The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK

This book examines the impact on member states of long-term foreign policy co-operation through the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Focusing on Germany and the UK, it provides an up-to-date account of how they have navigated and responded to the demands co-operation places on all member states and how their national foreign policies and policy-making processes have changed and adapted as a consequence. As well as exploring in depth the foreign policy traditions and institutions in both states, the book also offers detailed analyses of how they addressed two major policy questions: the Iranian nuclear crisis; and the establishment and development of the European External Action Service. The book’s synthesis of country and case studies seeks to add to our understanding of the nature of inter-state co-operation in the area of foreign and security policy and what it means for the states involved.

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NEW PERSPECTIVES IN GERMAN POLITICAL STUDIES

THE EU’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN GERMANY AND THE UK Co-operation, Co-optation and Competition

Nicholas Wright

New Perspectives in German Political Studies Series Editors William E. Paterson Aston University Birmingham, UK Thomas Saalfeld Universität Bamberg Bamberg, Germany

Far reaching changes are now taking place in Germany. Stability lay at the core of the German model and much of the writing from Peter Katzenstein and Manfred Schmidt onwards sought to explain this enviable stability. Changes in the external environment have created a number of fundamental challenges which pose a threat to that stability. Germany is now Europe’s central power but this has generated controversy about how it is to exercise this new power. Although attention is often centred on German power the migration crisis demonstrates its limits. New Perspectives in German Political Studies aims to engage with these new challenges and to cater for the heightened interest in Germany. The Editors would welcome proposals for single-authored monographs, edited collections and Pivots, from junior as well as well-established scholars working on contemporary German Politics. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14735

Nicholas Wright

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK Co-Operation, Co-Optation and Competition

Nicholas Wright Department of Political Science University College London London, UK

New Perspectives in German Political Studies ISBN 978-3-319-93469-3    ISBN 978-3-319-93470-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953056 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: YAY Media AS / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Julie

Preface

The former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is famously reputed to have once asked ‘who do I call if I want to call Europe?’ Regardless of whether he actually said it, the story is popular among academics and students alike and provides a useful starting point for any discussion of EU foreign policy, how it is made, where, by whom, and for what purposes. These are not new questions, but as anyone who has worked in EU studies in recent years will know, they remain a source of continuing fascination and debate amongst scholars—something to which the large number of conference panels, journal articles and books devoted to EU foreign policy in recent years attests. They remind us of the challenge the ever-­ evolving European foreign policy-making environment poses as an object of study. They also highlight a number of wider issues we must address. These include: the nature of foreign policy-making in a highly interdependent and multilateralised world; the role of nation-states as actors within this world as well as important sources of foreign policy in their own right; and when states do decide—as they have done in the context of the EU— to cooperate closely and intensively over the longer-term, what the consequences of this might be. It is these questions that lie at the heart of this book. Studying EU foreign policy and foreign policy-making also offers an important means of analysing and seeking to understand our increasingly complex world. This book started life almost a decade ago as a doctoral research project. At the time, the primary international question was how to respond to the global financial crisis. The years since have seen the EU rocked to its core by a succession of further challenges. The crisis in the vii

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Eurozone triggered by the 2008 financial meltdown brought the whole integration project perilously close to unravelling at times with its underlying causes as yet unresolved. The actions of a resurgent and revisionist Russia to the East resulting in the annexation of The Crimea, the ongoing conflict in The Ukraine and its involvement in Syria have resulted in much soul-searching about defence and security cooperation and what role the EU could and should play in this. And it has struggled to deal with the mass movement of people from Africa, the Middle East and beyond fleeing a combination of poverty, hunger, drought, political instability and war, most notably the Syria conflict. The EU’s clumsy and often highly imperfect efforts to mitigate and manage the consequences of these crises have contributed to the emergence of strong populist forces in many EU member states that are, amongst other traits, vociferously Eurosceptic and quick to blame an aloof and out of touch ‘Brussels elite’ for their national travails. The UK’s decision in June 2016 in favour of Brexit is the most dramatic expression to date of this loss of faith in the European ‘project’— and has itself been added to this list of crises which the EU must address. In some form or another, each have challenged EU member states to come up with a collective, unified response in the context of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, although the responses have not always resulted in meaningful policy actions. Together, these crises also highlight another longer-term problem: the threat posed to the EU by the decline of the post-war international system and the institutions established to manage and maintain it. Indeed, this is perhaps the most significant long-term risk it faces. The EU is at heart a system of law codifying the commitments its members have agreed to make to one another to facilitate and sustain their cooperation and mutual trust. Its engagement with the international community is largely predicated on the acceptance by its international partners of a functioning rulesbased international system and arguably one of the EU’s most significant international successes has been its contribution to the construction of precisely this. Today, however, this system is under strain as never before. The US, which did more than any other individual power to establish the post-war international order in the first place and was for so long Europe’s ally in defending and sustaining it, is today questioning its merits and worth. Meanwhile, other big actors like China, India and Russia are pushing back against attempts to constrain their growing international power, whether economic, political or military. But at precisely the moment when the EU should be vigorously defending and promoting the rules-based international order upon which so much of its international influence

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depends, it finds itself diplomatically, economically and institutionally weakened after years of crisis that have occupied so much of its political bandwidth. Whether it can overcome this remains to be seen—but if it is to once again demonstrate the value of institutionalised cooperation between states both internally and externally, then it must. Given this, the need for a genuine Common Foreign and Security Policy has arguably never been clearer although the challenges to making it reality remain significant. Equally, in light of this, the value of studying and understanding how EU member states make collective decisions around foreign and security policy is as pertinent as ever. This book is offered as a contribution to this effort at increasing our understanding of these processes. In writing this book I have amassed many significant debts of gratitude. First and foremost I must thank all those who agreed to be interviewed for the project. The majority of them must remain anonymous, but the officials in foreign and defence ministries in London, Paris and Berlin, in the European Commission, General Secretariat of the Council, European External Action Service and in various Permanent Representations in Brussels were hugely generous with their time and candid in responding to my questions. I hope I have done justice to their answers—their insights will, I hope, be this book’s most significant contribution. Next I would like to thank the many academics who have helped make this project reality. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Hussein Kassim and Dr Vassiliki Koutrakou (my PhD supervisory team at UEA), Professors Anand Menon (KCL) and William Paterson (Aston) who examined the thesis, and Dr Christine Reh at UCL: their sage and honest advice and their encouragement over several years have been invaluable. I would also like to thank the many excellent academic colleagues who have read and commented on different parts of the text, especially the anonymous reviewer whose suggestions and comments were extremely helpful and greatly appreciated—to be clear, any mistakes are my responsibility and mine alone. The team at Palgrave Macmillan—Ambra Finotello, my editor, Imogen Gordon Clark and Oliver Foster—have guided, supported and advised by turns (as well as demonstrating enormous reserves of patience!). My parents and sister give me constant and enthusiastic support for everything I do. And finally, my deepest and most heartfelt thanks go to my wonderful family—Julie and Nathaniel. Their love and support is the foundation of everything. Wymondham, UK May 2018

Nicholas Wright

Contents

1 Introduction   1 Constructivism, Supranationalism and the CFSP   3 Rules, Norms and Socialization   6 Europeanization and the CFSP   8 Explaining the Institutionalisation of Cooperation in the CFSP  10 ‘The Nation-State Is Still Here’—Why the National Still Matters in CFSP  14 Policy Coordination  15 Europeanisation and ‘Uploading’  17 The Continuing Challenge of the Capabilities-Expectations Gap  19 Socialisation in the Council  20 How Member States Engage with the CFSP  22 The Development and Institutions of the Common Foreign and  Security Policy  23 Structure and Organisation of the Book  28 A Note on Sources  29 Bibliography  30

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Part I The United Kingdom and the CFSP  37 2 From Pusillanimous Realism to Defensive Engagement: Britain’s Changing Relationship with the CFSP  41 Introduction  41 British Attitudes to European Foreign Policy Cooperation Since Maastricht: An Elite Consensus  41 ‘Pusillanimous Realism’—Britain and the CFSP (1991–97)  44 ‘Pragmatic Vision’—Britain and the CFSP (1997–2007)  47 Re-positioning Britain  48 Engaging with the World  51 ‘Defensive Engagement’—Britain and the CFSP (2007–15)  54 The Brown Premiership (2007–10)  54 The Coalition Government (2010–15)  56 Conclusion  60 Bibliography  61 3 Institutional Structures and Processes: British Foreign Policy-Making and the CFSP  67 Introduction  67 Political Leadership and Strategic Management  67 FCO Structures and Processes  71 The European Correspondent and the Political Director  71 The Domestic CFSP Stakeholder Network  73 ‘Mainstreaming’ CFSP  75 Communication Networks  76 UKREP  77 Conclusion  80 Bibliography  84 4 Winding Up the Machine: How the UK Engages with the CFSP  87 Introduction  87 Ally Towards All, Enemy Towards None: Managing Relationships with Partners  87

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The Input Process  91 Policy Priorities and ‘Red Lines’  93 The Impact of Brexit  99 Conclusion 103 Bibliography 106

Part II Germany and the CFSP 111 5 From Perennial Follower to ‘Reluctant’ Leader? Germany’s Relationship with the CFSP 115 Introduction 115 The Kohl Years: Restraint and ‘Leadership Avoidance’ 116 The Schröder Years: ‘Quiet Revolution’ and the End of  ‘Equidistance’ 120 The Merkel Years: The Emergence of the ‘Reluctant Hegemon’? 124 The Treaty of Lisbon 126 The Eurozone Crisis 127 Libya and Ukraine 129 Germany as a Responsible Military Power 132 Conclusion 135 Bibliography 138 6 Institutional Structures and Processes: German Foreign Policy-Making and the CFSP 145 Introduction 145 Political Leadership and Strategic Management 145 Structures and Processes 149 Policy Coordination 149 Policy-Making—Berlin 150 Policy-Making—Brussels 152 Interactions with Other Member States 156 Conclusion 159 Bibliography 162

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7 Emerging Leadership: How Germany Engages with the CFSP 165 Introduction 165 Shared Leadership 167 Poland and the Weimar Triangle 169 The ‘Big Three’—Germany, France and the UK 171 Germany as Exemplar 173 Germany as Mediator 177 Germany as Unilateral Actor 180 The Impact of Brexit 183 Conclusion 185 Bibliography 188

Part III Case Studies 193 8 Countering Proliferation: The Iran Nuclear Negotiations (2002–15) 195 Introduction 195 Iran’s Nuclear Programme as Policy Issue 196 British Policy Towards Iran 202 German Policy Towards Iran 206 British and German Engagement with the CFSP on Iran 210 Conclusion 214 Bibliography 218 9 The Establishment of the European External Action Service  225 Introduction 225 The EEAS as Policy Issue 226 British Policy Towards the EEAS 229 German Policy Towards the EEAS 235 German and British Engagement with the CFSP on the EEAS 238 Conclusion 244 Bibliography 247

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10 Conclusion 253 What Does an Examination of Policy Coordination Reveal? 254 Do We See Convergence in Structures and Policy Outputs and Is This Significant? 257 How Successful Are Britain and Germany at Uploading Their Preferences? 259 Co-operation, Co-optation and Competition: Theoretical Implications and Pathways for Further Research 262 Bibliography 266 Bibliography 269 Index 301

Abbreviations

AA BMVg CFSP COREPER CSDP DfID EEAS EPC ESDP FAC FCO HR/VP JCPOA MoD NATO NPT PESCO PSC SEA TEU UKREP UNSC UNSCR

Auswärtiges Amt Bundesministerium der Verteidigung Common Foreign and Security Policy Committee of Permanent Representatives Common Security and Defence Policy Department for International Development European External Action Service European Political Cooperation European Security and Defence Policy Foreign Affairs Council Foreign and Commonwealth Office High Representative/Vice President Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Ministry of Defence North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Permanent Structured Cooperation Political and Security Committee Single European Act Treaty on European Union United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the EU United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Resolution

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Predictability and stability are two of the most precious commodities in international relations. One of the most important contributions made by the EU—and indeed the whole process of integration—has been to facilitate both to a degree unrivalled in any other international organisation. In particular, in the more than a quarter of a century since it was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has proven unique in terms of the intensity, transparency and frequency of co-operation and interaction it has facilitated between EU member states. At the same time, the CFSP has also provided them with an important platform from which to engage with partners and competitors around the world. Where they are able to agree on shared goals and a common purpose, the CFSP can enable member states to speak with a powerful collective voice and produce policy with significant impact, for example in responding to the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Russian action in the Ukraine. Even where they are not, the CFSP nonetheless plays an important role in moderating and mediating their interactions and disagreements, thereby contributing to what Duchêne (1973) referred to as the domestication of member state relations. The CFSP has thus become a highly significant component of foreign policy-­ making in all member states. Perhaps inevitably, one of the questions that arises from this concerns the impact of such a level of cooperation over such an extended period of time on the states themselves. Does it change the way they organise for and © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_1

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approach policy-making? Does it affect the way they articulate and pursue their interests and preferences? Is it possible that a more profound transformation is taking place in terms of how they conceive of and identify their interests and preferences in the first place, driven not only by cooperation in foreign and security policy-making but also by powerful processes of European integration that have drawn states closer and closer together across a much wider range of policy areas? These and related questions have provided the foundation for a wide range of scholarship in recent decades and have been addressed from a number of perspectives including International Relations Theory, Europeanisation and Comparative Politics. That this remains such a debated field underlines both the complexity and dynamism inherent in EU-level foreign policy co-operation and what it implies for the states involved. This book seeks to contribute to this discussion by focusing on two of those states: Britain and Germany. They share a number of similarities. Both have global economic and diplomatic reach and ambition. Both have sought to benefit from the ability of the CFSP (and EU more generally) to multiply and amplify their international capacities at a time when they must increasingly compete with emerging and re-emerging powers around the world. And both enjoy positions of weight and influence in the EU’s foreign and security policy deliberations—although in the case of the UK, Brexit will mean at the very least an end to any formal and institutionalised role. Equally, their interactions with the CFSP and their partners states over many years have provided ample evidence of the commonality of challenges and threats they face internationally; and the benefits in facing these of collective, multilateral responses, even if the EU is just one part of a wider multilateral security architecture. Given their many similarities, what is interesting therefore is the differing views they have taken of the CFSP, not only in terms of its value and utility in achieving particular policy outcomes, but in the place it occupies in their more fundamental conceptions of how foreign and security policy should be made in the twenty-first century. Thus, for Germany the CFSP lies at the heart of everything it does in terms of identifying and pursuing its foreign policy goals, reflecting a deeplyrooted multilateralist and particularly European vocation for cooperation. For Britain, meanwhile, the relationship has been more transactional, contingent and detached, based on a pragmatism that has on occasion viewed EU-level cooperation as a necessary evil rather than anything more idealistic or normatively worthwhile. Given this, how these states

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have engaged with the CFSP since its launch, and particularly their varying motives and objectives in doing so, is interesting not simply for what it tells us about their specific concerns and desires, but also for the insights that can be offered into the complexity inherent in any kind of foreign policy cooperation and how nation-­states approach and seek to manage this complexity. The first aim of this book is therefore to draw out some of these insights by offering a comparative analysis of their history of engagement with the CFSP and the institutions, structures and processes they employ to do so. The book’s second aim is to contribute to the ongoing debate about how we theorise and explain member state cooperation in EU foreign and security policy. To this end it focuses on the application of constructivism to studies of CFSP and how this has contributed particularly to new supranationalist theorising on the transformative power of foreign policy cooperation on EU member states. While not contesting the importance and validity of Constructivism as a means of theorising international relations more broadly and European integration more specifically, what this book will challenge is the extent to which a whole-scale transformation has taken place at the national level as a consequence of cooperation in the CFSP, specifically in terms of the ideas, interests and preferences reflected in member state foreign policies. Thus, it questions a particular application of constructivist concepts that often privileges the institutionalisation of cooperation at the supranational level whilst neglecting the continuing importance of the national level, not only in terms of the influence that member states continue to exert over foreign policy-making, but also of the importance of national-level institutions as generators of norms, preferences and interests in their own right. In doing so, it seeks to test Stanley Hoffmann’s exhortation that ‘the nation-state is still here’ (1966: 863) and what this means in the context of EU foreign and security policy cooperation.

Constructivism, Supranationalism and the CFSP How then should we understand the implications and consequences of cooperation over the longer-term in foreign and security policy in the CFSP for member states such as Britain and Germany? In recent years two closely connected theoretical schools have become increasingly influential in seeking to answer this question: constructivism and—drawing from and building on this—new supranationalism.

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Constructivism emerged within the context of international relations theory in the late 1980s/early 1990s through the work of scholars such as John Gerard Ruggie (e.g. 1995, 1997), Alexander Wendt (e.g. 1992, 1994, 1999) and Peter Katzenstein (1996), partly in response to the ‘perceived failure’ of classic theories such as realism to explain the end of the Cold War (Parsons 2010: 82). The insights it provides and the approach it encapsulates can be summarised in terms of two inter-linked aims. First, it seeks to address, analyse and understand the role and influence of ideas, norms and identity within the theoretical debates relating to IR and integration. Second, and following directly from this, constructivism provides an extensive critique of what many of its exponents see as the essentially bipolar and binary nature of theoretical discussion in both these fields. Within IR theory this takes the form of the ongoing (neo) realist versus (neo) institutionalist debate, while its equivalent (if not analogue) within European integration literature can be found in the ‘narrow focus and sterility’ of the debate between (liberal) intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism (Risse 2004: 159). For constructivists, the starting point for an alternative analysis lies in understanding the importance of what Ruggie amongst others identifies as the ‘ideational factors’ that provide the basis for the ‘identity and/or interests’ of state actors but which neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theorising take for granted (1998: 4). For example, Alexander Wendt, one of the most influential constructivist theorists, argues that notions of power and interest ‘are constituted by ideas’ which provide the basis through which states are able to relate to one another, simultaneously defining and determining who and what they are (1999: 371–2). Consequently, only by understanding the centrality of ideas to how we construct social reality can we determine the relationship between interests and power. In particular, it is only through our collective intentionality as members of society that concepts such as ‘the state’, the ‘national interest’ and ‘sovereignty’ are imbued with meaning and validity (Ruggie 1998; Searle 1995). Thus, whereas realism and liberal institutionalism regard interests as exogenously given, a primary objective of the constructivist analysis is to ask how states ‘define their identity and interests in the first place’—what Ruggie considers the ‘foundational question’ (1998: 14). By answering this we can start to understand the social reality represented by the international system, including questions about how power operates within it. Moreover, these questions become particularly important when considering the nature of the structures and institutions that

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constitute this system, and how state actors construct and then behave in them—for example, the EU and CFSP. The potential benefits from applying constructivist thinking to studies of European integration would seem obvious, not least in terms of opening up and broadening out this research field beyond the restricted parameters noted above. However, a constructivist ‘turn’ in the literature did not take place until 1999, something Christiansen et al. (1999) argue was a paradox. They understood integration as resulting in the construction of a new polity—and a new type of polity at that. More importantly, the process by which this was taking place was itself transforming the states involved. With its emphasis on and interest in social change and transformation, therefore, constructivism could not only offer important insights into that process: it could establish entirely new ways of thinking about it. This ‘constructivist turn’ was building on another, earlier shift in how integration was being theorized. This was the emergence of a new supranationalist literature which began to supersede neofunctionalism as the main alternative to intergovernmentalism from the mid-1990s onwards (Kassim and Menon 2010). This literature was based on a new assessment of the power of EU institutions—most notably the European Commission which had become resurgent following the launch of the Single Market programme in the late 1980s. Theorists such as Pollack (1996), Pierson (1996) and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997, 1998) contended that the power of the EU’s supranational institutions was now such that ‘even collectively […] [member states were] constrained in their ability to control’ them (Kassim and Menon 2010: 5–6). State power was increasingly limited in the face of the ‘decisive influence’ these institutions were able to exercise (ibid) and the ‘considerable discretion’ they enjoyed regardless of member state preferences (Pollack 1996: 433). National governments no longer drive ‘or fully control’ integration: rather, the creation of supranational institutions was leading to a ‘new dynamic’ resulting in ‘changes in social expectations and behaviour’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997: 306, 300). In essence, while classical neofunctionalism had posited a narrow view of policy ‘spillover’ that saw the economic logic of integration in one policy area driving its extension to another, the ‘new supranationalists’ proposed a process that was much bigger and all-consuming. The links to constructivist thinking are clear. Indeed, it is notable that when Christiansen et al. set out to apply constructivism to how integration was being theorized, they saw this in terms of ‘go[ing] beyond’ the insights offered by supranationalist theorizing by focusing on ‘a crucial part of the

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process’ related to ideas, identity and ‘social context’ that the supranationalists had thus far neglected (1999: 528–9). Taking their cue from constructivist approaches to IR, their starting point was to highlight the importance for integration of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘social context’, particularly given the ‘transformative impact’ it has had and continues to have both on Europe’s system of states and on its constituent parts (ibid). Risse (2004) offers a similar argument, suggesting constructivism offers a more sophisticated means of understanding the effects of institutions—in this case specifically the EU—on both the identities and interests of actors, refuting the idea of governments as always clear about what they want and ‘never uncertain about the future’ (2004: 161–2). Thus, whereas rationalist approaches view social institutions such as the EU as serving first and foremost to constrain actors who possess ‘given identities and preferences’ and seek to pursue the latter through strategic behaviour (the ‘logic of consequentialism’), Risse argues that constructivism emphasises the alternative ‘logic of appropriateness’ (2004: 163). Thus, actors endeavour to ‘do the right thing’ rather than simply seeking to ‘optimize’ their particular preferences (ibid). In this context, the EU must therefore be recognised as a rich and layered social environment which governments (and other actors) are ‘deeply embedded in and affected by’ (ibid), thereby imbuing it with great transformative power. Rules, Norms and Socialization From this, we can identify the influence of constructivism on how integration is analysed and understood in a number of ways. First, and of particular interest, is the significance of rules and norms, given how central these are to both the identity and behaviour of actors. Stone Sweet et al. (2001a, b) highlight the importance of rules—both formal and informal—in defining who an actor is in a particular set of circumstances, how they can then express or pursue particular interests, and what is considered appropriate behaviour for doing so. To illustrate this, Risse offers the example of the ‘norm of sovereignty’ which not only regulates how states interact but also ‘defines what a state is in the first place’ (2004: 163) (emphasis in original). More broadly, collective norms and understandings define the rules of the game: thus, membership of the EU involves the ‘voluntary acceptance’ that it constitutes a certain, legitimate political order, and a recognition that its rules and obligations are binding—for example the acquis communautaire, etc. (ibid).

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The existence and impact of such a rule-bound policy-making environment has been a major focus in much of the scholarship on the EU’s institutions and their component parts (e.g. Bátora 2005; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Heisenberg 2005; Lewis 2000; Naurin and Wallace 2010). A good example is the ‘consensus bias’ in Council decision-making identified by a number of studies. For example, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace highlight how even though the proportion of decisions technically subject to unanimity has fallen significantly, compromise and consensus continue to ‘characterise negotiations’ in the Council (2006: 306). Similarly, Lewis (2000) emphasises the importance of consensus in the work of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the chief preparatory body for Council, arguing that the way it conducts business means its participants behave in more complex and communitarian ways than intergovernmentalist perspectives would expect or allow, with the search for consensus instinctive. Given the significant role played by Permanent Representations in contributing to the formation of policy positions in national capitals, not least in terms of how national interests are represented in Brussels, constructivist ideas would therefore seem to offer an alternative framework to explain what Bulmer and Lequesne (2002: 4) describe as the ‘explicitly interactive’ relationship between the EU and its members. By this account, Permanent Representations do not merely articulate national interests: they also play an important role in establishing and shaping them in the first place, doing so, moreover, on the basis of their own extensive and intensive interactions with the other national delegations and the officials operating in the various Community institutions. The second important area of constructivist insight is in understanding the role and impact of socialisation, defined as actors ‘internaliz[ing] norms and standards of behavior by acting in social structures’ (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1045). There is a broad literature examining this in the European context, focusing on the process and effects of repeated and intense interaction between diplomats and national officials operating in Brussels (e.g. Batora 2005; Egeberg 1999; Lewis 1998, 2000, 2005; Quaglia et al. 2008). Furthermore, a range of scholarship has emphasised the importance of socialization within the CFSP specifically (e.g. Juncos and Pomorska 2006, 2008), with a notable contribution being Glarbo’s examination of the impact of diplomatic interaction within CFSP and its precursor, European Political Cooperation (EPC). In particular he highlights what he characterises as a ‘co-ordination reflex’ (1999: 643),

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whereby member states avoid unilateral démarches, instead informing and consulting with partners prior to any foreign policy declarations. Locating his argument within a constructivist logic, Glarbo contends that the habitualisation of the coordination reflex highlights a ‘permanent inclination’ among diplomats which is not captured by rationalist theories that focus on a utilitarian assumption of costs and benefits: i.e. rather than being a deliberate choice, co-ordination is simply the ‘naturally done thing’ (1999: 644). In the process, it has become ‘one of the most important rules and terms’ used in discussions of European foreign policy (Smith 2004: 94). Such a reflex has now become a ‘familiar part’ of national policy-making according to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 160), visible in the interactions between officials at the different levels in the Council’s structures. The consequence of the day-to-day practices of political co-operation which have developed since the creation of EPC has been the increasing institutionalization and ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy co-operation (Allen 1998). A process of natural social integration has taken place: what Glarbo (1999: 650) terms the ‘institutionalised imperative of concertation’. Thus, the co-ordination reflex, and the practices and norms of behaviour among the member states and their officials that it implies, demonstrate the weakness in assuming that decision-making results only in outcomes that reflect the relative power of member states, formal decision rules and a utilitarian calculation of national interests (Lewis 2000). Instead, the possibility of the veto needs to be balanced against the shared desire to find common positions that all will endorse and implement (Galloway 1999). Moreover, the search for such agreements is taking place continuously, iteratively, and within increasingly institutionalised and socialised arenas such as COREPER, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), working groups, etc., resulting in a process through which national interests are continually defined, mediated and redefined, and not simply exported from national capitals. Europeanization and the CFSP We can also identify the influence of constructivist ideas in the Europeanisation literature. This focuses on the many and varied impacts of membership on EU member states and particularly the degree to which ‘Europe matters’ as a factor in domestic change (Bulmer and Lequesne 2002: 16). Much of the early literature on Europeanization focused

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­redominantly on policy areas dealt with under the auspices of the p Community Pillar, with far less consideration given to ostensibly intergovernmental arenas such as CFSP or Justice and Home Affairs. This balance has been redressed somewhat in recent years, with important studies by Tonra (2001), Wong (2005, 2007), Major (2005), Gross (2009) and Wong and Hill (2011). This lag partly reflects the difficulty of applying to the CFSP what was for some time the dominant discourse within the literature which understood Europeanization as a ‘top-down’ (downloading) process with the analytical priority to capture the level of penetration of the European level into the domestic, and based on the premise that the EU is the principal cause of domestic change (Major 2005). However, the CFSP poses a range of challenges to this approach. For example, while integration in the mainly economic and social policy areas has a clear driver or ‘entrepreneur’ in the form of the European Commission, and while directives and regulatory frameworks established within the supranational environment can be enforced—and hence their impact more clearly measured—there has been no equivalent formal and institutional catalyst for co-operation apparent within the CFSP. Instead, the member states have remained the primary drivers of co-operation, aided, particularly prior to Lisbon, by their 6-monthly rotating Presidencies, and conceivably representing 27 potential alternative policy entrepreneurs (with a possible 28th in the person of the High Representative) (e.g. Pomorska and Wright 2013). At the same time, as Major (2005) and Wong (2007) amongst others have emphasised, the CFSP is governed by treaties rather than legislation. It is therefore much more difficult to pinpoint EU influences that may be the cause of changes in national policy or policy-making structures. Moreover, given that the EU does not prescribe a particular CFSP model to which member states must adapt, notions of fit/misfit, key to the ‘top-down’ framework, are harder to apply. Two alternative frameworks for understanding Europeanization in the context of CFSP have been proposed instead. The first is a ‘bottom-up’ or uploading pattern whereby member states seek to upload particular preferences or objectives from the national to the European level (e.g. Wong and Hill 2011; Pomorska 2011; Pomorska and Wright 2013). The second is a ‘horizontal’ (or cross-loading) pattern as set out, for example, by Radaelli (2003: 41), and it is arguably here that we can identify the influence of constructivism most clearly. Thus, cross-loading does not involve the pressure to conform to set models but occurs due to ‘patterns of

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socialization’ which Wong (2007: 333), amongst others, argues is a more apt basis for understanding change. The significance of socialization has been noted already, particularly in the context of the ‘consensus bias’ in decision-making. For Major (2005: 180), a crucial component of such socialisation is learning, which she suggests is the predominant ‘carrier of change’ in the context of the CFSP. For example, in their research into the effects of enlargement on the CFSP committee network, Juncos and Pomorska note that CFSP working groups provided important ‘arenas for learning’ for the representatives of new member states after 2004, with officials learning that adopting radical national positions would result in ostracism which was ‘a losing strategy’ (2008: 497, 503). In this context, therefore, Europeanization can perhaps better be understood as a process of exchange of good or best practice between governments, which is ‘voluntary and non-hierarchical’ in nature and facilitated by the arena CFSP provides (Major 2005: 186). The impact is therefore likely to be more subtle, involving ‘ideational convergence’ (Radaelli and Pasquier 2007: 38) rather than transformation. Explaining the Institutionalisation of Cooperation in the CFSP In light of the above, the contention that the manner in which member states behave towards one another in the CFSP is governed by a particular set of rules and norms (both formal and informal) seems obvious and uncontroversial. This, after all, is an environment dominated by diplomats who have a clear set of norms and practices developed over a considerable period of time (see particularly Bátora 2005). The sui generis nature of the EU, of which the CFSP is a significant institutional component, implies more than this however. Thus, we have identified important constructivist concepts relating particularly to behavioural norms, logics of appropriateness, and socialization that have a particularly ‘European’ flavour—for example, the aforementioned coordination reflex and consensus bias in decision-making. However, as has been demonstrated, constructivism posits much more than this. It seeks, first and foremost, to understand how actors—be they officials, governments or states—continually construct and reconstruct, interpret and reinterpret their social environment in a process that is mutually constitutive. In this sense, therefore, the CFSP should be understood as a highly dynamic arena in and with which member states continually interact. More importantly, the result or outcome of this interaction is

 INTRODUCTION  

11

change, not merely in policy terms, but in how they view the world, and in how they identify, define and communicate their national interests. Above all, the expectation from a constructivist-based analysis of the CFSP would be to explain the emergence of shared or common interests and values that permeate the national as well as the Brussels levels—in essence that this environment not only generates norms, but also the interests and preferences of the member states. One of the clearest articulations of this argument is provided by Michael E.  Smith (2004). He offers a detailed theoretical analysis of how CFSP has developed, and the resulting shift in power from member states to this new institutional construct, that echoes many of the supranationalist arguments noted above. In essence, he contends that while intergovernmentalism might have been an appropriate framework through which to understand cooperation and its outcomes in the earliest days of EPC, it has become increasingly irrelevant as a means of explaining member state interactions. His starting point is thus to critique the oft-stated view that both EPC and CFSP are best understood as intergovernmental arenas—i.e. places where negotiations are conducted and agreements reached on the basis of bargaining between member states whose preferences are given; where traditional power differentials (e.g. economic, diplomatic, military) matter; and where governments dominate and control the process (e.g. Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993, 1998). Instead, and as has been contended in supranationalist analyses of other EU institutions (and particularly the Commission), a transformation has occurred in which member states are increasingly constrained or ‘locked in’ by their participation in longterm co-operation in the CFSP. Similarly critical stances are adopted by Glarbo (1999), Müller-­ Brandeck-­Bocquet (2002) and Sjursen (2011) amongst others who collectively argue that while the CFSP retains some of the key features of an intergovernmental regime, particularly in terms of formal decision-­making, the continuing power of the veto and a minimal role for supranational actors, the reality is significantly more complex. This complexity consists in the fundamental compromise which member states have had to make since the beginning of foreign and security policy co-operation, and upon which all subsequent developments have been based: the continuing trade-off between the wish to retain national control over the process and outcomes of cooperation and the desire for greater efficiency if meaningful and effective outputs are to be achieved.

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This has been exacerbated by two specific problems. The first is the ongoing tension between member states over the ends and means of cooperation, or ‘between those who wanted a concert of sovereign nations expressing coordinated views […] and those who wanted a common foreign policy as the expression of the [EU]’ (Nuttall 1992: 2). The second has been the problematic relationship and delineation between EPC/ CFSP and the Community, which has seen considerable anxiety on the part of states such as France and Britain on the one hand which have traditionally sought to prevent any ‘contamination’ of the foreign policy environment by supranational elements; and on the other, an equal concern particularly among smaller states that the intergovernmentalism of EPC and CFSP might dilute the degree of integration already achieved within Community policy areas (Smith 2004). These tensions are captured in the frequent references in the literature to how the CFSP has changed. Thus, Nuttall describes it as a ‘halfway house’, no longer purely intergovernmental but nor a ‘fully-fledged policy arm’ of the EU (2000: 275); Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet contends that ‘at no time’ has the CFSP been exclusively intergovernmental (2002: 278); Duke and Vanhoonacker characterize it as a form of ‘modified intergovernmentalism’ (2006: 181); and Sjursen talks about it as now being ‘something beyond intergovernmentalism’ (2011: 1091). Smith argues that this shift towards a more institutionalised and supranationalised system has involved a move away from a defensive or passive approach to foreign policy cooperation to a more positive, proactive one. Crucially, this has taken place as a consequence of the ability of first EPC and subsequently CFSP to ‘moderate’ areas of potential disagreement between states, not only by framing these in terms of ‘collective interests and rules’, but by ‘promoting collective European responses’ to major international issues (2004: 5–6). Together EPC and CFSP represent far more than passive frameworks within which member states transact the business of foreign and security policy cooperation, as intergovernmentalism would imply. Rather, they have a dynamic and impact of their own, the most important consequence of which is how participation within them affects the participants themselves. Thus, the institutions created by the member states to facilitate their cooperation are themselves influencing the process of institutional development as a consequence of fostering cooperative outcomes. As a result the ‘informal gentlemen’s agreement’ that characterised EPC at its launch has evolved into a system of both formal and informal legal obligations (2004: 11).

 INTRODUCTION  

13

At the same time, the impact of EPC/CFSP on member states cannot be overstated. Smith suggests that states are ‘fundamentally changed by virtue of their participation’ in this policy arena, and their interests and preferences are ‘susceptible’ to the range of influences that both EPC and CFSP have facilitated and enhanced (2004: 8). Moreover, he suggests not only that national interests are essentially malleable as a consequence of foreign policy cooperation but that the emergence of common interests in turn results ultimately in the creation of a common European identity and that ‘it is possible to […] see evidence of changes of policy within individual states by virtue of their participation in the system’ (2004: 8–9). This is a powerful argument reflecting a number of the constructivist insights discussed above, most importantly the role of rules and norms. For Smith, these are essential if what can be seen as the more general common aims and aspirations of member states are to become specific, pursuable policies. Essentially, Smith is arguing that the impact of cooperation within EPC and CFSP is discernible both in terms of changes to process—i.e. how cooperation takes place—and to substance—i.e. what that cooperation ultimately produces. Crucially, it has facilitated the emergence of one of the most important elements of international cooperation: the ability of the member states to predict the behaviour of their partners (2004: 90). This, in turn, has resulted in perhaps the most important implication of CFSP: describing foreign and security policy as ‘common’ entails a ‘higher-­ order obligation’ than mere co-operation (2004: 191). The emergence and ultimately codification of a particular set of norms has determined both how cooperation and policy-making take place, and what types of policy outcomes are produced, as well as leading to the creation of a ‘stable, rule-based system’ (2004: 243). This in turn has resulted in the gradual but steady internalisation of EPC/CFSP policies and procedures in the member states—the Europeanisation process outlined above. While applications of constructivism certainly contribute to a deeper understanding of how foreign policy cooperation has developed through EPC and CFSP, and what it means for those participating in it, several significant questions remain, not least around the role and behaviour of the member states. The claim that the EU ‘has fundamentally changed the ways its member states define and pursue their interests’ (Smith 2004: 263) remains problematic because while supranationalist theorising provides important insights, it pays insufficient attention to the nation-state level and makes assumptions about the inevitability of limitations on state

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power as a consequence of cooperation within the context of CFSP.  In doing so, it also fails to acknowledge the importance not only of states themselves as powerful sources of ideas and identity, but also of the individual ministries which make up governments, and which themselves are important institutional generators of ideas, norms values. A constructivist-­ informed analysis could therefore equally well be applied at this level, helping us not only to understand more about the role of these smaller institutional actors in national preference formation, but in the tenacity of the ‘national’ in multi-/supranational arenas. The reality is that national capitals remain the final arbiters of what is articulated in Brussels in the context of CFSP. The implications of this are discussed next.

‘The Nation-State Is Still Here’—Why the National Still Matters in CFSP As noted, this book seeks to challenge how constructivism has been applied within the body of new supranationalist EU scholarship that focuses on the CFSP. Specifically, it is contesting a particular interpretation of the impact of long-term institutionalised co-operation on the foreign policy-making processes and outputs of EU member states that privileges the role of one set of institutions—i.e. what we can loosely characterise as the ‘Brussels foreign policy system’—over another—i.e. the member states. Instead, by focusing much more on how states and their institutions define and pursue interests and preferences we can increase our understanding of the extent and nature of change (and transformation) within that system, and therefore the extent and nature of member state power within CFSP.  Moreover, the conceptual tools provided by constructivism can be equally well applied in this pursuit as they have been to understand the supranational level, not least in terms of the insights they can provide in understanding the persistence of the specifically national interests we can identify in the cases of Britain and Germany. In their critique of supranationalist theorizing as applied to the power of the Commission vis-à-vis the member states, Kassim and Menon (2010) provide a useful starting point for this. First, they highlight the ‘mismeasure of the respective powers’ of governments and the EU’s institutions in supranationalist analyses, reminding us of the dominance of the states over treaty reform processes, the formal prerogatives they possess, the importance of the Council in legislative outcomes, control over budgets, etc.

 INTRODUCTION  

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(2010: 23). Second, they dispute the so-called informational advantage enjoyed particularly by the Commission; and third they remind us that however great the resources available to the EU’s institutions, those available to member states are ‘far broader and far more formidable’, not the least of which is the fact that states are ‘repositories of sovereignty’ (2010: 27). Given that however much the CFSP has developed, it has achieved nowhere near the institutional sophistication or complexity of either the Community pillar or the Commission, not only can we therefore apply these points of criticism to how supranationalists analyse it—we can argue that they are even more pertinent and significant. State power still matters, and has a significant impact on what is agreed within the CFSP. Equally, how states and their governments perceive their place in the world is also important. These perceptions will certainly be influenced and shaped by interactions within the CFSP, but the contention here is that such interactions are not as transformational as has been implied. In short, wider issues such as geopolitics, national systems of foreign policy-making, diplomatic systems and traditions, etc. still matter. Thus, while there is no doubt that the CFSP is very important in how Britain and Germany understand and approach the wider world, it represents just one of a number of elements through which they act. Moreover, as will be briefly discussed now, the way they organise and approach the CFSP indicates a much more rationalist and interest-driven conception of its utility than supranationalist approaches imply. In particular, it highlights how claims over the emergence of shared ideas and common interests in CFSP are challenged by the stubborn persistence of the ‘national’ in this policy arena. This can be seen by examining, amongst others, the literatures on policy coordination, Europeanization, the Capabilities-­ Expectations Gap and socialisation in the Council. Policy Coordination The effective co-ordination of domestic policy is a recurring theme in research on public management (e.g. Peters and Pierre 2003), addressing as it does one of the key challenges facing all governments: how to achieve the most efficient and effective use of increasingly scarce public resources across multiple departments and multiple sectors. The assumption is that if a government is generally well-coordinated, it is likely to be more efficient—and therefore more effective at achieving its policy goals (Scharpf 1988; Spence 1999; Menon and Wright 1998; Kassim et al. 2000).

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For EU member states, however, the situation is considerably more complex. Indeed, Kassim et al. (2000: 10) describe it is ‘unique’. They are operating within a ‘multi-level political system’ (Kassim 2000b: 235) that, particularly since the SEA and TEU, has had increasing influence over, or regulatory control of, a vast array of policy areas (Beyers and Dierickx 1998: 290). Moreover, it is a system characterised by what Vincent Wright (1996: 149) calls a ‘continuous policy-making process’, thus placing a premium on effective co-ordination. Moreover, the ability of supranational EU institutions to function effectively depends on the effectiveness of the coordinational arrangements put in place by the member states (Kassim and Peters 2001: 297), who thereby provide the vital ‘administrative substructure’ for the implementation of EU policy (Bulmer and Lequesne 2002: 3). The challenges of coordination are especially interesting and relevant in the context of the CFSP. For example, in all its interactions with the EU, Britain demonstrates a coordination ambition that goes consistently beyond that of other member states, and the CFSP is no exception. Indeed, Kassim (2000a: 22) highlights an apparent paradox in its approach to policy coordination. This lies in the contrast between its administrative efficiency in formulating and implementing EU policy, something many partner states—including Germany—seek to emulate, and its perceived lack of success in securing its desired outcomes at the European level. The roots of this dichotomy lie in a combination of ‘cultural scepticism’ towards integration and the logic of centralisation and unity of purpose that have long characterised Whitehall’s bureaucratic and administrative arrangements (2000a: 50). What cannot be denied, however, is Britain’s willingness to commit both time and resources to ensuring its positions are clearly and coherently articulated, something that is clearly in evidence in how it approaches the CFSP. Moreover, and as will be discussed, it has demonstrated considerable effectiveness in influencing CFSP policy. While seeking to exercise influence is an aim of all British inputs, whatever the policy area, it is vital in CFSP given its status as one of the EU’s two leading foreign and security actors, and its insistence that member states remain in control of this arena. Thus, for example, across the network of working groups and committees that form the CFSP infrastructure, the idea that Britain would not have a clear position on a given issue has traditionally been unthinkable. Moreover, and as will be discussed, smaller states often look to it for leadership. Similarly, although Germany might not be able to boast the same level of success in policy coordination,

 INTRODUCTION  

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it too remains committed to exercising as much influence as it can within the CFSP, and indeed has increased its coordination ambition in this regard in recent years. The importance of the coordination literature, therefore, lies in what it tells us about how states approach the CFSP. Put simply, why do states continue to invest so much in seeking to influence outcomes if not to achieve a set of nationally-held objectives, whether they are to promote or prevent a particular outcome? The argument made here is that both Britain and Germany exhibit what is an essentially instrumental approach to the CFSP, even if there are variations between them, designed to achieve outcomes that reflect their particular interests and concerns. Consequently, while the CFSP provides an important arena in which to pursue and achieve these, such interests remain a national concern. Member states expend the time and resources they do on seeking to influence outcomes because they see this as having an impact in terms of their national objectives. This suggests that the power of the CFSP as a norm-generating arena able to transform the interests and identities of the member states is not necessarily as clear-cut as supranationalist accounts have claimed. The policy co-ordination literature thus reminds us of the importance of paying attention to what is happening at state level and that a consideration of the mechanics of how states make policy at the national and supranational level will be revealing in terms of how national interests are defined, articulated and pursued. Europeanisation and ‘Uploading’ The literature on Europeanization also emphasises how the ‘national’ challenges the way constructivist assumptions have been applied in supranationalist analyses of the CFSP. As noted, when seeking to understand the impact of the EU in the context of the CFSP, an alternative approach to the predominant top-down paradigm of Europeanization is required. Consequently, this component of the literature demonstrates a much stronger emphasis on how member states seek on the one hand either to collectivise or mutualise national preferences and positions, or on the other to prevent important areas of national concern from coming under pressure at the European level. There are clear examples of Europeanization in terms of organisational adaptation. For example all ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) must organise (or reorganise) to facilitate the work of a dedicated European

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Correspondent whose responsibility is to coordinate CFSP and CSDP matters with national foreign ministries and plays a central role in shaping the agenda of FAC meetings (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). In a number of states which joined in the 2004 enlargement, organisational change has been considerable. For example, Kajnč (2011) notes that the internal organisation of the Slovenian Foreign Ministry ‘changed dramatically’ following accession, with re-structuring designed to reflect the frameworks of the EU both in terms of CFSP and its wider external relations. Meanwhile, in Poland, Pomorska (2011: 170) notes that adaptation has involved de-centralisation and greater information-sharing in the Polish Foreign Ministry, as well as the recognition that the EU needs ‘to be present throughout’ its structures and policies if Poland is to engage effectively both with the CFSP and the EU more broadly. However, a characterisation of Europeanization in this environment in terms simply of formal adaptation in response to pressures from the supranational level is neither adequate nor appropriate to account for what is actually taking place in the CFSP. As noted, this is a policy-making arena that is dynamic and multi-directional, operates on multiple levels and for much of its history has lacked a single, supranational policy entrepreneur with equivalent influence to the Commission, or mechanisms to enforce decisions. Moreover, the continuing power of the veto is more than just a symbolic nod towards intergovernmentalism. It remains the clearest indicator that however strong the cooperation, the national cannot be ignored. Indeed, the national remains very much a core component of what is taking place in CFSP, and we can identify a range of issue areas where Europeanization has occurred as a consequence of the national projection—or uploading—of policy preferences by member states (e.g. Wong 2005; Pomorska and Wright 2013). For example, Charillon and Wong (2011) note how many of the EU positions on the Arab-Israeli dispute originate in Paris and London, while Daehnhardt (2011) highlights how Germany achieved a change in wording in the European Security Strategy to talk about ‘preventive’ as opposed to ‘pre-emptive’ engagement, thus ensuring the use of military force would remain a last resort. Perhaps the clearest example of more ‘obstructive’ uploading is the continuing refusal of Cyprus to allow discussion of any issue that it feels would undermine its position vis-à-vis its ongoing dispute with Turkey. These examples remind us that member states view the CFSP as an important arena for the pursuit of national interests, challenging supranationalist assessments of the CFSP and its transformative impact on states. Thus, while adaptation to the

 INTRODUCTION  

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demands placed on member states by participation in the CFSP has clearly occurred—as noted in terms of organisational structures—this cannot be equated to the convergence that some have implied. The Continuing Challenge of the Capabilities-Expectations Gap Christopher Hill’s conceptualisation of the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ (1993) highlights the significant disparity between the stated aims of the CFSP as first set out in Article 11 of the TEU, and actual policy outcomes. The crux of his original thesis is that the EU’s ability to fulfil either its existing roles in the international system or potential future ones match neither its own expectations nor those of external third parties. To illustrate this, he sought to categorize the capabilities available to achieve the goals set for the CFSP in terms of resources, policy instruments, and the ability of member states to agree policy (1993). These would provide what he later termed a ‘yardstick’ against which progress could be measured, the purpose being to highlight the problematic relationship within European foreign policy between ends and means, where the former have been neither clearly defined nor agreed by the member states (Hill 1998: 18). His concept has since become one of the dominant paradigms in assessments of the CFSP, and has been utilized in many of the subsequent critiques of the EU’s claims to international actorness, particularly in terms of its capacities to mount meaningful responses to international crises. The reasons most commonly identified for this failing, by Hill in his original thesis and in many subsequent analyses (e.g. Menon 2008; Tojé 2008a, b), lie in the nature of decision-making within the CFSP. This in turn reflects the determination of member states to retain the maximum degree of control over policy in this area. Thus, while subsequent treaty reforms have sought to introduce some degree of flexibility into decision-­ making, in practice this has remained consensual. For example, Amsterdam included provisions for constructive abstention, designed to enable states to step back from a particular decision whilst recognising that it committed the entire Union and therefore they could not act to inhibit or prevent action based upon it (Smith 2004). The treaty also introduced some measure of qualified majority voting on the implementation of policy, if not the policies themselves. To date, however, neither innovation has been utilised. Thus, while the continuing consensus-bias ensures the views of all member states continue to be accommodated provided goals remain

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­ eneral, the more precise or specific they become, the harder it is to ensure g agreement, particularly given the lack of enforcement mechanisms. The risk, therefore, is of lowest common denominator policies, while the agile leadership that is so crucial for effective crisis management, for example, remains problematic (Howorth 2009; see also, Menon 2008). The crucial gap is therefore one between stated collective aims and what member states will actually permit. From a rationalist/realist perspective, these difficulties are neither surprising nor unexpected (Menon 2008). Thus, even allowing for their similarities, the member states still represent 28 individual perspectives based on sometimes sharply differing determinations of national interest, differing capabilities and resources, and, indeed, differing forms of involvement in the international system, ranging from the historic preparedness to intervene of Britain and France, to the neutrality of Ireland and Austria. At the same time, they show us how the system of decision-making has also at times fallen victim to fundamental differences between member states over the extent of integration into the foreign policy arena, the international role of the EU, and the nature and purpose of any security identity it might seek to develop (e.g. Kagan 2004; Tojé 2008b; Howorth 2009). Indeed, arguably the most important dividing line in this context has been between those who have traditionally supported a ‘European’ agenda (e.g. France) and those who adopt a more ‘Atlanticist’ stance (e.g. the UK and some Central European and Baltic states). The ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ thesis does not (and cannot) in and of itself explain why member states choose to support, oppose or refrain from actively pursuing particular policy options. It does, however, highlight the point at which ideas and aspirations must be transformed into actionable policy if they are to be achieved. The fact that there remains such a noticeable discrepancy between the two once again demands the question as to why. The presence of the ‘national’ provides the most obvious and logical explanation, therefore calling into question the extent to which CFSP has actually ‘transformed’ how member states determine their interests and make and pursue foreign policy choices. Socialisation in the Council The final aspect of the critique provided here draws from Jeffrey Lewis’ extensive work on decision-making within the Council of Ministers (1998, 2000, 2005, 2010). Lewis’ research has examined the processes of

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decision-­making, concepts of identity, and socialization, with a particular focus on how senior officials in bodies such as COREPER operate, interact and view their roles. His analysis of COREPER reveals that a ‘distinct culture of compromise’ (1998: 479) has evolved, along with an identifiable ‘nucleus of community’ (2000: 261). However, of equal importance is the fact that this environment has not resulted in the development of an ‘overarching supranational identity’ on the part of officials; rather, members of COREPER talk in terms of possessing ‘dual personalities’ or being ‘Janus-faced’ (2005: 939–40). The environment in which COREPER ambassadors interact is central to this. With members all facing the same task of having to deliver results domestically and collectively, the socialization process that takes place within COREPER has created a secondary allegiance to the collective arena. Members of COREPER spend more than 100  days per year together, meaning that negotiation becomes ‘a way of life’ (2000: 264). At the same time, the shared recognition that decision-making is most effective when done collectively has created a context in which the norms of compromise and consensus govern how COREPER functions, supporting the belief that all will profit in the long-run (2000: 268). In their analysis of COREPER, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace also highlight the intense nature of the working relationships, arguing that these educate the Permanent Representatives about the needs and interests of their peers making them in turn ‘predisposed’ to finding solutions acceptable to as many as possible (2006: 80). Lewis is not arguing that as a consequence of these intensive and continuous interactions national interests are being redefined or that divergent interests do not exist. Rather, he is suggesting that the manner in which policy is agreed—the how—contradicts an instrumental notion based purely on hard-bargaining. Socialization means that members of COREPER become ‘like-minded’, sharing a collective interest in the success of the system (2000: 274). In a view that remains the case today one official described their role as ‘manag[ing] and co-operat[ing] for the long term […] [T]here is a confidence that I will deliver the goods at home and a confidence to deliver the goods collectively. I must find a way to synthesize the two’ (ibid). Crucially, this synthesis does not take place at the expense of either the national or the supranational. Rather, they become ‘complexly intertwined’, with the Permanent Representatives having ‘operationalized the concept of ‘double-hatting” (2005: 967). Thus, it is entirely possible to have two ostensibly contradictory identities co-­existing,

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with national identities—and loyalties—remaining as important as ever, but interpenetrated by a loyalty to the European level and this particular epistemic community (ibid). While what has emerged from the interactions and socialization taking place in COREPER may blur boundaries, it is not necessarily as transformational as a more supranational interpretation might imply. As the accounts of German and British officials in subsequent chapters demonstrate, a similar judgement can be made in how we understand what is happening within the CFSP. Socialisation is a vital component in ‘oiling the machine’ of decision-making, and indeed many of the diplomats interviewed talk in terms of ‘dual loyalties’ or of a commitment to reaching agreement. However, this does not diminish the importance of pursuing nationally-derived interests and preferences. Rather, it provides a framework in which this can be done. Constructivism thus provides a means of understanding how states pursue or defend national interests without assuming that the CFSP is transforming either how they behave, or the interests and preferences their behaviour is pursuing.

How Member States Engage with the CFSP How then do member states such as Britain and Germany engage with the CFSP and with what impacts and consequences over the longer-term? By focusing attention on the national level and how this interacts with the supranational, the following chapters set out  a complex but interesting picture as the states in question employ a range of tactics and strategies in pursuit of their objectives. These reveal three primary strategic motivations or drivers depending on the issue in question, the circumstances in which it is being addressed and how the state determines its interests and preferences: cooperation—e.g. with partner states and relevant EU institutions; cooptation—i.e. efforts to instrumentalise the CFSP and its policy instruments in pursuit of particular objectives, based on a strategy of uploading of preferences; and competition—e.g. with partner states or with the CFSP (and therefore the EU) as the appropriate venue for institutional action on a particular question. These three are not necessarily mutually exclusive and they highlight the dynamism inherent in the relationship between the two states and the CFSP.  Most importantly, the analysis demonstrates that far from being side-lined by the emergence of Brussels as the new locus of European foreign policy-making, Britain and Germany—and indeed EU member states more generally—remain vital

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elements in a foreign policy-making environment they strive daily to shape where they can, but will contest and challenge when they must.

The Development and Institutions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy There is a wealth of literature that covers in considerable detail the development of the CFSP and the institutional structures that have developed to facilitate its operation—for example, Gross (2009), Howorth (2014), Keukeleire and Delreux (2014), Smith (2004) and Tonra (2001). It is therefore not the intention of this book to try to repeat these already comprehensive analyses. However, given that the subsequent chapters will discuss aspects of these questions in some detail as they pertain to the two states in question, a brief summary of the development and structures of the CFSP is provided here by means of introduction. This serves to highlight two important points: first, how the EU and specifically Brussels has emerged as an increasingly important locus of foreign policy-making activity and expertise, a process characterised by Allen (1998) as ‘Brusselisation’; and second, that however important Brussels has become, it has not replaced member state capitals as sources of foreign policy-making influence and power. Thus, the two levels form structurally integrated components of a larger system that is dynamic, multi-directional and on any given day involves a multitude of actors operating at multiple levels to develop policy across an equally varied number of issue areas and questions. The structures for co-operation that became the CFSP grew out of European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was launched in 1970. EPC was an intergovernmental political track that existed alongside but remained institutionally and legally independent of the EEC. It was, in essence, an ‘informal, intergovernmental gentleman’s agreement’ (Smith 2004: 11) which became an ‘accepted and indispensable’ element of member states’ foreign policy-making (Wallace 1983: 14). Indeed, remarking on how important EPC had become, Douglas Hurd, who would serve as British Foreign Secretary from 1989 to 1995, wrote in 1981 as a Minister of State in the FCO that due to EPC ‘in some areas of diplomacy [UK] foreign policy is formed wholly within a European context; and in no area is the European influence completely absent’ (1981: 383). As he subsequently reflected, cooperation—or at least ‘the attempt to achieve it’—had become a key driver of national policy (Hurd 1994: 421). Perhaps the most significant legacy of EPC was the range of

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precedents it set for how member states would interact on foreign policy—in particular, the institutionalisation of engagement also referred to as the ‘consultation reflex’ (Glarbo 1999). The 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed at Maastricht sought to significantly upgrade foreign and security policy co-operation. Replacing EPC with the CFSP, it saw foreign policy cooperation brought within the institutional frameworks of the newly-established EU but crucially maintained its intergovernmental character and kept it distinct from the supranational Community policies and institutions through the ‘pillar system’.1 A number of ambitious goals and objectives were agreed for CFSP in the TEU, including: safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union; preserving peace and strengthening international security; and developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law (Title V, Article 11, TEU). The consultation reflex referenced above was also placed on a formal footing, with Member States having ‘a duty to inform and consult one another […] on any matter of foreign and security policy “of general interest” before taking action on the international scene’ (HM Government 2013: 20). To facilitate these objectives, the TEU also included a new set of legally-binding policy instruments, including common positions, common actions and joint actions while a legal basis for EU sanctions was also established for the first time. Institutionally, the small EPC Secretariat was incorporated into the better-resourced General Secretariat of the Council. Taken together, these changes were intended to move the EU towards a more proactive promotion of its collective norms and values internationally, as well as enabling it to continue facilitating trust and predictability in intra-EU relations, a key component of the treaty (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). The negotiations that led to Maastricht, it should be noted, were taking place against a backdrop of significant international upheaval. The end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification provided stark reminders of the need for robust and effective structures for European level foreign and security policy interaction. Indeed, concerns over the impact of a newly-reunified Germany on Europe’s balance of power and the desire to see its European vocation reinforced—a feeling that was as strong in Berlin as in Paris and elsewhere—served as major drivers for the establishment and development of CFSP. However, and as the later chapters illustrate, a fundamental fault-line has run through the heart of CFSP since its launch. This has been between the intergovernmentalist preferences of states like the UK and France

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which have sought to maintain the greatest possible degree of national control over foreign policy cooperation on the one hand, and more integrationist states such as Germany which are more comfortable with increased communitarisation of this policy area. This tension has perhaps been most apparent in debates over the effectiveness (or not) of CFSP outputs and the frustrations that grew in the 1990s that the CFSP was not meeting expectations, characterised by Christopher Hill as a ‘Capabilities-­ Expectations Gap’ (1993). The most tragic example of this tension was in the failure of the EU collectively to respond to the break-up of Yugoslavia and deal with the subsequent civil wars in the 1990s, contradicting in brutal fashion the 1991 claim by Jacques Poos, Luxembourg’s foreign minister, that the ‘hour of Europe’ had come (Rupnik 2011: 18). The inability of EU member states to deal with this crisis without the support of the US underlined the limitations of co-operation through the CFSP as well as member states’ military capabilities. It also underscored the profound importance of political will as the basis for any kind of meaningful action. Reforms in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and particularly Lisbon (2009) were all designed to address these tensions while managing the constraints imposed by national sovereignty. Among the most notable reforms in Amsterdam was the creation of the position of High Representative for the CFSP (HR) who would be based in the General Secretariat of the Council and supported by a new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. While the HR position had only limited resources and lacked any formal power of policy initiative, its first occupant, former NATO Secretary-General and Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana, demonstrated its agenda-shaping potential, leading Duke and Vanhoonacker to argue it was ‘the most important innovation’ in the treaty’s CFSP reforms (2006: 168). Indeed, Solana’s ability in this regard resulted in the position enjoying a ‘unique stature’ in the diplomatic world (Rieker 2009: 708), as evidenced by his role in the E3+3 negotiations with Iran (see Chap. 8). Nice continued this process of reform to the CFSP.  Its most significant elements were the institutionalisation of the recently launched European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (see Chap. 5), designed to give the EU a meaningful crisis management capacity; and the creation of a permanent, Brussels-based forum, the Political and Security Committee, to support CFSP policy and decision-making (see below). While Nice highlighted the emergence of Brussels as a focal point of foreign and security policy decision-making in the EU, its centrality was most clearly underscored by the Treaty of Lisbon.

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This was the most significant effort to date by member states to address the problems of lack of coherence and efficiency in EU foreign policy. Born out of the failed Constitutional Treaty (2004), Lisbon introduced 62 amendments to the TEU, of which 25 related to the CFSP.  Together, these sought to improve and enhance capacities and resources and to draw together the different institutional components of EU external relations, including trade, aid and economics. In short, it was intended to finally and unequivocally link the ‘politics with money’.2 To this end, its biggest impact was institutional. It upgraded the position of High Representative for CFSP to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, merging it with the post of European Commissioner for External Relations, with the holder also becoming a Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). This new ‘double-­ hat’ post is intended to encourage greater consistency and coherence across the previously separate elements of European foreign policy (Lieb and Maurer 2008). To facilitate greater consistency and coherence, the HR/VP now serves as permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (see below) whereas pre-Lisbon such meetings were chaired by the country holding the six-month rotating EU Presidency. The HR/VP also chairs the ‘Commissioners group on external action’ bringing together the European Commissioners responsible for all aspects of EU external relations, again in an attempt to better coordinate activities at EU level.3 The new HR/VP also enjoys new powers of initiative and responsibility for ‘facilitating the harmonisation of member state views’ (Dagand 2008: 6). Aiding the HR/VP since 2009 has been the European External Action Service (EEAS), perhaps Lisbon’s most significant institutional innovation, designed to ‘support the High Representative in fulfilling her mandate’ (Consilium 2010), and running the 139 EU Delegations around the world (see Chap. 9). Finally, Lisbon provided provisions for more comprehensive co-operation in security and defence through Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO), enabling ‘member states that want to integrate their defence policies more closely to do so’ (Gostyńska-­Jakubowska and Odendahl 2017). Having been unused for the first decade after Lisbon, plans for PESCO involving 25 member states were finally launched at the end of 2017. Thus, in the years since EPC was first established foreign and security policy co-operation within the EU has become increasingly institutionalised and sophisticated with Brussels becoming an increasingly important location of decision-making, even if national capitals—particularly Berlin, Paris and London—remain crucial centres of influence.

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The institutional structures that have developed to facilitate and support CFSP and CSDP highlight this process of ‘Brusselisation’. They also demonstrate the complexity and dynamism of interactions between member states themselves, and between member states and the institutional structures they have created. These exist on four main levels. At the apex of EU political decision-making and leadership is the European Council. Created in 1974 but only a formal EU institution since Lisbon, the European Council is the ultimate strategic and agenda-setting authority in the EU, setting its ‘political direction and priorities’ (European Council 2017). Although it does not provide permanent strategic leadership across all foreign policy-related dossiers, foreign policy does form a core component of the discussions between its members, the 28 heads of state and government. Its formal conclusions identify priorities and issues of concern, and can outline actions to be taken or goals to be reached to which other institutions will then respond. Sitting below the European Council is the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) which, since 2009, has been the ministerial configuration within the EU responsible for EU external actions.4 Meeting monthly at foreign minister level, the FAC is chaired permanently by the HR/VP and its role is to ‘ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s external action’ and to define and implement the CFSP ‘based on guidelines set by the European Council’ (Consilium 2017a). To that end and depending on the agenda item under discussion, it may also involve member states’ respective ministers of defence, development and trade. For example, the March 2017 FAC was preceded by an informal breakfast meeting of defence ministers convened to discuss CSDP (Consilium 2017b). Supporting the FAC is the Political and Security Committee (PSC) established, as noted, by the Nice Treaty. The formal role of the PSC is to manage CFSP and CSDP, supervise ongoing crisis management operations and provide strategic advice and policy options to the FAC; it also prepares the agenda of FAC meetings although this is formally approved by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) the most senior ambassadorial configuration within the Council structures.5 Replacing the Political Committee which met on a more ad hoc basis and brought together the Political Directors in member state foreign ministries, the PSC meets at least twice a week at ambassadorial level, permanently chaired by an official from the EEAS. It deals with all CFSP- and CSDP-related matters through its responsibility for ‘the definition of and follow-up to the EU’s response to a crisis’.6 The PSC is arguably the most

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important institutional interlocutor for the HR/VP and has been described as the ‘linchpin’ of the CFSP (Duke 2005). Ultimately, though, its effectiveness rests on the ability of member states to reach agreement and is only effective ‘to the extent that consensus allows’.7 Finally, beneath the PSC is a network of 20+ working groups and working parties that together form the engine-room of CFSP and CSDP policy- and decision-making. Some of these have cross-cutting roles, such as the Nicolaidis Group which prepares meetings of the PSC, or regional or topical responsibilities, such as the Working Party on the Western Balkans Region (COWEB) or the Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN). The most important workings groups are the Politico-Military Group which prepares the political aspects of CSDP missions, the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) which provides military advice to the PSC and directs all military activities carried out in the context of the EU (Consilium 2017c). Drawing together representatives from each member state’s Permanent Representation or officials from the relevant domestic ministries as required, the working groups together provide the common assessments, technical preparation and means of consultation and coordination necessary for any diplomatic action carried out through the CFSP.  In this they are assisted and supported by officials from the relevant departments of the EEAS and European Commission directorates-general. EEAS and Commission officials also attend meetings of the PSC and FAC. ‘Playing the CFSP game’ effectively therefore requires member states to invest considerable resources of time and expertise in a complex, multi-level and ongoing policy-making process. By its very nature this also necessitates effective inter-ministerial coordination at the domestic level (discussed further in later chapters) as well as the use of bilateral diplomatic networks.

Structure and Organisation of the Book In presenting its argument and analysis, the book is divided into three sections. The first two focus on Britain and Germany individually with three chapters in each covering: their historical relationship with the CFSP and its place in their broader foreign policy-making; the institutional structures and processes which support their policy-making; and a specific examination of their engagement with the CFSP on a range of particular policy questions and issues. The third section provides two more detailed case

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studies focusing on the Iran nuclear negotiations and the establishment of the European External Action Service. The first allows us to consider how Britain and Germany as members of the so-called ‘E3’ states sought to instrumentalise the CFSP and the EU’s range of foreign policy instruments in pursuit of a specific set of objectives. The second explores the role of both states in the development of a new but contested institution, and particularly their ambitions for and concerns about this new institution. Overall, a detailed account is offered of how Britain and Germany have engaged with the CFSP, primarily in the period 2000–15, thereby contributing to our broader understanding of the trajectory of EU foreign and security policy cooperation at the theoretical and empirical levels.

A Note on Sources The analysis presented in the book draws from two main sets of sources. The first are official documents including reports, statements, declarations and speeches, from a range of national and supranational institutional locations. These include the chancelleries, foreign and defence ministries, and parliaments in Britain and Germany; and at the EU level from the European Council, Foreign Affairs Council (including Council conclusions), General Secretariat of the Council, European Commission, European Parliament and European External Action Service. These are supported by interviews from a range of officials and politicians conducted between 2010 and 2017 from the following institutions: the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development; and the German Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry) and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Defence Ministry). In Brussels, interviews were conducted with officials from UKREP, the German Permanent Representation, the French Permanent Representation, the Swedish Permanent Representation, the General Secretariat of the Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European External Action Service. Additional interviews were also conducted in the Quai d’Orsay (French Foreign Ministry). The majority of the interviews were conducted in person, with a small number conducted by telephone, as indicated. Where more than one official from the same institution has been interviewed during a similar time period, they have been differentiated by a code (e.g. GO6). With a couple of exceptions, all interviews were conducted on the basis of strict anonymity.

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Notes 1. The pillar system consisted of Community policy in Pillar 1, CFSP in Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 for co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs, which like CFSP was also intergovernmental. 2. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6). 3. This group includes Trade, Transport, International Cooperation and Development, European Neighbourhood Policy, Enlargement, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, and Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship. 4. Prior to 2009 and the entering into force of Lisbon, foreign affairs were dealt with by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) which has now been split, although traditionally the two bodies meet on the same day, one after the other. 5. COREPER is itself divided into two: COREPER I which meets at Deputy Permanent Representative level and tends to focus on what pre-Lisbon would have been characterised as Pillar 1 Community policy; and COREPER II which meets at Permanent Representative level and deals with foreign affairs, economics affairs, JHA, etc. 6. Official Journal of the European Communities (2001) Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee—Annex (2001/78/CFSP), available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cmsUpload/l_02720010130en00010003.pdf. 7. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017.

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Daehnhardt, P. (2011) ‘Germany in the European Union’. In Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.) National and European Foreign Policies—Towards Europeanization (London and New York: Routledge). Dagand, S. (2008) ‘The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP’. European Security Review, 37, pp. 5–9. Duchêne, F. (1973) ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’. In Kohnstamm, M. and Hager, W. (eds.) A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community (London: Macmillan). Duke, S. (2005) ‘The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political and Security Committee’. Working Paper 2005/W/05 (European Institute of Public Administration). Duke, S. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2006) ‘Administrative Governance in the CFSP: Development and Practice’. European Foreign Affairs Review, 11, pp. 163–192. Egeberg, M. (1999) ‘Transcending Intergovernmentalism? Identity and Role Perceptions of National Officials in EU decision-making’. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3), pp. 456–474. Galloway, D. (1999) ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: Intergovernmentalism Donning the Mantle of the Community Method’. In Westlake, M. (ed.) The Council of the European Union, 2nd Edition (London: Cartermill). Glarbo, K. (1999) ‘Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), pp. 634–651. Gostyńska-Jakubowska, A. and Odendahl, C. (2017) ‘A Flexible EU: A New Beginning or the Beginning of the End?’ CER Insight. Centre for European Reform, 18 May. Gross, E. (2009) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (2006) The Council of Ministers (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Heisenberg, D. (2005) ‘The Institution of ‘Consensus’ in the European Union: Formal Versus Informal Decision-making in the Council’. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), pp. 65–90. Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp. 305–328. Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?’. In Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds.) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge). Hoffmann, S. (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-state and the Case of Western Europe’. Daedalus, 95(3), pp. 862–915. Howorth, J. (2009) ‘The Case for a European Grand Strategy’. Europe: A Time for Strategy. Egmont Paper, No. 27, pp. 15–24.

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Lewis, J. (2005) ‘The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union’. International Organization, 59(4), pp. 937–971. Lewis, J. (2010) ‘Strategic Bargaining, Norms and Deliberation’. In Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. (eds.) Unveiling the Council of the European Union—Games Governments Play in Brussels (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Lieb, J. and Maurer, A. (2008) ‘Creating the European External Action Service’. SWP Comments (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Major, C. (2005) ‘Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy—Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?’ Politics, 25(3), pp. 175–190. Menon, A. (2008) ‘Security Policy and the Logic of Leaderlessness’. In Hayward, J. (ed.) Leaderless Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Menon, A. and Wright, V. (1998) ‘The Paradoxes of ‘Failure’: British EU Policy Making in Comparative Perspective’. Public Policy and Administration, 13(4), pp. 46–66. Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), pp. 473–524. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (2002) ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-­ Making System of the European Union’. European Foreign Affairs Review, 7(3), pp. 257–282. Naurin, D. and Wallace, H. (eds.) (2010) Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Nuttall, S. (1992) European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Nuttall, S. (2000) European Foreign Policy (Oxford: OUP). Parsons, C. (2010) ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory’. In Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science, 3rd Edition (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Peters, B. and Pierre, J. (eds.) (2003) Handbook of Public Administration (London: SAGE Publications). Pierson, P. (1996) ‘The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’. Comparative Political Studies, 29(2), pp. 123–163. Pollack, M.A. (1996) ‘The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis’. Governance, 9(4), pp. 429–458. Pomorska, K. (2011) ‘Poland: Learning to Play the Brussels Game’. In Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.) National and European Foreign Policies—Towards Europeanization (London and New York: Routledge). Pomorska, K. and Wright, N. (2013) ‘Europeanization and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. In Bretherton, C. and Mannin, M. (eds.) The Europeanisation of European Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 151–163.

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Tojé, A. (2008a) ‘The Consensus–Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy’. Security Dialogues, 39(1), pp. 121–141. Tojé, A. (2008b) ‘The European Union as a Small Power, or Conceptualizing Europe’s Strategic Actorness’. Journal of European Integration, 30(2), pp. 199–215. Tonra, B. (2001) The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate). Wallace, W. (1983) ‘Introduction: Cooperation and Convergence in European Foreign Policy’. In Hill, C. (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (London: George Allen & Unwin). Wendt, A. (1992) Social Theory and International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press). Wendt, A. (1994) ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’. American Political Science Review, 88(2), pp. 384–396. Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Wong, R. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of Foreign Policy’. In Hill, C. and Smith, M. (eds.) International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: OUP). Wong, R. (2007) ‘Foreign Policy’. In Graziano, P. and Vink, M.P. (eds.) Europeanization: New Research Agendas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.) (2011) National and European Foreign Policies— Towards Europeanization (London and New York: Routledge). Wright, V. (1996) ‘The National Co-ordination of European Policy-Making: Negotiating the Quagmire’. In Richardson, J.  (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy-Making (London: Routledge). Zürn, M. and Checkel, J.T. (2005) ‘Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State’. International Organization, 59(4), pp. 1045–1079.

Bibliography—Official Documents Consilium (2010) Council Decision Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU) (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2017a) Defence Cooperation: Council Establishes Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 Member States Participating, 11 December (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://dsms.consilium.europa.eu/952/ Actions/Newsletter.aspx?messageid=18144&customerid=54447&password=e nc_5370703674506E3145595063_enc. Consilium (2017c) Foreign Affairs Council, 6 March 2017—Background Brief, 3 March (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/meetings/fac/2017/03/06/.

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Consilium (2017d) Council Preparatory Bodies, 9 November (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatorybodies/?Page=2. European Council (2017) The European Council, 15 June (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/. HM Government (2013) Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Foreign Policy (London: The Stationery Office). Official Journal of the European Communities (2001) Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting up the Political and Security Committee—Annex (2001/78/CFSP) (Brussels: Consilium).

PART I

The United Kingdom and the CFSP

Perhaps the least controversial thing that can be said about the UK’s relationship with the EU is that it has been and remains controversial. Indeed, since the June 2016 Brexit referendum it only seems to have become even more so, while the consequences for British foreign policy are likely to be profound. The UK Government’s position paper—Foreign Policy, Defence and Development—A Future Partnership (HM Government 2017a) recognises the important role played by the EU in international affairs, and emphasises the involvement of the UK in developing and contributing to its capacities in this regard. This reflects the broader direction of UK international engagement since the end of the Second World War, wherein the UK has styled itself as a multilateral power par excellence, directly contributing to the construction and expansion of many of the most important institutions of international governance, and championing the establishment of a rules-based international system. In the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015 document, for example, the maintenance of this system was identified as a core British national interest, contributing to the UK’s capacity to ‘punch above its weight’ in international affairs (HM Government 2015). However, not only does Brexit entail the UK’s departure from a major component of this system, it also signals the apparent repudiation by the UK electorate of an elite political and diplomatic consensus that has seen the EU’s foreign policy-making environment, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), become a core element in the UK’s international strategy. Thus, Brexit represents a great political cleavage with the potential to limit and perhaps even prevent co-operation with the UK’s nearest

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allies, regardless of the hopes expressed by the government for close future ties. An examination of the UK’s foreign and security policy contribution to—and expectations of—the EU in recent years, and particularly since the 1991 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) which formally established the CFSP, reveals just how profound this cleavage could be. Different governments from different parties have adopted varying postures regarding the EU: thus the ‘ardent nationalism’ and pro-American bias of the Thatcher years (Hill 1996: 70) was replaced by relative isolation under Major; then the rhetoric-heavy but ultimately ‘outcome-lite’ pro-Europeanism of Blair gave way to the more ambivalent positions of Brown and Cameron. However, whatever their wider policy and ideological differences, and these were often profound, throughout this period UK foreign policy shared two key features: pragmatism and continuity. In the context of the CFSP—i.e. behind the closed doors of the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee and the numerous working groups where policy is negotiated and agreed—British engagement has been far more subtle and nuanced than the sometimes ferocious and binary domestic discourse on the EU would suggest. Instead, a rationale based around instrumentalism and an assumption of leadership has been the foundation of British engagement, underlining an elite view of the CFSP as merely one element in a wider ‘toolkit’ which Britain seeks to instrumentalise for the promotion and pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. It is to this that Brexit poses such a profound challenge, calling into question the UK’s continuing ambition and capacity to be a global actor, as well as its sense of place and importance in the international system. This section is divided into three chapters. The first examines the nature of this elite political and diplomatic consensus on EU foreign policy. It begins by examining the basis for this consensus before looking in turn at the main governmental periods prior to the referendum: the ‘pusillanimous realism’ of the Major years; the ‘pragmatic vision’ of the Blair and Brown governments; and the ‘defensive engagement’ of the Cameron-led Coalition. The second chapter explores the institutions, structures and processes by which UK foreign policy feeds into and is, in turn, influenced by the EU level in the context of the CFSP. The third chapter considers how the UK has engaged with the CFSP in the years up to 2015 and briefly considers the potential consequences of Brexit for UK foreign policy-­making in the context of Europe.

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Bibliography Hill, C. (1996) ‘United Kingdom: Sharpening Contradictions’. In Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in European Foreign Policy (London and New York: Routledge).

Bibliography—Official Documents HM Government (2015) National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (London: The Stationery Office) HM Government (2017a) Foreign Policy, Defence and Development—A Future Partnership Paper, 12 September, London. Available at: https://www.gov. uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-afuture-partnership-paper.

CHAPTER 2

From Pusillanimous Realism to Defensive Engagement: Britain’s Changing Relationship with the CFSP

Introduction This chapter examines the evolution in British official attitudes to foreign and security cooperation in the EU.  It begins by arguing that an elite political and official consensus has existed around the purposes and benefits of CFSP. To explore what this has meant for cooperation, it breaks the years 1991–2015 into three main periods: the ‘pusillanimous realism’ of Major (1990–97); the ‘pragmatic vision’ of Blair (1997–2007); and the increasingly ‘defensive engagement’ of Brown and Cameron (2007–15). Taken together, these demonstrate that pragmatism, continuity, a focus on practical outputs rather than institution-building, and the assumption of a strong British leadership role have provided the foundation for how the UK has engaged with the EU foreign policy cooperation.

British Attitudes to European Foreign Policy Cooperation Since Maastricht: An Elite Consensus A notable feature of the relationship between British foreign policy and the EU in the period from the Maastricht Treaty to the 2016 referendum was the remarkable continuity in terms of principles and outcomes pursued by Conservative, Labour and Coalition governments (e.g. Dryburgh 2010a; Daddow 2013, 2015; Schnapper 2015). Thus, despite perceptions, for example, of John Major’s governments as ‘semi-detached’, and © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_2

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those of Tony Blair as far more positive and engaged (James and Oppermann 2009), the differences were frequently more about the style and manner of Britain’s engagement rather than the objectives to be achieved. So while 1997 brought the promise of a step change in the UK’s relationship with its European partners, not only did Blair’s government face the same dilemmas and challenges as its predecessors; more often than not its responses were similar in style and substance (Bache and Nugent 2007). Meanwhile, there was ‘strong continuity’ between the Liberal Conservative foreign policy of the Coalition and New Labour (Daddow 2015: 312). Pragmatic engagement was the order of the day: despite a reputation as a strong Eurosceptic, when William Hague became Foreign Secretary in 2010 he promised an ‘activist, positive and energetic’ foreign policy towards the EU (Hague 2010b). This, in turn, repeated a pattern of positive intent shown by all incoming governments going back at least as far as 1979 (Wallace 2005). The ‘remarkably consistent’ preferences (Dryburgh 2010b: 259) of all governments were clear: a strong British presence at the heart of Europe and, where appropriate, a strong voice for the EU internationally, with both intended to protect and promote British interests. Several important contextual factors underlie this continuity and provide a framework for understanding how Britain has related to the EU, its place within British foreign policy calculations, and the UK’s perception of its place in the international community. First, Britain’s approach in terms of its role in and contribution to common European foreign policy has remained essentially pragmatic and, broader debates over integration notwithstanding, largely non-ideological (Forster 2000). Thus, since the inception of EPC and then its successor the CFSP, Britain’s primary focus has been on practical outputs rather than institutional development, with CFSP seen as an important supplement to a declining national capacity to act (ibid). Second, European-level cooperation has been just one element in a broader strategy designed to maintain British influence globally through its wide range of international organisational memberships (particularly its permanent Security Council seat), its willingness to back up its diplomacy with the use of military force, and its commitment to NATO and the transatlantic alliance (Wallace 2005). These feed into a third factor. The high level of continuity reflects what has been essentially an elite political consensus regarding Britain’s place in the world in general, and the aims, purposes, costs and benefits of British

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participation in European foreign policy co-operation more specifically (Bache and Jordan 2008). Thus, the relationship with the CFSP has been judged first in terms of Britain’s determination to maintain the primacy of NATO within Europe’s security architecture, and the transatlantic security relationship with the US; and second according to Britain’s ability to exercise leadership and influence in foreign and security policy by virtue of its power (military, diplomatic and economic) and global reach. This is frequently emphasised in official discourse. For example, after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote: With our record of making and effecting a global foreign policy, Britain is now well placed to play a leading role in making [CFSP] work: setting the European foreign policy agenda (1994: 421)

Six years later, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair declared: ‘Britain’s place has always been at the centre of Europe. […]  I hold to my view that Britain’s destiny is to be a leading partner in Europe’ (Blair 2000). Obviously Britain has not been alone in seeking to use EU membership to help mitigate and adapt to upheavals in the international environment since 1989 (Forster 2000). However, while dramatic the pressures these geopolitical changes have imposed on the UK and its EU partners for political and institutional adaptation represent not so much a new phenomenon as an upping of the tempo, albeit a significant one. Rather, the key change in foreign policy priorities actually occurred much earlier at the beginning of the 1970s with the decision by member states to participate in foreign policy co-operation within EPC. This represented a clear recognition on the part of states like Britain that their ability to act uni- and bilaterally was no longer sufficient. As had been demonstrated in defence terms with the establishment of NATO, multilateralism represented the most practical and pragmatic means of pursuing foreign policy preferences. In light of this, it is interesting to see how British calculations of CFSP’s utility have altered in recent years, and particularly how opinion has shifted in official attitudes to how far the EU has actually delivered on its promise to develop into a genuinely effective foreign and security actor. This has been reflected most obviously in decreasing British support for the CSDP, now considered by some in Whitehall as ‘an inefficient use’ of limited resources (O’Donnell 2011: 420). This highlights the two key themes discussed in this chapter. First is the clear and obvious sense of pragmatism underpinning British foreign policy.

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Thus, Britain has sought to instrumentalise CFSP and the foreign policy instruments it incorporates, while utilising and prioritising alternative multilateral venues as required. Second, and more importantly, however great its contribution to the development of CFSP, Britain’s priority has always been to ensure EU-level cooperation does not reduce the effectiveness of other actors, particularly NATO. At times, therefore, there is a real sense of British semi-detachment from foreign policy cooperation—or at least an ‘ambiguity with regard to [its] wholehearted commitment’ (Oliver and Allen 2006: 187). This has been a prime feature of Britain’s attitude to integration more generally both before and since accession in 1973. The origins of this lie in the UK’s changing fortunes in the post-war period which have, in turn, impacted on how it has engaged in foreign policy cooperation in the context of the EU.

‘Pusillanimous Realism’—Britain and the CFSP (1991–97) Compared to other aspects of integration, the idea of foreign and security policy cooperation, if not always the practice, proved relatively uncontroversial for Britain during the 1990s. It had previously been very supportive of EPC, with officials and politicians ‘enthusiastic’ about the possibilities this offered (Allen 1988: 187)—the Thatcher government produced a paper in 1985 that ‘wholeheartedly endorsed’ it (Self 2010: 132). Indeed, Britain was considered the prime mover in terms of EPC outputs and institutional developments, particularly during its first decade (Hill 1996). This support reflected two key points of principle that remain central to the British approach to foreign policy cooperation: first, that EPC remain institutionally separate from the EEC; and second that cooperation would always be intergovernmental, with the ‘traditional instruments of foreign policy…[and] the right to make decisions…the property of the member states’ (Hurd 1981: 386). These principles formed the basis for how Britain negotiated the CFSP elements of Maastricht, and subsequent treaties. Moreover they have been pursued and defended subsequently by governments of all parties. This implicit consensus notwithstanding, however, the handling by the Major government (1990–97) of cooperation on specific issues, particularly Bosnia, was problematic, demonstrating an inability or unwillingness to understand the ramifications of the end of the Cold War and what these would mean for the recently established CFSP.  Meanwhile, high profile

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disputes over the ERM, the safety of British beef, the appointment of Jacques Delors’ successor as Commission President, and the government’s opposition to the Social Chapter resulted in what was essentially a British policy of ‘non-cooperation’ (Evans and Menon 2017: 6), leaving it increasingly marginalised until the election of Labour in 1997 and thereby weakening any claim it might make to leadership (Bache and Nugent 2007; James and Oppermann 2009). Alongside France and Germany, Britain dominated negotiations over what became the CFSP in 1990–91 (Smith 2004). Initially it had not welcomed the discussions, considering them ‘a negotiation before its time’ (Dryburgh 2010b: 259). However with the end of the Cold War, the need to anchor a newly-unified and potentially dominant Germany within the structures of Europe had propelled political union onto the IGC’s agenda, meaning Britain had little choice but to participate fully to ensure that the predominant position of member states vis-à-vis control over foreign policy cooperation was not threatened or diluted. The Major Government was ultimately delighted by the system that emerged which, from its perspective, institutionalised the two preferences outlined above (Dryburgh 2010b). However, beyond the desire to consolidate member states’ prerogatives and ensure that cooperation did not impact negatively on NATO, there seemed ‘little willingness in London’ to map out any more tangible longer-term objectives for CFSP (Hill 1996: 85). The limitations of London’s strategic vision came quickly and tragically to light with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disappointed wider expectations that CFSP would enhance and improve European actorness in foreign and security policy. However, the reality is that it was never designed to provide the kind of immediate crisis management needed in the Balkans. This in turn reflects the fundamental and ongoing weakness in what the member states had themselves created: an intergovernmental system that would tolerate lowest common denominator policy and inaction as the price of consensus (e.g. Regelsberger and Schmalz 2001). For Britain specifically, Bosnia reveals its lack of ambition for the CFSP and a ‘realpolitik’ perspective on how national power should be exercised in the post-Cold War period. For Britain, CFSP was a forum for intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign states. It was not the job of the member states operating through CFSP to end the Bosnian conflict—ultimately only ‘those doing the fighting’ could make that decision (Hurd 1994: 424). Rather, the CFSP’s role was to prevent rivalries between the member states over

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Bosnian policy, and help them develop a framework through which a negotiated settlement could be achieved (ibid). In other words, for the UK CFSP was continuing from where EPC had left off: a ‘modification’ rather than a fundamental transformation of the existing arrangements (Oliver and Allen 2006: 192). In Bosnia, Britain was pursuing a solution that would avoid the use of force if at all possible, an ambition many of its partners shared (Gow 1996). The role of the CFSP was limited to facilitating the intergovernmental cooperation necessary to achieve this. This narrow view of its utility was underlined by the creation of an ad hoc contact group consisting of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the US and Russia which provided the principal arena for diplomatic discussions on Bosnia. For Britain, whatever role CFSP played, the important decision-making would take place elsewhere, a similar approach to that taken in its response to Iran’s nuclear programme from 2003. The Major Government’s approach to Bosnia was thus inherently conservative, rooted in a realist and highly pragmatic analysis of the international system and the ability of states to deploy power within it. No British national interest was considered as being at stake in Bosnia and so ‘the instinct of the realist was to stay out’ (Hurd 1997: 130). Instead, London advocated a policy of non-intervention, employing sanctions and an arms embargo to contain the conflict within the collapsing Yugoslav state. Whatever the rationale for such narrow pragmatism, it exposed a lack of understanding of the implications of ethnic violence for the integrity of states; of the need for a robust European response to avoid potential regional destabilisation; and of the obvious national interest in ensuring this did not occur. Moreover, not only did Britain suffer considerable and sustained criticism, including being accused of supporting appeasement (Gow 1996), its strategy also resulted in splits with key allies, particularly Washington. So stark were the disagreements between London and the new Clinton Administration that relations were soon strained ‘almost to breaking point’ (Self 2010: 94). With the UK government struggling across a range of issues, particularly economic, its handling of Bosnia only undermined further its credibility and claim to international or European leadership. Far from being pragmatic, British realism instead seemed ‘pusillanimous’ (Gow 1996: 97), with efforts to protect national prerogatives in foreign and security policy of limited value given the lack of strategic direction from London. Arguably the only positive longer-term outcome was the development of closer defence and security links with France which bore fruit in 1998 at St Malo (Oliver and Allen 2006).

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Addressing the deficiencies in CFSP exposed by Yugoslavia was a priority of the foreign policy component of the 1996 intergovernmental conference which produced the Treaty of Amsterdam. Britain supported many of the proposed reforms, including creating a High Representative for CFSP provided he/she remained clearly within the institutional structures of the Council. However, so divisive had Europe become within the governing Conservative Party, and consequently so heated the domestic debate around all aspects of integration, that the contribution of the moribund government to the IGC was essentially obstructionist. For their part, Britain’s European partners were happy to delay final negotiations until the general election when they hoped and expected a more pro-­ European Labour government would take office (Wallace 2005). When new Foreign Secretary Robin Cook addressed the House of Commons on 9 June 1997, he declared that ‘New Labour goes to the Amsterdam summit in a constructive spirit of partnership, not the sterile spirit of oppositionalism’ (Hansard 1997).

‘Pragmatic Vision’—Britain and the CFSP (1997–2007) An assumption of leadership was central and explicit in British foreign policy under Tony Blair’s governments. Moreover, although Blair’s premiership was ultimately overshadowed by the consequences of 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War—most notable of which was the ultimate confounding of his hopes for a sea-change in the relationship between Britain and the EU—few recent prime ministers have so dominated its formulation and implementation. In part this reflected the unprecedented authority over domestic policy exercised by his Chancellor, Gordon Brown. Even so, Bulmer-Thomas (2006: 2) believes Blair’s dominance was such that it is ‘not unreasonable’ to consider British foreign policy during this time as ‘Blair’s foreign policy’, despite his office lacking clear prerogatives in this area (O’Malley 2007). What is striking, though, is that Blair’s attempts to effect long-term change in the relationship between Britain and Europe, and ensure for Britain the kind of leadership role in the EU he desired, ultimately failed. Moreover, it is Blair himself who must shoulder much of the blame for this. His determination to support the Bush Administration in Iraq, and his inability to overcome the domestic dominance of Brown, who ­effectively vetoed British membership of the single currency through his five

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economic tests, meant that by the end of his premiership Blair’s European policy was largely defunct. Indeed, in the view of Charles Clarke, his former Home Secretary, ‘his stewardship was, if not a failure [then] very close to failure in relation to Europe given what his ambitions [were]’.1 To understand New Labour foreign policy, therefore, one must examine the role of Blair in framing and driving it, and the restrictions he faced. Blair’s starting point was that Britain could and should be a force for good in the world (Williams 2005). Thus it needed to be willing to intervene, militarily when required, something reflected strongly in the interventionist positions he frequently adopted. According to Clarke he repudiated the ‘walk passed on the other side school’; rather ‘Britain can and should, and therefore Europe can and should, influence what’s going on in the rest of the world, including militarily’. To achieve this, Britain needed to play a global role looking beyond Europe and the Atlantic Alliance (Oliver and Allen 2006), but only on the basis that these two essential pillars of British foreign policy were strong and engaged. It was to achieve this that so much of his energy was devoted, based on the premise that while Britain might not be materially or economically dominant, the force of its moral argument combined with a willingness to back this with action and a heavy dose of pragmatism would enable it to cajole and lead its allies in the direction wanted. Blair himself characterised this as ‘pragmatic vision’ (1999b). Two elements of this ‘vision’ stand out, and were constants throughout the period. The first was his efforts to re-invigorate Britain’s relationship with the EU and reposition it at the heart of decision-making. As Blair himself declared in 1997, ‘we cannot shape Europe unless we matter in Europe’ (Kassim 2008: 172). The second was a broader articulation of how Britain should engage with the world, for which its relationship with the EU and US were crucial. Re-positioning Britain The idea of Britain as a ‘bridge’ between the USA and Europe has been central to British foreign policy for at least six decades (e.g. Paterson 2007; Stephens 2005). Central to Blair’s foreign policy was the desire to redefine and re-energise Britain’s relations with Europe to enhance its role as such a ‘bridge’. For Blair, the relationship between the two was crucial to ensuring a stable international system and a Britain at the heart of EU

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decision-­making would be stronger in the eyes of the US, in turn making it more influential in Europe (Williams 2005). As Blair put it: Britain is stronger with the US by reason of being in Europe […] we are stronger in Europe if strong with the US. Stronger together. Influential with both. And a bridge between the two (1999c).

The pragmatism of this position is emphasised in his memoirs: [I]n a world of new emerging powers, Britain needed Europe in order to exert influence and advance interests. […] It was a practical question of realpolitik. (Blair 2010: 533)

Blair invested considerable personal time and effort to achieve this, particularly prior to 2001, and his efforts were not without success. In 1994 he inherited a party that was arguably more at ease with Europe, and Britain’s relationship with it, than it had been in decades and pro-­ Europeanism became ‘a key element of New Labour’s modernizing project’, with ‘constructive engagement [with Europe] a mainstream view’ by the 1997 general election (Kassim 2008: 170). Even before this, Blair had signalled to the other member states convening for the Amsterdam IGC negotiations that they could expect much more positive engagement from the Labour government that would likely be representing Britain by the end (ibid). Once in office, Blair sought to build and enhance relations with partner states—for example the ‘Third Way’ initiative with German Chancellor and SPD leader, Gerhard Schröder (Schröder 2006)—and ‘like-minded partners’ across Europe with a view to ‘promot[ing] the UK to the status of core insider’ (Kassim 2008: 172). These efforts contributed to a sense that Britain was behaving as an ‘essentially constructive’ partner (Smith 2005: 709) and facilitated future British initiatives, particularly plans to develop EU foreign and security policy co-operation. It was here that Britain’s claim to leadership was most realistic and achievable. The Anglo-French St Malo Agreement in December 1998, which made possible the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),2 was arguably the most eye-catching European success of Blair’s first term and probably the most significant British contribution to EU foreign and security policy since the launch of CFSP. Crucially, it allowed Britain to restate its European leadership credentials even as it held back from participating in the single currency,

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giving Blair ‘a way of accomplishing a useful task without taking too many electoral risks’ (Chirac 2012: 216). ESDP was not, however, simply the Blair government casting around for a European role. Rather, it was born out of growing Anglo-French convergence around the idea that, following Yugoslavia, Europe needed greater autonomy in crisis management and less reliance on the US (House of Lords 2012). Moreover, a more capable Europe acting to complement NATO could share the security burden, thereby strengthening the alliance, a view that remains central to British policy. In essence, while NATO continued to do ‘the heavy-lifting’, the EU could act autonomously when the situation demanded, but always on the understanding that ‘CSDP is the junior partner to NATO in terms of military capabilities’.3 St Malo thus seemed to resolve the perennial question between Europe’s two leading military powers (and frequent rivals) over the relationship between NATO (and thus the US) and an autonomous European military crisis management capability. It galvanised a process resulting first in the creation of ESDP, followed by initiatives to improve member state military capabilities and coordination, and the launch of a number of crisis management missions. For Britain, these developments—particularly improved capabilities—could only be positive (Gross 2009). In the decade that followed, Britain played ‘a leading role in all the EU’s major security initiatives’ (Williams 2005: 60), including the launch of the plan for EU Battlegroups.4 In foreign and security policy, at least, Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ seemed initially to bear fruit. The desire to re-position Britain at ‘the heart’ of Europe suffered major set-backs following 9/11, however. The global shift in priorities that followed, and particularly the war in Iraq which split the EU’s leading powers, are often cited as crucial in upsetting Blair’s plans to re-anchor Britain in Europe (Paterson 2007). Iraq demonstrated to Britain’s EU partners that however constructive it sought to be, it remained fundamentally Atlanticist, despite the difficulties this created (Dorman 2003). Indeed, Gerhard Schröder suggested that ‘the traffic on Mr Blair’s bridge is too often one way’ (Stephens 2005: 20). However, this does not tell the whole story. Although 9/11 and Iraq contributed to the significant loss of momentum in Blair’s European ambitions from 2001 until his departure from office in 2007, domestic politics—indeed, internal Labour party politics—also played a major role. Despite being considered the most Europhile British Prime Minister since Heath (Smith 2005), the pro-European credentials of both Blair and

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his government were never unambiguous. For example, New Labour’s 1997 manifesto pledge to ‘lead a campaign for reform [because] Europe isn’t working in the way this country and Europe needs’ was a clear indication of how Britain’s ‘constructive engagement’ was imagined (Smith 2005: 707): in effect he was seeking to transpose Labour’s domestic electoral message to the European stage (Kassim 2008).5 That Blair needed to characterise the relationship in this way reflected the deep-rooted problems in how British voters perceived EU membership. Blair’s choice not to engage in a conversation with the electorate about the benefits of integration, particularly during the relative honeymoon period of his first term, wasted a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’ to settle this question (Kassim 2008: 183) and was arguably the greatest failing of his European policy. In part this reflected a refusal to confront a largely Eurosceptic print media, particularly on the question of the single currency which became emblematic of this weakness (Paterson 2010). At the same time, the decision by Chancellor Gordon Brown to veto British membership—taken with little or no input from the Prime Minister (Kassim 2008)—revealed the true extent of Blair’s power as head of government. In theory he could have replaced Brown with someone willing to pursue British participation in EMU. That he felt unable either to openly challenge or over-rule his chancellor (Stephens 2001) demonstrated that the latter was considered ‘invulnerable and immovable’ (Paterson 2010: 314). Despite his electoral success, Blair was unwilling to risk his position by taking on either his most influential minister or a broadly hostile media over the Euro. More than Iraq or his close support of the Bush Administration, it was his refusal not to join battle domestically on the question of Europe that thwarted the first aspect of Blair’s vision, his ambition to re-position Britain in Europe. Thus, the generally ‘proactive’ approach to the EU in Labour’s first term can be contrasted with the more ‘reactive’ and ‘defensive’ nature of the second and third (Menon 2004; Smith 2005; Sherrington 2006). Engaging with the World The second constant in Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ was his articulation of how Britain would engage with and seek to influence a dramatically changing world. This he set out most clearly in his Chicago speech on the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ (Blair 1999a). This made an intellectual and moral case for intervention in states deemed to pose a risk to international stability through their potential to spread chaos and

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disorder across borders (Atkins 2006). Early manifestations of these ideas came in Robin Cook’s 1997 call for an ‘ethical dimension’ to UK foreign policy, and the establishment of a new Department for International Development (DfID), now a key component in foreign policy-making in Whitehall (see Chap. 3). However, in Chicago Blair was espousing something much more radical, suggesting that when necessary the principle of non-­ intervention—fundamental in international relations—‘must be qualified’ (1999a). He saw globalisation as having political and security ramifications, not merely economic, meaning traditional distinctions between domestic and foreign policy no longer applied as ‘[m]any of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world’ (1999a). Furthermore, such was the level of interdependence that in the case of disasters, atrocities or even failed states, liberal democracies were obliged to intervene both morally and for their own security, albeit on the basis of international co-operation (ibid). Delivered against the backdrop of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, which he had strongly advocated, Blair’s speech is often seen as a justification for military actions not sanctioned by the UN. However, for him the justice of the cause was beyond question, based as it was on ‘values’ and ‘not on any territorial ambitions’ (Blair 1999a). Crucially, if those international institutions responsible for maintaining peace and security—particularly the UN—were unable or unwilling to act, they risked being side-lined by those who would—i.e. coalitions of like-minded liberal democracies, ­particularly the US and EU. Williams (2005) sees considerable continuity between these ideas and Labour’s long tradition of liberal internationalism. There is, moreover, a clear connection between Blair’s thinking on foreign and domestic policy. In essence, he was endeavouring to apply his ‘Third Way’ philosophy to the problems of the international community by ‘marrying’ realism and idealism in a new iteration of enlightened self-­ interest (Atkins 2006). Perhaps more significantly, this moral discourse was intended to bridge the fault line between Britain’s relationship with Europe and its ‘special relationship’ with the US. For Blair the language of shared values was a ‘moral glue’, enabling him to emphasise unifying factors at a time when events risked forcing the two apart. Implicit in this was the recognition that Europe could not rely indefinitely on US protection and needed to make a security contribution commensurate with its economic power. Equally, the US needed to remain involved in the maintenance of international stability

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but in partnership with its European allies. To achieve this, the EU needed foreign and security policies that complemented NATO, strengthening rather than weakening EU/US ties, or even establishing the EU as a rival (Paterson 2007). A philosophy which emphasised shared liberal democratic values and the need for the US and EU to work together to protect and promote these was therefore essential. These were influential ideas. The language was echoed, for example, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, reflecting British influence on the document (Consilium 2003). However, a policy based around bridging transatlantic differences could not be ‘an end in itself’ (Niblett 2007: 627); indeed Blair’s failure to bring Europe and the US closer together, in the process putting Britain back at the heart of Europe, partly reflects the ‘exaggerated view’ he had of his own influence over US policy (Williams 2005: 65). At the same time, while Britain’s claim to leadership in European foreign and security policy made sense, it would always be contingent on the support of partner states. Thus, British success in developing the ESDP/CSDP and promoting initiatives such as Battlegroups could never compensate for its failure to participate in the key European integration project—the single currency. Consequently when the split occurred with France and Germany over Iraq—in essence, when Britain was perceived as choosing Atlanticism over its EU partners—it was marginalised in the two most important debates taking place within Europe. The most significant differences between the Blair Governments and those of his immediate predecessor lay less in the substance and underlying direction of travel than in the tactics employed to get there and the personality of the leader pursuing them. Both Blair and Major saw Britain as having an important international role, although Blair made far greater efforts to instrumentalise the EU and CFSP to support this. Equally, a key element of this—the St Malo Agreement—was the result of several years of convergence with France that began during Major’s premiership and based on a pragmatic recognition of the need for greater collaboration within Europe to give it more autonomy in security, whilst simultaneously making it a more effective partner to the US. In this there is significant continuity not only between Major and Blair, but between Blair and his Labour and Conservative successors. Ultimately, however, his sometimes ‘grandiose and vague’ foreign policy objectives (Williams 2005: 207) never squared the circle of how to be at the heart of Europe whilst remaining close to the US.

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‘Defensive Engagement’—Britain and the CFSP (2007–15) The Brown Premiership (2007–10) Blair’s ‘pragmatic vision’ continued to some extent under Gordon Brown’s relatively brief administration. In general Brown was less interested in and had less opportunity to focus on ‘traditional’ foreign policy than his predecessor. The exception was his efforts to galvanise an international response to the 2008 global financial crisis, particularly through the G20, reflecting his belief that multilateral solutions were needed to solve this at the global level, while domestically without a healthy economy the UK would not have the resources to match its international commitments (Daddow 2013). Like his predecessor, Brown was a convinced Atlanticist, seeing the Anglo-American relationship as the basis of a broader partnership between the US and Europe, with ‘Britain as bridge’ a key component in his thinking (Schnapper 2015). Similarly, there was a clear internationalist tenor in the assertions of a global, activist Britain that needed to use its strengths ‘so that we are a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world’ (Miliband 2007). However, while generally supportive of the EU, there was a definite lessening of Blair era ‘Euroenthusiasm’ (Schnapper 2015) and a greater willingness to criticise its more specific failings, something Brown had frequently done as Chancellor. Indeed, one of the most memorable and symbolic expressions of Brown’s public ambivalence to the EU came in his decision to sign the Treaty of Lisbon alone, a day after his fellow EU leaders, having made little previous effort either to explain its significance or ‘sell’ it domestically (ibid). Brown’s more hands-off approach, particularly to the EU, allowed David Miliband, his Foreign Secretary, considerable autonomy in foreign policy. Miliband continued the British approach of seeking to instrumentalise the CFSP to support UK objectives and to ensure it a leadership role. In an early speech, he called for the EU ‘to be a greater asset in foreign policy’ (Miliband 2007). Convinced that a weak EU foreign policy would in turn reduce British influence in the wider international arena, he described his ambition for foreign policy co-operation thus: I came into office committed to the idea that Britain had an interest in a strong European foreign policy, not least because I thought we could have significant influence over it.6

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Unsurprisingly, he was also clear that British Foreign Secretaries should always expect to wield influence in EU foreign policy debates, given Britain’s position as a ‘big’ European power: [There is] the opportunity to be [influential] if he or she chooses to be so. And if Britain really kicks up a stink, it’s hard for something to happen and if we really push for something, we can often get things to happen.7

Miliband felt he achieved a position of relative seniority and influence among his peers ‘quite quickly’ although this was also a consequence of the range of complex issues he and his peers were confronting, particularly in Kosovo, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia.8 Domestically, the tools and resources available to Miliband to achieve influence and pursue leadership were impacted by the financial constraints imposed by the Treasury. This was an important driver of the major re-­ organisation of the FCO initiated by Miliband which saw a significant ­re-­focusing of attention and resources towards the wider world at the expense of the EU. Miliband characterised this re-organisation as follows: [We] refocused […] on our strategic priorities. We had a more rigorous approach to what we were trying to achieve […] [We] asked some rather searching questions about what the Foreign Office was for, and we concluded […] it was a global network. It was there to provide services to business and citizens.9

One of the main consequences of this process was a major down-grading of Europe as an area of priority for the FCO, a stance maintained subsequently under the Coalition. In part this reflects the greater control exercised by domestic line ministries over their policy areas and institutional relationships in Brussels, meaning the need for FCO coordination was reduced (Kassim 2008). However useful this strategic review, though, it was simply making a virtue out of necessity: the reality for the FCO throughout this period was of an ever-tightening budgetary settlement and the need to make hard choices and do more with less—a reality that would become even more challenging under the Coalition’s austerity policies. The result, according to one senior FCO official, was a ‘conscious decision to shift resources’ in recent years away from Europe and towards the Middle East and the world’s emerging economies, again something that continued under the Coalition.10

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At the same time, a sense of frustration was starting to become apparent in London at the direction of travel and sense of commitment among some member states to foreign policy co-operation, and particularly towards the development of CSDP.  In the context of ongoing and extremely costly UK military commitments, particularly in Afghanistan, there were doubts notably within the Ministry of Defence about the credibility of the EU as a vehicle for defence co-operation in any form; about the value of some EU states as military partners (something subsequently underlined by the limited involvement of European states in the 2011 Libyan campaign); and of the utility of the European Defence Agency. Thus, by 2010 Britain had already ‘started to withdraw’ from CSDP (O’Donnell 2011: 423), a process that only became more marked under the Coalition government and began to characterise broader attitudes to EU foreign policy co-operation. The Coalition Government (2010–15) David Cameron’s Coalition Government saw a shift from the ‘pragmatic vision’ of its predecessors to a more ‘defensive engagement’ in its approach to EU foreign policy co-operation. This can be explained in part by the increasingly Eurosceptic mood of the Conservative Party. However, it also reflected the longer term changes in elite attitudes to the effectiveness and utility of CFSP and CSDP noted above. Under the Coalition, these were arguably compounded by the degree of retrenchment in terms of the resources and capacities the UK was willing and able to invest in foreign policy following the costly interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the impact of the global financial crisis on domestic budgets. While the UK was still a comparatively wealthy country with global diplomatic and military reach, the ambition and over-confidence of the Blair years (particularly post-2001) was consciously consigned to the past. In this, and indeed in their broader approaches to foreign policy, there are therefore important similarities between the governments of David Cameron and Gordon Brown. Like Brown, Cameron sought to learn from the failures of the post-2001 period, deliberately adopting a more modest and ‘cautiously realist’ approach (Daddow 2013: 110). Cameron was also quite ‘hands off’, preferring to let his Foreign Secretaries, particularly William Hague, take the lead. To the extent Cameron espoused a foreign policy philosophy, it was one of ‘liberal Conservatism’, rooted in a pragmatic view of Britain’s military and economic power and diplomatic

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ties, thereby demonstrating clear continuity with New Labour (Daddow 2015). These could be seen clearly in two instances which, significantly, involved the Prime Minister directly: the UK’s involvement in the 2011 NATO mission in Libya and the 2010 bilateral Lancaster House defence treaties with France, which Cameron considered very much a ‘personal accomplishment’.11 However, his unsuccessful attempt to secure cross-­ party support for a proposed American-led military intervention in Syria in 2013, in part due to poor party management, was considered to have diminished Britain’s international influence, notably in Washington (Strong 2015; Gaskarth 2016). Meanwhile, the UK’s absence from the minilateral ‘Normandy Format’—a core element of European efforts to resolve the Ukraine crisis led by Germany and France—left him accused of being a ‘foreign policy irrelevance’ (Parker 2015) while for the US it was further evidence ‘they are just not that engaged’ (Dyer 2015). Indeed, the House of Lords European Union Committee criticised his government for not being ‘as active or visible […] as it could have been’ on Ukraine (2015: 29). Such high-profile mis-steps, and particularly the sidelining of the UK over Ukraine, have led to some to question whether Cameron had ‘a clear strategic sense of foreign policy’ (Seldon and Snowden 2015: 487). These criticisms also extended to Cameron’s approach to EU foreign policy co-operation. In general, the EU was seen largely through the prism of Eurosceptic pressure from within his own party and indeed around the Cabinet table. For example, Cameron’s 2009 decision to withdraw Conservative MEPs from the main centre-right EPP grouping in the European Parliament and the 2013 pledge to hold a referendum on EU membership following a renegotiation of British membership seemed more about short-term party management than the pursuit of a coherent strategy. Meanwhile, although the EU was recognised as having some value by ‘extend[ing] the impact and weight we bring to bear in foreign affairs’ (Hague 2010a), it was seen as only one of a range of possible options: Co-operation within the EU on the great global issues has allowed us to advance our shared interests and values with effect. But that does not mean we should try to forge a single European position and voice on everything. […] The EU is part of but far from all of the solution to the fundamental challenges we face. (Hague 2012).

To some extent this simply reflects the pragmatism that so often lies at the heart of British foreign policy. Indeed, whilst considered highly Eurosceptic

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as opposition leader, once he became Foreign Secretary William Hague came to recognise the value of the co-operation facilitated by and through the CFSP, notably in the context of the Iranian nuclear crisis (House of Lords 2017) (see Chap. 8). However, the toughening of Eurosceptic positions domestically meant a gradual but noticeable hardening of the UK’s attitude towards all aspects of EU co-operation. This had a number of manifestations. First, the desire to avoid internal party or Cabinet disputes and awkward encounters with Select Committees led some officials to believe there was a general ‘risk aversion’ within government, reflected in a growing sense of detachment from important CFSP debates.12 Equally, some felt that official thinking in London was not always articulated clearly enough to EU partners: ‘we struggle to explain [what] we are supportive of’, argued one official, seeing weaknesses in particular in how the UK approached debates over capabilities development through CSDP and closer ties between the EU and NATO.13 Another example of this was the government’s ambivalent approach to the new European External Action Service, established under Lisbon. Its lukewarm support was reflected in an anodyne commitment ‘to cost and budget neutrality overall’—i.e. that it should cost no more than the institutional elements it was replacing/combining (see Chap. 9).14 In practice, though, as the difficulties in achieving this became clear, the UK’s position started to seem more like intransigence and obstructionism based on an ideological rejection of the new institution, rather than the logical extension of cautious domestic budgetary policies and a traditionally sceptical British attitude towards EU institution-building. When taken with other UK positions, such as its ongoing rejection of a permanent EU operational headquarters for CSDP missions and its new preference for bilateral defence co-operation, the UK seemed now to be pursuing ‘an essentially defensive agenda’ and was ‘trying to hold back things’.15 While there is some truth to this, the reality is more complex. As noted, British ambivalence to the benefits of CFSP and particularly CSDP had been building for some time and was not confined to politicians. Within the UK foreign policy establishment a broader frustration was emerging by the end of the 2000s over the failure of the CFSP and CSDP to live up to previous ambitions. For example, one diplomat felt that they had been only ‘moderately successful’: [i]t hasn’t probably met the aspirations some people had for it 10 years ago. And I think the next decade, if anything, might be a bit tougher because

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there will be less money, less willingness to get stuck in around the world. […] [T]he EU has kind of bumped up against the limits of its ambition and its resources.16

Similarly, another felt the EU had ‘become a bit more effective as a foreign policy actor but has never really taken off’.17 Meanwhile, Lord Ricketts, who as Deputy Political Director at the FCO at the time of St Malo was closely involved in the negotiations, considers that the CSDP, the ‘linear descendant’ of that deal, ‘has developed into something much more modest’ (2017: 36). While rather gloomy, this assessment of the EU’s foreign policy capacity should be set in the context of the broader reappraisal of British foreign and defence policy taking place at this time. Under the Coalition, serious questions were being asked not only about the systems and processes through which Britain sought to exercise influence in the wider world— including the ‘value added’ of CFSP and CSDP—but also how to establish a more coherent approach to national security in a time of austerity. In practical terms this saw the launch within the FCO of the Diplomatic Excellence Initiative to ‘expand Britain’s diplomatic network […] and to put its budget on a surer footing’ (Daddow 2015: 307). However, it also saw more ambitious changes. The establishment of a new National Security Council and the publication of the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) alongside a Strategic Defence and Security Review were all attempts to bring greater coherence and focus whilst making clear the UK would continue to play an international role, despite its reduced resources. As the NSS explained, to protect its interests Britain needed to ‘maintain the capability to act well beyond our shores and work with our allies to have a strategic presence wherever we need it’ (HM Government 2010: 4). While multilateral institutions were important to this, so too were bilateral relationships, and in Europe perhaps none more so than that with France. The closeness and importance of the Anglo-French relationship was demonstrated beyond doubt by the Lancaster House defence agreements signed in 2010. The two states had been moving towards a similar world view on defence and security for some time, as demonstrated by the UK’s SDSR and the earlier 2008 French Defence White Paper, which the British had advised on, and the decision by President Nicolas Sarkozy to re-­ integrate France into NATO’s military structures (a policy also strongly advocated by his predecessor, Jacques Chirac) (Bickerton 2010). In part, the treaties were a response to their ‘relative and parallel decline’

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(Lindley-­French 2010: 14), and their joint determination to maintain a capacity for strategic influence. For the UK, this decline had become painfully apparent after extended military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan had diminished its resources and capabilities, while the financial crisis had left it with the challenge of how to pay for its continuing international presence and ambition. The economies of scale offered by defence co-­operation with France were thus very attractive. However, the treaties were more than just an exercise in financial belt-­ tightening. They also reflected the degree to which both the UK and France had lost faith in EU efforts to galvanise defence co-operation and the improvement of capabilities by member states, with the French decision on NATO throwing this into sharp relief. Indeed, so frustrated had the EU’s two most significant military powers become at the lack of serious progress and commitment from their partners, including Germany, that they were prepared to ‘forge ahead’ with bilateral military co-­operation, despite the threat it was deemed to pose to EU efforts and CSDP (O’Donnell 2011: 428). Indeed, some observers have suggested that their Combined Joint Expeditionary Force could prove ‘more credible’ than any EU force (Ricketts 2017: 36). And while the UK remained practically involved in a number of CSDP missions, for example Operation Atalanta, the Lancaster House treaties signalled the extent of Britain’s disengagement from CSDP, perhaps the most high-profile example of British foreign and security policy leadership and influence in the EU. Thus, while the Coalition period certainly saw a marked increase in Eurosceptic attitudes at the highest political levels, these alone were not responsible for the shift to ‘defensive engagement’ that characterised UK involvement in CFSP during this period.

Conclusion This chapter has explored Britain’s relationship with the CFSP from its establishment in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 to the end of David Cameron’s Coalition government in 2015. It has argued that despite sometimes profound differences in domestic policy, a remarkable degree of continuity has existed between governments of all parties in terms of the purposes of and benefits from EU foreign policy co-operation. Indeed, so strong has this continuity been that, prior to 2015, what was in essence an elite political and diplomatic consensus existed based around a pragmatic belief in Britain as an active power for whom multilateralism has been the chief means of maintaining its status and capacity to act globally.

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Thus, while the level of enthusiasm for CFSP certainly fluctuated after Maastricht, as has the effectiveness of UK strategy towards it, there has been general acceptance that it represents an important (and at times crucial) element in the UK’s foreign policy toolkit. Equally, there has been a shared view around the guiding principles of British engagement with CFSP: the primacy of intergovernmentalism in decision-making; a focus on practical outputs rather than institution-building; complementarity with NATO when dealing with security and defence issues; and that the UK expects to play a central leadership role. These principles will be explored in more detail in Chaps. 3 and 4.

Notes 1. Interview, Norwich, 2011. My emphasis. 2. Since the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 3. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 4. These were a joint initiative to create small rapid reaction forces capable of quick deployment in crisis management operations (Consilium, 2009). 5. In his long-anticipated 2013 speech on Britain’s relationship with the EU, David Cameron adopted a similar tone: ‘I want to speak to you today with urgency and frankness about the European Union and how it must change’ (my emphasis) (Cameron, 2013). 6. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 7. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 8. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 9. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 10. Interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 2010 (UKO1). 11. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 12. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 13. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 14. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 15. Interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 2010 (UKO1). 16. Interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 17. Interview, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6).

Bibliography Allen, D. (1988) ‘Britain and Western Europe’. In Smith, M., Smith, S. and White, B. (eds.) British Foreign Policy—Tradition, Change and Transformation (London: Unwin Hyman).

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Atkins, J. (2006) ‘A New Approach to Humanitarian Intervention? Tony Blair’s “Doctrine of the International Community”’. British Politics, 1(2), pp. 274–283. Bache, I. and Jordan, A. (eds.) (2008) The Europeanization of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Bache, I. and Nugent, N. (2007) ‘Europe’. In Seldon, A. (ed.) Blair’s Britain 1997–2007 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Bickerton, C. (2010) ‘“Oh Bugger, They’re in the Tent”: British Responses to French Reintegration into NATO’. European Security, 19(1), pp. 113–122. Blair, T. (2010) A Journey (London: Hutchinson). Bulmer-Thomas, V. (2006) ‘Blair’s Foreign Policy and its Possible Successor(s)’. Briefing Paper CH BP 06/01 (London: Chatham House). Chirac, J. (2012) My Life in Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Daddow, O. (2013) ‘The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the Coalition’. The Political Quarterly, 84(1), pp. 110–118. Daddow, O. (2015) ‘Constructing a ‘Great’ Role for BRITAIN in an Age of Austerity: Interpreting Coalition Foreign Policy, 2010–2015’. International Relations, 29(3), pp. 303–318. Dorman, A. (2003) ‘Loyal Ally—The United Kingdom’. In Buckley, M. and Fawn, R. (eds.) Global Response to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond (London and New York: Routledge). Dryburgh, L. (2010a) Examining Adaptation: UK Foreign Policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 1990–2001 (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing). Dryburgh, L. (2010b) ‘Blair’s First Government (1997–2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: Seismic Shift or Adaptation?’. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 12(2), pp. 257–273. Dyer, G. (2015) ‘White House No Longer Sees Anything Special in UK Relations’. The Financial Times, 1 May. Evans, G. and Menon, A. (2017) Brexit and British Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press). Forster, A. (2000) ‘Britain’. In Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G. (eds.) The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States (Manchester and New  York: Manchester University Press). Gaskarth, J. (2016) ‘The Fiasco of the 2013 Syria Votes: Decline and Denial in British Foreign Policy’. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), pp. 718–734. Gow, J.  (1996) ‘British Perspectives’. In Danchev, A. and Halverson, T. (eds.) International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd). Gross, E. (2009) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

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Hill, C. (1996) ‘United Kingdom: Sharpening Contradictions’. In Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in European Foreign Policy (London and New York: Routledge). Hurd, D. (1981) ‘Political Co-operation’. International Affairs, 57(3), pp. 383–393. Hurd, D. (1994) ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. International Affairs, 70(3), pp. 421–428. Hurd, D. (1997) The Search for Peace (London: Little, Brown and Company (UK)). James, S. and Oppermann, K. (2009) ‘Blair and the European Union’. In Casey, T. (ed.) The Blair Legacy—Politics, Policy, Governance and Foreign Affairs (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Kassim, H. (2008) ‘A Bid Too Far? New Labour and UK Leadership of the European Union’. In Hayward, J.  (ed.) Leaderless Europe (Oxford: OUP), pp. 167–187. Lindley-French, J.  (2010) ‘Britain and France: A Dialogue of Decline?’ International Security Programme Paper, 2010/02 (London: Chatham House), pp. 1–47. Menon, A. (2004) ‘From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq’. International Affairs, 80(4), pp. 631–648. Niblett, R. (2007) ‘Choosing between America and Europe: A New Context for British Foreign Policy’. International Affairs, 83(4), pp. 627–641. O’Donnell, C.M. (2011) ‘Britain’s Coalition Government and EU Defence Cooperation: Undermining British Interests’. International Affairs, 87(2), pp. 419–433. O’Malley, E. (2007) ‘Setting Choices, Controlling Outcomes: The Operation of Prime Ministerial Influence and The UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq’. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 9(1), pp. 1–19. Oliver, T. and Allen, D. (2006) ‘Foreign Policy’. In Bache, I. and Jordan, A. (eds.) The Europeanization of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Parker, G. (2015) ‘Britain ‘Irrelevant’ in Ukraine Solution’. The Financial Times, 6 February. Paterson, W.E. (2007) ‘The United Kingdom between Mars and Venus: Bridge or Bermuda Triangle?’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 8(1), pp. 1–12. Paterson, W.E. (2010) ‘Strategy and Politics in the Blair Era’. In Raschke, J. and Tils, R. (eds.) Strategie in der Politikwissenschaft: Konturen eines neuen Forschungsfeld (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag), pp. 301–321. Regelsberger, E. and Schmalz, U. (2001) ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Amsterdam Treaty: Towards an Improved EU Identity on the International Scene?’. In Monar, J. and Wessels, W. (eds.) The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (London: Continuum). Ricketts, P. (2017) ‘The EU and Defence: The Legacy of Saint Malo’. The RUSI Journal, 162(3), pp. 30–38.

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Schnapper, P. (2015) ‘The Labour Party and Europe from Brown to Miliband: Back to the Future?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1), pp. 157–173. Schröder, G. (2006) Entscheidungen  – Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe Verlag). Seldon, A. and Snowden, P. (2015) Cameron at 10: The Inside Story—2010–2015 (London: William Collins). Self, R. (2010) British Foreign and Defence Policy Since 1945—Challenges and Dilemmas in a Changing World (Basingstoke and New  York: Palgrave Macmillan). Sherrington, P. (2006) ‘Confronting Europe: UK Political Parties and the EU 2000–2005’. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8(1), pp. 69–78. Smith, J.  (2005) ‘A Missed Opportunity? New Labour’s European Policy 1997–2005’. International Affairs, 81(4), pp. 703–721. Smith, M.E. (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Stephens, P. (2001) ‘The Blair Government and Europe’. The Political Quarterly, 72(1), pp. 67–75. Stephens, P. (2005) ‘Britain and Europe: An Unforgettable Past and an Unavoidable Future’. The Political Quarterly, 76(2), pp. 12–21. Strong, J.  (2015) ‘Interpreting the Syria Vote: Parliament and British Foreign Policy’. International Affairs, 91(5), pp. 1123–1139. Wallace, W. (2005) ‘The Collapse of British Foreign Policy’. International Affairs, 81(1), pp. 53–68. Williams, P.D. (2005) British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Bibliography—Official Documents Blair, T. (1999a) Prime Minister’s Speeches—1999—Doctrine of the International Community (London: HM Government). Blair, T. (1999b) Prime Minister’s Speeches—1999—The New Challenge for Europe (London: HM Government). Blair, T. (1999c) Prime Minister’s Speeches—1999—Britain in Europe (London: HM Government). Blair, T. (2000) Prime Minister’s Speeches—2000—Committed to Europe, Reforming Europe (London: HM Government). Cameron, D. (2013) EU Speech at Bloomberg, 23 January (London: HM Government). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/euspeech-at-bloomberg. Consilium (2003a) European Security Strategy—A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels: Consilium).

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Consilium (2009b) EU Battlegroups (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720-Factsheet-Battlegroups_EN.pdf. Hague, W. (2010a) Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World—1 July 2010 (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office). Available at: http://www.fco. gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=22462590#. Hague, W. (2010b) Foreign Secretary William Hague Opened the European Affairs Debate in the House of Commons on June 3 2010 (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office). Available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=22319419. Hague, W. (2012) Europe at a Crossroads: What Kind of Europe do we Want? (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office). Available at: http://www.fco. gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=Speech&id=825459182#. Hansard (1997) ‘Column 804—9 June 1997’. (London: Houses of Parliament). Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo970609/debtext/70609-08.htm. HM Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: The Stationery Office). House of Lords (2012) European Union Committee—31st Report of Session 2010–12—European Defence Capabilities: Lessons from the Past, Signposts for the Future (London: The Houses of Parliament). House of Lords (2015) European Union Committee—6th Report of Session 2014–15—The EU and Russia: Before and Beyond the Crisis in Ukraine (London: The Houses of Parliament). House of Lords (2017) European Union Committee, External Affairs Sub-­ Committee Oral Evidence: Post-Brexit Foreign and Defence Co-operation—Lord Hague of Richmond; Baroness Ashton of Upholland; Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, 16 July (London: The Houses of Parliament). Miliband, D. (2007) New Diplomacy: Challenges For Foreign Policy (London: Chatham House).

CHAPTER 3

Institutional Structures and Processes: British Foreign Policy-Making and the CFSP

Introduction This chapter looks at the machinery and mechanisms by which Britain’s inputs into the CFSP have been made. It begins with a discussion of the political leadership and strategic management of British foreign policy in the context of CFSP before examining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the key officials within this with a responsibility for CFSP, the broader Whitehall stakeholder network, and the role of UKREP. It demonstrates the high level of domestic and Brussels-level coordination that has traditionally characterised all aspects of British EU policy-making, as well as the considerable degree of flexibility in the system that has left the UK with a reputation for efficiency and effectiveness in CFSP policy-making.

Political Leadership and Strategic Management The political leadership and strategic management of British foreign policy are formally exercised by the Foreign Secretary as head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, as implied in the previous chapter, the power and authority of the Foreign Secretary over the strategic direction of UK foreign policy depend very much on his/her relationship with the Prime Minister and their interest in foreign affairs. Moreover, ‘strength of personality’ also matters in this relationship.1 Poguntke and Webb (2007) argue that this reflects a wider trend in recent years that has © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_3

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seen a growing concentration of power around heads of government, a process they characterise as the ‘presidentialization’ of democratic politics. While the extent to which this is really a new phenomenon has been contested (House of Commons 2009), it is certainly the case that some prime ministers, particularly Tony Blair, can often operate as their own foreign minister, particularly when it comes to ‘history-making’ decisions, while the actual foreign minister is left with more routine or day-to-day questions (a feature of the German system discussed in Chap. 6).2 Membership of the EU seems to have contributed to this. In particular, the creation of the European Council has institutionalised and formalised this development, bringing together European heads of state and government in quarterly meetings which amongst other things set the strategic direction of European foreign policy and the priorities for the CFSP. With coalition governments generally rare in the British system so, the post of Foreign Secretary is normally reserved for a senior political ally (or potential leadership rival) of the Prime Minister. The relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary is necessarily close, however dominant the former may be. For example, Robin Cook noted at the time of his departure from the FCO in 2001 that it was pointless seeking to stay once Blair had resolved to replace him: ‘[They] work so closely together […] that I knew it was impossible to do the job with authority if I did not have Tony’s backing’ (2004: 7). This is not to argue, though, that Foreign Secretaries are always constrained or lack autonomy. Despite, for example, the significant role played by Blair, the volume of work and number of issues requiring attention make it impossible for any Prime Minister to devote all his/her attention to foreign affairs. David Miliband notes, for example, that he enjoyed ‘a pretty free hand’ throughout his time in office despite occasional tensions with the ‘No. 10 briefing machine’, for example over a speech he gave touching on defence issues.3 More importantly, as the formal and institutional centre of foreign p ­ olicy-­making and implementation, the FCO—and therefore any Foreign Secretary—enjoys advantages in terms of information, expertise and human resources significantly beyond those available to Downing Street. The key point is that on the major strategic questions, which in turn often dominate the frequent bilateral and summit meetings that appear regularly on the Prime Minister’s schedule, s/he expects—and needs—the agreement and support (or at least acquiescence) of the Foreign Secretary in terms of the policy being pursued. Although lacking the resources of the FCO, the Prime Minister’s ability to provide strategic and political direction to UK foreign policy, including

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on issues relating to British input into CFSP, is supported in a number of ways. Within Downing Street, s/he has a small civil service team consisting of a Principal Private Secretary and four to five private secretaries, one of whom is seconded from the FCO and responsible for foreign affairs. This official acts as ‘the Prime Minister’s voice’, working with the Cabinet Secretary and feeding into the Cabinet Office (CO) in any foreign policy-­ related discussion.4 The role of the Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretary, meanwhile, is ‘intergovernmental coordination’, and the servicing of the numerous Cabinet committees in which policy is determined, such as the several European Unit Exit sub-committees—indeed, the CO has been described as the ‘gear-box’ for such coordination.5 Prior to the post-­ referendum Whitehall re-organisation, within the CO there were two secretariats dealing with EU policy. The first was the European and Global Issues Secretariat (EGIS) (now part of DExEU), with a staff of approximately 30, and focused primarily on the coordination of policy ‘internal-­ to-­the-EU’ rather than CFSP which has traditionally remained separate and ‘owned by’ the FCO.6 Where there is a cross-over, for example relating to CSDP policy, it is more likely to be discussed in the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat (FDPS) which is responsible for ‘driving the coherent quality and delivery of foreign and defence policy across departments’ (Cabinet Office 2012b). As part of its role, the FDPS also supports the National Security Council. Created in 2010 specifically to provide political leadership in wider questions of foreign and security policy, the objective of the NSS is to achieve ‘a strategic and tightly coordinated approach across […] government to the risks and opportunities the country faces’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 9). Meeting weekly, it brings together the Prime Minister and all senior ministers with security responsibilities, including Foreign, Defence and International Development Secretaries (Cabinet Office 2012a, c). The FCO normally raises ‘particularly high profile or sensitive or difficult’ issues with the FDPS and National Security Council to ensure that the FCO and Downing Street ‘are joined up’.7 The political leadership exercised by Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary is also supported by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DfID, which both have significant interests in and make important contributions to the direction of foreign policy-making (see below). In this context, it is worth highlighting the publication in 2010 of a British National Security Strategy ‘for the first time in [the] country’s history’ (Cabinet Office 2010: 5). This sought to provide a framework for coordinated

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government decision-making, based around a ‘hard-headed reappraisal’ of national priorities, the capabilities required to achieve them, and the resources available to do so (Cabinet Office 2010: 9). While certainly an innovation, it was perhaps most revealing in terms of the desire to address what some consider a long-standing British problem of a ‘lack of strategic consistency’ by encouraging more ‘joined-up’ strategic-level political thinking in British foreign and security policy.8 Finally, in terms of the political management of European policy, it is important to highlight the significant shift in the centre of gravity within Whitehall in recent years. The Foreign Secretary serves as the Prime Minister’s most senior adviser on all aspects of foreign policy, with the FCO his/her primary source for that advice. Historically, the FCO, the CO and the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP) have formed the triangle or three pillars upon which all British policy inputs into the EU have been based and controlled. However, as noted, the direct control exercised by line ministries over their policy inputs into Brussels and their communications with UKREP have increased in recent years, with ‘every lead department [having] a direct link to UKREP’.9 The significant resources squeeze the FCO faced under ­successive governments in the years prior to the referendum, combined with (or justifying post hoc) a belief that ‘sufficient expertise’ existed within other ministries to deal with EU issues, resulted in a significantly reduced staffing allocation on European policy (Kassim 2011; Kassim et al. 2010).10 The FCO thus ceased ‘pretend[ing] to be a filter or channel which others must come through’ and a strategic decision was made to reallocate resources out of Europe and towards the Middle East and emerging economies, with the aim of having ‘more foreign, less office’.11 The FCO has remained a key player in broader European policy by virtue of its ownership of the bilateral diplomatic network, and its involvement in a range of regional diplomatic networks within Europe, including the Iberia, Benelux and Nordic-Baltic networks. The picture that emerges, though, is of an FCO that has been under continuous pressure in recent years, and has seen its overall role decrease, while its influence has fluctuated depending on the strength of the Foreign Secretary within government, and his/her relationship with the Prime Minister (UKO2; see also Kassim et al. 2010). For example, under the Coalition the balance between the FCO and the CO was considered to be better because William Hague was regarded as a ‘strong Foreign secretary’ while the then UK Permanent Representative, Jon Cunliffe, had previously been the PM’s adviser on

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Europe.12 Since the referendum, responsibility for managing the bulk of EU-related policy-making has shifted to DExEU, although CFSP remains the purview of the FCO (see Chap. 4).

FCO Structures and Processes Below the ministerial level is a dense network of formal and informal interactions through which British foreign policy-making and implementation take place, and inputs into CFSP are managed. At the centre of this sits the FCO for which CFSP has become ‘an exclusive area of competence’ (Aktipis and Oliver 2011: 79). Although the FCO ‘takes the lead’ in determining what the government’s position will be in CFSP, it ‘works closely’ with those other ministries which need to feed into the policy-­ making process.13 In particular, the MoD and DfID as the two other core ministries involved in CFSP make regular policy inputs, particularly—but not only—in the context of military and/or civilian crisis management situations.14 The fourth key actor is UKREP which is responsible for negotiating outcomes in Brussels based on the instructions agreed in London, but which also shapes those instructions by determining ‘what is desirable and achievable’ in the Brussels context.15 The expectation, therefore, is that coordination and consultation will take place as and when required, with the FCO leading the process. An illustration of this would be policy on the CFSP budget. Thus, while the FCO would take the lead in establishing the government’s position, it could not, for example, instruct UKREP to negotiate a budget increase without first liaising with the CO to ensure consistency with the overall UK position on EU budget changes, something which would necessarily also involve input from the Treasury.16 The European Correspondent and the Political Director Following accession in 1973, British participation in EPC required important organisational changes within the FCO (e.g. Allen and Oliver 2006). Most notable was the establishment of the key posts of European Correspondent and Political Director. As head of the CFSP department, it has been the job of the Correspondent to ‘make CFSP work’ by leading on all CFSP policy-making and coordination, and ‘pull[ing] together the advice’ that goes up to ministers when addressing a CFSP question.17 While each member state has a Correspondent, their specific job descriptions tend to vary, meaning they ‘have similar jobs but […] [with] slightly

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different components to them’.18 Thus, French Correspondents have often been closely involved in policy towards the Western Balkans and so have often dealt directly with the FCO’s Western Balkans expert as well. There are also different views within EU foreign ministries about where the Correspondent should be based, with some sitting closer to the Political Director than others.19 In the FCO, the Correspondent has traditional reported to and worked closely with the Political Director.20 Within EU circles, the position of Political Director is regarded as the ‘key job’.21 Today styled as Director-General Political within the FCO, the post had to be created to enable UK participation in the preparatory sessions for EPC ministerial meetings, formalised with the creation of the Political Committee after Maastricht (Duke 2005: 7). The Political Director generally deals with ‘hard foreign policy issues, including negotiating EU policy’, and serves essentially as the ‘number 2’ at the FCO, and is regarded as ‘the right-hand’ to foreign ministers across the EU.22 For example, the UK Political Director was a central figure in the St. Malo negotiations, working through the night when drafting the final agreement.23 S/he is the ‘most senior advisor’ to the Foreign Secretary on CFSP matters, particularly on crisis areas such as the Iranian nuclear negotiations and ‘the hard stuff ’ with the US and Russia.24 While the Correspondent and the CFSP department manage CFSP policy, within the FCO ownership of specific policy dossiers remains with the desk officers in the respective geographical directorates or departments. The CFSP department coordinates briefings, for example for the Political and Security Committee, but the component brief comes from the desk officer whose ‘job [it is] to lead and put that policy together’.25 Thus, these departments will either develop instructions and send these directly to UKREP, or work on these in conjunction with the CFSP department officials who are developing the broader British approach on a particular policy, but always in consultation with the relevant stakeholders across Whitehall.26 The creation of the EEAS in 2009 introduced a new actor into this process, adding an additional set of relationships to be developed and managed.27 An example of how the stakeholder network on a particular issue can spread beyond the FCO can be seen in British policy towards Sudan and China. In the case of the former, a dedicated Sudan Unit was established which, although based in the FCO, included officials seconded from DfID to ensure that the development and coordination of policy is sufficiently close.28 Moreover, these officials will also be dealing with their

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respective counterparts in other major EU capitals and more broadly. Similarly, while a specific FCO department has been responsible for policy towards China, it works within a wider Whitehall group to ensure coordination across departments.29 As will be discussed, UKREP also plays an important role in this process. The Domestic CFSP Stakeholder Network Interaction with the broader stakeholder network has perhaps been most apparent in between the FCO and the MoD and DfID, particularly in relation to CSDP policy. Thus, while this is led by the FCO’s Security Policy Department, the relationship with the MoD is very close.30 There is also a joint MoD-FCO unit responsible for Euro-Atlantic security, covering both NATO and EU CSDP policy, as well as the OSCE and arms control. One FCO official noted the importance of informal relationships between officials and emphasised the ‘good understanding’ he had established with both MoD and DfID colleagues.31 Another described the FCO/MoD relationship as ‘hand-in-glove […] they [FCO] write the cheques and we [MoD] have the money’.32 This can in part be explained by the relatively small size of the British ‘Pol-Mil’ community, with many officials often having worked in both departments ensuring that their mutual briefing is ‘actually quite good’ and the ‘policy-generation process is efficient’.33 Geography also plays a role in this as, unlike many other EU capitals, in London the foreign and defence ministries are located close together. This facilitates regular meetings between FCO and MoD officials, with some meeting 3–4 times per week.34 The MoD also has officials in UKREP able to feed directly into CSDP policy-making in Brussels. The close cooperation has also resulted in the development of a model of CIVMIL cooperation based around an ‘integrated’ planning process (previously ‘comprehensive approach’) that has been almost unique among member states (House of Commons 2010b). Many of Britain’s partners struggle with the role and place of the military within their political structures for both cultural and historical reasons and so it is generally ‘extraordinarily difficult’ to get meetings involving both foreign and defence ministries, despite this being the modus operandi in London.35 Meanwhile, FCO/MoD/DfID cooperation has been facilitated and enhanced with the creation of the Stabilisation Unit.36 Located in DfID, it is an ‘integrated civil-military operational unit’ bringing together officials from all three ministries and drawing from expertise across government to respond

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to failing or ‘conflict-afflicted states’ (Stabilisation Unit 2012, 2014). As such it has become a key actor in the development of CIVMIL approaches and has been the ‘object of deep scrutiny’ among Britain’s EU partners.37 It has provided the basis for the UK to support CSDP crisis management missions, for example EULEX Kosovo, EUPol Afghanistan and EUMM Georgia (FCO 2016). When a CSDP decision is required at the political level, a paper will thus be drafted jointly by the three ministries for the National Security Council to consider and approve.38 The impact on the FCO of the creation of DfID in May 1997 should briefly be discussed. Along with the growing role of the Prime Minister, DfID’s establishment has also been considered a significant challenge to the FCO’s primacy in foreign policy, not least because the provision of development aid was one of its most important instruments. For example, Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary 2001–06) argues that a government’s aid policies inevitably have consequences for its foreign policy—‘development aid is foreign policy’ (2012: 394) (his emphasis). Indeed, Tony Blair was well aware his decision to create DfID was ‘not popular with the Foreign Office’ (2010: 24), not least because by separating aid from the FCO it lost a major part of its budget. Although more recently David Miliband declared that ‘it would not be healthy or right for the Foreign Office to see DfID as its enemy’ (House of Commons 2010a: 116), in 2017 the International Development Secretary, Priti Patel, made clear she considered development assistance to be one of the UK’s key means of international influence and that it was ‘massive, greater than our foreign policy’ (McVeigh 2017). While this assessment would be contested by the FCO, it underscores the sense that the latter’s place as the ‘pre-eminent foreign policy-making body’ has long been under threat (House of Commons 2010a: 116). The creation of the new ministry has certainly added to the institutional complexity in developing and implementing UK foreign policy. Moreover, there are indications that DfID’s interaction with the FCO and MoD has not been without difficulties. Despite initiatives like the Stabilisation Unit, some feel that although the FCO/MoD relationship is strong, DfID ‘remains the problematic area’ with cooperation and coordination hampered by a culture of ‘moral superiority’ over diplomats and military officials, while its policy of outsourcing implementation, for example to NGOs, has created problems at the operational level.39 Indications of tension are also apparent from DfID’s side. Suggesting that the FCO, CO and Treasury often behave like a ‘clique’, one official emphasised the

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importance of DfID having a secondee in the FCO who can ‘report back to us when they feel DfID has an interest’. In light of this, it is worth noting the Foreign Affairs Committee’s recommendation in 2010 that the government instigate a ‘comprehensive, foreign policy-led review’ of the structures, processes and priorities of the three departments with a view to improving the ability of the FCO to perform its primary functions (House of Commons 2010a: 118–19). The Committee also declared it ‘incongruous that the position of the only government department with a global reach is threatened with erosion at a time when globalisation is acknowledged as the key phenomenon of our times’ (ibid.). Again, this indicates concern over the FCO’s struggles in the face of organisational change as well as financial strictures. ‘Mainstreaming’ CFSP One of the key responsibilities of the European Correspondent has been the management of the FCO’s method of CFSP policy-making, known as ‘mainstreaming’.40 In essence, this involves ensuring that country or area specialists, who may or may not have experience of EU foreign policy-­ making processes, understand what CFSP is, and what it might mean for areas under their purview—for example, it is the responsibility of the Africa Director to determine ‘what they want EU policy on Africa to be’ and feed into that process as appropriate.41 The role of the Correspondent and CFSP department is then to ensure that policy made by other departments is ‘consistent’ with the UK’s broader EU policy, and that UKREP receives appropriate instructions.42 A key aspect of the Correspondent’s job is therefore ‘to lubricate the communication’ around the FCO to ensure that the CFSP component of a policy is properly understood and incorporated into the policy-making process.43 Thus, if a particular geographical department complains that ‘Europe doesn’t get it  […]  [our job] is to explain, well there’s a reason they don’t’ and offer alternative approaches.44 The intention, therefore, has been to ensure that CFSP is not merely an add-on or afterthought. There has, though, been a debate in recent years within the FCO over the merits of mainstreaming as opposed to the system preferred in many other EU member states, particularly France, of having a strong centre— i.e. ‘a big, powerful CFSP department which basically makes the policy and checks that the geographical departments are okay with [it]’.45 One advantage of mainstreaming is that it should mean the policy pursued is

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better attuned to the needs of the respective geographic departments; equally, however, there is the danger these only pay lip-service to the EU aspects of their policy, without seriously attending to them.46 The challenge with mainstreaming, moreover, is not simply to encourage it, but to be able to manage it given the potentially large number of issues and officials involved.47 Indeed some of the attraction of the strong centre lies in the capacity this provides to ensure greater consistency and coherence in a state’s overall CFSP policy, although the danger remains of the ‘tail wagging the dog’ in policy terms.48 This has been observed in how the French have sometimes pushed for CSDP missions not necessarily because a particular country required one but because they ‘think it’s about time [they] had another […] and it will be good for the CFSP’ or because they wanted to ‘[show] what it could do’ in the years before they rejoined NATO and saw the relationship between the two organisations as ‘a straight competition’.49 Communication Networks Both the European Correspondent and Political Director are also members of important networks within the wider membership community, meeting regularly with their opposite numbers. Correspondents deal with ‘lighter and easier’ points while any unresolved or more political issues will normally be referred up to Political Director level.50 Both will usually accompany the Foreign Secretary to meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, with the Political Director meeting his/her peers formally at 28 at the beginning of a Presidency, in parallel to the Council. Outside this, they meet regularly and informally, often with their American counterparts, for ‘a bit of horizon-scanning’ to identify likely future areas of crisis.51 Following the creation of the PSC in 2000 and the appointment of permanent ambassadors to coordinate CFSP, Political Directors have become more removed from this process, however. In part this reflects the reality that with Political Directors increasingly ‘pulled off in so many different directions’ nationally, there was a real need for a body that would exercise ownership over CFSP.52 However, ‘an architecture of informal meetings’ remains, with Political Directors from other member states often ‘coming in [to the FCO] just to check-in and catch-up’.53 Despite this, there is a sense that the control exercised by the Political Director in London may have weakened somewhat, although it depends to some extent on the individual in post and whether they are ‘on top’ of their

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subject.54 One former Political Director emphasised that he made a point of calling his opposite numbers regularly so there was ‘no hiding place from the Brits’, with the aim of ensuring that no-one felt ‘ignored, condescended to and only picked up when somebody thinks you can be useful’.55 Finally, all these contacts have been supported by regular FCO briefings for the other member states on Britain’s approach on the full range of European issues.56 For the European Correspondent, communication with his/her European counterparts is even more frequent. Much is done by email or phone with the aim, for example, of determining what other governments are thinking on particular issues, what their priorities will be in Council meetings, etc.57 While the European Correspondent normally makes ‘a big effort […] to talk to everybody’, the scale and intensity of this undertaking should not be underestimated: with 28 member states, an agenda of 10 items entails ‘a hell of a lot of phone calls’ over a 24–48 hour period.58 Moreover, such interactions are ‘classic [FCO] diplomacy’ and are conducted not only by the CFSP department but by other department heads and directors ‘so that when there are differences, [we] understand what [they] are’.59 The European Correspondent must therefore be in regular, one-to-one communication with his/her opposite numbers. Conversations with ‘the larger, more active member states’ would take place once or twice a week, as would those with the Commission, General Secretariat of the Council and, latterly, EEAS, while conversations at Political Director level can happen ‘pretty much every day’ with Paris and Berlin.60 However, Correspondents will rarely meet at the same time as their Political Directors prior to Council sessions, or have formalised monthly meetings. Often they are too ‘busy running around re-writing drafts’ and so instead most of their interaction in Brussels occurs over ‘coffees in the margins’.61 David Miliband also highlighted the importance of these informal encounters for politicians: ‘there were always boring enough parts of [meetings] so you’d want to go and just have a gossip with people’.62 UKREP UKREP is the other key actor involved in organising and making British inputs into the CFSP. It is not merely the vehicle through which instructions generated by London are pursued, however. Rather, it is ‘integral […] the deliverer of policy’ and ‘very closely plugged in’, playing ‘a significant role in policy-making’—‘policy is not made in Brussels or in

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London, but somewhere between the two.’63 It should be noted, though, that the importance of UKREP and the Brussels system notwithstanding, they are part of a wider policy-making machine. For the UK, traditional bilateral relationships and the national embassy network remain essential, with the latter remaining the ‘key source of permanent understanding’ of a particular country’s views on each issue.64 The FCO would thus typically have three main sources of information: what UKREP reports; what the relevant British embassy reports; and the European Correspondent’s direct channel to their relevant opposite number. UKREP is therefore only one component of a broader relationship with each individual state with its work complementing and building on bilateral communication taking place between capitals.65 As one official emphasised, ‘forg[ing] an agreement on a policy […] can’t just be done by bureaucrats in Brussels.’66 UKREP fulfils a number of functions in this regard. Particularly important is its ability to provide the FCO with ‘intelligence on the ground’ on developments in Brussels.67 More significantly, it must also makes judgements as to what is ‘doable and not doable’ in negotiations, something normally reflected in the process by which instructions are generated.68 These normally focus on the outcomes London is seeking, with ‘quite a lot of leeway’ given to UKREP in terms of achieving them, something that differentiates the UK from many other member states.69 This was the case, for example, in the negotiations to establish the EEAS.70 In essence, UKREP’s role has been to ‘make the Brussels machine turn in the direction we want’, making it an important element in how London makes and coordinates policy.71 The aim is always to ‘influence people and their thinking upstream’, ensuring that when a policy or action comes up for decision, ‘you’ve already got your fingerprints on them as much as possible’.72 The flexibility allowed UKREP to achieve this means that on CFSP questions British officials have generally been regarded within Brussels as effective, efficient, and frequently in a position to craft compromises.73 The differences (and tensions) between London and UKREP in terms of understanding ‘what the market will bear’ should not be discounted, however.74 One official noted that ‘we often underestimate just how much other people are having to compromise’ while another felt there was ‘insufficient awareness in London of what other capitals want’.75 The desire for efficiency and continuity is also reflected in the UK’s military representation in Brussels. Like the majority of states, Britain has the same official act as Military Representative to both NATO and the EU, something which one official felt was ‘pretty essential’ to ensure effective

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policy-making.76 The Military Representative normally attends 1–2 NATO Military Committee meetings per week, plus North Atlantic Council meetings as required, and the weekly EU Military Committee meeting, as well as occasional meetings of the PSC. For much of the early 2000s, the instructions given to the UK’s Military Representative vis-à-vis the EU were primarily to avoid ‘sign[ing] us up to anything or get[ting] us into any trouble while we’re engaged in the real business in Iraq and Afghanistan’, reflecting the MoD’s view of the EU as ‘a bit of an optional extra’ while serious, large-scale operations would remain the domain of NATO.77 That said, the more ‘unstructured’ and ‘free-thinking’ nature of PSC meetings is contrasted positively with NATO meetings.78 While the former are ‘normally disposed to make progress’ and to that end have a ‘sense of complicity that helps create consensus’, NATO meetings always face the possibility of Greco-Turkish tensions causing problems.79 For the UK, arguably the most important effect of this ‘double-hatting’ has been to help prevent duplication and unnecessary competition between the two organisations (although there have been tensions with its partners over its objections to an operational headquarters for CSDP missions, something now going ahead following Brexit).80 The interaction between London and UKREP is constant. UKREP officials normally report to London on the day a meeting is held, although this is ‘not a hard-and-fast rule’.81 At the working group level the channels of communication will go directly from FCO desk officers to officials in UKREP, and officials ‘up to head of department level’ may go to Brussels to attend particular working group sessions.82 At the same time, UKREP has often acted as the initiator of a policy-making process in CFSP. Thus, it may identify a particular issue that ‘is going to happen’ in the coming months, draw London’s attention to this and suggest a course of action which, in turn, has often formed the basis of London’s formal response.83 Similarly, in a fast-moving crisis situation such as Georgia in 2008, UKREP can often drive the British response—in this example, the UK’s PSC Ambassador was able to feed the conclusions from high-level domestic meetings directly into the PSC’s own discussions and vice versa.84 This ability to provide leadership has been facilitated by the comparative efficiency of the British system which enables a swift response from London despite the range of people who need to be consulted. The ‘speed and openness of communication’ between UKREP and key domestic ministries has been identified as one of the strengths of the British system.85 In this the UK compares favourably with many other states: for example,

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Germany is ‘normally quite a lot slower’ whereas Britain is frequently the ‘most responsive and the quickest moving’.86 Indeed, one German official considered that Germany had ‘a less operative structure as for instance the Brits’.87 There are some differences in how UKREP has organised for and approached the CFSP compared to other members. For example, in contrast to states such as Germany, France and Italy, Britain has sent only a relatively junior official to the Nicolaides group, which prepares meetings of the PSC.88 This has meant, though, that on occasion Britain has been unable to provide an immediate response, particularly on major issues, needing instead to consult with more senior diplomats or with London.89 A second important difference is the role played by Britain’s Deputy PSC Ambassador. The position is not unique to the UK–France, Sweden and Germany each send one, for example. However, the brief given to Britain’s deputy has been and ‘doesn’t really exist’ in other permanent representations.90 In most cases, the Deputy PSC Ambassador will act as their state’s PSC coordinator and participate in working groups such as the POLMIL or CIVCOM groups. While the UK’s Deputy PSC Ambassador does a certain amount of this, his/her brief has tended to focus on looking more broadly ‘at the big picture’ and especially ‘get[ting] more upstream influence over what was coming out of the Secretariat and the Commission’.91 A major priority for Britain has been to ensure consistency between the issues being dealt with in the PSC and the external relations question dealt with by Coreper—such as the preparation of trade negotiations with 3rd countries, for example. One former Deputy PSC Ambassador felt that the Ambassador’s regular involvement in PSC meetings allowed him the flexibility to perform this more roving role.92 It is, moreover, an approach admired by others. One German diplomat saw considerable advantage in having two senior diplomats doing ‘behind-the-scenes dealing and wheeling’ and this contributed to the UK’s greater flexibility.93

Conclusion This discussion of the structures and processes supporting British participation in CFSP policy-making highlights a number of things. First, it demonstrates the premium that Whitehall places on effective coordination in foreign policy as in all other areas of EU-related policy-making. Britain has always sought to have an agreed position on a given CFSP issue that represents the settled view of all the relevant stakeholders. Moreover, the

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process by which this has been achieved demonstrates a strong and obvious coordination ambition (Kassim et al. 2000, 2001). Second, this coordination ambition in CFSP has been supported by intensive and continuous interaction involving officials based in London and UKREP, as well as their counterparts in Brussels and other national capitals. This is intended to ensure that London is fully aware of the perspectives and viewpoints of partner states on any given issue, but also to enable it to deploy influence as necessary at multiple points within its diplomatic network. Taken together, these reveal a sophisticated machinery designed to manage and instrumentalise the CFSP for the pursuit of particular objectives, whether ‘positively’—i.e. by the promotion of particular aims—or ‘negatively’ by preventing or blocking those policies or initiatives deemed as damaging to British interests. How the UK does this will be discussed next along with the implications of Brexit and Britain’s departure from the EU’s foreign policy system.

Notes 1. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 2. Lord Peter Ricketts, a former Political Director and Permanent Secretary at the FCO as well as the first National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, argues that ‘the Prime Minister has had a leading role in foreign policy for generations’ (House of Commons 2009: 117). 3. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 4. Charles Clarke, Interview, Norwich, 20 June 2011. 5. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2, UKO3). 6. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2, UKO3). 7. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 8. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 9. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2010 (UKO1). 10. At the time of the 2005 British EU Presidency, the number of FCO officials dedicated to EU policy peaked at around 200. By 2010 that number had fallen to around 90. UKREP and the EU institutions have also been less popular postings among FCO staff, with many preferring to go ‘abroad-abroad’ rather than spend 3–4 years in Brussels. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2010 (UKO1). 11. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2010 (UKO1). 12. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 13. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2).

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14. Interviews, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012 and Department for International Development, London, 2010. 15. Telephone Interview, UKREP, Brussels, 2010. 16. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 17. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6) and 2011 (UKO3). 18. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 19. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 20. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2, UKO3). 21. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 22. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 23. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 24. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, (UKO2, UKO3) and retired FCO official, 2011. 25. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 26. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 27. Telephone Interview, UKREP, Brussels, 2012. 28. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 29. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 30. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. This contradicts a statement by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee that the ‘Ministry of Defence, not the FCO, is […] the [UK’s] lead’ on CSDP matters (House of Commons 2008: 71). 31. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 32. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 33. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 34. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 35. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 36. First set up in 2004 as the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, it became the Stabilisation Unit in 2007 to ‘reflect its role in supporting the management of the MoD’s Stabilisation Aid fund’ (House of Commons 2010b: 30). 37. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. The French Strategic Affairs Unit (Direction des Affaires Stratégiques), which brings together officials from the Foreign and Defence Ministries in the Quai d’Orsay, is intended for a similar purpose. 38. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 39. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 40. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 41. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2).

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42. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 43. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 44. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 45. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 46. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 47. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 48. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). He goes onto suggest of the French that ‘their default setting for almost any given problem in the world is to send an ESDP mission. […] We spend huge amounts of time talking them off.’ 49. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London (UKO3) and retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 50. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 51. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 52. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 53. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 54. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 55. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 56. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 57. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 58. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 59. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 60. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2) and 2012 (UKO6). 61. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 62. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 63. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2, UKO3) and Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 64. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 65. One example of more institutionalised bilateral interaction is the annual deutsch-britische Europakonsultationen (German-British European Consultation meeting) at Minister of State (AA 2013). 66. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 67. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2) and Telephone Interview, UKREP, 2010. 68. Telephone Interview, UKREP, Brussels, 2010. 69. Telephone Interview, UKREP, Brussels, 2010. 70. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 71. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 72. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 73. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012.

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74. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 75. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3) and Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 76. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 77. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 78. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 79. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London (UKO3) and retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 80. Interviews, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011, and UKREP, Brussels, 2012. 81. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2010 (UKO1). 82. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 83. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 84. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 85. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 86. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 87. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 88. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1, GO2). 89. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 90. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 91. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 92. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 93. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1).

Bibliography Aktipis, M. and Oliver, T. (2011) ‘Euopeanization and British Foreign Policy’. In Wong, R. and Hill, C. (eds.) National and European Foreign Policies—Towards Europeanization (London and New York: Routledge). Allen, D. and Oliver, T. (2006) ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’. In Bache, I. and Jordan, A. (eds.) The Europeanization of British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Blair, T. (2010) A Journey (London: Hutchinson). Cook, R. (2004) The Point of Departure—Diaries from the Front Bench (London: Pocket Books). Duke, S. (2005) ‘The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political and Security Committee’. Working Paper 2005/W/05 (European Institute of Public Administration). Kassim, H. (2011) ‘The Role of the FCO in UK Government—Written Evidence from Professor Hussein Kassim, School of Politics, Social and International Studies, University of East Anglia’. Foreign Affairs Select Committee (London: Houses of Parliament).

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Kassim, H., Dittmer-Odell, M. and Wright, N. (2010) ‘EU Policy Coordination in the United Kingdom’. In Puntscher Riekmann, S., Dür, A. and Gaisbauer, H.P. (eds.) Study commissioned for the Austrian Federal Chancellery, ‘Internal Coordination on EU Policy-Making in Member States: Processes and Structures’ (Salzburg: Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg). Kassim, H., Menon, A., Peters, B. and Wright, V. (eds.) (2001) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The European Level (Oxford: OUP). Kassim, H., Peters, B. and Wright, V. (eds.) (2000) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level (Oxford: OUP). McVeigh, T. (2017) ‘Priti Patel Insists UK’s Aid Influence is “Massive”’. The Guardian Newspaper, London, 18 June. Poguntke, T. and Webb, P. (eds.) (2007) The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Stabilisation Unit (2014) Working in European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Missions: Deployee Guide, October. London. Straw, J. (2012) Last Man Standing (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Bibliography—Official Documents Auswärtiges Amt (2013) Pressemitteilung: Staatsminister Link und britischer Europaminister Lidington leiten 3. deutsch-britische Europakonsultationen (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Cabinet Office (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty—The National Security Strategy (London: The Stationery Office). Cabinet Office (2012a) The National Security Council—Who’s Who?. (London: The Cabinet Office). Available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/ national-security-council-whos-who. Cabinet Office (2012b) Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat (London: The Cabinet Office). Available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/foreign-and-defence-policy. Cabinet Office (2012c) National Security Council (London: The Cabinet Office). Available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/national-securitycouncil/. FCO (2016) International Secondments for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London: HM Government). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/ guidance/international-secondments-for-the-foreign-and-commonwealthoffice#opportunities-for-civilians. House of Commons (2008c) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty—Third Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2009a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Developments in the European Union—Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1–112) (London: Houses of Parliament).

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House of Commons (2010a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008–09—Fifth Report of Session 2009–10 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2010b) Defence Committee: The Comprehensive Approach: The Point of War is not Just to Win but to Make a Better Peace—Seventh Report of Session 2009–10 (London: The Stationery Office). Stabilisation Unit (2012) What is Stabilisation (London: HM Government). Available at: http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/about-us/what-is-stabilisation.html.

CHAPTER 4

Winding Up the Machine: How the UK Engages with the CFSP

Introduction As discussed above, Britain’s coordination ambition in CFSP has been comprehensive and very much geared to the exercise of influence. Moreover, as a bigger member state it has generally been ‘expected to intervene’ in discussions and decision-making.1 The previous chapter highlighted how positions are agreed among all relevant domestic stakeholders on the full range of policy issues as quickly as possible, before being pursued at EU level, with UKREP playing a crucial role, especially in terms of determining and communicating to London ‘what the market will bear’ in any given situation. This chapter examines in more detail how Britain has engaged with the CFSP in practice. It considers its relationships with partner states, then how it has sought to exercise influence in particular cases, including British policy priorities and ‘red lines’. It concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of Brexit for UK foreign policy cooperation with its European partners.

Ally Towards All, Enemy Towards None: Managing Relationships with Partners The requirement to find consensus among 28 member states makes the building of productive relationships and partnerships essential to the exercise of influence or achievement of particular outcomes within CFSP.2 For © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_4

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the UK this process has always been a pragmatic exercise carried out on an issue-by-issue basis,3 and something at which it has generally been considered effective.4 For David Miliband, the strategy was always ‘you try and be an ally to everybody. Ally towards all, enemy towards none’,5 reminding us that no state can be ignored. That said, there are some states with which the UK has frequently had an affinity or shared outlook, even if it would not claim any natural or constant allies. Notable amongst these are northern European states including Denmark, The Netherlands, Finland and Sweden which were identified as being the most likely to align with Britain on broader foreign policy questions and most likely to support British positions on CSDP.6 One Swedish diplomat concurred, indicating that her country was often close to Britain, although also emphasising that, like Britain, Sweden did not have ‘natural allies’ within CFSP.7 Britain’s most important interlocutor in CFSP—although not necessarily always its easiest—has been France, particularly on questions related to CSDP. Regardless of whether they are in agreement (and they may often not be), the relationship with France is considered the UK’s ‘most important’ in the EU, something reflected in Downing Street’s reference to France as Britain’s ‘natural partners’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2012).8 In particular, the bilateral defence and security relationship London has developed with Paris in the years since the St Malo Agreement has become fundamental to how it views European security. This importance manifests itself regularly at EU level, most obviously in how it seeks to instrumentalise CFSP and CSDP.  Unsurprisingly, the French have a similar view of Britain’s importance. Consultation with the UK is regarded as the ‘first reflex’ as the two parties explore ‘whether there will be space for decisions and for agreements’ on a given issue.9 One official closely involved in CSDP in the French Foreign Ministry described the UK as ‘a unique interlocutor and partner’ as a consequence of their range of diplomatic and military assets.10 Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, formerly French Ambassador to the UK, offered a similar assessment in evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU: [we] are natural partners in security and defence for the reasons that we are similar in size, similar in our capabilities and similar in the budgetary allocation that we make for defence. Internationally, we have the same kind of responsibilities; we are permanent members of the UN Security Council; we are NATO allies; European members; and nuclear weapons states, so we share common interests and responsibilities. (House of Lords 2011: 2)

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From the British side, what makes this relationship especially important however is not just their similar capabilities but that they have demonstrated they are ‘ready to use them’, as evidenced by their leadership of and participation in NATO’s operations in Libya in 2011.11 A consideration of capabilities and a readiness to use them, although significant, only provides a partial explanation for their mutual importance, however. Rather, Anglo-French cooperation reflects the fact that they have long shared what Simón (2013: 21) calls ‘an ‘extrovert’ strategic culture and global vocation’ and so their developing partnership has ‘transcend[ed] European matters’. This is echoed by the House of Lords European Union Select Committee which declares that the two countries ‘share a global approach […] and a willingness to deploy forces’ (2012: 22). Consequently, although in their political rhetoric the French are much more explicitly and ‘viscerally attached’ than the British to an idea of European defence and to having ‘a European fingerprint on any crisis situation’, the reality is that their objectives vis-à-vis the CFSP are ‘not that different’: both want the EU to play a more significant security role and seek more in terms of capabilities and investment by their partners to support this.12 Despite sometimes fierce disagreements over other aspects of integration, therefore, their relationship has been built around a strong sense of pragmatism, as evidenced by the two bilateral defence treaties signed on 2 November 2010, and additional agreements made subsequently in Paris in February 2012.13 Following this, Foreign Secretary William Hague declared that ‘France and the UK are co-operating more closely on foreign and security policy issues than at any time since the second world war’.14 Prior to the 2016 referendum, therefore, an important component of any CFSP decision, particularly on security matters, was whether these two states could find the space for some degree of bilateral agreement or consensus. Achieving this is something both seek to do prior to formal discussions in Brussels. The constant interactions between their officials at multiple points in the system, for example between the different ministries or between diplomats in Brussels, have facilitated this, ensuring that their mutual awareness and understanding of each other’s priorities and concerns has generally been strong. One retired senior British diplomat felt that where France and the UK had been able to reach prior agreement or consensus on a particular point, it ‘always went straight through’ in Brussels; however, if agreement was not secured beforehand, for example if the Presidency tabled an issue unexpectedly, ‘then metaphorically the

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other[s] […] would sit back […] and watch the Exocets being exchanged’.15 This is not, of course, to claim either that these two states alone have been able to dictate to their EU partners or that an agreement between them would guarantee an agreement at 28. Rather it is to recognise, given their resources, capabilities and status, that any potential disagreement has often been a major obstacle to CFSP decision-making. In contrast, and although obviously still important, Britain’s relationship with Germany has been different and, in security and defence terms at least, much less a partnership of equals. On major diplomatic issues, for example the negotiations over Iran’s enrichment programme (see Chap. 8) and the European response to the Ukraine crisis, Germany’s voice always matters. Indeed, and as discussed in Chap. 7, it is now playing a far more prominent leadership role in CFSP than ever before. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the FCO’s CFSP officials will normally speak with both their French and German opposite numbers daily on a wide range of issues.16 What is interesting to note, however, is that while German officials and diplomats tends to emphasise the importance of both France and Britain as their primary interlocutors in CFSP, the UK has generally regarded Germany as having less to offer, particularly in terms of security capabilities. Having the Germans involved remains important but they have tended to be ‘less active’ on CSDP and whilst having significant interests across a number of issues are considered to have been ‘less consistently involved’.17 Indeed, in the context particularly of security Britain has long wanted ‘them to do more’.18 It is interesting to note, moreover, that the Germans were unhappy about the Anglo-French Lancaster House agreements. Gerald Howarth, then Minister of State at the MoD, suggested that the agreements had ‘put a few noses out of joint’, for example (House of Lords 2012: 23). As a consequence an additional ‘structured dialogue’ was established between Britain and Germany,19 and since the referendum efforts have been made by both sides to launch more comprehensive defence co-operation post-­ Brexit (Wright 2017b). This reflects the reality that as Europe’s biggest and economically most powerful state, Germany has become an increasingly essential voice in CFSP, and where the UK has been able to make common cause with both Berlin and Paris, they constitute a formidable bloc. This point was emphasised in the FCO’s White Paper Active Diplomacy for a Changing World which states that it is in Britain’s interests ‘as a global player […] to work with our EU partners, in particular France and Germany’ (FCO 2006). This will likely be an even more important requirement following Brexit.

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A final and important point for discussion is Britain’s interactions with those where a meeting of minds has been less easily assumed. As one UK diplomat put it, diplomacy is ‘not just about talking to your mates’.20 Thus, in the context of CFSP British officials have often spent more time trying to resolve the differences it has with others or ensuring that smaller states do not feel that a directoire of larger states is trying to dictate policy.21 Indeed, it has been ‘very conscious’ of this fear and therefore has ‘tried to form relationships with as many as possible’.22 Similarly, there may be occasions where officials from a partner state find themselves in a difficult situation as a consequence of domestic politics or the policy being pursued by their capitals. The case of Austria in 2000 is instructive here: when the far-right Freedom Party entered government with the mainstream People’s Party the other 14 member states broke off official diplomatic contacts for several months. A British diplomat recalled going ‘out of my way’ to talk to his Austrian counterparts at meetings, however, on the basis that government policy was ‘not their fault’ and eventually there would come a time in the future when their support might be required.23 Maintaining relationships across the board is essential and consequently so is pragmatism: ‘you’ve got to deal with what you’ve got’.24

The Input Process The channels of communication outlined above are vital to the process by which Britain (and indeed any member state) makes inputs into CFSP policy-making. While important, a state’s size, resources and capabilities do not automatically bestow influence. Rather, being able to operate effectively within the CFSP environment—and thereby exercise ­leadership—has been a priority for the UK and, moreover, is something at which it is considered very effective.25 For David Miliband, the basis for this is straightforward: ‘leadership is about persuasion—you can’t lead if you can’t persuade’.26 There have even two important elements to the UK’s ability to do this: the quality of the papers it tables, and the degree of preparation ahead of any decision.27 The objective of any British contribution, whether through a paper or in a meeting, has always been that ‘we were listened to because we were authoritative’ while ‘expertise and knowing what you’re talking about is (sic) a big thing and something we normally do quite well’.28 Britain’s partners concur with this, with one Swedish diplomat describing British officials as ‘very effective, efficient and well-organised’.29

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‘Moral weight’ is also considered important.30 Thus, where a state has a demonstrable knowledge about and experience in a particular issue, country or region, they can expect their views to carry weight—for example, Poland when discussing Belarus as they ‘probably have thought about it a lot and they’re well informed’.31 For its part, Britain would expect its voice to be heard on questions relating to South Asia, its former colonial territories and defence and security questions—Zimbabwe, Iran and Pakistan in particular were highlighted.32 Indeed, David Miliband argued that the ‘EU-Pakistan relationship was really started thanks to Britain’.33 Backing for France by the EU and particularly the UK and Germany for anti-terrorist operations in Mali in 2013 is also worth noting in this regard (Traynor 2013). If knowledge and expertise are to make a difference, though, they must be deployed in support of a good argument, underscoring the importance assigned above to the quality and extent of preparation. As part of this and relating directly to the previous discussion of relationships, papers and proposals must take account of the views, interests and concerns of others, something to which British officials have devoted considerable time.34 A successful proposal will be ‘carefully balanced […] [and] take account of as many as possible of the reasonable interests of others’.35 For example, in the context of the PSC a successful argument is one that is ‘strong in its underlying basis’ but also recognises the interests of other member states, ‘find[ing] ways in which they will need to be reflected in the policy, and that can make quite a difference’.36 The UK has enjoyed an important linguistic advantage in this regard. With Council Conclusions being drafted in English, British officials are very well placed to craft compromise wordings or come up with alternative language.37 Timing also matters. It is much easier to find ways of incorporating the views of others earlier on in the process, rather than having ‘to re-jig’ later, hence the importance of devoting sufficient time and effort to conferring with partners in advance of any decision.38 A British diplomat involved in CSDP emphasised how discussions, compromises and trade-offs take place ‘informally and bilaterally’, with British officials occasionally even meeting their opposite numbers and ‘sharing instructions’ as a means of finding agreement. The key point is not to ‘negotiate in meetings to the extent possible’.39 Perhaps the most important factor in achieving influence in the input process is the willingness of a state to commit resources—financial, military, diplomatic, etc.—as well as time and energy in pursuit of a particular

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policy or outcome. Being ‘willing to put your money where your mouth is’ sends an important signal of intent.40 For example, Britain chose not to participate in the 2008–09 EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission. As a ­consequence, although asking occasional questions in the PSC and making clear their ‘red lines’ over the long-term future of the mission, Britain ‘more or less stayed quiet’, allowing those who had committed resources or troops, such as France and Poland, to lead the discussion.41 The drafting of the first Common Strategy on Russia following the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a different example.42 Here, although reluctant Britain was concerned that if it did not participate in the drafting process, what would be designed ‘would be horrible’.43 Consequently, it cooperated with France and Germany to create the strategy, even though the process was difficult, and from there was able to help build a wider consensus around it.44 All these different elements contribute to the degree to which Britain can be—and is regarded as—effective in terms of the process of CFSP. But in each of these, it is how the UK relates to partner states that has perhaps been most significant: ‘even though they strive for their policy, they’re also flexible […] there is a sense they’re being humble and not pushy’.45

Policy Priorities and ‘Red Lines’ While Britain seeks to articulate a clear and agreed position across the full range of issues dealt with in CFSP and CSDP, it is clear that unlike states such as Germany or France there has been no over-arching British ‘European vision’ providing a narrative or foundation for the policies pursued. Rather, British engagement has been pragmatic and conducted on an issue-by-issue basis. It is perhaps a fair criticism that this has contributed to the ongoing absence of strategic direction noted above. Thus, while being effective in the context of specific policies, the UK has lacked ‘strategic consistency’.46 On the whole, therefore, British engagement with the CFSP and CSDP can be characterised as predominantly defensive in nature—it has sometimes seemed more focused on preventing certain developments than initiating new forms of cooperation. This even applies to CSDP which at first seemed to be an exception. In recent years, as noted above, British interest and belief in CSDP has declined dramatically as the wider momentum underpinning its development decreased, and its focus seemed to shift primarily to civilian crisis management, something not initially envisaged by the UK or France. Thus, to the

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extent that there is a British ‘narrative’ of CFSP, it is based around a small but specific set of ‘red lines’ that have been quite consistently pursued by British Governments since Maastricht. The most important of these has been the general principle that foreign and security policy cooperation remains intergovernmental, something re-iterated in the Lisbon Treaty: [Lisbon’s] assertion of the Member States’ responsibility for setting the strategic direction of EU external action through the European Council […] underlines the Government’s success in ensuring that foreign policy will remain an intergovernmental area of activity controlled by Member States. (FCO 2008)

Alongside this, there are also a number of specific policy ‘red lines’ which underscore the UK’s defensive approach. The first example of this is Britain’s position on the EU’s continuing embargo on arms’ sales to China. Instituted following the suppression of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the embargo was announced in a European Council declaration the same month (European Council 1989). Because of this, it is only politically binding, unlike similar embargoes adopted since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Normally adopted as Common Positions through the CFSP, these are legally-binding on member states (Hellström 2010: 22). Moreover, member states have interpreted the precise terms of the Chinese embargo differently (ibid). For example, France has long considered it as applying only to lethal equipment, Britain to lethal equipment that could be used for ‘internal repression’, while Germany places tight restrictions on any military equipment (ibid). The lack of clarity and differences in interpretation has resulted in disagreements between member states over whether to lift it, something China has sought consistently since 2000 (ibid). In April 2004, for example, there was a ‘heated’ debate within the PSC over whether to end it, with the French demanding its removal, the Danes opposing this without clear links to progress in Chinese human rights, and Britain among those broadly in the middle (Rettman 2011).47 That said, Britain remains sensitive to the strong US opposition to its lifting (ibid). Thus, for Britain the lifting of the embargo has been a red line issue, much to the frustration of what one diplomat describes as the ‘panda-hugging’ member states who have pushed for it to be ended, such as France, Spain and Greece.48 What is noteworthy here is the extent to which Britain’s position has provided diplomatic cover for other, smaller states who support the ban.

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There was a feeling that were Britain suddenly to advocate an end to the arms embargo, Sweden, Denmark and others would likely follow suit quite swiftly.49 At the same time, these same states are happy to allow Britain to be seen as the one ‘holding out against the Chinese’ and be ‘punished’ for doing so, enabling them to avoid this while still remaining popular in Washington.50 The status of the ban over the longer term is increasingly in question, however. Prior to the Brexit referendum, Britain was essentially balancing its position in support of maintaining it—something the US had long lobbied for—with the growing desire within the Council and other EU institutions that it should be ended. In 2010, for example, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative, described the embargo as ‘a major impediment’ to stronger EU-China co-operation on foreign and security matters (Rettman 2010). At the same time, the UK has itself advocated the development of an EU-China strategic relationship, as well as seeking to strengthen its own bilateral ties with China.51 The tensions in these contradictory positions are likely only to increase post-Brexit for the UK and EU. Indeed, Japan has expressed its concerns that one consequence of Brexit will be the lifting of the embargo (Harding 2016). It will, moreover, remain a highly sensitive subject among member states regardless of Brexit, reflected in the fact that they have avoided as far as possible placing it formally on the political agenda at any point (Hellström 2010). The second example of the UK’s predominantly defensive approach is in the British policy towards CSDP, one of its most important areas of policy engagement in CFSP. As discussed above, alongside France Britain was the prime mover in initiating security and defence cooperation following the St Malo Agreement. Since then, three consistent positions have formed the basis for Britain’s subsequent engagement. First, whatever cooperation takes place, the primacy of NATO in European defence must be maintained. Second, the relationship of CSDP to NATO must be one of complementarity, and CSDP cannot be allowed to either duplicate or undermine NATO. Finally, a primary purpose of CSDP must be to encourage not only increased but also ‘smarter’ investment in defence and security capabilities by EU member states, something that will ultimately also have a beneficial impact on NATO. In the almost two decades since St Malo there has been no significant change in any of these positions, with the first two in particular representing ‘red lines’ for the UK. The primacy of NATO in Europe’s security architecture has been a regular aspect of government comments on CSDP.  For example, Tony

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Blair told the House of Commons in December 2000 following the Nice Council that ‘[c]ollective defence will remain the responsibility of NATO’ (Oakes 2001: 44) and in evidence to the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Robin Cook stated clearly that ‘nothing that has happened in European security is going to undermine that central role of NATO’ (House of Commons 2000). Similarly, when asked if NATO would remain the ‘cornerstone of European defence’, Jack Straw declared that ‘we are determined that it should do so’ (House of Commons 2003a). In the Commons, NATO has been consistently referred to in such terms, for example by David Miliband in 2008 and William Hague in 2011. Indeed, Hague added that CSDP could provide ‘a range of security tools’ in areas where NATO would not be engaged.52 Similarly, in a 2011 letter to Catherine Ashton, Hague and Phillip Hammond, the then Defence Secretary, described NATO as ‘the UK’s primary defensive alliance’. A House of Lords report reiterated the Government’s continued view of NATO as ‘the cornerstone’ of European security and defence, with CSDP playing only a ‘complementary role’ (2012: 21). The official position that CSDP must complement NATO and not be permitted either to duplicate or undermine it has also been clear, unequivocal and consistent. Thus, Cook stated that: ‘we have quite explicit statements […] that we will only launch a European-led [ESDP] operation where NATO as a whole is not involved’ (House of Commons 2000). In 2002, meanwhile, then FCO Political Director Peter Ricketts emphasised British opposition to any idea that ESDP/CSDP could develop down the path of collective defence: We have always said that ESDP should not undermine or duplicate NATO […] there are different views amongst different member states […] our position has been that it is best to keep collective defence guarantees with the integrated military structure to deal with them, which is NATO. (House of Commons 2002)

Similar points were made by Jack Straw (House of Commons 2003a, 2004) and were central to a working paper on CSDP entitled ‘Food For Thought’, presented to the Italian EU Presidency in August 2003 (House of Commons 2003b). This declared UK opposition to any proposals ‘which would imply competition, rather that complementarity, with NATO’ (ibid). In 2006, Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett described being ‘very mindful of the dangers of duplication’ and of the need to have

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‘a set of complementary strands’ (House of Commons 2006). The need to avoid duplication along with the Government’s efforts in Brussels to ensure this were both stressed in its official response to a report on NATO and European defence (House of Commons 2008b: 17). Meanwhile, the original report quoted the MoD’s view on the complementarity of CSDP and NATO: NATO has a far greater capability than ESDP.  But the range of security instruments that the EU can deploy allows it to add value in different ways. (House of Commons 2008a: 84) (emphasis added)

That this view had also prevailed at EU level is apparent in the December 2008 Presidency Conclusions which called for a ‘strengthening’ of the EU/ NATO partnership ‘in a spirit of mutual enhancement and respect’ (Consilium 2008: 17). In their letter to Baroness Ashton, Hague and Hammond also emphasised the ‘unique and complementary role’ that CSDP can play, declaring, moreover, that ‘complementarity is vital’ (2011). Finally, in December the same year, Hague stated in the Commons that the government ‘will never agree to’ duplicating institutions (Hansard 2011). Again, the consistency in official pronouncements is stark. Capabilities have been Britain’s third key objective and concern, particularly in the period since St Malo. From the outset, an important British objective of security and defence cooperation was to provide a catalyst for a Europe-wide improvement in capabilities. These, in turn, would strengthen Europe’s contribution to NATO, thereby also reinforcing their complementarity. A key component of this has been the refusal to countenance unnecessary institution-building which again has been a consistent red line. In 2000, for example, Cook talks about the ‘stress’ Britain placed on capabilities and that these forces ‘are not available only’ to the EU (House of Commons 2000). Similarly, a specific British goal during the negotiations of the Nice Treaty was for member states to ‘meet capability requirements’ (ibid), while Straw argued that CSDP was ‘a very important means by which Member States […] will be required’ to improve capabilities (House of Commons 2001). Peter Ricketts described how he expected CSDP to put ‘further pressure’ on partner states to spend more on capabilities, noting that this important British aim had been incorporated into a key EU working group report on defence (House of Commons 2002). Britain’s Food for Thought paper focused primarily on the need for improved capabilities, whilst also

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demanding that any institutional development be judged against ‘whether it would increase the EU’s capacity for rapid and effective action’ (House of Commons 2003b). Meanwhile, both the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees have supported the Government’s position that improved capabilities must be at the forefront of cooperation (House of Commons 2008a, b, c). The last of these quoted David Miliband who stated: ‘improved capability development amongst Member States is a key UK objective’ and that ‘the European problem is not an institutional one, it is to do with capabilities’ (House of Commons 2008c: 75). British support for the development of EU Battlegroups and the inclusion of clauses in Lisbon governing Permanent Structured Cooperation also reflect these aims. More importantly, they again emphasise the highly instrumental view Britain has taken of the value of CSDP in terms of its material contribution as opposed to broader integration objectives. The importance of these three positions was reiterated by a number of officials. These noted that the overall British position towards CSDP had remained essentially unchanged since 1998—i.e. the achievement of ‘complementary burden-sharing with NATO’.53 Institution-building and the possibility that CSDP might be a ‘challenge to NATO’ were both characterised explicitly as ‘red lines’, something that ‘has been a long-­ standing British position for years’.54 CSDP missions were viewed as being ‘part of our toolkit which we can use when it’s the right time and […] place’, provided they are focused, provide value for money and are time-­ limited.55 Moreover, Britain’s desire was not merely to transform European capabilities but also the philosophy under which they would be used, with the primary objective being to make  them ‘more expeditionary’ whilst avoiding duplication with NATO.56 British support for the development of Battlegroups was very much based around this, and this initiative enabled UK engagement with partners such as Denmark and Sweden who were very interested in British ideas on force transformation. Indeed, the Nordic Battlegroup was considered ‘a very effective vehicle for the transformation of the Swedish military’ (House of Commons 2008a: 75), reflecting the influence of such ideas.57 Ensuring sustained engagement in pursuit of these objectives has been challenging in recent years, however. In particular British commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan meant much of Whitehall’s POL-MIL capacity was focused on these operations, with reduced ‘bandwidth’ available for European policy objectives. The provision by the UK of an operational headquarters for Operation Atalanta, the anti-piracy mission off the coast

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of Somalia, was thus at least in part designed to refute accusations by France and Germany amongst others that Britain ‘was not pulling [its] weight in the EU’.58 The degree to which British engagement in CSDP has been impacted by the ‘temporary enthusiasms’ of No. 10 has also been an issue, with the UK having ‘missed opportunities to show leadership and develop CSDP’.59 Indeed, while at official level, for example in the PSC, the UK has ‘generally wanted to make things happen’ there have been times when ‘we’ve had a more defensive agenda’.60 As discussed previously, a clearer strategic direction from the very top of government could perhaps have enabled the UK to achieve more in this policy area.

The Impact of Brexit At the time of writing the Brexit negotiations are ongoing with their final outcome unclear. That withdrawal from the EU will have consequences for the UK’s foreign policy-making is clear. Indeed, there has already been some significant institutional impacts on Britain’s foreign policy-making capacities whilst a number of others can be foreseen. Domestically, Brexit has involved one of the most significant administrative reorganisations of Whitehall in recent years, with the establishment of two new departments—the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) and the Department for International Trade (DIT). Together with the FCO, these ministries are tasked with facilitating the process of withdrawal and establishing a range of new, post-Brexit relationships with the EU and other states around the world. Unsurprisingly, the creation of two additional institutional actors has further complicated the UK’s already complex foreign policy-making environment whilst placing additional strains on the resources and human capital available for these tasks. Of the two new ministries, DExEU has had the greatest immediate impact on the FCO and its place in European policy-making. DExEU’s brief is ‘overseeing negotiations to leave the European Union and establishing the future relationship between the UK and EU’ (HM Government 2017b). To do this, it has brought together parts of the FCO’s European Directorate with the European and Global Issues Secretariat (EGIS) from the Cabinet Office—which prior to the referendum served as the engine room for domestic coordination of UK policy inputs into the EU (see Chap. 3)—as well as officials seconded from a range of other Whitehall departments. While the negotiations are ongoing, DExEU will also be responsible for all aspects of UKREP’s work which pertain to the Brexit

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process (HM Government 2016). However, with the FCO retaining ownership of CFSP policy-making as well as the UK’s diplomatic network, UKREP will therefore be jointly instructed by and report to the two ministries and their Secretaries of State. Given the time-limited nature of DExEU’s role, the assumption is that officials transferred to the department will return to their home ministries once the Brexit process has been completed. Doubts remain, though, as to whether such a complex set of negotiations can be completed in the time available and with the resources allocated. Article 50 specifies a two-year period for the completion of withdrawal negotiations although it is likely a transition period of at least two more years will be required to negotiate the post-Brexit relationship, whatever form this ultimately takes (Perez-Solorzano 2017). Britain’s departure from the EU means an end to its participation in all of its policy-making structures and processes, including those of CFSP. Thus, Britain’s voice will no longer be heard on the wide range of questions discussed by the Foreign Affairs Council, Political and Security Committee or the numerous working groups where so much CFSP business is conducted. Being ‘outside the room’, the UK’s capacity to exercise influence on its EU partners will therefore be significantly diminished. It also means both the UK and EU lose access to their respective capabilities: the UK will no longer able to benefit from the potential of the EU to act as a multiplier for member states’ capacities in the international arena, for example in the area of sanctions; and the EU will lose the economic, diplomatic and military weight the UK can bring to bear in support of EU foreign policy objectives. British foreign policy makers must therefore determine what this will mean for the UK’s broader capacity to pursue its foreign policy objectives and for co-operation with its European partners. Regardless of Brexit, the UK and EU27 will continue to share a range of common international objectives and face the same complex set of threats. These include the need to maintain and sustain key aspects of international security governance such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime; responding to the challenge posed by a revisionist Russia; dealing with the causes and consequences of instability on Europe’s eastern and southern peripheries; the mass movement of people, etc. The declaration by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a former Foreign and Defence Secretary, that ‘[t]here is no geostrategic threat to France or Germany or continental Europe that would not be a threat to Britain’ post-Brexit highlights the importance of their ongoing cooperation (House of Commons 2016: 26). As one of Europe’s two leading military powers, Britain will also continue

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to have an important role—and voice—in debates over European security and defence. The UK Government has made clear it seeks a ‘deep and special partnership’ with the EU27 on foreign, defence and security policy (HM Government 2017a: 2), and a number of EU states have also stressed the importance they place on maintaining the closest links with the UK.  The challenge for both sides is how to achieve this. How far will Britain’s absence from EU structures impact on cooperation between the two sides and how can any negative consequences be mitigated and their ongoing cooperation facilitated? Although clearly significant, the EU is just one ‘venue’ through which the UK pursues foreign, security and defence policy cooperation with its European partners. Interaction and engagement will continue through a number of other channels. First, bilateral relations will become even more important and the UK is starting to boost the resources it makes available to the diplomatic network that sustains these, having created 50 additional posts across Europe in 2017 (FCO 2017). As noted previously, in recent years the UK has developed a particularly close defence and security partnership with France, formalised in the Lancaster House Treaties. Paris hopes that these agreements will remain ‘Brexit-proof’ (Ghez et al. 2017: 6) and has made clear that it does not believe Brexit should be an obstacle to their continued cooperation: French-British co-operation is particularly close […] [and] will not be undermined by Brexit because it is mainly bilateral, because of the political and strategic convergences between our two countries, which remain unchanged, and because of the strong integration of our industries. (Embassy of France 2017)

Similarly, the UK and Germany are seeking to enhance their defence co-­ operation having already sought to elevate their engagement prior to the 2016 referendum (HM Government 2016), while a German Defence Ministry official emphasised that ‘the British have every opportunity to remain engaged outside of the EU’ (Chuter and Sprenger 2017). Second, the UK will also be able to engage with former EU partners through other multilateral organisations, particularly NATO and the United Nations. The UK remains a significant actor in each and can utilise them to enhance and further institutionalise its long-standing relationships with European partners. However, this is unlikely to be entirely unproblematic. Institutionally, interactions within NATO are less intensive

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and the issue areas covered less extensive than in the CFSP, meaning it cannot act as a substitute. Strategically, meanwhile, NATO faces a period of uncertainty in light of the greater ambivalence towards its utility expressed by the current Trump Administration, while European members are starting to look once again at EU pathways to greater defence and security cooperation partly as a response, for example through Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PESCO) (Consilium 2017). As discussed, the UK attaches huge importance to NATO and the transatlantic alliance and a significant strategic divergence would be highly problematic for London. Meanwhile, in the context of the United Nations there are indications that the UK will find its capacity to exercise influence less certain and that it can no longer take the support of its European partners for granted. For example, the UN General Assembly voted in June 2017 that the long-running dispute between the UK and Mauritius over the Chagos Islands should be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by 94 to 15. Significantly, the majority of EU states—including France, Germany and Spain—abstained (BBC 2017). This decision was compounded but the UK’s failure to have its candidate for the ICJ elected in November 2017. Although we should not read too much into individual votes, they do highlight the potential for the UK to find itself facing greater diplomatic difficulties and even isolation in future disputes. For example, were the sovereignty and status of territories such as the Falkland Islands to be challenged in years to come, the UK could find it much more difficult to respond. The priority for London, therefore, must be both to sustain the credibility and legitimacy of the British position within both organisations and thereby maintain its capacity to exercise leadership and influence within each. A more activist approach to both will therefore be needed to avoid the risk that Brexit is seen as part of a growing international disengagement and drift into semi-isolation, a perception that will only be strengthened by further cuts to the UK’s diplomatic and military capabilities. A re-invigorated multilateral vocation would send a clear signal of the UK’s intent to remain both a relevant international actor and an active partner for its European allies. The third channel through which the UK can maintain its engagement with its EU partners on foreign, security and defence policy questions is by formalising its commitment to develop the ‘deep and special partnership’ it has called for. There are a number of potential frameworks for this, while clear precedents exist for the involvement of non-member states in the

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EU’s foreign and security policy. One framework would be a ‘strategic partnership’, something the EU has already established with a number of key third party states including the US, China and India. While there is no fixed or precise definition of what constitutes a strategic partnership, they generally share two core characteristics: a commitment to joint decision-­ making and long-term mutuality of interest (Wright 2017a). These are enacted through regular summitry and strategic dialogues along with other levels of formal interaction and shared agendas, and it is possible to imagine such an arrangement between the UK and EU27 ­encompassing the full range of their ongoing co-operation in trade and economics as well as foreign and security policy. While strategic partnerships have been characterised by some as the loosest form of potential post-Brexit relationship (Koenig 2016), their inherent flexibility would enable both sides to develop and deepen their future relationship in particular policy areas should they wish to. As part of such a partnership or on a more ad hoc basis, the UK could also seek to participate in future CSDP missions or initiatives such as PESCO. For example, although its accession process remains ongoing, Serbia has participated in EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia; meanwhile, Norway has formal agreements for participation in CSDP missions and cooperation with the European Defence Agency, and coordinates with the EU on a wide range of foreign policy questions. Non-membership is therefore not necessarily a bar to involvement, although the challenge would remain how much influence and control the UK could expect to exercise in such situations. The most ambitious and controversial option for the UK would be to seek ongoing involvement in CFSP structures such as the PSC and working groups through some form of observer status. It is difficult to imagine the EU27 being prepared to grant the UK any form of formal decision-making role, and the UK may not be prepared to accept such diminished involvement. However, given both sides have a pragmatic interest in maintaining British involvement in some form, a means to finesse this could be found if sufficient political will exists. The devil, as with all questions around Brexit, will lie in the detail.

Conclusion This chapter has outlined how the UK has pursued its objectives and sought to exercise influence over policy-making within the CFSP.  What emerges is something of a paradox. On the one hand, UK officials have

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generally been highly effective at the process of CFSP and ‘playing the game’, demonstrating an ability to operate within an environment governed by norms of consensus and the avoidance (as far as possible) of formal vetoes. One the other, however, when talking about CFSP, the British approach has essentially been pragmatic rather than ‘ideal-’ or ‘value-based’—i.e. it emphasises the practical and instrumental importance of the CFSP, without necessarily having any larger vision in terms of what it should or could be for. British officials are clearly socialised to the ‘rules of the game’ and norms of behaviour but these matter only in terms of how they help achieve British objectives. Strategically, in terms of the what, the British view of CFSP remains embedded in rationalist and instrumental calculations of its utility in specific contexts, rather than having any meaningful broader objective. The UK is clearly not unique in viewing the CFSP in terms of how it can support the achievement of nationally-defined preferences and objectives. However, for a country which has frequently claimed a leadership role for itself, the lack of a broader vision or purpose does seem limiting. Indeed, as the final section of the chapter has shown, there is a certain irony that the big ‘idea’ in terms of the UK’s relationship with its EU partners is now withdrawal. This will have very significant consequences for the UK’s capacity to achieve the kind of influence over the direction of European foreign, security and defence policy that it has always claimed for itself.

Notes 1. Interview, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 2010. 2. One British official described Cyprus as being the ‘honourable exception’ to this: ‘[It] defines any given issue through the prism of ‘what does this mean for our dispute with Turkey?’ and then just ruthlessly pursues that, no matter what the wider circumstances’. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 3. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 4. Interviews, French Permanent Representation, Brussels, (FO1) and General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels (EU1), 2010 and Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, May 2012. 5. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 6. Interviews, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (UKO3) and retired official, Ministry of Defence, 2011. 7. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 8. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3).

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9. Interview, French Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (FO1). 10. Interview, French Foreign Ministry, Paris, 2011 (FO3). 11. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. Concern was expressed by the House of Lords European Union Committee that Libya demonstrated how far European military capability ‘relies […] on UK-French involvement. There is a danger that […] a disproportionate burden for European defence will rest on these two nations at a time when Europe’s near abroad remains unstable’ (2012: 9). 12. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 13. These outlined more concrete steps for their cooperation, including the development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary force, the establishment of a Joint Force Headquarters, and a programme to develop unmanned aerial vehicles (Prime Minister’s Office 2012). 14. Hansard, HC Deb 20 February 2012, Col. 65WS. 15. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 16. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, (UKO2, UKO3, UKO6), retired FCO official and retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011, and Ministry of Defence, London, 2012 (UKO8). 17. Interviews, retired FCO official and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (UKO3), 2011. 18. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 19. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 20. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 21. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 22. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence official, 2011. 23. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 24. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 25. Interviews, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels (EU1), DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels (EU4), French Permanent Representation, Brussels (FO1), German Permanent Representation, Brussels (GO1), 2010; Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3); and Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 26. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 27. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 28. Interviews, retired FCO official and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London (UKO3), 2011. 29. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, 2012. 30. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 31. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 32. Interviews, DG RELEX, European Commission, 2010 (EU4) and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 33. Interview, London, 6 December 2010.

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34. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London (UKO3) and retired FCO official. 35. Interview, retired FCO official, 2011. 36. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 37. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, 2012. 38. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 39. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 40. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 41. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence Official, 2011. 42. See Annex II, Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, June 3 and 4 1999 (150/99 REV 1). 43. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 44. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 45. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, 2012. 46. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence Official, 2011. 47. It should be noted that the account of this PSC debate came from a leaked US diplomatic cable (Hellström 2010). 48. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 49. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 50. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 51. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 52. Hansard, HC Deb 9 December 2008, Col 419; HC Deb 5 December 2011, Col 5WS. 53. Interview, Ministry of Defence, London, 2012. 54. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 55. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO2). 56. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence Official, 2011. 57. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence Official, 2011. 58. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence Official, 2011. 59. Interview, retired Ministry of Defence Official, 2011. 60. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3).

Bibliography BBC (2017) Chagos Legal Status Sent to International Court by UN, 22 June. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40376673. Chuter, A. and Sprenger, S. (2017) ‘Amid Brexit, Germany and UK to Expand Defense Cooperation’. Defense News, 21 July. Available at: http://www. defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/07/21/amid-brexit-germany-anduk-to-expand-defense-cooperation/. Ghez, J, Kirchner, M, Shurkin, M, Knack, A, Hall, A and Black, J. (2017) Defence and Security after Brexit: A Snapshot of International Perspectives on the Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU. RAND Europe.

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Harding, R. (2016) ‘Japan Fears Brexit Blow to EU Arms Embargo on China’. The Financial Times, London, 4 July. Hellström, J.  (2010) The EU Arms Embargo on China: A Swedish Perspective (Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency). Koenig, N. (2016) EU External Action and Brexit: Relaunch and Reconnect, Policy Paper 178, 22 November (Berlin: Jacques Delors Institute). Oakes, M. (2001) Research Paper 01/50: European Security and Defence Policy: Nice and Beyond (London: House of Commons Library). Perez-Solorzano, N. (2017) ‘Brexit Negotiations Phase Two—Here’s What Happens Next’. The Conversation, 9 December. Available at: https://theconversation.com/amp/brexit-negotiations-phase-two-heres-what-happens-next88893?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton&__twitter_ impression=true. Rettman, A. (2010) ‘Ashton Pragmatic on China in EU Foreign Policy Blueprint’. EUObserver, Brussels, 17 December. Available at: http://euobserver.com/ china/31538. Rettman, A. (2011) ‘Leaked Cable Shows Fragility of EU Arms Ban on China’. EUObserver, Brussels, 25 July. Available at: http://euobserver.com/ china/32658. Simón, L. (2013) ‘The Spider in Europe’s Web? French Grand Strategy From Iraq to Libya’. Geopolitics, 18(2), pp. 403–434. Traynor, I. (2013) ‘EU Set to Back French War in Mali’. The Guardian Newspaper, 17 January. Wright, N. (2017a) ‘The Government’s Brexit White Paper: A Missed Opportunity’. The UK in a Changing Europe, 17 February. Available at: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-governments-brexit-white-paper-a-missed-opportunity/. Wright, N. (2017b) Brexit and the Re-making of British Foreign Policy. UCL European Institute Working Paper, December. Available at: https://www.ucl. ac.uk/european-institute/analysis/2017-18/wright-brexit-foreign-policy.

Bibliography—Official Documents Consilium (2008a) Presidency Conclusions—Brussels, 11 and 12 December 2008 (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2017a) Defence Cooperation: Council Establishes Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 Member States Participating, 11 December (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://dsms.consilium.europa.eu/952/ Actions/Newsletter.aspx?messageid=18144&customerid=54447&password=e nc_5370703674506E3145595063_enc. Embassy of France in the United States (2017) Statements Made by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Paris—21 July, available at: https:// franceintheus.org/IMG/html/briefing/2017/DDB-2017-07-21.html.

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European Council (1989) Presidency Conclusions—European Council—Madrid, 26 and 27 June 1989 (SN 254/2/89) (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/848998/1989_june_-_ madrid__eng_.pdf. FCO (2006a) Active Diplomacy for a Changing World—The UK’s International Priorities (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2008a) Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report on ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty’ (Third Report of Session 2007–08) (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2017) Quarterly FCO Update to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 September (London: HM Government). Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/foreign-affairs/Correspondence/2017-19/ FCO-to-Chair-relating-to-corporate-matters-14-September-2017.pdf. Hague, W. and Hammond, P. (2011) Putting the Comprehensive Approach to Work—Letter to Baroness Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence). Hansard (2011d) House of Commons Written Ministerial Statements—Monday 5 December 2011—Foreign and Commonwealth Office—EU Foreign Affairs Council—Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Column 5WS) (London: Houses of Parliament). HM Government (2016a) Department for Exiting the European Union: Written Evidence from the Department for Exiting the European Union to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (REU0021), November (London: Houses of Parliament). HM Government (2016b) Defence Secretary Welcomes Deeper Security Relationship with Germany, 25 January, London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-welcomes-deeper-security-relationshipwith-germany. HM Government (2017a) Foreign Policy, Defence and Development—A Future Partnership Paper, 12 September, London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-a-futurepartnership-paper. HM Government (2017b) Department for Exiting the European Union—About Us, London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ department-for-exiting-the-european-union/about. House of Commons (2000a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Uncorrected Evidence—21 November (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2001) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20–40)—5 December (London: Houses of Parliament).

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House of Commons (2002) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40–59)—10 December (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2003a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40–52)—10 June (London: Houses of Parliament). Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/774/3061001.htm. House of Commons (2003b) Foreign Affairs Committee: Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Minister of State for Europe, Dated 8 September 2003 (London: Houses of Parliament). Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/1233/3102804.htm. House of Commons (2004a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40–59)—25 May (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2006b) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1—102)—13 December (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2008a) Defence Committee: The Future of NATO and European Defence—Ninth Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2008b) Defence Committee: The Future of NATO and European Defence—Government Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2008c) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty—Third Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2016) Foreign Affairs Committee: Implications of the Referendum on EU membership for the UK’s role in the world, Fifth Report of Session 2015–16, 26 April (London: The Stationery Office). House of Lords (2011) European Union Sub-Committee C: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Policy Inquiry on British-French Defence Relations— Evidence Session No.2 (Qu 32–58) (London: The Houses of Parliament). House of Lords (2012) European Union Committee—31st Report of Session 2010–12—European Defence Capabilities: Lessons from the Past, Signposts for the Future (London: The Houses of Parliament). Prime Minister’s Office (2012) UK-France Declaration on Security and Defence (London: HM Government).

PART II

Germany and the CFSP

German foreign policy has been marked by continuity during the last few decades. It is reliable and calculable. It is guided by our values and interests […] However, German foreign policy is not static. It always reflects the world around us. (Westerwelle 2010)

These remarks by the late Guido Westerwelle, Germany’s Foreign Minister from 2009–13, encapsulate both the nature and ambition of German foreign policy in the nearly three decades since unification, communicating a combination of apparent continuity and dramatic if not always obvious change. Moreover, they go to the heart of the debates over the extent to which the CFSP has been responsible for a transformation not only in how member states make foreign and security policy, but in how they conceive of and identify their preferences and interests. Germany would seem to be the perfect exemplar of such a transformation, having embedded its international identity within a European frame of reference, and anchored itself to the common values and norms of behaviours underpinning this. However, its development since 1990 suggests something different and more subtle. Thus, while rhetorically it places its foreign and security policy within the multilateral context provided by the CFSP, as well as NATO, the UN etc, in recent years it has become increasingly comfortable using the CFSP as a venue to pursue openly its own particular preferences and objectives. Indeed, not only do German policy-makers seek to use the CFSP’s system and structures to promote German influence, their national systems of policy-making are intended to give clear direction over where and how such influence is to be exercised. The three

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chapters in this section examine how and why this has happened, and what it means in practice for German foreign policy-making. Germany’s evolution as a foreign and security policy actor is of particular interest given the historical sensitivity surrounding its behaviour in these contexts. Having initially been anxious to reassure its neighbours and partners that reunification would not threaten Europe’s peace and stability, the trajectory of change within Germany in the post-reunification period has been dramatic. It has not been alone in seeking to wrestle with the security challenges thrown up first by the collapse of Yugoslavia, then the War on Terror, and more recently by the need for coherent and effective crisis management to respond to instability in the EU’s near-abroad, particularly Syria and Russian action in the Ukraine. However, these have posed for it an additional and unique set of political and moral dilemmas, as Sebastian Harnisch neatly outlines in the context of the German response to Kosovo: [Kosovo] confronted the German foreign policy elite and the wider public with a conflict between key norms of its post-Second World War foreign policy: multilateralism (never alone), observance of the law (never again), and human rights (never again concentration camps). The tension between these core values and between their protagonists in the German public debate was much more serious than in any of Germany’s allies […] the Kosovo War in particular struck right at the heart of Germany’s post-Second World War role as a civilian (if not pacifist) power. (2001: 51)

German involvement particularly in NATO and the EU and CFSP has been crucial to its ability to address such dilemmas, with these constituting the ‘two pathways' through which its security has been conceived and pursued (Aggestam 2000: 64). They have created the space within which it has been able to play an increasingly significant role as an international actor, often under pressure from partner states, whilst addressing some of the most difficult moral questions thrown up by its twentieth Century history. They have also enabled it to balance two ostensibly competing internal narratives: its position as the civilian power (Zivilmacht) par excellence; and a determination to move beyond its history, key to which has been a willingness to countenance the deployment of military force abroad. Together, these highlight what is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Germany’s foreign policy evolution over the last two decades: while its default position remains rooted in multilateralist and partnership-based

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approaches to foreign policy, it now seems far more willing to assert itself, even if this results in public splits with key allies, as witnessed in its decision not to participate in NATO’s implementation of a No-Fly Zone over Libya in 2011, or its separation from Britain and France over policy towards Syria (e.g. Speck 2013). To explore these different and sometimes competing influences, this section is divided into three chapters. The first provides a brief analysis of the trajectory of change in German foreign and security policy from reunification to the present. The second examines the structures and processes established in Berlin and Brussels for the development and pursuit of German foreign policy in the context of CFSP.  The final part considers how Germany acts in practice and the increasing leadership role it has started to play in CFSP. Together, these chapters demonstrate how much German foreign policy and its interaction with the CFSP have evolved, and the extent to which its position as Europe’s ‘indispensable power’ is now as valid in EU foreign policy as it is in EU economic policy.

Bibliography Aggestam, L. (2000) ‘Germany’. In Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G. (eds.) The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press). Harnisch, S. (2001) ‘Change and Continuity in Post-unification German Foreign Policy’. German Politics, 10(1), pp. 35–60. Speck, U. (2013) Chancellor Merkel’s Strategic Opportunity (Brussels: Carnegie Europe). Available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/07/03/chancellormerkel-s-strategic-opportunity/gdmm.

Bibliography—Official Documents Westerwelle, G. (2010) Speech by Guido Westerwelle, Member of the Bundestag and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs at the German Council on Foreign Relations Berlin, 21 October 2010 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt).

CHAPTER 5

From Perennial Follower to ‘Reluctant’ Leader? Germany’s Relationship with the CFSP

Introduction Nearly two decades since Hanns Maull (2000) asked whether Germany remained a civilian power in the aftermath of the Kosovo War (see also Kundnani 2011; Tewes 2001), it is possible to identify this crisis as a watershed moment not only in the development of European foreign and security policy more widely, but also in the evolution of German foreign policy in the post-reunification period. In a very real sense, the reaction to Kosovo of the newly-elected Red-Green coalition government led by SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Green Party Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer represented the culmination of the pressures brought to bear by the combination of events and changing expectations that had accompanied Germany’s first decade as a unified state. Indeed, it forms part of a clear and unmistakeable trajectory of change since 1990 that has seen Germany exchange its status as ‘political dwarf’, first for the role of reluctant participant (Wittlinger 2010: 118), and now more recently for one as an important initiator of policy in the CFSP. While the CFSP remains just one facet of Germany’s engagement with the EU and the wider international community, it is nonetheless highly significant having formed a key part of German efforts to build trust and confidence with its partners, and maintain stability and predictability in its foreign relations (Aggestam 2000). One German Foreign Ministry official described it as ‘the essential part […] this is the forum where we actually © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_5

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can express our foreign policy’.1 Another stated that he ‘could not imagine’ conducting foreign and security policy without it. He continued: [T]his is the framework in which […] in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, security and defence policy happens. Everything else is […] a complete non-­ starter. It’s not imaginable, quite simply.2

Such statements highlight the unique nature of Germany’s relationship with the CFSP and its importance in German conceptions of its foreign policy role today. The CFSP represented just one part of the solution that Europe’s policy-­makers devised to address the challenges the member states faced at the beginning of the 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, a political vacuum was created in Europe and new initiatives were needed to promote co-operation (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002), and ensure that external pressures would not interfere with or further disrupt integration. At the same time, and linked to this, was the question of how to manage the EU’s inter-state and inter-institutional dynamics (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008), and particularly the necessity of anchoring the newly-unified Germany firmly within Europe, something the government of Helmut Kohl government was as anxious to achieve as Germany’s partners. Together, these pressures provided the crucial catalyst for the establishment of the CFSP (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002), and the backdrop against which the trajectory of change since unification should be viewed. This chapter explores these developments, breaking the period up into three sections: the restraint and ‘leadership avoidance’ of the Kohl years; the ‘quiet revolution’ and ‘end of equidistance’ that characterised the Schröder governments; and Germany’s emergence as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ under Angela Merkel.

The Kohl Years: Restraint and ‘Leadership Avoidance’ Much of the analysis of the nature and degree of change in Germany’s role and role conception within both the EU and wider international community has been based around the concept of normalization (e.g. Katzenstein 1997; Paterson 2003, 2010a; Bulmer and Paterson 2010; Hyde-Price 2003; Rummel 1996; Wittlinger 2010). This is concerned with the extent to which a post-unification Germany could, should or would seek to

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become a ‘normal’ nation-state, and what this would mean in practice when dealing with foreign policy. Throughout its existence, the basis of the Bonn Republic’s foreign policy consisted of a renunciation of power politics and the rejection of any form of nationalism within the international arena, coupled with a strong commitment to multilateralism (Katzenstein 1997; Wittlinger 2010). Indeed, from this perspective the CFSP represents an ideal expression of this ‘European vocation’, characterised by a ‘reflexive multilateralism’ through which German actorness could be ‘veiled by multilateral process and discourse’ (Paterson 2010a: 42; see also Heisenberg 2005). More generally, in its membership of NATO and the EC/EU Germany sought, largely successfully, to balance its loyalties to the European and Atlantic alliances as the two key components in its international identity, consciously avoiding situations where it would have to choose between them (Wittlinger 2010). The chief characteristics of its foreign policy could therefore be encapsulated as modesty, self-limitation and a ‘culture of restraint’—or, in Paterson’s words, a ‘leadership avoidance reflex (2003: 211). Following unification, however, the sustainability of this role conception soon came into question. Domestically, the Maastricht Treaty represented the apogee of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Europeanist policies. From then on, ‘Euro-idealism’ in Germany—or alternatively, Germany’s ‘Euro-vocation’ (Paterson 2010a, 2011)—began to decline significantly, particularly as the economic costs of reunification and possible impacts of future eastern enlargement became clearer (Wittlinger 2010). At the same time, unified Germany faced growing pressure from its international partners to live up to the ‘international responsibilities’ its new status entailed, particularly in light of its decision not to participate in the first Gulf War coalition where it was criticised for its ‘cheque-book diplomacy’, and then its apparent ‘assertiveness’ in its unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (Hyde-Price 2003: 188, 190). Consequently, Germany’s political and foreign policy elite faced the challenge of trying to balance their Zivilmacht role conception with the need to demonstrate to their allies that Germany was a stable and reliable partner, willing to share the burdens of maintaining international peace and security (Wittlinger 2010). Paterson (2003) frames this dilemma in terms of realist or Westphalian versus post-Westphalian analyses. He argues that in the period immediately following reunification the prevailing post-Westphalian orthodoxy saw Germany as a ‘post-national state’, tied in to both Europe and the wider international system through ‘ever higher degrees’ of integration

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and interdependence. In Germany’s case, such post-nationalism had a number of characteristics, including an exaggerated multilateralism, a readiness to pool sovereignty at the European level, a reliance on ‘soft power’ and the avoidance of explicit leadership, except in conjunction with France (ibid.). Countering this, the Westphalian analysis saw in the post-reunification period an opportunity for Germany to escape from the ‘constraints of semi-sovereignty’ and ‘pursue a normalization course’ enabling it to talk more confidently in terms of national interests—and therefore making it no different from either France or Britain (ibid: 207). Moreover, by following an approach based consciously and unashamedly around self- and national interest, Germany would be able to secure for itself the position of ‘central balancer’ in key decisions (ibid.), an important point given the subsequent change in its approach to European integration generally, and foreign and security policy more specifically discussed below. Rejecting the notion that Germany would return to realist ‘normalcy’, however, in 1997 Katzenstein argued that following unification it was a version of this post-Westphalian state that had come to pass. Noting that German political leaders spoke in terms of political responsibility rather than power, and consciously avoided either a high profile or explicit leadership role, he contended that these were indicative of a ‘deeper transformation’ whereby Germany had been tamed by the institutionalization of power at the European level (Katzenstein 1997: 3). The German focus on ‘soft power’ reflected its considerable similarities with the EU in terms of institutions and practices, meaning a milieu had been created at EU level in which German policy-makers and politicians felt ‘at home’ and that helped anchor Germany in Europe (ibid: 40–1). This, in turn, demonstrated Germany’s ‘indirect institutional power’—the ability to ‘shape the rules of the game’ at the European level in ways that would favour its policy in the long term (ibid: 25). In their analysis of indirect institutional power, Bulmer et  al. (2000: 135) set out how such power ‘pays back’ through subsequent systemic empowerment, for example through Germany’s ability to ensure that the European Central Bank, when created, reflected the concerns and priorities of the Bundesbank. Overall, Germany and the EU had evolved in ‘mutually supportive ways’ (Katzenstein 1997: 44). Thus, while Germany remained ‘semi-sovereign’ and more internationalized in both the European and Atlanticist institutions than either France or Britain who took more instrumentalist and realist approaches to the exercise of

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power at the European level, German political elites were well-placed to ‘exploit the fortuitous institutional fit’ (ibid: 41). Two decade later, however, and the notion of Germany as a ‘tamed power’ no longer seems to hold. For Harnisch and Schieder (2006), Germany’s European policy had become weaker, leaner and meaner over the previous decade, a point with which Bulmer and Paterson (2010) concur, arguing that Germany has become more assertive and willing, if necessary, to proceed alone. Moreover, domestically the previously permissive consensus that supported ‘tamed power’ has become far more conditional (ibid.). Thus, even though it will remain a key participant in the EU’s core groups, not least the Eurozone, Germany’s European diplomacy is becoming more calculating with it likely to be a far more robust negotiating partner, particularly regarding the EU’s finances (ibid: 1073). This latter concern has become increasingly important within the CFSP (see below). Overall, therefore, for Bulmer and Paterson (2010), this willingness to be more robust and assertive reflects the reality of Germany as an increasingly ‘normalized’ power. Such robustness and assertiveness is clearly reflected within the field of foreign and security policy. For Wittlinger (2010), it is this aspect of German policy that has undergone the most change since reunification, while Hyde-Price (2003: 184) notes the ‘quiet revolution’ that has been underway throughout this period, particularly regarding the use of force as an ‘instrument of statecraft’. Wagener (2006: 79) makes a similar point, noting that Germany in the mid-2000s was using military instruments to achieve foreign and security goals ‘much more intensively’ than in the previous decade. The pressure on reunified Germany to assume a greater burden in relation to international security became particularly acute in relation to the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which challenged the utility of Germany’s Zivilmacht role conception (Hyde-Price 2003). For the Kohl Government, and indeed for the Bonn Republic more generally, the historic memory of German militarism meant that the explicit exercise of power was to be avoided. However, this seemed increasingly incompatible with the need to preserve stability in Europe, one corner of which was engaged in a particularly brutal conflict, aspects of which seemed dangerously reminiscent of Germany’s own troubled history. The decision by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) on 12 July 1994 that out-of-area operations by Germany’s armed forces were permissible if conducted under a clear UN mandate was therefore

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momentous (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003). While not denying the principle that armed force only be used under exceptional circumstances, it did not preclude its use altogether. Thus, while non-violent conflict resolution would remain the guiding principle of German foreign policy, the way was open for more robust action, particularly in partnership with allies, and based on the central objective of securing and promoting international peace (Hyde-Price 2003). A quiet revolution had indeed taken place in German foreign policy since reunification.

The Schröder Years: ‘Quiet Revolution’ and the End of ‘Equidistance’ The implications of this ‘quiet revolution’ became clear in the response of the SPD-Green government’s response to the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, the arrival in October 1998 of the new Gerhard Schröder-led coalition, thereby ending 16  years of governments led by Helmut Kohl, proved highly significant to Germany’s foreign and security policy in a number of ways. The generational change meant that in Schröder and his deputy Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister and Green Party leader, Germany was for the first time led by politicians with no memory of the Second World War and for whom German history provided the justification for action rather than inaction. In this context, not only did Kosovo challenge the three key norms in the country’s post war foreign policy identified above, it became the catalyst for a remarkable change of direction with the German government publicly advocating the use of force as an instrument of statecraft, albeit in limited ways. The role of Joschka Fischer in persuading both his own party and the wider public to support German participation was particularly striking. Just a few years previously, he had been highly critical of German military participation in out-of-area operations, but his position changed following Serbian attacks on UN ‘safe havens’ in Gorazde and Srebrenica in ­Bosnia-­Herzegovina. As Hyde-Price and Jeffrey note, for Fischer, Schröder and their generation, human rights were ‘central to their political beliefs’ giving ‘political coherence, direction and legitimacy to their foreign policy objectives’ (2001: 706). Thus, Fischer contended that in the face of genocide, pacifism—however moral its basis—was simply not an acceptable response (Harnsich 2001). As he himself argued in his debates with his own party, ‘I didn’t simply learn ‘never again war’ but rather ‘never again

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Auschwitz’ (Fischer 2008: 187).3 Meanwhile Schröder, in a televised address on 24 March 1999, declared to the German people: We defend freedom, democracy and human rights. We cannot allow that only one hour away from here by air, these values are treated with contempt. (quoted in Schweiger 2004: 38)

The decision to send 4000 military personnel to participate in KFOR4 was thus momentous in the evolution of Germany’s post-unification foreign policy, representing what Wittlinger characterises as a conscious effort to move from ‘rehabilitation to emancipation’ (2010: 123). This was further underlined by Germany’s championing of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, a post-conflict strategy designed to stabilise the region through economic investment, democratisation and improved relations with the EU (Hyde-Price 2003). However, whilst the normative argument was a key part of the Red-­ Green decision to become militarily involved in the NATO campaign in Kosovo, it also reflected a more pragmatic set of calculations. Kosovo was the first major foreign crisis the new coalition government had faced. Untried and untested, it needed to prove itself domestically by dealing with the very real problem of large numbers of refugees potentially arriving in Germany as a consequence of the fighting; and internationally, by demonstrating to the US and others that it was a reliable ally and genuine strategic partner (Harnisch 2001; Wittlinger 2010). Fischer himself recalled the significance of the decision on whether to support NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: Germany was one of the most important members of the transatlantic alliance. The future of that alliance would perhaps be determined by Germany’s decision. What then? (2008: 104)

Taken together, these factors suggest Schröder and Fischer were not necessarily seeking to abandon the key tenets of four decades-worth of German foreign policy; rather, they were seeking to ‘re-tool’ it for a Germany that was finally emerging as an equal partner. Thus, in a speech in November 2001 Schröder declared: [A]fter the epochal changes since autumn 1989 Germany has regained its full sovereignty. With that it has also taken on new duties which our allies

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remind us of. We have no right to complain about that. Rather we should be pleased […] we have become equal partners in the community of nations. (Schröder 2006: 180)

However, although participation in the Kosovo campaign may have reflected a more ‘self-confident’ Germany, it had also stretched the Zivilmacht concept to ‘breaking point’ (Hyde-Price 2003: 205). Following Kosovo, Germany was in the forefront of efforts to improve and shape the EU’s crisis management capabilities, in part reflecting a desire not to be side-lined by Anglo-French efforts at leadership in this regard. Throughout the 1990s the German government had made the case for common European defence, but had faced opposition particularly from Britain which was concerned about the deleterious effect this might have on NATO (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003). However, Kosovo demonstrated all too clearly that despite huge investments in national defence, Europe’s states collectively remained unable to mount substantial military operations without the leadership or support of the US (a problem that persists to this day). A direct consequence of this was the decision to develop the ESDP (now CSDP) as the crisis management arm of the CFSP. Building on the Anglo-French St Malo Agreement, in 1999 Germany used its concurrent presidencies of the EU and Western European Union (WEU) to drive the project forward, seeing in this an opportunity to further the cause of European defence co-operation, but in a way complementary to NATO (Hyde-Price 2003). This aim was also boosted at the latter’s annual summit in Washington in the same year, where agreement was reached on ‘Berlin Plus’, paving the way for future EU use of NATO capabilities for crisis management tasks (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003). Thus, while the creation of ESDP demonstrated an increasing convergence between the formerly opposing positions held by France and Britain on European defence co-operation, it also signalled an acceptance by Germany of both the ‘utility and legitimacy of military crisis management’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffrey 2001: 706), further underlining the change taking place within German foreign and security policy. Germany’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan further demonstrated its ‘increasingly participatory approach’ and ‘greater assertiveness’ in foreign policy under the Red-­ Green coalition (Wittlinger 2010: 118). The Schröder government played a major role in consolidating the international alliance that had been created to conduct the war on terror, underlining its commitment by

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deploying 3900 Bundeswehr troops to Afghanistan, the largest combat deployment undertaken since 1945 (Hyde-Price 2003). Indeed, Foreign Minister Fischer even threatened to resign if the Bundestag failed to support the mission (Schweiger 2004: 38). Thus, while the German government maintained the position that military measures were first and foremost about deterrence, such deterrence would now also include major offensive operations, ensuring the Bundeswehr was seen as ‘an army in action’ and not merely a standing defensive force (Verteidigungsarmee) (Wagener 2006: 84). Others have been less positive about Germany’s contribution, however. Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German ambassador to both the UK and USA, has been critical of the Bundeswehr’s approach to Afghanistan noting that despite the significance of its deployments, it ‘only grudgingly and belatedly engaged in the counterinsurgency operations’ which were a key element in British and particularly American strategy (2012: 47). However, when Washington’s attention turned to Iraq, it became impossible to hide the growing split between the still avowedly multilateralist Germany, and a US that had lost faith in the ability of existing international institutions and alliance structures to support it in its prosecution of the war on terror (e.g. Overhaus 2006).5 Drawing a ‘sharp distinction’ between the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and what was being proposed in Iraq (Langenbacher and Conradt 2017: 348), Schröder did not simply refuse German participation: he made his nation’s vociferous opposition to the Iraq conflict an article of faith to such an extent that it became a key element of the 2002 German federal election campaign, one of the few times foreign policy has taken centre stage in this way (Paterson 2010b). Although Schröder’s coalition secured reelection, victory came at the expense of growing isolation within the EU.  The consequent German dependence on the Franco-German EU partnership, and Germany’s reduced ability to have a positive impact on the key debates surrounding enlargement and constitutional change (over which Fischer had been especially influential during the first Red-Green government), demonstrated the essentially tactical nature of Schröder’s stance on Iraq (Paterson 2010b). In terms of Germany’s relationship with its two largest EU partners, Iraq did result in a renewal of its partnership with France that had previously been in a serious state of decline, but the possibility for a new axis of cooperation between Berlin and London disappeared, while the UK also struggled to maintain influence (Schweiger 2004: 35). Indeed, Schweiger argues that both London and Berlin ‘failed

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to take advantage of the promising correspondences in their positions’ on the future of the EU which had been emerging, instead finding themselves pushed into ‘two opposing camps’ (2004: 35), in part as a consequence of the debilitating splits over Iraq. Ultimately Schröder’s ‘No’ to Iraq—and his willingness to create an alliance of opposition that included Paris, Moscow and Beijing—suggests not only that the ‘leadership avoidance reflex’ was no longer an appropriate descriptor, but also that the Berlin Republic had finally been ‘freed from the constraints’ of its Bonn predecessor (Wittlinger 2010: 312). However, German foreign policy emancipation came at the price of severely damaging the bilateral relationship with Washington,6 whilst Schröder’s rhetoric served to create unease amongst his European allies over German ‘unilateralism’ (Hyde-Price 2003). The policy of equidistance between the European and transatlantic alliance structures, a key element in the Bonn Republic’s foreign policy, seemed to have been ­abandoned, and with it, in the short term at least, went an important part of Germany’s ability to exercise a ‘balancing’ influence.

The Merkel Years: The Emergence of the ‘Reluctant Hegemon’? Since becoming Chancellor in 2005, Angela Merkel has led four coalition governments: the so-called Grand Coalitions of the CDU/CSU and SPD (2005–09, 2013–17 and the current government since March 2018) and the CDU/CSU-FDP government of 2009–13.7 German foreign policy throughout this period has been marked by a striking degree of activism. In the context of the EU, this can be seen in German efforts to rescue and revitalise the EU’s constitutional reform process, culminating in the agreement of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2008; in seeking to address the Eurozone crisis, although Berlin’s initial response was somewhat lacklustre; and in dealing with the refugee crisis (e.g. Wendler 2017). Unsurprisingly, it has also been a central player in the EU’s response to Britain’s imminent withdrawal following the 2016 UK referendum. Internationally, Merkel has also been at the forefront of European efforts to lead on climate change as well as deal with the crises surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme (see Chap. 8) and in the Ukraine. However, while it is possible to discern a more robust and energetic foreign policy approach during the Merkel years, a significant tension remains between German

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willingness to resort to hard power (i.e. military instruments) as part of this and the expectations placed on it by partner states that it should do so. In the need to manage this tension we can find considerable continuity between the Merkel governments and those of her post-reunification predecessors. Clearly, her governments have continued to show considerable reticence regarding international military action—most notably in Libya in 2011 and more recently in Syria in 2013. However, this has not prevented the deployment of the German military to help deal with a range of international situations with a greater frequency and intensity than previously. Indeed, Major (2017) suggests that this is one of the areas where change has been ‘most visible’ in Germany’s external action. In 2016, for ­example, Bundeswehr forces were involved in missions in Mali, Sudan, The Horn of Africa and Bosnia. Perhaps most significant, though, has been their 16-year deployment to Afghanistan where German forces have participated in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and subsequent Resolute Support missions, the latter providing training to the Afghan military (Bundeswehr 2017).8 Meanwhile, Germany has been ‘the biggest contributor to NATO’s deterrence measures in Eastern Europe’ and is one of four countries leading NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland (Major 2017). Thus, while German engagement with the world remains very strongly rooted in the ideal of Zivilmacht, and a commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ (Steinmeier 2016), these have arguably become more nuanced. As with her predecessor, the willingness of Angela Merkel and her governments to countenance the use of force demonstrates the ongoing trajectory of change since 1989 in official attitudes to the international role Germany should be willing and able to play. Alongside this has been perhaps the most challenging aspect of Germany’s evolution since 1989: its emergence and recognition as Europe’s pre-eminent power, albeit with some reluctance. Thus, in the years since 2005 we see German politicians and officials becoming more willing to accept a greater leadership role across the gamut of European policy-making. While this has been most obvious in foreign economic policy, in recent years it has also been increasingly apparent in more ‘traditional’ foreign and security policy, particularly in the context of crisis management, with the Ukraine crisis perhaps the clearest recent example of this. In a speech in February 2015 during his

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second period as Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier encapsulated the challenge thus: For a quarter of a century, we lived in the hope that peace and stability were, at long last, guaranteed in our part of the world. But it was an illusion. The question of war and peace has returned to the European continent (Steinmeier 2015).9

Central to our understanding the foreign and security policy of Merkel’s governments, therefore, is an analysis of how Germany’s leaders and foreign policy-makers have themselves sought to understand, manage and accept this change, and how crises have helped drive it. In this context, the four key topics discussed here provide important insights: the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon; the Eurozone Crisis; the Libyan and the Ukraine crises; and the evolution in official and public attitudes to the use of force. The Treaty of Lisbon A foreign policy priority of the first Merkel government was to repair the damage done by her predecessor to relations with key European partners and Washington. In this regard, she ‘made an enormous effort’ (Dempsey 2013: 9), although ‘simply not being Gerhard Schröder was enough to guarantee a positive impact’ in Washington (Paterson 2011: 63). Indeed, despite disagreements with the US over action to address climate change and regulate hedge funds, Merkel quickly established a warm personal relationship with President George W. Bush.10 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Foreign Minister from 2005–09 and again from 2013–17, suggested that German foreign policy was characterised by a ‘confident modesty’ during this time, with a sense of mission in which the focus on human rights remained central (Wittlinger 2010: 133). While this may be true, it was also characterised by the dominance of the Chancellor herself, something that was perhaps ‘unexpected’ given that it is usually the foreign minister who leads in foreign policy, at least in the early years of any coalition (Paterson 2011: 63). Merkel, though, was able to assert herself quickly in this area. In part, this reflected the difficulties she faced in driving her programme for domestic economic reform. Her consequent willingness to allow her SPD Finance Minister, Peer Steinbrück, to do ‘the heavy lifting’ here enabled her to focus instead on foreign affairs (Paterson 2011: 63). Having taken ‘a lively interest in foreign policy’ from her first day as

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Chancellor (Dempsey 2013: 3), she was helped by the fact she took office just as Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac were about to leave, and by Germany’s 2007 presidencies of the EU and G8 (Paterson 2010b). The result was that Merkel very quickly became ‘Europe’s star politician’ (Barysch 2007). Crucial to this was her successful and deft resuscitation of the apparently moribund European constitutional reform process that resulted in the Treaty of Lisbon. There is little doubt that both the actions of the German government and Merkel herself were essential to the eventual agreement. Germany’s intervention, particularly during its 2007 EU Presidency, was ‘fundamental’ (Bulmer 2010: 56); a ‘rescuing mission with German leadership’ in which Merkel played a crucial personal role (Laursen 2012: 19), in the process demonstrating ‘her formidable energy’ (Dempsey (2013: 4). The importance to Germany of achieving agreement on the new treaty should not be under-estimated. Having pressed for a mandate during the 2006 Austrian Presidency to resume negotiations during the German Presidency the following year (Bulmer 2010), it was then prioritised by Berlin, with the subsequent negotiations ‘conducted in a highly centralised manner’ from the Chancellery (Paterson 2014: 173). Indeed, an official in the Federal Foreign Ministry, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA), emphasised the importance of this, noting the involvement of key officials in the Chancellery and Merkel herself in driving the process forward: ‘it was basically our Chancellor, Mrs. Merkel, who then said, this is our chance—let’s make use of it.’11 As part of this, Merkel suggested a negotiation format based around ‘focal points’, with each government appointing two special representatives and with government leaders dealing directly with one another (Paterson 2014). The result was an ‘unusually disciplined’ negotiation in which Merkel’s own negotiating skills were ‘an important ingredient’ of success (Laursen 2012: 28). The final outcome was considered a triumph for the German government ‘and Chancellor Merkel personally’, securing her position as Europe’s ‘pre-­ eminent’ leader (Paterson 2011: 65). The importance of her personal involvement would also be seen in the response to the Ukraine crisis in 2014 (e.g. Wright, 2018) (see below). The Eurozone Crisis While Merkel’s handling of the process that produced the Treaty of Lisbon was sure-footed, her initial response to the issue that dominated her

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second and third governments, the Eurozone crisis, was far less so (although she was hardly alone in this). Thus, even as Germany has emerged as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ as a consequence of Europe’s economic and financial travails and its own economic predominance (Paterson 2011: 57; Soros 2012),12 Merkel herself has been criticised for being focused on narrow problem-solving while lacking an overall strategic ‘European vision’ (Paterson 2010b: 513; Dempsey 2013: 7).13 For Paterson (2014: 183), Merkel’s inability to set an agenda beyond saving the Euro and retaining power meant ‘extreme caution’ has predominated. Thus, even though Germany has become increasingly important within Europe and beyond, her second administration was marked at times by a sense of drift and ‘a loss of focus’ (ibid). In part, Crawford and Czuczka (2013) argue, this reflects her own natural caution. At the same time, Merkel has been careful to recognise the limitations placed on her by domestic public opinion. This has provided a powerful back-stop in terms of how she dealt with negotiations over bail-outs to struggling Eurozone countries (Paterson 2014). Thus, she worked hard to persuade her electorate and the Bundestag that providing such support should not be equated to the creation of a transfer union (Kundnani 2011). Rather, Merkel argued that Germany, as ‘Europe’s largest economy, has a particular responsibility for our continent’; equally, she has been forthright in demanding that Germany’s partners accept their share of the burden (Merkel 2010).14 Her approach has been to present these as ‘two sides of the same coin— Germany’s interests were Europe’s interests’ (Dempsey 2013: 5). However, while this may have sought to remind and reassure EU partners of Germany’s European vocation, it also showed it to be ‘more willing to impose its economic preferences’ on others (Kundnani 2011: 41). The significance and all-consuming nature of the Eurozone crisis should not be underestimated. However, the consequence of Merkel’s need (and preference) to focus on this has meant that at times other aspects of foreign policy, particularly security and defence, were neglected at a time when important strategic questions arose, not least regarding Europe’s Southern and Eastern neighbours (Dempsey 2013). Indeed, Dempsey argues that she initially showed ‘very little interest’ in security and defence policy (ibid), although these have subsequently become central issues for her governments. Notwithstanding the absence of a broader foreign policy strategy, specific foreign policy objectives were achieved: for example, one of the most important consequences of the Treaty of Lisbon was the establishment of the European External Action

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Service, an institutional development championed by Berlin. The boosting of the role of the European Council both in setting the overall strategic direction of the EU and in dealing with major diplomatic and security crises has also been a major consequence of Lisbon’s reforms. Domestically, meanwhile, there have been significant reforms to the Bundeswehr under her administrations (Dyson 2013). But the charge has been made that beyond economic concerns, the primary focus of German foreign and security policy has been to keep the country from becoming embroiled in any major military activity. High profile opposition to military interventions in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2013 were seen as providing clear evidence of this.15 Indeed, Germany’s rejection under the 2009–13 CDU/CSU-FDP coalition of the intervention in Libya was seen as having been especially damaging to the country’s reputation and ‘record as an alliance partner’ (ibid). Libya and Ukraine The German decision to oppose the NATO-led operations in Libya in 2011 was not the first occasion the Merkel government had demonstrated a willingness to pursue a policy path at odds with that of key partners or a more equivocal attitude to multilateralism. In 2010, for example, Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister from 2009–13, had called publicly for the US to remove its nuclear weapons from Germany, rather than seeking to negotiate this through NATO structures as might have been expected (Kundnani 2011). However, opposition to the Libyan intervention was particularly problematic as it placed Germany at odds with its two key European defence and security partners, Britain and France. Despite Westerwelle’s claim that the German decision was ‘understood and respected’ (2011),16 France was believed to have been ‘enormously embarrassed by Germany’s UN vote against the Libya intervention’,17 which seemed to show Germany abdicating its international responsibilities. This strengthened the already growing belief in Paris and London that their time and efforts were better spent investing in bilateral defence and security cooperation rather than expending more energy at the EU level given Germany’s continuing reluctance to commit to the development of a credible military component to the EU’s CSDP. And while German public opinion may certainly have been an important factor, the Libya decision was nonetheless strongly criticised domestically and even within the German Government. Wolfgang Ischinger

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(2012) suggested that Germany’s behaviour during the UNSC Libya vote crisis was viewed within government with embarrassment and noted that Westerwelle was criticised personally both by Merkel and his own party, as well as a number of former chancellors, foreign and defence ministers, and members of the Bundestag. Moreover, although Ischinger argues that fears that Libya demonstrated Germany was once again embarking on a ‘sonderweg’ (lit. ‘special way’) are misplaced, he has warned of the danger of the country being perceived as an unstable or unreliable ally in the future (ibid). In light of the subsequent post-conflict collapse of Libya’s state institutions and its ongoing internal turmoil, German fears over the risks involved in intervention seem largely to have been confirmed, however. In contrast to policy towards Libya, the German response to the Ukraine crisis has highlighted its centrality to European foreign policy and the leadership role it can—and is increasingly expected—to play. There were, of course, a number of crucial differences between Libya and Ukraine. The first was geographical proximity: ‘Ukraine is so much closer to Germany […] whatever happens will have an impact on Poland and Germany. There was no alternative [to German involvement].’18 Another difference, which followed on logically from the first, was the firm belief from the outset that the crisis could not be resolved by force (Forsberg 2016). Rather, Germany has encouraged and pursued a classic dual-track Zivilmacht strategy ‘involv[ing] enforcing economic sanctions while also continuing to communicate with Russia’ (House of Lords 2015: 30). The third was the systemic shock Russian action in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine has caused to the European security architecture Germany has for so long supported. Berlin was therefore left with little choice but ‘to put its rhetoric in action’ (Major 2017). Consequently, it has also been at the heart of efforts to ensure the response to Russian actions in the Ukraine has been robust, international and multilateral (Stewart 2016; Adomeit 2015), particularly since the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014. To that end, it has been ‘at the centre of a tightly-­ knit web of multilateral and international crisis management activities’ (Fix 2016: 112), primarily the EU’s CFSP, but also the OSCE, NATO and the so-called ‘Normandy Format’, an ad hoc mini-lateral process through which Germany and France have sought to press Russia and the Ukraine to resolve the crisis. Throughout, the personal involvement of the Chancellor has been key. One of her officials declared that ‘the German role in the Ukraine crisis

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has entirely only to do with the Chancellor’ and that despite their mutual antipathy, the Russian President had accepted her as his primary diplomatic interlocutor on this issue.19 Christoph Heusgen, her chief foreign policy advisor from 2006–17, noted that Merkel ‘had spent many hours speaking to President Putin about the current crisis and the ­implementation of the Minsk Protocol’, while the UK FCO emphasised that international diplomatic efforts ‘had been largely led by Chancellor Merkel’ (House of Lords 2015: 30). At the same time, her interventions have been vital in achieving and maintaining a unified position at EU level. The difficulties in doing this, particularly over an extended period of time, should not be underestimated. A number of EU states, including France and the UK, were concerned about the impact of sanctions on their own economies (Qvortrup 2017), while Cyprus, Greece and Hungary have been among those subsequently pressing for sanctions to be lifted (EurActiv 2016).20 Meanwhile others, particularly some Central and East European states, have ‘tend[ed] to be quite aggressive [over Ukraine] but they don’t have the means to be aggressive’.21 A key challenge for Merkel and her advisors has therefore been how to strike a balance between the multiple concerns—and different historical experiences of Russia—of partner states. Hans-Dieter Lucas, a former Political Director at the AA, explained in 2015 that for Germany’s response to Russia to be effective, it needed to be seen as part of a broad EU consensus and be sensitive to the concerns of other Member States to avoid any impression of German high-­ handedness (House of Lords 2015: 32). Thus, considerable importance has been placed on ensuring the response reflected the collective effort of the European Council in agreeing the sanctions regime and the determination of Chancellor Merkel ‘under no circumstances […] to be alone in this.’22 Merkel herself confirmed that agreement at the December 2017 European Council to extend sanctions by a further six months was only reached after ‘intense discussions’ (Gotev 2017). Given these challenges, it is worth noting that the strength of the EU response and particularly its sanctions regime came as a considerable surprise to President Putin (David 2016). One final point is that while Merkel has invested considerable personal time and energy in these diplomatic efforts, it is notable that she has done very little in terms of engaging broader German public opinion on security matters, preferring to leave this to AA, BMVg and even the Presidency. Following Libya and against the backdrop of the developing crisis in Ukraine and worsening relations with Russia, the fitness and capacity of

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Germany’s Foreign Ministry to deliver on its core purposes came under scrutiny in a year-long reflection process initiated by Frank-Walter Steinmeier during his second period as Foreign Minister. The resulting report—‘Review 2014—A fresh look at German Foreign Policy’ (Auswärtiges Amt 2014)23—sought to offer a roadmap for escaping a binary perception reducing foreign policy to ‘two extremes: either just talking or shooting’ (Steinmeier 2015). It highlighted how Germany needs to better use ‘the full spectrum of foreign policy instruments’ at its disposal to respond to crisis and ‘strengthen order-building capacities’ (Janning 2015); and outlined a series of reforms to structures and processes to improve the Auswärtiges Amt’s capacity to think strategically and create ‘a new culture of outward and forward thinking’ (Techau 2015) (see Chap. 6). But in a world where ‘crises will, for the foreseeable future, no longer be an exception, but increasingly the norm’ (Steinmeier 2015), it was also an attempt to articulate a bigger vision for a 21st century German foreign policy. This called for a more engaged Germany at the heart of Europe, working to strengthen multilateralism and the international rules-based order, and demonstrating its willingness ‘to shoulder responsibility worldwide’ (Auswärtiges Amt 2014: 47). This was how Germany should seek to manage its ‘elevated role on the world stage’ (Janning 2015). Germany as a Responsible Military Power The theme of ‘responsibility’ was now emerging as an increasingly central concept in German foreign and security policy. At the 2014 Munich Security Conference, three of Germany’s most high-profile politicians— President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen—all delivered a similar message: that it was time for Germany to accept a ‘new responsibility’ in foreign and security policy and that the country needed to ‘be ready to engage in international affairs earlier, more decisively, and more substantially’ (Major 2017). As part of this, Gauck made clear that a change in attitude to the use of military force as an instrument of German foreign policy was required: ‘Germany will never support any pure military solution, […] However, when the last resort—sending in the Bundeswehr—comes to be discussed, Germany should not say ‘no’ on principle.’ (Deutsche Welle 2014). Von der Leyen made a similar point, albeit more emphatically: ‘To sit and wait is not an option. If we have means, if we have capabilities, we have the obligation and we have the responsibility to engage’ (ibid.).

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These public statements represent the extent to which official attitudes to the use of force as a necessary instrument of foreign policy have changed. More importantly, they demonstrate the emergence of a more robust Germany with a changing sense of its own place in the international system: as a globally-engaged power seeking to meet ‘a self-imposed obligation to assume more responsibility internationally’ (Hanisch 2015: 1). Thus, German foreign and security policy today is focused on sustaining the rules-based international order and maintaining peace and security, particularly at the regional level. These ideas are articulated clearly in the 2016 German Defence White Paper (Weissbuch) which links them to broader, norm-based objectives, particularly the ‘ambition […] to improve the conditions of human co-existence in a sustainable manner and to protect and strengthen international human rights’ (Bundesregierung 2016: 22). Any resort to the use of military force must therefore be seen in this light: [W]e want to have stability in our neighbourhood, whether it’s in the east or in the south, so we employ the whole range of measures and instruments that we have at our disposal starting from diplomacy and ending in military means.24

Crucially, the willingness to contemplate the use of military force reflects a reassessment of how Germany should respond to the increasing threats and challenges it and its allies face. These are exemplified by Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and subsequent involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine (as discussed), and by the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.25 In an increasingly unstable and uncertain world, Germany must be prepared to play a greater and potentially more muscular international role—including ‘boost[ing] its military role on the world stage’ (Keohane 2016: 1). This was emphasised by Chancellor Merkel herself in her forward to the Weissbuch: Germany’s economic and political weight means that it is our duty to take on responsibility for Europe’s security in association with our European and transatlantic partners […] We must stand up even more for our shared values and demonstrate even greater commitment to security, peace and rules-­ based order than we have done to date. (Bundesregierung 2016: 6)

Despite promises on military spending by Defence Minister von der Leyen in 2016 and 2017, it remains to be seen whether Germany can and will deliver on these commitments, particularly meeting the NATO

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target of 2% of GDP on military spending (it currently spends around 1.2%) (Delcker 2017). However, strong support for the development of EU military co-operation through PESCO does indicate a willingness to do more to address the issue of capabilities in harness with partners and allies. However, while official attitudes largely accept the need for Germany to adopt a more robust outlook in a less certain international environment, public support is less clear. While there has been a definite change, particularly since the Paris attacks, domestic opinion remains complex and contested. For example, although Gen. Harald Jujat, a former Bundeswehr Chief of Staff, described German participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan as ‘the most important experience for the German armed forces’ (Alessi 2013), there was considerable public unease over this deployment, particularly when it seemed that what had begun as a stabilisation mission might instead be turning into a counter-insurgency operation or even a war, with opposition rising from 34% in 2008 to 55% in 2013 (Bundeswehr 2013; see also Kundnani 2011). At the same time, though, broader public attitudes towards and trust in the German military remained positive—or at least indicated ‘cordial indifference’ (Fiebig 2013: 93).26 In contrast, the decision to deploy German forces to Mali in 2016 to replace a Dutch contingent as part of the UN mission received little public attention. Public opinion towards NATO, the transatlantic alliance and collective defence is similarly complex. Two polls conducted in 2017 offered apparently contradictory results: while a Pew Research Survey found only 40% of Germans in favour of military support for a NATO partner attacked by Russia specifically (Stokes 2017), another suggested 73% would back action to defend partners attacked by an unnamed aggressor while both showed a majority of Germans still support remaining in NATO (Morgan 2017). Finally, when it comes to levels of defence spending—and particularly meeting the NATO 2% target—51% of the public felt that Germany should neither increase nor decrease its current levels, while 88% thought the country should prioritise European over transatlantic defence and security cooperation (Körber Stiftung 2017). In part this reflects increasingly negative attitudes towards the Trump Administration, but also longer-­term support for European and EU-level security co-operation. Given Germany’s difficult history, such equivocation in the public’s attitude towards a more active foreign and security policy—and particularly the use of the military—is unsurprising. (Franke (2017) characterised

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it as ‘jein’: a mix of ‘ja’ (yes) and ‘nein’ (no)). To be clear, tight constraints on the use of military force will continue to be imposed through the German constitution and the Bundestag, with military missions enacted within the context of international law and multilateral organisations, particularly the UN and NATO. Moreover, Germany is very far from abandoning its Zivilmacht approach to international engagement and will continue to prioritise the use of economic and soft power instruments. However, it is testimony to how far attitudes have evolved in Germany that discussions around the use of military force are considerably less controversial than before. Indeed, Karl-Heinz Kamp, President of Germany’s Federal Academy for Security Policy, suggests that the German public has accepted that the more uncertain and unstable international environment has necessitated greater military spending, even if ‘no-one really likes this’ (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik 2016).

Conclusion This chapter has explored the evolution of German foreign and security policy since the watershed events of 1989–90. In doing so it has argued that nearly thirty years on from reunification, a commitment to Zivilmacht and its ongoing multilateral vocation remain central to its international engagement. At the same time, Germany’s foreign policy and its conception of itself as an international actor have changed considerably. While the brief examination offered here demonstrates the considerable continuity throughout this period, it nonetheless highlights the importance of the generational change in leadership marked by Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship; and particularly the continuity between his governments and those of his successor, Angela Merkel, in terms of their willingness to pursue Germany’s national interests more overtly and explicitly than previously. Consequently, today’s Germany enjoys a more robust international profile and is willing to publicly challenge partners to an extent not seen previously. This has been demonstrated by its assertive stances on the Eurozone, its opposition to military action in Libya, and its leadership of the international response to Russian action in the Ukraine. While this does not necessarily mean, as Kundnani has argued, that Germany’s reflexive multilateralism should therefore be seen as more ‘contingent’ (2011: 35), it does indicate the emergence of a more ‘normal’ foreign policy, akin to those of partners like the UK and France. However this normality does not mean the abandonment of the normative

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foundations of Germany’s post-war engagement with the world, captured in the principles of ‘never alone, never again, never again concentration camps’. Rather, we see these finding official expression through the idea of an activist German policy built around obligation and responsibility—a continuation of the same ‘healthy modification of Germany’s […] traditional foreign policy identity’ Maull described in the context of Kosovo (2000: 2). Indeed, in this regard it is worth noting that a Gallup Poll found that in 2017 it had replaced the US ‘as the top-rated global power’ in terms of soft power (although this also reflects the significant drop in the US’s reputation under President Trump) (Ray 2018). Thus, if Germany has emerged as Europe’s ‘reluctant hegemon’ as a result of its economic power, the way it manages its increasing centrality to European foreign and security policy suggests a determination also to behave and present itself as a ‘responsible hegemon’. The inevitable tensions between normative principles and the realities of international politics mean that Germany will continue to be a ‘complicated’ partner (Ischinger 2012: 57). How this complexity manifests itself in terms of its policy-making for, and involvement and engagement in, the CFSP is discussed next.

Notes 1. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). Interviewee’s emphasis. 2. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2). 3. ‘Ich habe nicht nur ‘Nie wieder Krieg’ gelernt, sondern auch ‘Nie wieder Auschwitz’ (2008: 187). 4. KFOR—Kosovo Force, the NATO-led peace-keeping force dispatched to Kosovo in June 1999. 5. Overhaus argues that the Iraq War served to highlight a deeper structural crisis within transatlantic relations, caused by an end to what he terms the ‘benign American hegemony’ which underpinned post-1945 multilateralism. This manifested itself principally in an unwillingness on the part of the Americans to allow their European partners a greater say over policy-making, which was itself a consequence of a repeated European inability to provide political and military leadership when the situation has required (2006). See also: Valasek, T. (ed.) (2012) All Alone? What US Retrenchment Means for Europe and NATO (London: Centre for European Reform). 6. Fischer recalls an angry editorial in the New York Post christening him and then French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin ‘the axis of weasels’ (2012: 216).

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7. Following the September 2017 Bundestag elections, Mrs. Merkel led a caretaker administration until a new coalition agreement was signed between the CDU, CSU and SPD in March 2018. 8. The ISAF mission ended in December 2014 and was succeeded by the Resolute Support mission from 1 January 2015. The Bundestag voted in December 2017 to extend German involvement in Resolute Support by an additional 3 months while talks in Berlin continued over the formation of a new government. 9. These comments are similar to the view expressed by one senior British FCO official that after 25 years they are having ‘to learn how to do geopolitics again’. FCO Internal Seminar, January 2015. 10. Merkel hosted the President and his wife to a ‘folksy summer barbeque’ at a village in her home state in the former East Germany, and Bush later described Merkel in his memoirs as ‘trustworthy, engaging, and warm’ and ‘one of my closest friends on the world stage’ (Crawford and Czuczka 2013: 104–5). 11. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6). Paterson (2011) notes that she was supported in this by her appointment of Christoph Heusgen, the former Chief of Staff to the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, as her chief foreign policy advisor. 12. Soros declared that ‘As the strongest creditor country, Germany is emerging as the hegemon’. 13. Dempsey suggests that this lack of vision is not restricted to Europe, but also extends to Germany’s relationship with the US (2013: 9). 14. Merkel’s willingness to be assertive in this regard led to accusations that Germany—and she in particular—applied ‘nasty pressure’ to other Member States, including Ireland and Hungary, in order to postpone debate on regulations intended to further reduce car emissions (EurActiv 2013). Germany was reported to have raised the prospect of risks to future bailout funds for Ireland and the closure of car plants in Hungary unless they supported its wishes, leading one anonymous EU source to describe its behaviour as ‘rogue’ (ibid). 15. In refusing to participate in any military action in Syria, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle made clear that German ‘participation has not been requested, nor are we considering it’ (Werkhäuser 2013). Germany was joined in this by the UK. However in the UK’s case it was because Prime Minister David Cameron, who had advocated British participation in a US-led intervention, was defeated by a vote in the House of Commons. 16. In a statement to the Bundestag on 18 March 2011, Westerwelle stated: ‘During the last few days, we’ve talked over and weighed up the potential benefits and the risks of a military operation in Libya […] We respect and understand those partners in the [UNSC], in the [EU] and in the Arab

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League […] However, in view of the considerable foreign policy and military risks involved, the German Government came to a different conclusion […] That’s why we were unable to agree on this part of the Resolution […] Our partners indicated […] that they understood and respected our decision. Germany’s international commitment is appreciated’ (Westerwelle 2011). 17. Interview, Ministry of Defence, UK, London, 2012. 18. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017 19. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017. 20. It should be noted that the impact of sanctions on the German economy has also been considerable. For example, in 2016 they were estimated to have cost the German pharmaceutical sector alone €2.1 billion with other sectors such as car manufacturers also significantly affected. 21. Interview, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Brussels, 2016. 22. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2017. 23. German title: ‘Review 2014—Außenpolitik Weiter Denken’. 24. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, February 2017. 25. Following these attacks, France invoked the Treaty of the European Union’s mutual defence clause, Article 42.7, the first time this had happened. The clause states: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter’. 26. Former German President Horst Köhler coined the term ‘freundliches Desinteresse’ (cordial indifference’ in 2007 to describe the German public’s attitude towards its armed forces and their service overseas (Fiebig 2013: 93).

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Rummel, R. (1996) ‘Germany’s Role in the CFSP—“Normalität” or “Sonderweg”’. In Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London and New York: Routledge). Schröder, G. (2006) Entscheidungen  – Mein Leben in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe Verlag). Schweiger, C. (2004) ‘British-German Relations in the European Union after the War on Iraq’. German Politics, 13(1), pp. 35–55. Soros, G. (2012) The Tragedy of the European Union, 10 September. Available at: http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/the_tragedy_of_ the_european_union/. (Accessed: 8 September 2013). Stewart, S. (2016) ‘The Future of the Minsk Agreements’. SWP Comments 14 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Stokes, B. (2017) NATO’s Image Improves on Both Sides of Atlantic. Pew Research Center, 23 May. Techau, J.  (2015) ‘The Steinmeier Review of German Foreign Policy’. Judy Dempsey’s Straetgic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 19 March. Available at: http:// carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59422. Tewes, H. (2001) Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Wagener, M. (2006) ‘Normalization in Security Policy? Deployments of Bundeswehr Forces Abroad in the Era Schröder’. In Maull, H.W. (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Wendler, F. (2017) ‘Recalibrating Germany’s Role in Europe: Framing Leadership as Responsibility’. German Politics, 26(4), pp. 574–590. Werkhäuser, N. (2013) ‘Germany Won’t Participate in Syria strike’. Deutsche Welle, 31 August. Available at: http://www.dw.com/en/germany-wont-participatein-syria-strike/a-17057769. Wittlinger, R. (2010) German National Identity in the Twenty-First Century—A Different Republic After All? (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Wright, N. (2018) ‘No Longer the Elephant Outside the Room: Why the Ukraine Crisis Reflects a Deeper Shift Towards German Leadership of European Foreign Policy’. German Politics, pp. 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.201 8.1458094.

Bibliography—Official Documents Auswärtiges Amt (2014a) Review 2014—Außenpolitik Weiter Denken (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (2016) German Security Policy—Silent Acceptance of the Necessary, 19 October (Berlin: Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik). Available at: https://www.baks.bund.de/de/node/890.

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Bundesregierung (2016) Weissbuch: Zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Bundeswehr (2013) Umfrage: Gute Werte für die Bundeswehr, 14 January (Berlin: Bundeswehr). Available at: http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/ bwde/!ut/p/c4/NYs9D4JAEET_0S0XTAh2Egq1pBFozAEb3HgfZ F28hh_vXeFM8po3AyOkevOl1QgFbyz0MMx0nqKa4oLKvGVHa_ GjIpIg41Ne6NDDIx_TYA4eJVPQCyWubCSw2gKLzWZnTkbRAkOh20ZX xT_6qMv-Wt1Pddnemg425y4_WMwF4Q!!/. Bundeswehr (2017) Afghanistan: Resolute Support und ISAF, 6 December (Berlin: Bundeswehr). Available at: https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/ bwde/start/einsaetze/afghanistan/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnM z0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTANcLQwcQ02cLELcvIwMXMz1wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxmhFiqB-sH6UflZVYllihV5BfVJKTWq KXmAxyoX5kRmJeSk5qQH6yI0SgIDei3KDcUREAAiL46A!!/dz/d5/ L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/. House of Lords (2015) European Union Committee—6th Report of Session 2014–15—The EU and Russia: Before and Beyond the Crisis in Ukraine (London: The Houses of Parliament). Merkel, A. (2010) Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Opening Ceremony of the 61st Academic Year of the College of Europe in Bruges on 2 November 2010. (Berlin: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government). Steinmeier, F-W. (2015) Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the Closing Event of ‘Review 2014—A Fresh Look at German Foreign Policy’ (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt), 15 February. Steinmeier, F-W. (2016) Breaches and Bridges—German Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt), 27 June. Westerwelle, G. (2011) Policy Statement by Federal Minister Westerwelle in the German Bundestag on Current Developments in Libya (UN Resolution)—18 March 2011 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt).

CHAPTER 6

Institutional Structures and Processes: German Foreign Policy-Making and the CFSP

Introduction This chapter considers the mechanisms by which Germany makes foreign policy in the context of the CFSP. As with Chap. 3, it focuses on political leadership and strategic management, institutional structures and processes. It discusses the roles of, and relationships between key institutional actors, particularly the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry, in setting and executing German foreign policy, a process made more complex by the requirements of coalition government and the need to involve a wide range of stakeholders, particularly from economic ministries. It goes on to examine the challenges within the German system of achieving effective co-ordination for the positions pursued in Brussels, the efforts to improve this, and the impact the involvement of a greater number of stakeholders has had on the position and influence of the Foreign Ministry within this process.

Political Leadership and Strategic Management Day-to-day management of German foreign policy is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister and the Federal Foreign Ministry, the Auswärtiges Amt (AA). However, as in Britain where the Prime Minister predominates as head of government, in Germany the overall strategic direction of foreign policy rests with the Chancellor (Bundeskanzler/in) through the © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_6

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principle of Richtlinienkompetenz or ‘overall coordination and guidance’, as set out in Article 65 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government 2012). The nature of Germany’s proportional electoral system, meanwhile, means that coalition governments are the norm, with the long-standing convention that the junior coalition partner takes the Foreign Ministry. This makes the relationship between Chancellor and Foreign Minister, a key element of any government, of particular interest as their membership (and frequently leadership) of separate parties would seem to add additional complexity to the political management of foreign policy. The relationship is further complicated by the fact that the Foreign Minister leads a large, permanent bureaucracy while a new Chancellor upon taking office will need to reconstruct their foreign policy staff within the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt). This means that historically the Foreign Minister has frequently dominated foreign policy, at least during the early years of a coalition (Paterson 2011: 63). This can be seen, for example, in the influence exercised by Joschka Fischer during the first SPD-Green coalition, although this subsequently tailed off during the second. The exception to this, however, has been Angela Merkel, as discussed in Chap. 5 (ibid.). One of the characteristics of post-war German foreign policy has been the relative longevity in office of its foreign ministers, leading to a strong level of continuity and political stability. For example, Frank-Walther Steinmeier (SPD) held the post in both of Angela Merkel’s CDU-led Grand Coalitions (2005–09 and 2013–17); Joschka Fischer (Green) from 1998–2005 under Gerhard Schröder; and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) was Germany’s longest-serving post-war Foreign Minister, in office from 1974–92 in both SPD and CDU-led coalitions.1 Consequently, how the relationship between Chancellor and Foreign Minister works depends on the degree of interest taken by the former in foreign policy and particularly EU-related issues. For example, Helmut Schmidt (Chancellor 1974–82) was particularly concerned with European Monetary Policy, but far less so with institutional issues and so left those to Hans-Dietrich Genscher.2 Similarly, Schröder (Chancellor 1998–2005) left institutional matters to Fischer (Bulmer and Paterson 2010). By contrast, Helmut Kohl (Chancellor 1982–97) was completely dominant ‘in defining what Germany should do in Europe’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffrey 2001: 697). To some extent, Chancellor Merkel has been able to emulate her predecessor and mentor in this regard, exercising considerable dominance over German policy towards Europe. Indeed, the significance of the

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Eurozone crisis has seen the Foreign Ministry lose influence over broader European policy in favour of the Finance Ministry and the centralisation of European policy-­making within Merkel’s Chancellery (Paterson 2014). Techau (2015) argues that Steinmeier’s ‘Review 2014’ process was thus at least in part an attempt to ‘regain some of the influence’ the AA had lost to the Chancellery. This highlights the extent to which Chancellors are now interested in the ‘high politics’ aspects of foreign policy—not least the continuous high-level summitry that is a hallmark of modern international relations and which some suggest has come ‘at the expense of both the professional diplomatic corps and the foreign ministers’ (Dunn 2004: 143).3 As noted, this has partly been driven by the regular European Council meetings, along with frequent G8 and NATO summits, which together have ensured that Chancellors (and their prime ministerial and presidential peers) are seen to be taking the ‘history-making’ decisions. It also demonstrates how Chancellors—like most heads of government—will usually grow into the international aspects of their role as their administration progresses and they understand better the most important issues and relationships that impact on the state. For example, Fischer was considered far less influential in the second SPD/Green Coalition (2002–05) largely because Chancellor Schröder had by then ‘learned the ropes’ and deliberately taken charge of key relationships with Paris, Washington, Moscow, etc. (Grant 2005: 3). How successful he was in managing and developing these is another question. For example, his unsuccessful efforts with President Chirac of France to have the EU arms embargo on China lifted succeeded in creating anger across the US political divide, leaving the impression that ‘commerce not principle’ was driving EU foreign policy (ibid), and further undermining his position in Washington. By contrast, and as noted, upon taking office Angela Merkel was immediately thrust into the centre of German foreign policy with the Presidencies of the European Council and G8, although this seemed to suit her. One AA official declared that she ‘loves dealing with international affairs […] she loves dealings and wheelings (sic) […] she knows she’s good at it. She gets good marks in the press for that and where does that leave the Foreign Minister?’4 Beyond this central ministerial relationship there have been two other elements to the relative continuity and stability within German foreign policy since reunification. The first has been a significant degree of cross-­ party consensus in favour of European integration and the CFSP on the

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one hand (e.g. Derlien 2000), and a transatlantic security relationship based around NATO on the other. For example, Merkel declared in 2009 that NATO ‘is and will continue to be the crucial corner-stone of our collective defence’ (Merkel 2009) while the Weissbuch characterises it as ‘an indispensable guarantor of German, European and transatlantic security’ (Bundesregierung 2016: 64). The second has been the generally pro-­ integration attitude of the public which Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1064) describe as a ‘permissive consensus’, although they also acknowledge how much more fragile this has become in recent years. And even if the German ‘love affair’ with Europe may be waning among the citizenry, an elite consensus, particularly among politicians and officials, remains broadly supportive of integration in general and the CFSP and NATO specifically as the key components of Germany’s foreign policy.5 This is reflected in how the wider political goals of German foreign policy are set out, for example in official government documents and discourse, as well as in the comments of the officials involved. One stated that: German foreign policy is based on a large, domestic consensus on the EU politically, [creating] a very high degree of continuity and predictability if governments change. German foreign policy is always defined through Europe.6

The centrality of Europe to German foreign policy is explicit in official discourse. The AA declares that Europe ‘is the foundation of Germany’s foreign policy’ (AA 2012), while the Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) (BMVg) 2006 Weissbuch declared that Germany’s concept of security is ‘comprehensive […] forward-­ looking and multilateral’ with its political goal being to ‘strengthen the [EU] as the core area of European security’ (BMVg 2006: 6, 33). Similarly, the Defence Policy Guidelines of May 2011 declare that the UN, NATO and the EU together form the ‘international framework of our security and defence policy’ (BMVg 2011: 5) and the 2016 Weissbuch emphasises how Germany ‘embraces mutual interdependence in the domain of security’ (2016: 23). Finally, the Review 2014 documents describes European integration as ‘the foundation of all German foreign policy’ (AA 2014: 11). In describing the different elements of German foreign policy, one AA official located them clearly within its European and international commitments, using the analogy of concentric circles. Thus, a first EU/CFSP

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circle sits inside a second, wider NATO circle inside a third representing other multilateral institutions including the UN and the Security Council. This he sought to contrast with the efforts by the French and British to compartmentalise and separate their different commitments, particularly to the UN Security Council and the EU.7 For some, though, grandiloquent sentiments regarding German multilateralism need to be contrasted with the resources it is willing to commit in support of its goals. Thus, Wolfgang Ischinger was critical of the ‘modest’ level of ambition expressed in the Defence Policy Guidelines and the general lack of attention he felt the government and officials pay to military issues (2012: 47). Meanwhile, the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, who replaced Frank-Walther Steinmeier as German Foreign Minister in the Grand Coalition in 2017, expressed scepticism over commitments made by Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen to meet the NATO defence spending target of 2%, declaring ‘I don’t know where this money should come from’ (Saeed 2017).8

Structures and Processes Policy Coordination Domestically, the Chancellery, AA and BMVg form the core network of ministries involved with foreign policy and particularly the CFSP and CSDP. In recent years efforts have also been made to improve the ability of the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Economic Cooperation and Development to make inputs into the policy process. Reflecting the growing ‘nexus’ between security and development, this implies recognition in Berlin that improved coordination is required, even if in practice there still remains ‘less of a need’ for this in foreign and security policy because fewer ministries are usually involved.9 At the same time, the Finance Ministry has become an increasingly important interlocutor given the on-going ‘resources crunch’ and the centrality of funding to foreign policy, reflecting a constant effort ‘to improve things’.10 Prior to the CFSP, such coordination structures barely existed between the different German ministries whereas today, ‘even if it looks slow from the outside’,11 structures within the AA, BMVg, as well as the Interior and Justice ministries have been changed. An example of this has been the increased ‘need for lawyers and judges for legal missions’ internationally.12 More striking, as noted above, has been the increasing centralisation of decision-making over foreign policy—particularly foreign economic

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policy—within the Chancellery (Paterson 2014). Not only does this reflect the significance attached by the current Chancellor to resolving the Eurozone crisis, but more broadly it suggests that Derlien’s thesis of Germany ‘failing successfully’ in terms of European policy coordination is no longer appropriate (if, indeed, it ever was). As shown in Chap. 5, Chancellor Merkel’s determination to rescue the constitutional treaty process as well as the ongoing need for action to stabilise the Eurozone has resulted in the emergence of a new, central co-ordination machinery better able to support these aims. However, better coordination and communication between the AA and other ministries was identified as a key objective by the Review 2014 report (AA 2014), highlighting a desire on the part of Steinmeier, as Foreign Minister, to wrest back some of the influence over foreign policy making the AA has lost to the centre in recent years (Techau 2015). Policy-Making—Berlin Within the AA, responsibility for EU policy is divided between two Directorates-General. The European Directorate-General is ‘responsible for devising, shaping and coordinating the German Government’s policy on Europe’ with effective coordination key to ensuring that policy is ‘reliable and predictable’ (AA 2017a). The Review 2014 highlighted the need for it to play a greater ‘conceptual role’ in foreign policy-making while in a development not dissimilar to the ‘mainstreaming’ approach in the FCO (see Chap. 4), other departments would appoint an ‘EU charge d’affaires’ to assess the impact of new initiatives on EU-related foreign policy (Janning 2015). Meanwhile, the Political Directorate-General 2 is responsible for analysing, planning, shaping and coordinating German foreign policy within the EU and more broadly, with a particular focus on European and transatlantic security (AA 2017b). It is from here that German policymaking for the CFSP is managed and directed, with close coordination with the BMVg on CSDP questions, for example around capabilities or the European Defence Fund.13 In 2015, a new Directorate-­General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction was also established following the Review 2014 (AA 2017c) with the aim of providing the ministry with more ‘bespoke’ crisis response capacities (AA 2014: 44). Within the Chancellery, oversight of EU foreign policy takes place within Department 2, Foreign, Security and Development Policy (Abteilung 2— Auβen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik), and Department 5, European

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Policy (Abteilung 5—Europapolitik) (Bundesregierung 2014). Foreign policy specialists in these departments are generally seconded from the AA for a finite time period, with the official likely to have an interest in ensuring a smooth relationship between the two ministries as he/she usually returns once the secondment is completed. For example, one recent head of Department 2 previously served as the German European Correspondent.14 While the AA is significantly larger in terms of the resources and numbers of officials it dedicates to the CFSP (and foreign policy in general), the relationship with the Chancellery is not as asymmetric as might first appear. The latter is still able to deploy significant influence, particularly at the highest echelons of government as noted previously, although often the Chancellor will need to make strategic choices regarding the issues to prioritise, such as Iran or Ukraine or policy towards China.15 The relationship between the two is perhaps best characterised as both cooperative and competitive: [T]he Chancellery has a tiny apparatus, but they do have people concerned with foreign policy. […] There is a certain competition. The Chancellor meeting with Medvedev or Putin or, say, Obama, obviously that’s a different level with which we cannot compete. But we prepare all the paperwork for the Chancellor’s office. What they make of it, we don’t see. They usually shorten it and make terrible speaking notes or something like that out of it, but the political line should be the same. And of course there’s much (sic) interaction. We telephone when we have a new idea about something, or when we do a change of direction we ask them. And of course also on their level you have telephone conferences with Paris and London: Downing Street and not the FCO; and Elysee and not the Quai d’Orsay.16

The focus for the Chancellery should thus be on strategic issues and direction rather than more detailed policy: Policy formulation honestly is a matter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs […] Obviously we have to harmonise our views, particularly with the Chancellery. But again the Chancellery, in spite of what is said sometimes, doesn’t have the capacity, I mean the work capacity and the filtering capacity, of really looking into the details of foreign policy […] What they do and what the Chancellor herself does is to pick certain important strategic points and issues, and to decide on their direction […] I would say, to a certain extent the Iran dossier is one […] and perhaps policy towards Russia and certain aspects of our policy towards China.17

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That said, to ensure the Chancellery is always aware of issues under discussion, they will normally be ‘invite[d] from the beginning’ whether or not a formal guideline is required.18 The Chancellery may also become involved if an issue agreed at the highest political level, for example with another head of state or government, subsequently reappears as a problem at the working group or Council level.19 However, there remains the possibility of tensions between the Chancellery and AA on substantive issues of policy which can be exacerbated by the different outlooks the two may have. For example, on the issue of policy towards Iran (see Chap. 8), one senior EEAS diplomat noted a ‘split’, with the AA taking a far broader or flexible perspective: This is not surprising because the psychological thing is if you work in a foreign ministry and you know that you have to cooperate with other countries on many things, you cannot isolate one thing. You are always inclined to be more cooperative than if you are in the Chancellery and you don’t have so many foreign policy issues and most of the cooperation is on economic issues or other things.20

Policy-Making—Brussels Like Britain, the AA officials central to policy-making are the Political Director, who is the overall head of PDG2 as well as being the chief advisor to the Foreign Minister, and the European Correspondent who is the ‘accessory’ to the Political Director.21 The Correspondent directs work on the CFSP in Berlin and Brussels, and is the focal point for coordination within the broader national foreign policy structures dealing with CFSP. As such, he/she passes CFSP-related instructions to Germany’s Permanent Representation in Brussels, including to the PSC Ambassador, and prepares for the Foreign Affairs Council,22 underscoring Derlien’s argument that since Maastricht the AA has been ‘substantively in charge of’ German inputs into the CFSP (2000: 70). Within the AA, the division of labour is clearly expressed, with the staff in the Permanent Representation the negotiators, while Berlin determines the parameters of what they can negotiate, including where any ‘red lines’ may be.23 However, during the 2008 German Presidency this separation was relaxed somewhat, with Berlin providing framework instructions but leaving it up to the officials in Brussels to work out the details. Normally, however, they are given ‘a line to take, points to make and background’, although some Brussels-based officials see the boundary as less clear-cut.24

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For the PSC, as the key CFSP arena in Brussels, a formalised, routinised process of agreeing and communicating instructions exists. The guiding principle for policy-making in Berlin is to always have a position on any given issue, thus emulating both Britain and France. As one official puts it ‘with our economic connections to all corners of the world, we are always concerned’, and this they try to reflect in the instructions transmitted to Brussels.25 With the PSC meeting twice per week, this requires instructions to have been agreed in the capital among the relevant ministries, signed off by the Political Director and then transmitted the night before a meeting.26 Following each PSC session, a report is then received in Berlin usually by midnight the same day. This gives feedback on how particular German positions were received by partner states and the direction of travel in the discussions, and is made available to all those in Berlin responsible for formulating the original instructions.27 If the matter relates to a CSDP crisis management mission, instructions must also be agreed with the BMVg first, as well as the Ministry of Finance if there are cost implications, and more widely as required. In such situations, the policy lead is usually taken by the relevant desk or regional officer, with the CSDP unit in the AA providing technical details. Once a formal request has been made by the PSC for a crisis management concept, following a recommendation from a particular PSC working group, the domestic lead in Berlin then transfers from the desk/regional officer to the CSDP unit who advise accordingly. In the view of an AA official involved in CSDP policy-making, the processes at EU level are far more dynamic than their equivalents in NATO which are much more formalised. In his view, this reflected the ‘much more advanced’ relationships at work between EU member states.28 The PSC Ambassador is central to this process. While the Permanent Representative has an important formal role to play given the  overall responsibility of COREPER II for preparing Foreign Affairs Council meetings, the increasing pressure of time and weight of business to be transacted mean that the majority of foreign policy matters are dealt with at the level of the PSC and for the most part simply nodded through by COREPER II. Indeed, one official noted that the Permanent Representative and the PSC Ambassador may not meet in person for a week or more if their respective schedules are particularly hectic, so ‘a certain trust and confidence’ between the two are essential.29 The PSC Ambassador is supported in his/her work by a team of around 30 officials, including 4 military advisors from the BVMg and officials

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from the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.30 From the vantage point of Brussels, it is possible to see where divisions and disputes have arisen in Berlin, and so s/he can intervene ‘by describing the situation that we’re in, the needs that we have in order to push forward a point’, etc.31 To facilitate this there is a weekly video conference with Berlin and additionally a weekly telephone conference with officials from the BMVg has recently been introduced.32 This is intended to ensure key points and messages from Brussels are not lost in the sometimes lengthy written reports through which much of the policy-making is carried out, and enables those involved to ‘get to the nitty-gritty’.33 One PermRep official highlighted the challenge posed when his Berlin colleagues lack flexibility, describing how he jokingly told them they were ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘not allow[ing] me to play with what other member states suggest or what the EEAS suggests.’34 The advantage of video and telephone conferences is that such messages do not have to be conveyed in writing. While the process of instructing the PSC is ‘very strictly formalised’, at the level of working groups it is less so, with individual country/thematic desks working more directly on their respective dossiers with their PermRep colleagues. These in turn provide Berlin with feedback in a permanent and continuous reporting procedure, and a change in policy can be recommended if and when necessary.35 Being informed about and able to comment on papers that come from other states is a crucial aspect of this, with a speedy response time therefore being essential: ‘We will always read a paper and give instructions […] whenever it comes in—even if it is 7pm the evening before’.36 An example of the close working relationships between Berlin and Brussels is the AA’s Africa division which feeds the relevant CFSP working groups with instructions as required. This means that officials in Berlin are able to establish ‘close and direct links’ to their colleagues in Brussels, with ‘immediate desk-to-desk communication, or even session-to-desk communication’.37 At the same time, where officials report regularly, there is an expectation that instructions will be ‘along those lines’ suggested by PermRep officials, while PermRep desk officers are encouraged to communicate with Berlin as soon as they have an agenda for a meeting in order to ‘impress our ideas’ on the consequent instructions.38 Despite the injunction that Berlin has an agreed position on everything, however, there are occasions when the system does not always function effectively. One PermRep official involved in CSDP policy-making complained of many occasions when he had none for his particular working group and therefore ‘had to go [his] own way’.39

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Finally, where an issue or region requires it, a dedicated task force can be created to support inter-ministry policy-making and coordination, although one senior official noted that creating such a group is ‘reasonably rare’.40 For example, in August 2012 Task Force Syria was established by the AA to coordinate all measures being taken across the government in relation to the Syrian crisis (AA 2012). A similar task force was created to coordinate policy towards Sudan prior to the country’s division in 2011, in particular to enable more effective participation by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development which had been somewhat laggard in contributing up to that point.41 The creation of the Sudan Task Force went some way to resolving this, in turn removing the need to formally involve the Chancellery and thereby providing ‘a polite and face-­ saving’ way forward.42 It also indicates a desire on the part of the AA to maintain its central role in coordinating CFSP inputs and avoid involving the Chancellery as far as possible. The domestic coordination of policy-making and agreeing of instructions can be onerous and places considerable demands on all national systems, and Berlin is no exception. One official felt that the process had become more complicated, particularly since the establishment of the PSC in 2001, although he noted that complexity ‘has always been there’. However, as he went on to explain, the key point is that the whole system is geared to one, clear purpose: There is just one official position […] This is, I think, the answer that our system gives to all this complexity […] the strength of it only becomes evident when you think about the complexity and the very many different layers involved. The good thing about the instruction is if, on the basis of that, you decide something, then nobody at home can complain anymore. They’ve all agreed to it.43

Consequently, the Permanent Representation plays a central role in how Germany coordinates and pursues policy in Brussels. As Kassim and Peters (2001: 298) have argued, governments in general will respond to initiatives in Brussels in the context of what is negotiable; the role of the Permanent Representation is therefore to make sure domestic ministries understand what is realistic in this context. In the German system, which is characterised by more autonomous line ministries than in Britain, for example, and both horizontal and vertical fragmentation within the administrative system more broadly, the PermRep’s role in the formation of policy becomes even more important (ibid: 334).

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For example, the PermRep can be in a position to identify the stakeholders in a particular issue that may not yet be recognised as such in Berlin.44 An illustration is the greater focus on internal security since Lisbon, which included the creation of the Committee of Internal Security (COSI), a new standing committee to be the equivalent for the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security of the PSC for CFSP.45 The increasing linkage between internal and external security has meant that ahead of their Berlin colleagues, PermRep officials can find themselves discussing security matters internally with their Interior Ministry colleagues with a view, for example, to future policing missions that would be decided initially within the PSC.46 Close cooperation with officials seconded to the PermRep from other ministries is also important. For example, discussions with BMVg officials working in Brussels can identify issues that may not have been raised between the two ministries in Berlin, and the AA can then be quietly made aware of the need to coordinate better domestically before issuing instructions.47 Finally, the PermRep has the advantage of being able to bring together officials within a ‘PSC team’ with operational, financial, legal and regional expertise who are able to work together to develop policy comprehensively and ‘in a sound way’.48 Interactions with Other Member States The policy-making process is also underpinned by the interaction between the member states. There are frequent formal and informal contacts between the national capitals at foreign, defence and chancellery level, and particularly between Germany, Britain and France.49 For example, a Franco-German Security Policy Council meets twice a year at ministerial and political director level and a Security Policy Directors meeting ­involving all three states meets 1–2 times per year.50 More generally, as well as the regular Gymnich sessions and meetings on the fringes at the UN each September,51 within the AA it is considered ‘a necessity’ for the European Correspondent to speak regularly to French and British colleagues.52 The establishment of these personal relationships can prove very important, enabling the Correspondent to ‘just pick up the phone’ if confronting difficulties on a particular issue.53 Consultation also takes place using ‘non-papers’. This technique is commonly employed within German administrations to float policy ideas or place issues on the agenda while circumventing strict rules on legislative scrutiny. There is a legal requirement on all ministries to inform the

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Bundestag about any official papers or opinions, including the agreement of agendas for the EU Foreign Affairs Council,54 and as such it is a time-­ consuming process that also makes it harder to have policy discussions before arriving at a formal position.55 Instead, therefore, the AA will produce a non-paper on an issue it wishes to discuss before circulating this domestically or among partner states to gauge opinion or move the policy discussion forward. Indeed, one Swedish diplomat recalled having received a number of non-papers from German officials on a range of issues within her working group.56 The network of contacts established by PermRep officials is also a vital source of informal interaction, information gathering, testing of ideas etc. One official emphasised the importance of this ‘informal track’ to decision-­ making, noting that ‘the more people you talk with the better, in all directions—other member states, inside the PermRep, with capitals, also with other ministries’.57 For example, within the RELEX working group, responsible for drafting the legal instruments for sanctions once the PSC has taken the political decision, formal meetings can take place regularly—in the case of Iran they were held five days a week at times—and are supplemented by frequent telephone and email contacts.58 The officials involved thus get to know and understand each other’s positions extremely well—echoing Lewis’s findings on COREPER (1998, 2005, 2006). Indeed, on the more complex issues it is impossible for them to rely purely on formal meetings to find agreement. Rather, it is in the informal exchanges where movement can be made, compromises offered and agreement reached, with ideas often floated here before being formally proposed to capitals.59 Although there may be those in the AA who would contest the assertion that ‘most matterof-fact foreign policy’ is now being made in Brussels,60 the fact remains that the PSC and its supporting structures have become crucial arenas for decision-making and therefore place German PermRep officials, including the German PSC Ambassador, at the heart of their national policy discussions. There are, though, some criticisms of how the German system functions. For example, one official suggested that ‘despite prejudice, we are badly organised and we don’t prepare things properly’.61 He also contrasted the relative lack of flexibility in the German system with that in Britain. Thus, while UKREP, as noted, has relatively senior and experienced diplomats dedicated specifically to trouble-shooting rather than having a specific working group responsibility, the German PermRep lacks such freedom over where to focus its expertise. At the same time, he believes that Germany does not always take leadership positions commensurate with the country’s

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size and foreign policy importance, something that can be problematic given that other countries often expect it to lead (see Chap. 7). Moreover, while German PermRep officials receive instructions on nearly every issue, they can be quite vague or even offer no real position to pursue: What we usually do is, we sit in the meeting and our instructions say “listen carefully to the others and what they want”, and then we decide what we want, which is completely absurd […] we are one of the very few delegations who get instructions on every and each point but very often our instructions are dilatory. They are null […] I’m not sure whether the Brits receive instructions on each and every point. Probably not. But they don’t say anything. I mean, embarrassingly enough we actually say what we have in the instructions, which is sometimes null.62

There can also be significant differences in perspective depending on whether an official is capital- or Brussels-based, something that affects all member states. Thus while many AA officials, particularly younger ones, will have had direct experience during their career of working in the Brussels environment, this is not always the case. And even for those who have, there may be different understandings of the priorities or approaches to take. For example, a German official seconded to the General Secretariat of the Council contrasted the understanding of its role among PermRep officials with the lack of awareness of its existence in Berlin. In describing the 2008 Presidency, she noted how few officials were aware of what it did or of how policy-making in Brussels functioned: I had the impression that when we started the Presidency for example, nobody […] had a clue what the Secretariat is […] For the people here in the Permanent Representation, of course it’s normal. They know that the Secretariat exists […] But this also gives you an example of how much capitals know what’s really going on in Brussels. Because they get the reports of course, but if these people have never been to Brussels, then they don’t know how Brussels is working […] and then it’s really difficult sometimes to judge what’s going on, because there is a special dynamic here […] in the capital you just write down your instructions. But I don’t think everybody’s always aware that this is maybe unrealistic.63

She makes the point that this can often be down to the age of many of the heads of unit involved. Usually they are 45–50 years old and will not necessarily have been to Brussels in the early parts of their career in contrast to their peers in the UK, for example. Efforts have been made in recent

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years to change the German system, though, with it now being normal for younger AA officials to have a posting to Brussels.64 The Review 2014 called for job rotation between Berlin and Brussels to be more effectively managed and for interactions with German diplomats working in EU institutions to be ‘more systematic’ (Janning 2015), with these changes to have been implemented by the end of 2016.

Conclusion The picture that emerges is of a system attempting to achieve a policy-­ making and coordination ambition commensurate with the country’s size and potential influence. Policy-making is dominated by the AA on the basis of its extensive expertise and the detailed and exclusive focus it is able to give to the CFSP. However, this does not prevent the Chancellor from intervening in more strategic issues, or dominating ‘history-making’ encounters at European Council meetings and summits. Other ministries are also being encouraged to feed into the policy-making process more effectively, and the creation of ad hoc task groups implies an understanding of the need for flexibility in the system to facilitate this, but also a determination on the part of the AA to retain overall control of the policy-­ making and coordination process as far as possible. Within the AA there is a hierarchy not dissimilar to that in Britain, with clear lines and formal processes of reporting. This is underpinned by a less formalised network of continuous interactions between Berlin-based desk officers and their Brussels colleagues which suggests a more flexible and fluid approach to the day-to-day business of feeding into the CFSP, particularly at working group level. Overall, both internally and among partner states, there is an expectation that Germany will be in a position to respond in any given situation. However, in practice the fact that the consultation process between Berlin and the PermRep in Brussels can at times be quite ponderous while the instructions received by the PermRep are on occasion vague or lacking in detail indicates that the system in Berlin is unable to react as quickly to the demands placed on it as it might hope.

Notes 1. Genscher served first under Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974–82) and from 1982 his Christian Democrat successor Helmut Kohl. The only break in this period was the two weeks from 17 September to 1 October 1982. During this time Schmidt served as his own caretaker for-

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eign minister after Genscher’s FDP switched their support to Kohl’s CDU, enabling the latter to form a new coalition government. 2. Schmidt also suggested that he was free to devote only 10% of his time to foreign affairs because of the other demands on his time (Paterson 2014). 3. Dunn states: ‘The growth of executive power in both general terms and in foreign policy in particular is a feature of modern politics in many countries, which has also led to the growth of summitry. In foreign policy this trend is at the expense of both the professional diplomatic corps and the foreign minister’ (2004: 143). 4. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 5. See: Ian Traynor, ‘End of the love affair with Europe isolates Merkel’, Guardian, 3 June 2010, cited in Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1064). 6. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 7. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 8. To meet this target would require  an increase in the annual German defence budget from €37bn to €60bn, ‘making it by far the largest military power in Europe’ (Saeed 2017). 9. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 10. Interviews, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3 and GO4). 11. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 12. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 13. Interview, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin 2017 14. Interviews, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3) and 2012 (GO6). 15. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO5). 16. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 17. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO5). 18. Interview, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2017. 19. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 20. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 21. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 22. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1) and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 23. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3 and GO4). 24. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 25. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). He contrasts this with the Italians, for example, whom he suggests are more inclined to ‘follow the stream’ with solid instructions provided on important issues but with the Italian Permanent Representation left to work out which way the stream is going. 26. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1) and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 27. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3).

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28. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 29. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2017. 30. Interviews, German Permanent Representation and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2017. 31. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2017. 32. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2017. 33. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2017. 34. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2017. 35. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 36. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 37. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO5). 38. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 39. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 40. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO5). 41. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO5). 42. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO5). 43. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2). 44. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 45. The Area of Freedom, Justice and Security replaced the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. 46. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 47. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 48. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2). 49. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1) and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3 and GO4) and 2012 (GO6). 50. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 51. Gymnich is the name given to informal meetings of EU foreign ministers where they are not constrained by an official agenda or the need to take formal decisions. The first such meeting took place in 1974 at the German castle of Gymnich in the town of Erftstadt in the Rhine valley. 52. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 53. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 54. Such requirements also exist in Denmark and The Netherlands. 55. Interviews, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6) and General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 2010 (EU3). 56. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 57. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2). 58. While the PSC can task the PMG or CIVCOM to focus on particular issues, it can only invite RELEX to draft a mandate on sanctions as the latter remains answerable to COREPER II rather than the PSC—‘a nuance but it is nonetheless important’. EU4, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 12 November 2010.

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59. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2). 60. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 61. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 62. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). Interviewee’s emphasis. 63. EU1, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 8 November 2010. 64. Hans-Dieter Lucas, Political Director at the AA from 2011–15, served previously as Germany’s Ambassador to the PSC.

Bibliography Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. (2010) ‘Germany and the European Union: From ‘Tamed Power’ to Normalized Power?’. International Affairs, 86(5), pp. 1051–1073. Derlien, H. (2000) ‘Germany: Failing Succesfully?’. In Kassim, H., Peters, B. and Wright, V. (eds.) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level (Oxford: OUP). Dunn, D.H. (2004) ‘The Lure of Summitry: International Dialogue at the Highest Level’. In Jonsson, C. and Langhorne, R. (eds.) Diplomacy, Volume III (London: SAGE). Grant, C. (2005) ‘Germany’s Foreign Policy: What Lessons can be Learned from the Schröder Years?’ (London: Centre for European Reform Essay, CER). Hyde-Price, A., and Jeffrey, C. (2001) ‘Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(4), pp. 689–717. Ischinger, W. (2012) ‘Germany after Libya: Still a Responsible Power?’. In Valasek, T. (ed.) All Alone? What US Retrenchment Means for Europe and NATO (London: Centre for European Reform). Janning, J. (2015) Germany’s Foreign Ministry Reinvents Itself. European Council on Foreign Relations, 18 March. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/ commentary_germanys_foreign_ministry_reinvents_itself311411. Kassim, H. and Peters, B. (2001) ‘Conclusion: Co-ordinating National Action in Brussels—A Comparative Perspective’. In Kassim, H., Menon, A., Peters, B. and Wright, V. (eds.) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The European Level (Oxford: OUP). Lewis, J. (1998) ‘Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of Permanent Representatives’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 36(4), pp. 479–504. Lewis, J. (2005) ‘The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union’. International Organization, 59(4), pp. 937–971.

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Lewis, J. (2006) ‘National Interests: Coreper’. In Peterson, J. and Shackleton, M. (eds.) The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Paterson, W.E. (2011) ‘The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49, Annual Review, pp. 57–75. Paterson, W.E. (2014) ‘Germany and the European Union’. In Padgett, S, Paterson, W.E. and Zohnhöfer, R. (eds.) Developments in German Politics 4 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Saeed, S. (2017) ‘German Foreign Minister Voices Skepticism on NATO Spending Target’. Politico, 1 March. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/german-foreign-minister-voices-skepticism-on-nato-spending-target/. Techau, J.  (2015) ‘The Steinmeier Review of German Foreign Policy’. Judy Dempsey’s Straetgic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 19 March. Available at: http:// carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59422.

Bibliography—Official Documents Auswärtiges Amt (2012a) Germany’s Foreign Policy Parameters (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/ AktuelleArtikel/111027-ZweiJahreAupo-node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2012b) Pressemitteilung: Auswärtiges Amt richtet “Task Force Syrien” ein (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2014a) Review 2014—Außenpolitik Weiter Denken (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2017a) The European Directorate-General (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt) Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Abteilungen/ Europaabteilung_node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2017b) Political Directorate-General 2 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt) Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/ abteilungen/2-node. Auswärtiges Amt (2017c) Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aamt/auswdienst/abteilungen/snode. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006) Weissbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2011) Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests—Assuming International Responsibility— Shaping Security Together (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung).

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Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2016) Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Bundesregierung (2014) Die Bundeskanzlerin und das Bundeskanzleramt (Berlin: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung). Available at: https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2015/03/201503-04-broschuere-bundeskanzlerin-bundeskanzleramt.pdf?__ blob=publicationFile&v=1. Bundesregierung (2016) Weissbuch: Zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Merkel, A. (2009) Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel Before the United States Congress (Berlin: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government). Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (2012) The Duties of the Chancellor, Berlin. Available at: http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Webs/BK/ En/Office-and-Constitution/Duties/duties.html.

CHAPTER 7

Emerging Leadership: How Germany Engages with the CFSP

Introduction During the years of the Bonn Republic, Germany avoided either an explicit leadership role in foreign and security policy or, perhaps more importantly, the risk of isolation. However, its ‘emancipation’ under the Chancellorships of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel has brought it to a point where, although not explicitly seeking a leadership role, neither will it avoid one. It therefore finds itself increasingly in a position of emergent leadership in foreign and security policy (to some extent mirroring its more natural leadership in economic matters), with this being the logical next step in the trajectory of change mapped out above. Indeed, it seems to be a response to what one official identified in 1997 as the need for a normalised German foreign policy to be less reliant on partners and ‘more self-confident in the formulation of German interests’, while also accepting greater international responsibilities, assuring its neighbours of good relations and affirming there would be no repeat of the past (Aggestam 2000: 71). More than two decades on, while emphasis continues to be placed on the need to work closely partners, Germany is also displaying a greater self-confidence in its foreign and security policy. This represents an interesting challenge to the idea of Germany as a state uncomfortable or unwilling to pursue national interests in a policy area that has historically been very sensitive both domestically and to its neighbours. A common explanation of how Germany approaches the © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_7

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CFSP (and foreign policy-making more broadly) would see it locating its positions and interests in the language of common and shared values and emphasising the transformation that has taken place since 1945—as very much a state that was reconstructed—and which  reconstructed itself— around a new, multilateral and civilian identity and role conception. Equally, as much as the EU was historically intended to ‘contain’ any dangerous future expression of German ambition it is also a system—as Bulmer et al. (2000) have argued—which reflects German concerns and priorities. Thus, when we inspect German foreign policy-making more closely, we find unsurprisingly that it is perfectly willing to pursue national preferences, and determinedly so. Moreover, in doing so its younger diplomats feel it is acting no differently from its two chief peers, the UK and France: France and the UK view the EU as a vehicle to follow their political goals […] and that’s what we get now criticised for: that now reunification is fulfilled and Germany has a prime weight inside the [EU], is Germany now following its own interests? Hey, we’re just doing what France and the UK have been doing all along […] The younger generation now […] say, ‘well we’re all here to follow our interests and become basically as France and the UK have been’.1

The difference lies in how Germany goes about this—i.e. multilateralist, never isolated, prioritising civilian means, emphasising human rights, etc. (It should be noted here, of course, that no member states likes to be isolated—indeed, ‘this is a red line for all’.)2 To explore this further, this chapter examines how Germany pursues its goals in the context of its most important multilateral foreign policy framework and environment: the CFSP.  Several types of behaviour are identified which are categorised as follows: ‘shared leadership’ whereby it works with partners to achieve particular objectives; Germany as an ‘example’, whereby it acts as a hub around which other states can converge; Germany as a ‘mediator’; and finally, ‘unilateral’ Germany, whereby it will occasionally risk isolation in pursuit of particular goals. Taken together, these reflect a strong continuing preference for multilateral cooperation but also a greater willingness to stand apart from partners and to take clear leadership positions when necessary.3 They also illustrate how viewing the CFSP through a lens of ‘competition’ is increasingly important in understanding German foreign policy-making, where previously co-operation and co-optation were more usual.

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Shared Leadership An important practical aspect of EU foreign and security policy is the obvious need for member states to cooperate if they are to make their voices heard and protect and promote their interests globally. For example, one AA official stated that ‘all European partners know full well that by themselves they’re not strong enough’.4 The question, therefore, is the degree to which an individual member state is able to set the direction of travel on a particular issue. For Germany, shared leadership is the preferred approach (as it is to the achievement of its EU policy goals more generally). This reflects what remains its instinctive multilateralism: ‘No initiative can be successful if Germany alone presents it—we need partners’.5 Developing this idea, another official believed strongly that ‘it’s always better if there are two big countries making a proposal’.6 The bilateral relationship with France is the clearest exemplar of this and for many years has been one of the primary drivers of integration. Indeed, under Chancellors Schmidt and then Kohl, the development of this relationship enabled Germany to progress from ‘follower to co-leader’ in action if not in name (Paterson 2010a: 44). (An interesting corollary to this is the suggestion by Hans Stark (2006: 120) that the French have traditionally tended to over-estimate German power, while Germany has underestimated theirs, and as a consequence the French perhaps ‘attach greater importance’ to the relationship than their neighbours.) But although the Franco-German relationship has involved close cooperation on economic issues, it has been less close or effective in security and defence. In part this comes from what German officials believe is a different basic attitude towards the purpose of the EU and CFSP, which one characterised as follows: France wants Europe as a vehicle for their own national interest and […] glory, and we want Europe as a safe haven and a stable and prosperous community which gives us the chance to do our business with all these countries and make money. So, that’s basically a different outlook.7

As Aggestam (2000) has noted, a number of more specific factors have contributed to this, including France’s withdrawal in 1966 from NATO’s military structures. Most notable, though, has been the opening up of a clear division in their strategic priorities since the end of the Cold War. Thus, while for France the Mediterranean and Francophone Africa have

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been of principal interest, Germany has prioritised relations with its eastern neighbours and the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood (ibid). A German PermRep official contended, for example, that Eastern European states would be more likely to gravitate towards Germany: ‘A lot of Eastern European, of new member states, they would seek our advice and they would come to us. I assume more so than to France or to [the] UK.’8 A German official working in the General Secretariat of the Council also emphasised Germany’s particular interest in Eastern Europe.9 Thus, while France remains ‘for historic reasons our major partner’, there is clear evidence of Germany’s more eastward focus.10 A good example is in how it has traditionally approached the state holding the rotating Council Presidency: We would always try to find out where does the Presidency sit […] for instance with the Czech Presidency it was an easy half-year for us because in so many topics we are very close. Swedish, less so, but nevertheless.11 And then you have the Spanish, where there is a sort of traditional coalition perhaps with Mediterranean or Southern countries […] you knew there would be differences […] whereas with the Czechs or with the Belgians, Hungarian, Poles […] that’s close to us so we would always try to be close and we did jointly things with them now before we come into the Presidency in order to build on that for later on.12

One recent area of significant Franco-German leadership has come in security and defence policy with their development of proposals for PESCO which was finally launched at the end of 2017 with 25 member states participating (EEAS 2017a). The June 2017 European Council had called on members to set out their ideas for how cooperation should be developed. Supported by six other states,13 France and Germany produced a vision for PESCO that sought to balance the French focus on ambitious cooperation and the German wish for it to be inclusive with the ‘game-­ changing’ element their willingness for PESCO to be  both process and framework: i.e. it enables participating states to determine their own timetable for reaching agreed but nonetheless ambitious goals (Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017: 3). While de France et al. (2017: 8) have argued that there is an ‘inherent contradiction’ between an ambitious PESCO and an inclusive one, a German Defence Ministry official argued that the 2017 ideas were different from what had originally been envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon as a means primarily of facilitating the development of EU

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Battlegroups: ‘we believe that [PESCO] would be the best tool, the best instrument and the best also political signal to the other side of the Atlantic, to show that we are really willing to do more’.14 Poland and the Weimar Triangle Perhaps the most important eastern channel of ‘shared leadership’ is the relationship with Poland, with relations described as ‘of eminent importance’ to both states (AA 2017). For Germany, Poland’s role in the East has long been considered ‘analogous’ to that of France in the West (Frasch 2009: 2), a sentiment also expressed in 2010  by then  Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle: I’d like to see relations with Poland reaching the level achieved between Germans and the French […] That’s why my very first trip as Foreign Minister took me to Warsaw (2010).

As with France, German-Polish relations have great historical significance, placing them in a much broader context that the CFSP. This is emphasised, for example, by symbolic events such as the joint cabinet meeting chaired by Chancellor Merkel and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk on the 20th anniversary of the 1991 German-Polish Treaty, and by the joint interview given by Westerwelle and his Polish counterpart Radek Sikorski to the Tagesspiegel on 5 November 2010 (AA 2010, 2012b).15 Equally, and again as with France, when Germany and Poland disagree this can have a deleterious effect on EU policy-making, as has occurred in budget negotiations for example (Bendiek 2008: 3). More recently tensions between Berlin and Poland’s Law and Justice Party Government have increased over a range of issues, particularly the EU’s response to the refugee and migration crisis. At the December 2017 European Council meeting, for example, Chancellor Merkel was critical of the ‘selective solidarity’ shown by member states including Poland opposed to the Commission’s refugee relocation plan (Karnitschnig 2017). German-Polish bilateral links have been augmented by the so-called Weimar Triangle, which brings together Germany, Poland and France in a regular ‘trilogue’ to create ‘a forum of equal partners at the heart of Europe’ (AA 2012a). Established in 1991 by German Foreign Minister Genscher and his French and Polish counterparts, Roland Dumas and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Weimar Triangle is intended to facilitate

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annual consultations between the three states on issues of European policy. Although it has been hampered at various times by tensions between the three states, it nevertheless provides a useful institutional illustration of how both France and Poland are regarded as ‘of the utmost importance’ to how Germany formulates its foreign and security policies (Bendiek 2008: 1). Consequently, while its remit takes in a range of matters, including economics, the Weimar Triangle has enabled Germany to share l­eadership with Poland on a number of foreign policy initiatives intended to end what it sees as historic east-west divisions, for example through the Eastern Partnership, the eastern component of the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) (ibid). More broadly, trilateral cooperation and coordination through the Weimar grouping also supports the promotion of their respective national interests at EU level, and the setting of policy agendas. Together, they can form an influential ‘core’ group which Bendiek believes is ‘indispensable’ to finding solutions to the range of issues currently on the EU’s security policy agenda (2008: 3). Following the result of the June 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK, the foreign ministers of the three states issued a joint statement declaring ‘we believe there is a need to intensify cooperation and to give it fresh impetus’ and committing themselves, amongst other things, to ‘an intensified and more effective’ CSDP (AA 2016). The importance of Poland and the Weimar format to Germany’s ability to lead in the CFSP was highlighted by a range of officials in the AA and German PermRep. For example, one emphasised the positive impact the grouping has had in terms of policy inputs: It actually has been quite fruitful […] One such initiative just recently has been the CSDP where we make suggestions as to how to increase the capabilities of the EU. This was born inside the Weimar Triangle, and from there it was presented to the wider forum of the EU partners, but not as a fait accompli […] as a proposal.16

Another suggested that Germany and Poland are quite close ‘in a lot of topics’.17 In seeking to explain this, it was suggested that a shift in recent years in Warsaw’s traditionally Atlanticist alignment to a more ‘European’ perspective had been important—as a result, Poland ‘has triggered some ideas’, particularly regarding the CSDP.18 These have included proposals to strengthen the CSDP through the creation of a permanent civil-­military EU headquarters for crisis management,19 an idea that was finally being taken forward in 2017 as EU members started to plan their post-Brexit CSDP cooperation. A focus on developing CSDP also formed part of an ambitious

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agenda presented by Poland for its 2011 Council Presidency, where it sought to prioritise the improvement of the EU’s crisis response capabilities (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 14). As Major and Wassenberg (2011: 1) note, the agenda was drawn up ‘in close consultation with France and Germany’, and set out in a letter from the Weimar group which was subsequently accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council in January 2011 (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 14). The ‘Big Three’—Germany, France and the UK The most influential leadership partners for Germany have been Britain and France, and where Germany has been able to cooperate with both it has arguably been able to demonstrate shared leadership—and therefore exercised influence—most effectively. Together the three have launched a number of joint initiatives that have been significant in shaping the direction of both the CFSP and ESDP/CSDP from the outset. For example, using its Council Presidency in the first semester of 1999, Germany was instrumental in the establishment of the ESDP following St Malo— although it was operating somewhat in ‘reactive mode’ to this initial impetus.20 Perhaps the most high-profile cooperation in recent years has been the E3+3 negotiation process with Iran over its nuclear programme resulting in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (discussed in Chap. 8). Amongst officials the strong belief is that where they have been able to act in concert, their ability to achieve particular policy outcomes has been greatly enhanced. One declared that ‘if the Big 3 can agree, the chances of success are very high’.21 Similarly, another felt that ‘if the three decided on something, and really want badly to have it, then there’s quite a leverage […] to push something through’. However, the same official stressed that fears they might create a so-called Directoire that would dominate the CFSP are somewhat misplaced: It’s easier to agree with one partner than with two partners at the same time, especially if it’s partners of the same big level. I think it’s easier to find ­agreement with Luxembourg on some issues, but France and Britain is rare, actually.22

Other member states have also acknowledge the influence of the three when they work together. For example, a Swedish diplomat suggested the three work well together where they can agree, noting in particular their cooperation on Iran.23

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Underpinning this cooperation is the intense and frequent contact that has become the norm across their foreign and defence ministries, as well as at the highest government levels. As noted, there are institutionalised and semi-institutionalised formats for their interaction, including the Franco-German Security Policy Council, which announced in February 2014 the first deployment in an EU mission of elements of the Franco-­ German Brigade, in this case to Mali (AA 2014)24; and the security policy directors meeting involving all three.25 An AA official involved in CSDP noted that when a CSDP issue is particularly urgent, for example when developing mission proposals, he could be in contact with his French and British counterparts several times a day. More generally, he suggests that while ‘the geometry is mixed’ depending on the issue—i.e. other countries such as Italy, Poland and Spain may be important actors in particular contexts or situations—Britain and France are ‘constant partners’.26 Perhaps the most obvious expression of this can be seen in how they have often supported each other’s Presidencies. For example, there were intense efforts between the three prior to the French Presidency in the 2nd semester of 2008: In CFSP in general, we would be close to France and the UK and you could see that during the French Presidency or before […] The French had a strong interest in being successful, obviously. Therefore a lot [of] things were prepared among the three at foreign ministry, at chancellery level, between capitals, before the French Presidency in order to try to guarantee success.27

CSDP provides a number of instances of how the three have cooperated successfully to provide leadership on a particular issue or initiative. For example, the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the creation of EU battlegroups were two important steps in its initial operationalisation and they cooperated on the inclusion of a mechanism for Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO) within the Treaty of Lisbon. The battlegroup concept came about as a consequence of the successful deployment of a small EU force in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 (Operation Artemis). This joint initiative was designed to create relatively small but easily deployable and autonomous rapid reaction forces for use in crisis management operations (Consilium 2009b). Underlying this aim was the shared belief that the EU needed to improve its effectiveness in this area, so the development of battlegroups was con-

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sidered essential both to increase the numbers of deployable troops available for such operations, but also as a tool for the broader goal of national force transformation as the key to greater overall European capabilities, something Britain was particularly keen to achieve (see Chap. 4).28 It was these objectives that lay at the heart of the original paper submitted jointly by the three in 2004 which was subsequently adopted by all member states and incorporated into the EU’s ‘Headline Goal 2010’ (Consilium 2009a).29 Similarly, the initiatives that led to the launching of the EDA and the PESCO mechanism reflected positions originally shared and then agreed by the three. Taken together, these examples provide some illustrations of how Germany enacts its preference for working with partners when promoting particular initiatives or policy goals within CFSP and CSDP.  As well as reflecting the practicalities of operating in a consensual system—i.e. the need to develop alliances with like-minded states etc.—this also sits well within a German role conception based around multilateral approaches to foreign policy-making. But while the strategy and methods employed place a premium on sharing leadership, the goal is to use that leadership to achieve outcomes that satisfy German interests and upload these to the European level.

Germany as Exemplar This second approach sees Germany acting—or seeking to act as—a hub or focal point around which other states, normally but not exclusively smaller, will coalesce with an expectation of and desire for German leadership on a particular issue or policy area. One German PermRep official outlined this expectation as follows: You will find easily, and that’s really easily, fifteen or a dozen member states who come up to us in every meeting basically and ask: “what do you think about it because we would like to think the same way you do?” They’re looking for leadership, and we don’t provide this necessarily all the time.30

He went on to describe how a previous German PSC Ambassador had been regarded by his colleagues as ‘a great Russia expert’ and consequently many had looked to him for guidance on how the EU should deal with Russian question. This reflects some interesting features both about the structural reality of operating within the CFSP and of the role conception

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German officials assign their country in this arena. For many states, and particularly the smaller, there are clear resource issues inhibiting their ability to participate fully in the CFSP and CSDP’s numerous working groups and committees (e.g. Dryburgh 2010). Being comparatively resource-rich particularly in terms of personnel and access to information, Germany, like France and Britain, therefore enjoys certain structural advantages in its efforts and ability to ensure its views and perspectives are fully represented and articulated across all policy and issue areas. That Germany may sometimes be less effective at this than its two largest peers has been noted. At the same time, it is viewed—and perhaps more importantly seems to view itself—as representing an alternative centre of gravity to the others, holding positions that are generally considered as more mainstream and less extreme, thereby making them easier for other states to align with.31 This is allied with a sense of responsibility to protect the interests of smaller states, something that it also sets out to do in other policy areas, and which is considered a ‘trademark’ of German foreign policy.32 As Bulmer and Paterson (2010: 1058) have noted, in its European policy more broadly Germany’s ‘strong pro-European credentials’ have been important in enabling it to upload its preferences in other policy areas because it has been perceived as less threatening by its fellow member states. An example of this more mainstream positioning was highlighted in the context of the 2010 Belgian Council Presidency (July–December): At the beginning of the Belgian Presidency the Belgians came to us and said, “well, like it or not but we tend to follow rather your lead than the UK or French […] because they have extreme positions and you, Germany, are more mainstream and you’re also taking into consideration the positions of smaller countries, so we’re very much leaning on you.” That comes through as a motive for many, especially the Eastern Europeans who wouldn’t say “oh, Germany is the greatest”, but they tend to discover and state for themselves “basically we can sort of align our foreign policy positions rather with the German position” […] for pragmatic reasons […] They recognise there are possibly three centres of gravity inside the EU, [so] which is the one that actually takes on board our national interests as a Baltic state or as Slovakia, or something like that?33

An example was Germany’s promotion of a ‘non-paper’ on progress in developing the EEAS sent to the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in December 2011. The AA’s intention was to raise a number of issues upon which Germany had concerns prior to the High

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Representative’s publication of her own official report, but also to demonstrate how widely shared these anxieties were. Consequently, the final document was co-­ signed by 11 other foreign ministers although there was disappointment later that the High Representative ‘did not make one single concrete ­suggestion […] on how to improve the functioning’ of the EEAS in her own report (see Chap. 9).34 A higher profile version of such leadership can be seen in the publication of the ‘Final Report’ by the so-called Future of Europe Group, convened by Guido Westerwelle in early 2012 as ‘part of the strategic debate on the future of European integration’ (AA 2012d; Reynders 2012). The report offered recommendations on a range of issues, including ‘decisive steps’ to be taken to augment the EU’s power as a global actor. These included strengthening the High Representative’s coordinating powers vis-à-vis other Commissioners with external action responsibilities; the operationalisation of PESCO; and the introduction of more majority voting within CFSP to ‘prevent one single member state from being able to obstruct initiatives’ which at the time was taken to mean the UK (AA 2012c: 6–7; Traynor 2012). While the Polish Foreign Minister took a high profile in announcing the group’s conclusions, they reflect strongly views expressed at both official and ministerial level within the AA. For example, in a speech in August 2012, Westerwelle (2012) made a number of declarations that are represented in the final report: [W]e need Europe to be a stronger global player. We need more cooperation, for example in external relations and with respect to the Defence and Security Policy. I know full well […] that not everyone in Europe wants to go down this path. But it is absolutely obvious that we are a continent with common security interests. We are a security community. And it is therefore a matter of simple logic that greater cooperation in the ESDP could be the next tangible step.

Similarly, the Final Report stated: There is a need to strengthen the [CSDP]. Our defence policy should have more ambitious goals which go beyond “pooling and sharing”. The possibilities for the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation should be implemented. (AA 2012c: 6)

Germany was particularly unhappy with and anxious to reduce the disconnect between the financial instruments the Commission has at its

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disposal, and the role of the High Representative and EEAS in deploying these: [T]here’s an Annex [in Lisbon] which states very clearly which units from which institution will be merged together to form the EAS and one of the decisive factors was financial aid, financial instruments. There’s a long Article—Article 9—which […] will tell you how difficult negotiations were and that we reached a compromise, and that we member states aren’t really happy with it. We want a revision of that in 2013 because still it’s the Commission that has the money and the EAS […] plays a very minor role. And I don’t know how the saying goes in English, but the person who has the money calls the shots.35

Again, the Final Report emphasises the need to expand the authority of the High Representative and EEAS in this regard (AA 2012c). Germany’s success in positioning itself as a ‘hub’ around which others could coalesce in order to promote this particular change agenda can be seen from those that also participated: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain (Reynders 2012). A final example can be seen in the approach taken by Germany during its two-year term on the UN Security Council from 2011–13, a role it described as ‘a special responsibility it has to live up to’ (AA 2012a). This involved adopting a very different strategy to Britain and France, which have actively sought to avoid any perception of a formal linkage between their roles as P5 members and members of the EU.  Instead, Germany made a conscious effort to act as a hub for, and representative of, its European partners, declaring its role to be ‘self-evidently as a representative of all UN members and particularly EU member states’ (AA 2011). The aim was described as follows: [Britain and France] do not want to be appearing to coordinate a European position […] They do not want to inform partners in Brussels to the extent that these partners should not get the wrong idea that […] France and the UK are obliged to take back this feedback into their work in New  York, whereas we see our task differently. We actually want to play this European perspective and regularly tell our partners what we are doing, why we are doing it, and thus basically living up to a sort of a European seat.36

In this they were assisted to some extent by the fact that on certain issues the EU and Security Council agendas complement one another, for exam-

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ple in advancing peace and security in Africa, and at the time particularly in Sudan (Schöndorf and Kaim 2011: 4). Germany has also sought to promote the position of the EU itself within the UN, for example by sponsoring a 2011 resolution to give the organisation independent speaking rights within the General Assembly (AA 2012: 11). However, Germany’s ability to play this role was hampered as it lacked the structural advantages of permanent Security Council membership, and by how its own efforts to secure a permanent seat may be perceived (AA 2009). Moreover, as discussed, its refusal to support UN resolutions on Libya left it isolated, breaking its own long-standing rule. Together, these examples indicate how Germany strives  to promote and articulate its interests and objectives by working with partners and endeavouring never to be isolated. It is also particularly revealing as to the role conception it assigns itself—but it is important to recognise that it has not always been successful at exercising this kind of influence. The Schröder Government was criticised, for example, for having ‘betrayed its role as a champion’ of the smaller member states during the Iraq crisis (Overhaus 2006: 74). Overall, though, the role of hub or ‘example state’ allows Germany to operate in a way that distinguishes it from France or Britain, and act as an alternative pole of influence. An interesting question is what impact Britain’s departure from the EU will have on Germany’s ability to play this kind of leadership role. With France left as the only other major foreign policy actor in the CFSP, could smaller states look to Germany even more to act as a bigger ‘champion’ when seeking to push for action or change on a particular issue? Or could they start looking to others as an alternative to balance the influence of the two biggest member states? German officials will certainly want to ensure the former option.

Germany as Mediator While the role of mediator might legitimately be considered as underpinning both previous forms—and indeed be seen as a subset of both—it does merit individual consideration as it highlights how for Germany acting as a mediator sits well within a role conception based around multilateralism and protecting the interests of smaller states. Germany as mediator has been explored in other contexts, for example by Adomeit (2000) in his examination of German-Russian relations. The concept of mediator—or ‘bridge’—is particularly useful here given that EU decision-making is designed around achieving consensus, particularly in questions of foreign and security policy. Moreover, this is a policy area where two states, France

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and Britain, have traditionally predominated, but have also often had cause to disagree over the direction and purpose of cooperation, not least in terms of its impact on NATO and the transatlantic security alliance, and the kind of role the EU can and should play in the international environment. As the other ‘big’ state, therefore, Germany feels itself ideally placed to play the part of mediator or balancer. Such a role conception is reflected in comments about how Germany acts in the CFSP made by a number of officials. A German PermRep official outlined how Germany prefers to be viewed by partner states, explicitly rejecting the idea of big states imposing their views or preferences onto their smaller partners: ‘This is not the position that traditionally Germany would like to be seen in. This is not the picture we have—I have—of ourselves’.37 Similarly, one of his colleagues in Berlin declared that ‘we always respect the interests of smaller partners, and defend their interests, and that’s what makes us a natural mediator’. Indeed, he was clear about the centrality of the mediation role to how Germany operates in this environment: ‘we need to bridge gaps, we need to be mediators to play our role’. In his view, the nature of the CFSP as a policy-making environment facilitates and encourages this: It brings very often into the situation where we are the mediator, where we are actually trying to be in the centre of it. […] I think it’s fair to say that up until 1989 we basically followed the mainstream and we were needed ­sometimes to bridge gaps between extreme positions of partners. But we’ve never been extreme in our positions at any time.38

A refusal to adopt extreme positions again reflects the historical desire to avoid isolation and a determination to build coalitions to achieve particular outcomes. Moreover, it is a role that German representatives have played at the highest level: Obviously if you have a foreign minister who is a bully, or […] who is a weakling, who never speaks up in any circumstance, you have two extremes there. And if you are somebody who is perceived as being a mediator with a good cause then obviously your position is stronger. […] we have been lucky with our foreign ministers […] Genscher with a big competence and so his word really counted […] [and] Fischer.39

Two brief examples of its efforts to act as mediator are offered here. The first is Germany’s role with regards to policy towards Iran (see

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Chap.  8). Mediation here took place at two levels. The first was at the strategic level within the E3+3 format by facilitating agreement between France and Britain, but with the additional complication of dealing with the United States. This was not always straightforward: Whenever we meet […] we have a pre-consultation format. That is the Americans with the 3 Europeans. So there’s a 2 layer thing. So beforehand we know exactly how the others feel […] and usually Germany had sort of kept the middle ground and was often able to bridge gaps or bridge differences between partners. Now, this is possibly sometimes more difficult. There’s France even harder than the US. The UK in between and it’s more difficult.40

The other level, meanwhile, involved German efforts at maintaining the EU-wide consensus on the sanctions regime which, like the maintenance of the sanctions regime against Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis, was a challenging undertaking. The second example relates to the negotiations between the ‘big 3’ states in 2005 over the plans to establish the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to support the EU Military Committee and today based within the EEAS. In this case, the key to any agreement lay in the ability to find a compromise between the French and British positions, and Germany found itself holding the balance. It required 18 months of negotiation ‘à trois’ to reduce the gap between the two. Ultimately the disagreement came down to a difference in the manning levels each considered acceptable, with France and Germany wanting a figure of 89 and Britain 87. The French had initially wanted significantly more, while the British significantly less—although after agreement was reached, manning levels have since risen to 200+.41 Germany has a unique position at the centre of Europe, both geographically and in terms of the integration process. Along with the financial weight it can bring to bear when necessary, this means that its voice cannot be ignored in situations where it may hold the balance, particularly between France and Britain. What is less clear, however, is whether the ‘mediator’ role conception is quite so readily recognised and accepted by its partners. For example, when asked which member states he would most often discuss CSDP-related issues with, one senior French official in Brussels highlighted his close interactions with UK officials and with others from Spain, Poland and Hungary, but made no mention of Germany.42 That Germany could and has sought to play such a role is clear, though.

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Germany as Unilateral Actor Acting unilaterally action is arguably the approach German foreign policy makers remain least comfortable with in the context of CFSP, particularly given the risks it presents of isolation. As noted, for Germany the natural approach involves working with partners and sharing leadership on particular initiatives. Prior to Lisbon, the rotating Council Presidency provided member states with a formal means for the exercise of leadership within the CFSP, although within the  strategic parameters set by the European Council and the need to operate within the Troika system, but since 2007 the changes instituted under Lisbon have restricted the ­opportunity to plan and set agendas. However, crisis management and particularly the need for rapid response is one area which by its nature challenges efforts to achieve longer-term continuity, demanding but often not always resulting in swift and meaningful reactions from the member states (e.g. Menon 2008). It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that on the relatively rare occasions when Germany has taken positions at odds with partner states in order to achieve particular outcomes, these have usually involved either specific crisis management situations or the structures created to respond in such circumstances. In general, these situations have involved ‘red line’ issues for Germany, of which two stand out. The first is a pragmatic concern over budgets, particularly in the context of military-based CSDP missions, reflecting a greater assertiveness on the issue of expenditure more generally across the full range of EU policy areas in recent years (e.g. Grant 2005). The second is Germany’s ongoing normative preference for civilian-based over military-­based crisis response. Together, these reflect what have been identified as the three key principles upon which German participation in the CFSP and CSDP is guided: the primacy of the Bundestag regarding decisions over military deployments; the separation of police from military command, and civilian and military components in crisis management; and clear rules over funding.43 While the defence of ‘red line’ issues can be characterised as essentially negative, necessarily involving the rejection or prevention of initiatives or proposals deemed to cross them, Germany has demonstrated a growing willingness to take a stand when this is felt to be in the national interest, even when it may be isolated as a consequence. One official described it thus: I think if something is important for us, basically the only thing that counts is our red lines, and we would strongly fight for our position without […]

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trying to accommodate others’ positions in those areas. I mean, you might have a main aspect and you might have a side aspect where you would be willing to give in […] from the beginning, but I think our red lines would be so important […] that we would stick to them.44

One example of this has been Germany’s historical determination to stick to the EU’s agreed policy towards Cuba, based on the 1996 Common Position which placed progress towards improved human rights and greater political freedoms at the heart of EU-Cuba relations.45 Prior to the beginning in 2014 of negotiations on a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Cuba, Germany had been vociferous in its determination that the EU maintain its tough stance against the country. One official involved in this was not clear as to why his government maintained such a tough stance on this particular issue, but noted its continuing refusal to sanction any weakening of the EU position: I don’t know why it is Cuba, why we stand there so strongly, but there’s a strong red line. We have gone through from working group to PSC to Minister in Council, where the Minister says “no, no way” and where the Chancellor says “no way, we’re not moving on that”, which is interesting.46

Similarly, the security of Israel has been non-negotiable for Germany, to the extent that Council Conclusions will be ‘on the comma’—i.e. the minister will defend a particular formula in Council down to the tiniest detail, something that happens very rarely given how much will have been agreed in the working groups and in the PSC.47 The operational funding of crisis management is an issue of regular concern for Germany, and one where officials ‘are not willing to be in a position of having to react’.48 Thus, while Germany remains strongly committed to the CFSP, this does not entail providing a blank cheque for its execution: ‘German foreign policy is always defined through Europe […] [but] because of budgetary constraints we don’t accept everything automatically’.49 The 2006 review during the Finnish Presidency of the Athena funding mechanism which administers common costs relating to EU military operations under CSDP provides a prime example of this (Consilium 2017). Proposals were made to include intelligence in the list of items covered by common funding automaticity, which Germany feared would mean adding the cost of satellite imagery, with the potential to double the existing €60bn budget. Having known in advance about what was essentially a French

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plan, German officials promised to block them throughout the remainder of the six months, and even to raise them in the Council under their own subsequent Presidency where they could face a veto. They then tabled a counter-proposal that had been pre-negotiated with like-minded member states and which formed the basis of the ultimate agreement predicated on ‘cost efficiency and operational needs’. It is interesting to note that during these discussions, the UK had actually acceded to the French proposal to ensure the French in turn would not block a British proposal in NATO over the development of its rapid reaction capability. However, according to a German official involved, the UK ‘was happy we blocked it!’50 A second example relates to proposals to send a military mission to Côte d’Ivoire. In this case, the German preference for civilian-based crisis responses provided the impetus. Following Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to accept the outcome of the 2010 presidential election that had seen his rival Alassane Ouattara victorious, a civil war had broken out. Strong statements from the High Representative’s office at the time highlighted the need for an orderly transition and respect for human rights, while detailing the EU’s initial response which was based around sanctions on senior ex-­ regime figures (EEAS 2010). France in particular had strongly advocated a military response. However for Germany, while understanding French interest in their former colony, the resort to a military solution raised significant concerns and went against their red line that the military option should only be considered after all civilian options had been explored. Moreover, there was some concern regarding how France viewed the CSDP and the military instruments at its disposal: [France] wants to use the EU to protect French interests in places like Côte d’Ivoire. We understand but it depends on the means. France very quickly looks to military means—for us, these are only as the last resort—the preventive action in the [2003 European Security Strategy].51

An AA official made a similar point, highlighting a general anxiety in Berlin over the possibility of being dragged into an overseas conflict: Côte d’Ivoire is far away. It could, in the end, if there was an international engagement, be disastrous and bloody. So what we rather want is for the Africans to settle this problem by themselves, foremost and not appear as sort of colonial interventionists. So, we made a policy of saying okay, we can make all kinds of offers to Gbago […] to leave. We make all kinds of

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financial offers and offers of engagement for the new elected President Ouattara. Red line: we don’t want a CSDP operation going on.52

Separately, another official highlighted the additional concern that having the EU engage in an area where the UN was involved had the potential to undermine the latter. Ultimately, the French acted instead in conjunction with the UN to bring about a resolution to the fighting. These examples demonstrate both Germany’s willingness and ability to pursue particular national interests within the CFSP.  Particularly in the latter two cases, Germany felt it had no choice but to take a proactive stance in support of particular objectives regarding the management of resources and use of military instruments within the CSDP. Overall, while instances of this more unilateral behaviour remain the exception, the increasing ‘emancipation’ in German foreign policy discussed previously means this is likely to occur more often in the future.

The Impact of Brexit This final section considers briefly the potential implications of Brexit for how Germany engages with the CFSP. As the discussion of the Ukraine crisis in Chap. 5 demonstrated, Germany plays an increasingly central role in EU foreign policy discussions, in part because of the UK’s growing marginalisation in the years immediately prior to the Brexit referendum, but also by virtue of its own emergence as Europe’s pre-eminent and indispensable economic power. The significance of Brexit therefore is in its potential to accelerate a pre-existing trend by removing entirely a key foreign policy actor from the CFSP environment. In terms of the CFSP and CSDP and how Germany acts within these, Brexit’s biggest impacts are therefore likely to be on policy- and decision-making dynamics and the resources available for the pursuit and implementation of agreed EU foreign policy objectives. How Germany and other states respond to these changed circumstances will affect significantly the future pathways and direction of EU foreign policy cooperation. From the German perspective, Brexit will obviously end the possibility of formal cooperation between Europe’s ‘Big 3’ in the context of EU foreign policy-making although, as noted, bilateral cooperation with the UK will not only continue but is currently being expanded, particularly in defence. Given the UK has the potential to remain, in the short- to medium-term at least, an influential foreign policy power, it is also logical

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to assume that where the situation demands, the potential for ad hoc cooperation between Germany, France and the UK will remain and, indeed, will be pursued. However, it is also clear that Brexit is resulting in a significant re-evaluation of the UK by Germany (and other EU member states) with the view in Berlin that by leaving the EU the British ‘have diminished their own importance’ (Besch and Odendahl 2017: 10). Chancellor Merkel even suggested in May 2017 that the reliability of the Anglo-Saxon powers as partners could no longer be assumed as a consequence of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the US, declaring that Europeans must ‘take our fate into our own hands’ as ‘the times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over’ (Zalan 2017). Within CFSP, Brexit will not affect Germany’s preference for shared leadership. An interesting question will therefore be the extent to which it needs to compensate for the loss of the UK as a partner and, if so, whether there are particular states it will seek to work with more intensively. Since the election of Emmanuel Macron as President of France in May 2017 there has been a renewed focus on the Franco-German relationship and whether it can once again become an engine of integration. As noted, historically their partnership has had less impact on security and defence as compared to other policy areas, so it was notable that cooperation in these areas was highlighted at their biannual joint cabinet meeting in July 2017. Macron joined with Merkel to commit to a closer collaboration and to give ‘new impetus’ to their bilateral relationship, including the development of a new generation of joint fighter jets and a range of other military research projects (Briançon and Posaner 2017). To be clear, the primary focus in Berlin and Paris in the coming months will be on finding some degree of consensus on reforms to the Eurozone and strengthening the EU economy. However, as the EU’s two major foreign policy powers there will certainly be no diminution of expectations made of them to lead internally or externally, particularly in the face of emerging crises. Meanwhile, Germany’s ability to act as a balancer or alternative pole to France is likely to remain important. Despite the current strain in relations between Berlin and Warsaw, it must be assumed that Germany will also seek to strengthen the foreign and security policy component of its relationship with Poland over the longerterm and the institutional framework provided by the Weimar Triangle would also seem an obvious focal point for foreign policy collaboration, even if it has sometimes flattered to deceive in terms of actual outputs. Another ‘big’ state which Germany may seek to collaborate with further

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is Italy which is regarded in some quarters as a logical candidate to ‘re-generate a new E3’, although again domestic Italian politics will impact on this.53 It is noteworthy that in the months since the Brexit referendum, one of the main areas of EU activity has been in pushing forward co-operation in security and defence. Indeed, there is a certain ironic symbolism in the decision by the EU27 in 2017 to finally agree to the establishment of an operational headquarters for CSDP after it had been blocked for so many years by the UK. This was, though, just one element of a much bigger and more ambitious European Security and Defence package which included the announcement of a new European Defence Fund and the launch of PESCO (EEAS 2017b). While Brexit may have served as a catalyst, these developments have also been driven by broader insecurity and instability in the European neighbourhood and internationally. In this regard, if it works PESCO has the potential to encourage a sea-change in how member states collaborate in defence and develop ‘a more common understanding of Europe’s defence and future’ (Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017: 7). Crucially from the German perspective, and as noted above, it has been established based on ‘inclusiveness’: We don’t want to go alone and we don’t want to go only with a few. We want to have as much…[to] bring everybody with us. […] We believe we should keep everybody on board and try to get things done together.54

This provides a useful reminder of Germany’s most important strategic priority in response to Brexit: to maintain ‘the stability and integrity of the EU’ (Besch and Odendahl 2017: 1) as it seeks navigate an increasingly turbulent international environment. The challenge remains whether Germany is willing to fully take on the broader leadership role this may require: ‘many countries look to Germany not only to moderate influence but to actually lead and I think we still have trouble in accepting such a lead role’.55

Conclusion This chapter has examined how Germany engages with the CFSP, identifying a range of different approaches. The most common of these, reflecting a German commitment to partnership and the avoidance of isolation, is characterised as shared leadership whereby Germany will seek to work with other states to develop policy ideas and proposals. Alongside this we

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also see Germany seeking to act as a hub or example around which other primarily smaller states can coalesce, and as a mediator or balancer particularly between the two other ‘big’ states, France and the UK. Finally, although less common Germany is also willing to act unilaterally and risk potential isolation—for so long a sine qua non of its diplomacy—when a policy debate starts to push up against its particular red lines. While Brexit is unlikely to alter a German approach to CFSP predicated primarily on shared leadership, it will change the power dynamics within CFSP to some extent, while in the absence of the UK Germany will also likely seek to build and develop partnerships with other states deemed as credible foreign policy partners such as Poland and Italy. Taken together, the different approaches to CFSP pursued by Germany underscore its commitment to European foreign and security policy cooperation and highlight how crucial the environment provided by CFSP remains to its diplomacy and how it engages with the world.

Notes 1. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 2. Interview, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 2010. 3. For a discussion of German leadership activity in the context of the Ukraine crisis, see Wright, N. (2018) ‘No longer the elephant outside the room: Why the Ukraine Crisis reflects a deeper shift towards German leadership of European foreign policy’, forthcoming in German Politics,  published online 3 May, https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1458094. 4. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 5. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 6. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6). 7. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 8. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 9. Interview, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 2010 (EU1). 10. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 11. The Czech Republic held the rotating presidency from January to June 2009, Sweden from July to December the same year. 12. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 13. These were: Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. 14. Interview, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2017. 15. Jutta Frasch emphasises the particular importance to German-Polish relations of ‘symbols, gestures and serious expressions of commitment’ (2009: 3). Westerwelle and Sikorski (2012) also wrote a joint article in the New

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York Times entitled ‘A New Vision of Europe’ and published on 17 September 2012. 16. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 17. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 18. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 19. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1) and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 20. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 21. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 22. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 23. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 24. The Franco-German Brigade consists of French and German units and forms the basis of the Eurocorps. It was founded in 1987 and became operational in 1989. 25. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 26. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 27. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 28. Interview, UK Ministry of Defence Official (retired), 2011. 29. Interview with Dr. Claudia Major, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, January 2011. 30. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). Interviewee’s emphasis. 31. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 32. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 33. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 34. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6). The other signatories were the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden. 35. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO6). 36. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 37. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO2). 38. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 39. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 40. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 41. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 42. Interview, French Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (FO1). 43. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 44. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 45. See Official Journal of the European Communities (1996) Common Position of 2 December 1996 Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba (96/697/CFSP) (Brussels: Consilium). It was formally repealed by the Council in December 2016.

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46. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 47. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2010 (GO1). 48. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 49. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 50. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 51. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO4). 52. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2011 (GO3). 53. Interview, German Permanent Representation, February 2017. 54. Interview, Federal Defence Ministry, Berlin, March 2017. 55. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, February 2017.

Bibliography Adomeit, H. (2000) ‘Russia and Germany—A ‘Normal’ Relationship’. The RUSI Journal, 146(6), pp. 55–61. Aggestam, L. (2000) ‘Germany’. In Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G. (eds.) The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States (Manchester and New York: Manchester Univerity Press). Bendiek, A. (2008) ‘EU Foreign Policy Perspectives—A Call for the Revival of the Weimar Triangle’. SWP Comments (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Besch, S. and Odendahl, C. (2017) Berlin to the Rescue? A Closer Look at Germany’s Position on Brexit (London: Centre for European Reform). Billon-Galland, A. and Quencez, M. (2017) Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense? Policy Brief No. 33, The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the European Leadership Network, available at: https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/10/Can-France-and-Germany-Make-PESCO-Work-as-aProcess-Toward-EU-Defense-.pdf. Briançon, P. and Posaner, J.  (2017) ‘Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron Rekindle German-French Romance’. Politico, 13 July. Available at: https:// www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-and-emmanuel-macron-rekindle-german-french-romance/. Bulmer, S., Jeffrey, C. and Paterson, W. (2000) Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. (2010) ‘Germany and the European Union: From ‘Tamed Power’ to Normalized Power?’. International Affairs, 86(5), pp. 1051–1073. de France, O, Major, C. and Sartori, P. (2017) How to Make PESCO a Success. Policy Paper #21, Armament Industry European Research Group, September. Dryburgh, L. (2010) Examining Adaptation: UK Foreign Policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 1990–2001 (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters Publishing).

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Frasch, J. (2009) ‘A Fresh Impetus for German Polish Relations’. SWP Comments 14 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Grant, C. (2005) ‘Germany’s Foreign Policy: What Lessons can be Learned from the Schröder Years?’ (London: Centre for European Reform Essay, CER). Karnitschnig, M. (2017) ‘Migration Reopens EU’s Political Divide’. Politico, 15 December. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/migration-reopenseu-political-divide/. Major, C. and Wassenberg, F. (2011) ‘Warsaw’s Ambitious CSDP Agenda’. SWP Comments (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Menon, A. (2008) ‘Security Policy and the Logic of Leaderlessness’. In Hayward, J. (ed.) Leaderless Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Overhaus, M. (2006) ‘Civilian Power under Stress: Germany, NATO, and the European Security and Defense Policy’. In Maull, H.W. (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Paterson, W.E. (2010a) ‘Does Germany Still have a European Vocation?’ German Politics, 19(1), pp. 41–52. Reynders, D. (2012) ‘Slowly But Surely on the Path Towards a Federal European Union’. EurActiv.com, Brussels, 27 August. Available at: http://www.euractiv. com/future-eu/slowly-surely-path-federal-europ-analysis-514393. Schöndorf, E. and Kaim, M. (2011) ‘Peace, Security and Crisis Management— German priorities in the UN Security Council 2011/12’. SWP Comments (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Stark, H. (2006) ‘The Franco-German Relationship, 1998–2005’. In Maull, H.W. (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Traynor, I. (2012) ‘EU Heavyweights Call for Radical Foreign and Defence Policy Overhaul’. The Guardian Newspaper, 18 September. Zalan, E. (2017) ‘Merkel: Europe Cannot Rely on Its Allies Anymore’. EU Observer, Brussels, 29 May. Available at: https://euobserver.com/foreign/138041.

Bibliography—Official Documents Auswärtiges Amt (2009) Reforming the United Nations Security Council (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/ Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/VereinteNationen/ReformVN/ReformSR_ node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2010a) “Europe Doesn’t End at Poland’s Eastern Border”— Foreign Ministers Westerwelle and Sikorski in an Interview with the Tagesspiegel, 5 November 2010 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2010/101104-BM-SikorskiTagesspiegel-Int.html.

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Auswärtiges Amt (2011b) Schwerpunkte: Deutschland im Sicherheitsrat (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussen politik/Friedenspolitik/VereinteNationen/DEUimSicherheitsrat/101013SchwerpunkteSRMitgliedschaft_node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2012a) Germany’s Foreign Policy Parameters (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/ AktuelleArtikel/111027-ZweiJahreAupo-node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2012c) Poland (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01Nodes/Polen_node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2012d) The Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626338/publicationFile/171837/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe.pdf. Auswärtiges Amt (2012e) Meeting of the “Future Group” of EU Foreign Ministers (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2012/120319_Treffen_zukunftsgruppe.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2012f) Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinten Nationen und einzelnen, global agierenden, internationalen Organisationen und Institutionen im Rahmen des VN-Systems in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2014b) Erklärung des Rates des Deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats (DFVSR), 19 February (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/14021 9dfvsr-erklaerung/260082. Auswärtiges Amt (2016a) Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the Weimar Triangle, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany), Jean-Marc Ayrault (France) and Witold Waszczykowski (Poland), on the Future of Europe, 28 August (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/ Newsroom/160828-gemeinsame-erklaerung-weimarer-dreieck/282930. Auswärtiges Amt (2017d) Poland (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/poland/227880. Consilium (2009c) Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service (14930/09) (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http:// register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf. Consilium (2009d) EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) (Brussels: Consilium) Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Final%20 FACTSHEET%20EUFOR%20TCHAD-RCA%20version%209_EN.pdf.

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Consilium (2017b) Athena—Financing Security and Defence Military Operations (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ policies/athena/. EEAS (2010) Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Brussels: EEAS). Available at: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/ foraff/118694.pdf. EEAS (2017a) Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)—Factsheet, 13 December (Brussels: EEAS). Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ files/pesco_factsheet_13-12-2017_final.pdf. EEAS (2017b) EU Security and Defence Package, 19 October (Brussels: EEAS). Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_ en/16693/EU%20Security%20and%20Defence%20package. Official Journal of the European Communities (1996) Common Position of 2 December 1996 Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba (96/697/CFSP) (Brussels: Consilium). Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union—1 July 2011–31 December 2011 (Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Westerwelle, G. (2010) Speech by Guido Westerwelle, Member of the Bundestag and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs at the German Council on Foreign Relations Berlin, 21 October 2010 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Westerwelle, G. (2012b) Address by Dr Guido Westerwelle, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Opening of the 11th Ambassadors Conference, 27 August 2012 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Westerwelle, G. and Sikorski, R. (2012) A New Vision of Europe (Berlin: Auswartiges Amt).

PART III

Case Studies

CHAPTER 8

Countering Proliferation: The Iran Nuclear Negotiations (2002–15)

We launched our diplomatic initiative because we wanted to offer an opportunity to Iran to address international concerns […] Iran’s decision to restart enrichment activity is a clear rejection of the process the E3/EU and Iran have been engaged in for over two years with the support of the international community. —Statement by Germany, United Kingdom, France and the EU High Representative on the Iran nuclear issue, January 2006 (Consilium 2006).

Introduction The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by France, Germany, the UK, the US, China and Russia (the so-called E3+3 or P5+1 powers) and Iran on 14 July 2015 was the culmination of 12+ years of at times tortuous international negotiations. There is a burgeoning literature on what Joshi (2013) dubs the ‘permanent crisis’: Iran’s attempts to develop a military nuclear programme and the efforts of the international community, led in the early years by France, Germany and the UK as the so-called ‘E3’, to counter this.1 The prevention of Iranian nuclear p ­ roliferation has presented the EU collectively and the ‘E3’ individually with one of their most difficult international challenges, while the JCPOA represents one of the most highprofile successes of EU-led diplomacy. President Trump’s recent  unilateral withdrawal of the US from the agreement signals the abandonment of the © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_8

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diplomatic strategy of his predecessor in favour of a policy of ‘aggressive containment’ towards Iran (Geranmayeh 2017: 1). In light of this, it is timely to re-visit how this agreement came about, and particularly how the UK and Germany as two of the key international actors involved approached and contributed to this process within the context of the CFSP. To do this, this chapter begins with a brief background to and contextualisation of the crisis, including the initial decision of the E3 to exercise leadership in the international response in the absence of a policy lead from the United States. It then examines both states’ individual interests and objectives in doing so, and how they sought to pursue these through, and thereby instrumentalise, the CFSP. In particular, it considers how their ad hoc ‘E3’ leadership group which included France simultaneously set them apart from but also increasingly depended upon the support of their other EU partners through the CFSP. This is exemplified by the need to maintain the sanctions regime the EU imposed on Iran throughout the period of the negotiations, upon which their credibility as leaders was based. The Iran nuclear negotiations are thus a useful example, first and foremost, of strategic action based on co-operation and co-optation.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme as Policy Issue The foundation of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This came into force in 1970 and provides the ‘basic legal instrument’ for the ­international non-proliferation regime (Denza 2005: 290). Britain was one of the original signatories in 1968 and was strongly committed to it ‘from the outset’ (ibid), while Germany signed the following year, ratifying the treaty in 1975 (AA 2006). These commitments therefore pre-date EU efforts through EPC and then CFSP to address proliferation and, indeed, for Britain pre-date even its membership of the European Community. Both states therefore demonstrate pre-existing and longstanding national preferences for non-proliferation. This is also reflected in their membership of other multilateral organisations such as NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and, in Britain’s case as a P-5 member of the Security Council. For example, responding to a House of Commons report on Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2000, the UK government agreed that:

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Britain as a nuclear weapon state, a permanent member of the Security Council, a leading member of NATO, and a member of the G8 and EU has a key role and a key responsibility in trying to put all [WMD] under international arms control regimes. (FCO 2000: 9)

The German government made a similar statement in its 2006 defence policy Weissbuch: [T]he Federal Government is strongly engaged in the pertinent international institutions and forums, in particular in the [UN], the Disarmament Conference […] and the G8. Given the threat emanating from [WMD], special importance has to be attached to the universalisation and reinforcement of the treaties on the prohibition and non-proliferation of [WMD]… particularly the [NPT]… In the EU, Germany supports arms control policy efforts within the scope of the EU strategy against the proliferation of [WMD]. (BMVg 2006: 45)

A commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament is also a key element of the 2016 Weissbuch (BMVg 2016). The NPT regime provides the basis for how non-proliferation is approached by member states individually and in their collective efforts through the EU and CFSP. It is seen as the key element in the broader system of ‘existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms’ (Consilium 2003b: 6) whose foundations lie in the UN and, since 2004, in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which requires all states to address the threat WMD pose to international peace and security (Consilium 2008). In this context, therefore, the CFSP can be characterised as a tool or instrument through which member states can pursue and promote non-­ proliferation, providing an appropriate forum through which they can pool their efforts in achieving this shared national interest. This can be seen, for example, in the unambiguous language with which the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) addresses WMD proliferation. Identifying this as one of the five key threats to European security, it declares it to be ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’ (Consilium 2003a: 3). The ESS’s sister document, the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Consilium 2003b), agreed at the same December 2003 European Council, re-iterates this point, stating that the EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide. (Consilium 2003b: 2)

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It went on to emphasise the ‘collective responsibility’ shared by member states and EU institutions in meeting these risks before detailing a range of measures to be adopted by the Union. Two important points emerge from these documents. First, they are setting out very clearly a framework through which member states should—and agree to—address potential proliferation, thereby necessitating action where it is identified. This is reflected in the nature of the EU sanctions regime imposed on Iran which has been more punitive than that imposed at UN level.2 Second, any EU action must also take account of the ‘real and legitimate security concerns’ many third countries have (Consilium 2003b: 7). This foreshadows the ‘twin-track’ approach adopted by the E3/E3+3 towards Iran, whereby incentives for cooperation have been as important as penalties for non-cooperation (e.g. House of Commons 2008: 44). It is also interesting to note that the initial concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme first emerged in the 18  months prior to these strategies being agreed, with the E3 démarche to Tehran taking place just two months before, in October 2003. The timing suggests there were already long-standing concerns over Iranian plans—and indeed over the nuclear ambitions of other states such as North Korea— which necessitated an agreed and codified EU-level approach to non-­ proliferation. The EU strategy documents can therefore be seen as part of wider efforts to address the Iranian challenge. Iran was also one the original signatories of the NPT but has never hidden its desire to develop its nuclear programme, although always maintaining it is for civilian purposes only. The origins of the 2002 crisis lie in the IAEA’s failure in the early 1990s to detect clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons programmes, particularly in North Korea. As a consequence, the IAEA agreed a strengthened control regime in 1997 (Jones 2009). However, although Iran signed the protocol introducing these stricter controls, it had yet to ratify this by August 2002 when an Iranian opposition group made public information regarding two undeclared nuclear facilities, strengthening ‘long-held suspicions’ in the international community about Iran’s ultimate nuclear ambitions (ICG 2006: 1; Ansari 2006: 198; Bowen and Brewer 2011).3 An EEAS official previously involved in EU Iran policy at the Commission was blunter, declaring that ‘Iran was caught red-handed’.4 Its subsequent failure or refusal to ‘provide assurance to those who doubt its intentions’ (House of Commons 2004: 19) thus lies at the heart of the problem. Achieving such assurances remained the primary objective of the E3/E3+3 process, and the purpose of the sanctions agreed within the CFSP.

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The diplomatic crisis that developed over Iran’s nuclear programme coincided with the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Kienzle (2009) highlights the stark contrasts in the approaches pursued by the so-called ‘big 3’ EU states towards the two countries. Iraq was the cause of the most serious foreign policy division to date among EU states, with France and Germany on one side opposing a US-led intervention, while Britain was among those, including a number of soon-to-accede Central and Eastern European states, siding with Washington. While the divisions came about as a consequence of a clear US policy choice in favour of invasion, they were exacerbated by the decision of the three to ‘push their [own] Iraq policies towards opposing extremes’, making consensus impossible (Kienzle 2009: 15). An official in DG RELEX at the time noted that prior to the invasion of Iraq the chief problem was ‘not enough discussion’. Thus, at the European Council in Barcelona in March 2002, for example, Iraq was discussed for ‘approximately 1½ minutes’ because the member states ‘did not want to talk about it’.5 By contrast, the absence of any kind of US leadership towards Iran by the Bush Administration made the same kind of European divisions ‘virtually impossible’ (Kienzle 2009: 15). Indeed, on Iran a leadership vacuum existed, with Washington having apparently little to offer beyond the perpetuation of the ‘tough rhetoric and economic sanctions’ that had represented US policy for so long, but which had produced few if any concessions (Takeyh and Maloney 2011: 1297).6 The origins of this vacuum lie in the nature of US strategy towards Iran. This Ansari characterises as essentially ‘one of neglect’ whereby Iran could do what it wished ‘as long as it didn’t bother anyone else’ (2006: 136). However, he goes on to argue that it was ideologically driven rather than either rational or realist, and increasingly placed Washington at odds with its European allies (although the continuing absence of US competition to European companies in Iran was not something they were anxious to change) (ibid). By contrast, the EU approach towards Iran emphasised engagement, albeit conditional on political and economic reform (e.g. European Commission 2001). For example, GAERC Council Conclusions in May 2002 stated: The Council, reiterating its continued support for the process of reform and its willingness to strengthen relations […] evaluated progress in EU-Iran relations […][It] noted that broad agreement existed on […] the overall approach […] [which] should include a serious dialogue on questions such as terrorism, proliferation and regional stability. (Consilium 2002)

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Thus, while no less serious in how it has approached questions of Iranian proliferation, the EU strategy has highlighted its preference and support for engagement rather than confrontation. Thus, it emphasised its efforts since 1998 to ‘seek possibilities for co-operation’ with Iran, underlined by the launch in 2002 of negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and for a Political Dialogue Agreement (Consilium 2009: 1; Consilium 2012). Overall, the EU’s objective has ‘remain[ed] to develop a durable and positive relationship’ with Iran, even as it has sought a solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation (Consilium 2012: 1). When the crisis developed, there was ‘a clear decision’ between Britain, France and Germany that the E3 format was the most appropriate way to respond to Iran.7 Indeed, they felt ‘it was natural […] that the three of us should be doing something together’ on the issue.8 This consensus—or at least apparent lack of division—was demonstrated most strikingly on 21 October 2003 when the E3 foreign ministers, Dominique de Villepin, Joschka Fischer and Jack Straw, seized the diplomatic initiative. Flying to Tehran, they agreed an accord that would see the Iranians re-engage in co-operation with the IAEA, ratify the additional NPT protocols and suspend voluntarily its enrichment activity (IAEA 2003; ICG 2006: 1). In return, the way was open to dialogue ‘as the basis for longer-term co-­ operation’ (ICG 2006: 1). This was a high-risk strategy necessitated by the lack of a meaningful US response to the revelations about Iran’s nuclear programme, but which at the same time presented Europe with an opportunity. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighbouring Iraq in February 2003 and an IAEA report critical of Iran for violating its NPT obligations increased significantly the pressure on Tehran. The E3 states could therefore ‘prove the merits and efficacy of diplomacy, bring Iran to heal, restrain the United States, and heal trans-Atlantic wounds’ (Ansari 2006: 202). In short, this was a diplomatic opportunity too good to miss. However, despite initial success, the negotiating process quickly became bogged down, with the IAEA claiming aspects of Iranian declarations on its nuclear programme were missing, while Iran in turn was ‘unhappy with the ‘carrots’ obtained from the EU’ (Sauer 2007: 10). This has led to criticism of the value of the E3 process. For example, Harnisch argues that it was in essence a ‘buffer’, serving as a tool by which the three could resolve domestic disputes that had emerged in the post-Iraq setting (2007: 2). He goes on to suggest, though, that anyone who believes that the E3 format demonstrated these states had overcome their differences following Iraq and ‘finally got their act together’ is misguided or ‘in a state of

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denial’ (ibid). Rather, he contends that the diplomatic démarche of October 2003 relied on implicit recognition by the Bush Administration, the IAEA, fellow EU member states and ultimately the Iranian government to have any validity. Such criticism is perhaps over-stated, though. For example, one British official rejected this analysis, suggesting that while it ‘may have had that effect […] it wasn’t the primary purpose’.9 Certainly the apparent failure of the E3 process was demonstrated when it was superseded by the E3+3  in 2006, when Russia, China and the US formally joined the group. However, the fact remains that in October 2003 the US was not in a position to act, therefore negating the possibility of a meaningful Security Council response. Meanwhile as important members of the UN and IAEA as well as the EU, the E3 states could legitimately claim to be acting to support their principles, objectives and, most importantly, international obligations. Questions should be asked about the relationship between the E3 and their fellow member states over the longer term. Although the E3 received support from their EU partners, the other states nonetheless asked Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP (HR) from 1999–2009, to act as a go-between to ensure they were not left out of the process (Sauer 2007). The E3 format ‘was extremely antagonising for some’, notably Italy which resented its omission.10 Meanwhile smaller states feared they were ‘always in the hands of the bigger’.11 This is an interesting observation given that both British and German officials made clear their desire not to be seen as dominating their smaller partners.12 That said, apart from their involvement in decision-making on sanctions the other 24 member states made ‘very little positive contribution’ to the process.13 That EU sanctions were consistently tougher than those imposed by the UN (see also House of Commons 2008),14 indicates, moreover, that the E3 were able to maintain a consensus in support of strong action, however unhappy some member states may have been, no mean feat given the breadth and strength of views across the then EU26. Greece in particular ‘made a big fuss’ as a consequence of its oil exports from Iran, while Sweden was ‘more idealistic’ preferring engagement and cooperation and known to be sceptical in general about the effectiveness of  sanctions.15 Spain and Cyprus were also unenthusiastic (Smith 2010). One further point of interest here is the evolving role of the HR in the E3/E3+3 process. Prior to 2006, the HR’s function—and that of the General Secretariat of the Council—was primarily to provide support to the E3 (e.g. Consilium 2004). Indeed, at first it was considered as essentially ‘a

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kind of postman assignment’. However, once the E3 had expanded to become the E3+3  in 2006, the HR’s role ‘completely changed’.16 He became in essence their joint representative, a role formally recognised in Security Council Resolution 1929 (UN 2010).17 It is unsurprising that the importance of the E3 states was eclipsed with the involvement of the US, Russia and China. Indeed, it was suggested that the E3 remained involved simply ‘for historical reasons. But […] if the exercise would be starting now, I’m not sure the E3 would be involved. But this is almost a heretical thing [to say].’18 What is perhaps more surprising is that the HR not only remained involved, but became such a pivotal actor in the process, and that the non-EU ‘+3’ were willing to be represented in this way, rather than asking, for example, the UN Secretary-General to perform this task. The reality was that by 2006 none of the six states wanted to take the lead and Solana ‘basically was just the only person who was ready to go to Tehran’.19 Cathy Ashton, Solana’s successor as the EU’s new HR/VP,20 had the tough task of maintaining the unity of the E3+3 during the intense negotiations that culminated in the JCPOA,21 while her successor, the current HR/VP Federica Mogherini, ultimately steered the process to a successful conclusion. In the years since the JCPOA was signed the EU role has continued. Indeed, with the participants now focused on implementation, its ability to convene and facilitate discussions as well as mediate in disputes means, in the view of Blockmans and Viaud, that it is now accepted as ‘primus inter pares’ by all the parties involved (2017: 1).

British Policy Towards Iran British policy towards Iran in the context of the nuclear negotiations reflects the efforts of the domestic foreign policy regime in London to formulate and then upload to the international level its national preferences, and the pragmatism which underpinned these, as outlined previously. The FCO led on Britain’s response to the Iranian nuclear programme, but with input from other departments with an interest, particularly Number 10, the MoD and the Security Services.22 Two key objectives remained central to British policy throughout: first, the desire for an improvement in bilateral relations with Iran; second, the demand that Iran recognise and live up to its international responsibilities and obligations under the NPT and other WMD treaties (e.g. FCO 2004a, 2005). Successive governments have seen in the achievement of the former a means of promoting the latter, which is reflected in the two key principles

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which have formed the basis of British policy: ‘constructive engagement’ (e.g. House of Commons 2000b; FCO 2004a, b), and ‘conditionality’ (e.g. FCO 2004a: 1). Both have been crucial components in how Britain engaged in all multilateral contexts dealing with Iran, including the E3/E3+3 process and the CFSP, and so provide a useful basis for the analysis. Historically, Britain’s bilateral relationship with Iran, like that of the US, has been complex and at times difficult.23 Following a period of significantly increased tension immediately after the 1979 revolution, there were signs of a gradual rapprochement from 1985 onwards, and particularly during the late 1990s (House of Commons 2004: 7). The policy of ‘constructive engagement’ pursued since then reflects the strategic importance British governments continue to assign to Iran, and the guarded optimism with which the election in 1997 of the reformist Mohammed Khatami as President was viewed. In 2000, for example, the government highlighted the advantages for Britain not only from improved economic relations, but also as a consequence of Iran’s ‘central strategic position, and its key role in regional security’, which gave it the potential to support efforts to address threats such as narcotics trafficking and international terrorism, as well as the possibility it could play a positive role in the Middle East Peace Process (House of Commons 2000b). For example, in 2004, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated: Iran is a crucial player in a region central to the challenges which the UK and the international community face: the fight against terrorism, the proliferation of [WMD], international crime and illegal migration. (FCO 2004a: iii)

Moreover, even after the 2003 revelations about Iran’s nuclear programme, London remained positive about the possibilities for bilateral relations. Thus, the government concurred with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s conclusion that ‘the prospects for longer-term improvements in the [Anglo-Iranian] relationship remain good’ (House of Commons 2004: 13), even if they remained difficult in the short term (FCO 2004a). In other words, the policy of constructive engagement would remain the basis for interaction with Iran. Conditionality, the second principle, is directly linked to Britain’s support for the international non-proliferation regime which, as noted, has been a long-standing British interest pursued though a range of ­multilateral structures such as the UN, IAEA, etc. Indeed, the government makes

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clear that anti-proliferation measures ‘require a collective international response’ (FCO 2004b: 23). For the UK, maintaining the integrity of this regime therefore required Iran to satisfy the concerns of the international community about its nuclear programme. As successive governments were at pains to emphasise, Britain was not seeking to prevent Iran exercising its right to develop a civilian nuclear programme—even if some questioned whether it actually needed to given its oil reserves (e.g. House of Commons 2006).24 Rather, they have demanded that Iran follow the same rules as any other member of the international community. In other words, it must observe what is arguably the key norm of international relations, pacta sunt servanda (‘treaties must be observed’) (e.g. Rittberger and Zangl 2006), in this case by responding appropriately to the IAEA’s questions and concerns (e.g. FCO 2003, 2004a, 2005). Conditionality should not be understood only in terms of Britain’s bilateral response, however. It was also important in how this response was internationalised, something Britain consistently sought and encouraged (e.g. FCO 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2008). In particular, it provided an essential means of attaining and maintaining consensus first with Britain’s E3 and EU partners, but also in the E3+3 format and at the UN and IAEA. Thus, while Britain followed a policy of constructive engagement, it did so with the proviso that such engagement was contingent on Iran recognising and living up to its international responsibilities and obligations (e.g. FCO 2003, 2004a, 2005). It should be noted that there was disagreement between Britain and the US over the constructive engagement policy, particularly once President Bush identified Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union speech (Bush 2002). Jack Straw played this down as an ‘honest disagreement’ (House of Commons 2003), but on 2 April 2003 made clear to the Foreign Affairs Committee that Britain would have ‘nothing whatsoever’ to do with any military action against Iran (FCO 2003: 14). In so doing, he reiterated Britain’s preference for a diplomatic approach, an important point of consensus with Germany, France and other EU states. The focus on engagement and conditionality does not mean British policy was monolithic. The key change, though, was not of substance but of emphasis, with a shift away from engagement towards conditionality as negotiations with Iran became progressively harder, particularly following the election in 2005 of the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President, and wider concerns emerged over the spread of Iran’s regional influence following the US-led invasion of Iraq. This shift can

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be seen in official government pronouncements during this period. In 2000 although expressing wariness over Iran’s nuclear intentions, including ‘reports of Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability’ with Russian assistance, the UK government emphasised that it recognised Iran’s ‘legitimate security concerns’ (House of Commons 2000a). Consequently, improved bilateral links, facilitated by domestic political reform, represented ‘the best means’ of ensuring Iran lived up to its NPT responsibilities (FCO 2000: 3).25 Following Iranian agreement to suspend uranium enrichment after the E3 visit to Tehran in October 2003, Jack Straw reported to Parliament that this ‘represents a good start to the process of resolving international concerns […] [but] the real test will be full and early implementation of the [Iranian] commitments’ (Hansard 2003). In 2004, the tone started to change, however. The government emphasised that engagement ‘should remain our policy’ but that Iran would ‘need to address our political concerns’ (FCO 2004a: 3–4). Later that year, however, it was talking of ‘critical’ rather than constructive engagement (FCO 2004b: 14). In 2005, it again emphasised that Iran needed to ‘fulfil its international obligations’ (FCO 2005: 31). Meanwhile, in 2006 Jack Straw observed that while no-one was certain Iran was seeking to develop nuclear weapons, ‘we are absolutely sure […] Iran [has] failed to meet its very clear obligations’ under the NPT (House of Commons 2006), and an FCO report declared that Iran was ‘failing to cooperate adequately with the IAEA’ (FCO 2006). In 2007, although again ­accepting that it had ‘every right’ to develop a civil nuclear programme, David Miliband chastised Iran, demanding ‘it accept that it has responsibilities to the […] international community. It cannot violate the [NPT]’ (Hansard 2007). And in 2008 an FCO report was even more explicit, declaring that Iran ‘must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. This is the primary goal of UK, and E3+3, policy’ (FCO 2008: 5). The Coalition Government continued the approach adopted by its predecessors, but with a markedly tougher tone and against a backdrop of increasing tensions in UK-Iranian relations. In a Commons debate in May 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague declared: The single biggest foreign policy priority after Afghanistan and Pakistan is to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability could unleash a cascade of nuclear proliferation and significantly destabilise the region. (Hansard 2010, c180)

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The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iranian President in 2013 was seen in London as an opportunity to inject fresh impetus into a negotiation process ‘which had been moribund’ under his predecessor (Smith 2014: 6), as well as to attempt a thaw on UK-Iranian relations which had reached a low point with the storming of the UK embassy in Tehran in November 2011. When the final deal was reached, it was hailed by Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond as ‘a landmark moment in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, and a victory for diplomacy’ (Hansard 2015). Engagement and conditionality have been the basis of British policy towards Iran. At the same time, it has focused on the necessity for a collective international response to Iran to uphold the integrity of the NPT regime. Consequently, for Britain the UN and IAEA as the source of authority for the NPT regime have been the primary institutions, while the role of the EU and CFSP has been to support them. One British official described the CFSP as ‘essential’ in this sense, believing that the fact that a European consensus around a tough sanctions regime was maintained for so long suggests that Britain had ‘successfully Europeanized’ its policies.26 For Britain, the CFSP thus had an important instrumental role to play vis-à-vis Iran and as will be discussed, Britain saw the E3 as a means of galvanising the other member states and ensuring their response to Iran remained suitably robust.

German Policy Towards Iran The comments of two AA officials encompass how German policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme was constructed. One declared: ‘we can’t allow Iran to escape nuclear control. They can’t just go about and create an atomic weapon’; meanwhile, another described it as ‘unthinkable’ that Germany and its E3 partners would do anything on Iran ‘without the backing of the other member states’.27 It is within these parameters that German policy developed after the crisis began in 2002. In many ways the basis for German policy is the analogue of Britain’s. It focuses on political, economic and social engagement (e.g. Bundesregierung 2001; Bundestag 2004) while employing diplomatic pressure and sanctions to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons—i.e. the same ‘dual approach’ as its partners (e.g. AA 2007, 2011). This policy in turn fits into Germany’s wider objective of preventing WMD proliferation, with a clear, long-standing and vital national interest identified as preventing either state or non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons (e.g. AA and BVMg 2009: 10;

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BMVg 2011: 2–3). Again, like Britain, Germany considers this objective achievable only multilaterally and in partnership with other states (e.g. AA 2000; Bundestag 2005; BMVg 2011: 5). There are, though, some important ideational differences, discussed below, in terms of how Germany conceptualises the problem of proliferation itself, and how it identifies itself within the multilateral environment it believes is essential to resolving this. However, throughout the negotiations it remained as committed as Britain to achieving an effective, comprehensive and sustained European response as an essential part of how the international community dealt with Iran. As noted, Germany has strongly supported the international non-­ proliferation regime from the outset. It is committed to the ‘values and objectives’ of a system that is ‘treaty-based, transparent and verifiable’ (AA 2006: v). The NPT represents the ‘cornerstone’ of this system and a ‘key task’ of the international community is to uphold and strengthen it (AA 2011b, 2016). Indeed, it has often called for the ‘legal and political instruments’ underpinning it ‘to be strengthened’ (AA 2000: 69), something requiring the ‘universalisation and reinforcement’ of the treaties (BMVg 2006: 45). Non-proliferation and disarmament represent important components of a German security policy geared first and foremost to conflict prevention (BMVg 2006) but they are also ‘increasingly important instruments of crisis management’ (BMVg 2016: 82). The emphasis it places on linking these agendas represents a small but important area of difference from Britain. Germany sees them as either mutually supportive or mutually undermining: nuclear disarmament requires ‘an efficient non-­ proliferation regime’ but this is unsustainable in the absence of nuclear disarmament, making them ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Westerwelle 2012). This emphasis on the inter-linkage of disarmament and non-­ proliferation indicates a different ideational basis to how Germany approaches proliferation compared to London, which in turn reflects Germany’s status as a non-nuclear weapons state. This is not to suggest that Britain does not also pursue nuclear disarmament—rather, that for German this aim is more explicit and fits into its role conception as a civilian or even ‘pacifist’ power. Like Britain, Germany considers an effective international response essential to the achievement of non-proliferation. Crucial to regional and global security and stability, non-proliferation can only be achieved through a ‘co-operative security policy’ (AA 2000: 69). In this, the UN is the key actor—it must ‘play a central role’ in the framework of broader

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security cooperation (Bundesregierung 2002: 4) and be the ‘central institution if multilateralism is to be effective’ (Bundesregierung 2007a: 23). NATO is also seen as having an important and ‘active contribution’ to make in this context (BMVg 2016: 66). In addition, Germany has also called for a ‘new strategic consensus’ on international measures to combat proliferation (Bundesregierung 2004: 5) and has pursued this within the UN system. For example, following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, it joined with a group of 11 other countries to establish the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (sometimes also referred to as the Friends of the NPT) to advance the non-proliferation and disarmament agendas as ‘mutually reinforcing processes’ (AA 2010) and acts as coordinator of the group (AA 2016).28 Germany also promoted both objectives through its 2011–12 membership of the Security Council (AA 2011a; Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations 2012). Beyond the UN, Germany used its 2007 Presidencies of the G8 and European Council to prioritise non-proliferation. Thus, it led its G8 partners in committing to ‘counter[ing] the global proliferation challenge’ and to supporting the UN and Security Council in achieving this (Bundesregierung 2007b, c), while pushing its EU partners to do the same (Bundesregierung 2008). Compared to Britain, there are small but significant differences in how Germany approaches the international structures, particularly in how it views the role of the EU and CFSP. Both states obviously recognise their instrumental importance. However, whereas Britain takes a more pragmatic view, Germany’s stance could be characterised as more ideational and absolutist in the sense that Germany foreign and security policy are ‘largely defined’ through the EU and CFSP (AA and BVMg 2009: 11). Indeed, it describes itself as being ‘committed to serving world peace’ by being a strong partner in Europe (BMVg 2011: 3). Consequently, while for Britain the CFSP may have become an essential channel in resolving the Iranian crisis, for Germany it was always so. One explanation for this is Germany not having P-5 status in the Security Council. Consequently, while it may be influential in the UN, the EU represents an important formal international framework through which it can pursue its objectives vis-à-vis Iran. (A British official suggested that this is a reason Germany is in favour of a stronger EU role in other international organisations more generally.29) German-Iranian relations since the 1990s have followed a similar path to those of Britain, with a focus on engagement and negotiation giving way to growing frustration and support for stricter international sanctions.

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Prior to 2002, Germany’s primary concerns were Iran’s human rights record—considered ‘catastrophic’ by the government (Bundesregierung 2001: 1)—and efforts to develop political and economic relations with Tehran. As in Britain, Iran was also seen as a potentially important strategic partner in addressing drug-trafficking (ibid). From 2002 onwards, however, Iran is mentioned in the official retrospective government assessments of global disarmament (Jahresabrüstungsbericht). Initially concerns focus on its links to importation and exportation of rocket technology (Bundesregierung 2002). However, in 2004, following the visit in 2003 of the E3 foreign ministers to Tehran, more detailed analyses highlight its failure to comply with IAEA demands for full and transparent declarations about its nuclear programme, while there is increased ‘concern’ over the impact of its nuclear intentions on regional security (Bundesregierung 2004: 21–2). As a consequence, Iran is listed alongside North Korea and Libya as being at the centre of ‘international non-proliferation efforts’ (Bundesregierung 2004: 5). The same year, Foreign Minister Fischer declared that while Germany was not trying to infringe on the ‘sovereign right’ of states to develop civilian nuclear programmes, a nuclear-armed Iran would be ‘a dangerous development in […] one of the most dangerous regions’ (Bundestag 2004). Assessments in subsequent years paint a similar picture, but demonstrate growing concern and frustration at perceived Iranian intransigence. For example, the 2004 Jahresabrüstungsbericht uses almost identical wording, again bracketing Iran with North Korea, although highlighting progress following the E3 visit (Bundesregierung 2005). In 2005, as the negotiations become difficult, the government demands that Iran act in good faith and build trust if it wants cooperation from the E3 and their EU partners (Bundesregierung 2006). In 2006, the government refers explicitly to a ‘secret’ weapons programme and to the growing risk to Iran of ‘self-isolation and confrontation’ (Bundesregierung 2007a: 4, 15). It also notes that despite lacking Security Council membership, Germany would remain active and engaged in the E3+3 process to achieve a ‘diplomatic solution’ (ibid). The 2007 assessment focuses particularly on the efforts of Germany’s EU Presidency to promote support for Security Council Resolution 1737 which strongly censured Iran (Bundesregierung 2008). It also noted its efforts with France and Britain to promote another resolution, UNSCR 1803, against Iran, and re-iterated the risks to Iran of ‘self-isolation’ and ‘confrontation’ (Bundesregierung 2008: 15). In 2008, the government notes the EU agreement to implement autonomous sanctions against

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Iranian banks in addition to ongoing efforts at the UN (Bundesregierung 2009). Finally, in 2010, the government re-states its objective that Iran return to negotiations, noting that sanctions are just one part of the ‘double-track’ strategy (Doppelstrategie), with the possibility of resolving the crisis remaining in Iranian hands (Bundesregierung 2010: 2–3). By 2016, a year on from the JCPOA, the assessment highlights the agreement as a ‘rare success in the diplomatic relations of the Middle East’ with Iran now subject to the ‘strongest IAEA verification and monitoring measures in the world’ (AA 2016: 19–20). This brief discussion illustrates a number of key points. First, like Britain, the German government has pursued a consistent policy of demanding cooperation and transparency from Iran over its nuclear programme, in return for which it will enjoy improved political and economic relations. Second, Germany has remained entirely committed to achieving a diplomatic solution to the crisis, for which the UN and EU are vital and mutually supportive (a similar approach to that adopted over the Ukraine crisis). Thus, while it does not enjoy Security Council membership, it nonetheless sought to support and promote UN efforts to compel Iran to comply with Security Council Resolutions. To do this, it operated individually, but also through its Presidencies of the EU and G8. Of particular importance, then, were Germany’s efforts through the E3 to set the policy direction on Iran within the EU and CFSP.

British and German Engagement with the CFSP on Iran Of interest here is how Britain and Germany conceptualised the E3/E3+3 and sought to use it to operationalise the CFSP (and EU) in the international response to Iran. Both wished to employ it as one of several instruments to ensure Iran lived up to its international responsibilities, something that could only be achieved in a multilateral context—a ‘multifaceted system and architecture’.30 In this architecture, the international institutions that mattered most were the UN—particularly the Security Council—and IAEA as these provided the legal basis and authority for any international action against Iran over its nuclear programme. For Britain, therefore, the function of the CFSP and EU was to contribute to the enforcement of these resolutions, not to achieve a particular EU objective per se (although this may be an additional outcome), or act according to an EU-generated norm. Germany took the same view of the importance of upholding and

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even strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. Moreover, while it was more comfortable in identifying its foreign policy within a European framework, the desire to instrumentalise the CFSP was as strong as for Britain, and perhaps even stronger. For Germany, the E3/E3+3 format was an important instrument for achieving this, and can be seen as perhaps the most notable recent example of its efforts at shared leadership with France and Britain (discussed previously). For both states the role of the EU was to operate within this larger international framework. This is not to suggest that the EU is not an important actor in its own right, but rather to remember that it is part of a wider picture, and that ensuring Iranian non-proliferation has far greater ramifications, involving as it does the enforcement of UN and IAEA resolutions. The EU matters in terms of its ability to deploy foreign policy instruments (legal, economic, etc) in pursuit of this objective. Thus, EU sanctions as well as their corollary in terms of potential political, economic and trade links—the ‘carrot for Iran’31—gave the organisation weight and influence. Moreover, not only did these instruments enable it to play a meaningful role, their availability required it to do so. Along with the consensus among member states in support of non-proliferation, they provided the basis for the EU sanctions regime. Equally that consensus, exemplified by the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as the interdependence and membership cross-over between the EU, UN and IAEA, meant that the E3 expected nothing less than the maintenance of a robust sanctions regime and, moreover, one that would be tougher than the UN’s. For example, one German diplomat declared that with the sanctions package, Germany’s ‘national objective, together with the E3 partners, was […] to make sure that the EU sends a very clear and strong message to Iran’.32 Similarly, a British official suggested that having ‘worked very closely’ to develop the sanctions, they ‘want all member states to respect [it] […] and do what they can to make sure they’re implemented’.33 The E3 format served two important functions in this process. It was a tool for Britain, Germany and France to galvanise action at European level and ensure the EU continued to live up to its commitments vis-à-vis support for non-proliferation. It also provided a means of engaging with global partners, as well as Iran, and in the absence of meaningful US involvement in the initial stages of the crisis, to provide leadership in the international response. As a consequence, the E3 was thus both part of and also separate from the EU. Its authority—as well as that of the HR as

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the E3+3 envoy—was underpinned and reinforced by the EU by virtue of the sanctions the latter could deploy or improved economic links it could offer. But equally, E3 diplomacy operated beyond the EU, engaging with the ‘+3’ at the global level and in other multilateral contexts. In support of this function, the intention of all E3 states was to instrumentalise the EU to achieve a very particular goal as part of the wider non-proliferation architecture. This is demonstrated by the manner in which E3 leadership was presented by to their EU partners—i.e. as a fait accompli. Although achieving E3 policy on Iran was ‘unthinkable’ without the backing of the other member states, no agreement was ever formally negotiated among the whole membership delegating power to them.34 Indeed, the other states ‘didn’t have any choice’.35 Despite this, they were generally willing to accept—or at least acquiesce in—E3 leadership.36 What is interesting, though, is that despite their anxiety to avoid being seen as one of ‘the big ones trying to bully the small ones’,37 Germany had no objection to creating this European mini-contact group or directoire. Indeed, as one senior official demonstrated, there was a definite realism in the German stance towards its shared leadership role on Iran: [I]t has to do with […] economic weight and the weight we can throw in when it comes to sanctions, because most of the business with Iran inside the EU is done by Germany, the UK and France […] And the other aspect obviously was the set-up in the Security Council […] That’s why we could convince our partners […] to hold still and let us […] lead the way […] And it’s too serious and threatening a situation that we can just bicker about who has better mediating qualities […] That was fairly quickly accepted.38

It is also shown by the fact that key decisions on Iran were taken within the E3+3 or UN Security Council (plus Germany),39 not by the EU.  Perhaps the clearest evidence for this is the fact that Iran policy remained predominantly a matter for Political Directors.40 Within the FCO, for example, the Political Director dealt directly with the department’s Iran experts, with the CFSP department only becoming involved in terms of briefing other states and ‘handling Italy’ which, as noted, had difficulties accepting its exclusion from the E3.41 Similarly, despite the importance of the HR, in a real sense the E3+3 process was not ‘a Brussels-­ driven exercise’: rather, key meetings and discussions, particularly with the ‘+3’, went through capitals.42

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The role of the CFSP, then, was to facilitate E3 leaderships in a number of key ways. First, it was the arena in which the political agreements were made to institute and strengthen sanctions on Iran. Thus, although their legal and financial frameworks were negotiated and finalised in the RELEX working group, the political mandate came from the PSC (AA 2008: 32). The process for turning this mandate into an agreed set of measures required, in turn, often intense negotiations that could involve meetings lasting 12+ hours a day, three to four times per week, with one official noting ‘you spend more time with these people than your family’.43 Beyond this, the CFSP also facilitated the diplomatic interactions between the E3 and their EU partners. Thus, it provided a vital framework within which the E3 communicated with the other member states about the status of the negotiation process, the thinking of the ‘+3’ states, etc. As part of this, within the PSC the efforts of the E3 were aimed at ensuring a level of transparency in their briefings that was sufficient to ‘reduce the level of discomfort’ for their partners caused by their leadership.44 In general, the FAC and PSC received formal briefings prior to and de-briefings following meetings of the E3+3, although these did not take place at working group level.45 Meanwhile, the decision quite early on to involve Javier Solana, the HR, was also taken with the aim of making the management of this dynamic easier. Not only did it serve the practical purpose of ensuring that the General Secretariat of the Council was closely involved in drafting the relevant papers relating to the offer of a strategic relationship between the EU and Iran—a key element in any solution46; it also meant that to some extent the other member states were represented. Solana’s role in this sense was to act almost as the ‘conscience’ of the other states.47 The HR also had an important ‘balancing’ role to play so the other member states ‘[didn’t] have to turn to the EU3’ to find out what was happening in the negotiations.48 Although not always straightforward, it was the achievement and maintenance of agreement at 27 on the policy towards Iran that was the E3 states’ chief concern and objective within CFSP. There was a ‘basic agreement’ on the need for the two-track approach of negotiations and sanctions, but beyond that there were ‘different views’.49 One of the most significant challenges was to maintain the consensus on the robustness of the sanctions regime. For Britain and France as P-5 states especially, it was vital that the EU’s response not only remained in lock-step with that of the Security Council, but that its sanctions regime was even more stringent—or, as a senior Iranian diplomat put it, ‘more Catholic than the

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pope’ (Mousavian et al. 2013). However, as noted there were a range of attitudes towards sanctions among the member states, with some less convinced about their effectiveness, and others of the need for them to be so tough.50 Meanwhile, the challenge of achieving unanimity was not limited to the PSC but also extended to decisions taken in the RELEX group. Although technically the regulations on Iran could be agreed by a qualified majority, one German diplomat declared that ‘very many colleagues would rather be shot than to allow for that, because it would absolutely change the way that the game works’.51

Conclusion The overall success of the ‘E3-only’ component of the process and the engagement with Iran that it initiated is certainly questionable. Indeed, one official involved contended that the E3 essentially failed.52 The complexity of the negotiations was matched only by the repeated impasses and delays, and David Miliband suggested the process had spent ‘more time in stasis […] than in action’ over the whole period.53 However, of interest here is what this tells us about how Britain and Germany interacted with the CFSP on the question of Iranian nuclear proliferation. They decided to create, with France, what was essentially a 3-state contact group—or directoire—and through this sought to lead the EU response to Iran, even after the ‘+3’ states became involved. Moreover, whilst there were sometimes strong disagreements between member states over the extent and severity of EU sanctions, sanctions were not only maintained, at times they were even strengthened.54 This demonstrates a determination on behalf of the UK and Germany (as well as France) to utilise the CFSP first to achieve nationally-based security goals in the absence of meaningful action by the UN Security Council, and then to ensure their objectives remained the basis of EU policy in the longer-term. Whilst not unusual for Britain, given what has already been said about its pragmatic and instrumentalist view of the CFSP, Germany’s willingness to do the same is noteworthy given how it would identify itself as much more communautaire. The CFSP was thus essential both in the initial ‘E3-only’ stage of the process in terms of developing a meaningful EU response to Iran and also from 2006 onwards for E3 engagement with their ‘+3’ partners. Its most important contribution was to enable them to maintain agreement with their EU partners over both the policy towards Iran and its implementation. As would be expected, therefore, British and German strategy was

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thus co-operative in terms of working with partners within the CFSP to achieve these goals. However, it was also about co-opting the EU to achieve a number of other wider objectives: normatively, to support the NPT regime at the international level and the UN system within which it is located; but also pragmatically to give credibility and legitimacy first to the E3 process with Iran, and then to their ongoing participation once the negotiations internationalised further after 2006. A consequence of this, though, was the increasing involvement of the High Representatives. Their ability to play a coordinating and mediating role ultimately made them the most influential European actor in the negotiations, something that was unforeseen. Given this, the comments of Helga Schmid, Secretary-­ General of the EEAS since 2016 and previously heavily involved in the negotiations, are revealing: Only the [EU] could have played that role. […] Russia, China and the US could not have done it, but also none of the EU Member States […] It was only the EU that was accepted because the EU was perceived by both sides as a neutral actor, as a moderator, a facilitator. We were bridge builder in the context between Iran and the US, which continues to be difficult.55

Notes 1. See, for example: Ansari, A.M. (2006) Confronting Iran—The failure of American foreign policy and the roots of mistrust (London: Hurst and Company); Borda, A.Z. (2005) ‘The Iranian Nuclear Issue and EU3 Negotiations’. FORNET Working Paper, 8; Bowen, W.Q. and Brewer, J. (2011) ‘Iran’s Nuclear Challenge: Nine Years and Counting’. International Affairs, 87(4); Dalton, R. (ed.) (2008) Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock (London: Chatham House); Denza, E. (2005) ‘Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European Union and Iran’. European Foreign Affairs Review, 10, pp.  289–311; Harnisch, S. and Linden, R. (2005) ‘Iran and Nuclear Proliferation—Europe’s Slow-Burning Diplomatic Crisis’, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, 6(17); Joshi, S. (2013) The Permanent Crisis—Iran’s Nuclear Trajectory (Whitehall Paper 79). (London: RUSI); Sauer, T. (2007) ‘Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Case of Iran’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’). 2. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2). See also House of Commons (2008: 43).

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3. Ansari argues that revelations about the Iranian nuclear programme were ‘as much an embarrassment to Western intelligence agencies’ who failed to detect them as they were for the Iranians (2006: 200). 4. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 5. Interview, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 2010. 6. Iran did in fact make a secret proposal to the US in May 2003 which was rejected by the Bush White House despite some interest from the US State Department (Sauer 2007: 8). Hooman Majd identifies former Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi as the ‘principal author of the infamous Iranian ‘proposal’ to the White House’ which set out the steps Iran was prepared to take to normalise relations but which was ‘rejected by George Bush out of hand’ (Majd  2008: 186). In response to the offer, VicePresident Dick Cheney’s office reportedly responded ‘[w]e don’t negotiate with evil’ but Patrikarakos argues that ‘[t]o dismiss the offer out of hand must go down as a colossal act of short sightedness bordering on the negligent’ (2012: 22–5). 7. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 8. Interviews, FCO Official (retired), 2011 (UKO4), and German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO3). 9. Interview, FCO Official (retired), 2011 (UKO4). 10. Interviews, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012, FCO official (retired), 2011 (UKO4) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 11. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 12. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2, GO3) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3). 13. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 14. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2) and European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 15. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 16. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 17. Paragraph 33 states that the Security Council “[e]ncourages the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution” (UN 2010). 18. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 19. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 20. Following the agreement of the Treaty of Lisbon, the High Representative also became a Vice-President of the European Commission (see Chap. 9). 21. A German diplomat who had been critical of some of Ashton’s other work as HR/VP was fulsome in his praise for her contribution to the Iranian negotiations, declaring she was ‘doing a very good job’. Interview, Auswärtiges

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Amt, Berlin, April 2012. Reflecting on her experiences at a public lecture at University College London in December 2015, Ashton described the E3+3 as ‘an unusual grouping that continued to work together even when there were issues outside’—i.e. the developing crisis in the Ukraine. 22. Interview, FCO Official (retired), 2011 (UKO4). 23. See Ansari (2006, chaps. 1 and 2) for a detailed examination of AngloIranian relations since the nineteenth century. 24. The Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2004 Report on Iran stated that ‘the arguments as to whether Iran has a genuine requirement for domesticallyproduced nuclear electricity are not all, or even predominantly, on one side. …[However] we do not believe that the United States or any other country has the right to dictate to Iran how it meets its increasing demands for electricity’ (House of Commons 2004: 19). 25. Similarly, in a memo to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the FCO stated: “Ultimately […] we believe the best means of ensuring Iran abides by its treaty commitments lies in the continuation of the political reform and rapprochement with the West begun under President Khatami […] Hence our policy of engagement with Iran on non-proliferation and other issues” (House of Commons 2000c). 26. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 27. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO3) and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO7). 28. The original members are Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (AA 2010), with The Philippines joining in 2013 (AA 2016). 29. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 30. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 31. Interview, FCO Official (retired), 2011 (UKO4). 32. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2). 33. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 34. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 2012 (GO7). 35. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 36. Interviews FCO Official (retired), 2011 (UKO4) and German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. (GO3). 37. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2). 38. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO3). 39. This depended on whether or not Germany had a seat on the Council as one of the 9 non-permanent members which it did for example from 2011–12. 40. Interviews, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2011 (UKO3) and 2012 (UKO6). 41. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6).

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42. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 43. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2). The interviewee offered some interesting insights into the process of negotiating the sanctions: ‘it also has to do very much with the drama […] There are situations in which before a decisive meeting there is an informal pre-meeting in which people discuss the choreography of how it’s going to go […] so as to create the drama that can help everybody in the end to go back showing ‘I fought like a lion and this here is the best thing we could get, and nobody could possibly get anything better than this’.’ 44. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 2012 (UKO6). 45. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 46. An EEAS official noted that the General Secretariat of the Council was ‘basically the supporting structure’ when it came to Iran—a role now taken on by the EEAS—with the team of officials involved remaining very small throughout. Interview, European External Action service, Brussels, 2012. 47. Interview, FCO Official (retired), 2011 (UKO4). 48. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 49. Telephone Interview, Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 50. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2). 51. Interview, German Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012 (GO2). 52. Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 2012. 53. Interview, London, 6 December 2010. 54. Interviews, German Permanent Representation, Brussels (GO2); European External Action Service, Brussels and Swedish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 2012. 55. Schmid was speaking at the Carnegie Europe event ‘Europe and Iran: Beyond the nuclear deal’ on 17 May 2017 (http://carnegieeurope. eu/2017/05/17/europe-and-iran-beyond-nuclear-deal-event-5595).

Bibliography Ansari, A.M. (2006) Confronting Iran—The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust (London: Hurst and Company). Blockmans, S. and Viaud, A. (2017) ‘EU Diplomacy and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Staying Power?’. CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017-28, Brussels, 14 July. Bowen, W.Q. and Brewer, J.  (2011) ‘Iran’s Nuclear Challenge: Nine Years and Counting’. International Affairs, 87(4), pp. 923–943. Denza, E. (2005) ‘Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The European Union and Iran’. European Foreign Affairs Review, 10, pp. 289–311. Geranmayeh, E. (2017) The Coming Clash: Why Iran will Divide Europe from the United States. European Council on Foreign Relations, October.

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Harnisch, S. (2007) ‘Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-­ building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative’. European Security, 16(1), pp. 1–27. ICG (2006) ‘Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?’ Middle East Report No. 51 (Brussels: International Crisis Group). Jones, S. (2009) ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran: An introduction’. Research Paper 09/92 (London: House of Commons Library). Joshi, S. (2013) The Permanent Crisis—Iran’s Nuclear Trajectory, Whitehall Paper 79 (London: RUSI). Kienzle, B. (2009) ‘Between Consensus and Dissonance: Explaining the EU’s IRAQ and IRAN Policies’. Fornet CFSP Forum, 7(3), pp. 12–16. Majd, H. (2008) The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran (New York: Doubleday). Mousavian, S.H., Lewis, P. and Dalton, R. (2013) Nuclear Iran: Negotiating a Way Out (Transcript) (London: Chatham House). Available at: http://www. chathamhouse.org/events/view/188579. Patrikarakos, D. (2012) ‘Lighting Iran’s Nuclear Fuse’. The World Today (London: Chatham House). Rittberger, V. and Zangl, B. (2006) International Organisation: Polity, Politics and Policy (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Sauer, T. (2007) ‘Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Case of Iran’. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’). Smith, B. (2010) Iran’s Nuclear Programme, and Sanctions, SN/IA/5275 (London: House of Commons Library), 13 October. Smith, B. (2014) Iran, the Nuclear Negotiations and Relations with the UK, SNIA/7010 (London: House of Commons Library), 3 December. Takeyh, R. and Maloney, S. (2011) ‘The Self-limiting Success of Iran Sanctions’. International Affairs, 87(6), pp. 1297–1312.

Bibliography—Official Documents Auswärtiges Amt (2000) Deutsche Auβenpolitik 2000 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2006) Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Key Documents, 2nd Edition. (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2007a) Iran: Let us Seize the Opportunity for New Talks (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/ Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherUndMittlererOsten/ Iran/071205-iran.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2008) Vademecum für die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2010b) Joint Statement by Foreign Ministers on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation—New York, 22 September (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt).

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Auswärtiges Amt (2011a) Pressemitteilung: Außenminister Westerwelle: Unerlaubte Verbreitung von Nuklearmaterial und technologien verhindern (6 November) (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2011b) Schwerpunkte: Deutschland im Sicherheitsrat (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/ A u s s e n p o l i t i k / F r i e d e n s p o l i t i k / Ve r e i n t e N a t i o n e n / DEUimSicherheitsrat/101013-SchwerpunkteSRMitgliedschaft_node.html. Auswärtiges Amt (2011c) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt. de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/Abruestung_/Nukleares/NVV_node. html. Auswärtiges Amt (2016b) Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2016 (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/290426/b0f786 1be0fb9bbe6d24e2c7dc320996/170531-jab-2016-deu-data.pdf. Auswärtiges Amt and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2009) The European Security and Defence Policy (Berlin: Federal Foreign Office and Federal Ministry of Defence). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2006) Weissbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2011) Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests—Assuming International Responsibility— Shaping Security Together (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (2016) Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung). Bundesregierung (2001) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Carsten Hübner und der Fraktion der PDS  – Drucksache 14/6319 – Deutsch-Iranische Beziehungen (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2002) Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung – Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Abrüstung, Rüstungskontrolle und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotenziale (Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2001) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2004) Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung – Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotenziale (Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2003) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2005) Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung – Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotentiale (Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2004) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2006) Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung – Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung

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und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotenziale (Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2005) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2007a) “Europa gelingt gemeinsam”  – Präsidentschaftsprogramm – 1. Januar–30. Juni 2007 (Berlin: Bundesregierung). Bundesregierung (2007b) G8 Summit—Chair’s Summary—Heiligendamm, 8 June (Berlin: Bundesregierung). Bundesregierung (2007c) G8 Summit—Heiligendamm Statement on Non-­ proliferation (Berlin: Bundesregierung). Bundesregierung (2008) Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung – Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotenziale (Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2007) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2009a) Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung – Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Bemühungen um Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung sowie über die Entwicklung der Streitkräftepotenziale (Jahresabrüstungsbericht 2008) (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2010a) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Niema Movassat, Dr. Diether Dehm, Inge Höger, Alexander Ulrich und der Fraktion DIE LINKE.  – Drucksache 17/2745 – Das iranische Atomprogramm und die Verhängung von Sanktionen seitens der EU gegen den Iran (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundestag (2004) Deutscher Bundestag – 15. Wahlperiode – 138. Sitzung. Berlin, Donnerstag, den 11. November 2004 (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundestag (2005) Deutscher Bundestag – 15. Wahlperiode – 183. Sitzung. Berlin, Mittwoch, den 29. Juni 2005 (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bush, G.W. (2002) State of the Union Address (Washington: State of the Union Address Library). Available at: http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/2002george-w-bush. Consilium (2002) Conclusions—2425th Council Meeting—General Affairs— Brussels, 13 May 2002 (8649/02) (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2003a) European Security Strategy—A Secure Europe in a Better World (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2003b) EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (15708/03) (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2004) Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the Agreement on Iran’s Nuclear Programme (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2006) Statement by Germany, United Kingdom, France and the EU High Representative on the Iranian Nuclear Issue (Brussels: Consilium). Consilium (2008b) Council Conclusions and New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems, 17 December (Brussels: Consilium).

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Consilium (2009a) EU-Iran—Basic Facts (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-IRAN_Basic_ facts_April_2009.pdf. Consilium (2012) Factsheet—The European Union and Iran (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/EN/foraff/127364.pdf. European Commission (2001) COM (2001) 71 Final—Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council—EU relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities). FCO (2000) Foreign Affairs Committee: Eighth Report of the Session 1999–2000— Weapons of Mass Destruction—Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2003) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism—Tenth Report of Session 2002–03—Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, September 2003 (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2004a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Iran—Third Report of Session 2003–04— Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2004b) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism—Second Report of Session 2003–04—Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, March 2004 (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2005) Foreign Affairs Committee: Sixth Report of the Session 2004–05— Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism—Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2006b) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism—Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2008b) Fifth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee—Session 2007–08— Global Security: Iran—Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (London: The Stationery Office). Hansard (2003) Written Statements (Commons)—Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs—Iran—HC Deb 23 October 2003 vol 411 cc46-8WS (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2007) Written Answers for 23 July 2007—Foreign and Commonwealth Office—Iran: Foreign Relations—Column 706W (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2010) House of Commons Debates—Foreign Affairs and Defence— Column 180—26 May (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2015) Iran: Nuclear Deal 15 July 2015—Column 894 (London: House of Parliament).

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House of Commons (2000b) Foreign Affairs Committee: Eighth Report, Session 1999–2000—Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2000c) Foreign Affairs Committee: Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence—Appendix 1—Memorandum Submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2000d) Foreign Affairs Committee: Eighth Report, Session 1999–2000—Weapons of Mass Destruction—Report, Proceedings, Evidence and Appendices (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2003a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40–52)—10 June (London: Houses of Parliament). Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/774/3061001.htm. House of Commons (2004b) Foreign Affairs Committee: Iran—Third Report of Session 2003–04 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2006a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1–19)—8 February (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2008d) Foreign Affairs Committee: Global Security: Iran— Fifth Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). IAEA (2003) Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers—21 October 2003, Vienna. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml. Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (2012) Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York. Available at: http://www.new-yorkun.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/05/non-proliferation.html. UN (2010) Resolution 1929 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th Meeting, on 9 June 2010 (New York: United Nations). Westerwelle, G. (2012a) Rede Außenminister Guido Westerwelles auf dem “Forum für eine atomwaffenfreie Welt” in Astana, 29 August (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt).

CHAPTER 9

The Establishment of the European External Action Service

‘The [EEAS] will mark a new beginning for European foreign and security policy […] which will enhance our ability to act more creatively and decisively in an increasingly challenging world’ —Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, December 2010 (EEAS 2010).

Introduction The European External Action Service (EEAS) represents part of the institutional response to the perennial problems of inefficiency and incoherence that have affected the CFSP since its launch. For Hemra et al. (2011: 3), it is the ‘institutional embodiment’ of the member states’ ‘somewhat ambivalent ambition that the EU should be a diplomatic heavyweight’. The challenge policy-makers have faced since the creation of the CFSP, encapsulated in Hill’s concept of the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ (1993), is of achieving that coherence and efficiency by making more effective use of all the instruments and resources available to the Union. In particular, this involves better use of the significant economic, trade and aid instruments traditionally deployed by the Commission to support the foreign and security policy goals determined by the Council through the CFSP. While attempts were made in the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) to improve the ability of the EU to agree and then implement particular CFSP objectives, these did not address the key issue relating to © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_9

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the institutional division between EU external relations as practised by the Commission on the one hand, and the CFSP as an entity controlled and administered through the Council’s structures on the other. The Treaty of Lisbon, in sum, was an attempt to turn the ‘rather accidental arrangements’ that had existed up to that point into ‘something more sensible and coherent’ (Crowe 2008: 13). In pursuit of this, the EEAS was one of Lisbon’s ‘more eye-catching innovations’ (Whitman 2008: 6)—the show-­ piece of a new, more joined-up approach to EU external relations. This chapter explores the roles of Britain and Germany in its establishment and their differing attitudes and views as to its purpose and merits. The chapter begins with a brief outline of the EEAS as a policy issue. It then examines in turn the development of the official British and German positions towards the EEAS in the pre- and post-Lisbon periods. The final section considers how they engaged with their fellow member states within the structures of the CFSP to pursue and promote these. Two quite opposing standpoints are revealed. On the one hand Germany, as one of the states to have originally advanced the concept of a ‘European Foreign Ministry’, worked to promote the idea and push for the development of an institutional actor that could provide a focal point for EU foreign and security policy-making independent of both Commission and Council. On the other, the UK remained sceptical of the need and value of this new institution, a viewpoint which became more pronounced with the arrival in office of the Conservative-led Coalition government in 2010. Thus, while for Germany the EEAS was a means to deepen and augment cooperation in CFSP policy-making, for the UK it was a potential challenger and competitor to member states’ national prerogatives, to be co-opted where possible and constrained when not.

The EEAS as Policy Issue The idea for a European diplomatic service first emerged from the Convention on the Future of Europe launched in 2002. It envisaged an entity that would support the work of the High Representative by bringing together the policy advice and administrative support provided by the Council Secretariat, the Commission’s relevant directorates-general, and its global network of overseas missions (Miller 2003: 50). The process by which the EEAS formally came into being began with the signing of the Draft Constitutional Treaty in October 2004. However, it went into abeyance twice—first, following the rejection of the

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Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters in referenda in 2005, and then in 2008 when the revised treaty was also rejected, this time by the Irish (Behr et al. 2010). It was only with the final ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 that the serious work of constructing the EEAS could begin in earnest. Lisbon defined the role of the EEAS as follows: The scope of the EEAS should allow the HR to fully carry out his/her mandate as defined in the Treaty. To ensure the consistency and better coordination of the Union’s external action, the EEAS should also assist the President of the European Council and the […] Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations as well as closely cooperate with the Member States. (Consilium 2009: 2)

However, following its inception the development of the EEAS was notable for a considerable vagueness over its design, structure and ultimately its purpose beyond the fairly general outline provided above. Lieb and Maurer (2008: 2) noted the ‘considerable leeway’ in the treaty text over interpreting the EEAS’s actual role, while Crowe (2008: 7) noted that Lisbon is ‘thin on detail’ beyond its role in assisting the High Representative. A number of observers have argued that the reforms introduced by Lisbon have the potential to bring considerable benefits to the development and exercise of EU foreign and security policy. For example, Behr et al. (2010) highlight the potential for far greater coherence among the different institutional actors involved, consistency in pursuing particular agendas and pushing policies through to their conclusion, better use of existing resources and capabilities, and a far higher overall visibility for the EU as a foreign policy actor. Duke (2008) and Lieb and Maurer (2008) each made similar points. Despite the EEAS’s considerable potential, however, a significant proportion of the analysis in the years immediately after it formally came into operation on 1st December 2010 was critical. In particular, this emphasised the challenge faced by the new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in terms of building up institutional capabilities, articulating immediately an expanded and more coherent foreign policy, and recruiting the staff to deliver it (Burke 2012). For example, Hemra et al. described it as suffering from an ‘institutional and political malaise’ and lacking ‘a vision and clear strategy to make the most of its capabilities’ (2011: vi, 23). Similarly, Lehne (2011: 18) suggested there was a danger the new service could ‘drift into irrelevance’ without this. More recently, he

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s­uggested that the EEAS suffered from a ‘weak institutional identity’ (Lehne 2013). Arguably of far greater concern for Ashton were the anxieties expressed by member states over the extent and direction of the EEAS’s development. For example, in a letter to the HR of 8 December 2011, 12 foreign ministers, including those from France, Germany, Poland and Sweden, stated that: The [EEAS] has the potential to significantly enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external action. From the start we have strongly backed the view and have a major interest in a strong and efficient EEAS. […] We would like to join efforts to further enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS and to help it develop its full potential. In this context we would like to offer some suggestions on how the functioning of the Service could be further improved.1

Although expressed in diplomatic language, this was a clear statement by the signatories of their concerns over what they felt was the slow pace of development, and the need for the HR to take a firmer grip of the process. Similarly, an Austrian foreign ministry non-paper of April 2011 noted that cooperation in the field in terms of EU delegations to third countries was ‘not very homogenous’.2 In particular, it identified coordination, information-­sharing within delegations, and between EU delegations and member state embassies, and crisis management as areas of concern. Meanwhile, in 2013 it was suggested that while the EEAS occasionally ‘displays the leadership role of a collective EU foreign ministry’, more often than not it ‘amounts to little more than a secretariat for foreign policy co-ordination’ (Lehne 2013). The establishment of so important an institution was always going to be complex and difficult, particularly as the EEAS was seeking to absorb long-standing components of both the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, raising what Duke (2008: 15) calls ‘a multitude of turf sensitivities’. However, the problems it has faced are illustrative of a deeper issue, which is the role of the member states in its inception and construction. Crowe argues that the creation of such an institution with ‘so little guidance’ in the Treaty would obviously be contentious (2008: 7). In this regard, it is interesting to note the similar paucity of detail in the original TEU regarding the CFSP, which stands in stark contrast to the detailed proposals set out for the path to Economic and Monetary Union. As Ginsberg (1998: 14) notes, the provisions on the CFSP were ‘necessarily

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vague’ in order to secure agreement. Most obviously, this highlights the similar challenge in this case of putting flesh on the bones of a policy that touches on issues of national sovereignty and consequently remains hugely sensitive for many member states. It is this that makes the establishment of the EEAS such an interesting and relevant subject of analysis given the important role Germany and Britain played in the negotiations that led to its creation and in the subsequent debates over its strategic direction, management and staffing. In particular, it encapsulates the on-going dilemma they (and indeed all member states) have faced since cooperation first began in foreign and security policy. On the one hand, with the EEAS they have sought to create an institution able not only to play a strong diplomatic role for the EU and be of benefit to their overall foreign policy aims, but also to reduce the power of the Commission by accruing the main instruments of foreign policy-making and implementation to the Council. On the other hand, whilst doing this, they have also sought to maintain their own national diplomatic networks and relationships (Furness 2011). Or, to put it another way, ‘[e]verybody supports coordination in principle, yet at the same time nobody wishes to be co-ordinated’ (Lehne 2013). Once again, therefore, we must consider what their particular national interests were as regards the EEAS, how these were articulated and then pursued as policy objectives. The argument here is that the establishment of the EEAS represents a pragmatic and functional attempt by member states to create an institutional counter-balance to the power of the Commission in foreign affairs. At the same time, rather than providing a new ideational or normative centre for genuinely ‘common’ foreign and security policy, in its early years it instead became a new arena for competition between the member states and between member states and the institution itself in terms of the former’s ability to exercise influence over the EEAS’s strategic direction, staffing etc., as well as the broader direction of the CFSP.

British Policy Towards the EEAS British policy towards the establishment and development EEAS has been based around three core principles: the maintenance of intergovernmentalism within foreign and security policy-making at the Brussels level; a general scepticism towards institution building, expansion or development; and a determination to ensure value for money. Each has

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informed how Britain has viewed the EEAS and its potential impact on the CFSP, and again emphasise the pragmatism inherent in UK foreign policy. Initially, Britain was ambivalent towards proposals to create a European-­ level foreign service. As one official described it, ‘when it came, [we] weren’t the most enthusiastic in the club’.3 The government was particularly concerned about the much more communautaire approach advocated initially by Germany (e.g. House of Commons 2003b, 2004; Crum 2004), which amongst other things suggested that the Commission become more integral to EU external relations decision-making. As the process of negotiating the Draft Constitutional Treaty progressed in the early 2000s, however, the government’s position altered. The reforms that would bring the EEAS into existence were seen as offering the chance to streamline the Union’s external relations capacity, bringing more of this under the Council’s ambit, strengthening the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and in turn achieving greater accountability to member states. These pragmatic and functional justifications were used consistently by all governments subsequently, including the Coalition, even though in opposition the Conservatives had opposed the establishment of the EEAS and raised hurdles to its functioning once in office again from 2010.4 For example, William Hague stated in the House of Commons on 3 June 2010: [M]y party did not support the creation of the [EEAS], but it is now a fact […] It is our task now to ensure that the service is both useful to the nations of Europe and respects the role of national diplomatic services. (Hansard 2010c)

(His Labour predecessor, David Miliband, was critical of this position however, declaring the coalition to be ‘particularly conflicted when it comes to Europe because they don’t know if they want a stronger European foreign policy or not’.)5 For Britain, therefore, the appeal of the EEAS lay first and foremost in its ability to complement national foreign policy objectives, with the idea of establishing a rival or competitor to member state predominance in foreign and security policy considered unacceptable. This approach is consistent with previous British positions supporting the establishment of CFSP within a separate pillar in Maastricht, the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP operating from within the Council, and the creation of the PSC.

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The evolution of the British position has revolved principally around British understandings of what the EEAS is, and what it is not. Britain does not consider it a diplomatic service in the classic sense, so a first priority has been to ensure it does not encroach on traditional national responsibilities, particularly the provision of full consular services. For example, in a written Parliamentary answer in June 2002 outlining the Government’s view about the creation of a ‘common European diplomatic service’, Jack Straw declared that ‘it is for EU member states to organise their respective diplomatic services at the national level’ (Hansard 2002). Similarly, having been the British Government’s representative to the Convention, Peter Hain as Leader of the House noted that Britain had ‘argued against’ proposals for a ‘fully-fledged diplomatic service’ (House of Commons 2003b). In 2006, Geoff Hoon, Minister for Europe (2006–07), declared that the government was ‘sceptical’ about the advantages of having a ‘quasi-­ diplomatic service’, arguing that ‘[w]e still believe that this kind of external representation is best done through the Member States, and indeed most […] are of that opinion’ (House of Lords 2006: 38). In 2009, Chris Bryant, Minister of Europe (2009–10), again dismissed suggestions the EEAS might assume a consular role on behalf of member states: I disagree with […] [the] characterisation of the [EEAS] as a diplomatic service in all but name […] we are determined that [it] should not move down that route. It is important that we retain our own consular services […] we believe that we provide those services in an exceptional way. (House of Commons 2009)

British opposition to any provision of consular services at European level was re-iterated by a number of officials. One emphasised the government’s position that no European-level body could be trusted to provide the same level of service to British citizens: [W]e had no faith whatsoever that a European function could ever provide the level of service to British nationals that we felt that they expected, so no politician would ever take the risk.6

Meanwhile, another highlighted the political sensitivity, particularly for the Coalition, about any ‘perception that the EEAS was taking on work that properly belonged to national foreign offices’.7 A determination to prevent the EEAS from ‘encroaching’ on the diplomatic

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prerogatives of member states has thus been a clear ‘red line’ for the UK. The EEAS ‘supplements and complements, but does not replace, the UK diplomatic service’ (Hansard 2012). The second British priority has been to ensure that the EEAS does not dilute the CFSP’s intergovernmental character. This is something which it has interpreted ‘strictly’ (Balfour and Raik 2013: 6) and the question of the precise role to be played by the HR as head of the EEAS is illustrative of this. As discussed, Britain supported the creation of this post, but when the idea first emerged from the Convention that the HR would ‘double-­ hat’ as head of the CFSP but also as the Commissioner responsible for external relations, this was highly problematic for London. In particular, there were questions over what such double-hatting would mean in terms of the Commission’s relationship to the CFSP. In 2003, for example, Peter Hain highlighted government concerns that as a consequence the Commission might in effect gain ‘a back door into the [CFSP] in areas where it does not have a competence’ and while there might be ‘tight linkages’ between the two posts, declared the government ‘not satisfied with the position as it currently stands’ (House of Commons 2003b). The government position, articulated subsequently by then FCO Political Director Peter Ricketts, was therefore against the new post being ‘a full member’ of the Commission (House of Commons 2003a; see also Menon 2003). Equally, there was determination to ensure that both the HR and EEAS would be subject to control by national governments through the Council of Ministers. In this, Ricketts was confident in 2003 that the British view was prevailing among EU partners: [T]he debate is moving in the direction that our Government has set out […] the idea that we should strengthen the [HR] and […] his attachment to the Council as the deliverer of decisions adopted in the Council is gaining ground […] we need to gather as many as we can around our approach. (ibid)

In 2004, Jack Straw reiterated this, noting Britain’s view of the basis for the HR’s authority: [Their] responsibility is to carry out the common foreign policy agreed […] by Ministers. […] The overwhelming responsibility on him or her is very clear, it is the mandate of the Council—full stop. […] he cannot possibly give us orders. This is a union of Nation States. (House of Commons 2004)8

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He then emphasised the increased control member states would enjoy over the external relations functions exercised by the Commission, particularly the overseas missions, as a consequence of the strengthened role of the HR and the creation of the EEAS (ibid). In 2007 Kim Darroch, the UK Permanent Representative to the EU, made a similar argument: Our view is that […] the High Representative representing both the Council and the Commission and [EEAS] […] does increase the Council’s role. It gives us more influence over how the Commission spends its external affairs budget […] the opportunity to put diplomats from Member States into […] joint missions overseas and […] enhances the role of the Council overall, so we see this as a good thing without wanting to caricature it as a Council takeover. (House of Lords 2007: 26)

Following the agreement of Lisbon, in 2008 the UK government stressed its success in ensuring that the CFSP remained ‘in the hands of the Member States based on consensus’ (FCO 2008). Under the new arrangements, the role of the HR would be to ‘enact agreed foreign policy’ which in turn would ‘remain an intergovernmental area of activity controlled by the Member States and strengthening [their] authority over other areas of EU external action’ (ibid) (emphasis added). The Government also re-iterated the possible advantages for Britain of the new dispensation. Thus, Chris Bryant stated in October 2009: [I]n a country where all the Member States of the EU have a significant interest we would want the [HR] to be able to use all the different levers that are available through from pre-conflict to conflict to post-conflict to peace-building […] at the moment those are spread differently around the various different elements of the Council and the Commission and we believe that it is important to have much better co-ordination. (House of Commons 2009)

That said, while Parliament encouraged the government to ‘engage positively’ with partner states in developing the EEAS following Lisbon (House of Lords 2008: 197), it noted the lack of detail in either the treaty or the government’s responses to questions as to what structures would ultimately emerge (House of Commons 2008; House of Lords 2008). The third British priority, linked to both of these, has been to ensure complementarity and value for money. British opposition to unnecessary institution-building has been discussed already in the context of the CSDP

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and similar concerns pertain here. The benefits of the EEAS lie in bringing the EU’s disparate range of external relations functions as far as possible under one institutional roof. For London, it was therefore imperative to prevent expensive and unnecessary duplication of functions or bureaucratic growth in achieving this. For example, in 2006 Geoff Hoon emphasised the need not to ‘duplicate existing services provided very effectively already by Member States’ (House of Lords 2006: 39). Similarly, following Lisbon the FCO made clear that the purpose of the HR and EEAS should be to ‘reduce bureaucratic duplication and improve the coherence and effectiveness of policy implementation’ (FCO 2008; see also House of Commons 2009). Moreover, while these were objectives established o ­ riginally by Labour they were also pursued by the Coalition after 2010.9 It is worth noting in this regard that some smaller states saw in the establishment of the EEAS ‘opportunities to reduce their own diplomatic networks and […] save a bit of money’, something the UK was not willing to accept.10 An important aspect of this under the Coalition government after 2010 was the principle of ‘budget neutrality’. In essence, this demanded that the EEAS should require no more expenditure than that spent by the institutional elements it replaced/combined: the EEAS must ‘create savings’ and the British government were ‘committed to cost and budget neutrality overall’.11 This aim was repeated regularly in official government statements. For example, David Lidington, Minister for Europe (2010–16), declared that the establishment of the EEAS ‘should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality’ (Hansard 2010a) and must provide ‘value for money’ (Hansard 2010b; see also Hansard 2011a, b, c). That said, one official noted that in practice ‘we [have] had to tolerate a certain amount of growth in the EAS budget and from the perspective of our ministers, that’s something we’re not very happy about’.12 Overall, therefore, Britain’s view of the EEAS during and following its creation has remained guarded. The main British position has been to cooperate with the new institution ‘where it has a clear added value on issues that matter’ to Britain, for example in achieving stability in the European neighbourhood, conflicts in Africa, Iran and the Middle East Peace Process.13 The unspoken inference, though, is that where it did not do so, Britain remained wary of engagement with it. This guardedness can be seen in the three core principles which underpin British policy set out above. As will be shown below, these very much determined how Britain engaged with the establishment and subsequent development of the EEAS.

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German Policy Towards the EEAS In contrast, German policy towards the EEAS has always been more favourable. However significant the potential functional or instrumental benefits of the EEAS in terms of streamlining foreign policy-making (e.g. AA 2007), for Germany it is as important for the emphasis it places on what is common in CFSP. This fits very much into its broader ideational view of how the CFSP should function, particularly that it should provide ‘the famous telephone number that Mr Kissinger mentioned’ and enable Europe ‘to speak with one voice’.14 This idea of a ‘stronger European voice in the world’ was also emphasised by EEAS officials as a benefit of the new service, despite differing views on how to organise it (Juncos and Pomorska 2013: 15). Germany is also considered to have ‘a more genuine commitment to a real EU foreign policy’.15 Consequently, it was always ‘very much in favour of [the EEAS] and pushed it from the start, and we’re still doing that’.16 Historically, Germany has favoured bringing the CFSP closer to the Community’s frameworks, and was unhappy with the separation institutionalised by the pillar system in Maastricht (Aggestam 2000). More generally, it has sought a better linkage and coordination between the policy produced by the CFSP, and the financial and economic instruments available through the first pillar to implement this. It has also favoured the extension of majority voting within the CFSP and allowing the European Parliament greater scrutiny over it (ibid). This would suggest there should be little common ground between Germany’s more communautaire vision and Britain’s championing of intergovernmentalism. However, it is interesting to note that while both apparently come from opposite sides in terms of the direction of travel they have favoured for the CFSP, there have been areas of commonality. In particular, both have seen an effective HR supported by an efficient EEAS as important to strengthening the EU’s global voice—albeit only in certain circumstances for Britain—and Germany has also been anxious to ensure that institutional development delivers coherence and efficiency rather than unnecessary bureaucracy or expense. The difference is that Germany has presented these ‘macro’-objectives in terms of achieving broader ‘European’ goals, whereas Britain’s approach has been more functional, focusing on how the EEAS can support the achievement of national objectives. That said, Germany nonetheless views the EEAS (and HR) as contributing to the accomplishment of German foreign policy objectives as pursued through the CFSP.

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At the root of German policy has been a frustration at how the CFSP has interacted historically with other areas of EU external relations. The EU has suffered from a ‘disconnect between money and politics’ in terms of how it delivers foreign policy,17 so a key aim of Lisbon from the German perspective was to develop a genuinely ‘comprehensive approach [on] all aspects of the [EU’s] external action’.18 Indeed, the ‘philosophical idea’ behind the role of the HR, supported by the EEAS, is to ‘guarantee’ this.19 Greater coherence, coordination and continuity in foreign policy are essential, but can only be delivered centrally through the ‘single-desk principle’ (Bundesregierung 2010b: 8).20 While at the Convention Germany and particularly its foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, advocated a more federalist approach (e.g. Fischer 2000; see also Menon 2003), what ultimately emerged were proposals for a HR who would be independent, both of the Commission and of the European Council, and supported by the EEAS. The German government has repeatedly emphasised the importance of this independence if the HR and EEAS are to deliver on the three objectives required of them. It was referred to, for example, in the 2009 coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP which suggested that the ‘interlinkage of EU foreign policy with the individual foreign policies of member states is best achieved by an independent EEAS’ (Bundesregierung 2009a: 118; and AA 2008). Other official statements have made similar points (e.g. Bundesregierung 2009b, 2010a; Bundestag 2010a; AA 2012). From the German perspective, if the problems of ‘lowest common denominator’ policy and ‘conflicting interests [among] member states’ are to be resolved, achieving independence from the Council is just as important as from the Commission.21 Policy should rather be driven by a ‘neutral person’, with the achievement of a coherent CFSP ‘in the interests of all member states’ (Bundesregeriung 2010b: 3).22 As noted, an important area of commonality with Britain has been to avoid the creation of unnecessary additional bureaucracy and ensure value for money. For example, one official noted that one expected advantage of the EEAS would be the ‘institutional memory’ it provides now that the HR and her staff have replaced the rotating presidency in chairing meetings of the FAC, PSC and various working groups.23 However, if the new structures are to be justified, such streamlining must also be accompanied by a concomitant improvement in the ‘interconnectedness’ of EU-level foreign policy-making (Bundesregierung 2009b). Equally, the principle of ‘cost neutrality’ must apply (Bundesregierung 2010b; Bundestag 2010a).

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At the same time, there are a number of significant differences. First, Germany has officially welcomed the additional power of scrutiny the European Parliament now enjoys through the budgetary responsibilities the HR exercises as a Commission Vice-President (Bundesregierung 2009b, 2010b). It is interesting to note, though, that while this may be seen as increasing transparency and accountability, some officials are less convinced. For example, one suggested that it would not be a good idea for MEPs to have any further involvement as they ‘don’t really know much about foreign policy’.24 Furthermore, the Government had to reassure the Bundestag that its rights of scrutiny over Germany foreign policy were in no way changed by Lisbon (Bundesregierung 2010b). A second important difference comes in the German position vis-à-vis the provision of consular services by the EEAS. Whilst accepting that this remains a possibility only in the long-term, the government has declared itself open to the possibility provided the relevant legal questions are resolved first (e.g. Bundesregierung 2010c). This was reiterated by an AA official who noted that the first priority must be for ‘the EAS to do its job’ but that in a few years ‘we can talk about [it] taking over consular affairs’.25 A third difference lies in German attitudes to EU representation in 3rd countries and in international organisations. Again, an emphasis has been placed on the EU being able to ‘speak with a single voice’ (AA 2008: 108), with the EEAS having a vital role to play through the EU delegations, but this is an issue upon which there was considerable disagreement with Britain’s Coalition government (discussed below).26 Overall, it is important to note that while the federalist vision outlined by Joschka Fischer in 2000 may not be representative of Germany’s overall objective for EU foreign and security policy, the achievement of further integration is. For Germany, strengthening the roles of the HR and EEAS has been an important component of this. The aim is to create ‘a stronger Europe […] in this situation we need more Europe, so this is our approach’.27 While this contradicts the principles of British policy towards the EEAS, it is interesting that both have seen it as an instrument able to accomplish their particular aims. This indicates not only how much remained to be resolved after its establishment in terms of how the EEAS would develop and the role(s) it might play in the longer-term, but that determining these would continue to be an area of disagreement and competition between member states.

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German and British Engagement with the CFSP on the EEAS While the establishment of the EEAS represented a major institutional reform, it was not immediately clear whether it would indeed prove to be ‘one of the most meaningful innovations’ of Lisbon (Bundestag 2010b). Although nearly 10 years on it is gradually transforming both the output and implementation of the CFSP—for example with the European Security and Defence package announced in October 2017 (EEAS 2017)—the vagueness in the treaty provisions concerning its creation noted above reflected the ambivalence of member states identified by Hemra et  al. (2011). Moreover, they demonstrate what was essentially a stalemate in negotiations between those preferring a more centrally managed, ‘European’ foreign policy machine—especially the smaller states—and those (e.g. France and Britain) concerned primarily with the maintenance of intergovernmentalism and preservation of national sovereignty. This division was summarised by an UKREP official as follows: There is some pragmatism but […] the approach does also reflect relatively deep-seated views […] I think Germany has traditionally wanted more Europe across the board, and that includes more Europe on foreign policy, whereas […] the UK and France have a stronger tradition of independent diplomacy and are perhaps […] more cautious.28

In this sense, the development of the EEAS is a microcosm of the central tension that has always overshadowed foreign policy cooperation. Britain and Germany are excellent exemplars of these competing approaches. The arrangements that led to the creation of the EEAS demonstrate that neither achieved an ascendency, but also that there is no over-riding norm for greater integration in CFSP that is leading to a transformation at the national level as some have theorised. Moreover, the fact that both have seen the EEAS (and HR) as important to the achievement of national foreign policy objectives again underscores the instrumentalist approach both states have taken towards the new institution, regardless of the ‘European’ language that Germany may use in describing its long-­ term benefits. Consequently, the EEAS and the negotiations that brought it into being represent first and foremost an arena of competition between the states. Moreover, this competition continued after its establishment, with the focus shifting to the policies the new institution should prioritise

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and the allocation of key portfolios within its Brussels structures and in its overseas missions. For example, there was ‘a bit of a competition’ to get national diplomats into key posts, with the French ‘ahead there’ according to one German official. He went on to note the challenge of recruiting German diplomats to certain EEAS postings: ‘If you’re looking for somebody for Abuja […] then you have to knock on doors. If you’re looking for someone for New York, you’ll have a lot of applicants’.29 For the purposes of this analysis the period can be divided into two halves—pre- and post-Lisbon. As noted, the pre-Lisbon period was punctuated by periods of intense diplomatic activity beginning with the Convention itself and followed by the two IGCs in 2004 and 2007. In between these came the so-called ‘period of reflection’ (e.g. House of Lords 2005; AA 2007), during which time the discussions ‘went off the boil’.30 Prior to the 2007 IGC, however, the UK government sought to re-open the decisions on the revised role of the HR and the establishment of the EEAS to seek further ‘clarifications’ of what the new arrangements would entail, something which came as ‘a surprise to many’ (Avery and Missiroli 2007: 6). More broadly, British engagement followed the path outlined in Chap. 4. Input into the negotiations on the EEAS was led by the FCO’s Europe Directorate, which ensured consultation with ministers and drafted the instructions for UKREP. However, other parts of Whitehall were consulted as appropriate, particularly, for example, the Treasury on the issue of budget neutrality and there was also ‘a lot of interaction with DfID’ on the question of development programming.31 UKREP, meanwhile, played an important information gathering role, particularly from the Commission, General Secretariat of the Council and European Parliament.32 One key issue for Britain was the place of CSDP within the new structures. After all, part of the rationale for the EEAS was ‘to better integrate the soft power instruments […] with the more hard power instruments like CSDP’. However, French determination not to dismantle or rebuild the existing structures or change reporting lines meant that initially much ‘was left unchanged’ and the new structures were ‘not as joined-up’ as Britain would have liked.33 Ministerial involvement was also significant, with David Miliband, and then William Hague and David Lidington all closely involved and ‘very interested’ pre- and post-Lisbon respectively.34 Thus, despite initial concerns or misgivings following the Convention, Britain did fully engage in the process of establishing the EEAS.

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Germany by contrast was always strongly supportive of the concept of an EEAS, as noted. An initial proponent of the service, it cooperated with France in presenting the initiative, thus demonstrating its preference for working in partnership when making policy proposals.35 A number of other member states needed to be convinced, however: [W]e had to convince a couple of them. The first idea that came to many people’s minds was: foreign policy, now done by Brussels? No way. This is national sovereignty. So we had to explain what we want[ed] and how it’s supposed to work and by and by I think more people understood that it’s basically a good idea and we should give it a try.36

During the ‘period of reflection’, German commitment in the longer-term to achieving treaty change remained strong, although discussions remained ‘behind closed doors’, involving the highest official and ministerial levels in the AA and Chancellery.37 Indeed, one AA official sought to highlight the very clear importance of Germany in getting the treaty process back on track. Noting that the input for the 2007 IGC ‘was set by Germany’, he argued that ‘it was basically our Chancellor, Mrs Merkel, who […] said, this is our chance, let’s make use of it’.38 In this sense, therefore, the German approach was much more positive and proactive than Britain’s, although Germany had the institutional advantage of the rotating Council Presidency to help drive its proposals forward. Post-Lisbon, meanwhile, Britain and Germany have demonstrated similar preoccupations in terms of ensuring the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the EEAS.  The formation of Britain’s Coalition government in 2010 changed the underlying political view of the EEAS as noted. Thus, while philosophically opposed to its establishment, the government took a pragmatic decision to engage with the EEAS ‘as something which was an established fact and to then manage the risk’.39 Moreover, it was very important for FCO officials to remember that the ‘bottom line was that the Tories opposed [its] establishment […] which is our backstop on the policy’.40 This has been reflected in a subsequent determination to ensure the EEAS and HR ‘[k]eep their political focus’ on issues where Britain sees them as adding value, such as the development of strategic partnerships.41 These were an idea that Britain ‘signed up to […] from the start’ and which they believed would be ‘a really important bit of European policy’ given the potential impact of bringing the EU’s collective weight to bear on relations with the US, Russia, China etc.42 For Britain, this has

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been an area where the EU is seen as being able to add genuine value through the strategic continuity the HR and EEAS can provide. For example, David Lidington stated in July 2011 that Britain was keen that the EU identifies concrete goals [for strategic partnerships], preferably using its trade levers, with each country. And that the EU places an equally high priority on its relations with India. (Hansard 2011d)

However, there was some ‘frustration […] about the EAS’s inability to really grip’ the strategic partnerships policy.43 Indeed, in the foreign policy component of the British Government’s pre-referendum Balance of Competences review exercise, concern was expressed that in the case of the EU and China, the strategic partnership ‘has never equalled the sum of its parts’ (FCO 2013: 51). At the time, it could not have been foreseen that a strategic partnership might also be considered as a means of framing the UK’s future relations with the EU (Koenig 2016; Wright 2017). British pragmatism has also been clear in the focus on budget neutrality and in the considerable sensitivity as regards the EEAS and external representation. For example, in a written statement in 2011, David Lidington emphasised that ‘the EAS should limit its representation of the member states to agreed areas’ (Hansard 2011b). In particular, there have been concerns over how far the EEAS would seek to ‘assert the right to make greater statements on behalf of the EU’, something which has been a ‘red line’ for Britain.44 British opposition on this question has led to tensions with Germany and other member states, however. There was particular criticism of Britain’s refusal to allow the EEAS to speak in international organisations unless it was ‘in the name of the EU and its [then] 27 member states’, something one official described as being ‘almost sabotage’ given the large number of international declarations this affected.45 He went on to suggest that FCO officials were actually ‘very uncomfortable’ with this position, but were operating on ‘strict and direct orders’ from William Hague. A British diplomat disputed this, however, suggesting that the German view ‘probably’ reflected the fact that they were not on the Security Council and so the alternative was ‘the most promising for a bigger German role’. However, he entirely accepted that Germany was ‘on the opposite side of the argument’.46 This indicates a number of things. First, Britain has shown a clear and continuing willingness to reject any proposals that it has felt would threaten the prerogatives of member states in CFSP. It also suggests it has

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adopted an essentially defensive stance, as outlined in Chap. 4. Equally, though, the establishment of the EEAS has encouraged some interesting changes in the processes by which Britain has made inputs into the CFSP. While previously it would have prioritised engagement with incoming presidencies, because this work is now carried out by the EEAS the FCO in particular has paid more attention to the new body. For example, whereas previously the FCO’s Africa Director might not have engaged especially with the Brussels’ institutions, under the new dispensation he/ she would need to get to know and communicate more regularly and effectively with the EEAS’s Africa Director, and so on. One official felt that this in turn could re-energise the FCO’s ‘mainstreaming’ policy and that similarly, the PSC might also become ‘a more important place for brokering compromises’.47 It is interesting to note the differing views about the longer term prospects for co-operation between London and the EEAS prior to the referendum. Thus, while one official suggested there had been a ‘greater alignment’ of UK and EEAS interests, another was less optimistic, concluding that while Britain would work with it, ‘they don’t really add a lot’.48 Finally, it is interesting to note the reaction to having Catherine Ashton as HR from 2009–14: that she is British was not considered especially significant—indeed, the Coalition government did not deem it a reason to be supportive of her. One official stated that ‘if ministers had felt that there were wider issues for the UK interest that meant that we had to publicly oppose the EAS […] they would have been quite happy to do that.’ Rather, where Britain has been satisfied with what the EEAS has done, it was ‘not necessarily because Ashton’s British, but [because] their policy instincts are similar to our policy instincts’.49 Despite Germany’s more positive and proactive stance towards the EEAS, it has demonstrated some similar preoccupations, particularly with the  body’s functioning and organisation (see also Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). In part these reflect an organisation in need of time to function ‘at full speed’ (Consilium 2009: 10). For example, it was criticised early on for being slow to provide documents on CSDP questions, doing so ‘only at the very last minute’, but then demanding an immediate comment or policy response from national capitals.50 Of more serious concern, however, was the manner in which Catherine Ashton as High Representative was managing the EEAS in its first months of operation. An AA official suggested, for example, that the EEAS lacked ‘political clout’ and that Ashton’s lack of a foreign policy background and nous meant she was struggling to ‘live up to’ her predecessor, Javier Solana. The same official

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went on to suggest that such was Solana’s gravitas that in FAC meetings, even though he was not chairing ‘still you had the impression that he was’.51 Another AA official questioned the ability of either the EEAS or HR to deal with policy in crisis areas such as Sudan.52 One explanation offered for this was the end of the rotating presidency of the FAC after Lisbon. Previously, when a member state had only six months, ‘you put all your energy in it. But if you’re now [HR] having four years, why should you rush’, especially if you are meeting lots of resistance.53 An official in the General Secretariat of the Council also noted the difficulty the HR faced in the early days in asserting her authority in one particular FAC meeting: [O]ne of the agenda items was the Middle East Peace Process […] we had an exchange of views on where things are and how things are happening. What did you have? […] 11 of the 27 ministers taking the floor to describe their own personal visit to Gaza […] How could Ashton shut them up? She just said, well I take note of all your experiences and all your contributions, and we’ll move on.54

These concerns formed part of a wider series of problems Germany had with the structure and set up of the EEAS in its early days. For example, it felt revisions were needed to Article 9 of the 2010 Council Decision which set out how the EEAS would function (Consilium 2010) relating to financial aid and financial instruments. In particular, it was concerned the Commission had retained too much financial control, leaving the EEAS merely ‘involved in programming’.55 This and related concerns about how the EEAS was being organised led to a significant intervention in the form of the ‘Non-Paper of the 12 Foreign Ministers’ sent to the High Representative in December 2011 (discussed in Chap. 7). A ‘German initiative’ intended to offer ‘constructive’ input, the non-paper was intended to further enhance the effectiveness of the EEAS and to help it develop its full potential and reach ‘cruising speed’.56 To do this, it highlighted 5 areas of concern: preparation for the FAC; coordination with the Commission; internal EEAS procedures; the building up of overseas delegations; and the full involvement of member states. From the German perspective, the value of the EEAS has always lain in its ability to provide a coherent and global approach. This non-paper encapsulated, therefore, the wish for a more effective linkage between the EEAS, Commission and member states, something which needed to be addressed in Brussels but also in the EU’s many overseas delegations.57

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The comprehensive nature of what it covers suggests a maximalist approach that contrasts with the almost ‘hands-off’ British view of the EEAS, and is designed to ensure the EEAS can fulfil its potential as set out in the original treaty. While the ideas may have been presented in partnership with other states, they represented a clear effort by Germany to influence the long-term direction of the EEAS. Moreover, well before Ashton was succeeded as HR in 2014 by Federica Mogherini, Germany was already looking to the new Commission and the next HR ‘to see if there will be more dynamism in the EEAS after that’.58 Mogherini’s status as a former Italian Foreign Minister indicates that the member states wanted a higher profile and experienced politician to take the EEAS and CFSP forward. Meanwhile her decision to move her office into the Commission’s headquarters at the Berlaymont building and make more use of her ‘Commission hat’ signalled a determination to draw together the range of external relations instruments at her disposal and pursue a more joined up EU foreign policy (Rüger and Helwig 2014).

Conclusion Today, the EEAS is a recognised focal point in EU foreign and security policy-making for both member state and third countries. It has achieved a degree of institutional equilibrium and has established stronger linkages to other institutions, notably the Commission, than in its early days. The challenges involved in setting it up should not be underestimated. As well as coordinating the member states and their many and varying foreign policy preferences and interests, the High Representative was also expected to create an entirely new institution by bringing together pre-existing components of the Commission and Council Secretariat as well as member state secondees, which for some of those involved was a very painful process. One official recalled an ‘iron curtain’ between the Commission and those of its personnel who were being transferred, while the decision of Commission President Barroso to nominate his Chef de Cabinet for the plum posting of Head of EU Delegation to Washington ‘gave a very bad feeling’ and the sense that the Commission was seeking to secure the best postings before anyone else.59 At the same time, the EEAS was expected to take on the reins of EU level diplomacy and be the primary source of policy advice and analysis for the development of a truly common EU foreign and security policy even as it faced organisational upheaval and a freeze on resources. This would certainly have challenged whoever had been appointed High

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Representative in 2009, even if the member states themselves had achieved a consensus on what precisely the new service should do and how. What this chapter has illustrated, though, is that no real consensus existed beyond the agreement to establish this new institution. Indeed, once that decision had been taken and the process of getting the EEAS up and running began in earnest, varying national preferences quickly emerged as to its purpose, focus, the amount of resources it should be given, and the relationship it should enjoy with the member states. Thus, a whole new arena of contestation and competition between member states opened up, as demonstrated by the examples of Britain and Germany. As discussed here, they had quite pronounced differences on many of these questions which reflected their long-standing pre-occupations with and preferences for the degree of integration they have wished to see in CFSP. While the UK’s Brexit decision means that in a few years it will no longer be party to that process of contestation, the other member states clearly will as they continue to seek to exercise influence over not only what EU foreign policy is on any given question, but how that policy is made and the institutional balance that exists between national and supranational institutions in making it.

Notes 1. Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, 8 December 2011. 2. Austrian non-paper, “European External Action Service—Cooperation between EU Delegations and EU Member State Embassies on the Ground”, 12 April 2011. 3. Telephone interview, FCO official (retired), 2011 (UKO4). 4. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 5. Interview, House of Commons, London, 6 December, 2010. 6. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2012 (UKO6). 7. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 8. Straw went on to stress British efforts to address the problems the draft Treaty represented in this regard: ‘I was concerned […] that this person could not be tripped up by responsibilities to the College of Commissioners, in particular […] that: “[…] Commissioners shall neither seek nor take

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instructions from any government or other body.” […] one morning [I] went through this in very great detail with colleagues. Most of them […] had not thought about this’ (House of Commons 2004). 9. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 10. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 11. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2); telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 12. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 13. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 14. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). See also Merkel (2010) and Bundesregierung (2010a). 15. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 16. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 17. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 18. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2010 (GO1). See also Bundesregierung (2010b). 19. Interview, German Permanent Representation, 2010 (GO2). 20. Interviews, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6, GO7). 21. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 22. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011 (GO3). 23. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO7). See also AA (2008: 10). 24. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 25. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 26. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6); telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 27. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO7). 28. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 29. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 30. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 31. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 32. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 33. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 34. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 35. Germany had also consulted closely with France ahead of the 2000 Nice Summit which initiated the treaty reform process that led to the Convention and ultimately to Lisbon (Fischer 2008). In his memoirs, meanwhile, Jacques Chirac is quick to claim the credit for the idea of a European constitution ‘[i]n the speech I gave to the Berlin Bundestag in June 2000’; he goes on to acknowledge, though, that ‘it could not have seen the light of day if there had not been a Franco-German agreement to develop it’ (2012: 307–8). 36. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6).

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37. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 38. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 39. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 40. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 41. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 42. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO2). 43. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 44. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 45. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). At the time the interviewee put the figure at over 100. 46. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 47. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 48. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011 (UKO6). 49. Telephone interview, UKREP, 2012 (UKO7). 50. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011 (GO6). An official at the Swedish Permanent Representation agreed, suggesting she was ‘totally shocked that papers, documents were not sent out. You had to look for things. And I thought […] this [is] Brussels, this well-organised […] capital of the EU […] [but] it’s still quite a young organisation and it’s getting better.’ (Telephone interview, 2012) 51. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO7). 52. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011 (GO5). 53. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2011 (GO3). 54. Interview, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 2010 (EU3). 55. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 56. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 57. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6, GO7). 58. Interview, Auswärtiges Amt, 2012 (GO6). 59. Interview, General Secretariat of the Council, 2016.

Bibliography Aggestam, L. (2000) ‘Germany’. In Manners, I. and Whitman, R.G. (eds.) The Foreign Policies of the European Union Member States (Manchester and New York: Manchester Univerity Press). Avery, G. and Missiroli, A. (2007) ‘Foreward’. EPC Working Paper No. 28—The EU Foreign Service: How to Build a More Effective Common Policy (Brussels: European Policy Centre). Balfour, R. and Raik, K. (2013) ‘Introduction’. In Balfour, R. and Raik, K. (eds.) The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies—EPC Issue Paper No. 73 (Brussels: European Policy Centre), pp. 1–11.

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Behr, T., Siitonen, A. and Nykanen, J.  (2010) ‘Rewriting the Ground Rules of European Diplomacy: The European External Action Service in the Making’. Briefing Paper 57 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs). Burke, E. (2012) Europe’s External Action Service: Ten Steps Towards a Credible EU Foreign Policy (London: Centre for European Reform). Chirac, J. (2012) My Life in Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Crowe, B. (2008) The European External Action Service: Roadmap for Success (London: Chatham House). Crum, B. (2004) ‘Power and Politics in the European Convention’. Politics, 24(1), pp. 1–11. Duke, S. (2008) ‘The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations’. Eipascope, 2008/1, pp. 13–18. Fischer, J. (2008) Die rot-grüne Jahre – Deutsche Außenpolitik vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September (Köln: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch). Furness, M. (2011) ‘Who Controls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU External Relations’. In European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, Boston, 3–5 March 2011. Ginsberg, R.H. (1998) ‘The EU’s CFSP: The Politics of Procedure’. In Holland, M. (ed.) Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms (London: Pinter). Hemra, S., Raines, T. and Whitman, R.G. (2011) A Diplomatic Entrepreneur: Making the Most of the European External Action Service (London: Chatham House). Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp. 305–328. Juncos, A. and Pomorska, K. (2013) ‘“In the Face of Adversity”: Explaining the Attitudes of EEAS Officials Vis-à-vis the New Service’. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(3), pp. 1332–1349. Koenig, N. (2016) EU External Action and Brexit: Relaunch and Reconnect, Policy Paper 178, 22 November (Berlin: Jacques Delors Institute). Lehne, S. (2011) More Action, Better Service: How to Strengthen the European External Action Service (Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Lehne, S. (2013) ‘Between Hesitations and Aspirations’. European Voice, Brussels, 18 July. Lieb, J. and Maurer, A. (2008) ‘Creating the European External Action Service’. SWP Comments (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Menon, A. (2003) ‘Britain and the Convention on the Future of Europe’. International Affairs, 79(5), pp. 963–978. Miller, V. (2003) ‘The Convention on the Future of Europe: Institutional Reform’. Research Paper 03/56 (London: House of Commons Library). Rüger, C. and Helwig, N. (2014) ‘Mogherini as EU High Representative: How Can She Redefine the Role?’ EurActiv.com, 29 October. Available at: https://

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www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/mogherini-as-eu-highrepresentative-how-can-she-redefine-the-role/. Vanhoonacker, S. and Pomorska, K. (2013) ‘The European External Action Service and Agenda-setting in European Foreign Policy’. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(3), pp. 1316–1331. Whitman, R.G. (2008) ‘Foreign, Security and Defence Policy and the Lisbon Treaty: Significant or Cosmetic Reforms?’ Global Europe Papers 2008/1 (Bath: University of Bath). Wright, N. (2017) Brexit and the Re-making of British Foreign Policy. UCL European Institute Working Paper, December. Available at: https://www.ucl. ac.uk/european-institute/analysis/2017-18/wright-brexit-foreign-policy.

Bibliography—Official Documents Auswärtiges Amt (2007b) Federal Foreign Minister Steinmeier: Taking Stock of Germany’s EU Presidency (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2008) Vademecum für die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt). Auswärtiges Amt (2012g) The European External Action Service (Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt) Available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/ Europa/Aussenpolitik/EAD_node.html. Bundesregierung (2009b) WACHSTUM. BILDUNG. ZUSAMMENHALT. Koal itionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP 17. Legislaturperiode (Berlin: Bundesregierung). Bundesregierung (2009c) Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst muss unabhängig sein (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2010a) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Niema Movassat, Dr. Diether Dehm, Inge Höger, Alexander Ulrich und der Fraktion DIE LINKE.  – Drucksache 17/2745 – Das iranische Atomprogramm und die Verhängung von Sanktionen seitens der EU gegen den Iran (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2010b) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Sevim Dag˘delen, Dr. Diether Dehm, Jan van Aken, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. – Drucksache 17/956 – Deutsche Positionen zur Ausgestaltung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundesregierung (2010c) Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dietmar Nietan, Axel Schäfer (Bochum), Dr. Rolf Mützenich, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der SPD  – Drucksache 17/938  – Gestaltungschancen des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes  – Notwendige Weichenstellungen für eine effektive Arbeit der Hohen Vertreterin (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Bundestag (2010a) Aktueller Begriff  – Europa  – Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag).

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Bundestag (2010b) Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/1981 – 17. Wahlperiode – 9 June 2010  – Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP  – Einen effizienten und schlagkräftigen Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst schaffen (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag). Consilium (2009c) Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service (14930/09) (Brussels: Consilium). Available at: http:// register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st14930.en09.pdf. Consilium (2010) Council Decision Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU) (Brussels: Consilium). EEAS (2010) Statement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire (Brussels: EEAS). Available at: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/ foraff/118694.pdf. EEAS (2017b) EU Security and Defence Package, 19 October (Brussels: EEAS). Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_ en/16693/EU%20Security%20and%20Defence%20package. FCO (2008a) Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report on ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty’ (Third Report of Session 2007–08) (London: The Stationery Office). FCO (2013) Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union—Foreign Policy (London: HM Government). Fischer, J. (2000) Speech by Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000—From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration (Berlin: Auswartiges Amt). Available at https://www. cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/1/14/4cd02fa7-d9d0-4cd2-91c92746a3297773/publishable_en.pdf. Hansard (2002) Written Answers for 17 June 2002 (London: Houses of Parliament). Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020617/text/20617w03.htm#20617w03.html_sbhd0. Hansard (2010a) Written Answers to Questions—8 July 2010—Column 390W (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2010b) Written Ministerial Statements—Thursday 22 July 2010— Foreign and Commonwealth Office—General Affairs /Foreign Affairs Council— Column 37WS (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2010c) House of Commons Debates—3 June 2010—European Affairs— Column 613 (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2011a) Written Answers to Questions—Tuesday 3 May 2011—Foreign and Commonwealth Office—European External Action Service: Manpower— Column 616W (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2011b) House of Commons Written Ministerial Statements—19 May 2011—Foreign and Commonwealth Office—Pre-Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council (23–24 May 2011)—Column 30WS (London: Houses of Parliament).

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Hansard (2011c) House of Commons Written Answers 14 June 2011—Foreign and Commonwealth Office—EU Expenditure: External Affairs—Column 731W (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2011e) Written Ministerial Statements—Thursday 14 July 2011—Foreign and Commonwealth Office—Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council—Strategic Partners—Column 45WS (London: Houses of Parliament). Hansard (2012) Written Answers to Questions—Thursday 19 January 2012— Column 931W (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2003c) Select Committee on European Union: Minutes of Evidence—Examination of Witnesses(Questions 20–39)—Thursday 16 January (London: Houses of Parliament). Available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/80/3011603.htm. House of Commons (2003d) Select Committee on European Scrutiny—Minutes of Evidence—Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20–39)—Wednesday 16 July (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2004a) Foreign Affairs Committee: Minutes of Evidence— Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40–59)—25 May (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Commons (2008c) Foreign Affairs Committee: Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty—Third Report of Session 2007–08 (London: The Stationery Office). House of Commons (2009b) European Committee B: External Service (London: Houses of Parliament). House of Lords (2005) European Union Committee: 10th Report of Session 2005–06—Evidence from the Minister for Europe—The European Council and the United Kingdom Presidency (Report with Evidence) (London: The Stationery Office). House of Lords (2006) European Union Committee: 48th Report of Session 2005–06—Europe in the World (Report with Evidence) (London: The Stationery Office). House of Lords (2007) European Union Committee: 35th Report of Session 2006–07—The EU Reform Treaty: Work in progress (Report with Evidence) (London: The Stationery Office). House of Lords (2008) European Union Committee: 10th Report of Session 2007–08—The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment—Volume I: Report (London: The Stationery Office). Merkel, A. (2010) Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Opening Ceremony of the 61st Academic Year of the College of Europe in Bruges on 2 November 2010. (Berlin: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government).

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

This book has explored two interlinked questions: how and why Britain and Germany interact with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in the way that they do. It took as its starting point the application to our understanding of CFSP of new supranationalist theorising and the constructivist turn in the literature examining European integration, which posit a transformation in how member states approach the CFSP both in practice and ideationally. In particular, this literature argues that continuous interaction and engagement over the long-term by member states in the CFSP results in changes not only in how they pursue, articulate and defend their national preferences and interests, but in how they formulate these in the first place. These are powerful claims implying that the CFSP has evolved into a major giver and shaper of norms and identity, not merely sitting atop a structure created by the member states, but penetrating every aspect of that structure, including the institutions and processes of the member states themselves. Consequently, the impacts and effects of long-term cooperation and interaction are likely to be profound, with the logical conclusion being changes not merely to the processes by which EU member states make and conduct foreign and security policy, but a transformation in how they view the world and their place in it. Can such analyses adequately explain what has and is taking place in the CFSP, particularly in reference to these two states? The argument here is that while constructivism can and does provide important insights in terms © The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9_10

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of the how of policy-making through important concepts such as ­socialization, accounting for the what, specifically the policy outcomes that member states seek and which reflect their national interests and preferences—the pursuit of which explains their decision to engage in the CFSP in the first place—is much more complex. The absence of comprehensive consideration in new supranationalist theorising of what is taking place at the national level—including in terms of the norms, values and identities that are being generated by national institutions such as foreign ministries and diplomatic systems—is an important omission. This book has therefore sought to address this gap by looking at what is taking place at the national level, and the traditions, structures and processes represented there, in order to better understand how these states interact with and within the CFSP. This final chapter draws together some of the key themes to have emerged from the empirical research. It begins first with the examination of British and German efforts at policy coordination and what this reveals. Second, it discusses the extent to which convergence in institutional structures and policy outputs can be detected and the potential significance of this. Third, it considers how far both states have sought to pursue and promote national objectives through what the Europeanisation literature frames as ‘uploading’. Finally, it discusses some of the potential theoretical implications and future avenues for further research.

What Does an Examination of Policy Coordination Reveal? The argument made in the coordination literature (e.g. Kassim et al. 2000, 2001; Derlien 2000) is that how member states organise can make a difference in terms of their ability to exercise influence over policy-making in Brussels. Moreover, where a state such as Britain exhibits a strong coordination ambition, this is likely to be reflected in complex and sophisticated administrative machinery at both the national and Brussels levels. The application of this literature to the question of how these states interact with the CFSP is important because how they organise is indicative both of the degree to which they seek to project national preferences in foreign and security policy to the CFSP, and then instrumentalise it to accomplish them. In short, why devote time and resources to effective coordination if not to accomplish nationally-derived interests and goals?

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As the empirical evidence shows, both states demonstrate a clear determination to achieve effective coordination in foreign and security policy in order to be best placed to exercise influence. Both consider it a sine qua non that they will have a domestically agreed position on whatever policy issue or question is under consideration. Britain has well-established institutional mechanisms in place in the FCO to ensure effective internal policy coordination; and more broadly to bring together other stakeholders such as the MoD, DfID and the Prime Minister’s office. This reflects a broader coordination ambition, regardless of whether the issue in question relates specifically to the CFSP or another multilateral setting. This coordination has been supported by the FCO’s internal policy of ‘mainstreaming’ designed to highlight the significance of the CFSP for all areas of Britain’s foreign policy. A number of those interviewed also emphasised the importance of regular meetings and less formal discussions with colleagues in-­ house and in other departments. This is particularly important, for example, in matters relating to CSDP which involve particularly the MoD but also DfID. The evidence here is that the FCO and MoD have worked particularly closely, while the relatively small size of and familiarity within the ‘Pol-Mil’ community is seen as facilitating efficient policy-making. While political and policy leadership comes largely from the FCO, the Prime Minister also plays an important role in setting the strategic policy direction. UKREP is also a key actor in this policy-making process, providing vital information and contributing significantly in terms of the strategy and tactics needed to accomplish particular outcomes in Brussels. Finally, the importance of bilateral diplomatic networks should not be ignored, reminding us that although significant, for the UK the CFSP represents just one component in a broader matrix of engagement and foreign policy coordination. Crucially, though, this capacity to influence will be lost as a consequence of Brexit and even if alternative structures for British engagement with EU foreign policy-making can be agreed, these will never entirely mitigate this loss. While German officials have openly acknowledged that their success in achieving effective coordination is not as great as Britain’s, Germany nonetheless demonstrates a significant coordination ambition in foreign and security policy. This reflects the fact that while it locates the accomplishment of its foreign policy within a range of multilateral contexts, of which the EU is possibly the most important, it nevertheless has a clear set of national preferences and goals. Again, coordination is achieved through a combination of formal and informal structures and processes. These seek

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to ensure good linkages between the AA and other key foreign and security policy stakeholders such as the Chancellery and BMVg. This is supported, for example, by the secondment of senior foreign ministry officials to act as advisors to the Chancellor (something that also happens in Britain). Moreover, efforts have also been made to improve broader coordination of foreign and security policy within the German system, and particularly to involve other relevant departments. As in Britain, the German Permanent Representation is also a key actor. Important differences remain in terms of the degree of efficiency and flexibility in the German system overall, echoing previous literature (e.g. Derlien 2000). Meanwhile, although the objective of German policy coordination is to ensure a clear and agreed position on all issues, the evidence indicates that this is not always achieved. What is perhaps most significant, though, is the intent these efforts at coordination represent. However important the CFSP to both, they have clear foreign policy agendas that look beyond the European level and thus CFSP forms just one part of the wider ‘toolkit’ available to pursue these. This requires, though, that their domestic foreign policy-making regimes are appropriately organised and prepared in order to defend and promote their preferences and objectives. This also feeds into the leadership role both seek to play within the CFSP. Again, there are important differences: for Britain, such leadership has always been assumed but not necessarily always achieved, whereas for Germany it is a role it plays reluctantly but increasingly. Nevertheless, both states have expected their policy positions to carry weight in CFSP, although since the Brexit vote they have obviously been following starkly differing trajectories in terms of their capacity to influence policy-making. What these efforts do not tell us, though, is how successful each state is at exercising influence. Indeed, confirming the arguments set out in the introduction, the country chapters show that effective policy coordination cannot in and of itself deliver successful outcomes: the machinery may be fine-tuned and efficient, but influence necessitates a range of other factors, particularly ongoing engagement on policy issues deemed of particular importance; ideational leadership in terms of offering clear policy solutions to particular problems or challenges; and the commitment of resources in pursuit of these. Thus, effective policy coordination provides a foundation for, and perhaps an ability to magnify efforts at, policy leadership and proactive engagement but it cannot make up for the absence of these. Indeed, as the case of Britain’s growing disenchantment with the

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CSDP demonstrates, the objective of the policy coordination machinery has been to prevent initiatives the UK does not like rather than necessarily offering an alternative vision. As will be discussed further below, the precise relationship between coordination and policy outcomes continues to be worthy of further examination.

Do We See Convergence in Structures and Policy Outputs and Is This Significant? The Europeanization literature has frequently wrestled with the question of convergence as a consequence of EU membership (e.g. Harmsen 1999). While complex to define, for simplicity convergence is considered here in terms of foreign policy structures and policy outputs. As discussed above, participation in CFSP places certain organisational demands on foreign ministries, one of the most notable at national level being the need to have a European Correspondent, while in Brussels to be able to participate in structures such as the PSC and its network of working groups. Britain and Germany have both organised their national and Brussels-level structures in order to engage effectively with the CFSP. However, whilst there are parallels between the two, as indicated in the country studies, there are small but important differences in terms of roles assigned to particular officials, dossiers covered, the working groups or committees they participate in, etc. In recent years the FCO has also reduced its broader coverage of EU policy, focusing primarily on CFSP. This reflects both the greater ability of the wider Whitehall network to handle European-focused policy and the need for the FCO to target increasingly scarce resources on areas of growing diplomatic importance, particularly the emerging economies in Asia and Latin America. For both countries, convergence towards particular forms of organisation reflects the practical demands of participation in CFSP.  However, it is primarily a matter of functional effectiveness. The picture in terms of convergence in policy priorities is more complex. A strong argument can be made that through the acquis politique the CFSP represents a significant body of pre-existing commitments, repeated cooperation and agreed policy positions on a range of issues. This in turn is supported by a range of shared practices, most notably the consultation reflex, captured under the broader concept of socialization. However, the evidence presented indicates that Britain and Germany both continue to

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focus on their own policy priorities and domaines réservés as well. For example, Germany has had a particular interest in developing the Eastern Partnership and has shaped and led the EU—and wider European response—to Russian action in the Ukraine; Britain, meanwhile, has promoted EU relations with Pakistan and former colonies in Africa and, in its early years at least, been a driver of CSDP development, particularly around capabilities. These priorities may or may not be shared by the majority of other members. Equally, they—and the outputs they generate—represent national interests and priorities that may often pre-date both the EU and foreign policy cooperation in CFSP. As noted, there has been some convergence on a range of important policy issues. These include the principle of developing the EU’s crisis management response capability and leadership of the response to Iran’s nuclear programme, the latter considered to be of such a level of significance that their joint leadership role with France was simply assumed. However, while these are shared as priorities, again either their origin pre-­ dates CFSP—for example a commitment to the NPT regime in the response to Iran; or their importance is derived from an external source— for example, for Britain the desire to improve European military capabilities through CSDP to achieve a broader improvement in capabilities available to NATO, an ambition Germany also shares, if perhaps to a lesser extent. Moreover, in the case of CSDP, Germany has shown a clear preference for civilian over military crisis management responses, indicating an important difference with Britain. This perhaps says more about the commonality of problems and challenges they and other states face, rather than any deeper transformation of underlying interests. It also supports the conclusion that both states seek to instrumentalise the CFSP to achieve particular policy goals in particular ways. Again, while these may be shared and the arena provided by the CFSP may be important in helping states reach a consensus on a policy action, it does not suggest that particular national interests have been changed or transformed via involvement in it. Indeed, in the case of the ongoing if gradually diminishing German reluctance to utilise military force, if anything this seems to have been reinforced as a national preference. What this underlines, then, is a recognition and acceptance on the part of Britain and Germany (and their fellow member states) of the CFSP as an essential forum for the exploration of whether collective policy responses are feasible and how these can then be developed and implemented. That it may not be the only venue for important foreign and security policy

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decision-making is clear—for example, the onus placed by Britain on NATO’s place in Europe’s security architecture or the value of the OSCE in maintaining multilateral engagement with Russia for Germany. However, CFSP and the meetings of working groups, ambassadorial bodies and the FAC that embody it have become a central component in how member states think about the practice of modern foreign policy-making, so much of which has become a collective endeavour. And, indeed, their close cooperation in the CFSP (and EU more generally) has had implications for how they engage with and in other international bodies such as the United Nations where EU states have become an effective and highly-­ coordinated grouping. In this sense, therefore, member states have adapted to and converged around particular ways of doing things in the context of the development of CFSP and how it operates. Once again, though, this speaks to process rather than necessarily to policy content.

How Successful Are Britain and Germany at Uploading Their Preferences? In considering the projection of national interests and preferences into the CFSP, we can again draw on the Europeanization literature, this time through its concept of policy ‘uploading’. Given the largely instrumental perspective Britain has taken towards CFSP, it is unsurprising that it has sought to upload particular national preferences to the EU level which, as noted, has represented an important functional component in its wider foreign policy ‘toolkit’. (And indeed it is worth recalling that since the earliest days of EPC, foreign policy was an area considered by both the UK and its partners as one where it could and should be expected to exercise influence and develop a leadership role.) Thus, since the establishment of CFSP we have seen a range of British-inspired initiatives, for example to develop EU relations with its former colonies; to develop an EU military capability complementary to NATO; and to ensure a robust EU-level response to Iran to underpin wider international efforts at the UN and IAEA. From the British perspective, these are areas where the CFSP and EU ‘add value’ to its broader foreign policy—and where Britain in turn enhances what the EU can do. Equally, however, where it has had less interest in the policy in question, for example its decision not to become involved in the CSDP mission to Chad, it has remained semi-detached, leaving those who have promoted the policy to lead and only intervening

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if particular red lines were crossed, for example regarding the financial implications of policies or missions. This can be characterised as a pragmatic and essentially defensive approach. Thus, while the British system has certainly sought to understand and take on board the perspectives of its partner states through UKREP and bilateral links, these may have had only a limited impact on its broader foreign policy making domestically. Germany, however, adopts a slightly different stance. As discussed, four different styles can be discerned in its engagement with the CFSP, with its preferred choice being to operate in partnership when promoting a particular policy preference—such as the joint proposal with France for the EEAS. It has also been studious in its efforts to be seen as a champion (and protector?) of the interests of smaller states. However, while avoiding unilateral action wherever possible, it has nevertheless sought to upload its particular preferences in terms of developing the Eastern Partnership, responding to the Iranian and Ukrainian crises etc. It has perhaps been more comfortable than Britain in articulating these preferences in ‘European’ or broader normative terms—for example, in its stance on Iran and the need for robust European action, or in the diplomatic response to Russia. Indeed, the close identification of German foreign and security policy with the frameworks provided by the EU (and NATO) certainly make such an articulation easier and more natural than it would perhaps be for Britain. However, this should not disguise the fact that Germany is nonetheless pursuing policy objectives and preferences determined at the national level as being of national importance. Moreover, like Britain it is equally prepared to adopt a defensive stance to prevent a particular policy, for example on questions of expenditure or decisions (not) to deploy CSDP missions. For Germany, though, the starting point is always that European perspective: its history and conception of itself as an international actor demand an approach that frames everything through Europe, multilateralism and a rules-based international system. (That said, a legitimate question can be posed about whether repeated official statements emphasising German commitment to multilateral structures and locating German policy within these is increasingly about reassuring partners—that Germany ‘doth protest too much’. A Germany that has become markedly more assertive in foreign and security policy over the last decade may feel an increased need to reiterate its commitment to multilateralism, even while gradually becoming more willing to ‘flex its muscles’.) The ability of both states to work with partners, whether in presenting policy proposals or crafting compromise etc., also matters here. The

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e­ vidence suggests that both have been effective and are regarded by their partners as such. Britain has seemed to enjoy an advantage in terms of its ability to persuade partner states, partly linguistic but also due to the effectiveness of its arguments, preparation and flexibility, all of which are founded upon a generally efficient domestic policy-making process. Germany, meanwhile, represents an important counterbalance to both Britain and France which are both regarded as outliers at times, and as noted works hard to position itself as a champion or defender of the interests of its smaller partners. (Indeed, one of the consequences of Brexit will be a change in this complex balance of powers among member states absent the UK.) This indicates that both states are effective at the process of policy-making—the how of CFSP—although British officials could perhaps be considered as having enjoyed a slight advantage. The important point, though, is that being good at the process cannot be equated to a change in the what—i.e. it does not indicate a change or transformation in national preferences or interests as a consequence of what is taking place within the CFSP. Indeed, the opposite might be a more plausible explanation: what better way, after all, to pursue and promote a national preference at European level than by ensuring you are effective at the process itself? Such a conclusion echoes the arguments of Juncos and Pomorska (2008), for example, about how new member states have ‘learnt’ within CFSP committees. If we consider the two case studies in this context—the response to the Iran nuclear crisis and the establishment of the EEAS—we see clear examples of successful uploading of preferences. In the case of Iran, Britain and Germany alongside France adopted a clear and unequivocal position in terms of the need for a robust international response and a recognition of the capacity of the EU collectively to lead that response. The establishment and maintenance of such a stringent sanctions regime, in the face of sometimes significant opposition from EU partners, reflects both the seriousness of the security challenge and their success in achieving and maintaining a consensus around their dual-track diplomatic approach. While the efforts of the E3 were ultimately eclipsed by the addition of the ‘+3’ non-European powers and particularly the diplomatic marathon conducted by three successive High Representatives, the framework for EU action and the principles underlying this remained largely consistent throughout. In the case of the EEAS, meanwhile, we see the proposal for an EU ‘diplomatic service’, first mooted in the Draft Constitutional Treaty and based on a Franco-German proposal, coming to fruition with the

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Lisbon Treaty. Germany can therefore claim to have successfully uploaded its policy preference; but while the UK was a late and perhaps reluctant convert, it was also able to achieve some measure of success in ensuring a clear demarcation of powers and responsibilities between the EEAS and member states on the one hand, and between the EEAS and other EU institutions on the other, thereby ensuring key national prerogatives were protected. Both cases are therefore useful in demonstrating the ongoing relevance of ‘uploading’ as a Europeanisation dynamic as well as reminding us just how hard member states can push—and push for—their particular preferences at EU level.

Co-operation, Co-optation and Competition: Theoretical Implications and Pathways for Further Research The theoretical basis of this book has been to challenge arguments particularly within supranationalist theorising that long-term participation in CFSP has transformed member states foreign policy-making and thinking. That there has been some change and adaptation, particularly institutional, is not contested and indeed has been demonstrated quite convincingly in the Europeanisation literature. The specific concern of this book has been to think about what has taken place at the national level, based on the contention that this part of the puzzle has been neglected when thinking about drivers of change and why, how and to what extent change happens. In theoretical terms, this book has argued that the principles of constructivism can be a useful starting point for such an inquiry. In particular, they can give us insights into the roles and activities of the national level institutions involved in foreign policy-making which are important sources of the ideas, norms and notions of identity that are so central to the shaping and articulation of what we identify as a state’s national interests and preferences. This in turn speaks to Ruggie’s demand, as noted in the introduction, that we consider how states ‘define their identity and interests in the first place’ (1998: 14). The discussion of how British and German foreign policy making takes place and the range of domestic institutions involved highlights just how complex and dynamic the processes of domestic interest and preference formation are, and that while involvement in the CFSP clearly matters, so to do a wide variety of other ­influences including history, departmental norms and identities, and the particular characteristics of a state’s policy-making process.

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At the same time, Smith’s argument that the common in CFSP clearly entails ‘a higher order obligation’ between member states than might be found in other institutional contexts demands that we evaluate carefully the place of the CFSP within this puzzle. It requires us to consider what such an obligation entails and how it manifests itself. In terms of process and participation, we can see this obligation expressed most clearly through the socialisation that takes place within CFSP, something best exemplified by the coordination reflex—indeed, the efforts of Britain and Germany in this regard have been highlighted in the preceding chapters. We also see it in the willingness of member states to support and contribute to the institutionalisation and ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy cooperation through the establishment of institutions such as the EEAS, PSC and HR/VP—here, again, the involvement of both states has been clearly demonstrated. However, the idea that that obligation has contributed to an ideational transformation at national level is far less convincing. Instead, Dûchene’s characterisation of what occurs through long-term cooperation and interaction as a ‘domestication’ of member state relations feels more plausible. Thus, we have in CFSP a system that enables 28 member states to come together with sometimes sharply differing views and interests and discuss, mediate between and mitigate these differences in a way that facilitates their ongoing cooperation. Moreover, it is worth noting that not only does the CFSP enable to a very great extent the containment of disagreement, it also enables member states to manage a perhaps even more corrosive factor in any joint foreign policy-making endeavour: apathy (an issue that itself merits more attention in how we think about EU foreign policy-making). This is no small achievement. It reminds us as well—as Keukeleire and MacNaughton argue (2008)—that as much as anything else, the CFSP is a system of international relations in and of itself, with all the complexities and challenges that brings. What then of the national? In terms of thinking about its significance in the ongoing evolution of CFSP, two potential pathways for future research are proposed here. First, having demonstrated the ongoing importance of the national level in terms of how states engage with the CFSP, what also becomes clear is our need to better understand and theorise how the different institutional actors involved in national-level foreign policy-making interact and engage with each other as well as with the Brussels level. Important comparative work has already been done within the Europeanisation literature—for example by Wong and Hill (2011)—that looks at foreign policy-making across a number of member states. However

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an opportunity exists to build on this by pursuing a more systematic examination of the institutional consequences and impact of cooperation within CFSP that draws on the framework provided by the policy coordination literature. As has been shown, a focus on policy coordination lays bare both the ambition and capacities of member states to link not only their national and Brussels-level administrative and diplomatic components but also to explore the extent to which participation in the CFSP impacts horizontally at the national level. This is particularly important given the increasing number of domestic governmental actors with an interest in the range of issues falling under the aegis of foreign and security policy. How do ministries responsible for internal security, justice, policing, aid and development etc. engage with the ‘traditional’ foreign policy actors, particularly foreign and defence ministries, on such questions? Who are the agenda-setters? Which ministries are involved in particular policy issues, why and when, and to what extent is this wider group of actors either reinforced, empowered or constrained by the requirements of CFSP? What kinds of impacts and influence does the CFSP, in turn, have on their national-level interactions and vice versa? How ultimately do national governments think about, frame and construct the commitments that participating in CFSP entails and how is this then reflected in what they do and how they do it? The policy coordination literature offers a template for thinking about these questions and for a systematic comparative study of member states that could provide valuable insights into the interaction of the national and supranational levels in EU foreign policy-making. Related to this, the second important avenue focuses on the Brussels level, and particularly the role of the institutional structures that represent the ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign and security policy-making—particularly the EEAS and the PSC. As shown above, both the idea of an EU level ‘foreign ministry’ and the development of that idea into the institution we recognise today as the EEAS were highly contested among the member states. Unsurprisingly, considerable research attention has been focused on the development, activities and capacities of the EEAS in the years since Lisbon, for example the recent study by Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018). As noted above, moreover, its establishment has certainly resulted in institutional responses at member state level, particularly in foreign ministries. Once again, though, deeper questions can be asked as to its effect on the national level. For example, how do national actors engage with the EEAS? What place does it occupy in terms of their ambitions and strategies to exercise influence over policy outcomes and does this vary

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depending on the resources a member state is willing and able to devote to foreign and security policy questions? Have the rules and norms that govern the policy-making environment changed as a consequence of the role its officials play as permanent chairs of working group, PSC and FAC meetings? As the EEAS has emerged as an important focal point and institutional expression of EU foreign policy, understanding the consequences of this among national capitals is important. At the same time, the establishment of the PSC is regarded as an important milestone in the ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign and security policy-making, yet research into this body remains limited. As the primary diplomatic interface between national and supranational levels, and with significant responsibilities in terms of overseeing crisis management operations, PSC ambassadors play a crucial role in translating national objectives and goals into CFSP outputs and then in ensuring these are appropriately and successfully enacted. Its evolution as a body and the importance of the PSC ambassador within national foreign policy-making structures are therefore deserving of renewed attention, particularly given the expectations that may be placed upon it with the developing ambitions among the EU27 for greater cooperation and integration in EU defence and crisis management capabilities. * * * This book has questioned the claim that long-term cooperation and interaction within the CFSP results in a transformation in how member states identify and conceive of their national interests and preferences. This is not to say that the CFSP has not had an impact on member states, or that there has been no change or adaptation as a consequence of their participation in its structures. However, if we are to avoid falling into the ‘trap’ of taking a state’s identity or interests ‘for granted’ (Ruggie 1998: 4), equally we must avoid making the same mistake from the other side by assuming that the CFSP has more of an impact on member states than it actually does. We cannot assume the national will be changed or transformed by the international or multilateral. More specifically, even if change can be identified, we cannot assume that it is the CFSP that is the source of that change. As has been shown, Britain and Germany engage with the CFSP in a range of ways. Their domestic foreign policy-making regimes are dense and complex with the institutions and networks they comprise all placing

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their own demands on the CFSP.  Moreover, there are important and deeply-embedded traditions, behaviours and assumptions about the world and their place in it that feed into the processes by which they determine their preferences and interests, and then how these are pursued in CFSP. Certainly, Brussels is an important contributor to these processes. However, it is by no means clear in either country that their national institutions, which have their own norms, values and preferences, are being subsumed or supplanted by what is taking place in the CFSP. This is not to suggest that British and German interests and preferences are given or fixed—rather that their domestic institutions remain robust and resilient sources of interests, values and identity in their own right and therefore are demanding of attention as well. Meanwhile, it is also clear that regular and regularised interactions between member state officials over the long-­ term in CFSP have resulted in the emergence of accepted norms that regulate their behaviour and can result in the development of secondary loyalties: officials engaging in the Brussels system recognise their responsibility to reach agreements and ‘make the room work’. However, we must be wary of equating this with a deeper transformation in how national officials involved in CFSP conceive the interests and preferences it is their job to protect, promote and pursue. Put simply, being effective and efficient at the process is an essential requirement if a state is to achieve its goals in CFSP. Ultimately, by highlighting the power and importance of national foreign policy-making in the context of the CFSP we are reminded that nation states remain central to our understanding of how EU foreign and security policy operates, and to international relations more broadly. However complex the international system and however influential the role of international organisations within it, the nation state nevertheless remains the most enduring institution of all.

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Index1

A Acquis Communautaire, 6 Afghanistan, 56, 60, 79, 98, 122, 123, 125, 134, 205 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 204 Amsterdam, Treaty of, 25, 47, 93, 225 Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), 156 Article 50, 100 Ashton, Catherine, 95, 96, 174, 227, 228, 242–244 Athena Funding Mechanism, 181 Austria, 20, 91, 176 Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and Department 2, Foreign, Security and Development Policy, 150 and Department 5, European Policy, 151 and Directorate-General for Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and

Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 150 and European Correspondent, 151, 152, 156 and European Directorate-General, 150 and German Permanent Representation to the EU, 256 and leadership of foreign policy-­ making, 145 and policy coordination, 149–150 and policy-making, 150, 152, 159, 235 and Political Director, 131, 152 and Political Directorate-General, 2, 150 and PSC Ambassador, 152 and Review 2014—A fresh look at German Foreign Policy, 132 and Richtlinienkompetenz, 146 and role of Chancellor, 145

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2019 N. Wright, The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK, New Perspectives in German Political Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93470-9

301

302 

INDEX

Auswärtiges Amt (cont.) and role of foreign minister, 145 and Sudan Task Force, 155 and Task Force Syria, 155 B Balance of Competences Review, 241 Barroso, Jose Manuel, 244 Battlegroups, 50, 53, 98, 168, 172 Beckett, Margaret, 96 Belarus, 92 Belgium, 176, 245n1 Berlin Republic, 124 Blair, Tony, 38, 41–43, 47–54, 56, 68, 74, 95–96, 127 and the Doctrine of the International Community, 51 and the Third Way, 49, 52 Bonn Republic, 117, 119, 124, 165 Brexit, viii, 2, 37, 38, 79, 81, 90, 95, 99–103, 170, 183–186, 245, 255, 256, 261 Britain and 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), 59, 69 and Bosnia, 45, 46 and CFSP, 3, 16, 17, 22, 28, 37–39, 41–61, 67–81, 87–104, 172, 203, 206, 208, 210–214, 226, 230, 232, 233, 238–244, 255, 259, 261, 265 and coalition government (2010–2015), 56–60, 240 and Conservative foreign policy, 42 and CSDP, 43, 53, 56, 59, 60, 88, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 233, 239, 256–258, 260 and EEAS, 226, 229–234, 237–244 and EPC, 12, 43, 44, 196 and ERM, 45 and EU operational headquarters, 58

and foreign policy co-operation, 43, 44, 54, 56, 60 and Germany, 2, 3, 14, 15, 17, 22, 28, 29, 45, 80, 90, 92, 99, 101, 145, 156, 171–174, 184, 195, 200, 207, 211, 212, 214, 226, 229, 238, 240, 245, 253, 255, 257–263, 265 and Iran, 200, 202–206, 209–214, 261 and Lancaster House Treaties, 60, 101 and Maastricht Treaty, 38, 41, 43 and the Middle East, 70 and NATO, 43, 57, 96, 122, 182, 197 and New Labour foreign policy, 48 and 9/11, 47, 50 and Operation Atalanta, 60, 98 and policy coordination, 254, 255, 257 and St Malo Agreement, 49, 53, 88, 95, 122 and Strategic Defence and Security Review, 59 and Ukraine crisis, 57 and UN Security Council, 42, 88, 196, 197, 213, 241 and the US, 48–49, 95, 179, 203, 204 and Whitehall, 43, 52 and Yugoslavia, 45, 47, 50 Brown, Gordon, 38, 41, 47, 51, 54–56 Brusselisation, 8, 23, 27, 263–265 Bryant, Chris, 231, 233 Bundestag, 123, 128, 130, 135, 137n8, 137n16, 156, 180, 206, 207, 209, 236–238, 246n35 Bundeswehr, 123, 125, 129, 132, 134

 INDEX 

Bush, George W., 126, 137n10, 204, 216n6 Bush Administration, The, 47, 51, 199, 201 C Cabinet Office (CO), 69, 70, 99 Cameron, David, 38, 41, 56, 57, 60, 61n5, 137n15 Chagos Islands, 102 China, viii, 72, 73, 94, 95, 103, 147, 151, 195, 201, 202, 215, 240, 241 Chirac, Jacques, 50, 59, 127, 147, 246n35 Clarke, Charles, 48 Clinton Administration, The, 46 Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, 60, 105n13 Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER), 7, 8, 21, 22, 27, 30n5, 153, 157, 161n58 Committee on Internal Security (COSI), 156 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Capabilities-Expectations Gap, 15, 19, 20, 25, 225 and constructive abstention, 19 and coordination reflex, 10, 263 and crisis management, 27, 122 and development and institutions, 23–28 and Europeanisation, 8–10, 18, 262, 263 and institutionalisation, 3, 10–14 and Nicolaides group, 80 and working groups, 10, 16, 38, 100, 154, 159, 174, 259 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

303

and complementarity with NATO, 95–98 as ESDP, 53, 122, 171 and EU operational headquarters, 58, 79, 185 and launch of, 59, 171 Community pillar, 9, 15 Constitutional Treaty, see Draft Constitutional Treaty Constructivism and constructivist ‘turn,’ 5, 253 and end of the Cold War, 4 and European integration, 3–5, 253 and ideas, 4, 7, 8 and IR theory, 4 and norms, 4, 6–8 and rules, 6–8 Convention on the Future of Europe, 226 Cook, Robin, 52, 68, 96, 97 Côte d’Ivoire, 182 Council of the European Union, 14 Croatia, 117 Cuba, 181 Cunliffe, John, 70 Cyprus, 18, 104n2, 131, 201 D Darroch, Kim, 233 de Villepin, Dominique, 136n6, 200 Delors, Jacques, 45 Denmark, 88, 95, 98, 161n54, 176 Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU), 69, 71, 99, 100 Department for International Development (DfID), 29, 52, 69, 71, 73–75, 239, 255 Department for International Trade (DIT), 99 Draft Constitutional Treaty, 226, 230, 261 Dumas, Roland, 169

304 

INDEX

E Eastern Partnership, 170, 258, 260 E3/E3+3, 198, 201, 203, 210, 211 EUFOR Tchad/RCA, 93 EULEX Kosovo, 74 EU Military Committee, 79, 179 EUMM Georgia, 74 EUNAVFOR Atalanta, 103 EUPol Afghanistan, 74 European Central Bank (ECB), 118 European Commission, ix, 5, 9, 26, 28, 29, 105n25, 161n58, 199, 216n5, 216n20, 245n1 European Correspondent, 17–18, 71–73, 75–78, 151, 152, 156, 257 European Council, 27, 29, 68, 94, 129, 131, 147, 159, 168, 169, 180, 197, 199, 208, 227, 236 European Defence Agency (EDA), 56, 103, 172, 173 European Defence Fund, 150, 185 European External Action Service (EEAS), ix, 26–29, 58, 72, 77, 78, 128, 152, 154, 168, 174–176, 179, 182, 185, 198, 215, 218n46, 225–245, 260–264 Europeanization and convergence, 50, 122, 257 and uploading, 9, 17–19, 254, 259, 262 European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP), 170 European Political Cooperation (EPC), 7, 8, 11–13, 23, 24, 26, 42, 44, 46, 71, 72, 196, 259 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), see Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) European Security Strategy (ESS), 18, 53, 182, 197 European Union Military Staff (EUMS), 179

Eurozone crisis, 124, 126–129, 147, 150 EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 197, 211 EUTM Somalia, 103 F Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt), 146 Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 119 Federal Defence Ministry (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung) (BMVg) and Defence Policy Guidelines, 148, 149 and Defence White Paper (Weissbuch), 133 Finland, 88, 186n13, 187n34, 245n1 Fischer, Joschka, 115, 120, 121, 123, 136n6, 146, 147, 178, 200, 209, 236, 237, 246n35 Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), 18, 26–29, 38, 76, 100, 152, 153, 157, 171, 213, 236, 243, 259, 265 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Active Diplomacy for a Changing World, 90 and Africa policy, 242 and Brexit, 90, 99–103 and budget, 71, 74 and CFSP, 67, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77, 90, 100, 212, 255, 257 and CFSP mainstreaming, 75–76, 255 and CSDP, 59, 73, 96 and Deputy PSC Ambassador, 80 and DfID, 29, 71–75 and Diplomatic Excellence Initiative, 59

 INDEX 

and EEAS, 234, 239, 242 and Europe Directorate, 239 and Iran, 202–205, 212, 217n25 and leadership of UK foreign policy, 23, 67–71 and MoD, 29, 71, 73, 74, 255 and PSC Ambassador, 79, 80 and role of Foreign Secretary, 54, 68, 70, 203 and role of Prime Minister, 67, 68, 70, 74, 81n2, 255 and Security Policy Department, 73 and Stabilisation Unit, 73, 74 and Sudan Unit, 72 Ukraine crisis, 57, 90, 125–127, 130, 179, 183, 210 and UKREP, 29, 67, 70, 77–80, 81n10, 100 and Western Balkans, 72 France and CFSP, 12, 45, 75, 88, 90, 93, 169, 172, 177, 214, 260 and Germany, 46, 57, 80, 90, 92, 93, 99, 100, 102, 130, 156, 168–174, 177, 179, 184, 186, 195, 199, 200, 204, 211, 212, 214, 228, 245n1, 246n35, 261 and Lancaster House treaties, 60, 101 Franco-German Security Policy Council, 156, 172 French Foreign Ministry (Quai d’Orsay), 29, 88, 151 Future of Europe Group, 175 G Gabriel, Sigmar, 149 Gauck, Joachim, 132 Gbagbo, Laurent, 182 G8, 127, 147, 197, 208, 210

305

General Secretariat of the Council, ix, 24, 25, 29, 77, 158, 168, 201, 213, 218n46, 228, 239, 243 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 146, 159–160n1, 169, 178 German Permanent Representation to the EU, 29, 256 German Polish Treaty (1991), 169 Germany and Brexit, 183–186 and China, 195 and EEAS, 175–176, 179, 226, 229, 235, 237, 238, 240, 242–244 and European vocation, 2, 24, 117, 128 as exemplar, 111, 173–177, 238 and France, 45, 46, 53, 57, 80, 90, 92, 93, 99, 100, 102, 130, 168–174, 177, 179, 184, 186, 195, 199, 200, 204, 211, 212, 214, 228, 245n1, 246n35, 261 and Grand Coalition, 124, 146, 149 and Iran, 171, 195–202, 206, 209–214, 261 and Kosovo, 112, 115, 120–122, 136 and leadership of foreign policy, 115, 120, 121, 124, 126, 132, 145–159, 165, 166, 174, 180, 181, 183, 235, 237, 262 and Libya, 129, 130 and Maastricht, 24, 152, 235 as mediator, 166, 177–179, 186 as a military power, 60, 132–135 and multilateralism, 2, 112, 117, 118, 123, 132, 135, 149, 166, 177, 260 and NATO, 60, 117, 129, 130, 133, 134, 148, 208, 258 and PESCO, 102, 134, 168, 185

306 

INDEX

Germany (cont.) and Poland, 125, 130, 169, 170, 179, 184, 186, 228 and policy coordination, 16, 149–150, 254, 256 and Red-Green coalition, 115, 122 and Russia, 46, 130, 195, 259 and shared leadership, 166, 167, 171, 184–186, 212 and Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 121 and Syria, 129, 137n15 and Trump Administration, 102, 134 and Ukraine crisis, 57, 90, 130, 179, 183, 210 as unilateral actor, 180–183 and United Kingdom, 24, 46, 57, 79, 80, 90, 92, 98, 101, 102, 135, 137n15, 168, 171–174, 179, 183, 184, 186, 195, 196, 212, 214, 226, 238 and United Nations, 119, 129, 176, 177, 208, 212, 259 and United Nations Security Council, 130 and Weimar Triangle, 169–171, 184 and Westphalian vs post-Westphalian analyses, 117 Gorazde, 120 Greece, 94, 131, 201 H Hague, William, 42, 56–58, 70, 89, 96, 97, 205, 230, 239, 241 Hain, Peter, 231, 232 Hammond, Phillip, 96, 97, 206 Heath, Edward, 50 Heusgen, Christoph, 131, 137n11 High Representative for the CFSP (and later of the Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice President) (HR/VP) and the EEAS, 26, 235 as permanent chair of the FAC, 26 Hoon, Geoff, 231, 234 Hungary, 131, 137n14, 179 Hurd, Douglas, 23, 43–46 I India, viii, 103, 241 Intergovernmentalism, 4, 5, 11, 12, 18, 61, 229, 235, 238 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 196, 198, 200, 201, 203–206, 209–211, 259 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 102 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 125, 134, 137n8 Iran, Islamic Republic of, 1, 29, 46, 55, 90, 92, 124, 151, 152, 157, 171, 178, 195–215, 234, 258–261 E3+3, 25, 171, 195, 198, 203, 210, 212 Iraq, 47, 50, 51, 53, 56, 60, 79, 98, 123, 124, 177, 199, 200, 204 Ireland, 20, 137n14 Ischinger, Wolfgang, 123, 129, 130, 136, 149 Italy, 46, 80, 172, 176, 185, 186, 186n13, 187n34, 201, 212 J Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 171, 195, 202, 210 Jujat, General Harald, 134 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 9, 30n1, 30n5

 INDEX 

K Kamp, Karl-Heinz, 135 Khatami, Mohammed, 203, 217n25 Kohl, Helmut, 116–120, 146, 159–160n1, 167 Kosovo, 52, 55, 112, 115, 120–122, 136, 136n4 L Libya, 57, 89, 105n11, 113, 125, 129–132, 135, 137n16, 177, 209 Lidington, David, 234, 239, 241 Lisbon, Treaty of, 26, 54, 94, 124, 126–128, 168, 172, 175, 226, 227, 261 Lucas, Hans-Dieter, 131, 162n64 Luxembourg, 25, 171, 176, 245n1 M Maastricht, Treaty of, see Treaty on European Union (TEU) Macron, Emmanuel, 184 Major, John, 38, 41, 44–46, 53 Mali, 92, 125, 134, 172 Mauritius, 102 Medvedev, Dimitri, 151 Merkel, Angela, 116, 124–135, 137n7, 137n10, 137n14, 146–148, 150, 165, 169, 184, 240 Miliband, David, 54, 55, 68, 74, 77, 88, 91, 92, 96, 98, 205, 214, 230, 239 Ministry of Defence (MoD), 29, 56, 69, 71, 73, 74, 79, 90, 97, 202, 255 Minsk Protocol, 131 Mogherini, Federica, 202, 244 Munich Security Conference, 132

307

N National Security Council, 59, 69, 74 Neofunctionalism, 4, 5 Netherlands, the, 88, 176, 186n13, 187n34, 217n28, 245n1 New supranationalism, 3 Nice, Treaty of, 27, 97 Non-papers, 156, 157, 174, 228, 243 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, 208 Nordic Battlegroup, 98 Normandy Format, 57, 130 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 25, 42–45, 50, 52, 53, 57–61, 73, 76, 78, 79, 88, 89, 95–98, 101, 102, 111–113, 121, 122, 125, 129, 130, 134, 135, 147–149, 153, 167, 178, 182, 196, 197, 208, 258–260 North Korea, 198, 209 Norway, 103 NPT, see Treaty on the Non-­ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons O Obama, Barack, 151 Operation Artemis, 172 Operation Atalanta, see EUNAVFOR Atalanta Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 73, 130, 259 Ouattara, Alassane, 182, 183 P Pakistan, 92, 205, 258 Patel, Priti, 74 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 26, 98, 102, 103, 134, 168, 169, 172, 173, 175, 185

308 

INDEX

Poland, 18, 92, 93, 125, 130, 169–172, 176, 179, 184, 186, 187n34, 217n28, 245n1 Policy coordination, 15–17, 149–150, 228, 254–257, 264 Political and Security Committee (PSC), 8, 25, 27, 28, 38, 72, 76, 79, 80, 92–94, 99, 100, 103, 106n47, 152–157, 161n58, 162n64, 173, 181, 213, 214, 230, 236, 242, 257, 263–265 Political Committee, 27, 72 Political Director, 27, 71–73, 76, 77, 81n2, 96, 131, 152, 153, 156, 212 Portugal, 176 Putin, Vladimir, 131, 151 R RELEX working group, 157, 213 Ricketts, Peter, 59, 81n2, 96, 97, 232 Rifkind, Sir Malcolm, 100 Rouhani, Hassan, 206 Russia 2008 war with Georgia, 55 EU Common Strategy, 93 and JCPOA, 195 and Ukraine, 1, 112, 130, 131, 135, 179, 258 S Sarkozy, Nicolas, 59 Schmid, Helga, 215 Schmidt, Helmut, 146, 159n1, 160n2, 167 Schröder, Gerhard, 49, 50, 115, 116, 120–124, 126, 135, 146, 147, 165, 177 Serbia, 103 Sikorski, Radek, 169, 186n15

Single European Act (SEA), 16 Single Market, 5 Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, 169 Slovenia, 117 Socialisation in the Council, 15, 20–22 and Europeanisation, 15 Solana, Javier, 25, 137n11, 201, 202, 213, 242, 243 Spain, 94, 102, 172, 176, 179, 186n13, 201 Srebrenica, 120 Stability Pact for South-East Europe, 121 Steinbrück, Peer, 126 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, 125, 126, 132, 146, 147, 149, 150 St Malo Agreement, 49, 53, 88, 95, 122 Straw, Jack, 74, 96, 97, 200, 203–205, 231, 232, 245n8 Sudan, 72, 125, 155, 177, 243 Supranationalism, see New supranationalism Sweden, 80, 88, 95, 98, 186n11, 187n34, 201, 228, 245n1 Syria, viii, 57, 112, 113, 125, 129, 137n15 T Thatcher, Margaret, 38, 44 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 16, 19, 24, 26, 38, 228 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 196–198, 200, 202, 205–207, 215, 258 Trump Administration, 102, 134 Trump, Donald, 136, 184, 195 Turkey, 18, 104n2, 217n28 Tusk, Donald, 169

 INDEX 

U Ukraine, viii, 1, 57, 124, 129–133, 135, 151 United Kingdom, see Britain United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP), 29, 67, 70–73, 75, 77–81, 81n10, 87, 99, 100, 157, 239, 255, 260 United Nations (UN), 52, 101, 102, 111, 119, 120, 129, 134, 135, 138n25, 148, 149, 156, 176, 177, 183, 197, 198, 201–204, 206–208, 210, 211, 215, 259 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 88, 130, 137n16, 149, 176, 212, 214 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, 197 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737, 209 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1803, 209 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929, 202 United States of America (USA), viii, 25, 43, 46, 48, 50, 52–54, 57,

309

72, 94, 95, 103, 106n47, 121–123, 126, 129, 136, 137n13, 147, 179, 184, 195, 199–204, 211, 215, 216n6, 240 V von der Leyen, Ursula, 132, 133, 149 W War on terror, 112, 122, 123 Weimar Triangle, 169–171, 184 Westerwelle, Guido, 111, 129, 130, 137n15, 137–138n16, 169, 175, 186n15, 207 Y Yugoslavia, 25, 45, 112, 119 Z Zimbabwe, 92 Zivilmacht, 112, 117, 119, 122, 125, 130, 135

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