The refugees crisis in the European Union: between the fundamental human rights and the efforts towards securitization

The Refugee Crisis in the European Union

The Refugee Crisis in the European Union

Between the Fundamental Human Rights and the Efforts Towards Securitization

Edited by MIHAI ALEXANDRESCU

Copyright © CA Publishing, 2016, For this edition. All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

CA Publishing Series ”Leadership and Communication in the Current World” edited by Mihai Alexandrescu and Claudiu Marian, Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca (Romania) Proofreading by: Ioana Ștefănuț Text and cover design by: Mihai-Vlad Guță

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României Alexandrescu, Mihai         The refugee crisis in the European Union : between the fundamental human rights and the efforts towards securitization / Mihai Alexandrescu. Cluj-Napoca : CA Publishing, 2016     Conţine bibliografie      ISBN 978-606-8330-50-1 341.43 First published 2016 by CA Publishing Cluj-Napoca, B-dul Eroilor 34/3 Phone: 0040364807636 e-mail: [email protected] website: www.ca-publishing.ro

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Preface

or the past few years the Mediterranean Sea has become a graveyard for the people coming from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, in search of a better life or simply life. But on many other occasions the waves of the Sea have hidden the dreams of the Others. At the edge of the Old Continent there is a gap between Us and Them. Unfortunately, the ‘clash of civilizations’, as described by Huntington, reveals also a clash between societal security and fundamental human rights. The meaning of each of these terms is different and right at the same time. This book is based on a debate initiated with my students from the MA Program ‘Leadership and Communication in International Organisations’ at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History (Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of History and Philosophy). But I have also chosen two contributors who are in a position to share their important knowledge in the field of this topic. They were more than willing to engage with our debate and to bring forward their own distinctive and refreshing perspectives. Sergiu-Constantin Dur wrote a very interesting analysis of the Syrian conflict which provides an extraordinary support in our debates. Paul Popa brought a detailed and very helpful introduction in the complex field of international refugee law. This book is certainly richer due to their contributions. Many thanks especially to Priscilla Oltean for her initiative to develop the analysis on the theoretical ground created by the securitization theory. I would like to include a special note of thanks to Ioana Ștefănuț for proofreading the whole book and for her observations and comments which have helped us finish our arguments. But also to Pállukács Hajnal and Horia Furcovici for their invaluable help. Finally, I would like to show my gratitude to CA Publishing House for its support in publishing this book and for the initiative to open up the series on ‘Leadership and Communication in the Current World’. Mihai Alexandrescu Department of International Studies and Contemporary History Cluj-Napoca, April 2016 5

List of Abbreviations ACHPR

African Court on Human and People’s Right

ADRA

Adventist Development and Relief Agency

AFP

Agencie France Presse

AMIF

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

CEAS

Common European Asylum System

CEPOL

College Europeen de Police

CFR

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency (US government)

CNN

Cable News Network

EASO

European Asylum Support Office

EC

European Communities

ECHR

European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR

European Court of Human Rights

EMCDDA

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction

ENI

European Neighbourhood Instrument

EP

European Parliament

EU

European Union

eu-LISA

The EU Agency for Large Informational Systems

EURODAC

European Dactyloscopy

EUROPOL

European Police Office

EUROSUR

European Border Surveillance System

Frontex

Frontières extérieures

FSA

Free Syrian Army

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

IACHR

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

ICG

International Crisis Group

ICJ

International Court of Justice

IJRC

International Justice Resource Centre

IRGC

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

IS

Islamic State

ISF

Internal Security Fund

ISW

Institute for the Study of War

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs Council

JN

Jabhat al-Nusra

KNC

Kurdish National Council

KRG

Kurdistan Regional Government

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LAS

League of Arab States

LGBT

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender

MB

Muslim Brotherhood

MEP

Member of the European Parliament

MOC

Military Operations Command

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organisations

NMC

Northern Military Command

OAS

American Convention on Human Rights

OAU

United African Organisation

OCHA

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

OIC

Organization of the Islamic Conference

OPEC

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe

Pegida

Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West

PKK

Kurdistan Worker’s Party

PM

Prime Minister

PYD

Democratic Union Party (Syria)

SCS

School of Critical Studies

SDF

Syrian Democratic Forces

SNAP

Strategic Needs Analysis Project

TFEU

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UDHR

Universal Declaration on Human Rights

UK

United Kingdom

UKIP

United Kingdom Independence Party

UN

United Nations

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNKRA

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

US/USA

United States of America

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

YPG

People’s Protection Units (Syria)

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List of Contributors Mihai Alexandrescu, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University Sergiu-Constantin Dur, MA Student at the Program ‘Management of Security in the Contemporary Society’ at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Also Erasmus Student at Ankara University. Mihai Ilea, MA Student at the Program ‘Leadership and Communication in the International Organisations’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Priscilla Oltean, MA Student at the Program ‘Leadership and Communication in the International Organisations’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Pállukács Hajnal, MA Student at the Program ‘Management of International Relations and European Policies’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Corina Palaghie, MA Student at the Program ‘Leadership and Communication in the International Organisations’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Paul Popa, PhD Student at the Doctoral School ‘International Relations and Security Studies’, Babes-Bolyai University. Also PhD Student at the Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Seconda Università Degli Studi di Napoli. Adina Șerban, MA Student at the Program ‘Management of International Relations and European Policies’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Gabriel Uifălean, MA Student at the Program ‘Management of International Relations and European Policies’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University. Monica Ungureanu, MA Student at the Program ‘Leadership and Communication in the International Organisations’, at the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University.

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Contents PREFACE 5 List of Abbreviations6 List of Contributors 8 List of Figures and Tables 10 Migration Securitization Towards Refuge Securitization – the State Security Against the Global Human Rights? Mihai ALEXANDRESCU 11 PART I. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 23 Syria – An X-Ray of a perpetual crisis International law on refugees: between norm and moral Sergiu-Constantin DUR 25 International law on refugees: between norm and moral Paul POPA

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PART II. HOW SECURITIZATION WORKS 91 Ways of Securitizing Migration in the European Union as a Result of the 2015 Refugee Crisis: Typology of Actors, Discourses and Effects Priscilla OLTEAN 93 The European Identity and the Refugee Crisis Corina PALAGHIE & Monica UNGUREANU

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The reactions of Central and Eastern European national leaders regarding the refugee crisis. Case studies: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland Adina-Elena ȘERBAN 143 Hungary and the Migrant Crisis** PÁLLUKÁCS Hajnal

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European NGO’ and the Refugee Crisis: Case studies of Serbia and Hungary* Gabriel UIFĂLEAN 171 PART III. ANOTHER CASE OF THE REFUGEEE CRISIS  The Humanitarian Ukrainian Crisis and the European Union Mihai ILEA

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REFERENCES

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List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Stages of the securitization process.

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Figure 2. Securitization of an issue by presenting it as a priority.

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Figure 3. Securitization of an issue by presenting it as an existential threat.

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Table 1. Origin countries of refugees and migrants coming to Germany - as far October 2015.

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Table 2. Adopted/proposed measures in order to cope with the refugee crisis.

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Migration Securitization

Towards Refuge Securitization – the State Security Against the Global Human Rights? MIHAI ALEXANDRESCU

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n 2015 the European Union (EU) was confronted with a huge humanitarian crisis. That was the effect of a too long conflict in Syria.* The meaning of this crisis is very different for the national politicians from the EU. It is obvious that the EU has been unready to assume really the status of actor in the international system. The 2015 crisis showed that the European integration process is too far to be finished and that the Member States have their own definition of the integration. In this chapter, I will start from the assumption that there are two different crises: (a) a humanitarian crisis of the people from Middle East who are seeking a host country in the EU and (b) a European Union crisis in its integration process namely an identitarian crisis in the face of globalisation. The two crises did not determine each other, they have had an autonomous evolution, but they intensified each other. Based on this finding, we can understand better the mechanisms and the meanings of the process of migration securitization.

The theory (if any) of securitization** In this chapter I have chosen the theoretical approach of securitization, defined initially by the Copenhagen School. But, as Thierry Balzacq noted recently, ‘there coexist various theories of securitization’ (Balzacq 2014: 8).

See the article of Sergiu-Constantin Dur in this book. This meaning is suggested by the title of an article by T. Balzacq, S. Guzzini, M.C.Williams, O. Wæver, H. Potomäki (2014) ‘Forum: What kind of theory - if any – Is securitization?’, in International Relations, March 2014: 1-41 *

**

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Nevertheless, he prefers to write about ideal type rather than a theory of securitization. In this chapter, it is not my intention to explain my position about the securitization theory (a forthcoming study will be published in this sense), but to show how its mechanism is obvious in the case of migration and refuge. In this respect, I will use in my presentation the approaches set up by the ‘Copenhagen School’ and by some of its critics. Starting with Barry Buzan’s concern with the security conceptualisation, and with the initiation of a theoretical debate on its effects in the international system, this concept managed to broaden the agenda of international politics including threats against the state and military security, neglected by the traditional discourses. In this respect, new actors were included, as individuals and substate groups. Also a deepening of the security meaning included the analysis of human and societal security. Thus, the authors of the Copenhagen School developed a theoretical approach of the securitization which explains how security influences the governmental policies. It is more important to understand that the Copenhagen School tries to demonstrate that security is not an objective condition, but an intersubjective act which implies some actors as elites and a specific audience. First of all, the securitization is a speech act which needs the response of an audience. Therefore, the securitizing actors (or the elites) assume the role to define the hypothetical or real threats to state and society. Securitization is more than politicisation of an issue. Through securitization, an issue is viewed as a threat for the state or/and society, meaning for the sovereignty or/and the identity. Security is now the central concept in the idea of national survival. According to Ole Wæver (1995), it is about a security rhetoric marked by survival, priority of action and emergency. Thus ‘in naming a certain development a security problem, the “state” can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites […] With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act […] By uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.’ (WÆVER 2007 [1995]: 73). In this respect, it is more obvious that the state ‘defends itself

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against threats to sovereignty and society defends itself against threats to identity.’ (WÆVER 2007 [1995]: 85). The Copenhagen School explains that the securitization process is an intersubjective act between a securitizing actor and a significant audience. For the authors of the book Security. A New Framework for Analysis, securitization is ‘a more extreme version of politicisation.’ (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 23). In the logic of the Copenhagen School, an issue may be fixed in a spectrum that includes three differential approaches: non-politicisation (with low-implication of the audience), politicisation (with medium-implication of the audience) and securitization (with high-implication of the audience). The words between the brackets are stressed in order to highlight the degree of involvement of the audience. In this chapter, I wish to emphasize the asymmetry of the relationship between securitizing actors and audience. The latter is reactive to the speech act of the elites which manipulate its fear. Buzan et al. suggest that ‘the way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations.’ (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 25). Defining the securitization as a speech act which aims to gain the acceptance and tolerance of the audience – who thus legitimises the violations of procedures and rules (I would add also norms) by the state – it is natural that the arguments of the elites be built on three pillars: threat, priority and emergency. Finally, the audience should be morally weakened in front of the existential risk. Having this question in mind, we could understand better Wæver’s definition of the societal security. In his 1995 famous article, Wæver stresses an interesting interpretation of this concept: ‘If the societal sector is securitized in an unsophisticated way, however, the result could be used to legitimize reactionary arguments for, on the one hand, defining immigrants and refugees as security problems and, in the other, presenting European integration as a national security threat.’ (WÆVER 2007 [1995]: 82). Putting the refugee crisis into the societal sector and speaking about societal security, we have to be concerned also with identity. One of the main issues in the globalisation debates is the threat to the identity and the minority. In the 21st century’s debate minority should be replaced by commu-

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nity. Moreover, identity should not be analysed as a cultural issue but as a societal one. In Michel Foucault’s logic, the governmental policies and actions are the outcomes of the speech acts which ultimately reaffirm the speech itself (FOUCAULT 1980: 93-94). The so-called “Paris School” of securitization tries to develop the lessons of Foucault. It is worth noting here the explanation offered by Didier Bigo who stresses this process as a correlation between: (a) certain successful speech acts of political leaders; (b) mobilization created by them in favour or against certain groups of people and (c) the specific field of security professionals (police, gendarmerie, intelligence services etc.) (BIGO 2002: 65). Keeping the same framework of interpretation, I render here some quotes from the explanation on securitization that Bigo and Tsoukala have formulated in 2008. ‘Security(zation) has neither a positive connotation nor a negative one, even if institutional narratives tend to insist on the first, and ‘critical’ narrative on the second. The (in)securitization process is then a social and political construction related to speech act, but these speech acts are not decisive. […] They are also dependent on the capacities of the field agents to patrol the boundaries of the field, to open or to restrict the definition of what security is, to block to limit the alternatives. What we call (in)security is then a field effect and not the result of a specific strategy of a dominant actor. […] The proximity with Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde’s thesis is then strong, but we resist the idea that international security has a specific agenda, that this agenda is about survival, and that security can be conceptualized as ‘beyond normal politics’ and as ‘politics of exception’. For us, the existential threat and the politics of terror cannot be distinguished so easily from the simple threat and feeling of unease’ (BIGO AND TSOUKALA 2008: 4-5). Beyond the nuances that are observed in the two approaches mentioned above, the securitization theory is built on the speech act theory as it has been defined by Austin, and the securitization is ‘an illocutionary and not a prelocutionary act’ (WÆVER 2014: 27-28). Securitization is not a premeditated plan, because the securitizers are not able to control the result of their securitizing move. The result depends on how the speech act is processed by the audience and its reaction to it.

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Securitization of migration Migration is an omnipresent element in the history of humankind. The sedentary state is real only at its structural level and through its policies, because otherwise people have always found the opportunity to move to other areas looking for welfare or security. Christian Joppke states that ‘sovereignty and citizenship are two generic principles of the modern nation-state that are challenged by immigration.’ (JOPPKE 1999: 8). A UN survey, in 2000, noted that the European Union would need 674 million immigrants until 2050 in order to keep the “current dependency ratio” (UN 2000: 3). In literature, the issue of migration is analysed also in relation to minority. Gwendolyn Sasse (2005: 674-680) follows this comparison in terms of three major problems: political stability, social cohesion and welfare and multi-level governance. Security remains the core concern and the hinge of all of them. In other words, these concerns would be translated into integration which emphasizes the issue of rights. In this logic, we notice how security and rights are set in opposition by the public discourse of the elites. In 2003, Christina Boswell published, at Chatham House, a work depicting the post-war migration policies in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. In her analysis, the author emphasizes a tendency of these states, in the early post-war years, to adopt a generous immigration policy determined by the need of labour force. In particular, the sources of immigration were colonies and former colonies of the European states. Thus, after 1947, thousands of Algerians settled in France. In the UK, from 1948 to 1961 were registered more than 278,000 residents who had come from the West Indies, India and Pakistan. In Belgium, in 1970, there were about 700,000 registered foreign residents coming from Italy, Spain, Greece, Morocco, Turkey, and Congo (BOSWELL 2003: 11-23). After the Western labour markets became overfilled, the governments of the host countries began to restrict the immigration flow. In this regard, the official discourse changed in the sense of associating immigration with a threat to identity and cultural homogeneity, then with the socio-economic

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insecurity for citizens, and since 2001 with illegal immigration, organised crime and terrorism. Gradually, the public speech intended to increase the confusion between illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, volatilising the concrete causes which determine this population movement. The radicalisation of public speech leading to the criminalisation of these concepts is based on the manipulation of the feelings of fear and insecurity of citizens. What strikes in the European official discourse is the definition of “cultural difference” as a threat, while the European Union wants to be the promoter of multiculturalism. Identity conflict comes from the state’s inability to assimilate culturally and linguistically newcomers, and from the rejection of an identity transformation, the state tracking only the economic benefits of migration. On the other side there is a resistance of migrants in order to maintain their identity. This conflict is based on the struggle between assimilation and integration. Here I consider more appropriate the observation of Barry Buzan et al.: ‘the threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society. […] This threat works on the societal level when the incoming population is of a different cultural or ethnic stock from those already resident. It is amplified when migrants seek to maintain their identity rather than adapting to that prevailing in their adoptive country.’ (BUZAN 1993: 45). Under this discursive mechanism, one can see three images of migrants: (a) religious fanatic in France as a threat to secularism and centralization; (b) the revolutionary and deviant in Germany, against control and social partnership; (c) the rebel and rioter in the UK as an opponent to the traditional rules of the community (BIGO 2002: 70). Actually, immigrants are perceived as anti-citizens, thus a threat for society. Within the “Paris School” we could include the 2002 article of Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala explaining the impact of the ambivalent discourses and policies of the Western states in the securitization of migration. For both authors migration securitization is ‘a symbolic process’ built

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on ‘rhetorical arguments’. The securitizing actors are: politicians, security agencies and the media. The four main axes of their arguments are: (a) a socioeconomic axis; (b) a securitarian axis; (c) an identitarian axis and (d) a political axis (CEYHAN AND TSOUKALA 2002: 21-39). Jef Huysmans, who established the concept of securitization of migration, noted that the process was carried out in the EU on three major themes: internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state. He introduced the concept of ‘security continuum’ which it defined as ‘an institutionalised mode of policy-making that allows the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drugs traffic and money-laundering to the area of migration.’ (HUYSMANS 2000: 760). The same author suggests that the migration securitization is mainly a political-solving act. In this respect, he noted that the ‘security continuum emerged first of all from professional and political cooperation in the area of internal security in Europe (HUYSMANS 2000: 761). More particularly, he considers migration as a ‘politically powerful signifier’, namely a material form which reflects a sound-image, opposed to a signified which is a mental concept. In this logic, I notice that, finally, the material interpretation of the migration would help in the understanding of the post-structuralist discourse which explains securitization in the objective terms, as opposed to the intersubjective interpretation of the Copenhagen School. Very interesting is the meaning of ‘Europeanisation of migration policy’ as ‘part of a political spectacle’. The border control could be an instrument used by the EU to stop an uncontrollable immigration from third states. But the semantic of this control is contradicted by a real differentiation made by the EU officials in the visa policy. By opposing the European integration to an extended multiculturalism (with the risk of altering the European feature of the multiculturalism), in fact the visa policy is more selective with the countries of origin of the immigrants. This is the sense given by Huysmans to ‘the cultural implications of border controls’ (HUYSMANS 2000: 763). Step by step for two decades we have been the witnesses of a radicalisation of the nationalist approach in the European cultural discourse sometimes hav-

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ing even a new-racist significance.* It is very interesting that the literature interpreted this development since the end of the Cold War (MILES 1989; SIVANANDAN 1990; WEBBER 1991; WIEVIORKA 1995). A very good observation has been made by G. Karyotis who wrote that ‘the securitization of migration and the rapid increase in xenophobia in Greece can to some extent be attributed to the element of surprise. The sudden influx of migrants caught both state and society unprepared.’ (KARYOTIS 2012: 399). This finding could be extended to the whole European Union. And the reactions of the elites are important to be analysed.** A neo-racist discourse in the European public sphere is a question of education and political opportunism of some politicians and media. By manipulating the fear of a specific audience these politicians become more representative and finally the elites who the determine a securitization process.

Securitization of refuge In 2015, Boris Colinas carried out an interesting survey about how frequently the expression ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ was used in the Wall Street Journal between 1980 and 2003, and noticed a surge starting 2001 (COLINAS 2015). Actually, the pattern is the same in the securitizing move regarding the migration issue. The 2010 study of Alexandria J. Innes reveals very clearly the image of refugees and asylum seekers in the perception of the British public opinion. The mass influx of refugees creates the image of homogeneous groups and, associated with their countries of origin, leads to the fear of terrorist threats. We observe a gap in the international refugee law*** because this corpus was written with a focus on the individual human rights (INNES 2010:461). In this logic, the attempts of some liberal states to avoid the respect of collective human rights are understandable. Moreover, the easy way to ignore these rights has been to switch the sense of the context from the humanitarian In this chapter, I assume the meaning given by Etienne Balibar – ‘racism without race’ – which in the postcolonial era highlight the cultural differences. For further details, see E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein (1991) ** See, in this book, the studies of Priscilla Oltean, Adina Serban and Pállukács Hajnal. *** For more details, see the chapter of Paul Popa in this book. *

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crisis into the security threat. To avoid the paradox of securitizing the refuge, some political elites in the EU have refused to use the term ‘refugees’, labelling them as ‘illegal immigrants’. On the other hand, the 2015 European hysteria in the face of the mass influx of refugees/migrants shows that neither the EU nor its Member States are prepared to receive so many people. I appreciate as very relevant the comment written by Simon Heffer in The Telegraph: ‘But where the EU is failing, in the first instance, is to differentiate very publicly between genuine refugees and everyone else. Recent figures show just one in five migrants are Syrians fleeing civil war. “Everyone else” includes not just those from Africa or Asia who are simply looking for a welfare state to settle down in, but those from the Middle East posing as refugees who are returning to Europe to engage in acts of terrorist murder.’ (HEFFER 2015). Such discursive interpretations can be seen also at the level of state leaders, particularly at the members of the “Visegrad Group”. In their case, it is about a straightforward neo-racist speech act. In the context of the terrorist attack in France (November 2015) and social troubles in Germany (December 2015), the Slovak Prime Minister stated: ‘Many things are being said and written, but the Slovak government sees a direct link between the current migration flows and the (November) attacks in Paris and recent events in Germany’ (MICHALOPOULOS 2016). In the language of securitization, this is an obvious example as how a leader uses a context to create a securitizing move. At the same time the European media emphasizes also the statements of a Polish diplomat who said that the ‘Central and Eastern EU countries do not have the experience to live with citizens from North Africa or the Middle East’ (MICHALOPOULOS 2016). In the same logic, I include also the speech of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, on 22nd October 2015, at the EPP Congress in Madrid, where he presented his definition of human rights: We have a heartfelt compassion for the people who left their homes. They are victims of the bad governance of their own countries. They are victims of bad international political decisions. And they are victims of our bad European policy

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as well which raises expectations that are impossible to be fulfilled. They are obviously victims of the human traffickers. But considering them victims must not turn ourselves into being victims. Just because we do not consider them enemies we must not act against ourselves. Our moral responsibility is to give back these people their homes and their countries. It can’t be our objective to provide them with a new European life. Right to human dignity and security are basic rights. But neither the German, Austrian nor the Hungarian way of life is a basic right of all people on the Earth. It is only a right of those ones who have contributed to it. Europe is not able to accept everyone who wants a better life. We have to help them to get back their own lives with dignity and we have to send them back to their own countries. […] We have to discuss our own intentions regarding our own continent without hypocrisy and pharisaism. What do we think about our civilization heritage? Can the change of cultural pattern [be] forced externally? Do we accept parallel societies? Or we defend our tolerant and rule of law based way of life we have lived so far? (ORBÁN 2015I). In the context of the refugee crisis, the security speech acts are the expression of a fear of states in their inability to manage a complex humanitarian crisis and to respond to the reactions of their surprised citizens. Thus through a securitizing move, the official could create (maybe unintentionally) the ground for neo-racist discourses. In the logic of the securitization theory, I could conclude that through this speech act, one of the main assumption of the theory is demonstrated: the securitizers cannot control the reaction of their audience. Their move does not have a long-term perspective, but only an electoral/demagogical perspective. In this respect, the human rights could be denied by an electoral reason. Denying the refugee status to the people coming from an area of conflict means to reject their right to survival. This is a form of masked criminalisation of a human right: the right to seek asylum, which is determined also by a general psychosis of a terrorist threat.

Concluding remarks The current world is in a process of transformation. After the Cold War, the international system went through a stage when the states needed to rede-

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fine themselves. Some of them managed to do it, while the others remained in the paradigm of traditional thinking. Thus, I conclude that there are two kinds of states: some with an updated social contract, adapted to the needs of the citizens, and others keeping the centralisation of government, more concerned with their territoriality. Beyond all these aspects, in the 20th century, the states learned the benefits of economic cooperation, even of internationalisation. There was a long and difficult process with a gradual reduction of the barriers between the states, determining the globalisation. In this context, I consider the securitization of international migration as a failure of the liberal democratic state to manage the effects of globalisation, but also the abdication from the humanitarian mission assumed by the states through the principles and values set out by international norms. Based on these considerations, the thesis of Buzan and his colleagues becomes obvious: ‘securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation.’ (BUZAN ET. AL. 1998: 23). We could even emphasize that officials use the securitization rhetoric to get the agreement of the audience to the policy they plan to develop. However, securitization is not preceded by a premeditated plan, because the leaders are not able to predict the outcome of the process initiated. The result depends on how the speech act is processed by the audience and its reaction (KARYOTIS 2012: 390-408). In all this rhetoric, the actors are concerned to reduce the threats that were identified in the cultural interaction, reaching the stage where they believe themselves in their speech, moving away from the values that ​​ the states have previously assumed in international relations. Keeping the concepts of the securitization theory, this kind of discourse has a legitimizing role, but I think it is caused by the state’s fear of losing control over the forces that compose it. Finally, beyond all these security speech acts of the nation-state, this crisis reveals the need to reform the concept of international community and the way how it understands the global human rights.

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S E R G I U - C O N S TA N T I N D U R

Part I

General Framework

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Syriaof a–perpetual An X-Ray crisis S E R G I U - C O N S TA N T I N D U R

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hat began as an internal rebellion against an autocratic regime has changed over time and was transformed into a regional crisis in which Syria has become the hottest spot (STRATFOR 2015A). The crisis began in the spring of 2011, when the regime reacted brutally against a peaceful youth demonstration, but the spiral of conflict had been moving for decades. The economic, social and political grievances accumulated during this time manifested more assertively in Syria in the spring of 2011, driven by the revolutionary trend that led to the overthrow of leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, and mobilized by means of modern communication. The transition from peaceful anti-government protests to civil war was influenced by the aggressive response of the security forces, a practice that became state policy. The main regional and global rivals of the regime in Damascus had and took the opportunity to intervene in the conflict, in an attempt to accomplish their own agenda. They were blocked by the support the regime is receiving from its allies, which fuelled the Syrian crisis and turned the conflict into a proxy war (HOKAYEM 2012). Interests and multiple interactions involved in this type of war further complicate the conflict in Syria and remove the prospect of its settlement. The hopeless situation in which the Syrian crisis is at the moment, exacerbated by the resulting humanitarian condition, has led many Syrians to seek refuge abroad. This is in fact the premise for this academic paper, and in order to analyse it we must: map the actors involved in the Syrian crisis, focusing on identifying interests, interactions, rivalries or complicities that they have developed and assess the impact generated by this crisis on the Syrians. In the first chapter, I will present the anachronistic-internal con-

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text that set the framework for the crisis that Syria is experiencing now. The next three chapters are designed to review the internal, regional and global actors taking part in this conflict, while the last part focuses on highlighting the humanitarian impact of the Syrian crisis. Consequently, we performed an analysis of the Syrian crisis on three levels: local, regional and global. The complexity of this conflict is determined by the multitude of actors involved in it and the opposing interests that they have in this area. In examining the local level, I will focus on presenting the regime in Damascus and its domestic allies and explain the diversity of actors who oppose them. The analysis of regional actors will take into account three major categories that have emerged during these years: the Damascus regime allies, opponents of the regime and the Islamic State. Regarding the global level, we consider the implications of global actors in terms of their geopolitical and systemic interests, but especially in terms of the short and medium-term effects of their involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Syria – the country of structural contradictions The Syrian crisis emerged as an outbreak of structural contradictions that have created a permanent state of internal instability, sometimes even armed confrontations, and have developed a fertile land for magnifying the current crisis. The main factor of instability was the lack of national consciousness. This was and still is the biggest challenge for most countries in the region: to build national consciousness in a space where loyalty manifests itself on the level of family, clan, community, tribe or region. This is one aspect that we need to keep in mind in order to understand the complexity of the Syrian crisis. Syria, as it appeared on the map before 2011, was created in the interwar period under a French mandate. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, France, judging like a true colonial power, aimed to administer the territories on which Syria and Lebanon would later appear. Those new entities have held this structural vulnerability since the beginning.

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The issue of governance that created such a situation was exacerbated by the fact that, since the 7th decade of the last century, the Alawi minority took advantage of the internal instability and gradually took over the instruments of power, which before that, had been the privilege of the Sunni and Christian living in Damascus and Aleppo. Governance was exercised through the Ba’ath Party and became a means by which the Alawi elite managed to acquire a privileged political and economic status. The administrative, military and security apparatus had been sculpted around the Alawi elites but, in order to secure the durability of the project, they co-opted a number of Sunni, Christian and Druze notables. Therefore, an entire network of alliances, clients, connections and complicities was created under the aegis of their chief architect Hafez al-Assad, who became president after a coup d’état in 1970. Hafez tried to manage the fragmentation of society by promoting the idea of Syrian Arab nationalism. It was the period when Syria was competing with Iraq and Egypt for supremacy within the Pan-Arab movement. The Leaders of the three countries exploited this ideology in order to manage internal fragmentation and to conceive federal projects that would be patronized by them. Syrian Arab nationalism failed to adjust the fragmentation of the Syrian society and, perhaps more importantly, the loss of privileges by some old elites and the downgrade of a great part of the middle class have created resentment and a desire for changing the status-quo. The opponents’ speech started to acquire a sectarian tone, just like it has now, and since the 8th decade of the last century, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been the most prominent opponent of the regime in Damascus. The Propaganda, in sectarian terms, promoted by MB, found a receptive environment in the conservative circles and among those dispossessed by the rise of the Alawi. The Salafi movements, very present in the conservative circles, considered the Alawi, based on a fatwā delivered in the 13th century by Ibn Taymiyyah, a greater evil than the Jews and Crusaders. The offensive against the regime was fuelled by the regional rivals of Syria, especially by Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. Besides Islamists, the regime suffered challenges also from the left side of the political spectrum,

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mainly from members who broke away from the Ba’ath Party, to whom the socialists, Nasserists and Communists, are added (LANDIS AND PACE 2006). They managed to exploit the grievances of the population that led to a series of protests to which the regime responded aggressively, and destroyed the opposition, which was forced to operate clandestinely. The Islamists became the most effective in organizing themselves and, having to face the regime’s intransigence and the policies of force adopted against the opposition, they became radicalized. The brutal repression of the opposition was countered with attacks against the regime, against which the latter retaliated with tougher policies. The situation enters a spiral of violence that escalated to its climax in February 1982, in Hama, when after a major rebellion coordinated by the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime army intervenes and kills between 10,000 and 20,000 people (LUND 2011). The Hama Massacre, as it is known, has remained implanted in the collective mentality and amplified the feeling of society’s segregation across confessional lines. Even if the regime finally restored the order, over the structural contradictions existing in the Syrian society, resentment towards this event was strong. Although Syria has experienced a phase of relative stability after this event, it had only offered the illusion that internal anomalies can somehow be managed forever. Earlier centrifugal forces only entered a state of latency and waited for the right moment to manifest, which happened in 2011, but at a much larger scale. The manifestations against the regime were retaliated against with the same aggression, only this time, the armed rebellion, strongly supported from the outside, degenerated into a civil war that engulfed the whole country, which over time turned into a proxy war that attracted a wide range of external actors whose contradictions currently block solving the crisis (HOLLIDAY 2013). To understand the complexity of the Syrian crisis and the lack of perspective involved in it, the following three chapters are designed to review internal, regional and global actors which compete in this conflict.

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Internal actors Despite the fact that we are entering the sixth year of conflict, analysts have trouble identifying who fights against whom. The complexity of the conflict is basically a reflection of the Syrian society: a lot of local actors who have formed alliances structured on family, clan, tribal or sectarian lines, or just following a pragmatic logic. For a comprehensive analysis at the local level, it is necessary to consider four categories of actors: the regime of Bashar al-Assad and his domestic allies, the political opposition groups, the militias that fight on the ground that are mostly independent from the political echelon and the Kurds.

The regime in Damascus Although they relied upon a large number of Alawi elite citizens, Hafez al-Assad, and later his son Bashar al-Assad, co-opted notabilities from the other religious communities in the Syrian government. The result was that around the ruling family a real network of complicities was interlinked by implanting them in all the key posts of the state, clients of the regime, regardless of their religious confession. Therefore, in order not to lose the economic and political privileges, the regime is supported by representatives of other confessions. In addition, representatives of the middle class, also from the whole spectrum of confessions, support the regime. The Alawi community represents between 10-12% of the population (CIA 2016), and even if it was supposed to be privileged before the crisis, a great number lived in poverty. For this reason, several opposition movements have developed from their ranks, which currently militate against the regime. Regarding the situation on the ground, in January 2016, the regime was controlling about 20% of Syria, namely the strategic strip linking Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, and also the Levantine coast (ISW 2016: 1). Following the direct Russian intervention with airstrikes from 30th September 2015 (AL JAZEERA 2015A), the regime stabilized its position and even advanced in some areas in the North West and South West (CASAGRANDE 2016). The Special Brigades of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, along with Hezbollah managed to establish various local militia

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formed of Alawi, Druze, Sunni, Palestinians, Christians and Assyrians, who fight for the regime. These troops were integrated into a single command that is called “National Defense Force” or “People’s Army” (LUND 2015F). Since the Arab Sunni represent about 74% of the Syrian population, the regime has manipulated the fears of the minorities, arguing that a future Sunni Islamist government would threaten their communities. As a result, besides the great number of Alawi on which the regime can count, Assad also enjoys the support of a big part of the Druze, Ismaili, Shia and Christian communities (ICG-163 2015: 22). Moreover, it strives to ensure basic services for the population living in the territory controlled by them, with the aim of increasing their prestige. Because of that, but also for pragmatic and security reasons or because they fear that the alternative would be much worse, Sunnis living here prefer the control of the regime.

The Syrian political opposition Regarding the opponents of Assad’s regime, there is a clear distinction between political and military opposition. Although there are some relations of cooperation between the two parties, the most important militia fighting on the ground act independent of political representatives backed by regional powers. Since the beginning of the crisis there was a clear need for a united opposition to participate in political negotiations with the Damascus regime. Thus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, together with other countries outside the region, were involved in encouraging the coagulation of such an opposition (ICG-143 2013). However, the dominant characteristic of the political opposition was the lack of unity and coherence. Meanwhile, several leaders have emerged and claimed to speak in the name of the people, but so far only two organizations were able to solidify a range of opinions of the opposition: The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and The National Coordination Body. These are two organizations that were founded in exile and encompass several political opponents from the entire social and confessional Syrian spectrum. The biggest obstacle for them is that they have very limited influence on the dynamics on the ground, controlling a number of groups that call themselves the

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Free Syrian Army, but they don’t have a consistent coverage on the ground. In addition to that, by being forced to work many years in exile or underground, they have no political experience and no ability to gather around them large masses of people or to gain significant support for their ideas. The latest and most promising political opposition conference, attended by representatives of ground fighters, was held on the 10thof December 2015 in Saudi Arabia. If we look closely at what happened there, we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, some activists in exile were absent because they contested the presence of radical Islamists groups such as Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham. Secondly, the designation process of delegations that took part in the negotiations with the Assad regime sparked tensions and prompted the rejection, by Ahrar al-Sham, of the common declaration signed by the participants, including by their delegate present at the conference. These problems have led to the postponement of the peace conference scheduled for early January 2016. Militias fighting on the ground are outraged by the fact that they are under-represented in the negotiations with the regime. In this context we can notice three important aspects: (a) there is difficulty in ensuring a complete representation of all parties forming the opposition; (b) political opposition delegations have no real coverage on the field and (c) the authority of these delegates is affected by the allegations that they are customers of the regional powers. In these circumstances, the political representatives claiming the right to negotiate with the regime failed to convince the most important military groups fighting on the ground that they can represent their interests. As a result, they have no ability to influence the dynamics of militias which are fighting on the field. Hence, the delegation of negotiators from the opposition has functionality and credibility problems, which dramatically weaken their position in negotiations with the regime in Damascus, in the absence of a common negotiating mandate. Beyond political representation, an important issue that illustrates the fragility of the Syrian opposition is ethnic representation. While the Kurds participated at the conference in December 2015, they did it as representatives of the two national coalitions, the Syrian Kurdish groups not being

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invited. The Kurds, supported by the US, have contributed very efficiently on the ground in the offensive against the Islamic State, but because of Turkey’s pressure they haven’t been invited. In response, they have organized their own peace conference. Given that about 10% of Syria’s population is excluded from the negotiating table, the peace process will keep the germs of discontent which may evolve in later conflicts (CIA 2016) The discussions from December 2015 reveal another aspect: only internal actors were invited, clients of the regional rivals of the regime, which seem to be more interested in fulfilling their own interests than resolving the Syrian crisis. Moreover, Jabhat al-Nusra, considered by many experts as the most powerful organization, if we exclude the Islamic State, was not invited, despite the fact that they are fighting side by side with Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and other groups from the Free Syrian Army in some areas. In such circumstances, the prospect of solving the Syrian crisis is remote.

The Syrian military opposition The fragmentation of the Syrian society can be best seen when trying to analyse the internal groups fighting in the Syrian conflict. Since the beginning of the anti-regime uprising, the main feature of the internal military opposition was the lack of unity, which led to the inability to concentrate efforts, and probably to the survival of the Damascus regime until now. It is estimated that currently, in Syria about 1,500 groups, comprising around 300,000 fighters are fighting (CAFARELLA AND CASAGRANDE 2015). Different identities have led them to different ideologies and goals. More than that, absolutely all home-grown groups including the regime too, depend on the support of external actors, regional or global (ICG-146 2013). Under such circumstances, some militias have become the instrument through which external actors pursue their own agenda, leading to conflict in the relationships between militias. Precisely for this reason, the military opposition is amorphous, but also extremely fluid because it develops alliances based strictly on conjunctures, depending on short-term benefits. Consequently, any attempt to characterize it becomes a challenge.

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Currently, two major types of groups can be identified: the revolutionary one and Salafi-jihadists. The first category includes the groups that are explicitly identified with the Syrian revolution and whose agenda is strictly limited to the Syrian territory. In the second category are the groups that reject the idea of the state in the current form and seek the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate through violence, the most visible and important one being the Islamic State (IS). The complexity of the situation is revealed after a more detailed analysis of the former category. From the point of view of ideological beliefs, in this category we find non-ideological fighters who simply want to overthrow the regime, secular groups that promote democratic principles following the European model and Islamist groups. The latter are also split in several factions, depending on the degree to which each imagines that social, political and economic aspects of a community must be governed by the Islamic law. Islamism is actually the ideologisation of Islam and it advocates the implementation of the precepts of Islam over all aspects of society, to varying degrees. The most conservative and intransigent groups within the first category are the Salafi-Islamists, but they do not go as far as Salafi-Jihadists, who have called for a fight against all combatants in Syria and even aim to demolish the international system now in place. These doctrinal differences are extremely important because they reflect divisions, contradictions and discrepancies that have led to armed conflicts within the military opposition, and further, to their lack of efficiency. They also raise important questions on the trajectory of Syria in the event of the overthrow of the regime. 1. Free Syrian Army Since the rebellion took a military form and Syria became a civil war field, the focus of Western and local rivals was to provide all the support the rebels needed to turn the conflict in their favour. They faced two major dilemmas: what groups are eligible for support and how to integrate them into a single command. Thus, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) project was born initially as a group founded in the summer of 2011 by deserters from the Syrian army who had established their headquarters in Turkey (O’BAGY 2013).

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In the end, the FSA became an umbrella that tried to gather under its leadership as many groups as possible, groups that defined themselves as “moderate”. It was meant to be a unification project, which postulated the fight for democracy, Syrian nationalism, and the fact that they distanced themselves from the Salafi-Jihadists. However, the FSA has become more of a brand, because the project failed from the start. Effectively, they could not put together a unified command because the dynamics on the ground were extremely fluid and the militias could not be controlled. As a result, the West and the regional rivals of the regime set up two command centres, Military Operations Command (MOC) in Jordan and Northern Military Command (NMC) in Turkey, to train, supply and put under a single command the groups that they supported (ICG-163 2015: 22). The major challenge was to identify those who were eligible for support. This strategy to arm the “moderates” failed because some groups had deserted with all the received equipment to the side of organizations considered undesirable, such as Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State. Others have abandoned the weapons they had received and fled from the advance of the same groups. More importantly, there have been several situations where groups that have had a radical ideology have diluted their rhetoric to be eligible for support (JONES 2013). In addition, the Western powers, but especially the US, have diversified their strategy by supplying local clans and tribes. This strategy cannot be sustainable for two reasons: (a) these clans do not have great field coverage and; (b) they fight especially for the protection of their families. Moreover, pragmatism may push them in a future alliance with organizations that are undesirable to the West, if they feel they can win more. To conclude this section, the policy of the West to arm the “moderates” failed. Firstly, because we cannot classify the supported groups as moderate. If we consider human rights a measurement unit, no group can be considered moderate, since nobody took hostages. If we refer to secularism, no group has mentioned a future Syria where religion is separate from the state (LANDIS 2015). The standard by which this support is guided was determined by the ideology of these groups and the links they have with Salafi militias, but some of the material provided to the “mod-

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erates” came into the hands of these undesirable militias. All in all, groups which are actively supported by MOC and NMC programs are presented as part of the Free Syrian Army, but they have little coverage on the ground, the most powerful being the Salafi militias. 2. Syria – fruitful ground to radicalism Following a mapping of the dynamics on the ground, we find that groups which embrace a Salafi vision are the strongest. There are several factors that explain why Syria has come to represent a fertile ground for radicalization: (1) the presence for more than forty years in the highest ranks of the state of a family that comes from a minority that was regarded by many as heretical (although we have shown that the regime was based also upon notables from other denominations); (2) the discriminatory policies promoted by them have fuelled resentment among the population. When the revolt began, what was extensively used by interested actors, was the image of an Alawi regime which, supported by Iran and Hezbollah, suppressed the Sunni majority, who was fighting for freedom. As in the past they used to work underground, being the most important force that challenged the regime, Islamists have been the most effective in organizing themselves when the rebellion started. Additionally, the brutality with which the regime responded to protests and the perpetuation of the crisis fuelled this trend. In this framework, Salafi movements flourished until they became the core of the Syrian conflict (ICG-131 2012: 7-10). This happened due to other considerations also, that are worth mentioning. After the intervention of the international coalition against former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Syria became the main gateway through which foreign fighters were infiltrating Iraq (KULICK AND SCHWEITZER 2009). With Syrian support, they created a whole network of logistical support, forged relationships with local jihadists and got to know t he land and local particularities (BENOTMAN AND NASERALDIN 2012: 2). When the anti-regime rebellion broke out, the Salafists, especially Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda (JONES 2013) exploited all these opportunities.

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Another factor that is supposed to have contributed significantly to the rise of the Salafists is assigned to the regime in Damascus and its plots to discredit the opposition. It is alleged that the regime released jihadists whom they had imprisoned in the past and even that it mobilized radical groups for its benefit (LISTER 2014). Indeed, the regime benefited from the rise of the Salafi militias, seeing that it validated its theory of being the only desirable alternative, because a scenario in which Syria would be in the hands of radical Islamists was feared by everyone. Furthermore, it has justified its repression, saying that it is fighting a foreign conspiracy which is using local terrorists to change a legitimate regime. In addition to that, the ineffectiveness of the moderates led to the loss of their credibility. The voices of the opposition which called for dialogue have been compromised once the regime has chosen the path of military repression. Furthermore, the FSA demanding support or even foreign military intervention from the West, was discredited by Salafi rhetoric. For many of those who had moderate visions, the disappointment regarding the lack of action of the West, combined with the lack of consistency on the field by groups of the FSA and the significant advance recorded by Salafi militias, was an incentive to side with the latter. The West’s indecisiveness was seen as complicity to the crimes of Assad’s regime, and while Western governments were planning how to act, Salafi militias were extremely efficient fighting both on the field and in the media. Until the West decided on the course of action, much of the population adhered to the radical vision. This also happened because the voice of moderate Islamists was weak. The rise of radicalism also has a systemic component present in all Muslim areas. Nationalism and socialism, both ideologies taken over by regional leaders and put into practice by infusing them with local particularities, were a complete disillusionment because of the failure to create wealth. Moreover, they developed corrupt, conservative, cynical and repressive regimes, deaf to the needs of the population. When Islamist groups began to challenge this, their exegetes were repressed by most regimes in the region. However, in 1979 an Islamic revolution removed an autocratic regime in Iran. Despite the fact that for some regional actors, even Sunnis, the event

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was seen as a source of inspiration, for the conservative Gulf powers the example of the Iranian revolution was perceived as a vital threat. As a result, they have started a substantial program to promote Islamist Sunni currents. The consequences of this can be seen through the rise of radical Islamists groups, and after the so-called Arab Spring we have seen that wherever there have been riots, Islamist beliefs have played a significant role. Regarding Syria, in addition to the previously exposed factors, Salafi rhetoric explained in simple terms the chaotic situation and offered hope. Salafism gives instant and absolute legitimacy to those who invoke it because it is trying to replicate a society created by the Prophet. Salafi ideology proposes a simple and accessible legitimacy and provides an accessible system of beliefs, essential in these difficult times. They delegitimize the regime using simple words, portraying it as an apostate and they legitimize the struggle by aiming to create a state that functions after Islamic principles. For that they found a receptive audience. The economic problems of the past have caused massive migration to the city, but because the expected welfare did not follow through, they became an easy prey for Salafi rhetoric. In addition, the five-year conflict, with all the hardships involved, pushed people to embrace radical views. A very important role in disseminating Salafi messages has also been played by the religious preachers, the most important being those from the Gulf conservative monarchies. Also in this area, private persons with radical views developed a number of networks through which they supported with funds the war in Syria (LISTER 2014). Salafi groups were strengthened by the infusion of foreign fighters. It is estimated that since the beginning of the conflict between 20,000 and 30,000 foreign fighters entered Syria (SCHMID 2015). They went there because the Salafi message resonated with them, which is why they enlisted in their movement. Some came with combat experience from other war-thorn areas and contributed to the advance of radical militias. They also trained those who lacked experience and this gave them more consistency on the field. The Military performance of the radicals and their available resources also

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attracted non-ideological fighters, who came along with weapons and other materials. Perhaps they did this out of opportunism, but on the medium and long term the Salafi propaganda may radicalize them. Considering all these factors, we find that the emergence of radical movements no longer appears as an anomaly, but rather as a natural development. The identity crisis, cult of violence and search for ways to combat shortages brought on by this crisis lead to the embrace of this way of life. The rise of the Salafi groups is the symbol, the expression, the effect, and perhaps the current political and military blockage of the Syrian crisis and their strong presence on the ground is raising important questions over the future of Syria after a complete regime change. By the fact that many Salafi groups are not willing to compromise rises a legitimate question on how a regime change can be implemented efficiently, which is the desired aim of regional and global rivals of Syrian government. 3. The main Salafi-Islamists groups The complexity of the situation on the ground does not stop there, and the analysis of the main Salafi-Islamists groups will reveal this fact. The groups whose defining part is the Salafi vision are of several different types. We see militias without much ideological vision but who embraced Salafi symbols and a rhetoric of pragmatism, to have access to weapons and money (O’BAGY 2012: 10). We have groups that militate with the desire of changing the regime with an Islamic one. Here we can include Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam (LUND 2015B). There is also Jabhat al-Nusra, which from an ideological standpoint is placed somewhere between these groups and Salafi-jihadists, and whose members imagine they are the tools for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam along with other militias of lesser importance founded the Islamic Front (ICG-155 2014: 18). It is an alliance of autonomous groups, in which the coordination and cohesion varies, and a factor that prevents the harmonization of their positions is represented by their foreign affiliations. If Ahrar al-Sham receives special support from Qatar and Turkey, Jaysh al-Islam is on the payroll of Saudi Arabia (LUND 2015D). We cannot evaluate the dependence of these

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groups on foreign donors, but it is sure that this dependency has contributed to the lack of coordination on the ground even between groups that shared the same ideology, simply because they were used by their foreign patrons in their own benefit. One example in this respect is the situation of the Jaysh al-Mujahidin organization, a mixed coalition of autonomous groups. The pragmatism of the fighters gathered non-regimental fighters and radical Islamists on the same side, but because they are close to the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia objected that they should be included in the program to receive support through Military Operations Command (MOC). Returning to the Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham, although there are no significant ideological differences between them and Jabhat al-Nusra, the first two were invited to the peace conference organized on December 10th 2015 in Riyadh (LUND 2015E). Ahrar al-Sham refused to sign the joint statement at the end of the conference, which brings to light the fact that there is a clear contradiction between the objectives of the most important groups operating in Syria. Interesting is the fact that the Islamic Front cooperates in Northern Syria with Jabhat al-Nusra. Jabhat al-Nusra ( JN) deserves a special examination because on the long term it is considered a greater danger than the Islamic State (CAFARELLA 2014: 10-12). According to some studies, their goals are identical, what differs is their methodology, because in the end, JN seeks also to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate. Firstly, being an al-Qaeda branch, JN profited most from jihadist network operations that existed in Syria. This affiliation has given them access to resources and it soon established itself as one of the strongest groups on the ground. What makes them more dangerous is that they operate through rebel partner groups and affiliates, which envelops in a shroud of mist the true dimension of the organization (ICG-163 2015: 22). They also adopted a pragmatic and flexible policy. I stated that in the North they are cooperating with the Islamic Front. However, even in the North there were fights between them and those supported by Western groups. That has not prevented them to cooperate with the militias from MOC in the Southwest against the Islamic State. To understand the com-

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plexity of the Syrian crisis, troops that JN is fighting in the northeast are driven and supported by the Northern Military Command (NMC) set up in Turkey. However, there is evidence that Turkey is backing JN, mainly because the latter is fighting the Syrian Kurds. The problem is that the difference in views pushed JN to fight against militias supported within the NMC program (ICG-155 2014: 18). Moreover, to win public support, JN adopted a policy that provides assistance and social services. In addition, they mitigated their rhetoric and abstained from discriminatory acts, which allowed them to embed in the society. These, combined with efficiency in asymmetric warfare, have increased their ranks with fighters that came even from among the militias supported by MOC and NMC programs. In these circumstances, the international offensive against the Islamic State can be exploited by Jabhat al-Nusra which is acting more wisely. The rise of Salafi groups has weakened the opposition considered as moderate by the West and strengthened the regime by discrediting the uprising. The problems for those who want Assad’s departure do not stop there. The rebel-controlled territory has become a mixture of groups who are fighting with the regime or with each-other. It is a challenge to distinguish between desirable opposition from the point of view of the Western conception and radical groups that must be stopped. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that some radical militias have camouflaged their beliefs in order to benefit from outside support, and others, unhappy with the Western powers for not doing enough and attracted by the efficiency of radical groups, to which the mirage offered by Salafi ideology is added, have changed sides to the radical militia (LUND 2015F). Consequently, the situation seems hopeless and will be further complicated after we consider the Syrian Kurds.

The Kurds from Syria It is estimated that the number of Syrian Kurds before 2011 was between 2 and 2.2 million, which constitutes about 9-10% of the total population (CIA 2016). Kurds are the largest non-Arab minority, concentrated in north and north-eastern Syria. There are also large communities of Kurds in Syria’s two main cities, Damascus and Aleppo (LANDINFO 2010). They have always

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been marginalized by the leadership in Damascus and the 2011 revolt gave them the opportunity to advance the projects defined in nationalist terms. It is assumed that there was a tacit understanding between Damascus and the Kurds, through which the government guaranteed their autonomy, and for this reason they didn’t take part in the riot. On the 21st January 2014, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), one of the two major political blocs, unilaterally declared the independence of the Rojava region (SOLOMON 2014). This was not recognized by the international community, but, de facto, the Kurds are controlling significant areas of northern and north-eastern Syria. Their claims were met with hostility by rebels fighting in those areas, which led to continued clashes between sides, but the fiercest battle that they are waging is with IS and, so far, they proved to be the most effective direct rival fighting on the ground against them. This has turned them into the main internal force on which the US is building the fight against the IS (LUND 2015C). To benefit from US support, the Kurds have developed an organization called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the People’s Protection Units (YPG) have the strongest representation. They were joined by militias of Arabs and Syrians. The strategic difficulty for the US is to ignore that YPG is nothing but an extension of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), the number one enemy of Turkey. Moreover, the US also considers the PKK a terrorist group, but the lack of options leads them to tacitly accept this complicity. Except for the fact that they have managed to alienate Turkey, the US strategy has been successful so far in this regard: the Kurds advancing to the detriment of the IS in eastern Syria. Syrian Kurds are cooperating also with the Russian Federation, which provides them with intelligence, equipment and aerial support. Thus, Syrian Kurds fighting in North Western Syria are gaining ground to the disadvantage of militias supported by Turkey. As a result, this prompted a direct intervention by Turkey in the Syrian conflict by shelling Kurdish-led positions in North Western Syria (URAS 2016). Turkey’s main aim is to prevent Syrian Kurds from North Western Syria to unite their controlled territory with the rest of the Kurds which control Northern Syria up to the Euphrates River.

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The relations within the ranks of Syrian Kurds are not without rivalry. The historical disunity of the Kurds is also reflected in this situation. The political spectrum is polarized between two political blocks: the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a coalition of several small groups (CAVES 2012: 1). PYD has close links to the PKK, while KNC is closely linked to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The long dispute between the PKK and the KRG for political supremacy among Kurds was transferred to the Syrian groups, the latter becoming in the current context a centre of rivalries between the PKK and the KRG. According to some specialists, PYD and KNC would not be anything but the instruments of PKK and KRG, which they use to achieve their political objectives (CAVES 2012: 4). Tensions between Syrian Kurds have even led to sporadic clashes between them. This is a brief inspection of some key internal factors and their interactions, conflicting or friendly. This mosaic of groups with identities, ideologies and different objectives is impossible to coagulate now that they are fighting for every scrap of territory; the question is what will happen if the regime in Damascus will disintegrate.

Regional actors The analysis of local actors should be followed by an identification of regional actors (states and non-states), who intervened in the conflict and who are projecting their power in this crisis, directly or through intermediaries. I have mentioned some, but for a better understanding of the complexity of the crisis, a more detailed overview of their involvement in the conflict is required, especially as they are the main sponsors of domestic groups. Moreover, it will help us understand why the prospect of solving the Syrian crisis is so remote.

Regime allies Iran is the most important factor which is contributing to the regime’s efforts to maintain its position. Of course, the direct airstrike intervention

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of the Russian Federation adds significantly to the stabilization of the regime and sends a signal to everyone that the regime cannot be changed. However, in relative terms, Iran has invested its highest resources to protect its ally because they have the most to lose in case of its removal. A comparison between Iran’s regional position in 1979 and in 2011 gives us a clue about Tehran’s decision to support the government in Damascus. If in 1979 Iran was isolated regionally and internationally, in 2011 it reached an influential position in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon, and by using Shiite communities it has put pressure on the Gulf monarchies. Syria’s importance lies in the fact that it was the central pivot in Iran’s regional strategy. According to an Iranian cleric, Syria is the 35th province of Iran and the first line of defence against rival powers (SADEGHI-BOROUJERDI 2013). Without Syria, the second line of defence consisting of Hezbollah and the proxies from Levant would remain totally exposed (GOODARZI 2013: 27). This is the perception of the importance that Syria plays in Iran’s regional strategy, and the whole assembly is now threatened. Seen this way, the crisis in Syria is a vital threat to the security of Iran. It would be the biggest loss at the regional level since the creation of the Islamic Republic, to the benefit of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the US and other Gulf monarchies. This explains the decision to intervene to save the Assad regime. Syria is not only the most important ally of Iran, but also the route for supplying Hezbollah and proxies from Levant (BYMAN 2006). Removing Syria from the equation would significantly limit Iran’s ability to project its power in the Levant. More importantly, the prospect of removing and replacing its allied regime with one of allegiance to regional rivals will generate additional pressure on Hezbollah and on its allied regime in Baghdad. Given these security concerns, Iran has decided to support Damascus with everything at its disposal. The preservation of the regime outweighs the costs involved. It provides them military equipment and experts for technical support. Military support is also backed up by unconventional means (technology and experts in informational warfare). The ground troops of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Special Forces

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Al-Quds are providing training for regime soldiers and loyalist militias, and are also engaged directly in confrontation. Iran’s Basij militias are also fighting on the field. We don’t know the number of Iranian troops in Syria. What is known is that the Special Brigades Al-Quds managed to establish various local militias fighting alongside Assad – about 50,000 people according to Lund (2015F). These are heterogeneous militias composed of Alawi, Sunni, Druze, Christians, Assyrians and Palestinians and have been integrated into a single command of “National Defense Force”. Moreover, in this composition there are also 3000-4000 Shiite militias coming from Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan (LUND 2015A). Iranian support for Syria’s regime has been increased by Hezbollah. They appeared in the field in May 2013 and their contribution has proved to be crucial in regaining some key positions for the regime. Given their proficiency in guerrilla warfare, they are participating both in actual combat and in training paramilitary troops and governmental forces. All these forces were integrated into a single command of Al-Quds chief, Qassem Suleiman. The financial burden for Iran is also a considerable one. It is estimated that Iran is spending on average between 600 and 700 million dollars per month to support the governmental regime (SADJADPOUR 2014). The importance of Syria determines the leaders in Tehran not to quantify the war effort in financial terms (FILKINS 2013). This viewpoint is reinforced by the comments of a senior Iranian cleric, Mehdi Taeb, who claimed that if “Iran loses Syria, Tehran cannot be kept” (FULTON ET AL. 2013). This statement may seem exaggerated, but for the hardliners of the Iranian leadership this is how the importance of Syria is perceived in their regional strategy. For these reasons, they have accepted the image losses that they have recorded. Baghdad is also on Damascus’ side. The government led by Haider al-Abadi does not feel comfortable, given the influence that Iran has in their country, but are on the side of Damascus because instability there directly affects them. Salafi-jihadist groups that flourished in eastern Syria have united under the banner of the Islamic State and currently control about 25% of Iraq. In addition, the prospect of a government in Damascus associated with the Gulf monarchies is perceived as a threat.

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The regime opponents In this regional confrontation that has always been centred on the logic of a balance of power, the main opponents of Assad’s regime are: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, UAE and Bahrain. The different interests of these actors in the region are reflected in the lack of a common position which also influences the capacities of action of internal actors. Although the regime in Damascus was considered by the international public opinion to be a regime that promotes and supports terrorism, hence the possibility that someday it will embrace the fate of Saddam Hussein, the instability that followed the removal of the latter, developed in the public sphere the idea that Assad is a factor of stability. They were all aware of the contradictions of the Syrian society and the example of Iraq could validate the theory that a predictable anomaly is preferred, instead of unpredictable normality. Normality here is equivalent to removing the autocratic regime in Damascus. The vision was not shared by regional rivals, and when the regime showed signs of losing control the support for rebelliousness didn’t delay. The area of opponents of the current regime is much wider, which in this case is an obstacle in removing the regime. Even if the common goal is removing the regime led by the Assad family, alternatively each one sought to promote their own agenda in Syria. This is visible through the fact that each of the regional powers has developed its own customers inside Syria, which are trying to manipulate for their own benefit. It is an additional factor contributing to the inability of the Syrian opposition to develop a joint action program. Moreover, because of their desire to remove the regime, regional actors have tacitly or directly supported Salafi groups, and now these groups have become difficult to control and so the dynamic seems out of control in the territories controlled by the rebels. The bitterest adversary of the government in Damascus is Saudi Arabia. The motives that lie behind the Saudi policy against Assad are ideological, sectarian and strategic, with focus on the latter. Riyadh sees in the Syrian crisis an excellent opportunity to weaken Tehran’s regional position, which has seen a considerable upswing after Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown. We saw that for Iran the possibility of losing its most important

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ally is the greatest threat that it has had to manage since the end of its war with Iraq (First Gulf War - 1980-1988). For this reason, Syria is the field of indirect confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is not the only theatre in which these two regional powers are competing. There is a real Cold War between them and the struggle for influence is visible on several fronts (STRATFOR 2014). The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran deserves special attention because a future peaceful prospect in the Syrian crisis will largely depend on the will of these two actors. Also before the Islamic Revolution their relations were cold. Among the main issues we can include ideological fracture, regional geopolitical rivalry and competition within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The elements of convergence were the alliance with the USA and the opposition to the USSR. The situation deteriorated irreparably in 1979 when the Islamic Revolution came with a new model for the Muslim community, an approach that was antagonistic to the conservative Saudi vision. The Iranian revolution contested the Saudi model especially in the religious field, which until then was their monopoly. This direct attack on Saudi identity led to an ideological battle for acquiring spiritual primacy in the Muslim world. Two antithetical visions about the organization of the Muslim world were standing face to face: Pan-Islam proposed by Khomeini and puritan Sunni Islamism (Wahhabism) postulated by the house of Saud (FÜRTIG 2009). As a counter measure, Saudis painted Iranian revolution in sectarian terms and have labelled Iran as sectarian, not revolutionary. They played the card of Shia threat, arguing that they are the “fifth column” by which Iran seeks regional hegemony (STRATFOR 2015B). Additionally, they developed a fierce policy to export their Wahhabi model. Ideological competition was followed by a geopolitical competition. This has expanded and today we are witnessing a true Cold War, the ongoing theatres being Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan (STRATFOR 2014). The Saudis are the main supporters of Iran’s regional enemies. In these circumstances, Saudi Arabia would be the main actor who would benefit from the removal of Assad. We are witnessing a zero sum game where both countries pursue maximal

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goals, which lead us to the conclusion that the prospect of ending the conflict is out of reach (LEWIS 2014: 22-23). Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, has provided the steadiest support for the anti-regime opposition. Both strove to rally the Arab world against Assad and the main vector in achieving this objective was the media channels they patronize. For the opposition, their support was material, financial, political and diplomatic. They have taken steps to organize a political opposition and provided them with diplomatic support. Regarding the militias fighting on the ground, despite the fact that they stated their support for the nationalist moderate groups, much of their help has reached radical groups. Here we already have a fracture between the two countries. While Saudi Arabia supports the Jaysh al-Islam, the favourite client of Qatar is Ahrar al-Sham. These two militias are fighting together on some fronts, but at the conference in Riyadh on 10th December 2015, their position could not be harmonized. Also, both countries have tacitly accepted the transfer of funds from private donors from their states to radical groups. Saudi Arabia has not tried to prevent the approximately 2,500 fighters to fight in Syria. It is the second largest contingent after Tunisia’s 3,000 (MOORE 2016). This phenomenon can be a threat on the long-term to the stability of the kingdom. As we have seen, the mujahidins who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan ended up turning against the ruling monarchy in Riyadh because they considered it corrupt and servant to the West. Also the other Gulf monarchies, except Oman, oppose the regime in Damascus. Groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), however, are a point of dispute between them. Whereas Turkey and Qatar supports MB projects, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE are opposing them. This rivalry has affected the efficiency of the rebellion. Turkey is another regional actor which is actively involved against Assad’s regime. Relations between the two countries were always tense, and the causes for this were economic, military or historical (ILGIT AND DAVIS 2013). Therefore, Turkey has attempted to offer diplomatic, financial and military support to opposition movements (HOKAYEM 2012). Together with Western

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partners, they have developed a command centre where they were trying to support and coordinate desirable groups (from their point of view) Northern Military Command (NCM). In addition to overthrowing the regime, Turkey pursues its own agenda in Syria. According to Turkey’s strategic doctrine, their number one enemy are the Kurds. In such a situation, they try to thwart their plans in Syria by shelling their positions (AL JAZEERA 2016). At the same time, they supported radical groups who fought against them, especially Jabhat al-Nusra and adopted an “open door policy” for jihadists who went to fight in Syria. This policy has weakened the “moderate” groups supported by their Western allies. Until now, their politics proved to be wrong, because, if before they had one rival, namely the Syrian regime, now they have to manage an equation facing three rivals: the regime, some of the Syrian Kurds and the Islamic State (BARKEY 2014). IS affiliates have even performed attacks on Turkish territory. What is even worse for them is that the voice of the Kurds is increasingly assertive, and the West is condemning the dual policies of Turkey. Jordan hosts the second command centre that provides training, supplies and coordination for an array of militias hostile to the regime - Military Operations Command (MOC). Jordan is one of the main hubs by which these militias are supplied and this can be seen directly on the ground, because militias operating in southwestern Syria, around the village of Deraa, are straining the regime’s forces. In addition, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has offered its good offices in an attempt to coagulate the Syrian desirable opposition. Lebanon and Israel are two actors who look with attention and concern at the developments in Syria, given their proximity to it. Lebanon is directly affected by two phenomena which threaten its stability, already doubtful: the wave of refugees and the polarization of society in relation to the Syrian crisis. In the first five years of conflict, nearly 1.1 million refugees have been registered in Lebanon, which means an enormous pressure on the small state whose population barely reaches 6 million (HEISBOURG 2015). Moreover, the intervention of Hezbollah on Assad’s side has exacerbated tensions within the Lebanese society and there were even clashes between support-

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ers and opponents of Assad’s regime (ISW 2013). In these circumstances, the position of Lebanon is one of neutrality, in hope of a swift resolution of the crisis. Israel also took a position of neutrality but it has a more assertive policy. The instability in Syria worries them because some hostile groups can acquire an arsenal of weapons that could threaten their territory, which is why they often bomb arms convoys heading toward Hezbollah positions. Except for this threat, the Syrian crisis helps them by moving the regional and international public attention away from the Palestinian issue. Regarding their position in relation to the Syrian regime, they are not in favour of overthrowing Assad because the unpredictability that is deemed to follow represents an unwanted alternative.

The Islamic State The Islamic State deserves special attention given the key role that the organization has taken on in the last two years. After examining the elements making up this heterogeneous group we can infer the circumstances which have given rise to a phenomenon that has changed the equation of the Syrian crisis. We can find in this movement former Ba’ath regime staff from Iraq, Syrian and Iraqi nationalist insurgents and youth without an ideological engagement, but whom the lack of prospects pushed to embrace a project promoted by a hand of radical Sunni clerics. Above all, perhaps the most consistent component of this construct is represented by the local tribes (FROMSON AND STEVEN 2015). What is often overlooked in evaluating the space self-proclaimed as an Islamic Caliphate is that about 8 million people live within its boundaries, united by the local circumstances and by the same enemies (FROMSON AND STEVEN 2015). Firstly, the discriminatory policies promoted by the governments in Damascus and Baghdad have alienated Sunni tribes. Secondly, the vacuum of power and authority as a direct result of the civil war has created an acute sense of insecurity in eastern Syria. Looting, chaos, anarchy, all caused by conflicts for power pushed the population here to embrace the project developed by a handful of radical clerics which exploited the desire for revenge of former officers of Saddam Hussein’s regime, now fighting in

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Syria. They capitalized on the discontent of Sunni tribes in western Iraq and thus were able to expand the project there also. Iraqis prefer the IS instead of the central authority and the Syrians prefer the IS authority instead of anarchy. The idyllic portrayal of a Pan-Islamic caliphate attracted within their ranks a large number of the estimated 30,000 foreign fighters who arrived in this theatre of confrontation (EARNEST 2016). Moreover, IS contingents were supplemented with “moderates” who have switched sides, together with all the materials received from the West or regional regime rivals. The phenomenon has gained momentum especially after the fulminating advance in the summer of 2014, when they managed to conquer Mosul, in Iraq (LUND 2014). The conquered territory has allowed access to financial, material, human and military resources that enabled them to develop governing institutions. But the Caliphate must be governed and the incapacity to deliver the promised welfare will disappoint adherents. From here, the implosion of the Islamic State can occur. Furthermore, their refusal to coexist with groups which are challenging their global and radical vision to expand the caliphate can lead to antagonistic relationships with most of the actors in the Syrian conflict. In addition, an international coalition was created against them which has advanced a strategy of containment and elimination of all sources of funding, aiming at an implosion of the entire construction (MCINNIS 2015). Only in 2015, the IS has lost about 14% of its territory. In these conditions, they are now controlling about 78,000 km2 in Syria and Iraq. The regime in Damascus is governing approximately 20% (30,000 km2) of Syria, but it is the strategic strip linking Damascus to Homs, Hama, Aleppo and the Levantine coast. About 65% of the population lives here. The successful offensive against the IS has doubled the Syrian territory controlled by the Kurds, to about 16,000 km2. All the other militias are massed in approximately 10% of the Syrian territory (IHS 2015). The regime’s strategy is to bomb these territories to force people to leave. As a result, a lot of people are forced to leave and rebel militias are losing their manpower and support amongst the population.

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The rise of the IS further complicates the Syrian crisis and the regime in Damascus and its allies are trying their best to exploit this threat and to pose as the only viable option in this context.

The Syrian crisis – from rebellion to proxy war The Syrian drama could not have taken such a scale had it not been for the support from abroad, Syria becoming as such the field of confrontation between a very wide range of regional and global actors. Great regional actors see their influence closely linked to the outcome of the war in Syria (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013b). This fact further complicates the prospect of solving this crisis, given the difficulty of harmonizing the positions of actors with such different objectives. Rivalries are great on either side of the barricade, and also amongst those who are against the regime we can notice different agendas. Iran cannot abandon its oldest ally and the main pillar on which their regional strategy is built, while regional rivals of Syria and Iran are struggling to limit Iranian influence. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are virtually in an undeclared war with the regime in Damascus, and if they would now step back they would suffer serious loss in terms of credibility (GARFINKLE 2015). Besides the fact that they invested substantial resources in overthrowing Assad, they cannot change their policy now because it would compromise the ability of the Syrian political opposition in negotiations with the regime. In addition to that, the more the regime is expanding its control on the ground before the negotiation process starts, the more it will aim to capitalize it politically by claiming legitimacy. In these conditions, the pressure on the regime will be maintained by foreign rivals. This proxy war has not remained at a regional level. Great global actors could not remain neutral at the developments in Syria and the positions and actions taken have to be considered in order to have a complete picture of the Syrian crisis and to understand why the prospect of solving this crisis is so remote.

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Global actors Among the global actors, the United States adopted the most virulent position against Assad’s regime. France and Britain have expressed repeatedly their anti-regime position and supported it by providing diplomatic and military assistance to some militia groups which they considered moderate. Returning to the USA, they are following incompatible objectives. They are supporting some militias in the attempt to overthrow Assad’s regime, but at the same time they want to restrict Salafi groups, which is impossible, given the fact that the latter groups are the strongest groups and are very active on the ground through the alliance system they created. If at some point the possibility for a direct intervention to overthrow the regime was taken into account, the experience of Iraq and the opposition of Russia and China in the UN Security Council have blocked the effort (AHMAD 2013). As a result, the US have worked to overthrow the regime by consistently funding some militias which they considered desirable. The strategy proved once again flawed, because some of this support has reached the Jabhat al-Nusra and other jihadist groups. To limit such losses, the US together with their local partners established MOC and NMC in Jordan and Turkey, to train and coordinate the anti-Assad offensive. With the rise of the Islamic State, the main objective has become their containment and their destruction. If containment policies can already be seen, complete destruction will be problematic because it is impossible to destroy the resentments of a population. Radicalism proliferates when the state fails and insecurity installs. Examples which validate this hypothesis can be found not only in post-Saddam Iraq and Syria, but also in Afghanistan, Yemen or Libya. However, the US’ goal against the regime in Damascus remains the same. They aim to replace the government with one led by groups that they perceive as moderates. The problem is that moderates will never win because they are too divided and are lacking real influence on the ground. The real power on the ground is in the hands of the regime, the Islamic State, and other Salafi groups, and because the US do not have a response to this reality, they are trying to keep them all weak. The USA applied economic sanctions against the regime, although in the end, these

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are harming the people living there, about 65% of those remaining in Syria (KOZAK 2015: 10). They are also arming opposition militias fighting the regime and have developed a bombing strategy to weaken the IS. In the end, regarding the other Salafi groups, although some are supported by their local partners, the US looks at them with suspicion. American confusion gave the Russian Federation the opportunity to intervene directly in the conflict. By virtue of the special relationship that binds the Russia and Syria and the strategic importance of the latter, Russia has placed itself on Assad regime’s side from the beginning of the crisis, offering them economic, diplomatic and military support. The problems the regime was facing as a result of the erosion of the Syrian army in the war efforts, emboldened Russia to intervene directly in the conflict on 30th September 2015, using the pretext of participation in the international coalition against the IS. There have been debates on what the actual objectives of the Russian air campaign are, given the fact that 80% of the bombings were conducted outside the territory that the IS was controlling (LUND 2015C). In reality, Russia has not intervened against the IS or the rebels, but to support the regime in Damascus, which was endangered on several fronts. The Russian intervention stabilized the regime’s position and diminished the capabilities of some moderate militias. Moreover, in the North West theatre, near Aleppo, the government-supported troops and their allies have registered significant progress. In the long term, Russia’s position is not comfortable because they are risking to remain blocked in the conflict. It is assumed that Westerners want to increase the cost of Russia’s direct involvement, which is why together with their local partners they will inject more weapons to the opposition with which they agree. In such circumstances, they will ensure that no one will win, that the regime will become even more dependent on the Russian support and the latter will become stuck in this crisis. Following this logic, the Russian Federation would then be the target of the international community’s opprobrium for supporting a regime blamed for the deaths of over 250,000 people (OCHA 2016). In all these realistic-school based strategies one thing is being forgotten: the suffering of the Syrians. The last strong point

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on which Russia and Assad’s allies rely is the attempt to secure the territory that is now being occupied by the regime, leaving the other side in chaos and radicalism in the hope that at some point their rivals will conclude that the return to the pre-conflict status quo is the lesser evil. The challenge for the regime and its allies is to try to hold out until then, and for that purpose their policy has become a war by all available means. We saw how the fragmentation of the Syrian society has blocked all the projects of unity among the opposition and how the rebellion turned into a war of all against all. This situation was fuelled by the outside powers, because, while regional actors share the common goal of overthrowing the regime, they have developed their own clients inside Syria who came in conflict with each other. Of course, Assad’s regime, strongly supported by its regional allies, has worked to capitalize on the disunity of the opposition so they could stay in power. What began as an uprising against an autocratic regime evolved with time into an insurgency, then a civil war and finally a proxy war with irreconcilable regional interests that has put aside any prospect of solving this crisis. Last but not least, in order for the picture to be complete, global powers have not assisted passively but interfered in the conflict, on one side or the other, which further complicates this equation. At least for now, the many interests at stake here are making any agreement on a peaceful solution to this conflict impossible and the most visible and tragic impact is felt by the Syrian population. The problem is that time is not on the Syrians’ side, and an analysis of their humanitarian situation will allow us to understand why some of them have chosen to seek refuge abroad.

The humanitarian situation A United Nations report has revealed that the five years of violent conflict have claimed the lives of over 250,000 people and injured more than a million people (OCHA 2016). Life expectancy has been reduced by 13 years, the Human Development Index regressed by four decades and the number of children going to school was reduced by 50% (AL-MAHMOUD 2015).

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Regarding the Syrian economy, a report published at the end of 2015 reveals that it was contracted in real terms by 50% compared to 2011 and the Syrian pound depreciated by 80% (BUTTER 2015: 10). By the end of 2014, 82% of Syrians had been living in poverty and about 3 million people had lost their jobs because of the war (AL-MAHMOUD 2015). It should be noted that before the crisis, Syria’s population was just under 22 million (CIA 2016). The territory that remained under the administration of the government in Damascus is under international sanctions and the only financial and material support comes from Iran and Russia, which keeps the government on the floating line. In other areas the situation is even more troublesome. Even though rebel groups are striving to provide some basic services, the regime policy is to displace the local population and to create the impression that only the areas controlled by the government are habitable. Even if the rebels were advancing in the detriment of the regime, they were losing population due to the regime’s bombing policies. Above all, those living in areas controlled by the IS are subject to daily bombardments by a wide range of actors. The Syrian War has been transformed into a total war. As a result, the critical infrastructure of the state also became the target of attacks – industrial plants, energy production and distribution units. A comparison of satellite images at night, between March 2011 and September 2015, reveals that electric light intensity was reduced by 80% and blackouts are also frequent (The Economist 2015). The agricultural sector, another crucial element of the Syrian core infrastructure was seriously affected. Previous to the outbreak of the crisis, 46% of Syria’s population was living in rural areas and 15% of the national workforce was carrying out activities in the agricultural sector, which produced about 27% of GDP (BUTTER 2015: 12). At the end of 2015, depending on the region, agricultural production declined between 40 and 60% (SNAP 2014). The war has also affected the classic lines of trade, which led to numerous shortcomings, from medicine, food and fuel, to fertilizers (SNAP 2014).

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In this environment of generalized insecurity and the rising of oil prices by 200%, many local entrepreneurs have relocated businesses in neighbouring states, further contributing to mass unemployment. Government institutions continue to function but are almost entirely dependent on external support. An underground economy and informal trade networks have emerged, substituting the formal economy destroyed by the war. Network speculators are exploiting gaps caused by the war, creating a war economy, very profitable for them. For example, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the US are financing basic food purchases and are delivering products in some areas controlled by militias, but local profiteers sell them at overprice. A kilo of wheat came to cost 250 and one milk powder 300 dollars (BUTTER 2015: 12). The front line is not suppressing the smuggling activities. With the tacit support of the parties, there are exchanges between the territories controlled by the government and the militias, between the territories of rival militias and even between the territories controlled by the IS and other actors. Because of that, this war economy has merged with the revolution. Some rebel groups have developed a strong economic interest in this war, which has generated conflicting relationships with other groups in their fight for more benefits. This can also be an obstacle in resolving the Syrian conflict because peace is undesirable to some prosperous businesses. In these circumstances, the registering by the institution of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of 4.72 million Syrian refugees at the beginning of 2016 should not come as a surprise. Additionally, around one million have not yet been registered (UNHCR 2016). The pressure is felt mostly by the states located in the proximity of Syria. Turkey currently hosts 2.6 million, Lebanon 1.1 million – representing approximately 1/5 of the population of the entire country, Jordan about 638,000, Iraq over 245,000 and Egypt 118,000 (UNHCR 2016). From these figures 50.7% are women, and from the male category 27% are children up to seventeen years of age. Moreover, the war has displaced about 6.6 million people within Syria (OCHA 2016). According to the UNHCR (2016), the refugee camps in the above-mentioned states do not have sufficient funds to cover all basic

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services: those in Turkey are catering for only 44% of the needs, Lebanon for 63%, Jordan for 62%, Iraq for 42%, and Egypt for 31%.

Concluding Remarks: Leaving Syrians no options The national unity policies promoted by the regime in Damascus for the past 50 years have failed to fill up the segmentations threatening the state-building since its inception. To annihilate all the centrifugal forces and to maintain a compact state, the authoritarian regime in Damascus has developed a clientele system that orbited around the Assad family. All key positions have come to be occupied by family members of the regime’s clients, who have intertwined a web of complicities around it, and in this way the state has come to represent the regime’s own projection. As a result, it is a mistake to think that there can be a regime change alongside the preservation of the institutions. The experience of post-Saddam Iraq should not be forgotten. The new regime will have to dismiss tens of thousands of civil functionaries and military officers, some on charges of having contributed directly or indirectly to the crimes of the regime, others because of suspicions over their loyalty to the new establishment. Eliminating the regime will destroy the state and the price of it will be chaos, opening a competition for power between different factions whose loyalty manifests itself at family, clan, tribe or region level. We can see that even now, when they have a common enemy, they cannot agree to adopt a unitary course of action. Moreover, factions loyal to the regime will not drop their weapons even if the regime will collapse. In conclusion, preserving the current regime with a period of transition in which Assad would yield the position to someone close to the ruling family remains the only solution. Those who fight for the regime are counting on this and their strategy is to resist until the international community will conclude that maintaining the regime is the least bad alternative. This scenario involves two major obstacles. Firstly, the Syrian war has become a proxy war between the major regional actors. Appeasing this crisis largely depends on their will to reach a compromise because the internal actors whom they are backing are almost totally dependent on their support.

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The problem is that Iran and Saudi Arabia see the completion in Syria as a zero-sum game and are not willing to give up their fundamentally antagonistic positions now, because their entire regional strategy depends on this outcome (SADJADPOUR 2012). In these circumstances, no formula to protect the interests of both has been found so far. Secondly, even if an agreement to halt the conflict is reached between the regional actors, it will take time until the violence ceases, because the dynamics on the field are out of control. Groups who had the most consistent power projection on the field are primarily Jabhat al-Nusra and militias within the IS, and they are operating autonomously from regional actors and are not willing to compromise. Additionally, even if external patrons will urge their internal clients to lay down the arms, it is doubtful that they will comply. The fighters on the ground who have experienced extreme forms of violence will find it difficult to accept reconciliation with the regime from Damascus and their disarmament will also be problematic given the amount of weapons that have been pumped into Syria. Yet, the population still living in areas controlled by rebels may force them to accept a compromise, being exhausted by this conflict and the insecurity involved. They may even be willing to embrace a dictatorship again, because in this case a new form of stability and security will take the place of chaos and insecurity. These statements are only assumptions, their implementation being still far ahead. The problem for the Syrians is that time is not on their side. We have seen the scale of the humanitarian disaster, but the double lock in which Syria is removes the prospect of a peaceful resolution of this crisis, thus worsening the suffering of the population. In this paper we have identified that only a Hobbesian fear and a totalitarian regime can maintain the stability of a structurally contradictory society. Therefore, it was not difficult for the society to be fully displaced by the ongoing conflict and an extremely important role has been played by the sectarian rhetoric that has intensified the inter-confessional conflict (TANNER 2014). Sunni-Shia hostility, deeply implanted in the public consciousness, has propagated itself from one generation to another and in times of crisis it has been reinvented to serve certain political agendas. The current situation

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is not a discordant note, all domestic and regional actors using messages and symbols of sectarian nature to legitimize their policies. The regime has worked to portray the struggle as one against the Sunni Islamist fundamentalists who are threatening everyone who refuses to embrace their radical views, stating that they are the only guarantors of pluralism. The regime’s enemies have called for a fight against an oppressing Alawi regime. Iran’s and Hezbollah’s intervention was exploited by the Gulf monarchies and Jordan, who warned against the rising of Shias in the region. The whole battle was pencilled in sectarian terms and because in the Middle East imagination often becomes reality, the conflict has taken sectarian nuances (BYMAN 2014). For these reasons, the prospect of peaceful coexistence is even more remote, especially since their current policies are based on the exclusion of others, and the legitimacy of their actions is given by the fact that they all feel victims of a conspiracy undertaken by the other party (PHILLIPS 2015). Regardless of what happens, great parts of Syria will still be ungovernable for a period of time which is difficult to predict because of the multitude of actors involved and the irreconcilable visions which they pursue. What we must understand is that the lack of prospect is the main feeling that the Syrian population, exhausted after five years of conflict, is experiencing. All these aspects presented in this paper should be taken into consideration when judging the decision taken by millions of people to give up the little they still had in search for hope in foreign countries.

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International law

on refugees: between norm and moral PA U L P O PA

I

n recent years the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict caused large groups of people from the Middle East and North Africa to seek temporary or permanent relocation in the Member States of the European Union and beyond. Invocation of the international law on the protection of individuals, alongside the social and political reactions, emphasized in some cases the superficial compliance with certain provisions in force, fragile application and implementation of the necessary tools, suggesting inability of solidarity. An analysis is necessary on how those created a crisis on the status of refugees and asylum seekers and how some interpretations and their application are often influenced by morality. In order to determine if we are dealing with a crisis its definition as a traumatic course of events with specific characteristics threatening the quality of some default conventions or situations should be considered. In order to settle a crisis extraordinary measures should be taken, involving the interaction between policy makers and ad hoc actions to combat the existence of elements such as surprise and insecurity caused by the course of events or other possible manifestations of xenophobia and nationalism (ROBINSON 1996). A crisis can be of several types (foreign policy, economic, international, social, cultural, etc.) with four specific conditions: (1) the existence of a shift in the internal or external environment, which (2) generates a threat to the existing situation by (3) the need for adopting economic, military, social, etc. measures (4) in as short a time as possible (BRECHER 1978). Analysing the mentioned criteria, we can conclude that we are dealing with a crisis in Europe caused by the changing external environment (the Arab

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Spring and the Syrian conflict) that threatens the stability of the EU (reprioritization of political agendas in order to solve this problem) by adopting urgent measures (there were meetings of European leaders for quotas distribution of groups and necessary economic mechanisms), because of the continuous flow of people arriving in Europe. The context and nature of the current crisis creates the opportunity of an analysis on how the terms like “refugee”, “asylum seeker” or “international migrant” are defined. Unfortunately, the confusion of these terms may be attributed mostly to some states, regional and international entities, which can sustain ineffectiveness in handling crisis situations. International migrant refers to the person who leaves the place in which they reside and they can be defined as immigrant (an international migrant who enters the area from a place outside the country) or emigrant (an international migrant departing to another country by crossing the international boundary) (MESSER ET AL. 2012). The phenomenon of migration is fuelled by globalization and can be found in various forms throughout history. Jackson wrote that migration represents the geographic movement of people across a specified boundary for the purpose of establishing a new permanent or semi-permanent residence (JACKSON 1969). With regard to refugees, regulations established by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) points out that refugees are not considered as migrants (UNGA 1990). These categories are added to undocumented (illegal) migrant or other cases that are ‘of concern’ to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). To be clear, the main difference between immigrant and refugee is that a refugee involuntarily relocates constrained by the circumstances in which they find themselves (JACKSON 1969: 17), while an immigrant relocates determined by other reasons that are not related to life-threatening situations, persecution or discrimination. In defining immigrants, subcategories are taken into account. An economic immigrant aims to identify and establish in a particular place / country where they can have economic benefits, development and prosperity, etc., unlike others who are seeking to settle in a place where they can identify

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culturally with that place or community. Family migrants are those looking to relocate for family reunification (MESSER ET AL. 2012). In this respect, States and regional organizations have developed many policies on migration and immigrants, which unfortunately, in some cases, are applicable to refugees. The importance of delimiting these categories is determined not only by provisions or their reasons for relocation, but by their effects, involving very different mechanisms, policies and instruments. Regarding the international regime of refugees and asylum seekers, article 1 (A) (2) of the Refugee Convention of 1951 defines a refugee as an: individual who is  outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence, who is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. (UNGA 1951) 1 From a procedural standpoint, an asylum seeker is distinguished as that person who wants to receive refugee status under the Refugee Convention of 1951 (KNEEBONE 2009). The right to seek asylum is granted even by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and it refers to the possibility for a person who fulfils the requirements of the regulations to seek asylum based on a fear for their life or safety (KNEEBONE 2009). Given that a refugee is someone who “flees” persecution, the procedures for examining applications for asylum can be complicated and time consuming. Not all asylum seekers become refugees, but every refugee is initially an asylum seeker. The supremacy of these concepts demonstrates the subtleties of interpretation of international law into national law and various regional regulations. These interpretations are determined by how the actors relate to the provided obligations and rights and especially the effects that these have on their interests. States and international actors relate to the legislation in force and existing relationships are conducted under international norms.

1 For detailed definition see Goodwin-Gill (2008) and Szableska and Karim (2013).

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Norms, as rules, represent the protection of a set of values which impose a certain behaviour: to do or not to do. This infers rights and obligations of each participant so that there is a universality of values unanimously respected. The international norms follow the same principles of rights and obligations which become mandatory for those who choose to acquire them. International norms aim to quantify moral values and principles (GOERTZ 2003. BUT SEE ALSO RISSE ET AL. 1999) and impose a predictable behaviour based on obligations assumed by the states. These rules are actually principles that define a community of states and have evolved during the course of history (ROSENTHAL 2015). On the other hand, moral is both the ability to distinguish right from wrong and the ability and willingness to do what is right. Using only norm as a way of solving such situations is inappropriate, as long as it is in interdependence with morality. A norm can be amoral or immoral because it does not always promote morality or, even more, it can contradict it (STEINER 2003). In this relationship, between morality and norm, jus cogens norms2 are distinguished as rules that underpin the entire system of international law. These are essentially moral rules and there can be no derogation, just as they are sustained by their character of mandatory universal morality (MAY 2011). Given the complexity of these distinctions, I wish to emphasize the criteria of analysis relating to the status of refugees. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the crisis of refugees through a legal but also a moral dimension, as by distinguishing legal and moral obligations of states. In order to provide 2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annex), concluded in Vienna on 23 May 1969, Art. 53: Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”) “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character” (UN 1969). Thus, jus cogens includes, at a minimum, the prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination and the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force.

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an answer to this question we will be taking into consideration three main hypotheses, which debate on the following: (a) national sovereignty vs. fundamental rights; (b) gaps in refugee law and (c) morality v. interculturalism. First of all, based on the argument that sovereignty cannot be placed above the human right to safety, we consider how the post-war regulations have redefined states’ actions in international relations. Starting with the UDHR, the individual receives recognition in international law. Refugee law is framed in fundamental human rights, meaning that it essentially enjoys the privileges of a jus cogens norm. Jus cogens norm superiority is undeniable and binding to any other right of the international system. The evidence given in the analysis is that sovereignty against the right of refugees, is not only not superior, but it’s not even equal. In the second section we discuss international regulations on the protection of refugees and especially the gaps in the international law on refugees that are causing different applications. The framework provided by the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the subsequent provisions laid down by the Refugees Protocol of 1967 fails to cover all situations that may arise in protecting refugees and asylum seekers. Although regulations adopted at regional level plus other international provisions are trying to create uniform applicability of the provisions in this regard, any essential additions made by subsequent acts are also susceptible of interpretation by the states and regional organizations which, according to their own moral values, choose how they are applied: extensively, restrictively or not at all. The third hypothesis argues that the morality of states related to refugee protection should not be dependent on the complexity of intercultural issues. The main reason for States’ reluctance to accept refugee groups is that they will cause social problems. The cause is further supported if those are groups of refugees coming from countries and societies which adhere to different cultural values. Interaction between cultures can indeed raise certain social issues, not just for those who are in the host State but also for refugees or those who come to seek asylum. These issues are also highlighted in the field of migration. It is increasingly apparent that states, especially

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Western ones, have a very restrictive policy on foreign persons who want to relocate on their territory. In this regard, it raises an internal question of morality, regarding its citizens, and an external one, regarding refugees.

Sovereignty and fundamental human rights The rights of refugees and asylum seekers are included in the area of human rights. The regulations in this regard have grown considerably and, due to this extension, the analysis regarding refugees and asylum seekers can be vast. The regulations take into account both the rights and obligations of refugees and persons applying for asylum and those of States and organizations that manage such situations. Starting the analysis based on the legal foundations and international normative architecture, there are major implications in relation to the role of morality in the interpretation and enforcement of specific instruments, but also the way in which fundamental rights have priority over sovereignty. Before the advent of nation states, asylum represented a universal institution with religious overtones, later it received a form of territoriality becoming a concept based on sovereignty. Asylum and international protection were seen as one institution, but states appropriated the right to have exclusive control over their territory: to accept, to exclude, to expel or to provide protection. Currently, international protection and asylum are two different institutions. While the first is a prerogative of international law, the second is a prerogative of the state (GOODWIN-GILL 1996). States that are signatories to international regulations are legally compelled to provide asylum, but only under the limits set by such “recommendations”, yet most of them often cite sovereignty as a defence mechanism. The assumption by states of international moral norms means that these are to be implemented and complied with, but mostly brings with it the responsibility that these are to be respected as shared, universal and generally binding values. In this situation a dilemma arises regarding the states and organizations that choose not to adopt such regulations and international moral norms. The role of national legislative systems in the implementation

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and compliance with the international norms on refugees and asylum seekers reflects the importance of the rule of law at national level when it comes to extending the application of the right to seek asylum (KNEEBONE 2014). For this purpose, the doctrine differentiates between the role of community and the rule of law. Sovereignty in terms of rule of law can be understood as legal (parliamentary sovereignty) or political (popular sovereignty). The distinction between morality and norm in this case must be filtered through several identifications. The Positivist school of thought distinguishes between a legal system and the validity of laws. The “law of integrity” based on morality which can be exclusive and inclusive emerges from this (KNEEBONE 2014: 30). The exclusive version promotes the idea according to which what the law is and what it wants to be are two different dimensions. What law is must be implemented in practice or social activity. The inclusive version allows for the use of moral instruments that are not necessarily found in the law, but moral criteria can be found in the particular legal system in order to legitimize it. This means that moral criteria are sufficient or necessary for legal validity in certain circumstances (such as the definition of equality) (KNEEBONE 2014: 40). Even if accepting refugees unconditionally would lend legitimacy to democracy by protecting fundamental rights and would also cause economic growth, compliance with international provisions and procedures that may bring prejudice to the security and national or political interests often causes a restrictive interpretation of the rules regarding refugees and asylum seekers. In this respect, it must be assumed that morality has a reflective character and it is an active component (STEINER 2003: 182). With regard to asylum, what is good must be promoted, in which case a distinction between norm and moral is necessary. Therefore, when it comes to the right of refugees and asylum seekers a discussion only about the fundamental rights of individuals or institutional obligations is insufficient. This is about an interaction of an individual manifesting in the system with

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the particular circumstances the individual finds himself in, resulting in the case of individual morality versus collective morality (ROSENTHAL 2015: XII-XVI). In this regard, Article 14 (1) of the UDHR3 was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, General Assembly resolution 217 as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations.4 This was the first regulation to guarantee the right of anyone to seek and apply for asylum in other countries. Sir Hersh Lauterpacht pointed out that at the time of its adoption, given the post-war context, the UDHR was considered by the signatory States as a recommendation. Moreover, none of the signatories would have agreed that it would be binding, but rather a milestone in the adoption of other national, regional or international acts in the spirit of the Declaration (LAUTERPACHT 1950). The statement was criticized for being a link between moral values and fundamental rights that many states fail to adhere to, as they are not considered to be universal. As it is an expression of moral intuition, it creates a link between human rights and legal rights in a certain interpretation which is likely to create confusion between morally and politically false (FIESER 2001). In its content, the UDHR places the fundamental rights in international law, bringing a challenge to the traditionalist doctrine that the state and not the individual is the subject of international law. The doctrine considers that these rights are superior and dispensable to sovereignty because rela3 The major limitation of the UDHR is that it does not define in legal terms what constitutes a refugee. In the absence of a clear definition of “refugee” United Nations General Assembly Resolution 29 (V) of December 14, 1950 establishes a Geneva conference on refugee status between 2 and 25 July 1950 signed by 26 states. Its purpose was to establish that everyone can be considered a refugee if that person fit the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and June 30, 1928 or under the Convention of October 28, 1933 and February 10, 1938, the Protocol of September 1, 1939 or the Constitution of the International on refugees. Also one of the major shortcomings of the applicability of the Convention was established that the events occurred before 1 January 1951 in Europe or anywhere else. However, the Refugee Protocol of 1967 eliminates these time and geographical restrictions, except that regarding last restriction, states that have ratified the Refugee Convention of 1951 can choose to keep this restriction. For example, of the present Council of Europe’s Member States, Monaco and Turkey still retain only the geographical restriction. Monaco provides refugee protection under bilateral Agreements with France. In Turkey, asylum seekers whilst non-European has formally excluded from protection of the Refugee Convention of 1951, they may apply for “temporary asylum-seeker status” under Turkish law, pending UNHCR’s efforts to find a solution for them elsewhere. See e.g. ECtHR (2009) and ECtHR (2010). 4 Refugee Protocol of 1967 conferred the refugee definition in the Convention of 1951, and the possibility that its regulations can be offered to all refugee situations that may follow its signature. For more details, see GOODWIN-GILL (2008) and SZABLESKA AND KARIM (2013).

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tions among states represent a universal right for humankind as a result of individual sovereignty (BEDI 2007). Asylum through the UDHR becomes an equal right to that of sovereignty and, alongside other rights stipulated, is creating the legal architecture for other normative acts with regard to fundamental human rights. The mandatory character of its regulations was subsequently confirmed through the practices of the International Court of Justice who argued that fundamental human rights transposed in international law are no longer dependent on standards of the sovereignty of states, and the individual is no longer at the mercy of governments but above them, his rights being erga omnes (ICJ 2005). Subsequently, the Refugee Convention of 1951 emphasized one of the most important rights that refugees can enjoy: Article 33: prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”) 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (UNGA 1951). The refugee enjoys the right to be housed as long as the danger persists in the place from where the refugee is. It is considered that this obligation of states is regarded as a fundamental right of refugees and the non-refoulement is a jus cogens norm,5 from which there should be no exemptions of 5 Initially this text was applicable to those people who have entered the territory of the host state. The consequences of this interpretation were that refugees or asylum seekers could be rejected at the border until it was established that their situation fell under the Convention (1951). However, with time this provision was given a broader interpretation made in the spirit of the Convention so that the state is obliged to house refugees or asylum seekers until it is determined whether the reference to the country of origin poses or not danger to life and integrity. For the avoidance of discrimination, applicability is restraint both to those who present themselves at the border and on those who enter illegally in the host state, with or without required documents. In this sense ruled UNHCR’s Executive Committee, calling on States to respect the institution of asylum, emphasized even more strongly “the need to admit refugees into the territories of States, which includes no rejection at frontiers without fair and effective procedures for determining status and protection needs” (UNHCR EXCOM 1997). The UN General Assembly pronounced on the same lines as UNHCR and the Executive Committee, although less systematically: in Resolution 52/103 of 12 December 1997 after stating that “everyone is entitled to the right to seek and enjoy asylum from other countries’ persecution”, it called on states to refrain from taking measures that jeopardize the institution of asylum, in particular by returning or expelling asylum-seekers refugees or measures that are contrary to international human rights and refugee law and to humanitarian principles (UNGA 1998). Note that the obligation on states to admit a person arriving at their border and to initiate proceedings to determine whether he or she fulfils the conditions for recognition of refugee status should not, in all logic, depend on

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any kind (ALLAIN 2003 AND UNHCR 1993). 6 Interpretations of this are universal, no state or other entity are exempt in respect of this interpretation and there can be no appreciation or different instruments on applying the character as a jus cogens norm of the right of non-refoulement. The UNHCR in its conclusions progressively revealed that non-refoulement right has become a peremptory norm of international law. As much as states want to prevail on certain obligations regarding refugees and asylum seekers, non-refoulement right is ensured by its jus cogens character. This obligation cannot be violated even if states are part of an organization or association in which there are institutions that provide protection for refugees and asylum seekers (ALLAIN 2003: 86-87). It was also stated in this sense by the International Court of Justice in 1986 in a ruling by which it praised the peremptory nature of the right of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm and that states have an obligation to respect and protect it. Any other interpretation is to be considered as a confirmation of the norm and not an exception to it (ICJ 1986). Inevitably, conditions and general criteria stipulated by the Convention leave room for many interpretations. These are mainly realized by the state or national courts in which the legal problems of interpretation arise. In many situations primarily the national interest is considered, which materializes through invoking sovereignty as the supreme virtue which aligns their interests with the general interests. To confirm refugee law as a fundamental right any other regional conventions or regulations that focus on the promotion and respect of fundamental human rights must also be considered. the presentation of official application. In other words, the host country should not begin steps to verify the lawfulness of any removal order and in the meantime admit the person to territory (assuming he or she does not have other entry documents). Even though no application has been made for the recognition of refugee status, while be there may still be some doubts in this regard as far as the refugee convention is concerned, the situation is clear in respect of the Rome Convention; clearly the ECtHR has ruled on the point: “having Regard to the circumstances of the case, the fact that the parties concerned had failed to explicitly request asylum did not exempt Italy from fulfilling its Obligations under Article 3” (ECTHR 2012). For more details, see CHERUBINI (2015: 47-53). 6 However, the Refugee Convention of 1951 establishes a restriction on this right and it is considering whether the refugee poses a risk or threat to the national security of the state of refuge. The benefit of the present Provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there is reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final Judgment of the particularly Serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. See ECTHR 2015C.

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However, when it comes to the nature of the right of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm, it has universal applicability and it is binding. The Convention on Refugees of 1969 adopted by the United African Organization (OAU Convention), the current African Union, banned the rejection of refugees and asylum seekers at the border of a State (OAU 1969). This obligation was confirmed by the African Court on Human and People’s Right (ACHPR) who pointed out that a state cannot send a person, no matter what, in the state where he/she risks being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment (ACHPR 2000). Europe holds an important position in the international refugee protection system and in granting asylum applications. Following the events that took place on its territory, it was necessary that the European states adopt an act on the protection of universal human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR drafted in 1950 and in force since 1953) has set the basis on which these rights can be interpreted. Even if there is no direct reference to the status of refugees, its regulations may be subject to wide interpretations. These regulations establish the general framework of human rights, in their essence, and their interpretation is the concern of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In this regard, the ECtHR considered in its jurisprudence that the rights of asylum seekers and refugees are to be filtered by fundamental rights laid down in the text of the ECHR. Thus, the ECtHR in its cases has established that people in a position to apply for asylum or refugee status enjoy the protection offered by certain regulations of the ECHR in relation with other European and international legislation. A first assessment would suggest that the European Court of Human Rights has jurisdiction to hear cases of refugees or asylum seekers, regardless of the country of origin, as long as they are on the territory of signatory states of the ECHR. In some cases, the ECtHR interpretation was that the signatory states of the European Convention on Human Rights must take the necessary measures in order to ensure that refugees enjoy all the rights that a citizen of a signatory Member State has. The circumstance by which an applicant

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may be subjected to inhumane treatment by one of the Member States involves responsibility from another Member State to take the necessary actions so that the rights of the applicant, established by the Convention, are respected (ECTHR 2011).7 Moreover, the ECtHR ruled in the Khamrakulov v. Russia case that a person persecuted in their home country cannot be repatriated by a State where they requested asylum, as long as there is confidence that in the country of origin they will be subjected to inhuman treatment, contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECTHR 2015B).8 These decisions only emphasize the superiority of rules on refugee protection over sovereignty. A special case is certainly the European Union, whose mechanisms leave room for interpretation and greater enforcement by Member States. The EU has developed its own mechanisms on refugees and asylum seekers status.9 It was observed that a big problem in this field within the European 7 The facts of the case show that the Afghan asylum seeker who fled Kabul in 2008, entered the European Union through Greece and on to Belgium where he travelled, applied for asylum. According to the Dublin rules, Greece was held to be the Member State responsible for the examination of his asylum application. Therefore, the Belgian Authorities in June 2009 transferred him there where he faced detention in insalubrious conditions, living on the streets without any support material. At issue in the Judgment was the risk of violating Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and / or Article 13 (the right to effective remedy). The Court held that the Belgian Authorities had the means of preventing his transfer to Greece by utilizing the sovereignty clause. Given the evidence presented on the situation in Greece, the Belgian authorities could not presume that the applicant would be treated in conformity with ECHR Obligation but it was up to the Belgian Authorities to first verify how the Greek Authorities applied their legislation on asylum in practice. For details, see also: ECTHR 2015A. Not all situations attract the non-applicability of refoulement of the ECHR. For example, in ECTHR 2015C, the Court held that the rejection by the Romanian Immigration Office and the Bucharest Court of an application for asylum from an Afghan national, is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention on grounds of the lack of credibility and evidence he risked ill-treatment at the hands of the Taliban if sent back to Afghanistan. On 16 December 2010, the applicant was declared an “undesirable person” in the Romanian territory for fifteen years, on the grounds of his involvement in activities likely to jeopardize national security. He was placed in Otopeni detention and the Court considered the conditions of detention and the right to justice were not violated, but condemned the decision of the High Court of Justice and Cassation to reject the appeal for not being filed within the period stipulated by law because it infringes the provisions of Art. 5 (4) because it did not consider the lack of permanent residence and thus they could have acknowledged the summons sent, in ECTHR 2015C. 8 For more details, see related cases: ECTHR 2012A, ECTHR 2008A; ECTHR 2008B. In contrast to these cases, for example in question ECTHR 2015D, Court held that the applicants to the proposed deportation of the Iraqis would not violate art. 3 ECHR, based either on the general situation of violence in Iraq, or on the basis of past serious threats and violence occurred in 2008. That does not justify the application of non-refoulement because the persons concerned could not prove that once repatriated they will suffer violations of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. 9 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (2000) also captures, like other similar acts, in particular the ECHR, the rights enjoyed by citizens of the signatory states. It is established within its right to

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Union has always been ‘a game’ of outsourcing and gradual shifting of responsibility from the Member States to the European Community and the European Union, or other countries (DA LOMBA 2004). However, the principle of the European Union on the transfer of responsibilities has given rise to criticism and doubts regarding its compatibility with international norms on refugees and asylum seekers. These transferable skills may affect the very right to seek asylum or even to the non-refoulement right. Even so, it remains a concept built into the system of the European Union policy on the right of refugees and asylum seekers (DA LOMBA 2004: 166-169). In concluding the reasoning and interpretations outlined above, sovereignty remains one of the reasons cited by states when it comes to implementing and applying the provisions on the right of refugees and asylum seekers. The complexity of extreme situations in which fundamental human rights are called into question, invoking sovereignty is inopportune. In this respect, we are dealing with a lack of morality of a state that claims sovereignty in order to protect against ‘invasion of refugees’ and which is completed by an illegitimate attitude. As I pointed out, the right of refugees and asylum seekers is a fundamental human right, jus cogens norm is considered as superior to sovereignty and any derogation from it is a violation of international regulations in force. Regardless of national legislation, refusing to accept refugees and asylum human dignity (art. 1), the right to life (art. 2), right to the integrity of the person (art. 3), prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 4), which are supplemented by Article 18 which provides for the right to asylum under the Refugee Convention of 1951, however, requiring that it be consistent with the Treaty on European Communities. The following article is for Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition that collective expulsions is prohibited and no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is worth mentioning that the CFR recognizes the right of refugee and asylum seeking persons under the Refugee Convention of 1951 on the status of refugees. But according to the text, the Member States’ obligation, bound by Refugee Convention’s regulations, is that having a general application does not attract major sanctions if the European Communities/Union or Member States choose not to complete it with additional own provisions; Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining lodged asylum application in one of the Member States by a third-country national; European Union Law - Asylum Procedures Directive, Council Directive 2005/85 / EC of 1 December 2005, the European Union Law - Dublin II Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, the European Union Law - Qualification Directive, Directive 2004/83 / EC of 29 April 2004.

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seekers, based on the State’s right of sovereignty is a violation of the principles to which the State adhered and thus a crime against the international legal system. However, we must not overlook the fact that the illicit nature of the invocation of sovereignty to the detriment of the legislation on the status of refugees and asylum seekers should be liable to penalties, which in the context of current international law remains an ideal. In this case, at the most, states and international and regional organizations can, to some extent, isolate the state itself, or apply economic, diplomatic or political sanctions, which can be mostly formal, minor ineffective or lacking concrete effects. The supremacy of international regulations in this regard is characterized by mandatory application, but ultimately morality remains the main factor which influences the attitude of the state.

Interpretation of gaps in refugee law Protection of refugees and asylum seekers is set by generally applicable laws, but as these are incomplete, subsequently specific tools and interpretations influenced by context, tradition and needs were developed within their framework. Regulations on the rights of refugees are numerous as a consequence of the Second World War. In this regard the rules, instruments and mechanisms for refugees and asylum applications can be grouped into two broad categories: (1) international principles and regulations (the UDHR, the Refugee Convention of 1951) relating to the status of Refugees and other forms of international protection arising from principles, concepts and other regulations10 and (2) those of regional entities (associations and unions of states). 10 A number of other international instruments also affect the rights of asylum seekers: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 12 and 13; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, Articles 5.d.i and ii; the United Nations Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 3; the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, Articles 27 and 28; the OAU Convention of 1969; the Organization of American States’ Declaration; the United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum; and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Individuals who are not nationals of the country where they live. All were in their references to refugee protection dimension an essential part of humanitarian law. They come as a complement and update rules on the status of refugees and asylum seekers. At the level of regulations and even in literature these provisions are reflected in some legislation, once to highlight their character fundamentally and especially to be able to comprise as many situations as

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It should be considered that in defining these concepts, statutes adopted by the states or regional and international organizations are taken into account. Even if their definition was established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later by the Geneva Convention (1951), supplemented by the Optional Protocol in New York (1967), some entities have revisited the criteria by which a person can be considered as having obtained refugee status and can be granted asylum. Although it takes into consideration the general characteristics of the refugee, the Geneva Convention (1951) was criticized for its narrow definition of refugees. Its provisions do not apply to Internally displaced (IJRC 2015). The Convention provides for three conditions in order for a person to be considered as a refugee: (1) the person must be outside the country of origin or residence, (2) there must be fear of persecution without any possibility to protect or defend against it, and this fear must be (3) determined on the basis of persecution and discrimination listed in the article.11 In time, practice has required that the definition contained in the Convention be interpreted in a broader sense, thus leading to a situation where a person is considered a refugee even if they did not leave their place of residence, if there are threats that endanger their life and safety, becoming so called Internally displaced persons (IJRC 2015). possible in which people can be categorized as refugees or asylum seekers. 11 The Refugee Convention of 1951 places a number of restrictions on eligibility for refugee status. Article 1 (C) states that Convention regulations shall cease to apply to persons who voluntarily refused the protection of the home state, lost country of origin, benefit from the protection of another state or the causes that led to the granting of refugee status have ceased. Article 1 (D) excludes individuals who, at the time of the 1951 Convention, were already receiving protection or assistance from other UN organ or agency. Article 1 (D) largely applied to Koreans receiving aid from the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and Palestinians receiving aid from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and continues to apply to the latter. The Convention does not apply to persons who are recognized by the State of refuge as having the same rights as nationals of their own (art. 1 E) or if it has committed crimes against humanity and other non-political crimes before entering in the State of refuge or other acts committed against UN principles (Article 1 F). Given the activity of terrorist group Islamic State in Syria and its contribution to the conflict it is necessary to perpetuate reviewed applicability criteria of art. 1F on the acts committed by a refugee or asylum seeker in a terrorist organization. “Both in theory and in practice it is considered that such membership exclusion clauses represent the rights enjoyed by a refugee or an asylum seeker. Still to be analysed and considered whether those reasons and aims of the Organization’s activities affect the values ​​of the UN Charter and are of a criminal nature. (CHERUBINI 2015: 36).

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One of the issues that are subjected to discussion and interpretation of the national courts is about the character that the “fear” or the “persecution” must have. The Convention fails to establish if fear should be considered based on objective factors relating to the place where the person came from or whether it is the emotional state of the subject and how they perceive the situation which forced them to flee. Although the UNHCR’s interpretation is that fear is a personal condition and should be determined by how individuals relate to the overall situation, it is subject to criticism. The lack of information on the evolution of events in the country of origin, and the person’s rejection of national practices can lead to a broad interpretation of the subjective element (UN AD HOC COMMITTEE 1950). Therefore this subjective element has to be analysed from the perspective of objective elements, which led them to seek refugee status: whether it lasts or if it is well-founded. This interpretation in this sense is complementary to the existence of persecution which is satisfied by the criteria established by the Convention (torture, etc.) and for which there is no need to be performed repeatedly in order for it to be regarded as persecution. With respect to other rights this persecution must be determined outside of state emergency (CHERUBINI 2015). It was concluded that what is relevant in determining a persecution where the state of origin does not want to or cannot act on its responsibility to protect is not the identity of the persecutor, but his intentions. Each case must be analysed both through the filter of national, regional or international instruments regarding the fulfilment of all the criteria stipulated by the Convention, and especially through the interpretation of national or international courts. The link between fear and persecution (political opinions, membership of a particular group, etc.) must be established (CHERUBINI 2015). Under the Convention, Member States grant asylum to refugees who fall within the eligibility criteria set out in its provisions, but it does not refer to those who are at the stage of asylum seekers. People who have no nationality or those who cannot prove they meet the conditions stipulated by it are not taken into account (PLAUT 1995). The Convention distinguishes between

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three categories of refugees: tout court and those legally present (categories that have not yet defined their status, and are in accordance with the laws on foreigners in the host country - documents, visas, etc.) and those who stay legally - with a recognized status or a temporary right to stay. The differences between these categories are given by the protection they enjoy (CHERUBINI 2015: 10). The Refugee Convention of 1951 leaves room for interpretation under its applicability meaning that it can be extended to any situation that is not included or referred to in the text of the agreement. This last recommendation of the Convention has led to a new type of refugee, which does not fall under the terms of the Convention. Through this, states have chosen to offer additional protection to several groups of people, even if they did not meet the conditions laid down by the Convention, and some states have chosen to introduce legislation of their own, independent of international law. These interpretations have been left to the states without being binding for other countries, criteria were determined by extending the applicability and interpretation of the text of the Refugee Convention of 1951 or by more precise application of national or conventional provisions.12 12 For example, India is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees nor its Optional Protocol on Refugees of 1967. In this regard was adopted Foreigners Act (1946), “which is consulted by the current law with regard to authorities, refugees and asylum seekers. The primary and most significant gap in this law is that it does not contain the term ‘refugee’; consequently, under Indian Law, the term ‘foreigner’ is used to cover permanently or temporarily aliens residing in the country. This places refugees, along with immigrants, and tourists in this broad category” (DHAVAN 2003 CITED IN NAIR 2007: 1,3, 5-7). For further details on the procedures of asylum applications by UNHCR on the status Indian see SENI 2003. *** U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals, Fauziya KASINGA, Applicator File A73 476 695 - Decided June 13, 1996 Interim Decision # 3278: (1) The practice of female genital mutilation, which results in permanent disfiguration and poses the risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications, CAN BE the basis for a claim of persecution. (2) Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice have been recognized as members of a “particular social group”. Within the definition of the term “refugee” under section 101 (a) (42) (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1994) (US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1996). *** France-Council of State granted asylum to Iraqi national who had participated in honour killing while still a minor holding that family pressure has lowered his freewill and his young age has made him especially vulnerable to pressure, the Conseil d’état [EC] [Council of State] April 7, 2010, Rec. Lebon 2010, IX-X, 319 840 (Fr.) (Decision is only available in French), accessed on 19.01.2016. More details see: SZABLESKA AND KARIM 2013: 195-205.

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Although they are similar in defining features and follow the same logic, it appears that some interpret these criteria in a broader sense so that a person can be considered a refugee or be given asylum in different ways depending on the host region or state. This follows as a result of the interpretation of the text of the Final Act of the Refugee Convention of 1951 mentioned above. The sensitivity of specific terms is underlined by the set of rules and regulations that are in many cases unable to capture the entire range of situations. Legal loopholes leave room for interpretations that are solved through the filter of their own values and principles. It is important to notice how far states and international bodies can reach in their restrictive or extended interpretation of certain provisions. This infers that any in extenso interpretation is based on the moral values of the interpreter. Some organizations and regional associations of states have taken steps to appropriate these regulations or even to apply and comply with its provisions, but are more extensive in terms of interpretation. In this regard, the Organization of United Africa, the current African Union adopted the Convention Governing the Specific 1969 Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa. It reiterates the definition of refugees and although the text lists discriminatory situations that can lead to refugee status, this list is much more extensive than that provided in the text of the 1951 Convention on Refugees.13 13 Resolution 26 and 104 of the OAU Assemblies of Heads of State and Government, calling upon Member States of the Organization who had not already done so to accede to the Refugee Convention of 1951 and to the Protocol of 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, and meanwhile to apply their provisions to refugees in Africa: for the purposes of this Convention, the term “refugee” shall mean every person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to political fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of political events, is unable or, owing to political fear, is unwilling to return to it. 2. the term “refugee” shall apply to every person who also, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another outside country of origin or nationality. 3. in the case of a person who has several nationalities, the term “the country of which he is the national auxiliary ‘shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of which he is a national if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national (OAU 1969). *** Following adoption by other international charters on human rights the African Charter on Human and People’s Right was adopted in 1981, which at Article 12 provided the right of a person to be granted

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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Refugee Protocol of 1967 are considered as being the OAU Convention’s foundation. In this respect, any gap that might arise in interpreting the text of the Convention should be supplemented by the terms mentioned or any other provisions of international regulations. It also has to be considered that it will be interpreted through the mechanisms for applying national constitutional texts, so the regimen of refugees under the OAU Convention enjoys a broad interpretation (MUJUZI 2012). It can be seen from the text that the OAU Convention has taken into account the right to free movement of persons displaced, offering a broad interpretation of the provisions of the Refugee Convention of 1951. Organization of American States signed, on 22 November 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights (OAS 1969). This Convention resumes the constitutional and fundamental rights of the citizens of signatory states to enjoy refuge in case their life and integrity is jeopardized in their countries, or where they reside.14 However, unlike other similar statements, subsequent to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention and its Optional Protocol of 1967 relating to refugees, provides a new, unique definition or criteria for interpretation and application asylum in accordance with regulations of national and international laws (OAU 1981). 14 American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Organization of American States: Article 22. Freedom of Movement and Residence (...) 7. Every person has the right to seek asylum and in the foreign be granted territory in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political offense crimes related. In no case he is to be returned to the country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if the right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions. *** note in this case that the American States signed the American Declaration of the rights and duties of Man, in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948 a few months before the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This considers enunciating fundamental rights enjoyed by citizens of the signatory states, which makes reference to the right of residence and home of every person in the country of origin: Article VIII. Every person has the right to fix his residence within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to move within the territory freely, and not to leave it except by his own will. The Declaration then refers to asylum, which can be requested by any person as long as it is not subject to common crimes but also by national laws or international regulations: Article XXVII. Every person has the right, in case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the Laws of each country and with international Agreements (IACHR 1948). For more details on the rights of refugees under US regulations see: SHELTON 2008: 68, 71, 76 (about the legitimacy regulations adopted under the American Convention on human rights) and SHELTON 2008: 350-380 (complying with the rules proposed by the states); (LEBLANC 1977: 13-25).

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of international regulations on refugees and asylum seekers. Some regional regulations have been made as more extensive forms of recommendations15, to uphold and enforce the provisions of the 1951 Convention and its Optional Protocol of 1967. Like other organizations that have adopted regulations on the status of refugees and the possibility of submitting an application for asylum, in the Arab and Islamic states, based on religious law, similar provisions are considered. However, unlike those mentioned above, in many instances the Arab and Islamic states chose not to ratify or not to apply the provisions adopted at the Arab League or the Organization of the Islamic Conference in this regard.16 For example, Article 12 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam the following is established: “Every man shall have the right, within the framework of the Shari’ah, to free movement and to select his place of residence whether within or outside his country and if persecuted, is entitled to seek asylum in another country. The country of refuge shall be obliged to provide protection to the asylum-seeker until his safety has been attained, unless asylum is motivated by committing an act regarded by the Shari’ah as a crime” (OIC 1990). 15 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, held at Cartagena, Colombia from 19-22 November 1984. This statement supports existing international provisions but is also offering a definition of a broader concept of refugee: persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. Without being a treaty, the provisions of this statement are included in the national law of some countries in Latin America. Unlike the definitions found in the Convention, the African Declaration of Cartagena has considered several criteria such as the threat of generalized violence; internal aggression; and massive violation of human rights. Unlike the definition in the refugee convention by the African Union, however, the refugee must show a link between herself or himself and the real risk of harm; Applicants must all demonstrate that “their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened.” This demand is similar to the UN Refugee Convention, which requires that THE individual’s risk of persecution needs to be proved at the level of a particular individual rather than in general. (OAS CARTAGENA 1984). 16

Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights (ISLAMIC COUNCIL 1981); Cairo Declaration on

Human Rights in Islam (OIC 1990); Cairo Declaration on Protection on Refugees and Displaced People (ARABIC-ISLAMIC STATES 1992) Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries (LAS 1994) (not ratified, but amended LAS 1994 (art. 28); Resolution on the Problem on Refugees in the Muslim World in 2003.

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It can be seen that it reiterates the right of free movement of refugees and implies an obligation of states to respect this right in accordance with religious principles. Meanwhile, Article 28 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights says: “Everyone shall have the right to seek political asylum in other countries to escape persecution. This right shall not be enjoyed by persons facing prosecution for an offense under ordinary criminal law. Political refugees shall not be extraditable” (LAS 1994). It may be noted that the tools provided in this regard are not as comprehensive as those of other regional organizations, and even if they fall within the limits of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention on Refugees and its Optional Protocol of 1967 relating to refugees, these texts are missing not only flexibility, but also applicability. For example, the Arab Charter proposed in 1994 was “primitive” and the model proposed in 2004 also has major shortcomings given that the two acts are not significantly different (SHELTON AND CAROZZA 2013). Many Middle Eastern states have chosen to ratify only part of these texts; others chose to give them a constitutional character (Lebanon). But when it comes to applying tools and regulations, many Middle Eastern states are referring only to UNHCR, because many Muslim states express reservations when it comes to the adoption and application of the Convention and Protocol. Middle Eastern states have the tendency to rely on their national legislation on immigrants. Over time, the manner in which they managed Palestinian refugees could be observed. Although refugees were not refused based on religious values, the concept of refugee in Muslim law has, in some cases, stigmatizing connotations (STEVENS 2014).17 A concrete example is that of Iraqis who, during the wars in 1991 and 2003, were considered as “guests” in Jordan, a clear distinction between them and the Palestinians being made. They preferred terms such as muhajrin (emigrants), manfyin (the forgotten) or mughtarabin (the exiles) and certainly 17 To see the retained attitude that the Syrian government have for humanitarian aid coming from international bodies, especially the United Nations.

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not refugees. Therefore, in the case of Syrians arriving in Muslim states, they are seen as temporary visitors, until the national conflict is resolved, and certainly not as refugees, which for some would mean a humiliating status. In the absence of national provisions of employment of those persons, they are not considered or treated as refugees and the international applicability of the provisions is often cumbersome (STEVENS 2014). The reservations the Muslim states have are related to internal opposition on the integration of refugees, the resources used and how they can be integrated, misconceptions about economic and social hardship, national security and the obligations that could be generated by signing and ratifying the Convention and the Protocol. On the other hand, according to Islamic law, not only the state has the obligation to worry about such people, but also each individual, thus providing a broader spectrum than asylum granted by the Convention, Protocol or any other international provision in this regard (STEVENS 2014). In the Middle East, most often, the applicability of international regulations on refugees is optional or partial, because such responsibilities are assumed from a religious perspective, more by the citizens than by states. Even if this obligation is religious and universal, it does not indicate an application of refugee status as provided in the specific regulations. Most of the times there is no strategy or interest at the state level, beside learning and applying religious values. Therefore, mechanisms of international regulations can be hampered by lack of effective involvement of state institutions which often leave these procedures only to international bodies. In the African states and the Middle East a peculiar type of refugee is found, the economic refugee. Unlike economic migrants looking to relocate in order to have a better life, economic refugees would be compelled to seek asylum because economic conditions in the country of origin and living standards make it impossible to respect the fundamental rights (WESTRA 2015). In the context in which host states make programs designed to determine the refugees to return to their home states and there is a restriction

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of the right of free movement, they are a nuisance for both parties (HOVIL AND OKELLO 2008). In internal affairs, it can be seen in regulations and instruments adopted in the European Union or European Communities. The EU Dublin Convention of 1990 represented one of the first notable steps. It took into account the obligations and rights that the Member States have on refugee and asylum claims. Through its responsibilities, a Member State shall examine and resolve requests for asylum filed on its territory or assist other Member States.18 The Dublin Convention has been often criticised because it does not consider the rights of refugees very seriously, other than those rights provided for in the Geneva Convention, lacking major influence and reflecting in particular the fear of Member States regarding migration and a stronghold attitude of the European Union (BOSWELL AND GEDDES 2011). The Dublin Convention has been replaced in part by Council Regulations on responsibility of Member States to examine requests from citizens coming from third countries, known as the Dublin II Regulations. Both instruments provide that a Member State must consider asylum requests from the European Community or the European Union or those submitted to its borders. In addition, it has an external responsibility to examine applications for asylum in third countries establishing the concepts of first country of asylum or safe country of origin (DA LOMBA 2004: 115-21). The Maastricht Treaty considers the issue of asylum as being of common interest for Member States (the third pillar) and led to the establishing of procedures on Asylum (1992), defining the safety conditions according to which refugees can be repatriated, the minimum guarantees for asylum procedures (1995), burden sharing in terms of temporary protection (1995), but mostly uniform interpretation of “refugee” (1996). Even if certain mechanisms and instruments adopted in the European Communities were considered, asylum policy was characterized more by a lack of a judicial control mecha18 Dublin Convention of 1990 defines the term ‘alien’ as any person who is not a citizen of any Member State who applies for asylum under the Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol (EU 1997).

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nism. Former Article K 3 (2)c of the EU Treaty regulated this control as an exception. Control from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is done on the basis of certain agreements concluded between Member States, the provisions of which they expressly commit to. Without any pressure of judicial review by the European Court of Justice on the fundamental rights of citizens of states outside the Community, obligations of States could be subjected to the control of the European Court of Human Rights or the national courts (DA LOMBA 2004). With a democratic deficit in the third pillar, the European Court of Justice could not ensure a common interpretation and proper application of the stipulations on refugees and asylum seekers. The Amsterdam Treaty moves asylum policy in the first pillar and establishes in Article 63 a period of 5 years for adoption by the institutions of the Community of policies on standards of asylum, the recognition of asylum, procedures of the Dublin II Convention and standards for temporary protection. Even so, some countries (Ireland, Britain and Denmark) have reserved the right of option in the application of Community rules on asylum, but have adopted separate protocols. Regulations that impose many restrictions on asylum policy are characteristic of the European Communities and subsequently the European Union.19 Many of the measures proposed and taken into consideration are too technical regarding necessary travel documents, visas, temporary limits of acceptance, conditions of stay, penalties on refugee carriers (etc.) due to considerations for border control and ignoring the needs and specific circumstances of the refugees in favour of migration control policies (DA LOMBA 2004: 95-111). The provisions of the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its Refugee Protocol of 1967 represent the general framework through which many regional organizations have adopted their own measures on the protection of refugees. Gaps left intentionally were opportune because it allows each entity 19 See Joint Position 1996 in which refugee status is granted to individuals who suffered from persecution in countries of origin from some non-state actors taking into account in the granting of asylum or refugee status how the person concerned may benefit from the protection of home state, and only if it could consider lacked specific procedures (EU 1996).

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to adopt provisions according to its needs. Interpretations can be adapted to historical conditions and cultures of each region or state. Although it would be desirable for these to be extended in most cases with much broader stipulations (for many more rights of refugees and asylum seekers) there are cases (such as the European Union for example) in which there is a reluctance to give wide interpretation to these regulations. Indeed, norms of international law are scarce, but this should not be regarded as a mistake or an error, but rather an opportunity to achieve interpretations depending on the moral character of the entity that wishes to apply them. The general purpose and values are not always necessarily universal; morality however has a binding universality. Its specificities are not for strict interpretation but highlight the interactions between individuals and states, in a complex set of connections and relationships regarding supporting, promoting and respecting universal morality.

Morality v. Interculturalism in the issue of refugees When it comes to the application and enforcement of legislation on refugees and asylum seekers, there are certain reservations of states, especially Western states, based on social issues that might be brought on by the acceptance of refugees. In this sense, morality of states’ action on refugee protection should not be dependent on the complexity of intercultural issues. Morality of these attitudes is related but not dependent on the complexity of intercultural problems caused by the clash of interests of their citizens with some covenants and obligations that a state may assume internationally or regionally (REED 2007). To confirm or deny these hypotheses two major interpretations have developed in the literature, which try to explain to some extent the attitude of state: the partialist and impartialist theories. They try to explain how states react to provisions on refugees and asylum seekers, depending on how they interpret sovereignty in relation to them.

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According to the partialist theory, sovereignty is seen as a “guarantee of the survival and prosperity of a large and varied number of national communities that share common tasks and identities. Attempt to override sovereignty, image of a political community, only to distribute other foreign members may be unethical because it ignores the importance of moral culture and cause a political danger by some special measures taken for particular identities, which may have an undemocratic character”(GIBNEY 2004). Whatever the mandatory provisions of law on refugees and asylum seekers are, the partialist theory places state sovereignty in the centre of this debate. The theory sustains that the national interest represented by the cultural identity of citizens has superior status to that of refugees. The exclusive right of states to decide on the policy on refugees and asylum seekers is based on people’s and nations’ moral pretensions to self-determination and promoting their cultural and historical identity (GIBNEY 2004: 24). No matter how veracious the partialist theory may seem, it ignores not only international provisions, but it can be criticized for the use of concepts omitting the complexity of international relations. This theory is based on the right and interest of the state’s citizens to enjoy “isolation” from any kind of external factors. Or, in this case, it ignores not only the provisions on the right of refugees and asylum seekers, but also the realities of an international system characterized by phenomena such as globalization and transnational relations. It is true that refugee groups can give rise to feelings of xenophobia and nationalism, but these fail to explain the difficulties in motivating moral demands of a state’s citizens to reject groups of refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, even groups of refugees may be considered appropriate and desired by the state’s citizens for economic and even social reasons. There are states which refuse the refugee quota citing the national interest but if such compliance involves isolating the State externally, it can have negative consequences. Norm acts as mediator between the national interest and moral theory (PLAUT 1995: 140) and the impartialist theory on asylum highlights the com-

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plex interplay between national interests, international norms and morality, which is able to determine states to ensure the rights of its citizens along with those of refugees (REED 2007: 159). Respecting the rights of every person, even of a refugee, by a cosmopolitan State confirms the legitimacy it has to protect its citizens. If these distinctions are the subject of some debate in liberal democratic societies, the discrepancy between what they promote and what the facts are should be mentioned. Interpretation of international provisions can differ depending on the states or associations of states determined by moral values or ​​ religious beliefs or other historical and geographical considerations developed in the course of history. One interpretation would be that the State’s moral obligation regarding its own citizens is achieved through cultural interpretation, so that this obligation would be incompatible with the universal responsibility to provide protection. Thus, sovereignty remains the power to exclude any security imbalance brought on by groups of anonymous people with uncertain intentions, so as asylum policy is performed according to the electoral interests (REED 2007: 30). Legal regulations are most often too technical and rigorous in interpretation and application and may be subject to reservations or criticisms. In defining and promoting their own policies (economic, social, political internal / external), states or regional organizations may use legal fireworks designed to restrict application of the provisions. But the state is the best example of moral unity based on territoriality, culture, religion, association, language or history and has a functional responsibility to ensure security and basic needs of its citizens (GIBNEY 2004: 26). Depending on moral values existing in that State, regulations concerning the protection of refugees may be extensive or restrictive.

Concluding Remarks Within the European Community and later the European Union, a problem regarding refugees was the assumption by Member States linked to an

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equal distribution of responsibilities concerning refugees. Anchored in a fear of migration and border control, it has been found that the European legislation precisely establishes the obligations of Member States as rights to protect themselves from possible “invasion”. The distinction between policy on migration and refugees was often elusive and the limits imposed on the free movement resulted in refugees resorting to illegal methods of entry into the European Union. This certainly undermines the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, but also creates problems in the European Union and the Member States. Surprised by the wave of refugees during the wars in former Yugoslavia, the European Community has failed many times in mediation and crisis management so that countries like Germany have come to assume most obligations in the absence of effective cooperation between Member States (KOSER 2000). However, the experience of refugees in the Balkans has proved that the EU and Member States must overcome the rigors and limits of the Geneva Convention by establishing a system of “temporary protection” which means an awareness of the humanitarian obligations of Member States, re-evaluating the principle of international responsibility and voluntary repatriation oriented solutions (KOSER 2000). In the absence of national commitments, international moral norms only ensure that its rights are safeguarded in this context. The general character of the rules stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Refugees should be supplemented by rules based on characteristics posed by each entity. Incidentally, this was the purpose of the regulations: to be adjusted with specific traits and beliefs from different cultural areas. I believe that states or associations of states that have expanded the applicability and interpretation of the general stipulations should not be charged or punished because they have chosen to do so. The debates on the impact that “cultural clash” may have on cultural identity may be restricted by accepting refugees with similar identities and shared values. The criticism that can be made is that it can lead to a cultural responsibility of states for certain categories of persons whose refuge was

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driven by the national interests of other states. The implications in this sense are sensitive, however regarding international policy, each state or regional organization must assume responsibility for the effects produced by their own actions. The regime for refugees in African countries and those in the Middle East is much more extensive but inapplicable. Even if there are different cultural identities, many of them are linked to European colonization. Given that many of these states are ruled by authoritarian regimes or some who do not share the same democratic values, the rights of refugees and asylum seekers are respected only if the law is implemented. However, it was found in international practice that less developed countries granted asylum faster and for longer periods of time, compared to those who have a strong economy. Most often, the latter have a strict policy on immigrants based on fear of “cultural invasion” that would destabilize the state, both economically and socially. Moreover, they tend to prioritize national interests, so they are reluctant to accept refugees for fear of publicly condemning their country of origin and thus inhibiting diplomatic ties. Unfortunately, the number of refugees increases and the number of countries willing to accept refugees decreases (PLAUT 1995: 139-140). Regional bodies which have developed their own mechanisms on granting asylum may simplify the procedures for granting such a status and especially can better manage the flow of refugees. Common values of the associations of states make relocation of the refugees easier, due to their shared values. Many of the problems related to refugees can be tackled through mechanisms and instruments developed at regional level. In this regard, asylum granted exclusively in developed nations is not always the right solution, because this discrimination towards refugees can continue. Most often, placing and relocating refugees to communities, countries that have the same values, norms and beliefs as them, can be the best solution.

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Part II

How Securitization Works

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Ways of Securitizing Migration in the European Union as a Result of the 2015 Refugee Crisis: Typology of Actors, Discourses and Effects PRISCILLA OLTEAN

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he refugee crisis has triggered a broad process of re-securitization of migration in the European Union, the waves of immigrants transferring the migration issue from the usual policy agenda to the panic policy agenda. The refugee and immigrant issue is part of a wider debate regarding the securitization of migration, debate involving particularly Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (1993). The securitization theory, proposed by the Copenhagen School and presented in a detailed manner in Security, a new framework for analysis (Buzan et al., 1998), focuses especially on establishing the agenda, on the actors and the referent objects, presenting the securitized issue not only as an absolute priority, but also as an existential threat. However, the Copenhagen School does not sufficiently conceptualize the securitization ways, nor the types of discourses or the different effects they have on the public and, implicitly, on the establishment of the crisis management agenda. The School of Critical Studies (SCS) completes the debate, especially by analysing the role of the speech act in the securitization process. Both the SCS and the Copenhagen School present securitization as a subjective social construct, but the first one focuses more on the exploration and analysis of the security discourses and emphasizes not the establishment of the agenda, but the institutionalization of governmental technologies (HUYSMANS 2004). Jef Huysmans (2006), in The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, presents securitization as a complex process, a matter of “political and normative practice” (COSKUN 2008: 208) through which the speech acts are connected with the bureaucratic processes (HUYSMANS 2006). In this manner Huysmans

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transfers the focus from constructing the agenda, from the actors and the issue, to the political technologies and the way the communities should act regarding a securitized issue. Didier Bigo (2002), Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002) and Thierry Balzacq (2005) have also participated in the debate, pointing out in countless papers the importance of security discourses and the effects that they have upon the audience and upon the elaboration of the agenda of crisis management. This chapter aims to explore the securitization of migration in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, using as main analysis tool the securitization model proposed by the Copenhagen School. Trying to establish whether and how the securitization of migration occurred in the European Union, this chapter argues that the process was conducted due to the use of two different types of discourses by the securitizing actors: one type of discourse that presents the migration as an absolute priority and one type of discourse that presents the same issue as an existential threat. The speech acts were sustained by actors who perceive differently the refugee crisis, and the two distinct types of discourses have produced, at the civil society level, two different ways of perceiving migration – the public maintained and continued the rift occurred at the political leadership level and positioned itself either on the side of those who see migration as a supreme priority, or on the side of those who see it as an existential threat. Consequently, the two types of leaders, discourses and opinions of the European audience have led to the enactment and implementation of two different types of exceptional measures, the establishment of the agenda and institutional technologies being carried out according to the perception and discourses of the securitizing actors. So, proving – on the basis of the model proposed by the Copenhagen School – that migration was securitized in the EU in the context of the refugee crisis, this article is proposing a conceptualization of two distinct ways to achieve securitization: (1) by presenting an issue as an absolute priority and (2) by presenting the same issue as an existential threat. The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first one presents the theoretical framework on which the study is based, analysing the securitization theory proposed by the Copenhagen School, with special focus on its essential

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elements: the actors and the security discourses, the audience and the exceptional measures that are used in order to face the problem. The second section concerns the securitization of migration in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis and it presents the stages and the distinct ways of achieving this process, while in the third section the hypothesis that migration was securitized in the context of the refugee crisis in two distinct manners will be widely discussed and analysed. The final part reiterates the fact that migration went through a new process of securitization once the refugee crisis was triggered and it proposes an overview of the two distinct ways in which this process was conducted.

The securitization theory proposed by the Copenhagen School The Copenhagen School provides a constructivist approach of security analysis, stating that there are no actual security problems, but only situations in which certain issues are perceived, built and promoted as threats or as security problems by certain actors. This process of building and promoting an issue as an existential threat is conducted through the speech act (WÆVER 1995: 55), but we can assume there is a successful securitization of an issue only when there is a significant audience that accepts and perceives the given issue as being, indeed, a security problem. It is imperative from the very beginning to make a clear distinction between securitization and politicization, the first one being understood as an extreme version of the second (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 23-24). “Any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)”. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, securitization can be defined as being a dramatization of “existential issues in politics to lift them above

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politics” (1998: 26). As a result, through securitization, a phenomenon is understood as a threat of great importance for a certain referent object and, consequently, all means available can be employed in order to reduce or combat that threat. The referent object, the one targeted by the existential threat, “is that which you can point to and say: ‘it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to…” (BUZAN AND WÆVER 2009: 225). Each sector has its own referent objects: for example, in the societal sector, the referent object would be represented by a nation’s identity, language, religion or culture, and in the political sector, by the state’s sovereignty, by the authority and legitimacy of the regime, or by the political ideology. According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is a subjective social construct, often determined by the existence of a perceived threat and not quite by the existence of a real one: “the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 24). If the traditional (objective) approach to security points that the threats are concrete, measurable and immediate, in the contemporary approach, these are considered subjective, built through political discourses and dramatization (CAMPBELL 1998: 1-2). A certain phenomenon can represent a threat or something essentially important to a given society, and at the same time, for another one, it can be innocuous and insignificant. Buzan (1998) recalled in this regard that religion, for instance, has been securitized in some states such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, while other countries (France or USA) give little importance to religious aspects. Also, culture has been securitized in the former USSR, and at the same time, in countries such as Great Britain or Holland, it was quite insignificant: “What may seem a legitimate securitization within a given political community may appear paranoid to those outside it (e.g., Western perceptions of Soviet concerns about pop music and jeans). Conversely, outsiders may perceive that a political community undersecuritizes a “real” threat and thus endangers itself ”. (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 30)

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Based on the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization, we realized the following diagram showing the stages of the securitization process.

Figure 1. Stages of the securitization process.

One can observe the following phases: (1) the securitizing actors notice the existence of a major problem; (2) the actors, through security discourses, present that problem to the audience as an absolute priority or as an existential threat; (3) the audience accepts the problem as such and therefore puts pressure on the political leaders to adopt an agenda for crisis management; (4) the political leaders immediately adopt and implement a series of exceptional measures to face the identified security problem (fig. 1).

Securitizing actors Securitization actors or agents are the ones who identify the issue, perceive it as a supreme priority or existential threat and realize the speech acts, through which they present the issue to the public. Briefly, “the securitizing actor is someone (…) who performs the security speech act” (Buzan at al., 1998: 40). Most frequently, securitizing actors are represented by state or religious leaders, individuals with important political functions, by interest groups or national governments. The actors will not speak for themselves, they won’t refer to their own survival, but “their argument will normally be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization or some other larger community, principle or system” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 40). Actors are nothing but people “placed in positions of power by virtue of be-

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ing generally accepted voices of the security discourse, by having the power to define security” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 31). Considering the fact that the speakers, those supporting the speech act, do not represent themselves but certain collectivities, a securitizing actor can be considered not only the individual who sustains the speech act, but the collectivity itself represented by that individual (for example Hungary, represented by Orbán, not Orbán himself; Germany represented by Merkel, and not Merkel herself ). Therefore, the nation and the state can be also considered securitizing actors, through their representatives: “someone – some group, movement, party, or elite – acts with reference to the nation and claims to speak or act on behalf of the nation” (BUZAN AT AL. 1998: 41). The same happens in the case of the state: for instance, if the head of a government presents an opinion, he presents it according to that state’s interests. The government, respectively the head of the government who gives the speech, is not representing itself, but represents the state as a whole – “the government is the state in this respect” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 41). Although the success of the securitization process is strongly influenced by the speaker’s position, “no one is guaranteed the ability to make people accept a claim for necessary security action” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 31). There were cases in which even governments have failed to realize securitization, not being able to convince the audience to accept a certain issue as a security problem (for example Great Britain in the Suez Crisis or the USA in the Vietnam War).

Security discourse Through the speech act, securitizing actors present a certain issue as an absolute priority or existential threat, thus trying to convince the public of the necessity of using exceptional means to face it (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 26): “In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means”. The security discourse shows the referent object and indicates exactly how it is threatened. However, holding

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the security discourse is not enough to create securitization, this being just a securitizing move (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 31). The securitization process succeeds and is fully completed only when the audience accepts the approach presented by the securitizing actors. The success of the speech act depends, on the one hand, on domestic, linguistic and grammatical issues, and on the other hand, on external, contextual and social aspects – the need to have a position that allows making a security speech (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 32). In building a security discourse it is essential “to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes the existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out (…) plus the particular dialectics of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector, and so on” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 33).

The audience Barry Buzan (1998: 31) argues that “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value?” Securitization takes place, as it was mentioned before, only when the actor presents – through the security discourse – the issue as an existential threat or supreme priority, and the audience accepts this approach. “A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitization move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (BUZAN ET AL., 1998: 25). In order to convince the public to accept the arguments in favour of securitization, an essential aspect is represented by the relationship between the speaker and the public, but the emitter’s function or position of power as well as the quality of the security discourse are also important for a successful securitization. If there is no significant audience to accept the approach

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presented by the securitizing agents, one can only note the existence of securitization attempts, and not of securitization itself.

Exceptional measures Securitizing actors present, through the security discourses, a certain issue as a supreme priority or existential threat just in order to convince the public of the need to adopt exceptional measures, or in order to legitimize and justify the override of normal politics’ rules, which otherwise would be mandatory. This way, through the security speech act, by amplification and dramatization of an issue and by presenting it as an existential threat, the securitizing actor claims the right of using extraordinary means and of breaking the rules of ordinary politics in order to tackle the problem and cope with the crisis (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 26). In conclusion, the Copenhagen School claims there are no security problems unless they are built, created through securitizing moves, during which the actors exaggerate and dramatize a particular matter, referring to it as an existential threat addressed to a referent object and therefore claiming the right to use any means in order to manage the situation and ensure the survival of the threatened referent object. Securitization is seen and understood as a subjective social construct, thus being noticed a significant difference between the classical, traditional, objective approach to security and the contemporary, constructivist and subjective one (IOV 2013: 47). The essential, the sine-qua-non elements of a successful securitization process are (1) the securitizing actors, those who conduct (2) security discourses, through which a certain issue is presented as an existential threat, (3) the audience who accepts the issue as such and (4) the exceptional means used for dealing with the perceived threat. Although complex, the securitization theory proposed by the Copenhagen School does not emphasize – in the discussion about actors, discourse, audience or measures – the difference between the creation of security problems by presenting them (1) as existential threats and (2) as emergencies or supreme priorities.

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“Something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority. This is the reason we link the issue to what might seem a fairly demanding criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 24). The theory of the Copenhagen School combines the two approaches to the security issue, alternatively defining securitization as being determined by the presentation of that given issue as an absolute priority, and as an existential threat, but not conceptualizing enough the differences between the two perspectives. The securitization of migration in the European Union in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis Migration has been and is still considered – especially in the present context of the refugee crisis – a security problem. Making a brief historical retrospect, it can be easily noticed that migration has been often seen as such by the Europeans. In the interwar period and during the Cold War, migration was perceived as a security threat from the perspective that the foreigners who entered the country could have had hidden ambitions, identities or interests, likely to endanger the national security, but it was difficult to make a clear distinction between the genuine refugees and those who were seeking asylum for conducting covert operations (IOV 2013: 142). Unlike the Cold War period, when migration was considered a security issue from a political, military and intelligence services’ point of view, nowadays migration is seen more as a problem in terms of societal security, being perceived as a threat to the national identity, culture, religion, language and values of the indigenous societies. However, amid the significant growth of asymmetric threats, amid the recent consolidation of strong terrorist networks and in the light of the recent attacks in Paris, the political and military aspects, together with the intelligence services’ ones continue to represent essential elements in the process of securitization of migration in the European Union.

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Typology of actors and security discourses The political leaders from national and European levels or the leaders of certain movements, organizations and institutions become securitizing actors when they identify and present to the public, through a security speech act, a particular issue as an absolute priority or as an existential threat – “actors who securitize do not necessarily say ‘security’, nor does their use of the term ‘security’ necessarily always constitute a security act” (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 33). In the context of the refugee crisis, there are two categories of securitizing actors: (1) those who securitize migration by presenting it as a supreme priority and (2) those who securitize migration by presenting it as an existential threat. The securitization carried out by the actors from the first category involves the perception and presentation of the issue as being an urgent one, which has absolute priority over others and which, accordingly, allows the violation of normal politics’ rules (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 33). The statements of German Chancellor Angela Merkel regarding the waves of immigrants are relevant in this respect. The Chancellor claims that managing the refugee crisis is a supreme priority for the European community: it is not only more important than the Greek debt crisis (Freeman, 2015), but it is vital for the security of the Schengen Area and of the European Union as a whole, having thus priority over all the other issues. The same opinion is shared by other European leaders, such as Martin Schulz, Donald Tusk or JeanClaude Juncker: Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament: “Europe is facing an epochal challenge with migration flows unseen since the Second World War as more and more people are fleeing from the brutal war in Syria. (…) Our priority must be to stop the bloodshed forcing people to flee from their homes. (…) If we fail to address migration on any of these fronts, if we let ourselves be distracted by those who spread fear, then we also fail to uphold the idea of a united Europe based on common values and solidarity”. (SCHULZ 2015)

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Joe Kaeser, President & CEO of German engineering giant Siemens “I think currently the single biggest issue Europe has is not so much about inflow of investment...What we have today is a massive inflow of refugees. If Europe masters the refugee challenge, they will also master their economic destiny going forward”. (SOONG AND CHANDRAN 2015).

Donald Tusk, President of the European Council “Today everything is immigration. We live in sobering, shocking times. There is a divide between the east and the west of the EU”. (TUSK 2015).

Dimitris Avramopoulos, European Commissioner on Migration “We are at a crossroads in 2016. The decisions and actions we take together will define the future of our Union – because it is precisely what defines us as a Union that is at stake”. (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016).

Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission “The first priority today is and must be addressing the refugee crisis. (…) The numbers are impressive. For some they are frightening. But now is not the time to take fright. It is time for bold, determined and concerted action by the European Union, by its institutions and by all its Member States. This is first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity. And for Europe it is also a matter of historical fairness. (…) So it is high time to act to manage the refugee crisis. There is no alternative to this” (JUNCKER 2015).

Angela Merkel, German Chancellor “For only together will Europe succeed in mitigating the root causes of flight and displacement worldwide. Only together will we succeed in effectively com-

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bating criminal human trafficking rings. Only together will we succeed in better protecting the external borders of the European Union. (…) It is only together that we will succeed in tackling the huge job of integrating so many refugees. (…) Let us work together on this!” (MERKEL 2015). The verbs and phrases which stress the need to take concrete measures (“it is high time to act”, “It is time for bold, determined and concerted action”), the adjectives that describe the situation as a crisis (“epochal challenge”, “sobering, shocking times”), the reference to the management of migration as a priority (“the single biggest issue Europe has…”, “Today everything is immigration”, ”The first priority today is…”), the emphasis on the need to act together (“it is only together that we will succeed”, “Let us work together on this”) and conditioning the future of the European Union to the management of the refugee crisis (“If we fail to address migration… then we also fail to uphold the idea of a united Europe”, “If Europe masters the refugee challenge, they will also master their economic destiny”, “the actions we take together will define the future of our Union”) reveal the perception and presentation – by these securitizing actors – of migration as an absolute priority, which requires urgent actions and a swift management of the crisis, otherwise there is the possibility that the situation will worsen and the European unity, values and even the European Union as a whole will be exposed to real threats. On the other hand, in contrast with the first category of actors, who refer to migration as an issue that has absolute priority, there is a second category of actors, who present the same issue as an existential threat. The statements and discourses that animate fear and panic, and those with strong anti-Islamic, racist and xenophobic connotations have become more and more frequent, increasing proportionally with the number of refugees who arrived in the Member States. The leader of the German movement Pegida has made numerous appeals to strengthen the collaboration between the European anti-Islamic parties and organizations, stating during a protest in the Czech Republic that “It is more important than anything else that the patriots in Europe connect and cooperate to fight this menace” (GOLDMAN 2015). Statements which main-

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tain and amplify the anxiety of the citizens are coming especially from the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and German leaders. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, citing statistics that reveal the increasing number of refugees, declared that: “There will be no let up; we should expect escalating pressure. If these tendencies remain relevant, we should expect the very opposite of a winter break, and should prepare instead for an increasing flood of people” (ORBÁN 2015). On another occasion, Viktor Orbán has stigmatized the action of the European leaders who opened their doors and offered help to refugees, saying that “Europe is being betrayed. It is being taken from us. (…) Everything which is now taking place before our eyes threatens to have explosive consequences for the whole of Europe” (ORBÁN 2015). In support to his anti-refugee arguments, Orbán has also brought up the Christian values and the identity of Europe, mentioning the deep cultural, religious and mentality differences of the European and Islamic societies: “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? […] There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders. (…) If Europe does not return to the path of common sense, it will find itself laid low in a battle for its fate” (ORBÁN 2015H). The Hungarian Prime Minister went even further and stated that “the factual point is that all the terrorists are basically migrants” (MORTIMER 2015). “Linking terror to migration, Orbán says the “number one job” after Paris is “to defend the borders and to control who is coming in”. NATO and EU countries are “at war” with Islamists in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and, he says, “it’s quite logical” that “enemies” would seek to send fighters with migrants coming into Europe” (KAMINSKI 2015). The President of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman, also adopted a harsh stance against refugees. He emphasized in his statements that the young Muslims should not emigrate to Europe, but should rather stay in Syria and Iraq to fight against the Islamic State, giving thus his firm opinion that

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Europe is facing not a mass migration of refugees, but an organized invasion: “I am profoundly convinced that we are facing an organized invasion and not a spontaneous movement of refugees” (KHAN 2015). Björn Höcke, the leader of the Party Alternative for Germany (AfD), stressed in his statements that “by the end of 2016 there will be as many Muslim males of military age in Germany (5.5 million), as there are young German men of that age” (Igler, 2015). The same politician also declared: “Let’s not forget, the Syrian who comes to us has still his Syria. The Afghan who comes to us has still his Afghanistan […] But if we lose our Germany, then we have no more home” (CHADWICK 2015). Matteo Salvini, member of the Northern League Italian party emphasized the sanitary threats to which the European citizens are exposed, affirming that “TB and scabies do not come from Finland. Unfortunately, with a backward health system in North Africa these people reported illnesses that we had defeated for years” (CHADWICK 2015). The Polish president Andrzej Duda also highlighted that the waves of refugees are likely contribute to epidemic outbreaks, which represent a real threat to Europe’s security. He reminded that “The security of citizens is the most important question – financial and physical security as much as health” (CHADWICK 2015). The anti-immigration attitudes of these leaders were reiterated after the adoption of mandatory quotas in the Justice and Home Affairs Council ( JHA) on the 22nd of September 2015. The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, disavowed the relocation system, declaring that: “As long as I am prime minister, mandatory quotas will not be implemented on Slovak territory” (RFI ROMANIA 2015). The Czech Republic was also dissatisfied with the decision of the JHA Council, intending to make an appeal against the implementation of mandatory quotas of refugees at the European Court of Justice (RFI ROMANIA 2015). Hungary has also declared itself strongly against the quotas, giving assurance that no asylum seeker will be received in Hungary anymore, regardless of the number set by the Commission or the pressures exercised from Brussels (FEHER 2015).

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In the above mentioned examples we have noticed two typologies of actors: (1) the ones who securitize migration by presenting it as an absolute priority and (2) the ones who securitize migration by presenting it as an existential threat. The first category claims that the refugee issue prevails over the other issues on the European agenda, imposing immediate crisis management actions, but the situation is not (yet) perceived as a threat. The actors from the first category insist upon the fact that there is a crisis situation, a delicate situation that, if not immediately solved, will (in a hypothetical future) represent a threat to the quintessence of the European system. The situation itself is not a threat, but it could become one, either if urgent measures are not taken, or if these fail (fig. 2). In their discourses, these securitizing actors show the absolute need of immediate action, in order to prevent an eventual degradation of the situation. This type of discourse is dominated by verbs of action, invitations to cooperation, appeals for rapid and efficient crisis management, as well as proposals of possible solutions. Below there is an illustration of the first way of securitizing an issue.

Figure 2. Securitization of an issue by presenting it as a priority.

The second category of securitizing actors presents the issue as an already existential threat, insisting upon the need to adopt drastic measures to combat it. In these actors’ discourses, the issue of refugees appears as a priority only because it is considered a real threat to the survival of the European values and identity, and even of the European system as a whole, which is why it is automatically justified to break the normal politics’ rules and to

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undertake exceptional measures – it is imperative to treat the problem with extraordinary means. These actors’ security discourses are dominated by the existence of anti-Islamic, racist and xenophobic elements, being designed in such a way as to maintain or even amplify the citizens’ anxiety and fear, as well as their attitude of intolerance towards the refugees. Due to the perception of immigrants as an existential threat, the actors belonging to the second category reject the European crisis management attempts, refusing to accept or integrate, under any circumstances, immigrants in the states they represent. In the following diagram, I have presented the process of this type of securitization.

Figure 3. Securitization of an issue by presenting it as an existential threat.

The debate on the securitization of migration firstly targets the societal sector, the main – but not the only – referent object being, in both cases of actors and discourses, the European identity. What is noteworthy is the fact that the two categories of actors perceive and relate to it in a different manner. The first category understands the European identity as representing the essential democratic values of the European Union, such as the respect towards the fundamental human rights, the freedom of movement (and, implicitly, the defence of the Schengen Area), together with the rule of (European and international) law. This is why the actors from the first category insist, on the one hand, to respect refugees’ rights, the legal provisions concerning asylum seekers, and to guarantee international protection to those who really need it and, on the other hand, they insist upon the defence of political and economic values and on taking up concrete measures to ensure both the security of the Schengen Area and that of the liberal politi-

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cal and economic system of the European Union and its Member States. The second category of securitizing actors perceives the European identity as being represented by the culture, mentality, religion and, implicitly, by the Christian, democratic values (gender equality, women’s rights and so on), therefore presenting Islam and, respectively, the waves of Islamic refugees as an existential threat both to the European Christian identity and to the political, economic and security standards of the European Union. German Chancellor Angela Merkel: “For Europe is a community of shared values, a community founded on shared rules and shared responsibility. In my opinion this means that we must be guided by the values we have enshrined in the European treaties: human dignity, the rule of law, tolerance, respect for minorities and solidarity. In my opinion it means that pan-European challenges are not to be solved by a few member states on their own, but by all of us together” (MERKEL 2015). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán: “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity” (ORBÁN 2015H). Despite the fact that certain leaders (Merkel, Tusk or Schulz) use an argument that stresses the urgency and primacy of managing the crisis and despite the fact that other leaders (Orbán, Fico or Zeman) present immigration as an existential threat to the European security, if the population does not perceive and accept the situation as a security problem – which requires the undertaking of urgent exceptional measures – we can only talk about the existence of securitizing moves and not about the securitization of migration per se. In order for the securitization process to occur, the securitizing actors’ discourses must be accepted by a significant audience.

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Accepting migration as a security problem As a result of the existence of two distinct categories of leaders, who have presented to the public two different types of discourses, the European audience has positioned itself either on the side of those seeking for solutions and managing the crisis in the most effective way, or on the side of those emphasizing the threat represented by the refugees and the need to reject them. In the first phase, the public opinion empathized with the refugees’ situation. Many people across Europe signed online petitions and voluntarily offered help in refugee hotspots, some providing financial or material support, while others sheltering the refugees in their own homes. Subsequently, due to the emergency situation that was triggered in some states, due to the political leaders’ statements and due to the fact that an increasing number of immigrants arrived at the European gates, a number of anti-Islamic and xenophobic demonstrations have begun. The public opinion was however sensitized by the image of the three-year-old Syrian child found dead on the shores of Turkey. Shortly after, the European audience was divided into pro- and anti- refugees, this reflecting nothing but the rift occurred at the political leadership level regarding the perception of immigration waves. In cities such as Berlin, Dresden, London, Belfast or Warsaw, there were manifestations in which pro-migrant banners – such as “Refugees welcome”, “No more deaths” (GIBSON 2015) or “Solidarity with refugees” (GANDER 2015) – were displayed simultaneously with protests against immigrants – the latter still being the most numerous. The fact that the citizens of the European Union have accepted migration as a special security issue completed the actors’ securitizing moves, all necessary conditions for the securitization process to take place being thus fulfilled. Perceiving migration as an absolute priority or existential threat to the European societies was emphasized through numerous actions, the citizens expressing themselves, most often, through the media (European, national or local press, blogs and websites), through social media networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) as well as through widespread protests and demonstrations.

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The extreme right parties (UKIP, the Northern League, Alternative for Germany) and the anti-Islamic groups in Europe (Pegida – Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, in Germany; Anti-Islamic Block, in the Czech Republic; Pediga, English Defense League, Britain First – in the UK (COHEN 2015) have organized a wide range of events condemning the open door policy supported by the European Union and, especially, by Germany. During one of the events organized in the Czech Republic by the Anti-Islamic Block, the citizens openly declared their support for president Zeman, agreeing on his attitude and efforts against accepting refugees. Citizens admitted they felt threatened by the newcomers, associating them with chaos, disorder and social tensions (EURACTIV 2015). In one of its studies, the Czech Academy of Sciences revealed that approximately 70% of the Czech population is against refugees, perceiving their arrival in Europe as a real security threat (EURACTIV 2015). In Poland, thousands of people have protested against refugees (EURONEWS 2015), wrote and chanted slogans such as “Today refugees, tomorrow terrorists!”, “Poland, free of Islam!”, “Stop the Islamization of Europe” (GANDER 2015). The same fears expressed by the European citizens – during the securitization of migration as a result of the dissolution of USSR – through slogans like “Migrants are taking our jobs!”, “Migrants empty the state’s wallet!”, “Warning! Islamic fundamentalists take control of the West!”, or “Migrant is a criminal!” (MILES AND THRÄNHARDT 1995: 59) are still used nowadays against the refugees: “No money, no jobs, no homes” (THE STREAM-AL JAZEERA 2015), “Islam will be the death of Europe”, “You’re not welcome here so go home” or “Send them back” (DAILY SABAH 2015). The public perception about refugees has changed significantly in Germany too. During an anti-immigrants protest in Dresden, a citizen stated: “Every Monday night we come to gather peacefully. (…) We just don’t want to become strangers in our own country” (SHUBERT 2015). To show that refugees are not welcome, some shelters prepared for them had been attacked and a gym in Dresden was even set on fire (TEFFER 2015). Large-scale protests against immigration were held in Berlin, where thousands of people demanded the resignation of the German Chancellor, chanting “Merkel must go” and “Traitor to the people” (CALDERWOOD 2015). Despite the criticism con-

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cerning the failure to respect the public opinion, the German Chancellor maintains the open door policy, stating that “If we start having to apologize for showing a friendly face in emergencies, then this is not my country” (THE ECONOMIST 2015B). These anti-refugee manifestations took place after a significant change of German public opinion: if in early September of 2015, the German citizens welcomed the refugees with smiles and applause, in October, the same year, the frequency of anti-immigrant protests have increased. According to a study made by the German Public Television, 51% of Germans are afraid of the refugee waves – perceive them as a threat – not knowing to what extent the newcomers can integrate within a secular, democratic society with a special responsibility towards Israel and the Jews (THE ECONOMIST 2015B). “What seems to be worrying a lot of people now is that people from different cultures are coming here, and they don’t know how they will integrate, and that’s quite a diffuse fear, and that’s now being exploited by some political forces” (MARTIN 2015).

Exceptional measures taken by the European Union Since the issue of refugees has been raised above the ordinary European politics and thus transferred on the panic policy agenda, the political leaders have resorted to the proposal and the adoption of extraordinary measures in order to cope with the crisis as effectively as possible. Although no state can face the challenge raised by migration alone, there is still no European policy in this area. And even if the European Agenda for Migration, presented in May 2015, underlined the real need to formulate a common position on asylum and migration, the progress in this respect has been relatively modest. The lack of concrete actions was the main reason why the European Union was taken by surprise by the waves of refugees arrived on the continent, being politically, economically, legally and institutionally unprepared to deal with such a situation. The current refugee crisis required urgent finding and implementation of means to manage the waves of immigrants, on a short term, and to coherently and effectively approach asylum and migration, on a medium and long term.

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On the 9th of September 2015, the European Commission proposed a set of concrete measures to deal with the crisis, measures which also included the urgent relocation of 120,000 refugees, the creation of a common list of safe countries, increasing the efficiency of the return policy, as well as the allocation of special funds to combat the causes of immigration, particularly from Africa and Syria (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016). One of the first measures taken by the European Union targeted a refugee relocation system based on compulsory quotas. On the 22nd of September 2015, during the JHA Council, the ministers of the EU Member States adopted the European Commission’s plan to relocate 120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy and Hungary (HOLEHOUSE 2015). The number of refugees to be received by each country was calculated according to an “algorithm that takes into account four factors in different proportions: 40% - the size of the state, 40% - GDP/inhabitant, 10% - unemployment rate and 10% - the number of asylum requests” (CINCEA 2015). Despite the fact that the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary opposed the compulsory quotas (Traynor, Kingsley, 2015), the system was adopted, each Member State having to receive, depending on the above mentioned criteria, a certain number of refugees. If a state does not accept the imposed quotas, it is liable for infringement and forced to pay a fine of 0.002% of the GDP (CINCEA 2015) to the European Union. At the proposal of the European People’s Party, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund was increased in order to ensure a sum of 6000 Euros/refugee to every country that decides receiving immigrants (TRAYNOR 2015). Another proposal of the European Commission (which in January 2016 was still under debate) aims to adopt a common European list of safe countries of origin (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016), given the fact that there are immigrants and refugees coming from countries that pose no particular security problems. It is unacceptable that states such as Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016) are considered unsafe countries and, implicitly, refugee countries of origin. For example, according to reports regarding the origin states of the refugees in Germany, Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia are ranked 2nd, 3rd and 4th, after Syria, meanwhile Macedonia is on

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the 7th place, after Iraq and Afghanistan (SCHUBERT 2015) – provided that Albania, Serbia and Macedonia are candidate states for accession to the European Union (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016). Table 1. Origin countries of refugees and migrants coming to Germany - as far October 2015 (SHUBERT, 2015).

No.

Origin country

Number of immigrants/refugees

1.

Syria

73,615

2.

Albania

45,125

3.

Kosovo

34,723

4.

Serbia

22,958

5.

Iraq

16,566

6.

Afghanistan

16,360

7.

Macedonia

11,691

The refugee crisis also determined the adoption of exceptional financial measures, among which the creation of a Trust Fund for Africa, at the proposals of the European Commission – worth approx. 2 billion Euros, and a Trust Fund for Syria – worth 500 million Euros (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016). Moreover, the Commission’s proposal to increase the EU budget for the remaining months of 2015 in order to cope with the refugee crisis was approved by the EU Council on the 8th of October 2015 and by the European Parliament on the 12th of October 2015 (EP-NEWS 2015). The budgetary rectification includes the allocation of: “€100 million for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) in commitment appropriations; €1.3 million in commitment and payment appropriations for 120 new posts at FRONTEX, EASO and Europol agencies; and €300 million in commitment appropriations for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) to contribute to the Madad Trust Fund” (EP-NEWS 2015). Also, due to the fact that the current refugee crisis revealed the existence of some significant breaches in the security system of the European Union’s external borders, on the 15th of December 2015, the European Commission

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voted a series of measures concerning the improvement of the EU’s external borders control, aiming to ensure security inside the Schengen Area and, actually, inside the whole European Union – these measures are to be proposed for adoption to the EU Council and to the European Parliament. One of the most important proposals of the Commission in this regard is the creation of a new borders control agency – European Border and Coast Guard (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016) – which will be complimentary to Frontex. The human resources of the new agency will be at least twice as numerous as those of Frontex, reaching approx. 1000 permanent employees until 2020. Another proposed solution to increase security in the Schengen Area was the introduction of a new provision in the Schengen Borders Code, to allow mandatory security checks at the external land, air and sea borders of the Union. The collected data are to be inserted into the existing European and national databases (Schengen Information System, The Interpol Stolen, Lost Travel Documents), in order to verify if the immigrants who arrive pose any security threat (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016). Table 2. Adopted/proposed measures in order to cope with the refugee crisis (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016).

Triple the capacities and assets for the Frontex joint operations Triton and Poseidon in 2015 and 2016 Additional € 60 million in EU emergency funding for frontline Member States

27 may 2015

EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling Relocation Scheme to relocate 40,000 people from Italy and Greece

Hotspot approach in Italy and Greece with deployment of Migration Management Support Teams

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€1.8 billion from EU budget for Trust Fund for Africa €500 million from EU budget for Trust Fund for Syria Relocation Scheme to relocate 120,000 people from Italy, Greece and other 9 September 2015

Member States directly affected An EU Action plan on return A permanent crisis relocation mechanism under the Dublin system A European list of safe countries of origin Full implementation of EU rules on asylum and migration

23 September 2015

Additional €800 million from Member States in humanitarian assistance for UNHCR, World Food Programme and other organisations Additional €100 million in EU emergency funding for frontline Member States

30 September 2015

€1.3 million to increase staff of EU Agencies Frontex, EASO, Europol Additional €200 million in EU humanitarian assistance for UNHCR, World Food Programme and other organisations

8 October 2015

Additional €17 million in EU aid for Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

24 November 2015

€4 billion in EU budget for 2016 to address the refugee crisis (European Commission, 2015)

15 December 2015

Establishing a European Border and Coast Guard Legal migration package including revision of Blue Card

March 2016

Further reform of the Dublin Regulation Proposal for a structured system on resettlement Updated strategy on human trafficking

Actions completed. Proposals adopted by the co-legislators but not yet implemented. Proposals adopted by the Commission but not yet adopted by the co-legislators. Work ongoing. The European measures and proposals for an efficient management of 2015 migration crisis were much more numerous and more complex than

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it has been previously outlined. The fact is that the European Union has resorted to exceptional means to cope with the challenge posed by refugees, which only shows that migration has indeed been securitized – it came out of the normal politics and became a particular security problem, being currently understood as an absolute priority or as an existential threat that must be combated by all available means. Also to be kept in mind that, in light of the new waves of refugees and given the recent attacks in Paris, the European Commission decided to accelerate the implementation of the measures mentioned in the European Agenda on Migration and in the European Agenda on Security (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016).

Exceptional measures taken by the EU Member States Among the measures taken at a national level, we can distinguish, on the one side, the drastic measures, such as building fences, using water cannons or tightening illegal immigration punishments, and on the other side, emergency measures, such as the temporary reintroduction of borders control in the Schengen Area or the suspension of rail traffic on certain routes. The drastic measures, characterized by a high degree of vehemence, harshness and even violence were taken by the leaders who perceived the waves of refugees as an existential threat (e.g., Hungary), while the emergency measures – targeting less the rejection of refugees and more the peaceful and quick management of the situation – were taken by leaders who considered that the arrival of immigrants was a priority, a crisis situation which requires immediate action (e.g., Germany and Austria). The case of Hungary is relevant for the first category of measures, this state adopting the most drastic actions for managing the situation. The Hungarian authorities resorted to the building of fences at the borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop the flow of refugees (MORRIS AND GRAY 2015), the borders being permanently under military supervision. There were also some violent clashes between the immigrants and the Hungarian authorities, the latter using tear gas and even water cannons to remove the refugees from the Hungarian borders. Moreover, the airspace at the border with Serbia was also closed on a 20 km strip, up to an altitude of 1350 m, to

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ensure the safe use of that space by the Hungarian ambulance, police and army services (PETO AND SZAKACS 2015). Legislative measures were also taken, aiming a significant toughening of punishments for illegal immigration, the new laws coming into effect on the 15th of September 2015. Many refugees were arrested and sentenced to deportation, despite the fact that the trail had shown they emigrated from conflict areas and were seeking asylum. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Helsinki Committee have expressed their concern regarding possible violations of refugees’ rights (THAN 2015). Other states affected by massive immigration waves (ex: Austria, Germany, Greece or Italy) have also taken special measures to cope with the crisis, but these measures distinguish themselves from the previous ones through the low degree of violence and through the intention of solving the situation rather than rejecting the refugees. The authorities in Austria and Germany also decided to use exceptional means such as the temporary reintroduction of borders control, according to the Schengen Agreement regulations for emergency situations. Also, after Austria has declared that it can no longer cope with the wave of refugees, the rail traffic to Germany was temporarily stopped and the German police have started to reinforce controls at border crossing points. Similar measures of increasing controls have been taken at Austria’s borders with the Czech Republic and Hungary, too (HARDING 2015). Greece and Italy were also forced to adopt new legislative acts to provide the opening of new hotspots, needed in order to ensure a more efficient screening process and registration of refugees (SMITH 2015).

Discussions The refugee crisis has triggered a complex process of re-securitization of migration within the European Union, this phenomenon being – again and stronger than ever – present on the European crisis agenda. Hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived on the European continent in 2015 fleeing war and persecutions. They found the European Union without a common policy on migration and thus without the possibility to coherently and efficiently manage the situation. Faced with a fait accompli, the political leaders

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have reacted in different ways to the challenge posed by the refugee crisis, the European community being thus divided between those who supported the granting of international protection to those in need, and those who rejected any pro-refugee measures, refusing to be part of the European solution for crisis management. Among the relevant actors in the securitization of migration in the current context stood up, on the one hand, Angela Merkel, Donald Tusk, Martin Schulz and others alike, who sought urgent mobilization and presented the refugee crisis as a security issue that has absolute priority, and, on the other hand, Viktor Orbán, Robert Fico, Björn Höcke, Miloš Zeman and others, who used in the construction of their anti-refugee arguments Islamophobic, racist and populist elements, exploiting the fear, uncertainty and concern of the people, and capitalizing them into electoral gains. Based on the concept that “foreigners” have a different identity, religion, culture and values, the securitizing actors of the second category have presented migration (to the public) as an existential threat both to the national health, educational and security systems and to the European values and identity. Into a Europe affected by an economic and identity crisis, the national leaders’ discourses frequently blamed the immigrants and refugees for everything that went wrong within the Union, the newcomers being seen as scapegoats, especially regarding the lack of a real social integration, as well as regarding violence, terrorism and socio-economic tensions (IOV 2013). The securitization process could not be achieved, however, without the audience’s acceptance of migration being a security problem. The discourses and statements of the European political leaders, of the leaders of anti-Islamic movements and of institutions with competences in the field of migration determined a split within the European civil society – similar to the one occurred at the European leadership level – between the pro- and anti- refugee exponents. The citizens have noticed the existence of a crisis situation and expressed their concern, solidarity, fear or dissatisfaction by organizing large-scale protests and demonstrations all over Europe, from Poland to Spain, and from Italy to Sweden, presenting banners and slogans

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encouraging granting international protection for refugees, on the one side, and stopping the so-called Islamization of Europe, on the other side. Dramatizing migration and interpreting it as an existential threat to the European states and societies have determined a significant alienation from refugees (who obviously do not assume the same values, culture and identity as the Europeans). Even if the cultural aspects are extremely important in the development of the securitization process, the immigrants and refugees are not strictly seen as a societal threat, but also as an economic or political one, and following the terrorist attacks in Paris (CNN LIBRARY 2015), they are more and more often perceived as an important threat in terms of security. The main axes, around which the anti-immigration arguments revolve, largely remain the same as in the previous processes of migration’s securitization experienced by Europe in the last half century. The identified axes (CEYHAN AND TSOUKALA 2002: 24) are as follows: The socio-economic axis – immigrants are associated with increasing unemployment, grey economy and the crisis of the welfare state (e.g., the UK doesn’t distinguish between refugees and economic migrants, perceiving all newcomers as part of the latter) The security axis – refugees are especially associated with terrorism, violence, tensions and with a significant reduction of borders control (e.g., France) The identity axis – immigrants are perceived as a threat to the culture, religion, identity and values of the host society (e.g., Hungary, Germany) The political axis – racist and xenophobic anti-immigration discourses are frequently used to obtain political gains or advantages (e.g., Hungary). The securitization process is not reduced to the existence of actors, securitizing moves and a significant audience that accepts an issue as a security problem, but includes also a set of exceptional measures, taken in order to cope with the crisis and to ensure the survival of the endangered referent objects (in this case - the Schengen area, the identity, the religion and the European values, as well as the liberal economic and political system).

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According to the exponents of the Copenhagen School (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 25), “securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking the rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules”. Analysing the states’ behaviour, it was noticed how Schengen Area Member States, such as Austria and Germany, have temporarily suspended the basic principles of the Schengen Agreement, breaking the rules and instituting border controls. The national leaders have implemented either urgent measures, such as the temporary suspension of rail traffic on certain routes, the reintroduction of border controls or the opening of new hotspots, or drastic measures, such as toughening penalties for illegal immigration, building fences or using water cannons to keep refugees away. Exceptional measures have been taken at European level, too: new economic funds were created (funds for both the EU Member States and for the refugees’ origin countries), emergency relocation systems were implemented and ambitious measures to improve borders management were proposed. It was therefore shown that the securitization of migration within the context of the 2015 refugee crisis was realized in two different ways: (1) by perceiving and presenting migration as an absolute priority and (2) by perceiving and presenting migration as an existential threat. Actors, security discourses, the public opinion and even the exceptional measures preserve and continue this rift between the two different means of securitization. The actors in the first category (the Merkel model) have made speeches oriented towards finding solutions, towards efficiently managing the situation, indicating the supreme priority of the issue. These actors and their speeches imprinted to the civil society the opinion that we are facing a crisis, an emergency situation that needs to be solved, and therefore it is highly required the immediate implementation of concrete, constructive measures, aiming to reduce tension and uncertainty. At the same time, the actors from the second category (the Orbán model) have resorted in their security discourses to anti-Islamic and xenophobic arguments, highlighting the existence of a threat to the European Union and its Member States’ security – especially to the societal, economic and military security. This type of discourses has amplified fear and anxiety

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within the civil society, a significant part of it developing strongly negative and even violent attitudes towards refugees and thus justifying the national leaders’ implementation of drastic measures for the rejection of newcomers.

Conclusions According to the securitization theory proposed by the Copenhagen School, a problem is securitized when it is perceived as an absolute priority or as an existential threat, being taken out of the normal politics spectrum and transferred to the panic policy agenda. The process of securitization is completed through the acceptance of this approach by a significant audience, the latter exerting pressure upon political leaders in order to establish an agenda for crisis management. The actors’ securitizing moves and the audience’s acceptance of the security problem legitimize the use of extraordinary means to cope with the triggered crisis (BUZAN ET AL. 1998: 24-25). In the context of the 2015 refugee waves, the existence of securitizing actors and moves, the exaggeration and dramatization of migration, and its presentation – through the speech act – both as an absolute priority and as an existential threat to certain referent objects, the audience’s acceptance of the given issue as being a security problem, the adoption and implementation of exceptional measures and even the override of normal politics’ rules prove that the securitization theory proposed by the Copenhagen School perfectly fits the current European reality, revealing nothing more than the fact that migration, in the context of triggering the refugee crisis, has passed through a new successful process of securitization. This chapter has not only shown that the re-securitization of migration has occurred, but also that the process was simultaneously conducted in two distinct ways: (1) by presenting migration as an absolute priority and (2) by presenting it as an existential threat, the security speech acts being presented to the public by two distinct categories of actors and having two different types of results. In both situations, the securitization process has been successfully completed, the audience accepting the actors’ approaches, so that we can definitely affirm that migration in the EU is again, and more strongly than ever, perceived as a security problem.

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The European Identity and the Refugee Crisis

C O R I N A PA L A G H I E & M O N I C A U N G U R E A N U

G

lobalization influences every key aspect of one’s existence and thus, in accordance with a causality relationship pattern, new tendencies directed towards addressing some effects of this phenomenon emerge. Such an effect may be perceived through a process of strengthening principles and values of national identity. Take the case of the European Union: Member States relate to each other through their common historical heritage and assess themselves as being part of a geographical space defined by cultural and identity-related aspects. However, each and every Member State holds onto its own particularities which are generally stronger than that of a common shared identity. Ever since its beginnings, the European Union has been functioning as a conglomerate of states that chose to deliberately transfer a part of their own decision-making capacities towards supranational bodies, making use of cooperation as its main instrument. Even though the EU has been existing as a freestanding entity since the 1950’s and despite many attempts, one could not deny that it has failed to achieve the “United States of Europe” ideal, the ultimate federation of states which share a common vision and identity. The overrule of the Constitutional Treaty in 2003 due to a negative feedback as an outcome of the French and Dutch referendum argues that some European citizens reject such a European configuration and highlights peoples’ attachment to their own national identities. It is safe to note that, despite the important progress made in respect of European integration, a well-put and unanimous assumed European identity that could act as an engine of unification of the European demos has yet to emerge.

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The issue of European identity has been a topic of interest for important authors ever since the Maastricht Treaty came into effect in 1993, marking the shift from the European Community to the European Union. The year 1993 is critical in respect of understanding the European identity problem. It also represents a milestone in terms of EU functioning paradigms as the intergovernmental model was replaced by the supranational one. The EU has thus been transformed into a new type of international organism which is due to define its own identity in relation with its citizens. This chapter is designed to approach the issue of European identity, a hot topic for scholars who fail to come up with a unanimously accepted position in this respect. One should bear in mind that the European identity has the potential of being influenced by particular events and in the aftermath of certain dynamics it could even be rephrased in accordance with interests and the discourse of certain political elites. Furthermore, one should take into consideration that the present refugee crisis could very well dictate the direction in which the European identity could develop. Given such a hypothesis, two potential scenarios emerge: firstly, a scenario in which the European society assumes a multicultural approach, thus affirming its intellectual roots and secondly, a scenario in which the European society relates to the foreign group through its Christian heritage and engages such a group in a process of assimilation. One could notice that religion is probably the main criteria, which distinguishes the two cultures brought into discussion. In this respect, the European society tends to refer to the Muslim communities bearing in mind the differences between its own religion and that of the opposite group, this also being one of the main catalysts of Islamophobia. In order to customize this study, we will follow discourses of Muslim refugees so that we could not only understand the manner in which they perceive the European society, but also with the purpose of noting the Muslim perception in terms of how the host society would refer to them based on the European values and principles. Moreover, we would like to establish if repeated interactions between these two groups will result in any substan-

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tial changes in terms of European identity or if the newly arrived group is to interfere in any way with the ongoing process of defining the European identity. In this respect, two main objectives emerge: (1) to understand the manner in which refugees perceive the environment in which they arrive; (2) to tell if refugees are willing to comply with the European lifestyle during their stay on EU soil.

European Identity Before engaging this discourse in any particular assumption, it is necessary to clearly define the terms of identity and national identity in order to better comprehend those particularities which define the wider European identity. Samuel Huntington defines identity as one’s or a group’s perception of itself, representing the product of self-conscience based on which entities acknowledge that they possess qualities which differentiate one from another (HUNTINGTON 2004: 22). Therefore, the coherence of a group consists mainly of the subjective perception of these individuals that they belong to the same group. This perception is learned through complex cognitive means and processes. Firstly, it is necessary to recognize that a certain group exists as a free standing entity and that this group has specific characteristics that are used to establish inclusion and exclusion from that certain group. Generally speaking, these characteristics can refer to a commonly acknowledged external enemy such as gender, ethnic, religious or other similar forms of social parity. Secondly, it is necessary for the individuals to define themselves as being part of the group. Dieter Fuchs addresses the issue by asserting the following: “Without such a subjective assignment the collective would stay a purely cognitive phenomenon without social relevance” (FUCHS 2011: 9). With regard to the concept of national identity, one should take in consideration the two main types of identities as defined by the manner in which membership into a group is granted: the French and the German model. While the French model is based on jus soli, the German one makes use

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of the rule of jus sanguinis. The former is based on the principle according to which an individual becomes a citizen, part of the group, by living on a well-outlined territory and by acquiring a set of rules and norms as they were established through the French Revolution (CESARANI 1996: 76). Given such a design of principles, a child born on French soil would become a citizen even if the parents are of different citizenship. This model implies that the process of socialization gains a highly relevant role as the individual, through an ongoing learning mechanism, not only becomes aware but also voluntarily adopts particular values and principles that mold him into an exponent of the French state. The second model of citizenship acquirement has historical roots that can be traced in the evolution of the German people. In this particular case, national feelings of belonging come before the emergence of a well put nation-state, moreover the entire idea of a national identity is not based on the concept of citizenship but finds closure through belonging to a distinctive racial, cultural and linguistic group. Therefore, the meaning of German identity can be decrypted by understanding that the community that emerges from this particular type of model is by its nature organic, hermetic and reticent in terms of encompassing new members. One can gain this type of ethnic identity through direct blood ties with the members of the community. A child becomes a German citizen only if the parents are also of German citizenship. Following the particularities of the depicted models, one can notice that the French model of citizenship acquirement is more inclusive given that the second generation of immigrants automatically becomes a first generation of citizens. On the other hand, the German identity is more exclusive as it is based on a community of descendants, being more reluctant to strangers. In accordance with TFEU, Art. 2, paragraph 1: “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship” (EUROPEAN UNION 2010).

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One can notice that the acquirement of European citizenship demands the obtainment of a EU Member State citizenship and thus is dependent on the country’s own regulations, meaning that an extra-communitarian individual can access this status more easily in France than he would in Germany. However, citizenship is also a practice (“feeling a citizen of ”) and implies a process of social construction whereby citizens interact and share values and rules that allow them to live together and provide them with a collective identity. Thus, citizenship does not only depend on the recognition of a status but also demands a feeling of belonging that is built collectively and through participation until “empowerment” is achieved (CESARANI 1996: 91). The concept of European identity is short of a universally accepted definition. Given that citizenship can be acquired depending on national regulations concerning the matter either through jus soli or jus sanguinis, it is safe to say that the European identity lacks a clearly formulated base that could establish its inclusive or exclusive character. However, what is clear indeed is the fact that European citizenship can be obtained by becoming a citizen of any Member State. A main issue can be identified: despite having an abstract idea on European citizenship, there is no idea on how a European identity could be formally assumed at a European level, nor is there any common understanding on which principles should comprise the basis of European citizenship. In other words, at the present moment there is no joint position with regard to a European identity of the entire EU demos and thus favoring the affirmation of each and every nation’s identity and also the occurrence of discriminatory treatments between individuals of different groups. The process of framing a definition of European identity has always been seen as a challenge. As Bauman suggests, “you have a lot of little pieces on the table which you hope to arrange in some meaningful whole – but the image which ought to emerge at the far end of your labour is not given in advance” (BAUMAN 2005: 48). Bauman’s position reveals a certain degree of struggle as a characteristic of any attempt to configure a formally assumed European identity. One could note that the European identity must be

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built as a sum of national identities. As delicate as it might be, this assertion implies an attempt to homogenize certain characteristics that at some point might come in conflict. In this respect, the European Union should not only create, but also assume a common identity that could act as a binder of all elements that compose the European construct. “The EU is now caught in the contradictory situation of having to define a common European culture that is universal – but not so universal that it is global and thus not distinctively European – and at the same time does not negate national and regional cultures” (DELANTY AND RUMFORD 2005: 60). A question emerges: how should the European identity look like? Should it be organic, based on ethnicity and jus sanguinis or should it be inclusive based on jus soli and an individual’s will to be a part of a group? One must seek the answer to these questions in the European history itself. In this respect, this paper will follow two of the known dimensions that the European identity encapsulates. Firstly, the European identity consists of multiple layers under the form of a wider system, referring to those elements which give unity to the European demos. This can be perceived as a spiritual component of the wider system which invokes the JudaeoChristian heritage that has granted coherence to the European continent over centuries. Starting from the 1950’s, the Judeo-Christian heritage has been doubled by an intellectual component acquired, in the aftermath of the creation of the European Community itself, as an articulation of the desire to maintain peace on the continent. The two layers of European identity are characterized by different degrees of acknowledgement at the European level. One could note that the spiritual component which prevailed until the mid-twentieth century has fallen into desuetude leaving space for the intellectual component’s reign as a defining element of Europe. Given certain historical milestones and the inputs that have penetrated the system, one could assume that the two elements can become interchangeable.

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Islamophobia and the implications of the Syrian refugee crisis The European identity system is multi-layered. Assumed at the level of principles it remains latent in the collective mentality even if there is an absence of catalysts that might imply its acknowledgement. At present, Europe is confronted with a refugee crisis that is not only reflected trough political and social problems but also through fear of a possible threat to the European identity itself. As we have previously mentioned, the identity of a group can be influenced by the system’s inputs and this is the case of a group with a spiritual and intellectual identity which is radically different and implies the necessity of identifying a proper manner in which the hosts can relate to the alien group. Given such a display of conditions, one could note that European identity might be very well influenced by the alien group that reaches Europe. History has revealed that in some cases there is a tendency toward defining the European culture by negatively relating other cultures to it, especially the Oriental one. Eduard Said addresses this particular issue by asserting „the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures” (SAID 1997: 8). In accordance to Eduard Said’s dialectics: “For Orientalism it was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus conceived.” (SAID 1997: 4445). Until the mid-twentieth century Christianity and Judeo-Christian heritage were perceived as a unifying element, not only in terms of European culture but also referring to Europe as a whole. Thus Europeans have identified a common enemy in Orientals, an enemy of the Christian religion, a true catalyst of an identity enriched by negatively relating to this group. A group that bears a different culture may interfere with another group’s process of forming its own identity. Eduard Said observes that the Orient reflects itself in defining the West as its opposed image (SAID 1997: 1-2). Fear of the unknown generates aggressive responses and implies the subconscious to engage in this type of defensive mechanisms. Beverly MiltonEdwards deems Islamophobia as a constant in time, as an attitude assim-

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ilated in our contemporary society based on the experience of historical interactions (MILTON-EDWARDS 2006: 63-64). Beyond the historical experience there are certain specific events that can very well interfere with the dynamics of relationships between different groups. Terrorist attacks claimed by extremist cells of Islam confession create new mutations in terms of the manner in which the West relates to the Middle East, proliferating tendencies of ostracising the Muslim communities given the criteria of a generalized association between Islam and terrorism. Given the manner in which the West relates to this distinctive group, a manner which is also deeply imprinted in its collective experience and which is doubled by the most recent negative experiences generated by Islamic extremism, it is safe to note that the ongoing refugee crisis has the potential to interfere with the European identity itself. In the aftermath of 9/11, the export of Islamic terror has perpetuated not only the globalization of fear of such an asymmetrical phenomenon, but also the spread of the perception of Islam in a pejorative fashion. Events of recent occurrence in which terrorists targeted European objectives, especially against the French society (Charlie Hebdo and the November Paris attacks), have engaged a spirit of collective solidarity with grave effects in terms of deepening Islamophobia and the polarization of the global society in this respect. Given such a course of action and taking into consideration the organic character of the state apparatus, one can notice that some tendencies towards Islamophobic discourse are found even in the manner in which some Member States are addressing the issue of the refugee crisis. The polarization of the European society is transposed to a political level as Member States adopt extremely different rhetoric which reflects the lack of coherence and a common coordinated position at a supranational level. The decision making process in the European Union is hindered by the differences between States and thus the chances of projecting an actual and effective framework meant to tackle the Syrian refugee problem in the short term are becoming increasingly slim. The extent to which the States are ready to accommodate refugees is strongly connected to how the particular States perceive the importance of the spiritual component

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or political component of the European identity. Moreover, in the wake of such a threat to society, that of massive flows of refugees that could easily alter the European way of life, one could notice that the Judaeo-Christian heritage becomes a reference point in some discourses, such a case being that of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán. But at present, Europe is lacking solidarity in the scope of a common vision regarding the refugee problem. This particular lack of solidarity may be fuelled by the absence of a well put European identity, unanimously accepted and embraced by the 28 States, leaving space for national interpretation on what could be the best solution for the crisis. In terms of the general issue of integration, the political discourse is dominated by a number of relevant concepts which describe certain specific approaches. In this respect we are referring to either the approach of integration through the prism of multicultural diversity, or through assimilation as potential solutions of managing minority groups. Given the massive influx of refugees that struggle to cross onto European soil, the attempt to put together a European identity can be very well influenced by the manner in which the EU, as a supranational entity, assumes either one of the mentioned approaches and promotes it on a political level. Taking into consideration these assumptions we do consider the possibility that two distinct scenarios may emerge depending on which of the two components of the wider European identity prevails. The first proposed scenario implies integration through the principles of multiculturalism. According to Anthony Giddens cultural pluralism is a: “model in which ethnic cultures are given full validity to exist separately, yet participate in the larger society’s economic and political life. A recent outgrowth of pluralism is multiculturalism, in which ethnic groups exist separately and equally. To achieve distinct but equal status will demand major struggles and as yet this is a very distant option. Ethnic minorities are still perceived by many people as a threat to their job, their safety and the national culture” (GIDDENS 1986: 497). Therefore, we can note that multiculturalism is based on the hypothesis that all cultures are equal and coexistence between two groups that em-

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brace two different formulas should not be based on the idea that over time the culture of the majority should absorb that of the minority. In other words, multiculturalism negates that the culture of the majority is the correct one and the desirable pattern for all the citizens of a certain territory. By approaching such a dialectic, the European community defines itself by relating to the intellectual component as its fundamental identity element. Moreover, by applying such a pattern, Member States would engage in a process of conserving the cultural characteristics of the newly arrived group. Furthermore, we believe that the implications of such an approach claim that the new group should accept the principles of European citizenship based on the French model. From the European identity perspective, this solution reflects the success of the fundamental principles of the European construct, which could now find a practical expression. One could thus witness a transfer from the level of principles to the level of facts of such assumed ideas. If properly applied this model would presume the harmonious coexistence between radically different groups in which mutual respect governs inter-human relationships. “A policy of integration may be part of progressive multiculturalism, which supports the integration of immigrants by granting them political rights as a means to create a genuinely multicultural society.” (HUYSMANS 2000: 15). The second scenario proposed by this paper is based on the idea of integration through assimilation. Approaching such a solution implies that the Judeo-Christian heritage is the one that gives unity to the European demos and reflects the European cultures’ superiority when compared to the Oriental one, it depicts the dominance of the majority group against the minority one, being thus an attempt of societal homogenization. According to Irene Bloemraad, “in current formulations, assimilation (or alternatives such as integration or incorporation) usually means the narrowing of differences between immigrants and the native-born majority population in certain aspects of social life (e.g. labour force participation), but leaves open the difference along other often cultural lines ranging from

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food preferences to fundamental beliefs and ideas regarding existence.” (BLOEMRAAD ET AL. 2008: 163). Anthony Giddens defines assimilation as the social process in which immigrants abandon their original customs and practises, adapting their own behaviour to the norms and values assumed by the majority. Furthermore, in accordance with the assimilationist approach, an immigrant is to change his/her lifestyle, including language or cultural outlooks as one of the steps of his/her integration into the host society (GIDDENS 1986: 497). We assume that imposing an approach of integration through assimilation would undermine the social coherence and would result in a deepening of social polarization given that this type of discourse is based on imposing the value system of the majority through the wider European identity system with its double Judeo-Christian and intellectual component. Worth mentioning is the fact that the spiritual component would come in conflict with the main element that opposes the two cultures: religion. In order to understand the possible effects of the two scenarios and in order to assess which of the two meets the minimum requirements that are in accordance with the refugees’ expectations, we do believe that it is well worth following the discourse of the latter on this particular issue. Therefore, we seek the opportunity of analysing discourses of such refugees who arrived in Europe, in order to identify which of the two is the best solution not only in terms of refugees’ identity and their expectations, but also to determine how interaction between the Europeans and the refugees will proceed: will it be a clash, or will it be a harmonious coexistence between the two? Given that we have appreciated the European identity system as a rather passive one, but which can very well become active due to interactions with this new group, it is necessary to follow the particularities of such an input in order to better evaluate the potential effects of such a situation. In this respect, we have chosen to analyse responses recorded by Al Jazeera in a series of interviews published in October 24th 2015 (Transcript retrieved by the authors of the article, AL JAZEERA 2015B). The criteria on which we argue the relevance of the interview in our study lay merely in the questions which the person who

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moderated the interview has posed to her respondents. We have chosen two respondents: an Iraqi man, aged 27, and a Syrian mother of four. The selected questions follow three main directions: (1) the manner in which the refugee perceives the fear of Europeans regarding their group; (2) the refugee’s willingness and capacity to integrate in a cultural environment that is completely different from that of his/her own country; (3) the manner in which the refugee perceives the difficulties that emerge from his/her own refuge and the conclusion of this step in his/her life. The two interviews reveal two perspectives: one of a collective meaning and the other focused on the individual. These approaches reflect their thoughts with regard to the fact that Europeans fear them. The manner in which the questions are built makes use of words with emotional meaning, thus highlighting the antithesis of two groups with mutual fears (scared, afraid, impose). First respondent, a 27-year-old man from Iraq: 1. In Europe there are mixed opinions. Some people are scared specifically of young men like you who are travelling alone because there are a lot of people thinking that maybe you are coming to do a problem in Europe. They’re in general afraid. What would you say to them? I don’t think someone who travels all the way here risking his own life comes to cause problems. They are going to a country that recognizes their identity, humanity, his life and makes him feel he is a human being with rights. In our countries rights were lost in war. Humanity is lost. There are killings, beheadings, stealing, bribery, embezzlement of public money, nothing is left. We are looking for a country where there is law that protects us in order to live normal lives like anyone else in that country. Those who belong to a religion should be free to practice it. Everyone should be free to live the way they want. 2. Syrians, Iraqis like you, there are different traditions, there’s different food, there’s different language, there’s different religion. So, do you think it will be easy for you to integrate into Europe? We have overcome a very critical stage where we sacrificed our lives. There are things we need to learn based on the asylum they give us. We are obliged. There is no option. We have to go with it and start learning the culture and laws. The idea of laws applies to us not only in Europe but in the whole world. I wish for such a law to follow instead of the old traditional tribal law which is all about killing and beheading and backwardness. 3. So what would you say to those who think that you will arrive in Europe and you will impose your traditions on them. We are going to help them build their countries. We will give them the knowledge we have from our countries and add to theirs. I hope this happens and they understand us instead of them thinking that we have come to take from them. We are just looking for asylum and law. They are the people of the land and they are our generous hosts. Most of us are students and fear for our lives. I don’t think that someone who passed through all this comes to a foreign country to cause problems. He is already defeated and full of problems. He left his country because of problems.

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The answers of the young Iraqi reveal the refugee’s collective perspective. Faced with Europe’s generalized fear “of young men who are travelling alone that maybe [they] are coming to do a problem in Europe”, the twenty-seven-years-old man presents an impressive argumentation system. He starts by expressing his perplexity with regard to the idea that one could even think that a person would risk putting its own life in danger to reach a certain place only to cause problems. He then presents a quintessence of what caused this migration wave. His country was torn by war and such a context hinders any perspective of respecting human rights. After all, these refugees are seeking a country that would recognize identity, humanity and life so that they could feel “human beings with rights”. The Iraqi man highlights what has been lacking in his country: law. This law is what “we are looking for” as it is a law “that protects us”. The protection provided by law must combine “protection” with “rights”. He now highlights the meaning of the concept “rights” which should not be limited to the “right to live”, as it must also include “freedom of life” because “everyone should be free the way they want”. Given this conclusion, the reporter insists: “Syrians, Iraqis like you, there are different traditions, there’s different food, there’s different language, there’s different religion. So, do you think it will be easy for you to integrate into Europe?” We can easily observe the meaning which the reporter associates whit the verb “to integrate” in this particular context. It reveals an approach of integration through giving up or, in a best case scenario, adapting his own traditions in accordance with the new cultural environment. Differences in terms of traditions that are being pointed out in the reporter’s question refer to: food, language and religion. On the offset the Iraqi man tightens his argumentation by putting an emphasis on the following: “We have overcome a very critical stage where we sacrificed our lives.” The definition of this sacrifice is based on the asylum conditions “they give us”. This asylum implies “things we need to learn”. This sacrifice is an obligation. This asylum is necessary because the war has annulled their rights.

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Given these conditions “there is no option”. This war has not only forced them to leave their own country, but also to come to Europe in their search for security and stability. As this is the price that has to be paid in order to gain security, the young Iraqi expresses the following: “We have to go with it and start learning the culture and laws.” One can observe the association of two highly relevant concepts for the respondent’s plea: “culture” and “law”. The refugee fled a war that destroys rights and traditions, and is willing to accept to make sacrifices and the asylum in order to gain safety and be protected by law. By choosing to come to Europe, the refugee has also chosen a certain set of judicial values. The European law should be applied “not only in Europe but in the whole world.” Following this conclusion, the young refugee makes a fundamental statement: “I wish for such a law to follow instead of the old traditional tribal law which is all about killing and beheading and backwardness.” Following this plea, the reporter insists on a message addressed to Europeans by the refugees. The answer defines the “integration” of the refugee in the new cultural framework. Different from the initial meaning given to the concept of integration by the reporter, the understanding of the young man exceeds this framework and is defined in terms of active participation of the newly arrived in building the host state. The refugee stresses that they are “refugees” who are holders of a cultural tradition different from the European one, and not outsiders deprived of education and training. In this regard, he points out to the fact that the refugees can help the host states arguing that “we can give them knowledge we have from our countries and add to theirs”. Explicitly, the refugee recognises the generosity of the hosts, trying to underline the fact that their ultimate goal is not to take from the Europeans, because the Europeans “are the people of the land”. This interview tries to stress that the aim of the refugees is „asylum and law”, and not “to cause problems”. Given these conditions, one can consider that for the person in discussion the best solution would be the multicultural one, as he wants to protect and preserve his own identity, but is also willing to conform and respect the European principles.

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Such availability would be desirable to be found in the speech of the majority of refugees. A multicultural model would not only facilitate coexistence between the two cultures but would also allow the refugees to retain the main elements of their own identity system. One can note that this kind of dialectics can also be found in other refugees’ discourses depicted in other interviews. The majority of refugees claim that they would like to return to Syria after the conflict is over and the living conditions are favourable. This fact strengthens the idea that it is necessary to adopt a multiculturalism grounded solution and not a model of integration based on the assimilation of the foreigner group given that their return to Syria is more than plausible. Second respondent, a Syrian mother travelling with her four daughters to Germany: 1. In Europe there are some people who are very welcoming to refugees like you and others who are a bit scared of what they hear on the news, maybe about what’s happening in Syria or in the Middle East in general. Is this something you thought about before going? I don’t know what to say. Traditions and culture in Syria are different than in Germany. The way they perceive the Syrian refugees is not that good. I feel a bit scared because I recall the way people looked at us in Turkey and Macedonia. They treated us nicely, but I felt they look down on Syrian refugees. It’s a difficult feeling. You noticed that, are you afraid you will encounter that kind of look again and again? I’m scared of the way they look at us but we are forced to go to them. We are looking for stability and security. We don’t want anything else. 2. We are here half way on this train. You still have to go maybe trough Hungary, maybe trough Croatia depending on what’s happening on each border. But when you arrive do you think it’s going to be easy? Life will certainly be difficult for me there in terms of language and many other things. I know about them. However, my daughters and I will be relieved. At Hasaka when shells used to hit the neighbourhoods, we didn’t know who would die and who would survive. I have to go to a place where my children and I can settle down. This is of utmost importance. The other types of hardships are part of life until you achieve your goals. My ambition is that, they become something. I wish one of them to be a doctor, another one a housewife and so on. I wish they have great future. 3. So when you reach Germany and you have a bit of stability you can believe in those dreams a little bit more than back home in Syria? Surely. Back home most of the schools and universities are closed. When I used to send my girls to school, they would go for two days and stay home for two days. Schools were also attacked. I used to worry whenever I went to pick them up from school that something might have happened to them, but there when I send them to school I know that nothing will happen to them.

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The second interview reveals a refugee’s individual perspective, this being the case of the answers given by a Syrian mother of four. The refugee’s speech is focused on her own personal future which had been put in danger in her country of origin. She seeks “stability” and “security”. The reporter then depicts two different perceptions that Europeans manifest toward new-comers: “there are some people who are very welcoming to refugees like you” and at the same time there are “others who are a bit scared from what they hear on the news”. This European ambivalence confuses the Syrian woman: “I don’t know what to say”. Far from having a discourse as put together and well-argued as that previously analysed of the Iraqi refugee, she tries to underline that “traditions and culture in Syria are different than in Germany”, the country she seeks to reach. It is perhaps an argumentation of a more emotional load. She makes use of verbs such as: to know, to feel, to wish. In this formula the Syrian refugee addresses the issue of cultural differences between Europeans and her fellow countrymen, as not being perceived correctly by the former. Although she admits that she enjoyed a fair treatment in Turkey as well as in Macedonia, she could not help noticing that her hosts embraced an attitude of superiority (“I felt they look down on Syrian refugees”). Given that Europeans have a tendency toward superiority in their approach to Orientals, it may be the case that such attitudes perpetuate anxiety in communities of refugees as they fear they would become a target of xenophobia and Islamophobia. Interestingly enough, despite the fact that Europeans usually relate in a negative manner to the Middle East culture, the exponents of the latter do not feel as if there is a consistent difference between the two groups, deeming them as equal. This might reveal that they do indeed respect the European culture, they do not assess it as being inferior to that of the Middle East. Should this be true and should the Europeans embrace a similar stance towards the new comers, then a harmonious coexistence could very well become a reality. The price that the refugee must pay in order to get a hold of “stability” and “security” involves learning a new language and successfully surpassing any obstacles that might hinder her path toward Germany at the HungarianCroatian border.

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The woman proceeds by depicting the reality of the world she left behind in comparison with a dream of a fresh new start in Germany: “At Hasaka when shells used to hit the neighbourhoods, we didn’t know who would die and who would survive.” “My ambition is that, they [my children] become something. I wish one of them to be a doctor, another one a housewife and so on. I wish they have great future.” Caught in between two worlds, her approach is less focused on aspects related to identity or culture, but it reaches a more pragmatic dimension that finds closure in mere survival (“the other types of hardship are part of life until you achieve your goals”). The understanding of the meaning behind the phrases put together by the Syrian woman reveals not only optimism that strengthens her ability to cope with struggles, but also the dramatic story of a person willing to leave aside the issue of cultural identity in favour of acquiring and accessing “stability” and “security”. Her and her children’s effective integration in a new society is loaded no more with multicultural valences. By answering the reporter’s questions, the Syrian refugee brings yet another argument that proves the impossibility of having a future in her own country: the war hindered the prospect of a proper educational system and without such an establishment, her daughters’ future is extremely affected. The final paragraph of her closing remarks depicts the story of the refugee’s and her daughters’ personal security. The Syrian system is no longer able to provide security to its citizens and she believes that Germany would act as a safe haven in which protection is guaranteed: “but there when I send them to school I know that nothing will happen to them”. At a first glimpse, one may notice that the assertion makes reference to safety as being provided by the German system. However, a deeper meaning can also be retrieved: the Syrian woman would send her children to school and therefore she wants her children to be integrated in the host country. By integrating them in the German educational system, the fact that more cultural elements of European origin are to be assimilated follows naturally. The desire to inte-

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grate her children in the educational system reveals that she wishes for her children to enjoy the benefits of a European lifestyle. It may very well be the case that returning to Syria once the war is over is not an option until that particular and unforeseen moment in time where they would be disconnected from the reality in which they were educated. Both discourses are built around the idea that refugees seek harmonious coexistence in Europe. This particular coexistence may be possible if two requirements are to be met: (a) the preservation of their religious and cultural identity, and (b) respecting the European judicial norms. Moreover, both discourses reveal the fact that a multicultural system would be more appropriate in detriment of a scenario in which assimilation would be the means of integration. Although we cannot assume a generalized approach based on only two opinions, their relevance must not fall into desuetude as they offer a clear idea on how refugees perceive their future life in Europe based on their own experience. If one would follow the discourses and rhetoric assumed by refugees in other interviews, he or she would acknowledge the fact that this position is embraced by most of the refugees. In fact, the Iraqi man and the Syrian woman echo larger segments and groups, revealing their will to live on European soil on which they seek security and stability, the lack of these two in their country of origin being the main cause that precipitated their resettlement.

Concluding remarks As we have seen, the concept of identity in general depicts particularities of a group which act as unifying catalysts by establishing its criteria of inclusion or exclusion. The European identity model is frequently debated in literature, without a unanimous meaning being conceived yet. History itself is what shaped the different arguments in such a debate, describing Europe with all the events shared in the past, with its spiritual component derived from the Judaeo-Christian heritage. However, portraying Europe without its intellectual component, obtained through the economic and political project of the EU, provides a shallow image rather than an exhaustive re-

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sult. This supposition is valid the other way around, as the two components are the main layers which form the wider European identity system. A formal expression of one’s belonging to the EU is the European citizenship. Given the differences between the spiritual and intellectual dimensions of the system in discussion, a question arises: How should one acquire this citizenship? Should one gain it through the jus soli rule? Or should one gain it based on the jus sanguinis principle? This opposition between the two concepts is yet another argument that proves the lack of homogeneity in terms of a common definition for the European identity, leaving room for interpretation and debate. The ongoing refugee crisis reminds Europeans of the lack of coherence in terms of what is defining for Europe and the EU as a whole. Massive inflow of migrants who bear a different culture, religion and identity can very well interfere with the rhetoric assumed by some Member States, sometimes resulting in conflicting approaches and unilateral decisions. Should there be a EU-wide common position on the matter of what defines the European identity, the migrant crisis would have far less power of influence and polarization at the European level. The absence of a formal framework leaves the European identity at the mercy of the elites’ discourses, which can relate either to the spiritual component, given the rise of post 9/11 Islamophobia, or to the intellectual component as a reference point. Should the spiritual component prevail, then by all means integration would be developed under the principle of assimilation of the foreign group. However, should the intellectual component dominate, then the group would be subject to a multicultural approach. The best solution can be traced in the speeches of the refugees themselves. Following the answers provided by the two refugees interviewed by Al Jazeera, one could argue that the solution lays in two different dimensions, both being based on the criteria of generation. If for the adult segment of the new-comers it is more appropriate to impose a solution based on multiculturalism and mutual respect of identities and their particularities, in the case of their children an assimilation pattern of integration is more plausible in order to assure their adoption of European cultural elements.

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of Central and Eastern European national leaders regarding the refugee crisis. Case studies: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland ADINA-ELENA ȘERBAN

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hroughout this chapter I will focus on the perception and the approach of the refugee crisis in the European Council by national leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. The hypothesis on which I will build this approach is that national identity, the internal conditions and the personal ambitions are structuring the Heads of State and Government behaviour in the European Council and are influencing its activity and results. For this purpose, I will assess the Central and Eastern European leaders’ prospects on the refugee crisis and their impact on the efficiency of the European Council and European Commission activity. Therefore, the first objective of this paper is to identify the types of discourse promoted by the heads of state and especially by the heads of the government from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the reasoning behind these speeches. The second objective is to identify how the speeches of national leaders from Central and Eastern Europe are perceived at the European Council level and the effects they produce. Thus, to achieve these objectives, our study seeks to answer the following research questions: What kind of discourse do the leaders of Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland promote and on what grounds? How are the speeches and the main decisions of the leaders in the European Council received? What effects can these speeches produce on the process of identifying and implementing solutions at the EU level?

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To address these research questions we will analyse only the speeches of the heads of state or government of Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland, and not of other politicians from these countries, and we will focus mainly on the attempts to introduce a mandatory quota system for redistributing refugees among the EU Member States.

Central European leaders’ speeches on refugees and the reasoning behind them With the outbreak of the refugee crisis, and especially during its evolution, it has become a trend to talk about a new split in the European Union. If in the context of the Greek crisis there have been discussions about the North-South discrepancy, in light of the refugee crisis the focus has been placed on the East-West division, or the division between mature democracies and post-communist states. Although, after the disaster in the Mediterranean of April 2015, all the European leaders have agreed on the importance of solidarity at the Union level and expressed their willingness to mobilise all efforts to prevent the loss of other human lives at sea and to address the root causes of migration, when the European Commission presented the plan to introduce mandatory quotas for the reallocation of refugees, it was clear for everybody that this plan will not be accepted very easily. However, Western countries did not foresee the magnitude of the controversy aroused by the system of compulsory quotas, nor the radicalization to such extent of the speeches and actions of Central and Eastern European states. On each occasion presented to them, the national leaders of Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland expressed their disagreement with the introduction of a mandatory quota system and developed an anti-refugee and anti-Muslim rhetoric, showing in some cases the willingness to accept refugees, but only if they are Christians.

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Hungary In a year in which hundreds of thousands of people made extraordinary efforts to reach the European Union because of the dangers lurking at home – in the conflict areas from Africa and the Middle East – the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, was one of the most prominent political voices who supported the strengthening of the Union’s borders. Since early 2015, the Hungarian prime minister has assumed the role of defender of Christianity and warned leaders and citizens that immigrants will “alter Europe’s civilisation [...] [and] if that happens, that’s irreversible. There is no way back from a multicultural Europe ... to a Christian Europe” (RETTMAN 2015). Therewith, regarding the quota system, Orbán has campaigned tirelessly for its rejection arguing that “[w]e think all countries have a right to decide whether they want to have a large number of Muslims in their countries [...]. If they want to live together with them, they can. We don’t want to and I think we have a right to decide that we do not want a large number of Muslim people in our country” (ROBINS-EARLY 2015). Another important discursive line of the Prime Minister of Hungary is that he suspects a “masterplan” behind all developments in the EU. In one interview given to a Swiss newspaper, Viktor Orbán mentioned the “leftwing studies about the future of the EU and a possible European superstate” and a theory for this “new world” idea, developed by the European Left and “radical American Democrats”, and expressed his conviction that the migrant crisis is also connected to this masterplan. According to the Prime Minister, all the indirect evidence shows that the vast majority of future migrants who fully integrate will be left-wing voters and therefore the migrant crisis constitutes a means to import leftist voters in Europe. The Premier also suggested that his country is fighting this plan and said: “We did not like the images which were shown around the world when we were building the fence, and when we were called heartless. But that was the price we had to pay” (PÁLFI 2015). During the same interview, Orbán talked about freedom of expression in Europe, claiming that “the free and sincere exchange of opinions is less and less a part of the culture of the European political elite”. He believes that what dominates European public speech

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today is simply chatter about nice but secondary topics of lesser significance because Europe fails to speak about “freedom… Christianity…nation and pride in European public speeches”, which are fundamental issues. Instead of this, the European elite only discusses superficial, secondary issues such as human rights, progress, peace, openness and tolerance (PÁLFI 2015). Also, in early September 2015, Viktor Orbán declared that the refugee problem is not Europe’s problem, but it’s a “German problem”, adding: “[n] obody would like to stay in Hungary. So we don’t have difficulties with those who want to stay in Hungary. Nobody wants to stay in Hungary, neither in Slovakia, nor Poland, nor Estonia. All of them would like to go Germany. Our job is only to register them” (EURONEWS 2015). Furthermore, a few days later the Hungarian Prime Minister showed his conviction that refugees are actually economic migrants and announced that the government in Budapest decided to place boards along the border, stating clearly what people should do if they want to enter Hungary legally. Therefore, people can go to the official crossing points to complete the documents and be asked if they applied for asylum in Serbia. “As we regard Serbia as a safe country, if they did not apply for asylum there, their request for asylum in Hungary will be rejected” Viktor Orbán continued (THORPE 2015). The Hungarian Prime Minister’s tenacity to stop the flow of people entering his country was demonstrated by moving from the discursive level to the adoption of drastic measures. Thus, during the refugee crisis we have witnessed the Hungarian police spraying water cannons and tear gas at people trying to cross the country’s border, the building of $80 million razor wire border fence, the adoption of a legislation which allows the army to fire rubber bullets at migrants and refugees and even publishing ads in Lebanese newspapers warning people not to attempt the journey to the Hungarian borders (ROBINS-EARLY 2015).

Slovakia The next most active politician in terms of opposition to the mandatory quota system in 2015 is Robert Fico, the Prime Minister of Slovakia. He

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has developed an anti-refugee and an anti-Muslim rhetoric to the extent that the Party of European Socialists decided to consider his suspension. On many occasions, the Slovak Prime Minister said: “We strongly reject any quotas ... If a mechanism for automatic redistribution of migrants is adopted, then we will wake up one day and have 100,000 people from the Arab world and that is a problem I would not like Slovakia to have” (GOTEV 2015). Initially, the Slovak Prime Minister declared his willingness to accept a small number of refugees, but only if they were Christians and only if they did not “endeavour to change the nature, culture, and values of the state. I can hardly imagine Muslims integrating in Slovakia, without members of their family and out of their environment. They would not have the opportunity to practice their religion. So let’s not close our eyes to reality [...] Given that Slovakia is a country where the Catholic Church dominates, followed by the Lutheran Church, we cannot tolerate an influx of 300 to 400,000 Muslim immigrants who would start building mosques all over the place” declared Robert Fico at a press conference on September 9 (ROBERT 2015). Furthermore, Robert Fico illustrated a lack of tolerance towards minorities during a radio interview saying that his country was “incapable of integrating the Roma. But still we pretend that we are able to integrate someone from Eritrea or someone from a completely different religion with different traditions”. Gianni Pittella, the leader of the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament, quoted Robert Fico as having said that Slovakia was “built for Slovaks, not for minorities”, although the Slovakian Prime Ministers strongly denied this statement (ROBERT 2015). Also, the Slovak leader has made himself remarked by threatening that he is ready to propose “a discharge of his country from the European Union” if they are forced to keep taking refugees from the Middle East (BURMAN 2015).

The Czech Republic Same as their Visegrád Group allies, the Czech officials have expressed indignation and rejection concerning the introduction of a compulsory quo-

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ta system. But unlike his Hungarian and Slovak counterparts, the Czech Prime Minister, Bohuslav Sobotka, has not developed an anti-Muslim rhetoric. Instead, the Czech President, Miloš Zeman, has been remarked since 2011 through sharp comments such as: “Calling someone a moderate Muslim is like calling someone a moderate Nazi”. More recently he has talked about a “tsunami” of immigrants ready to engulf Europe and called for a much stronger defence of the EU’s external borders (CAMERON 2015). The official position of the Czech government is that a quota system to redistribute refugees within the EU will not work because the Czech Republic is not a country in which refugees would like to stay, so they will leave for Germany and as a consequence, Germany would then seal its border with the Czech Republic anyway. Also, the Czech government claims that the quota system as a permanent mechanism that would allow the European Commission to distribute refugees according to certain economic indicators would be a breach of national sovereignty. But the problem for Czech politicians is their inability to explain these arguments to their European partners mainly because of a lack of fundamental knowledge on European Union and poor language skills (EHL 2015). In general, the Czech political elite do not show too much interest in European affairs, a lack of a thorough knowledge of European decision-making and the functioning of EU policies being often observed among officials in Czech ministries. This phenomenon can also be explained by the existence of two specialized bodies for Czech EU policy – The State Secretariat of EU Affairs within the Government Office and the Foreign Affairs Ministry – which are unable to work effectively and fail to coordinate with each other and with the other Czech ministries that have implications for the EU policy (LÉKO 2011). Also, Czech officials fail to make themselves understood and to influence the negotiations in Brussels due to language barriers. For example, during a meeting of the EU interior ministers held on September 22, Milan Chovanec, the Czech interior minister was sitting alone when the others chatted because he is not able to speak any language but Czech (EHL 2015). Although the Czech prime minister opposes mandatory quotas, he claims that his government wants to help, but as a decision of a sovereign state

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and not as part of a mandatory system: “We support the right of countries to freely choose the scope of their solidarity, which we have also demonstrated by our decision to provide a home for a number of Syrian families” the Social Democrat said (BEDNÁROVÁ 2015). Moreover, the Prime Minister declared that if mandatory quotas were dropped, the country would be prepared to take in as many refugees as it did during the war in the Balkans, which was over 10,000 people. “What the country strongly objects to is the principle of a mandatory re-distribution which would be open-ended and could definitively rob the country of control over who it opens its doors to in the future” (RADIO PRAHA 2015).

Poland In Poland we notice an inconsistent speech, which evolves from the anti-Muslim or rather pro-Christian rhetoric, to the idea of rejecting refugees in the light of mandatory quotas, but subsequently the refugees were accepted and afterwards, the new Polish government rejected them again. In the second half of May 2015, the Polish Prime Minister, Ewa Kopacz, declared: “Today Christians who are being persecuted in a barbaric fashion in Syria deserve Christian countries like Poland to act fast to help them” and she decided to accept sixty families of Syrian Christians (AFP 2015B). A few days later, she stated that she opposed any kind of compulsory quotas, adding that she supported the idea of a system based on voluntary compliance by Member States of a number of refugees, but it should be the Member States, and not every European institution, who decide on their number (BEDNÁROVÁ 2015). Following this logic, the Polish Prime Minister attended the meeting of Visegrád Group, signing, along with the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak prime ministers, a joint statement in which they warned that any proposal leading to the introduction of mandatory and permanent quotas for the solidarity measures is considered unacceptable. But, contrary to all her previous declarations and promises, the Polish government decided to accept the mandatory quota system proposed by the EU. In this context, the opposition has exploited the Polish society’s feelings of fear for Islam, favouring the election of Beata Maria Szydło as the Prime Minister of

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Poland, on 25 October 2015. The new prime minister has a much tougher approach with regard to the compulsory quotas system. Amid the terrorist attacks in Paris, she declared that the situation has changed: “[w]e will be proposing to sit down at a table and think over, whether the solutions which have been proposed are good. In our view, we are not prepared to accept those quotas of refugees” (BARTECZKO AND SZARY 2015).

The reasoning behind the discourses As for the reasoning behind those national approaches that are opposing the values assumed by the EU we can identify some reasons that the four countries subjects of our analysis have in common: historical heritage, social and economic reasons and political interests. The traumas left on Central and Eastern Europe by various conquests and especially by communism have not yet been fully overcome and they have determined a behaviour of victimization among the former communist states. I do not refer to the countries playing a victim role, but to the existence of a collective mentality that is reluctant to change and lacks openness to multicultural policy against a background of fears based on historical experience. In Eastern Europe, where borders were frequently redrawn, the nation is still widely seen as an ethnic/cultural entity rather than a political one, and cultural and ethnic homogeneity is regarded as an asset that helps prevent the disintegration of the state. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the two multinational countries in the region – Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – broke up almost immediately after the disappearance of communist dictatorships (SCHWEITZER 2015). Also, on the same note, one cannot ignore the argument that the leaders of each state are following the national interest, thus justifying the refusal of the four countries to transfer any part of national sovereignty towards the supranational level of the EU. Of course, a number of internal problems faced by the governments and societies of the four countries in Central-Eastern Europe are determining the tough stance adopted towards the refugee crisis. First of all, we must take into consideration that we are talking about states that began to reg-

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ister economic progress only after the fall of communism. Therefore, they are still facing numerous problems related to poverty and economic stability and they need help from the EU to continue their development. Also following this logic, we can identify the reluctance to accept refugees in terms of the costs incurred with regard to the national budgets and national contributions to the funds intended for management of the refugee crisis, but also in terms of the European funds which could be attracted by each of the states, if we consider that the EU budget, namely the structural and the cohesion funds will be restructured to address issues of refugee integration. Secondly, we are talking about states whose social policies are dominated by systemic deficiencies, and accepting refugees would effectively double their problems. Thirdly, the attempts of the four states to integrate the Roma communities in their society have failed, and this suggests that the integration of refugees will be at least as difficult. Lastly, the tough positions taken by the Hungarian, Slovak, Czech and Polish governments can be attributed to political considerations. In the case of Hungary, Viktor Orbán promoted a xenophobic manipulative discourse to exit the crisis of internal unpopularity which he was facing. The Hungarian government’s strategy seems to have worked. Far-right sympathizers were recovered and, after a decline in late 2014 and early 2015, the popularity of Viktor Orbán and his conservative Fidesz party has been restored. As regards Slovakia, in the context of the parliamentary elections of March 2016 and the significant radicalized public opinion, the Slovak governing party Smer-SD, considered any condemnation of xenophobia or Islamophobia risky because it might be perceived as a concession in favour of a common EU policy on migration. In June 2015, 6,000 people took to the streets of Bratislava to rally against a national quota of migrants. In a country where discontent rarely takes the form of street protests, this shows the importance given by the Slovak population to this topic. People living in disadvantaged regions of southern and eastern Slovakia perceive refugees as an economic and security threat. In these circumstances, the Slovak government has developed a populist rhetoric, which consists of labelling refugees sometimes as potential terrorists, sometimes as economic migrants

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in order to manipulate the public opinion and use the momentum created by this issue to defy Brussels and therefore to build domestic political capital. In the meantime, issues like corruption scandals, economic discontent, and public frustration with the political establishment slowly begin to be forgotten (BILÁ 2015). The Czech case is similar to that of Hungary and Slovakia. In the Czech society there is a general feeling that people should be afraid of everything related to Islam, this feeling being amplified by populist politicians, headed by the president Miloš Zeman. With regards to the system of mandatory quotas for refugees, there is a unity of approach between the main Czech political parties. Nobody wants to allow foreigners to enter the country, and the problem is becoming a sort of political game: whichever party undertakes more efforts and succeeds best in refusing refugees will win the next parliamentary elections in the country, in 2017 (EHL 2015). Concerning Poland, the government’s stance on refugees was very unclear and hesitant, being determined largely by the ad hoc political dispute in the run up to the parliamentary elections held on 25 October 2016. For the former Prime Minister, Ewa Kopacz, the refugee crisis was believed to be a gift from heaven. Given that the Polish society is so homogeneous and knows almost nothing about multiculturalism, the refugee issue could be used for any political purpose, particularly ahead of the elections. The Polish government first declared a policy of resistance to the proposals of some countries in Western Europe to redistribute refugees within the EU. With this message, Kopacz went to Prague, on September 4, for a meeting with her Central European counterparts convened by Viktor Orbán. However, two weeks later, the Visegrád solidarity began to unravel. The determination of most Western European countries on the refugee issue proved to be unshakable and as a result, at a meeting of the interior ministers of the EU on September 22, the Polish government agreed to accept not only the 5,082 refugees assigned to Poland but 2,500 more, one Polish ministers acknowledging that Poland would have been outvoted anyway (KUISZ AND WIGURA 2015). After this event, Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz has been heavily criticized by Beata Maria Szydło, the leader of the right-wing opposition

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Law and Justice Party, for the betrayal of the Polish allies. The latter won the elections in October 2015.

The impact of the Visegrád Group leaders’ speeches on the effectiveness of the European Council and the European Commission’s efforts to manage the refugee crisis Following the tragic events in the Mediterranean, the EU heads of state and government met in a Special Summit on migration on 23 April 2015 and agreed to mobilise all efforts to prevent more people from dying at sea and to address the root causes of migration. On this occasion, the EU leaders decided that the reaction should be focused on four main areas: strengthening their presence at sea, fighting traffickers, preventing illegal migratory flows and reinforcing internal solidarity and responsibility, also underlining the crucial role of the Commission’s forthcoming Communication on the European agenda on migration (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2015A). This agenda was presented by the European Commission on 13 May and in addition to identifying concrete actions and measures in four key areas, stipulated that the EC will present a legislative proposal by the end of 2015 to provide for a mandatory and automatically-triggered relocation system to distribute those in clear need of international protection within the EU (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015A). While this project was widely supported by a number of states, especially Germany and Italy, countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom have expressed their surprise and criticism on this provision, stressing that the reallocation of refugees is desirable, but any decision should belong to the Member States and must have a voluntary basis. Against this background, the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, and the Belgian Minister, Theo Francken, have criticized these states that are unwilling to step up measures to help refugees (RADIO POLAND 2015). Along with the first package of proposals of the European Commission, of 27 May 2015, which included the emergency transfer of 40,000 people from Italy and Greece to other Member States and the relocation of 20,000 people from outside the EU, an EU action plan against migrant

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smuggling, guidelines on fingerprinting and a public consultation on the future of the Blue Card Directive (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015B), the discrepancies between the positions of Member States have deepened. On the one hand, the Western countries, Italy and Greece fervently supported these proposals and on the other hand, the prime ministers of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were increasingly vocal in rejecting any quota system. For example, Robert Fico declared that he does not consider it fair “that someone is dictating to us that we have to take the migrants” and on several occasions he proclaimed its readiness to join a blocking minority if the decision was to be made in the Council of the European Union on the basis of the qualified majority voting system. Moreover, the Slovak Interior Minister, Robert Kaliňák, described the Commission’s proposal as insincere and hypocritical given that the accession into Schengen is denied for Romania and Bulgaria due to a fear of Roma migration, but with North African migrants nobody seems to have a problem (BEDNÁROVÁ 2015). Despite these statements, the European Council of 25-26 June 2015 focused on three key dimensions: relocation/resettlement, return/readmission/reintegration, cooperation with countries of origin and transit. At the same time, the European Council agreed on a number of interlinked measures to help 60,000 people, including the temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from the frontline Member States Italy and Greece to other Member States of 40,000 persons and the agreement that all Member States will participate including through multilateral and national schemes in the resettling of 20,000 displaced persons in clear need of international protection, reflecting the specific situations of Member States (EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2015B: 2-3). The leaders of the four Central Eastern European states met on 4 September 2015, in Prague on the occasion of an Extraordinary Visegrád Group Summit on migration. They adopted a joint declaration which was intended to serve as a basis for coordinated positions of the countries of the Visegrád Group in the run up to the extraordinary meeting of the EU Ministers of Interior of 14 September 2015 and the October European Council. The Prague Declaration highlights the fact that Hungary is among the countries most

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exposed to migratory pressures and affected by their impacts. In this context the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic have confirmed their full support for Hungary in addressing this challenge, offering to provide Hungary with further assistance. The Joint Declaration says that the countries of the Visegrád Group will continue to fulfil their obligations under the EU program, including the responsibility to protect the EU’s external borders and Schengen area, stressing that under these conditions of great urgency, the EU must focus on a constructive dialogue leading to effective common action and avoid any mutual accusations. It has also been noted that the essence of a common approach is to preserve the voluntary nature of the measures of EU solidarity so that each Member State could rely on its experience, best practices and resources available. At the same time, a call was made for respecting the principles agreed at the highest political level, including the European Council conclusions. The Declaration warned that any proposal leading to the introduction of mandatory quotas and permanent solidarity measures would be unacceptable (CZECH PRESIDENCY OF THE VISEGRÁD GROUP 2015A). Then, in a joint conference in Prague, the Czech and Slovak leaders have declared that their governments are willing to create a rail corridor for Syrian refugees traveling from Hungary to Germany, if Berlin and Budapest agree. The Hungarian Prime Minister stressed that Germany must provide visas for refugees, so that they can go to Germany. At the same time, the four prime ministers criticized again the creation of a mandatory quotas system and Robert Fico warned that EU’s Schengen system of passport-free travel must remain intact but the uncontrolled migration raised the risk of terrorists circulating freely within the EU (AFP 2015A). A few days later, on 9 September 2015, the European Commission presented a second set of proposals: one of an emergency relocation of 120,000 people from Italy, Greece and Hungary; a permanent relocation mechanism for all member states; a common European list of safe countries of origin; a more effective return policy; a guide on public procurement rules for refugee support measures; measures to address the external dimension of the refugee crisis; and a trust fund for Africa (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2015C). This

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proposal proved to be a very controversial one and after enormous efforts to broker an agreement on the new relocation plan, the need for an urgent solution required the use of the system of qualified majority voting, on the grounds of Art. 78(3) TFEU1 and Art.80 TFEU2, although this voting mechanism is common for less-controversial measures and it has never been used for something as sensitive as migration or refugee relocation. Four countries – Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic – were against the proposal, Finland abstained from the vote and the other member states, including Poland which had opposed the quotas, voted in favour of the proposal. Thus, the Council adopted a decision which establishes an exceptional transfer mechanism involving 120,000 applicants for international protection from Italy and Greece to other Member States. It was also established that for each person transferred under this decision, the Member State where the refugees are relocated shall receive a lump sum of EUR 6,000, while Italy and Greece shall receive a lump sum of at least EUR 500 (COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2015: 88, 91). The next day, on 23 September, a special meeting of the European Council was held and this occasion was used by the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, to express his disappointment regarding the manner in which the decision on the system of compulsory quotas was made and by Viktor Orbán to suggest a plan meant to keep refugees and migrants in Syria’s neighbouring countries. He proposed the creation of a monetary fund where nations are to contribute 1% of their EU contributions and 1% of their EU income. The money would then be used to strengthen border control and send aid to refugee camps primarily in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (ROBINS-EARLY 2015).

1 Article 78(3) TFEU reads: “[…] in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned”. 2 Article 80 TFEU reads: “[…] the policies of the Union in the area of border checks, asylum and immigration and their implementation are to be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States, and Union acts adopted in this area are to contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle”.

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Over the next period, the European Council of 15 October, the Meeting on the Western Balkans migration route of 25 October, the Valletta Summit on migration and the Informal meeting of heads of state or government of 12 November, were occasions on which the European leaders met to discuss the ways to address the challenges related to migration in the long term and to improve cooperation between countries along the migration route of the Western Balkans, but also with the African countries. Meanwhile, given the conditions in which the decision was made, Slovakia has decided to appeal to the EU Court of Justice the plan to distribute 120,000 asylum seekers, based on Article 263 TFEU3. The Prime Minister, Robert Fico, declared that in his opinion the redistribution scheme should have been decided in the European Council, where he could have used its veto power (Gabrizova 2015). Also, in early December, the Hungarian government said it would follow the example of Slovakia and will file a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice against the compulsory plan adopted on 22 September (DALLISON 2015). A new twist in the process of managing the refugee crisis was caused by the terrorist attacks in Paris, on 13 November 2015, especially considering that a Syrian passport was found near the body of an attacker of the French national stadium. Greek officials confirmed that the holder of the passport went with a group of 69 refugees from Greece, and later applied for asylum in Serbia. Against the background of the Paris attacks, the Foreign Minister of Poland declared that he saw “no political possibility” of implementing the European Union’s new scheme to redistribute asylum applicants among member states and that “Poland must retain full control over its borders, asylum and immigration policy” (THE ECONOMIST 2015). Subsequently the new Polish Prime Minister said the situation has changed in light of recent 3 Article 263 of the TFEU reads: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.”

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events and effectively stopped receiving refugees. Simultaneously, the states that had voted against the mandatory quota system adopted similar positions, Fico noting triumphant that he had warned the other European leaders of “enormous security risks linked to migration. Hopefully, some people will open their eyes now” (THE ECONOMIST 2015). Moreover, even states that have advocated most actively in favour of the introduction of mandatory quotas have changed their views on migration and asylum, starting to pay particular importance to the strengthening of external borders and use of thorough controls, both at the EU external borders and national borders. This change of perception in the EU is best illustrated through the events of 29 November 2015, when, in the context of the meeting between the EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey, Angela Merkel held a mini-summit with leaders from Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden in order to continue the process of taking in and sharing hundreds of thousands of refugees a year directly from Turkey. The surprise Mini-Summit suggests that Merkel gave up the idea to convince its partners from Central and Eastern Europe to adopt a mandatory refugee-sharing scheme across the EU. The “coalition of the willing”, as defined by diplomats, asked the European Commission to present a proposal to create a voluntary system of allocating refugees, with the possibility for other countries to join the future system (TRAYNOR 2015).

Concluding Remarks At the end of this chapter, taking into account what has been argued so far, I believe that national identity, domestic conditions and personal ambitions are structuring the Heads of State and Government behaviour in the European Council and are influencing its activity and results. From the analysis that I have conducted in this chapter on the Central and Eastern European leaders’ prospects on the refugee crisis and their impact on the efficiency of the European Council and European Commission activity, I emphasize here the following conclusions:

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The main features of the discourses of Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland leaders are a constant expression of rejection of the mandatory quota system and of the support for strengthening the EU’s borders and the development of an anti-refugee and anti-Muslim rhetoric. These types of speeches are based on historical, economic, social and political factors. The main reasons for structuring the anti-refugees discourse type are ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the citizens of the four countries and their fear of multiculturalism, the desire not to transfer national sovereignty in terms of migration and asylum to the European Union, poverty and economic insecurity, the lack of effective social policies, the failure of Roma integration, the political leaders’ desire to gain popularity domestically and the desire to win the forthcoming elections. Overall the Visegrád Group leaders’ speeches were perceived as unwarranted and contrary to EU principles, most European leaders speaking about the lack of heart and reasoning of the four national leaders. At the same time, these discourses led to aggressive rhetoric by some Western Europe leaders against Central and Eastern European countries, considering the need to punish the countries that do not support the quota system proposed by the Commission by reducing their access to European funds. The attitude of the four states towards refugees and mandatory quota system proposed by the European Commission has resulted in a series of controversies and disputes at EU level and represents the main reason why this system was adopted late. However, despite opposition from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the system of reallocation of 160,000 refugees was adopted, confirming that Central and Eastern European states were right to argue that it is likely it will not work. Greece has proved to be unable to retain refugees in the so-called hotspots, from where they should be picked and moved to Europe, and some refugees have refused to go even in relatively rich countries. In this context and in light of the Paris attacks, the EU policy has gradually begun to focus on strengthening the external borders, a measure of securitization heavily supported by the four Visegrád states.

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Hungary and the Migrant Crisis

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I

t is well known, that Hungary’s Prime Minister is no stranger to controversy, especially when it comes to matters of the European Union. The situation is the same in the current context of the European migrant crisis. Viktor Orbán, in an effort to defend and uphold Europe’s common values – among which the main pillar in his vision is Christianity – has set off on the war path against allowing migrants into his country or the EU. Seeing as Hungary is currently on the outer edge of the Schengen area, the country’s officials have taken it upon themselves to play the role of gatekeepers of Christianity, channeling their medieval forefathers, even though Judeo-Christian values have been removed as constitutional basis for the Union. However, it is also true, that Hungary has been reluctant to receive outsiders in past years, regardless of where they came from. The situation is more than somewhat ironic, as EU laws allow for easy travel, be it in touristic or work purposes, inside the Schengen area. This standpoint has been properly reinforced by the banners that popped up all throughout the country, seemingly overnight. The purpose of these banners, which bare Hungary’s coatof-arms, was to warn immigrants about the rules one has to play by once one finds oneself inside the country’s borders. Texts such as “If you come to Hungary you cannot take the Hungarians` jobs” stand proof of a profoundly antagonistic viewpoint. They also fuel the ‘fear-campaign’ relied upon by many a politician during the course of history. The fear-campaign would of course not be complete (nor very effective for that matter) without the * This is an article published in Journal of Global Politics and Current Diplomacy, 2015, 3(2): 31-40.

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hate speech and antagonizing of alterity, employed with such finesse by the leading politicians in Hungary. The anti-migrant propaganda in Hungary was set in high gear from 2014 onward, not even the official website of the Hungarian Government was exempt. The mentioned site, as many such sites do, has a news stream which serves as official communication between the Government and the public. Articles and communiqués are uploaded constantly regarding any matter of state, be it internal or external. Between September and December there was an abundance uploaded material that had to do with the migrant crisis, refugees and/or Hungary and other EU states’ debates on the matter. At the same time, in seemingly every other material, there was a reference to the aforementioned subjects, be it even a hidden apropos in a sentence. Viktor Orbán has a keen sense, when it comes to public speaking. His oratorical and debate style is mostly confrontational. He relies heavily on influencing his public by use of emotional cues. He has held his position on the migrant crisis and has developed a rhetoric that reveals a ‘savior-complex’ and an unwavering negative attitude towards alterity coupled with the firm belief that that he and his Government are the only ones treating the matter appropriately and lawfully. He has taken many opportunities to express that Hungary is protecting its own borders and by doing so the European Union’s border. In a speech given in Parliament in the second half of the month of September, he stated that “the migrants are not only pounding on the door, but they are breaking the door down on us” (ORBÁN 2015E). The manner of expression does not only display the above mentioned negative attitude towards alterity, but also criminalizes it, by use of terminology that denotes aggression, invasion of privacy and a criminal act, fueling the fear-campaign. In the same speech, he compared the measures taken by the government to those of a person protecting their family (ORBÁN 2015E). The statement directly contrasts with that above and evokes feelings of which the human brain’s primal region is responsible, those of danger and survival. To the same effect, he also described the migrant crisis as a “brutal threat” (ORBÁN 2015E). After

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the Paris attacks on the 13th November 2015, his position and rhetoric in the migrant crisis began to gain more and more ground. Orbán held an extraordinary speech at the Hungarian Parliament on the 16th November in which he sought to make his position on the matter clear once again, which began with the phrase `Europe has been attacked! `, and through which he summarized all that Hungary had done and all reactions to it (ORBÁN 2015F). The Asylum Information Database’s Country Report on Hungary, issued in November 2015, a document bearing the logo of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and edited by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles provides for a clearer understanding of what it takes to be considered eligible for asylum in Hungary. It contains an overwhelming amount of information, the essence of which is that there are gaping holes and inconsistencies in the country’s asylum procedure. Some of the issues seem solvable. Others, however seem to have been tailor made so as to prevent positive responses on asylum claims. Such is the case with what is known in EU law as ‘safe third country’ rule. In July 2015, the Hungarian government, amending the relevant legislation regarding asylum, created two lists: one of countries of origin, another of third countries deemed to be safe. In both instances EU candidate countries, with the exception of Turkey, are considered safe. This category includes Serbia. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) set forth recommendations against considering Serbia a safe third country in 2012, on the basis of its lack of “a functioning asylum system” (ECRE 2015: 45), a viewpoint which it still maintains, and is strengthened by the opinion of Amnesty International (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2015: 78). The amendment to the Hungarian Asylum Act entered into force on the 1st of August. Seeing as the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers entered into the country by means of the Hungarian-Serbian border, the fact that the latter mentioned country is silently acknowledged as a safe third country means that the totality of asylum claims issued by these people have been or will be rejected (ECRE 2015: 44-45). Furthermore, failing to take into consideration the UNHCR’s position in the aspect of safe third countries and, as such, applying the concept in an improper manner constitutes

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a violation of Hungary’s obligations as per EU laws (HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE 2015: 7). Once the Hungarian Asylum Act was amended, measures started being taken in order to slow down the constant influx of migrants, which had seemingly become the sole focus of the government. The building of physical barriers, i.e. barbed wire fences at the Hungarian-Serbian border, at first and the Croatian-Hungarian border after was defended by the government, who chose to argue the need to register each and every person who claims refugee status, in order to be in accordance with EU law (ORBÁN 2015A). Compliance was impossible beforehand because of the fact that most migrants crossed the border into Hungary on the sidelines, and not at the official check-points. Thus, by means of the fences, the government could ensure the necessary conditions for the law to be enforced. In addition, Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, defended these actions by stating the need to protect ‘the European lifestyle’, a choice of words which again constitutes an argument against alterity. He utilized the same frame of thought early in 2015, in January, after the attacks in Paris, France, related to the Charlie Hebdo publication, by being one of the first voices to blame migration for the onset of terrorism. In this instance, he described migration as a threat to the European way of life (ZALÁN 2015). The act of setting a physical boundary is that more disconcerting, seeing as it is, and always has been widely known, that most of whom the fence is meant to keep out do not plan to reside in Hungary, but to move on to other, wealthier countries in Western and Northern Europe, most of which have consented to allowing them in. As they are sure to be aware of this, Hungarian officials seem not only to have taken it upon themselves to be the gatekeepers of Europe, against dangers from the outside, but seem determined to save the EU from itself. The second list, the one listing safe countries of origin, is again viewed as another breach of international legislation, in the sense that it provides for people seeking asylum to be discriminated against on the basis of their nationality, of where they come from. People fleeing countries marked as “safe” will have a much harder task in explaining why their particular situ-

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ation in that country or upon their return to that country would constitute basis for being awarded refugee status in Hungary. The fences, mentioned earlier in the present article, went up beginning with the month of July, regarding Serbia, and September, regarding Croatia. The migrants, who up until the summer of 2015 were viewed as a severe inconvenience, now became a severe threat to the nation’s sovereignty, terminology widely utilized in propaganda articles and Hungarian officials’ speeches. Even more measures were taken, which might be described as drastic. After erecting the fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border, on the 15th of September officials amended the legislation in a way which meant anyone crossing the border irregularly would be committing a crime and as such, face legal action and be arrested. The government also thought of a way to further lessen the numbers of people crossing into Hungary, passing amendments which allow police and army personnel to use specific, non-lethal weapons, such as rubber bullets and tear gas (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2015: 76). Official international reactions followed, as expected. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, made a statement regarding the matter in which he expressed his views and accused Hungarian officials of violating international law: “The package of measures brought in overnight between Monday to Tuesday is incompatible with the human rights commitments binding on Hungary, (…) This is an entirely unacceptable infringement of the human rights of refugees and migrants. Seeking asylum is not a crime, and neither is entering a country irregularly.” (OHCHR 2015). In his statement, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also referred to the aforementioned poster campaign run in Hungary in 2014 and earlier in 2015, which provided another reason for Zeid Ra’ad Zeid AlHussein to consider the Hungarian government’s actions to be xenophobic and anti-Muslim (OHCHR 2015). When faced with criticism, being it of any kind and coming from any direction, Hungarian high officials uphold a strong front, defending the measures taken. Szijjártó Péter, the Minister for External Affaires expressed

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disappointment regarding the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ critique, stating Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein does not judge the fact that the Hungarian policemen stationed at the border were victims of prolonged assault at the hands of aggressive migrants who threw rocks and pieces of concrete at them (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015D). In an interview for the Austrian Der Standard in early September, Szijjártó replied to criticism received from the Austrian chancellor on the issue of the fence being built on the Hungarian-Serbian border. Szijjártó stated that the chancellor’s position is confusing, seeing as he had urged Hungary to register migrants and not to let them pass into Austria beforehand, and is at this point criticizing the Hungarian-Serbian fence, which was meant to do just that (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015C). Although there were conflicts between Hungarian and Austrian officials, in late September, Austria recognized the need for a border control system on the Hungarian-Croatian border (ORBÁN 2015B). Furthermore, by late October it became clear that even Austria was considering the idea of building their own physical barrier on the border (ZALÁN 2015). In order to assure cooperation between Hungary and Serbia, Szijjártó and his Serbian counterpart, Ivica Dacic, held talks in Belgrade, on the 18th September. The Hungarian Minister for External Affaires stated that Hungary has not one, but three suggestions with regard to the migrant crisis: the creation of a force within the EU which would be equipped to protect the Greek borders; the EU should take over the financing of the existing refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon and also build new ones; the EU should offer monetary support to the countries on the transit path of the migrants, Macedonia and Serbia (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015G). Moreover, he stated that in these instances, Hungary would be willing to accept some sort of quota agreement, seeing as the burden should be shared by all 28 Member States (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015G). At the same time, conflicts with Croatian officials came to a head, when Croatia began sending unregistered migrants to the Croatian-Hungarian border, without notifying Hungarian officials, who viewed the incident as a border violation and one that is under suspicion of multiple criminal

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offences (KOVÁCS 2015). Szijjártó was quick to point out that while Zoran Milanović, Croatian Prime Minister judged Hungary on the way they treated migrants, the Croatian immigration system cracked under pressure in less than two days (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015E). The outcome of the conflict was the fence set up on the border. The lack of diplomatic rhetoric is an all too obvious characteristic of the Hungarian Minister for External Affaires with regard to the migrant crisis. Referring to a statement made by the Greek Minister for Internal Affaires about the fact that Greece protects its borders, Szijjártó responded in a press release by blatantly affirming that the Greek Government believes that the European people are stupid. Translating the actual quote in one of the news articles on the Hungarian Government’s website, it would sound somewhat as follows: “(…) it would be beneficial, if the Greek Government would stop considering the European people stupid, but would proceed to take meaningful steps in order to protect its borders and register the immigrants.” (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015B). When prompted by a journalist at a press conference on the 19th of September regarding his harsh statements, Szijjártó explained that in this case, there is no room for diplomatic finesse (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015H). However, Szijjártó’s Romanian counterpart, Bogdan Aurescu, cannot be accused of having a well thought out diplomatic rhetoric either in his criticism regarding the physical barriers built on the Hungarian borders. The Romanian Minister for External Affaires at the time, stated that the erection of fences is an “autistic and unacceptable gesture” (PURCĂREA 2015). The statement is of course offensive to many and unbecoming of a state official, especially due to the fact that he used a term describing a disorder in a way for it to mean abnormal, colloquially stupid. However, Szijjártó was, again, quick to respond, saying that he had hoped for more humility from a minister under a Prime Minister who is facing criminal charges (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015I). The outcome was similar to that of the conflict with Croatia, though not as drastic: the continuing of the Hungarian-Serbian fence onto the Hungarian-Romanian border was decided, however, no action was taken.

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In October at the mini-summit on Western Balkan migration, Orbán reiterated that the measures taken by Hungary had the purpose of complying with Dublin and Schengen asylum and border security rules (ZALÁN 2015). This is the same reason for which when word came of a possible mini-Schengen area, where some Western states might have reintroduced mandatory border control (a measure similar to which they had so vehemently criticized Hungary for undertaking) and Hungary would have been left out of it, Orbán voiced the following opinion: “[It would be unacceptable for Hungary to be pushed out of Schengen] because we were the only ones out of the Member States, who truly protected the Schengen’s, that is the free movement area’s outer borders.” (ORBÁN 2015C) His statement came after the four states of the Visegrad Group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia), at their summit in Prague, on the 3rd of December reached an agreement to form a common front against the idea of restricting freedom of movement between states already part of the Schengen area, arguing that the proposal diverts political attention without targeting the core problem. At the same time, they announced the forming of a group they named ‘Friends of Schengen’, which they intend to be a forum for discussion on the matter (CZECH PRESIDENCY 2015: 2). Hungary’s Prime Minister also voiced his view on border control, stating that it is a “question of sovereignty” and “national responsibility” (ORBÁN 2015D). After multiple negative reactions to the measures taken by them, Hungary still does not seem willing to compromise in any aspect regarding the migrant crisis, including the matter of the system of quotas. Hanging on to the firm belief that the system of quotas will not solve the main issue of the crisis, in late September the countries of the Visegrad Group decided to reject the system of quotas suggested by Brussels (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015A). The Hungarian Minister of External Affaires stated that debating a system of quotas is a waste of time (SZIJJÁRTÓ 2015F). Instead, the reaction of the Hungarian Prime Minister and his cabinet was to ask for “a world-scale answer to a world-scale problem” (ORBÁN 2015G), so they suggested to the

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UN that the quota system should be a burden beard by all states, not only in Europe. In their opposition to the system of quotas, Hungarian officials endorsed a petition to gather signatures of citizens in order to further oppose it. Hungary even went as far as to proceed with legal action against the system of quotas at the Court of Justice of the European Union, the plaint’s arrival at the aforementioned institution was announced on the 4th of December on Hungarian national television (TRÓCSÁNYI 2015). This was the second such plaint to arrive at the Court of Justice, after Slovakia also handed in a similar document. It is interesting to observe that the Hungarian Minister for Justice seems to agree with a statement launched by one of the show’s hosts, regarding the fact that the system of quotas is a measure that goes against the principles of the Geneva Convention. The question posed by the Minister for Justice was if the fact that they are denied a choice of where to settle is contrary to recognition of their human dignity (TRÓCSÁNYI 2015). Hungary has been a thorn in the EU’s side in many aspects over the time it has been a member. However, in this case, against all the negative responses and negative press it has received for the manner in which it’s officials have chosen to deal with the migrant crisis, there are many, not necessarily in positions of power, but citizens of the EU, who stand by the actions taken by Hungary and who view it as a positive. The message boards of many related articles and that of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Facebook page stand testament. (ORBÁN FACEBOOK) Of course, even more continue to oppose Hungary’s position citing multiple treaty and convention related offences. In any case, the debate becomes one of decoding a legal nebula in the EU framework, which provides for the existence of loopholes, which then can be exploited by anyone capable of perceiving them. Does the asylum seekers’ right to benefit from international protection override the right of the state to protect its citizens and its borders, or is it the other way around? This question seemingly only has a moral answer, as in the moral obligation of states to ensure protection for people fleeing from an area in which war and conflict and insecurity are the norm, should these people ask for pro-

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tection. The main fear of alterity, so profoundly exploited by politicians and media alike, in this case refers to the concern that, amongst the people who ‘deserve’ help (i.e. the people fleeing from conditions mentioned above), Islamic State fundamentalists are hiding, waiting for an opportunity to pounce. This idea in itself cannot be combated, because the likelihood of it is too great. In any case, European states should have been able to notice warning signs of what can only be described as a mass exodus coming their way. Theoretically, at least, they should have been able to produce an early warning system, which could recognize and assess potential terrorist threats, in an effort to stop them.

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European NGO’

and the Refugee Crisis: Case studies of Serbia and Hungary*5 GABRIEL UIFĂLEAN

T

he events in Syria have provoked a grave humanitarian problem that affects not only the neighbouring countries of the war-torn state, but also the ones located on other continents where many victims seek escape from the conflict. Governments and international organizations have taken different stances on the matter, each underlining particular interests that they hold above everything else in their approach. Some have welcomed the displaced people and have sought to offer them safe haven, others have chosen to keep them in specially set up camps until they are able to return to their homeland, while others have closed their borders completely. Public opinion has also been sharply divided between those who wish to help these people by welcoming them as their neighbours and those who look at the masses with suspicion, dreading the potential dangers they see in letting so many people into their countries. In this difficult context, several non-governmental organizations have risen to the challenge of responding to the crisis. Through the means available to them, many have attempted to help the people afflicted by the events. Working with other institutions and authorities, they represent actors that warrant more consideration and a more careful review of the role they play in supporting humanitarian causes worldwide. While it would be unrealistic to say that any and all such organizations are bound to act when faced with such situations, it is important to note that those that have become involved do provide some improvement to the situation, at the lowest levels. This chapter will attempt to offer a perspective on how civil society takes a *

This is an article published in Journal of Global Politics and Current Diplomacy 2015, 3(2): 41-53.

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stance on such an issue. As such, the focus will be on understanding these actors’ standing on the international stage, on their objectives and interests, on their actions and their results. A deeper understanding of what civil societies and NGO’s are, and what they offer for the communities in which they are active, will help establish a starting point. Moving further we can attempt to identify the main ways in which they act to achieve their objectives and then apply our analysis to a few examples of NGO’s involved in the refugee crisis at the moment. We will be looking for connections between such organizations and humanitarianism in modern society. The main questions that we seek to answer are: (1) What type of NGO’s are involved in this crisis? (2) What are their objectives and their means of actions? (3) What is their impact in the broader perspective of a crisis that sparks intense debates on all levels of the international and national stage? The last question in particular will be difficult to answer, seeing how the work of such organizations is often not as well documented and reported, both internally and externally, as that of an official governmental institution, for example. As such it can be difficult to determine the true implications that the actions of NGO’s have in influencing the general problem. Not only that, but it can be difficult to analyse them as a united front, acting towards the same ends, seeing how even when their objectives are similar, they often act completely independent from one another. This could be considered a major detriment in achieving their full potential. The cases studied in this chapter will view the general situation of some European countries affected by the crisis, where NGO’s have made a mark. Thus we have the case of Serbia, where civil society is providing a rapid and effective response along with other important actors in the region. We also have the case of Hungary, where institutions have reacted defensively to the tide of refugees, yet organizations and citizens have tried to actively help them nonetheless. The humanitarian response has been visible in these countries and non-state actors have been at the forefront.

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Defining NGO’s and their place in international humanitarian aid Non-governmental organizations have existed in various forms throughout modern history. Examples ranging from the associations advocating equal voting rights for all people, environmental protection organizations and charities have shown the ability to grow from local groups to transnational actors (DAVIES 2014). Their efforts are often recognized by both states and international institutions and they change the way in which certain issues are viewed and solved. Ever since the formation of the United Nations, NGO’s have been valued as providers of expertise in their field of interest and partners in realizing projects aimed at helping communities at regional or international levels (MARTENS 2005). In 1989 the World Bank released Operational Directive 14.70, which sets a framework for involving NGO’s in its activities. This document offers us a useful summary of the main elements that define this type of organization. In essence, they represent private, non-profit, value-based associations that are unaffiliated to any government (WORLD BANK 1989). Acting in specific areas of interest (ex. Environmental protection, humanitarianism or education) they carry out activities that promote certain values and bring about a change in a community that they see as being beneficial to the people that form the said community. They are largely funded by contributions from their members, donations or certain funds established by states or international bodies, with the entire budget invested in their activities. Through their constitution, the members of an NGO exercise the right to vote on the principal policies of the organization, including electing representatives and management. When acting on a national or international level, many NGO’s develop an expertise in their field and are able to provide valuable information that can be used in drafting policies or policy recommendations by the proper authorities. Often characterized as supporting charity and development at a societal level, NGO’s take initiative on many humanitarian causes. The basic principles of humanitarianism, as established by the United Nations General Assembly, strongly resonate with the basic principles under which most organizations operate. The desire to protect life and respect for human

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beings (Humanity), to act in accordance only with the need of a person (Impartiality), without being influenced by outside factors of power (Independence) or being drawn to choose sides in conflict (Neutrality) (UNGA 1991), are paramount to an organizations’ system of values. Thus we can understand that they will seek to direct their own resources towards specific groups of people in need. It should be noted that organizations have as a defining feature their reliance on volunteering members and on the funding that they can receive through grants given by private or public institutions. It is therefore essential for an NGO to be able to offer comprehensive and feasible programs and projects to access the necessary funding and support from national or international authorities, as well as to have the capabilities to attract potential volunteers to help in their cause (GIBBS ET AL. 1999). One could argue that giving people the opportunity to volunteer is also an important step in fulfilling a group’s goal. By bringing previously uninvolved members of the community in the campaigns, they learn the values of the organizations, become influenced by them and integrate them in their own way of thinking. This can create an ever larger base of supporters that will drive society towards a change of values, attitudes and practices. In the context of a refugee crisis that puts pressure on local governments to act in managing a large influx of migrants pass through its borders, as is the case of countries such as Turkey, Serbia, Greece, Hungary or Austria, local NGO’s can face an especially strong pressure to put together a proper response in due time. However, one could argue that it is in these situations that more people feel encouraged to volunteer and help in the unfolding situation. Associations that are able to put together an adequate structure to facilitate volunteering can attract many members of society who want to contribute, as they would feel safer in the group and gain confidence that collective effort will bring changes that individual sacrifice would not. Donations coming from concerned citizens could also be more easily attainable, as many are drawn to the humane and charitable nature of organizations that seek to help large groups in need of help.

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The Operational Directive of the World Bank states some of the key factors in an NGO’s success. These include partnerships with donors and institutions, a political environment where comprehensive laws regulate and encourage NGO activity, the ability to operate with limited resources in an efficient manner, to promote community involvement and to respond rapidly and effectively as soon as problems arise (WORLD BANK 1989). These are elements that we will see to a certain degree in our case studies.

Case study: Serbia According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, over 485,000 had registered their intention to seek asylum in the year 2015, at the end of November (UNHCR 2015B). Even before the influx reached its peak in October, there were already large groups arriving in July-August. Many of those who wished to go further into the European continent would become stranded for long periods of time, especially after the neighbouring countries Hungary and Croatia closed their borders. Several camps were set up near Serbian border towns, while a large percentage remained near Belgrade waiting to be registered. Both national and international organizations have intervened to help in managing the situation. The UN Serbian Country Team has allocated a total budget of 7.45 million dollars to offer basic necessities for the victims (UNHCR 2015B). NGO’s cooperated with authorities and specialized agencies right from the beginning in order to cover the most important needs of the people arriving in the country: access to food, water, sanitation, housing and information. We can find examples of projects undertaken by organizations to start fundraising and donation campaigns, put in place regular supply deliveries, establish contact with major refugee groups, bring experts to offer them legal assistance, counselling and other forms of assistance. Refugee Aid Serbia gives us an example of how local NGO’s were able to create a common platform on which to act. It was formed as an umbrella group of 9 organizations, in order to pool their efforts to provide aid for the refugees stranded in Belgrade (HAINES-YOUNG 2015). These included

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local branches of international organizations such as Save the Children and ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency), as well as local organizations such as Giving Back Serbia, the Anna and Vlade Divac Foundation and the Belgrade Foreign Visitors Club. Most of them were concerned with different social problems than those posed by the influx of migrants in the capital, yet they were able to find common ground in the desire to offer better conditions for the refugees. With the help of their extensive network of contacts and related organizations, they were able to bring over 500 volunteers from over 50 countries to Belgrade to assist in their daily activities and have been continuously gathering donations since September 2015 (REFUGEE AID SERBIA 2015). They based their approach on the idea that intervention has to be swift and effective, in order to maintain a steady flow of aid for the refugees. As such, they partnered with local businesses, such as clothes manufacturers, food and water suppliers, transportation firms to deliver the supplies anywhere needed free of charge, telecom companies for Wi-Fi and charging stations and individual donors who would offer to pay for accommodation in hotels for children or families (HAINES-YOUNG 2015). From the end of September until the present, Refugee Aid Serbia has been conducting its operations with increasing support from local and international communities. The reports made by the UNHRC show how each of these organizations were also able to implement specific programs, as part of the broader efforts to assist refugees. Save the Children and SOS Children, for example, focused on offering housing, sanitation, psycho-social support and protection for children and their families in designated safe spaces (UNHCR 2015A). Other specialized organization offered legal advice or translation in languages spoken by the displaced people. In the latter category we find the example of The Belgrade Centre of Human Rights, an organization concerned with the theory and practice of human rights. Since 1995, The Belgrade Centre of Human Rights have formed a team of professionals in fields concerning social/political sciences, economics and law, in order to both study and promote human rights nationally (BELGRADE CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 2015A). Their usual activities include publishing,

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researching and reporting the state of human rights in the country, informing the public and putting forwards suggestions for laws and reforms of state institutions. More recently they have focused intensely on providing legal assistance to asylum seekers and humanitarian assistance. Together with the UNHCR they conducted a 12-month project, starting in January 2015, to bring legal advisors to the asylum seekers entering the country. Their stated objectives are to help people understand the rights granted to them by national and international law, so that they may be able to apply for asylum respecting the necessary procedures (BELGRADE CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 2015B). The contact they establish with the refugees also helps in signalling potential human rights abuses they may have been subjected to. As recently as November 2015 a report was issued by the organization regarding the inadequate treatment they received from the Bulgarian police, as they were passing through the country to reach Serbia. The Centre has gone so far as to submit recommendations for the Bulgarian authorities on how to better handle the flow of refugees and migrants and how to prevent abuses. These focused not only on the way in which the Bulgarian authorities instruct and monitor their agents, but also on allowing civil society and outside institutions (the Ombudsman, the National Preventive Mechanism against Torture) to assist in managing the situation, to ease tensions that may occur between the arriving people and the police (BELGRADE CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 2015C). We can observe from their example that an NGO can use their influence to interact with state institutions, to implement new policies and procedures to resolve matters. By encouraging debate over the policies regarding the granting of asylum or migration policies, for example, long term legislative solutions may be obtained. To date it is difficult to accurately ascertain the true extent to which their contribution has influenced local institutions to change regulations and practices, however the fact that they bring these topics into discussion is important for the democratic process and decision making cycle, nonetheless.

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Case study: Hungary The Hungarian government has come under criticism from media, international institutions and advocacy groups for the decisions they made regarding the problem of the asylum seekers. The national Parliament brought a series of amendments to the country’s legislation that allows authorities to declare a state of crisis in certain areas on the basis of trouble caused by “mass immigration”, authorizes the use of military personnel to help in managing the situation, criminalizes illegal border crossing, as well as damaging barriers (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2015). The borders were closed, fences and rows of razor wire were put in place and both police forces and soldiers on guard had authorization to use their weapons in defence against unarmed refugees. Several people were convicted of illegal border crossing and placed in detention camps, where sometimes asylum seekers were also housed until they received response on their applications. Many others were sent back to Serbia, Greece or Macedonia, which were declared “safe areas” for them (NÉPSZABADSÁG ZRT. 2015). Riots were documented between the groups of people seeking to enter or pass through the country and the authorities keeping them in place. Civil society groups have generally declared their dissatisfaction with the fact that they were not allowed in the transit zones along the Hungarian Serbian border, where many of these altercations took place. As a result of these new legislative measures, over 1,100 people were being detained for illegal border crossing in October (though the number has steadily decreased), the number of people arriving the country, asylum applications and asylum statuses granted all fell drastically (UNHCR 2015B). Hungary has taken a firm stance against the plan to redistribute asylum seekers in various EU countries by varying quotas and it has been reported that they launched media campaigns meant to deter others from coming to Europe. Excessive use of force in dealing with protesting migrants, unsuitable conditions in the detention and reception camps, slow response to asylum requests and hostile language used by local politicians to describe them has been reported (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2015A). In this situation local NGO’s faced difficulties due to a general reluctance of the governing

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bodies and a majority of the population to assist the asylum seekers and welcome them into the country. They attempted not only to directly help these people, but also to urge local authorities to reconsider their stance. One example is a joint statement released in September 2015, with over 40 signatories, in which the government is called upon to improve its efforts in managing the situation at Röszke, cooperate with the proper international bodies and ensure that they act with “due respect for human rights” (GREENPEACE HUNGARY 2015). In the small town neighbouring the Serbian border, hundreds of people were forced to a halt on their way into the EU, and kept outside by officers assigned to control the flow of people arriving into the country (FIELD 2015). On 16th of September there was an altercation that received international attention, as police armed in full riot gear pushed back the refugees trying to get past a crossing gate. A UNHCR representative commented that they had the necessary logistics to help the authorities manage the situation, yet their offers were rejected (FIELD 2015). What some national news outlets saw as a violent act committed by asylum seekers angered at the border patrols, others saw as a failure of the government to adequately handle the refugee situation, leaving organizations, independent groups and international organs to attempt to improve the situation. Similar to our previous case study, we see a variety of different organizations stand behind this initiative, in spite of their different missions: Amnesty International Hungary, Chance for Children Foundation (concerned with helping and educating disadvantaged children), Clean Air Action Group, Green Academy, Greenpeace Hungary (ecologically oriented), European Network Against Racism Hungary, Hungarian LGBT Association, Rainbow Mission Foundation (concerned with gay, bisexual and transgender rights) (GREENPEACE HUNGARY 2015). The fact that they all gathered around this initiative shows that civil society is capable of operating in an informal network, in order to show support for a common cause. While these groups are attempting to bring different problems to the forefront of public discussion, they are often seen in the same light: as countercultural, opposed to the current status quo, attempting to right a certain

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wrong in society, in line with norms that transcend national consciousness and become transnationally relevant. It’s important to note that this solidarity could be enhanced by the recent actions the government has taken in regards to NGO’s that deal in divisive social, political or cultural issues. After several politicians accused members of being political activists attempting to ‘enforce foreign interests’ in the country (HUNGARIAN SPECTRUM 2015), several audits were ordered on some of these organizations (especially those who accessed foreign funding, such as the EEA grants), going so far as to lead to legal prosecution for suspicion of engaging in illegal activities (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2015B). This attitude has been called hostile by delegates of the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2014, who see it as an attempt to silence or discourage NGO’s who are critical of the government and support causes that it does not agree with (HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE 2015). One of the most remarkable movements created during this period is Migration Aid. Originally established by the Entrepreneurs Club Association in Budapest in June 2015 (BUDAPEST SENTINEL 2015) to distribute supplies for the asylum seekers and help them reach the camps they were assigned to (MIGRATION AID 2015), they soon attracted numerous followers and branched out to become a semi-structured organism capable of acting somewhat independently. Communicating mainly through social media, they acted as a platform where willing citizens could become ad hoc volunteers and later as a group that has an effective internal functioning mechanism. They recruited full time coordinators to manage teams and meetings in the main areas and established communication mechanism to help groups cooperate, thus giving somewhat of a formal hierarchy and functionality within their organization (BUDAPEST SENTINEL 2015). Although many financial donations have been sent to them, they have avoided them so as not to attract criticism or scrutiny from financial monitoring institutions. Similarly, to the NGO mentioned in the previous case study, they send messages through all communication means regarding the kind of materials most needed by refugees, so that the public may choose to donate the respective items. In an interview given by the spokesperson of the group

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for the Budapest Sentinel, she has stated that this form of support comes as a form of ‘quiet protest’ of many people who disagree with the negative view the media and the government hold against the asylum seekers, that many do not share these views and would rather see humanitarian action taken to help them (BUDAPEST SENTINEL 2015). At the same time, it could be said that such a structure is unstable to a certain degree and the movement could disband as quickly as it was formed, if it does not serve a purpose. Even in the interview the representative of the group said that their plans were not for the long term and they were uncertain of how long their organization could last. With the closure of the borders and the halt of transit in October 2015, it seemed as if Migration Aid would have little to contribute to. It is remarkable in this sense that they were able to refocus their efforts on areas still confronted with large groups of immigrants and go beyond the borders of their country to achieve their goals. With the help of volunteers inspired by their story, an organization was registered in the UK by the name of Migration Aid International, to carry out their activities in any country affected by the crisis (MIGRATION AID INTERNATIONAL 2015). Their teams are present throughout the Balkans, helping asylum seekers along the main migration routes. What’s more, they continuously advertise efforts made by other organizations and use their large following on their website and social media pages to inform people on the most recent developments in the refugee crisis. It is impressive to see a shift from urgent improvised humanitarian intervention at a national level, to a more long-term transnational organization, acting out public awareness campaigns and sending autonomous volunteer teams in critical areas. This shows that in spite of restrictions placed by local policy, civil society is capable of finding the means to carry out their stated mission, even if this means internationalizing their concept and organization. A similar concept, but with differing means of action, can be seen in the case of the Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary, an activist group formed by both natives and refugees in 2012, in order to lobby for refugee rights

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(MIGSZOL 2015). Their history shows that they have used methods often associated with NGO’s engaged in controversial topics. The have spoken out against laws and regulation that seem biased and unfair towards the target group (ex. A law criminalizing homelessness passed in 2013) and unfair condition in which they are treated (MIGSZOL 2015). They go further by organizing demonstrations against such laws: protests, meetings, circles of silence against them. They also engage the asylum seekers in their camps, so as to assess the state in which they are being kept and discover their needs, motivations and opinions. While this organization has attempted to assist refugees through direct charitable acts, their main focus seemed to be activism aimed at encouraging people to demand a solution at a national level. As such they concentrated on informing the public regarding the plight of asylum seekers, protested against the legislative measures taken by the state to meet the problem and encouraged all EU citizens to contact their MEP’s, with a standard email asking them to pressure the Hungarian government to renounce some of the measures it has adopted (NO-RACISM. NET 2015). While these actions have attracted the support of many citizens and have drawn participation in their gatherings, these groups were largely ignored by authorities. To date they have not communicated any intent to discuss the situation with the protesters, nor acknowledge their requests. As a conclusion we can say that in Hungary both grassroots movements and established organizations have found common ground in trying to offer short and long-term solutions for the crisis at hand. They have been able to gather groups of volunteers and donations on a continual basis, without monitoring membership strictly or keeping strict logs of resources made available to them. It would seem that this was enough to deal with the initial large waves of asylum seekers, however they did become more structured and formal when the flow was reduced and more focused action was needed. Well established organizations continued to protest against the treatment they received from the authorities and called for more adequate action in the refugee crisis. It would seem that the recent problems have become a milestone in their struggle to encourage certain values in

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the public space and increase their legitimacy in the face of the government and of the Hungarian people.

Concluding Remarks The recent troubles caused by the large number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015 has brought about an impressive response from civil society. In a relatively short period of time they have managed to establish a somewhat continuous flow of supplies and services for the people in need, thus improving their condition and alleviating a part of the pressure put on local authorities. As we have seen in the case studies, many different types of organizations have decided to respond to the cause of helping asylum seekers, linking it to their respective mission statements and objectives. Often what they share in common is an orientation towards charitable activities that help people in need, acting in favour of people that are in a way or another marginalized and vulnerable and the desire to improve society by fostering compassion and civic participation. This has led to various associations joining in a unified effort either to offer direct intervention in areas of interest, or to bring awareness of the problem to society and encourage debate and constructive solutions for authorities. We cannot be certain to what extent their activism becomes noticed by governments, especially since it can be argued that certain states have little regard for voices coming from this sector of the population. It is important to take note of the grassroots initiatives that have come up as well. With participants representing various subgroups of the local population, these groups have been successful in organizing large scale volunteer activities and donation campaigns to bring those willing to the heart of the situation. They have even proved themselves successful enough to formalize their structure and continue supporting their cause. This may show that even civic movements that arise from an urgent unforeseen need in society can have the ability to bring about a certain benefit to it, but also to demonstrate the capacity to establish themselves as fully-fledged legal

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entities and functioning organizations. It remains to be seen if these newly formed movements will continue to function even when the current problems will subside, or when the public support that propels them to act will start to wane. Considering that public opinion on refugees and those that help them may be swayed either towards support or aversion very quickly, depending on new controversies that arise, it could become very difficult for these organizations to be able to sustain themselves only through public support. Seeing as authorities in our case studies have either worked in parallel with these organizations, without seeking a partnership that would unite efforts as a whole, or that they may have even placed barriers and hindrances in their way, they may find it more and more difficult. Moreover, as governments in certain countries show hostility towards asylum seekers or are simply unwilling to use the full extent of their abilities to help them. We can be certain that the work of these organizations and groups shows that at a national and international level there is a willingness to become involved coming from the general public. Their actions are noticed by international organizations such as the UNHCR, as they represent an integral part of a larger response to a crisis of a European scale. While they may face certain difficulties in their wake, and the true results and effect of their involvement is difficult to measure, they are certainly having an impact on the situation, one that deserves more attention and a detailed analysis in the future.

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Part III

Another case of the Refugeee Crisis

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The Humanitarian Ukrainian Crisis and the European Union MIHAI ILEA

T

he Ukrainian population that has migrated towards the European Union (EU) Member States’ territories represents a current issue, especially given the large number of migrants seeking shelter. The problem started after the outbreak of the Ukrainian Crisis which has resulted in the dislocation of over 2.5 million people. The issue we intend to analyse is determined by the large number of Ukrainians that have left their country to seek shelter in the EU. For example, in 2015 there were over 400,000 Ukrainian people seeking shelter in Poland’s territory alone (LYMAN 2015). The research of this chapter focuses on the EU or its Member States’ inability to manage the large number of Ukrainians currently found in Poland. The present chapter intends to explain the EU crisis management mechanism triggered by the humanitarian issue brought by the Ukrainian immigrants. The problem of the Ukrainian immigrants is much more complex because, according to a report by the Polish Immigration Office, there are three distinct types of Ukrainian applicants for refugee status: (a) participants in the November 2013 Kiev riot (people who fear being persecuted by the Ukrainian state), (b) Ukrainian Tatars that left the Crimea Peninsula when Russia annexed it in March 2014, after refusing Russian citizenship and being forced to leave the country, and (c) Ukrainians from Luhansk and Donetsk who left because of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (POLISH IMMIGRATION OFFICE 2015). Given this fact, not all Ukrainian applicants have been granted refugee status, which constitutes the basis for this paper. Considering the multiple rejections by the Polish state of the refugee status

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requests, we intend to analyse both the EU immigrant management mechanism and the Polish national management system. The present paper’s objectives are the identification of the European immigration management mechanism, from the level of direct involvement in the territories of conflict, to the European institutions dealing with the immigration management, to the Polish national immigration management institutions. All of these mechanisms will be analysed with the purpose of determining the cause that led to the incapacity to manage the Ukrainian immigrants. The research questions of the present paper are: what are the immigration management mechanisms used by the EU? Does Poland have the necessary management system for a wave of Eastern European immigrants? Why do the Ukrainian refugees apply for a short term work visa and not asylum? The research hypotheses are: the labelling of the Ukrainian immigrants’ situation in Poland as a refugee crisis; the identification of the immigration management systems of the EU; the consideration of the Ukrainian immigration crisis as a precedent for the current Syrian refugee crisis. The research will be divided into three parts, respectively the identification of the EU management mechanism for international crises, the identification of the EU immigration management mechanisms and the identification of the Polish national immigration management mechanisms.

The EU instruments for avoiding a refugee crisis The EU immigration management systems relies on the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000) and the European Human Rights Convention. According to these fundamental documents, the EU member states abide by the principle of refoulement which forbids the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to persecution, because in these situations their rights could be violated. According to these documents, the EU has created a complex management system for the immigrants that have

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come from outside its borders, thus the need to identify it in the context of the issue risen by the large number of Ukrainian immigrants in the 20142015 waves. In anticipation of mass migrations to its territory, the EU has a crisis management system for the entire world. One of the main purposes of this system is to support the affected populations in their own states so that they won’t migrate towards more secure and prosper areas. Inside the European Commission there is the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department as part of the EU Mechanism of Civil Protection. This mechanism represents a system established with the purpose of allowing coordinated assistance from member states involved in action to victims resulted from natural disasters or man-made crises around the world (EUROPEAN COMMISSION: C). The Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department aims to support and save the populations affected by natural disasters or man-made crises. This is the EU humanitarian assistance system and is established by the Lisbon Treaty. It offers assistance through two main instruments, respectively Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection which have been joined in 2010 by the European Commission with the purpose of creating a stronger and more efficient response system to humanitarian crises (EUROPEAN COMMISSION: A). In the Ukrainian Crisis context, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department has been directly involved after it identified the damages caused by the conflict. In the report published in October 2015 there are approximately 5 million people in need of humanitarian aid, 1.4 million of which have been registered as internally displaced and over 1.1 million that sought shelter in neighbouring states. Following the identification of this humanitarian crisis, the European Commission has allocated, in the first half of 2015, 242 million euros as early assistance, through which 460 000 people affected by conflict have been directly assisted. (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016).

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The Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department allocates the money for the support of the people in need through projects. Projects for the direct allocation of money, projects for ensuring fresh water and cleaning equipment, and projects for ensuring food, shelter and fresh drinking water have been created. All of these have been realized in collaboration with local and international Nongovernmental Organizations (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2016). Despite the direct implication in supporting the affected populations, the EU is still confronted with the immigration of a part of these populations. The problem is that most of these people, especially males, refuse to be registered as internally displaced people (hereinafter IDP) because they fear being recruited by the Ukrainian army and sent to the conflict zone. These people are being harassed by separatist groups who are also trying to recruit them. According to the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department, in trying to escape the conflict zone, approximately 1.1 million people have sought shelter in neighbouring states. Of these 1.1 million, 400,000 have migrated to Poland (LYMAN 2015). As result of these migration, we are going to analyse both the EU immigration management mechanism and the Polish national immigration management system.

The EU mechanism for migration management In order to manage the waves of immigrants, the EU has created a complex mechanism composed of a legislative basis and a series of European level institutions which either collaborate with national institutions or establish the norms to be followed. To understand the management procedure of the immigrants that arrive from outside of the EU borders, we will approach the management mechanism for this immigration problem. Inside the European Commission there is the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs which is committed to managing the policies that insure all the necessary activities for the development of a stable and secure environment, and also to building a EU common policy on migration and asylum. The Directorate seeks the constitution of a Common

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European Asylum System. Among the main policies the Directorate deals with are: Legal Migration, Irregular Migration and Refoulement, the Common European Asylum System, Schengen, Borders and Visas, and the European Migration Agenda (EUROPEAN COMMISSION: F). The Common European Asylum System consists of a standard for the management of refugees and immigrants at European level. The asylum request procedure is similar in all member states, according to the Directive regarding asylum procedures. After the submission of the asylum request, the solicitors are sheltered and they receive food in a Reception Centre under the terms established by the Directive regarding the admission conditions. After this procedure, the solicitor is fingerprinted and his fingerprints are uploaded in EURODAC database, after which the information is verified to determine which state is responsible for the solicitor according to the Dublin Regulations. The next step consists of an interview, with assistance from a translator, after which it is decided if the solicitor is granted the refugee status or is rejected and returned back to the responsible country. In case the asylum request is rejected, the solicitor can ask for recourse (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2014). The enforcement of policies adopted on European level is carried out by six agencies functioning inside the Directorate: Frontex (The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of EU), EUROPOL (European Police Bureau), CEPOL (European Police College), EMCDDA (The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction), EASO (European Asylum Support Office), eu-LISA (The EU Agency for Large Informational Systems) (EUROPEAN COMMISSION: E). To facilitate access for immigrants from outside the EU, the European Union Portal for Immigration was created in November 2011 to manage the external borders, this way enforcing the national institutions that deal with border management (EUROPEAN COMMISSION: D). Also, Frontex deals with the establishment of an evaluation mechanism that verifies the correct application of Schengen regulations and intensifies the

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coordination of cooperation between the national border surveillance authorities through the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). EUROSUR represents a large informational system which is divided between the national border protection authorities. In the future, Centres of National Coordination of EUROSUR will be set up in the member states with an exterior EU border (FRONTEX: B). Frontex and eu-LISA are important for the Ukrainian immigrants issue because, on January 31, 2014 they signed a Work Arrangement allowing Frontex to gain access to the EURODAC database (the refugee fingerprint database), the Schengen Informational System II (SIS II), the VISA International System (VIS), and the eu-LISA; this has led to closer cooperation between the two agencies, and better and more secure management for immigrants from outside of Europe (FRONTEX: A). Due to this cooperation between the two agencies, it has been established through EURODAC that approximately 400,000 Ukrainians entered the Polish territory in 2014. Moreover, Frontex is important in the context of the Ukrainian migration issue because it is the agency that aids member states in common refoulement operations when a member state has made a decision to return an illegally established immigrant from its territory if he/she refused to turn back to the country of origin (FRONTEX: B). Frontex has a disability due to the Return Directive, an integrated part of the Schengen acquis. In the context of the Ukrainian migration issue, Poland alongside FRONTEX has the ability to return the migrants due to the fact that Ukraine is a signatory of the Return Directive as of 2002. This directive is a part of the Dublin Regulations which identifies the responsible state for every immigrant (ECRE 2015). Alongside FRONTEX and eu-LISA, which deal with the registration and verification of immigrants from outside the EU, there’s also the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) which deals with the development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). EASO functions as an expertise centre on the EU refugee problem and provides aid to the member

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states that have issues with their refugee management system. In the context of the Ukrainian migration issue EASO is important because it establishes the standard policy for all member states thru CEAS. The CEAS was established in 1999 and in 2001 it showed the first results through the adoption of the Directive for Temporary Protection, consisting of granting temporary protection to the displaced persons from non-EU states that were in incapacity to return to their state of origin, based on the Principle of Solidarity. Another result of this system is the European Refugee Fund established in 2005 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2014). In June 2008, a series of directives and regulations on European temporary protection have been introduced in the CEAS, which later became the new standard at the EU level: the Asylum Procedure Directive which simplified the decision making process; the Reception Conditions Directive which establishes the standard of material conditions for refugees from all member states; the Qualification Directive which qualifies the basis for granting international protection; the Dublin Regulations which increases the protection for refugees while their status in the managing member state is established; the EURODAC regulations which allows the security forces access to the eu-LISA database (EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2014). These directives and regulations represent the legal basis under which the Ukrainian immigrant issue in Poland should be managed.

The Polish Management System for immigrants from outside of the EU Poland is one of the member states located on the external border of the European Union, thus representing either shelter for Eastern European refugees, or a transit country for immigrants seeking a better pay job in Western Europe. After the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, approximately 400,000 Ukrainian citizens sought shelter in Poland. Therefore, we will analyse the Polish management system for immigrants. The legal bases for the immigration issue in Poland are: the Polish Constitution adopted on 2 April 1997 giving foreigners the right to asylum in Poland, the Foreigner Law of June 2003 which guarantees protection

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to the foreigners found on Polish territory (modified through the 29 May 2008 Amendment), and the 14 June 2006 Law regarding the entrance and stay on Polish territory of the EU member state citizens. For the management of the immigrants’ issue, Poland has a system of institutions that function on a legal basis and the above-mentioned European norms. The Polish institutions qualified to manage the immigrants are: the Polish Border Guard, the Immigration Bureau (part of the Ministry for the Internal Affairs and in close relations with the CEAS), the Refugee Council, the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court (CBAR 2011). The forms of protection ensured by the state of Poland are: asylum, refugee status (in conformity with the 1951 Geneva Convention), subsidiary protection, temporary protection (utilized in cases of mass immigration), and temporary sitting permit. Once granted one of these statuses, a foreigner has the following rights: the sitting right, the right to work, and access to public services and medical services (LOHEIDE ET. AL. 2012: 22-23). The asylum procedures function after the following model: the asylum can be requested at the border guard or the Immigration Bureau where the border officer or the public servant cannot refuse the request. In the next 48 hours the Immigration Bureau will organize an interview, assisted by an interpreter. After the interview there is a preliminary verification phase in conformity with the Dublin Directive which will establish if Poland is the state responsible for the applicant. The verification will be made by the Dublin Division of the Immigration Bureau which will check if the applicant’s fingerprints are found in the EURODAC database, if the applicant owns a VISA in the Dublin System, and if the applicant has declared passing through other EU member states. After this check the Polish state may decide whether it is or it is not responsible for that applicant. After this verification is finished, the Poland will apply following procedures: if it decides that it is responsible, the asylum insurance procedure will focus on the reasons why the applicant has left his home country; if it is decided that another state is responsible for the applicant, the latter will be transferred to

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the responsible state, the decision being subject to suspension for fourteen days (LOHEIDE ET. AL. 2012: 23-24). In this case responsible for the transfer is the Dublin Unit of the Immigration Bureau. In case the applicant submits an appeal against the Immigrant Bureau’s decision, there are four possibilities: (a) the application can be rejected or interrupted; (b) the applicant is granted refugee status, (c) the applicant is granted subsidiary protection; (d) the applicant is granted tolerate sitting permit (LOHEIDE ET. AL. 2012: 25). Once granted refugee status in Poland this person enjoys financial support and individual aid both from the state and from some special NGOs specifically created to support and integrate the refugees in local communities. From the Polish state the refugees benefit from financial support and twelve months’ accommodation in one of the eleven refugee centres of the Immigration Bureau. NGOs offer support for problems encountered once the refugee is settled. For integration into the workforce, refugees are assisted by the Polish Humanitarian Action. Their integration in the Polish society is mediated by the Counselling Centre for refugee and the repatriated which offers free Polish language courses and professional re-qualification courses. In order to support the local communities around the refugee centres, the Polish Migration Forum Foundation has been created. It organizes meetings and workshops with local people who are in direct contact with these refugees, study sessions in collaboration with the media and awareness raising campaigns in order to determine and discuss possible sentiments or fears in relation to the refugees (LOHEIDE ET. AL. 2012: 10-17). Alongside these NGOs, the Ukrainian World in Warsaw is a welcoming centre for Ukrainians, offering support to the Ukrainian immigrants and refugees. Within this centre they have access to free Polish language courses, and are assisted by psychologists and lawyers committed to help them in finding jobs and places to live (UKRAINIAN WORLD 2015).

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Concluding remarks After analysing both migration management systems (the EU and the Polish) we can see that their legal and institutional bases have certain small gaps which put the applicant in the situation where he has to prove that his rights are severely endangered in his home country. The problem raised by the Ukrainian migrants’ situation is that they haven’t all migrated to Poland from the same exact place and for the same reasons. Due to this fact, only a small part of the Ukrainian applicants for asylum have been granted refugee status, based on the fact that not the entire country has been devastated by conflict. The Polish state has the legal and institutional framework in place to face a large wave of immigrants and refugees, but the state has been avoided by many Ukrainian migrants after many of the asylum applications were rejected. The explanation for the fact that presently, most of the Ukrainians in Polish territory are there with a short term work visa is that the process of granting refugee status is too difficult and bureaucratized while the short term visa granting process is much simpler and more accessible to the migrants seeking to obtain the resident status, in order to avoid repatriation. They have also been encouraged to apply for a short time work visa by the fact that most of the asylum applications have been rejected and because they feared the Dublin Directive II according to which they could be returned to their country (LYMAN 2015). In conclusion, the problem analysed by this paper cannot be considered a precedent for the current Syrian Refugee Crisis because most of the Ukrainian immigrants have been granted temporary resident status in Poland and not refugee status, most of the Ukrainians helped by the EU are actually found in Ukraine and not in the EU member states.

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