in September the same year the emphasis in her much-quoted Florence speech was on cooperation and finding “winwin” solutions with the EU. She offered a sum of 20 billion pound as ‘down payment’ before negotiations started and full cooperation on security and defence. A government white paper entitled Foreign policy, defence and development: A future partnership paper was issued. It stated that “the UK wants to build a new, deep and special partnership with the EU” (my emphasis).39 The white paper lists British contributions to the EU’s CFSP, and they are major ones: commanding operation Atalanta, leading contributor to Operation Sophia and the training of the Libyan coast guard, key leadership roles in the EU operation Althea and to missions in Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo and Somalia; provision of operational HQs for EU battle groups and provided HQ at Northwood for an EU military exercise in 2017, provides strategic airlift, inter alia to the French-led Operation Barkhane in Mali, and drives progress on NATO-EU cooperation. It goes on to list British assets in foreign and development policy, and then to the key theme of what this new and special partnership should look like: This should be “deeper” than any such relationship in existence— here Norway is an example with its participation in the battle groups and in the EDA—but as said, the British want a deeper relationship than this. It should also be “unprecedented”,40 defined as “breath-taking in

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cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development, and in the degree of engagement that we envisage”.41 In particular, “the EU and Britain should have close consultations on foreign and security policy issues with the option to agree joint positions on foreign policy issues”.42 On defence, the British want to contribute to the EU’s “Force Catalogue”—which must be a way of participating in PESCO, discussed below. It is further suggested to work with the EU “during mandate development and detailed operational planning”.43 Further, Britain offers to work on the EU-NATO relationship where a clear division of work is of paramount importance, as “NATO will continue to be the cornerstone of our security”.44 On defence industrial development the British suggest that they participate in EDA and their projects, the Commission’s EDF, and the European Defence Research Programme and the European Defence Industrial Programme. In short, the bid is for British participation to the fullest in all EU foreign, security, and defence policy. In the paper’s conclusion it is very clearly spelt out that Britain wants to continue the existing relationship with the EU and expand it, emphasizing the mutual interests of the EU and the British side. “What the UK is offering will be unprecedented in its breath….45 and in its depth, in terms of the engagement…the UK’s ambition is to work as closely as possible with the EU”. This White Paper is adamant that Britain be involved to the fullest extent possible in everything that develops in the EU in the security and defence field. This can be interpreted in three ways: First, as a rather desperate move by a demandeur in negotiations where the EU is the stronger party; second, as a negotiating move in the area where the EU needs Britain the most; and third, as a nice gesture with little real importance since EU defence policy will not mean much and Britain therefore has nothing to lose by being conciliatory towards the EU in this field. The truth is probably a combination of motives one and three: Britain is the demandeur in the Brexit negotiations but it does not fear that the EU will all of a sudden compete with NATO and the US’s predominance in Europe. Therefore, it is ‘risk-free’ to associate itsdel with everything the EU does, and such association may also entails a possibility to influence EU developments. The old adage that there should be no duplication with NATO’s primacy is still of key importance: whatever the EU does in this field, it must complement and not challenged NATO.

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What France thinks about this is very important as it is the main actor on defence in Europe besides Britain. Britain’s position s crystal-clear: The transatlantic relationship should continue and prevail—the US through NATO guarantees Europe’security—in close cooperation with Britain. Britain has nothing to lose and much to gain by being fully associated with the EU’s development in security and defence—by being a player, it can influence, at least indirectly, and by being “willing and able”, gain positively in the EU. Britain certainly knows that the EU needs it and not vice versa in this field, and in this respect the situation is similar to Tony Blair’s ideas back twenty years ago when he inserted Britain in EU policy in this field. He wanted to gain influence by being willing to cooperate in the main field of strength for Britain. At that time he wanted to compensate for the lack of participation in the Euro; now Britain wants to compensate for leaving the EU as well as to ensure that EU security and defence policy does not rival that of NATO. In short, Britain has everything to gain and nothing to lose by being willing to participate in all aspects of EU security and defence policy. During the Brexit negotiations that finally started at the end of 2017 and really only got underway in 2018 defence and security played little if any role. From the British side the position was extremely open, as detailed above: Britain offered its full cooperation on all aspects of EU foreign and security policy. On the EU side, however, the tone was very different. The Commission’s negotiation stance was marked by a ‘zerosum’ strategy, both in economic affairs as well as in the few instances where security issues were relevant. For instance, the EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier even suggested that Britain could not remain part of the important Galileo satellite programme after leaving the EU.46 This was a very hostile move by the EU, as the argument was that Britain could not be trusted with the handling of sensitive data because British companies bidding for contracts under the space programme would be outside EU legislative control. “To justify this by claiming that the EU may not be able to trust Britain with information is obviously absurd”, writes The Times reporter.47 Britain has contributed 12% of the development cost of Galileo but is confronted with a threat to exclude it from all contracts, many of which were to be awarded in 2018. Britain found this to be very unreasonable, but Mr. Barnier replied that “the UK decided unilaterally and autonomously to withdraw from the EU. This implies leaving its programmes as well”.48 Yet he also wanted Britain to continue to pay into the EU’s development programmes for overseas aid.49

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The British response to this is to aim at developing its own satellite program with allies like Australia, according to The Times.50 This may be a response to the EU’s tough negotiating strategy. The ‘tit-for-tat’ response is a logical one, given the unfriendly EU stance. At the time of writing in mid-2018, the Brexit negotiations are so far not very promising for Britain. It has offered a ‘win-win’ position from the very beginning, albeit unsure of what kind of trade regime it wants, but in the security and defence field the British position has been one of maximum cooperation with the EU. On the EU side there has been little interest in this, but it must be added that this policy field has not figured much in the talks. Yet the Galileo case shows that the EU prefers to play ‘hardball’. This can only imply that Britain seeks alternative arrangements with partners, and such a position also implies that the EU weakens its own defence union possibilities. Moreover, the EU Commission seemed to agree that Britain cannot participate in the EDF, according to The Telegraph’s reporting on May 28th, 2018.51

Conclusions: EU’s Defence Prospects Dimmer Than Before The way to assess the likelihood of whether such lofty proposals as a defence union in the EU may actually materialize is to look at the requirements for substance that they entail. Russia cannot be deterred unless one is able and willing to do so militarily. One cannot control a border without sensors, police, intelligence, and enough man power on site. The EU does not have any record of rapid deployment in sharp operations, of real control of its outer border (Schengen) or of anti-terror measures. It is therefore clear that the envisioned defence union is a chimera. Where the EU can harmonise and cooperate is in R&D, procurement, and perhaps common capacities, but there are NATO processes in this area as well as coalitions like NORDEFCO and the Northern Group. Thus, the only ‘added value’ of the new EU package of three initiatives (CARD, EDF, PESCO) is the money for co-financing. The British show keen interest in participating in all aspects of EU foreign, defence and security policy, as the White paper discussed above shows. This keenness could hardly be overstated: one wants a deeper, broader, and indeed a very special partnership. When analyzing these

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recent EU proposals, such cooperation should be feasible and uncontroversial on both sides. The EU policies proposed do not contain any strategy for defence, be it military operations or deterrence or defence of Europe. They therefore do not challenge the role of NATO and transatlantic primacy. The fact that the EU would like to develop what is called a defence union in the long run remains conjecture, not underpinned by real military planning or strategy. The EU can however act as a civilian power, on a logic of market harmonization: It makes sense to spend more wisely, to integrate in R&D, to develop common defence capacities. This is a continuation of the planning processes of the EDA where networked information and the creation of a semblance of a market place might lead to more rational economic policy-decisions. If Britain is not part of this work, the EU loses a lot, as Britain is the leading defence industrial actor in Europe. And the British would like to participate, probably on the logic that when leaving the EU, one must compensate as much as possible. This is what led Norway not only to making the EEA agreement on participation in the internal market, but also to full participation in EDA and in the Nordic battle group. In sum, it would seem very clear that both the EU and Britain would benefit from a ‘special partnership’ with the EU. For Britain this implies a possibility of influencing the development of the EU initiatives, not least making sure that they do not compete with NATO. It also provides Britain with another arena in which to play a leading role. However, the greatest advantage accrues to the EU, for Britain is and remains a vital security and defence actor in Europe: It is among the biggest spenders on R&D in defence along with France and Germany: together they represent more than 90% of total spending. Clearly the EU should not want to lose Britain as it now enhances its role in this area through PESCO, CARD, and the EDF. The “removal of UK defence capabilities for the EU inventory..represents a considerable dimunition of collective EU defence capability that some estimate will be reduced by a quarter”.52 While there is a need to find new modalities for Britain’s participation in all these defence and security configurations there is little doubt that the EU needs Britain more than vice versa in this field. This is why Tony Blair changed British EU policy in this field back in 1998 when he signed the St. Malo declaration with France on the development of EU military capacity. He realized that the EU needed Britain in this policy area and that contributions here would bring influence. Now that Britain

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is leaving the EU there is no general influence to be had as a ‘side-­effect’ of a strong presence in EU security and defence policy, but I would argue that such a presence nonetheless brings good-will and influence beyond EU formal meetings where Britain no longer will be at the table. As such, the argument of Blair still holds. The role that Britain can play in influencing the direction of EU security and defence policy also matters, in fact it is vital in the sense that competition NATO-EU must be avoided. The US under Trump has received major criticism in Europe, especially from the EU’s president Tusk and German chancellor Angela Merkel. The dismay over Trump is a direct cause of much of the talk about autonomous EU defence policy and defence union. Russia revisionism is another cause. The ‘benign’ development of the EU in this policy area is that it complements and does not challenge NATO in any way: NATO and therefore US primacy in Europe remains. Germany is in two minds about American security dependence for the time being. British influence in EU security and defence policy can ensure that the division of labour between NATO and the EU remain as it has been so far: NATO is the serious defence actor based on art 5 solidarity, it does ‘the heavy lifting’; whereas the EU tries to develop security policy for second order issues such as terrorism, migration shocks, and procurement improvement. Importantly, France is likely to side with Britain and the US in this. The EU is not a unitary actor and cannot mimick one by acting through a small ‘directoire’. NATO has one actor which is of paramount importance and some few others that form an inner core: The US, Britain, France, Holland, Poland, Norway and Denmark make up the able and willing in war-fighting. The importance of like-mindedness and the ability to act quickly and conduct operations together cannot be underestimated when we talk about strategic action such as deterrence, coercion, and military operations. This is not the type of security and defence policy that the EU will be able to conduct and it should not pretend that it will develop a so-called ‘defence union’ unless that term means something very different from normal usage. Britain will have to develop the terms of its role in the various EU defence initiatives, including Europol, but there is no reason why it should achieve the special partnership it wishes for as this is in the EU interest. But as we have seen above, the case of Galileo indicates the opposite. The EU continues to pursue a ‘zero-sum’ negotiating strategy over Brexit in general, also in the defence area where it needs Britain.

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Notes













1. I know this from my own experience, being deputy foreign minister in the 1990s. 2. Statement at the Leangkollen defence conference, Oslo, February 2017, reported in Security Brief 2-2017 from the convener, the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, p. 1. 3. Ibid., p. 2. 4. 2016 find title. 5. Foreign affairs MEPs want the EU to respond faster and more robustly to real threats, which they say requires European armed forces to work together better. “Two thirds of EU citizens would like to see greater EU engagement in matters of security and defence,” says the text, referring to June 2016 Eurobarometer survey. 6. Commission report on EU defence Union. 7. See e.g. J.H. Matlary and M. Petersson (2013) NATO book. 8. From here onwards this chapter (the discussion of EU policy and the discussion of France) contain some excerpts from my chapters on the EU, Britain, and France in my book Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe Act Strategically? Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, UK. 9.  See e.g. my book Security Policy in the European Union: In the New National Interest, Palgrave Macmillan, paperback 2013. 10. J.H. Matlary, In the New National Interest: EU Security Policy Dynamics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, paperback edition 2013. 11. See Matlary, op.cit., for details on this political process. 12.  A former Norwegian NATO ambassador tells the story of how the Belgian ambassador always took the floor in debates, opining on this or that. Belgium is a very small military actor. Once he overheard the American ambassador say to the British: “So What Do They Contribute?” 13. See the discussion in Matlary and Petersson (2013). 14. “Conclusion: NATO’s Transformed Vision of Security”, Sebastian Mayer, pp. 309–310, in Mayer (ed) (2014), NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics. The Changing Provision of Security, Palgrave Macmillan. 15. Matlary, op.cit., 2013. 16. Ibid. 17.  Details about this are found in my book European Union Security Dynamicsi op.cit. 18. Ibid. 19.  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/13/ defence-cooperation-23-member-states-sign-joint-notification-on-pesco/. 20. Op.cit. 21. Mogherini at a summit in Latvia on September 7th, 2017.

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22. Fact Sheet on PESCO, European Commission, November 13th, 2017. 23.  R. Beckmann and R. Kempin (2017), “EU Defence Policy Needs a Strategy”, September, SWP Comment. 24. Matlary, J.H. European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest, op.cit. 25.  Introduction to the 2016 strategy by f. Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for External Affairs. 26. “EU-Kommission: Europa kann militarische macht warden”, FAZ, June 12th, 2017. 27. FAZ, February 15th, 2018. 28.  This document, which was ordered by the new president, Macron, is shorter than the white paper, but it presents an updated view of threats and risk and was ordered by the new president Macron. 29. Ibid., pp. 59–60, numbers 185–189. 30. Ibid., see heading on p. 58: La construction d’une autonomie strategique europeenne. 31. Ibid., p. 60. 32.  “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: Global Action for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, EU Commission, adopted by the member states in June, 2016. 33. Ibid., p. 63: “In the new security architecture that is developing France will propose various formats for integration to various states according to the criterion of the ‘willing and able’”. 34. Ibid., p. 69. 35. “Germany Admits It Will Miss NATO Spending Target”, The Times, May 15th, 2018, David Charter, Berlin correspondent. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. (No further source is provided for these statistics). 38. Saxi, here, p. 17 (in draft). 39. HM Government, September 2017 (date?). 40. Ibid., p. 18. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid, p. 19. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., p. 22. 46. “By Threatening to Exclude Britain from the Galileo Satellite Programme, Brussels Is Playing Games with European Security”, The Times, May 9th, 2018, and “EU Warns UK ‘Cannot Be Trusted’ with Sensitive Data”, The Telegraph, April 21st, 2018. 47. Ibid. 48. Reuters, May 14th, 2018.

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49. Ibid. 50.  The Times, “RAF Takes Control in Space”, May 21st, 2018. 51.  The Telegraph, May 28th, 2018, The Commission shuts Britain out of the defence fund. 52. RAND Europe, Defence and Security After Brexit: Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK’s Decisions to Leave the EU. Black, J. et al., 2017, Cambridge, UK.

PART II

Britain’s Coalitions

CHAPTER 8

Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends? Tormod Heier

Introduction This chapter analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) effort to forge closer ties with smaller states in Northern Europe. The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) manifests UK’s quest for integrating more troops into its command structure, but partners’ favourable view of this concept may also have a negative impact on Britain’s leadership role in Europe. The chapter argues that the JEF is a concept born of economic necessity for the UK and for its partner states, but for different reasons: While the UK sees the JEF as a ‘gap-filler’ for independent action, partner states see the JEF as a key arena for ‘networking,’ in case military reinforcements should be required on short notice. Russian assertiveness in Europe and beyond as well as uncertainty on where the US administration under president Donald Trump may go, underscore these sentiments even more. At its core, the JEF offers a coherent multinational framework for exploiting the fruits of political partnership and military jointness. The small states of the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the three Baltic

T. Heier (*)  Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_8

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countries, as well as Sweden and Finland—a ‘cluster of eight’ trusted partners that benefit from relations forged diplomatically, historically, politically and militarily—have been invited into the UK chain of command.1 The idea behind the JEF, introduced by Chief of Defence Staff (2009–2013) General Sir David Richards in 2012, is to create ‘a framework into which others fit’.2 Seeking a deeper integration than previously achieved,3 the JEF exceeds the ambition of the 2010 UK-French Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). While the CJTF has a combined command structure,4 the JEF partners are to operate ‘embedded’ under British command.5 This means that the UK and its partner states will integrate operations across the domains of air, sea and land. As the key pillar of any UK operation abroad, economic ambitions of ‘doing more with less’ may impact Britain’s independence. This is worth scrutinising because while such rhetoric is often used to display political vigour, strategic vision and statesmanship, it often conceals many vulnerabilities. Called ‘a force of friends’ by the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence (2014–2017) Sir Michael Fallon,6 the JEF follows a broader pattern of British forces gradually becoming more ‘international by design’.7 The Strategic Defence and Security Review introduced ‘defence engagement’ as a core military task for the first time in 2015,8 ensuring that partnerships will become ‘central to all that we do’.9 Britain’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union incentivised bilateral partnerships even more, a point elaborated in more detail by Haaland Matlary in her chapter. The UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, which was a ‘strategic handrail’ in the initial JEF period,10 makes the point that ‘strong alliances and partnerships are more important than ever’.11 Unilateral deployments are meant to be the exception rather than the rule.12 As this chapter argues, this change is not because the UK wants a more multinational approach, even though shared interests is portrayed as the primary factor. Due to critical force reductions and chronic economical shortcomings within the British Armed Forces, the change is rather out of necessity. Using Norway as a case study, this chapter seeks answers to the following two questions: what are the motives for the JEF as seen from both a UK and a partner state perspective and what impact might different motives have on the UK’s leadership role in Europe? It begins with a categorisation of Britain’s partner states and a short overview of existing research, moves on to present UK and Norwegian perspectives and ends with conclusions with regard to the UK’s leadership role in Europe.

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Categorising the JEF’s Cluster of Eight Using Norway as a case to generalise about JEF partner states’ motives is not without problems. Indeed, each partner state is unique. Some are NATO members, others are EU members and some are both. Moreover, their cooperation will likely be tested by divergent strategic aims as dictated by geopolitical vulnerabilities to Russia. For example, whilst Finland, Norway and the Baltic states share a border with Russia, the geographical position of other states such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands creates differing strategic imperatives. As another example, Finland, Sweden and Norway attempt to maintain a nationally balanced defence force, whilst other countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and the Baltic states, have abandoned this ambition. Finally, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands are Atlantic and maritime oriented, whilst Sweden, Finland and the Baltics are more focused towards the ‘heartland’. Geography matters. As far as the JEF is concerned, three commonalities make the ‘cluster of eight’ a sufficiently homogeneous group. First, in the event of a bilateral dispute, episode or crisis with Russia, all of the abovementioned states would suffer from political, diplomatic and military inferiority. Their negotiating power, defined as their diplomatic room for manoeuvre,13 becomes considerably larger once they join a broader operational framework such as the JEF. Second, these states also suffer from serious shortcomings in their national defence structures. Lack of resilience makes time a critical factor. Therefore, in the event of a bilateral crisis with Russia, all of these states will reach out for consultations and prospects for reinforcements among larger powers. These factors are of particular importance, because neither military assistance nor serious consultations can be based upon ad hoc considerations. Nor can they be made on the eve of action, or when a crisis may or may not turn into a war.14 Credible reinforcements or consultations can neither be trusted nor expected to be accomplished on a timely basis. Hence, as in the case of Sweden and Finland, consultations or subtle expectations of reinforcements from the West cannot even be mentioned for fear of Russian reactions or domestic turmoil.15 Swedish and Finish characteristics are explored in more detail throughout Møller and Petersson’s chapter. Nevertheless, no matter how the member of the cluster defines their national security interests, being part of a British chain of command extends its room for manoeuvre. Although JEF is a framework for

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a rapidly deployable multinational force, capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including conventional deterrence, warfighting, crisis management, security cooperation and humanitarian assistance, there is no denying that for Northern Europe Russia is the defining parameter for the JEF.

Previous Research A vast amount of literature has been devoted to the broader phenomenon of partnerships and defence engagement. In its essence, defence engagement is about coping with chronic austerity and exploiting scarce resources more effectively. This is particularly so among like-minded states that suffer from the same problem. Indeed, the average cost of sophisticated warfighting materiel increases 3–5% above annual inflation. This means that the UK, like all other states, suffers from a steady decline in absolute defence spending (unless the inflation is compensated by an annual growth in the defence budget of 3–5% each year, which in the case of the UK has been set to 0.5%).16 As a result, partnerships have become an essential prerequisite for defence funding because national forces such as logistics, medical services and maintenance, cannot be scaled down at the same rate as a mechanised division or an aircraft carrier group.17 In relative terms, therefore, the overhead costs for the few remaining combat units increase, which again undermines states’ ability to maintain a sovereign force. The wider implications that derive from this logic are often neglected, particularly when it comes to constraints on independent action. Being confined to policy, so-called pooling and sharing tends to ignore the unpredictable dynamics arising from like-minded states going to war or dealing with a crisis for different reasons. Much research has been done on national constraints in ‘out-of-area’ operations.18 Important insights have also been made by a plethora of think-tanks, including numerous accounts of how to ‘streamline and focus [defence] efforts’, and what ‘the best chance of success will be’.19 But the literature seldom discusses force integration in a context of national peril. It thereby fails to unveil the unpredictable and dynamic interaction between sovereign patrons and dependent clients, all of which face the same dilemma: avoiding crises that are too big to handle alone, but too small or too serious for a patron to engage in.

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Putting Britain’s defence engagement into a context defined by states bordering Russia allows us to scrutinise the JEF in a contemporary, authentic and realistic environment. This is a context where partner states’ expectations of British solidarity are pitted against Whitehall’s demands for flexibility and freedom of action. It is a context where national priorities become more pressing, and thus more important than solidarity and collective ideals. Under such circumstances, the JEF becomes a mechanism by which partner states’ interests are funnelled through the chain of command to impact British priorities and British courses of action. This context allows us to challenge the political expectations of like-mindedness, mutual trust and cohesiveness. Such expectations are often used to describe deeper partnerships to the public, but which often seem to be exercises in political rhetoric rather than to convey any real substance.20 That said, the JEF is designed to complement NATO and if a crisis escalates to collective defence and ‘Article 5,’ the JEF may offer a ‘phase 0’ undertaking with follow-on NATO forces replacing them in due course. The operational perspective of such an endeavour is scrutinised in more detail in Cantrill and Lockwood Meyer’s chapter. But such operations are not without challenges, because few states welcome other states’ access to their command structure unless they are forced to. In the political debate however, this kind of dependence is sometimes portrayed as positive. Britain’s pamphlet, Joint Expeditionary Force (2017), advocates ‘to pack a more powerful punch’ for UK security.21 However, the substance and reliability of such statements are seldom thoroughly discussed. Nor are these statements challenged within a context where British partners are facing an existential crisis and are forced to make harsh choices ‘here and now’. The extent to which the UK and its partners are able to provide a ‘powerful punch’ under such circumstances remains an open question. A viable strategy for any JEF member is therefore to get ‘more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest’.22 For Britain, this means that each partner in the JEF will regard the British command structure as a potential ‘force multiplier’ in the event of a bilateral crisis with Russia. Lawrence Freedman’s definition of strategy as ‘the art of creating power’ is thus suitable to our case. It allows us to go beyond the narrow perception borrowed from Clausewitz, where ‘clashes between opposing wills’ mainly occur between friends and foes.23 On the contrary, as the UK and its partner states have entered

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the JEF for different reasons, ‘fog and friction’ will also arise within a ‘force of friends’. As Britain’s Armed Forces have become ‘international by design’, a point scrutinised even more in Johnson’s chapter, the implications of deeper partnerships are worth scrutinising.

The ‘Gap-Filling’ Motive The JEF can be seen as a British ‘gap-filling’ instrument that addresses the dual pressures of financial austerity and demand for more forces. By inviting smaller states into the chain of command, Britain can fill shortages of personnel, material or critical competence and deploy a cohesive force on short notice. Showing regional leadership on this issue allows the UK to maintain unity of command and sustain an independent force, thereby avoiding a more complicated dual leadership model, as in the shared UK–French CJTF framework. While the UK–French relationship is explored in more detail in Faure’s chapter, the ‘gap-filling’ motive in this chapter can be explained by structural and process-based factors. Structure refers to the physical presence of land, sea and air forces. By contrast, process refers to acts by which a force’s physical presence translates into a tangible political outcome; this rests on skills, competencies and experiences that are ingrained in the military profession.24 With regard to structure, reductions in forces, the suspension of procurement programmes and the elimination of entire platforms have created severe capability gaps in Britain’s Armed Forces. Even though Britain’s 2015 defence budget was the world’s fifth largest,25 and there was a desire to maintain a full spectrum force, the UK’s sovereign force for conventional high intensity operations has eroded. In written evidence presented to the House of Commons, the deputy director-­general of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Professor Malcolm Chalmers, pointed out that Britain’s military capabilities are ‘now primarily designed to be used as contributions to collective operations, rather than in defence of uniquely national interests’.26 By inviting ‘gap-fillers’ into the command structure, the JEF facilitates higher readiness and better sustainability throughout operations. Additional capacity from other states not only strengthens Britain’s legitimacy on the eve of a deployment, but also makes the tactical performance more agile. The integration of partner-state capabilities at the bottom end of the chain of command has boosted a force that suffered a 30% reduction in real

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defence spending between 1985 and 2015.27 It allows British force commanders to better exploit synergy among a broader range of mutually reinforcing platforms they cannot muster alone. Hence, whereas during the 1990s and 2000s British forces were customised for small-scale operations, today’s force structure faces a larger and more conventional adversary in a much larger area of operations.28 The reconfiguration towards large-scale conventional operations has made ‘gap-filling’ more precarious. The fact that approximately 95% of UK trade is shipped and that the UK has become a net energy importer from the mid-2000s,29 puts a higher demand on a larger force with more sustainability in the North Atlantic. There is thus a greater demand for access to ‘gap-filling’ capabilities that the UK cannot provide itself (i.e. more personnel, navy vessels, maritime air patrol aircraft or submarines). The availability of only 19 frigates and destroyers and the expected annual delivery of only one new frigate every year from 2023, is described by the Parliamentary Defence Committee as ‘woefully low’ and ‘challenging’.30 With regard to process, the lack of critical expertise, skills and competence may also explain the UK’s motive for establishing the JEF. By more systematically pooling other states’ knowledge into a British chain of command, UK forces get access to regional expertise in potential areas of operations: for example, how Russian submarines exploit the various layers of saltwater under ice caps or in Norwegian fjords; how brackish water affects anti-submarine warfare skills in the Baltic; or how snow and ice affect soldiers’ combat skills in Sweden and Estonia. Britain’s shortcoming in these areas, which represent an essential element for UK forces’ survivability and combat efficiency, became particularly evident during cold weather training in Norway in the mid-2000s. Following a Royal Marines exercise in 2004, more than 125 troops were evacuated back to the UK with frostbite and injuries.31 ‘Gap-filling’ allows British commanders, staff officers and personnel at all levels to rebuild skills that had been ingrained during the Cold War. It thus allows a new generation of British officers to relearn the characteristics of its primary area, which is the North Atlantic operational space. What is the evidence for this motive? What Is the Evidence for ‘Gap-Filling’? Among the most reliable sources are speeches and interviews with the two Commanding JEF Generals, Sir David Richards (2012) and Major

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General Stuart Skeates (2017), as well as a 2013 non-paper from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and information retrieved from officers in the JEF Headquarters and in the UK MoD (2017). All sources seem to resonate with the UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, which considers partnerships increasingly important to sustain independence.32 A key consideration raised by General Richards (Chief of Defence Staff 2012–2014) was to retain Britain’s ‘influence and status within NATO and amongst key allies’.33 Five years later, this imperative had increased in importance as the UK decided to leave the EU. According to General Skeates, the UK could now display a clearer leadership role in Europe and act as a framework nation that—‘in addition to the United States’—could provide substantial capabilities to Europe and beyond.34 The two generals also argued that the conceptual thinking on how influence should be gained would have to change. According to General Richards’ speech from 2012, the 8% defence cut in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 had made British forces ‘more vulnerable and less able to respond in a confident and timely manner’.35 The JEF should therefore be regarded as an instrument to ‘squeeze the most from resources available’.36 Explaining how the JEF could create synergy, General Skeates underscored the importance of shared interests in the North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea Region. This incentivised a regional pooling of key platforms, such as medium-range air defence capabilities, strategic lift, joint fires and vessels for command and control.37 Similar sentiments were also echoed in e-mail correspondence with the UK MoD; as partner states’ staff officers have been embedded in the Permanent Joint Force Headquarters, ‘military engagement between partner nations will be considered “business-as-usual”’.38 A more focused approach that goes beyond the UK-French CJTF can thereby proceed, because—as General Skeates has pointed out— ‘discussions on who is in charge become less contentious; […] it is easier to work with smaller states in the JEF’.39 This was also confirmed further down in the chain of command. According to the chief of staff at the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) at Northwood, Colonel Richard Cantrill, the CJTF seems to be more politically driven, more about the bilateral relationships than a combined response to any particular threat. The JEF, however, seems to be a more ‘bottom-up’ approach based upon military experiences from collaboration in Afghanistan and elsewhere.40 This is consistent with General Richards’

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expectation that like-minded states that had ‘fought with distinction’ under British command in Afghanistan would join.41 Moreover, by emphasising sustainability, a gradual disintegration of combat efficiency could be avoided through a more comprehensive pooling of regional forces. Richards’ admonition that ‘numbers, or mass, still matter’, was explicitly echoed by General Skeates. In the context of 2017, it was important that Europe was able to muster a more resilient force, preferably also a non-US coalition: ‘nine nations will obviously bring more capabilities into the theatre than one nation alone’.42 Thus, as pointed out by the British defence attaché to Norway and Iceland, Lieutenant Colonel Andy Walker from the Royal Marines, such a force would also mean that Russia would have to take nine states into consideration rather than one.43 According to the two JEF-commanders, more updated ‘regional expertise’ could also be incorporated into the command structure.44 This would not only ‘create opportunities for soldiers and officers to progress their career through linguistic and cultural specialism’,45 it would also, according to General Skeates, funnel more regional skills and operative experiences into the planning and execution of operations.46 Real synergy, therefore, requires British forces to forge deeper links with likeminded partner states so that they can, in the words of General Richards, ‘act in partnership with us’.47 As Colonel Richard Cantrill points out, this synergy is exploited on a daily basis through a more ‘common approach in doctrines, techniques and procedures’.48 An important aspect of synergy was also how the smaller partner states could be ‘appropriately incorporated’.49 Referring to the CJTF, where command was shared, the British MoD now revised its ambition for the JEF. In the quest for more synergetic partnerships, the ‘integration of allied components’ into the chain of command was a fundamental prerequisite for operational success.50 This was also underscored by General Skeates: ‘our partners’ staff officers are not liaison officers, but truly embedded in the command structure’.51 Following the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the desire for closer partnerships increased further. According to Commander Joint Forces Command (2013–2016) General Richard Barrons, crucial parts of the British force suffered from shortcomings that were ‘foundational to all major armed forces’.52 By 2017, the Armed Forces were ‘on the verge of institutional failure’.53 Similar sentiments were also voiced by Commander Allied Maritime Command (2013–2015) Admiral Peter Hudson and the

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director of military sciences at RUSI, Dr. Peter Roberts. Both claimed that British forces lacked critical resilience and expertise; the Royal Navy, in particular, was ‘poorly placed to fulfil those subconscious assumptions of dominance [in the North Atlantic] which shaped the DNA of the service for centuries’.54 Protracted counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations in the post-Cold War era had been detrimental to specialist skills and techniques. This had resulted in a steep decline in what used to be ‘ingrained competence’ in conventional high-intensity warfare.55 Statements made by Sir Michael Fallon upon the signing of the initial memorandum of understanding for the JEF in 2015 resonate with the military admonitions. For example, his comment that ‘the JEF enables us to share knowledge, skills and resources and deploy our joint forces in a fast, flexible and integrated manner’56 is explicitly tied to the increasing demand for ‘gap-fillers’ that arose throughout 2015 and 2016. By reinvigorating the maritime patrol cooperation with Norway, Sir Michael claimed that the partnership would ‘help keep Britain safer and more secure’. This also meant that Norwegian forces, such as F-35 fighters, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft or new submarines in the North Atlantic could ‘further increase the protection of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and our two new aircraft carriers’.57 This vulnerability had become explicitly acute in 2015. While searching for a suspected Russian submarine incursion outside the home port of Britain’s nuclear base in Faslane, Scotland, British forces had to request assistance from US maritime patrol aircraft. Britain’s anti-submarine capacity had, according to Hudson and Roberts, deteriorated significantly since the end of the Cold War,58 and the incident was a clear indication of the fact that Britain had become ‘highly dependent on cooperation from [its] allies’.59 For the UK, the Russian Bastion Defence Concept is back on the agenda. This evidence is also underscored by the House of Lords’ voicing concerns that UK capability gaps could leave British security more exposed to external risks,60 in part because the Armed Forces are currently ‘below the number of full-time and reserve personnel specified in the SDSR 2015’ in most areas,61 and in part because of ‘over-reliance on a small number of personnel with specialist skills, such as fighter pilots’.62 Similar statements were echoed by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which claimed that the ‘manpower fielded to the Armed Forces [was] inadequate bearing in mind the range, complexity and potential concurrency of tasks expected of them’.63

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The evidence suggests that a more vigorous partner state engagement in the UK’s Armed Forces is not just a policy of choice. As the UK rebuilds its forces, its reliance on ‘gap-fillers’ higher up in the command structure is as much a policy of necessity.64

The ‘Network’ Motive In contrast to the UK as framework nation, the JEF’s partner states are more inclined to share than to pool their forces. This is not out of preference but out of necessity due to increased dependency on larger allies’ military capabilities.65 In the event of a crisis, which would be seen as existential for any Russian rim-state in Northern Europe, sharing allows access to decision-makers in London. From Whitehall national concerns and interests can be addressed more rapidly through pre-arranged networks and consultations or even reinforcements can be provided. Like the UK’s gap-filling motive, partner-states’ network motive can also be explained in terms of structure and process. With regard to structure, integrating tactical forces into the British force structure means that even the smallest partner state can contribute militarily in a meaningful way. By focusing on UK shortages, and paying attention to their own comparative advantages, partner states can exploit critical shortcomings in a British operation. The British need to be able to organize the rapid detachment of a mechanised infantry battalion from Denmark, or an Estonian cyber unit, is seen as a much-welcomed ‘window of opportunity’. As the British force structure, according to Britain’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, has ‘a low level of ‘spare capacity’ to provide flexibility and resilience in unexpected emergencies’,66 partner-states’ commanders, staff officers, liaison officers, legal advisors and red card holders are able to bond with a common professional community in Britain’s armed forces. For partner states that depend heavily on consultations or military assistance, ‘networking’ with a leading European power is of paramount importance. The Netherland’s deployment of a navy vessel and Norway’s deployment of a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to the British operation in Sierra Leone during the 2015 Ebola outbreak are two examples of the cultivation of such networks. Denmark’s deployment of six F-16 jet fighters to the 2011 Libyan campaign spearheaded by the UK and France is another,67 while Estonia’s deployment of explosive ordnance

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device teams to the British Task Force Helmand in Afghanistan is a fourth. The structural aspects of the networking motive resemble those of the British ‘gap-filling’ motive, which by and large emphasised how structural shortcomings could be addressed through integration, jointness and synergy. However, as seen from a partner-state perspective, process is more important than structure. By filling gaps at the lowest level in Britain’s chain of command, foreign ambassadors, councillors, defence attachés and civil servants are more intimately tied to UK institutions, decision-makers and processes that deal with bilateral consultations and reinforcement issues. This structure allows even the smallest partner state to succeed in gaining access to a UK defence minister, a deputy chief of defence or a senior defence official. Such contacts are crucial for smooth decision-making and crisis management. The emphasis on networking is not intuitively evident. Evidence therefore needs to be put into a larger context, which is the demand for a ‘safety bridge’ between Europe and the United States. Such arrangements have become more precarious as the number of NATO members has increased, and unanimous decisions are harder to reach on short notice. For partner states that have abstained from having a sovereign force, or suffer from fundamental shortcomings, tardy and indecisive action will rapidly lead to collapse in those states’ national defence. By actively supporting bilateral arrangements that include national forces, the JEF becomes a reliable ‘first responder’ in a crisis. This is partly because NATO’s command structure has been reduced in scale, from approximately 30,000 personnel in 27 headquarters in 1990 to a little over 6500 personnel in six headquarters today. But also, according to Head of Defence Capability Section in NATO Colonel Andrew Budd, because the present command structure ‘has not had to exercise command and control in any traditional sense in that time frame’.68 Thus, according to former Director on Crisis Management in NATO, Mr. Ilay Ferrier, because of the high turnover of personnel in the Alliance, there is a ‘continuous risk for erosion of NATO-wide crisis management experience and misperceptions of Alliance structures and relationships’.69 For smaller states that can no longer sustain even modest crisis management operations for more than a few days, rapid access to allied consultations and reinforcements is of the utmost importance. Cultivating a network of British decision-makers therefore closes a critical gap. This is

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not a gap in structure, as described through Britain’s ‘gap-filling’ motive. On the contrary, it is a gap in process, where JEF partners’ fear of NATO indecisiveness leads to inconclusive action. This makes the JEF members more inclined to cultivate bilateral arrangements that lie outside the formal, transparent and familiar NATO arrangements.70 What Is the Evidence for ‘Networking’? The description of the JEF as an arena for ‘networking’ is underscored by various sources. Among the most valid are the Norwegian MoD in Oslo, the Norwegian Embassy in London and the Senior Norwegian National Representative in the JEF Headquarters at Northwood. According to several sources in the Norwegian MoD, NATO’s collective commitments, as enshrined in Article V of the Washington Treaty, are rather vague. The wording, which allows an individual member state to take action ‘as it deems necessary’,71 does not provide a sufficiently credible commitment. According to the policy director in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Mr. Svein Efjestad, the daily effort to enhance bilateral networks throughout Europe has become more important than during the Cold War: ‘it allows the individual member states to increase their flexibility in preparing for the event of a crisis’.72 Following Efjestad, through the JEF, Norway can pursue two mutually reinforcing policies: one towards the UK and one towards Europe, with the UK as a first priority.73 The policy director’s statement suggests that the JEF arrangement is part of something bigger for Norway, namely a means of increasing Norway’s freedom of action, not only with regard to international engagements abroad, but also with regard to crisis response operations at home. As another senior defence official, Mrs. Kristin Mørkestøl, points out, ‘We foresee that the JEF will be a useful and flexible tool which may ensure efficient decision-making and effective crisis management in a variety of crisis situations—complementary to and possibly in support of, for instance, NATO, the EU, the UN or other actors’.74 However, as all JEF partners suffer from severe shortages within their national force structures, dependency on reinforcements at home is increasing, and thus of far greater strategic importance than detachments overseas. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which, according to Norway’s minister of defence, was a serious ‘wake-up call’,75 any effort

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that can help allied consultations and reinforcements run more smoothly is now crucial. According to a senior Norwegian MoD official, ‘while US forces will have to transport themselves between 8000 and 10,000 kilometres, a British amphibious force, a submarine or a few frigates may geographically be much closer. This may be essential for providing a credible deterrent component on short notice if a crisis should arise’.76 Claiming that NATO’s ability to provide rapid and timely assistance was severely weakened, Norway’s senior military representative to NATO, Lieutenant General Robert Mood, criticised the Alliance for being ‘a club of speakers’. In the event of a bilateral crisis with Russia, slow decision-making processes in the Alliance would be highly problematic.77 Both the political and military leadership in Norway seem to have reduced confidence in NATO’s formal consultancy mechanisms when it comes to effective decision-making. Another challenge, according to the Norwegian defence attaché to London, Colonel John Andreas Olsen, is that NATO members have ‘a land-centric focus’ to the Baltic States and Poland that may be at the expense of ‘the transatlantic maritime domain’.78 Concerns about the slowness of allied responses became particularly evident in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to Mr Efjestad, the initial US deployments to Poland and the Baltic countries were originally part of a bilateral arrangement between the United States on the one hand and Poland and the Baltic states on the other (known as the European Reassurance Initiative).79 Because the American deployment was channelled through bilateral arrangements first, it could happen more rapidly. Hence, after some months, the US contingent could subsequently be transferred to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.80 As Mrs Mørkestøl pointed out, ‘the JEF is very much about speeding up processes of consultation, and increasing prospects for reinforcements in times of crisis’.81 This evidence resonates with statements made by Colonel Olsen, who claims that to make multilateral arrangements like the JEF run smoothly, the UK and its partner states have to know and understand each other well and that ‘the JEF allows their military forces to do exactly that’.82 The JEF enables Norway to build on the long tradition of cooperation, which includes activities such as the UK’s Royal Marines’ cold-weather training in Norway. According to Olsen, through the JEF, UK forces can learn more about partner states’ climatic and geographical conditions; ‘it allows Britain to rebuild a more traditional skill set into a new generation of troops, particularly in climatic and geographical conditions

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that also are important for the UK’.83 This point was also underscored by Norway’s Senior National Representative (SNR) to the JEF Headquarters in Northwood, Commander Erik Hansen: from a military point of view, deployments become less risky when commanders and staff officers have reliable contacts with allied colleagues and thus updated knowledge about the specific climatic and geographical conditions in any area of operation.84 After all, operations are about people and people are about trust. Trust is gained by operating together over time. The JEF is, as such, a concrete example of how partner states can more systematically circumvent collective indecisiveness. It provides a viable example of how smaller states attain security through networks that are deemed crucial when rapid and decisive action is required. This point has gained more clout as crises have become increasingly complex. The blurred distinction between peace and war and the ambiguity between civilian and military actors, intentions and capabilities, challenge partner states’ effectiveness. These ‘grey zones’ not only complicate states’ interagency coordination and cross-cutting skills, but also blur the indicators necessary to transfer responsibilities from national to allied defence arrangements in NATO. In this context, therefore, the JEF arrangement allows partner states and the UK to operate below the conventional— or even old-fashioned—NATO threshold.85 JEF allows Nordic partners to accelerate joint operations and exercises in cold weather operations; it thereby becomes easier to get the UK’s attention. With investments in similar jet fighters and maritime patrol aircrafts, this aspect increases even more.86 At the same time, according to Commander Hansen, the framework also allows Norwegian decision-makers to maintain greater freedom of action, because ‘there are no binding commitments to join any operation if we do not want to’.87 The Russian annexation of Crimea made Norwegian networking easier. According to Colonel Olsen, ‘What we regard as increased Russian assertiveness in the North Atlantic is today shared by the UK. Norway’s geography has become more strategically important to Whitehall, and political and military agencies are looking more towards the North’.88 This point was also underscored by a senior staff officer from one of the partnering nations, who claimed that Nordic territories had become more strategically important for a successful JEF entry into the Baltic Sea Region and the High North.89 These perspectives coincide with the main message in written evidence provided by the Norwegian Embassy to the House of Commons. In a 2017 Parliamentary inquiry, the Embassy stated that:

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Norway is especially concerned about the freedom of manoeuvre in the Norwegian Sea, North Sea and the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap in the event of a crisis [and] … would particularly welcome a stronger UK maritime posture in the North Atlantic in order to deter a potential adversary and defend these waters should actions be required.90

These statements corresponds with Olsen’s Whitehall Paper NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence.91 Summarising the findings before the House of Commons, Colonel Olsen argued that NATO’s command structure does not provide sufficient security in the North Atlantic, and urged the UK to take a leading role in the North Atlantic Ocean.92 The JEF can be seen as a long-term investment in bilateral relations, which may supplement, stir, or accelerate NATO procedures. In turn, a successful JEF enables like-minded nations to act fast when necessary under British stewardship.

Conclusion Where does this leave us regarding the opening question about motives for the JEF and the UK’s leadership role in Europe? This analysis shows us that Norway and the UK are attracted to the JEF for different reasons. While the UK regards the JEF as a ‘gap-filling’ instrument for national independence, as a way to cope with economic austerity, Norway sees it as a ‘first responder’ that needs to be constantly cultivated at all levels in the chain of command. Increased Russian assertiveness in the High North, as well as uncertainty as to where the US administration under President Donald Trump may go in the years ahead, underscore this conclusion. Motives for the JEF therefore seem to be both contradictory and ambiguous. How may this impact UK’s leadership role in Europe? On the one hand, the provision of a framework into which partner states easily fit is likely to improve Britain’s operational resilience. A more rigorous framework within which tactical ‘gap-fillers’ can be accessed keeps the image of ‘Global Britain’ alive. This is key to the UK’s selfperception, ambition and its credibility vis-à-vis the United States, NATO and smaller partner states in Northern Europe. It also shows that the UK is interested in offering leadership in Europe after BREXIT; it is leaving the EU, not Europe.

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On the other hand, Britain’s long-standing independence in the North Atlantic may also be affected. Britain’s military shortcomings are of a fundamental character,93 and force commanders will increasingly have to rely on partner states’ capabilities. No matter how cohesive a ‘force of friends’ may seem to be, incorporating partner nations’ forces into the chain of command will restrain Britain’s flexibility and freedom of movement. The cluster of eight cannot seize national control over their ‘gapfilling’ forces. Partner states will thereby influence Britain’s command structure through numerous parallel chains, which for democratic and constitutional reasons are obliged to control decisions made by UK force commanders. Military objectives, courses of actions and nomination of targets will be scrutinised by partner states’ red card holders, legal advisors and liaison officers. These control mechanisms are neither under British command nor mandated to underscore UK interests. They are part of a national control regime that puts national interests before Britain’s military independence.94 Even one of Britain’s most trusted partners, Norway, decided to withdraw its forces during the peak of the 2011 Libyan war. Disagreeing with British, French and US generals on what the target-list should look like, a like-minded ally aborted its’ operations.95 A more rigorous partnership programme may therefore export partner states’ domestic problems into UK decision-making processes. British independence will also be affected by expectations arising from within the JEF. As ‘gap-fillers’ underscore Britain’s image as a leading military power, expectations of reciprocity develop—consciously and unconsciously. In any bilateral crisis between a loyal ‘gap-filler’ and Russia, British independence is likely to be squeezed between objectives and considerations that can be hard to reconcile. On the one hand, credible commitments have to be made to sustain British credibility as a leading power. This is particularly the case with respect to ‘gap-fillers’ that have reallocated scarce defence resources from their national defence structure to make UK operations more sustainable. On the other hand, the same expectations may also limit the UK’s freedom of action because Britain’s Armed Forces rely upon the same ‘gap-fillers’. It is, however, unlikely that any partner state will provide ‘gap-fillers’ to the UK in such a situation. As Northern Europe is one of the world’s most integrated regions, any partner state’s demand for the JEF will mean that other states in the cluster also have reasons for concern. In times of looming

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crisis, therefore, Britain’s ‘force of friends’ will have very few friends left that are willing to contribute national forces to underpin a UK operation in any theatre but their own. Moreover, nearly all JEF partners are Russian border states. This means that in any bilateral crisis with Russia, a UK partner state will produce an immediate spill-over effect on decisions made in Whitehall. British independence may thereby be strained because partner states exploit the JEF as a tripwire for something bigger. Through formal and informal networks, decision-makers in Whitehall and Northwood are exposed to partner states’ expectations of consultations, diplomatic initiatives and military leadership with expeditionary forces. This is either out of fear of abandonment, or out of fear of institutional indecisiveness in NATO. These expectations may not necessarily resonate with British priorities or threat assessments, but they may nevertheless increase the sense of urgency that partner states want to induce to get UK attention and resources. In conclusion, the JEF is a most welcome initiative. Like-minded nations are ‘stronger together’ and through training, exercise and operations their military forces will be more integrated. Trust will be developed through shared experiences, common mind-sets, and if done well the sum is greater than the parts. This article demonstrates that ‘a force of friends’ is beneficial to all parties involved, but that there are plenty of issues that need care and attention along the way as the JEF is transitioning from idea to reality within the coming years.

Notes





1. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom Joint Expeditionary Force”, 5 December 2013, p. 1. 2. Chief of Defence Staff General Sir David Richards, speech at RUSI, 17 December 2012, p. 9. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-david-richards-speech-to-the-royalunited-services-institute-rusi-17-december-2012. 3. Richards, p. 6. 4.  Interview with Major General Stuart Skeates, Standing Joint Force Commander, All Souls College, Oxford 8 November 2017. See also DCDC and CiC, “Combined Expeditionary Force (CJEF) User Guide”, 20 November 2012, pp. 4–1. 5. E-mail correspondence with UK Ministry of Defence official, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Taylor, European Bilateral relations and EU Exit, 7 November, 2017.

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6. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Sweden and Finland Join UK-Led Response Force”, News Story, 30 June. https://www.gov.uk/ government/news/sweden-and-finland-join-uk-led-response-force. 7.  UK MoD, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom”, London: TSO, p. 49. 8. UK MoD, “UK’s Global Role Reinforced in New International Defence Engagement Strategy”, Press Release, London, 17 February 2017. 9.  The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy”, London, 2017, p. 1. 10. Richards, p. 9. 11. “UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy”, 2017, p. 1. 12. Ibid., p. 4. 13. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1966, p. 7. 14. The term crisis derives from Latin and means a situation that may go both ways, either towards something that is more stable and predictable or towards something catastrophic. Here, the term ‘crisis’ is defined as an unstable situation where there is an inherent tension ‘between “military logic” (the need to increase the readiness and reduce the vulnerability of the military) and “diplomatic logic” (the need to maintain control over military forces to avoid unwanted escalation).’ Alexander George, Avoiding War, Boulder: Westview, 1991, p. 25. 15. For an analysis of Sweden’s problems with neutrality, see Mikael Holmstrøm, Den dolda alliansen, Sveriges hemliga NATO forbindelser, Stockholm: Atlantis 2011. See also Sweden’s parliamentary debate on NATO’s Host Nation Support agreement: Sveriges Riksdag (2016) “Samforstandsavtal om vardlands stød. Sammensatta utrikes- och forsvarsutskottets betenkande”, 2015/2016: UFøU4. https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/CC7A890D-585C4472-94F7-23AA9169A7E8; Hans Wallmark, ‘Sveriges møylighetar at søka medlemskap i NATO’, interpellation 2016/2017: 6, Riksdagen, Stockholm, 13 October 2016. 16. Malcolm Chalmers, “Osborne’s Summer Surprise for Defence. Guaranteed Real-Terms Spending Increases”, Briefing Paper London: RUSI, July 2015. The Conservative Government of 2015 promised to compensate the annual increase of defence procurements with 0.5% annually until 2020/2021. On: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201507_bp_osbornes_summer_surprise_for_defence.pdf. See also HM Government, “Summer Budget 2015”, 5 July 2015, pp. 26–27. 17.  See e.g. Sverre Diesen (2013), “Towards an Affordable European Defence and Security Policy? The Case for Extensive European Force Integration”. In Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (eds.), NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political

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Will, Basingstroke: Palgrave, pp. 57–70; Håkon Lunde Saxi (2017), “British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nation Concept”, Defence Studies, 17(2), 2017, pp. 171–197. 18. See for example David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together; Fighting Alone, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014; Beatrice de Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose (eds.), Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Support for Foreign Military Missions, London: Routledge, 2015; Jürgen Schuster and Herbert Maier, “The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of American-Led War on Iraq”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2(3), 2006, pp. 223–244. 19. See e.g. Tomas Valasek, Surviving Austerity. The Case for a New Approach to EU Military Collaboration, Brussels: Centre for European Reform, 2011; Dick Zandee, Margriet Drent, and Rob Hendriks, “Defence Cooperation Models—Lessons Learned and Usability”, Clingendael Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2016). See also Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, “Transforming European Forces’, Survival 44(3), 2002, pp. 117–132; Carl Ek, ‘NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitments”, CRS Report to the Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007. 20. Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness, and Kjell Arne Røvik (2007), Organization Theory and the Public Sector. Instrument, Culture and Myth, London: Routledge. 21. Foreword by sir Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, in “Joint Expeditionary Force”, London, Ministry of Defence, June 2017, p. 1. 22. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History Account, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. xii. 23.  Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 75, 104. 24.  Tormod Heier (ed.), Kompetanseforvaltning i Forsvaret [Managing Military Competence in Norway’s Armed Forces]. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget, 2017. 25. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016, February 2016, ‘Top 15 Defence Budgets 2015’. 26. The House of Commons, “Written Evidence from Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies”, Global Security: UK–US Relations. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we16.htm#note82. 27. Saxi, “British and German Initiatives …”, p. 6. 28. E-mail correspondence with Taylor, UK Ministry of Defence, November 7, 2017.

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29. H M Government, “The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security”, May 2014, p. 17. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_ Maritime_Security_2014.pdf. Oxford Research Group, “SDSR 2015: Continuity, Control and Crisis in UK Defence Policy”, ORG Briefing— January 2016, p. 5. 30. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Restoring the Fleet: Naval Procurement and the National Shipbuilding Strategy”, HC 221 of Session 2016–2017, 21 November 2016, p. 19. 31.  BBC, “MoD Hit with More Kit Complaints”, BBS News Channel, 22 February 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3510639.stm. 32. “UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy”, 2017, p. 3. 33. Richards, p. 5. 34. Interview with General Skeates, 8 November 2017. 35. Richards, p. 3. 36. Ibid. 37. Interview with Skeates. 38. E-mail correspondence with Taylor. See also UK MoD 2017, pp. 3, 8. 39. Interview with Skeates. It is worth mentioning that, according to Skeates, the Anglo-French cooperation at the tactical level was much easier due to fewer political considerations. 40.  Interview with Colonel Richard Cantrill, The Permanent Joint Headquarters, Northwood, 15 November 2017. See also MoD, “Joint Expeditionary Force”, 2017, p. 3. 41. Richards, p. 8. 42. Interview with Skeates; the view is consistent with interview of Cantrill. 43. Interview with UK’s Defence Attaché to Norway and Iceland, Lieutenant Colonel Andy Walker Royal Marines, Oslo, 17 November 2017. 44. Richards, p. 9; interview Skeates. 45. Richards, p. 11. 46. Interview with Skeates. 47. Richards, p. 12. 48. Interview Cantrill. 49. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom Joint Expeditionary Force”, 5 December 2013, p. 1. 50. Ibid., p. 2. 51. Interview with Skeates. 52.  Statement by General Sir Richard Barrons in Sam Jones, “Britain’s Withered Forces Not Fit to Repel All-Out Attack”, Financial Times, 16 September 2016. 53. Statement by General Sir Richard Barrons in David Bond, “Williamson Takes Helm as Armed Forces Face Budget Squeeze”, Financial Times, 3 November 2017.

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54.  Peter Hudson, and Peter Roberts (2017), “The UK and the North Atlantic: A British Maritime Perspective”. In John A. Olsen (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic. Revitalising Collective Defence, pp. 75–76. Similar statements are also found in House of Commons Library, “The Royal Navy’s New Frigates and the National Shipbuilding Strategy: December 2016 Update”, 14 December 2016. 55. Hudson and Roberts, pp. 80, 86. 56.  The Copenhagen Post, “Denmark Joins International Strike Force”, 30 November 2015. On http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-joins-international-strike-force.html. 57.  UK MoD (2016), “UK and Norway Agree New Cooperation on Maritime Patrol Aircraft”, News Story, November 10. 58. Hudson and Roberts, p. 80. 59. Victoria Ward, ‘MoD Forced to Ask US for Help in Tracking Russian Submarine’, The Telegraph, 9 January 2015. http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11334836/MoD-forced-to-ask-US-forhelp-in-tracking-Russian-submarine.html. 60. House of Lords, p. 1. 61. House of Lords, p. 8. 62. House of Lords, “Future Capability of the UK’s Armed Forces”, Library Note I, 16 December 2016, p. 3. 63. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review”, 10 July 2016, HL Paper 18, p. 22. 64. UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, p. 4. 65.  Tormod Heier, “Norsk Russland-politikk og norsk alliansepolitikk—to uforenlige størrelser?”, Vardøger 37 (2018), pp. 129–131. 66. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, p. 22. 67.  Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2016), “The Danish Libya Campaign: Out in Front in Pursuit of Pride, Praise, and Position”. In Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen (eds.), Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 68. Andrew Budd, “Defence Capabilities”, presentation on the Conference Military Exercises, Deterrence and Crisis Stability, Brussels, 10 August 2017. It should be mentioned that NATO decided on 8 November 2017 to re-establish a new command for the Atlantic and a new Command for logistics in order to secure the transatlantic sea lines of communications and a rapid movement of military forces across Europe (Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO Announces Major Changes to Its Military Command Structure”, Atlantic Council, November 8 2017. 69. Ilay Ferrier (2017), “NATO’s CMX Exercises 1992–2012: High-Level Strategic Pol-Mil Exercising”, presentation on the Conference Military Exercises, Deterrence and Crisis Stability, Brussels, 10 August 2017.

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70. Svein Efjestad, “Norway and the North Atlantic: Defence of the Northern Flank”. In Olsen (ed.), “NATO and the North Atlantic…”, p. 62. See also Tormod Heier, “Influence and Marginalization. Norway’s Adaptation to US Transformation Efforts in NATO, 1998–2004”, Ph.D. thesis, Oslo: University of Oslo, 2006, pp. 235–238. 71. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, Article 5. http://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. 72. Interview with Policy Director in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Mr. Svein Efjestad, Oslo, 29 August. 73. Ibid. 74. Interview with Senior Advisor of Security and Defence Policy, Mrs. Kristin Mørkestøl, MoD, Oslo, 29 September 2017. 75.  Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide, “Charting NATO’s Future”, speech at ACUS Conference, 25 September 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/ no/aktuelt/minister-of-defence-ine-eriksen-soreide-speech-at-acusconference-charting-natos-future/id2454050. 76. Interview with senior MoD-official that spoke on conditions of anonymity, Oslo 2017. 77.  Robert Mood, “Skal vi fortsette med hodet i sanden?” [“Should We Continue to Stick Our Heads in the Sand?”], Aftenposten, 23 February 2017. 78. John Andreas Olsen, ‘Introduction: The Quest for Maritime Supremacy’. In: Olsen, NATO and the North Atlantic…, p. 7. 79. Interview with Efjestad. See also John J. Hamre, and Heather A. Conley (2017), ‘The Centrality of the North Atlantic to NATO and US Strategic Interests’. In Olsen (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic…, pp. 43–58. 80. Interview with Mr. Efjestad. 81. Interview with Mrs. Mørkestøl. 82. Interview with Norway’s Defence Attaché to the United Kingdom and Ireland, Colonel John Andreas Olsen, London 22 September 2017. 83. Interview with Olsen. Confirmed through interview with Walker. 84.  Interview with Norway’s National Senior representative to the JEF Headquarter, Commander Erik Hansen, Joint Force Command, Northwood Headquarters, 14 November 2017. 85. Tormod Heier, “The Logic of Asymmetry: Russia’s Approach Towards NATO”. In Janne H. Matlary and Tormod Heier (eds.), Ukraine and Beyond. Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 277. 86. Interview with Hansen. Confirmed through interview with Skeates. 87. Interview with Hansen. 88. Interview with Olsen.

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89. Informal conversations with a selected group of embedded staff officers from JEF partner-states, Northwood Headquarters, 14 November 2017. 90.  House of Commons, “Written Evidence Submitted by the Royal Norwegian Embassy, London”, p. 1. 91. John Andreas Olsen (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic. Revitalising Collective Defence, Whitehall Paper no. 87, London: RUSI. 92.  John Andreas Olsen, “Written Evidence Submitted by John Andreas Olsen”, House of Commons, London 21, p. 1, April 2017. 93. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, p. 26; General Sir Barron’ statements in Jones 16 September 2016; Jones, “Britain’s Withered Forces …”, 16 September 2016 and in Bond, ‘Williamson takes helm …’, 3 November 2017. 94. Tormod Heier, “Is ‘Out-of-Area’ Also ‘Out-of-Control’? Small States in Large Operations”, RUSI Journal 160 (1), 2015. 95.  Heikki Eidsvoll Holmås (2016), “Tiden for evaluering er nå, Ap”, Aftenposten, 19 May. Mr. Holmås was Minister in the Centre-Left Government that decided to participate with Norwegian forces in the war against Libya in 2011.

Bibliography Auerswald, D. P., & Saideman, S. M. (2014). NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together; Fighting Alone. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Binnendijk, H., & Kugler, R. (2002). Transforming European Forces. Survival, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 117–132. Bond, D. (2017). Williamson Takes Helm as Armed Forces Face Budget Squeeze. Financial Times, 3 November. Chalmers, M. (2015). Osborne’s Summer Surprise for Defence: Guaranteed Real-Terms Spending Increases. Briefing Paper. London: RUSI. Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P. G., & Røvik, K. A. (2007). Organization Theory and the Public Sector. Instrument, Culture and Myth. London: Routledge. de Graaf, B., Dimitriu, G., & Ringsmose, J. (eds.) (2015). Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Support for Foreign Military Missions. London: Routledge. Diesen, S. (2013). Towards an Affordable European Defence and Security Policy? The Case for Extensive European Force Integration. In Matlary, J. H., & Petersson, M. (eds.), NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will. Basingstroke: Palgrave, pp. 57–70. Efjestad, S. (2017). Norway and the North Atlantic: Defence of the Northern Flank. In Olsen, J. A. (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic. Revitalising Collective Defence. Whitehall Paper, vol. 87, no. 1. London: RUSI.

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Ek, C. (2007). NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitments. CRS Report to the Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Freedman. L. (2013). Strategy: A History Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press. George, A. (1991). Avoiding War. Boulder: Westview. Hamre, J. J., & Conley, H. A. (2017). The Centrality of the North Atlantic to NATO and US Strategic Interests. In Olsen, J. A. (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic. Revitalising Collective Defence. Whitehall Paper, vol. 87, no. 1. London: RUSI. Heier, T. (2006). Influence and Marginalization. Norway’s Adaptation to US Transformation Efforts in NATO, 1998–2004. Ph.D. thesis, Oslo: University of Oslo. Heier, T. (ed.) (2017). Kompetanseforvaltning i Forsvaret [Managing Military Competence in Norway’s Armed Forces]. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget. Holmås, H. E. (2016). Tiden for evaluering er nå, Ap. Aftenposten, 19 May. Holmstrøm, M. (2011). Den dolda alliansen. Sveriges hemliga NATO forbindelser [The Covert Alliance. Sweden’s Secret NATO Connections]. Stockholm: Atlantis. Howard, M., & Paret, P. (1976). On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hudson, P., & Roberts, P. (2017). The UK and the North Atlantic: A British Maritime Perspective. In Olsen, J. A. (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence. Whitehall Paper, vol. 87, no. 1. London: RUSI. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2016). The Military Balance 2016. London: RUSI. Jakobsen, P. V. (2016). The Danish Libya Campaign: Out in Front in Pursuit of Pride, Praise, and Position. In Henriksen, D., & Larssen, A. K. (eds.), Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jones, S. (2016). Britain’s Withered Forces Not Fit to Repel All-Out Attack. Financial Times, 16 September. Lunde Saxi, H. (2017). British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nation Concept. Defence Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 171–197. Mood, R. (2017). Skal vi fortsette med hodet i sanden? [Should We Continue to Stick Our Heads in the Sand?]. Aftenposten, 23 February. Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Schuster, J., & Maier, H. (2006). The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of American-led War on Iraq. Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 223–244. Søreide, I. M. E. (2015). Charting NATO’s Future. Speech at ACUS Conference, 25 September. Available at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/ aktuelt/minister-of-defence-ine-eriksen-soreide-speech-at-acus-conferencecharting-natos-future/id2454050. Accessed 21 Nov 2017.

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The Copenhagen Post. (2015). Denmark Joins International Strike Force, 30 November. Available at http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-joins-international-strike-force.html. Accessed 11 Oct 2017. The House of Commons, Written Evidence from Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Global Security: UK–US Relations. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we16.htm#note82. Accessed 11 May 2018. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. (2013). The United Kingdom Joint Expeditionary Force, 5 December. London: TSO. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. (2015). National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom. London: TSO. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. (2017). Sweden and Finland Join UK-led Response Force. News Story, 30 June. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. (2017). UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy. London: Whitehall. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. (2016). UK and Norway Agree New Cooperation on Maritime Patrol Aircraft. News Story, November 10. Valasek, T. (2011). Surviving Austerity. The Case for a New Approach to EU Military Collaboration. Brussels: Centre for European Reform. Ward, V. (2015). MoD Forced to Ask US for Help in Tracking Russian Submarine. The Telegraph, 9 January. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ uknews/defence/11334836/MoD-forced-to-ask-US-for-help-in-trackingRussian-submarine.html. Accessed 11 Oct 2017. Zandee, D., Drent, M., & Hendriks, R. (2016). Defence Cooperation Models— Lessons Learned and Usability. Clingendael Report. Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

CHAPTER 9

Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the Nordic-Baltic Region—Ways of British Leadership Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson

The Baltic Sea has never been a strategic priority for the UK. In British strategy, the goal has traditionally been to deny Russian and/or German access to the North Sea (and the North Atlantic) by blocking the seaways out of the Baltic Sea. The British fleet has only occasionally sailed into the Baltic Sea, for instance during the Crimean War, in order to project power. This was also the strategy during the Cold War. There were plans for massive nuclear strikes by the British Bomber Command and the US Strategic Air Command in the region, including in Finland, as well as to close the Danish straits and deny Soviet forces access to the North Atlantic. Still, it was too dangerous to conduct more extensive military operations in the Baltic Sea, given that the Soviet Union and its allies controlled large parts of it. That did not mean, however, that the UK was uninterested in the region during the Cold War. Finland, and especially Sweden, played a role in British and Western strategic thinking. Although Finland was J. E. Møller (*) · M. Petersson  Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_9

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regarded as part of the Russian sphere of influence, and thus largely written off in Western strategies, the hope was that it would not meet the same destiny as the rest of Eastern Europe, in the form of a communist coup and an alliance with the Soviet Union. Militarily, Finland was weak and viewed as a possible transit area for Soviet troops attacking Norway, and potentially Sweden. Still, the UK and the West did not give up Finland on other fronts, such as economic and cultural integration. Sweden and the UK also exported advanced defence materiel, such as aircraft, to Finland. Sweden was, however, a different case. It was considered ‘neutral on our side’ by the West, and a huge military asset in the region. The UK therefore tried to integrate Sweden as much as possible in the Western defence structures, without being a formal ally. Sweden was a key to denying the Soviet Union and its allies access to the two strategic hotspots in the region—the Baltic Straits and Northern Norway—and was therefore strongly supported by the Western great powers with advanced technology, intelligence, and information about Western war plans. Since the end of the Cold War, Finland and Sweden have been politically, economically and militarily integrated in the West to a degree that had not been considered possible before. Membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)-program (1994) and EU membership (1995) have clearly placed these two countries in the Western camp. Militarily, Finland and Sweden have contributed to the major post-Cold War NATO peace operations and been seen as NATO’s most eager partners. The UK supported that development during the 1990s and 2000s, but it was not until after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War that Britain started to engage more deeply in the region, for instance through the establishment of the Northern Group. Since then, and especially since the Ukraine crisis started in 2013, an important question from a UK and NATO perspective has been what kind of role non-aligned Finland and Sweden can have in the Western defence of the Nordic-Baltic region against a revisionist Russia. In this chapter, we will try to answer this question through an analysis of how the cooperation between these two NATO partners and the West in general, as well as the UK in particular, has evolved. First, we consider the two countries’ interaction with Britain and the West during the Cold War. Then we briefly present their integration into Western structures during the two decades after the Cold War, before we move on to

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discuss the interaction between Finland, Sweden and Britain in what has been referred to as a ‘New Cold War’.1

Sweden, Finland and the West During the Cold War During the Cold War, the security situation in the Nordic-Baltic region was very different compared to now. The Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States and controlled Poland, Eastern Germany, and, to some extent, Finland. The 1948 Finno-Soviet pact of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), and the restrictions on Finland’s defence forces from the peace treaty, limited Finland’s room for manoeuvre. Sweden, on the other hand, was strong, had a lot of room for manoeuvre, and could consequently cooperate secretly with the West. Despite these differences, the UK had a role in integrating both Sweden and Finland as much as possible into Western economic and military structures. Sweden—‘Neutral on Our Side’ One of the most important keys to understanding Sweden’s balancing between the East and the West during the Cold War is the events that took place during the formative years at the end of the 1940s, and the action taken at that time by the great powers. Most authors agree that the Swedish policy that was established and the relations that were created with the East and West during those years were more or less continued until 1989–1991.2 Back in 1948–1949, the UK had a major role in solving the ‘Scandinavian defence dilemma’, that is ‘the idea of associating Sweden with the North Atlantic security system without its being a formal member of it’.3 In the late 1940s, Scandinavian defence did not make much sense without Sweden. At that time, the Swedish Armed Forces contained the fourth largest air force in the world, considerable maritime forces, and an army that—when fully mobilized—could put 600,000 soldiers in the field. The West needed Sweden for the defence of Scandinavia, but the Swedish government did not want to abandon its traditional non-alignment policy. As Juhana Aunesluoma has shown, the British attitude towards the negotiations on a neutral Scandinavian defence union was quite nuanced compared to US policy. While the US ‘cure’ for the ‘stubborn’ Swedes

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who did not openly want to join the West was ‘isolation’, ‘the British sought to achieve their goals with subtler and quieter means in an atmosphere of close confidence, trust and consultation’.4 Ironically, just shortly after the breakdown of negotiations for a Scandinavian defence union and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty, the US changed its policy towards the Swedes and adopted a ‘British’ policy, which—in turn—eventually led to an informal, but quite extensive and intense, Swedish integration in the North Atlantic security system.5 Eventually, the Scandinavian defence dilemma had been solved by a more flexible attitude from both Sweden and the US, encouraged by the British during the whole process, but at the price of a divided Scandinavia.6 The main reason Sweden had not seriously considered joining the Atlantic Pact was a combination of neutralist identity and realpolitik. Sweden had not been involved in a war since the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, and many Swedes, including the government, were of the opinion that the traditional Swedish neutrality policy was a major reason that Sweden had lived in peace for more than 100 years.7 Among the more realist arguments for Swedish neutrality policy, the so-called Finland argument had a prominent position.8 The logic of the Finland argument was, in short, that if Sweden joined NATO, the Soviet Union would occupy—or at least demand military bases in—Finland and thereby increase the tensions between the blocs in the whole Nordic region, which was not in anybody’s interest. It can be argued that after the blocs had been formed in 1948–1949, the Finland argument became a component of the wider ‘Nordic Balance’, an analytical concept used since the 1960s, but in practice a fundamental concept in Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish security thinking long before that.9 However, the Swedish government was open to quite extensive and intense secret military integration with the West, which was of benefit to the West. Military cooperation with Denmark and Norway was most extensive and concerned all branches (especially the air forces), logistics, and intelligence. The contact with the UK and the US was less extensive, but more important, and also focused quite heavily on the air force. Furthermore, for Sweden it was extremely important to get access to advanced (military) technology, which the Western great powers could provide, and the UK played an important role in this regard. It can be argued that Sweden became a reliable military partner for the Western

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great powers. It was not imaginable that the Swedish Armed Forces would be used against the West.10 In sum, it can be argued that the solution found to the Scandinavian defence dilemma was the next best solution for all states involved, including the Soviet Union. Of course, the UK and the Western powers would have preferred to have Sweden in NATO, but Sweden’s ‘friendly’ neutrality policy was better than a rigid one. The Russians would have of course preferred a Sweden without any ties at all to the West, but as long as Sweden remained outside NATO, the solution was acceptable. Finland—Gradual and Cautious Westernization ‘The service rendered by Finland to mankind is magnificent’,11 Winston Churchill stated in the midst of the Winter War (1939–1940). Plans were even made to support Finland with British forces. However, for various reasons, such as Sweden refusing to be used as a transit country, the plans of assistance fell through.12 In fact, after having fought alongside Nazi-Germany against the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Continuation War (1941–1944), Finland rather received a declaration of war from Britain at the end of 1941.13 Still, this was largely for the sake of appearances.14 However, it provided Britain with a seat at the negotiating table as the war was coming to an end. By insisting on a resumption of the pre-war imports of timber and paper from Finland, a major export at the time, Britain managed to avoid total Soviet control over Finland’s economy.15 This proved to be an important part of the country’s tightrope walk through the Cold War. Along with Sweden, Great Britain remained the only foreign hope for Finland as the Second World War was approaching its final stages.16 However, as Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden stated in August 1944, ‘Russian influence will in any event be predominant in Finland and we shall not be able, nor would it serve any important British interests, to contest that influence’.17 Consequently, the British kept a low profile in the Allied Control Commission (ACC) that arrived in Finland the following month and remained until the Finno-Soviet Peace Treaty was signed three years later. However, the directive from the Foreign Office to the British delegation of the ACC indicates an interest in the fate of Finland: ‘Our ultimate policy is to ensure a free and independent Finland, but it must always be remembered that Finland is a conquered country and will have to work her passage home’.18 Still, Britain largely

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‘wrote Finland off’ for the rest of the decade, and thus left the country in the Soviet sphere of influence. In April 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the bilateral Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA treaty), whereby Finland was obligated to repel any attack from the West, potentially assisted by the Soviet Union. Despite this treaty against the West, Finland made several military procurements from the West. Already in 1953, the Finnish Air Force received their first new planes since the War, in the form of British de Havilland Vampire Mk.52 training jets. A British radar system was acquired as well.19 In 1956, Finland also ordered British Folland Gnat F.1 fighter aircraft.20 In fact, despite having a role in Soviet strategic thinking as a buffer against the West, most of Finland’s military procurements during the 1950s came from the West.21 However, in the 60s, the Soviet Union wanted more control over the defence posture of its ‘buffer state’. ‘We distinctly hear the sabre rattling and the noise of the military preparations of NATO, carried on the waves of the Baltic Sea from the West to our shores’.22 Despite bearing resemblance to more recent remarks by Russian officials, these are the words of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ahead of the so-called Note Crisis in 1961, when the Soviet Union deemed military consultations with Finland necessary due to increased Western presence in the region. Although Finland’s President, Urho Kekkonen, came to an understanding with Khrushchev that at least deferred the military consultations, the crisis reinforced the Soviet desire to shape the Finnish defence forces. A ‘supplementary defence budget’ was therefore set up the following month, specifically intended for acquiring Soviet air defence missiles and MiG-21s, the first of which arrived already the following year.23 However, the delivery was delayed due to British objections. Britain initially interfered, as the MiGs were equipped with air-to-air missiles and would therefore represent a breach of the stipulations in the peace treaty. In the end, a compromise was reached, whereby the procurement of MiGs was accepted, whereas that of surface-to-air missiles was not. However, the agreement also included an assurance that Finland would balance its procurement of defence materiel from the Soviet Union with similar acquisitions from the West.24 Consequently, British Vigilant antitank missiles were purchased as well.25 Although Soviet MiGs were purchased in the subsequent decades as well, Finland to a large extent returned to acquiring Western aircraft.

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The 1970s were thus characterized by several large orders for Swedish J-35 Drakens, whereas 50 British Hawk Mk.51s were included in the Air Force between 1980 and 1985.26 These acquisitions point to a gradual westernization of the Finnish Defence Forces, which in turn might have facilitated the switch to American F-18 Hornet fighter jets, as well as more general integration into Western defence structures, as the Cold War came to an end. The same gradual westernization is evident in the political and economic realms as well. Prime Minister and later President Kekkonen was successful in steering the nation into the Nordic Council in 1955, a few years after it had been established.27 Although membership in the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the European Union, was unthinkable, Finland approached this Western organization already during the Cold War. Already in 1961, the so-called FINEFTA agreement made Finland an associate member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which Great Britain had joined the preceding year. In 1973, as Great Britain advanced from being an EFTA member to full membership in the EEC, Finland landed an association agreement with the EEC.28 A decade later, as the Cold War was nearing its final stages, Finland continued its Western economic orientation by becoming a full member of EFTA, as well as a member of the Council of Europe.29 In other words, Finland became gradually more associated with the West both politically and economically. In general, Finland was thus successful in gradually and cautiously approaching the West militarily, politically, and economically without aggravating its eastern neighbour. In the words of the aforementioned directive from the UK Foreign Office, Finland worked its passage home.

Sweden, Finland, and the West During the 1990s and the 2000s Despite the significant differences between Sweden and Finland during the Cold War, the two countries were soon united along the same security political path as the Iron Curtain was lifted. Although Finland and Sweden did not join NATO, an active and dynamic partnership with the alliance evolved. They also became members of the European Union, and increased their defence cooperation with the other Nordic countries.

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Active Partners of NATO After the Cold War, Finland and Sweden were among the group of former or present European ‘neutrals’—Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland— that did not see NATO membership as a goal. For them, participation in NATO’s PfP programme rather became a way of modernizing their defence forces while at the same time maintaining their traditional security policies, working for transparency and democratization, and contributing to UN-mandated peace operations.30 Sweden, together with Finland, joined the PfP programme at its inception in 1994 and have, since then, been the most active partners among the former ‘neutrals’, with Sweden commonly referred to as ‘the number one partner’.31 By December 1994, Finland and Sweden had also managed to conclude their first Individual Partnership Program (IPP), which is a bilateral agreement of cooperation between a partner state and NATO. Finland and Sweden joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995, which is an important tool for achieving interoperability.32 When it comes to troop contributions to UN-mandated and NATOled ground operations—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan—Sweden and Finland also stand out. Both the quantity and the type of forces sent by Finland and Sweden reflect their willingness to contribute to NATO’s operations: Finland and Sweden have sent relatively large, combat (or combat-like) forces while other NATO partners have sent relatively small support (or support-like) forces.33 Britain encouraged and supported these substantial contributions from the two non-aligned Nordic countries, for instance by playing a critical part when Sweden decided to send troops to Afghanistan.34 In 2008, Finland and Sweden became the only non-NATO members participating in the NATO-managed Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative.35 In addition, Finland became involved in the NATO Response Force (NRF).36 The NRF had been established in 2003 with the intention of increasing NATO’s capability to react swiftly, as the force is able to deploy in less than five days and be operational for a month without reinforcements.37 However, Finland’s participation was at the lowest possible level, which meant that Finland would only join the complementary pool of the NRF, and thus not commit to any future activities.38 Finally, Sweden, but not Finland, also participated in the UN-mandated and NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011 with eight

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fighter jets. It was the first time that Sweden participated with fighter jets in a peace operation since the Congo operation in the 1960s. The planes were, however, not allowed to hit ground targets (except for in self-defence).39 Active Members of the European Union Finland’s gradual approach towards the EU, for instance through its membership in EFTA and association agreement with the EEC, facilitated Finnish membership in the Union as the Cold War came to an end. Consequently, Finland submitted its membership application to the then European Community (EC) already in March 1992, and became an EU member in 1995, together with Sweden.40 Since then, Sweden and Finland have been working to strengthen the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP), for instance by being active in the process leading up to the Petersberg initiative in 1996. Sweden has also been leading, whereas Finland has been participating in, the Nordic Battle Group since 2008. Furthermore, the two countries have been working for closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. However, most EU members have also possessed membership in NATO (11 of 15 in 1995, 22 of 28 in 2013). In other words, NATO was the main arena for cooperation on security and defence related issues for most EU members during the two decades after the Cold War ended. This policy area was thus given lower priority in the EU, leading to slow progress and only modest results. In other words, the EU did not become the strong security and defence political cooperative body that Sweden and Finland envisioned and attempted to develop. Still, there is no doubt that the two countries’ membership in the Union has integrated them further into Western structures, including in the area of security and defence. Nordic Cooperation on Security and Defence The end of the Cold War facilitated cooperation between Finland and Sweden, and more generally between the Nordic countries. Bilaterally, the initial focus was on cooperation between the two countries’ respective navies. Considering that both the Finnish and Swedish Coastal Ranger units already used Swedish as their working language, this was a natural area where cooperation could be developed.41 With close

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maritime cooperation between the two countries, the so-called SEA Surveillance Cooperation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS) was established the following decade, with particular focus on situational awareness, monitoring of the Baltic Sea area and interoperability between the two countries’ navies.42 Together with Denmark and Norway, the two countries also signed the Nordic Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC)-agreement in 1994, and the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Support (NORDCAPS) in 1997. The latter was intended as a cooperative body for coordinating the Nordic contribution to international military operations. An interesting aspect in this regard, is that a so-called Letter of Intent was signed between the UK and the NORDCAPS nations a few years later, which formalized the cooperation between Britain and the Nordic countries in Peace Support Operations.43 In addition, it stated that the signatories would ‘Undertake to explore the possibility for joint training, exercises, courses and other co-operative arrangements in order to improve inter operability [sic] between UK and Nordicforces [sic] through NORDCAPS.’44 The Letter of Intent thus indicated that the UK was supportive of Nordic cooperation. It also demonstrated an interest in cooperating closely with the Nordic nations, including Finland and Sweden, in order to improve their operational effectiveness. In order to strengthen their national operative capacities, the Nordic countries also established the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP) in 2008.45 The following year, all three Nordic initiatives (NORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP) were merged in a new framework called Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). At that time, the primary driver for the cooperation was cost efficiency rather than security; the focus was on procuring defence systems together rather than planning for defending the Nordic-Baltic region together. Over time, however, NORDEFCO has increased Nordic consultation and strategic thinking among the Nordic governments and defence establishments, which has to do with the worsened security situation in the region since 2013–2014.46 Still, it seems unlikely that NORDEFCO will develop into anything more than what it is at the moment, namely a military-political tool.47 Finland and Sweden thus became firmly integrated into Western structures during the two decades after the Cold War ended. This development was encouraged by Britain, who also showed an interest in cooperating more closely with the two former ‘neutrals’.

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Sweden, Finland and the West in the ‘New Cold War’ Swedish and Finnish integration into the Western defence structures in general, with the UK in particular, has continued, and in fact has intensified, over the last several years. At the same time, the UK has become more active in the region, especially since 2010 when it initiated the Northern Group. ‘We cannot forget that geographically the United Kingdom is a northern European country. […] For too long Britain has looked in every direction except its own backyard’, Defence Secretary Liam Fox stated in November 2010 in conjunction with its establishment.48 The group, or forum as he called it, included the Baltic and Nordic countries (including Sweden and Finland), as well as Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland, and has since then had regular meetings at the ministerial level.49 This initiative was a clear signal that the UK intended to focus more on Europe, and especially Northern Europe, after almost twenty years of out-of-area operations. Still, this focus on Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea did not really gain momentum until the security situation in the area deteriorated in conjunction with the Ukraine crisis from 2013 onwards. Whereas Ukraine was desperately trying to become associated with the EU, the opposite process had been initiated earlier that year in Britain. In his so-called Bloomberg speech in January, Prime Minister David Cameron had introduced the possibility of an EU referendum for Britain, given that the Conservative Party would win the following elections.50 As this initiated the process known as Brexit, it will serve as our point of departure for considering the development of the cooperation between Britain, Sweden, and Finland in this new security environment. What kind of role has Britain had, and what kind of role can it have in the future in integrating Finland and Sweden into Western defence structures in general, and the defence of the Nordic-Baltic region in particular? Despite their gradual integration into Western defence structures in the 1990s and the 2000s, as previously presented, neither Finland nor Sweden had signed bilateral defence- and security-related agreements with the UK. It is therefore noteworthy that both countries finalized such bilateral agreements with Britain during 2013. In April, Swedish Defence Minister Karin Enström, and UK Minister for International Security Strategy Andrew Morrison signed a comprehensive bilateral MoU. This agreement concerned both the provision of host nation

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support, as well as general principals and responsibilities in conjunction with training, exercises, testing, and evaluation.51 More specifically, it defined the legal status of military personnel when invited to participate in military training with the other, and enabled the mutual participation in training required to develop interoperability and sharing of knowledge and experience.52 In other words, the agreement facilitated a more practical military collaboration between the two countries. A few months later, a bilateral agreement between Finland and Britain entered into force as well.53 However, it concerned only the mutual protection of classified information, and was thus not as comprehensive as the bilateral agreement between the UK and Sweden. Despite this difference, the two agreements indicate a mutual interest in more bilateral cooperation. In addition to bilateral relationships, we can also identify the development of further multinational cooperation. Sweden announced in October that it would offer its contribution to NATO’s Response Force (NRF), the high readiness, multinational force that Finland had been involved in since 2008.54 Finland, Sweden, and the UK were thus all participating nations in the NRF’s test exercise, Steadfast Jazz, in November.55 The following year, Britain also chose to participate in the annual exercise BALTOPS, a maritime military exercise in the Baltic Sea area.56 This was the first time since 2009 that Britain provided troops to a BALTOPS exercise, which indicates a renewed interest in the area. This development created excellent opportunities for Finland and Sweden to cooperate closely with Britain. It seems clear that both NATO in general and Britain in particular considered close cooperation with both Finland and Sweden as important in the new, deteriorated security situation. This was especially evident at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, where several measures were initiated that were intended to enhance cooperation with NATO partners. Overall, the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) was launched in order to improve the operational effectiveness of multinational forces in NATO-led operations.57 As a prolongation of the PII, certain partners were granted ‘enhanced opportunities’ for deeper cooperation, also known as the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (EOP) programme. Finland and Sweden were considered the most able and willing NATO partners, alongside Australia, Georgia, and Jordan, and consequently deserved this tailor-made partnership.58

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Although this was presented as a gesture, it seems evident that NATO considered certain countries more important to cooperate with due to regional challenges.59 During the summit, Finland and Sweden also signed so-called Host Nation Support Agreements with NATO, which clarified policy and procedures for operational and logistic support sites for NATO forces operating on Finnish and Swedish territory, upon mutual agreement.60 As host nations, they were also intended to provide host nation support, which was defined as the civil and military assistance rendered in peace, emergencies, crisis and conflict by a Host Nation to allied forces and organisations, which are located on, operating in or transiting through the Host Nation’s territory, territorial waters or airspace.61

An interesting aspect of this agreement is the specification that the support should be provided in the event of a crisis or conflict, as well as during peace. Although this is not equivalent to a guarantee that NATO forces would be deployed to these partner countries in the case of a military conflict on their territory, the agreement would make it easier for them to be. With the PII in mind, it seems evident that the intention of the measures taken at the summit in Wales was to facilitate effective cooperation with NATO partners Finland and Sweden on their own territory. The following year, Britain became a full-fledged member of the so-called SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea) arrangement. This was an extension of the bilateral SUCFIS (Surveillance Cooperation Finland Sweden) arrangement that had been established already in 2006.62 The new SUCBAS arrangement, which was formed in 2009, also included the Baltic States, Denmark, Germany, and Poland, and was therefore a more comprehensive regional collaboration. In line with the renewed interest in the area, Britain joined this multinational surveillance cooperation at a SUCBAS seminar in Hamburg in March 2015.63 The idea with this regional surveillance cooperation was to exchange information between national governmental institutions in the Baltic Sea area.64 Through this arrangement, Finland, Sweden, and the UK could thus improve their situational awareness in the Nordic-Baltic region.

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A few months later, the Conservative Party won the general election in the UK. With Cameron’s pledge from 2013 in mind, the outcome of the election took the UK one large step closer to Brexit. Although Brexit was still considered highly unlikely at this point, the election results still may have created some uncertainty among those cooperating closely with Britain through the EU. It is therefore interesting to note that Finland and the UK started planning a bilateral defence agreement later that year, similar to the one between Sweden and Britain.65 Although the causal link between these two events is difficult to establish, it is not farfetched, as Finland, without a formal NATO membership, has been very active in strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy. This was for instance seen in early 2015, when President Sauli Niinistö attended an EU summit in Brussels, where he urged the Union to prioritize security.66 With Finland showing a clear desire to strengthen this policy area in the EU, it is not unthinkable that the potential loss of one of its strongest military powers instigated discussions on deeper defence cooperation on a more bilateral basis. Despite the initiation of these talks already in 2015, the bilateral agreement was not signed until July 2016. By that time, the three countries had put their ability to cooperate closely in the area to the test through participation in both BALTOPS 15 and BALTOPS 16, the latter of which was hosted by Finland for the first time. While this major exercise was underway, Sweden signed bilateral defence agreements with both the US and the UK. On 8 June, Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist and US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter signed a so-called Statement of Intent, with the intention of increasing and enhancing the already active defence cooperation between the two countries.67 Three days later, Defence Minister Hultqvist and UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon signed a Programme of Defence Cooperation in London. The aim was to identify new initiatives, develop defence capabilities, and enhance interoperability. It also included more than 50 specific activities intended to improve the ability of the two countries to act together.68 Hultqvist and Fallon stated in a joint article that the agreement opened the door to more cooperation regarding concepts, doctrines, interoperability, and development of strategic and operational understanding. They also emphasized cooperation regarding development of defence systems.69 More generally, the Swedish government stated that close cooperation with Britain on defence-related issues was a priority.70

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At this point, bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Britain was significantly more comprehensive than between the latter and Finland, which is highlighted by the lack of any references to bilateral cooperation with Britain in Finland’s foreign and security policy report, which was published a week later.71 The only reference to the UK in the Finnish report was under the sub-headline ‘Strengthening the European Union as a security community’, where it was stated that a longer-term assessment of the impacts of Britain’s referendum on whether or not to stay in the EU was needed.72 However, following the referendum on 23 June, Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö seemed clear about the negative effect this would have, as he stated that Brexit would be a big blow to EU’s CSDP.73 A few weeks later, the bilateral defence agreement with Britain that had been planned since 2015 was finalized. This implies a close connection between Brexit and the increased focus on bilateral cooperation between Finland and the UK. The so-called Defence Protocol was signed by Defence Minister Niinistö and his British counterpart Michael Fallon in conjunction with NATO’s summit in Warsaw in July 2016.74 This agreement was a framework for cooperation on security- and defence related issues, with particular focus on crisis management, information sharing, standardization, education, training and exercises.75 Defence Minister Niinistö claimed that Finland and the UK became close defence partners through this agreement, and hinted that the partnership would develop in a similar way as that between the UK and Sweden.76 It therefore seems evident that the agreement initiated a bilateral defence relationship that was going to be dynamic and progressive. As a prolongation of the bilateral agreement signed in July, the British embassy in Helsinki reopened its defence section in September. General Sir Gordon Messenger, the UK’s Vice Chief of Defence, stated during his visit in Helsinki in conjunction with the event that the only way to achieve the peace and stability we all seek is to work together with partners, to share our different perspectives and achieve a better understanding. The UK’s investment in its Defence Attaché network is an important and necessary part of that.77

This indicates the two-way interest in the cooperation between Finland and the UK. The close bilateral cooperation was not just beneficial to the small, non-aligned and somewhat exposed Nordic country,

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but also for Britain. A few weeks later, Defence Minister Niinistö and US Deputy Secretary of Defence Robert Work signed a Statement of Intent similar to the one Hultqvist and Carter had signed a few months earlier.78 Like Sweden, Finland thus prioritized bilateral defence cooperation with the UK and the US, as well as to multinational cooperation. A particular focus area at the Warsaw summit had been to increase cooperation with the EU, for example in countering hybrid threats.79 A clear expression of this initiative was the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed the following year, which would establish a so-called European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki.80 The MoU was signed by Finland, Sweden, and the UK, as well as the US, Germany, France, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. In addition, both EU and NATO representatives were present at the signing.81 The hybrid centre was thus intended as a multinational NATO/EU centre located in the capital of EU member and NATO partner Finland. During the summer of 2017, several initiatives were taken to further strengthen the cooperation between the two NATO partners and members of the alliance. In early June, Finland, Sweden, and the UK once again trained together in the Baltic Sea area during the annual BALTOPS exercise.82 Later that month, Finland and Sweden formally joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) when Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist and Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö met at a signing event in Stockholm. The JEF has the ability to support NATO, EU, and UN forces and should be able to mobilize 10,000 troops on short notice as of 201883 (see also Heier’s chapter in this volume). As Defence Secretary Fallon stated in conjunction with the signing, We are like-minded countries and have worked together in the EU. Unfortunately, that will come to an end in two years. We are leaving the political union, which is why we are reinforcing our military partnerships.84

In other words, this initiative specifically, and the increased military cooperation with partners Finland and Sweden more generally, was regarded as important in light of Britain’s upcoming separation from the Union.

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Defence Secretary Fallon also stated, ‘I hope that the JEF will bring reassurance to countries like Finland and Sweden. Membership provides them with groups of friends who are ready to take action and provide assistance.’85 Although not a guarantee of military assistance in the event of a crisis, this statement is a strong indication that Britain would take action if the situation called for it. However, as Cantrill and Meyer point out in the final chapter in this volume, it is not given where and when the force will be deployed, and which nations that are able to contribute. Despite that, the JEF implies that the defence cooperation between the UK and the two non-aligned Nordic countries has come a long way over the last few years, and that the UK has succeeded in integrating Finland and Sweden further into the Western defence of the Nordic-Baltic Region. In conjunction with the defence ministers’ meeting on 29 June, Finland and Sweden also strengthened their bilateral defence cooperation with another strong European military power, namely Germany. Both countries signed bilateral framework agreements with dialogue, information exchange, capabilities, materiel, research, and cooperation within international organizations as focus areas.86 In addition, Finland signed a so-called Letter of Intent on joining the German-led Framework Nations Concept (FNC), the idea behind which was to coordinate contributions from smaller nations under a stronger ‘framework nation’.87 In this way, the FNC resembles the JEF, as both consist of a group of smaller countries under a major NATO state.88 In light of Defence Secretary Michael Fallon’s statement on providing assistance through JEF, an interesting legal change entered into force in Finland on 1 July. The aim of this legislative package was to strengthen national security by improving the country’s ability to request and receive assistance from other states.89 Finland was thus facilitating Western support in the event of a crisis. These initiatives highlight a tendency in Finnish and Swedish defence and security policy over the last few years to strengthen ­ cooperation bilaterally with NATO members important for regional security (the UK, the US and Germany), in groups of like-minded countries (JEF, FNC), and multilaterally in larger Western organizations (NATO and the EU). In other words, cooperation with Britain in several different constellations has become an important part of the two non-aligned countries’ security and defence policy.

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In October, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats was officially inaugurated in Helsinki. That this event was important for both NATO and the EU is highlighted by the presence of both NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the High Representative of Foreign Affairs in the EU, Federica Mogherini. ‘The centre will make an important contribution to our security’, Secretary General Stoltenberg declared.90 Finland was thus intended to have a central role in the Western effort to understand and handle the increasingly present threat of hybrid warfare. With its coming on board as one of the now 12 participating nations, it is evident that Britain supported this development. Towards the end of 2017, Finland and Sweden also signed up for the most recent defence initiative in the EU, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which aims at enhancing member states effectiveness in addressing security issues by strengthening the defence cooperation within the Union.91 In light of Brexit, it was not surprising that the UK was one of three EU members that did not join this cooperation. However, Finnish and Swedish participation will presumably integrate their defence forces even more in the West. More closely related to Britain, is the two countries reaction to the poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergej Skripal and his daughter Julia in Salisbury in March 2018. Despite having to maintain a functioning relationship with Russia, especially Finland with its 1340 km long Russian border, both Finland and Sweden expelled one Russian diplomat each, thus showing solidarity with Britain.92 A similar reaction seems unthinkable during the Cold War. Finland and Sweden are thus much closer to the West in general, and the UK in particular, in this ‘new Cold War’. The two countries also signed a trilateral defence agreement with the US in early May 2018, thus deepening the defence cooperation with core nations in NATO further, despite formally remaining outside the Western alliance.93

Conclusions In this chapter, we described and analysed the role Britain has had in integrating Finland and Sweden as much as possible in the Western defence of the Nordic-Baltic region. During the Cold War, the UK

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did much to secretly integrate Sweden into Western defence structures. Britain also contributed to keep Finland technologically and economically anchored in the West. In the 1990s and the 2000s, Britain, Finland, and Sweden could openly cooperate militarily through the EU and NATO’s PfP programme, and in NATO-led ground operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The UK contributed to Sweden and Finland’s deep integration into NATO’s defence structures. Since the Russo-Georgian War, NATO’s focus has slowly changed from out-of-area operations to territorial defence. The UK is no exception to this trend, as was shown by the Northern Group initiative in 2010 and many other initiatives after that. Since then, and especially since the Ukraine crisis began, the UK has been a leading security actor in the Nordic-Baltic region, encouraging and including Finland and Sweden in all sorts of military activities without binding them to mutual security guarantees. Although Brexit seemed to potentially draw Britain further away from Europe, our analysis demonstrates that the defenceand security policy cooperation with countries like Finland and Sweden actually has increased. Despite the confusion linked to the effects of Brexit, as e.g. Johnson presents in his chapter in this volume, our findings indicate that Britain is not distancing itself from Europe militarily. On the contrary, Brexit seems to have strengthened Britain’s strategic role in the Nordic-Baltic region. The current setting is fundamentally different from during the Cold War, when Finland and Sweden were neutral and in many ways ‘wild cards’ (especially Finland). Now their roles in Western strategic thinking are much more similar and important, as they are seen as key assets in the region. With its diplomatic skills and initiatives, Britain has contributed to the current situation in important ways, and nothing indicates that this will stop. Should, however, Brexit lead to a shrinking British economy, this will also affect the UK’s ability to cooperate on security and defence related issues. On the one hand, it can lead to less cooperation due to economic restraints and strategic priorities. On the other hand, defence and security cooperation is often driven by the potential economic advantages of pooling and sharing resources. It therefore seems more likely that Britain’s cooperation with the two non-aligned Nordic states will develop further in the future, and that Britain will continue to have a leading role in the defence of the Nordic-Baltic region.

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Notes















1. Medvedev (2016). 2. Kronvall and Petersson (2012). 3. Aunesluoma (2003, p. 80). 4. Ibid., pp. 65, xiv. 5. Silva (1999). 6. Petersson (2012). 7. Johansson (1995). 8. Kronvall (2003). 9. Brundtland (1966). 10. Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen (1994), Petersson (2003), Säkerhetspolitiska utredningen (2004), Dalsjö (2006), Gribbe (2011), Holmström (2011). 11. Quoted in Aaltola (2009, p. 23). 12. Vehviläinen (2002, pp. 63–66). 13. Ruotsila (2005, p. 117). 14. Clements (2012, p. 264). 15. Rentola (2012, p. 172). 16. Ibid., p. 171. 17. Quoted in Aunesluoma (2012, p. 231). 18. Quoted in Penttilä (1991, pp. 8–9). 19. Penttilä (1991, p. 57). 20. Ries (1988, p. 185). 21. Penttilä (1991, p. 85). 22. Quoted in Penttilä (1991, p. 96). 23. Ries (1988, p. 191). 24. Ibid. 25. Penttilä (1991, p. 106). 26. Ries (1988, pp. 200–202). 27. Klinge (2003, p. 143). 28. Forsberg and Pesu (2016, p. 480). 29. Penttilä (1991, p. 152). 30. Petersson (2011), Cottey (2013), Dahl (2014). 31. Dahl (2012). 32. Petersson (2011). 33. Ibid. 34. SOU (2017:16). 35. Petersson (2011). 36. Karvinen and Puistola (2015, p. 144). 37. Lindley-French (2015, p. 111).

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38. Karvinen and Puistola (2015, p. 144). 39. Egnell (2015). 40. Klinge (2003, pp. 161–162). 41. Salonius-Pasternak (2014, pp. 4–5). 42. Ibid., p. 5. 43. Forsvarsdepartementet (2002). 44. Ibid. 45. Regjeringen (2008). 46. Saxi (2016). 47. Forss and Holopainen (2015). 48. Ministry of Defence (2010). 49. Ibid. 50. Cabinet Office (2013). 51. Utrikesdepartementet (2013). 52. Johnston (2013). 53. SopS (49–50/2013). 54. NATO (2013). 55. Wang (2013). 56. US Navy (2014). 57. NATO (2017a). 58. Dahl (2018). 59. Dahl (2017, p. 81). 60. SopS (82/2014). 61. Ibid., § 1.11. 62. SUCBAS (2017). 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Nurmi (2016). 66. Tasavallan Presidentin Kanslia (2015). 67. Regeringen (2016). 68. Regeringskansliet (2016). 69. Fallon and Hultqvist (2016). 70. Regeringskansliet (2016). 71. Valtioneuvoston kanslia (2016). 72. Ibid., p. 19. 73. Orjala (2016). 74. Puolustusministeriö (2016a). 75. Puolustusministeriö (2016b). 76. Nurmi (2016). 77. British Embassy Helsinki (2016).

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78. Puolustusministeriö (2016c). 79. NATO (2016). 80. Hybrid CoE (2017). 81. Valtioneuvosto (2017). 82. US Navy (2017). 83. Ministry of Defence (2017). 84. Nurmi (2017). 85. Ibid. 86. Puolustusministeriö (2017). 87. Ibid. 88. Saxi (2017). 89. Ulkoministeriö (2017). 90. NATO (2017b). 91. European Union External Action (2018). 92. Ulkoministeriö (2018), Regeringskansliet (2018). 93. Regeringen (2018).

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Hybrid CoE. (2017). Memorandum of Understanding on the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats [Online]. 11 April 2017. Available at: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ Hybrid-CoE-final-Mou-110417-1.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Johansson, A. W. (1995). Neutralitet och modernitet: Andra världskriget och Sveriges nationella identitet [Neutrality and Modernity: The Second World War and Sweden’s National identity]. In Huldt, Bo & Böhme, Klaus Richard (eds.), Horisonten klarnar: 1945–Krigsslut [The Horizon is Clearing: 1945– the End of the War]. Stockholm: Probus. Johnston, P. (2013). UK and Sweden Sign Defence MOU [Online]. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 19 April 2013. Available at: https://blogs.fco. gov.uk/pauljohnston/2013/04/19/uk-and-sweden-sign-defence-mou/. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Karvinen, J., & Puistola, J.-A. (2015). NATO ja Suomi [NATO and Finland]. Helsinki: Auditorium. Klinge, M. (2003). Finland in Europe. Helsinki: Otava. Kronvall, O. (2003). Den bräckliga barriären. Finland i svensk säkerhetspolitik 1948–1962 [The Fragile Barrier. Finland in Swedish Security Policy, 1948– 1962]. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan. Kronvall, O., & Petersson, M. (2012). Svensk säkerhetspolitik i supermakternas skugga 1945–1991 [Swedish Security Policy in the Shadow of the Superpowers 1945–1991]. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press. Lindley-French, J. (2015). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization—The Enduring Alliance. Second Edition. Abingdon: Routledge. Medvedev, D. (2016). Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at the panel discussion at the Munich Security Conference [Online]. Embassy of the Russian Federation. Available at: http://thailand.mid.ru/en/key-issues/1165-dmitry-medvedev-s-speech-at-the-panel-discussion-of-the-munich-security-conference. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Ministry of Defence. (2010). Defence Secretary Launches New Forum of Northern European Countries [Online]. 10 November 2010. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-launches-new-forum-of-northern-european-countries. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2017). Sweden and Finland Join UK-Led Response Force [Online]. 30 June 2017. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/swedenand-finland-join-uk-led-response-force. Accessed: 11 May 2018. NATO. (2013). Sweden to Join NATO Response Force and Exercise Steadfast Jazz [Online]. 14 October 2013. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natolive/news_104086.htm. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2016). Warsaw Summit Communique [Online]. 9 June 2016. Available at:  https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. Accessed: 11 May 2018.

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———. (2017a). Partnership Interoperability Initiative [Online]. 7 June 2017. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_132726.htm. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2017b). Secretary General Participates in Hybrid Centre of Excellence Inauguration with Finnish Leaders and EU High Representative [Online]. 2 October 2017. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_147497.htm. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen. (1994). Had There Been a War…: Preparations for the Reception of Military Assistance 1949–1969. Stockholm: Fritzes. Nurmi, L. (2016). Suomi solmii Britannian kanssa puolustussopimuksen [Finland Is About to Conclude a Defence Agreement with Britain]. Turun Sanomat [Online]. 1 July 2016. Available at: http://www.ts.fi/uutiset/ kotimaa/2706906/Suomi+solmii+Britannian+kanssa+puolustussopimuksen. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2017). Defence Secretary of the UK: JEF Forces Ready to Assist Finland—“Finland Is Not Alone”. Aamulehti [Online]. 30 June 2017. Available at: https://www.aamulehti.fi/kotimaa/defence-secretary-of-the-ukjef-forces-ready-to-assist-finland-finland-is-not-alone-200237370/. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Orjala, A. (2016). Puolustusministeri Niinistö: Britannian lähtö kolaus EU: n yhteiselle turvallisuuspolitiikalle [Defence Minister Niinistö: Britain’s Departure Is a Blow to the Common Security Policy of the EU]. YLE Uutiset [Online]. 24 June 2016. Available at: http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8983253. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Penttilä, R. E. J. (1991). Finland’s Search for Security Through Defence, 1944–89. London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd. Petersson, M. (2003). “Brödrafolkens väl”: Svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949–1969 [“The Welfare of the Brother Folk”: Swedish-Norwegian Security Relations 1949–1969]. Stockholm: Santérus Förlag. ———. (2011). NATO and the EU ‘Neutrals’—Instrumental or Value Oriented Utility? In: Edström, H., Matlary, J. H., & Petersson, M. (eds.), NATO: The Power of Partnerships. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. (2012). Sweden and the Scandinavian Defence Dilemma. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 221–229. Puolustusministeriö. (2016a). Suomen ja Iso-Britannian puolustusministerit allekirjoittivat puiteasiakirjan [The Defence Ministers of Finland and Great Britain Signed a Framework Document] [Online]. 9 July 2016. Helsinki: Puolustusministeriö (Ministry of Defence, Finland). Available at: https:// www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/2016/suomen_ja_iso-britannian_ puolustusministerit_allekirjoittivat_puiteasiakirjan.7908.news. Accessed: 11 May 2018.

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———. (2016b). Framework Arrangement for British-Finnish Defence Co-operation between the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Ministry of Defence of Finland [Online]. 9 July 2016. Helsinki: Puolustusministeriö (Ministry of Defence, Finland). Available at: https://www.defmin.fi/files/3634/FIN-UK.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2016c). Statement of Intent Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland [Online]. 7 October 2016. Helsinki: Puolustusministeriö (Ministry of Defence, Finland). Available at: http://www.defmin.fi/files/3543/ Statement_of_Intent.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2017). A Framework Agreement Signed Between Finland and Germany [Online]. Helsinki: Puolustusministeriö (Ministry of Defence, Finland). Available at: https://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases/2017/a_ framework_agreement_signed_between_finland_and_germany.8583.news. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Regeringen. (2016). Statement of Intent between the Secretary of Defense of the United States of America and the Minister of Defense of Sweden [Online]. 8 June 2016. Stockholm: Regeringen (The Government of Sweden). Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/49d2af/globalassets/regeringen/ dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/statement-of-intent-swe_us-20160608_ signed.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2018). Trilateral Statement of Intent Among the Department of Defence of the United States of America AND the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden [Online]. 8 May 2018. Stockholm: Regeringen (The Government of Sweden). Available at: http://www.government.se/49993c/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/2018/trilateral-statement-of-intent-8th-may-2018.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Regeringskansliet. (2016). Sweden and the United Kingdom Enhances Defence Cooperation [Online]. 11 June 2016. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). Available at: http://www.government.se/ articles/2016/06/sweden-and-the-united-kingdom-enhances-defence-cooperation/. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2018). Sverige utvisar en rysk diplomat som följd av attacken i Salisbury [Sweden expels a Russian Diplomat as a Consequence of the Attack in Salisbury] [Online]. 26 March 2018. Stockholm: Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/ pressmeddelanden/2018/03/sverige-utvisar-en-rysk-diplomat-som-foljd-avattacken-i-salisbury/. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Regjeringen. (2008). Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Kingdom of

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Sweden and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland on Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP) [Online]. 11 November 2008. Oslo: Regjeringen (The Government of Norway). Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fd/temadokumenter/mou_nordic-support-defence-structures_nettutgave.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Rentola, K. (2012). Great Britain and the Soviet Threat in Finland, 1944–1951. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 171–184. Ries, T. (1988). Cold Will—The Defence of Finland. London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers Ltd. Ruotsila, M. (2005). Churchill and Finland—A Study in Anticommunism and Geopolitics. London and New York: Routledge. Säkerhetspolitiska utredningen. (2004). Peace and Security: Swedish Security Policy 1969–1989. Stockholm: Fritzes. Salonius-Pasternak, C. (2014). Deeper Defence Cooperation: Finland and Sweden Together Again? [Online]. Briefing Paper 163 (2014). Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti (Finnish Institute of International Affairs). Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/186091/bp163.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Saxi, H. L. (2016). Hvordan revitalisere NORDEFCO? En statusrapport og noen konkrete tiltak for å styrke samarbeidet i hverdagen [How to Revitalize NORDEFCO? A Status Report and Some Specific Measures to Strengthen the Everyday Cooperation]. In: Storm Jensen, M. (ed.), Nordisk forsvarssamarbejde 2016—Vilkår og muligheder [Nordic Defence Cooperation 2016— Conditions and Opportunities]. Copenhagen: Forsvarsakademiet. ———. (2017). British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept. Defence Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 171–197. Silva, C. (1999). Keep Them Strong, Keep Them Friendly: Swedish–American Relations and the Pax Americana, 1948–1952. University Dissertation. Stockholm: Stockholm University. SopS. (49–50/2013). Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the Mutual Protection of Classified Information [Online]. 49–50/2013. Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö (Ministry of Justice). Available at: http://www.finlex.fi/data/ss/2013/ss20130050.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (82/2014). Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the Government of the Republic of Finland and Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation as Well as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe regarding the Provision of Host Nation Support for the Execution of

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NATO Operations/Exercises/Similar Military Activity [Online]. 82/2014. Helsinki: Oikeusministeriö (Ministry of Justice, Finland). Available at: http:// www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/2014/20140082/20140082_2. Accessed: 11 May 2018. SOU. (2017:16). Sverige i Afghanistan 2002–2014: Betänkande av Afghanistanutredningen [Online]. SOU 2017:16. Stockholm: Statens offentliga utredningar. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/492dc9/contentassets/257a87e121a14684b4fb7e4488131827/sveriges-samlade-engagemang-i-afghanistan-under-perioden-20022014-sou-2017.16.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. SUCBAS. (2017). SUCBAS Rationale [Online]. Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea. Available at: http://sucbas.org/. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Tasavallan presidentin kanslia. (2015). President Niinistö in Brussels: EU to Prioritise Security [Online]. 29 January 2015. Helsinki: Tasavallan presidentin kanslia (Office of the President of the Republic of Finland). Available at:  http://www.tpk.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=319943&nodeid= 44807&contentlan=2&culture=en-US. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Ulkoministeriö. (2017). Kansainvälisen avun antamista ja pyytämistä koskeva lakipaketti voimaan heinäkuussa [Legislative Package on the Provision of and Request for International Assistance to Take Effect in July] [Online]. Press Release 120/127, 28 June 2017. Helsinki: Ulkoministeriö (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland). Available at: http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=363859&nodeid=15146&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2018). TP-UTVA linjasi kansalliset toimet Salisburyn hermomykkyiskun johdosta [President of the Republic and Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security Policy Decided on Finland’s Actions following Salisbury nerve agent attack]. [Online]. Press release 152/2018, 26 March 2018. Helsinki: Ulkoministeriö (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland). Available at: http:// formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=373440&nodeid=15146&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI. Accessed: 11 May 2018. US Navy. (2014). 13 Nations to Participate in 42nd Annual Exercise BALTOPS 2014 [Online]. Available at: http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_ id=81410. Accessed: 11 May 2018. ———. (2017). BALTOPS 2017 [Online]. Available at: http://www.c6f.navy. mil/forces-efforts/baltops. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Utrikesdepartementet. (2013). Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Conduct of Exercises, Training and Integrated Test and Evaluation Activities and the Provision of Host Nation Support [Online]. SÖ 2013:21. Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden). Available at:

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http://www.regeringen.se/49ec0a/contentassets/aacb3289d37d49b3a9ba626e289b2aff/so-2013-21_web.pdf. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Valtioneuvosto. (2017). Eurooppalainen hybridiuhkien osaamiskeskus perustettiin Helsinkiin [European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats Established in Helsinki]. [Online]. Press Release 159/2017. Helsinki: Valtioneuvosto (Finnish Government). Available at: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/ en/article/-/asset_publisher/10616/eurooppalainen-hybridiuhkien-osaamiskeskus-perustettiin-helsinkiin?_101_INSTANCE_3qmUeJgIxZEK_languageId=fi_FI. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Valtioneuvoston kanslia. (2016). Valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko [The Government’s Foreign and Security Policy Report] [Online]. Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 7/2016. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kanslia (Prime Minister’s Office, Finland). Available at: http://formin.finland. fi/public/download.aspx?ID=159271&GUID={B084DC8B-BF65-4B64A1A7-7E5E108F0753}. Accessed: 11 May 2018. Vehviläinen, O. (2002). Finland in the Second World War—Between Germany and Russia. Translated by Gerard McAlester. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wang, S. (2013). NATO “Steadfast Jazz” Military Exercise 2013 [Online]. NATO Association of Canada. Available at: http://natoassociation.ca/natosteadfast-jazz-military-exercise-2013/. Accessed: 11 May 2018.

CHAPTER 10

The JEF as a Force Multiplier: The Example of Joint Amphibious Response in the Nordic-Baltic Theatre Richard Cantrill and Eystein Lockwood Meyer

Introduction British leadership in Northern Europe is welcomed by the Nordic-Baltic states for several reasons, but the common interest in keeping it a stable and prosperous region based on democratic and liberal values is clearly the foundation, reflecting the national interests of the United Kingdom as pointed out by Rob Johnson in Chapter 2. A more revisionistic and assertive Russia is challenging the stability in the Nordic-Baltic region, making Russia the major security concern in the Nordic and Baltic countries. Therefore, security solutions are clearly a key aspect of the current willingness for increased cooperation and acceptance of British leadership in the region. While bilateral relationships with the United States are the ultimate strategic deterrence for the region (punishment), the countries also seek deterrence by denial through hedging strategies using R. Cantrill  Royal Marines, London, UK E. L. Meyer (*)  Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_10

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multilateral options. Hence, as mentioned by Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson in chapter eight, the Nordic-Baltic countries contribute to NATO, the EU, and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with the expectation of quid pro quo military support in the event of a hypothetical Russian aggression1 towards them. To meet regional expectations, and to be seen as a legitimate military leader in Northern Europe, the UK must possess credible and available military capabilities. As Tormod Heier points out in Chapter 9, time is a critical factor for the Nordic and Baltic states in a bilateral crisis with Russia, due to lack of resilience. Credible support to the region then requires timely employment of military forces that can, ideally, pre-empt and deny a Russian incursion and territorial occupation until US support arrives.2 Alternatively, the use of force might hamper, disrupt, and delay Russian forces from reaching their objectives, and thereby deny them the possibility to change posture from offensive to defensive operations, with more favourable force ratio calculations. At the same time, it will create diplomatic space to negotiate and compromise before the disaster is complete.3 The availability of British forces at high readiness to provide such intervention and support varies over time based on rotation plans and other operational commitments. This chapter will limit itself to the amphibious forces available, implicitly assuming that naval and air forces are in place to deploy an amphibious force, with acceptable risk, within the JEF construct (or a wider NATO/European and American amphibious cooperation).4 In the event of a Russian aggression, the NordicBaltic countries are likely to keep most of their military forces at home, so the core JEF fighting force will consist of British and Dutch forces. The landing force available at high readiness is thus likely to consist of 3 Commando Brigade’s Lead Commando Group and one Marine Combat Group from the Netherlands, at a minimum, with possible additional European and American support. This chapter will address where such an amphibious force should be employed within the Nordic-Baltic theatre of war for an optimal strategic effect from a military perspective; we do not, however, prescribe a ‘Maginot line strategy’, acknowledging instead that in reality the military logic will be pitted against political desire for freedom of action. The conclusion drawn could then be used to inform capability development and training and exercise priorities of the British, Dutch and other cooperating amphibious forces.

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We first establish the criteria for ‘optimal military strategic effect’, and then select the two most relevant areas of operations for comparison and conclusion. Finally, we make some recommendations for host nation preparations and the development of amphibious capabilities. Several assertions in this chapter are based on interviews with serving and retired officers from the UK, the Netherlands, and the Nordic and Baltic States, many of whom wished to remain anonymous. Other assertions are the authors’ own opinions, based on their own experience as serving officers in the Royal Marines and the Royal Norwegian Navy, respectively. The methodologies used are interviewing5 and self-reflexivity6,7 and the views contained in this chapter are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Optimal Military Strategic Effect Since the Allied strategic ambition is to deny or delay a larger force from reaching its potential objectives with a smaller force, the strategy must be based on the philosophy of attrition8 and force ratio calculations to make the opponent ask himself, ‘Do I have enough troops to attain my objectives with acceptable risk of failure?’ Therefore, the highest strategic impact on the opponent in this regard is based on where the use of the amphibious force will fix the highest number of opposing troops. The standard heuristic for calculating combat forces is the rule of 3:1 to succeed with an attack and 1:3 to succeed with a defence. Logically, these should not be rules for success, but rather for stalemates. Of course most military planners, including Russian ones, recognise this, and therefore they have historically used a doctrinal tactical force ratio from 3:1 to 4:1 for main attacks that must break through the defensive lines of the opponent. In the final year of World War II, the superiority was sometimes as high as 9:1 for a critical breakthrough sector.9 Complicating factors in force ratio calculations include joint force contributions and differences in technology and technical and tactical options; therefore, this chapter cannot draw an exact conclusion, but only indicate a potential force multiplying effect. Risk is the result of an undesirable condition multiplied by the likelihood of its occurrence. While every situation has risk attached, not every situation is worth monitoring. However, situations that are characterised by a high level of uncertainty clearly carry a high risk if the potential outcome is unwelcome. This means that increasing the uncertainty for the

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opponent will increase risk, which will have to be treated accordingly. In military operations, risk can be treated through Ends, Ways and Means. To force an opponent to treat their risk by changing their Ends—in other words, reducing their ambition—is to achieve deterrence. Risk can only be treated through adaption of Ways to a certain extent, due to the capacity of the force allocated to a specific operation. Increasing the Means will compensate for this, but there is always a limit to how much capacity any actor has. Ensuring that the opponent’s force ratio calculations, which are based on the acceptable risk, do not add up to the available force will coerce a change in the Ends (and achieve deterrence), or force the opponent to expose weakness that can be exploited. Since the opponents’ uncertainty increases proportionally with our freedom of action, it is important to put the amphibious force in a position where it can maximise its freedom of action. And because the operating environment can be influenced by the joint functions of fires, manoeuvre, information, and civil military cooperation, it is the opportunity for manoeuvre that represents the largest potential for freedom of action. Manoeuvre is the only military activity that can put forces in favourable positions and occupy or regain territory; therefore, it is often the decisive action of a military force. The distinctive features of amphibious forces make them extremely flexible. Exploiting sea, air, and land for mobility, amphibious forces are able to support combat operations through manoeuvre of light protected land forces with a combination of strength, protection, range, and speed that no land force can match.10 The four types of amphibious operations (demonstration, raid, assault, and withdrawal) can be applied to counter enemy operations in the rear of the land forces, to strengthen the front line, to secure a retreat, to support the front line with tactical flanking manoeuvres, or to move further into the rear of the enemy to raid highvalue targets or assault in support of an operational turning manoeuvre.11 In the last case, in particular, it is challenging for the enemy to know which of the two is the goal, or if the manoeuvre is a feint. In such a situation, the logic of paradox also applies. If the enemy thinks that a turning manoeuvre against them would be considered to have to high risk, and is therefore unlikely, and they choose not to protect the area with substantial forces, there is an opportunity to manoeuvre with less risk and therefore manoeuvre may become a more likely option for the attacking force. Hence, the enemy would have to take the full amphibious force into calculation on all possible fronts (deep, front, and rear)

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simultaneously until they know with certainty what the amphibious force is committed to. It follows that the amphibious force’s freedom of action to choose between all the different kinds of manoeuvre creates an uncertainty the enemy can only fully compensate for with an increase in own forces to meet the required force ratios on all fronts simultaneously. This force-multiplying feature of amphibious forces is only true given a geography that allows for the full range of amphibious manoeuvre options. It is geography that determines what kind of mobility has utility. If there is no shoreline, the use of landing craft for surface manoeuvres loses its utility, and the ability to manoeuvre ashore in numbers, “protected” with light armour, will no longer be available. In this case, the amphibious force will only have the attributes of light airborne troops left. But just the presence of a shoreline does not provide the full range of theoretical options for surface manoeuvre. It is the length of the shoreline relative to the depth of the battlespace that determines which options are available. And the distances are relative to the areas the opposing tactical units cover. There will, for example, be no option for a turning manoeuvre, unless there is a shoreline behind the enemy’s tactical front-line troops. On a different scale than a possible scenario in the Nordic-Baltic region, the historical example of Operation Chromite with the landing in Inchon in Korea in 1950 illustrates the threat such a manoeuvre represents to an actor with an exposed shoreline in the operational rear area. Hence, geography that allows for the full range of options for amphibious manoeuvres would be favourable to the employment of the amphibious force from a force-multiplying perspective. Another factor that influences the space for manoeuvre is the enemy. The positioning of troops ashore in combination with artificial obstacles along the shoreline and supported by naval, air and special forces in a layered Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defence will of course influence accessibility for amphibious forces. A break-in battle to get ashore will not be preferable, as it risks losing too much combat power before manoeuvre can be converted into an actual effect on the ground, or indeed threatening the overall endeavour of delivering combat power from sea to land. The British assessment of Operation Corporate in the Falklands War in 1982 included a clear statement from General Julian Thomson, who commanded the landing force during the operation: ‘Landing without achieving air superiority was a risky undertaking, and should not be repeated in future …’.12 Despite often being cut off by commanders and staff officers when planning operations, leading them

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to discard amphibious options, the quote continues: ‘… unless it is absolutely unavoidable, as was the case in this operation.’13 Might this also be the case in the event of a Russian incursion? The Russians clearly has a vote when it comes to where and when an amphibious manoeuvre is possible, but this influence goes both ways and is highly dependent on the risk the Allies is willing to take. The following factors therefore constitute the criteria for ‘optimal military strategic effect’ around which different strategic options will be assessed: access, the area’s importance for Russia, force-multiplying effect, and the climate in the area and whether or not the amphibious force is equipped and trained for it.

Strategic Options for Employment of the Amphibious Force In the hypothetical event of a Russian attack on the Nordic-Baltic region, NATO would most likely be involved.14 NATO’s main effort to regain and restore territory in the Nordic-Baltic region would necessarily involve a train of heavy land forces from continental Europe. It is in light of this strategy that the strategic options for the employment of the amphibious force in a time of crisis need to be assessed (Fig. 10.1).

Fig. 10.1  Where should the amphibious force be employed?

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Should the amphibious force be used to secure strategically wellplaced Iceland to support maritime access for American support to Europe? Should it be used to secure the Danish straits to support follow on access to the Baltic Sea? Should it be used to secure the island of Gotland, strategically placed for those who want control of the Baltic Sea region? Should it be used for direct support in a potential delaying operation in the Baltic States or Finland or Sweden? Should it be used to secure the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOMI) of NATO forces in the Baltic or Norway? Should it be used to secure RSOMI of USMC from the prepositioned storage sites in Norway?15 Should it be used in direct support of a potential delaying operation in Northern Norway? Or should it be kept in reserve as a ‘fleet in being’16 for later employment? This list is not exhaustive, but covers some of the options most likely to be put on the table should the situation dictate. The criteria for optimal military strategic effect suggest an operational concept that emphasises opportunity for manoeuvre, threatening the full depth of the battlespace in the operations area. Therefore, seize and hold missions to secure distinct geographical features like Iceland, the Danish straits or Gotland will not be further examined. The defensive mission to support RSOMI will also clearly not exploit the full range of manoeuvres, and therefore not be pursued further. This pre-filtering leaves two primary options for further comparison: the Baltic Sea area, including direct support in a potential delaying operation in the Baltic States, Finland or Sweden; and Northern Norway, including direct support in a potential delaying operation in Northern Norway.

The Baltic The Baltic Sea area is a confined space, sheltered from the Atlantic Ocean by Scandinavia. The only maritime access is through the Danish Straits and the Kiel Canal, together constituting a chokepoint that demands vast resources within Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Mine Counter Measure (MCM) capabilities to be used in a time of crisis. In the event of war, the chokepoint would represent a very high risk for maritime access to the Baltic Sea, and in a time of crisis, the attempt to sail forces through the chokepoint could be the trigger that escalates the situation to war (Fig. 10.2).

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Fig. 10.2  Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in the Baltic Sea area

Russian land in the area consists of the Russian exclave Kaliningrad and the coastline at the bottom of the Finish Bay near Saint Petersburg. Russia has made Kaliningrad a fortress for its Baltic fleet, with an airbase and short-range ballistic missiles (Iskander) capable of carrying nuclear warheads.17 The exclave is protected by an air defence system, including the S-400, which, with its 400-kilometer range, can potentially deny airspace far into the neighbouring countries. Kaliningrad will act as a springboard if Russia attempts to activate their A2/AD Bastion in the Baltic Sea area. Although it is a strongpoint, the exclave has the natural disadvantage of vulnerable lines of supply. This is why a hypothetical Russian attack on the Baltic States would have to include the early securement of an overland line of supply to Kaliningrad: namely the ‘Suwalki Gap’—the border strip separating Kaliningrad from Belarus. The protection and sustainment of the exclave, and to keep NATO as far away from Moscow as possible are the main ingredients of the importance of the region to Russia. If the amphibious force were to operate in the Baltic Sea, there are a number of possibilities as to where the landing force could be employed. However, with the exception of the Finnish Bay, all the options consist of

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the reinforcement of a tactical front line fighting against a heavy armoured land force. This arrangement is not to the advantage of a lightly protected force in a relatively flat landscape. If the Finnish Bay can be exploited for surface manoeuvres, it might be possible to land the force ashore near Hamina in Finland or Narva in Estonia behind the Russian tactical front line and threaten the overland line of supply. Nevertheless, these options are few and would require relatively few extra Russian forces to treat the risk. Moreover, according to a RAND report, it would require approximately seven brigades, of which three are heavily armoured, with necessary joint support to prevent Russia from reaching the outskirts of Tallin and Riga within 60 hours.18 That is far from what the Baltic States and the present NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) forces have available, and an ill-protected brigade would make little difference in a frontline battle. Therefore, the force-multiplying effect of employing the amphibious force in the Baltic Sea region would be minimal. The brackish water in the Baltic Sea freezes to ice in the shallow parts near the shoreline during the winter,19 reducing the space for surface manoeuvres even more. While the landing force is equipped and trained for all the climatic conditions they could face in the area, the same is not necessarily true for all the warships forming the amphibious force. Therefore, there could be times during the winter months that the amphibious force simply would not be able to operate in the Baltic Sea.

Northern Norway Maritime access to Northern Norway is possible from the open ocean or along the Norwegian coastline. While the open ocean makes it possible to use sensor and weapon systems to their maximum effect, the geography of the coastline provides concealment and hampers detection (and target data). The Russian A2/AD Bastion Defence in the Norwegian Sea, if activated, would challenge both options (Fig. 10.3). Russia has common border with Norway and maritime access to the Barents and Norwegian Seas from the Kola Peninsula and the White Sea. Russia has established a base for strategic submarines at Kola, which provides access to the vast ocean areas. The Russian Northern Fleet is there to protect this strategic deterrent, and is supported with land, air, and special forces. The Bastion Defence concept would naturally include control of at least a part of Northern Norway to be effective. The Russian Bastion would most likely be activated if a crisis were to escalate into war in the Baltics, linking the two operations areas together and creating a

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Fig. 10.3  Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in Northern Norway

potential for spillover effects between them. Since the area provides the ultimate strategic depth in military options, it is of existential importance for Russia. The geography of Northern Norway dictates that an enemy must advance in parallel to the coastline, and an adequate Russian land grab would inevitably expose a vulnerable rear area to a potential amphibious manoeuvre. In this area, all types of amphibious operations are possible against all parts of the battlefield, providing the optimal freedom of action for an amphibious force. During the winter months, however, the presence of some ice in the bottom of the fjords due to brackish water may hamper or prevent some options. Nevertheless, the Gulf Stream along the coastline provides water temperatures the larger ships can endure, and therefore the amphibious force can operate in the area throughout the year. The marines in the amphibious force are also equipped and trained for the arduous conditions in the area during the dark winter months. However, without acclimatisation, the most extreme conditions likely pose undue risk to the force and could be a temporary ‘show-stopper’ for amphibious operations. Nevertheless, considering all the various factors, the force-multiplying effect would be close to optimal in Northern Norway.

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Comparing the Baltic and Northern Norway Access to both areas would be challenging in a time of crisis, but access to the Baltic through the Danish Straits and Kiel Canal chokepoint would carry extreme risk in the event of escalation. Therefore, Northern Norway is considered a more viable option for the deployment of amphibious forces than the Baltic Sea. Both areas are of high strategic importance to Russia. Nevertheless, for Russia to decide between Kaliningrad and the Northern Fleet Bastion that protects their strategic deterrence would be an obvious choice, with the strategic deterrent being the priority. Hence, the willingness to accept risk for the establishment of the Northern Bastion would be less than for the Baltic Sea Bastion, and the willingness to compromise on the force ratio calculations would be less in the North. Even with the Russian A2/AD Bastions, geography and the ­climate are still the most important factors for the freedom of action of the amphibious force. While these factors would only provide a marginal force-multiplying effect most of the year in the Baltic Sea area, they would provide a near optimal force-multiplying effect throughout the year in Northern Norway. Therefore, the presence of the amphibious force in Northern Norway would have the highest force-­ multiplying effect against Russia. The effect would be further improved with an early deployment that offers little or no opportunity for Russia to seize territory and consolidate its position to achieve a more favourable force ratio. The key question, then, is, What should Norway, with allied support, do to shape the battlespace for an optimal timely employment of the amphibious force? And further, What should the amphibious force do to improve its utility in Northern Norway?

Shaping the Battlespace for Early Employment of the Amphibious Force Sea control, necessary for access to and within the operations area, is imperative for the early deployment of the amphibious force. Local knowledge of the area is important to exploit the best options available, and Norway should therefore ensure the Commander and the staff of the amphibious force have access to this knowledge through at least one embedded staff officer or liaisons. Further, the most

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time-consuming tasks related to establishing sea control and ­ shaping should be carried out mostly by Norway. These tasks include AntiSubmarine Warfare, Mine Counter Measures, and amphibious reconnaissance. Command and control and intelligence-sharing arrangements need to be agreed upon in advance. Certain logistic arrangements, like Forward Air and Maritime Refuelling Points, and the protection of those, could also reduce the employment time. And finally, the synchronisation with Norwegian operations in the area would require at least one embedded staff officer in the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and liaisons to the tactical service headquarters, all with reliable and secure ways of communicating with the amphibious force. The key is shaping to provide freedom of action, which allows for a choice of time and place of a potential decisive manoeuvre. The final decision must be made as late as possible, synchronized with other actions, and timed to exploit opportunities. This requires a capacity for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) that covers all theoretical options, so the commander can weigh the options and pick the best one at the last possible moment to achieve the most important principle of war for offensive action: surprise. Many people are unaware of the role of amphibious reconnaissance and its contribution to freedom of action related to time and space. When a landing beach is in danger of being compromised, reconnaissance is conducted in a covert/discreet manner during darkness at both high and low tide. This is a task normally conducted by Special Forces, and since 2004 the Norwegian Coastal Rangers have trained as an integrated part of the British or Dutch amphibious forces during their winter exercises in Norway and abroad, improving the overall amphibious reconnaissance capacity. This has also led to a Norwegian Amphibious Reconnaissance Unit consisting of Coastal Rangers and EOD divers participating in the NATO Response Force in 2009 and 2016 as an integrated part of the Dutch amphibious force. This increased capacity in amphibious reconnaissance increase freedom of action with regard to simultaneous options for manoeuvre in Northern Norway, thereby optimizing uncertainty for the enemy. Such a capacity is also useful to create deception and can delay the enemy’s ability to react with certainty, while making it possible to choose another option if the landing site is compromised on very short notice. With all the options for surface manoeuvre in Northern Norway, the amphibious

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reconnaissance capacity should be sustained or increased to provide the optimal freedom of action for the amphibious force.

How Can the Amphibious Force Improve Its Utility in Northern Norway? Freedom of action related to time and space is very much dependent on the speed and range of surface vessels. The current Landing Craft Utility (LCU) in service in both the Royal Marines and the Dutch Mariniers has a maximum speed of 10 knots.20 This is slow compared to the Russian Dyugon class’ 35 knots21 or the American LCAC’s more than 40 knots.22 The last part of the insertion (Ship-To-Shore/Objective Manoeuvre— STOM) can actually be done by landing craft that can sustain a speed of 20–50 knots and can theoretically sail a distance of 300–1000 nautical miles. That means a possible distance of 150 nautical miles between the amphibious shipping to the landing beach without refueling. By establishing Forward Maritime Refueling Points (FMRP) for the surface vessels and Forward Air Refueling Points (FARP) for the rotary wings, the range along a coastline can be extended as far as desired. Hence, it is possible to conduct amphibious operations towards an operationally deep area while the large amphibious shipping is kept at a necessary safe distance. Therefore, the British and Dutch amphibious forces should upgrade their surface manoeuvre capabilities to modern standards. The amphibious force could also benefit from more training in the challenging conditions of Northern Norway. The Royal Marines’ current bi-annual training with a small part of the whole force only maintains a low level of the competence required for a rapid employment of the amphibious force. More frequent training with a larger force would improve the credibility of the force’s rapid response ability. Moreover, the amphibious forces should familiarise themselves with as many options for manoeuvre as possible from Kirkenes to Narvik, while simultaneously demonstrating resolve. The Norwegian policy of balancing reassurance with deterrence would probably not allow a full-scale demonstration, but manoeuvres with small units should fall within the range of what is considered acceptable in the current political climate. During these winter deployments to Norway, further integration and cooperation with related host nation units should be standard procedure, as it would reduce the time needed for employment.

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Conclusion In the hypothetical event of a Russian aggression in the Nordic-Baltic region, the available amphibious force should be deployed to Northern Norway. The main reasons for this conclusion are the space to exploit superior ability to manoeuvre with the amphibious force and the proximity of the strategically most important area for Russia. Of all the options assessed in this chapter, this one will create the highest strategic force-multiplying effect against Russia in the Nordic-Baltic theatre. If the deployment of the amphibious force to Northern Norway made it necessary for Russia to send an extra division to the front, the spillover effect would be formidable. It would mean potentially one Russian division less in the main front against a NATO counter offensive to regain the Baltic. Using the force ratio heuristic of 3:1, this in turn would mean three fewer NATO divisions would be required in the main effort. While this is only indicative, the numbers are significant with an even smaller force-multiplying effect. Therefore, to say that one amphibious brigade has the value of three divisions is perhaps a bit tendentious, but not necessarily incorrect. Such a ’Churchillian strategy‘, fixing a larger force with a smaller one in the strategic flank to weaken the main front, has proven valuable before23 and is likely to be of great importance in the future. It could be said that rapid response by a UK-led amphibious force is crucial to an overall allied strategy for dealing with aggression against the Nordic-Baltic region. Further, to improve the credibility of a strategy like the one described, it is recommended that landing craft in particular be upgraded to improve their high-speed and long-range capabilities; that Norway prepare locally, in cooperation with allies, for the rapid establishment of necessary sea control and shaping for the insertion of the amphibious force, including sustained or increased capacity for amphibious reconnaissance to provide the optimal freedom of action for the amphibious force; and that the range of manoeuvres be tested, developed, and demonstrated during exercises.

Notes

1. Aggression: Hostile or violent behavior or attitudes toward another; readiness to attack or confront, i.e. a crisis that is in danger of escalation. 2. The US will have to move the majority of required troops and equipment 8–10,000 km, expected to take at least 4–5 weeks before they are ready for combat in Europe.

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3. Heier, T., Norges forhold til Russland, Dagens Næringsliv, Oslo, December 18, 2017. 4. The European Amphibious Initiative or the outcome of the Commander Marine Corps Europe and Africa’s Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary Symposium could constitute the framework for such an operation as well. 5. Davies, P., Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services, Politics (Vol. 21, No. 1, 2001), pp. 73–80. 6.  See Carreiras, H. et  al. (eds), Researching the Military (London: Routledge, 2016). 7. Hudson, P., and Roberts, P., “The UK and the North Atlantic: A British Military Perspective”, in NATO and the North Atlantic Revitalizing Collective Defence, edited by John Andreas Olsen, RUSI Whitehall Paper 87, London, 2017, p. 76. 8.  Milevski, L., “Grand Strategy Is Attrition. The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict”, in Forsvarets Stabsskole, Militære Studier Special Edition 2017, p. 163. 9. Wardak, G. D. et al., The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy 3: Issues of Operational Art (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992) p. 301. 10. This is only true when embarked. The minute the light force lands, it looks rather weak, slow and range-limited, compared to an armored force. 11. A turning manoeuvre cuts off the lines of supply for the opponent and forces him to retreat or establish a new tactical front to restore control of the logistical support to the main front. 12.  Thomson, J., “Falkland Islands—Operation Corporate”, May–June 1982, in Amphibious Assault—Manoeuvre from the Sea, edited by Tristan Lovering, Seafarer Books, Suffolk, 2007, p. 465. 13. Thompson, p. 465. 14. Even though Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, the region is institutionally and economically intertwined and it is, for all practical purposes, impossible not to trigger a NATO mobilisation. 15. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). 16. A fleet of naval vessels that because of its mere existence is a factor in the calculations of opposing strategists even though it is inactive or appears to be immobilized. Merriam Webster Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fleet%20in%20being. Accessed 5 March 2018. 17.  BBC, “Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers Nato”, BBC News Channel, 22 November 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-38070201. Accessed 22 December 2017.

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18.  Shlapak, D. A., and Johnson, D. W., Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank—Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation, 2016, pp. 1–2. 19. Finnish Meteorological Institute, Baltic Sea Ice Winters. http://en.ilmatieteenlaitos.fi/baltic-sea-ice-winters. Accessed 22 December 2017. 20. Wikipedia, Landing Craft Utility. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Landing_Craft_Utility#LCU_Mk.9. Accessed 22 December 2017. 21. Wikipedia, Dyugon-Class Landing Craft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Dyugon-class_landing_craft. Accessed 11 January 2018. 22. Wikipedia, Landing Craft Air Cushion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Landing_Craft_Air_Cushion. Accessed 22 December 2017. 23.  The Mediterranean Strategy and amphibious commando raids against Norway during World War II drew German forces away from Northern France and the Eastern Front in the several hundreds of thousands.

Bibliography BBC. (2016). Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers Nato, BBC News Channel, 22 November 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38070201. Accessed 22 December 2017. Carreiras, H. et al. (eds) (2016). Researching the Military. London: Routledge. Davies, P. (2001). Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services, Politics (Vol. 21, No. 1, 2001). Finnish Meteorological Institute. Baltic Sea Ice Winters. http://en.ilmatieteenlaitos.fi/baltic-sea-ice-winters. Accessed 22 December 2017. Heier, T. (2017). Norges forhold til Russland, Dagens Næringsliv, Oslo, December 18, 2017. Hudson, P., and Roberts, P. (2017). The UK and the North Atlantic: A British Military Perspective, in NATO and the North Atlantic Revitalizing Collective Defence, edited by John Andreas Olsen. London, RUSI Whitehall Paper 87. Merriam Webster Dictionary. (2018). https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fleet%20in%20being. Accessed 5 March 2018. Milevski, L. (2017). Grand Strategy Is Attrition. The Logic of Integrating Various Forms of Power in Conflict, in Forsvarets Stabsskole, Militære Studier Special Edition 2017. Shlapak, D. A., and Johnson, D. W. (2016). Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank—Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html. Accessed 24 May 2018.

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Thomson, J. (2007). Falkland Islands—Operation Corporate, May–June 1982, in Amphibious Assault—Manoeuvre from the Sea, edited by Tristan Lovering. Suffolk: Seafarer Books. Wardak, G. D. et al. (1992). The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy 3: Issues of Operational Art. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Wikipedia. Dyugon-Class Landing Craft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Dyugon-class_landing_craft. Accessed 11 January 2018. Wikipedia. Landing Craft Air Cushion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Landing_Craft_Air_Cushion. Accessed 22 December 2017. Wikipedia. Landing Craft Utility. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_ Craft_Utility#LCU_Mk.9. Accessed 22 December 2017.