The Dangerous Duty of Rebuke: Leviticus 19:17 in Early Jewish and Christian Interpretation

The Dangerous Duty of Rebuke: Leviticus 19:17 in Early Jewish and Christian Interpretation

Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism Editors René Bloch (Institut für Judaistik, Universität Bern) Karina Martin Hogan (Department of Theology, Fordham University) Associate Editors Hindy Najman (Theology & Religion Faculty, University of Oxford) Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar (Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, KU Leuven) Benjamin G. Wright, III (Department of Religion Studies, Lehigh University) Advisory Board A.M. Berlin – K. Berthelot – J.J. Collins – B. Eckhardt Y. Furstenberg – S. Kattan Gribetz – S. Mason – F. Mirguet – J.H. Newman A.K. Petersen – M. Popović – I. Rosen-Zvi – J.T.A.G.M. van Ruiten M. Segal – J. Sievers – W. Smelik – G. Stemberger – L.T. Stuckenbruck L. Teugels – J.C. de Vos

VOLUME 185

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/jsjs

The Dangerous Duty of Rebuke: Leviticus 19:17 in Early Jewish and Christian Interpretation By

Matthew S. Goldstone

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018026297

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1384-2161 isbn 978-90-04-37656-4 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-37655-7 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.



‫לאבי מורי ראובן יואל בן אליהו ואסתר ז"ל‬

For my father, Robert Joel Goldstone z’’l

∵

Contents Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations xi Introduction 1

part 1 How to Rebuke? Leviticus 19:17 in Context 1 The Moral and the Judicial Dimensions of Rebuke in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Gospels 29 2 Boundaries of Love: Reading Lev. 19:17 in Light of Lev. 19:18 45 3 Slanderous Speech: Reading Lev. 19:17 in Light of Lev. 19:16 65

PART 2 Can One Rebuke? Rebuke in the Tannaitic Midrashim 4 An Impossible Task: Rebuke in Sifra 91 5 A Perilous Practice: Rebuke in Sifre Devarim 115

part 3 Should One Rebuke? Rebuke in Later Rabbinic and Monastic Literature 6 An Undesirable Activity: Rebuke in Early Monastic Literature 145 7 An Unwelcome Commandment: Rebuke in the Babylonian Talmud 176 8 An Inescapable Obligation: Rebuke in Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu Literature 205 Conclusion 236

viii Bibliography 245 Index of Ancient Sources 265 Index of Modern Scholars 272 Subject Index 276

Contents

Acknowledgements I am forever grateful to the numerous individuals who have helped me to complete this work. I have been fortunate to benefit from the presence of faculty, staff, and graduate students in the Skirball Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies and the broader New York University community: My advisor Jeffrey Rubenstein whose support and insights have been crucial throughout the entire project; Lawrence Schiffman, Alex Jassen, Adam Becker, and Elisha Russ-Fishbane, the other members of my dissertation defense committee who offered helpful feedback for revising my dissertation for publication; Marion Kaplan who encouraged the formative stages of this project during the department’s dissertation proposal workshop; David Konstan of the Classics Department and Gerald Heverly of the Elmer Holmes Bobst Library who offered suggestions for contextualizing my topic; Caroline Gruenbaum, Zachary Levine, Joshua Schwartz, Alex Weisberg, and other participants in the department’s graduate student reading group with whom I shared various drafts of chapters; the other members of my cohort, Adrian Sackson, Danielle Drori, Judah Bernstein, and Julie Deluty, who have been especially supportive partners in bringing this work to fruition from the very early stages of my prospectus; and the former and present administrative staff in the Hebrew and Judaic Studies department, Ryan Grubbs, Hannah Katz, Maddy Goico, and Nadia Kahn for all their help. Beyond the NYU community, this project has also benefited greatly from the insights of a number of other scholars including Christine Hayes, Michal BarAsher Siegal, and Eliezer Diamond who offered helpful comments on my discussion of rabbinic sources in light of monastic literature, Steven Fraade who provided me with a number of sources on rebuke in the Second Temple period, Beth Berkowitz with whom I spoke about the overall structure of my argument, Dov Weiss whose work has proven a useful analog to my own, Marc Bregman with whom I spoke about Tanḥuma literature, Azzan Yadin-Israel who offered feedback on my analysis of the tannaitic midrashim, Aryeh Amihay with whom I discussed rebuke in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Yishai Kiel who provided me with relevant Pahlavi sources, and Carl Perkins who suggested numerous improvements for my introduction. I am indebted to the reviewer of my book manuscript for their helpful comments as well as to the anonymous readers of my articles related to this work who offered a number of critical suggestions. A version of part of my argument in Chapter 2 appeared as “Rebuke, Lending, and Love: An Early Exegetical Tradition on Leviticus 19:17–18” in the Journal of Biblical Literature

x

Acknowledgements

136.2 (2017): 309–323. A few points made in Chapter 3 appeared in “Dual Dimensions of Discipline in Jewish Wisdom and Early Rabbinic Sources” in Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 35:3 (2017): 115–133. Some material underlying a section of Chapter 4 was published as “Rebuke and the Self-Acknowledged Limits of Rabbinic Authority” in Jewish Studies Quarterly 23:1 (2016): 1–21. Additionally, a version of part of Chapter 8 appeared as “You Must Rebuke Your Fellow!: Midrash Tanchuma’s Subversion of Bavli Arakhin 16b” in Hebrew Union College Annual 88 (2017): 89–112; reprinted with permission from the Hebrew Union College Annual. I am grateful to these journals for allowing me to include this material in the present work. I would also like to thank Karina Hogan and René Bloch, editors of the JSJ Sup. Series, as well as Marjolein van Zuylen, editor of Biblical Studies at Brill for all their support in bringing this project to print. My work has also been supported financially by a number of grants, prizes and scholarships. Notably, the preparation and publication of this book was made possible by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture. In addition, the various grants and stipends from New York University and the Skirball Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies made completion of this work possible. Last but not least I am indebted to my friends and family whose support and encouragement has been unwavering. I must especially recognize Peter Stein for all of our conversations and for his feedback. I am truly blessed to call him a friend. To my ḥavruta Yosi Cirlin for all of the learning we have accomplished (and hopefully will continue to accomplish) together. To my wife Leora Kling Perkins who remains an enthusiastic source of inspiration. And, of course, to my immediate family, my brother Benjamin, my mother Barbara, and my father Robert ‫ז"ל‬, who made all of this possible.

Abbreviations AB  Anchor Bible AJEC Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity BAR Biblical Archaeology Review BDAG Danker, Frederick W., Walter Bauer, William F. Arndt, and F. Wilbur Gingrich. Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000 BDB Brown, Francis, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament Bib Biblica BibInt Biblical Interpretation BINS Biblical Interpretation Series BSac Bibliotheca Sacra BTB Biblical Theology Bulletin BZAW Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft CAH Cambridge Ancient History CBC Cambridge Bible Commentary CP Classical Philology CSCO Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium. Edited by Jean Baptiste Chabot et al. Paris, 1903 DCH Dictionary of Classical Hebrew. Edited by David J. A. Clines. 9 vols. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 1993–2014 DJD Discoveries in the Judaean Desert DSD Dead Sea Discoveries EEC Encyclopedia of Early Christianity. Edited by E. Ferguson. 2d ed. New York: Garland, 1997 EncJud  Encyclopaedia Judaica. Edited by Fred Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum. 2nd ed. 22 vols. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007 GELS A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint. Takamitsu Muraoka, Leuven: Peeters, 2009 GKC Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar. Edited by Emil Kautzsch. Translated by Arthur E. Cowley. 2d. ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1910 HALOT The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament. Ludwig Koehler, Walter Baumgartner, and Johann J. Stamm. Translated and edited under the supervision of Mervyn E. J. Richardson. 4 vols. Leiden: Brill, 1994–1999 HAR Hebrew Annual Review HThKAT Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament HTR Harvard Theological Review

xii

Abbreviations

HUCA Hebrew Union College Annual ICC International Critical Commentary IDBSup  Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume. Edited by K. Crim. Nashville: Abingdon, 1976 JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society Jastrow Jastrow, M. A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature. 2d ed. New York, 1903 JBA  Sokoloff, Michael. A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic Periods. Ramat-Gan, Israel; Baltimore: Bar Ilan University Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002 JBL  Journal of Biblical Literature JECS  Journal of Early Christian Studies JJP  Journal of Juristic Papyrology JJS  Journal of Jewish Studies JPA  Sokoloff, Michael. A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period. Ramat Gan, Israel; Baltimore: Bar Ilan University Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002 JQR  Jewish Quarterly Review JR  Journal of Religion JRS Journal of Roman Studies JSJ  Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods JSJ Sup. Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism JSQ  Jewish Studies Quarterly JTS  Journal of Theological Studies JWSTP Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus. Edited by Michael E. Stone. Assen: Van Gorcum: Philadelphia Fortress, 1984 LCL  Loeb Classical Library LSJ  Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones. A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon, 1996 NEchtB Neue Echter Bibel NICOT New International Commentary on the Old Testament NIDOTTE New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis. Edited by Willem A. VanGemeren. 5 vols. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997 NJPS New Jewish Publication Society NovTSup Supplements to Novum Testamentum NRSV New Revised Standard Version NTS New Testament Studies

Abbreviations

xiii

OED  Oxford English Dictionary. Prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner. 2d. ed., 16 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 ParOr Parole de l’orient PG Patrologia Graeca [= Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca]. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857–1886 RevQ Revue de Qumran SNTSU Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt SP Sacra Pagina STDJ Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah StPatr Studia Patristica SVTP Studia in Veteris Testamenti Pseudepigraphica TDNT Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Edited by Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–1976 TDOT Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament. Edited by G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren. Translated by John T. Willis et al. 8 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974–2006 TLOT Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament. Edited by Ernst Jenni, with assistance from Claus Westermann. Translated by Mark E. Biddle. 3 vols. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997 TSAJ Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum VT Vetus Testamentum VTSup Supplements to Vetus Testamentum WBC Word Biblical Commentary WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament ZABR Zeitschrift für altorientalische und biblische Rechtgeschichte ZAH Zeitschrift für Althebräistik

Introduction What is the extent of our responsibility to respond to the shortcomings of others? If a friend, family member, or colleague commits an offense do I have an obligation to confront them? How do I offer constructive criticism without damaging my relationship with another person? These questions seem to reverberate strongly within the contemporary Western world, in which the notion of individual rights and autonomy is so pronounced. To challenge another’s actions impinges upon their freedom. Yet, to say nothing encourages them to continue their transgressive behavior unimpeded and ultimately degrades the moral fiber of society at large. Although based in a significantly different social setting, texts from late antiquity also respond to the complexity and urgency of these questions. This book engages with these key questions by exploring fundamental discussions about the nature of interpersonal responsibility contained in early Jewish and Christian texts. The Bible commands that: “You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. Reprove your kinsman, but incur no guilt because of him” (Lev. 19:17).1 This verse describes a duty to challenge others who transgress rather than harboring animosity or simply overlooking their infraction. But this Levitical injunction provides little guidance on the practical performance of rebuke. Daily life presents us with many situations in which we might consider speaking out against someone for doing something wrong. But how does one actually go about chastising another person? It is no simple task to tell someone that they have erred. Is it even worthwhile to speak up or should such confrontation be avoided? Early Jewish and Christian sources that interpret the Levitical command to rebuke grapple with these acute questions and in this way conceptualize the nature of a person’s responsibility for the failings of others. Beginning with the biblical obligation to rebuke recorded in Lev. 19:17, in this book I explore to what degree, and in what forms, this injunction was embraced, rejected, and understood by religious communities in antiquity. In tracing the development of this obligation as it was experienced in Jewish and Christian groups from the Bible through texts contemporaneous with the rise of Islam, we encounter strikingly divergent answers to the question of rebuke. Yet, despite these differences, all of these sources tackle the same core ethical issue: What is the nature of my responsibility to confront the misconduct of others? This issue remains contentious now as it was in antiquity. In examining 1  ‫יתָך וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ָע ָליו ֵח ְטא‬ ֶ ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח ֶאת ֲע ִמ‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ .‫לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א ֶאת ָא ִחיָך ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬. Translations of the Hebrew Bible generally follow the NJPS translation unless otherwise noted.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376557_002

2

Introduction

the responses of early Jewish and Christians works to the challenges of the obligation to rebuke, perhaps we can better understand the nature of our interpersonal obligations today. 1

What is Rebuke?

Leviticus 19:17 commands that you rebuke your fellow, but what exactly constitutes rebuke?2 Although any attempt at an all-encompassing definition is destined to failure, it is possible to identify a few key elements that delineate the contours of this activity – at least of our purposes. First, rebuke emerges from a confrontation between two parties. Unlike blame, which does not require the presence or awareness of a second party, rebuke is targeted toward another person or group (the rebuked) and intended by the rebuker to be heard and acknowledged.3 Additionally, rebuke is specifically directed toward the offending party, unlike slander and gossip that are directed toward others.4 Like these other activities, however, rebuke is primarily performed through speech.5 At times rebuke can move beyond verbal or written communication and involve an act of physical violence, yet, even when it includes a physical element, rebuke still differs from corporal punishment insofar as the latter is primarily a use of physical force that does not necessarily involve a verbal component.6 Another key aspect of rebuke is accountability. The rebuker holds the rebuked party culpable for his or her actions or beliefs, and desires for the rebuked to recognize the incorrectness of a particular action, set of actions, belief, or set of

2  Unless otherwise specified, throughout this work I employ the terms “rebuke” and “reproof,” as well as their various declensions and conjugations, synonymously. 3  Altham, “Reproach,” 268; Watson, “Two Faces of Responsibility.” Similarly, rebuke is to be differentiated from feelings without an assertion, or asserted only to express an appraisal without accountability (Macnamara, “Holding Others Responsible,” 94). 4  “Slander” and “gossip” can be understood as distinct activities, particularly with regard to the intention of the speaker. However, both are fundamentally related insofar as they constitute negative and problematic speech acts. Indeed, slander is perhaps best understood as a malicious subcategory of gossip. To some degree I will differentiate my usage of these terms in Chapter 3, applying “slander” to the discussion of Proverbs and tGad with “gossip” primarily reserved for Ben Sira, which presents a more ambiguous scenario. However, the reader should not draw too sharp a line between these activities and at times my use of these terms will be more interchangeable. 5  Neufeld, “Acts of Admonition and Rebuke”; Macnamara, “Holding Others Responsible.” 6  O ED, 13:305, s.v. rebuke.

Introduction

3

beliefs.7 The ultimate goal, of course, is to elicit compliance by compelling the other party to refrain from undesirable behaviors or beliefs.8 Even using these various parameters it can still be quite difficult to identify instances of rebuke. For example, the two criteria of accountability and intent to elicit compliance revolve around a particular intention of the rebuker that may or may not actually be expressed. Assertions that lack an explicit indication of intention occupy a gray area between rebuke and expressions of emotion or disapproval. Thus, for instance, anger can often lead individuals to decry or curse a person or situation. Outcries of this nature possess most of the traits that one finds in rebuke. However, the underlying motivation in these instances stems from a desire to express the individual’s indignation rather than primarily in order to correct the future beliefs or actions of the offending party, even if this is an implicit expectation. Both an angry outcry and a verbal rebuke are performative statements – the former primarily cathartic while the latter involves an important communicative aspect.9 Of course many statements of rebuke can be shouted in anger or include a curse, but does an emotional expression lacking an explicit correctional intent constitute rebuke?10 Definitely labeling an interpersonal interaction as rebuke is thus no easy task. In spite of the difficulties involved in affirming whether any given act should technically be considered rebuke, most of the sources I discuss are of clear and direct relevance insofar as they are prescriptive rather than descriptive – that is to say, they explicitly discuss what rebuke is or should be. Direct citation or clear allusions to Lev. 19:17, as well as the presence of key Hebrew roots and Greek lemmata that indicate rebuke, mark these sources as germane.11 Nevertheless, the aforementioned parameters for delineating the contours of rebuke remain relevant as a litmus test for comparing how different texts understand the act of rebuke. While the sources I will explore share a common 7  Macnamara, “Holding Others Responsible,” 90. 8  “Demands internally aim not at defiance, but at compliance … A demand is fully successful as the kind of thing it is only if its target does as directed because she was so directed” (Macnamara, “ ‘Screw You!’ & ‘Thank You,’ ” 897). 9  By “cathartic” I simply mean relief attained through the expression of intense emotions. 10  It is also possible to argue that the response of the rebuked is equally important in determining whether a statement constitutes rebuke or an angry outburst. For my purposes the intention of the rebuker is the determining factor since I will be focusing upon explicit discussions about the obligation to rebuke that are directed toward the potential rebuker. Statements intended by the rebuker as a rebuke, but not recognized as such by the rebuked, still constitute a rebuke albeit a failed attempt. 11  The main roots and lemmata include the following: Hebrew: ‫ר‬.‫ע‬.‫ ג‬,‫ה‬.‫ח‬.‫ מ‬,‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ ;י‬Greek: ἐλέγχω, ἐπιπλήσσω, ἐπιτιμάω, ἐμβριμάομαι, ὀνειδίζω; Syriac: ‫ܟܣܣ‬, ‫ܓܥܪ‬, ‫ ;ܟܗܪ‬Aramaic: ‫ר‬.‫ע‬.‫ ג‬,.‫ף‬.‫ע‬.‫ ז‬,‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫נ‬.‫ק‬.

4

Introduction

core sense of the act of rebuke, minute differences in these sources’ description of rebuke will allow us to better understand how each text relates to this practice. 2

Ambiguities and Tensions

It has become commonplace to assert that all texts evince varying degrees of ambiguity. In the early decades of the twentieth century, however, many literary scholars would have deemed a text saturated with ambiguity as defective – only an unskilled author would allow such blemishes to mar his work. In 1930 however, William Empson challenged this paradigm, finding “poetic richness” and literary value in the conscious inclusion of ambiguity.12 His foundational work, Seven Types of Ambiguity, opened the doors for understanding ambiguity as an intentional rhetorical device. Applying Empson’s legacy to the biblical canon, Robert Alter identifies a particularly lucid example from the end of the Book of Genesis. Focusing on the story of Joseph who is sold into the servitude of Potiphar, Alter directs our attention to the height of this narrative drama. Potiphar’s wife attempts to seduce Joseph and after he flees from her advances she is faced with explaining the situation to her irate husband. At this juncture the biblical author encodes a loaded ambiguity into the wife’s retelling of events. She tells her husband, “The Hebrew slave whom you brought into our house came to me to dally with me” (Gen. 39:17).13 Alter points out that this verse can be read in two substantially different ways; either highlighting Joseph’s sin or the husband’s culpability for bringing this slave into the house in the first place. He punctuates the two readings as follows: 1) “the slave came to me – the one you brought us – to dally with me,” or 2) “the slave came to me, the one you brought us to dally with me.”14 According to the first reading, Joseph bears complete responsibility for his actions. By contrast, the second reading is a direct attack on the husband, “suggesting that he had perversely invited trouble by introducing such a sexual menace into the household.”15 As Alter notes, the Hebrew of this verse gives no clear indication of which interpretation is to be preferred. Instead the text presents us with a highly loaded 12  Baldick, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 7–8. Empson himself describes most of the ambiguities he discusses as “beautiful” (Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, 235). 13   ‫את ָּלנּו ְל ַצ ֶחק ִּבי‬ ָ ‫ ָּבא ֵא ַלי ָה ֶע ֶבד ָה ִע ְב ִרי ֲא ֶׁשר ֵה ֵב‬. 14  Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, 110. 15  Ibid., 110.

Introduction

5

ambiguity that simultaneously captures two opposing interpretations of the event. Ambiguity spawns literary intrigue. The Bible as a whole is rife with points of ambiguity and Lev. 19:17 is no exception.16 What is noteworthy about this verse, however, is the presence of literary tensions. Generally speaking, an ambiguity refers to “openness to different interpretations; or an instance in which some use of language may be understood in diverse ways.”17 Such instances frequently enrich a text by opening up new possibilities of meaning. In a similar manner, there are some types of literary tensions that can enhance stories. Mounting tension quickens the pace of a narrative and drives the reader toward the plot’s impending climax. But there is another type of tension, resulting from contradiction and inconsistency, which can work in an opposing fashion. According to Empson, contradiction constitutes a subcategory of ambiguity and implies tension: “the more prominent the contradiction, the greater the tension.”18 Tensions represent polarized interpretive possibilities that remain in opposition. While an ambiguity can allow for the coexistence of diverse readings, a tension represents a necessary choice between two mutually incompatible options. In a true tension neither possibility dominates or outweighs the other nor can either be fully embraced at the expense of the other. The reader faced with such a tension is caught in a quandary; one route must be adopted but such a decision rejects the alternative. When it comes to interpreting divine law, tensions of this type are particularly problematic. Which reading is meant to be normative and which potentially goes against God’s will? While legal ambiguities allow readers the opportunity to select their preferred interpretation across a spectrum of possibilities, a tension presents two mutually irreconcilable options. One is right and the other is wrong. Interpreting an ambiguity sacrifices competing possibilities; selecting one option in an unresolvable tension threatens to result in a misunderstanding of God’s will. 16  The Book of Leviticus is marked by numerous ambiguities that are fleshed out in the Second Temple period. See the discussion in Harrington, “Interpreting Leviticus in the Second Temple Period,” 220–25. James Kugel already noted the “whole host of questions” that emerge when one considers Lev. 19:17 as “an actual legal requirement” (Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 215). 17  Baldick, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 7. 18  Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity, 235. Empson’s categorization of “contradiction” as a form of ambiguity can be seen in his last two types of ambiguities. The first describes examples that are “contradictory or irrelevant and the reader is forced to invent interpretations” while the second highlights material that is “full of contradiction, marking a division in the author’s mind.” See the descriptions of these types in his table of contents (Ibid., vi).

6

Introduction

When viewed through the eyes of the early Jewish interpreter, Lev. 19:17 is fraught with tensions. Each clause of the verse encodes a core ambiguity that, when considered from the perspective of practical application, leads to contradiction and an interpretive decision of significant consequence. On the one hand, the necessity of selecting one option to the exclusion of another opens up the possibility that some readers might definitively affirm one interpretative path as clearly correct, roughly rejecting the alternative and anyone who holds it as wholly incorrect and as a threat to proper Jewish practice. On the other hand, the danger of selecting the wrong interpretation may make readers quite anxious and wary of following either alternative. The risk of doing the exact opposite of what God desires may paralyze the decision making process leaving readers indecisive and unable to engage with the law. Exploring the various ambiguities that emerge from Lev. 19:17, as read with an eye toward practical application, reveals the presence of a number of tensions. By identifying the key issues at stake in each of Lev. 19:17’s three clauses, as well as the problems generated by the literary context of this verse, we can anticipate the concerns of this verse’s early Jewish and Christian interpreters. 3

The Importance of Leviticus 19:17

Many readers have suggested that chapter 19 is the preeminent section of Leviticus. The 19th century scholar Marcus Kalisch opened his comments on this chapter by suggesting that, “This remarkable chapter is perhaps the most comprehensive, the most varied, and in some respects the most important section of Leviticus, if not of the Pentateuch.”19 Indeed, David Tabb Stewart has even dubbed chapter 19 as a “mini-Torah.”20 Amidst an ongoing description of priestly duties and religious rituals, this chapter stands at the apex of the socalled “Holiness Code” and catches the eye as a collection of morally-oriented laws that bear affinity to the Decalogue.21 Its preponderance of enduring ethical injunctions is responsible for amassing widespread interpretative reactions among both Jewish and early Christian readers. Moreover, the perceived centrality of this section prompted interpreters to adopt some of its injunctions, 19  Kalisch, Leviticus, 404. 20  Stewart, “Leviticus 19 as Mini-Torah.” Also note Porter, Leviticus, 151–52. 21  For parallels between Lev. 19 and the Decalogue, see Stewart, “Leviticus 19 as Mini-Torah,” 301–304. While many traditional and academic readers have pointed to the similarities between the beginning of Lev. 19 and the Decalogue, Jacob Milgrom, one of the preeminent scholars of Leviticus, ultimately rejected the idea of Lev. 19 as a “second Decalogue” (Stewart, 300–301).

Introduction

7

such as the well-known “love your fellow as yourself” (Lev. 19:18), as the key to the Torah as a whole.22 The exemplary role of this chapter points to the high stakes later readers would have ascribed to the proper interpretation of this chapter’s precepts.23 Our verse in particular stands in a prominent position for early exegetical attention. Lev. 19:17 serves as the counterpoint to the “golden rule” of loving one’s fellow (Lev. 19:18), augmenting the importance of its correct interpretation. The core placement of our verse in chapter 19 of Leviticus, and in juxtaposition with the law of brotherly love, thus primes the rebuke command as a site for heightened scrutiny and heated disagreement. The command’s equivocal elements would receive dueling interpretations by later exegetes, pitting these interpreters against one another as they struggled to assert the priority of their own reading. More troubling than the ambiguity of the verse’s scriptural components is the fact that most of these points of uncertainty revolve around the competition between two polar opposites. Each of Lev. 19:17’s three clauses provokes a fundamental tension between antithetical interpretations that produce irreconcilable paradigms for practical application. It is these tensions and the discussion of their ramifications that will occupy our attention in subsequent chapters as we turn to the reception of Lev. 19:17 in later Jewish and Christian literature. 4

Leviticus 19:17 in its Levitical Context

Leviticus 19:17 commands that, “You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. Reprove your kinsman, but incur no guilt because of him” (‫לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א ֶאת ָא ִחיָך‬ ‫יתָך וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ָע ָליו ֵח ְטא‬ ֶ ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח ֶאת ֲע ִמ‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ‫) ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬.24 This verse easily divides into three clauses: 22  We find that both early Christian and early rabbinic figures identify the commandment to love your fellow as yourself (Lev. 19:18) as the crux of their religious traditions. See R. Akiva’s statement on this verse in Sifra Qedoshim 4 that loving one’s fellow is a great principle of the Torah and New Testament sources such as Mark 12:31. Also see, Akiyama, The Love of Neighbour in Ancient Judaism. 23  Indeed, Hannah Harrington has argued for the “vital importance of Leviticus” as a whole to Second Temple period Jews, augmenting the importance of this particular chapter and verse within that interpretative milieu (Harrington, “Interpreting Leviticus in the Second Temple Period”). 24  My discussion will revolve around the Masoretic Text as unfortunately the Dead Sea Scrolls fragments of the Book of Leviticus do not include this section (see Ulrich, The Biblical Qumran Scrolls, 124). However, as we have learned from Qumran, we should not overstate the significance of a particular textual version as alternatives may have existed

8 Lev. 19:17a Lev. 19:17b Lev. 19:17c

Introduction

You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. Reprove your kinsman, but incur no guilt because of him.

‫לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א ֶאת ָא ִחיָך‬ ‫ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬ ‫יתָך‬ ֶ ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח ֶאת ֲע ִמ‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ .‫וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ָע ָליו ֵח ְטא‬

The first clause of the verse (Lev. 19:17a) directs the Israelite not to harbor hatred. The second clause (Lev. 19:17b) instructs the Israelite to rebuke his kinsman while the third clause (Lev. 19:17c) cautions against incurring sin. These three clauses stand in an ambiguous relationship to one another and contain a number of other core ambiguities that reappear in discussions of rebuke found in later sources. Yet, even before unpacking the various dimensions of each individual component, the larger literary context of this verse raises a number of concerns. It is generally recognized that Lev. 19:11–18 constitutes a single unit comprised of four sets of couplets (verses 11–12, 13–14, 15–16, and 17–18).25 Each pair of verses is marked by the concluding words “I am the LORD” and Jacob Milgrom characterizes the entire section as a list of abiding “ethical duties,” in contrast to the “religious duties” and “miscellaneous duties” that surround it.26 All eight verses open with a prohibition indicated by repetition of the word ‫לֹא‬ (“do not”). These negative commandments are accompanied by the presence of a few positive injunctions that primarily serve to explain or contrast with the prohibitions – rather than appearing as separate rules in their own right.27 The predominance of these negations and the subordinate role of the positive injunctions create an overall impression of a collection of practices to be avoided. This somewhat negative tone pervades the section as a whole and, as we shall see, is particularly true of our biblical couplet. Narrowing in on the two verses immediately prior to Lev. 19:17 we encounter a couple of themes that will reemerge more prominently in later engagement with the practice of rebuke. These lines prohibit improper judgement and, as interpreted by many Second Temple readers, forbid gossip:28

and been used by early interpreters (see the articles in Cross and Talmon, Qumran and the History of the Biblical Text). 25  Schwartz, “Selected Chapters of the Holiness Code,” 137; Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 305; Magonet, “The Structure and Meaning of Leviticus 19,” 152–53. 26  Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1596–97. 27  Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 305. 28  See, for example, 1QS 7:15–17: “The man who slanders (‫ )רכיל‬about his fellow shall be excluded for one year from the pure-food of the Many, and be punished; but if it is against

Introduction

9

15 You shall not render an unfair decision (‫) ַּב ִּמ ְׁש ָּפט‬: do not favor the poor or show deference to the rich; judge (‫ ) ִּת ְׁשּפֹט‬your kinsman fairly. 16 Do not deal basely with your countrymen (‫)לֹא ֵת ֵלְך ָר ִכיל ְּב ַע ֶּמיָך‬. Do not profit by the blood of your fellow: I am the LORD. From an intertextual perspective, Christopher Chandler correlates Lev. 19:15– 18 with the end of the chapter (Lev. 19:33–36) as well as with material in the Decalogue (Exod. 20:16–17) and the Covenant Code (especially Exod. 23:1–3, 6–9), all of which revolve around the theme of proper judgement.29 Chandler even goes so far as to suggest that “Leviticus 19:15–18, 33–36 is the fullest expansion of the laws for just judging in the Pentateuch.”30 In his mind, the judicial context marked by the noun ‫“( ִּמ ְׁש ָּפט‬judgement”) and the verb ‫“( ִּת ְׁשּפֹט‬judge”) in verse 15 frame the remainder of this section. This legal framework offers one possibility for understanding the nature of rebuke – as a judicial practice. However, this forensic sense stands in opposition to the more private and interpersonal notion of rebuke that one might anticipate from reading Lev. 19:17 in isolation. In addition to the theme of judgement, the biblical couplet directly preceding Lev. 19:17–18 evokes the issue of gossip. The vague phrase “Do not deal basely with your countrymen” (‫ )לֹא ֵת ֵלְך ָר ִכיל ְּב ַע ֶּמיָך‬in verse 16 employs the term ‫ ָר ִכיל‬, which is typically associated with the word ‫רֹוכל‬ ֵ (“merchant”).31 It is therefore often understood as a prohibition against “moving about in the manner of a merchant, who is presumed to be privy to secret dealings and gossip. This is how the sense of talebearing developed in postbiblical Hebrew.”32 While there are certainly other plausible interpretations of this enigmatic term, the understanding of ‫ ָר ִכיל‬as gossip drifts dangerously close to the damaging type of speech one might employ in rebuking. The primary difference seems to lie in the audience – gossip, particularly in the malicious form of slander, is spread the Many that he slanders then he shall be banished from them, and he is never to come back again.” 29  Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 97–102. 30  Ibid., 101. The understanding of this material as judicial is affirmed by J. R. Porter in his commentary to Leviticus (Porter, Leviticus, 154–55). While these commentators and others read this biblical section as judicially oriented, many others disagree and frame Lev. 19:17–18 as more interpersonal. The tension between these two possibilities will reemerge as we examine the crux of Lev. 19:17’s rebuke command. 31  See for example, 1 Kgs. 10:15, Ezek. 17:4, 27:13, and Neh. 3:31. 32  Levine, Leviticus, 129; Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1643–44. This is perhaps also reflected in the Septuagint’s translation: πορεύσῃ δόλῳ (“to proceed with guile”).

10

Introduction

to others while rebuke confronts the offending individual him or herself.33 A number of Second Temple sources explicitly bring the issue of rebuke into dialogue with the concern of gossip, a pairing reinforced by the Babylonian Talmud. The proximity of the commandment against gossip and the obligation to rebuke highlights the possible tension between these two types of speech and betrays a lurking anxiety that will come to the fore in later texts. The two verses immediately prior to the rebuke commandment thus introduce the key themes of judgment and gossip that will haunt discussions of rebuke in the work of later interpreters. As noted, Lev. 19:17–18 constitutes a literary couplet. These verses mark the end of the larger unit that began with verse 11 and, in the eyes of many readers, they constitute the epitome of the entire section. In order to highlight the individual units of these verses and the parallelism between them we can separate each into three clauses: 17a You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart 17b Reprove your kinsman 17c but incur no guilt because of him. 18a You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen 18b Love your fellow as yourself 18c I am the LORD.

‫ לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א ֶאת ָא ִחיָך ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬17a ‫יתָך‬ ֶ ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח ֶאת ֲע ִמ‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ 17b .‫ וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ָע ָליו ֵח ְטא‬17c ‫ לֹא ִתּקֹם וְ לֹא ִתּטֹר ֶאת ְּבנֵ י ַע ֶּמָך‬18a ‫ וְ ָא ַה ְב ָּת ְל ֵר ֲעָך ָּכמֹוָך‬18b .'‫ ֲאנִ י ה‬18c

Jacob Milgrom and Baruch Schwartz in their commentaries on Leviticus identify a chiastic structure formed between these two verses with Lev. 19:17a and 19:18b–c serving as general commands that bracket the details sandwiched between them in Lev. 19:17b–19:18a.34 Viewed from this perspective, hating one’s kinsfolk becomes the inverse of loving one’s fellow. Similarly, the concrete action of rebuke aligns with the prohibitions on vengeance and bearing a grudge. When we graphically juxtapose these two verses, the multiple axes of relationship between them come more clearly into focus:

33  See my discussion of the nature of rebuke above. 34  See Jacob Milgrom and Baruch Schwartz’s discussions and charts (Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1646; Schwartz, “Selected Chapters of the Holiness Code,” 145–46; Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 317–19).

11

Introduction

Lev. 19:17a

Lev. 19:18a

You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart.

You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen.

Lev. 19:17b & c

Lev. 19:18b & c

Reprove your kinsman, but incur no guilt because of him.

Love your fellow as yourself. I am the LORD.

Placed in tandem, the general command of Lev. 19:17a that forbids hatred, stands beside the details of Lev. 19:18a that forbids taking revenge or bearing a grudge. These latter actions may actually be manifestations of the hatred Lev. 19:17a describes. Harboring hatred, one is likely to express this emotion through an act of vengeance, or by bearing a grudge and refraining from acting on the other person’s behalf.35 Looking down the diagonal, the injunction against hatred (Lev. 19:17a) stands in contrast to the directive to love one’s fellow (Lev. 19:18b). The latter also appears parallel to Lev. 19:17b’s command to rebuke. This dual framing of rebuke (preceded by hatred and rhetorically paralleled by love) begs the question of whether rebuke is intended as a channeling of one’s feelings of hatred or if rebuke is supposed to emerge from a place of brotherly affection. Reading the first two clauses of Lev. 19:17 (hatred and rebuke) continuously without the subsequent verse (love) one might favor the former possibility. Yet, in light of the full biblical couplet, perhaps rebuke can only properly be performed from a posture of love rather than hate.36 Before turning to an in-depth investigation of the three component clauses of Lev. 19:17, there is one final point worthy of note. Previously I suggested that the larger literary unit of Lev. 19:11–18 gives the impression of a list of practices from which one should abstain in order to avoid sin. The few positive injunctions are ancillary to the main prohibitions, painting an overall negative picture. This negative tone carries over to the proper performance of rebuke, which is surrounded by warnings.37 Directly prior to the obligation of rebuke 35  Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 318. 36  This is the position adopted by Milgrom: “One of the ways to love your fellow according to this unit (vv. 17–18), is to reprove him openly for his mistakes. And, conversely, the only admissible rebuke is that which is evoked by love, not by animosity, jealousy, or lust for power” (Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1648). 37  Jonathan Magonet may allude to this sense when he describes how the “negative and positive formulations of the various verbs act against the contrasting positive and

12

Introduction

(Lev. 19:17b) is the ban against hatred (Lev. 19:17a). Immediately following it is the admonition not to incur sin (Lev. 19:17c). The beginning of the next verse, which aligns with Lev. 19:17b along the diagonal, is the prohibition against taking vengeance or bearing a grudge (Lev. 19:18a). The presence of the admonitions not to hate, take vengeance, or bear a grudge, alert the would-be rebuker to the dangers of an inappropriate response to another person. This larger framework of prohibition and warning hints at the possible dangers involved in rebuke – if one is not careful, he or she may end up falling into sin. 5

Leviticus 19:17a – You Shall Not Hate your Kinsfolk in your Heart

The opening component of the verse (“You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart”; Lev. 19:17a) could be read in tandem with the subsequent clause (Lev. 19:17b) – do not hate, but rather channel that hatred into rebuke.38 Alternatively, this first line could be disconnected from that which follows. As James Kugel notes: [T]he first part of the verse might be understood quite separately from the rest: ‘You shall not hate your brother in your heart’ could simply be taken as a blanket injunction to avoid hatred of one’s ‘brother’ … ‘You shall surely reproach your fellow and you shall bear no sin because of him’ might then be taken to refer to an entirely different matter.39 When taken as a distinct prohibition (severed from the injunction to rebuke) this first clause appears to legislate one’s emotional reaction to another person. Within its biblical context however, this rule may have primarily intended actions associated with a particular emotional state.40 Not hating would thus be expressed by refraining from the actions delineated in Lev. 19:18a (taking vengeance and bearing a grudge). Similarly, within a biblical context we find that commands to “love the Lord your God” or to “love one’s fellow as oneself” refer in large part to acts of loyalty rather than simply an emotion.41 Despite this more action-oriented emphasis, later interpreters could easily narrow in negative contents of the commands themselves” (Magonet, “The Structure and Meaning of Leviticus 19,” 159). 38  Hieke, Levitikus: 16–27, 2:729. 39  Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 216. 40  Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 319. 41  Malamat, “Love Your Neighbor as Yourself.” This is not to say however, that affective dimensions are absent (Arnold, “The Love-Fear Antinomy in Deuteronomy 5–11”).

Introduction

13

on the affective or cognitive dimension of not hating, particularly as the verse stresses that one should not hate another in “your heart.”42 Later interpreters might thus ask: Does the text attempt to regulate emotion directly or does it transform these feelings into manifest acts that are more easily recognized and legislated, such as approved rebuke or prohibited vengeance? If the former, how is one practically to avoid animosity or control their emotions at all? If the latter, it is possible that bearing a grudge (‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫ )נ‬itself is not necessarily actionbased and therefore brings us back to the problem of regulating emotions.43 The cognitive/affective framing of the commands to avoid hatred and to express love, whether or not they are primarily intended as action-oriented, direct the reader’s attention away from the other party (the object of these emotions) and bring the focus onto the acting subject. This glance back toward the rebuker him or herself is intensified by a number of other elements in these verses. Lev. 19:17a and 19:18b both refer to the other party with respect to the self – “your kinsfolk” (‫ ) ָא ִחיָך‬and “your fellow” (‫) ְל ֵר ֲעָך‬. Moreover, each verse includes an additional word directing our attention back to the subject: Lev. 19:17a evokes “your heart” (‫ ) ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬and Lev. 19:18b explicitly states “as yourself” (‫) ָּכמֹוָך‬. The presence of the second person suffixes when describing the other person, in conjunction with the added words pointing back to the subject, direct our focus onto the actor instead of the other party. This shifting of the reader’s gaze back onto the subject calls into question whether Lev. 19:17 is

42  As Baruch Schwartz emphasizes, despite the general biblical usage of emotions to also convey proper actions, here the word “in your heart” indicates that the emotion of hatred is specifically intended (Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 319). It must be recalled however, that in antiquity the heart was more properly the home of one’s thoughts, rather than emotions (DCH, 4:506). The intention here would therefore be a cognitive hatred (Hieke, Levitikus: 16–27, 2:728). Many manuscripts of the Septuagint thus render this word as τῇ διανοίᾳ, “inwardly, i.e. in one’s mind” (Wevers, Septuaginta, 300). 43  If Lev. 19:17b is read as a continuation of Lev. 19:17a, then the angered party is instructed to rebuke the object of their hatred, rather than channeling this emotion into one of the negative practices described in Lev. 19:18a. Rebuke would thus constitute proof of avoiding harboring hatred. Yet, how is one to observe or punish someone for bearing a grudge without a definite act? Furthermore, if the verse is only regulating the “actions” supplied to manifest hatred, then how does bearing a grudge serve as a punishable manifestation? The possibility that these verses regulate unverifiable emotions may be heighted by the conclusion of Lev. 19:18, “I am the LORD.” According to some interpretations, Leviticus 19:14’s prohibition against placing a stumbling block before the blind (‫וְ ִל ְפנֵ י ִעּוֵ ר לֹא ִת ֵּתן‬ ‫ ) ִמ ְכׁש ֹל‬concludes with a reminder of God’s presence (“You shall fear your God: I am the LORD”) in order to ensure compliance since the blind individual cannot determine the perpetrator. Similarly, perhaps the reminder of God’s presence in Lev. 19:18 serves the same purpose of ensuring compliance with commands oriented toward internal states.

14

Introduction

first and foremost about rebuking the other party or if this verse prioritizes the acting subject. Reading Lev. 19:17a as independent of Lev. 19:17b, the former clause appears to revolve around the subject’s internal state while the latter is concerned with responding to another person. Once these two clauses are integrated, however, the tension between a focus on the self and a focus on the other party becomes more acute. Is rebuke primarily intended to chastise and reform another person for some negative activity, or is rebuke first and foremost about a productive cathartic activity that diverts one’s hatred away from damaging manifestations such as vengeance? This underlying ambiguity over who constitutes the ultimate focus is transformed into a sharp tension when we consider the practical application of the verse. Should a person rebuke another party who acted wrongly but did not personally offend or affect the observer?44 If I have animosity toward someone without any particular transgression in mind must I nonetheless air this grievance? What marks the endpoint of a successful rebuke – purging of one’s personal animosity or acknowledgement of fault and remorse by the other party? If only one of these two goals is realized, must the rebuker continue until both are fulfilled? These points of uncertainty problematize the entire practice of reproof, calling into question when a person must engage in the act, how it should be performed, and whether one has successfully completed the required rebuke. Indeed, some later interpreters question whether rebuke is even a proper expression of hatred or if reproof itself might heighten the problematic feeling of hatred rather than defusing its force. Consequently, if the goal of the first part of the verse is to alleviate anger, then perhaps rebuke should be avoided. The ambiguity over whether Lev. 19:17 intends to affect the hating subject or the transgressing other thus evolves into a tension between a focus upon the self and a focus on the other, problematizing the proper conditions for rebuke and even calling into question the value of rebuke as a cathartic expression in the first place. 6

Leviticus 19:17b – Reprove your Kinsman

Narrowing in on the rebuke clause itself (“Reprove your kinsman”; Lev. 19:17b) we find that this act permits multiple connotations. The commandment to reprove utilizes the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬, which carries a number of different

44  As Kugel notes, “the person required to do the reproaching need not be a victim – indeed, the offense involved may be a victimless crime” (Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 227).

Introduction

15

meanings: decide, prove, argue, reprove, convict, appoint, declare, etc.45 Several scholars have argued over the “primary” connotation of this verb as it appears in the conjugation used by our verse. Some see private “reprimand” as the verb’s primary sense. Others believe a judicial meaning of “determining what is right” is primary.46 This disagreement surrounding the proper sense of ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬ also comes directly into play in the early Greek translation of the Pentateuch. The dual sense is captured in the Septuagint’s translation of ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ as ἐλέγχω ἐλέγξεις, where the lemma ἐλέγχω carries both a sense of “rebuking” as well as “determining the truth” or “convicting.”47 The ambiguity over the primary connotation of the words for rebuke in Lev. 19:17b is not simply a quality of this Hebrew root alone. As Kugel argues, different exegetical possibilities are latent in the verse itself depending on whether one reads it in isolation or in the broader context of the preceding verses.48 Looking at Lev. 19:17 on its own (or together Lev. 19:18), one gets the impression of a private, moral activity. The charge not to hate one’s “fellow” (‫ ) ָא ִחיָך‬implies that one has a somewhat personal relationship with the other party.49 In addition, the commandment to love one’s fellow speaks to one’s interpersonal relationship. Moreover, the aforementioned terms and linguistic elements that focus the reader’s attention back to the self (‫ ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬, ‫ ָּכמֹוָך‬, and the second person suffixes) also give the impression of an interpersonal interaction. In contrast to this personal sense of rebuke, the broader context of Lev. 19:11–18 might suggest a more legal framing. Leviticus 19:15 reads, “You shall not render an unfair decision: do not favor the poor or show deference to the rich; judge your kinsman fairly.”50 According to J. R. Porter, this verse “begins a series of instructions designed to safeguard the proper administration of the law.”51 Consequently, he interprets the prohibition against hatred in Lev. 19:17 as forbidding “hatred against a man accused of a crime” as this would “make an impartial verdict difficult.”52 The connection between Lev. 19:15 and 19:17 is 45   B DB, 406–7; DCH, 4:409–10; HALOT, 2:410; G. Liedke, “‫ יכח‬ykḥ hi.,” TLOT 2:542–44; G. Mayer, “‫ יכח‬ykḥ,” TDOT 6:64–71; John E. Hartley, “‫יכח‬,” NIDOTTE 2:441–45. 46  See G. Liedke, “‫ יכח‬ykḥ hi.,” TLOT 2:542; G. Mayer, “‫ יכח‬ykḥ,” TDOT 6:64–71; HALOT 4:1698– 99. Also see Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 103n37. 47   B DAG, s.v. ἐλέγχω; LSJ, s.v. ἐλέγχω; GELS, s.v. ἐλέγχω. However, see the Septuagint variants in Wevers, Septuaginta, 214. 48  Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 229–31; Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 322. 49  As Schwartz points out, this term indicates a close relationship between the subject and the other party (Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 322). 50  ‫יתָך‬ ֶ ‫לֹא ַת ֲעׂשּו ָעוֶ ל ַּב ִּמ ְׁש ָּפט לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ְפנֵ י ָדל וְ לֹא ֶת ְה ַּדר ְּפנֵ י גָ דֹול ְּב ֶצ ֶדק ִּת ְׁשּפֹט ֲע ִמ‬. 51  Porter, Leviticus, 154. 52  Ibid., 155. Also see the comments of Gordon Wenham who connects Lev. 19:17–18 to the previous verses by stating that, “It is much better to avoid taking your brother to court at all. These verses give some alternative remedies” (Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, 268).

16

Introduction

underscored by the parallel language employed to refer to the other party. This section as a whole (Lev. 19:11–18) continually switches between a few different appellations: “your fellow” (‫) ֵר ֶעָך‬, “your kinsman” (‫) ֲע ִמ ֶיתָך‬, “your countrymen” (‫) ְּבנֵ י ַע ֶּמָך‬, and “your brother” (‫) ָא ִחיָך‬. However, the same term, “your kinsman” (‫) ֲע ִמ ֶיתָך‬, appears in both Lev. 19:15’s discussion of proper judging and Lev. 19:17’s command to rebuke. This parallel terminology strengthens the link between these two verses in particular, heightening the judicial sense of the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬in our rebuke clause.53 The personal (or moral) and judicial dimensions of rebuke mark an important point of ambiguity in the understanding of our verse. However, when it comes to practical application, this ambiguity is transformed into a tension over the proper audience and setting for administering rebuke. If rebuke is intended as a personal action then it should ideally be performed in private so as not to embarrass the other party or encourage them to defend themselves against the accusation before their peers. By contrast, if rebuke is meant to be understood judicially then this implies a more public and exposed context in which a person’s transgressions are aired openly.54 The driving coercive force behind rebuke similarly hinges upon one’s understanding of this dimension. Personal rebuke implies a morally driven change of heart motivated by an offender’s recognition of having harmed the rebuker. Judicial rebuke, on the other hand, conveys more institutional force that compels the transgressor to comply or else face possible communal sanctions. The tension between a private and a public setting may also be amplified by the doubling of the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬. In Lev. 19:17 the biblical root appears in the form of an infinitive absolute plus imperfect (‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ).55 Jacob Milgrom suggests that, “The infinitive absolute hôkēaḥ before the verb tôkîaḥ is used to

53  Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation, 321–22. 54  Carol Newsom describes the difference between a private or public understanding of the verse as the difference between “the corrosive effect of a grievance nurtured in private” (which she believes to be the contextual sense of the verse) and “a directive for community praxis” (which is how this verse is understood in Serekh ha-Yaḥad; Newsom, The Self as Symbolic Space Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran, 141). 55  Gesenius records that the infinitive absolute serves to “emphasize the idea of the verb in the abstract, i.e. it speaks of an action (or condition) without any regard to the agent or to the conditions of time and mood under which it takes place” (GKC, 335 (§113)). Such doubling (particularly with an infinitive absolute) is not uncommon in biblical literature and, contrary to later rabbinic exegesis that seeks to uncover hidden layers of meaning, probably appears for added stress (Callaham, Modality and the Biblical Hebrew Infinitive Absolute, 5).

Introduction

17

lay emphasis on an antithesis.”56 This antithesis is the tension between the internal hatred described in Lev. 19:17a and open rebuking recommended by Lev. 19:17b where ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ implies “open reproof.” In Milgrom’s understanding, the infinitive absolute helps to overcome one’s “psychological barrier” against expressing their grievances to their fellow.57 The biblical author is quite aware that people may be hesitant to confront others and thus stresses the need for such exposed dialogue.58 This “antithesis” between the internal and the external, the hidden and the exposed, magnifies the tension between private and public settings for rebuke. 7

Leviticus 19:17c – Incur no Guilt because of Him

Turning to the final clause of Lev. 19:17, the reader is suddenly confronted with an explicit reference to sin: “incur no guilt (lit. ‘sin’) because of him” (‫וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא‬ ‫ ; ָע ָליו ֵח ְטא‬Lev. 19:17c). What is the nature of this sin and to whom does it belong? Is the sin generated through an action done by the rebuker or is it somehow related to the original transgressor?59 There are a number of different ways to understand the referent of this sin, marking the word as a highly ambiguous element in the verse. If the sin refers to the original transgression committed by the offending party, then this phrase could mean that by refraining from rebuke one actually takes responsibility for the crime committed by the other party.60 Alternatively, the sin could point to future transgressions that the offending party will perform if you hold your tongue.61 On the other hand, if the sin belongs to the would-be rebuker there are another set of potential meanings. Failure to rebuke itself could constitute a sin through the neglect of a positive scriptural injunction. Even more detrimental, if this phrase points ahead to Lev. 19:18a, then refraining from rebuke could lead to the sin of bearing a 56  Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1648. Milgrom references Gesenius’ discussion of the functions of the infinitive absolute, however Gesenius himself does not list our case (see GKC, 355– 58 (§113p)). 57  Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1648. 58  It is often far easier to release one’s consternation or anger to a third party (slander) than to confront the offending party him or herself (rebuke). Thus, Lev. 19:16–17 explicitly forbids the former while encouraging the latter. 59  See Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 51n20; Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 154. 60  Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1649. 61  As Menachem Bolle suggests, “putting his sin upon him” implies that through your silence and refraining from rebuke you encourage him to continue to sin (Bolle, Sefer va-Yiqra, 66).

18

Introduction

grudge or taking vengeance against the offending party.62 Finally, the sin could belong to the rebuker but could actually be a byproduct of the rebuke itself rather than a result of failure to rebuke. An ineffective rebuke could encourage a rebellious individual who originally transgressed accidently to continue his actions intentionally in the future. Alternatively, one may offer a rebuke that results in the humiliation of the offending party, which itself would constitute the sin.63 The term “sin” (‫ ) ֵח ְטא‬in this third clause of Lev. 19:17 offers a plethora of interpretative possibilities for the envisioned scenario. From the standpoint of an individual deciding how to respond to problematic behavior, this ambiguity escalates into a tension regarding the proper course of action. The sin involved could either be his own or that of the offending party, but either way the guilt could land on his own head. More disheartening is the fact that the sin could result from either refraining from rebuke or from performing the rebuke improperly, leaving the potential rebuker uncertain how to proceed. To remain inactive might tacitly allow oneself to slide into transgression. But to actually confront the other person not only has a similar possible outcome, but has the added social concern of damaging the relationship with this other person going forward. This latent tension between the necessity of rebuke and the danger of going too far or rebuking improperly is developed by two other elements of the clause. Lev. 19:17c stands in a somewhat uncertain relationship to the clause that preceded it. The Hebrew letter “‫ ”ו‬that bridges Lev. 19:17b and 19:17c can either function conjunctively (“and”) or disjunctively (“but”).64 Many later interpreters opt for the latter understanding, that the “‫ ”ו‬functions disjunctively, suggesting that while one should rebuke (Lev. 19:17b), they should be careful not to go so far as to incur guilt (Lev. 19:17c). However, read conjunctively, this final piece of the verse could mean that the act of rebuke itself is necessary for avoiding guilt: rebuke and do not incur guilt!65 The interpretive ambigu62  Schwartz, “Selected Chapters of the Holiness Code,” 147. Milgrom sees a similar interpretation implied in Ben Sira 8:17a, which suggests that “by not reproaching your friend, your anger may lead you to harm him and because of it incur sin” (Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1649). 63  Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, 1649. Also see Schwartz, “Selected Chapters of the Holiness Code,” 284n84. This last reading is partially picked up by early rabbinic sources, which read the phrase as referring to embarrassment, although the sin remains on the rebuker. 64  The ambiguous force of this letter is noted in Jewish Publication Society, Tanakh, 252. 65  “If you do not rebuke, you will be punished because you have abstained from a positive commandment and you will bear his sins” (Bolle, Sefer va-Yiqra, 66). Targum PseudoJonathan offers a slightly different conjunctive reading: “Even if you embarrass, you will not bear guilt because of him” (‫)ברם אין מיבהית לא תקבלון מטולתיה חובא‬. The term

Introduction

19

ity captured by the equivocal letter “‫ ”ו‬underscores the fundamental tension introduced by the unclear nature of the sin involved. On the one hand, refraining from fulfilling one’s obligation to rebuke may be sinful. On the other hand, going too far with a rebuke is also sinful. The potential rebuker is trapped in uncertainty, walking a tightrope to avoid plunging into sin. The tension between sinning as a result of improper rebuke and incurring guilt due to failure to rebuke is augmented by the biblical usage of the root ‫א‬.‫ש‬.‫ נ‬together with mention of sin (‫ פשע‬,‫ חטא‬,‫)עון‬.66 This syntactic construction generally means to “bear sin,” and within Leviticus and other priestly sources it typically indicates bearing one’s own sin, rather than bearing the sin of another (i.e., God removes the sin).67 According to Baruch Schwartz, a majority of such instances of bearing one’s own sin reflect “sins of commission” (having performed a problematic action) while only a few cases refer to “sins of omission” where “the negligence involved is tantamount to the commission of an offense.”68 Although Schwartz classifies Lev. 19:17 as an example of omission (“failure to rebuke one’s fellow is presumed to result in taking active revenge on him”) this is not entirely clear, especially as the majority of instances of .‫א‬.‫ש‬.‫נ‬ + sin are cases of having committed an inappropriate deed.69 The fact that this linguistic construction can refer either to doing something improper or to refraining from doing something proper reinforces the inherent tension between understanding Lev. 19:17c as warning against excessive rebuke or against failure to rebuke. Lev. 19:17c involves a basic ambiguity over the nature of the sin involved and the relationship between this sin and rebuke: Does one sin through refraining from rebuke or from improper rebuke? The dubiety of this phrase places the would-be rebuker in a precarious position. If the sin is one of omission then one must rebuke. But if the sin of one of commission then one should refrain from rebuke. The only safe ground, preserving this activity from a truly inescapable situation, is a perfectly performed rebuke. The danger of slipping into sin, either by omission or commission, is heightened by the broader biblical couplet. As noted previously, Lev. 19:17b is surrounded by warnings and prohibitions – Lev. 19:17a forbids hatred, 19:17c warns of sin, and 19:18a condemns ‫ברם‬, which frequently functions disjunctively (“but”), in this instance appears to serve as a conjunctive: “even”. See JPA, 114 s.v. ‫ברם‬. 66  This root is fairly common in the Book of Leviticus, appearing over twenty times in various constructions, a significant number of which are related to sin (Warning, Literary Artistry in Leviticus, 154–56). 67  Schwartz, “‘Term’ or Metaphor: Biblical nāśāʾ ʿăwōn/peša ʿ/ḥēṭʾ.” 68  Schwartz, “The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature,” 13. 69  Ibid., 13.

20

Introduction

vengeance. These admonitions generate an ominous tone that amplifies the danger of incorrectly understanding the sin of Lev. 19:17c. In striving to avoid sin one might misinterpret the verse and accidently slip into the actual sin intended by the verse.70 8

The Practice of Parrhesia71

Early Jewish and Christian discussions of Lev. 19:17 and rebuke are not the only sources from antiquity that grapple with the responsibility of reproving others for inappropriate behavior. Within the Greco-Roman and early Christian world we encounter the practice of parrhesia, which presents a fruitful heuristic parallel to rebuke. Literally meaning “all speech” (πᾶν ῥῆμα), parrhesia is the act of speaking the truth. As described by Foucault in a series of lectures that he gave at Berkeley in 1983, this practice consists of five essential features that strikingly resemble elements of rebuke.72 First, parrhesia is “frank speech,” that is to say, an unadulterated expression of what the speaker has in mind. Second, proper parrhesia is speaking what one knows to be true, as opposed to the negative act of flattery. “Danger” constitutes the third component of parrhesia where the speaker risks harm or even death in speaking his mind.73 This corresponds to the fourth aspect of “criticism,” that the speaker’s words challenge and disrupt the existing situation. Finally, Foucault describes “duty” as the last characteristic of parrhesia; one has an obligation to speak. To this listing we can also add that parrhesia has as its goal bringing about a change in the addressee.74 On many levels, rebuke within an early Jewish and Christian context mirrors the practice of parrhesia. As a biblical commandment, the act is certainly a duty, and fundamentally reproof is about critiquing another person in order to elicit change. As we shall see, the element of danger emerges in tannaitic sources in which the exegesis of Lev. 19:17 highlights the detriments of rebuke. The issue of truth will arise in our investigation of Ben Sira and the Testament 70  That is to say, if one misinterprets the sin of Lev. 19:17c as refraining from rebuke (when it is “actually” about an inappropriate rebuke), one might end up committing the sin by an overly zealous attempt. Conversely, if one misinterprets the sin of Lev. 19:17c as an inappropriate rebuke (when it is “actually” about not refraining from rebuke), one might end up committing the sin by avoiding rebuke so as not to perform inadequately. 71  Thanks to David Konstan for sharing his reactions to an earlier version this section. 72  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 12–20. 73  Use of parrhesia thus requires significant courage (TDNT 5:873). 74  Artman-Partock, “Dialogue and Dialogism in Rabbinic Literature,” 32.

Introduction

21

of Gad where proper rebuke is contrasted with the prohibition on gossip from Lev. 19:16. Finally, rebuke is an act of speaking frankly without concealing one’s thoughts. Despite these direct parallels between parrhesia and rebuke however, there are a few features that distinguish the two practices. Parrhesia is “always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor.”75 By contrast, rebuke can be performed by one in a position of power relative to the other party. Additionally, in the Greco-Roman world parrhesia was an institution with a set of socio-cultural rules for proper performance. In the rabbinic world, while there may have been etiquette surrounding rebuke, it does not appear to have entailed the same degree of formalization. These differences notwithstanding, the similarities between parrhesia and rebuke make the former an ideal candidate for comparison.76 In the past decade several scholars have examined parrhesia within a Jewish context, including Tali Artman-Partock, Dov Weiss, and Julia Watts Belser.77 Artman-Partock examines parrhesia in Second Temple sources and explores how the actual language of parrhesia (‫ )פרהסיא‬is employed in the rabbinic literature. By contrast, Dov Weiss and Julia Watts Belser consider how rabbinic sources portray individuals using parrhesia towards God. In contrast to these studies, parrhesia as an interpersonal practice is the main dimension of this phenomenon relevant for the present work. Within the Greco-Roman and early Christian world the practice of parrhesia appears in a few different areas of discourse. One major arena is the political sphere.78 As a political act, parrhesia is about speaking the truth to the

75  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 17–18. 76  To be clear, I am not making an argument for historical influence; rather I am suggesting that parrhesia serves as an important cultural parallel for elucidating Jewish and Christian reactions to rebuke. Indeed, Dov Weiss essentially equates rebuke and parrhesia as parallel cultural phenomena: “In both ancient Israel and in the Greco-Roman world, critiquing a friend was deemed a virtue. To denote this act, the Bible frequently uses the term tokheḥah (‘rebuke’) while the Greco-Roman writings tend to use the term parrhesia (‘frank speech’)” (Weiss, Pious Irreverence, 6). Similarly, in his discussion of “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” Michael Cook includes mention of both parrhesia as well as rebuke, the latter within a rabbinic context (Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 563, 570–73). Moreover, we find some instances where the key Greek lemma for rebuke (ἐλέγχω) is utilized in conjunction with parrhesia: ἐλέγχειν μετὰ παρρησίας (see Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 106). 77  Artman-Partock, “Dialogue and Dialogism in Rabbinic Literature”; Weiss, Pious Irreverence; Belser, Power, Ethics, and Ecology in Jewish Late Antiquity. 78   T DNT 5:871–73.

22

Introduction

general public or to a monarch.79 We find examples of this usage from Greek texts of the 5th century BCE, such as in the work of Euripides, all the way through Christian texts of the 4th and 5th centuries CE, such as in the work of John Chrysostom and the ecclesiastical histories of Sozomen and Theodoret.80 Marking an important aspect of the movement from a pagan to a Christian Roman Empire, Peter Brown famously traced a shift in the political use of parrhesia by philosophers to Christian clergy over the 4th and 5th centuries.81 In addition to this civic capacity, parrhesia manifests itself in the realm of interpersonal relationships, specifically in friendship.82 Philodemus, an Epicurean philosopher of the 1st century BCE, devoted an entire work to parrhesia based upon the lectures of his teacher Zeno. In his eyes, parrhesia is a fundamental component in a solid friendship relationship. In the 1st century of the Common Era, Plutarch devoted a section of his Moralia to the question of distinguishing a friend from a flatterer.83 The former would employ parrhesia for confronting a friend while the latter would merely offer insincere words of praise.84 These different dimensions of parrhesia will be relevant for the conclusion of the present work, in which I return to this practice in order to highlight specific parallels between parrhesia and rebuke.

79  Bartelink, “Quelques observations sur parrēsia dans la littérature paléo-chrétienne,” 10, 38; Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, chap. 2 and 3. For a corrective to the anachronistic understanding of parrhesia as a “right” within the Athenian democracy, see Konstan, “The Two Faces of Parrhesia.” 80  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 11; Bartelink, “Quelques observations sur parrēsia dans la littérature paléo-chrétienne,” 38. 81  Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity. Brown shows how philosophers occupied an important role of interceding between local nobility and the larger government structure through the use of parrhesia. Governors were dependent on the support of the local elite and therefore had to present themselves as open to being persuaded to change their minds (chap. 1). Originally the philosophers were the best suited for this role (chap. 2). However, as monks and bishops rose in power, particularly gaining the support of the poor masses, they usurped this key position (chap. 3). 82  Following Arnaldo Momigliano, David Konstan suggests that within the Greco-Roman world, “Пαρρησία as a private virtue replaced παρρησία as a political right” (Philodemus et al., On Frank Criticism, 3; Momigliano, “Freedom of Speech and Religious Tolerance in the Ancient World,” 185; TDNT 5:873). In addition to the standard political and interpersonal usages, we can also note the role of parrhesia in the act of martyrdom and polemical debate (Bartelink, “Quelques observations sur parrēsia dans la littérature paléo-chrétienne,” 24–26, 42, and 52; Artman-Partock, “Dialogue and Dialogism in Rabbinic Literature,” 91– 112, 140 and passim; TDNT 5:885–86). 83  Plutarch and Babbitt, Plutarch’s Moralia, 264–395. 84  Philodemus et al., On Frank Criticism, 4. Such topics also appeared in early Christian works such as in Clement of Alexandria’s The Pedagogue (Ibid., 5).

Introduction

9

23

Overview of the Project

The Levitical commandment to rebuke is equivocal. Each clause of the verse presents a key ambiguity that, in the eyes of later interpreters, creates a tension with regard to practical application. Lev. 19:17a opens up the conflict between rebuke as primarily about extinguishing one’s animosity and rebuke as first and foremost about affecting the other party. The middle clause of the verse raises the question of whether rebuke is a private interpersonal activity or a public judicial act. The third clause of the verse provokes uncertainty as to whether one must rebuke or whether one should refrain from rebuke in order to avoid sin. These various tensions serve as the frame for the chapters that follow. Part 1 opens with a chapter that examines the competing moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke (Lev. 19:17b) in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Gospels. Contrary to previous scholarship that excessively associates the Dead Sea Scrolls with the judicial understanding of rebuke and the Gospels with the moral orientation, both of these corpora actually present a similar spectrum of passages ranging from a more moral to a more judicial take on rebuke. A better distinction between these sources’ approaches to rebuke thus lies in the different strategies they each use to synthesize the moral and judicial sides of rebuke. The subsequent two chapters in Part 1 look to the immediate literary context of Lev. 19:17, exploring how the obligation to love one’s fellow (Lev. 19:18) and the prohibition against gossip (Lev. 19:16) impact interpretation of rebuke. Chapter 2 returns to the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Gospels to gauge the influence of Lev. 19:18 on the ways in which these works understand rebuke. The Dead Sea Scrolls mark rebuke as an expression of fraternal love and employ it as a tool for demarcating the boundaries of their sectarian community. By contrast, a hitherto unrecognized interpretation of Lev. 19:17–18 preserved in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke identifies rebuke as opposed to love and rejects rebuke in favor of fraternal love. By recommending loving everyone, even your enemy, these Gospels blur the boundary between friend and foe thereby erasing the type of boundary established in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Chapter 3 turns to works of ethical exhortation (Proverbs, Ben Sira, and the Testament of Gad) to explore the ways in which these works understand rebuke in light of Lev. 19:16 and gossip. Each work adopts a different approach for bringing these activities into dialogue, highlighting additional problematic dimensions in the performance of rebuke. Part 2 moves to the tannaitic period (c. 70–c. 200 CE) and the danger of falling into sin raised by Lev. 19:17c. Focusing on the earliest rabbinic Midrash on Leviticus, Sifra, in Chapter 4 and the beginning of Sifre Devarim in Chapter 5,

24

Introduction

these chapters demonstrate how, unlike earlier works that engage with the question of how to rebuke, the tannaitic midrashim look to the higher order question of whether one is actually capable of rebuking. Texts from this period interpret the scriptural commandment as a site of violence and danger, leading a vocal contingent of tannaim to eschew rebuke as an unachievable practice. I suggest that this position correlates with rebuke’s destabilizing impact on interpersonal relationships. The three chapters in Part 3 return to the opening of Lev. 19:17 and the tension between a self and an other-orientation. In contrast to the early rabbinic sources in Part 2 that question whether rebuke can be performed, sources in these chapters engage with the more foundational question of whether one should rebuke. Chapter 6 revolves around monastic sources and demonstrates how the early monks reject confrontation of others in favor of humility and a cultivation of the self. The Babylonian Talmud is the subject of Chapter 7, where a key passage in Tractate Arakhin problematizes the act of rebuke by grappling with its obligatory yet dangerous nature, ultimately rejecting rebuke in favor of more introspective practices. A passage from Midrash Tanḥuma, the focus of Chapter 8, systematically counters Tractate Arakhin’s arguments and culls evidence from across the Talmud, magnifying the obligation of rebuke to the point that one who fails to rebuke is held culpable for the offender’s sin. While the Bavli’s discomfort with rebuke bears striking resemblance to the rejection of rebuke in monastic sources, I suggest that the strong endorsement of rebuke in Midrash Tanḥuma is best understood in light of a growing valuation of confrontation in late rabbinic literature and the obligation to “forbid wrong” in early Islam. In the conclusion of this work I return to the Greco-Roman and early Christian practice of parrhesia (discussed above) in order to demonstrate how parrhesia serves as a useful heuristic tool for better understanding some of the particular expressions of, and reactions to, rebuke that I describe over the next few chapters. I also suggest that my analysis of rebuke may provide insight into the study of parrhesia. Foucault’s genealogy of parrhesia focuses on the “problematization” of the role of truth while assuming a variety of stable elements within this practice, including the dual focus of parrhesia on both the self and another person. However, the question of whether a person should be focused upon oneself or another becomes problematic within rabbinic and some monastic sources on rebuke, conceptually functioning as a different type of problematization of parrhesia. Bringing early Jewish and Christian discussions of rebuke into conversation with parrhesia thus not only aids our understanding of the former, but can shed light on the latter as well.

Introduction

25

The radically diverse and conflicting reactions to Lev. 19:17 on the part of its early interpreters speak to the verse’s multiple dimensions of ambiguity. When considered from the perspective of praxis, these points of uncertainty develop into ostensibly irreconcilable tensions. Mapping these core tensions onto early Jewish and Christian discourse reveals a conceptual progression from questions of how to rebuke in pre-rabbinic sources, to the problem of whether one can rebuke in the tannaitic midrashim, to the question of whether one should engage in rebuke in monastic and later rabbinic texts. Heuristically aligned with each of the three clauses of the biblical verse, each part of this book points to another layer of intricacy entailed by the Levitical command to rebuke one’s fellow. The story of rebuke and Lev. 19:17 in late antiquity reveals a series of complex confrontations at the heart of religious leadership between the desire to enforce proper praxis and a competing aspiration to embody the true ethical ideal. Studying the clash between these dueling aims reveals a broader tension underlying religious life that continues to resonate strongly today.

part 1 How to Rebuke? Leviticus 19:17 in Context

∵

chapter 1

The Moral and the Judicial Dimensions of Rebuke in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Gospels The Hebrew root for rebuke employed by Lev. 19:17 (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ )י‬carries both judicial and moral connotations.1 When comparing the understanding of this verse in the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) to that of the Gospels many scholars tend to reduce these collections’ respective positions to one of these two facets. Typically the DSS are said to evince a strong judicial application of Lev. 19:17 while the Gospels adopt a more moralistic framework for engaging with rebuke. Such a distinction, however, fails to capture the nuance of our available sources and loses sight of the ways in which both corpora navigate the tension between the judicial and moral dimensions of rebuke. In contrast to this binary approach, the present chapter demonstrates how the DSS and the Gospels each include texts that gravitate toward opposing ends of the moral-judicial spectrum. The DSS preserve a text that leans toward the moral as well as a source that embraces the judicial. The Gospels likewise contain a passage that frames rebuke judicially and a passage that envisions rebuke as a moral activity. Each collection also includes at least one source that unites the two competing understandings of rebuke. However, in the texts that combine the judicial and the moral, each corpus resolves the tension between these two dimensions in different ways. The diverse application of the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke in the DSS and the Gospels highlights the multiple tactics employed during the Second Temple and early Christian period to concretize rebuke as an applicable practice. 1

Rebuke in the Dead Sea Scrolls

The DSS include explicit discussions of the biblical commandment to reprove in the Damascus Document (CD) and the Community Rule (1QS).2 The most 1  See my Introduction. 2  The initial reconstructions of the Dead Sea Scrolls relevant to our analysis can be found in Baumgarten, DJD, XVIII:65–66, 158–160; Alexander and Vermes, DJD, XXVI:98–102; Eshel et al., DJD, XI:1–74. In addition, see Nitzan, “4Q Berakhot (4Q286–290),” 497n31; Kister, “Divorce, Reproof, and Other Sayings in The Synoptic Gospels,” 220 ff. Unless otherwise noted, translations are based upon Charlesworth et al., The Dead Sea Scrolls. I will not be treating passages

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376557_003

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extensive and overtly exegetical of these instances appears in the Damascus Document (CD 9:2–8), which directly quotes the obligation to rebuke in Lev. 19:17. The other main texts (CD 6:20–7:3 and 1QS 5:24–6:1) also reference the Levitical verse, with CD 7:2–3 requiring community members to rebuke according to the “commandment” (‫ )כמצוה‬and 1QS 5:24–6:1 including elements from each of Lev. 19:17’s three clauses: Do not hate, rebuke, and do not sin.3 Each of these three passages presents a different interpretation of Lev. 19:17, particularly with regard to the moral versus judicial senses of rebuke. While CD 6:20–7:3 offers a primarily moral reading of our verse, CD 9:2–8 works in the opposite direction emphasizing the judicial dimension of rebuke. The third text, 1QS 5:24–6:1, brings the two sides of rebuke together by relegating the moral aspect to the mode in which rebuke is administered and employing the judicial dimension to inform the performative setting. CD 6:20–7:3 offers the clearest instance of a personal, moralistic framing of rebuke. This brief pericope includes the obligation to reprove one’s fellow among several other duties that seek to strengthen the interpersonal relationship between community members: 20 To offer up the holy things in accordance with their detailed requirements, to love each man his brother 21 as himself (‫אהוב איש את אחיהו‬ ‫)כמהו‬, to support the poor, destitute, and proselyte, and to seek each man the peace of 7:1 his brother. And let no man trespass with regard to his near kin; (rather, let him) stay away from unchastity 2 in accordance with the precept; let each man rebuke his brother in accordance with the ordinance (‫ )להוכיח איש את אחיהו כמצוה‬and not keep a grudge 3 from one day to the next (‫)ולא לנטור מיום ליום‬. And let him separate himself from all impurities (‫)הטמאות‬, according to their precept … This passage incorporates rebuke into a list of key interpersonal obligations that allow community members to separate themselves from impurity (‫)טמאות‬. Requirements to “support the poor, destitute, and proselyte” and to “seek each such as 1QHodayot 17:8–9, 11, and 22–24 that discuss divine rebuke nor passages that include an example of rebuke but are of limited interest for understanding the attitude toward rebuke in the DSS (such as 1QpHab 5:10, which mentions that the Teacher of Righteousness was rebuked). 3  Some scholars, such as Eyal Regev, believe that the Damascus Document and the Community Rule reflect “distinct social groups” (Regev, Sectarianism in Qumran a Cross-Cultural Perspective, chap. 4). While this is certainly possible, I am interested in the evidence of the DSS as a whole as reflecting a related understanding of rebuke, in contrast to that which we find in the Gospels (which themselves reflect a variety of authors and communities).

The Moral and the Judicial Dimensions of Rebuke

31

man the peace of his brother” follow from the overall commandment of loving one’s fellow as oneself (Lev. 19:18b). The commandment (‫ )מצוה‬of rebuke is listed directly before the prohibition on bearing a grudge, implicitly linking Lev. 19:17b and Lev. 19:18a and tying these requirements back to the reference to Lev. 19:18b that opens this section. Rebuke is thus framed as an expression of fraternal love. By focusing on the role of rebuke as avoidance of bearing a grudge, in addition to listing this command subsequent to laws concerning personal interaction with one’s fellow (“to seek each man the peace of his brother”) and relationships with family members (“let no man trespass with regard to his near kin”), this passage highlights the moral dimension of the commandment of rebuke. Although the author may ultimately have the greater welfare of the community in mind, the immediate context is personal and private. There is one new element (not present in the biblical verse) that this passage introduces in connection to rebuke: the “from one day to the next” temporal dimension. Similar language also appears in CD 9:6 (‫אם החריש לו מיום‬ ‫ )ליום‬where one who “was silent from day to day” does not fulfill the obligation of rebuke in Lev. 19:17. The implication appears to be that a person must rebuke the offender on the very day of the infraction, rather than postponing the chastisement.4 David Rothstein suggests that this same day rebuke obligation is related to same-day requirements for punishment and testimony: “CD requires that witnesses come forth on the day on which the crime was committed because biblical law, as understood by the Qumran sect, requires that the offender be punished on that very day. In other words, same-day punishment entails same-day testimony.”5 Rothstein links the obligation of same-day rebuke with the obligations of same-day punishment and testimony. This connection to the penal system suggests a judicial framework. However, according to Rothstein, this requirement for immediate rebuke, testimony, and punishment stems primarily from a desire to remove moral pollution and impurity from the community.6 This aspiration appears clearly in CD 6:20–7:3, which juxtaposes the “from one day to the next” requirement with an admonition to 4  This likely assumes an obligation to rebuke within a 12 hour, rather than 24 hour, period (Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 91; Schiffman, Law, Custom and Messianism, 188n103, 191–92). For discussions of this language and its biblical resonances see Dimant, “Torah Quotations in the Damascus Document,” 133; Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 94; Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 153–54. 5  Rothstein, “Same-Day Testimony and Same-Day Punishment in the Damascus Document and Jubilees,” 21. 6  Ibid., 12–20. For discussion of a similar link between rebuke and separation from impurity in 4QBerakhot (4Q286–290), see Nitzan, “The Laws of Reproof in 4QBerakhot (4Q286–290) in Light of Their Parallels in the Damascus Covenant and Other Texts from Qumran Legal Texts and Legal Issues,” 160.

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community members to “separate from all kinds of impurity.” Consequently, while the judicial laws of testimony and punishment may be responsible for the language of “from one day to the next” in CD 7:3, a more moralistic sense dominates this passage’s presentation of rules for interpersonal interaction for avoiding sin-induced impurity. If CD 6:20–7:3 provides a slight nod toward the judicial dimension of rebuke with the language of “from one day to the next” while primarily concentrating on its moral dimension, CD 9:2–8 moves entirely into the judicial realm. This text evinces a full blown rejection of affective motivations for rebuke, replacing Lev. 19:17’s link between hatred and reproof with a more dispassionate procedure. The discussion of rebuke is immediately followed by laws regarding oaths, lost property, and witnesses. This juxtaposition, with rebuke prior to the topics of oaths and witnesses, again evokes a judicial setting. The actual interpretation of Lev. 19:17–18 in CD 9:2–8 furthers this understanding:7 2 And as to that which he said, “You shall not take vengeance nor keep a grudge against the sons of your people,” [Lev. 19:18] anyone of those who enter 3 the covenant (‫ )>מבאי< הברית‬who brings a charge against his neighbor without reproof (‫ )אשר לא בהוכח‬before witnesses, 4 but brings it in his burning wrath (‫ )בחרון אפו‬or tells it to his elders to put him to shame, is taking vengeance and bearing a grudge. 5 It is written only, “He takes vengeance against his adversaries and keeps a grudge against his enemies.” [Nah. 1:2] 6 If he was silent from day to day (‫אם החריש לו מיום‬ ‫ )ליום‬and in his burning wrath (‫ )ובחרון אפו‬charged him with a capital offense, 7 his iniquity is upon him, for he did not fulfill the ordinance of God which says to him, “You shall surely 8 reprove your neighbor so that you do not bear sin because of him.” [Lev. 19:17] This pericope begins with an exegesis of Lev. 19:18, understanding vengeance or bearing a grudge to be constituted by several different factors: Reporting a misdeed to witnesses without “reproof,” bringing such a report in anger, and/or presenting the matter to the elders in order to put his fellow to shame. The first of these three possibilities captures our interest as a direct reference to Lev. 19:17.8 7  For an extensive treatment of philological and other text-critical elements of this passage see Schiffman, Law, Custom and Messianism, 186–89. 8  As Schiffman notes: “Since this Qumran text begins with an exegesis of Lev. 19:18 and ends with the interpretation of the preceding verse, Lev. 19:17 (hokheaḥ tokhiaḥ …), there can be no question that the use of the verbal noun hokheaḥ in our Qumran passages means ‘with fulfillment of the commandment of reproof of Lev. 19:17’ as interpreted by the sect” (Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 90; Schiffman, Law, Custom and Messianism, 190n117). This interpretation is

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The conclusion of our passage glosses this reproof requirement by interpreting Lev. 19:17 as requiring one to rebuke rather than remaining silent and only speaking up in a moment of anger. In this passage the Damascus Document intertwines the commandments of reproof (Lev. 19:17) and vengeance (Lev. 19:18) with the former constituting the proper action that must be taken in order to avoid violating the latter.9 The most important aspect of this integration of rebuke and vengeance for our purposes is the strongly judicial framing of these injunctions.10 The discussion of witnesses, the presence of the elders, and mention of capital cases all indicate that a judicial scenario is envisioned. This judicial interpretation of Lev. 19:17 is manifest in the anticipation of a public forum for the actual performance of the rebuke. In the Damascus Document, vengeance and holding a grudge are understood as a disruption of the proper legal process while rebuke serves as an integral component. While the dominant tenor of CD 9:2–8 is judicial, a hint of the moralistic/ interpersonal dimension ostensibly manifests itself in the admonition not to accuse someone in anger – an element that appears in the text’s discussion of both Lev. 19:18 and Lev. 19:17. The affective verbs “love” and “hate” in these two verses contribute to the moralistic reading of the law of rebuke.11 In the present text, the mention of burning wrath (‫ )בחרון אפו‬may also evoke the moralistic dimension.12 However, CD 9:2–8 incorporates the emotional dimension only to reject it – one should not act in anger. Wrath is an expression of one’s personal feelings and relationship to the other party. But rebuke, according to this passage, should be a more impersonal action devoid of personal grievances. There is no mention of love or any other feeling that should be associated with the performance of rebuke. Rather, this passage indirectly suggests that affective factors should not be involved. CD 9:2–8 introduces the moralistic dimension of rebuke through mention of one’s emotional state, but dictates that this is an contra Weinfeld who understands hokheaḥ (‫ )הוכח‬as “proof” or “evidence” rather than “reproof” (Weinfeld, The Organizational Pattern and the Penal Code of the Qumran Sect, 74). 9  Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 92–93; Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 54; Dimant, “Torah Quotations in the Damascus Document,” 133. 10  The interpreter may be adopting a judicial context solely from the forensic sense of the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬or, as some have suggested, the greater Levitical context – specifically Lev. 19:15 – may have contributed to the choice of a judicial context here (Carmody, “Matt 18:15–17 in Relation to Three Texts from Qumran Literature,” 143). 11  Kugel at times refers to the moralistic dimension of rebuke as “externalizing” – that is to say, making one’s emotion of hatred (or perhaps love) manifest (Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 227). 12  It is interesting to note that this passage does not employ the emotions of love (‫ב‬.‫ה‬.‫)א‬ and hate (‫א‬.‫נ‬.ֹ ‫ )ש‬that actually appear in the biblical verse. These emotions appear explicitly in other DSS passages concerning rebuke however.

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improper mode of performing this activity. The present passage thus moves furthest from the moralistic side of rebuke and places it firmly within the legal and public sphere. Rebuke takes place in a communal setting and should be devoid of personal feelings toward the other party. While previously we observed that reproof in CD 6:20–7:3 is primarily moral and concerned with sin-based impurity, in CD 9:2–8 the affective dimension of rebuke is minimized and rebuke is conceptualized as a core component of the legal system.13 Between these two poles stands 1QS 5:24–6:1, which integrates the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke.14 In order to resolve the tension between these two aspects, the moral dimension is relegated to the affective way rebuke is performed while the judicial manifests itself in the setting for rebuke, as a reminder that rebuke is a necessary component of the community’s legal procedure. 1QS 5:24–6:1 reads as follows: 24 … They shall admonish (‫להוכיח‬ ֑ ) 25 one another in t[ru]th, humility, and merciful love (‫ )בא[ם] ֗ת וענוה ואהבת חסד‬to one another. He must not speak to his fellow with anger or with a snarl, 26 or with a [stiff] neck [or in a jealous] spirit of wickedness. And he must not hate him [in the­ fores]k[in] of his heart, for he shall admonish him on (the very same) day (‫ )כיא ביומ יוכיחנו‬lest 6:1 he bear iniquity (‫)עוון‬15 because of him. And also let no man accuse his companion (‫ )רעהו‬before the Many without a confrontation before witnesses (‫)לפני הרבים אשר לוא בתוכחת לפני עדים‬ … As James Kugel notes, this section is a “conflation of the two approaches.”16 While the opening speaks of the internal state of the rebuker – humble and full of loving-kindness – the conclusion of this passage provides a highly judicial and communal context for the practice of rebuke.17 Reproof is a necessary step before bringing charges against an offender. The act of reproof must be performed in the presence of witnesses (‫ )לפני עדים‬in order to bring a claim against the transgressor before the public (‫)לפני הרבים‬. The reference to “on 13  We can also note that 4Q477, which will be discussed in the next chapter, also offers a judicial framework for rebuke. 14  For a technical discussion of the end of this passage see Schiffman, Law, Custom and Messianism, 194–200. 15  1QS 6:1 cites Lev. 19:17 using the term ‫ עוון‬rather than the term ‫חטא‬, which is found in the MT version of Lev. 19:17 as well as the version of Lev. 19:17 cited in CD 9:8. It is unclear how this variation occurred (see Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 107n67). 16  Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 228. 17  One might even suggest that the word “truth” mentioned alongside humility and merciful love also directs our attention to the more impersonal and judicial dimension.

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35

(the very same) day” reinforces this judicial context as it is basis for Rothstein’s argument linking rebuke to testimony and communal purity. The judicial dimension thus appears to dominate the passage as the proper setting for performing reproof. While the latter half of this excerpt from the Community Rule emphasizes a public and legalistic use of rebuke, the opening of the passage focuses on one’s inner state. 1QS 5:24–6:1 admonishes members of the community to reprove in “t[ru]th, humility, and merciful love to one another” rather than in “anger or with a snarl, or with a [stiff] neck [or in a jealous] spirit of wickedness,” or from a place of hatred. Proper feelings constitute the correct way in which rebuke is intended to be administered. The emotions of hate and love in Lev. 19:17–18 have the potential to generate a moralistic performance of rebuke in a private context. In the present text however, the affective dimension is harnessed as the mode of delivery rather than dictating the setting or ultimate goal of rebuke.18 A public, judicial act of rebuke is envisioned with the emotional element relegated to the regulation of attitude rather than location. In differentiating rebuke as discussed in the DSS from the rabbinic concept of hatra’ah (“warning”), Moshe Weinfeld suggests that, “The law of Lev. 19:17–18 is of moral and not of forensic nature, i.e. it aims to avoid conflict and hatred between members of the Israelite society and in this sense it occurs in the rules of Qumran.”19 To support this point Weinfeld cites selections from 1QS 5:24–6:1. In order to assert that 1QS 5:24–6:1 is devoid of forensic overtones, Weinfeld argues that the word ‫ בתוכחת‬in 1QS 6:1 (“And also let no man accuse his companion before the Many without a confrontation [‫ ]בתוכחת‬before witnesses”) means “proof” rather than “reproof.”20 However, it is hard to deny that the term ‫ בתוכחת‬in this fragment carries the sense of “rebuke.” First, it follows directly after a clear reference to Lev. 19:17 and the obligation to rebuke. Second, the judicial dimension of rebuke is already well established in CD 9:2–8. For these reasons I am compelled to understand this term as referring specifically to rebuke and Lev. 19:17.21 Nevertheless, the fact that Weinfeld engaged with 18  Kugel hints at this idea but implies that two different types of rebuke are at play: “That the two are, to this text’s author or editor, still quite separate matters is clear: he not only indicates their separation by the word ‘moreover’ (vegam) – as if to say, ‘Now here is a separate aspect of the Law of Reproach’ – but he has also clearly distributed the various requirements of the two kinds of reproach in their proper places (that is the first sort of reproach must be administered ‘in truth and humility,’ etc.; only the second requires the presence of witnesses)” (Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 228–29). 19  Weinfeld, The Organizational Pattern and the Penal Code of the Qumran Sect, 75. 20  Ibid., 74. 21  See Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 94–96.

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this passage as primarily moral encourages us not to overstate the judicial dimension and to recognize the presence of its moral elements even if they are relegated to the manner in which rebuke is performed rather than its setting. The DSS draw upon both the moral and judicial aspects of rebuke. CD 6:20– 7:3 revolves around the moral dimension while CD 9:2–8 envisions rebuke as a dispassionate public performance. Bridging these two orientations, the Community Rule resolves the tension between the dual connotations of the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬by employing one for the tone in which rebuke should be delivered and the other for the proper context for administering rebuke. As we shall see, the Gospels similarly present a range of understandings of rebuke from a personal private affair to a more judicial framework with at least one source representing each dimension and one text integrating the two. 2

Rebuke in the Gospels

When asked for the primary New Testament passage that treats the issue of rebuke and bears affinities to the discussion of Lev. 19:17 in the DSS, scholars instinctively gravitate toward Matthew 18:15–17.22 As I shall suggest, this pericope envisions rebuke as a private interaction that only shifts into a public forum when this ideal form of confrontation fails. In this way, Matt. 18:15–17 combines the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke, construing one as ideal and the other as a reluctantly accepted possibility. In addition to Matt. 18:15–17 we also find two other Gospel passages, Matt. 7:1–5 and Luke 17:1–4, that engage with the act of rebuke.23 These two passages provide opposing perspectives with the former framed by a judicial context and the latter picturing a private interpersonal performance of rebuke. This range of positions among the Gospels mirrors that of the DSS. However, while the mediating DSS text (1QS 5:24–6:1) resolves the tension between the moral and the judicial by differentiating between the manner of rebuke and its context, the mediating text in the Gospels (Matt. 18:15–17) diffuses the tension between these two dimensions by linking them to the response of the transgressor. Matthew 18:15–17 imagines a progression from an interpersonal encounter to a communal setting:

22  Dowd, “Is Matthew 18:15–17 about ‘Church Discipline’?,” 140–41; Kampen, “The Significance of the Scrolls for the Study of the Book of Matthew,” 163–67; Luz, Matthew 8–20, 453; Mignard, “Jewish and Christian Cultic Discipline to the Middle of the Second Century,” 143–68. 23  On these passages see Schenk-Ziegler, Correctio fraterna im Neuen Testament, 277–311.

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15 “If another member of the church (ὁ ἀδελφός σου)24 sins (ἁμαρτήσῃ) against you, go and point out the fault (ἔλεγξον αὐτὸν) when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained your brother. 16 But if he does not listen, take one or two others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. 17 If the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church (εἰπὲ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ); and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church, let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.25 These verses present a three step process for rebuking (ἔλεγξον) one’s brother (ἀδελφός) that appears to draw on both the judicial and the moralistic valences of rebuke:26 The rebuker is initially encouraged to confront an offender one on one. If this private encounter is ineffective, the next step is to bring along multiple witnesses to the rebuke.27 Finally, if the offender still does not heed the reproof, the matter should be raised before the church as a whole (εἰπὲ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ). Refusal to repent at this juncture leads to the offender’s exclusion from the community.28 Scholars have suggested that this Matthean passage stands in direct dialogue with Lev. 19:17–18, primarily based on linguistic similarities.29 Göran Forkman, for example, points to the particular terminology of “sinning” (ἁμαρτάνω), “brother” (ἀδελφός) and “rebuke” (ἐλέγχω), which all appear in some form in the Septuagint’s rendering of Lev. 19:17.30 However, 24  Literally “your brother.” 25  On this second part of the verse see Waddell, “The Meaning of Matthew 18:17b,” chap. 3–4. Translations from the New Testament generally follow the NRSV unless otherwise noted. 26  Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 61. Note Chandler’s critique of Kugel (Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 114–19). Some treat this section as offering a four step process for rebuke, separating out the final state of excommunication (see Waddell, “The Meaning of Matthew 18:17b,” 9; Adams, Handbook of Church Discipline, 28–30; Laney, “The Biblical Practice of Church Discipline,” 358 ff.). 27  While some understand the witnesses in Matt. 18 as witnesses to the actual offense, most assume that they are witnesses to the rebuke rather than the sin (Laney, “The Biblical Practice of Church Discipline,” 359–60; Adams, Handbook of Church Discipline, 59–61). 28  On the particular framing of the recalcitrant brother as “a Gentile and a tax collector,” see Dowd, “Is Matthew 18:15–17 about ‘Church Discipline’?,” 144–47. 29  Allen, Matthew, 197; Hagner, Matthew: 14–28, 530–31. 30  “These three terms seem to be inspired by Lev. 19:17, the basic passage about the duty of reproving” (Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 124). However, note the variant of πλησίον for ἀδελφός (Wevers, Septuaginta, 214). Also see Duling, “Matthew 18:15–17,” 11–12; Kister, “Divorce, Reproof, and Other Sayings in The Synoptic Gospels,” 226; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 228; Dunn, “Matthew 18.15–20 in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 37–38. We can also note that Matt. 18:16 mirrors the language of LXX Deut. 19:15. The former reads: ἐπὶ στόματος δύο μαρτύρων ἢ τριῶν σταθῇ πᾶν ῥῆμα (Matt. 18:16); the latter reads: στόματος δύο μαρτύρων καὶ ἐπὶ στόματος τριῶν μαρτύρων

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while many observe Lev. 19:17 in the background, scholars generally have not moved beyond linguistic similarities to posit a direct exegetical connection. Instead they have turned to the sources from Qumran, particularly CD 9:2–8, in order to draw connections to these texts and thereby implicitly connect Matt. 18 to Leviticus. Scholars have identified a number of important parallels between Matt. 18:15–17 and the rebuke material found in the Dead Sea Scrolls.31 Timothy Carmody in particular has articulated a succinct list of similarities: 1) there is an offense committed by a member, 2) there is a stage during which the offender and another member are alone, 3) they are both three step processes, 4) they are both concerned with reproof, 5) there is a stage of judgement involving the full assembly or governing body, and 6) there is some form of implied judgement.32 However, some scholars disagree as to whether or not rebuke at Qumran was in fact a “three step process” (3) and involved a step of one on one rebuke (2).33 Additionally, one might add to Carmody’s listing the presence of witnesses and the fact that both ostensibly intertwine moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke.34 Yet, despite all of these similarities, scholars σταθήσεται πᾶν ῥῆμα (Deut. 19:15); Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 128; Dunn, “Matthew 18.15–20 in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 42. It has also been suggested that Matt. 18:15–17 is using Lev. 19:18, however this connection is not explicit in the text (Dunn, 60). 31  Some have even posited that Matt. 18:15–17 is dependent on DSS material, however many believe this to be unlikely (Kister, “Divorce, Reproof, and Other Sayings in The Synoptic Gospels,” 223; Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 127–28; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 230–32; Carmody, “Matt 18:15–17 in Relation to Three Texts from Qumran Literature,” 158; Dunn, “Matthew 18.15–20 in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 2–4). 32  Carmody, “Matt 18:15–17 in Relation to Three Texts from Qumran Literature,” 150–51. For another general comparison see Duling, “Matthew 18:15–17,” 15–16. 33  While some believe that this initial stage of one on one rebuke is implied in the DSS, a significant contingent rejects this reading. For examples of the former, see Brownlee, The Dead Sea Manual of Discipline, 23; Catchpole, “Reproof and Reconciliation in the Q Community,” 83; Carmody, “Matt 18:15–17 in Relation to Three Texts from Qumran Literature,” 150–51; Kister, “Divorce, Reproof, and Other Sayings in The Synoptic Gospels,” 223. For the latter, see Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 127; Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 55; Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 225; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 230. 34  On the parallel of witnesses, see Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 127; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 231; Dunn, “Matthew 18.15–20 in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 61. On the intertwining of moral and judicial dimensions, see Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 127; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 227 and 231. For some other similarities, see Dunn, “Matthew 18.15–20 in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 31, 33, 60, and 62.

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have emphasized a number of differences in motivation, the importance of the number of witnesses, and the response of the offending party.35 In sum, scholars unanimously recognize important parallels between Matt. 18:15–17 and rebuke at Qumran, but disagree over questions of dependence as well as some of the particular points of correspondence. Whereas at Qumran rebuke becomes a foundational component of the legal process, within the Matthean community – at least in light of Matt. 18 – rebuke is a process that begins on the individual level of attempting to resolve an interpersonal dispute. In this way Matt. 18 maps onto the rebuke scenario envisioned in Leviticus that takes place between an offending and an offended party. Only if such a confrontation fails does the situation escalate to involve third party witnesses and ultimately the entire community. As scholars have noted, rebuke in Matt. 18 appears to be more oriented toward repentance on the part of the offender than condemnation and punishment (as we find at Qumran). This sense is heightened by the material immediately preceding Matt. 18:15–17, which introduces the analogy of a shepherd pursuing a single stray sheep in order to return it to the flock. Just as a single lost sheep should be returned, so too should an individual who diverges from the proper path. While a similar motive may partially underline the desire to report transgressive behavior reflected in the DSS, the immediately public nature of rebuke in the DSS contrasts with Matthew’s reluctance to bring the matter before the entire community. Ultimately, when more discrete attempts fail, the offender must be brought before the collective as a means of maintaining communal boundaries against recalcitrant individuals who threaten not only a particular peer, but the authority of the community as a whole. But ostracism is the last resort, at which point the offender’s clear refusal to yield marks him or her as a hopeless case and potential danger. In Matt. 18:15–17, rebuke functions first as fraternal encouragement of repentance that only devolves into a public affair when continual defiance becomes a threat to the community. Matthew 18 thus resolves the tension between the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke by applying the former in the case of a receptive audience and the latter in the case of a recalcitrant transgressor. Matthew 18 finds an important parallel in the beginning of Luke 17 (verses 1–4).36 Unlike Matt. 18:15–17, which is initially framed by a sheep parable 35  Carmody, “Matt 18:15–17 in Relation to Three Texts from Qumran Literature,” 151–158; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 230–231; Dunn, “Matthew 18.15– 20 in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 31–35; Catchpole, “Reproof and Reconciliation in the Q Community,” 84. 36  The relationship between Luke 17 and Matthew 18 is difficult to determine (Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 126; Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke (X–XXIV ),

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encouraging pastoral activity, Luke 17 opens with Jesus warning his disciples against causing someone to stumble. Luke 17:1–4 moves toward the moral dimension of rebuke. 1 Jesus said to his disciples, “Occasions for stumbling are bound to come, but woe to anyone by whom they come! 2 It would be better for you if a millstone were hung around your neck and you were thrown into the sea than for you to cause one of these little ones to stumble. 3 Be on your guard! If another disciple sins,37 you must rebuke the offender (ἐπιτίμησον αὐτῷ), and if there is repentance, you must forgive (καὶ ἐὰν μετανοήσῃ ἄφες αὐτῷ.). 4 And if the same person sins against you seven times a day, and turns back to you seven times and says, ‘I repent,’ you must forgive.” One is prohibited from inducing another’s fall. But if they should fall, then there is a responsibility to respond to one who has stumbled. Here the emphasis on repentance (μετανοήσῃ) and forgiveness (ἄφες) is even more explicit than in Matthew.38 No turn to witnesses or the greater community is invoked however, as the author of Luke limits the scenario to the first stage of Matt. 18’s process. Luke also adds the dimension of continual forgiveness for repeated offenses. Unlike Matt. 18 which describes the extended process for an unrelenting offender, Luke 17 only addresses the case in which the sinner repents, even if he continues to sin again afterward. Moreover, in the case of repeated offenses, no additional rebuke is mentioned – only the necessity of forgiveness. In contrast to Matthew, Luke limits the scope and performance of rebuke. A single interpersonal rebuke is mentioned and then the focus shifts to the obligation to forgive. Additionally, while Matthew employs the standard Greek term for rebuke that is also found in the Septuagint translation of Lev. 19:17 (ἔλεγξον), Luke prefers the more “gentle admonition” carried by the term ἐπιτίμησον.39 Overall, Luke 17 downplays the role of rebuke, particularly in comparison to 1139); Duling, “Matthew 18:15–17,” 10–14; Martinez, “Brotherly Rebuke in Qumran and Mt 18:15–17,” 228–229; Bovon, Luke 2, 2:491–492). 37  Note the important manuscript difference here between an undetermined object of the sin and the subject as the object of the sin (“if another disciple sins against you”; Bovon, Luke 2, 2:495). 38  In general there is a strong focus on repentance in the Gospel of Luke (see Fitzmyer, The Gospel according to Luke (I–IX), 237–39). 39  According to Joseph Fitzmyer, “The vb. epitiman carries the nuance of a frank, but gentle admonition: politely telling him that he is wrong” (Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke (X–XXIV ), 1140). This is the regular term employed by the Septuagint for translating the Hebrew ‫( גער‬Fitzmyer, The Gospel according to Luke (I–IX), 546). Forkman suggests that Luke’s particular choice of ἐπιτίμησον is the result of his desire to avoid the

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41

Matt. 18. Yet, like Matt. 18, Luke 17 envisions a primarily private and interpersonal setting for rebuke. In this way Luke 17 engages with rebuke as a moral activity, largely devoid of public, judicial aspects. The last major passage frequently referenced when discussing rebuke in the Gospels is Matt. 7:1–5 where Jesus is presented as admonishing his listeners not to judge one another and introducing the famous parable of the speck and the log.40 According to some scholars, this section even directly relates to material from Lev. 19, including verse 17.41 Whereas in Matt. 18 and Luke 17 rebuke is a necessary step toward eliciting repentance, here we see that the position attributed to Jesus initially opposes confrontation over another’s sin. Also unlike these other two sources, in Matt. 7:1–5 the possibility of rebuke is introduced by a strongly judicial set of verses: 1 Do not judge (Μὴ κρίνετε), so that you may not be judged. 2 For with the judgment you make you will be judged (κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε), and the measure you give will be the measure you get. 3 Why do you see (βλέπεις) the speck in your neighbor’s eye, but do not notice (οὐ κατανοεῖς) the log in your own eye? 4 Or how can you say (ἐρεῖς) to your neighbor, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ while the log is in your own eye? 5 You hypocrite, first take (ἔκβαλε) the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly (διαβλέψεις) to take the speck out of your neighbor’s eye. Between the opening two verses of this passage and those that follow we detect a shift in audience. Speaking in the second person plural the first two verses discourage judging others. The subsequent verses switch to the singular and reject individual confrontation by asserting that as much as another may have sinned you are in no position to mention this as a bearer of even greater iniquity yourself.42 At first glance, the use of singular language may be construed as evidence that this material should be limited to the private interpersonal sphere. However, the language of this section likely reflects a lingering trace “Semitic-sounding parataxis” of ὕπαγε ἔλεγξον (Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 126). 40  Luz, Matthew, 350. The parallel in Luke 6:37–42 is sometimes also mentioned in this regard and will be discussed in the next chapter (for brief notes on the relationship between Matt. 7:1–5 and Luke 6:37–42, see Ibid., 349). For a semi-recent detailed discussion of this section see Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” esp. ch. 4. 41  Doeve, Jewish Hermeneutics in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, 197; Derrett, “Christ and Reproof,” 274; Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 157. 42  However, note that Luz sees the entire process as “in the context of the community in which even the splinter in the brother’s eye is simply not a private matter” (Luz, Matthew, 353).

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from an earlier stage of transmission. The editor of Matt. 7:1–5 is presumably drawing directly from a well known proverb that was typically transmitted in singular language. As Donald Hagner contends, the shift between persons likely reflects a combination of materials from different oral traditions.43 We should therefore not assume that the singular language evinces a desire on the part of the editor to highlight the moral dimension of rebuke. While the singular language is retained in Matt. 7:3–5, the placement of these words following the opening verses of this chapter creates a broader judicial framework. Matthew 7:1 admonishes the listeners not to judge others lest they themselves be judged. Employing plural language, the speaker addresses a number of listeners, reinforcing the public aspect of this discussion of judgment. Moreover, as Christopher Chandler notes, when it comes to the word κρίνω (“judge”), “Matthew‘s gospel reveals a strikingly consistent use of this word along with its compound and cognate forms” with the sense of “legal judging.”44 Beyond this specific use of the term κρίνω, Chandler argues that this entire section of the Gospel is “midrashing” on (i.e., interpreting) Lev. 19:15–18, 35–36 and particularly picking up on judicial dimensions.45 He suggests that “Jesus’ statement on judging in Matt 7:1–2a would correspond to the laws on just judging in Lev. 19:15, 35” and that “the measure-for-measure saying of Matt 7:2b is midrashically linked to the law of just measuring by a judge in Lev. 19:35.”46 The opening two verses of this section thus establish a judicial frame. In its present form, the judicial framework in Matt. 7:1–2 is exemplified by the subsequent verses. As Ulrich Luz notes in his comments on Matt. 7:3–4, “the admonition first to remove the beam from one’s own eye illustrates the principle of 7:1.”47 The judicial opening of this section thus extends to the later verses that apply the admonishment to an individual context. However, while Matt. 7:1 issues a blanket warning against judging, the advice of Matt. 7:3–4 is tempered by 7:5, which allows for a situation in which one is able to point out another’s flaws. The tradition attributed to Jesus urges the listener to refrain from focusing on or correcting the error of one’s fellow until recognizing personal failings. However, once one recognizes his or her own error and removes

43  Hagner, Matthew: 1–13, 168. For a more source critical discussion of the editing of this passage, see Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 158–60. However, Chandler’s discussion is motivated by a theological concern to demonstrate that these verses “faithfully reflect the teaching of Jesus” (Ibid., 160). 44  Ibid., 164–65. 45  Ibid., 167–68. 46  Ibid., 167–71. 47  Luz, Matthew, 352.

The Moral and the Judicial Dimensions of Rebuke

43

this “log” he or she may then be able to take the speck out of their neighbor’s eye and rebuke him.48 Matthew 7:1–5 reflects a judicial understanding of rebuke that highly discourages this practice unless one has first addressed one’s own personal flaws. In contrast to the DSS where all of the sources recommend rebuke against other members of the community, the Gospels include a passage in favor of rebuke (“you must rebuke the offender;” Luke 17:3), a passage that is hesitant toward certain opportunities for rebuke (Matt. 18), and a passage that encourages the audience to generally avoid rebuke (Matt. 7). Despite this more diverse attitude toward rebuke within the Gospels, like the DSS, they present three different tactics for resolving the tension between moral and judicial modes of rebuke. Luke 17 envisions a wholly moral scenario geared toward the repentance of the transgressor. By contrast, Matt. 7 frames its example of rebuke from a judicial perspective, where reproof constitutes an illustration of improper judgement. Between these two poles, the first Gospel text examined, Matt. 18:15–17, mediates between the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke. Unlike the Community Rule, which differentiated between these aspects by applying one to the tone of rebuke and the other to the setting for rebuke, Matt. 18 assigns these dimensions to two different reactions on the part of the transgressor. A private response is ideal for a sinner who heeds such advice. A communal setting is necessary however, for the transgressor who fails to listen. Through this distinction, Matt. 18 offers a competing resolution to the moral/ judicial tension. 3

Moral and Judicial Dimensions of Rebuke in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Gospels

The DSS and the Gospels adopt similar strategies for resolving the tension between the moral and the judicial dimensions of rebuke. Both the DSS and the Gospels include passages that opt for one aspect over the other: One source from the Damascus Document (CD 9:2–8) and Matt. 7 imagine a judicial framework for rebuke while another source from the Damascus Document (CD 6:20–7:3) and Luke 17 emphasize the moral dimension. Beyond this tactic 48  “The solution indicated by v 5 indicates the responsibility that is prior: one’s own faults are to be remedied first. Then, and only then, may one turn to help the shortcomings of another” (Hagner, Matthew: 1–13, 169–70). At the end of the day rebuke is still an option, as Derrett emphasizes, “Jesus agrees (7. 5 c) that a brother should rebuke a brother … First correct the gross fault in your disposition and then you will know how to correct the petty defect in your brother’s” (Derrett, “Christ and Reproof,” 276).

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of rejecting one of the two dimensions of rebuke in favor of the other, both corpora also contain a passage that employs a different strategy – a synthesis between the opposing dimensions. The Community Rule brings the moral and judicial together by relegating the former to the manner in which rebuke is performed and the latter to the proper setting for rebuke. Similarly, Matt. 18 begins with a private, moral rebuke encounter as the ideal performance setting, but introduces the judicial aspect in the case of a recalcitrant sinner. Rather than perpetuating a reductionist model for contrasting these collections, the present chapter highlights their similar methods for resolving the tension at hand as each textually-represented community sought to understand the proper parameters for performing rebuke. The two major dimensions of rebuke broadly align with two different types of contexts. Moral descriptions of rebuke are typically described in private interpersonal settings while the judicial side of rebuke frequently imagines a public communal context. But what is the nature of the relationship between the rebuker and the rebuked party? Throughout the sources examined in this chapter the language describing the connection between the rebuker and the rebuked party is one of fellowship and proximity. The Gospel passages regularly refer to the transgressing party as one’s “brother” (ἀδελφός). Some of the DSS also use this relation (‫ ;אחיהו‬CD 6), while others refer to the transgressor as one’s neighbor (‫ ;רעהו‬1QS) or as a fellow member of the community (‫)>מבאי< הברית‬. All of these terms point to a fellow member of one’s local group. In the next chapter we shall see how this discussion of rebuke in the DSS and Gospels expands to include those outside of one’s immediate community.

chapter 2

Boundaries of Love: Reading Lev. 19:17 in Light of Lev. 19:18 The biblical command to rebuke one’s fellow is intimately connected to the obligation to love one’s neighbor found in the subsequent verse. Lev. 19:17 and 19:18 form a literary couplet juxtaposing these two injunctions and compelling later interpreters to grapple with the nature of the relationship between rebuke and love. The present chapter highlights two divergent approaches to this task, one emerging from the DSS and the other appearing in the Gospels. While love serves as a common reason for both the DSS and the Gospels to reject rebuke targeted toward those outside of one’s community, the respective links between love and rebuke within each of these corpora stand in stark contrast. As argued by Ari Mermelstein, the DSS employ love and rebuke to draw a sharp distinction between insider and outsider – rebuke is reserved for members of the sect. Building upon this observation, I highlight how rebuke affirms internal sectarian boundaries by responding to the liminal case of the deviant member. The act of rebuke holds the transgressor at a distance from his fellow community members, a distance amplified by the written record of the occasion preserved in 4Q477. At the same time, the act of rebuke must be performed in love, emphasizing the continual inclusion of the offender within the fold. This dual movement of pushing a transgressor away while simultaneously reminding him of his membership captures the DSS’ delicate balance between love and rebuke. In opposition to the synthesis between love and rebuke recommended in the DSS, the Gospels mark these two postures as antithetical. The Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel of Matthew and the Sermon on the Plain in the Gospel of Luke preserve a version of a hitherto unrecognized exegetical tradition on Lev. 19:17–18. According to this tradition, various actions associated with rebuke are the types of activities performed by one’s enemies and not to be imitated. Rather, one must respond with love by inverting the negative action of the other. If someone hits or curses you, the proper loving response is to turn the other cheek or bless them. Setting love and rebuke at odds with one another, the Gospels endorse the former and reject the latter. These texts thus take the juxtaposition between Lev. 19:17 and 19:18 as a cue to allow love of neighbor to negate the obligation to rebuke one’s fellow entirely. Moreover, in rejecting rebuke, the Gospels also deconstruct the type of communal © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376557_004

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boundary so decisively inscribed by the DSS. While the DSS utilize love and rebuke as a means of distinguishing between insiders and outsiders, the Gospels demand love and refuse rebuke even for one’s enemies, thereby blurring the line between friend and foe. This chapter thus demonstrates how although the DSS and the Gospels both read Lev. 19:17’s obligation to rebuke and Lev. 19:18’s charge to love in light of one another, their understandings of the relationship between love and rebuke dramatically diverge. 1

External Boundaries: Between Us and Them

One of the unusual aspects of rebuke in the DSS is the fact that it is limited to members of the community. One might expect outsiders, those who have yet to realize the extent of their errors, to be a prime target for chastisement. Yet, in the Community Rule (1QS 9:16–18) we read of a limitation on the Master’s (‫ )משכיל‬ability to rebuke, which is restricted solely toward members of the sect:1 16 … But one must not argue (‫ )להוכיח‬nor quarrel with the men of the pit (‫)אנשי השחת‬, 17 so that the counsel of the Torah (‫ )עצת התורה‬might be concealed in the midst of the men of deceit. One must argue (‫)ולהוכיח‬ with true knowledge and righteous judgment (only with) the chosen of 18 the Way … The Community Rule admonishes the Master to avoid rebuking the “men of the pit” (‫)אנשי השחת‬, a euphemism for non-community members.2 Here rebuke is conceived of as an internal affair, the administration of which is limited to those within the community.3 The prohibition on rebuking outsiders is also juxtaposed with holding back “counsel of the Torah” (‫)עצת התורה‬, implicitly aligning the act of conveying this insight with the act of rebuke for insiders. One’s attempt to improve and refine others – whether through

1  Although the translation of this passage refers to a general individual (“one”), 1QS 9:12 makes it clear that these rules are directed particularly toward the Master. On this passage see Schiffman, Law, Custom and Messianism, 201. 2  Schiffman, 201n168. 3  It is possible that the limiting of rebuke to insiders in this passage is based on an interpretation of the word “your kinsman” (‫יתָך‬ ֶ ‫ ) ֲע ִמ‬in Lev. 19:17 to mean excluding outsiders. However, the term “your kinsman” (‫יתָך‬ ֶ ‫ ) ֲע ִמ‬does not actually appear in this passage therefore if such an exegetical move is taking place it is only implicit.

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content knowledge or chastisement – is limited to those of the elite community.4 The affective dimension of rebuke comes into play here in order to differentiate between insiders and outsiders. Leviticus 19:17–18 offers two competing paradigms for the emotional drive prompting rebuke. When read in isolation, Leviticus 19:17 appears to frame rebuke primarily as an expression of one’s hatred for another individual. When brought into conversation with the subsequent Levitical verse, however, rebuke has the potential to turn into an expression of love. In light of the beginning of a DSS passage explored in the previous chapter (1QS 5:24–6:1), it becomes clear that the DSS community opted for the latter option: 24 … They shall admonish (‫להוכיח‬ ֑ ) 25 one another in t[ru]th, humility, and merciful love (‫ )בא[ם] ֗ת וענוה ואהבת חסד‬to one another. He must not speak to his fellow with anger or with a snarl, 26 or with a [stiff] neck [or in a jealous] spirit of wickedness. And he must not hate him [in the fores]k[in] of his heart, for he shall admonish him on (the very same) day (‫ )כיא ביומ יוכיחנו‬lest 6:1 he bear iniquity (‫)עוון‬5 because of him. And also let no man accuse his companion (‫ )רעהו‬before the Many without a confrontation before witnesses (‫… )לפני הרבים אשר לוא בתוכחת לפני עדים‬ 1QS 5:24–6:1 includes the commandment of rebuke within a general list of commandments exemplifying the obligation to love one’s fellow as himself. Here the community member is explicitly encouraged to rebuke others positively, with “merciful love” and not to allow rebuke to manifest itself as an expression of hatred. Although this source does not explicitly quote Lev. 19:17, it draws upon the three major elements of this verse: Do not hate, rebuke, and do not sin. 1QS reads Lev. 19:17a’s prohibition on hatred as a qualification of proper rebuke – one should not rebuke from a posture of hatred. Instead, one is encouraged to rebuke from a place of humility and love. Although the passage does not mention Lev. 19:18 explicitly, it does include a qualified use of love (“merciful love”) and, if the last part of this section (which mentions bringing a charge against one’s fellow) is intended as a link to CD 9:2–8, then this would serve as a gesture toward the exegesis of Lev. 19:18a found in that text. In this way, 1QS 5:24–6:1 rejects the interpretation of Lev. 19:17a-b where rebuke is primarily an expression of hatred and instead reads Lev. 19:17b and Lev. 19:18b together, allowing love to be the driving principle behind reproof. 4  On this point see the discussion in Mermelstein, “Love and Hate at Qumran,” 250–52. 5  As noted above, 1QS 6:1 cites Lev. 19:17 using the term ‫ עוון‬rather than the term ‫חטא‬, which is found in the MT version of Lev. 19:17.

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Reading this source and the previous, which prohibited rebuke against outsiders (1QS 9:16–18), together, love emerges as the proper mode of rebuke that is exclusively intended for members of the group. The link between love and rebuke within a communal setting appears even more pronounced at the beginning of the Community Rule (1QS 1:3–4), which establishes a broader program: “In order to love all that he6 has chosen, and to hate all that he has rejected, keeping away from all evil.”7 The ideal community member should align his emotional relationships with God’s identification of good and evil. Love and hate thus serve as human affective markers for that which God desires or despises. Refining the scope of this admonishment to the sectarian dualism so prevalent in the DSS, this passage goes on in lines 9 and 10 to instruct that members of the group are to “love all the Sons of Light (‫ולאהוב‬ ‫ … )כול בני אור‬and to hate all the Sons of Darkness (‫)ולשנוא כול בני חושך‬.” Love of what God chooses and hatred of that which God rejects applies directly to the distinction between insiders and outsiders. The role of love and hate in the DSS, particularly as manifest in the issue of rebuke, has been aptly discussed by Ari Mermelstein who adopts a “social constructionist” methodology to demonstrate how the DSS employ “love and hate as vehicles for constructing and embracing the group’s distinctive worldview.”8 As Mermelstein describes it, the ideal member would love all of his fellow sectarians and hate everyone else. Within this framework, the sectarian was expected to rebuke his fellows in love, and express his hatred for others by refraining from rebuking them. Emotions, drawn from the language of Lev. 19:17–18, thus serve as performative expressions of group identity that starkly divide between “us” and “them.” In addition to the emotion of love based upon Lev. 19:18b, the other two clauses of Lev. 19:18 also seem to influence the discussion of rebuke in the DSS. In 1QS 1:3–4 the Community Rule sharply distinguishes between the proper affective relationship community members should have with others: love toward fellow members and hatred toward outsiders. In alignment with this dichotomy, vengeance also enters the conversation, albeit emanating from the divine. The instructor is to teach the community “to hate all the Sons of Darkness, each according to his guilt at the vengeance (‫ )בנקמת‬of God” (1QS 1:10–11). In introducing the concept of God’s vengeance toward the Children of Darkness, 1QS 1 draws together the opening and closing elements of Lev. 19:18 – “You shall not take vengeance (‫ )לֹא ִתּקֹם‬or bear a grudge against your countrymen” and “I am the LORD.” God’s vengeance against the outsider mirrors the community 6  The “he” here refers to God, as is made clear in the preceding lines of text. 7  .‫ולאהוב כול אשר בחר ולשנוא את כול אשר מאס לרחוק מכול רע‬ 8  Mermelstein, “Love and Hate at Qumran,” 241.

Boundaries of Love

49

member’s hatred for the non-sectarian.9 In this way 1QS allows all three clauses of Lev. 19:18 to inform its boundary enforcing reading of rebuke. The reference to “the vengeance due him from God” in 1QS 1:11 conceptually aligns with CD 9:5, which quotes Nah. 1:2 (“The LORD is a passionate, avenging (‫ )וְ נ ֵֹקם‬God; The LORD is vengeful (‫ )נ ֵֹקם‬and fierce in wrath; The LORD takes vengeance (‫ )נ ֵֹקם‬on His enemies, He rages against His foes.”) as a way of relegating vengeance to God.10 One way of reading the quotation of Nah. 1:2 at this junction is to say that vengeance and bearing a grudge are forbidden for community members because God is the only one allowed to practice either action. Alternatively, James Kugel is of the opinion that the use of Nah. 1:2 is “not (as so many translators and commentators have urged) that vengeance and grudge-bearing are a strictly divine prerogative and are not to be undertaken by humans, but that vengeance and grudge-bearing are appropriate only with actual enemies …”11 Regardless of whether or not community members were permitted to take vengeance or bear a grudge, the use of Nah. 1:2 here clearly asserts that God directs these activities toward God’s enemies who, according to 1QS 1, are the Children of Darkness. In this way, the divine activity of vengeance and grudge bearing toward outsiders mirrors community members’ hatred toward non-sectarians. In sum, while Lev. 19:17–18 speaks about a person’s relationship with his fellow, the DSS repurpose these verses in order to inscribe and solidify communal boundaries. The element of hatred from Lev. 19:17 is transformed into the proper mode of interaction with outsiders and the mention of God in Lev. 19:18c appears to motivate the introduction of Nah. 1:2, which links vengeance and bearing a grudge (Lev. 19:18a) to God. In contrast to this agonistic posture toward outsiders, rebuke (Lev. 19:17b) is joined with the obligation to love one’s fellow (Lev. 19:18b) in order to create the requirement to rebuke other members of the sect as an expression of one’s loving comradery. However, while the emotions of love and hate from Lev. 19:17–18 serve to reinforce communal boundaries there is also another aspect particular to the issue of rebuke, namely, the deviant insider.

9  As Ari Mermelstein describes it there is a “sectarian requirement to align the member’s emotions with those of God” (Mermelstein, 246). 10  Although some refer to the use of Nahum in CD 9 as a “paraphrase,” I take the citation formula as indicating that this reference should be seen as a quotation – even if was purposefully modified from others versions of this verse. 11  Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 53n27. For another discussion of the use of Nah. 1:2 here, see Jassen, Scripture and Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 238–42.

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Internal Boundaries: The Offender Within

An offender deserving of rebuke impinges upon the purity of the group as a whole. One who commits a transgression, even unintentionally, allows moral impurity from the world of Darkness to invade the community’s ranks. By acting inappropriately the deviant community member threatens to undermine the divide between insider and outsider, between the purity of the group and the impurity of the Children of Darkness. In response to this possible break, the DSS employ rebuke as a tool for affirming internal communal boundaries against the threat of a deviant insider. In contrast to external boundaries between sectarians and others, “internal communal boundaries” refer to distinctions within the group itself. As I shall suggest, by combining the act of rebuke with the requirement of love, in addition to creating a written record of an offender’s crime (4Q477), the DSS navigate the tension generated by a deviant insider by simultaneously pushing him away and drawing him close. This dual movement buttresses internal communal boundaries by reaffirming the offender as a member of the group while marking his sinful actions as deviant. Although the DSS reflect a strong hatred toward those outside of the sect, the greatest animosity was reserved for those from within who threatened the group’s purity and reached the breaking point of being expelled from the community. As Eyal Regev notes with regard to the ban against excommunicated members, “This ban suggests that outcast members were treated as the most loathed outsiders.”12 One who violates the trust of his compatriots represents a far greater threat than someone outside of the community. Having broken the group’s rules, such an individual could serve as an exemplar for others or a catalyst for further penetration of impurity into the group’s sacred ranks. Complete severance of relationships and disavowal are clearly necessary. Yet, what to do with an individual who inadvertently violated communal norms? The community adopted at least two primary responses to those who would not be completely expelled: temporary exclusion from membership activities (such as meetings and communal meals) and a reduction in the offender’s food rations. Regev suggests that, “These punishments not only discouraged deviance, but also maintained the group’s morality without using violence.”13 He postulates that “Partial suspension of membership status or total excommunication derived from the idea of the group’s collective guilt. Continued intimacy with the transgressor would blemish the group’s moral status and result

12  Regev, Sectarianism in Qumran a Cross-Cultural Perspective, 49. 13  Ibid., 121.

Boundaries of Love

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in collective divine punishment.”14 In order to preserve the purity of the group, an inadvertent offender must be quarantined. Although it is necessary to publicly condemn a transgressor’s actions and temporarily separate him from his fellows, it is also important to simultaneously reaffirm the offender’s membership, which would be fully reinstated after an act of purging (whether through ostracization, reduction in food rations or otherwise). Here is where rebuke emerges as a Janus-facing response to the incongruity of the deviant insider. Rebuke allows community members to condemn an offender and his actions while simultaneously affirming his continued membership in the community. Rebuking in love captures the dual movements of pushing away and drawing near that reflect the community’s response to the liminal status of this offender. CD 6:20–21 requires that each member of the group love his brother as himself (‫)אהוב איש את אחיהו כמהו‬, which is exemplified by actions such as rebuke. As Ari Mermelstein writes, “As a verbal performance, reproof would affirm the love that bound members of the sect to each other.”15 Mermelstein interprets rebuke in love from the perspective of communal hierarchy. He suggests that, “The link between reproof and these emotions is apparently an acknowledgement that, because of the hierarchical structure of the sect … reproof could be used as an expression of hate rather than love.”16 He thus understands reproof to be focused “upon the importance of group unity, demonstrating a clear sensitivity to the dangers of the group’s hierarchical structure.”17 While I fully agree with Mermelstein’s assessment that these elements are intended to contribute to group unity, I am not convinced that the primary concern is with the hierarchical structure. I would posit that the concern is rather with any member of the group treating an offender as an outsider regardless of either member’s social standing. Rather than primarily responding to the sect’s hierarchy, loving rebuke seems to be more fundamentally about group cohesion in the face of deviance. While the element of love in rebuke reaffirms the offender’s insider status, there is another aspect of rebuke in the DSS that subtly marks the transgressor as an outsider. Even once the rebuked offender is readmitted into the community a record of his transgression remains inscribed in the community’s memory. Evidence for this aspect of rebuke derives from 4Q477, which functions as a quasi-act of communal grudge-bearing. Unlike those DSS discussed previously that present prescriptive guidelines for the practice of rebuke, 14  Ibid., 121. 15  Mermelstein, “Love and Hate at Qumran,” 255. 16  Ibid., 259. 17  Ibid., 260.

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4Q477 is descriptive, providing possible evidence of the actual performance of rebuke at Qumran.18 Esther Eshel, who produced the initial publication on 4Q477, entitled the sum of its five fragments “The Rebukes of the Overseer.”19 She notes that the text “preserves remnants of a legal record, compiled by the sect’s Overseer (‫)מבקר‬, of those members who were rebuked after committing a sin.”20 Consisting of a series of “fixed formulas, such as ‘And they rebuke X son of Y’, followed by an allusion to the man’s sin,” Eshel contends that this “official” text was “probably read out in public by the Overseer.”21 Charlotte Hempel, in a short response, notes that Eshel’s choice of title is actually quite misleading. The plural language of the rebuking party combined with the absence of a direct reference to the Overseer indicates that it is more likely other community members or the witnesses themselves who perform the actual rebuke.22 In light of these factors, Hempel recommends emending the title of this text to “The Overseer’s Record of Rebukes.” Yet, even this title may encode unwarranted assumptions, leading Stephen Reed to proffer the alternative: “List of Rebukes made by the Community.”23 Reed also suggests that this list was employed for the purposes of “the annual evaluation and ranking of individuals in the community.”24 Reed’s revised title emphasizes the active role of the community in administering and remembering the transgressions of their fellows. It is not the leadership alone that records the transgression, but the community as a whole that inscribes the offense into the collective memory of its constituents. If 4Q477 is indeed a list of actual instances of rebuke performed within the DSS community, then this source greatly advances our understanding of the

18  For a short summary of 4Q477’s relationship to the other passages on rebuke discussed above, see Metso, The Serekh Texts, 58–59. However, note Kister’s hesitancy to see 4Q477 as recording reproof for specific transgressions or requiring witnesses (Kister, “Divorce, Reproof, and Other Sayings in The Synoptic Gospels,” 220n92). 19  Eshel, “4Q477 – The Rebukes by the Overseer.” Of the five fragments, “two fragments were still connected at a few points, while the third was attached by J. Strugnell” compelling Eshel to group them together as “frg. 2.” (see Ibid., 111). However, Stephen Reed contends that there are actually four fragments that make up “frg. 2” (see Reed, “Genre, Setting and Title of 4Q477,” 147n3). Also see Pfann and Alexander, DJD, XXXVI:474–83. 20  Eshel, “4Q477 – The Rebukes by the Overseer,” 111. Eshel also points out that this text is unusual insofar as it records personal names of community members (Ibid., 121–22). 21  Ibid., 111. 22  Hempel, “Who Rebukes in 4Q477.” These points are reiterated by Reed (Reed, “Genre, Setting and Title of 4Q477,” 147). 23  Reed, “Genre, Setting and Title of 4Q477,” 148. 24  Ibid., 148.

Boundaries of Love

53

function of rebuke within this community.25 First, the very preservation of a written record found stored together with other significant texts in Cave 4 suggests that transgressions were meticulously documented for future reference. As Lawrence Schiffman already noted, “Such records served a dual purpose. They certified that the offender had been previously reproved for committing the same offense, and, if the offense had been committed in front of a single witness, served as the basis for conviction if other single witnesses should later report the same offense.”26 In this regard, rebuke in the DSS serves a purpose beyond those aims already underling the biblical verse. Peter Wallace Dunn delineates four major functions of rebuke at Qumran: 1) to serve “the peace of the community, by keeping the members from harboring grievances against one another;” 2) “to help keep track of the transgressions of the members;” 3) “to warn the person of the seriousness of his transgression;” and 4) “so that the rebuker might not also become guilty.” Leviticus 19:17 itself appears to align with two of these motivations: To avoid harboring hatred (1) and to prevent the rebuker from sinning (4). The novelty of 4Q477 is in the documentation of rebuke for future reference. The preservation of such events, particularly if they were intended to be recited before the community on regular occasions, plays a broader commemorative role. Indeed, the first legible line of this text reads, “to make their offences to be remembered” (‫)ל] ֗הז֗ כיר את נעוי֗ ֗ת ֗ם‬.27 Preserving members’ sins and reiterating them publicly engraves them within communal memory. Yet, by opening with an emphasis on the sins (‫)נעוי֗ ֗ת ֗ם‬, 4Q477 also hints that it is the actions that are dangerous rather than the people themselves. Nevertheless, preserving a written record of a transgressor’s offenses permanently marks him as a deviant from the group. As noted previously, 1QS 1:10–11 forbade taking vengeance or bearing a grudge against insiders and instead only allowed such actions (at least for God) against outsiders. The written record of an offender’s crime however, functions in some respects as a form of grudge-bearing. By preserving a record of the transgressor’s actions, and especially if these documents were recited in a public ceremony, the community as a whole carried a “grudge” against this 25  In discussing the DSS community, I am employing the singular term “community” rather than the plural. While the DSS may reflect a group of connected communities, of which Khirbet Qumran was a part, I use the singular term here to highlight what appears to be their shared view on rebuke. It is of course possible that there are nuances between the role and application of rebuke among these different communities, but for the sake of clarity I will discuss these works, and the groups they may have represented, as a whole. 26  Schiffman, Sectarian Law, 78. 27  Eshel, “4Q477 – The Rebukes by the Overseer,” 113.

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individual. While this quasi-grudge would ideally not impact everyday relations, it would reemerge if the offender ever committed another transgression. As Schiffman noted, a later offense would reawaken the record of the earlier crime in order to punish the offender. In this way, 4Q477 gives evidence of a communal or institutionalized form of grudge-bearing against the rebuked party, hinting at his affinity to outsiders. Yet, as discussed above, unlike official punishments in the DSS that temporarily remove a member from the group, rebuke serves as a means of reaffirming the offender’s insider status while recognizing his improper “outsider-like” actions.28 Indeed, despite preserving the offender’s sin, the record also reminds us of his continual membership – were the offender truly ostracized from the group, his name might be blotted out entirely. In this way, rebuke simultaneously pushes the offender away by holding his sin against him – treating him as an outsider – and draws him near by insisting upon love as the motivating emotion. Most literature discussing the erection of boundaries at Qumran adopts an “us vs. them” externally-oriented perspective. The stark dichotomy between light and darkness, good and evil, clearly differentiates members of the sect from outsiders. But, in addition to this dimension of establishing external boundaries, rebuke also highlights the important aspect of internal deviance.29 While “external” and “internal” boundaries are inextricably interconnected, the latter presents an additional challenge not encountered when facing the outsider. The outsider is to be avoided and degraded without question. When confronted with a deviant insider however, a conflicting desire to push the offender away would be coupled with a sense of fraternal responsibility for bringing him back into the fold. Rebuke, and the emotions associated with this practice, function as a mechanism for resolving this tension. Overall then, while the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke (discussed in the previous chapter) manifest themselves along the divide between individuals and the larger community, once the affective dimension is added, rebuke expands to dictate broader insider-outsiders boundaries, and particularly the case of a deviant individual who conceptually straddles this line. Turning now to the Gospels, we shall see how Lev. 19:18 and love actually function in the opposite direction, collapsing the distinction between insider and outsider. 28  Similarly, new initiates in the process of entering the sect would undergo a transition period of quasi-membership status before becoming fully inducted (at least in the Community Rule, see Regev, Sectarianism in Qumran a Cross-Cultural Perspective, 46–50). While a new initiate or punished member would have certain restrictions placed upon them, they would also be accorded some room for participation in communal life and deserve the loving attitude prescribed for all members. 29  One can also point to the details of the penal system in this regard.

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Leviticus 19:17–18, Matthew 5, and Luke 630

In addition to the three major Gospel passages typically associated with Lev. 19:17 and rebuke (discussed in the previous chapter), a few scholars have also suggested looking to Matt. 5:23–24 or 43–47.31 To date, however, no one has explored the relationship of the larger unit of Matt. 5:38–46, and especially its Lucan parallel (Luke 6:27–42), to Lev. 19:17–18 and rebuke.32 In what follows, I suggest the presence of an early exegetical tradition on Lev. 19:17–18 that is preserved in these Lucan and Matthean pericopae.33 This tradition also appears in an early rabbinic midrash known as Sifra (compiled c. 3rd cen. CE) on Lev. 19:17–18 (which will be discussed in depth in a subsequent chapter). However, while the version in Sifra directly glosses these two Levitical verses, the versions in Matthew and Luke detach the tradition from Lev. 19:17 and rework it through inversion and augmentation. Understanding the relationship between these Gospel passages and the early midrashic interpretation of Lev. 19:17–18 sheds light on how these Gospels interpreted these two Levitical verses together and the radical difference in their approach from that which appears in the DSS. Sifra (Qedoshim 4) includes a set of anonymous and attributed glosses on Lev. 19:17–18. Within the unnamed commentary portion, Lev. 19:17 is understood 30  Note that some of this material appeared as Goldstone, “Rebuke, Lending, and Love.” 31  For the link between Matt. 5:23–24 and Leviticus see Allen, Matthew, 197; Albright and Mann, Matthew, 220; Dowd, “Is Matthew 18:15–17 about ‘Church Discipline’?,” 149. The primary factor motivating some scholars to turn to Matt. 5:46–47 is the unusual negative pairing of the terms “Gentiles” (οἱ ἐθνικοὶ) and “tax collectors” (οἱ τελῶναι) that we only find here and in Matt. 18:17 (ὁ ἐθνικὸς καὶ ὁ τελώνης; Thompson, Matthew’s Advice to a Divided Community, 185; Forkman, The Limits of the Religious Community, 125). David Catchpole has even noted the parallel in Luke 6:32–33 and related this to Matt. 18 (Catchpole, “Reproof and Reconciliation in the Q Community,” 85). As for Matt. 5:43–44, these verses have generally entered the conversation as a means to determining the origin of Jesus’ formulation of a biblical obligation to “love your neighbor and hate your enemy” (Smith, “Mt. 5.43,” 72; Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 236–38). We can also note an article by Duncan Derrett in which he discusses Luke 6:37–42 in relationship to Lev. 19:17 as part of a larger analysis (Derrett, “Christ and Reproof”). 32  Catchpole has noted that in the reconstruction of “Q,” the term “brother” (ἀδελφός) only appears in Matt. 7:3–5, 18:15 and Luke 6:41–43, 17:3 (Catchpole, “Reproof and Reconciliation in the Q Community,” 86). Also, see Kloppenborg, Q Parallels, 213. If this is correct, then it suggests a connection between the standard rebuke passages and Luke 6:41–43, which I argue is part of an extended exegetical reaction to Lev. 19:17 and rebuke. For a discussion of some of the material in this Lucan passage and how it relates to Q and Matthew, see Youngquist, Q 6:37–42. 33  There is also an important parallel in the so-called sectio evangelica of the Didache (1.3b– 2.1) that will not be discussed here; see Goldstone, “Rebuke, Lending, and Love,” 311–14.

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to condone a set of somewhat violent actions in place of harboring hatred while Lev. 19:18 is exemplified through the case of giving and lending. Sifra’s anonymous gloss on Lev. 19:17 read as follows: You shall not hate (‫ )לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א‬your kinsfolk in your heart (Lev. 19:17a). One might think you should not hit him, curse him, or slap him (‫יכול לא תכנו‬ ‫)לא תקללנו ולא תסטרנו‬. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. I only said hatred which is in the heart. And from where do we know that if he rebukes him even four or five times that he should rebuke again? The Torah therefore says you shall surely rebuke (‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ; Lev. 19:17b).34 One might think even if he rebukes him and his countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because of him (Lev. 19:17c). The prohibition in Lev. 19:17a of hating in one’s heart is ostensibly redundant. Where else would one harbor hatred if not their heart? In good rabbinic fashion Sifra seeks novelty underlying the superfluous scriptural qualification of such hatred.35 If hatred in the heart is what is specifically prohibited, the verse must be worded thus in order to permit other expressions of hatred, namely, hitting, cursing, or slapping. These types of actions are permitted as a valid form of response so long as one is not expressing hatred, but rather attempting to chastise.36 Similarly, the repetition of the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫“( י‬rebuke”) in the infinitive absolute plus imperfect structure (‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ) captures rabbinic attention as a source for the obligation to repeat the action several times. Finally, the last section of the verse, Lev. 19:17c, defines the limitations to this potentially unbounded expression of rebuke at the point when one embarrasses another.37 Within this series of interpretations the first clause, concerning 34  I have deviated here from the NJPS translation in order to highlight the doubling of the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫“( י‬rebuke”), which is not captured by the NJPS translation of “Reprove your kinsman.” 35  The exegetical interpretation of ostensibly superfluous material is characteristic of the midrashim attributed to the school of R. Akiva. See Kahana, “The Halakhic Midrashim,” 17–26. 36  See my discussion of the interpretation of this line in Chapter 4. The listing of these three acts likely appears in increasing order of intensity and humiliation, building up to the gloss on Lev. 19:17c that one should desist at the point of humiliation. It is also possible that the three actions described correspond to different types of interpersonal relationships: superiors, peers and inferiors (see Wink, “Neither Passivity nor Violence,” 105). 37   Sifra implies that one should not rebuke a person to the point at which they become embarrassed, lest this result in sin. This stands in contrast to an interpretation preserved in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, which emphasizes that even if one embarrasses their fellow they will not bear guilt because of this.

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hitting, cursing, or slapping, is quite striking. These measures seem extreme, particularly in contrast to the obligations enumerated in the rest of Sifra on Lev. 19. Accordingly, the continuation of this section in Sifra presents the views of several prominent rabbis that no one in their generation is able to give or receive proper rebuke. The presence of a collection of tannaim eschewing rebuke suggests that the anonymous gloss on Lev. 19:17 dates from the pre-tannaitic period and was inherited by these early rabbis who feel unable to simply ignore or change the tradition.38 Although Sifra itself was likely compiled in the 3rd century, this midrash contains a wealth of much older traditions. Günter Stemberger suggests that the “simple commentary” (of which our glosses are a part) is the earliest layer of Sifra and “is to be dated to the decades after Bar Kochba (parts of it may be earlier).”39 Similarly, Jacob Epstein and Yonatan Sagiv note that anonymous material in the tannaitic midrashim (as well as material brought in the name of late tannaim) can be of much earlier provenance.40 Given that this first part of Sifra’s commentary is totally anonymous and evokes a sharp reaction from early tannaitic figures, it is likely that it dates to a much earlier period. Following the exegesis of Lev. 19:17 and the pronouncement of several tannaim that no one is able to give rebuke, Sifra presents the prohibition against vengeance and bearing a grudge in Lev. 19:18a through a set of examples revolving around lending and borrowing: You shall not take vengeance (Lev. 19:18a): Until what point is vengeance? He said to him, “Lend (‫ )השאילני‬me your sickle” and he did not lend it (‫)ולא השאילו‬. The next day he said to him, “Lend me your axe” and he said to him “I will not lend you just as you did not lend me your sickle;” thus it says You shall not take vengeance. Or bear a grudge (Lev. 19:18a): Until what point is bearing a grudge? He said to him, “Lend me your axe” and he did not lend it. The next day he said to him, “Lend me your sickle” and he said to him, “Behold! I am not like you who did not lend me your axe;” thus it says or bear a grudge. You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen, but you can take vengeance and bear a grudge against others. Love your fellow as yourself (Lev. 19:18b). R. Akiva 38  For further discussion on this point see Chapter 4 below and Goldstone, “Rebuke and the Self-Acknowledged Limits of Rabbinic Authority,” 13–16. 39  Stemberger, “The Redaction and Transmission of Sifra,” 66*. 40  Epstein and Melamed, Mevoʼot le-Sifrut ha-Tannaim, 513; Sagiv, “Studies in Early Rabbinic Hermeneutics as Reflected in Selected Chapters in the Sifra,” 253. For more on the dating of Sifra, see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 285–7.

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says, “This is a great principle of the Torah.” Ben Azzai says, “This is the record of Adam’s line (Gen. 5:1) – this is a greater principle than that one.” The prohibition against vengeance and bearing a grudge from Lev. 19:18 is illustrated by the case of one who requests a tool from his fellow having previously refused to lend something himself. Vengeance would be refusing to lend to the other party because they refused you, while bearing a grudge would be lending to them, but making it clear that you are morally superior for doing what they refused to do. This illustration is followed by a gloss on the words “against your countrymen,” which is interpreted to mean that the verse allows one to take vengeance or bear a grudge against those who are not part of the “in group.” The conclusion of this section of the gloss includes statements by R. Akiva and Ben Azzai regarding a great principle of the Torah, where R. Akiva believes Lev. 19:18b to be of considerable importance. In sum, Sifra interprets Lev. 19:17 as allowing hitting, cursing, and slapping as appropriate forms of rebuke and glosses Lev. 19:18 as encouraging lending to other “insiders” in cases where one may be initially disinclined. The tradition in Sifra appears in an altered form in several early Christian texts.41 Luke 6:27–35, from the Sermon on the Plain, presents perhaps the clearest parallel: 27 But I say to you that listen, Love your enemies (ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν), do good to those who hate you (τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς), 28 bless those who curse you (τοὺς καταρωμένους ὑμᾶς), pray for those who abuse you (τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων ὑμᾶς). 29 If anyone strikes you (τῷ τύπτοντί σε) on the cheek, offer the other also; and from anyone who takes away your (τοῦ αἴροντός σου) coat do not withhold even your shirt. 30 Give to everyone (παντὶ δὲ τῷ αἰτοῦντί σε δίδου) who begs from you; and if anyone takes away your goods, do not ask for them again. 31 Do to others as you would have them do to you. 32 If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners love those who love them. 33 If you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners do the same. 34 If you lend (δανίσητε) to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend (δανίζουσιν) to sinners, to receive as much again. 35 But love your enemies, do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return. Your reward will be great, and you will be

41  For later rabbinic parallels to this tradition, see Goldstone, “Rebuke, Lending, and Love,” 310–11.

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children of the Most High; for he is kind to the ungrateful and the wicked. 36 Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful. This passage contains three major themes reiterated in a consistent order and summarized in verse 35 as “love your enemies, do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return.”42 Luke 6:27 opens with the command to love one’s enemies by doing good for those who hate you. The explication of those to whom one should positively respond despite their negative actions includes language that strongly resonates with Sifra’s gloss on Lev. 19:17–18. Specifically, Luke refers to those who hate you (τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς), curse you (τοὺς καταρωμένους ὑμᾶς), abuse you (τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων ὑμᾶς), and strike you (τῷ τύπτοντί σε). This list of negative actions parallels the biblical prohibition of not hating (‫)לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א‬ in one’s heart and the three categories in Sifra’s presentation of actions not biblically prohibited as actions of rebuke: hitting (‫)תכנו‬, cursing (‫)תקללנו‬, and slapping (‫)תסטרנו‬. The next thematic cue of one who takes something from you (τοῦ αἴροντός σου) in Luke 6:29b, as well as giving to all who ask in Luke 6:30, are tempered by the corresponding rhetorical question: “If you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, to receive as much again.” Here the issue of lending (δανίσητε; δανίζουσιν) corresponds to Sifra’s exemplification of Lev. 19:18a. Yet, once again the Gospel text reworks the early Jewish interpretation by promoting lending without expectation of return rather than simply lending without resentment. Additionally, the theme of doing good and lending to all challenges Sifra’s exclusionary reading of Lev. 19:18b as only referring to the “in-group.”43 Several of the parallel themes in Sifra and Luke appear in Matt. 5:38–44, indicating that this section should also be considered among the Matthean verses which engage with Lev. 19:17–18 despite not referencing Lev. 19:17 explicitly:

42  “In the next three verses (6.32, 33, 34) Luke then elaborates on three positive actions, ‘love, do good, lend’, that arise from the actions approved of in Luke 6.27–31. These three actions are then reinforced once again, in this same order, in Lk. 6.35a …” (Garrow, The Gospel of Matthew’s Dependence on the Didache, 225). 43  In contrast to the two garments that are taken in the New Testament material, in Sifra, the objects lent or borrowed are a sickle and an axe. The discrepancy between these objects can be understood as representing some of the standard possessions for each group. Agricultural tools appear frequently among utensils discussed in tannaitic literature and given the ideally transient nature of the early apostles clothing would be one of the few possessions they would be assumed to own (thus, for example, Matt. 10:9–10 and Luke 9:3).

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38 You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth” [Exod. 21:24]. 39 But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If anyone slaps you (ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει) on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also. 40 And if anyone wants to sue you and take your shirt, hand over your coat as well. 41 If anyone forces you (ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει) to go one mile, go with them two miles. 42 Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you (τὸν θέλοντα ἀπὸ σοῦ δανίσασθαι). 43 You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. Matthew incorporates slapping (ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει) as well as the idea of giving to one who wishes to borrow from you (τὸν θέλοντα ἀπὸ σοῦ δανίσασθαι) in his fifth antithesis. In addition, Matthew actually cites part of Leviticus 19:18, albeit as the opening of the sixth antithesis. Given that the antithesis form and quotation from Exodus do not appear in Luke, it is possible that this block of material was originally associated with Lev. 19:17–18 and then appropriated by Matthew or the editor of the antitheses as a gloss on Exod. 21:24 – leading directly into a separate gloss on Lev. 19:18.44 If this line of reasoning is correct, then the particular counter-biblical message that Matthew records Jesus promoting aligns more closely with the issue of retaliation than rebuke, likely prompting the use of Exod. 21:24 as opposed to Lev. 19:17.45 While Sifra glosses the limits to the prohibitions on hating, taking vengeance, and bearing a grudge, Matthew and Luke’s versions invert these traditions. Instead of allowing for various aggressive forms of rebuke and vengeance against others, the Gospels transform the aggressor into an opponent who should be greeted with a loving response no less than one’s friend should expect. Instead of prohibiting certain forms of lending or the refusal to lend, the New Testament pericopae encourage enthusiastically giving gifts without expectation of return. In this way, these sections of the Sermon on the Mount and the Sermon on the Plain appear to be actively challenging the exegetical 44  Horsley, “Ethics and Exegesis,” 90. The question of whether the antithesis form in the Sermon on the Mount is Matthean or pre-Matthean has been a subject of scholarly debate (Betz, The Sermon on the Mount, 212–214). 45  The resonance between these biblical passages is supported by Doeve’s correlation between the verses from Exodus that Jesus comes to reject with material in the Holiness Code in Leviticus. Specifically, he believes that the “eye for an eye” passage (Exod. 21:24) lines up with Lev. 19:15–18a, which “also speaks of judgment and forbearing vengeance” (Doeve, Jewish Hermeneutics in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, 193). Also see Derrett, “Christ and Reproof,” 277; Duling, “Matthew 18:15–17,” 13–14.

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tradition preserved in Sifra and are thus directly germane to discussion of Lev. 19:17–18. 4

Love, Rebuke, and the Gospels

Luke 6:27–35 and Matt. 5:38–44 both preserve a reworked version of an early interpretative tradition on Lev. 19:17–18. Just as in the DSS, various elements of Lev. 19:18 influence the way that rebuke in Lev. 19:17 is understood within these Gospel sections. Although rebuke and Lev. 19:17 are not explicitly mentioned in the present form of these passages, Matt. 5:43 cites what is generally understood to be an altered version of Lev. 19:18b – “You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” James Kugel has already suggested that this use of Lev. 19:18b is a response to the exegetical traditions on this verse that we see in the Damascus Document and in Sifra.46 In Sifra, the limiting phrase “You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen” (Lev. 19:18a), is interpreted to mean that “you can [take vengeance or bear a grudge against] others.” This exclusionary reading is activated by the DSS, which create a distinction between members of the group and outsiders. Ostensibly aware of this reading, Matt. 5:43 quotes the verse with the added element of hating one’s enemies in order to negate this attitude. In contrast to the DSS, which apply vengeance and grudge-bearing from Lev. 19:18a to others and the obligation to love from Lev. 19:18b to members of the group, Matt. 5 adopts a more universalistic reading: It is forbidden to take vengeance or bear a grudge against anyone. In fact, one must love everyone – especially one’s enemies. For Matthew (and Luke), love is the dominant element of this biblical couplet and loving everyone is the guiding principle for understanding Lev. 19:17–18 as a whole. What appears in Luke as a single unit is divided in Matthew into two separate antitheses – one that preserves the bulk of the exegetical material on Lev. 19:17–18 (antithesis 5) and one that cites Lev. 19:18b and reiterates the guiding principle of loving one’s enemies (antithesis 6). Although this material is split in Matthew, the parallel in Luke clearly demonstrates that these sections should be read together as a unit. Luke 6:27 opens by declaring that one should love their enemies before moving into the exegetical tradition thereby integrating the material in antitheses 5–6 of Matthew and setting love as the dominant motif for the section as a whole. Like the DSS, the importance of this affective dimension influences the way that rebuke is understood. However, while the DSS endorse rebuke in love, the Gospels perceive these two practices 46  Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 236–8.

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as antithetical. Hitting, cursing, and slapping – all expressions of rebuke in Sifra – become that which your enemies do to you, rather than something you should perform yourself. In response to these highly negative activities (associated with rebuke), the Gospels recommend offering the opposite. Bless the one who curses you and pray for the one who abuses you. Rather than rebuking the one who hits you, offer them the other cheek instead. These suggested responses are the proper way of loving one’s enemy. By directly setting these loving activities in opposition to the negative acts of one’s enemies (which Sifra associates with rebuke), the Gospels establish rebuke as the antithesis of love. Matthew and Luke invert the love/hate dichotomy associated with rebuke as it appears in the DSS. The members of the Dead Sea sect(s) were commanded to love insiders and hate outsiders. In these Gospel passages, the insider/ outsider distinction is broken down. In the previous chapter I closed by noting how Matt. 7 and 18 as well as Luke 17 all regularly refer to the transgressing party as one’s “brother” (ἀδελφός). In the present passages a wider variety of terms are employed to identify the other party. Matthew uses open-ended relative pronouns: Whoever slaps you (ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει) and whoever forces you (ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει). Likewise Luke uses the expansive language of giving to “everyone” who asks (παντὶ δὲ τῷ αἰτοῦντί σε δίδου). These pericopae explicitly do not want the audience to limit their activity to fellow community members. When they specify the identities of transgressive figures they are one’s “enemy” or the one who acts negatively toward you. Matthew and Luke thus employ Lev. 19:18 in a diametrically opposed fashion from the DSS. Whereas the DSS used love and hate to distinguish between community members and others, the Gospels employ love to break down the boundaries between one’s friends and one’s enemies. The element of hatred is thoroughly denigrated by being attributed to the offending party while a loving attitude is endorsed for all social interaction. While the DSS employ the affective dimensions of Lev. 19:17–18 in order to differentiate between insiders and outsiders and to assign love as the ideal mode for rebuke, the Gospels adopt an opposing position. Reworking an earlier exegetical tradition on Lev. 19:17–18, Matt. 5 and Luke 6 employ the affective dimensions of these verses in order to demolish the boundary between insiders and outsiders and to set love in opposition to rebuke. These Gospel passages emphasize the importance of loving everyone, particularly one’s enemies. Moreover, by attributing the expressions of rebuke recorded in Sifra to another person with a clearly negative connotation, and by admonishing the audience to respond lovingly – i.e., with the opposite action of this other person – these passages directly reject rebuke in favor of love.

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Within the sections of Matthew and Luke discussed above it is primarily the moral aspect of rebuke that is negated. However, we also find a rejection of the judicial dimension. In the previous chapter, we observed how passages in Matthew and Luke typically associated with rebuke employ both the moral and judicial dimensions of this practice. Luke 6 also offers us an opportunity for bringing these two dimensions together, this time in order to reject both. The entire section of Luke quoted above revolves around more moralistic dimensions of responding to one’s fellow. This material is then followed by 6:37– 42, which discourages the audience from judging.47 37 Do not judge (μὴ κρίνετε), and you will not be judged; do not condemn, and you will not be condemned. Forgive (ἀπολύετε), and you will be forgiven; 38 give (δίδοτε), and it will be given to you. A good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, will be put into your lap; for the measure you give will be the measure you get back. 39 He also told them a parable: “Can a blind person guide a blind person? Will not both fall into a pit? 40 A disciple is not above the teacher, but everyone who is fully qualified will be like the teacher. 41 Why do you see the speck in your neighbor’s eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye? 42 Or how can you say to your neighbor, ‘Friend, let me take out the speck in your eye,’ when you yourself do not see the log in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor’s eye.” Composed in plural language, the first two verses of this passage reject judging as a public activity. These verses offer an expanded parallel to Matt. 7:1–5, which admonishes the audience against judging and employs the parable of the speck and the beam. In Luke, the juxtaposition between these verses and the material discussed above from Luke 6:27–35 brings together the moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke in order to reject both. Luke 6:27–35 inverts the role of rebuke by turning it into the undesirable practice of one’s enemy. 47  While Matt. 7:1–5 may only partially reject judgment and rebuke (as there is still a possibility of removing the log from one’s own eye), in Luke 6 the discussion of judging (Luke 6:37–38) is separated from the parable of the speck and the log (Luke 6:41–42) by another parable and a verse regarding the relationship between discipline and teacher (Luke 6:39–40). Thus, while in Matthew the harsh rejection of judging (Matt. 7:1–2) is tempered by the resuscitation of the possibility of more personal rebuke (Matt. 7:3–5), in Luke the gap (Luke 6:39–40) between the rejection of judging (Luke 6:37–38) and the parable of the speck and the log (Luke 6:41–42) suggests that judging is completely negated.

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Luke 6:36–42 then introduces the judicial dimension and, through the parable of the speck and the beam, affirms that even this form of rebuke should generally be avoided. While the parable of the speck and the beam on its own leaves open the possibility for rebuke once one has perfected him or herself, the appearance of this material in Luke (following the earlier admonishment to respond to everything negative with love) rhetorically abolishes the value of such rebuke even if one reaches a state of self-perfection. In this way Luke employs love to subvert the practice of rebuke entirely. 5

Love and Rebuke

The DSS and the Gospels both read Lev. 19:17 and 19:18 together but reach opposing interpretations of the relationship between these two verses. Within the DSS, love (Lev. 19:18b) is the proper motivation for rebuke (Lev. 19:17b), which is reserved for fellow sectarians, while hatred (Lev. 19:17a) and grudgebearing (Lev. 19:18a) are directed toward others. In this way the DSS employ the commandment of rebuke in conjunction with the affective dimensions of these verses in order to draw a sharp line between insiders and outsiders. By contrast, in the Gospel passages hatred (Lev. 19:17a) and rebuke (Lev. 19:17b) are the types of activities others might perform, in response to which one is encouraged to respond with love (Lev. 19:18b), especially toward one’s enemies. The Gospel passages set love and rebuke in opposition in order to break down the boundary between insiders and outsiders. The DSS and the Gospels thus reflect diametrically opposed readings of the biblical couplet (Lev. 19:17–18).

chapter 3

Slanderous Speech: Reading Lev. 19:17 in Light of Lev. 19:16 The Pentateuch records the responsibility to rebuke as merely one commandment among many other obligations. In contrast to this marginal position, within works stemming from Jewish wisdom traditions the practice of rebuke moves to center stage.1 Some texts, such as the Book of Psalms and Job, pay more attention to rebuke than the Pentateuch but primarily incorporate it within a divine-human relationship.2 However, my interest is primarily in interpersonal rebuke rather than rebuke or confrontation against God.3 Consequently, in this chapter I examine three works of ethical exhortation where rebuke and Lev. 19:17 are discussed in terms of human relationships: The Book of Proverbs, Ben Sira, and the Testament of Gad. In each of these three works there are a number of verses that understand rebuke in light of the problem of malicious speech in the form of slander or gossip, bringing Lev. 19:17 into dialogue with Lev. 19:16.4 Proverbs implies that rebuke may be dangerously similar to gossip; Ben Sira questions whether one should rebuke in response to gossip; and 1  Wisdom literature refers to a broad genre including a variety of different types of texts that frequently employ key terms for wisdom, such as ‫ חכמה‬in Hebrew and σοφία in Greek, and which often provide sapiential instruction for living (Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 1). 2  For divine-human rebuke in Psalms and Job see, for example, Ps. 6:2, 38:2, 39:12, 50:8, 50:21, 94:10, 12, and 118:18, Job 13:3, 10, 16:21, 23:4, and 40:2. However, we also find a few instances where Job complains that his comrades do not offer proper rebuke (Job 6:24–26, 19:5) or do not heed rebuke (Job 13:6), and Ps. 141:5 (‫יחנִ י‬ ֵ ‫יֹוכ‬ ִ ְ‫ )יֶ ֶה ְל ֵמנִ י ַצ ִּדיק ֶח ֶסד ו‬refers to human rebuke. Nevertheless, despite the presence of these few interpersonal examples, they reveal little about the nature of interpersonal rebuke. In addition, we also find examples of rebuke within prophetic sources (Isaiah, Jeremiah, etc.). Yet, once again a majority of these instances involve divine rebuke (Isa. 26:16, 28:26, Jer. 2:30, 30:11, 14, 46:28, and Hos. 7:12); sometimes these examples also carry a judicial sense either directly from God (Isa. 2:4 and Mic. 4:3) or by a messianic figure (Isa. 11:3–4). The Wisdom of Solomon is another wisdom text that discusses rebuke; however, the majority of these instances refer to divine rebuke rather than interpersonal rebuke. See, for example, Wis. 1:3 and 12:2. Overall, while rebuke does play a more important role in Psalms, Job, the Wisdom of Solomon, and some prophetic texts, the majority of these cases revolve around divine-human rebuke or offer little insight into the nature and parameters of rebuke. 3  For a recent treatment of confronting God in rabbinic sources, see Weiss, Pious Irreverence. 4  See my note on “slander” and “gossip” in the Introduction.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376557_005

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the Testament of Gad differentiates between rebuke and slander based upon the intended audience. Collectively, these three works reveal another way in which the literary context of Lev. 19:17 influences the discussion of the proper performance of rebuke. 1

Rebuke in Proverbs

The Book of Proverbs employs several Hebrew roots that can denote rebuke. Proverbs, like Leviticus, utilizes the hiphil form of ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬to mean both rebuke and, in a few instances at least, to convey a judicial meaning of “indicting” or “convicting.”5 Along with ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬, and often in conjunction with its declension ‫תֹוכ ַחת‬ ַ , the other most significant Hebrew root in Proverbs that frequently implies some form of rebuke or correction is ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫י‬.6 Most commonly occurring in the nominal form ‫מּוסר‬ ָ (musar), the root ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫ י‬describes disciplining, rebuking, warning, teaching and suffering.7 Michael Fox, in his commentary on the Book of Proverbs, dedicates a short section to describing the meaning of musar along with several other major wisdom terms.8 He suggests that: The core notion conveyed by musar is the teaching of the avoidance of faults. In line with its root-meaning, y-s-r ‘punish,’ ‘inflict,’ musar is originally, and usually, a lesson intended to correct a moral fault. The goal of musar is always (except for the ironic use in Prov 16:22b) a moral insight or a quality of moral character.9 Musar, at least in Proverbs, is always framed authoritatively from a superior to an inferior party and it can manifest itself in both verbal and physical forms.10 In addition, musar can also refer to a warning prior to an inappropriate action and in several instances is nearly conflated with the core theme of wisdom 5  The instances where ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫( י‬in the hiphil) denotes rebuke far exceed the few occasions when Proverbs uses this verb in a judicial sense. 6  “… musar is frequently parallel to or conjoined with tokaḥat ‘chastisement’ and synonyms (3:11, 5:12, 6:23; and often)” (Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 34). 7  BDB, 415–16; DCH, 4:239–40; HALOT, 2:418–19, 557. 8  Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 34–35. An earlier version of his discussion of wisdom terms (Ibid., 28– 38) appeared as an article in 1993 (Fox, “Words for Wisdom”). However, in that prior version Fox did not address the term musar, apparently deciding to include it only in his later expanded commentary. 9  Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 34. 10  Fox brings Job 5:17 as an example of what he sees to be a clear case of physical discipline (Ibid., 34). See Pope, Job, 44.

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(‫ )חכמה‬itself.11 Thus, even more than ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬, musar is a critical term for understanding the central role of rebuke in Proverbs.12 The Book of Proverbs is an anthological collection of a wide variety of different wisdom sayings and traditions.13 Yet, despite its anthological nature, this work presents a fairly clear and consistent message about rebuke.14 Numerous verses explicitly extol the importance of rebuke and the value of pursuing it.15 Consequently, Proverbs asserts that the wise man welcomes and heeds rebuke while the fool or wicked person abhors and ignores it.16 As a result of this dichotomy, Prov. 9:7–8 encourages the wise individual to limit his rebuke to those who are also wise and will therefore listen – rather than bothering

11  Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 35. Musar can refer to “the entire process of attaining wisdom” or to “the substance of the teaching conveyed by correction” (Ibid., 35). The term thus carries quite a wide spectrum of meanings in Proverbs from content to process and from rebuke to wisdom itself. 12  This may also be seen from the fact that the root ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫ י‬appears several times within the first few verses of the Book of Proverbs as a whole while the first appearance of ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬only occurs in the 23rd verse of this opening chapter. While ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬and ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫ י‬are the two primary roots for rebuke in Proverbs, there are also a few instances of the root ‫ר‬.‫ע‬.‫ג‬, the semantic range of which includes shouting, rebuking, and growling and in a few rare cases the root ‫ד‬.‫ס‬.‫ ח‬can mean “reproach” or “shame” (Macintosh, “A Consideration of Hebrew g’r,” 471–73; Reif, “A Note on g’r”; BDB, 340, s.v. ‫ ָח ַסד‬II and ‫ ֶח ֶסד‬II; DCH, 3:277, s.v. ‫ חסד‬II, 281, s.v. ‫ ֶח ֶסד‬II; HALOT, 1:336, s.v. ‫ חסד‬I and ‫ ֶח ֶסד‬I). However, neither ‫ר‬.‫ע‬.‫ ג‬nor ‫ד‬.‫ס‬.‫ ח‬provides significant evidence for the present study; see, Goldstone, “Remove the Beam from Your Own Eye!,” 128–29. 13  “The book by its own testimony is a collection of sayings from an indefinite number of sages (see 24:23) over a number of generations” (Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 6). 14  It is difficult to disentangle discussions of “rebuke” and “discipline” in Proverbs, particularly with regard to the word ‫מּוסר‬ ַ . Indeed, in Prov. 6:23 the two may be intertwined in the form ‫מּוסר‬ ָ ‫ּתֹוכחֹות‬ ְ (lit. “reproofs of discipline”). Yet, even the meaning of “discipline” is directly relevant to our discussion insofar as it constitutes content, or a method, for steering a (potentially) erring individual away from an improper path. 15  See Prov. 1:8, 23, 3:11, 4:1, 13, 6:23, 8:33, 10:8, 10:17, 13:18, 15:31–32, 19:20, 23:12, 23, 27:5, and 29:15. Of these verses, four mention only the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬, eight use only the term ‫מּוסר‬ ַ , and the other five verses employ both roots. 16  See Prov. 1:7, 12:1, 13:1, 15:5, 10, 12, and 25:12. Similarly, Prov. 13:8 asserts that the poor do not heed reproof (‫)וְ ָרׁש לֹא ָׁש ַמע ּגְ ָע ָרה‬. However, this latter case does not fit well with the first hemistich of the verse which states that “riches are a ransom for a man’s life.” Some therefore suggest that this portion of the verse was erroneously copied from 13:1b. However, Fox concludes that none of the medieval or scholarly interpretations satisfactorily explain the version as it currently stands (Fox, Proverbs 10–31, 563–64). We also find that Wisdom itself rebukes people, strengthening the association between wisdom and rebuke, where rebuke serves as a means of encouraging someone to strive for wisdom (see, for example, Prov. 1:20–23).

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to chastise the foolish.17 Similarly, Prov. 19:25’s recommendation to “Beat the scoffer and the simple will become clever; reprove an intelligent man and he gains knowledge” (‫הֹוכ ַיח ְלנָ בֹון ִיָבין ָּד ַעת‬ ִ ְ‫ּופ ִתי יַ ְע ִרם ו‬ ֶ ‫) ֵלץ ַּת ֶּכה‬, suggests that rebuke (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ )י‬is efficacious for the wise but is not strong enough for the scoffer who requires a physical beating (‫ה‬.‫כ‬.‫)נ‬.18 In addition to targeting those who are already wise, several verses recommend that one should actively discipline children in order to inculcate them with wisdom.19 In these instances however, the root ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫ י‬is always employed, rather than ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬, perhaps signaling the more physical side of disciplinary punishment rather than simple words of rebuke.20 The overall impression that one gains from these trends is that Proverbs programmatically identifies rebuke and discipline as beneficial for the wise and their children but ineffective for the foolish and those who do not pursue the path of wisdom.21 17  Many scholars believe that the larger section that contains Prov. 9:7–8 (Prov. 7–10) is a later addition to the text (Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 306–7). Fox notes that Sa’adia Gaon interprets 9:7 to mean that only sometimes a rebuker will be abused by rebuking a wicked person, since it is possible to rebuke in such a way as to elicit the desired response. However, Fox himself believes the verse to imply that, “scorners and sinners reject chastisement, however delivered” (Ibid., 307). 18  While the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬can imply a physical rebuke, the juxtaposition here with the root ‫ה‬.‫כ‬.‫נ‬, which specifically denotes striking or hitting, suggests that ‫הֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ in this context refers specifically to verbal rebuke. On the term “scoffer” (‫ ) ֵלץ‬whom one should strike, see Fox, “Words for Folly,” 7–8; Fox, Proverbs 1–9, 42. Like the scoffer, Prov. 29:19 suggests that a slave cannot be disciplined by mere words. When seen in conjunction with the line in Prov. 13:8 that the poor person does not heed rebuke, these two verses imply that the lower classes of society (slaves and the poor) will not properly accept rebuke and should thus be categorized along with the scoffer or fool who similarly ignore or despise such moral correction. 19  See Prov. 13:24, 19:18, 19:27, 22:15, 23:13, and 29:17. 20  In addition to these major themes, there are also a number of other verses that mention rebuke/discipline in other ways; for example, Wisdom gets angry at those who ignore her rebuke (1:25 and 30), God rebukes those whom God loves (3:12), and fear of God is the discipline of wisdom (15:33). 21  The one major outlier from my generalization may be Prov. 29:1, which, according to the NJPS translation, suggests that too much rebuke is detrimental: “One oft reproved may become stiffnecked, but he will be suddenly broken beyond repair” (‫ּתֹוכחֹות ַמ ְק ֶׁשה‬ ָ ‫ִאיׁש‬ ‫)ע ֶֹרף ֶּפ ַתע יִ ָּׁש ֵבר וְ ֵאין ַמ ְר ֵּפא‬. However, Fox reads the verse in line with the trends delineated above: “A man often rebuked, who stiffens his neck, will suddenly be broken, beyond remedy” (Fox, Proverbs 10–31, 833). The NJPS translation implies that ‫ ַמ ְק ֶׁשה ע ֶֹרף‬is an unintended result of over-rebuke, and consequently a warning to would be rebukers. Contrastingly, Fox understands the phrase to be a warning to the man who is rebuked but refuses to listen that this will lead to negative consequences in the future: “A man who rebuffs criticism may persist in his stubbornness for some time, but punishment will befall him when he least expects it” (Ibid., 833). This line of interpretation is also adopted

Slanderous Speech: Reading Lev. 19:17 in Light of Lev. 19:16

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Proverbs regularly emphasizes the value of rebuke for the wise. However, in one important instance several verses juxtapose the value of reproof with the danger of excess speech and particularly slander. Prov. 10:17–18 employs two terms for rebuke (‫מּוסר‬ ָ and ‫ּתֹוכ ַחת‬ ַ ) combined with references to hatred (‫ ) ִׂשנְ ָאה‬and slander (‫מֹוצא ִד ָּבה‬ ִ ): “He who follows discipline shows the way to life, but he who ignores reproof leads astray. He who conceals hatred has lying lips, while he who speaks forth slander is a dullard.”22 The references to hatred and rebuke recall Lev. 19:17, while the connection to slander invokes for us Lev. 19:16.23 Prov. 10:17–18 brings the themes of these two verses together, aligning both hatred and rebuke with slander. If rebuke was one possible negative expression of hatred, the juxtaposition between these two verses in Proverbs suggests that slander is another manifestation of animosity. Rebuke and slander thus stand in parallel as alternative verbalizations of hatred. Already in Leviticus the juxtaposition between Lev. 19:16 and 19:17 hinted at a tension between rebuke and gossip. In Prov. 10:17–18 the clash between these two practices begins to emerge more clearly. Indeed, the subsequent verse in Proverbs (10:19) elaborates upon the dangers of uncontrolled speech: “Where there is much talking, there is no lack of transgressing, but he who curbs his tongue shows sense.” Proverbs 10:18 specifically focuses on one form of bad speech, namely slander. Proverbs 10:19 expands upon this idea by noting how all uncontrolled speech is detrimental and the ideal is to control one’s tongue. Reading these two verses together with Prov. 10:17 creates a friction between the detriments of too much or slanderous speech and the importance of speech in the form of reproof. However, it is important to point out that Prov. 10:17 specifically refers to heeding rebuke rather than administering it. In contrast to the general thrust of Proverbs, which actively endorses giving and receiving rebuke, these verses in chapter 10 give the impression that while rebuke is important to receive, one should be wary when engaging in this type of speech as it bears an affinity to slander and uncontrolled speech. by other scholars (Longman, Proverbs, 499–501; Murphy, Proverbs, 218–20; Scott, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, 168; Hurovitz, Proverbs, 542–43). 22  On these verses, see, Fox, Proverbs 10–31, 520–21. 23  Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 46; Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 217–18. Similarly, we might note Prov. 26:24–25, which also mentions hatred and speech, as well as Prov. 25:9–10, which discusses slander (see Ibid., 217–18; Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 45–47). It is of course possible that the material in these verses actually predates the composition of the Book of Leviticus. Regardless of the dating of these two works however, we can relate them with respect to their juxtaposition of the themes of rebuke and slander in order to better understand a broader concern about rebuke as detrimental speech.

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Proverbs chapter 10 begins to expand upon the tension between rebuke and problematic speech already noted in Leviticus 19. Juxtaposing a statement about the importance of heeding rebuke and the dangers of uncontrolled speech and slander, Prov. 10:17–19 subtly alludes to possible dangers involved in rebuking someone. While these verses recommend accepting rebuke, their focus on avoiding detrimental types of speech raises the possibility that rebuke itself may fall into this category. 2

Rebuke in Ben Sira

The Book of Proverbs endorses rebuke but qualifies this affirmation by suggesting a possible tension between rebuke and slander. The Book of Ben Sira likewise generally approves of rebuke with one passage in particular bringing rebuke and gossip into dialogue. However, rather than hinting at a potential blurring of the line between rebuke and problematic speech, Ben Sira engages in the question of reproof as a response to a possible slanderous accusation. The Book of Ben Sira was originally composed in Hebrew and later translated by the author’s grandson into Greek. While we possess the complete Greek text,24 our extant manuscripts of the Hebrew version remain incomplete.25 We observed above that the two most prominent Hebrew roots associated with rebuke in the Book of Proverbs are ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬and ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫( י‬generally in the nominal form ‫מּוסר‬ ָ ). The Septuagint version of Proverbs regularly translates the former using the lemma ἐλέγχω and the latter with the verb παιδεύω and the noun παιδεία.26 Similarly, in Ben Sira we find that these lemmata are the most com24  The Greek text of Ben Sira appears in two recensions, generally labelled “GI” and “GII.” The former is typically viewed as the “original” translation mentioned in the prologue while the latter constitutes an expanded version that may be partially translated from the Hebrew (rather than simply augmenting GI; Coggins, Sirach, 37). 25  For various versions of the Hebrew text, see Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem; Ben-Ḥayyim, The Book of Ben Sira; Beentjes, The Book of Ben Sira in Hebrew; Schechter, Taylor, and Singer, The Wisdom of Ben Sira. On different approaches to, and the challenges involved in, the Hebrew text, see Beentjes, “Reading the Hebrew Ben Sira Manuscripts Synoptically”; Beentjes, “Reconstructions and Retroversions.” For additional information on the provenance and extant forms of the Book of Ben Sira, see Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, Introduction; Gilbert, “Wisdom Literature,” 290–301; Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, chap. 2. 26  Note that while the original portion of the Septuagint to be translated was the Pentateuch, subsequently the rest of the Hebrew Bible was also translated into Greek and considered a part of the Septuagint corpus (see Greenspoon, “Septuagint”). While these are the regular lemmata used, there are some exceptions to this trend. In Prov. 3:12 ‫יֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ is actually translated as παιδεύει (the preferred term for ‫מּוסר‬ ַ ). In addition, LXX Prov. 15:5 appears to

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71

mon equivalents of ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬and ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫ י‬as they appear in the Hebrew manuscripts.27 In addition to these two frequent lemmata, the Greek lemma ὀνειδίζω can also sometimes denote rebuke.28 Surveying the appearances of rebuke terms in Ben Sira, we find that some verses offer a similar picture to that which we saw in Proverbs.29 Sir. 20:2 extols the virtue of rebuke by proclaiming: “How much better it is to rebuke (ἐλέγξαι) than to fume (θυμοῦσθαι)!” Similarly, several verses laud the one who recognizes and accepts proper discipline (παιδείαν).30 Moreover, Sir. 21:6 describes the one who hates reproof as walking in sinner’s steps (μισῶν ἐλεγμὸν ἐν ἴχνει ἁμαρτωλοῦ).31 Yet, if in the Book of Proverbs rebuke was generally reserved for the wise and not the foolish, in Ben Sira we encounter a more nuanced

translate ‫ּתֹוכ ַחת‬ ַ as ἐντολάς (“commandments”) and LXX Prov. 25:12 has δέδεται λόγος for ‫מֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ . Also note Prov. 10:17 which uses the form ἀνεξέλεγκτος. ‫מּוסר‬ ַ in Prov. 1:3 is rendered as στροφὰς λόγων νοῆσαί (“turning of words to understand”) and Prov. 13:1 uses ὑπήκοος (“obedient”) instead of ‫מּוסר‬ ַ (in a different type of syntactic construction). Aside from these few exceptions, LXX is fairly consistent. However, we should also note that the Greek lemma παιδεύω is not exclusively used to translate ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫י‬, as it appears in Prov. 3:12 for ‫יֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ , 5:13 for ‫מֹורי‬ ָ , and 25:1 for ‫ ִמ ְׁש ֵלי‬. Similarly, the lemma ἐλέγχω is not limited to translating ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫( י‬see Prov. 10:10 and 18:17). On the semantic range of these lemmata, see BDAG, s.v. ἐλέγχω, s.v. παιδεία, s.v. παιδεύω esp. 2; LSJ, s.v. ἐλέγχω, s.v. παιδεία esp. 7; GELS s.v. ἐλέγχω, s.v. παιδεία. 27  Yet, once again we find that these Greek lemmata are used for more than just the aforementioned Hebrew roots. For παιδεύω denoting ideas other ‫מּוסר‬ ַ , see, for example, Sir. 6:32, 31:19, and 37:23. ‫מּוסר‬ ַ is also translated as σοφία in Sir. 6:22, emphasizing the tie between discipline and wisdom noted above. Also see Di Lella, “Ben Sira’s Doctrine on the Discipline of the Tongue,” 240–41. 28  BDAG, s.v. ὀνειδίζω, s.v. ὀνειδισμός; LSJ s.v. ὀνειδ–είη; GELS s.v. ὀνειδίζω. For example, Prov. 25:10, discussed above, uses ‫ יְ ַח ֶּס ְדָך‬in the Hebrew, which is rendered as ὀνειδίσῃ in LXX. However, just as the rare usage of ‫ד‬.‫ס‬.‫ ח‬in Proverbs more likely means “shame” than “rebuke,” so too in LXX ὀνειδισμός more frequently appears to mean “disgrace,” “humiliation,” or a “bad reputation.” Thus, the lemma ὀνειδίζω regularly translates words such as ‫ֶח ְר ָּפה‬ in Hebrew Ben Sira, but never ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬or ‫ר‬.‫ס‬.‫י‬. In addition, in Ben Sira the lemma ὀνειδίζω is employed for translating ‫( קלון‬Sir. 5:15), ‫( תכלים‬Sir. 8:5, 22:20), and ‫( ינאץ‬Sir. 18:18, 20:15), supporting our understanding of ὀνειδίζω denoting “disgrace” rather than “rebuke.” 29  Similarly, Ben Sira raises the same issues as Proverbs with regard to the control of the tongue (Gregory, “Slips of the Tongue in the Speech Ethics of Ben Sira,” 324). 30  See, for example, Sir. 6:18, 18:14, 32:14 and 51:26. Some verses also speak particularly to disciplining one’s sons (Sir. 7:23, 30:1–2). In addition, Sir. 42:5 speaks of disciplining (‫מּוסר‬ ָ / παιδείας) children and striking (‫ ַהּכֹות‬/ αἱμάξαι) a servant (Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem, 280. However, most of this line is lacking in Beentjes, The Book of Ben Sira in Hebrew, 166). 31  Unfortunately, neither this verse, nor the one mentioned in the previous sentence, appear to have any Hebrew manuscript evidence. See the index list of verses in Beentjes, The Book of Ben Sira in Hebrew, 182.

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presentation that not only breaks down this divide, but also engages with guidelines for proper rebuke.32 Sir. 42:8 declares, “Do not be ashamed to correct (παιδείας/‫ )מוסר‬the stupid or foolish or the aged who are guilty of sexual immorality.”33 Unlike Proverbs, which largely regarded the disciplining of the foolish as futile, Ben Sira recommends such action.34 Furthermore, while Proverbs ostensibly prescribes a blanket approbation of rebuke for the wise, Ben Sira discriminates between proper and improper contexts: “There is a rebuke that is untimely (ἔστιν ἔλεγχος ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ὡραῖος), and there is the person who is wise enough to keep silent” (Sir. 20:1).35 Thus, for example, one should avoid rebuking their neighbor at a drinking party (ἐν συμποσίῳ οἴνου μὴ ἐλέγξῃς τὸν πλησίον; Sir 31:31). Finally, rather than speaking of rebuke against the wise, Ben Sira’s lengthiest discourse devoted to rebuke (Sir. 19:13–17) actually speaks of one’s friend (φίλον) and one’s neighbor (πλησίον) without explicitly specifying their intellectual ability. 3

Sir. 19:13–17 and its Relationship to Lev. 19:17

Sir. 19:13–17, preserved in both Greek and Syriac (although not in Hebrew), constitutes Ben Sira’s most extensive statement concerning rebuke. According to a number of scholars there is a strong connection between this passage and Lev. 19:17.36 Among them, James Kugel actually asserts that this section of Ben 32  In addition, Ben Sira introduces the element of a “slip of the tongue,” which also breaks down the dichotomy between sage and sinner. On this phenomenon, see Gregory, “Slips of the Tongue in the Speech Ethics of Ben Sira,” 324 ff. 33  The Hebrew for this verse reads, “‫על מוסר פותה וכסיל ושב וישיש ונוטל {ושואל} עצה‬ ‫בזנות‬,” according to MS B, and “‫]ב כושל ענה בזנות‬.[ ‫]ותה וכסיל‬..…[‫על מ‬,” according to the Masada Ben Sira Scroll. The latter is corrected to ‫ מרדות‬instead of ‫ מוסר‬based on a marginal reading (see Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem, 284; Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 479). Yigael Yadin believed ‫ מרדות‬to be the better reading as the lacuna in the Masada manuscript is too large for the word ‫( מוסר‬Yadin, The Ben Sira Scroll from Masada, 24). 34  It is possible that the correction of the stupid and foolish, like that of old men, is limited to “sexual immorality” (‫זנות‬/πορνείας). However, Patrick Skehan and Alexander Di Lella seem to interpret the “immorality” term as applying specifically to the “old people,” rather than distributing to the stupid and foolish as well (see Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 482). Also see Balla, Ben Sira on Family, Gender, and Sexuality, 144–45. 35  Segal translates this phrase as, “‫( ”יש תוכחת ואינה נאה‬Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem, 119). He notes that even though there is a commandment to rebuke (i.e., Lev. 19:17), in any event there are times when it is not good to rebuke and the one who remains silent is wise (Ibid., 120). 36  See Smend, Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach, 176; Schreiner, Jesus Sirach 1–24, 106; Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 289 and 294.

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Sira (or at least part of it) directly interprets Lev. 19:17.37 Based on Leviticus’ doubling of the verb ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬in the infinitive absolute plus imperfect, Kugel surmises that, “Ben Sira [specifically Sir. 19:13–14] deduced that the law actually envisaged two separate acts of reproval, one before any offense is committed, as a warning, and a second – should the first fail – to prevent any repetition.”38 Kugel goes on to provide further grounds for his position: [T]he fact that [Ben Sira] is in reality thinking of the Law of Reproach in Lev. 19:17 is announced both by his insistent use of the word “reproach” at the beginning of successive lines, along with the coupling of this verb with “neighbor” (as in Lev. 19:17) and the equivalent terms “friend” and “fellow,” as well as by his final invocation of the “Law of the Most High,” that is, the Pentateuch in which this law appears.39 The case for a strong link between Ben Sira and Leviticus presented by Kugel is challenged by Benjamin Wright III who addresses the “possible relationship” between Lev. 19:17 and Ben Sira, diffusing one of Kugel’s more tenuous connections.40 Wright surveys the larger literary context of Sir. 19:13–17 and argues that: “Kugel’s close mapping of Sir 19:13–14 onto Lev. 19:17 does not pan out, since the verse really does not enjoin two separate warnings, but rather two possible responses when confronting someone about rumors.”41 He goes on to question whether we can affirm that Ben Sira is actually interpreting Lev. 19:17 37  Already in his first discussion of the reception history of Lev. 19:17 Kugel claims that, “Here, to being with, is Ecclesiasticus (Ben Sira) in an elaboration upon this verse [Lev. 19:17]” (Kugel and Greer, Early Biblical Interpretation, 91). In his formal article devoted to the topic, he advances the argument that Sir. 19:13–17 is “an excursus on the commandment to reproach one’s friend/fellow/neighbor and an examination of the merits of reproach” (Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 48). Kugel extends this claim in his later work in which he explicitly employs the term “interpretation,” albeit it in scare quotes: “The earliest datable ‘interpretation’ of the Leviticus injunction to reproach one’s fellow and so forth is to be found in the book of Ben Sira” (Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 218). Even in the early 2000s Kugel maintained his position that this passage in Ben Sira clearly interprets the Levitical verse (see Kugel, Studies in Ancient Midrash, 21). 38  Kugel, Studies in Ancient Midrash, 21. The above cited claim is a more forceful version of his earlier thesis that the doubled verb “may have suggested to Ben Sira … two different sides of this commandment, investigating after the fact and reproving lest the offense be committed in the future” (Kugel and Greer, Early Biblical Interpretation, 91). 39  Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 219; Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 48. 40  Wright III, “Biblical Interpretation in the Book of Ben Sira,” 380–82. 41  Ibid., 381. Here Wright targets Kugel’s exegetical claim that Ben Sira interprets the doubling of the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬as motivation for two separate acts of reproof. Wright does not directly challenge Kugel’s other points about the similarities in language, but takes them into account when assessing whether or not we can prove Ben Sira’s conscious connection to Leviticus.

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at all. Admitting that Lev. 19:17 is the only instance in the Pentateuch where ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬is employed in a legal context, Wright also notes its frequency in Proverbs (from which Ben Sira commonly draws) and the fact that Ben Sira does not address the infamous commandment of neighborly love in Lev. 19:18. Yet, Ben Sira does refer to the “Law of the Most High,” leading Wright to “suspect that he had some particular injunction in mind.”42 Ultimately, Wright hedges that: Given the nature of the development of the biblical text, the way the role of the scribe/sage was developing in this period, and Ben Sira’s individual agendas, I am not sanguine about making general statements concerning Ben Sira’s use of biblical material and his interpretations of it.43 While Wright is skeptical about the connection between Sir. 19:13–17 and Lev. 19:17, Christopher Chandler wields the broader context as a tool for augmenting Kugel’s position. Chandler seeks to prove that Sir. 19:13–17 is not only tied to Lev. 19:17 in particular, but to the larger unit of Lev. 19:15–18 as well. He bases this expansion upon the theme of slander that appears both in Lev. 19:16 and the passage in Ben Sira that immediately precedes the present pericope (i.e., Sir. 19:5–12).44 Chandler strengthens Kugel’s connection to Lev. 19:17, asserting that: “Ben Sira advises the slanderer that the one who catches him – will hate (μισήσει) you (19:9), echoing the – you shall not hate (οὐ μισήσεις) command of Lev. 19:17.”45 He then goes beyond Kugel to conclude that: “Ben Sira is commenting upon Lev. 19:16 and 19:17 together.”46 Looking at the extant Greek and Syriac versions of Sir. 19:13–17, neither version preserves an unambiguous link back to Lev. 19:17.47 Yet, the collective evidence from both versions heightens the possibility that this passage should be read in light of the Levitical rebuke command.48 42  Ibid., 382. 43  Wright III, 382. 44  Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 121–22. 45  Ibid., 122. 46  Ibid. 47  Segal reconstructs the Hebrew as follows (Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem, ‫)קיה‬: ‫ ואם עשה אשר לא יוסיף‬,‫ הוכח אוהב אשר לא יעשה‬13 ‫ ואם אמר אשר לא ישנה‬,‫ הוכח אוהב אשר לא יאמר‬14 ‫ ולכל דבר אל תאמן‬,‫ הוכח אוהב כי כמה הוא דבה‬15 ‫ ומי לא חטא בלשונו‬,‫ יש נתקל ולא מלבו‬16 ‫ ותן מקום לתורת עליון‬,‫לר ַע טרם תזעף‬ ֵ ‫ הוכח‬17 48  Rudolf Smend notes that a number of early scholars suspected that the Syriac version of Ben Sira was based on the original Hebrew text and that since the discovery of manuscripts of the Hebrew version, this suspicion has been confirmed (Smend, Die Weisheit des

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English ( from Greek)49

English ( from Syriac)50

13 Question (ἔλεγξον)51 a friend (φίλον); perhaps he did not do it; or if he did, so that he may not do it again.

13 Rebuke (‫)ܐܟܣ‬52 your friend (‫ )ܪܚܡܟ‬so that he does not do that which is evil, and if he did, so that he does not again.

Jesus Sirach, cxxxvi). Similarly, Segal affirms that this supposition is the undeniable scholarly consensus (Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem, 59). However, Otto Eissfeldt qualifies that the Syriac translation is “occasionally dependent upon [the Greek text]” (Eissfeldt, The Old Testament, 599; Nelson, The Syriac Version of the Wisdom of Ben Sira, 131). However, Michael Winter notes that in some places we find that, “the Syriac version frequently offers a different wording (and meaning) in those parts of the book which are preserved in common with the Hebrew or Greek” (Winter, “The Origins of Ben Sira in Syriac,” 237). Milward Nelson, in his dissertation on the Syriac version of Ben Sira (which unfortunately only covers Sir. 39:27–44:19) notes that the Syriac translation omits a significant amount of material shared by the Hebrew and Greek versions (about 200 lines) and adds more than forty lines not present in the Hebrew or Greek (Nelson, The Syriac Version of the Wisdom of Ben Sira, 113). In describing differences between the Syriac and other versions, Nelson’s choice of language reveals his assumption that the Syriac version was actively changed from the Hebrew and Greek, rather than regularly preserving a more accurate depiction of the former (see Ibid., 132). For these reasons, I introduce the Syriac translation in the discussion here to ascertain whether the translation may support a reference to Lev. 19:17 but I will focus on the Greek version of the text in the subsequent section, which engages with the inner workings of the passage within its literary context. 49  The Greek text is based on Rahlfs and Hanhart, Septuaginta. Translation follows the NRSV except for the final line which diverges from the NRSV translation in order to emphasize a more literal rendition of the Greek. 50  The Syriac text is based on Vattioni, Ecclesiastico, 97; Lagarde, Libri Veteris Testamenti apocryphi syriace, 19. On the extant manuscripts of the Syriac version, see Nelson, The Syriac Version of the Wisdom of Ben Sira, chap. 2. Translation is my own; thanks to Adam Becker for his helpful suggestions. 51  A number of English translations render ἔλεγξον as “question” (see The Common English Bible, the New Jerusalem Bible, and the NRSV, for example). However, other versions translate this term as “admonish” (for instance, the King James Version, Brenton’s Septuagint with Apocrypha and the New American Bible). The Latin translation renders ἔλεγξον as corripe, the singular imperative of corripio, literally meaning “to seize” and figuratively meaning to “reproach, reprove, chide, blame,” (Vattioni, Ecclesiastico, 96–98; Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, 473–74 s.v. cor–rĭpĭo (conr–)). Note that Jerome did not translate Ben Sira for the original Vulgate, “so the present form of the book to be found in the Vulgate is essentially the Old Latin” (Coggins, Sirach, 37). 52  This is the aphel form of the root ‫ ܟܣܣ‬meaning “admonish” or “reproach.” See Sokoloff and Brockelmann, A Syriac Lexicon, 640–41 s.v. 2#‫ܟܣܣ‬.

76 14 Question (ἔλεγξον) a neighbor (πλησίον);53 perhaps he did not say it (μήποτε οὐκ ἐποίησεν); or if he said it, so that he may not repeat it (μὴ δευτερώσῃ). 15 Question (ἔλεγξον) a friend (φίλον), for often it is slander (διαβολή); so do not believe everything you hear. 16 A person may make a slip (ὀλισθάνων)54 without intending it. Who has not sinned with his tongue? 17 Question (ἔλεγξον) your neighbor (πλησίον) before you threaten him; and give place to the Law of the Most High (δὸς τόπον νόμῳ ὑψίστου).

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14 Rebuke (‫ )ܐܟܣ‬your neighbor (‫ )ܩܪܝܒܟ‬so that he does not speak [evil], and if he spoke, so that he does not repeat. 15 Rebuke (‫ )ܐܟܣ‬your friend because sometimes it is baseless slander (‫)ܡܐܟܠ ܩܪܨܐ‬55 and you should not believe every word. 16 For there is one who sins not from his heart and there is one who stumbles not with his tongue. 17 Rebuke (‫ )ܐܟܣ‬an evil person who has slandered many and do not believe every word.

According to verses 13 and 14 in the Syriac, the force of one’s admonishment is primarily future oriented – one should admonish someone not to act/speak and if they already have, so that they should not again. In the Greek, the latter idea of preemptively cutting off future repetition is the same, but the beginning of verses 13 and 14 both point back toward a past offense that may or may not have occurred.56 The Greek version revolves around the issue of determining the facts – whether or not the supposed offender actually did something problematic. By contrast, verses 13–14 in the Syriac have no stake 53  Some witnesses preserve φίλον (like verse 13) instead of πλησίον (Ziegler, Sapientia Iesu filii Sirach, 12:2:213). 54  Some witnesses add λόγῳ or λόγον, emphasizing that this is a slip (ὀλισθάνων) of the tongue. 55  The phrase ‫ ܡܐܟܠ ܩܪܨܐ ܣܪܝܩܐ‬seems to translate the Greek διαβολή (Smend, Griechisch-syrisch-hebräischer Index zur Weisheit des Jesus Sirach, 47). Sokoloff translates the phrase as “accusation, slander” (followed here) and notes the Greek κατηγορημένα (Sokoloff and Brockelmann, A Syriac Lexicon, 701 s.v. ‫)ܡܐܟܠ ܩܪܨܐ‬. It is interesting to note that κατηγορημένα from κατηγορέω (meaning to “speak against”) often implies before judges and carries a similar judicial valence as ‫( הוכיח‬see LSJ, 926 s.v. κατηγορ–έω). 56  The term μήποτε in Sir. 19:13–14 is best translated as “lest” or “perhaps,” indicating uncertainty as to whether or not the target of the rebuke actually performed the action or not (see LSJ, 1129 s.v. μήποτε 3; Moulton and Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament, 408 s.v. μή II and 410 s.v. μήποτε). As A. T. Robertson notes, “μή ποτε loses the notion of time in ποτε and has rather the idea of contingency, ‘but perchance’ rather than ‘lest at any time’ ” (Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, 988).

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in ascertaining the truth about the past, instead this version only addresses the cases where a problematic action definitively was or was not performed.57 Although Kugel formally engages with the Greek version, his assessment of the dual “reprovals” more closely aligns with the Syriac text.58 Wright’s challenge to Kugel emerges from the situation addressed in the Greek version. Thus, one might be inclined to suggest that the Syriac version evinces a stronger connection to Leviticus. However, a second, more pivotal variance between the Greek and Syriac suggests otherwise. Verse 17 in the Greek ends with a reference to what appears to be the Pentateuch, a key piece of evidence linking the passage to Leviticus: “give place to the Law of the Most High” (δὸς τόπον νόμῳ ὑψίστου).59 In the Syriac this reference is completely absent. Instead, verse 17 ends by reiterating the end of verse 15, which warns against believing everything that one hears.60 In this case, Kugel, Chandler, and Wright all focus in on the Greek text, ignoring the Syriac variation. Overall, neither the Greek nor the Syriac version agrees closely with Lev. 19:17. The Syriac translation’s possible exegetical tie to Leviticus may support Kugel’s claim, despite the fact that there is no explicit mention of the biblical commandment. As far as the Greek version is concerned, there appears to be a direct reference to the Pentateuch, but the scenario of establishing the truth about rumors only indirectly points to Lev. 19:17. Although neither of these two versions on their own constitutes decisive evidence for a connection to Lev. 19:17, the collective evidence that they present creates a strong link to Leviticus. Particularly with regard to the question of how Lev. 19:16 informs the interpretation of Lev. 19:17, Chandler’s persuasive claim that Ben Sira here relates to the larger unit of Lev. 19:15–18 encourages reading Lev. 19:16–17 and Sir. 19:13–17 in tandem as both grappling with the challenge presented by gossip.

57  Verses 15–17, however, shift to the issue of believing rumors, the topic that we find pervading the entire Greek version of this section. 58  The Syriac version refers to a “warning” to prevent a future act as well as an admonition not to repeat an already concluded act. To reiterate Kugel’s words from above: “one before any offense is committed, as a warning, and a second – should the first fail – to prevent any repetition” (Kugel, Studies in Ancient Midrash, 21). 59  The Hebrew word ‫ תורה‬in Ben Sira is regularly translated as νόμος, however, the latter term does not always mean ‫( תורה‬Schnabel, Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul, 31 and 37). Eckhard Schnabel, in his discussion of Ben Sira’s law-related terminology, includes this passage in his general list of instances where the law is invoked in order to establish “the Torah as the ‘vanishing point’ of the activity of the sage” (Ibid., 30). 60  Menahem Kister goes so far as to suggest that we simply do not have a Syriac translation of verse 17 since verse 17 in the Syriac is actually an alternative translation of verse 15 (Kister, “Divorce, Reproof, and Other Sayings in The Synoptic Gospels,” 213n63).

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Sir. 19:13–17 and its Literary Context

Unlike the pithy endorsements of rebuke scattered throughout the Book of Ben Sira, Sir. 19:13–17 devotes itself to the questions of ascertaining the veracity of gossip – it is uncertain whether a problematic act ever took place – and a person’s obligation to rebuke.61 Only if one discovers an offense is rebuke actually warranted. The potential rebuker is thus encouraged to tread carefully, addressing the suspected offender with an awareness that perhaps he was misinformed (v. 15).62 By engaging with rebuke through the lens of verifying gossip rather than on its own terms, Ben Sira intertwines conflicting directives: actively rebuke, but cautiously assess the situation before proceeding.63 This wavering between an imperative (ἔλεγξον) and uncertainty (μήποτε οὐκ ἐποίησεν) leaves the audience in a precarious position of needing to confront their fellow, but uncertain as to whether the encounter will backfire. The friction between these two impulses of imperative and hesitancy intensifies in verses 15–17 in which one is reminded that slander is rampant and they should not believe everything they hear but also that they must make way for the Law of the Most High (δὸς τόπον νόμῳ ὑψίστου).64 Assuming that the latter refers to Lev. 19:17, then there is a direct clash between the biblical obligation to rebuke and the sagacious advice to proceed with caution, at least when one is uncertain about whether or not the other party actually transgressed. The larger literary context further augments the tension between the need to rebuke and the value of remaining silent. Sir. 19:13–17 follows a section that treats the evils involved in gossip and appears shortly before a meditation 61  Duling, “Matthew 18:15–17,” 12. This is entirely true of the Greek version, and, as noted above, relevant to the latter half of the Syriac translation. The first two verses of the Syriac, however, deal directly with the topic of rebuke. As noted above, the Greek text may reflect a more accurate representation of the original Hebrew and thus the analysis in this section revolves around this version. 62  While Sir. 19:16 may refer to an accidental verbal offense by the friend or neighbor (Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 293), it is also possible that this reference to a slip of the tongue actually intends the one who spread the gossip in the first place – in which case the rebuker is reminded that this act may have been accidental. However, see Bradley Gregory’s discussion of these possibilities (Gregory, “Slips of the Tongue in the Speech Ethics of Ben Sira,” 331–32). 63  As noted, some translate ἔλεγξον as “question” rather than “rebuke” and the lemma certainly carries both meanings. In fact, both senses of the word may be in play in this section where the audience must question the accused offender to ascertain the truth of the gossip and, if accurate, he should then rebuke the offender. 64  Again, this tension is far less acute in the Syriac, which lacks both the element of uncertainty in verses 13–14 as well as the reference to the Law in verse 17.

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on the value of silence and appropriate speech.65 Poised between these two speech-oriented discussions, Sir. 19:13–17 addresses the particular case of responding to gossip concerning a friend or neighbor that, if true, would require rebuking them for their misdeed. Strikingly, despite the surrounding emphasis on the danger of telling or listening to gossip and the importance of silence, the audience is nevertheless encouraged to confront the friend or neighbor based upon the rumor.66 Such promotion of rebuke in the case of uncertainty appears to stand in contrast to Sir. 20:1 mentioned above: “There is a rebuke that is untimely (ἔστιν ἔλεγχος ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ὡραῖος), and there is the person who is wise enough to keep silent.”67 The cautious encouragement offered in Sir. 19:13–17 indicates that rebuke trumps these other paramount values of avoiding gossip and keeping silent but that the normal recommendation for verbal caution should still guide such confrontation. In the section preceding Sir. 19:13–17, Sir. 19:8 directs the one who hears gossip not to convey this to friend or enemy “unless withholding it would be sinful for you” (καὶ εἰ μή ἐστίν σοι ἁμαρτία).68 While some believe this is a reference to a witness withholding evidence (Lev. 5:1), it can also be understood in light of the Greek version of Lev. 19:17 and Sir. 19:13–17.69 There are a few linguistic links between Sir. 19:8 and its immediately surrounding verses on the one hand, and 65  Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 292–93, 300–301. Schnabel labels Sir. 19:4–17 as a section “on how to handle malicious gossip,” with Sir. 19:14–17 particularly focused on rebuke (Schnabel, Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul, 46). While the section dealing with the value of silence (Sir. 20:1–8) does not directly follow our passage, it begins by using the key terms ἔλεγχος and ἐλέγξαι in Sir. 20:1–2, suggesting that it is picking up on and continuing the theme of rebuke from Sir. 19:13–17. 66  Sir. 19:7 declares that one should never repeat gossip (μηδέποτε δευτερώσῃς λόγον), which potentially even applies to repeating gossip to the person who is being slandered. 67  Skehan and Di Lella note the ambiguous role of rebuke within the context of the need for keeping silent: “The next poem (20:1–8) gives wise comments and observations on the value of silence and of appropriate speech. Though admonitions may be called for in certain circumstances (cf., for example, the cases discussed in 19:13–17), there are other occasions when ‘an admonition can be untimely’ (lit., not in season) (v 1a). Under such circumstances, the wise will keep silent (v 1b)” (Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 300). 68  For manuscript variants of this verse see Ziegler, Sapientia Iesu filii Sirach, 12:2:212; Kieweler, “Freundschaft und böse Nachrede,” 70–71. There appear to be no extant Hebrew manuscripts of this verse (see the index in Beentjes, The Book of Ben Sira in Hebrew, 182). 69  Segal, Skehan and Di Lella (followed by others) suggest that the case of inappropriate withholding of gossip may reference Lev. 5:1 and the case of withholding damaging testimony (Segal, Sefer Ben Sira ha-Shalem, 116; Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 289; Kieweler, “Freundschaft und böse Nachrede,” 71; Marböck, Jesus Sirach 1–23, 234). In this case, by not conveying the gossip one will “become an accomplice in another’s sin” (Skehan and Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira, 293). However, in light of Sir. 19:17, the sin

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Lev. 19:17 and Sir. 19:13–15 on the other. Sir. 19:8 uses the language of friend or foe (ἐν φίλῳ καὶ ἐχθρῷ) and Sir. 19:9 warns that one who hears gossip will come to hate you (μισήσει σε). The term “friend” (φίλῳ) parallels Sir. 19:13 and 19:15 (φίλον) while “hate” (μισήσει) in Sir. 19:9 recalls the prohibition against hatred (οὐ μισήσεις) in LXX Lev. 19:17.70 In addition, the verb δευτερόω (which only appears four times in Ben Sira) appears in both Sir. 19:7 and 19:14. In the former it refers to repeating gossip and in the latter it concerns rebuking someone to prevent them from repeating a problematic action. The repetition of these lemmata, combined with the immediate juxtaposition of the gossip (Sir. 19:5–12) and rebuke (Sir. 19:13–17) sections, strengthen the link between gossip and rebuke.71 Thus, perhaps when Sir. 19:8 speaks of a case where withholding gossip “would be sinful for you,” this refers to the case of rebuking (where Sir. 19:17 may be referencing Lev. 19:17 when it adjures one to confront the friend or neighbor based upon gossip in order to “give place to the Law of the Most High”).72 If so, then the entire unit of Sir. 19:5–17 grapples with the combined challenges of reacting to gossip and confronting the potential offender (the object of the gossip). In navigating the relationship between gossip and rebuke, the author of Ben Sira appears torn between the crucial role of rebuke and the necessity of caution when dealing with gossip. Beyond the particular area of gossip, the theme of caution pervades the Book of Ben Sira as a whole. As Jack Sanders argues: “Almost equally as notable as the equation of wisdom and Torah … is Ben Sira’s development of the cautious aspect of wisdom, of the sage as the cautious

involved may not be that which was done by the party on trial, but actually the sin of the potential rebuker refraining from rebuking and thereby violating Lev. 19:17. 70  As mentioned above, Chandler also sees a link between Sir. 19:9 and Lev. 19:17 (Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 122). He connects the passage following Sir. 19:13–17 to Lev. 19 as well: “Just after this section on reproof (Sir. 19:13–17), however, there are certain allusions to the just judging of Lev. 19:15–18” (Ibid., 122). Similarly, Chandler believes that the subsequent chapter of Ben Sira “continues this wisdom midrash upon Lev. 19:15–18” (Ibid.). If Chandler is correct in mapping this section of Ben Sira onto Lev. 19:15–18, then it becomes more likely that Sir. 19:8 was originally intended to be in dialogue with this passage as well: “it is better to speak of at least Sir. 19:5–20:4 as reflecting Lev. 19:15–17, rather than merely Sir.19:13–17 reflecting Lev. 19:17” (Ibid., 122–23). 71  In addition, we can reiterate Chandler’s claim that both Lev. 19:16 and Sir. 19:5–12 address the slanderer and that in this larger unit Ben Sira is commenting upon Lev. 19:16–17 (Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 121–22). 72  However, we should note that the Syriac preserves the word “sins” (in the plural) indicating that perhaps the sin involved is more general rather than referring to a particular violation (Vattioni, Ecclesiastico, 97; Lagarde, Libri Veteris Testamenti apocryphi syriace, 19).

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man.”73 While many seek to identify Ben Sira’s primary interest as the “good life,” Sanders illustrates how attention to Ben Sira’s emphasis on caution expands this depiction to recognize the pivotal goals of attaining and retaining a “good name” and avoiding shame, which themselves are bound up with the keeping of the commandments.74 This broader framework helps to clarify Ben Sira’s decision to treat rebuke and gossip together from a cautionary perspective. While Ben Sira independently promotes the implementation of rebuke and the importance of guarding one’s tongue, the recognition that these two sagacious behaviors can clash provokes his most extensive treatment in which he encourages both – cautiously.75 The evidence thus far reveals a development from the Book of Proverbs to Ben Sira. The former consistently recommends rebuke for the wise while suggesting that it is unsuitable for the foolish. Although this trope is continued in Ben Sira, this later work engages in a more nuanced treatment that allows for the possibility of productively rebuking the foolish in addition to the recognition that there are inappropriate contexts for rebuke. Both Proverbs (Prov. 10:17–18) and Ben Sira (19:13–17) also bring rebuke into dialogue with the value of silence – particularly of avoiding gossip or slander. While Proverbs encourages the audience to accept rebuke and avoid slander Ben Sira tackles the inverse scenario where the audience is encouraged to give rebuke even in the case of potential gossip. By recommending caution and locating rebuke at a point of ambiguity between the obligatory and the forbidden, Ben Sira heightens the anxiety and danger surrounding rebuke that appeared in a more latent state in Leviticus.

73  Sanders, “Ben Sira’s Ethics of Caution,” 76. Sanders proceeds primarily based upon Ben Sira’s use of key roots such as ‫ד‬.‫ח‬.‫ פ‬,‫ר‬.‫מ‬.‫ש‬, and ‫ר‬.‫ה‬.‫ז‬. For our purposes it is relevant to highlight Sir. 37:31 in which Ben Sira seems to identify a lack of ‫מּוסר‬ ָ as the antithesis of caution (Ibid., 78). 74  Sanders, “Ben Sira’s Ethics of Caution,” 79–86, 91–94. 75  In general, Ben Sira’s treatment of guarding one’s tongue is couched in cautionary language (Di Lella, “Ben Sira’s Doctrine on the Discipline of the Tongue,” 250; Hultin, “Watch Your Mouth,” 149–158; Hultin, The Ethics of Obscene Speech, 120–28). However, except for Sir. 19:5–20:8, rebuke is regularly encouraged without the same degree of caution that we find accompanying other discussions of speech ethics. It is only in the context of this extended discussion of rebuke where the carefulness associated with speech in general confronts the particular case of rebuke.

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Rebuke in the Testament of Gad

The final relevant work of ethical exhortation that appears to draw upon the Levitical juxtaposition between rebuke and gossip is the Testament of Gad (tGad). Although originally the product of the Second Temple period, this text as well as the other Testaments of the Patriarchs were considerably reworked by later Christian hands making it almost impossible to separate and date constituent elements.76 As one of the Testaments of the Patriarchs, this work integrates a number of different genres including “wisdom” and “apocalypse,” as well as prescriptive maxims and narrative material.77 However, despite this variety, it is related to the Books of Proverbs and Ben Sira insofar as it offers moral advice to its intended audience. As John Collins describes the Testaments more broadly, “The area of affinity between these testaments and the wisdom literature is obviously the ethical exhortation.”78 Proverbs, Ben Sira, and the Testament of Gad are thus all invested in offering guidance for proper praxis. As we have seen, when it comes to the issue of rebuke, both Proverbs and Ben Sira discuss this activity with respect to slander and gossip. Similarly, tGad engages in the relationship between rebuke and slander, albeit from yet another perspective. TGad is interested in differentiating rebuke from slander and in highlighting the moral dimensions of the former. The very first chapter of this text contains an allusion to the Levitical rebuke command when Gad was supposedly angry at Joseph: “And the Spirit of hatred was inside me, and I did not want to see Joseph, neither with my ears nor with my eyes; for he had [not] reproved us to our faces, [saying] that except for Judah we were [all] eating the sheep; [rather] everything he told to [our] father, he believed” (tGad 1:9).79 Gad’s recognition of his transgressive harboring of hatred (μίσους ἦν ἐν ἐμοί) combined with the reference to rebuke (ἤλεγξεν) clearly points back to Lev. 19:17.80 In addition, Gad invokes the prohibitions of Lev. 19:18 immediately following his anecdote as he admits his sin: The subse76  Hollander and De Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 82–85; De Jonge, Studies on the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 63–86; Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 49; Davila, The Provenance of the Pseudepigrapha; Kugel, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 1697–1703. 77  On the former genres, see Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination; Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age; Collins, “Wisdom, Apocalypticism, and Generic Compatibility.” 78  Collins, “Wisdom, Apocalypticism, and Generic Compatibility,” 178. 79  Translation follows Kugel, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 1803–804. As Kugel notes, none of the extant manuscripts include the word “not” qualifying Joseph’s reproof; however, “this is an obvious error” (Ibid., 1804). My reading of this text follow’s Kugel’s emendation. 80  Ibid.

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quent chapter of tGad (2:1) reflects on how he held a grudge against Joseph, desiring to take vengeance by killing him (ὅτι πλειστάκις ἤθελον ἀνελεῖν αὐτόν, ὅτι ἕως ψυχῆς ἐμίσουν αὐτόν). In this way, tGad alludes to the prohibitions of Lev. 19:18 (bearing a grudge and taking vengeance) and employs them, as implied in Leviticus itself, as a direct result of harboring hatred (Lev. 19:17).81 The opening chapters of tGad thus engage exegetically with Lev. 19:17–18, linking the two verses together through an anecdotal account of their application and a related warning to Gad’s descendants. This initial reference to rebuke in tGad appears in the context of gossip/ slander – the same literary framing as Sir. 19:13–17 and Prov. 10:17–18.82 Gad reports that he saved a sheep from the claws of a bear but was grievously forced to slaughter it, believing it unable to survive.83 Joseph then slandered Gad and several of his brothers to their father with the claim that they were “slaying the best [of the flock] and eating them.”84 Gad’s indignation is prompted by Joseph slandering him to their father rather than confronting him directly (“for he had [not] reproved us to our faces”). While the related negative speech acts of slander and gossip stand at the center of Gad’s tale and the primary discussion of rebuke in Ben Sira, there are several important ways in which these texts diverge. While Ben Sira applied the element of gossip to an individual potentially deserving of rebuke, Gad portrays slander as misdirected reproof on the part of the rebuker himself (Joseph should have confronted Gad directly). Ben Sira thus encourages reproof against someone suspected of an offense (even by way of gossip) while Gad implies that the choice of audience distinguishes rebuke from slander and the value of the action. Furthermore, in contrast to Ben Sira who removed his major discussion of rebuke from the context of explicit anger, Gad incorporates Lev. 19:17’s element of anger, but projects it onto the 81  Gad goes on to relate another example of this type in which his hatred for Joseph’s dreams sparked his desire to “lick him out of the land of the living as an ox licks up the grass of the field” (Ibid.). Reference to Gad’s bearing a grudge reappears later in tGad 6 (Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 126). 82  Although Gad does not employ a Greek term directly denoting slander or gossip in this first chapter, this is clearly the connotation of his words and such a term does appear subsequently in tGad 3:3 (καταλαλιὰν). Kugel also sees an element of slander in Gad’s warning to his children: “instead of reproaching the ‘brother’ face-to-face (the other part of Lev. 19:17), ‘hatred’ spreads the report of the offense to others, thus substituting slander for open reproach” (Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 50). 83  The language here is reminiscent of David’s claim before Saul that: “Your servant has been tending his father’s sheep, and if a lion or a bear came and carried off an animal from the flock, I would go after it and fight it and rescue it from its mouth. And if it attacked me, I would seize it by the beard and strike it down and kill it” (1 Sam. 17:34–35). 84  Kugel, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 1803.

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one deserving of admonishment (himself) rather than the (potential) rebuker (Joseph). This is perhaps closer to Prov. 10:18 where the audience (conceived of as the target of rebuke) is chastened against concealing their anger. Finally, unlike Ben Sira who appears to address Lev. 19:17 alone and not Lev. 19:18, Gad directly treats the topics of hate, rebuke, bearing a grudge, and love, suggesting a much tighter connection between the testament and the themes of Leviticus 19:16–18.85 Ben Sira’s discussion of rebuke is not the only text that shares a close affinity to tGad. James Kugel, Christopher Chandler and others have focused on tGad as mirroring material found in the Dead Sea Scrolls.86 These sources certainly all treat the full biblical unit of Lev. 19:17–18. Likewise, tGad clearly employs the moralistic dimension of rebuke when it encourages interpersonal reproof as a means to alleviating hatred. Kugel also identifies the judicial dimension of rebuke within tGad 4:3, which mentions condemnation and punishment: “If a brother makes a false step, immediately it [‘Hatred’] wants to spread the tale to everyone, and is eager to have him condemned for it, punished, and executed.”87 However, this reading conflates gossip and hatred with rebuke, ignoring the opening chapter of the testament. In tGad 1 Joseph slanders rather than rebukes, and Gad harbors hatred against Joseph, desiring to kill him rather than rebuking him. In tGad 4 the slander and homicidal desires are conflated in contrast to rebuke.88 Rebuke is framed in a positive interpersonal (“moralistic”) manner as opposed to hatred and slander which lead to the undesired consequence of trial, punishment, and death (the “judicial” dimension). This dichotomy is reiterated in tGad 6 in which Gad admonishes his audience to “love one another with your hearts, and if someone sins against you, speak to him in peace, having banished the poison of hatred.”89 Speaking in peace would appear to be the case of proper reproof, motivated by love, in contrast to slander

85  Gad also goes on to reference the importance of love (“No matter what a man does, the hater will despise [him] … he will not love him”; tGad 3:2) and specifically love of one’s neighbor (tGad 4:2), the final element in Lev. 19:18. 86  While Kugel suggests that tGad 4 is related to Qumran material (“This passage bears a striking resemblance to the interpretation of Lev. 19:17 found in the Damascus Covenant and other Qumran texts”; Kugel, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 1805) he primarily focuses on tGad 6 when comparing the two (similarly, Hollander and De Jonge, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 333). 87  Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach,” 58. 88  The correlation between hatred and slander continues in tGad 5: “Hatred is evil, for it always goes together with falsehood, speaking against truth …” (Kugel, “Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 1806). 89  Ibid., 1807.

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which is tied to hatred.90 Moreover, insofar as slander is understood in tGad as confronting an authority figure (Jacob) or others rather than the ostensive offender (Gad), this negative report is functionally equivalent to judicial reporting/reproof before the Overseer and community at Qumran. Consequently, by rejecting slander tGad also implicitly rejects a judicial setting for rebuke.91 Thus, far from embracing the judicial side of rebuke as at Qumran, tGad rejects this judicial dimension, equating it with the inverses of rebuke (i.e., harboring hatred or slandering). 6

Rebuke and Gossip

The proximity between Lev. 19:16’s mention of gossip and the obligation to rebuke in Lev. 19:17 plants the seed for the conceptual alignment of these two activities. In this chapter we have seen three different ways in which works of ethical exhortation respond to the relationship between these two practices. Prov. 10:17–19 juxtaposes the importance of heeding rebuke with an admonition against excessive or slanderous speech. This rhetorical move subtly opens up the possibility that rebuke itself may constitute a form of excessive or slanderous speech. Read in this fashion, these verses push against Proverbs’ general trend of endorsing rebuke by hinting at an affinity between the act of rebuke and the speaking of slander. The Book of Ben Sira also offers a generally positive attitude toward rebuke. However, in contrast to Proverbs, in this work gossip enters the conversation from a different perspective. Rather than a blurring of the line between rebuke and gossip, in Ben Sira the major discussion of rebuke revolves around a question of rebuking in response to a potentially slanderous accusation. Surrounded by a larger unit warning against the misuse of speech, one might have expected Ben Sira to advise against reproof. Yet, this wisdom text ultimately endorses the use of rebuke, albeit cautiously. In tGad, rebuke and slander again are brought into dialogue from another angle. Rather than blurring the boundary between rebuke and slander, or positing rebuke as a response to a possibly slanderous accusation, in tGad rebuke and slander are compared in order to draw a stark differentiation between the 90  Kugel understands the phrase “speak to him in peace” to mean “reprove him (Lev. 19:17) ‘in peace’ ” (Ibid.). 91  Chandler offers a more nuanced reading of this material than Kugel, suggesting that Lev. 19:15–16 (concerning judging and slandering) are also in play (Chandler, “Blind Injustice,” 124–27). However, he does not adequately interpret tGad 4 in light of tGad 1.

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two: Rebuke is spoken directly to an offender while slander is directed toward a third party. Moreover, rebuke is a positive moral activity while slander is hateful and falls more along the public/judicial end of the spectrum. Lev. 19:16 and the issue of gossip informs the interpretation of rebuke in multiple ways. Each of the works discussed in this chapter employs gossip or slander differently in order to raise a red flag when it comes to the performance of rebuke. Proverbs implicitly suggests that rebuke itself could be an example of unwanted speech. Ben Sira shows how relying upon gossip could call into question whether rebuke is warranted in a given situation. Finally, the Testament of Gad draws a strong distinction between rebuke and slander but in so doing reveals that this distinction is largely dependent upon the audience – the same report could be slander or rebuke depending upon to whom it is told. Taken as a whole, these works of ethical exhortation offer a variety of ways for understanding the relationship and tension between gossip and rebuke that first emerged in Lev. 19:16–17. 7

Leviticus 19:17 in its Literary Context

These three chapters in Part 1 illustrate a variety of ways in which the practice of rebuke has been understood and problematized, particularly in light of Lev. 19:17 and its literary context. The common thread binding together the sources from the DSS, Gospels, and works of ethical exhortation is their exegetical approach to understanding how rebuke should be performed. The DSS and the Gospels both play with the competing moral and judicial dimensions of rebuke as tied to the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬. Each corpus offers a spectrum of sources ranging from one dimension to the other, including texts that seek to integrate these two different senses. They diverge however, in their approach to integration. The DSS prioritize the public/judicial element as the proper forum for rebuke while using the moral aspect as its proper mode. Contrastingly, the Gospels offer the moral interpretation as the ideal form of rebuke, while begrudgingly allowing for a more public/judicial setting for the recalcitrant sinner. The last two chapters have explored the ways in which Lev. 19:17’s immediate literary neighbors (Lev. 19:16 and 19:18) influence the understanding of rebuke. In the previous chapter we observed how Lev. 19:18 and the obligation of love serve as a means of wielding rebuke as a boundary marking tool. In the DSS, love is expressed through reproof and reserved for community members, reminding everyone that the deviant is still a part of the group. The Gospels move in an opposite direction, seeing love and rebuke as antithetical while

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using both in order to break down the boundaries between one’s friends and one’s enemies. When it comes to Lev. 19:16, several works of ethical exhortation offer a variety of ways for understanding the interaction between gossip/slander and rebuke. Proverbs juxtaposes the two, calling into question the value of reproof; Ben Sira recommends cautious rebuke in response to a transgression potentially reported slanderously; and tGad defines rebuke and slander in opposition to one another. Leviticus 19:17 contains a number of latent tensions exploited by Second Temple period sources for interpreting how rebuke should be performed. On its own, the Hebrew word for rebuke carries two major connotations, one judicial and the other moral. Each implies a different context for proper reproof. The immediate literary context of Lev. 19:17 also establishes a tension between rebuke and love on the one hand, and rebuke and gossip on the other. Navigating these various tensions, the DSS, Gospels, and works of ethical exhortation provide a number of different answers to the question of how one should fulfill Leviticus’ obligation to rebuke one’s fellow. While the majority of these sources (apart from Matt. 5 and Luke 6) engage with the functional issue of accomplishing rebuke, the early rabbinic passages explored in the next two chapters move to the higher order question of whether anyone is actually able to perform this activity properly in the first place.

PART 2 Can One Rebuke? Rebuke in the Tannaitic Midrashim

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An Impossible Task: Rebuke in Sifra The earliest preserved rabbinic comments on Lev. 19:17 appear in the tannaitic midrash known as Sifra. Compiled in the 3rd century CE, this work contains traditions that likely date back to the Second Temple period as well as dicta attributed to the first several generations of rabbis. Through a close literary analysis of the different parts of Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17, in this chapter I argue that Sifra magnifies the difficulties and dangers involved in rebuke by highlighting the tension between rebuke and sin. While the DSS, the Gospels, and works of ethical exhortation engage with the question of how to properly rebuke, the earliest rabbis move to the question of whether one can rebuke at all. 1

The Literary Sophistication of the Tannaitic Midrashim

There is a wide-spread assumption among scholars that tannaitic literature in general, and the tannaitic midrashim in particular, lack sophisticated structure and literary formulation.1 Ethan Tucker summarizes the position that: “the Mekhilta, Sifra, Sifrei and Midrash Tannaim are not redactionally impressive at all, and they are essentially collections of exegesis organized in the order of the Torah.”2 While this is certainly true in contrast to the highly developed structures in the Babylonian Talmud (the focus of Tucker’s work), as an overarching rule, this presumption is greatly overstated. First, the literary quality of the tannaitic midrashim is not uniform and even within individual works there

1  This perception has begun to change in recent years, although mostly with regard to the Mishna and Tosefta rather than the tannaitic midrashim. As Moshe Simon-Shoshan points out: “No less than four books that treat the question of the transmission and redaction of the Mishnah have appeared in recent years … They all see Mishnaic texts as carefully crafted works, shaped to fit the needs, interests, and agendas of the creators of the Mishnah” (SimonShoshan, Stories of the Law, 97). Also note Avraham Walfish’s argument for sophisticated literary features in the Mishna (Walfish, “The Poetics of the Mishnah”). The work of Azzan Yadin-Israel, however, represents an important movement in the direction of recognizing the literary complexity of the tannaitic midrashim (Yadin-Israel, Scripture as Logos; Yadin-Israel, Scripture and Tradition). 2  Tucker, “Literary Agendas and Legal Conclusions,” 15n30.

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can be a significant range of intentional rhetorical fashioning.3 Second, like the talmudim, the tannaitic midrashim are collections that incorporate and rework earlier material in ways that reveal sustained motivations. The scholar who has most vocally and consistently argued for the presence of sustained goals and polemics in tannaitic texts is Jacob Neusner, who famously touts a documentary approach that views each work as a discrete literary product from a particular authorship.4 While Neusner’s approach has rightfully accumulated numerous critiques, his position serves as an important counterbalance to the attitude that denies redactional sophistication in tannaitic midrashim.5 With regard to Sifra, Neusner argues that: “the authorship of Sifra has given us not a scrapbook of miscellanies but a cogent ubiquitous plan of rhetoric, logic, and topical interest as well. Sifra is a book, not a scrapbook, or even a collage.”6 Neusner takes his claim too far in whitewashing the anthological dimension of tannaitic midrashim. However, he points to the vital issue of intentionality in the formation and articulation of these creations as products of their historical contexts.7 Many contemporary scholars agree with Neusner that the tannaitic midrashim have particular aims in mind in their production of these literary products.8 Nevertheless, at times it is difficult to judge the degree of consciousness in midrashic redactional efforts.9 To varying degrees, literary elements in the tannaitic midrashim reveal the rhetorical goals of their editors. On a compositional level, some midrashim evince a macro-structure that encircles complete units or the entire work 3  Reuven Hammer describes how “the literary format and quality of the various sections differ radically” between various segments of Sifre Devarim (Hammer, “Section 38 of Sifre Deuteronomy,” 165). In his eyes, the Akivan material tends to appear in smaller more isolated units while the Ishmaelian interpolations “show evidence of careful editing resulting in the creation of entire literary units expounding specific subjects” (Ibid.). 4  A prime example of Neusner’s position can be found in Neusner, Judaism, the Evidence of the Mishnah. 5  For a succinct and encompassing critique of Neusner’s position, see Cohen, “Jacob Neusner, Mishnah and Counter-Rabbinics.” 6  Neusner, Sifra, 11. 7  Jaffee, “The Hermeneutical Model of Midrashic Studies,” 73. 8  For example, Martin Jaffee, in his review of Boyarin’s Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash, describes how Neusner, Steven Fraade, and Howard Eilberg-Schwartz all insist that “the editors of midrashic compilations are to be taken seriously as shapers of traditional discourse to specific ends of their own choosing” (Jaffee, “The Hermeneutical Model of Midrashic Studies,” 73). Similarly, Jack Lightstone, in his discussion of the meaning found in rhetorical form, emphasizes that “the midrashic process of the pericope, its structured pattern, bears the burden of the redactor’s intended aims” (Lightstone, “Form as Meaning in Halakhic Midrash,” 35). 9  Fraade, “Sifre Deuteronomy 26,” 292.

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through bookending terms or themes. For example, Hebert Basser has pointed to the positioning of R. Meir at the beginning and ending of the Ha’azinu section of Sifre Devarim, and Reuven Hammer has suggested that the entirety of Sifre Devarim is enclosed between a discussion of rebuke and reconciliation that mirrors its biblical object.10 Likewise, Elaine Phillips directs our attention to the first and last sections of Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael in which she claims that: “It is not merely coincidence that Pisha 1 has Moses and David ready to give their lives for Israel and Shabta 1 closes with the exhortation to all of Israel to give their lives for Torah, the Sabbath and the demonstrations of membership in the body of Israel.”11 Aside from these more global features, tannaitic midrashim also involve localized symmetry and highly structured pericopae.12 The extent of these purposeful constructions can be identified in their divergence from the biblical order of material and in the calculated repetition of key terminology and phrases marking the boundaries of discrete units.13 The organization of some of these passages even indicates the possible presence of basic chiastic structures.14 Even the most ostensibly erratic and contradictory arrangement of materials in tannaitic midrashim can be intentional. Indeed, both Daniel Boyarin and Steven Fraade have stressed how the polyphonic nature of some midrashic sections masterfully mirrors the multivocality of the biblical text itself.15 In addition to these overarching and more localized structured sections, many tannaitic midrashim involve sustained thematic trends and polemics.16 While at times these themes are generated by the biblical text under discussion, we also frequently find motifs that are only indirectly related, revealing the activity of an artistic hand.17 10  Basser, In the Margins of the Midrash, 69; Hammer, Sifre, 16. For another example of a section bookended in Sifre Devarim, see Fraade, From Tradition to Commentary, 147–9. 11  Phillips, “Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael a Study in Composition and Context,” 644–5. 12  Ibid., 676; Fraade, “Sifre Deuteronomy 26,” 288, 290; Fraade, From Tradition to Commentary, 161; Hammer, “Section 38 of Sifre Deuteronomy,” 174. 13  See, for example, Phillips, “Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael a Study in Composition and Context,” 646; Hammer, “Section 38 of Sifre Deuteronomy,” 168. 14  Hammer, “Section 38 of Sifre Deuteronomy,” 174; Fraade, “Sifre Deuteronomy 26,” 288– 9n121. The chiastic structure in particular was well recognized by ancient writers (Welch, Chiasmus in Antiquity, 14). For rabbinic awareness of the chiastic structure as a literary form see Ḳlaʼus, Pivot Patterns in the Former Prophets, 15n10. 15  See Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading of Midrash, 48–49, and 78; Fraade, From Tradition to Commentary, 162; Hammer, Sifre, 2 and 409n23. 16  For examples, see Basser, In the Margins of the Midrash, 68; Hammer, “Section 38 of Sifre Deuteronomy,” 175; Fraade, “Sifre Deuteronomy 26,” 290. 17  Phillips, “Mekhilta d’Rabbi Ishmael a Study in Composition and Context,” 644–6.

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In light of these assessments of the literary complexity of the tannaitic midrashim, my exploration of this material begins from the premise that all compositional features may be significant for uncovering a text’s array of goals. While some editorial features may be more reflective of conscious redaction than others, even seemingly unintentional literary features bear witness to the meanings a text carries as a discrete literary product and perhaps even to the subconscious concerns of its editor(s). In this regard, the present chapter constitutes an argument for the literary complexity of tannaitic material in general and the midrashim in particular. Against scholarly perceptions that retrospectively compare these works with the Bavli and declare them bereft of literary sophistication, my analysis of Sifra demonstrates that further attention must be paid to the subtle ingenuity behind these compositions. 2

The Anonymous Portion of Sifra on Lev. 19:17

The earliest rabbinic discourse directly engaging with the biblical mandate to rebuke appears in Sifra. Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17 (Qedoshim 4) neatly divide into two sections that first explain the biblical verse in a series of unattributed exegetical glosses and then preserve the voices of several early rabbis who consider its contemporary applications. The opening anonymous section divides Lev. 19:17 into three components and engages with each clause of the scriptural verse, connecting them into a coherent sequence. Based upon Sifra’s reading, Lev. 19:17 divides as follows: 17a) You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart 17b) Reprove your kinsman 17c) and/but18 incur no guilt because of him.

‫) לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א ֶאת ָא ִחיָך ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬17a ‫יתָך‬ ֶ ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח ֶאת ֲע ִמ‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ )17b .‫) וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ָע ָליו ֵח ְטא‬17c

As noted in the Introduction, it is not immediately obvious to the eye of the interpreter how these individual units relate. The first two clauses could stand independently of one another or the second could serve as a recommended course of action responding to the first.19 Additionally, the relationship be18  I deviate here from the NJPS translation in order to illustrate the ambiguity of the biblical text. 19  As James Kugel notes, “the first part of the verse might be understood quite separately from the rest: ‘You shall not hate your brother in your heart’ could simply be taken as a blanket injunction to avoid hatred of one’s ‘brother’ … ‘You shall surely reproach your fellow and you shall bear no sin because of him’ might then be taken to refer to an entirely different matter” (Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 216).

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tween the second and third clauses is also ambiguous. The third clause is connected to its predecessor by the Hebrew letter vav which carries both the conjunctive meaning of “and” as well as the disjunctive sense of “but.”20 Responding to these points of ambiguity, Sifra’s anonymous comments on Lev. 19:17 forge a coherent connection between the three clauses.21 The simple commentary portion reads as follows:22 1. Y  ou shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart (Lev. 19:17a) 2. One might think you should not hit him, curse him, or slap him. 3. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. I only said hatred which is in the heart. 4. And from where do we know that if he rebukes him even four or five times that he should rebuke again? 5. The Torah therefore says you shall surely rebuke (Lev. 19:17b).23 6. One might think even if he rebukes him and his countenance changes. 7. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because of him (Lev. 19:17c).

‫ לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א ֶאת ָא ִחיָך‬.1 ‫ לא תקללנו‬24‫ יכול לא תכנו‬.2 ‫ולא תסטרנו‬ ‫ תלמוד לומר ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך לא אמרתי‬.3 ‫ בשנאה שבלב‬25‫אלא‬ ‫ ומנין שאם הוכחתו ארבעה‬.4 ‫וחמשה פעמים חזור והוכיח‬ ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ‫ תלמוד לומר‬.5 ‫ יכול אפיʹ את מוכיחו ופניו‬.6 ‫משתנות‬ ‫ תלמוד לומר וְ לֹא ִת ָּׂשא ָע ָליו‬.7 .‫ֵח ְטא‬

20  As the NJPS translation explicitly notes, the exact force of this conjunctive is uncertain (Jewish Publication Society, Tanakh, 252). 21   Sifra is composed of material not only stemming from the tannaitic period, but also from the Second Temple period as well. The simple anonymous commentary portion probably represents the earliest layer (Stemberger, “Leviticus in Sifra,” 437 ff.; Stemberger, “The Redaction and Transmission of Sifra,” 66*; Epstein and Melamed, Mevoʼot le-Sifrut ha-Tannaim, 513; Sagiv, “Studies in Early Rabbinic Hermeneutics as Reflected in Selected Chapters in the Sifra,” passim). 22  The Hebrew text here follows Weiss, Sifra de-ve-Rav, 89a. I have divided the commentary into individual lines for the ease of reference. 23  I have deviated here from the NJPS translation in order to highlight the doubling of the Hebrew root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫“( י‬rebuke”), which is not captured by the NJPS translation of “Reprove your kinsman.” 24  I take the word ‫ תכנו‬as coming from the root ‫ה‬.‫כ‬.‫ נ‬meaning to hit or strike in the hiphil (Jastrow, 910). Alternatively, this word could be understood as coming from the root ‫ן‬.‫ו‬.‫כ‬ meaning to be firm or proper, in which case ‫ תכנו‬could mean to “set him straight” as Neusner translates the term (Neusner, Sifra, 1988, 108; Jastrow, 621–22). However, this understanding seems highly unlikely in light of the verb “striking” (‫ )תסטרנו‬that follows and the parallels in early Christian literature discussed previously. 25  The Venice and Vilna printed editions read ‫ כי אם‬instead of ‫אלא‬.

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Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17 follow the trifold division of the verse with three parallel sections. The first and last sections (lines 1–3 and 6–7) appear in the form of a hypothetical misinterpretation of the verse’s intent (‫ )יכול‬followed by a citation from the same portion of the verse under discussion that supports the correct interpretation (‫)תלמוד לומר‬. The middle unit (lines 4–5) presents the correct interpretation at the outset, asks for the scriptural source (‫)מנין‬, and concludes with the relevant clause from the verse (‫)תלמוד לומר‬. In order to understand the relationship between the different sections of Sifra’s simple commentary, it is helpful to employ a narratological frame for imagining the theoretical scenario envisioned by the collection of glosses. Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17 enhance the narrative elements already latent in the biblical verse, weaving each of the three components together into a more coherent whole.26 The citation of Lev. 19:17a in line 1 sets the stage by introducing the second person protagonist who is inclined toward an emotional response against another person, but whose hatred is forbidden by scripture. Lines 2 and 3 interject an anonymous narrating voice that clarifies this prohibition against anger: an internalization of the emotion is problematic, but an externalization through words or actions is appropriate.27 There is then a 26  Moshe Simon-Shoshan, drawing on theories of narrativity, emphasizes three key elements that are generally present in order for a text to constitute a narrative: “(1) narratives are representation of events; (2) narratives present two or more events in sequence; (3) these events must be inherently interrelated in such a way as to portray some change in the world represented by the text” (Simon-Shoshan, Stories of the Law, 18). While the biblical verse points outward toward “real events,” the sequential and interrelated aspects of the individual components of the verse are ambiguous. Sifra strengthens the bonds between each component of the verse, thereby enhancing the narrativity of the text. As Simon-Shoshan asserts, “[n]arrativity refers to a collection of textual attributes. All texts exist along a continuum of greater or lesser narrativity, depending on the number and prominence of the narrative attributes they contain” (Ibid., 220). Thus, while both the biblical verse and the rabbinic interpretation carry some narrative elements, Sifra is further along the spectrum, evincing a higher degree of narrativity. In addition to these “dynamic” elements of narrative, Simon-Shoshan suggests that the characteristic of “specificity” needs to be taken seriously as an important factor contributing to a text’s narrativity (Ibid., 18–20). Beyond augmenting the dynamic element of Lev. 19:17, Sifra also grants greater specificity to the theoretical events, as we shall see below. However, the narrative constructed in the midrash is not a “story” by Simon-Shoshan’s definition, which describes something “that occurred once and only once in the past” (Ibid., 20). 27  Some readers may be inclined to interpret Sifra’s comment here as forbidding all forms of hatred, including both externalizations of hatred in the form of hitting, cursing, and slapping, as well as internalized hatred kept in the heart. However, this interpretation is colored by the version of this material that appears in the Babylonian Talmud and Rashi’s comments there, as well as by a belief that the rabbis would not condone such externalized forms of hatred. I content that the proper reading of this passage, as articulated by

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narrative gap between this first unit and line 4, which discusses the repetition of rebuke. Based upon the first three lines it is forbidden only to harbor internalized hatred. However, up until this point there is no clear indication that the permitted actions constitute rebuke rather than a cathartic expression of anger. In light of line 4, however, the non-prohibited actions of line 2 now define and delineate the plausible forms of rebuke for Lev. 19:17b.28 Sifra implies that these actions constitute rebuke by moving directly from the permitted actions of hitting, cursing, and slapping (lines 2–3) to a person who has already rebuked another party (line 4). Had Sifra introduced the gloss on rebuke with another scriptural quotation, or asked a general question about the obligation to rebuke (i.e., from where do we know that a person must rebuke?), there would have been a clear separation between hatred and rebuke. By skipping over mention of an explicit obligation to rebuke and instead moving directly to the case of a person in the midst of rebuking, the midrash links hatred and rebuke, creating the impression that there is a biblical expectation of rebuke in order to avoid the prohibition of harboring hatred. The protagonist clearly followed this course of action and now looks around questioningly for instruction as to how to proceed: Is further rebuke warranted or should the continual ineffectiveness of the act be taken as a sign that the protagonist should desist? The anonymous voice returns in lines 4 and 5 to supply the answer to the protagonist’s unarticulated question: one should continue rebuking. Thus, traditional commentators such as Qorban Aharon and modern scholars such as Aharon Shemesh, is that the verse only forbids internalized hatred but permits externalized forms (Ibn Ḥayyim, and Vidal ha-Ẓarefati, Sefer Qorban Aharon, 258; Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 159). This interpretation is based upon the specific language Sifra employs. The Midrash introduces the possibility that one is forbidden from hitting, cursing, and slapping with the technical term yakhol. This term, followed by the response talmud lomar, always serves to refute the proposed interpretation (see Yadin-Israel, Scripture and Tradition, 53–54). This gloss therefore should be understood as rejecting the hypothetical premise that the verse forbids hitting, cursing, and slapping. This reading is further supported by the language used in the talmud lomar, “I only said hatred which is in the heart” (‫)לא אמרתי אלא‬, which explicitly limits the force of the verse to internalized hatred. The version of this tradition that appears in the Bavli, “the verse speaks of hatred in the heart” (‫ )שנאה שבלב הכתוב מדבר‬is more ambiguous and perhaps allows for an alternative reading. Consequently, as odd as it may appear to some readers, the anonymous tradition recorded in Sifra explicitly does not forbid hitting, cursing, and slapping. Elsewhere I have argued that this tradition actually stems from the Second Temple period and the tannaim transmitted it despite its problematic implications (see Goldstone, “Rebuke, Lending, and Love”). 28  This reading is also followed by Qorban Aharon and Aharon Shemesh (Ibn Ḥayyim, and Vidal ha-Ẓarefati, Sefer Qorban Aharon, 258; Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 159–60).

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lines 4 and 5 connect Lev. 19:17b back to Lev. 19:17a by imagining a scenario in which the protagonist’s anger is properly channeled into a repeated rebuke act. However, there is a limiting qualification to the apparently open ended permission for rebuke of lines 4 and 5. The final two lines (6–7) envision the potential adverse result of continual reproof and halt the protagonist before such a point is reached. The misinterpretation suggested in line 6, that one might be able to rebuke even if this involves embarrassment, is directly based upon Lev. 19:17b.29 The incorrect understanding is then rejected by the quotation of Lev. 19:17c. Sifra clearly reads the opening letter vav of Lev. 19:17c as a disjunctive limitation to Lev. 19:17b – one should rebuke but not incur guilt. This final comment closes the scenario envisioned by Sifra at a similar place to where it began – with a prohibition. Sifra’s narrativization of the three components of the biblical verse emphasizes the causal connection between each unit and the near-inevitability of finding oneself caught between the two sins that bookend the act of rebuke. Because one is forbidden to harbor hatred it becomes expected or even necessary to rebuke. But the interpretation of Lev. 19:17b presupposes that one has already repeatedly attempted to chastise the offending party to no avail. Rather than allowing the unfortunate rebuker to desist, Sifra demands further reprimand. However, at some unknown point the rebuker collides with another sin. In avoiding hatred, the rebuker may end up humiliating. By fusing the three components of the Levitical verse into a complete process, Sifra traps the unassuming irritated party on a course toward a far more damaging sin than the rebuker initially strove to avoid; by not harboring hatred the rebuker may end up embarrassing the other party. 3

Individual Elements within the Anonymous Portion of Sifra on Lev. 19:17

Sifra’s narrativization of the biblical commandment to rebuke establishes a trajectory from avoiding one offense to actually committing a different sin. Upon closer examination of Sifra’s language, the tension between averting and performing a sin, and the danger involved in the act of rebuke, move into sharper focus. In the first gloss, Sifra identifies three actions that form a progression moving toward harsher and more damaging confrontations: from 29  The phrase ‫( פניו משתנות‬lit. “his countenance changes”) likely but does not unequivocally refer to embarrassment. However, in the present context this is the most likely understanding. See, Goldstone, “Remove the Beam from Your Own Eye!,” 179–82.

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hitting, to cursing, to slapping.30 While one might be inclined to view the physical action of hitting as more severe than an imprecation, both mishnaic and midrashic sources prescribe a harsher punishment for the latter. For hitting a parent one is strangled while cursing a parent results in the more extreme death by stoning.31 The third of Sifra’s permitted forms of rebuke employs the Hebrew root ‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫ס‬, meaning to slap, particularly on one’s face or head. This root is rather rare in tannaitic literature but, when it does appear, it is a highly offensive activity.32 For example, mB.Q. 8:6 presents an ascending list of ways one can hit another and the corresponding monetary compensation required: If a man cuffed (‫ )התוקע‬his fellow he must pay him a sela [four zuz]. R. Judah says in the name of R. Jose the Galilean: 100 zuz.33 If he slapped him (‫ )סטרו‬he must pay him 200 zuz. If [he struck him] with the back of his hand (‫ )לאחר ידו‬he must pay him 400 zuz … This is the general rule: all is in accordance with a person’s honor.34 Simply hitting someone incurs the lowest financial penalty while slapping or striking with the back of one’s hand demand significantly higher payments. 30  All of the extant manuscripts conclude the list of three actions with slapping. The Venice printed edition preserves a list that begins with cursing followed by hitting while all of the other manuscripts have hitting before cursing. 31  Hitting a parent is listed among the violations warranting strangulation in mSanh. 11:1, whereas according to mSanh. 7:4, cursing a parent results in stoning. Mishna Sanh. 7:1 delineates the four rabbinic death penalties in two alternative hierarchies, both of which list stoning before strangulation. According to Chanoch Albeck (Albeck, The Mishna, 4:189) and most traditional commentators (e.g., Rambam, Bertinoro, etc.), these penalties are enumerated in decreasing order of severity, indicating that stoning was considered more severe. This greater severity for the verbal sin of cursing is confirmed by a comment in Mekhilta Devarim, which explicitly underscores that the Pentateuch was more stringent in the verbal matter of cursing than with regard to the action of hitting (Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 140). 32  According to the Bar Ilan Responsa Project (version 18+), the root ‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫ ס‬appears in only four places in tannaitic literature: mB.Q. 8:6; tA.Z. 5:7; Horovitz and Rabin, Mekhilta deRabbi Ismael, 261; Weiss, Sifra de-ve-Rav, 89a. In later rabbinic literature it often is used to describe striking someone’s mouth (BT Meg. 16b; BT Sanh. 92b; BT Nid. 30b;PT Shab. 8d) or jaw (BT Sanh. 58b). In BT Nid. 25b it appears to be a general reference to striking someone’s head. Also, the root ‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫ ס‬does not necessarily imply striking with one’s hand, and can include the use of an implement such as a shoe (see Margalioth, Midrash va-Yiqra Rabbah, 265 and Esther Rabba Parsha 4). 33   M SS Kaufmann A 50 and Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, 3173 (De Rossi 138) read “maneh” instead of “100 zuz.” 34  Danby, The Mishnah, 343. Also see tB.Q. 9:31, in which striking with the back of one’s hand incurs a penalty of 400 zuz not because of pain but due to disgrace (‫)בזיון‬.

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Given that slapping is a more dishonoring act than merely hitting, and cursing also appears to be more severe than hitting, it seems that Sifra presents the three rebuke acts in ascending order of severity and dishonor. Sifra may exclude this mishna’s supremely shaming act of a back-handed slap, which inevitably engenders humiliation, but the midrash still culminates in the demeaning regular slap.35 By beginning with less humiliating reactions and concluding with the most shame-inducing method of rebuke, this first comment paves the way for the final gloss that warns against humiliating the rebuked party. As one continuously rebukes the offender, the failure of such attempts prompts the use of increasingly harsh means. Ultimately the rebuker employs the most extreme form of reprimand, slapping, thereby nudging him dangerously close to humiliating the offender and consequently committing the sin he was cautioned against in Lev. 19:17c. Turning to the second clause of the Levitical verse, Lev. 19:17b, the repetition of the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫( י‬rebuke) in the infinitive absolute plus imperfect structure (‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ) captures rabbinic attention as a source for the obligation to repeat the action several times: “And from where do we know that if he rebukes him even four or five times that he should rebuke again? The Torah therefore says you shall surely rebuke (Lev. 19:17b).36 The particular numbers “four or five” are likely representative of continual repetition rather than intended as concrete limits.37 While often in the Mishna and Tosefta “four or five” refers to a “few,” the presence of the qualifier “even” indicates that the intention is an unbounded upper limit.38 Even after several continuously failed attempts at rebuke one should keep going. In the tannaitic midrashim attributed to the school of R. Akiva, such as Sifra, we often find this biblical linguistic construct

35  While mB.Q. 8:6 distinguishes between a regular slap (‫ )סטר‬and a back-handed slap (‫ )לאחר יד‬this does not necessarily mean that the root ‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫ ס‬cannot refer to the latter action in other contexts. Thus, perhaps Sifra actually does include this extreme level of slapping within its purview. 36  See Epstein and Melamed, Mevoʼot le-Sifrut ha-Tannaim, 703. 37  We find that the phrase “four or five” is used in tannaitic literature to describe benchmarks for practice, indicating a few times (Novick, “Crafting Legal Language,” 289). Thus, for example, mShab. 18:1 specifies that: “they may clear away [on the Sabbath] as much as four or five baskets of straw or grain to make room for guests or [to avoid] hindrance in the House of Study, but they may not do the like to the store-chamber” (Danby, The Mishnah, 116). The specific numbers provide guidelines but are generally not intended as concrete upper limits in the Mishna (Novick, “Crafting Legal Language”). 38  “The most common, and counterintuitive, way of canceling the upperbounded implicature in the corpora is by the use of ‘even’ (‫( ”)אפילו‬Novick, “Crafting Legal Language,” 296, 298–9). All of the manuscripts of Sifra aside from the Venice edition preserve the reading “even.”

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of an infinitive absolute plus imperfect glossed as a directive for repetition.39 In a number of these instances the implication is that there is an obligation rather than simple permission to repeat the action.40 Indeed, in our example, the use of the imperative form ‫“( ֲחזֹור‬repeat!”), which appears in most of the manuscripts, implies that there is a continual obligation rather than mere permission to continue rebuking.41 If Lev. 19:17a suggested even resorting to the potentially humiliating act of slapping, Lev. 19:17b now commands that one take continual action rather than yield. In this way, the rabbinic reading of the middle clause of the biblical verse propels the rebuker forward, escalating the possibility of sinning. If Sifra’s glosses on the first two clauses of Lev. 19:17 compel the rebuker to persist and even employ violent means, the midrash’s comments on the final clause of the verse highlight the extent to which control over the situation is outside of the rebuker’s hands and determined by the rebuked party. The last section of the verse (Lev. 19:17c) marks the limitation to the potentially unbounded expression of rebuke at the point when the rebuked party’s countenance changes. The phrase “his countenance changes” (‫ )פניו משתנות‬is not the only or even most common option for describing humiliation. A far more explicit means of conveying this idea would be through the root ‫ש‬.‫ו‬.‫ב‬, which directly connotes embarrassment.42 In addition to the root ‫ש‬.‫ו‬.‫ב‬, there is another expression for embarrassment that refers to one reddening (‫ )מאדים‬or whitening (‫ )מלבין‬the face of the other person.43 Given the availability of other, 39  Rosenblatt, The Interpretation of the Bible in the Mishnah, 11. Kugel notes that this may also have been a concern for early exegetes, such as the translators of the Septuagint (See Kugel, In Potiphar’s House, 243n21). 40  See, for example, Horovitz and Rabin, Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ismael, 325–26. Tzvi Novick discusses the proclivities for R. Ishmael and R. Akiva to interpret biblical verses as conveying obligation or permission. He notes that while the latter does not always see obligation, there is an “Akivan predilection for finding ‫ חובה‬where the verse does not call for it” (Novick, What Is Good, and What God Demands, 18). Thus, in encountering our gloss in the Akivan midrash, Sifra, we are justified in assuming a default interpretation of obligation rather than permission. 41  Only MS London and MS Oxford preserve the participial form ‫חוזר‬, which does not carry the same force as the imperative. 42  Among several instances of this root in tannaitic literature, we find a discussion of payments engendered by the one who embarrasses (‫ )המבייש‬for the one who is embarrassed (‫( )במתבייש‬mB.Q. 8:1). Similarly, in mKet. 3:7, embarrassment depends upon both the one who embarrasses (‫ )המבייש‬and the one who is embarrassed (‫)במתבייש‬. There are a number of other examples of this root in tannaitic literature. See for instance, mArakh. 3:4; tB.Q. 9:12; mSot. 9:15; Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 231; Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 118, 168, and 210. 43  The language of reddening (or whitening) the face of another to describe embarrassment appears in tannaitic sources including Sifre Zuta 12, mSot. 9:15, and mAvot 3:11 (according to MS Kaufmann A 50 but not MS Parma De Rossi 138 or MS Munich Cod. Hebr. 95;

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more common options for describing rebuke, Sifra’s choice of the unusual locution “his countenance changes” takes on greater significance. In contrast to alternative statements such as “until he embarrasses the other” (‫)מבייש‬, or until he “reddens/whitens the face of the other” (‫)מאדים\מלבין‬, the phrase “his countenance changes” (‫ )פניו משתנות‬emphasizes the action of the rebuked party and the passivity of the rebuker.44 The biblical verse framed the entire interaction from the perspective of the rebuker, even in this final component where sin results from the rebuked party’s reaction. By contrast, Sifra employs language that shifts the focus from the rebuker to the rebuked, highlighting the switch from the former’s control of the situation to that of the latter. While the rebuker initiated the interaction, the power to end the confrontation rests wholly upon the face of the rebuked. The phrase “his countenance changes” identifies the point in the envisioned scenario when the rebuker oversteps by embarrassing the other. Within the context of the exegesis of Lev. 19:17, the phrase marks the shift in the effect of the rebuker’s words and consequently the legal status of their action. This moment teeters on the line between harsh words that have the possibility of reforming and harmful words that actual end up injuring the rebuked party. The former are biblically mandated while the latter constitute a biblical prohibition (as marked by the resulting sin). Just as the physical face of the rebuked changes from an unidentified state to one of embarrassment, so too the action of the rebuker shifts from the performance of a biblical command to a violation. The rebuker’s position is thus quite precarious. One cannot know how many times to rebuke or whether such continual chastisement will eventually be effective or result in humiliation. The rebuker is thus trapped between the biblical mandate to continually rebuke and the reaction of the rebuked party. In fact, the merit of the rebuker’s actions as a justified fulfillment of the scriptural injunction in Lev. 19:17a-b or a violation of Lev. 19:17c is dependent upon the other party. see Sharvit, Massekhet Avot, 133). The phrase “whitening the face of his fellow” (‫מלבין פני‬ ‫ )חברו‬appears in the Babylonian Talmud (BT B.M. 58b and BT Sanh. 99a) and in Midrash Sekhel Tov (Exod. 16) describing rebuke. For a biblical example of a pale face as connected to humiliation, see Isa. 29:22. On the differences between the use of the root ‫ש‬.‫ו‬.‫ב‬ and the phrase reddening (or whitening) the face of another, see Weinstein, “Towards Understanding Boshet,” 56n3. Also see Crane, “Shameful Ambivalences,” 65–6. 44  Crane points out that shame, unlike guilt, focuses “on the offended as well as the offender, and may extend to others not immediately involved in the incident” (Crane, “Shameful Ambivalences,” 67). This is clearly seen in mB.Q. 8:1, which explicitly states that payment for shame is dependent upon both the one embarrassing and the embarrassed party (‫)הכול לפי המבייש והמתבייש‬.

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The collection of glosses in the simple, anonymous commentary on Lev. 19:17 dramatically heighten the tension and danger inherent in the scenario envisioned in the biblical verse. The angry party is commanded to express his or her emotions through the extreme measures of hitting, cursing, or slapping, and is ordered to continue rebuking indefinitely until the rebuked party’s reaction forces a conclusion. The merit or sin of the rebuker is dependent upon the reaction of the rebuked who either acknowledges the error or is put to shame. As a whole, this first half of Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17 reveals the difficulty and danger rebuke holds for the unassuming rebuker. 4

The Attributed Portion of Sifra on Lev. 19:17

Sifra’s simple, anonymous commentary on Lev. 19:17 understands the verse to command that one not harbor animosity towards their fellow but should rather rebuke them through words or deeds as many times as necessary, provided that they do not embarrass the other party. The unusual and difficult nature of this responsibility is felt in the several attributed responses that Sifra records in the second half of its comments on Lev. 19:17: 8. R. Tarfon said, ‘By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!’ 9. R. Elazar ben Azariyah said, ‘By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to receive rebuke!’ 10. R. Akiva said, ‘By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke!’ 11. R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri said, ‘May heaven and earth bear witness regarding me that more than four or five times Akiva was lashed because of me before Rabban Gamliel 12. because I would complain to [Rabban Gamliel] concerning [R. Akiva], 13. and how much would I know that he increased love for me.

‫ אמר ר' טרפון העבודה אם יש‬.8 ‫בדור הזה יכול להוכיח‬ ‫ אמר רבי אלעזר בן עזריה‬.9 ‫העבודה אם יש בדור הזה יכול‬ ‫לקבל תוכחת‬ ‫ אמר ר"ע העבודה אם יש בדור‬.10 ‫הזה יודע היאך מוכיחים‬ ‫ אמר רבי יוחנן בן נורי מעידני‬.11 ‫עלי שמים וארץ שיותר‬ ‫מארבעה וחמשה פעמים לקה‬ ‫עקיבא על ידי לפני רבן גמליאל‬ ‫ שהייתי קובל לו עליו‬.12 ‫ וכל כך הייתי יודע שהיה מוסיף‬.13 .‫לי אהבה‬

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Two prominent tannaim question whether there is anyone in their generation who is able to give or receive proper rebuke (lines 8–9). Following this, the voice of R. Akiva questions whether there is anyone who knows how to rebuke (line 10). The thrust of these three exclamations is assertive rather than inquisitive: there is no one capable of such things in our day! The forceful declaration of these pronouncements is solidified through the inclusion of the vocative oath (“By the Temple!”) that introduces each statement.45 The unusual threefold repetition of the oath emphasizes the resolve of the rabbis in their claims and lends the entire section an air of gravity. In this way, these three rabbis confidently proclaim the present condition in which this commandment cannot be properly fulfilled. R. Tarfon’s opening statement questioning “if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke” is ambiguous. Prior to reading R. Akiva’s statement one would likely be inclined to interpret this as a question of how to properly administer rebuke.46 However, as this is the specific intent of R. Akiva, it follows that the first statement likely refers to something else. Louis Finkelstein, in his comments on the parallel in Sifre Devarim, understands these words of R. Tarfon to mean that there is no one who is of proper ethical status to give rebuke.47 He understands the statement of R. Elazar ben Azariyah (that no one is able to receive rebuke) as expressing the idea that due to the unethical nature of the generation these people are not worthy (‫ )ראוי‬of rebuke at all.48 Finkelstein thus interprets the first two statements as referring to the status of the individuals as ethical people while the final statement (by R. Akiva) as referring to the actual act of rebuking. Reuven Hammer, in his translation of Sifre

45  In tannaitic literature the oath “by the temple!” generally strengthens the force of a statement and the resolve of its author. See, for example, tZev. 1:8 and Horovitz, Siphre ad Numeros, 129. 46  Rashi, in his commentary to BT Arakh. 16b, interprets this line to mean “in an honorific manner such that his face does not change” (Rashi BT Arakh. 16b s.v. she-yodeiah lehokhiaḥ). However, the Bavli does not include R. Akiva’s statement and this statement appears as “no one knows to rebuke.” Thus, Rashi’s comment was likely in response to this alternative version, rather than the version as it appears in Sifra. Other traditional commentators also suggest that R. Akiva’s statement means that no one is able to rebuke without causing public embarrassment (Pseudo-Raabad and Basser, Commentary to Sifre Deuteronomy, 5; Hillel ben Eliaqim and Koleditzky, Sifre le-ha-Tana ha-Elohi Rabbenu Shimon ben Yoḥai, 2). 47  Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 3. 48  Pseudo-Raabad explains this phrase (when it appears in Sifre Devarim) to mean that because people are so accustomed to doing what they want it is too difficult to stop them from these practices (Pseudo-Raabad and Basser, Commentary to Sifre Deuteronomy, 5).

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Devarim, follows Finkelstein by translating R. Tarfon’s statement as, “I doubt if there is anyone in this generation who is fit to rebuke others.”49 If R. Tarfon engages with the suitability of the rebuker, R. Elazar questions the capability of the one receiving rebuke. At first glance, one might envision the position of the rebuked party as quite simple. However, R. Elazar observes that this other partner in the rebuke act requires no less ability or status than the rebuker him or herself. Receiving a rebuke requires some form of acknowledgement of a wrong, hypothetically in combination with a repentant attitude toward future behavior. If the rebuked does nothing and offers no response, the rebuker is charged by the exegesis of the biblical verse to continue offering reprimand until it is accepted (or the rebuked party becomes embarrassed). The acceptance of rebuke and the admission that one has erred is an incredibly difficult response as it indicates weakness and fallibility. Rebuke is more likely to evoke an angry retort, a disavowal of the rebuker’s claim, or the socially deadly reaction of embarrassment. If R. Elazar is understood as focusing on the suitability of the actor who is charged with receiving rebuke, his comment highlights how the difficulty of this role, no less than that of the rebuker him or herself, requires a significantly capable individual. If the first two tannaitic proclamations focus on the ability of the human actor as unsuitable for giving or receiving rebuke, the third voice, that of R. Akiva, narrows in on the particular expression of rebuke. In light of the two previous assertions, R. Akiva’s statement assumes that someone may indeed be of a sufficient social or ethical status to rebuke. However, it does not follow that they are aware of the proper means of expressing their reprimand. The likely detrimental consequence of humiliation suggested at the end of the simple commentary demonstrates the necessity of a refined and well thought-out rhetoric for informing the offending party of their improper actions. R. Akiva declares that such tact is lacking among his contemporaries indicating that no one is skilled enough to successfully perform an act of rebuke without at least inadvertently triggering a negative response. The simple commentary section of Sifra on Lev. 19:17 laid the groundwork for establishing the commandment to rebuke as a challenge with significant potential dangers and drawbacks in its real-world application. The first three tannaim who respond to the biblical injunction continue this direction by asserting that the difficulty involved in properly rebuking renders the commandment practically infeasible for their generation. The latent pitfalls of rebuke, as elicited by the rabbinic interpretation of the scriptural obligation, mark both 49  Hammer, Sifre, 24. In his footnotes he states that: “The meaning is that there is no one free enough from sin to be fit to rebuke others” (Hammer, 390n8).

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the act of rebuke itself and the particular commandment to rebuke as unrealizable in the present rabbinic condition. 5

R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri

Up until this point, the general trend of Sifra’s comments problematizes the performance of rebuke as impossibly formidable and consequently inapplicable. However, in contrast to this presentation of the law of rebuke as sterile in their present condition, the last voice in Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17 undercuts this idea and reinvigorates the possibility of reprimand. R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri asserts that his complaints before Rabban Gamliel resulted in the corporal punishment of R. Akiva and an increase of love (lines 11–13). The formulation of his words implies that R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri merely registered a complaint with the patriarch who then authorized the actual punishment. However, the fact that R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri presents the lashes as stemming from his actions (“because of me”) in conjunction with his assertion that R. Akiva had greater love for him, implies that he considers himself an integral part of the rebukeact despite Rabban Gamliel actually issuing the lashes.50 Although R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri appears to reinvigorate the possibility of rebuke there are several factors that curtail the force of his anecdote. First, the major characters in his story, Rabban Gamliel and R. Akiva, are the rabbinic elite and respectively represent the epitomes of authority and the loving response. Rabban Gamliel the patriarch represents the figure of highest rabbinic hereditary capital.51 The Mishna in the second chapter of tractate Rosh Hashana records an episode in which Rabban Gamliel asserts his authority over his colleague R. Joshua. R. Joshua encounters R. Akiva who appears to support the incontrovertible authority of Rabban Gamliel over his colleagues (and even over the divine establishment of consecrated times). This mishna suggests that during the period when the Mishna and tannaitic midrashim were

50  Shemesh points out that the term “rebuke” (‫ )תוכחה‬does not appear in R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s anecdote, but that his words should nevertheless be understood as an example of rebuke (Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 156). It is not entirely clear what R. Yoḥanan was rebuking R. Akiva for, or what he may have said. For suggestions, see, Bacher and Rabinovitz, Aggadot ha-Tannaim, 1 Part 2:97n3; Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 4; Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 156n30. 51  However, Hayim Lapin notes that: “It is only in traditions in the Tosefta that Gamaliel is twice associated with the position of [Patriarch]” (Lapin, Rabbis as Romans, 53).

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compiled, R. Akiva (and other rabbis) were inferior to the patriarch.52 Rabban Gamliel thus represents the highest rabbinic authority making him the most likely to succeed at rebuke. In addition to the importance of Rabban Gamliel serving as the rebuker, there is significance to the choice of R. Akiva as the rebuked party. On the next Levitical verse (Lev. 19:18), Sifra includes the statement attributed to R. Akiva that loving one’s neighbor constitutes a fundamental principle of the Torah. R. Akiva’s emphasis on the love of neighbor in Lev. 19:18b mirrors R. Akiva’s actualizing of this command in R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s story. Despite being lashed as a result of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s complaints, R. Akiva responds with love, exemplifying the ideal of Lev. 19:18b that he propounds as a great principle. The close proximity of these two pericopae gives the impression that R. Akiva, the quintessential proponent of loving one’s fellow, would have responded positively regardless of his inner thoughts and feelings regarding R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s rebuke.53 R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s story thus employs not only the optimal rebuker, but the champion of the loving response as well. While R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri strives to combat his colleagues and recapture the possibility of rebuke, the selection of Rabban Gamliel as the medium of his reproof and the fact that it is R. Akiva who receives the rebuke, limit the force of his statement. The most socially acceptable rebuker (Rabban Gamliel) and the most receptive rebuked party (R. Akiva) can perhaps successfully engage in rebuke, but this does not mean that most of the people of the generation are capable. Beyond the fact that R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s position only includes those rabbis who are most apt for their roles as rebuker and rebuked, another reason to marginalize the force and impact of this statement is that R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri appears as a lone voice pitted against the other tannaim who express a generalized description of their generation. The editorial decision to include three different positions admitting the universal impossibility of effective rebuke and 52  Moshe Simon-Shoshan argues that the mishna in tractate Rosh Hashana depicts Rabban Gamliel as “the ultimate authority,” although not “the ideal authority” (Simon-Shoshan, Stories of the Law, 193, 179). Richard Hidary qualifies that the example in mR.H., which treats the proper setting of the calendar “may be a special example in which Rabban Gamaliel was recognized by his colleagues as the authority” (Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven, 264). For another example of Rabban Gamliel’s stature, see Horovitz and Rabin, Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ismael, 195–96, where the sages question whether Rabban Gamliel can serve them given his status. 53  In mAvot 6:6 (a late addition to the tractate), the rabbis include loving rebuke (‫אוהב את‬ ‫ )התוכחות‬as one of the qualities through which one acquires Torah, indicating the idyllic nature of responding to rebuke positively (Sharvit, Massekhet Avot, 229). Additionally, Prov. 9:8 provides another example of how the true Torah scholar should respond to rebuke with love.

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only one position defending its contextual achievability gives the impression that most rabbis would side with those asserting their inability to properly reprove. Furthermore, R. Akiva’s declaration that there is no one in the generation who knows how to properly rebuke immediately precedes R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s anecdote. As R. Akiva himself is the object of the supposedly successful rebuke, this juxtaposition implies that either R. Akiva did not remember R. Yoḥanan’s regular rebukes, or he did not consider them proper, despite ostensibly responding with love. There are several factors that marginalize the impact of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s statement vis-à-vis his colleagues. His anecdote refers to the ideal rabbinic players who could be involved in the act of rebuke, his statement presents a single response to the positions of several other tannaim, and R. Akiva himself – the object of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s rebuke – declares no one capable of properly performing this activity. Yet, even if R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s statement carries more weight than I have suggested, his words cannot erase the position propounded by his colleagues. At most R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri blunts the force of the more renowned figures who speak before him, leaving Sifra’s audience with a strong impression that the rabbis are not in favor of rebuke despite a position to the contrary. Hence, the overall impression from the attributed section of Sifra is that rebuke is incredibly difficult and consequently cannot and should not be practiced. 6

Sifra’s Literary Structure

When the simple anonymous commentary and the attributed portion of Sifra’s comments are read together similarities between several of the themes and words in the two halves suggest an inverse parallelism verging on a loose chiastic structure.54 A close analysis of these parallels heightens the sense of difficulty and danger involved in rebuke. 54  John Welch identifies 15 criteria for judging the strength of a chiasmus or “degrees of chiasticity” (Welch, “Criteria for Identifying and Evaluating the Presence of Chiasmus,” 4). Some of his categories such as “objectivity” are highly subjective and problematic, but his list provides a general guide for detecting the presence of this literary form. Our example from Sifra involves some of Welch’s criteria including reduplication of key terms, centrality, boundedness, and a central climax; however, it is not as “dense” or balanced as his ideal types. Like Welch, Ian Thomson notes that we find “both good and poor examples of most rhetorical forms, including chiasmus, the weaker instances approximating to, rather than exactly matching, the definition” (Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters, 22; also note Thomson’s critique of Breck’s definition of chiasmus [Ibid., 26n73]). In contrast to Welch’s non-hierarchical listing of features of a chiasmus, Thomson and others

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A) You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart (Lev. 19:17a). One might think you should not hit him, curse him, or slap him. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. I only said hatred which is in the heart. B) And from where do we know that if he rebukes him four or five times that he should rebuke again? The Torah therefore says, you shall surely rebuke (Lev. 19:17b). C) One might think even if he rebukes him and his countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because of him (Lev. 19:17c). C’) i) R. Tarfon said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!” ii) R. Elazar ben Azariyah said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to receive rebuke!” iii) R. Akiva said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke!” B’) R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri said, “May heaven and earth bear witness regarding me that more than four or five times Akiva was lashed because of me before Rabban Gamliel because I would complain to [Rabban Gamliel] concerning [R. Akiva]. A’) and how much would I know that he increased love for me.” In contrast to the majority of the Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17, which revolve around action and speech, the opening and closing lines focus on emotions. Section A begins with the biblical proscription against harboring hatred in one’s heart, which James Kugel has designated “hidden hatred.”55 The scriptural author is concerned with a person concealing malice that may eventually manifest itself negatively such as through vengeance or bearing a grudge (Lev. 19:18a).56 Rather than mask this strong feeling, the enraged party is focus on the primary feature of chiasmus, namely, a balanced inverse parallel structure (Dahood, “Chiasmus”; Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters, 25; Lund, “The Presence of Chiasmus in the New Testament,” 74; Lund, Chiasmus in the New Testament, 40–42; Welch, Chiasmus in Antiquity, 9). In my opinion, the Sifra passage contains a strong central point of inversion, but as various lexical repetitions and thematic parallels between the two halves could obviously be stronger, I have categorized this pericope as exhibiting only a loose chiastic structure. In addition to the less than ideal parallels in our example, section C’ is three times as long as C, including three different statements. Thomson notes that regularly the parallel sections are of equivalent length (Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters, 27). I would suggest that the magnitude of this difference is not unintentional and focuses our attention on C’ which also includes a hyperbolic element intended to intensify the claim (see below). 55  Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach.” 56  As noted above, Lev. 19:17–18 constitutes a single unit where the latter verse can be understood to forbid improper expressions of anger.

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commanded to openly reveal their thoughts in a direct confrontation with the offending individual. This theme of externalizing emotions also appears in Section A’ in which R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri proclaims that he knows R. Akiva increased his love for him. R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri employs the phrase “and how much would I know” (‫)וכל כך הייתי יודע‬, which is rare in the rabbinic corpus.57 The second half of the phrase (‫ )הייתי יודע‬is regularly used in rabbinic literature together with a negation (‫ )לא‬or qualifier (‫ אם‬,‫ )אילו‬to express something that someone did not know.58 In this case, however, the phrase appears in a positive sense to describe R. Yoḥanan’s supposed knowledge of R. Akiva’s reaction to being rebuked. The inversion of the phrase ‫ הייתי יודע‬from its regular use of conveying lack of knowledge is precisely in a case where one usually cannot have knowledge – regarding internal emotions. R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s entire anecdote is conveyed through his recollection of the events without any indication as to how he knows R. Akiva’s reaction. Yet, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri utilizes the words “and how much” (‫ )כל כך‬to amplify the quality of his knowledge and heighten the certainty of his assertion.59 The bookends of this literary unit thus engage with the theme of knowledge of, or externalization of, otherwise hidden emotions. Furthermore, Section A’ inverts the themes addressed at the outset: hidden hatred becomes revealed love.60 57  This phrase is preserved in all of the manuscripts of Sifra except for MS Oxford Bodleian Marshall Or. 24, which reads: ‫וכל כך יודע אני‬. The version in MS Oxford is similar to the reading found in most manuscripts of Sifre Devarim: ‫וכל כך יודע אני‬. Several other instances where MS Oxford disagrees with the other witnesses to Sifra but corresponds to the version of this pericope in Sifre Devarim suggest that the latter influenced the former: First, like Sifre Devarim, MS Oxford includes the prefix -‫ ש‬before the words ‫יכול‬ and ‫ יודע‬while none of the other Sifra manuscripts include this letter. Second, as will be discussed below, MS Oxford reads “more than five,” rather than “more than four or five.” Third, following Sifre Devarim, MS Oxford sets R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s anecdote in Yavneh. Finally, while all of the other Sifra manuscripts utilize either ‫ לי‬or ‫ לו‬to describe R. Akiva’s increased love, MS Oxford follows Sifre Devarim with the reading ‫בי‬. 58  The vast majority of examples use some form of: ‫ אילו הייתי‬,‫ אם הייתי יודע‬,‫לא הייתי יודע‬ ‫יודע‬, etc. (although Tanḥuma on Gen. 9 uses ‫)כי‬. All of the cases in the Mishna, Tosefta, and tannaitic midrashim, use one of these negative forms. There are several exceptions to this expression of lack of knowledge where this form is used to convey actual knowledge; however, all of these cases appear in later rabbinic literature (Buber, Midrash Tanḥuma, 2:35; Shemot Rabbah, Ki Tissa 42:6; Theodor and Albeck, Midrash Bereshit Rabbah, 646; Bemidbar Rabbah, Masaei 23:6 (with a parallel in Buber, Midrash Tanḥuma, 2:163; Tanḥuma [Printed] Masaei 4); and Leqaḥ Tov Shemot 5:22). 59  Alcalay, The Complete Hebrew-English Dictionary, 1020; Kena’ani, Oẓar ha-Lashon ha-ʻIvrit, 7:2113–4. 60  It is possible that this inversion stands in dialogue with Prov. 27:5, which reads: “Open reproof is better than concealed love.” The proverb contrasts the exposed (‫ ) ְמגֻ ָּלה‬and the hidden (‫) ְמ ֻס ָּת ֶרת‬, recommending that rebuke be open even if love is hidden. Similarly,

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Sections B and B’ are linked together through the common terminology of “four or five times” (‫ )ארבעה וחמשה פעמים‬and instances of the “actual” act of rebuke. Section B focuses on the rebuke language of Lev. 19:17 (‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ) and encourages the rebuker to continue chastising even after four or five unsuccessful attempts. In Section B’, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri recalls his fulfillment of the scriptural injunction when he rebuked R. Akiva more than four or five times.61 Placed between Sections A and A’, which describe hatred and love, Sections B and B’ connect these emotions, pointing to a tension between rebuke as motivated by animosity and rebuke as prompting affection. Pulling these antipodal emotions toward one another, these medial sections hint at the volatility of rebuke as caught between these diametrically opposed responses. This tension paves the way for the innermost sections of the loose chiastic structure that call the very the act of rebuke into question. The final sections, C and C’, discuss the limitations of rebuke. Section C qualifies that although one should theoretically continue rebuking until the reprimand is accepted, one should cease at the point of embarrassing the other party. By contrast, C’ expresses the limitation of rebuke due to the ineptitude of the generation. These limitations on rebuke in the exegetical interpretation and in the tannaitic dicta clash at the midpoint of Sifra’s overall Lev. 19:17 commands one to channel their anger into an open expression of rebuke. With regard to the inversion of this larger literary unit, Lund points out that “The inversion of similar ideas that recur in parallel position is one of the characteristics of the chiastic form” and that “It is common practice, when two parallel sections are far apart in text, to show their interdependence by inversion of two or more of their terms, or ideas” (Lund, Chiasmus in the New Testament, 336, 168). The dichotomies of hate/love and concealed/ revealed map onto a feature of chiasmus noted by Jonah Fraenkel: “the thematic principle in literary chiasm is generally introduced by the tension created between the two extreme framing elements A and A’. It is only natural that this tension should find expression not only in the description of certain mutually opposed objective facts such as ‘it did not rain’ against ‘it rained,’ but much more so in the tension arising from challenges to man’s conduct and attitude, e.g. ‘Rav Pappa decreed a fast’ or ‘R. Yona – when the world was in need of rain’” (Fraenkel, “Chiasmus in Talmudic-Aggadic Narrative,” 193). In our example the two dichotomies create a tension surrounding the issue of the expression of emotions. It is also possible that there is an additional “hidden” element in C’ where Proverb 9:8 (“Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you; Reprove a wise man, and he will love you”), which is explicitly cited in the Sifre Devarim parallel, may be obliquely referenced at the end of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s words. 61  All of the manuscripts except for MS Oxford Bodleian Marshall Or. 24 include both the numbers “four” and “five.” MS Oxford only has the number “five,” but as indicated in the notes above, it appears that this manuscript was influenced by the tradition in Sifre Devarim that also only includes the number “five.” Both the version in the simple commentary of “even four or five” and in R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s anecdote of “more than four or five” indicate a non-upper-bounded act (Novick, “Crafting Legal Language,” 295–300).

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gloss on Lev. 19:17. The anonymous commentary warns of the potential danger of humiliation while the tannaim simply declare the entire commandment inoperative.62 The point of contact between these sections marks the transition from the literary concern over real-world fallout from the application of the biblical mandate to the rabbinic “real-world” expression of rabbinic anxiety over the practice of rebuke. This juncture forms the apex of Sifra’s comments on the verse, accentuating the detrimental effects of, and adverse reaction to, the ideal goal of the scriptural law. There is also an added level of resonance between C and C’ii where both focus on the active role of the rebuked party. Section C notes that the rebuked party’s embarrassment is the limit of rebuke, and C’ii questions whether there is anyone who is able to properly accept rebuke. Observing the larger structure of this literary unit underscores the major themes of the passage explored above. The dichotomy between love and hate, the revealed and the concealed, frames the entire midrashic unit. The inverse parallelism suggests that love is an easily identifiable emotion while hatred is often hidden and undetectable. Sections B and B’ crescendo the drama forward toward the central sections with their repeated acts of rebuke. This centripetal force is reinforced by the general chiastic structure of Sifra’s comment on Lev. 19:17 that draws our attention to the center.63 The middle of the 62  It is possible that the unexpected tannaitic declarations of the ineptitude of their generation are framed with such extreme hyperbole in order to contrast this to the mere limitation established by the biblical verse. The use of such exaggeration magnifies the impact of this statement in the ears of this text’s audience thereby centering their attention on this point (Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters, 40). 63  One of the predominant understandings of the function of chiastic structures is to draw attention to a particular idea, often located at the center of the chiasmus. For scholarship on this point see the references in Assis, “Chiasmus in Biblical Narrative,” 295–96ns9–11. Fraenkel notes that the centerpieces of a chiasmus “present the crisis in each sample, and are the agencies for relieving the tension created by A and A’ and for overcoming the conflict caused by B” (Fraenkel, “Chiasmus in Talmudic-Aggadic Narrative,” 195). However, not all scholars agree that the center of a chiasmus is the main point (Jebb, Sacred Literature, 60; Ḳlaʼus, Pivot Patterns in the Former Prophets, 253–56). With regard to the role of sections B and B’, Fraenkel notes that “The second element (B) of the chiasm plays a double role. It develops the plot and at the same time relates to B’” (Fraenkel, “Chiasmus in Talmudic-Aggadic Narrative,” 193). In this comment of Sifra, B and B’ build the tension of an unresolved rebuke that must be repeated, provoking an expectation in the audience of an explosive confrontation. The chiasmus also heightens the general drama of the entire section. As Thomson notes: “If a suggestion were to be made to describe the relationship between form and content in this case, it would be that form enhances content. The symmetries that emerge in a chiasmus have the effect of making the combined impact of element X with its chiastic partner X’ more than the impact of X and X’ taken in isolation” (Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters, 39). Also see Thomson,

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chiasmus marks the breaking point at which positive intentions morph into undesired consequences. Not only do sections C and C’ provide a limitation to the applicability of rebuke, but they simultaneously undermine the aspirations of the framing sections A and A’.64 Section A demands rebuke as a proper means to avoiding the negative emotion of hatred. Yet, the limit of rebuke is marked by another emotion, humiliation, this time on the part of the rebuked party. The attempt to avoid one distressing feeling results in the fostering of an even worse emotion. Similarly, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri claimed to have successfully rebuked R. Akiva. Yet, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s assessment of his ability to properly rebuke and recognize love or a successful act of rebuke is undermined by the fact that R. Akiva himself claims there to be no one capable of rebuke in the central section of the pericope. Accordingly, the central climax of Sifra’s comment stresses the damaging effects of rebuke while concurrently sabotaging the positive goal of rebuke promoted in the outer sections. The result of this literary structuring is an enhancement of the idea that rebuke serves as a magnet for opposing emotions, which pulls the rebuker into several failed attempts and even the sin of humiliating another. 7

Rebuke in Sifra

Leviticus 19:17 hinted at the possibility of falling into sin while attempting to fulfill one’s obligation to reprove another. Sifra magnifies this tension between the need for rebuke and the dangers involved in its performance in a number of ways. On the one hand, Sifra emphasizes the extreme measures that a person should be willing to take such as hitting, cursing, and slapping and implies that one should make repeated attempts if at first unsuccessful. On the other hand, the lurking sin revolves around the countenance of the rebuked party, which is wholly outside of the rebuker’s control. There is an immense danger of slipping from fulfillment of a divine command into severe transgression and the potential rebuker does not know at what point this shift might occur. The difficulty involved in properly navigating this tension is reinforced by the three tannaitic figures who declare their generation incapable of properly giving or 27; Ḳlaʼus, Pivot Patterns in the Former Prophets, 26; Lund, Chiasmus in the New Testament, 40–42. 64  Ivo Strecker, in his article on chiasmus and metaphor, highlights how in “the internal dynamics of chiasmus … the two parts of this trope are characterized not by consonance but by dissonance, not by stabilizing resemblance but destabilizing antinomy” (Strecker, “Chiasmus and Metaphor,” 77). This antinomy starkly emerges from the clash between hatred and love presented at opposite ends of our example.

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receiving rebuke. The loose chiastic structure formed by the juxtaposition of the anonymous and attributed portions of the midrash further intensifies the tension between righteousness and sin, love and hate, the revealed and the concealed. The possibility of properly fulfilling the divine injunction becomes increasingly remote at the apex of the chiasmus where the danger of sin leads directly into three voices against the prospect of rebuke’s achievability. Even R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri who attempts to revive the possibility of reproof appears uncomfortable engaging in this activity himself, vicariously fulfilling his obligation through the more authoritative figure of Rabban Gamliel. In short, Sifra’s glosses on the commandment to rebuke involve several integrated layers of friction between rebuke’s ideal potential and the possibility of its actualization, marking it as a strong site of rabbinic anxiety.65 The strong agitation underlying this text leaves the reader with the impression that rebuke is an aspirational goal that can only be achieved by select individuals but is generally quite dangerous and should be avoided. In addition to Sifra’s primary passage on Lev. 19:17 and rebuke, there is another brief but revealing remark about rebuke in this Midrash. Sifra, Shemini 1 presents the fallout from Moses’ rebuking the Israelites in the desert: For what reason did all of the children of Israel weep for Aaron for thirty days but for Moses only [some of] the children of Israel and not all of the children of Israel wept for him? Because Aaron never said to a man or woman “you sinned.” But Moses, because he rebuked them (‫מפני‬ ‫)שהוכיחם‬, it was said about him that [some of] ‘the children of Israel wept for Moses’ (Deut. 34:8). This brief passage suggests that Moses’ rebuke is what prevented some portion of the Israelite population from bemoaning his death. In the next chapter, on Sifre Devarim, we will see more clearly the challenges Moses faced in rebuking the people. Additionally, this other tannaitic midrash offers more explicit insight into the nature of the dangers involved in rebuke that may have prompted the early rabbis to declare themselves incapable of fulfilling this scriptural obligation.

65  For another example of redactional conflict tied to underlying anxiety, see Hayes, “Displaced Self-Perceptions,” 275.

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A Perilous Practice: Rebuke in Sifre Devarim In addition to Sifra, there is another tannaitic midrash, Sifre Devarim, which engages with Lev. 19:17 and rebuke. Unlike Sifra, which directly comments upon Lev. 19:17 in its entirety, when Sifre Devarim explicitly cites this verse it ignores the rebuke clause (Lev. 19:17b).1 Nevertheless, while this aspect of the verse does not expressly appear, the attributed portion of Sifra’s commentary on Lev. 19:17 is incorporated directly into the body of Sifre Devarim. In fact, more attention is paid to the topic of rebuke at the outset of this Midrash than in the totality of Sifra’s comments on this biblical verse. In the present chapter I argue that Sifre Devarim expands Sifra’s problematization of rebuke and offers a clearer sociological motivation for refraining from correcting others. Beyond the formal concern of attempting to perform a commandment while ultimately falling into sin, Sifre Devarim recognizes the interpersonal ramifications of rebuke, specifically, the ways in which chastising others can lead to a fraying of interpersonal relationships. Such detrimental consequences lead the Midrash to admit that even Moses, the prototypical rebuker, faced serious opposition to his reproofs and that for most people it is beneficial to postpone or avoid rebuke if possible. 1

Moses as Exemplary Rebuker

The primary textual trigger that incites Sifre Devarim’s frenzy of focus on rebuke is the appearance of the locution “the words” (‫ ) ַה ְּד ָב ִרים‬at the beginning of the fifth book of the Pentateuch. Sifre Devarim understands the term ‫דברים‬ to refer specifically to words of rebuke (‫)דברי תוכחות‬. This is not the only midrashic gloss on the root ‫ר‬.‫ב‬.‫ ד‬that associates it with forceful speech. In Sifra (Shemini 2:7) the word “speech” (‫ )דיבור‬is glossed as “strength” (‫אין דיבור אלא‬ ‫)לשון עז‬. Additionally, in Sifre Bemidbar (Pisqa 99; a Midrash from the school of R. Ishmael) the root ‫ר‬.‫ב‬.‫ ד‬is associated with harshness (‫ )לשון קשה‬in contrast to

1  See Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 226 and the parallel passage (Ibid., 267) in which Lev. 19:17a is referenced in the context of describing how the violation of minor commandments leads to the transgressing of more severe commandments.

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the root ‫ר‬.‫מ‬.‫א‬, which is associated with supplication (‫)לשון תחנונים‬.2 The particular connotations of the root ‫ר‬.‫ב‬.‫ ד‬provided by these tannaitic midrashim lend themselves well to the assertive and polemical mode of speech that one might associate with rebuke, and thus it is not surprising to find a comment glossing the word ‫ דברים‬to mean rebuke at the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy where Moses begins his final address to the people.3 Adopting this understanding of ‫דברים‬, Sifre Devarim establishes Moses as the exemplary rebuker who serves as a model for subsequent biblical figures. Deuteronomy 1:1 begins: “These are the words that Moses addressed to all Israel on the other side of the Jordan.” Glossing this verse, the first Pisqa of Sifre Devarim opens with five exegetical sections, each of which follows the same form. First a biblical verse (beginning with either: “words of” [‫ ]דברי‬or “these are the words [of]” [)‫ )]אלה דברי(ם‬is presented that ostensibly encapsulates the entirety of a particular figure’s words. Second, the midrash rejects the hypothesis from the base verse that these words represent the sum of the figure’s words by asserting that the biblical character certainly prophesied4 more than the limited selection proposed. In three of the cases, a proof-text for the figure’s proliferative literary output reinforces the rejection of the hypothesis. The midrash then returns to the base verse, which it no longer understands as presenting the entirety of the figure’s words, and questions what the particular formulation implies. All five examples assert that the phrase indicating the words of the figure (]‫ אלה דברי[ם‬,‫ )דברי‬connotes rebuke. Finally, the midrash answers the question of how we know that the sections introduced by the base verse indicate rebuke by proffering a proof-text to support this reading. Through this standardized formula Sifre Devarim delineates five major examples of biblical figures rebuking others. The first of Sifre Devarim’s examples of 2  Kahana, Sifre on Numbers, 1:246, 653. However, note Menahem Kahana’s reservations about the distinction between ‫ דיבור‬and ‫ אמירה‬in biblical and rabbinic Hebrew (Ibid., 1:653–54). For additional examples from the amoraic midrashim see Margalioth, Midrash va-Yiqra Rabbah, 271; Theodor and Albeck, Midrash Bereshit Rabbah, 429; Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana 13:7; Yalkut Mekhiri Tehillim 106:18. On the shift in meaning of the root ‫ר‬.‫ב‬.‫ ד‬from the biblical period to the tannaitic period, see Gottlieb, “Language Understanding in Sifre Deuteronomy,” 60–1; Sarfatti, “Semantics of Mishnaic Hebrew and Interpretation of the Bible by the Tannaim,” 32–34. 3  Even later sections of Sifre Devarim appear to understand Deuteronomy as a work of rebuke. See Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 32 and Hammer, Sifre, 399. Additionally, the targumim understand Moses’ words, in part or in whole, as constituting rebuke (Maher, “Targum Pseudo-Jonathan of Deuteronomy 1.1–8,” 267–68, 277, and 289–90). 4  In all five examples some form of the word ‫( נתנבא‬prophesied) is used. The five figures include not only the classically understood prophets Amos and Jeremiah, but David and Solomon as well.

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rebuke serves as the prototype for the other four instances establishing Moses as the exemplar of rebuke whom all of the others emulate:5 1. These are the words (‫ ) ֵא ֶּלה ַה ְּד ָב ִרים‬that Moses addressed (Deut. 1:1) 2. Did Moses prophesy (‫ )נתנבא‬nothing but these words? Did he not write the entire Torah? 3. As it is said, Moses wrote the entire Torah (Deut. 31:9)?6 4. Why then does the verse state, These are the words that Moses addressed? 5. Hence we learn that they were words of rebuke (‫)תוכחות‬, 6. As it is said, So Jeshurun grew fat and kicked (Deut. 32:15).7 The word “these” (‫ ) ֵא ֶּלה‬in the base verse provokes exegetical attention (line 1). Why are “these” specifically highlighted as the words of Moses to the exclusion of others? The rabbis attributed the whole Pentateuch to Moses as verified by the inclusion of the proof-text that Moses wrote the entire Torah (line 3). Given that the word “these” cannot imply that Moses authored no other statements than Deuteronomy, the emphatic force of this term must be redirected to specify that the biblical passage conveys a particular type of statement (line 4) – namely, rebuke (line 5). Through deflecting the possibility that Deuteronomy encapsulates all of Moses’ words by bringing a verse to prove Moses wrote the whole Torah, Sifre Devarim intertwines the themes of rebuke and Torah. This connection is augmented by the fact that the Book of Deuteronomy itself constitutes a retelling and embodiment of the whole Torah.8 Furthermore, the emphatic force of the specifying element “these” highlights rebuke as a type of Torah that is somehow unique and worthy of particular attention. The theme of Moses’ rebuke as representative of Torah or the commandments more broadly also appears in two passages from the reconstruction of another tannaitic midrash on Deuteronomy – Mekhilta Devarim.9 The first example opens the entire work with the Holy One Blessed Be He declaring 5  On the nature of exemplarity in antiquity, see Roller, “Exemplarity in Roman Culture”; Novick, What Is Good, and What God Demands, chap. 8. 6  I have deviated here from the NJPS translation in order to highlight the presence of the term “Torah.” 7  Quotations from Sifre Devarim are based upon the translation by Reuven Hammer (Hammer, Sifre), although often biblical citations are changed to follow the NJPS translation. Unless otherwise noted, the Hebrew text follows Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy. 8  The Greek name for the book of Devarim, Deuteronomion, apparently is based upon a noncontextual reading of Deut. 17:18 but “is an apt designation for the book, which recapitulates the teachings of Genesis through Numbers” (Tigay, Deuteronomy, xi, 168). Several of the targumim also make mention of Torah in their opening discussion of Deut. 1:1. 9  This work is also known as Midrash Tannaim (see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 298–9). For a list of the few known fragments of this work, see Kahana, Manuscripts of the Halakhic Midrashim, 108–111. For a discussion of some of the problems

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that Moses’ rebuke is as precious as the Ten Commandments, a proposition affirmed by R. Ishmael.10 The second passage, glossing the phrase “to expound this teaching saying” (‫ּתֹורה ַהּזֹאת ֵלאמֹר‬ ָ ‫ה‬-‫ת‬ ַ ‫ ) ֵּב ֵאר ֶא‬from Deut. 1:5, spawns a vignette of Moses rebuking the people to come and relearn any Torah from him that they might have forgotten.11 The connection between rebuke and Torah generated in Sifre Devarim and augmented in Mekhilta Devarim suggests that reproof occupies a position of particular interest for the tannaim. There are several ways through which the framing of Moses’ Deuteronomic speech as rebuke at the opening of this midrash establishes Moses as the paradigmatic rebuker. First, the example of Moses appears at the head of the list of several biblical rebukers: Amos, Jeremiah, David, and Solomon. Each of the subsequent examples is introduced by the expression “similarly” (‫)כיוצא בו‬, marking their reproof in reference to that of Moses. In addition to priority within this list, Moses also chronologically predates the other figures. Despite the fact that the midrash will later turn to examples of rebuke among the patriarchs, and even assert that Moses himself learned from Jacob, at the outset Moses is presented as the earliest rebuker who serves as a model for those who follow. Beyond sequential and chronological exemplarity, the formulaic progression of the midrashic exposition of Moses’ words also serves as a model for the later examples. As noted, each of the five examples of a biblical rebuker follows the same established pattern of questioning whether a verse encapsulates with Hoffman’s reconstruction of this work, see Kahana, “New Fragments of the Mekilta on Deuteronomy,” 486n7, 495. 10  Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 1. The conclusion of Pisqa 2 in Sifre Devarim asks the same question as Pisqa 1: “Did Moses prophesy nothing but these words?” However, instead of referring to Deut. 1:1, all of the manuscripts indicate that this is a reference to the Ten Commandments. This is contrary to the version Finkelstein includes in the body of his text, which is based on Midrash ha-Gadol (Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 11). Hammer suggests that: “this Midrash was originally concerned with the question of the relation of the Ten Commandments to the rest of the Torah” (Hammer, Sifre, 392–3). We find another potential link between the Ten Commandments and rebuke in Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael where a gloss on Exod. 13:19a includes a brief discussion of the Ten Commandments followed by glosses on Lev. 19:17–18 (Lauterbach, Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, 1:179–81). 11  Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 4. Two factors indicate that the context of this passage is rebuke despite the midrash stating that “Moses said (‫ )אמר‬to them” rather than rebuked them (‫)הוכיחם‬. First, it is immediately preceded by R. Joshua glossing the previous words “Moses undertook” (‫הֹואיל מ ֶֹׁשה‬ ִ ) as referring to rebuke. However, note that no manuscripts of the parallel to this text in Sifre Devarim 4 include this line attributed to R. Joshua. Second, the recreation of Moses’ words is set at his deathbed (‫)סמוך למיתה‬ and this story appears shortly after a passage highlighting the importance of waiting until one’s deathbed (‫ )סמוך למיתה‬to rebuke. Hence this section should be understood as describing part of Moses’ rebuke.

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the totality of the figures speech, challenging that the person certainly had more to say, redefining the base verse as rebuke, and offering a proof-text to support this assertion. Reuse of this same rhetorical structure marks the case of Moses as exemplary for establishing that particular words constitute rebuke. Thus, in addition to its sequential and chronological priority, Moses’ rebuke is also paradigmatic as the formula for assessing later instances of rebuke. Although this opening example sets up Moses as the optimal rebuker, already within this archetypical case there is a hint of the detrimental consequences reproof easily engenders. There is a significant textual gap between the opening verse of Deuteronomy purported to designate rebuke (line 1) and the example proffered to prove that Moses’ words actually constitute rebuke (line 6). The latter comes from the opposite end of the Book of Deuteronomy in chapter 32. Why does Sifre Devarim select a proof-text supporting the interpretation of Deut. 1:1 that appears so many chapters later rather than opting for a more local verse?12 It is possible that selecting an example from near the end of the book of Deuteronomy demonstrates that the book begins and ends with rebuke, indicating that this is true of the rest of its contents as well.13 However, such a solution still does not answer the question of why specifically Deut. 32:15 was selected. Deut. 32:15 appears in the two column poetic section toward the end of the Pentateuch. After an initial exordium, the first major portion of the poem discusses God’s relationship with the Israelites.14 Verse 15 introduces several lines that emphasize the people’s disloyalty to God. God watched over and protected the people, providing them with all of their needs (Deut. 32:10–14), but the people responded like a kicking cow, forsaking and spurning God: “So Jeshurun grew fat and kicked – You grew fat and gross and coarse – He forsook the God who made him and spurned the Rock of his support” (Deut. 32:15). On the one hand, this verse points out how the people disobeyed God and thus serves as a simple example of Moses rebuking the Israelites by pointing out their failings. 12  Even if the editor of this section did not recognize any immediately local proof verse, there are numerous other possible verses in Deuteronomy from which an example of rebuke could have been drawn. For example, Deuteronomy 28 includes a vast section of blessings and curses (eventually known as the “rebuke section”) that certainly offer plenty of relevant material. Targum Pseudo-Jonathan explicitly labels this section beginning from Deut. 28:15 as words of rebuke (‫)כד פתח משה נביא למימר פיתגמי אוכחותא האילין‬. 13  While Deut. 32:15 is near the end of the book of Deuteronomy, there are still a significant number of verses before the conclusion of the entire Pentateuch. However, the verses in Ha’azinu, the penultimate parasha of the Torah, offer a much stronger example of rebuke than the material in the final parasha (ve-Zot ha-Berakha) which is explicitly formulated as a final blessing rather than chastisement. 14  See Jeffrey Tigay’s outline of the deuteronomic poem (Tigay, Deuteronomy, 299).

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On the other hand, the use of this particular verse foreshadows the negative effects of rebuke. God acted for the benefit of the people who then responded by kicking; so too one who rebukes another in order to help them is often met with a retaliatory response. By selecting a verse that explicitly revolves around a negative response to an act of benevolence in order to confirm that Moses’ words constitute rebuke, Sifre Devarim hints at the link between rebuke and people’s reflexive rejection of such helpful correction. Just as the Israelites kicked back against God’s support, one who is rebuked instinctively becomes self-defensive and dismissive. Introducing such a defensive posture as the proof-text for the midrashic claim that Moses is rebuking the people subtly indicates that rebuke in general, even when performed by someone as exemplary as Moses, provokes negative reactions. 2

“To All Israel”

The second major segment of the first Pisqa in Sifre Devarim continues explicating Deut. 1:1 with three anonymous glosses on the words “to all Israel.” The midrashic comments on this phrase reveal the type of backlash that Moses anticipated against his admonishment. This section transforms the theoretical concern of contemptuous responses to rebuke (hinted at above) into concrete examples. It is only due to Moses’ skill as a rebuker that he is able to avoid these pitfalls. By illustrating how the exemplary figure of Moses narrowly avoids these dangers, Sifre Devarim opens up the possibility that those who are not so proficient at reproof will likely be unable to anticipate, and thereby escape, antagonistic reactions. Deut. 1:1 specifies that Moses spoke “to all Israel” (‫) ֶאל ָּכל יִ ְׂש ָר ֵאל‬, eliciting several midrashic interpretations of why the verse specifically refers to “all” of the people.15 Each of the different glosses simultaneously refines our understanding of how Moses’ approach constitutes the ideal form of rebuke and highlights the dangers involved in engaging in such activity. The first of these glosses presents the theoretical scenario in which Moses only gathered some of the people to illustrate the wisdom of his decision to reprimand them all at once:

15  Rashi, in his comments on Deut. 1:1, presents these different glosses as sequential and connected (Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 3). For a discussion of different approaches to reading these glosses, see Moshe David Avraham Trevish Askhkenazi, Sifre, 2.

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To all Israel (Deut. 1:1): Had he rebuked only some of them, those who were in the market place (‫ )שבשוק‬might have said, “You have heard this from the son of Amram, and you did not answer him back (‫ולא הייתם‬ ‫ !?)משיבים לו דבר כך מכך‬Had we been there, we would have responded to him four or five times (‫ )ארבע וחמש פעמים‬for every one of his words (‫על‬ ‫”!)כל דבר ודבר‬ If Moses had focused on only a portion of the people, then those who were not present for the rebuke would have goaded the rebuked Israelites for not responding to Moses with several witty retorts. When carried out improperly by only including some culpable individuals, rebuke can proliferate itself in detrimental forms. First, the marketplace-Israelites effectively rebuke their compatriots for not challenging Moses (“You have heard … and you did not answer him back?!).16 Not only do the marketplace-Israelites employ a somewhat disrespectful moniker for Moses (“the son of Amram”), but their rebuke attacks the validity of Moses’ warranted criticisms by suggesting that the others should have defended their improper actions.17 Their challenge also clearly stems from self-promoting motives of asserting their superiority over their colleagues (“you did not answer back … we would have responded”). Another adverse reaction to only rebuking some of the population is that the marketplace-Israelites who escape the immediacy of Moses’ charges have the opportunity to muster attacks on Moses himself. The repetition of the word ‫ דבר‬in this section – “you did not answer him back” (‫ולא הייתם משיבים לו‬ ‫ )דבר כך מכך‬and “for every one of his words” (‫ – !)על כל דבר ודבר‬harkens back to the rebuke connotation of this term established at the outset, implying that an improperly performed rebuke can backfire in the form of retaliatory challenges against the original rebuker. Furthermore, the marketplace-Israelites boast that they would have responded “four or five times” (‫ )ארבע וחמש פעמים‬against Moses. The language of “four or five times” may reference the parallel language 16  Had the midrash begun the words of those in the marketplace with their potential response to Moses (“Had we been there …”) the force of their statement would merely have implied that their fellow Israelites’ response was deficient and that these Israelites could have done better. By opposing a statement in second person direct speech against what the rebuked Israelites did not do with what the marketplace Israelites would have done, their words carry a strong sense of critique against the former’s lack of action. 17  The nomenclature, “the son of Amram” (‫)בן עמרם‬, appears several times in Sifre Devarim in the mouth of combative figures where it may have a negative connotation. See later in this Pisqa as well as in Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 20. However, in comparing Moses to other prophets, the anonymous voice of Sifre Devarim also uses this moniker with what appears to be a positive force (see Ibid., 148). Nevertheless, Finkelstein, in the name of Louis Ginzberg, notes that this is a disgraceful title (‫ ;לשון גנאי‬Ibid., 4).

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in Sifra that impels a rebuker to reiterate an ineffective rebuke even after “four or five times.”18 An improper rebuke not only generates a challenging response, but can proliferate and multiply the number of attacks, forcing the rebuker to respond to each point. In this way, improper rebuke may incite a continual cycle of escalating verbal exchanges. Moses’ sagacious decision to gather all of the people together not only avoided any pushback against his rebuke but also prevented some of the people from rebuking others for not generating multiple responses.19 In this way, Moses’ action exemplifies the proper form of rebuke that avoids both the problem of an unreceptive audience as well as the potential snowballing of counter critiques. The first interpretation of “to all Israel” highlights the disadvantages of only targeting some of the offending parties at once by constructing a fictitious alternative scenario. The second of the three glosses presents what Moses actually did when he gathered all of the Israelites together. While the first interpretation suggests that anyone not present may have assembled multiple rejoinders, this gloss engages with the possibility of responses even by those standing directly before Moses: “Another interpretation: To all Israel (Deut. 1:1): Hence we learn that Moses had gathered them all together, from the oldest to the youngest, and said to them, ‘I am about to rebuke you. If anyone has anything to say in rebuttal, let him come forth and speak.’ ” Moses is imagined to have explicitly informed the Israelites that he intends to rebuke them. This prepares the people for what is about to follow so as not to catch them off guard. By preemptively revealing his intentions to the people rather than simply beginning with harsh words, Moses diffuses the situation and deflects spontaneous emotional reactions. Being forewarned, the people are less likely to react instinctively like the kicking cow encountered above. Not only does Moses caution the Israelites about what to expect but he also invites them to respond, thereby maintaining control over the conversation. This second gloss on “to all Israel” thus tempers the first, which implied that Moses gathered all of the people in order to avoid them challenging his words. Moses is receptive to responses so long as they do not spiral into a war of criticism.

18  See my discussion of this phrase in the previous chapter. 19  The midrash assumes that gathering all of the Israelites together for Moses’ words avoids the problem of some of them challenging his critiques. It is not entirely clear whether this is because none of the people would actually be haughty enough to respond to Moses before the entire community or if none of them would have been able to come up with an appropriate response in the moment. Either way, the second gloss on “to all Israel” addresses the possibility of some Israelites having retorts even if all of the people had been gathered together for the original rebuke.

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The third and final gloss on “to all Israel” switches the focus from Moses to the people themselves: “Another interpretation: To all Israel (Deut. 1:1): Hence we learn that all of them were masters of rebuke (‫ )בעלי תוכחה‬and able to stand up under rebuke (‫)יכולים לעמוד בתוכחות‬.” The phrase “masters of rebuke” is ambiguous and can be interpreted in two antithetical directions. The first possibility is to read “masters of rebuke” as indicating that all of the people were receiving or deserving of rebuke.20 According to this interpretation, Moses was fully warranted in his decision to rebuke all of the people as he knew that their actions necessitated chastisement. Alternatively, the phrase could mean that all of the people were rebukers themselves or regularly gave rebuke.21 Together with the subsequent pronouncement that everyone was able to “stand up under rebuke,” this understanding implies that everyone was proficient at giving and receiving rebuke. This depiction of the Israelites stands in stark contrast to that of the generation of the early rabbis who declare themselves incapable of giving or receiving rebuke, which appears in the next section of this Pisqa. The different glosses on the words “to all Israel” emphasize Moses’ astute decisions in rebuking the people, advancing the theme of his exemplarity. As the paradigmatic rebuker, Moses has the foresight to anticipate the potential complications with his critique (i.e., that those not present would challenge it) and to preemptively construct the optimal setting by gathering everyone together. Through bringing everyone together and offering them an opportunity to speak first, Moses ensures that they will accept the rebuke appropriately without becoming immediately defensive. Additionally, the interpretation that all of the Israelites must have been able to stand up to rebuke reveals the predilection for exclusively offering rebuke to those who are capable of receiving and properly responding. Despite this positive portrayal of Moses, these three glosses also subtly expose the challenges that a rebuker faces. If a rebuke is not situated and executed precisely, one runs the risk of a strong and violent backlash. This portion of our midrash thus continues to laud Moses as the paradigmatic rebuker but also develops the concern of detrimental responses to rebuke hinted at previously. 20  This is the interpretation adopted by Hammer (Hammer, Sifre, 24). Pseudo-Raabad understands the phrase ‫ בעלי תוכחה‬to mean receivers of rebuke (‫)מקבלי תוכחה‬. See Pseudo-Raabad and Basser, Commentary to Sifre Deuteronomy, 5. 21  Hammer, Sifre, 390n7. R. Hillel ben Eliaqim understands the phrase to imply that they regularly rebuked one another (‫( )שהיו מוכיחין זה את זה‬Hillel ben Eliaqim and Koleditzky, Sifre le-ha-Tana ha-Elohi Rabbenu Shimon ben Yoḥai, 2). This meaning is in line with the biblical formulation that we find in Prov. 29:1 (‫ּתֹוכחֹות‬ ָ ‫) ִאיׁש‬. See Michael Fox’s comments on this structure in Fox, Proverbs 10–31, 833–34. Also, BDB, 407, s.v. ‫ ;תוכחת‬DCH, 604, s.v. 2 ‫ ;תוכחת‬HALOT, 4:1699 s.v. ,‫ תוכחת‬2 ‫ יכח‬:‫תכחת‬.

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The Attributed Portion of the Sifra Material in Sifre Devarim

The three glosses on the phrase “to all Israel” thematically pave the way for the next section of Sifre Devarim, which imports the attributed portion of Sifra’s comments on Lev. 19:17.22 We observed that one reading of the final interpretation of “to all Israel” suggested that the Israelites were both able to adequately give and receive rebuke. By contrast, the voices of the tannaim taken from Sifra deplore that no one in their generation is able to properly give or receive rebuke. If previously the dangers of rebuke were hinted at by Moses’ expert tactics, the present section suggests that the difficulty involved in proper reproof renders the practice inapplicable. There are a few significant differences in the text of the attributed passage as it appears in the two tannaitic midrashim.23 While the manuscripts of Sifra consistently associate R. Tarfon with the position that no one is capable of rebuking, several witnesses to Sifre Devarim lack this position entirely and identify R. Tarfon as the one denying the presence of people capable of receiving rebuke (excluding R. Elazar ben Azariyah entirely).24 By opening with this position, Sifre Devarim smoothly transitions from the discussion of the Israelites who were capable of receiving rebuke to the current generation which is not.25 22  It is my contention that Sifra is the original context for the attributed section that was later adopted by Sifre Devarim. Joshua Moss notes that the appearance of this section in Sifre Devarim is “a much poorer ‘fit’ in this context than it was in Sifra, where the topic of giving and receiving rebuke was actually in view in the base text” (Moss, Midrash and Legend, 260). He concludes that: “Although the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, I believe that Sifre Devarim knew the version in Sifra” (Moss, 261). While I concur with Moss’ judgment, he seems to ignore the presence of the three glosses on “to all Israel” which directly lead into the attributed section. Nevertheless, Moss is correct in arguing that the attributed section fits more firmly into the context of Sifra than Sifre Devarim. 23  On this passage as it appears in Sifra, see the previous chapter. 24  MSS JTS Rab. 2392, Berlin Tübingen 1594.33, London 341 and the editio princeps (Venice, 1545) all preserve the reading of R. Tarfon stating that no one is able to receive rebuke and exclude any mention of R. Elazar ben Azariyah (note that MS London employs the term ‫ שיודע‬instead of ‫)שיכול‬. By contrast, MSS Vatican 32 and Oxford Neubauer 151 maintain R. Tarfon’s position as referring to one who is able to rebuke and R. Elazar ben Azariyah as holding that no one is able to receive rebuke. The latter (MS Oxford) also appears to be somewhat corrupt, including an additional position attributed to R. Azariyah which is identical with that of R. Elazar ben Azariyah. This is likely a scribal error due to homeoteleuton. 25  The exclusion of the position discussing the suitability of the generation for giving rebuke may have appeared extraneous given R. Akiva’s position that no one knows how to rebuke. If the editor(s) of Sifre Devarim saw these two statements as virtually synonymous, it would not be surprising that the former was excluded.

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Aside from this switch in positions, there are several significant variations in R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s anecdote. In Sifra, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s complaint against R. Akiva resulted in the latter being whipped (‫)לקה‬. By contrast, Sifre Devarim employs the verb ‫נתקנתר‬, which likely means to “strike with a goad,” ostensibly a more brutal act.26 In Sifre Devarim R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s words include the addition of the location Yavneh, which adds a greater element of specificity and locates the anecdote in an area of rabbinic control. In addition, the number of times R. Yoḥanan rebuked R. Akiva appears as “more than five” rather than “four or five.”27 Sifra’s language of “four or five” aligns with its simple commentary while Sifre Devarim does not use this language despite the appearance of the phrase several lines prior in the first gloss on “to all Israel.” Beyond these differences, the version preserved in Sifre Devarim ends with R. Akiva increasing love for R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri for each and every rebuke (‫)על כל אחת ואחת‬.28 This parallels the language of the first gloss on “to all Israel” where the marketplace-Israelites would have responded to each of Moses’ words (‫)על כל דבר ודבר‬. Finally, Sifre Devarim includes an explicit citation of Proverbs 9:8, a verse that may have been implicit in the Sifra’s version of the story. According to Prov. 9:8, the fool hates the one who rebukes him while the wise man loves his rebuker. The explicit quotation of the verse following R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s statement frames R. Akiva’s loving response as an actualization of the prescribed response of the wise man. In general, some of these differences between the related passage in Sifra and Sifre Devarim reflect their contexts. As noted, the parallel language of “for each and every rebuke” and the variant position attributed to R. Tarfon in Sifre Devarim link this material to the previous section of “to all Israel.” Furthermore, the switch from lashes (‫ )לקה‬to striking with a goad (‫ )נתקנתר‬aligns this section with a later pericope in Pisqa 16 that also uses the latter root and refers to some of the same tannaitic figures. However, not all of the differences directly link to other elements in Sifre Devarim. Nevertheless, they may have been intentional

26  Both Aharon Shemesh and Louis Finkelstein connect this term to the Greek κεντρόω. However, while Finkelstein suggests interpreting the thrust of this term in a weaker fashion (‫)לרגז‬, Shemesh adopts the more forceful physical act of striking (Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 4; Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning and the Obligation to Testify,” 156). Shemesh goes on to note that occasionally ‫ קנתר‬can have alternative meanings with less physical connotations, however these cases often appear in the form of ‫( דברי קינתורין‬Ibid., 156). 27  “More than five” is the reading preserved by most manuscripts (MSS Vatican, London, and Oxford) and the editio princeps. However, MS JTS reads “many times” (‫ )פעמים הרבה‬and MS Berlin reads “100 times” (‫)ק' פעמים‬. 28  This appears in all but the editio princeps.

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for enhancing the story – such as through the specification of Yavneh and the addition of Prov. 9:8 to lend biblical support to the anecdote.29 From a literary perspective, the attributed portion of the Sifra material and the “to all Israel” section form a loose chiastic structure that highlights the point where these sections meet. The first gloss on “to all Israel” and R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s statement share the language of “for every one of his words/rebukes” (‫ )על כל דבר ודבר \ על כל אחת ואחת‬as well as the number five.30 Moreover, the former section portrays a potential example of a problematic response to rebuke while the latter section inverts this message with an “actual” example of a perfect loving response. The second gloss on “to all Israel,” which specifies exactly how Moses performed his act of rebuking (gathering the people from old to young and preemptively asking for responses), aligns with R. Akiva’s declaration that no one in his generation knows how to properly rebuke. Finally, the last of the three glosses, which asserts that all of Israel was able to withstand rebuke, stands in direct dialogue with R. Tarfon’s pronouncement that no one in his generation is able to receive rebuke. In contrast to the apex of the chiasmus in Sifra that highlighted the limitations of rebuke, the central point of this structure in Sifre Devarim accentuates the shift from the Israelites who could receive rebuke to the generation of the rabbis who are unable to do so.31 By juxtaposing the Mosaic exemplary case of rebuke in the three glosses on “to all Israel” with the two tannaitic pessimistic descriptions of the current generation, Sifre Devarim exposes a sharp contrast between the biblical and contemporary periods. This discord is heightened by the fact that the midrash began with a list of all the biblical figures who successfully rebuked the people. While figures of the biblical past were able to both properly give and receive

29  Simon-Shoshan argues that “ostensibly superfluous detail can actually play an important role in a story’s rhetorical strategy. It is precisely an abundance of details in a story that allows the text to create the illusion of a complete narrative world in which the characters play out the action of the story. This serves not only an aesthetic function but a rhetorical one as well. The more a reader feels that the story takes place in a recognizable world, the more likely he is to internalize the lessons of the story as reflecting the values and workings of the real world” (Simon-Shoshan, Stories of the Law, 222). 30  The version of the attributed section that appears in Sifre Devarim lacks the full formulation of “four or five” as it appears in Sifra, which would have formed a closer parallel to the language in the “to all Israel” section. 31  The center point of the chiasmus is once again located between the exegetical section and the attributed section, dividing between the two (see Thomson, Chiasmus in the Pauline Letters, 35).

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rebuke, according to R. Tarfon and R. Akiva, there is no one of such ability at the present time.32 4

Moses’ Difficulties with Rebuke and the End of the First Pisqa

Despite Moses’ carefully crafted rebuke, the midrash goes on (after incorporating the material from Sifra) to describe the popular resentment of Moses’ reprimand. The earlier “to all Israel” section portrayed how some Israelites might have reacted negatively to Moses’ rebuke by attacking their compatriots. Overall, the section highlighted how Moses shrewdly avoided some of the potential dangers of rebuke. Now, however, Sifre Devarim shifts to present an attack directed personally toward Moses and eventually (in Pisqa 3) to reveal the internal monologue of Moses’ own thought process. These passages pick up on the theoretical hazards of rebuke depicted above, concretizing them to reveal how Moses encountered these difficulties. One interpretation of the words “in the wilderness” (Deut. 1:1) asserts that “we learn that he rebuked them for what they had done in the wilderness.”33 The subsequent gloss, however, presents an angered reaction by the people: “They seized their infant sons and daughters and hurled them into Moses’ bosom, saying to him, ‘Son of Amram, what ration or sustenance do you intend to provide for them?”34 While this attack on Moses is not directly framed as in response to Moses’ rebuke, the derogatory use of the appellation “Son of Amram,” which appeared shortly before in the hypothetical rejoinders of the people to Moses’ rebukes, as well as the overall context of this section as revolving around rebuke, suggest that this challenge reflects the type of retort Moses could have anticipated. A more explicit depiction of the threat Moses faced appears in the third Pisqa, which inserts a note of anxiety into his voice: So also Moses said, “If I rebuke Israel first at this time, they will say of me, ‘It is because he has no power to bring us into the land and to overthrow Sihon and Og before us that he is rebuking us!’ ” That is why he waited until he had brought them into the land and had overthrown Sihon and Og before them, and only then did he proceed to rebuke them.35 32  However, the biblical case should not be taken as completely idyllic as all of the people clearly did something wrong to warrant being rebuked. 33  Hammer, Sifre, 24. 34  Ibid., 24. 35  Ibid., 30. See the parallel in Mekhilta Devarim 1:4 (Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 4).

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This passage contrasts the image of Moses as the unwavering leader from the opening of Pisqa 1 with the possibility that even this preeminent figure feared the potential backlash from a miscalculated attempt at rebuke. Moses simultaneously stands as an inimitable paradigm for proper rebuke and a source of relief that rebuke is a difficult endeavor even for the expert, implying that one should always anticipate a negative reaction.36 While the former depiction imagines rebuke as a difficult yet feasible activity, the latter view problematizes rebuke entirely. Even the paradigmatic leader Moses, who took extreme precautions to ensure a successful rebuke, feared or even faced a negative response. The broader message that emerges from these passages is that preeminent figures in the biblical period could rebuke, but as even they confronted vociferous opposition, later individuals should think twice before rebuking.37 5

Deathbed Rebuke

The theme of rebuke continues into the second Pisqa, which highlights another of Moses’ rebuke tactics; this time one that he inherited from the patriarchs. This section explicitly recommends postponing rebuke in order to avoid detrimental consequences: 1. Another Interpretation: It was in the fortieth year (Deut. 1:3): Hence we learn that he rebuked them only when he was about to die. From whom did he learn this? From Jacob, who rebuked his sons only when he was about to die, as it is said, And Jacob called his sons and said, “Come together that I may tell you what is to befall you in days to come” (Gen. 49:1). Reuven, you are my first-born (Gen. 49:3) – do we not know that Reuven is 36  Tzvi Novick emphasizes the “gap” between the past and the present that at times “may be so great as to be inimitable” (Novick, What Is Good, and What God Demands, 203). A similar instance can been seen in Novick’s discussion of the case of Moses needing to “meditate between sections and between topics;” there, the rabbis offer the argument that “if one who hears from the Holy One and speaks in the holy spirit must meditate between sections and between topics, how much more so an ordinary person who hears from an ordinary person” (Novick, 203–204). 37  Alternatively, one could suggest that the inability of Moses to fully compensate for all eventualities teaches that people should rebuke and not feel disheartened for not succeeding perfectly. However, I find this reading less convincing as the initial image of Moses contrasts him with the abilities of the tannaim who are largely unable to rebuke, and the backlash that Moses receives appears to confirm their hesitations rather than undermine them. Additionally, the difficulties Moses faced in rebuking suggest that R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s cavalier report of numerous rebukes ending in love is exaggerated or misinterpreted. See my discussion of this material in the previous chapter.

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3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

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the first-born? Rather this tells us that Jacob said to him, “Reuven, my son, let me tell you why I did not rebuke you all these years: so that you would not leave me and go off to cleave to my brother Esau.” There are four reasons why A should not rebuke B until A is about to die: So that A would not be rebuking B over and over again; so that, whenever B sees A, he would not feel ashamed; so that B would not hold a grudge against A [‫[ ;]ושלא יהא בלבו עליו‬and so that B would depart from A in peace],38 for rebuke should bring about peace. You find the same things concerning Abraham, as it is said, And Abraham reproached Abimelech (Gen. 21:25). And what does it say subsequently? And the two of them made a pact (Gen. 21:27). So also concerning Isaac, as it is said, Isaac said to them, “Why have you come to me, seeing that you have been hostile to me and have driven me away from you?” (Gen. 26:27). And what does it say subsequently? Isaac then bade them farewell, and they departed from him in peace (Gen. 26:31). So also you find that Joshua rebuked Israel only when he was about to die, as it is said, Or, if you are loath to serve the LORD, choose this day which ones you are going to serve (Josh. 24:15), followed by, But the people replied to Joshua, “No, we will serve the LORD!” Thereupon Joshua said to the people … “You are witnesses,” etc. (Josh. 24:21–22). So also you find that Samuel rebuked Israel only when he was about to die, as it is said, “Here I am! Testify against me, in the presence of the LORD and in the presence of His anointed one” … They responded, “You have not defrauded us,” etc. He said to them, “The LORD then is witness” … They responded, “He is!” (1 Sam. 12:3–5). And finally you find that David rebuked Solomon his son only when he was about to die, as it is said, When David’s life was drawing to a close, he instructed his son Solomon as follows: “I am going the way of all the earth” (1 Kgs. 2:1–2). Moses addressed the Israelites (Deut. 1:3): Did Moses prophesy only the Ten Commandments? Particularly, whence do we learn that (he also taught) all of the commandments of the Torah, arguments a fortiori, arguments from verbal analogy, arguments from general categories and specific applications, the major rules and the details? From the verse, Moses addressed the Israelites in accordance with the instructions that the LORD had given him for them (Deut. 1:3).

38  This line does not appear in any of the manuscripts and is introduced by Finkelstein. See my discussion below.

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This portion of Sifre Devarim begins and ends with several biblical examples of deathbed rebuke (sections 1, 5–7).39 Following the initial examples of Moses and Jacob’s deathbed rebukes, we find a generalized statement of several major reasons why someone should wait until the last moments before death in order to rebuke. The conclusion of these rationales summarizes the ultimate goal of rebuke as peace, introducing two patriarchal examples of Jacob’s forefathers Abraham and Isaac fostering peace with Abimelech through rebuke.40 The opening quotation from Deuteronomy introduces a gloss on the verse’s specification that Moses’ speech took place in the fortieth year. This was the final year of the Israelites’ wandering in the desert and, as it was already the eleventh month, Moses would soon pass away before the people entered the land. The midrash does not feel compelled to once again ask how we know that this verse is dealing with the topic of rebuke, as the introductory explanation of Moses’ words at the start of Sifre Devarim is presumed to pervade the entire section. The immediate question thus concerns why Moses rebukes the people specifically at this juncture. Moses, who served as the paradigmatic rebuker at the outset of Sifre Devarim, apparently honed his strategy from Jacob whose words serve as the earliest example of deathbed rebuke.41 39  In some ways section 8 stands as an independent section within this larger unit. However, its relevance will be made clear below in my discussion of Pisqaot 1 and 2 as a literary unit. We can also note related deathbed rebuke material later in Sifre Devarim, which specifies that Jacob first rebuked each of his sons individually before gathering them all together (Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 53; Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 24). For a broader discussion of deathbed scenes in rabbinic literature (which skips our example however), see Saldarini, “Last Words and Deathbed Scenes in Rabbinic Literature.” 40  This section of Sifre Devarim includes a total of seven biblical examples divided between the topics of deathbed rebuke and rebuke leading to peace (Moses, Jacob, Abraham, Isaac, Joshua, Samuel, and David). Hammer has noted that the final example of King David is hardly an example of rebuke since it is framed as a blessing (Hammer, Sifre, 392n11). Nevertheless, the inclusion of the final example of David enhances the literary structure of the overall section by bringing the total number of biblical examples to seven, which is a prominent and significant number of folk and literary traditions (for a non-exhaustive list of examples see Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk-Literature, 6:688–89). For scholarship on the rabbinic use of seven elements to structure a passage, see Friedman, “Some Structural Patterns of Talmudic Sugiot,” 397–8; Rubenstein, “Some Structural Patterns of Yerushalmi Sugyot.” 41  There is a parallel passage in Sifre Devarim, Pisqa 54 that describes both Jacob and Moses only rebuking at the end of their lives (‫ ;משכלו ימיו משנטה למות‬Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 122; Hammer, Sifre, 112). Also note the parallel discussion of Jacob and Moses’ rebukes in Mekhilta Devarim 11:28 (Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 46). This material ascribed to Mekhilta Devarim is affirmed by a fragment published by Schechter (Schechter, “The Mekhilta to Deuteronomy,” 695–96). However, note that Abraham Goldberg suggests that this Pisqa belongs to the school of R. Ishmael (Goldberg, “The

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Citing the opening of Jacob’s final blessings to his sons in Gen. 49, the midrash points out the superfluity of Jacob reiterating to his elder son Reuven that he is the firstborn child. Accordingly, the addition of this detail in Jacob’s speech conveys a lesson to his son that relates to his status of being the firstborn – the concern that Reuven might flee to another firstborn, Esau. Jacob explains to Reuven why he did not rebuke him during his lifetime, waiting instead until the moment of his death. The underlying assumption behind Jacob’s explanation is that rebuke should take place in closer proximity to the offending action. Jacob’s statement to Reuven that his fear of abandonment prompted him to diverge from the anticipated norm of time-sensitive rebuke implies that when no extenuating circumstances interfere, the ideal rebuke should in fact take place closer to the problematic incident.42 Yet, despite manufacturing this premise, the midrash assumes deathbed rebuke, which is adopted by key biblical figures, to be the optimal form of rebuke.43 The midrash may even have been attuned to this shift from conditional to general practice insofar as Sifre Devarim interjects several general rationales that explain why rebuke should regularly be deferred until the end. Jacob’s exceptional circumstance that persuades him to postpone reprimand is his fear that Reuven might become upset and leave him. Yet, it is not only the anxiety of abandonment that concerns Jacob, but primarily the possibility that his angered firstborn would take refuge with another scorned firstborn, Jacob’s elder brother Esau.44 While in later rabbinic literature Esau becomes a paradigm for Christianity, in tannaitic material his presence is more likely a synecdoche for the Roman Empire or the non-Jewish Other.45 Alternatively, Esau School of Rabbi Akiva and the School of Rabbi Ishmael in Sifre Deuteronomy, Pericopes 1–54”). 42  Naphtali Zevi Berlin (also known as the Neẓiv) explains that since Jacob was dying, he was no longer worried that his rebuke would embarrass his children to the point at which they would leave him (Naphtali Zevi Judah Berlin, Sifre, 3:7). 43  The major exception to this principle, of course, are Abraham and Isaac’s rebukes of Abimelech, which presumably trump delay as they cultivate the ultimate goal of peace. 44  Moshe David Avraham Trevish Askhkenazi, Sifre, 8. Jacob’s deathbed “blessings” to his children (Gen. 49) may resonate in the mind of the interpreter with Isaac’s deathbed blessings to his sons Jacob and Esau in Gen. 27, particularly since the episode quoted a few lines later concerning Isaac’s rebuke of Abimelech leading to peace in Gen. 26 comes right before Isaac’s final blessing. The negative relationship between Isaac and Esau is also highlighted at the conclusion of Gen. 26 where Esau’s new wives are a source of bitterness for Isaac and his wife. 45  Ginzberg noted that: “The use of the names Edom, Seir, Esau, and similar ones, to describe Rome is very old, and probably coined at the time of Herod … In the Amoraic portions of the talmudic and midrashic literature the use of Edom for Rome is met with quite frequently … The appellation of Edom for Rome is rarely found in tannaitic sources”

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may simply be a literary element conducive for explaining the verbose biblical verse.46 However, we should not overlook rabbinic negative associations with Esau and the possibility that his appearance here points to a concern over rebuke prompting someone to break from the proper path in anger. Regardless of Jacob’s particular motivation, we see here a fear of rebuke that prompts the act to be postponed as long as possible. The anxiety surrounding rebuke illustrated in the previous sections of Sifre Devarim resulted in a carefully planned approach. By contrast, rather than articulating a deliberate method, Pisqa 2 encourages avoidance almost entirely. This marks a further problematization of rebuke and a progression toward suppressing the act entirely. 6

Four Reasons to Postpone Rebuke until One’s Deathbed

Following Moses and Jacob’s examples of deathbed rebuke, Sifre Devarim suggests that there are “four” motivations for waiting until death to rebuke. This section is problematic in two ways. First, while the introductory line announces four reasons, all of the manuscripts enumerate only three. Finkelstein, in his critical edition of the text, constructs a fourth reason in order to solve this dilemma: “so that B would depart from A in peace.”47 The second issue with (Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, 5:272n19). However, Moshe Herr presents one clear example of Esau referring to the Roman Empire in tannaitic midrashim, which happens to appear in Sifre Devarim 41 (Herr, “Roman Rule in Tannaitic Literature,” 117; Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 85). For other possible examples in tannaitic literature and for a discussion of the origins of the use of “Esau” as referring to the Roman Empire, see Herr, “Roman Rule in Tannaitic Literature,” 118, 123 ff. There is a plethora of literature on the role of Esau in rabbinic literature, much of which overemphasizes the metaphorical usage of his character as a polemic against Christianity. For wide-ranging discussions see Bakhos, “Figuring (out) Esau,” 251–3; Aminof, “The Figures of Esau and the Kingdom of Edom in Palestinian Midrashic-Talmudic Literature in the Tannaic and Amoraic Periods.” For an assessment of this midrashic episode in particular and the possibility of the temptation of Roman culture in general, see Ibid., 32n11, 177. The context here draws on the fraternal relationship of Esau and Jacob, which is a trope in itself (Langer, “Brother Esau?”). 46  Carol Bakhos asserts that the figure of Esau can depict many different things in rabbinic literature but “Esau at times is used merely to explain a scriptural philological ‘irritant’, and he is symbolic of neither Rome, nor Christianity, nor of Other, an indication of the rabbinic resistance to stabilising the meaning of scripture” (Bakhos, “Figuring (out) Esau,” 260). 47  Finkelstein notes that his fourth reason does not appear in any of the manuscripts and printed editions. He adds it into his text based on the commentary of R. Isaac ben Asher ha-Levi (see Judah ben Eliezer, Obadiah Bertinoro, and Moses ben Jacob, Rabbotenu Baʻale ha-Tosafot, sec. Deut. 1; Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 10).

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this pericope is that Jacob’s reason for waiting to rebuke his son Reuven until death, which prompts the insertion of the rationales, does not even appear in the list. The 18th century commentator R. Elijah Kremer (known as the Vilna Gaon) seems to have sensed the discrepancy between Jacob’s motivation for waiting until his deathbed and the reasons proffered immediately following. Instead of the fourth rationale as “departing in peace” as Finkelstein maintains, the Vilna Gaon suggests: “so that he does not leave him and go away” (‫ושלא יניחו‬ ‫ – )וילך‬to match the language used by Jacob (‫)שלא תניחני ותלך‬.48 This reading directly incorporates the explanation provided by Jacob into the four reasons and ensures that the number of rationales matches the introductory line. Looking closely at the three universally attested reasons, we find that these three rationales directly correspond to the three parts of Lev. 19:17 and Sifra’s simple commentary.49 In Sifra’s commentary on Lev. 19:17b, the infinitive absolute plus imperfect ‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ is glossed as requiring a continual act of rebuke in the event that the initial attempt is unsuccessful. Correspondingly, the first of the reasons offered here is so that one does not need to continually rebuke another; implying that were one to remain alive they would be obligated to do so. According to Sifra, Lev. 19:17c indicates that one should desist from rebuking at the point when the rebuked party becomes embarrassed. Sifre Devarim’s second rationale indicates that by waiting until the brink of death one avoids embarrassing the other party in later encounters in which they may recall the 48  This idea is also suggested by Pseudo-Raabad whose version of the text only had three rationales, leading him to conclude that the fourth was implied in the explication of Jacob’s statement (Pseudo-Raabad and Basser, Commentary to Sifre Deuteronomy, 8). Another possible fourth reason is preserved in Yalkut Shimoni Yehoshua 34: “so that the ones rebuking do not become rebuked” (‫)ושלא יהיו המוכיחין מתוכחין‬. Also see Naphtali Zevi Judah Berlin, Sifre, 3:7. 49  It is not necessary for the editor of Sifre Devarim to have actually possessed a copy of the Sifra pericope. It is sufficient for the editor to have been aware of the interpretative tradition that undergirds the anonymous portion of Sifra’s interpretation of Lev. 19:17 (see below). The possibility that the three rationales align with the three major components of the biblical verse (and its rabbinic gloss) may help explain why only three reasons appear in the manuscripts despite being introduced by a heading announcing four. If this grouping of three reasons was originally constructed in dialogue with Lev. 19:17, then a fourth reason would have disrupted the correspondence. However, if this unit was composed in isolation and only later integrated into Pisqa 2, this does not explain the discrepancy with the header – i.e., if the introduction was constructed later, then it should read “three reasons.” It is also possible that the motivation provided immediately before this pericope (Jacob’s concern of Reuven deserting him) may have constituted the fourth reason (as Pseudo-Raabad suggests). In this case, perhaps the editor actively wished to preserve the correspondence with Lev. 19:17 and therefore refrained from reiterating this previous reason in the context of the other rationales.

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incident and feel ashamed. Finally, the third rationale in Sifre Devarim, that “there should not be anything in his heart against him” (‫)ושלא יהא בלבו עליו‬, alludes to Lev. 19:17a, which forbids harboring hatred in one’s heart (‫לֹא ִת ְׂשנָ א‬ ‫) ֶאת ָא ִחיָך ִּב ְל ָב ֶבָך‬. Despite this correlation between the three rationales in Sifre Devarim and Lev. 19:17 as interpreted by Sifra, there is an important difference between the two: While the latter presents each component as part of one’s obligations, the former problematizes the different elements thereby transforming them into reasons to avoid rebuke. According to Sifra, Lev. 19:17b obligates one to continue rebuking – which is precisely the reason Sifre Devarim suggests postponing rebuke until death.50 Thus, the first drawback to rebuke is the possibility of finding oneself in a continuous loop of unheeded correction. With regard to embarrassment, even Sifra recognizes this as a problematic outcome of rebuke. However, Sifre Devarim expands the scope of the potential humiliation by noting that subsequent interactions between the two parties can reawaken the embarrassment spawned in the original encounter. By waiting until death one preemptively bypasses this possibility by ensuring that future meetings in which the rebuked will recall their humiliation cannot occur. In this way, the reasoning offered by Sifre Devarim subtly admits the likelihood of failure to avoid humiliation while chastising, but offers the means of at least evading the reawakening of this feeling in the future by postponing rebuke until the final possible moment. Lastly, Sifra understands Lev. 19:17a to prescribe rebuke as a means of avoiding harboring hatred in one’s heart. Sifre Devarim warns that by rebuking one runs the risk of encouraging the rebuked party to harbor their own resentment.51 In this manner, the midrash attacks the opening of the 50  Pseudo-Raabad finds this rationale problematic insofar as it undermines the commandment to continually rebuke. He therefore suggests that the biblical verse refers to an actual sin (‫ )עבירה‬while the advice given in Sifre Devarim refers to something annoying or insulting (‫ ;הקנטה‬Pseudo-Raabad and Basser, Commentary to Sifre Deuteronomy, 10). By contrast, R. Moshe Ashekanzi, in his commentary Toledot Adam, suggests that due to the necessity of only saying that which will be heard and accepted, as well as the limited number of people who are able to properly accept rebuke, the general commandment is pushed off until the day of death (Moshe David Avraham Trevish Askhkenazi, Sifre, 8). Also see Hillel ben Eliaqim and Koleditzky, Sifre le-ha-Tana ha-Elohi Rabbenu Shimon ben Yoḥai, 4. 51  As Moshe Ashkenazi points out, rebuke can lead to the other party harboring hatred prompting further confrontation in the future (see Moshe David Avraham Trevish Askhkenazi, Sifre, 8). The Neẓiv explains how waiting until death avoids the issue: “After death both his hatred and his jealousy concerning him are already gone, and why would he guard (‫ )יטור‬hatred concerning the deceased?” (Naphtali Zevi Judah Berlin, Sifre, 3:7).

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scriptural injunction by employing the same term “in his heart” (‫)בלבו‬, while modifying the circumstances to the case of one who has already performed an act of rebuke, thereby transferring the biblically undesired animosity onto the second party. This section concerning deathbed rebuke marginalizes rebuke on two fronts. First, by enumerating various drawbacks to the act of rebuke Sifre Devarim discourages anyone from partaking in this practice. Second, by formulating the several rationales for delaying rebuke in dialogue with the Levitical commandment and its interpretation in Sifra, the midrash highlights how rebuke tends to lead to the very consequences it seeks to avoid.52 In this way, Sifre Devarim not only challenges rebuke as an act, but subtly curtails the applicability of the biblical commandment to rebuke as well.53 Furthermore, aside from the specific reasons for waiting until death to rebuke, the very act of postponement itself, regardless of particular motivations, is another tactic for avoiding enacting the biblical mandate. Thus, this section of Sifre Devarim emphasizes the detrimental consequences of rebuke as a social action through statements that circumvent or castrate the biblical mandate. 7

Rebuke Leads to Peace

In contrast to the anti-rebuke sentiments of the list of reasons to postpone rebuke, Finkelstein’s reconstruction of the fourth rationale, together with the concluding remark of this pericope, emphasizes the positive dimension of 52  One might be tempted to interpret this as a tannaitic use of scripture against itself in order to marginalize the commandment of rebuke – something that was blatantly lacking in Sifra (see, Goldstone, “Rebuke and the Self-Acknowledged Limits of Rabbinic Authority,” 13–16). However, while the list of reasons to delay rebuke lines up thematically with Sifra’s exegesis of Lev. 19:17, the rationales appear in a different order from that of Sifra and there is no explicit citation of the verse here in Sifre Devarim. The absence of such a quotation is conspicuous against the backdrop of this textual unit that provides multiple biblical examples of rebuke acts. Were this in fact an example of the rabbis using scripture against itself to undermine the commandment, we would expect a more explicit reference to the biblical passage with typical exegetical terminology. 53  This idea was already expressed by various commentators on this Pisqa. R. Hillel challenges that by waiting until death one nullifies the commandment of rebuking (‫דא"כ בטלה‬ ‫ )מצות הוכיח תוכיח‬and offers a casuistic recontextualization of the biblical injunction as applying to the case of a known sinner in contrast to this passage which refers to general rebuke, not directed toward a particular offense (Hillel ben Eliaqim and Koleditzky, Sifre le-ha-Tana ha-Elohi Rabbenu Shimon ben Yoḥai, 4). As noted above, this tension was also felt by R. Ashkenazi in his commentary Toledot Adam.

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reproof: rebuke should lead to peace. This lofty goal introduces two biblical episodes that demonstrate how the earliest patriarchs employed rebuke in order to foster peace. Sections 3 and 4 recount the stories of Abraham and Isaac who each rebuke Abimelech regarding wells, leading to a covenant (Gen. 21) and peace (Gen. 26). Each episode on its own contains one explicit and one implicit element of rebuke leading to peace. The Abraham story in Gen. 21 employs the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬in stating that Abraham rebuked Abimelech, but they conclude their dispute with a covenant, merely implying a peaceful resolution. The parallel Isaac story does not directly utilize a rebuke-term but ends with an explicit mention of peace (‫)שלום‬. By bringing these stories together, both elements of rebuke and peace become explicit and the midrash implicitly provides another example of mimetically inherited knowledge of proper rebuke. The juxtaposition of the lofty goal for rebuke to foster peace and the encouragement to avoid rebuke is highly striking and ironic. According to sections 3 and 4, rebuke is entirely effective in ending the problematic behavior of the offending party and stifling any future confrontation. This stands in direct opposition to the fallout from rebuke attested to in the list of reasons to postpone the act until one’s deathbed. However, there is an important difference between the postponement examples (sections 1,2 5–7) and the peace examples involving Abimelech (sections 3 and 4). While most of the examples proffered throughout Sifre Devarim refer to rebuke of an “insider,” Abimelech, as a Philistine king, breaks this pattern. All of the other instances of rebuke in this larger deathbed rebuke section refer either to a son or sons of the rebuker, or to the entire people of Israel. Hence, these two examples of Abraham and Isaac stand out not only because they offer a wholly positive perspective on rebuke during one’s lifetime, but also because they discuss rebuke with outsiders as opposed to insiders. The insider-outsider divergence is heightened by the content of each type of reproof. Deathbed rebuke is primarily an ethical exhortation for one’s children or followers. By contrast, the rebukes of Abimelech surround a dispute over physical boundaries in the form of wells, which mirror the larger boundary-related issues of Israelite against non-Israelite. Finally, the insider-oriented cases are generally aimed at maintaining a relationship between the two parties and are thus highly cautious about the ramifications of rebuke. Conversely, in the two examples of rebuking an outsider, the stories end with Abimelech departing, symbolically ending any direct relationship (Gen. 21:32 and 26:31). Although it may be mere coincidence that the two available biblical stories tying rebuke to peace involve an outsider, the resulting dichotomy between postponed rebuke and rebuke leading to peace maps onto the general concern of avoiding rebuke when seeking to preserve an interpersonal relationship

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(rather than simply separating with a truce).54 In addition, these two outsider examples circumscribe the scope of the lofty ambition of rebuke leading to peace. If the juxtaposition of postponement and peace in section 2 is jarring, the two examples proffered alleviate this tension by designating “peace” as the absence of conflict rather than the maintenance of insider interpersonal relationships.55 8

Pisqaot 1 and 2 as a Literary Unit

Pisqaot 1 and 2 form a conceptual unit that both opens and closes by questioning the scope of Moses’ authorship.56 A similar limitation to Moses’ words is proposed in each, only to be rejected with the assertion that Moses is responsible for the entire Torah (Pisqa 1) as well as its intricate details (Pisqa 2, section 8). While the majority of material sandwiched between these bookends follows a lemmatic progression without tight literary coherence, the theme of rebuke pervades the unit. This topic particularly gravitates toward the beginning of Pisqa 1 and conclusion of Pisqa 2. The end of Pisqa 2 returns to the

54   Sifre Devarim in general has a negative view toward the nations of the world (see Fraade, From Tradition to Commentary, 67 and 228n229). If Abimelech was seen as falling within the category of these “other nations,” then the notion of peace takes on even more of a quality of avoiding conflict, rather than fostering an ongoing relationship. 55  I might also note that the examples of rebuke leading to peace involve Abraham and Isaac, whereas the idea of postponing rebuke is attributed to Jacob. This could perhaps be taken as a hint that already before Moses, with the initial three patriarchs, the attitude toward the possibility of successful rebuke had shifted. From this perspective we can view Abraham and Isaac’s acts of rebuke as an “ideal.” Just as I suggested with regard to Sifra, that rebuke remained an unreachable ideal, so too here the ideal rebukes of Abraham and Isaac already fall out of reach by the time of Jacob. 56  As Pisqa 2 concludes with a gloss on the middle of Deut. 1:3, which asks the same question that opened Sifre Devarim (as to whether Moses only prophesied these specific words, or much more), these two Pisqaot appear to form a conceptual unit. However, while Sifre Devarim begins by discussing Deut. 1:1, the majority of manuscripts of the conclusion of Pisqa 2 indicate that here the discussion revolves around the Ten Commandments. Nevertheless, Finkelstein diverges from the manuscript tradition by including a direct reference back to Deut. 1:1 rather than the Ten Commandments, a version which agrees with Hoffmann’s reconstruction of Mekhilta Devarim (Finkelstein, Sifre on Deuteronomy, 11; Hoffmann, Midrash Tannaim, 4). Whether or not Pisqa 2 explicitly mentions Deut. 1:1, the linguistic and thematic reference back to the opening question of Pisqa 1 marks the end of Pisqa 2 as the close of the inclusio of the larger conceptual unit contained between these two points.

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Mosaic authorship of the Torah reminding us of the fact that even this problematic commandment is a part of the divine law.57 While Sifre Devarim opens with a list of figures who rebuke, in the second Pisqa the biblical figures actively postpone reproof. As the audience proceeds through the text of Sifre Devarim, they encounter a progression of subtle attacks on the act of rebuke. From an opening that lauds the biblical practitioners of rebuke but hints at potential backlash, to the challenges that Moses faced and the tannaitic rejection of rebuke, the first Pisqa begins to problematize the act of rebuke. This message is expanded by Pisqa 2, which reaches back even to the patriarchs – including Jacob, from whom Moses himself learned to rebuke – in order to undercut the application of rebuke more strongly. In addition to these biblical instances of postponing rebuke, the oblique challenge to Lev. 19:17 presented by the three reasons to delay rebuke is another means through which this Pisqa subtly chips away at rebuke from within the Bible itself.58 In moving from the first to the second Pisqa then, the perception of rebuke shifts from a difficult endeavor to a problematic action that should be delayed as long as possible. In addition to this literary progression, there is also a strong chronological development against rebuke as well. The two earliest patriarchs (Abraham and Isaac) are the only figures who effectively perform ideal rebukes. Starting with Jacob, later biblical protagonists become anxious about this prospect, postponing, or as Moses did, preparing for negative backlash. This fear of rebuke culminates with the tannaim who generally find themselves unable to rebuke at all. Overall a subtle “decline of the generations” (‫ )ירידת הדורות‬message undergirds this material, increasingly marginalizing the possibility for rebuke. Yet, this progression is not entirely uniform and structurally the inability of the 57  The final example of deathbed rebuke (from King David to his son Solomon) serves as a thematic segue into the many facets of Torah that we find in section 8. While section 7 only quotes the first verse or two from 1 Kgs. 2, the subsequent verse enjoins Solomon to: “Keep the charge of the LORD your God, walking in His ways and following His laws, His commandments, His rules, and His admonitions as recorded in the Teaching of Moses …” (1 Kgs. 2:3). This aligns with section 8’s depiction of Moses learning “the commandments of the Torah, arguments a fortiori, arguments from verbal analogy, arguments from general categories and specific applications, the major rules and the details.” The theme of rebuke that pervades the larger passage is linked to section 8 through the many facets of Torah described in the final proof verse (section 7). The concluding remark in section 8, which reiterates Moses’ knowledge of Torah (in a broad sense), may be masking the attack against our particular verse (Lev. 19:17) by concluding with an affirmation of Torah as a whole. 58  While not explicitly mentioning Lev. 19:17, the intertextual allusion hints at the problematic nature of the commandment. See above.

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tannaim to rebuke is juxtaposed with Moses’ successful reprimand, rather than following Jacob and the others’ call for postponement. The placement of this material, rather than emphasizing a slow decline, actually accentuates a sharp break between the biblical and rabbinic periods. 9

The Dangers of Rebuke

The common denominator underlying all of the tannaitic concerns expressed about rebuke is the potential for destabilizing interpersonal relationships: By directly challenging a person’s behavior, a rebuker risks fostering a natural response of resentment. While Sifra provides limited insight into this rationale, Sifre Devarim provides clearer evidence. The opening section, which establishes Moses as the paradigmatic rebuker, employs a proof-text that subtly hints at the concern of backlash against a benevolent act such as reproof. People instinctively reject criticism and attack those who offer it. The second section, glossing “to all Israel,” mentions this concern more directly by highlighting the dangers Moses shrewdly avoids in his rebuke. The danger of damaging interpersonal relationships is especially prominent in the example of the deathbed rebukes, which provides the most explicit insight into the rationales behind the rabbinic reaction to rebuke. In this section we find Jacob’s fear of estrangement from his son Reuven and the reasons to postpone reproof, which include reawakening humiliation in subsequent encounters as well as leading to the other party’s hatred of the rebuker. The core concern is clearly that of negatively impacting the relationship one has with another person. Scholarship of the past several decades has overturned an older paradigm that envisioned the rabbis as the undisputed leaders of post-70 Judaism. Rather than an elite cohesive movement, the first generations of rabbis wielded little political and social power beyond their families and disciples.59 As non-institutionalized individuals or small groups, the early rabbis would have been highly dependent upon maintaining strong connections to their neighbors

59  Hezser, Social Structure; Levine, The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late Antiquity. For a succinct summary of previous and recent scholarship on this issue, see Miller, Sages and Commoners in Late Antique ʼEreẓ Israel, 7–17. In contrast to the general trend, Hayim Lapin sees a greater degree of rabbinic institutionalization correlating with the redaction of the Mishna (particularly Bava Meẓia) and suggests that this may reflect a movement from “an acephalous network of disciple circles to a centralized movement with authorized tradition” (Lapin, Early Rabbinic Civil Law and the Social History of Roman Galilee, 116–17 and 238).

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and particularly those in positions of power.60 They simply could not afford to offend anyone through the performance of this commandment and risk jeopardizing their connections and communal influence.61 For this reason it is quite understandable why the early rabbis would have been so concerned with the obligation to rebuke others.62 The best recourse for these rabbis was to challenge the biblical mandate by highlighting the dangers of rebuke and to retroject the advice of postponement into the mouths of the biblical figures who engaged in this activity. The tannaitic midrashim thus depart from earlier sources that asked how to properly rebuke and instead grapple with the question of “Can we rebuke?” In response this question, the early rabbis construct rebuke as a difficult activity, challenging for even the paradigmatic rebuker Moses. By highlighting the dangers involved in rebuke and threats that it poses 60  Richard Kalmin has claimed that Palestinian rabbis interact more frequently and in more informal contexts with non-rabbis than their Babylonian counterparts. Similarly, he has noted that Palestinian rabbis would have been somewhat dependent on these nonrabbinical figures for economic and social support. See Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia; Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine, esp. chps. 1–4; Kalmin, The Sage in Jewish Society of Late Antiquity, chap. 1. Another factor contributing to early Palestinian rabbinic investment in maintaining close relationships with their neighbors is their geographic proximity to one another (Hezser, Social Structure, 157–84; Rosenfeld, Torah Centers and Rabbinic Activity in Palestine, 41–75, 115–149; Lapin, Rabbis as Romans, chap. 3; Goodman, State and Society in Roman Galilee, A.D. 132–212; Schwartz, Imperialism, 132, 153–76). Hidary argues that the geographic proximity of early Palestinian rabbis meant that they “were competing to control the very same Jewish population” (Hidary, Dispute for the Sake of Heaven, 158). For Hidary this means that they were less tolerant of different practices. For our purposes it suggests that they were likely to have been well aware of the need to cultivate larger communal support, not only in favor of a rabbinic approach, but for themselves as individual leaders as well. However, note David Kraemer’s assumption that the geographic proximity of Palestinian rabbis actually inflated their authority (Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in Classical Rabbinic Literature, 221–22). 61  As Stuart Cohen has noted, “The much maligned ‘amei ha’areṣ of ’Ereṣ Yisra’el … could not simply be brow-beaten; eventually, they had to be won over” (Cohen, The Three Crowns, 151). 62  However, the tannaitic voices are not univocal. While several tannaim and the general thrust of Sifre Devarim eschew rebuke, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri stands out as a proponent. This can be explained by the fact that the reaction of the rebuked individual is shaped by the relationship between the two parties. While a person may be disinclined to heed the words of someone carrying equal or lesser status, a respected authority figure may be more likely to succeed in offering an accepted correction. Within the close ranks of rabbinic study circles, rebuke would be more likely to be heeded without retort, particularly when coming from an authority such as Rabban Gamliel (as in R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s anecdote). Thus, while on the whole the tannaim were willing to problematize rebuke and Lev. 19:17 in order to avoid destabilizing their relationships with others, within rabbinic master-disciple circles some rabbis were more open to its use.

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to interpersonal relationships, the tannaitic midrashim conclude that rebuke is no longer an operative practice. As we shall see, the practice of rebuke also comes under attack in the Babylonian Talmud and in early monastic sources. However, while the tannaim are primarily concerned with issues of feasibility, these later texts give rise to a new question about the value of performing rebuke: Should it even be attempted?

part 3 Should One Rebuke? Rebuke in Later Rabbinic and Monastic Literature

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An Undesirable Activity: Rebuke in Early Monastic Literature Reflections on the practice of rebuke in the first several centuries of the Common Era were by no means limited to figures operating in a Jewish context. This topic captured the interest of many thinkers across the eastern Mediterranean region who engaged with questions concerning the appropriate circumstances for, and relevance of, reproof. For the present investigation, the most important non-Jewish (but scripturally-oriented) community that entertained such issues was the desert fathers of Egypt. These monastic figures of the 3rd through 5th centuries bequeathed a valuable collection of traditions with striking similarities to rabbinic literature. In this chapter, I survey the monastic reaction to rebuke as a complement to my analysis of later rabbinic literature which follows. The dominant current among monastic texts rejects the practice of rebuke. I argue that this rejection emerges from a competing value of self-oriented perfection that finds the act of reproof detrimental to this goal. The deliberations leading to the monastic eschewal of interpersonal confrontation and the broader conclusions of this chapter will serve as an illuminating backdrop for better understanding developments in rabbinic receptivity to Lev. 19:17 and the practice of rebuke. 1

Reading Rabbinic Literature in Light of Early Monastic Sources

Scholarly study of Judaism and Christianity in antiquity is rife with comparative efforts. Needless to say, not all of the resulting observations are of equal value. Particularly within earlier scholarship we find works that far over-analyze and overstate the minutest of parallels. Challenged already in the 1960s by Samuel Sandmel in his well-known article, “Parallelomania,” the flood of simplistic comparisons has somewhat dwindled with new and more sophisticated methodologies emerging as a result.1 Rather than seeking to ascertain textual priority, direct influence, and unmediated interaction, recent comparative endeavors frequently opt for a more nuanced approach that highlights “shared 1  Sandmel, “Parallelomania.” For a direct response to Sandmel’s critique that argues for the continuing possibility of comparative work, see Doering, “Parallels without ‘Parallelomania’.”

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cultural space” and conceptual lines of overlap.2 This is not to say that efforts at uncovering direct textual influence have ceased, only that an increased critical awareness of modes of cultural transmission has shifted the academic gaze toward a more refined set of observations.3 In conjunction with these changes, the past few decades have witnessed renewed interest in comparative exploits with modern scholars of rabbinics turning to hitherto underappreciated bodies of literature. This is perhaps most apparent in the deluge of articles and conference panels devoted to studying the Babylonian Talmud in light of Zoroastrian Pahlavi literature.4 Most recently, as scholars continue to branch out into additional unmined resources, there has been a developing trend toward bringing rabbinic and monastic literature into dialogue. Already in the mid-1990s a few scholars were pursuing fruitful avenues of comparison between rabbinic and monastic Christian sources. Stephen Gero considered a story with parallels in the Bavli and in Cyril of Scythopolis’ biography of Saint Sabas, a founding figure of Palestinian monasticism, and Catherine Hezser devoted an important article to the apophthegmata of the monks and of the rabbis.5 These efforts paved the way for the first book-length treatment of monastic and Sassanian rabbinic literature, Michal Bar-Asher Siegal’s Early Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud. In this foundational work Bar-Asher Siegal highlights both formal and narrative parallels between the Apophthegmata Patrum (The Sayings of the Desert Fathers) and the Bavli, demonstrating the benefits of studying these two corpora in tandem.6 By establishing at the outset the wide geographic reach of monasticism and the availability of Egyptian sources within the Persian Empire, she shows how rabbinic texts may have drawn directly from the values and insights of their Christian compatriots.7 Following her contribution, others have continued to 2  See the discussion in Satlow, “Beyond Influence”; Smith, Drudgery Divine. 3  For somewhat recent examples analyzing direct textual interaction between rabbinic and Christian material see Amit, “A Rabbinic Satire on the Last Judgment”; Zellentin, Rabbinic Parodies of Jewish and Christian Literature, chap. 5. 4  See Secunda, “Talmudic Text and Iranian Context,” 45–46; Secunda, The Iranian Talmud, chap. 1. Also see the “Review Forum” section of JQR, vol. 106.2 (Spring, 2016). 5  Gero, “The Stern Master and His Wayward Disciple”; Hezser, “Apophthegmata Patrum and Apophthegmata of the Rabbis.” 6  After describing how she believes Egyptian monastic literature moved into the Sassanian world, Bar-Asher Siegal devotes a chapter to parallels in form, style and theme between the Bavli and the Apophthegmata Patrum, before turning to narrative overlaps and examples of more direct literary contact. 7  See especially Bar-Asher Siegal, Early Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud, chap. 2.

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explore this ripe connection seeking points of literary and editorial similarity. The present study advances this endeavor by evaluating monastic discourse surrounding rebuke as a lens to better understand later rabbinic engagement with this issue. Themes and tensions relating to rebuke within collections of monastic dicta offer us an important window into the larger ascetic milieu of which rabbinic culture was part. By tracing how and why many desert fathers chose to reject or embrace the practice of chastising others, this chapter serves as the necessary contextual backdrop for fleshing out subtle developments in rabbinic reactions to the Levitical command to rebuke one’s fellow. 2

The Sayings of the Desert Fathers

The present chapter draws its Greek primary material from the most important collection of early monastic dicta available: Apophthegmata Patrum (The Sayings of the Desert Fathers).8 This work appears in two9 major forms, systematic and alphabetical, with the former organized by theme and the latter by tradent.10 Although the different forms of Apophthegmata Patrum as we know them were likely only compiled in the early 6th century, they reflect the world of 4th and 5th century Egyptian monasticism.11 Originally transmitted as oral traditions, frequently spoken from abba (“father”)12 to disciple, the written records offer us a treasury of monastic sayings and a window into the lives of the early monks.13 Preserving statements on a wide array of topics from a 8  The English translations used in this chapter are based upon the editions of Benedicta Ward and John Wortley (Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers; Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers; Wortley, Give Me a Word) with Greek material (not provided in these aforementioned translations) taken from PG, vol. 65. 9  While most scholars discuss The Sayings as appearing in only two forms, John Wortley suggests that there are actually three major forms: alphabetic, systematic, and the “second part of (or appendix to) the first collection,” which is grouped with the alphabetic collection despite being anonymous and arranged by thematic headings (Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 1–3). For more on this “third” form see Ibid., Introduction. 10  For more on these two forms, their collection and development, see Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 85–88; Rubenson, “The Formation and Re-Formations of the Sayings of the Desert Fathers.” 11  Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 88; Gould, The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community, 4. 12  There were also a few “desert mothers” known individually as “amma” (see Swan, The Forgotten Desert Mothers). 13  The original oral traditions were likely in Coptic with later editors preserving them in Greek (Palladius, Palladius of Aspuna, xiv–xv). Detailed information about The Sayings

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number of different figures, Apophthegmata Patrum presents an aggregate picture of early Egyptian monasticism including “minority” voices that push against the mainstream advice offered by the majority of monks. As we shall see with regard to rebuke, the most prevalent position among the desert fathers was to eschew rebuke; but a few sources accept its utility and one unique tradition forcefully embraces the practice. This picture of a general rejection of rebuke is mirrored in other major monastic works by prominent individuals such as Evagrius of Pontus and Abba Isaiah of Scetis.14 However, as their discussions simply amplify the trend I will be establishing in material from the Apophthegmata Patrum I will not discuss passages from their works in depth. If the rabbis of the Babylonian Talmud were familiar with Egyptian monastic teachings it is most likely that their knowledge would have been mediated through Syriac translations.15 Monastic material from Egypt began to enter the Syriac-speaking east in the 5th and 6th centuries in translations of works such as Athanasius’ Life of Antony (written c. 357) and Palladius’ Lausiac History (written c. 419–420).16 The most important Syriac version of Egyptian monastic material, which draws upon The Sayings in addition to Athanasius and Palladius’ works, is the late seventh century collection The Paradise of the Fathers, collated by the Syrian monk ’Enanisho of Beit Abhe.17 As the present study seeks to understand not only the most authentic reaction to rebuke can be found in Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, chap. 3. For connections between this corpus and the Babylonian Talmud see Bar-Asher Siegal, Early Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud, chap. 3–4. 14  We find, for example, the tradition attributed to Evagrius that one should “avoid rebuking your brother’s faults lest you be deprived of compassion as one of an alien race” (Evagrius, Evagrius of Pontus, 51). For other related examples, see Ibid., 32, and 43–44. Likewise, in the Ascetic Discourses of Abba Isaiah of Scetis we find statements such as, “Do not argue with each other about anything, and do not criticize anyone,” and “If you go out together to work, let each one of you pay attention to himself and not his brother, neither counseling nor commanding him” (Isaiah, Chryssavgis, and Penkett, Abba Isaiah of Scetis: Ascetic Discourses, 41 and 69). For more examples see Ibid., 53, 91–92, and 123. 15  As Bar-Asher Siegal suggests, “The Syriac translations are especially useful to explain the access the composers of Talmudic passages might have had to monastic traditions in the Persian Empire” (Bar-Asher Siegal, Early Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud, 41). 16  Brock, A Brief Outline of Syriac Literature, 103. For the dates of these works see Palladius, Palladius, 3 and 7. For issues of translation and circulation see Brock, “Saints in Syriac,” 189–196. On the name of the latter work, see Palladius, Palladius of Aspuna, xix. 17  Palladius, Palladius, 9–10. E. A. Wallis Budge’s two volume work with English translation (’Enanisho, Book of Paradise) is the standard edition and will serve as the basis for Syriac sources (and their English translation) employed in this chapter. Note that I have modified many of Budge’s translations to render his English more understandable to the contemporary reader.

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from the desert fathers, but to trace how this reaction may have manifested itself within the cultural world of the Sassanian rabbis, both the “more original” Greek version and the later Syriac version of The Sayings will be considered together.18 However, working with written versions of oral traditions and later translations entails unavoidable difficulties. Attributions and details of stories or sayings can shift in the course of transcription and translation.19 Generally this will not pose a significant problem for survey-type observations regarding monastic reactions to rebuke as the possibility of minor variances has relatively little impact on broader trends. However, when it comes to close readings of particular texts slight accretions and shifts in language can have exponential consequences. One somewhat humorous example will suffice to illustrate how different versions of the same episode can result in divergent interpretations. And the old man also said, “It is written, ‘Whatever your eyes have seen, declare.’ But I say to you, that unless (‫ )ܕܐܠܐ‬you have not first touched with your hands, you shall not testify. For on one occasion the devil led astray a brother in a matter of this kind. This brother saw a brother committing sin with a woman, and the war being strong against him, he went to them, thinking that what he saw was really a man and a woman, and he kicked them with his foot, and said, ‘Enough, enough, how long [will you act thus]?’ And suddenly he discovered that the things were sacks of wheat. For this reason I say to you that unless (‫ )ܕܐܠܐ‬you have felt with your hands you should not offer rebuke” (‫)ܠܐ ܬܟܣܘܢ‬.20 An elder offers advice that even (supposedly) seeing an offense is insufficient evidence and one must actually “touch with their hands” before verbally 18  In discussing these sources I will generally not make strong distinctions between the Greek and Syriac collections as each corpus generally presents us with the same overall picture of a dominant rejection of rebuke and a minority acceptance of the practice. Additionally, while the Greek version is chronologically prior, it is possible that the Syriac version contains authentic early traditions of the desert fathers that do not appear in the Greek, providing another important reason to discuss both the Greek and Syriac collections (see Draguet, “Les versions syriaques des oeuvres des Pères grecs”). As Sebastian Brock notes with regard to Syriac hagiographic traditions, “Syriac not infrequently preserves texts translated from Greek whose Greek originals have either been entirely lost, or survive only in fragmentary or modified form” (Brock, “Saints in Syriac,” 184–85). However, see Rubenson, “The Apophthegmata Patrum in Syriac, Arabic and Ethiopic,” 305–309. On the Syriac versions of the Apophthegmata Patrum more generally, see Holmberg, “The Syriac Collection of Apophthegmata Patrum in MS Sin. Syr. 46.” 19  Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 13. 20  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:678–79 (English); 2:508 (Syriac).

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responding. He then proffers an anecdote to illustrate his point. In his story a brother mistakes sacks of wheat for fornicators and humiliates himself by chastising and kicking them. The elder thus reiterates his point that unless you have clearly determined the facts on the ground you should not offer rebuke. Were this fabulous account uniquely preserved in the Syriac collection it would indicate that for some monastic figures rebuke is a definite possibility so long as one first ascertains the reality of the situation. However, there is a Greek parallel that destabilizes this reading. According to the Greek version one is never authorized to rebuke: Abba Poemen said, “It is written: ‘Give witness of that which your eyes have seen’ … but I say to you even (καὶ) if you have touched with your hands, do not give witness. In truth, a brother was deceived in this respect; he thought he saw his brother in the act of sinning with a woman; greatly incensed, he drew near and kicked them (for he thought it was they), saying, ‘Now stop; how much longer will you go on?’ Now it turned out that it was some sheaves of corn. That is the reason why I said to you: even (καὶ) if you touch with your hands, do not reprove” (μὴ ἐλέγχετε).’21 Several close parallels between the Greek and Syriac versions suggest that these are two instantiations of the same dictum: The citation of a written admonition to speak once one has seen, the antithesis language of “but I say to you,” the admonition to touch with one’s hands, the mistaken presence of a man and woman sinning together, the verbal chastisement and kicking, and the revelation that the people are actually bags of produce. Despite these affinities however, the stories do contain several elements of difference. The Syriac version is spoken by an anonymous elder and includes a reference to a demon (‫ )ܫܐܕܐ‬while the Greek makes no mention of a demonic figure and is attributed to Abba Poemen.22 More importantly for assessing the text’s perspective on rebuke, while the Syriac word ‫“( ܐܠܐ‬unless”/“but”) serves to qualify the prohibition on rebuke, allowing such correction when one has established the facts, the Greek καί (“even”/“and”) indicates that even after identifying the truth one is nevertheless forbidden to act. 21  PG, 65:352; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 183–84; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 246–47. 22  The English translations imply that there is also a difference with regard to the particular produce found in the sacks. However, these are basically synonymous as the Syriac phrase ‫ ܬܠܝܣܐ ܕܚܛܐ‬implies sacks of wheat and the Greek θαλλοὶ σίτου can refer to sheaves of corn, wheat, or grain.

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It is possible and maybe even tempting to see the Syriac version of this passage as a conscious editorial change to allow for the possibility of rebuke. But such a claim is difficult to substantiate and ultimately yields little to further understand the Egyptian monks’ take on rebuke or how the rabbis may have encountered their positions. This example is therefore more instructive for cautioning us against too pedantic a reading of the texts we will be exploring. For this reason I rely primarily upon the aggregate evidence of several sources that together present a largely unified picture of monastic views on rebuke. While important minority voices will still be considered to temper the overall portrayal, the constantly reoccurring positions on rebuke will serve as a guide for analyzing the details of any given passage. 3

Early Christian Monasticism: Between Solitude and Interaction

Monastic attitudes toward rebuke are best understood against the backdrop of asceticism in late antiquity. Ascetic tendencies within early Christianity appear from the very outset in the writings of Paul and traditions preserved about Jesus in other New Testament era works.23 Recommendations to forsake financial, sexual, and other personal pursuits encouraged many to leave family and friends behind in a quest for higher levels of religious devotion. Some embraced celibacy and there may even have been a significant enough population opting for this lifestyle to be recognized as a discrete subgroup.24 Particularly from the 3rd century onward, within many Christian circles we find growing expressions of ascetic values and adoptions of an ascetic lifestyle.25 Fueled by religious and social fervor inclined toward the negation of bodily pleasures and worldly desires, many sought refuge from the world around them or at least attributed heightened value to those who embodied ascetic ideals, seeing in them a source of religious and political authority.26 Some fled the communal sphere entirely seeking solitude in the desert in a quest for personal perfection. Yet, a significant population of ascetics maintained “a close relationship

23  Rubenson, “Asceticism: Christian Perspectives,” 92; Clark, Reading Renunciation, 25–26. For a treatment of asceticism in the Gospel of Matthew, see Derrett, The Ascetic Discourse. 24  Aumann, “Origins of Monasticism,” 4–5. 25  Rousseau, “Monasticism,” 745. For a broad but generally unreliable discussion of the role of asceticism in 3rd century Syria, see Vööbus, History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient, vol. 1, chap. 3. 26  Brown, The Body and Society, 57–64 and 213–40.

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with society at large.”27 Over the course of the 4th century different types of ascetic practice gave rise to two distinct forms of Christian monasticism: eremitic (also known as “anchoritic”), or those seeking the solitary lifestyle of the hermit, and cenobitic, or those finding the greatest expression of their ascetic values within the confines of a community of likeminded practitioners.28 Conceptually these dual modalities of monasticism represent diametrically opposed polarities. In practice however, many Egyptian monks occupied a position along the spectrum between complete isolation and communal living (sometimes referred to as “semi-eremitic”).29 Navigating these two extremes, one of the core conundrums facing monks of the 4th and 5th centuries was finding the optimal balance between solitude and interaction.30 Each alternative, isolation or communal involvement, offered the monk competing benefits. The primary battlefield for a monk to conquer carnal desires and ascend the ladder of spiritual self-perfection was the solitude of his cell. Repeatedly mentioned throughout monastic dicta, sitting in one’s cell (κελλίον) served as a core ascetic practice and the cell functioned as a place 27  Rousseau, “Monasticism,” 755. While the term “monasticism” may stem from the Greek monos (“alone”), this type of seclusion was not necessarily total isolation from others but also referred to those living in separation from the world at large within smaller communities (Goehring, “Monasticism,” 612–13). 28  Aumann, “Origins of Monasticism,” 6. On the nature of these two different forms of Christian monasticism, see Goehring, “Monasticism,” 614. Literary sources typically attribute the formation of cenobitic monasticism to Pachomius (c. 292–346 CE) who founded some of the first monastic communities (Goehring, “Pachomius”). However, Pachomius’ achievement was not the creation ex nihilo of the institution of the monastery, but rather the unified organization and regulation of monastic groups (Harmless, Desert Christians, 122). This new development of cenobitic monasticism neither arose suddenly, nor completely supplanted existing forms of ascetic isolation (Rousseau, Pachomius, 65 and 75). Rather, it emerged somewhat organically from existing forms and values within monastic culture. However, in Philip Rousseau’s estimation, in the span of early Egyptian ascetic history cenobitic modes of monasticism gradually came to dominate (Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 33–34). 29  Rapp, Brother-Making in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 95–99. On this tension, particularly as it relates to the creation and maintenance of personal relationships, see McGuire, Friendship and Community, 9–17; Rapp, Brother-Making in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 101–48. 30  The tension between solitude and interaction should not be rarified into a competition between eremitic and cenobitic forms of monasticism. As Graham Gould emphasizes, “To discuss ‘solitude and interaction’ is not therefore to discuss ‘anchoritism and cenobitism’, but to examine the varied practice of a semi-anchoritic community whose organization allowed monks the possibility of choosing between several different patterns of life, and therefore forced them to assess the relative value of different amounts of contact with and avoidance of their neighbors” (Gould, The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community, 140).

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of refuge from the dangers of the world. Abba Moses thus famously instructed a brother to “Go, sit in your cell, and your cell will teach you everything.”31 Solitude in one’s cell not only allowed a monk to escape the demands of the outside world but also served as the prerequisite for the silent pursuit of hesychia (ἡσυχία), or “quiet/inner stillness.”32 This level of quiet reflection and control over one’s thoughts (λογισμοί) was of course only achievable in the absence of others.33 One of the ultimate goals of such seclusion was the pursuit of self-perfection through self-abnegation. By emptying oneself and cultivating a posture of spiritual distance from one’s carnal, worldly husk, the monk could propel himself closer to the divine. Paradoxically, the process of emptying oneself demanded devoting long hours of attention to oneself. Yet, only through such secluded introspection could a monk truly hope to achieve the epitome of spiritual perfection. Although isolation enabled one form of spiritual development, eschewing all social contact would inevitably undermine alternative avenues to spiritual improvement for oneself and others. Communal living offered opportunities for hospitality toward others and partaking in shared liturgical and consumptive rituals – means of expressing love unavailable to the uncompromising hermit.34 How could the aspiring anchorite possibly hope to follow in the footsteps of Jesus as a model of compassion and generosity when he distanced himself from those around him?35 Moreover, monks who achieved a high level 31  PG, 65:284; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 139; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 195. On this advice, see Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 44–45. While the sedentary lifestyle was encouraged by many, this should not be taken as an indication that monks did not travel (see Dietz, Wandering Monks, Virgins, and Pilgrims, chap. 1–3; Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 43–44; Rousseau, “The Spiritual Authority of the ‘Monk-Bishop,’ ” 390–91). 32  Harmless, Desert Christians, 228. On the possibility of a temporal shift in the meaning of this term, see Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 47–49. 33  For more on the role of silence, the cell, and self-imposed exile as a means toward selfperfection, see Gould, The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community, 150–64. 34  The monastic concept of agape, literally “love,” appears in Apophthegmata Patrum as a reference to shared liturgy and/or a communal meal (Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 249). In Gould’s estimation, the agape and hospitality were “common elements of the monastic life … regarded as important, even though in some cases problematic occasions for interaction” (Gould, The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community, 165). On the importance of love within monastic circles of the desert fathers see Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 262 ff. 35  As Arthur Vööbus relates in the name of St. Basil: “Without a life in fellowship with others it is impossible to fulfil the command of neighborly love” (Vööbus, History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient, 2:301).

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of self-perfection attracted more inexperienced devotees in search of a rolemodel as well as inquiries from those seeking sagacious advice.36 To turn a blind eye to these requests would protect a well-established monk from the vices of others but would also ignore his responsibilities toward them. In fact, many monks actively desired to communicate with others in order to “explain and defend their ideals, to praise their founders and heroes, and to prompt the admiring imitation of fellow Christians.”37 The choice to unwaveringly constrain oneself in the confines of a cell invariably renounced many opportunities for personal growth and shirked interpersonal responsibilities.38 Over the course of the 4th and 5th centuries the tension between solitude and interaction grew more acute as the cenobitic lifestyle became more popular and some monks acquired greater social influence, at times taking on positions of communal leadership.39 In these new roles of responsibility, time and space for escaping contact with others would take on greater value. The 4th century was also a period of great expansion for Christianity in general, 36  The level of devotion to, and dependence upon, experienced monks by their disciples is reflected in the broad scope of students’ questions that touch upon even the most basic aspects of ascetic life: “Disciples are shown asking their masters questions of the greatest simplicity, reflecting a confidence that virtually anything the father might say would be to their benefit” (Rousseau, “The Spiritual Authority of the ‘Monk-Bishop,’ ” 382; Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 19–21). Such questions reflect disciples’ beliefs that, “their spiritual fathers possessed the insight necessary to identify and describe their personal problems, and to propose for them suitable solutions” (Rousseau, “The Spiritual Authority of the ‘Monk-Bishop,’ ” 383). Particularly among eremitic monks we find a high reliance on direct teaching from elder to novice as the cenobitic world developed “Rules” providing an overview of monastic practice (BurtonChristie, The Word in the Desert, 77). 37  Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 11–12. 38  See Douglas Burton-Christie’s discussion of a source that actively marks “work of the soul” as “the concrete, practical work of tending to the needs of another” (Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 263). 39  Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 33–49. Apophthegmata Patrum in particular gives us insight into 4th century monasticism, the period during which the tension between seclusion and interaction was at a peak (Ibid., 12). We hear for example, of various monks founding and running monasteries: “Copres, a ‘presbyter’, is described as ‘having a monastery’; and it is specifically mentioned that he had changed from the solitary state to the coenobitic. Hor is portrayed in like terms. Having lived in the ‘uttermost desert’, he subsequently founded a monastery ‘near a town’, and was now ‘the father of many monasteries” (Rousseau, 40–41). Copres and Hor (alternatively “Or”) are among the various monks described in Historia Monachorum in Aegypto, a record of journeys through Egypt from the close of the 4th century (Russell, The Lives of the Desert Fathers, 4, 63–64, and 82). For the path breaking work on the growing authority of these figures, see Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity”; Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity, 1971–1997.”

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with bishops entering new fields of political administration.40 This concurrent ascent in influence and authority may have prompted jurisdictional disagreement.41 But, counterintuitively, greater monastic institutionalization often brought the desert fathers closer to the sphere of episcopal control rather than reinforcing demarcations of separation between monks and the church.42 In fact, one of the major developments in eastern monasticism during the 4th century was that monks became “more involved with the clergy and the pastoral Church.”43 Recognizing the spiritual benefits of clerical leadership, monks themselves even became priests and bishops.44 Yet, “[m]any monks expressed their fear of losing their spiritual gifts or slackening in their ascetic discipline if they assumed the concrete responsibilities of ecclesiastical office,” prompting them to opt for the more humble alternative of declining such an honor.45 Ironically, this humility toward positions of power was the perfect indicator of the ideal candidate for ecclesiastical office leading some to ordain monks against their will.46 Strengthening ties with the larger episcopal structure in conjunction with rising levels of communal responsibility threatened efforts at isolation and time for secluded devotion.47 As Egyptian monasticism shifted away from the eremitic side of the spectrum and monks found themselves in closer contact with their peers, the need for silence, separation, and privacy grew accordingly. The tension between solitude and interaction thus sharpened over the course of the 4th and 5th centuries as monks found themselves craving isolation from the public eye while recognizing the spiritual benefits of serving in positions

40  Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity the Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition, 23. 41  Ibid., 103. 42  Rousseau, “The Spiritual Authority of the ‘Monk-Bishop,’ ” 399–400. 43  Ibid., 338. 44  Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity the Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition, 147. For papyrological evidence cited by Claudia Rapp that “a remarkable number of monks had received ordination to the priesthood” (Rapp, 139–40) see Wipszycka, “Les clercs dans les communautés monastiques d’Égypte.” 45  Rapp, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity the Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition, 142. 46  “In a paradoxical inversion, the humility that prompts the rejection of ordination actually demonstrates a candidate’s supreme qualification for ecclesiastical office” (Ibid., 143–44). For discussion of monks made clergy against their will see Ibid., 137–52. 47  Already the master-disciple relationship between monks would force the master to focus on efforts at improving another. However, increased communal obligations threatened to overwhelm the possibility for isolated self-improvement.

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of leadership.48 During this period, the bidirectional pull between seclusion and interaction speaks to a core question of orienting one’s monastic identity: Should a monk be primarily and paradoxically focused upon self-perfection, or should a monk be devoted to the welfare and improvement of others in need of assistance? It is against the backdrop of this question that monastic figures tackled the issue of rebuke. 4

Rejecting Rebuke

When faced with the question of whether one should rebuke another person the dominant current within monastic discourse rejects this course of action. Despite the presence of a few passages that condone rebuke in certain situations (which we will examine below), an overwhelming majority of sources recommend refraining from engaging an offender.49 The following saying found in both Greek and Syriac collections is somewhat typical: Some Fathers questioned Abba Poemen saying, “If we see a brother50 in ܵ ), do you ‫ ܛ‬think that the act of committing a sin (ἁμαρτάνοντα / ‫ܛܐ‬ ܹ ‫ܕܚ‬ we should reprove him (ἐλέγξωμεν αὐτόν / ‫ ”?)ܕܢܟܣܝܘܗܝ‬The old man said to them, “For my part (Ἐγὼ τέως / ‫)ܕܐܢܐ‬, if I have to go out and I see ܵ ), I pass on my way withsomeone committing a sin (ἁμαρτάνοντα / ‫ܕܚܛܹܐ‬ out reproving him” (οὐκ ἐλέγχω αὐτόν / ‫)ܘܠܐ ܡܟܣ ܐܢܐ ܠܗ‬.51

48  Thus, by the 6th century we hear of Barsanuphius and John who exchanged letters from their cells rather than discussing issues face to face (Barsanuphius, John, and Chryssavgis, Barsanuphius and John, 5–10). 49  For examples of desert fathers recommending against confronting and rebuking others, see ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:744 (English) and 2:563 (Syriac); 1:849 (English) and 2:647 (Syriac); 1:883–4 (English) and 2:677 (Syriac); 2:967 (English) and 2:725 (Syriac); Wortley, Give Me a Word, 233. For anecdotes involving a father refraining from rebuking another brother, see Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 220–21, 342–43, and 488–89. 50  Kinship language is the norm within monastic texts. The use of “brother” as opposed to “father” in this passage should not necessarily be taken as connoting a difference in status between the questioners and the offender as it is likely that the fathers here are encountering someone of equal status whom they are uncertain whether they should rebuke. On the use of this kinship terminology and when different epithets may have been employed, see Rapp, Brother-Making in Late Antiquity and Byzantium, 101–3. 51  PG, 65:352; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 183; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 246; ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:678 (English); 2:508 (Syriac).

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ܵ ) the profEmploying participial forms of the verb to sin (ἁμαρτάνοντα / ‫ܕܚܛܹܐ‬ fered scenario offers an opportunity to stop a brother in the act while he is actually sinning rather than chastising him after the fact. The fathers who approach Abba Poemen are uncertain what they should do. By simply posing the question they demonstrate recognition of the value in rebuking (ἐλέγχω / ‫ )ܡܟܣ‬their fellow monk but are uncertain as to whether they should actually take this step. Abba Poemen’s response, as a description of his personal practice (“For my part …”), acknowledges the possibility that correcting another’s transgression could be a correct course of action, just not the one that he adopts. Rebuke is rejected, but with a tacit recognition that this practice could be beneficial for the potential sinner.52 Elsewhere Abba Poemen employs the parable of the speck and the log from Matthew 7:3 as another means of encouraging brothers not to comment upon the faults of others: “A brother asked Abba Poemen: ‘What is a hypocrite?’ The elder said to him: ‘A hypocrite is one who teaches (διδάσκων / ‫ )ܡܠܦ‬his neighbor something to which he has not attained himself (οὐκ ἔφθασε / ‫ܕܗܘ ܠܐ‬ ‫)ܣܥܪܗ ܘܠܐ ܡܛܐ ܠܥܒܕܗ‬, for it is written: ‘Why do you notice the speck in your brother’s eye when here there is a log in yours?’ ”53 Here the language is of “teaching” (διδάσκων) rather than explicitly that of “rebuke” (ἐλέγχω). But, in another saying Abba Poemen explicitly equates teaching one’s neighbor with rebuking them (“Teaching (διδάξαι) your neighbor is like reproving (ἐλέγξαι) him”) and his use of Matthew 7:3 as support confirms this reading here.54 Once again Abba Poemen discourages rebuking others and once again his words contain an implicit qualification. It is hypocritical to rebuke another for something one has yet to achieve himself – implying that if one has already perfected a particular quality then it might be permissible to attempt to aid another in this regard.55 As one of the most prolific authors of our extant sayings, Abba 52  Another tradition also obliquely recognizes that people rebuke their neighbor (and perhaps for good reason), but that ideally one should praise the other more than rebuking them: “An old man used to say, ‘If you wish to learn to know [your] neighbor, praise him more than you rebuke him’ ” (’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 2:929–30 (English); 2:715 (Syriac)). 53  PG, 65:352; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 247; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 184; ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:868 (English); 2:663 (Syriac). 54  PG, 65:360; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 253; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 189. Matthew 7:3 discusses pointing out a fixable fault with the intention of prompting the other to make a correction, which is typically understood as an act of rebuke. 55  The Greek word ἔφθασε (a conjugation of the verb φθάνω) indicates a quality that can be “achieved” or “attained” rather than an immutable characteristic (BDAG, s.v. φθάνω). Ward thus translates οὐκ ἔφθασε as an action (or lack thereof): “something he makes no effort

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Poemen provides nuanced teachings that reject rebuke, but with some degree of recognition of rebuke’s potential value for the other party. When a monk asks an abba or elder whether he should speak out against the actions of an offender the most frequent response is “No.” But what happens in the “real world” when one simply cannot hold their tongue? This is the question posed by one of the brothers to an elder who offers a more attainable alternative, providing one explanation why a person should refrain from rebuke: A brother asked an old man, and said to him, “My brother abuses me, and I cannot bear him any longer; what should I do? Should I rebuke him, or should I speak evil words to him (‫”?)ܐܟܣܝܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܐܡܪܝܘܗܝ ܒܝܫܐܝܬ‬ The old man said to him, “Both things are bad, whether a man rebuke him, or whether a man speak evil words to him;” and the brother said to him, “And what shall I do? For I cannot endure either.” The old man said unto him, “If you cannot bear both things, speak to him, but do not rebuke him (‫ ;)ܡܠܠܝܗܝ ܘܠܐ ܬܟܣܝܘܗܝ‬but if you speak to him in an evil manner, and he listens, you will be able to quiet him (‫)ܕܬܢܚܚܘܗܝ‬, saying, ‘I did not say such and such a thing, and it will be possible for the matter which is between you to be healed (‫ ;)ܨܒܘܬܐ ܕܬܪܝܟܘܢ ܕܬܐܣܐ‬but if you rebuke him to his face, you will make a sore which will be incurable’.”56 Here the impetus to rebuke stems not from an altruistic desire to improve the other party, but from a realistic ignoble impulse to respond to a personal affront. Recognizing his inability to remain silent, the brother presents the old man with two plausible courses of action: To rebuke the other or to speak “evil words” to him (‫)ܐܟܣܝܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܐܡܪܝܘܗܝ ܒܝܫܐܝܬ‬.57 Bothered by the options, the elder first replies that both are inappropriate. Yet, when the brother presses the issue and insists that he must respond to his abuser, the elder reluctantly acquiesces and recommends confronting the offender with words (“speak to him;” ‫ )ܡܠܠܝܗܝ‬rather than rebuking. His ensuing explanation is instructive. Evil words can be denied or finessed, but a direct chastisement is irrevocable and leaves a permanent mark. Significantly, the elder’s language of repairing to do himself” (Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 184). The Syriac here is somewhat clearer as it includes the phrase ‫ܘܠܐ ܡܛܐ ܠܥܒܕܗ‬. 56  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:832 (English); 2:632 (Syriac). 57  It is not entirely clear what “evil words” in this context refers to, however, as they are contrasted with rebuke, perhaps it refers to a simple angry retort without a corrective intention.

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the matter that is between them (‫ )ܨܒܘܬܐ ܕܬܪܝܟܘܢ ܕܬܐܣܐ‬implies that the concern is how such rebuke might harm interpersonal relationships. This source offers a rejection of rebuke in keeping with our observations from the tannaitic period: Rebuke has dangerous social implications. Yet, this text is unusual within the monastic corpus. When addressing the issue of rebuke most fathers engage with the question of whether one should take action against the other party or refrain from doing so. In the present example there is no alternative to action and the choice is between the lesser of two evils.58 Furthermore, as we shall see, when the monks discuss the detriments of rebuke they are far more concerned with its effects on the self rather than how it will effect others’ perceptions. This source therefore demonstrates an awareness of the social consequences of rebuke; but, the fact that considerations of this nature are rare indicates that such concerns were not the driving force behind monastic rejection of rebuke. Although often raised as a theoretical question, sometimes the choice to refrain from rebuke is presented purely anecdotally: “the old man went out by night and saw that the brother was committing sin with that woman, but he did not rebuke him. And he said, ‘If God who fashioned him sees [him], and is longsuffering, for if He so desired He could consume him, who am I that I should rebuke him?’ ”59 Recognizing that perhaps interceding would have been meritorious, the elder feels compelled to justify himself to an unspecified interlocutor. His explanation for not rebuking displaces responsibility for others’ actions to the divine realm – it is God’s priority. Yet, his words also contain a reflection upon his own condition, “who am I” to rebuke another. The elder adduces humility as an excuse for not acting. Humility in this situation is refraining from overstepping his earthly prerogative even if rebuke is warranted. But within the monastic world, humility existed not only with respect to the divine, but also in relation to others. In fact, as I will demonstrate, it is this interpersonal sense of humility as a means of striving for God-like self-perfection that motivates the desert fathers to reject rebuke despite its potential benefit to others.

58  Even in other sources where a brother feels almost inescapably compelled to verbally lash out at others the response is typically “flee” rather than speak at all. See, for example, Wortley, Give Me a Word, 201; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 145. 59  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:885–86 (English); 2:678–79 (Syriac). Also see the parallel in Wortley, Give Me a Word, 157–58; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 107.

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Humility as a Reason Not to Rebuke

Nascent Christianity enthusiastically endorsed humility.60 Within the Gospels, Jesus encourages his followers to adopt a humble posture.61 Early monastic figures drew upon this emphasis, understanding humility as an act of emptying oneself of haughtiness, pride, and other self-affirming tendencies. Through cultivating a stance of self-debasement and renunciation the pioneers of the monastic movement sought to follow Jesus’ example: “The fundamental way of being or orientation that enables such a reception of the divine is humility, understood here as the emptied self … Underlying this advocacy of self-emptying is the desire to follow the pattern of Jesus’ own self-emptying.”62 Trumpeting humility as a fundamental quality of Jesus’ divinity, Christian monks championed this virtue and sought to embody it as an act of imitatio Dei.63 Within the monastic world of late antiquity the quality of humility (ἡ ταπείνωσις) held pride of place.64 As Douglas Burton-Christie notes: Humility was the starting point for the desert monks, both because it was the first commandment and because they knew that without the selfemptying which humility implied, the treasures for which they had come to the desert would forever elude them. The Sayings is filled with questions about the meaning of humility and about how to acquire and cultivate it: its importance was equalled only by its elusiveness.65 Embodying the core ideal of ascetic self-perfection, a monk could manifest humility both in active practices such as hesychia as well as through refraining from responding to personal affronts. But, as with most virtues, humility is not a quality simply attained once and for all. Rather, through ascetic practice, constant vigilance, and hard work one could cultivate and develop this difficult 60  This ascetic humility was both with respect to God and other human beings – the latter being of particular import for our discussion (on this aspect, see Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 249–55). 61  See, for example, Wang, “The Humility Motif in the Gospel of Matthew.” Also note Wengst, Humility, chap. 4. 62  Foulcher, Reclaiming Humility, 66. “In pursuing humility, they were attempting to realize in their own lives the call to self-emptying exemplified in the words and witness of Jesus” (Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 236). 63  Ibid., 240–45. Even with the shift from more eremitic to more cenobitic modes of monasticism humility remained a constant value (Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 51). 64  BDAG, s.v. ταπείνωσις. 65  Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 236.

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trait.66 Along every step of the way the monk seeking to cultivate a humble disposition must scrutinize his actions and thoughts to ensure control over his responses. Particularly when confronted by the provocative actions of another, the humble monk should adopt an “attitude of surrender,” refraining from a defensive response. In the words of Graham Gould, “[h]umility can be seen, at its simplest, as the capacity to resolve situations of conflict by renouncing your own right to expect reparation or penitence when you have a grievance against someone.”67 Even beyond relinquishing a claim to reparations, true humility is willingness to “forgive a brother who has wronged you before he is sorry.”68 Interpersonal humility within a monastic context is refraining from reacting negatively to a conflict or provocation and instead forgiving the offender. According to this understanding, rebuke is the epitome of that which is to be avoided. Some statements of the desert fathers even obliquely assert humility as the opposite of rebuke or confronting an offender: “An old man was asked, ‘What is humility?’ And he said to him that asked the question, ‘If your brother offends you, and you forgive him before he can repent and entreat you, [that is humility].”69 Similarly, “A brother asked an old man, saying, ‘what is humility (‫ ’?)ܡܟܝܟܘܬܐ‬and the old man answered and said unto him, ‘That you do not pay back evil for evil.’ ”70 Elsewhere in the Greek version of The Sayings there is an even more explicit statement that a man’s humility (ταπεινόφρων) is established by his refusal to rebuke (ἐπιπλήσσω): “[This] holy one was so god-fearing and humble-minded that he would never rebuke anybody, not even so much as a word.”71 Along similar lines, Abba Poemen was asked about his humility – meaning his refraining from acting or speaking up when there was trouble: “the old man asked Abba Poemen, saying, ‘From where have you gotten such humility (‫ )ܡܟܝܟܘܬܐ‬that whenever it happens that there be trouble in the coenobium you do not speak (‫)ܠܐ ܡܡܠܠ ܐܢܬ‬, and do not interfere to put an end to contention (‫” ’?)ܘܠܐ ܪܡܐ ܐܢܬ ܢܦܫܟ ܕܬܫܪܐ ܚܪܝܢܐ‬72 In all of these statements humility is identified as the inverse of rebuke, or rebuke-like actions and, given the importance of humility in monastic culture, its opposite is quite negatively received. 66  Foulcher, Reclaiming Humility, 75. 67  Gould, The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community, 118. 68  Foulcher, Reclaiming Humility, 83. 69  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 2:950 (English). For discussion of a parallel Greek source, see Foulcher, Reclaiming Humility, 83. 70  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:601 (English); 2:443 (Syriac). 71  Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 290–91. On these Greek terms, see BDAG, s.v. ἐπιπλήσσω, s.v. ταπεινόφρων. 72  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:869–70 (English); 2:665 (Syriac).

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At times the affirmation of humility, as a rejection of rebuke, appears in more concrete forms such as keeping silent or refraining from judging others.73 As one monk quips: “I have many times repented that I spoke, but that I held my peace I have never repented.”74 A standard piece of monastic advice in the name of Abba Poemen recommends: “Whatever trouble comes upon you, victory over it is to remain silent.”75 In this way, holding one’s tongue is an expression of one’s humility.76 The valuing of silence even extends to the case of praising another: “A brother asked Abba Pambo if it is a good thing to praise one’s neighbor, and he said to him: ‘It is better to keep silence.’ ”77 Pursuit of silence as an expression of humility thus serves as part of the motivation for avoiding the verbal act of rebuke.78 Beyond silence, those determined to cultivate a humble disposition also find rebuke distasteful insofar as it requires judging another person.79 Even when another person has directly harmed a monk, to react judgmentally would be out of keeping with a humble disposition: “A certain old man used to say, ‘It is a disgrace for a monk to enter into judgment with the man who has done him an injury.’ ”80 As a first step toward attaining a self-emptied state of humility, one

73  For some other sources emphasizing the importance of silence, see ’Enanisho, 1:589–607 (English); 2:432–448 (Syriac). We might also note the desire to overcome anger, which is tied to eschewing confrontation as another mode of humility (see Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 267–73). 74  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:605 (English); 2:446 (Syriac). 75  PG, 65:332; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 233; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 172. 76  Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 250–51. We find that the act of remaining silent in the face of injustice is codified as an expression of humility in the 6th century Rule of St. Benedict: “The fourth step of humility is if, when obedience involves difficulty, adversity, and even the affliction of certain injustices, one silently embraces suffering in his heart” (Benedict, The Rule of Saint Benedict, 49). 77  PG, 65:333; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 235; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 173. Others allow for the possibility of speech over silence with qualifications (’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:698 (English); 2:525 (Syriac); and 1:873 (English); 2:668 (Syriac)). 78  Philip Rousseau notes how the recommendation for silence could be proffered by more eremitic monks to more cenobitic monks, highlighting the tension raised above between these two ends of the spectrum (Rousseau, Ascetics, Authority, and the Church in the Age of Jerome and Cassian, 42). 79  “The old men used to say, ‘There is nothing worse than a man passing judgment upon his neighbor’ ” (’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:874 (English); 2:668 (Syriac)). While silence and refraining from judging others often go hand in hand, we also find the recognition that holding one’s tongue does not prevent judgement (’Enanisho, 1:600 (English); 2:442 (Syriac)). Also see Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert, 273–82. 80  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:653 (English); 2:486 (Syriac).

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must distance himself from anger or hatred toward others – the core emotions driving judgment of others.81 Humility, understood as a purging of self-affirming tendencies, stands in direct opposition to rebuke, which draws upon feelings of self-entitlement and superiority with respect to others. The humble monk does not insert and assert himself over others to tell them what they should or should not do.82 For the monk who seeks to cultivate a humble persona, a necessary element of selfperfection, rebuke is not an option. Therefore, when presented with a choice, the quest toward self-perfection trumps the desire to respond to the other. 6

Rebuke as Harmful to the Self

Several sources pit the value of humility against the value of confronting others, preferring the former. As the cultivation of humility represents a focus on self-perfection while rebuke is (ideally) for the sake of setting the other on the correct path, I have suggested that this proclivity represents a broad preference that a monk should be self-oriented rather than other-oriented. The rejection of rebuke as an undesirable alternative to humility suggests that the tradents of these traditions are generally more concerned with working on themselves than going out of their way to help or improve others. This contention is bolstered by the presence of another set of texts that, rather than opting for humility over rebuke, actively reject the act of rebuking others as an impediment to self-perfection. While the emphasis of the sources observed in the previous section was on the preferability of humility over confrontation, the following statements actively denigrate rebuke as harmful to the self. “An old man was asked [by a brother], ‘If I see the sin of my brother am I to despise (‫ )ܐܒܣܐ‬him?’ And the old man said, ‘If we hide (‫[ )ܡܟܣܝܢܢ‬the fault] of our brother God will also hide (‫ )ܡܟܣܐ‬our [faults]; and if we expose (‫ )ܓܠܝܢ‬our brother’s [faults], God will also expose (‫ )ܓܠܐ‬ours.’ ”83 Here the brother asks about despising (‫ )ܐܒܣܐ‬rather than rebuking (‫ )ܟܣܣ‬but his question is relevant insofar as it addresses the issue of responding to another’s sin. Should he take the other’s sin into account and react in some way, 81  See ’Enanisho, 1:918 (English); 2:705 (Syriac). 82  In this way, rebuke is sharply differentiated from spiritual advice offered to someone seeking help. While in both cases the father stands in a position of authority with respect to the other, offering suggestions for present or future behavior, rebuke is generally uninvited and an imposition of the monk upon others while advice can be merely a (reluctant) concession to the request of others. 83  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:916 (English); 2:703 (Syriac).

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or should he ignore it? The elder’s response circumlocutiously advises against despising the brother. Utilizing a “measure for measure” type of argument, the elder warns the brother that exposing (‫ )ܓܠܝܢ‬his fellow’s sin results in God likewise exposing (‫ )ܓܠܐ‬his sin. The underlying prescription is to ignore or “hide” (‫ )ܡܟܣܝܢܢ‬the other’s sin so that God might do the same for us, rather than punishing us for our transgressions.84 Here the recommendation to avoid responding to another’s sin is due to the negative effects that this activity engenders for oneself. Even more explicitly than in the previous source, which focused on a divine reaction, elsewhere Abba Macarius cautions against rebuke because of the nature of the act itself. “Abba Macarius said, ‘If you reprove (ἐπιτιμῶν) someone, you yourself get carried away by anger (ὀργὴν κινηθῇς) and you are satisfying your own passion; do not lose yourself, therefore, in order to save another (Οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ἄλλους σώσῃς σεαυτὸν ἀπολέσεις).’ ”85 In the eyes of Abba Macarius, rebuke is primarily an act of expressing one’s anger against another person that can easily allow emotions to become overwhelming. While it may also have the beneficial product of “saving” another person it is certainly not worth the cost of losing oneself. Here self-oriented interests outweigh concern for the other. A similar statement by Abba Poemen places the maintenance of one’s own wellbeing before that of aiding one’s neighbor: “He also said: ‘To teach (διδάξαι) one’s neighbor is [the work] of a healthy person, free of passions; for what is the point of building a house for somebody else and destroying one’s own?”86 We saw above that “teaching” (διδάξαι) for Abba Poemen is equivalent to rebuke and, in keeping with his earlier citation of Matthew 7:3, that only the hypocrite who has not yet perfected himself rebukes others. The novelty of the present dictum is that “teaching” another without prior self-perfection is actually dangerous. Through the metaphor of building a house Abba Poemen admonishes his audience that diverting one’s attention to aid another is selfdestructive. One must be fully devoted to self-perfection; for until one’s own structure is complete even the ostensibly positive act of assisting another can allow the foundation to crumble. 84  The use of the verb ‫“( ܡܟܣܐ‬hide, cover”) here appears to carry the positive sense of overlooking sin rather than the negative valence of “covering up.” Interestingly, the text does not employ the word ‫ ܡܚܦܐ‬which carries the additional meaning of “expiating sin” or “pardoning” (Smith, A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 153). It is possible that the author wished to avoid using the verb ‫ ܡܚܦܐ‬in connection to a person “despising” another and for the sake of parallelism in the measure for measure argument used ‫ܡܟܣܐ‬ for both the human and divine sides of the equation. 85  PG, 65:269; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 131; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 184. 86  PG, 65:353; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 249; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 185.

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One final example will suffice to solidify the point that rebuke is not only dismissed as a negative alternative to humility, but is rejected as detrimental in its own right. The following anecdote also acutely stresses the underlying tension between seculsion and interaction that has been hovering below the surface of many of the previous sources:87 There was an anchorite (ἀναχωρητής) who became a bishop. Of his piety (δι᾿ εὐλάβειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν) he would reprove (ἐπετίμα) nobody, but used to tolerate the faults of each one with longsuffering patience. Now his steward was not administering the church’s affairs according to the book and some people said to the bishop: “Why do you not reprimand the steward as he is disdainful in that regard?” But the bishop postponed the reprimand. [The] next day those who had spurred him on against the steward came but the bishop hid himself somewhere when he learned of it. When they came up they could not find the bishop, but they searched diligently and, when they found him, they said to him: “Why were you hiding from us?” He answered: “Because in two days you want to rob me (συλῆσαι) of what I achieved in sixty years by praying to God” (δεόμενος τοῦ Θεοῦ).88 The episode opens with the background that our bishop protagonist started out as an anchorite. As a “pious” (εὐλάβειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν) individual he refused to rebuke others. But, his new role as bishop entailed certain communal responsibilities. In response to his silent refusal to confront a wayward steward, several community members stepped forward to demand action. Rather than confront the steward however, our bishop absents himself hoping to avoid conflict. When he is discovered and challenged by the people his concerns are revealed to the audience: He feels that they wish to “rob him” (συλῆσαι) of his six decade streak of non-confrontation. This source captures the core tension explored above between monastic isolationist desires and the sense of interpersonal obligation incumbent upon communal leaders. Despite moving into a position of communal responsibility, the bishop clings to his ascetic credentials. His hard-earned track record of non-confrontation is immediately threatened by the prospect of fulfilling his clerical duties. The possibility of rebuke looms as a destructive force that would strip him (συλῆσαι) of his painstaking efforts at self-perfection. In many ways, this source epitomizes the tension 87  The length and anecdotal nature of this source suggest that perhaps it is of later provenance than some of the previous passages cited (Rubenson, “The Formation and ReFormations of the Sayings of the Desert Fathers,” 11–12). 88  Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 296–99.

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between seclusion and interaction as it manifests itself in the monastic rejection of rebuke for the sake of self-perfection. 7 Self-Rebuke The previous sources give the impression that rebuke is almost thoroughly vanquished from the monastic playing field. However, in addition to a counter voice endorsing rebuke that will require our attention momentarily, there is also a reorienting of rebuke that transforms this action into an acceptable practice. As I have argued, rebuke’s orientation toward the other at the expense of the self serves as the primary reason for its rejection. But, what if there was a way to retain the act of rebuke while still focusing on the self? Indeed, the desert fathers conceived of, and endorsed, just such a possibility: Self-rebuke. Some sources, employing the verb μέμφομαι (lit. to “find fault with, blame”), suggest that the sinner’s path to repentance is marked by an act of selfreproach:89 “He also said: ‘Often, as soon as he has committed the sin, the thief, the liar or some other kind of sinner sighs or reproaches himself (μέμφεται ἑαυτὸν) and comes to repentance.’ ”90 This idea and terminology applies not only to the sinner, but even to one who engages in other non-ideal activities: “Be aware that there are three categories relating to the receiving of charity. Consummate ascetics … average ones … But if we are [in the third category,] sick and incapable of working to supply our own needs, let us ask, in great humility, ever reproaching ourselves (μετὰ πολλῆς ταπεινώσεως μεμφόμενοι ἑαυτοὺς διαπαντός).”91 In this advice for one who is unable to work and therefore requires alms, the speaker recommends a perpetual state of self-reproach (μεμφόμενοι ἑαυτοὺς) coupled with a humble attitude (ταπεινώσεως). Here humility and self-reproach are intertwined, bringing some form of “rebuke” into line with humility rather than setting them in opposition. Sometimes self-correction is joined with prayer and/or a change of heart as the indicators of repentance. For example, in a lengthy description of an angelic vision granted to a certain bishop, the angelic visitor reports God’s perspective on humanity and human sin: “[God] forgives men falling into sin like sons or patiently awaits their self-correction, their change of heart, their supplication 89  On this verb, see BDAG, s.v. μέμφομαι. Also note the examples in Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 80 and 188; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 126 and 252. For uses of this lemma directed toward others in The Sayings, see Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 202 [=542] and 210. 90  Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 398–99. 91  Ibid., 416–17.

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of his goodness (τὴν διόρθωσιν αὐτοῖς, μεταμελομένοις δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ δεομένοις ἀγαθότητος).”92 The verb διορθόω means to “make straight” or “set on the right path” and, like in the previous examples with the verb μέμφομαι, here it is used in the reflexive sense of setting oneself on the proper path.93 The idea that repentance and rejection of sin requires prayer, a change of heart and redirection in life is not new. In this sense these sources merely continue existing tropes for penitence. But conceptually they also serve as a model and inspiration for redirecting the normal concept of rebuke back onto the subject. Thus, most importantly for our purposes, we find texts that discuss self-rebuke using the standard Greek verb for rebuke: ἐλέγχω.94 The following instance includes self-rebuke (ἑαυτὸν ἐλέγξαι) in a list of proper actions for a penitent individual: These are the things appropriate for a penitent (τῷ μετανοοῦντι): to live alone, to show concern, to work hard, to grieve [for his sins], to take no thought for the world, to be a burden to no man, to afflict himself, to reprove himself (ἑαυτὸν ἐλέγξαι), to live in poverty, to condemn himself, always to keep watch by night and to implore God for his mercy with a laboring heart.95 Rebuke has morphed from an outward-oriented act of improving another into an inward-oriented task of maintaining one’s own proper penitent posture.96 But this is only part of the transformation. A set of two questions and answers, preserved together in one of the collections of sayings, aligns self-rebuke with humility as dual paths toward the same constructive purpose: Acquiring the fear of God (ὁ φόβος τοῦ Θεοῦ). In the first saying, humility is joined with its correlate of not judging as well as indifference to material goods: “A brother asked an elder: ‘How does the fear of God come to the soul?’ ‘If a man have [sic] humility (ταπείνωσιν), be indifferent to material goods and refrain from 92  Ibid., 564–65. 93  BDAG, s.v. διορθόω. For other instances of this lemma see Ibid., 272, 276, 312, and 472. Wortley also includes another possible example employing a non-standard word for rebuke with the phrase παρεκάλει ἑαυτὸν, which he translates as “he was reproving himself” (Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 152–53). 94  We also find an example of self-rebuke that employs the lemma ἐπιτιμάω, another standard Greek term for rebuke (Ibid., 220). Similarly, there is another source where a monk describes rebuking (ἐπιτιμῶ) his bad thoughts (οἱ λογισμοί) (Ibid., 292–93). 95  Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 364–65. 96  To be clear, I am arguing for a conceptual rather than a temporal development from other to self-oriented rebuke (although a chronological transition is certainly possible).

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judging [others] (μὴ κρίνειν), the fear of God shall come to him’, the elder said.”97 That humility should be a channel for receiving the fear of God is unsurprising. But, in the subsequent source, rebuke parallels humility as another path to the same goal: A brother visited an elder and asked him: “Abba, why is it that my heart is hard and that I do not fear God?” The elder said to him: “I think that a man acquires fear of God if he maintain [sic] [the habit of] reproving himself in his heart (κρατήσῃ τὸν ἔλεγχον ἐντῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ / ‫ܠܗܘ ܐܝܢܐ‬ ‫)ܕܡܟܣ ܠܗ‬.” Said the brother to him: “What is ‘reproof ’(Τί ἐστιν ὁ ἔλεγχος / ‫ ”?)ܡܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ ܡܟܣܢܘܬܐ‬The elder said to him: “It is that a man reprove his own soul in every situation (ἐνπαντὶ πράγματι ἐλέγχῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν / ‫)ܢܟܣ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܢܦܫܗ‬, saying to it: ‘Remember that you are obliged to meet God’ and saying this too: ‘What do I want with humankind?’ I reckon that if someone perseveres in such [actions] the fear of God will come to him.”98 Rebuke as we knew it before consisted in a onetime verbal act oriented toward another individual. But now all of these elements have shifted. When the brother asks for a definition of rebuke (ἔλεγχος / ‫)ܡܟܣܢܘܬܐ‬, the elder responds that rebuke is a constant (“in every situation”) self-oriented (“his own soul”) act, which we learned from his previous response is internalized (“in his heart”). Self-rebuke is thus the inverse of other-oriented rebuke with respect to its object, its application, and its articulation. In essence, rebuke has been transformed into a form of humility itself. Just as humility is a quality cultivated over time, so too (self-)rebuke is a habit to be “maintained”. Just as humility is coupled with silence, so too (self-)rebuke emerges as an internal monologue devoid of a need for verbal expression. Finally, just as humility’s ultimate goal is self-perfection, so too (self-)rebuke has become another tool for this very pursuit. 8

The Importance of Rebuke: A Counter Discourse

Although the vast majority of monastic sources that deal with the issue of rebuking others condemn the practice (or at the very least recommend against it), this does not mean that monks never engaged in reproof or that all of them 97  Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 96–97. 98  Ibid., 96–97; ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:839–40 (English); 2:639 (Syriac).

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considered rebuking others to be problematic. As observed previously, many monks took on public roles within the church and even became priests and bishops. While some, like the pious anchorite turned bishop, continued to avoid reprimanding others, not all monks adopted such a negative attitude toward responding to the sinner. Some monks such as Abba Theodore (or at least the tradition attributed to him) thought it important to strive to help those who have transgressed: Abba Theodore used to say, “If you have affection for a man, and it happens that he fall into temptation, stretch out your hand to him, and lift him up from there, but if he fall into heresy, and will not be persuaded by you to return, cut him off from yourself immediately, lest, if you tarry long with him, you be drawn toward him, and sink down into the uttermost depths.”99 Of course, as Abba Theodore admits, there is still a danger involved in helping others. As Abba Poemen warned about destroying one’s own structure for the sake of another, Abba Theodore cautions his listeners against pursuing the sinner who has fallen too far into sin. Only for those who might safely be pulled back up out of sin does he recommend reaching out to help. However, sometimes the desire to help others, even those capable of being saved, becomes an overwhelming task. The Syriac collection of sayings includes the story of three monks who each pursued a different path. “The first one chose to go about and see where there was strife, which he turned into peace …” However, he discovered that he was “unable to make every man to be at peace with his neighbor, and his spirit was sad.”100 Disheartened, he eventually went into isolation, fleeing from the impossible task of helping everyone. These texts suggest that some monks recognized the value of trying to help the sinning other, even if there were limits or if they ultimately became discouraged. There are also other sources that record instances of monks actually rebuking other monks. For example, “Abbah Isaiah, the elder of the church, rebuked (‫ )ܟܐܐ‬the brethren when they were eating that which had been prepared for them because they began to talk with each other.”101 Similarly,

99  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:687 (English); 2:515 (Syriac). 100  Ibid., 1:589–90 (English); 2:432–31 (Syriac). 101  Ibid., 1:622 (English); 2:461– 460 (Syriac).

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Abba Macarius desired to verbally rebuke (‫ )ܒܥܐ ܕܢܟܘܢ‬some other brothers.102 General sentiments against rebuking are thus not indicative of “actual practice.” In addition to the aforementioned passages, there are a handful of sayings that actually provide guidance on how one should go about confronting others. “Abba Poemen said, ‘If a man has sinned and denies it, saying: “I have not sinned,” do not reprimand him (μὴ ἐλέγξῃς αὐτόν); for that will discourage him. But say to him, “Do not lose heart, brother, but be on guard in the future,” and you will stir his soul to repentance.’ ”103 Although Abba Poemen once again warns against rebuking (μὴ ἐλέγξῃς αὐτόν), his advice for an alternative response is still a verbal correction (“Do not lose heart, brother, but be on guard in future”), albeit quite subtle so as not to discourage the sinner. Evasive terminology does not hide the fact that he is offering a suggestion for a more effective “rebuke.” Additional advice for rebuke comes from another father who teaches that timing is everything. A certain monk only ate unleavened cakes instead of bread. Once he and some other guests were sitting before an old man who served them boiled lentils and the monk took out his unleavened cakes. Seeing this, the old man “held his peace and did not rebuke him (‫ܫܬܩ‬ ‫ )ܡܢ ܕܢܟܣܗ‬before the brothers who happened to be there, but when they rose up from the table, he took him aside privately [and chastised him].”104 To rebuke a person publicly would be humiliating. By way of his actions, the old man therefore informs us that one should rebuke in private. Another monastic source offers guidance for dealing with an unaccepted “rebuke” by following the pattern of Matt. 18:15–17 where Jesus recommends that: If another member of the church sins against you, go and point out the fault when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained that one. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church, let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.

102  Ibid., 1:830 (English); 2:630 (Syriac). On the Syriac term ‫ ܢܟܘܢ‬see Smith, A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, 209 s.v. ‫ ܟܘܢ‬,‫ ܟܢ‬II. For another example, see Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 498–99. 103  PG, 65:328; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 170; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 231. 104  ’Enanisho, Book of Paradise, 1:691 (English); 2:519 (Syriac).

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In a parallel monastic text, Abba Betimius approaches Abba Poemen with just such a case: Abba Betimius asked Abba Poemen, saying, “If a man is angry with me, and I express my contrition (‫)ܬܝܒܘܬܐ‬, and he will not accept it, what am I to do?” The old man said to him, “Take with you two of your friends and express your contrition [in their presence].” And the old man Betimius said to him, “And if he will not be persuaded [to accept it]?” And Abba Poemen answered and said, “Take with you five others;” and Abba Betimius answered and said, “And if he will not be persuaded by these?” Abba Poemen said, “Then take with you a priest;” and Abba Betimius said, “And if he will still not be persuaded?” Abba Poemen said to him, “Without anger and without excitement pray unto God that He may put into his mind [the desire for peace], and straightway you shall have no further care.”105 While there are certainly differences between this monastic recommendation and its Gospel parallel, the basic idea of an increasing progression of witnesses followed by ignoring the offender is similar. Viewed in tandem with the previous episode of the elder who rebuked privately, this tradition provides guidance for dealing with a case of ineffective private confrontation.106 The few sources that include an example of rebuke are largely framed as descriptive rather than prescriptive, and even those that obliquely proffer advice for “rebuking” shy away from clear rebuke terminology. Abba Poemen thus warns not to rebuke (μὴ ἐλέγξῃς) even while offering a suggestion for how to perform a rebuke-like act. Against this backdrop of hesitancy toward recommending the practice of rebuke there is one startling source that reverses direction entirely, arguing for a position reminiscent of the Dead Sea Scrolls. One of the saints said that there is [nothing] better than this commandment (τῆς ἐντολῆς) not to belittle (ἐξουθενεῖν) any of the brothers, for it is written: “With rebuke you shall rebuke your neighbor without incurring sin on his account” [Lev. 19:17]. So if you see your brother committing sin and you do not speak up to make him aware of his own fault, his blood will be on your hands. But if he is rebuked and persists, he will die in his

105  ’Enanisho, 1:764 (English); 2:581 (Syriac). 106  Also see Bar-Asher Siegal, Early Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud, 89–90.

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sin. So it is good for you to rebuke with love (ἐλέγχειν μετὰ ἀγάπης): not to deride or belittle him as an enemy (μὴ λοιδορεῖν ἢ ἐξουθενεῖν ὡς ἐχθρόν).107 The anonymous speaker of this admonition opens by praising the commandment (τῆς ἐντολῆς) not to “belittle” (ἐξουθενεῖν) anyone. The monastic pericope then employs Lev. 19:17 as the proof (“for it is written”) that not belittling is a commandment of great importance. What is the connection between rebuke and belittling and why does an active command to rebuke imply that one should not belittle? The answer lies in the New Testament intertext underlying this passage. When speaking of a commandment not to belittle, the author of this tradition likely has in mind Rom. 14:1–10, which employs the lemma ἐξουθενέω in a prescriptive fashion: 1) Welcome those who are weak in faith, but not for the purpose of quarreling over opinions … 3) Those who eat must not despise (μὴ ἐξουθενείτω) those who abstain, and those who abstain must not pass judgment (μὴ κρινέτω) on those who eat; for God has welcomed them … 10) Why do you pass judgment (κρίνεις) on your brother or sister? Or you, why do you despise (ἐξουθενεῖς) your brother or sister? For we will all stand before the judgment seat of God. Romans 14 opens by instructing the “strong” (in faith) how to relate to those who are “weak” and only eat vegetables.108 In verse 3, Paul admonishes the strong not to “belittle” (ἐξουθενεῖν) those who are weak, an issue rhetorically reiterated in verse 10. The key term ἐξουθενεῖν links the monastic pericope to this New Testament chapter and deserves attention. While often translated as “belittle” or “despise,” this word is “constructed from οὐθέν (‘nothing’) and the prefix ἐξ, resulting in the meaning ‘to make absolutely nothing of.’ ”109 Thus, in verse 10 a challenge is directed against the strong “who are holding others to be ‘nothing.’ ”110 107  Wortley, The Anonymous Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 306–7. 108  Only the “weak” are explicitly identified in this verse, but it is contextually clear that the “strong” are Paul’s primary audience. As the two groups are established in contrast to one another, the “strong” are considered strong in faith just as the “weak” are weak in faith. There is a wide variety of opinions as to the identities of the weak and the strong; for a survey of the different interpretations, see Cranfield and Sanday, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 690–97. On the eating of vegetables, see Jewett, Romans, 837–38. 109  Ibid., 839; LSJ, 501. 110  Jewett, 850. This Greek verb can also carry a “strong sense of contemptuous rejection” (Byrne, Romans, 411).

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Leviticus 19:17 is proffered as evidence for the importance of not treating the weak “as nothing.” The author presents two hypothetical scenarios: In the first, someone fails to rebuke a transgressor resulting in bloodguilt. In the second, the act of reproof (whether successful or not) exonerates the rebuker from responsibility. The monastic speaker seems to interpret the Levitical phrase “without incurring sin on his account” as a prohibition against refraining from rebuke, which would consequently place a greater sin upon the head of the negligent rebuker. Finally, the speaker closes with a recommendation to “rebuke with love” (ἐλέγχειν μετὰ ἀγάπης) rather than “deride or belittle him as an enemy” (μὴ λοιδορεῖν ἢ ἐξουθενεῖν ὡς ἐχθρόν).111 This parallelism establishes rebuke as the inverse of belittling. On the surface, such an opposition is puzzling; ostensibly silence would be the preferable opposite of belittling. Given Paul’s tirade against judging and the monastic association between (and rejection of) judging and rebuke, we are left to wonder why rebuke occupies this position. The answer it seems stems from the fundamental meaning of ἐξουθενεῖν as “to set as nothing.” While the weak judge the strong, the latter “treat them as nothing,” or, in other words, refrain from expressing concern for them by rebuking them. Our monastic author interprets Paul’s problem with the strong as irritation at their treating the weak as nothing instead of positively responding to them – through loving rebuke.112 Understood in this fashion, loving rebuke becomes the inverse of treating the weak as nothing.113 Against the tide of sources that passively or actively reject rebuke, this lone text moves in the opposite direction. However, it does not directly sacrifice the pursuit of self-perfection in the process. Rather than pitting the outwardoriented act of rebuke against a commensurate self-oriented alternative, this 111  The word λοιδορεῖν means to “abuse or revile” but, ironically, can also sometimes carry the meaning of “to rebuke” (LSJ, 1060). Along similar lines, we find that ἐξουθενεῖν (in the passive-reflexive sense) is sometimes used in conjunction with being humble (LSJ, 501). For such an example in The Sayings, see PG, 65:405; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 220; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 290. 112  Our monastic reader of Rom. 14 may also be picking up on the word προσλαμβάνεσθε in verse 1 that can carry the sense of “assisting” or “coming to someone’s aid” (Jewett, Romans, 835); rather than ignore the weak, the strong must come to their aid by rebuking them. 113  The obligation to love one’s fellow appears prominently in Rom. 13 (and is mentioned in Rom. 14:14), setting it as part of the backdrop to Paul’s words in chapter 14. The interpretation underlying our monastic passage also draws support from verse 19 which speaks of “mutual upbuilding” (τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους). Rebuking another is a means of aiding them or “building them up.” Our passage thus interprets Paul’s condemnation of ἐξουθενεῖν as positive encouragement to lovingly respond to the weak through constructive rebuke.

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source presents three options that all respond to the other party: Deriding them (λοιδορεῖν), belittling them (ἐξουθενεῖν), or rebuking them (ἐλέγχειν). Although the act of belittling the other (or treating them as nothing) could be glossed as a preference for working on oneself, the context provides little support for this interpretation. When forced to relate to another (sinning) party the speaker recommends proper rebuke rather than a less constructive alternative. Even this act, however, is not truly altruistic as rebuke is necessary for avoiding personal bloodguilt. Ultimately, from the perspective of this anonymous father, one cannot avoid interpersonal responsibility toward others on the quest toward self-perfection since such passivity is detrimental to one’s own progress. 9 Conclusion Even fleeing to the furthest reaches of the desert does not always allow one to escape responsibility for others. Whether actively pursued by eager students or simply finding it necessary to share one’s wisdom, Egyptian monks of the 4th and 5th centuries were faced with the decision of to what degree they should interact with others. Against this backdrop, the desert fathers struggled with the diametrically opposed values of seclusion and interaction as competing modes of achieving spiritual perfection. While both courses ideally lead to similar results, they represent two distinct paradigms of monastic identity: Should a monk be primarily focused upon self-improvement, or serve as a guide for others? In reality, a balance between the two approaches is necessary. Yet, when it comes to the question of rebuke, the dominant prescriptive monastic voice opts for the former at the expense of the latter. As we have seen over the course of this chapter, the majority of passages in Apophthegmata Patrum that treat the question of rebuking others recommend against confrontation. Based upon examples that give preference to humility, texts that highlight the detrimental consequences of rebuke, and the endorsement of the practice of self-rebuke, I have argued that underlying this rejection of rebuke is a strong proclivity toward self-oriented modes of perfection. While helping others may be of value, a monk’s priority should be placed first and foremost upon him or herself; as Abba Theodore responded to a brother seeking advice: “I myself am in danger; what can I say to you?”114 However, it is important to reiterate that the prescriptive recommendation for humility and self-oriented practices in opposition to interpersonal confrontation does not necessarily dictate actual practice. As we saw, various texts 114  PG, 65:192; Wortley, Give Me a Word, 121; Ward, The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 76.

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framed as descriptive recorded instances of monks rebuking one another. Just as for the tannaim who eschewed rebuke, so too for the desert fathers, the rejection of rebuke is more theoretical than indicative of live application. Yet, a key difference underlies their ostensive similarity. The tannaim who dismissed the possibility of reproof were not questioning the obligation or value of rebuke in an ideal sense, but rather conceded the human inability to perform the task properly. By contrast, only one monastic source directly alluded to detrimental social ramifications as a reason to avoid rebuke. The primary impetus for rejecting rebuke within Apophthegmata Patrum stems from questioning the value of rebuke itself. Aside from a unique text that argues for the necessity of the scripturally ordained practice of reproof, most passages conclude that one should not rebuke another person as this act undermines efforts at humility and the cultivation of self-perfection. Thus, while the tannaim believed that ideally one should rebuke but practically no one is capable, the desert fathers questioned rebuke on a more substantive level, challenging the basic value of the practice and suggesting that it could be dangerous to the monastic project. As we shall see in the next chapter, a similar questioning of the value of rebuke is at play in the later rabbinic corpus.

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An Unwelcome Commandment: Rebuke in the Babylonian Talmud As a highly diverse corpus, the Babylonian Talmud (BT or Bavli) presents many different perspectives, often inconsistent with one another. When it comes to the question of rebuke, there is a tradition transmitted by R. Ila’ah in the name of R. Elazar ben R. Shimon that, “Just as it is a commandment incumbent upon a person to say that which will be heeded, so too it is a commandment upon a person not to say that which will not be heeded.” R. Abba responds to this statement by challenging the label “commandment” (‫ )מצוה‬and instead preferring the language of “obligation” (‫ )חובה‬based upon the Proverbial verse: “Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you; Reprove a wise man, and he will love you” (Prov. 9:8).1 Based on R. Abba’s response, this position is often associated with rebuke in general – that one should only rebuke someone who is open to critique. However, elsewhere in the Talmud we find opposing advice: “R. Zeira said to R. Simon, ‘Let the Master rebuke the household of the exilarch!’ He said to him, ‘But they will not accept [rebuke] from me.’ He said to him, ‘Even though they do not accept [it from you] let the master rebuke them!’ ”2 In contrast to the view of R. Elazar ben R. Shimon that one should refrain from confronting those who will not listen, R. Zeira encourages this practice even when it is known that the other party will not pay attention. These sources portray two conflicting attitudes toward rebuke. On the one hand, perhaps rebuke should be limited to cases where it will be effective. On the other hand, perhaps performing rebuke itself, regardless of whether it will be heeded, is valuable in its own right. The Talmud is replete with examples of rabbis rebuking one another, sometimes effectively and sometimes without the desired outcome. Yet, like the above sources, often this material does not engage directly with Lev. 19:17. In addition, frequently the key Hebrew root for rebuke (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ )י‬is absent, raising the question of whether or not a given source should actually be framed as an instance of rebuke. For the purposes of tracing rabbinic reactions to the biblical commandment to rebuke, it is necessary to narrow in on those sources that explicitly refer to Lev. 19:17 and employ a hiphil conjugation of the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬in the sense of reproof (rather than “proof”). But, 1  B T Yev. 65b. 2  B T Shab. 55a.

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even this is often insufficient. Even talmudic texts that treat the Levitical verse and the application of rebuke sometimes teach us little about the rabbis’ views on rebuke. For example, BT B.M. 31a records an exchange between an anonymous rabbinic figure and the fourth generation amora Rava concerning the implications of Lev. 19:17’s doubling of the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫י‬: One of the rabbinic figures said to Rava, “Shall I say that [the word] rebuke [in Lev. 19:17 implies that he should only rebuke] one time, [but the addition of] you shall surely [(lit. rebuke, you shall rebuke) teaches that he should rebuke] two times?” [Rava] said to him, “[The word] rebuke [on its own] implies even a hundred times; [what does] you shall surely [teach then]? [Based on the word rebuke] I know only that the master [should rebuke] a student. From where [do we learn that] a student [should rebuke] the teacher? The Torah says you shall surely rebuke – in all cases.”3 In this short exchange Rava rejects the restricted reading of the superfluous repetition of the word “rebuke” as merely indicating that the act should be repeated once. Instead, he sees the initial word “rebuke” as requiring almost unlimited attempts. The repetition of the root thus teaches something else entirely, namely, that a student is commanded to rebuke his teacher. Looking at this source in isolation, one might be inclined to say that Rava holds a particular view about the scope of Lev. 19:17 and the role of rebuke in general. But the enthusiasm for rebuke evinced by this pericope is of limited value for assessing more widespread amoraic perspectives on Lev. 19:17, and perhaps even of limited value for understanding Rava’s own position. This tradition is actually one of several in a string of similarly formulated glosses on scriptural repetitions, suggesting that linguistic features rather than attention to content or ideological positions are the driving force.4 Thus, in order to find a more accurate perspective on how the later rabbis relate to Lev. 19:17 and rebuke we must turn to the primary sugya (talmudic passage) that addresses this material in its own right: BT Arakh. 16b–17a.

3  B T B.M. 31a. 4  While each of the examples in this passage carries its own specific gloss, the standard language and attribution to Rava diminishes the value of this text for advancing our understanding of rebuke in its own right: “Rebuke” could be replaced by any other repetition with a similar interpretation. Additionally, although the gloss on Lev. 19:17 is attributed to Rava, this could theoretically be a later addition supplied in order to align this third example with the previous two that also bear his name.

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Leviticus 19:17 – A Problematic Obligation

The principal sugya addressing rebuke and Lev. 19:17 appears in BT Arakh. 16b– 17a. As I shall argue, over the course of the talmudic discussion the obligatory nature of rebuke is continually upheld, while its worth is regularly challenged. Simultaneously affirming and questioning the role of reproof, our sugya engages in a dialectic deliberation over the value of rebuke. Unlike the tannaitic response in Sifra that left the commandment intact by focusing on human shortcomings, in this chronologically later discussion the valuation of the injunction itself is at stake. The sugya’s interplay between acknowledgement of rebuke’s importance and a concurrent devaluation of its significance reveals that the desirability of the commandment itself has now become the target of consideration. In light of the monastic sources reviewed in the previous chapter, which pitted the benefit of critiquing others against devotion to improving oneself, I will suggest that a similar dynamic is at play in our rabbinic passage. Just as in the monastic material, in which humility and an inward-orientation trumped outward-looking obligations, so too for our sugya, the other-centered focus of rebuke results in its devaluation in contrast to internally-oriented concerns of self-improvement. Nevertheless, pertinent differences between rabbinic and monastic worldviews result in a more diverse picture emerging from our talmudic sources. Our sugya in BT Arakh. 16b–17a is comprised of several semi-discrete sections. The first preserves a version of the passage found in Sifra on Lev. 19:17. The second asks whether rebuke or humility is preferable, opting for the latter and proffering an anecdote to solidify the point. Finally, the third section asks “until what point” one should rebuke and remain in one’s place of residence, and what constitutes a minimal amount of suffering. In each of the units of the sugya there is an underlying tension – a persistent affirmation of the obligation to rebuke coupled with an opposing thrust that problematizes and devalues it. While the degree of investment in upholding the importance of rebuke varies from one section to another, its depreciation steadily resounds, climaxing at the apex of the sugya’s center. Tracing the dialectic consideration of rebuke across the sugya’s three units, and observing its literary placement following an extended discourse on evil speech (lashon hara), this chapter demonstrates how the Bavli tackles the new question of whether or not one should rebuke, ultimately endorsing the latter alternative.

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2 The Tannaitic Pericope Following a protracted treatment of evil speech (lashon hara), the Talmud switches gears to discuss rebuke by incorporating a version of the two-part tradition found in Sifra. In Chapter 4 I argued that this tannaitic section purposefully advances a forceful and potentially violent responsibility to rebuke in its simple exegetical section, which is then repudiated by several rabbinic authorities. On its own this tradition supports the thesis that the Bavli both upholds and challenges rebuke by accentuating the lengths to which one should go in order to rebuke and yet problematizing the commandment with regard to its contemporary feasibility. Although the Bavli’s rendition of this material closely mirrors its tannaitic parallels, several significant differences catch the eye. Two of these changes enhance the conflict between an unbending resolve to chastise and the detrimental ramifications of so doing, further bolstering my claim. Viewing the tannaitic tradition alongside the version in BT allows us to see these changes most clearly: Bavli Arakhin5

Sifra Qedoshim

Our Rabbis taught: You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. One might think you should not hit him, slap him, or curse him. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. The verse speaks of hatred in one’s heart. From where do we know that one who sees something distasteful (‫ )דבר מגונה‬in his fellow is obligated to rebuke him? As it says, you shall surely rebuke. If he rebuked him and he did not accept it, from where do we know that he should rebuke him again? The Torah therefore says, surely rebuke – in any case.

You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. One might think you should not hit him, curse him, or slap him. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. I only said hatred which is in the heart.

And from where do we know that if he rebukes him even four or five times that he should rebuke again? The Torah therefore says you shall surely rebuke.

5  The version presented here follows the standard Vilna printed edition; however, there are significant manuscript differences that will be discussed throughout the chapter.

180 One might think even if his countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because of him. It was taught, R. Tarfon said, “I wonder if there is anyone in this generation who is able to give6 rebuke.” If one said to him “Take the speck (‫ )קיסם‬from between your eyes,” he would [reply], “Take the log (‫)קורה‬ from between your eyes.” R. Elazar ben Azariyah said, “I wonder if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke.” [R. Akiva said, “I wonder if there is anyone in this generation who can receive rebuke.”]7 And R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri said, “May heaven and earth bear witness regarding me that many times Akiva was lashed because of me, because I would complain about [R. Akiva] before Rabban [Shimon ben]8 Gamliel. And all the more so that I increased love for him, In order to fulfill that which it says, Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you; Reprove a wise man, and he will love you.”

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One might think even if he rebukes him and his countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because of him. R. Tarfon said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!”

R. Elazar ben Azariyah said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to receive rebuke!” R. Akiva said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke!” R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri said, “May heaven and earth bear witness regarding me that more than four or five times Akiva was lashed because of me before Rabban Gamliel because I would complain to [Rabban Gamliel] concerning [R. Akiva], and how much would I know that he increased love for me.”

6  According to MSS Oxford 370, London 402, Munich 95, and Vatican 120 of BT, R. Tarfon’s position is that no one knows how to rebuke. According to MS Vatican 119 and the Venice and Vilna printed editions, R. Tarfon’s position concerns no one being able to receive rebuke. The Cambridge Geniza fragment (T-S F 2(2).29) lacks a position attributed to R. Tarfon. 7  A position attributed to R. Akiva appears only in MSS Oxford, London, and Munich as well as the Cambridge Geniza fragment. 8  M SS Oxford, Munich, Vatican 119, and the Vilna and Venice printed editions read, “Shimon ben Gamliel” while MSS London, Vatican 120, and the Cambridge Geniza fragment read, “Rabban Gamliel.”

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While the exegetical tradition preserved in Sifra appeared to skip over the moment when the rebuker first reproves his fellow (jumping from a delineation of approved actions to the necessity of repeated attempts should an initial effort prove ineffective), the Bavli provides the missing link. Sandwiched between the gloss that hatred in one’s heart permits hitting, slapping, and cursing and the interpretation of the doubled root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬as requiring continual attempts, all extant manuscripts of the Bavli introduce another interpretative step: “From where do we know that one who sees something distasteful (‫דבר‬ ‫)מגונה‬9 in his fellow is obligated to rebuke him? As it says, ‘you shall surely rebuke’.”10 Literarily, this gloss simply fills the gap between permissible forms of rebuke and the requirement to continue trying if at first one does not succeed. Yet, the particular idiom employed for denoting the other’s error, “something distasteful” (‫)דבר מגונה‬, is rather unusual and worthy of attention. Aside from our sugya, the phrase ‫ דבר מגונה‬appears in four other cases in the Bavli.11 The first two instances, found in tractates Niddah and Qiddushin, use the phrase to refer to a physical blemish on a woman.12 The bodily and unalterable nature of these defects suggests that our sugya has something different in mind. In the other two talmudic examples, ‫ דבר מגונה‬refers to something more mutable – either a particular locution (BT Pesaḥ. 3a) or the quality of one’s actions (BT Ned. 32a). These instances therefore have direct bearing upon our understanding of the connotation of the phrase ‫ דבר מגונה‬in BT Arakh. In both of these other examples, the label ‫ דבר מגונה‬applies to something that is only somewhat distasteful rather than anything egregious: Calling an animal “impure” is only distasteful in contrast to the more eloquent phrasing of “not pure” (BT Pesaḥ. 3a) and Abraham fears that he might possess some slight flaw (‫דבר‬

9  Michael Sokoloff translates the Aramaic root ‫י‬.‫נ‬.‫ ג‬in its active form as “to disgrace” and the passive form as “to look repulsive” (JBA, 296 s.v. ‫ גני‬#2). Jastrow translates the term ‫ מגונה‬as “deserving to be covered up, reprehensible, indecent; ugly” (Jastrow, 259 s.v. ‫גני‬ ‫)גנה‬. 10  The phrasing of this line varies among the manuscripts, but each preserves essentially the same material. Note, however, that MSS London and Vatican 119 lack the subsequent interpretation of the infinitive absolute (‫ּתֹוכ ַיח‬ ִ ‫הֹוכ ַח‬ ֵ ) as implying continual rebuke. 11  MS Oxford preserves a fifth occurrence in BT Ber. 31b; however, all of the other manuscripts of this passage read “‫דבר שאינו הגון‬.” This example will be discussed below. 12  In BT Nid. 17a, Rav Ḥisda prohibits having sexual relations during the daytime, which is explained by Abaye as a concern that a man will see ‫ דבר מגונה‬in his wife and she will become repulsive to him. In BT Qidd. 41a, Rav Yehuda quotes Rav as prohibiting betrothal of a woman during the day time lest he see ‫ דבר מגונה‬and she becomes repulsive to him.

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‫ )מגונה‬that would prevent him from being perfect (‫ ;תמים‬BT Ned. 32a).13 Thus, the phrase ‫ דבר מגונה‬in the Bavli applies primarily to something distasteful. Beyond the phrase ‫ דבר מגונה‬itself, a search of the related term ‫ גנאי‬in the Bavli similarly reveals several examples of minor or relatively insignificant offenses.14 Returning to the use of the phrase ‫ דבר מגונה‬in our sugya, it seems probable that ‫ דבר מגונה‬also connotes a moderately inconsequential offense. If so, then the Bavli’s selection of this particular idiom implies that one is obligated to rebuke another for even a minor fault.15 This extension of the obli13  In BT Pesaḥ. 3a the Torah is said to have gone out of its way to avoid a somewhat vulgar expression by adding several additional and extraneous letters: Gen. 7:8 refers to animals as “not pure” (‫ ) ֵאינֶ ּנָ ה ְטה ָֹרה‬rather than simply as “impure” (‫) ְט ֵמ ָאה‬. Based upon the Pentateuch’s avoidance of “something distasteful” (‫ )דבר מגונה‬in this verse (namely the word “impure”), R. Yehoshua ben Levi derives the premise that one should always avoid distasteful language when speaking. The context of this statement, within a longer discussion of opting for lofty language (‫ )לישנא מעליא‬suggests that the “distasteful” language in this case is only relatively unpalatable. The Torah often refers to animals as impure (‫) ָט ֵמא‬. It is only when compared to the more “lofty language” of “an animal which is not pure” (‫ ) ֵאינֶ ּנָ ה ְטה ָֹרה‬that the term “impure” (‫ ) ָט ֵמא‬takes on a somewhat negative connotation. Similarly, in the case of BT Ned. 32a, the Bavli relates a midrash on the biblical episode of God telling Abraham to walk before Him and “be perfect” (‫ ;וֶ ְהיֵ ה ָת ִמים‬Gen. 17:1). Abraham quivers in fear lest he possess some flaw (‫ )דבר מגונה‬and therefore not be perfect in the eyes of God. As Rashi emphasizes (BT Ned. s.v. shema nimẓa bi devar meguneh), Abraham’s fear is sparked as a result of God’s unprecedented demand for perfection (‫)שלא אמר לו והיה תמים עד עכשיו‬. From a rabbinic perspective, Abraham was clearly unconcerned with major flaws since God had already selected him. It is only with regard to the newfound standard of perfection that Abraham questions whether he possesses a minor flaw. 14  BT B.B. 123a includes a pericope that refers back to the use of ‫י‬.‫נ‬.‫ ג‬in BT Pesaḥ. 3a. A tradition preserved in BT Ber. 33b (as well as BT Meg. 25a) states that it is ‫ גנאי‬to praise a king who is wealthy in gold as having much silver since this depreciates his value. Here ‫גנאי‬ is again only negative relative to a preferable alternative rather than something highly problematic in its own right. BT Ber. 43b lists six things that are ‫ גנאי‬for a sage to do: To go to the marketplace perfumed, to go out alone at night, to go out with patched sandals, to speak with a woman in the marketplace, to spend time with amei ha’areẓ, and to get to the house of study last. Once again, these actions are more “distasteful” than morally abhorrent (particularly since some of these expectations are then qualified by the Talmud as to when they actually apply). For other examples of ‫ גנאי‬referring to something only somewhat distasteful, see BT Menaḥ 35a, BT Sanh. 93b and 94a, BT Shab. 64b, and BT Pesaḥ. 56a. 15  This reading is strengthened by a partial parallel in BT Ber. 31b where the exemplum of the prophet Eli chastising Hannah for ostensibly being drunk teaches that one should rebuke another upon seeing something that is not appropriate (‫מכאן לראה בחבירו דבר‬ ‫)שאינו הגון וצריך להוכיחו‬. The expression “something that is not appropriate” (‫דבר שאינו‬ ‫)הגון‬, which appears in most of the manuscripts, also seems to connote a less severe offense. As noted above, MS Oxford preserves the phrase ‫ דבר מגונה‬instead of ‫דבר שאינו‬ ‫הגון‬, potentially influenced by the wording of our present sugya.

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gation beyond responding to more extreme offenses (which one might infer from Sifra’s permission to hit, curse and slap the offender) builds upon our previous discussion of the force of the commandment to rebuke, augmenting the application of Lev. 19:17. One is required to rebuke another person, even for minor offenses. If the insertion of another exegetical comment on Lev. 19:17 further defines the rebuke requirement to encompass even minor transgressions, a second major addition, which appears in the second half of the tannaitic material, advances this idea while also cutting in the opposite direction. Although there are some slight differences in the opinions of the tannaim who decry rebuke in the Bavli from those in Sifra and Sifre Devarim, the most blatant accretion is an example of an ineffective reproof and the resulting retort:16 “If one said to him ‘Take the speck (‫ )קיסם‬from between your eyes,’ he would [reply], ‘Take the log (‫ )קורה‬from between your eyes.”17 Building upon the idea that ‫דבר מגונה‬ refers to something merely distasteful, the speck (‫)קיסם‬, concerning which one chastises another person, is also indicative of something minor rather than a major problem.18 This is especially apparent in contrast to the “log” (‫ )קורה‬that the other party points out. Once again the Bavli’s version of the tannaitic tradition implicitly heightens the force of the command by specifically describing rebuke as oriented toward even minor issues. The parable of the speck and the log not only augments the scope of the biblical obligation, but also subtly cuts against its desirability. This example is brought in order to concretize the case of an ineffective rebuker and an unreceptive rebuked party. However, it also adds a new dimension of concern. Without this illustration, the tannaitic assertions that no one knows how to properly give or receive rebuke potentially indicate only that the rebuker’s unconvincing rhetoric fails to prompt the offending party to yield. Rather than such a passive possibility, the particular formulation chosen to exemplify this failure portrays an escalating confrontation. By responding with a line that parallels the rebuker’s while upping the ante from a minor annoyance (a speck) 16  The relevance of some of these other differences will be discussed below. 17  While all of the extant manuscripts of this passage contain the word ‫“( עיניך‬your eyes”), a parallel in BT B.B. 15b has some manuscript traditions and printed editions that read ‫שניך‬ (“your teeth”). For a discussion of different versions of this idiom, see Derrett, “Christ and Reproof.” For a discussion of the possibility that the use of this idiom in the Bavli is derived from the Jesus tradition, see Davies and Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, 1:671n6. 18  This is similarly the case for the Gospel version of this idiom where the speck (κάρφος) similarly “stands for small moral defects” (Davies and Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew, 1:671).

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to a much larger irritant (a log), the offending party antagonistically shifts the onus onto the rebuker. Heightening the drama and raising the stakes through his combative retort, the offending party exhibits the danger of a failed rebuke inciting greater discord between the two actors. This illustration of inadequate rebuke thus further problematizes the act of rebuke beyond the dangers already noted at play in the original tannaitic passage. 3

Humility or Rebuke?

The first unit of the Bavli sugya sets the stage by adopting the tannaitic tradition regarding rebuke that both emphasizes and problematizes the requirement of Lev. 19:17. The two major additions to this section augment each of these facets by demanding reproof for even a distasteful infraction while displaying the dangers of a failed attempt. The second unit of this sugya contains a new approach in which Lev. 19:17 is assessed and deemed unworthy of application. In the second major section of the Bavli’s sugya on rebuke the value of reproof is contrasted with that of humility (‫)ענוה‬, with the latter clearly emerging as the priority: R. Yehuda son of R. Shimon asked of him,19 “Proper (‫ )לשמה‬rebuke and improper (‫ )שלא לשמה‬humility, which of these two is preferable?” He said to him, “Do you not admit that proper humility is preferable as the master said, ‘Humility is the greatest of all.’ Improper [humility] is also preferable as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: ‘A person should always occupy himself with the Torah and commandments even if improperly, for from improper [motivations] one will come to [occupy himself with them for] proper [motivations].’ ” R. Yehuda the son of R. Shimon pits rebuke against humility, a trait considered by some to be the greatest quality.20 Posing the question of preferability between the act of rebuke and humility tacitly acknowledges the value of the former; were rebuke clearly inferior to humility, or if it were the editor’s intention to thoroughly debase rebuke, a much lesser comparison could have been made. 19  Most of the manuscripts do not include R. Yehuda’s interlocutor. Only MS Vatican 120 and Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29 supply the name of his father, R. Shimon ben Pazi, as the addressee. 20  This statement that “Humility is greatest of all” has a parallel in BT A.Z. 20b in which it appears in the name of R. Yehoshua ben Levi, who disagrees with an alternative position that piety (‫ )חסידות‬is the greatest attribute.

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Yet, despite the fact that rebuke is paired with such a great partner as humility, this passage degrades reproof and Lev. 19:17 on several levels. Humility is selected as clearly superior. In fact, even improper humility is favored over proper rebuke. Moreover, following upon the heels of the previous section of the sugya that analyzed the biblical obligation to rebuke, the absence of any indication of humility’s scriptural status (in the majority of manuscripts) is glaring.21 The biblical obligation of rebuke is less preferable than the non-biblical value of humility. Correspondingly, the inclusion of Rav’s adage concerning Torah and commandments directly calls our attention to the disparity between rebuke’s Pentateuchal pedigree and the merely rabbinic provenance proffered for the value of humility. Thus, despite the perfunctory nod to rebuke’s value as a worthy contender against humility, the overwhelming preference for the latter in this section undercuts the desirability of rebuke and Lev. 19:17. The devaluation of rebuke continues as the sugya presents an exemplification of proper rebuke and improper humility. In this example, the act of improper humility is barely humility at all. In fact, the end result is closer to “evil speech,” lashon hara, rather than anything positive. Nevertheless, following on the heels of the previous pericope, the actions taken are framed as preferable to actual rebuke.22

21  In the BT A.Z. parallel to this material, Isa. 61:1 is adduced as support for R. Yehoshua ben Levi’s contention that humility is the most important quality. In our sugya, reference to this verse from Isaiah only appears in MS Munich 95 in which R. Yehoshua ben Levi’s full statement is included. Rather than truncating the statement to only include a reference to the biblical verse, which would purely function as proof of humility’s scriptural status, MS Munich 95 incorporates R. Yehoshua ben Levi’s complete dictum, retaining a comparative reference to piety. This comparative element aligns with the question of preferability in our sugya. Humility is superior to rebuke just as it is greater than piety. Consequently the biblical verse primarily supports humility’s elevated status vis-à-vis other alternatives rather than functioning as an assertion of humility’s scriptural status in its own right. Furthermore, in contrast to the Levitical obligation to rebuke that is explicitly formulated as a commandment, the mention of humility in Isaiah not only carries prophetic (rather than Pentateuchal) status, but is not formulated as a charge to be humble. In light of these factors, the absence of any scriptural reference in all of the other manuscripts begs the question of why the Levitical obligation to rebuke is considered lesser than the nonPentateuchal value of humility. One could easily find a Pentateuchal source for the value of humility, namely, Num. 12:3 (“Now the man Moses was very meek (‫) ָענָ ו ְמאֹד‬, above all the men that were upon the face of the earth”). Yet, this verse makes no appearance in our sugya. The lack of any such indication of humility’s scriptural (and particularly Pentateuchal) status thus stands in stark contrast to rebuke’s Levitical pedigree. 22  See Blankovski, Sin for the Sake of God, 60–61.

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What is an example of proper rebuke and improper humility? Like the [example] of Rav Huna and Ḥiyya bar Rav who were sitting before Shmuel. Ḥiyya bar Rav said to him,23 “Does the master not see that he is bothering me?” [Rav Huna] took it upon himself not to bother [Ḥiyya] further. After [Ḥiyya] left, [Rav Huna] said to [Shmuel], “This and that he did to me.” [Shmuel] said to [Rav Huna], “Why did you not tell him to his face?”24 [Rav Huna] said to [Shmuel], “Far be it from me that the offspring of Rav would be embarrassed by my hand.” The plethora of pronouns lacking a clear antecedent renders this passage somewhat opaque. But the most coherent understanding of the plot is as follows: Ḥiyya lodges a complaint against Rav Huna before their mutual teacher Shmuel. After Ḥiyya leaves, Rav Huna informs Shmuel of Ḥiyya’s problematic behavior. Shmuel questions why Rav Huna did not rebuke Ḥiyya directly for his bad behavior, to which Rav Huna responds that he was concerned with embarrassing him. As this example is proffered to illustrate proper rebuke and improper humility, it appears that in the eyes of the storyteller, Rav Huna’s complaints against Ḥiyya would have constituted the proper rebuke (had he actually expressed them to Ḥiyya himself) and Rav Huna’s hesitancy to rebuke lest he embarrass is the instance of improper humility. Humility is demonstrated by remaining silent rather than offering legitimate criticism. Yet, for reasons to be discussed below, Rav Huna’s motivations transform his restraint into an improper action, despite being preferable to the alternative. In his work, And before Honor – Humility: The Ideal of Humility in the Moral Language of the Sages, Richard Lewis surveys the nature of humility in early Jewish traditions, particularly within rabbinic literature. He argues that the rabbis transform the biblical meaning of humility (‫ )ענוה‬from a social category applicable to the politically and economically destitute into an ethical quality grounded in the negation of social hierarchy and the recognition of the inherent equality of humanity.25 From this perspective, Rav Huna’s unwillingness to rebuke is improperly motivated insofar as he is concerned with impugning

23  Some interpret Ḥiyya as speaking to Shmuel at this point, a view supported by MS Oxford and Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29, which include his name explicitly. However, it is also possible that he is speaking directly to Rav Huna. 24  There is a disagreement as to whether this refers simply to bringing his challenge before Ḥiyya, or if the implication is that he should have brought his challenge to Ḥiyya before Shmuel (for a discussion of the manuscripts here, see Lewis, And before Honor – Humility, 282n83). 25  See Lewis, 128, 135 ff.

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the honor of an individual with high status, Ḥiyya’s father Rav.26 In contrast to the correct form of humility, which would manifest itself as a concern for everyone’s dignity, including Ḥiyya himself, Rav Huna’s misplaced respect for the eminence of Rav renders his action deficient. From the perspective of Lewis’ observation that rabbinic humility is dependent on the fundamental recognition of human equality, Rav Huna misses the core component of humility. His “humble” act might not even constitute rabbinic humility (as Lewis understands it) in the first place, let alone an “improper act of humility.” Nevertheless, in light of the preface to the episode, which asserts that improper humility is most preferable, Rav Huna’s flawed act of humility is favored over rebuke. In addition to Rav Huna’s actions diverging from the basic idea of rabbinic humility as defined by Lewis, Rav Huna’s “humble” act may actually be detrimental in its own right. According to the timeline of the story, Rav Huna waits for Ḥiyya’s egress before immediately relating to Shmuel the various offenses committed by Ḥiyya. Purposefully delaying until the moment Ḥiyya’s is absent, and preemptively informing Shmuel of Ḥiyya’s infractions before Shmuel has a chance to question him, Rav Huna effectively turns a possible opportunity for rebuke into its transgressive inverse: Lashon hara.27 Rav Huna conveys negative details about his peer to a third party, rather than to Ḥiyya himself (or at least even in Ḥiyya’s presence). Moreover, his motivation for confiding in Shmuel is primarily to excuse his own behavior and exonerate himself rather than to benefit Ḥiyya. Rav Huna thus denigrates his colleague to a superior for self-centered purposes, an action hardly distinguishable from lashon hara.28 By presenting this episode in the context of a preference for improper humility over rebuke, the sugya deems even this quasi-act of lashon hara to be better than engaging in rebuke, further devaluing rebuke and Lev. 19:17. Aside from the devaluation of rebuke implied by the preference for improper humility, another aspect of this anecdote further problematizes rebuke. The element of embarrassment with which the story concludes (“Far be it from me that the offspring of Rav would be embarrassed by my hand”) recalls the concern over humiliation voiced by the exegesis of Lev. 19:17 at the opening of our sugya. According to Rav Huna, if he had indeed rebuked Ḥiyya he would likely have embarrassed him. Embarrassing the object of one’s rebuke is thus a live concern and certainly a good reason to think twice before engaging in 26  It also appears that Rav was Rav Huna’s teacher, providing added impetus to avoid impugning his honor (see Albeck, Mavo la-Talmudim, 195). 27  Although the Talmud does not employ the language of lashon hara at this juncture, Rav Huna’s actions appear to constitute an example of this type of slander. 28  On the nature of lashon hara in rabbinic literature, see Bernsen, “Lashon Ha-Ra (the Evil Tongue) and the Problem of Jewish Unity,” chap. 1.

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reproof. Concluding with this mention of embarrassment in an exemplification of proper rebuke also suggests that even the best intended act of correction will likely, or perhaps inevitably, result in the unwanted consequence of humiliation. Overall, this middle section of our sugya presents a potent challenge to the value of rebuke. While the relative value of reproof is considered high enough to juxtapose it with a quality as venerable as humility, the subsequent preference for the latter undercuts its worth. As even improper humility, verging on lashon hara in the exemplum, trumps rebuke, this section of our sugya thoroughly undercuts the desire to perform this scriptural injunction. 4

Until What Point is Rebuke?

In the third and final section of our sugya, the Bavli asks the extent or limit of several different situations: Rebuking, remaining in one’s place of lodging, and suffering. For the first of these cases, the sugya proffers three alternative answers attributed to different amoraim: One should reprove until hit by, cursed by, or arousing anger (‫ )ניזפה‬in, the object of one’s rebuke.29 These three options are linked to the views of tannaim who derive their positions from the biblical episode of King Saul who expresses his indignation at his son Jonathan for rebuking him:30 Until what point is rebuke (‫ ?)עד היכן תוכחה‬Rav31 said, “Until a blow (‫)הכאה‬,” Shmuel said “Until a curse (‫)קללה‬,” and R. Yoḥanan said, “Until indignation (‫)נזיפה‬.” [These views are] like a tannaitic debate: R. Eliezer says “Until a blow,” R. Yehoshua said, “Until a curse,” Ben Azzai says, “Until indignation.”32 Rav Naḥman bar Yiẓḥak said, “And the three of 29  It is clear that the endpoint is when the rebuker is hit or cursed by the rebuked party rather than the rebuker him or herself performing this action (Henshke, “Until When Should One Rebuke?,” 30). 30  Although Jonathan’s response to Saul’s question about David’s absence (1 Sam. 20:28–29) is not exactly the type of statement that one would normally construe as rebuke, this seems to be the way that the sugya understands the function of his words. See Rashi’s comments (s.v. ad qelala) as well as Hagahot ha-Baḥ on this gloss and Henshke, “Until When Should One Rebuke?” There is a significantly different version of this part of the sugya preserved in the Yemenite midrashic work Meor ha-Afelah. For a discussion of this version and Midrash, see Henshke, 35–36. 31  MS Vatican 119 reads Rava instead of Rav. Given the dating of the other two amoraim in this dialogue however, Rav is the preferred reading. 32  The correlation with the views of these three tannaim is missing in MS Munich 95.

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them derive their positions from a single scriptural source: Saul flew into a rage against Jonathan. ‘You son of a perverse, rebellious woman!’ (1 Sam. 20:30), and it is written, Saul threw his spear at him to strike him down (1 Sam. 20:33).” According to the one who said “Until a blow,” it is written, to strike him down And according to the one who said, “Until a curse,” it is written, to your shame, and to the shame of your mother’s nakedness (1 Sam. 20:30).33 And according to the one who said, “Until indignation,” it is written, Saul flew into a rage. And according to the one who said “indignation,” is it not written “a blow” and “a curse,” [therefore why is indignation also necessary]?! That case [is different] because of the great love that Jonathan had for David, he exerted himself more [than was necessary]. Hitting, cursing, and indignation, the three alternatives for the end point of rebuke, hark back to the midrash with which the sugya opened. Lev. 19:17’s prohibition on holding anger in one’s heart was interpreted to permit hitting (‫)יכנו‬, slapping (‫)יסטרנו‬, and cursing (‫)יקלקלנו‬. Two of the three terms directly correspond (‫ הכאה‬and ‫ )קללה‬and the word ‫ נזיפה‬both reminds us of the anger (‫לֹא‬ ‫ ) ִת ְׂשנָ א‬in the beginning of Lev. 19:17 and itself is a term employed by the Bavli as a word connoting rebuke.34 These three endpoints for rebuke thus parallel the three permitted forms of rebuke suggested at the opening of the sugya. At the outset of the Bavli sugya, the three actions describe the extreme measures permitted to a rebuker in order to reform an offender. In this third portion of the sugya, the three actions now portray the response of the rebuked party.35 This inverted reflection of the beginning of the sugya both heightens the obligation of rebuke and amplifies its danger. As noted above, when attributed to the rebuker the three actions demand that he or she adopt even such extreme measures for correcting the offender. When the sugya applies these extreme actions to the rebuked party in the context of asking the point until one must continue rebuking, it extends the obligation by forcing the rebuker 33  Munich provides the previous portion of 1 Sam. 20:30 (“You son of a perverse, rebellious woman!”) rather than the phrase (“to your shame, and to the shame of your mother’s nakedness”) found in the other manuscripts. 34  Jastrow, 891. Hitting and slapping are very similar actions so we can understand why only the most common of them would be reiterated while the other is dropped. Furthermore, the sugya is guided and restricted by the biblical evidence and therefore adopts an example (1 Sam. 20) that comes as close as possible to the forms of expression in the exegetical material above. It is important to note that the word ‫ נזיפה‬does not appear in the scriptural example and thus the choice of this particular term, which itself implies rebuke, is significant. 35  See Rashi’s commentary ad loc.

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not to simply give up when the offender passively refuses to accept reproof. The rebuker is obligated to continually rebuke (as indicated by the doubled root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ )י‬and to do so until the rebuked party becomes so provoked that he or she responds in kind. In this way, the extreme actions attributed to the rebuked party increase the intensity of the biblical injunction, forcing the rebuker to persist. Yet, in so doing, the sugya simultaneously elevates the level of danger in store for the rebuker. He or she must persevere, knowing the impending peril. By adopting parallel language for the acts of the rebuker and the offender, the sugya subtly blurs the line between the one who is in the right and the one in the wrong. When both commit similar actions in the context of their confrontation, the casual observer cannot determine who is the one rebuking and who is the one being rebuked. Furthermore, just as the insertion above of “Take the log from between your eyes” in response to the parallel language of “Take the speck from between your eyes” deflects our gaze onto the rebuker and his flaws, so too the analogous terminology here centers our attention on the ineffectiveness of the rebuker and his similarity to the offender. The slight difference between their actions is also instructive. While the offender may become angry (‫)נזיפה‬, the rebuker may slap him (‫)יסטרנו‬, potentially a more egregious and insulting act.36 Additionally, by specifically ending the responses of the originally rebuked party with another type of rebuke (‫)נזיפה‬, the Bavli establishes the possibility for a continual cycle of unending reproof.37 Beyond the implications of the parallel language, a blatant absence in this section indirectly problematizes rebuke. The sugya never explicitly offers the possibility that a successful rebuke, where the offender admits his sin and repents, could or should be the end point of rebuke. Perhaps this is simply too obvious, but the fact that such an auspicious possibility is deemed improbable for the rabbis is reinforced by the statement of R. Eliezer that appears toward the end of this unit: “If (‫ )אלמלא‬the Holy One Blessed Be He came to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with strict justice (‫)דין‬, they would not have been able to stand 36  In fact, three of the extant manuscripts (MSS London, Munich, and Vatican 119) read “scratch him” (‫ )יסרטנו‬instead of “strike him” (‫)יסטרנו‬. While this is likely the result of metathesis from the more unusual root ‫ר‬.‫ט‬.‫ ס‬to the more familiar ‫ט‬.‫ר‬.‫ס‬, the imagery is equally if not more violent. 37  The Bavli rhetorically places ‫ נזיפה‬at the conclusion of the listing, despite having to invert the order of the biblical verses. According to 1 Sam. 20, Saul first becomes angry at Jonathan (‫ ;וַ ּיִ ַחר ַאף ָׁשאּול‬1 Sam. 20:30), then curses him (‫ּולב ֶֹׁשת‬ ְ ‫ֶּבן נַ ֲעוַ ת ַה ַּמ ְרּדּות… ְל ָב ְׁש ְּתָך‬ ‫ ; ֶע ְרוַ ת ִא ֶּמָך‬1 Sam. 20:30) and finally prepares to strike him (‫ ; ְל ַהּכֹתֹו‬1 Sam. 20:33). Choosing to reverse the order of events allows the sugya to build to a crescendo and conclude by coming full circle back to rebuke.

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before his rebuke (‫)תוכחה‬, as it says, Come, stand before the LORD while I cite against you all the kindnesses that the LORD has done to you and your fathers (1 Sam 12:7).” Even the patriarchs could not have successfully withstood divine rebuke if it was too strict. Just as Rav Huna in the previous section assumed that his rebuke would result in embarrassment, so too this final section of the sugya assumes that it is highly unlikely that rebuke will end favorably. Across the three major units of our sugya there is a consistent trend. Each section upholds and at times augments the obligation to rebuke while simultaneously devaluing, problematizing and questioning the appropriateness of performing Lev. 19:17’s injunction. Building upon Sifra’s comments on the verse, the Bavli inserted an additional exegetical gloss that requires responding to even a “distasteful matter” (‫)דבר מגונה‬. Yet, it also exemplifies an unsuccessful attempt at rebuke with an illustration that intensifies the confrontation and projects the onus back onto the rebuker. Likewise, in the second unit of the sugya, rebuke is thought worthy of comparison with the highly esteemed quality of humility. But it quickly falls short and is disparaged as inferior to even improper humility, invoking the concern of humiliation in the exemplification of proper rebuke. Finally, in the last component of the sugya, the rebuker is urged to persist until provoking even a combative retaliation on the part of the offender. Nevertheless, this response is carefully constructed so as to blur the boundary between meritorious and deplorable actions, reiterating the danger of an escalating conflict and spiral of rebuke. The coexistence of these incongruent trajectories suggests that the sugya actively grapples with the act of rebuke and its biblical basis. This observation is reinforced by the context of our sugya, particularly the extended discussion immediately preceding it. 5 The Lashon Hara Context of the Bavli Sugya Beginning in BT Arakh. 15a, the Talmud engages in a prolonged discussion of lashon hara, or “evil speech.” Over the course of several folios the Bavli continually highlights the ubiquitous and potentially destructive nature of lashon hara. Then, abruptly, the sugya on rebuke dramatically appears without a clear segue.38 What prompts this connection between lashon hara and the commandment of rebuke? Looking back to the Pentateuch, a strong exegetical 38  The portion of the text directly connected to lashon hara concludes with a question related to one who has contracted a skin affliction (‫)צרעת‬, which is associated with lashon hara. From here the passage suddenly shifts to a discussion rebuke, introduced as a new topic with the phrase ‫תנו רבנן‬.

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explanation emerges from the Levitical context of the rebuke command. The verse immediately prior to the discussion of rebuke in Lev. 19:17 (i.e., Lev. 19:16) prohibits acting as a talebearer (‫)לֹא ֵת ֵלְך ָר ִכיל ְּב ַע ֶּמיָך‬. In PT Peah 1:1, a statement in the name of R. Ishmael identifies the prohibition against acting as a talebearer in Lev. 19:16 as the source for the warning against speaking lashon hara. Similarly, according to R. Elazar in BT Ket. 46a, this verse is the source for the prohibition on “expressing a bad name” (‫)מוציא שם רע‬, which is aligned with lashon hara in mArakh. 3:5 – the very mishna upon which the sugya about lashon hara and the discussion about rebuke appears. Although the scriptural juxtaposition between tale bearing and rebuke in Lev. 19:16–17 may have prompted inclusion of the rebuke sugya following the extended discussion of lashon hara, the latter material does not actually reference Lev. 19:16 explicitly. The absence of a direct reference to Lev. 19:16 obscures the exegetical connection between this verse and Lev. 19:17, foregrounding thematic links between lashon hara and rebuke. From the audience’s perspective, concluding the conceptual analysis of lashon hara with a turn to rebuke essentially marks the latter as an extension or subcategory of the former. Yet, rebuke stands out as conspicuously distinct. In contrast to lashon hara, which the extended sugya repeatedly demonizes, the initial shift to rebuke opens with a biblical mandate. Rhetorically, appending our sugya to the previous material not only subsumes rebuke within the broader category of lashon hara, but also highlights the sharp tension between the prohibited nature of lashon hara and the obligatory nature of rebuke. Despite residual acknowledgement of the mandatory nature of rebuke, the problematization of reproof that pervades our sugya, along with the detrimental association between rebuke and lashon hara forged by the literary placement of our passage, culminate in a sense that rebuke is to be avoided. Yet, the core of our sugya does not reject rebuke primarily as a result of the dangers that it entails, but rather in contrast to a preferable alternative. Why does the central passage of the sugya specifically select the rabbinic value of humility as preferable to the biblical obligation of rebuke? It is to this question that we now turn our attention. 6 The Sugya’s Inward Orientation At first glance, the Bavli’s sugya more effectively achieves the same end as the tannaitic midrashim: Rebuke is branded as dangerous and destabilizing. Yet, while the tannaitic attack on rebuke emerges from a posture of personal inability (there is no one capable of rebuking), the Bavli’s rejection of rebuke stems

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from a different concern. Rather than focusing on rabbinic ability to perform rebuke, the Bavli engages with the question of the desirability of the practice of rebuke. Tannaitic texts preserved the value of the scriptural obligation despite their awareness of the inability to perform it. The Talmud, by contrast, devalues the commandment itself. What prompts this discomfort with rebuke as even an ideal practice? Each of the three sections of our sugya subtly shifts attention back toward the self rather than the other party. As a primarily other-oriented practice, the act of rebuke often results in a person ignoring his or her own faults in order to focus on those of another person. But doing so compromises the pursuit of self-perfection. In order to refocus our attention upon one’s own faults, the Bavli sugya challenges rebuke and its other-oriented focus by inserting subtle elements that direct attention back toward oneself. 7

A Self-Oriented Focus: The Tannaitic Pericope

Subtle manuscript differences between the Bavli’s version of the tannaitic tradition and the form that it appears in the tannaitic midrashim reveal a number of features that suggest a redirection of our attention toward the role of the self in rebuke (rather than toward the other party). The main accretion in the first unit of our sugya that problematizes rebuke is the illustration of a failed attempt: “If one said to him ‘Take the speck from between your eyes,’ he would [reply], ‘Take the log from between your eyes.’ ” Previously we noted how this example shifts the onus onto the rebuker and threatens to escalate the conflict. At this juncture, we can highlight how this dialogue also shifts our attention from the outward-oriented act of rebuke to inward-oriented reflection upon one’s own flaws. Instead of attempting to remove the lesser impurity inhibiting another, this dictum challenges the rebuker to first consider his or her personal obstructions and imperfections.39 The inward-focused nature of this exchange is magnified by the surrounding literary context. This example of a failed attempt at rebuke appears between the opinions of R. Tarfon and R. Elazar ben Azariyah.40 However, the 39  Regardless of the intention of the rebuked party, or whether the rebuker actually does possess major faults, this line directs our attention back to the rebuker. My reading of this line focuses on where the attention is directed rather than the legitimacy of the challenge. 40  MSS Vatican 119, Vatican 120, and the printed editions all lack the third view of R. Akiva. Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29 has an unusual version in which the view of R. Akiva precedes the example of a failed attempt at rebuke, followed by R. Elazar ben Azariyah whose

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positions attributed to these two figures in the Bavli differ from the positions attributed to them in the tannaitic midrashim. Sifra R. Tarfon said, “By (MS Vatican 66) the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!” Sifre Devarim R. Tarfon said, “By (MS Vatican 32) the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!” Bavli R. Tarfon said, “I (MS Munich 95) wonder if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!”

If one said to him “Take the speck (‫ )קיסם‬from between your eyes,” he would [reply], “Take the log (‫)קורה‬ from between your eyes.”

R. [E]lazar ben Azariyah said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to receive rebuke!” R. Elazar ben Azariyah said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to receive to rebuke!” R. Elazar ben Ḥananiya41 said, “I wonder if there anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke!”

As the passage appears in Sifra, there is a movement from R. Tarfon’s rejection of suitable rebukers to R. Elazar ben Azaryiah’s rejection of suitable recipients of rebuke.42 The parallel in Sifre Devarim is more inconsistent. Several manuscripts begin with the lack of capable receivers of rebuke before turning to the absence of skilled rebukers while two manuscripts mirror the progression found in Sifra.43 According to all versions of the tannaitic midrashim however, one of the first two tannaitic positions targets the rebuker while the other describes the recipient. Had our sugya merely adopted one of these options, inserting the case of an ineffective rebuke between them would have emphasized the failure of both parties – the rebuker fails to offer an acceptable critique and position is introduced as a separate source (‫)תניא‬. There also may have been another position prior to that of R. Akiva, however it is not preserved in the fragment. 41  This appears to be an error as all other MSS read ‫עזריה‬. 42  This progression is preserved in all of the extant manuscripts. 43  MSS JTS, Berlin, London and the editio princeps of Sifre Devarim all begin with those who are unable to receive rebuke. MSS Vatican and Oxford preserve a reading closer to that of Sifra.

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the recipient responds inappropriately. But, the majority of manuscripts of our sugya associate both R. Tarfon and R. Elazar ben Azariyah with a position commenting upon the rebuker, an unprecedented version.44 Sandwiched between these two discussions of the rebuker, the inserted exchange is read with an exclusive focus on the rebuking party who is encouraged to view his own flaws before looking to those of another.45 The suggestion that this subtle manuscript difference implies a greater focus on one’s personal status rather than the flaws of others is supported by the view attributed to R. Akiva (in conjunction with the subsequent statement of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri) found in the Bavli. Sifra and Sifre Devarim Bavli

R. Akiva said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to rebuke!” R. Akiva said, “I wonder if there is anyone in this generation who can receive rebuke!”

Consistently in the manuscripts of the tannaitic midrashim R. Akiva expresses the position that no one knows how to properly rebuke (‫)יודע היאך מוכיחין‬.46 In Chapter 4 I suggested that this assertion is particularly poignant as R. Akiva’s 44  This is true of MSS Oxford, London, Munich, and Vatican 120 of BT. R. Elazar ben Azariyah is consistently associated with the tradition that no one knows how to rebuke (‫שיודע‬ ‫ )להוכיח‬except in Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29 where he describes the one receiving rebuke. R. Tarfon is assigned the position that no one is capable of rebuking (‫ )יכול להוכיח‬in MSS London, Munich, and Vatican, while MS Oxford uses the language of knowledge (‫)שיודע‬. Within all four of these manuscripts, however, both R. Tarfon and R. Elazar ben Azariyah address the rebuker. Given that this pairing appears in none of the tannaitic precursors to our sugya, its fairly consistent reoccurrence in the majority of Bavli manuscripts suggests that perhaps this is an intentional change. Additionally, it is important to note that these four witnesses all contain slight variations from one another within this portion of the sugya, suggesting that they do not exhibit direct and unedited dependence on one another. Only MS Vatican 119 and the subsequent printed editions follow a similar tradition to that which we see in several manuscripts of Sifre Devarim which begin with the recipient of rebuke and then move to the rebuker himself. 45  This is to some degree also true of Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29 insofar as the example of an ineffective rebuke follows R. Akiva’s declaration that no one knows how to rebuke and is bracketed on the other end by a new statement (‫)תניא‬, leading us to narrow in on the rebuker rather than both parties. Thus, the Geniza fragment and four of the five other (non-printed edition) manuscripts all directly associate the example of improper rebuking with the rebuker and not with the recipient, suggesting that the retort demanding introspection before outward critique should be taken seriously. 46  There is some slight variation between the manuscripts with regard to prefixes before the word ‫ יודע‬and the plural masculine ending of ‫מוכיחין‬, but all of them report the same position of no one knowing how to properly give rebuke.

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view immediately precedes the claim of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri to have successfully rebuked R. Akiva on numerous occasions. The Bavli paints a different picture. In the few manuscripts that include a position attributed to R. Akiva immediately before R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri, R. Akiva consistently declares that no one is able to properly receive rebuke.47 Juxtaposed to the words of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who purports to have repeatedly rebuked R. Akiva, the audience now sees R. Akiva no longer as doubting the effectiveness of his colleague, but as questioning his own success as a recipient of rebuke. R. Akiva’s self-reflection is mirrored by the conclusion of R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s words as they appear in the Bavli. According to the tannaitic midrashim, R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri concludes his remarks by asserting that his rebukes against R. Akiva were successful insofar as R. Akiva increased love for him (‫)שהוא מוסיף לי\בי אהבה‬.48 In all of the manuscripts of our sugya, however, it is R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri himself who is the one increasing love for R. Akiva (‫)שהוספתי בו אהבה‬.49 Noting the oddity of such an assertion, particularly as his comment is intended to demonstrate how he has fulfilled the proverb that rebuking a sage will engender the sage’s love (Prov. 9:8), the medieval commentators attempt to reinterpret R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s words.50 While this shift in language is quite subtle, the unprecedented and anomalous nature of this change, combined with its consistent appearance across all of the extant manuscripts, suggests that the difference in language is likely not accidental.51 47  As noted above, many of the manuscripts drop the statement of R. Akiva entirely. However, his view is consistently preserved in MSS Oxford, London, and Munich as referring to those who are unable to properly receive rebuke (‫)מקבל תוכחה‬. Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29 associates R. Akiva with the view that no one knows how to properly rebuke, but his position is removed from R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s statement (with the baraita of R. Elazar ben Azariyah intervening), thereby downplaying the connection between the two. 48  With regard to Sifra, MSS Vatican 66, London, Oxford, Parma and the Venice printing all clearly indicate that it is Akiva who increased love for R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri. MS Vatican 33 preserves a somewhat ambiguous reading: “that he increased love for him” (‫שהוא מוסיף‬ ‫)לו אהבה‬. Only in MS JTS do we find the variant reading with R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri as the subject: “that I increased love for him.” It is possible that this text was influenced by the reading we find in the Bavli. With regard to Sifre Devarim, the manuscripts more consistently affirm Akiva as the one who increased love for R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri. However, MS London does read “that he increased love for him.” Nevertheless, the preceding phrase “I knew about him” (‫ )וידע אני בו‬clearly indicates that Akiva is the one who increases love. 49  MS Oxford reads ‫ לו‬instead of ‫בו‬. Cambridge T-S F 2(2).29 does not include the term ‫בו‬ or ‫לו‬, but conjugates the verb ‫ הוסף‬so as to imply R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri as the speaker (‫)הוספתי‬. 50  See, for example, the comments of the Maharsha in his Ḥiddushe Aggadot. 51  We might expect scribes and copyists to have changed this formulation so as to make it more consistent with the cited proverb. The fact that all of the manuscripts maintain this more difficult reading is an indication that perhaps some later transmitters of the text understood the present formulation as purposeful, rather than as an error.

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If indeed the Bavli purposefully altered R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s language to reflect a reading focused more on himself than on R. Akiva (despite the difficulties such a new version generates) then this is another example in which this first unit of the sugya orients our gaze back toward the self rather than toward the other. In sum, the aggregate evidence from our sugya’s version of the attributed portion of the tannaitic midrashim subtly shifts the challenge to rebuke from a question of individual ability to a question of introspection. The added illustration of a failed attempt at rebuke encourages the rebuker to reflect upon his or her own faults rather than critiquing those of another. This prescription is enhanced by several minute shifts in language found in most talmudic manuscripts from the versions which we find in the tannaitic midrashim. Bracketing the illustration of rebuke with two discussions of the rebuker draws our attention to the rebuker rather than to the combined presence of both participants. R. Akiva’s self-doubt over his acceptance of rebuke and R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s self-oriented depiction of increasing love likewise direct the audience to adopt a more inward-looking gaze, instead of pursuing the outward-oriented attitude associated with rebuke. Consequently, in problematizing rebuke, the first unit of our sugya subtly begins to shift attention inward and away from the outward-orientation that defines rebuke. 8

A Self-Oriented Focus: Humility or Rebuke?

The second section of our sugya presents a more direct clash between inward and outward orientations, manifested by the question of preferability between rebuke and humility: “R. Yehuda son of R. Shimon asked of him, ‘Proper (‫)לשמה‬ rebuke and improper humility (‫)שלא לשמה‬, which of these two is preferable?’ ” This question asks about the proper relationship that one should have with another: Rebuke assumes the speaker’s superiority, while humility promotes an equality or even inferiority on the part of the actor vis-à-vis the other.52 Rebuke speaks to the need to change the other; humility orients the self toward one’s own position with respect to the other. This contrast emerges more vividly in light of Richard Lewis’ discussion of humility in rabbinic literature. Lewis devotes an entire chapter to exploring a number of sources that understand 52  As noted above, Richard Lewis understands rabbinic humility as an expression of the fundamental equality of humanity through the breaking down of social strata. While some may construe this view as emphasizing the role of others over and above the self, I understand this form of humility as primarily focusing on the self under the gaze of, and with respective to, others.

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humility as self-restraint from qapdanut (‫ ;קפדנות‬i.e., insisting that a particular situation align with one’s desires).53 In this context, humility is understood as consciously relinquishing control over a disagreeable person, position, or situation. Rather than imposing one’s will upon another, humility turns the actor’s gaze inward to enact a change in one’s own attitude, stifling negative behavior. Mapping the contrast between humility and qapdanut onto our sugya, we see how rebuke constitutes a biblically mandated and applied expression of qapdanut while humility represents the contrasting value of self-restraint.54 Just as the first section of our sugya charged the potential rebuker to reflect upon his own faults rather than the flaws of the other, so too the core question in this second unit contrasts a fixation on the other with the value of focusing on the self in relationship to others. However, while the first section merely posed looking inward as a possible challenge to rebuke, in the current stage of the sugya we find an explicit contest between the two, with the inwardoriented perspective carrying the day. The sugya thus crescendos from a subtle problematization of rebuke to a full blown rejection of rebuke in favor of an inwardly-focused alternative. Aside from the triumph of humility over rebuke, this middle unit of the sugya is also bracketed by elements that focus our attention on the self. The initial question of preferability introduces the qualifications of “improper” (‫ )שלא לשמה‬humility and “proper” (‫ )לשמה‬rebuke. The word ‫ לשם‬with the suffixed letter ‫ ה‬means “for its sake” (or literally, “for its name”). While the correct antecedent for this word is a matter of debate, it clearly indicates a proper motivation for performing an action.55 Adding this element directs attention inward toward questions of intentionality even as rebuke ostensibly orients the 53  Lewis notes that qapdanut is not simply “anger” as some would translate the term, but actually refers to a particular reaction where one attempts to change a situation that does not align with one’s desired ideal (see Lewis, And before Honor – Humility, 167–70). Elsewhere Lewis asserts that the most poignant feature (‫ )ההתנהגות הבולטת‬of the humble individual is refraining from qapdanut (Ibid., 257). The relationship between humility and qapdanut is already noted by Polonsky (Polonsky, “The Meaning of the Term ‘Anawa (Humility) in Talmudic Literature,” iii). 54  For a description of ‫ הקפדה‬that mirrors a rebuke encounter, see Lewis, And before Honor – Humility, 202. 55  Norman Lamm suggests three general categories for understanding the term ‫ לשמה‬in the context of studying Torah (Lamm, Torah Lishmah, 191–92). In his estimation, the term ‫ לשמה‬responds to the “problem of motivation” (Ibid., 190). For a different assessment of the term ‫ לשמה‬in rabbinic literature, see Neuwirth, “Between Intention and Action,” chap. 3 esp. 233–36. For Neuwirth’s discussion of Lamm’s categories, see Ibid., 237 ff. Yuval Blankovski suggests that the meaning of ‫ לשמה‬in the present version of this sugya is “for the matter itself” (‫ ;לשם הדבר עצמו‬Blankovski, Sin for the Sake of God, 61).

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practitioner outward. Thus, regardless of whether rebuke or humility is judged superior, the initial question is framed so as to narrow in on the role of one’s internal motivations. This unit of the sugya also concludes with a slight return to the self. Responding to Shmuel’s query as to why he refrained from rebuking Ḥiyya, Rav Huna expresses his concern that doing so might cause “the offspring of Rav to be embarrassed by my hand (‫)על ידאי‬.” Aside from Rav Huna’s misplaced concern for Ḥiyya’s ancestor rather than the man himself, the closing phrase of “by my hand” suggests that Rav Huna’s primary concern is with his own role rather than simply the effect upon the other.56 In truth, he is seeking to exonerate himself before Shmuel. While the wording employed may simply reflect talmudic idiom, the effect of closing this unit of the sugya with a reference back to the actor’s role in rebuke mirrors the opening where the term ‫ לשמה‬also draws our attention to the role of the rebuker rather than the other party.57 9

A Self-Oriented Focus: Until What Point is Rebuke?

The sugya concludes with an ostensibly unrelated debate which, upon closer inspection, implies that rebuke is unnecessary as long as the sages perfect themselves: Such is the circle of those who turn to Him (‫)זה דור דורשיו‬, Jacob, who seek Your presence. Selah. (Ps. 24:6) R. Yehudah Nesiah and the Rabbis disagree about [this verse]: One says, “[The status of] the generation follows the leader (‫)פרנס‬,” and one says, “[The status of] the leader follows the generation. What is the practical application [of this debate]? If you say that [their debate is with regard] to merit (‫)מעליותא‬, that one believes if the generation is virtuous then the leader is virtuous, and the other believes if the leader is virtuous then the generation is virtuous – but there is the [case of] Zedekiah who was virtuous and his generation was not virtuous! And [there is also the case of] Jehoiakim who was not virtuous and his generation was virtuous. As R. Yoḥanan said in the name of R. Shimon ben Yoḥai, “Why is it written At the beginning of the reign of King Jehoiakim son of Josiah of Judah (Jer. 26:1)? The Holy One Blessed Be 56  See Ibid., 61. 57  Additionally, the use of the phrase “by my hand” draws our attention back to the end of the first section of our sugya where R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri reflects upon how R. Akiva was whipped “by my hand” (‫)על ידי‬.

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He sought to return the world to wild and waste because of Jehoiakim, but when He looked at his generation He was pacified (‫)נתיישבה דעתו‬. The Holy One Blessed Be He sought to return the world to wild and waste because of Zedekiah’s generation, but when He looked at Zedekiah He was pacified.” [This proves that the debate over leader and generation is not about merit], rather we are talking about the matter of anger and mildness (‫)תוקפא וניחותא‬. The rabbis interpret the opening words of this verse from Psalms (‫)זה דור דורשיו‬ as referring to two different groups of people: The generation (‫ )דור‬and the leaders (‫)דורשיו‬, or those who engage in interpretation (‫ש‬.‫ר‬.‫ ;ד‬i.e., the rabbis). Debating the relationship between the leader and others in a generation, this passage initially suggests that the correspondence revolves around meritorious deeds (‫)מעליותא‬.58 If the leader behaves properly then the people should likewise, and vice versa. However, this proposition is disproven by the cases of Kings Zedekiah and Jehoiakim where God initially sought to destroy the world, but recanted upon identifying one worthy party (either the leader or the people). Mapping this discussion onto the greater thrust of our sugya, we find an approximate parallel. The biblical commandment to rebuke assumes that each person is responsible for ensuring that others behave properly. While the debate at hand does not explicitly delineate a responsibility for one party to reform the other, the question assumes a level of influence: Does the leader cause the people to be meritorious or do the people cause the leader to be meritorious? Thus, undergirding both the obligation of rebuke and the question of the relationship between leaders and followers lies an implicit assumption of interpersonal responsibility for the proper behavior of the other. However, this presumption is disrupted in both cases. The present passage undermines the mutual responsibility between a leader and his followers. The hypothesis that the merit of one party affects the other is discarded in light of evidence from two examples. In each of these instances God plans on destroying the world but reconsiders when one of the parties is found to be meritorious even while the other is not. What emerges from these examples is the idea that if one party is worthwhile in their own right, everyone is saved for their sake. Consequently, rather than worrying about attempting to reform everyone else, the leaders of the generation (i.e., the sages) merely need perfect themselves and everyone else will be saved accordingly. A potentially outward-oriented option is thus obliquely rejected in favor of an inward-oriented alternative. The inward nature of this conclusion is further 58  JBA, 696 s.v. ‫מעליותא‬.

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solidified by the ultimate resolution that the debate regarding the relationship between a leader and the people is a question of “anger and mildness,” or temperament.59 Cultivating a humble or mild disposition is thus an additional link between this final unit of the sugya and the discussion in section two. In addition to the aforementioned resonances between the second and third sections of our sugya, this final pericope introduces a new dimension. The debate between humility and rebuke was illustrated through a conflict between sages – with the primary disincentive to rebuke being embarrassment of the other party. But what of all the non-sage members of the Jewish community who err and whose honor the rabbis might be less concerned about violating? The end of our sugya addresses just such a question. One might think that the leader(s), in this case the sages, are responsible for rebuking and improving the masses. However, this concluding pericope assures the rabbis that by simply perfecting themselves others will be saved and thus there is no reason for them to actively seek to change others. 10 BT Arakh. 16b–17a in Light of Early Monastic Sources When one considers the prominence of confrontation within BT and later rabbinic culture, the discomfort with rebuke our sugya evinces is surprising.60 Why particularly in the case of rebuke does the Bavli shy away from interpersonal confrontation and recommend humility as a preferable alternative? One might have thought that rebuke is a highly productive form of confrontation to be lauded above other, less admirable examples. The devaluation of rebuke thus diverges from our expectation for how the Bavli should respond to this practice, particularly given its biblical pedigree. This strong reaction against

59  The translation of ‫ תוקפא וניחותא‬follows JBA, 750 s.v. ‫ניחותא‬. Rashi ad loc. explains that ‫ תוקפא‬refers to anger (‫ )כעס‬while ‫ ניחותא‬refers to the ease with which one is appeased (‫)נוח לרצות‬. However, the version of Rashi’s comments that appears on this text in the Ein Yaakov as well as in Maharsha’s version of Rashi, employ the word “humility” (‫)ענוה‬ to explain the term ‫ניחותא‬. This establishes an even stronger link between this portion of the sugya and the debate over humility and rebuke in the second section. Moreover, the commentary attributed to Rabbenu Gershom uses not only the word humility but the notion of qapdanut as well (‫כלומר שאם המנהיג קפדן כך כל הקהל וכן נמי אם הוא עניו אף‬ ‫)כולן כן‬. 60  For a discussion of the violent imagery of confrontation in the Bavli within its cultural setting, see Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud, chap. 3. Also see Dov Weiss’ discussion of confronting God within amoraic literature (Weiss, “Confrontations with God in Late Rabbinic Literature,” 12n42 and passim).

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rebuke is best understood against the background of early Christian monasticism described in the previous chapter. When we consider the larger sugya, and particularly the central section, in light of the ascetic sources examined in the previous chapter we find a striking parallel. In a number of monastic sources the question of whether or not to confront another person was rejected in favor of more humble efforts at selfimprovement. Likewise, the core of our sugya directly contrasts rebuke with humility and opts for the latter over the former. In the previous chapter, I argued that the decision of most desert fathers to eschew rebuke was due to the premium they placed on self-oriented efforts at achieving perfection and their concern over the ways that rebuke could derail this endeavor. In the present chapter, I have also uncovered an underlying focus on the self that serves as the primary impetus for questioning the value of rebuke. Thus, both BT Arakh. 16b–17a and a number of Greek and Syriac monastic traditions question the value of rebuke by bringing it into dialogue with humility, ultimately allowing the value of self-improvement to override concerns for the other. For both our sugya and the monastic sources, humility, in its various manifestations, stands as the key contrast to rebuke. However, monastic Christian and rabbinic Jewish conceptions of this quality significantly diverge. Within the world of the desert fathers, humility (ταπείνωσις) was an extreme act of “self-emptying,” most efficiently achieved by separating oneself from society at large. By contrast, as Richard Lewis has argued, humility (‫ )ענוה‬for the rabbis consisted of internalizing a negation of social hierarchy and recognizing the inherent equality of humanity.61 According to these definitions, the monastic approach to humility emphasizes attention directed inward through separation from others whereas the rabbinic conception of humility requires work on the self particularly with respect to others. Nevertheless, despite these disparate notions, for both groups humility serves a common purpose – proper imitation of the divine. For many monks, proper “reception of the divine is humility” as “the desire to follow the pattern of Jesus’ own self-emptying.”62 Similarly for the rabbis, God becomes an exemplary model of humility to be emulated by the righteous.63 Humility thus represented an aspiration of great value for both groups as a means to self-perfection through becoming more like God. 61  Lewis also discusses another dimension of rabbinic humility, namely, humility as selfrestraint from qapdanut. This conception of humility as refraining from asserting oneself with respect to others is more in line with monastic views. However, while the ideal pursuit of humility for the monks was in isolation, for the rabbis a more exemplary act of humility would be self-restraint in the face of the other. 62  Foulcher, Reclaiming Humility, 66. 63  Lewis, And before Honor – Humility, chap. 5 esp. 142 ff.

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Although our sugya rejects rebuke in favor of humility, there is also a certain reticence toward this position, recognizing and affirming the value of rebuke. The roots of this tension can be better understood when contrasted with the monastic use of humility to reject rebuke. While monastic humility primarily focuses on the self in isolation from others, rabbinic humility is primarily concerned with the self’s relationship with others. As a predominantly self-oriented practice, humility for the desert fathers is the polar opposite of rebuke. By contrast, rabbinic humility is grounded in a notion of interpersonal responsibility, shrinking the gap between its self-oriented aspect and the other-oriented act of rebuke. In contradistinction to monastic humility, the Janus-facing conception of rabbinic humility tempers a self-oriented focus, leaving room for the value of rebuke as another expression of one’s interpersonal obligations. This is perhaps one reason why the importance of rebuke continues throughout the sugya despite being overshadowed by the value of humility. In addition to competing conceptions of humility, another difference from the monastic world helps us to understand the anxious and ambiguous attitude toward rebuke in the Bavli. In general, the rabbis felt more bound to Pentateuchal prescriptions than their monastic Christian counterparts. For this reason they could not as easily evade the Levitical obligation to rebuke.64 Moreover, Lev. 19:17 was accompanied by a midrashic tradition that both augmented the obligation and problematized it. As inheritors of this interpretative tradition, the amoraim had added reason to actively engage with the force of the command while also having a precedent for avoiding it. While the desert fathers could (mostly) ignore the biblical rebuke requirement, the rabbis felt compelled to grapple with its demands. In fact, the divine source of this obligation led to a stark tension and even somewhat of a contradiction. Clearly, Lev. 19:17 is evidence that God desires people to engage in the practice of rebuke. But, if God is the model of humility and humility dictates that one should avoid rebuking others, then God should disapprove of rebuke.65 In striving to fulfill the divine will, should a person follow the scriptural command or follow 64  Particularly in the case of rebuke, the Gospels (e.g., Matt. 5 and Luke 6) present an alternative that Christians could easily adopt in place of the Levitical commandment. An obvious exception is the unique monastic tradition that lauded rebuke as a necessary practice. Yet, even in that case, the Levitical command merely served as a foil for the “better commandment,” which derived from Rom. 14 (see the previous chapter). 65  This would theoretically be true at least for humans. We find numerous examples of God rebuking people and rabbinic discussions of divine rebuke as beneficial. But, while God is capable of simultaneous humility and rebuke, the rabbis do not seem to see these as concomitant within the human realm.

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in the footsteps of the divine model? This internal inconsistency undergirds the ambiguity of our sugya that simultaneously acknowledges and devalues the obligation to rebuke. 11

Developments in the Rabbinic Attitude toward Rebuke

Both the tannaitic midrashim and BT reject the practice of rebuke as problematic. Yet, despite this similar conclusion, the motivations underlying these positions differ, revealing a development in rabbinic attitudes toward the obligation to rebuke. The tannaim declared the commandment of rebuke inoperative due to human inability. These early rabbinic figures aspired to fulfill the scriptural decree but felt themselves incapable of so doing, leading them to question whether anyone can properly perform the act. The Bavli, by contrast, presents a more piercing question. If the tannaim question whether anyone in their generation can rebuke, the amoraim move to a higher order issue of asking whether anyone should rebuke. It is crucial to appreciate that the Bavli’s rejection of rebuke and Lev. 19:17 is distinct from the dismissal of rebuke within the tannaitic midrashim. For the tannaim, rebuke is ideally a correct practice dictated by God that they simply are incapable of properly fulfilling. For the rabbis of the Talmud, the practice of rebuke is inherently problematic and of limited value. It is primarily the presence of a divine commandment to rebuke that forces them to grapple with its importance. Although we cannot know for certain why this shift in relating to rebuke occurs from the earlier to the later rabbis one possible explanation lies in the differing social situations of the tannaim and amoraim. I have suggested that the tannaim dismiss the obligation of rebuke due to its highly damaging social consequences, that is to say, the ways in which it destabilizes interpersonal relationships. For these early rabbis who did not command significant public influence it was highly important to maintain a positive relationship with those around them. By contrast, it appears that the amoraim do not reject rebuke primarily out of concern for its impact upon interpersonal relationships, but rather due to the outward-orientation that it entails. As more established religious leaders, the amoraim would not have had the same degree of concern over destabilizing relationships as their tannaitic predecessors. These later rabbis thus do not question whether or not they would be able to rebuke, but turn to the issue of whether rebuke is a desirable practice at all. This higher order topic of desirability will continue into the later rabbinic period. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, the rabbinic compilers of Midrash Tanḥuma provide a very different answer to the question of whether or not rebuke should be practiced.

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An Inescapable Obligation: Rebuke in TanḥumaYelammedenu Literature The final chapter of our exploration of early Jewish and Christian responses to Lev. 19:17 takes us to a late (or “post-classical”) midrashic text of ambiguous provenance: Midrash Tanḥuma. Like the term Midrash, Tanḥuma refers to both a process or genre of literature and an actual work.1 What I shall refer to as Tanḥuma Yelammedenu or simply Yelammedenu denotes a process or genre of Midrash that involves a particular set of features, especially a record of students requesting of a teacher that he teach them – yelammedenu rabbenu, the phrase from which this genre derives its name.2 Yelammedenu traditions appear in a number of later midrashic texts including Shemot Rabbah, Bemidbar Rabbah, and Devarim Rabbah, as well as Pesiqta Rabbati. What I shall designate here as Midrash Tanḥuma or simply Tanḥuma is a collection of midrashim organized according to a triennial cycle of Pentateuchal readings. This collection, which will be our primary focus, appears in two main versions typically referred to as the “printed edition” and the “Buber edition,” the latter named for its editor Salomon Buber. Previous generations of scholars debated the existence of an “early Tanḥuma” that preserved more “original” versions of the traditions found in our extant collections.3 There has also been significant debate over the dating of the Tanḥuma collections more generally. Contemporary work on Tanḥuma Yelammedenu suggests that this genre “began to crystallize toward the end of the Byzantine period in Palestine (5–7th cen. CE), but continued to evolve and spread throughout the Diaspora well into the Middle Ages, sometimes developing different recensions of a common text.”4 The major versions of Midrash Tanḥuma as we know them stem from the medieval period with the printed edition likely redacted in geonic Babylonia and the Buber edition redacted in 1  See Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu, chap. 1. 2  Weiss, “Confrontations with God in Late Rabbinic Literature,” 59. 3  For references to older scholarship, see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 302–306; Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” 1–28; Mirsky, “The Structure of Midrash Tanhuma,” 93–95. For criticism of older scholarship, particularly that of Felix Böhl, see “Bregman, “Reviewed Work: Aufbau und literarische Formen des aggadischen Teils im Jelamdenu-Midrasch by Felix Böhl.” 4  Bregman, “Tanḥuma Yelammedenu,” 503.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376557_010

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Italy-Ashkenaz (or perhaps Palestine).5 Thanks to the efforts of Marc Bregman, we can now identify three major redactional strata within the printed and Buber Tanḥuma collections.6 First there is an early layer from around the 5th century that regularly uses Galilean Aramaic as well as Greek and Latin terms. This is followed by the middle stratum (c. 6–7th cen.) that often replaces Aramaic with Hebrew and which is the most prominent layer, underlying a majority of Tanḥuma Yelammedenu passages. Finally, the late stratum dates from after the Islamic conquest and is roughly contemporaneous with the emergence of the two editions of Tanḥuma. The relevant passage for our discussion of rebuke only appears in the printed edition of Tanḥuma (Mishpatim, Section 7). This homily likely derives from the latest redactional layer of the two Tanḥuma collections and utilized some form of the Bavli as well as our sugya in particular. Our Tanḥuma homily purposefully reworks this earlier talmudic material in order to downplay its problematization of rebuke. Systematically purging the sugya of elements that challenge rebuke and Lev. 19:17, Tanḥuma introduces several alternative sources culled from across the Bavli that strongly endorse the practice of reproof. This renewed valuation of rebuke aligns with a preference for other-oriented responsibility, a theme subtly present in the passage’s literary context. 1 Midrash Tanḥuma and the Bavli Sugya It is well-known that Tanḥuma adopts and reworks earlier rabbinic material. Particularly when it comes to earlier Palestinian midrashim, there are numerous examples to show how Tanḥuma draws from its forerunners. When it comes to the Bavli however, there are fewer obvious parallels to make as strong a case. Jacob Elbaum, in describing the nature of Tanḥuma, and late midrashim more generally, thus suggests that while it is clear that these works 5  Ibid., 503. Based upon somewhat limited evidence, Samuel Mirsky suggests that the printed edition derives from Babylonia while the Buber edition comes from Israel (i.e., Palestine) (Mirsky, “The Structure of Midrash Tanhuma,” 99, 114 ff.). With regard to the Buber edition, Marc Bregman argues for a final redaction in Italy while Israel Ta-Shma favors Ashkenaz as a more likely candidate (Bregman, “Textual Witness of Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu Midrashim,” 51; Ta-Shma, “The Library of the Ashkenazi Sages in the 11–12th century,” 302). However, Allen Kensky returns to the view of Samuel Mirsky (disagreeing with Bregman and Ta-Shma’s view of an Ashkenazi/Italian provenance) by suggesting that the Buber version was indeed written in Israel (i.e., Palestine), between the late 8th and end of the 10th century (Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” Abstract, 77–78). 6  Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu, chap. 4; Weiss, “Confrontations with God in Late Rabbinic Literature,” 63–64.

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used amoraic midrashim, it is less certain as to whether or not they used the Bavli.7 Nevertheless, several scholars have undertaken to demonstrate that BT traditions influenced Midrash Tanḥuma. Allen Kensky, for example, in his dissertation on Midrash Tanḥuma, Shemot, indicates that there are several places where it is clear that the Bavli is the source of the Tanḥuma text.8 More recently, Ronit Nikolsky has treated two examples where she believes Tanḥuma reworks earlier Palestinian midrashim and is influenced by the Bavli. She demonstrates this by showing how Tanḥuma addresses a linguistic problem like the Bavli, rather than a social issue like we find in the Bereshit Rabbah parallel. To bolster this claim, Nikolsky points to both an interpretation of Ezek. 38:17 found only in the Bavli and Tanḥuma versions of a particular midrash and the fact that the presentation of certain material in Tanḥuma mirrors the Bavli’s dialogic structure (rather than that of earlier midrashim). While Nikolsky is likely correct in her assessment of these passages, she neglects to address the key question of whether the particular passages she analyzes in Tanḥuma postdate the Bavli’s version. The most recent work to treat the issue of BT material in Tanḥuma, Dov Weiss’ Pious Irreverence: Confronting God in Rabbinic Judaism, presents a more sophisticated approach that primarily discusses Tanḥuma and Yelammedenu traditions that seem to postdate the material they rework. Weiss presents several examples to show how these later midrashim employ material from the Bavli. The works of these aforementioned authors constitute significant academic precedent for finding examples of Tanḥuma reworking material in the Bavli. However, one cannot simply assume that all homilies within Tanḥuma postdate the Bavli or were aware of material found in the Bavli. One of the challenges in describing the relationship between Tanḥuma and the Bavli is that these works were compiled over an extended period of time. Some sections of Tanḥuma may originally predate traditions in the Bavli and vice versa. The earliest stratum of Tanḥuma dates to the 5th century and certain recent theories of the editing of the Talmud date its redaction to the 7th or 8th century.9 Assuming that a particular passage in Tanḥuma is later than one in the Bavli because Tanḥuma as a whole was likely compiled at a later date ignores the nature of these works. In order to demonstrate that a homily in Tanḥuma reworked a talmudic sugya, one must start by assessing the relative dating of the relevant passages.

7  Elbaum, “On the Character of the Late Midrashic Literature,” 57. 8  Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” 69–71. 9  Halivni, The Formation of the Babylonian Talmud, xxvii–xxviii.

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A majority of our talmudic sugya from BT Arakh. 16b–17a is composed of material attributed to tannaim and amoraim, particularly from the first few generations. While some amoraim from the third and fourth generations do occur, they appear primarily in the “Until what point is the end of suffering?” section that does not treat rebuke proper. Of course, the sugya is facilitated by the anonymous language of guiding questions such as “What is an example of proper rebuke and improper humility?” and “Until what point is rebuke?,” which should likely be attributed to the stammaitic layer. Additionally, a few extensions of statements attributed to named figures could also reasonably be dated to later redactional layers. When compared to many other sugyot in the Bavli, this particular sugya has relatively less unambiguously stammaitic material. Nevertheless, the problem of dating the stam remains. Some, such as David Weiss Halivni, proffer an extremely late date for the final redaction of this layer, pushing it as far back as the 7th or 8th century.10 By contrast, others, such as Robert Brody, have contended that a significant amount of the anonymous material should be attributed to an earlier date. Citing instances of late amoraim responding to anonymous material, anonymous material that glosses earlier anonymous material, and analogous instances from the Palestinian Talmud, Brody cautions against a late dating for most anonymous material.11 Although challenged by Shamma Friedman who argues that Brody’s few examples prove the general rule that a significant amount of anonymous material is late, there is certainly something to be said for recognizing diversity within the anonymous layer of the Talmud, which suggests an extended chronological development.12 Ultimately it is almost impossible to accurately date the redaction of our talmudic sugya even if one takes a strong stand in the debate over the dating of the anonymous material. However, if it is possible to establish the homily from Tanḥuma to be of late provenance, then this is a first step toward claiming that it probably had access to some version of the Bavli sugya. As previously mentioned, the passage from Tanḥuma that treats rebuke appears in only one of the two Tanḥuma works, the printed edition. This is not entirely surprising as Marc Bregman notes that while the two versions of Midrash Tanḥuma generally correspond in their homilies on Leviticus through Deuteronomy, the printed and Buber editions “to Genesis and Exodus are clearly two distinct works,” and 10  Halivni, xxvii–xxviii. 11   Brody, “Stam ha-Talmud ve-Divre ha-Amoraim”; Brody, “The Contribution of the Yerushalmi to the Dating of the Anonymous Material in the Bavli”; Brody, “On Dating the Anonymous Portions of the Babylonian Talmud.” 12  Friedman, “Wonder not at a gloss in which the Name of an Amora is Mentioned.”

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our homily appears in the section on Exodus.13 For our purposes, the fact that this text is lacking in the Buber edition is of particular importance. According to Bregman, despite the divergence between the two editions in Genesis and Exodus, they “share a large amount of closely parallel material,” which suggests that “the two recensions of the Tanhuma are both descended from one hypothetical, common ancestor.”14 The absence of our homily in the Buber edition indicates that it was not part of the “common ancestor” but is rather a later addition from the period when the two versions were redacted.15 Accordingly, our passage belongs to the later stratum of Tanḥuma that Bregman locates after the Islamic conquest. Moreover, if indeed the printed edition was redacted in “geonic Babylonia,” then it emerged from the same geographic region that produced BT. The absence of our passage from all manuscripts of the Buber edition is thus strong evidence that it was introduced into the printed edition of Tanḥuma at a late date when some form of the Bavli was already compiled. Aside from its late provenance, another factor suggests that our passage from Tanḥuma post-dates the Bavli and was working with some version of the Talmud. The homily from Tanḥuma augments the BT Arakh. passage by incorporating material from three other talmudic sugyot spread across the corpus. It employs passages from an extended discussion in BT Shab. 54b–55a, a shorter selection from BT Tam. 28a, and a pericope that is likely from BT B.M. 31a. The Bavli and Tanḥuma versions of the first two of these parallels are highly similar. The passage from BT B.M. 31a is cited by Tanḥuma as a baraita (‫)ותניא‬, rather than as part of an amoraic dictum, however the statement itself is identical and is not attested in any earlier rabbinic sources, suggesting that it stems from the Bavli’s tradition. Beyond these three cases, our homily also appears to draw on an interpretation preserved in BT A.Z. 4a.16

13  Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu, 3*. 14  Ibid., 3*. Also see Kensky’s comparison, specifically with regard to the beginning of the Book of Exodus in these two editions (Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” 60–65). 15  As Bregman notes, similarities between the printed and Buber editions are typically indicative of the middle layer while substantive differences reflect the later stratum (Bregman, “Stratigraphic Analysis of a Selected Pericope from the Tanhuma-Yelammedenu Midrashim,” 121). 16   Tanḥuma’s lengthy passage derived from BT Shab. 54b–55a concludes with a tradition attributed to Rav Yosef that the words “Begin here at My Sanctuary” (‫ּומ ִּמ ְק ָּד ִׁשי ָּת ֵחּלּו‬ ִ ) from Ezek. 9:6 should be read as “Begin here at My holy ones” (‫קֹוּד ַׁשי‬ ְ ‫) ִמ ִּמ‬, indicating those who have fulfilled the entire Torah. This same tradition appears in BT A.Z. 4a where, in conjunction with a gloss on Ezek. 21:8, it is interpreted as referring to the righteous who had the ability to protest and did not. This idea of the righteous failing to protest already appears as a theme in BT Shab. 54b–55a but without a reference to Ezek. 21:8. Tanḥuma

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Having established that our Tanḥuma section is of late provenance and utilized some version of the Bavli, the major question remaining is whether it also had a version of our sugya. Comparing the Bavli’s sugya with the Tanḥuma passage there are several components of the former that are missing in the latter. However, as I shall argue, the particular elements that are missing are specifically those that problematize rebuke and therefore should be understood as systematically removed by the editor of Tanḥuma. For the material that the BT sugya and Tanḥuma have in common, there are two sections not found in prior tannaitic versions or in other direct parallels suggesting that they were taken directly from our sugya. The first is a gloss that the Bavli adds to the earlier tannaitic tradition: “From where do we know that one who sees something distasteful in his fellow is obligated to rebuke him? As it says, you shall surely rebuke.”17 The second is the first half of the section “until what point is rebuke.” As this material is not in any tannaitic text and only appears in this form within the BT sugya, Tanḥuma likely derived it directly from our sugya. In addition to the two sections that appear only in our BT sugya and in the Tanḥuma homily, further evidence that Tanḥuma used our sugya can be found in the three glosses paralleled in Sifra. In each of these cases the version is consistently phrased differently in the Bavli manuscripts from the version found in Sifra and in all three instances Tanḥuma directly parallels the language in the Bavli.18 Glossing Leviticus’ prohibition on hatred in one’s heart, Sifra states: “I only said hatred which is in the heart” (‫)לא אמרתי אלא שנאה שבלב‬.19 By contrast, both the Bavli and Tanḥuma read “Scripture says ‘hatred which is in the heart’ ” (‫)שנאה שבלב הכתוב מדבר‬.20 In the second comment, Sifra states: “From where [do we learn] that if he rebuked him even four or five times [without it being draws on the intertextual relationship between these two sugyot by citing Ezek. 21:8 as a proof-text for the idea that the righteous are punished for not protesting. 17  There is an oblique parallel to this material in BT Ber. 31a–b. 18  Although it is theoretically possible that later scribes and copyists changed the Tanḥuma homily to conform to the version in the Bavli, this is unlikely as we find a significant difference within the first gloss on Lev. 19:17 as it appears in BT and Tanḥuma manuscripts. In all of the manuscripts of the Bavli there are three different acts associated with Lev. 19:17a – hitting, slapping, and cursing. By contrast, all manuscripts of the printed edition of Tanḥuma only contain two acts (slapping and cursing), omitting the act of hitting. If later copyists or scribes had reworked the Tanḥuma homily to conform to the Bavli then they most likely would have included all three actions. For a visual comparison of the overlapping material in Sifra, BT, and Tanḥuma, see the next section. 19  The printed editions read ‫ כי אם בשנאה‬rather than ‫( אלא שנאה‬as is found in all of the manuscripts). 20  MS Munich 95 lacks the words ‫ הכתוב מדבר‬but also does not include the phrase ‫לא‬ ‫ אמרתי‬that we find in Sifra.

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effective that] he should repeat and rebuke [again]” (]‫ומנין שאם הוכחתו [אפילו‬ ‫ ?)ארבעה וחמשה פעמים חזור והוכיח‬The Bavli and Tanḥuma leave out any indication of a number of attempts and simply state that “[If he] rebuked [him] and he did not accept [it], from where [do we learn] that he should repeat and rebuke him again” (‫?)הוכיחו ולא קבל מנין שיחזור ויוכיחנו‬21 Finally, in the third gloss Sifra reads, “One might think that even if you rebuke him and his countenance changes” (‫)יכול אפילו פניו משתנות‬. The Bavli and Tanḥuma consistently leave out the phrase “you rebuke him.”22 The fact that the Tanḥuma passage is of late provenance, used versions of several sugyot from across the Bavli, includes two sections that only appear in our sugya, and follows our sugya when it differs from Sifra indicates that the Tanḥuma homily is based directly upon our sugya. 2

Excluding Material

Tanḥuma Mishpatim 7 fashions an extended discussion of rebuke with the rhetorical agenda of advocating for its supreme importance. One of the ways the homily accomplishes this is through the introduction of several other talmudic passages (mentioned above). However, before introducing new material, Tanḥuma must first deal with the fact that the BT Arakh. sugya contains both tangential material not directly relevant to rebuke as well as a number of elements discussed in the last chapter that problematize rebuke. Tanḥuma actively reworks our BT Arakh. sugya by excluding material extraneous to the topic of rebuke and systematically removes those parts of the sugya that problematize Lev. 19:17 and the practice of reproof.23 The first two sections of the BT Arakh. sugya both focus exclusively on issues directly related to rebuke. In the third section, however, there is a significant amount of material that does not advance our understanding of this topic. The first unit of this third section derived a disagreement over the endpoint of rebuke from 1 Sam. 20, aligning the suggested possibilities with different parts of 21  MS Oxford Bodleian 187 actually preserves this line twice, but still does not have the language we find in Sifra. 22  Some of the Bavli manuscripts invert the words ‫ פניו משתנות‬but the Tanḥuma manuscripts all read ‫פניו משתנות‬. 23  As Norman Cohen argues regarding a particular example from the Tanḥuma Yelammedenu tradition, “The integrated nature of this homily is reflected as well in the presence of only a limited amount of superfluous material and of submotifs not associated in some way with the major themes” (Cohen, “Structure and Editing in the Homiletic Midrashim,” 18). Similarly in our example, I am positing that the editor actively excluded material deemed superfluous to a discussion of rebuke.

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the verses. Tanḥuma retains the list of three alternative endpoints to rebuke attributed to three amoraim along with the basic statement that these positions were derived from 1 Sam. 20. However, Tanḥuma excises three things: 1) The fact that this amoraic disagreement corresponds to a tannaitic disagreement, 2) the explicit connection between each position and its scriptural source and 3) the question as to why one of these positions is not redundant. Although all of this material treats the issue of rebuke tangentially, it does not significantly further our understanding of the nature or obligation of reproof.24 If Tanḥuma excludes material that is tangentially related to rebuke it should come as no surprise that the final two units of our sugya, which exhibit minimal connection to rebuke, are thoroughly ignored. In the Bavli these units of the third section of the sugya were linked to rebuke through the parallel language of “until what point.” Substantively however, they generally have no direct bearing on reproof. There is one line within this material that does discuss rebuke, but it portrays rebuke in a negative light and is therefore not worthy of inclusion. Thus, in appropriating our sugya for the construction of an extended discourse on rebuke, Tanḥuma only retains those sections that are immediately relevant. Beyond passages that do not directly advance our understanding of rebuke, Tanḥuma also systematically excises those sections and lines that present rebuke in a negative light. As noted, Tanḥuma preserves the Bavli’s version of the three glosses on Lev. 19:17. However, Tanḥuma does not include the voices of the three tannaim who eschew rebuke. This half of the tannaitic tradition portrayed rebuke as an impossible task that the rabbis declared themselves incapable of fulfilling. In making a strong case for the desirability of rebuke, this material had to go. But, what about the first part of the tannaitic source that established rebuke as a dangerous practice? My earlier analysis of this section demonstrated how it simultaneously heightens the obligation and portrays it as hazardous. In its current context in Tanḥuma, however, there are significant differences that enhance the level of obligation but obscure the danger.

24   Tanḥuma retains the basic quotation of the relevant material from 1 Sam. 20 while ignoring the extraneous step of explicitly linking each of the three rabbinic positions to their corresponding verse. In this way, Tanḥuma preserves the scriptural source for each position without engaging in the tangential question of whose view depends on which verse.

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An Inescapable Obligation

Sifra 1

2

3

4

5

BT Arakhin

Our Rabbis taught: You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. One might think you should not hit him, slap him, or curse him. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. The verse speaks of hatred which is in the heart. From where do we know that one who sees something indecent about his fellow is obligated to rebuke him? As it says, you shall surely rebuke. If he rebuked him and And from where do we know that if he rebukes he did not accept it, from where do we know that he him even four or five should go back and rebuke times that he should rebuke again? The Torah him? The Torah says, rebuke – in all cases. therefore says you shall surely rebuke. One might think even if One might even think if he rebukes him and his his countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because but incur no guilt because of him. of him. You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. One might think you should not hit him, curse him, or slap him. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. I only said hatred which is in the heart.

Tanḥuma Our Rabbis taught: You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. One might think you should not slap him or curse him. The Torah therefore says: in your heart. The verse speaks of hatred which is in the heart. From where do we know that one who sees something indecent about his fellow is obligated to rebuke him? As it says, you shall surely rebuke. If he rebuked him and he did not accept it, from where do we know that he should go back and rebuke him? The Torah says, rebuke. One might even think if his countenance changes. The Torah therefore says, but incur no guilt because of him. It was taught, “you shall surely rebuke,” [Based on the word rebuke] I know only that the master [should rebuke] a student. From where [do we learn that] a student [should rebuke] the teacher? The Torah says you shall surely rebuke – in all cases.

214 6

7

8

9

10

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R. Tarfon said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke!”

It was taught, R. Tarfon said, “I wonder if there is anyone in this generation who is able to rebuke.” If he said to him, “remove the speck from between your eyes!” He would say to him, “Remove the beam from between your eyes! R. Elazar ben Azariyah R. Elazar ben Azariyah said, “I wonder if there said, “By the Temple, if there is anyone in this anyone in this generageneration who is able to tion who knows how to receive rebuke!” rebuke.” R. Akiva said, “By the [R. Akiva said, “I wonder if Temple, if there is there is anyone in this genanyone in this generaeration who can receive tion who knows how to rebuke.”]25 rebuke!” R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri said, And R. Yoḥanan ben Nuri said, “May heaven and “May heaven and earth earth bear witness regardbear witness regarding me that more than four ing me that many times or five times Akiva was Akiva was lashed because lashed because of me be- of me, because I would fore Rabban Gamliel be- complain about [R. Akiva] cause I would complain before Rabban [Shimon to [Rabban Gamliel] con- ben] Gamliel. And all the more so that I increased cerning [R. Akiva], and how much would I know love for him, that he increased love for me.” In order to fulfill that which it says, Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you; Reprove a wise man, and he will love you.” 25  A position attributed to R. Akiva appears only in MSS Oxford, London, and Munich as well as the Cambridge Geniza fragment.

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215 And one who does not rebuke is caught in that very sin, as the master said, “Whoever is able to protest against the people of his household and does not protest is caught [in the sin] of the people of his household. [Whoever is able to protest against] the people of his city [and does not protest] is caught [in the sin] of the people of his city. [Whoever is able to protest against] the entire world [and does not protest] is caught [in the sin] of the entire world.”

Within Sifra and BT, the anonymous section of glosses concludes with the warning against incurring sin by embarrassing the other party (4). This is immediately followed by the tannaim rejecting rebuke (6–9), placing the problematization of rebuke at the apex of the juncture between these two halves of the commentary. In its new context, Tanḥuma introduces an additional gloss on Lev. 19:17 proving that a student must rebuke his teacher (5). This comment brackets the concern of embarrassing another person by returning us to an extension of the obligation to rebuke. Promptly after these comments on Lev. 19:17, Tanḥuma goes on to claim that one who does not rebuke is caught in the sin of that other person (12). Rather than the questioning of rebuke that follows in Sifra and the Bavli (6–11), thereby amplifying the fear of sin by overrebuking, in Tanḥuma a new section is introduced that highlights the sin involved in refraining from rebuke. In this way, Tanḥuma obscures the idea of rebuke as dangerous by introducing a new sin that overshadows the previous concern.26 26  One might suggest that the introduction of this new sin actually further problematizes rebuke by juxtaposing the sin of going too far with the sin of not rebuking at all. However, in Tanḥuma these two pericope are separated by an additional gloss on Lev. 19:17 that a student must rebuke a teacher. According to my reading, this space downplays the direct clash between the two avenues toward sin while allowing the sin of not rebuking, strengthened by the larger context, to overshadow the sin of embarrassment.

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Section two of the Bavli sugya, which compares proper rebuke to improper humility, is the most damaging to the value of reproof. For this reason it is entirely absent from Tanḥuma’s version. This is not to say that humility lacks value in the eyes of Tanḥuma’s editor(s). The printed edition of Tanḥuma includes the statement that “no quality is greater than awe and humility” (‫אין‬ ‫)בכל המדות גדול מן היראה וענוה‬, citing Deut. 10:12 as proof.27 However, when a discussion of humility challenges the value of rebuke it must be removed. Not only does Tanḥuma omit this entire second section, but it also refrains from extracting the one line directly relevant to rebuke from the third section of the Bavli where R. Eliezer states that, “If the Holy One Blessed Be He came to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with strict justice (‫)דין‬, they would not have been able to stand before his rebuke.” Such a description paints rebuke, at least when spurred by strict justice, as unbearable. As this tradition speaks negatively of rebuke, R. Eliezer’s words have no place in Tanḥuma’s project of lauding rebuke. By removing this tradition, along with the entire second section of the sugya and the latter half of the tannaitic material preserved in the Bavli’s first section, Tanḥuma actively crops the Talmud’s primary discussion of rebuke, leaving only those elements which advance a positive understanding of rebuke and Lev. 19:17. 3

Introducing New Material

In an analysis of a different homily from Tanḥuma, Ira Chernus demonstrates that this late Midrash combines earlier sources to create a new message, drawing authority from its predecessors. Summarizing the work of Tanḥuma’s editor he writes, [The editor] has taken a group of disparate traditions … and molded them into an apparently simple and straightforward unity. His ability is seen both in his choice of traditions and the way he combines them and gives them new contexts in order to communicate his own message with the apparent support of earlier authorities.28 The same can be said of our homily. Tanḥuma both deletes irrelevant and problematizing passages from our BT Arakh. sugya and incorporates other material from elsewhere in the Bavli in order to construct a thoroughly pro-rebuke 27   Tanḥuma, Qoraḥ 12. 28  Chernus, “On the History of a Pericope in the Midrash Tanhuma,” 63.

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homily. While not all of the appropriated talmudic pericopae explicitly treat rebuke, our homily frames and organizes all of this material into a sustained argument for the extreme importance of rebuke and Lev. 19:17. Above I highlighted the three major sugyot from which Tanḥuma draws as a means to demonstrating that Tanḥuma was working with some version of BT. A more detailed exploration of these three sections illustrates how each of them augments the importance of rebuke and the Levitical obligation. The first and shortest Bavli pericope Tanḥuma adopts is based upon a statement of Rava from BT B.M. 31a that we encountered in the beginning of the previous chapter: One of the rabbinic figures said to Rava, “Shall I say that [the word] rebuke [in Lev. 19:17 implies that he should only rebuke] one time, [but the addition of] you shall surely [teaches that he should rebuke] two times?” [Rava] said to him, “[The word] rebuke [on its own] implies even a hundred times; [what does] you shall surely [teach then]? [Based on the word rebuke] I know only that the master [should rebuke] a student. From where [do we learn that] a student [should rebuke] the teacher? The Torah says you shall surely rebuke – in all cases.” The first half of the Bavli’s version, which derives the number of times one should rebuke, is somewhat reminiscent of Sifra’s requirement for continual attempts. Tanḥuma already included a version of Sifra’s gloss in the form of repeating a rebuke when the other party does not heed it (‫)לא קבל‬. Consequently, this opening interpretation is unnecessary and only the second half of this tradition is imported into Tanḥuma: “It was taught [in a baraita (‫])ותניא‬: Rebuke, [from this] I know only that the master [should rebuke] a student. From where [do we learn that] a student [should rebuke] the teacher? The Torah says you shall surely rebuke – in all cases.” Although the content of this gloss is taken verbatim from BT B.M. 31a it is no longer attributed to Rava. Instead the passage is now marked as a tannaitic source (‫)תניא‬. Altering the introductory marker not only upgrades the authority of this tradition from an amoraic to a tannaitic dictum, but also locates it as an organic continuation of the preceding tannaitic glosses on Lev. 19:17. On a substantive level, this tradition also augments the force of rebuke by expanding the scope of the obligation. The biblical law uses the language of “brother” (‫ )אחיך‬and BT Arakh. adds another gloss with the word “fellow” (‫)חבירו‬. Both of these terms denote someone of similar social status. By expanding the obligation to include rebuking a teacher, this additional gloss now mandates confronting a superior, a more demanding requirement.

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BT Shab. 54b–55a is the next major source Tanḥuma employs. The first part of this material is basically copied verbatim: Whoever is able to protest (‫ )למחות‬against the people of his household and does not protest is caught [in the sin] of the people of his household. [Whoever is able to protest against] the people of his city [and does not protest] is caught [in the sin] of the people of his city. [Whoever is able to protest against] the entire world [and does not protest] is caught [in the sin] of the entire world. Protesting (‫ה‬.‫ח‬.‫)מ‬, rather than rebuking (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫)י‬, is the primary topic of this section. However, Tanḥuma introduces this material with a line that connects it to the previous glosses on Lev. 19:17 and frames it as a discussion of rebuke: “And one who does not rebuke (‫ )מוכח‬is caught in that very sin (‫)בההוא עון‬, as the master said …” By adding this simple connector Tanḥuma is able to maintain the original language of the BT Shab. 54b–55a passage, simultaneously transforming it into a directly relevant comment on rebuke that links to the biblical obligation. While the Levitical injunction provided a positive impetus to practice rebuke, this new amoraic passage highlights the detriments of failing to perform. Not only does a bystander who refrains from rebuking fail to perform a commandment, but he or she also incurs sin as a result. In Sifra the sin (‫)חטא‬ mentioned in Lev. 19:17 was understood as embarrassing the offending party through an ineffective rebuke. By contrast, in Tanḥuma the sin (‫ )עון‬is that of the original offender – which becomes the responsibility of anyone who fails to rebuke them. Tanḥuma thus shifts the nature of the sin from an inappropriate rebuke to the act of refraining from reproof. Moreover, according to this homily, one is liable not only for one’s fellow or one’s teacher, but for everyone in the entire world as well. Tanḥuma thus crescendos from the localized confrontations of friend and teacher in the glosses on Lev. 19:17 to an open-ended responsibility for one’s entire city and the entire world. The threefold progression from household to city to world is followed in BT Shab. by a statement attributed to Rav Papa that the exilarch’s household is caught [in the sins] of the whole world. Tanḥuma skips this statement, presumably because it could be taken as limiting the scope of the responsibility for rebuking the world to those in a position of power (such as the exilarch). The passage in Tanḥuma resumes with a remark attributed to R. Ḥanina concerning Isa. 3:14 (“The LORD will bring this charge against the elders and officers of His people”) that interprets the word “elders” in this verse to mean that even the elders are guilty of not protesting against the people. Then once again Tanḥuma skips over part of the talmudic sugya. Using Ezek. 9 as a springboard,

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the continuation of the homily declares that even the most righteous individuals often fail at rebuke. Introducing a parable in which the hypostatization of Justice (‫ )דין‬asks God why the righteous are different from the wicked, Justice suggests that even the completely righteous have failed to rebuke the wicked.29 God retorts that it is known that protesting against the wicked would have been ineffective and therefore the righteous cannot be held accountable. Justice counters that simply because God has access to this information does not mean that the righteous do – and therefore they cannot be exempt from the necessity of trying to protest. God concedes the point and allows everyone, including the righteous, to be punished. While BT Shab. moves on to discuss other verses in Ezek. 9, Tanḥuma summarizes the main point that, “You learn that even the completely righteous are caught [in the sins] of the generation” (‫)הא למדת שאפילו צדיקים גמורים נתפסים על הדור‬. Quoting Ezek. 21:8, Tanḥuma specifies that the righteous sin because they refrain from protesting against the wicked. The overall message of this excerpt from BT Shab. is that everyone (including the elders and the righteous) is responsible for everyone else (including the wicked). The final sugya that our Tanḥuma homily draws from the Bavli appears in BT Tam. 28a. According to the Talmud (BT Tam. 27b–28a), a certain man appointed for overseeing the temple would make rounds of the different guards to ensure that everyone was awake. If he found someone asleep, he was permitted to hit them or burn their clothing. After describing this situation, the Talmud quotes a baraita in the name of Rabbi [Yehuda ha-Nasi]: What is the proper path (‫ )דרך ישרה‬that a person should choose? Love rebukes (‫ )התוכחות‬for as long as rebukes are in the world comfort (‫נחת‬ ‫ )רוח‬comes to the world, goodness and blessing come to the world and evil departs from the world; as it says “But it shall go well with the rebukers (‫ ;)מוכיחים‬Blessings of good things will light upon them” (Prov. 24:25).30 And there are those who say He will strengthen [them] with extra faith as it says, “My eyes are on the trusty men of the land, to have them at my side” (Psa. 101:6). R. Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that R. Yonatan said, “Whoever rebukes his fellow for the sake of heaven (‫ )לשם שמים‬merits a portion of the Holy One Blessed Be He, as it says, ‘He who reproves a man 29  In contrast to the appearance of Justice (‫ )דין‬in BT Arakh., where R. Eliezer declares that even the patriarchs could not have withstood such divine rebuke, here Justice serves as an advocate for rebuke, prompting God to punish the righteous for not rebuking. On the hypostatization of Justice, see Kensky, Trying Man, Trying God, 319–25. 30  I have deviated from the NJPS translation in order to highlight the term ‫מוכיחים‬.

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will in the end [find more favor than he who flatters him]’ (Prov. 28:23); and not only this, but they draw out for him a thread of lovingkindness, as it says, ‘Find more favor than he who flatters him.’ ” Appearing toward the end of Tanḥuma’s extended discussion of rebuke, this passage drives home the point that rebuke is a highly positive and desirable practice. Loving rebuke is the “proper path” (‫ )דרך ישרה‬that a person should choose in life as rebuke brings all sorts of benefits to the world and removes evil from the world. Following the citation of Prov. 24:25, Tanḥuma introduces an additional gloss on this verse not found in the BT Tam. parallel: “For the rebuker and for the one rebuked” (‫)על המוכיח ועל המתוכח‬. Observing that the plural form of the word “rebukers” (‫ )מוכיחים‬is used in Proverbs, the homily specifies that both parties benefit from the act of rebuke.31 The end of this section brings the words of R. Yonatan that proper rebuke (i.e., for the sake of heaven) provides the rebuker with a portion of the divine – perhaps gesturing toward the eschatological or the world to come. Overall, while previous sections of Tanḥuma’s discussion of rebuke focused upon the nature of the obligation, here we find an emphasis on the value of the practice and the rewards in store for the one who chooses to pursue it. 4 Tanḥuma’s Other-Focused Orientation Midrash Tanḥuma incorporates material from several different talmudic tractates in order to highlight the value of rebuke. Weaving these passages into the base text from BT Arakh. while excluding any elements that problematize rebuke, Tanḥuma reworks this core sugya to transform its basic message.32 In the previous chapter I argued that the BT Arakh. sugya challenges Lev. 19:17 and rebuke based upon a competing emphasis on humility and a self-focused orientation. Tanḥuma’s constructed discourse, on the other hand, includes elements that push in the opposite direction, toward an other-oriented sense of interpersonal responsibility. 31  While there do not appear to be parallels to this gloss in the Bavli, we do find a more extended version of this tradition in Devarim Rabbah, another work in the Tanḥuma Yelammedenu family (see Devarim Rabbah [Printed] 1:1 and Lieberman, Midrash Devarim Rabbah, 12–13). 32  I believe that the Bavli Arakhin sugya (rather than any of the other talmudic passages) constitutes the core of Tanḥuma’s homily as the homily opens with material from BT Arakh. and the homily returns to the BT Arakh. sugya after inserting material from elsewhere.

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The first pericope added to Tanḥuma’s discussion is the obligation of a student to rebuke his teacher. A disciple, particularly vis-à-vis his mentor, is the epitome of a non-perfected individual. Yet, he is obligated to point out failings even in his teacher and role model. This stands in stark contrast to the BT sugya’s insertion of the rebuked party’s retort to “Take the log out of your own eye.” Whereas the Bavli emphasizes looking toward one’s own faults before considering those of another, Tanḥuma demands the opposite, that students overlook their own imperfections and actively point out the faults of their superiors. These diametrically opposed recommendations map onto the break between the self-oriented goal of pursuing self-perfection and the otheroriented objective of accepting responsibility for even those from whom one is supposed to learn. In this first pericope, Tanḥuma thus counters our sugya’s addition of a self-focused line by excluding this material entirely and introducing a competing gloss that emphasizes an obligation to rebuke that runs counter to traditional wisdom. Tanḥuma introduces the next major section taken from the Bavli (BT Shab. 54b–55a) with a line that at first glance focuses on the self: “And one who does not rebuke is caught in that very sin (‫)בההוא עון‬.” Read on its own, this statement directs our attention toward the negative ramifications that impact the potential rebuker who fails to act. However, this line is primarily included to introduce the passage from BT Shab. 54b–55a and ensure that we read its discussion of protesting (‫ה‬.‫ח‬.‫ )מ‬as a case of rebuke (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫)י‬. Viewed in light of this subsequent material, the sin is actually that of another party, underscoring the connection and obligation that the rebuker has for others. Failure to protest against the other party, whether they are one’s family, city, or world, results in the non-rebuker becoming “caught” in the sin of this other party. Indeed, it is “that very sin” (‫ )בההוא עון‬of the other that the non-rebuker becomes entangled with, rather than the sin of simply not rebuking.33 An underlying assumption of interpersonal responsibility drives this passage to assume a deep level of connection between all people: I am already implicated in someone else’s sin. If I act, I can save us both. If I passively desist, then both of us incur sin. A person’s meritorious character is inconsequential if he or she refrains from rebuking. The passage from BT Shab. teaches that even the completely 33  Alternatively, one could suggest that the phrase “that very sin” implies that the nonrebuker will himself fall subject to the same (type) of sin, which he would commit in the future. According to this reading, it is not literally the past (or present) sin of the other in which the non-rebuker is caught. Rather, by failing to rebuke he will find himself in this same (type) of sin at a later point. While this reading seems less likely, it still reinforces my basic point: One’s responsibility for the other is determinative. Whatever sin the other committed determines the sin that the non-rebuker will also commit.

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righteous are not saved by their own merits if they fail to rebuke the wicked. Even when they assume that their efforts will be in vain – and God actually knows this to be the case! – there is no excuse for failure to rebuke. Vocalizing ‫( ממקדשי‬from my holy place) as ‫( ממקודשי‬from my holy people), the talmudic midrash reads Ezek. 9:6 as teaching that the angels of destruction should begin with the most righteous (i.e., those who have fulfilled the entire Torah). Not only do the merits of the righteous fail to save them from the necessity of rebuke, but they are first in line to be punished for this failure. On an even more abstract level, this section can been see as an assertion that even God is not free from the interpersonal responsibility of rebuke. Framed as a dialogue between Justice and God, in this passage Justice rebukes God for differentiating between the righteous and the wicked. Once Justice wins the argument, God instructs the angels of destruction to act against everyone, beginning with the righteous. Regretting the previous decision to protect the righteous, God realizes that God is responsible for punishing them for their sin of failure to rebuke. This episode marks God as both in need of rebuke (from Justice) and as a necessary rebuker (for the failings of the righteous). Viewed from this perspective, the material adopted from BT Shab. carries the force of interpersonal responsibility up to the heavens where not even the divine escapes the urgency of this demand. The third passage that Tanḥuma draws from the Bavli (BT Tam. 28a) states that the rewards for rebuke are not only for oneself, but for the world as well. Although this passage concludes by stating that rebuke provides a portion of the divine and a thread of lovingkindness for the rebuker, it opens with global benefits. The presence of rebuke in the world brings comfort, goodness, and blessing to the world as a whole. Rebuking is beneficial for both the rebuker and the rebuked party. Rhetorically, this section moves in the inverse direction from the earlier passage about being caught in the sin of others. The beginning of the sugya from BT Shab. moved from one’s household, to one’s city, to the world. Here, the direction is from rebuke’s benefits for the world, for the rebuker and the rebuked party, and for the rebuker alone. These two passages emphasize the horizontal axis of interpersonal responsibility in the world and, as bookends to the story about Justice and God in the middle of the BT Shab. material, they focus our attention on the vertical axis of interpersonal responsibility that transcends the terrestrial-heavenly divide.34 As a broader message, 34  The material from BT Tam. is not immediately juxtaposed to the passage from BT Shab.. In between we find Tanḥuma’s brief version of BT Arakh.’s discussion of the endpoint of rebuke. However, logically this material from BT Arakh. should precede that of BT Tam. as the parameters of the obligation should precede discussion of its reward.

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the inclusion of this material highlights rebuke as that which connects all spatial dimensions. In this way, Tanḥuma uses rebuke to direct a person toward everyone other than him or herself, spinning an all-encompassing web of interpersonal responsibility.35 Looking beyond the confines of Tanḥuma’s discussion of rebuke proper, the larger literary context also reinforces the importance of interpersonal responsibility. The core verse that opens and drives Tanḥuma’s discussion of rebuke is of course Lev. 19:17. Yet, Tanḥuma does not place this extended treatment of rebuke and Lev. 19:17 among its homilies on Leviticus.36 Instead it appears somewhat randomly in between a series of homilies on Exodus 21:1 and 22:24. Given the abrupt interruption between this sequential material from Exodus, we must ask whether there is a thematic connection between rebuke and the topics discussed in the two sections.

35  Norman Cohen, in comparing amoraic and later midrashim, suggests that the latter evince much more flexibility with regard to form and ordering of material than the former (Cohen, “Structure and Editing in the Homiletic Midrashim,” 4–5; Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” 42). However, this should not be taken as an indication that these latter midrashim underwent a poorer editing process. Cohen compares two related homilies as they appear in Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana and Pesiqta Rabbati, arguing that “pisqa 10 of the Pesiqta Rabbati is a more fully developed, better edited homily” (Cohen, “Structure and Editing in the Homiletic Midrashim,” 17). He specifically notes how the later midrash appropriated material from Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana, “changing their placement, and adapting and expanding them to fit the thematic development” (Ibid., 17). Ultimately Cohen (followed by Allen Kensky) concludes that, “it is very plausible that the breakdown in the fixed structure of the rabbinic derashah was due to a conscious decision on the part of editors to enhance the artful editing of their homilies” (Ibid., 20; Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” 42–3). Along these lines, Jeffrey Rubenstein has shown how Tanḥuma and Pirqe de-Rabbi Eliezer “fashion sustained myths by weaving independent mythic motifs into larger structures (a larger complex of traditions) and extended narratives (adding details or descriptions)” (Rubenstein, “From Mythic Motifs to Sustained Myth,” 134). In this way Tanḥuma “explicitly combines and fleshes out the themes” which were “implicit in the [earlier] rabbinic traditions” (Ibid., 136). Like these previous studies, I am suggesting that Tanḥuma’s organization of the textual units culled from BT Shab. and BT Tam. is intentionally structured so as to emphasize the multiple dimensions and importance of rebuke. This is perhaps related to the tendency of Tanḥuma, Shemot to create a narrative progression by inserting verses without interrupting glosses (see Kensky, “Midrash Tanḥuma Shemot,” 30 ff.). However, note Chaim Milikowsky’s analysis of a particular Tanḥuma homily in which he believes the midrash combined sources in a “mechanical manner,” leading to a contradiction with a biblical account (Milikowsky, “The Punishment of Jacob”). 36  Both the printed and Buber editions of Tanḥuma skip from homilies on Lev. 19:1–2 to homilies on Lev. 19:23. This break is particularly surprising given the abundance of fodder for sermons that spans this gap.

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The homilies prior to the homily on rebuke treat issues of judging and judgement.37 Introducing the homily immediately before our section, Tanḥuma asks about the obligation for Jews to keep arbitration within the Jewish community rather than turning to non-Jewish judges. In the latter portion of this homily, R. Yehoshua ben Qorḥa scripturally derives the obligation of a disciple to speak up if he knows how to acquit a poor person and convict a rich person. He teaches that Deut. 1:17’s demand for impartiality in judgement states “Fear no man” (‫ )לֹא ָתגּורּו ִמ ְּפנֵ י ִאיׁש‬in order to ensure that everyone will speak up and not be afraid of the power of the rich. Conceptually, this is perhaps similar to the case of rebuke where one should act despite concerns over negative ramifications. The overall theme of proper judgement aligns with the emphasis on interpersonal responsibility established in the rebuke section. Those involved in judgement have an underlying obligation toward all litigants and the community at large. The outward-focus of the sections prior to our passage is mirrored by the homilies that follow. Exodus 22:24 demands that a lender should not act as a creditor or collect interest. The Pentateuch’s institution of lending is grounded in a concern for aiding the poor without locking them into an inescapable spiral of debt.38 Those with financial means are instructed to loan money freely to those in need. The first homily after our section on rebuke begins by depicting the responsibilities of the rich for the poor by asserting that God assesses whether the rich are generous with their money (‫)אם ידיהם פתוחה לעניים‬. Once again we find a focus on interpersonal responsibility – that of the rich for the poor. In sum, each of the three major passages taken from the Bavli and interwoven by Tanḥuma into our homily, as well as the literary placement of the homily itself, direct our attention outward toward others. The first text recommends for even an imperfect student to rebuke his teacher; the second forcefully declares that one is liable for the sins of everyone around them; and the third reveals how the reward for rebuke comes upon everyone, including the other person. Lastly, inserted between discussions of just judging and proper lending, the literary context of our homily further directs our attention outward, highlighting our interpersonal responsibility.

37  Perhaps the extended discussion of God judging the righteous triggered the inclusion of our homily at this juncture. A similar juxtaposition between judging and rebuke appears in Halakhot Gedolot Siman 50, Hilkhot ha-Dayyanim. 38  Lenders are thus prohibited from taking interest (e.g., Lev. 25:35–38).

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Devarim Rabbah: Rebuke in Other Yelammedenu Traditions

Discussion of rebuke is not limited to the Midrash Tanḥuma collections but also appears in the broader Yelammedenu traditions preserved in Shemot Rabbah, Bemidbar Rabbah, Devarim Rabbah, and Pesiqta Rabbati. In these other works there are several discussions of major biblical figures and prophets who rebuked (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ )י‬others.39 Particularly in Devarim Rabbah, just as in Sifre Devarim, there is an extended discussion of rebuke related to the beginning of the Book of Deuteronomy. Like Midrash Tanḥuma, this work also appears in two published versions: The printed edition and the edition edited by Saul Lieberman.40 Both of these editions contain traditions related to rebuke, and both generally treat rebuke as a positive practice. In fact, the root ‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫ י‬with the sense of rebuke appears over 30 times in the Lieberman edition of Devarim Rabbah. A brief survey of some of the many places in which rebuke is discussed in Devarim Rabbah will illustrate how this practice is endorsed by the wider Yelammedenu literature. While many of the rebuke-related examples in the printed edition of Devarim Rabbah also appear in Lieberman’s edition, there is one striking case found only in the former. God instructs Moses to repeat the Torah to the people (i.e., the content of Deuteronomy) but Moses is quite hesitant due to his previous experience rebuking them: R. Simon said, “When the Holy One Blessed Be He told Moses to repeat the Torah, [Moses] did not desire to rebuke [the people] for what they had done. R. Simon said, to what is the matter comparable? To a student who was walking with his master and saw a discarded glowing ember. Thinking that it was a precious stone he picked it up and burned himself. After several days he was [again] walking with his master and saw a precious stone. Thinking that it was a glowing ember he was scared to touch it. His master said to him, ‘Take it for it is a precious stone.’ Thus, Moses said, ‘When I said to the people “Listen you rebels,” I received my [punishment] from their hands. And now I am to go and rebuke them?’ The Holy One Blessed Be He said to Moses, ‘Do not fear.’ ”41 39  Examples include: Jacob (Pesiqta Rabbati 7), Moses (Shemot Rabbah 27:6 and 51:8; Devarim Rabbah [Printed] 1:2), Yitro (Shemot Rabbah 27:6), Ezekiel (Bemidbar Rabbah 15:12), Jeremiah (Bemidbar Rabbah 15:21), and Isaiah (Pesiqta Rabbati 4). 40  These editions differ primarily in the first several sections (Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 308). It is largely in these first sections that we find a discussion of rebuke, which is glossed as positive by both editions. 41   Devarim Rabbah [Printed] 1:8.

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Following Sifre Devarim’s association between Deuteronomy and rebuke, R. Simon’s example refers back to Num. 20 where the Israelites complain against Moses for lack of water. God instructs Moses to speak to a rock and bring forth water. Chastising the people (“Listen you rebels …”), Moses strikes the rock rather than speaking to it, ultimately resulting in his inability to enter the Promised Land.42 Given this previous experience, Moses is hesitant to rebuke the people, concerned that he might be punished again. R. Simon offers a parable of a student (Moses) and a master (God) to explain how Moses changed his mind. While in a first attempt the student mistook a glowing ember for a gemstone (just as Moses incorrectly rebuked the people and struck the stone), when a second opportunity presented itself, the master encouraged the student to take the real gemstone (just as God instructs Moses to rebuke the people and not fear the consequences). In Moses’s eyes, both his previous experience (the glowing ember) and the current situation (the gemstone) are opportunities for rebuke and thus equally dangerous. Given the previous consequences of his rebuke he is understandably quite hesitant to repeat the action. However, God’s response implies that rebuke itself (at least when performed properly) is truly a gem and only improper rebuke, or more accurately disobeying God’s command, is a burning coal. The parable thus equates proper rebuke with a precious stone that one should collect rather than fear. While this teaching does hint at the negative picture of rebuke as a burning coal, the driving message ultimately endorses this practice. Despite Moses’ previous bad experience with rebuke, God encourages him to try again and not to fear detrimental consequences. Heuristically, Moses stands as an exemplum for those who may also have previously experienced the negative ramifications of rebuking. Their concern over a repeated result is affirmed by Moses’ own anxiety. Yet, God’s response applies to them as well: Do not be afraid to rebuke when it is properly deserved. Just as Moses is hesitant but eventually accedes to God’s instruction, so too the average individual may be worried about rebuking but should heed the command of Lev. 19:17. In addition to jewels, rebuke is also positively compared with Torah. In a somewhat oblique example found in both editions of Devarim Rabbah, the proof that one who enters a synagogue and hears words of Torah merits to sit among the sages is based upon Prov. 15:31, “He whose ear heeds the discipline of life (‫ּתֹוכ ַחת ַחּיִ ים‬ ַ ) lodges among the wise.”43 In the exegesis of the phrase “discipline of life,” employing the Hebrew root for rebuke (‫ח‬.‫כ‬.‫)י‬, the midrash understands this to refer to words of Torah. By heeding discipline, which appears 42  See Num. 20:10–12. 43   Devarim Rabbah [Printed], Ki Tavo 7:3.

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in the form of Torah, one is entitled to reside among the sages. A more explicit example of a connection between rebuke and Torah appears elsewhere in the Lieberman edition of Devarim Rabbah: R. Yudan said in the name of R. Yehoshua ben Levi, “Rebukes are beloved since they are compared to words of Torah” (‫חביבות תוכחות שהן שקולות‬ ‫)כדברי תורה‬.44 R. Levi ben R. Ḥiyya said, “From where do we learn that rebukes are compared to words of Torah? Since it is written in connection to the [Ten] Commandments these are the words (Exod. 19:6), and it is written in connection to the rebukes [i.e., Deuteronomy], these are the words (Deut. 1:1). Just as this statement [i.e., rebuke] only strikes (‫ )מכה‬at the end, so too words of Torah only strike (‫ )מכין‬at the end …”45 Here one tradition asserts the value of rebuke as related to Torah while another finds a scriptural basis for the connection between rebuke and Torah. Although the exact sense of the link between rebuke and Torah attributed to R. Levi is somewhat ambiguous, the language of striking (‫ה‬.‫כ‬.‫ )מ‬evokes the image of a pedagogue engaged in disciplining a student.46 Torah and rebuke are thus related by their harsh disciplinary mode. Traditions preserved in Devarim Rabbah declare both a rebuker and a rebuked party worthy of blessing.47 Along these lines, this midrashic work also includes other indications that giving and accepting rebuke are praiseworthy actions. One such tradition draws upon Prov. 9:8 to consider the Israelites wise for accepting Moses’ rebuke, in contrast to the other nations of the world who are foolish for not accepting rebuke: “Do not rebuke a scoffer, for he will hate you – these are the nations of the world who do not accept rebuke … Reprove a wise man – this is Moses who rebuked Israel who accepted his rebukes since they were wise.”48 Other comments declare explicit rebuke (‫ )תוכחת מגולה‬to be greater than hidden love (‫ )אהבה מסותרת‬and that Moses’ rebuke itself was prompted by love.49 Finally, Lieberman’s edition of Devarim Rabbah opens 44  Lieberman records an alternative version found in another late collection: ‫חביבין עלי‬ ‫( דברי משה שהוכיח את ישראל‬Lieberman, Midrash Devarim Rabbah, 4n2). 45  Ibid., 4. 46  Perhaps the striking at the end of the Ten Commandments (the first use of “these are the words”) refers to Exod. 20:18–19 where the people are frightened and ask Moses to speak to them instead of God. According to a midrashic tradition, the power of God’s words actually caused the Israelites to die, requiring God to revive them. However, see Lieberman’s comments on this line (Ibid.). 47  See Devarim Rabbah [Printed] 1:9 and Lieberman, Midrash Devarim Rabbah, 12–13. 48  Ibid., 3. 49  Ibid., 3 and 9.

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with the assertion that even if rebuke is felt to be damaging, it is still valuable when coming from the mouth of someone like Moses who truly cares: “Wounds by a loved one are long lasting (Prov. 27:6) … these are the rebukes of the mouth of Moses our Master peace be upon him.”50 Whether compared to a burning ember and a precious gem or the harsh words of Torah, Devarim Rabbah preserves a number of traditions that recognize the potentially detrimental side to rebuke while suggesting that this is trivial compared to its great value. Those who are wise like Moses will give rebuke and those who are wise like the Israelites will accept it. The broader Yelammedenu tradition thus bolsters the positive valuation of rebuke we find in Midrash Tanḥuma. 6

Interpersonal Rebuke and Divine Confrontation

In a recent book on confronting God in rabbinic Judaism, Dov Weiss argues that over the course of the 4th through 7th centuries we see an increase in pro-confrontational positions, particularly within Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu traditions. While the major thrust of his argument pits tannaitic rejections of challenging God against post-tannaitic endorsement of this practice, he also demonstrates how “late rabbinic legitimation of confrontation intensifies over time.”51 Thus, although pro-protest traditions are more intense within the Bavli than earlier Palestinian midrashim from the 5th century, “they reach their fullest expression in the midrashim of Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu.”52 Weiss’ identification of an increased valuation of confrontation toward the divine in the Tanḥuma literature aligns with the evidence of the present chapter. Just as these late rabbinic midrashim endorse confronting God for potentially unjust acts, so too they encourage interpersonal confrontation through the act of rebuke. Taken together, we find that these late midrashim affirm a pro-confrontational position within both the human and divine realms. In order to understand why later rabbinic sources evince a higher valuation of confrontation, Weiss proffers a few different explanations.53 First, he looks to David Kraemer’s argument that within late rabbinic literature we find “a rabbinic openness to honestly face the traumatic historical realities 50  Ibid., 1. 51  Weiss, Pious Irreverence, 10–11. 52  Ibid., 11. 53  His primary discussion of explanatory phenomena appears toward the end of his second chapter (Ibid., 79–84). Also see Weiss, “Confrontations with God in Late Rabbinic Literature,” 91–94.

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of exile” and a reaction to “heightened injustices fueled, to a large extent, by the Christianization of the empire.”54 Problematizing various dimensions of Kraemer’s claim, Weiss goes on to suggest a different rationale: By the fourth and fifth centuries, we no longer have such anti-YHWH thinkers as Marcion, Celsus, Porphyry, and other Gnostics … We could speculate that without these external moral challenges to the Old Testament God, greater theological space could be granted to insiders, such as the later rabbis, to express their own frustrations, misgivings, and struggles with YHWH.55 In addition to this hypothesis, Weiss also points to a possible change in audience from tannaitic to amoraic literature with the latter reaching a broader population. One of Weiss’ more convincing explanations is the historical shift in the Greco-Roman practice of parrhesia (“outspokenness”). Weiss suggests that “the emergence of the Christian holy man as a figure of parrhesia in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries may have had an impact on later rabbinic biblical interpretation in the Byzantine period.”56 Beyond parrhesia, Weiss also provides a few hypotheses to differentiate the view of protesting in the Bavli and the Tanḥuma traditions. One possibility is the natural development of an idea already in “embryonic form.” Alternatively, a more literary factor may be at play: “Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu texts evince a certain theatrical dimension and are wont to build suspense in order to produce sensational and vivid retellings of the biblical story.”57 Although this explanation does not directly translate to the treatment of rebuke in these midrashim, it does bolster my close literary reading of the homily from Midrash Tanḥuma as an intentional argument in favor of reproof. Finally, Weiss looks to Sebastian Brock’s discussion of 4th–6th century Syriac hymns and homilies that “place ‘dramatic dialogues’ of ‘dispute’ into the mouth of rivaling biblical figures.”58 Regardless of the particular factor or factors that can explain the chronological increase in pro-confrontation rabbinic sentiments, this phenomenon of confronting the divine on its own parallels and sheds light on the increasing valuation of rebuke within late rabbinic midrashim.

54  Weiss, Pious Irreverence, 79. 55  Ibid., 81. 56  Ibid., 82. For my discussion of parrhesia and rebuke see the Conclusion. 57  Weiss, Pious Irreverence, 82. 58  Ibid., 83.

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Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong

Beyond the endorsement of confronting God described by Weiss, the early Islamic context can also shed light on the growing importance of rebuke within late rabbinic traditions.59 Early Islamic sources describe the duty of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” (al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa’l-nahy ‘an al-munkar).60 This precept appears at least eight times within the Quran itself, leading the foremost scholar of this Islamic principle, Michael Cook, to assert that it is “firmly rooted in Koranic diction.”61 At least one of these sources (Q7:157) is even “traditionally considered to go back to the Meccan [i.e., earlier] period of [Mohammad’s] career.”62 In addition to the Quran, there are numerous early Islamic traditions (Hadith) that affirm and expand upon this duty.63 The plethora of sources discussing this obligation in early Islamic literature speaks to the prominence of this idea during the period in which our homily was edited and enhances our understanding of why this value may have shifted between BT and the later Tanḥuma Yelammedenu traditions. In searching for the possible intellectual roots of the Islamic concept of “forbidding wrong” Cook considers rabbinic Judaism as a prime candidate. Speaking of Lev. 19:17 he notes that “a comparable duty is already prescribed in scripture.”64 After surveying a number of the major rabbinic sources on rebuke (not including Midrash Tanḥuma), Cook concludes that, Here, then, we have the beginnings of a scholastic elaboration of a religious duty or duties similar in character to forbidding wrong, though relatively far less salient. So far as I know, there is nothing comparable 59  As noted, the main homily on rebuke and Lev. 19:17 in Midrash Tanḥuma appears in the latest stratum of this collection, dated by Bregman to after the Islamic conquest. Early sources from the Quran and Hadith are thus potentially contemporaneous with, or even earlier than, the editing of our Tanḥuma homily. 60  The connection between rabbinic rebuke and Islamic “forbidding wrong” was already made by Michael Cook in his magnum opus (Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 570–73). There have been a number of previous studies comparing Midrash (both individual works and the process) with early Islamic literature. Of particular interest is Carol Bakhos’ chapter, “Ishmael in Later Midrashim,” in Ishmael on the Border. 61  Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 13. 62  Ibid., 48. 63  Ibid., 35. However, as Cook cautions, these traditions and the subsequent related discussion are not necessarily precisely the same as the original Quranic version of this obligation (see Ibid., 569). 64  Ibid., 570.

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in Syriac Christianity before Islamic times. A Jewish background to the Islamic duty is thus quite plausible. It is not, of course, proved by the general similarity, and I doubt if the case could be clinched. But this Jewish precedent would provide a starting-point for the development of the Muslim duty which is closer to the classical Islamic conception than are the vague Koranic verses that give the duty its name.65 Despite the plausibility for a connection between Jewish rebuke and Islamic “forbidding wrong,” Cook cautions that a Jewish background is not the only option: “Such a duty was also well known to the Latin West, where it was termed ‘fraternal correction’ (correctio fraterna).”66 Nevertheless, there are a number of sources in the Quran that actually discuss rebuke within communities of the “people of the Book” (i.e., Jews), strengthening the connection between rabbinic and Islamic engagement with rebuke. For example, Q3:114 “concedes that among the people of the Book there exists an ‘upstanding community’ which commands right and forbids wrong.”67 Another source, Q5:79, actually “condemns certain Israelites for failing to forbid each other wrong.”68 One of the most extensive discussions appears in Q7:163–6 where one group of Jews rebukes members of the community who violated Shabbat, while other community members refrained from doing so.69 These texts give the impression that Jews were (or at least were expected to be) rebuking one another for transgressions. The Quranic attribution of a parallel obligation within Judaism aligns with Tanḥuma’s insistence on the importance of Lev. 19:17. The geographic spread of some of the early Islamic sources on “forbidding wrong” also strengthens the link to Midrash Tanḥuma and is even helpful in understanding the monastic traditions discussed in Chapter 6. In discussing the provenance of sources that uphold the obligation to forbid wrong and those that downplay it, Cook distinguishes between two major centers. He notes the “disproportionate role of Kūfa in the provenance of those traditions (the majority) that do not attempt to play down the duty: Kūfa is the source of about twice as much of this material as all other centres put together.”70 This stands 65  Ibid., 572. 66  Ibid., 573. 67  Ibid., 14n5. 68  Ibid., 47. 69  Cook notes that while the sura itself is not totally explicit, “We have to understand from the context that a part of this community had reproved the Sabbath-breakers; another part (ummatun) then asked the reprovers why they bothered to admonish people whom God was going to punish anyway” (Ibid., 16, 28, and 47). 70  Ibid., 45.

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in contrast to Syria, which is the main “provenance of the traditions that work to play down the duty: here Syria is as productive as all other centres taken together.”71 Kūfa is located just south of the major geonic centers of Sura and Pumbedita where the late stratum of the printed edition of Midrash Tanḥuma may have been edited.72 Syria, on the other hand, was the primary center for monasticism within the Syriac speaking world and the likely gateway for the movement of Egyptian monastic traditions.73 The Syriac monastic traditions that eschewed rebuke are thus geographically proximate to the center of the most Islamic traditions against the obligation to forbid wrong while our homily from Midrash Tanḥuma was likely compiled in the Islamic center that most strongly defended the obligation to forbid wrong. However, the importance of this geographic parallel should not be overstated. Many of the earliest Islamic sources on “forbidding wrong” provide more of a general statement of the obligation rather than particular details (especially in comparison to later interpretation) and much of the discussion moves in a different direction than rabbinic discussions of rebuke.74 However, there are a couple of early sources that offer an intriguing similarity to one of the themes included in our Tanḥuma homily. According to one tradition, Abū Bakr (d. 634) quotes a saying from Mohammad that “threatens people with collective punishment from on high if they do not take action to right wrongs.”75 Similarly, Cook notes a tradition attributed to Ibn Mas‘ūd (d. 652) who “foretells that the Hour will come when people are at their worst, neither commanding right nor forbidding wrong. This disarray may be presented as a shortcoming of the believers, to be visited with divine displeasure.”76 The divine displeasure or even punishment in these sources recalls God’s punishing of the righteous in our 71  Ibid., 45. Cook hypothesizes that, “Such a contrast between the roles of the Kūfan and Syrian traditionists must surely be a reflection of the political geography of Umayyad times, with Kūfa as the leading centre of provincial opposition and Syria as the focus of metropolitan government. This in turn suggests that the material is often implicitly political even when not explicitly so” (Ibid., 45). 72  See Robert Brody’s map of “Geonic Babylonia and Environs,” which includes Sura, Pumbedita, Nehardea, and Kūfa (Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture, 37). 73  Bar-Asher Siegal, Early Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud, 43–55. 74  In fact, there are a number of factors that mark “forbidding wrong” as distinct from rebuke. For example, Cook points out that “forbidding wrong” is primarily for things that have yet to take place and not for those that have already occurred, unless it is to prevent future sins (Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 24–25). This stands in contrast to rebuke which is primarily past/present oriented. 75  Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 35–6. 76  Ibid., 40.

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homily for their failure to rebuke. Although there are certainly significant differences between the sources, the shared mention of divine investment in the institution of reproof and punishment for failure to fulfill the obligation speaks to the transcendent value ascribed to this practice. Later Islamic interpretations of “forbidding wrong,” particularly in the work of Ghazzālī (d. 1111), introduce other elements that recall aspects of the discussion of rebuke in Jewish sources. For example, many sources apply the obligation of “forbidding wrong” to the collective Muslim community and some passages suggest that it should specifically be limited to believers.77 Additionally, there is a discussion revolving around whether this duty should be performed publicly or in private.78 These factors remind us of the restriction of rebuke in the DSS to members of the community (Chapter 2) and the question of whether a public or private setting was preferable (Chapter 1). Another issue that arises in later interpretation of this Islamic obligation is a concern for the negative side-effects and danger involved in “forbidding wrong.”79 This of course was the major theme of tannaitic reactions to rebuke (Chapters 4 and 5), as well as to some degree within the monastic and talmudic traditions (Chapters 6 and 7). In more direct parallel to the Talmud, some Islamic interpretations of “forbidding wrong” introduce the obligation for the “performance of the duty against the grain of authority” (like the Bavli’s mention of a student rebuking a teacher), and the importance of being humble is also mentioned.80 In line with what we observed in Tanḥuma, interpretations of this Islamic duty also emphasize how distant wrongs are important to correct – even to the “uttermost ends of the earth.”81 These similarities, despite emerging after the latest

77  “Since the duty consists in coming to the aid of the faith, how could one of its enemies perform it?” (Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 11, 13). Cook also notes that, “Koranic exegesis has put most of its weight behind the interpretation of Q5:79 as a reference to the mutual forbidding of wrongs committed within the community” (Ibid., 27). However, many of these exegetes “understand the duty primarily as one to be performed by individual believers to each other, and not, say, by the community as a whole towards the world at large” (Ibid., 31). I will cite many of these specific examples from Cook’s abbreviated volume, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, which summarizes the findings of his larger work. Footnotes on the indicated pages point back to the larger work. 78  Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 29. 79  Ibid., 45–6, 51–56. 80  Ibid., 16, 28. 81  Ibid., 25, 41. However, geographically closer transgressions take precedence over more distant sins (Ibid., 25).

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rabbinic text we have considered, strengthen the connection between the obligations of Lev. 19:17 and “forbidding wrong.”82 While a majority of early Islamic traditions uphold the duty of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” there are a minority that limit its scope or recommend against its practical application.83 Sometimes this argument is based upon the preference for focusing on oneself before correcting others. Cook describes how one of these traditions recommends that, “One ought to start by putting oneself to rights before venturing to command and forbid others.”84 Some sources note the benefits of the solitary life while others recommend starting with fixing oneself if one’s motivation to forbid wrong is an inflated ego.85 We even find in the Quran itself (Q5:105) the statement “O believers, look after your own souls. He who is astray cannot hurt you, if you are rightly guided.”86 However, most commentators argue that this text does not negate the obligation of “forbidding wrong.” Indeed, Cook concludes that within the Islamic discussion of this obligation “We thus find no doctrinal rejection of forbidding wrong based on the principle of minding one’s own business.”87 Thus, although we find some resistance to the obligation of “forbidding wrong,” notably from the perspective of first working on oneself, this is a marginal voice within the Islamic tradition. In fact, the rejection of those who would marginalize “forbidding wrong” within early Islamic literature at times seems to directly respond to the way the act of rebuke is challenged in Jewish and Christian sources. For example, Ibn Mas‘ūd declares, “it is one of the worst of sins when someone is told to fear God, and responds: ‘Look to yourself!’ ”88 This declaration reminds us of the phrase, “Remove the log from your own eye,” which we encountered in the Gospel of Matthew and in the Bavli. The Islamic obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” offers an important parallel to Jewish rebuke. The issues raised by Islamic scholars concerning the Quran’s command remind us of a number of issues treated by early Jewish and Christian texts. More importantly, the temporal and geographic proximity between the early sources on this duty and the editing of our Tanḥuma homily reveals a shared embrace for correcting others during the early Islamic 82  In fact, later rabbinic interpretation of Lev. 19:17 within the Muslim world becomes linked to the Islamic obligation of “forbidding wrong” both in terms of terminology and themes (Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 572–73). 83  Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 95. 84  Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 43. 85  Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 83, 90. 86  Ibid., 85. 87  Ibid., 94. 88  Ibid., 93.

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period. Although we cannot know exactly why this stress on the value of confronting wrongs reverberates so strongly during this period, the Islamic focus on this responsibility at least allows us to better contextualize the shift from the Bavli’s rejection of rebuke to its wholehearted embrace in the later TanḥumaYelammedenu literature. 8 Conclusion Midrash Tanḥuma’s homily on rebuke actively reworks the earlier Bavli sugya in order to counter the Bavli’s problematization of Lev. 19:17. By excluding some material and introducing new sources, Midrash Tanḥuma expunges the majority of the Talmud’s critique of rebuke and constructs a sustained argument for the crucial importance of interpersonal reproof. This endorsement of rebuke is not limited to the printed edition of Midrash Tanḥuma, but also appears in other Tanḥuma-Yelammedenu traditions such as Devarim Rabbah.89 At the conclusion of the previous chapter I briefly described the movement from the tannaitic question of “can” we rebuke to the Bavli’s question of “should” we rebuke. With the evidence of Midrash Tanḥuma, one might suggest that we have returned to the realm of the Second Temple period’s positive engagement with rebuke. Yet, there is a fundamental difference. With the exception of a few key passages in the Gospels, Second Temple texts assumed that one should rebuke and explored how this should be accomplished. These sources generally assumed the value of rebuke and sought to clarify its application. Midrash Tanḥuma, by contrast, feels the need to a make a sustained argument for the value of reproof. For this reason the homily described in this chapter is most appropriately engaged in the question of “should” we rebuke, offering an opposing answer to the Bavli and most monastic sources.

89  There is also an emphasis on the importance of rebuke in the Geonic work, Halakhot Gedolot (Siman 50, Hilkhot ha-Dayyanim), which integrates the sugya from BT Arakh. with material from BT Shab. in a similar fashion to Midrash Tanḥuma.

Conclusion Leviticus 19:17 (“You shall not hate your kinsfolk in your heart. Reprove your kinsman but incur no guilt because of him”) generates a number of challenges for its interpreters. The core command of this verse and its immediate literary context give rise to a number of important questions. Should rebuke be a private, interpersonal act or a public, judicial encounter? Can rebuke be a manifestation of love or are the two mutually incompatible? What is the relationship between rebuke and gossip? Conflicting answers to these questions result in a wide variety of attitudes toward how rebuke should be performed. The first and last clauses of Lev. 19:17 open up a different set of issues. Lev. 19:17c warns against incurring sin, but it is unclear whether this is through an act of commission or omission. The danger of lurking sin and the potential for rebuke to disrupt interpersonal relationships prompt several of the early rabbis to call into question the possibility of properly performing this act at all. More radically, the question of focusing upon oneself rather than another, hinted at in the first clause of the verse, heuristically aligns with the monastic and later rabbinic question of whether or not rebuke is a valuable practice at all. From a bird’s eye view, there is a broad chronological shift in early Jewish and Christian reactions to Lev. 19:17 and rebuke. With the exception of Matthew 5 and Luke 6, sources from the Second Temple period are primarily engaged in answering the question of “how” one should rebuke by means of exegetical interpretation of Lev. 19:17 in its Levitical context. By the time of the early rabbis (tannaim) the operating question shifts away from how and moves to the higher order question of ability – can we rebuke? An even higher order question appears in later rabbinic literature and monastic sources, namely, should we even rebuke? Why does this shift occur? While there is likely no single motivation underlying this development, a variety of factors aid our understanding of some of these textual moments. The social and political instability of the earliest rabbis may have prompted them to eschew rebuke as a potentially damaging practice that would hinder their goal of establishing religious hegemony. Within the world of the early Christian monks, the intense focus on efforts at self-perfection seems to be the source of the problematization of rebuke as an other-oriented and potentially damaging practice. Likewise within BT, the ultimate rejection of rebuke in favor of humility appears to have been prompted by a similar impulse. Within the chronologically latest rabbinic text examined, Midrash Tanḥuma, the emphasis on critiquing others aligns with a greater openness toward challenging others among late rabbinic texts, a phenomenon also observed in early Islamic sources. These various factors

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi:10.1163/9789004376557_011

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highlight the social calculus at play in the exegesis of Lev. 19:17 and aid our understanding of the reasons why this commandment was embraced, rejected, and understood in such radically different fashions by Jewish and Christian communities in antiquity. In the introduction to this work I briefly suggested that Greco-Roman and early Christian discourse surrounding the practice of parrhesia (speaking the truth) can serve as an enlightening heuristic parallel to early Jewish and Christian texts about rebuke.1 Based upon Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia, I differentiated between political and interpersonal applications of this practice and I enumerated several key aspects of this activity: frank speech, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. At the outset of this book I aligned these different elements of parrhesia with rebuke in a general fashion. Having offered my arguments for the ways Lev. 19:17 and rebuke were treated in early Jewish and Christian sources, we are now in a position to observe a few precise points of affinity between parrhesia and rebuke that may shed light on both practices. In Chapter 2 I suggested that rebuke functioned as a mechanism of boundary reinforcement within the DSS, where members of the group were encouraged to chastise their peers and ignore outsiders. This interpersonal correction corresponds to the role of parrhesia in certain Greco-Roman conceptions of friendship. For example, according to Philodemus’ work on parrhesia, a key component of Greco-Roman friendship is the responsibility of each individual to offer correction to the other. Although Philodemus’ work is only partially extant, from what remains we are able to determine that he espoused “a form of psychagogy that depends on the active participation of all members of the community in the correction of one another.”2 Philodemus’ discussion of the importance of fraternal correction among “all members of the community” strongly resonates with the role of rebuke in the DSS where each member of the community was responsible for chastising others. Just as for Philodemus, so too in the DSS, correction of others is a core responsibility for members of the community. Moreover, according to Clarence Glad, Philodemus’ view of parrhesia includes “two perspectives, one directed ‘toward all men’ and another directed ‘towards one’s intimate associates.’ ”3 This distinction reminds us of the sharp division between applying rebuke to insiders and avoiding rebuke for outsiders within the DSS. Both systems also reflect an effort to balance

1  Thanks to David Konstan for sharing his reactions to an earlier version this section. 2  Philodemus et al., On Frank Criticism, 8; Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 124–32. For an overview of the major themes Philodemus discusses, see Philodemus et al., On Frank Criticism, 10–23. 3  Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 104.

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between the potential harshness of critique and the importance of expressing this critique lovingly.4 In contrast to the similar embrace of fraternal parrhesia in the work of Philodemus and the use of rebuke toward one’s peers in the DSS, in Chapter 2 I argued that passages in the Gospels demonstrate an adverse reaction to this type of relationship.5 David Konstan has explored the nature of friendship in early Christianity, particularly in the 4th century. He notes that, “classical friendship, and the ideals of equality and mutual virtue that it suggested, may have appeared incompatible with Christian humility and sense of sin.”6 Spelling out the nature of this incompatibility and the corresponding 4th century Christian view of parrhesia he writes, Christian humility, then, disrupts the classical ideal of friendship based on a consciousness of virtue. Christians writing in this vein present themselves to one another not as friends and equals, but as brothers united in the body of Christ, thanks to their common faith … The frankness of speech or parrhêsia that had been seen as the characteristic virtue of the true friend, as opposed to the flatterer, in Hellenistic accounts becomes applied, in this new context, to the good man’s complete openness before God. Taken together, the professions of humility toward peers and friendship with God exactly reverse the classical paradigm.7 Konstan’s description of the clash between parrhesia and humility directly aligns with the tension between rebuke and humility in monastic sources that I examined in Chapter 6. Moreover, although Konstan is describing the 4th century, perhaps the first hints of this position are already visible in Matthew and Luke. The rejection of parrhesia as a means of speaking the truth about another person and the preference for self-openness before God align with the rejection of rebuke and embrace of a loving response that we observed in the Sermon on the Mount and the Sermon on the Plain (Chapter 2). In examining the role of parrhesia as a key component of Greco-Roman friendship we 4  Within Hellenistic philosophical schools, David Konstan notes that, “the problem is to administer just criticism in a temperate way, avoiding both the excessive harshness that may discourage the moral improvement of the disciple and a lenient indulgence of the aspirant’s lax ways” (Konstan, “Friendship, Frankness and Flattery,” 12). 5  In contrast to Matthew and Luke, however, the Pastoral Epistles and other New Testament texts may offer more of an endorsement of parrhesia (Fitzgerald, Obbink, and Holland, Philodemus and the New Testament World, pt. 3). 6  Konstan, “Friendship, Frankness and Flattery,” 16. 7  Ibid., 101. For his broader discussion on this topic see Ibid., 97–106.

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achieve greater insight into the divergent paths adopted by the DSS and the Gospels with regard to Lev. 19:17. The DSS mirror the assumptions about correction as a crucial element in close interpersonal relationships while the Gospels reject this practice as damaging. As discussed by Philodemus and others, another key element of parrhesia is the challenge of differentiating the friend from the flatterer. Two axes distinguish the friend and flatterer, which are directly relevant for our purposes: truth and intention. A real friend tells the truth no matter how painful and his goal is to improve the other person. A flatterer, on the other hand, offers fictitious praise in order to enhance his own standing.8 These dual characteristics of truth and intention manifest themselves in a slightly different form within the tension between rebuke and gossip that haunted the works of ethical exhortation discussed in Chapter 3. In Ben Sira we observed that gossip was aligned with falsehood and in tGad that the intention of the speaker, as manifest in his choice of audience, differentiated rebuke and slander. While Philodemus’ flatterer might speak to the same person as the friend, in tGad the slanderer speaks to another person rather than the one requiring rebuke. Nevertheless, in both cases the key is intention – the flatterer and the slanderer both seek personal gain in contrast to the friend and proper rebuker who are devoted to the improvement of the other party. In these ways, the axes of truth and intention play out in both the philosophical work of Philodemus and the wisdom-related works of Ben Sira and tGad. Within these works the difference between friend and flatterer, slanderer and rebuker, revolve around the core binaries of truth/fiction and self-focus/other-focus.9 Highlighting these parallels allows us to contextualize and better understand the variety of concerns expressed in the Second Temple period works of ethical exhortation regarding the relationship between rebuke and gossip/slander. If the role of parrhesia in Greco-Roman friendship elucidates the nature of rebuke within Second Temple period sources, Peter Brown’s discussion of the political dimension of parrhesia within late antiquity sheds light on tannaitic aversion to rebuke. Although Brown primarily discusses the 4th century 8  As Clarence Glad concisely describes the first characteristic of the flatterer in Greco-Roman antiquity, “The flatterer has only his personal advantage in view … personal advantage is the flatterer’s most commonly noted feature” (Glad, Paul and Philodemus, 23–24). The words of the flatterer are also false in contrast to the true friend who “speaks but little, but what he says is true” (Ibid., 33). 9  There are of course significant differences between slander and flattery. For the sake of comparison, however, I have highlighted elements of similarity with regard to the issue of intentionality in order to bring them into alignment and to contrast them with the role of truth in friendship.

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onward, his insight into who was empowered to employ parrhesia and why provides a parallel for my argument about the earlier tannaitic view of rebuke as socially and politically dangerous (Part 2). According to Brown, parrhesia for nobles was tied to strong links of friendship: “It could only be exercised by those who felt that they could count on the friendship of the great.”10 Many did not have such secure relationships and were therefore unable to wield this political tool. Yet, philosophers were able to engage in parrhesia. Brown supplies a couple of different rationales for distinguishing philosophers from the other nobles, one of which is directly relevant for us.11 The philosopher could employ parrhesia because “he was uncompromised by political attachments.”12 His disconnection from “ties of patronage and friendship” freed him from concerns over disrupting the relationship with the object of his speech.13 As I suggested with regard to tannaitic sources, the rabbis were highly concerned over the ramifications of rebuke for destabilizing relationships with other people. Similarly, the political ties between non-philosopher nobles prevented their use of parrhesia. We thus observe a broad concern over potentially disruptive speech – parrhesia in the Greco-Roman world and rebuke in the rabbinic. This parallel may provide some indirect support for the hypothesis that tannaitic hesitancy toward rebuke stemmed from social and political factors. In addition to aiding our understanding of the tannaitic rejection of rebuke, Brown’s analysis allows us to better understand why the later rabbis did feel empowered to rebuke – even if they chose to forgo this practice (Chapter 7). Brown traces a shift in those able to employ parrhesia from the philosophers to religious authorities.14 As Christian religious leaders grew in their power and influence they were able to engage in parrhesia. Within the rabbinic sources on rebuke we noted that the discussion shifted from a question of ability to rebuke to the value of reproof. The tannaim, who lacked significant political and social power, declared their inability to rebuke. By contrast, the later Babylonian amoraim, who tackled the question of whether or not they should rebuke, indicated that they felt capable of engaging in this practice if they so desired. The correlation between political and social capital and the ability to engage in parrhesia thus manifests itself in works of both Christian and rabbinic leaders in antiquity. 10  Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity, 61. 11  Brown’s other major distinction between the philosopher and other nobles is that, “Only the philosopher, a man who had overcome anger and fear in himself, could stand in the way of the anger of others” (Brown, 64). 12  Ibid., 62. 13  Ibid. 14  Ibid., chap. 3–4.

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The practice of parrhesia within Greco-Roman sources and early Christianity serves as a useful analogy to rebuke within Jewish sources. The role of parrhesia within friendship elucidates the divergent reactions to rebuke in the DSS and the Gospels. Similarly, the challenge of distinguishing the friend from the flatterer offers a new perspective for considering the elements of truth and intention separating rebuke from slander within Second Temple period works of ethical exhortation. Additionally, Peter Brown’s work on parrhesia provides possible support for the idea that a significant factor behind the shift from tannaitic to amoraic reactions to rebuke can be found in the changes in rabbinic political and social status. Beyond these insights, a brief exploration of Foucault’s study of the problematization of parrhesia can also shed light on the tension between self and other-orientations in monastic and later rabbinic sources described in Part 3. In studying parrhesia and other social phenomena, Foucault’s analysis revolves around the idea of “problematization.” This concept is “concerned with how and why, at specific times and under particular circumstances, certain phenomena are questioned, analyzed, classified, and regulated, while others are not.”15 In a series of six lectures given at the University of California at Berkeley in 1983 Foucault traced the problematization of parrhesia from a political practice to a more philosophical endeavor.16 As a political act, Foucault identified a number of primary questions that challenged this practice: Who is qualified to speak freely? How can a truth-teller be properly recognized? These questions emerge from situating parrhesia in the nexus of rhetoric and education.17 By contrast, the more philosophical (or “Socratic”) mode of parrhesia brings together issues of “logos, truth, and bios (life) in the realm of a personal teaching relationship between two human beings.”18 According to Foucault, this form of parrhesia was more concerned with techne tou biou, or the “art of living,” as part of the greater program of the “care of the self” (epimeleia heautou).19 15  Deacon, “Theory as Practice: Foucault’s Concept of Problematization,” 127. 16  In fact, one of the names given to the collection of these essays is “Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia.” For a summary of Foucault’s project in these lectures, see O’Leary, Foucault: The Art of Ethics, 146–53. Foucault also engages with this dimension of parrhesia in some of his later lectures published as Foucault, On the Government of the Living; Foucault and Gros, The Government of Self and Others; Foucault, The Courage of Truth. 17  For a critique of Foucault’s disconnect between parrhesia and rhetoric, as well as the claim that Foucault’s focus on truth constitutes only “one parrhesiastic occasion,” see Walzer, “Parrēsia, Foucault, and the Classical Rhetorical Tradition.” 18  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 102. On the shift from public to private parrhesia, see Philodemus et al., On Frank Criticism, 3–5. 19  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 92 and 143.

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Socratic parrhesia raises a different set of problems: How does one tell the truth about oneself? How does one constitute oneself as a knower of truth by aligning one’s truth with one’s life?20 Foucault’s main interest and project with respect to parrhesia (and “care of the self” more broadly) revolves around the issue of truth.21 Thus, in a lecture in 1980 Foucault explicitly declared that, “Basically, what I would like to do … is write a history of the force of truth …”22 While his method of identifying the process of problematization is quite useful, Foucault’s narrow interest in the issue of truth ignores the ways in which the other aspects of parrhesia also developed and may have been problematized. Looking at the other major aspects of parrhesia, namely duty, criticism, and danger, we can understand monastic and rabbinic discourse on rebuke as another side to the history of the problematization of parrhesia. In discussing developments in Greco-Roman parrhesia, Foucault writes, I think that these techniques manifest a very interesting and important shift from that truth game which – in the classical Greek conception of parrhesia – was constituted by the fact that someone was courageous enough to tell the truth to other people. From there is [sic] a shift from that kind of parrhesiastic game to another truth game which now consists in being courageous enough to disclose the truth about oneself.23 Persistently tracking the issue of truth, Foucault recognizes a development in the object of parrhesia from speaking to another person to speaking about oneself. Yet, for Foucault, these two directions (inwards and outwards) are coexistent. He summarizes parrhesia as “a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people)” and “as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself).”24 Both the critique of oneself and the critique of others are regular dimensions of Socratic parrhesia. In fact, Foucault imagines parrhesia as a partnered activity, mutually improving both parties: “telling the truth about oneself was an activity involving several people, an activity with other people and even more precisely an activity with one other person, a practice for two.”25 However, what was a mutual act for the self and another according to Foucault becomes a troubling question of self or other in a monastic and rabbinic context. 20  Ibid., 97. 21  This focus is certainly not random; parrhesia has a particularly strong link to truth (Schlier, “Parrhesia,” 872–73). 22  Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 337. 23  Foucault and Pearson, Fearless Speech, 143. 24  Ibid., 19. 25  Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 5.

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In Chapter 6 I argued that 4th and 5th century monastic literature rejects rebuke in favor of self-oriented practices of striving for personal perfection. I linked the question of rebuke versus humility to a broader tension between isolation and communal involvement, which was a major question for many monastic figures, especially those in leadership roles. Mapping this analysis onto the idea of parrhesia, we find that what for the Greeks was a possible synthesis (at least in Foucault’s estimation) becomes a point of division for the monks. In the context of friendship, where both parties strive to forge a relationship, constructive critique can flourish as a mutual project. For those seeking to escape the communal however, the goals of the self and the other stand in opposition. The monastic movement into the desert thus seems to have triggered the problematization of the object of parrhesia (i.e. the self or the other), which was a stable element in Foucault’s evaluation of the Greeks. Rather than revolving around questions of truth, this problematization of parrhesia addresses the dimensions of duty, danger, and criticism, particularly with regard to the question of who should be the object of such action. Is one’s obligation primarily toward fashioning oneself as a humble being, or toward aiding the other? In what ways is it dangerous to critique another person – not with respect to physical ramifications, but with regard to one’s own emotional and spiritual state?26 The new problematization of the duty/danger/criticism side of parrhesia emerges quite clearly in monastic sources with regard to the clash between more eremitic and more public-oriented forms of monasticism. Within rabbinic sources, social isolation does not play the same role as we find within the monastic world. However, like their monastic counterparts, from our vantage point the later rabbis similarly problematized the duty/danger/criticism aspect of parrhesia in terms of the self versus other orientation. As I suggested in Chapter 7, the Babylonian Talmud directly engaged with a clash between the value of focusing on the other and focusing on the self in its discussion of Lev. 19:17 and rebuke. From a broader perspective, we also find this clash between self and other-oriented focuses between the Bavli and Midrash Tanḥuma, which I explored in Chapter 8. The main sugya on rebuke in the Babylonian Talmud rejected rebuke in favor of a self-oriented focus while Midrash Tanḥuma endorsed chastising others even while imperfect oneself. Rather than an issue of truth, the real problem at stake for monastic and later rabbinic sources is the tension between the roles of the self and the other within interpersonal 26  Along these lines, G. J. M. Bartelink describes how parrhesia can be a danger to an ascetic lifestyle by referencing the work of Abba Agathon, Isaac of Nineve, and Gregory of Nyssa (Bartelink, “Quelques observations sur parrēsia dans la littérature paléo-chrétienne,” 47, also 44).

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relationships. The monastic and later rabbinic discourse surrounding rebuke can thus be understood as another dimension of the problematization of parrhesia, a side of this phenomenon obscured by Foucault’s exclusive focus on truth.27 The Greco-Roman practice of parrhesia serves as a useful heuristic parallel for conceptually linking successive stages in the development of Jewish and Christian reactions to rebuke and Lev. 19:17. While the discrete social and political factors discussed in preceding chapters shed light on particular moments within the history of rebuke, aligning the trajectory of parrhesia with that of reproof allows us to form a more interconnected picture. Despite the various differences between these two practices, the heuristic use of parrhesia as an analogous phenomenon enhances our understanding of rebuke within a wider Greco-Roman context. Moreover, debates over the value of rebuke in late rabbinic and some monastic sources problematize a stable element in Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia, and thus conceptually serve as a different type of problematization of parrhesia. Thus, while parrhesia sheds light on rebuke, the latter can also aid our understanding of the former as well. The practices of parrhesia and rebuke speak to an ethical question of enduring relevance – what is the nature of interpersonal responsibility for the sins of others? No less so today than in antiquity people are faced with daily opportunities to contribute to the welfare of others by helping them recognize their mistakes. But confronting others takes courage and entails significant risk. Reproof can jeopardize relationships more easily than it can solidify the bonds of friendship. Yet, at least for philosophers of antiquity such as Philo, Philodemus, and Plutarch, speaking such a truth to another was an inextricable part of friendship.28 Whether out of a feeling of obligation toward another or a desire to flaunt one’s moral superiority, many people consider engaging in the practice of reproof. But making the decision to chastise another, no less than the action itself, is a demanding endeavor. Although every particular situation is different and every opportunity to rebuke unique, the variety of early Jewish and Christian sources that contemplate Lev. 19:17 grant us insight into the nature of this difficult and dangerous duty. 27  A related point regarding Foucault’s focus on truth as obscuring other important factors is noted by David Konstan in his review of Foucault’s On the Government of the Living: “I have grave doubts about the value of the framework about truth and power, to which Foucault is committed” as Foucault’s real contribution is in demonstrating “the emergence of a new idea and practice of penitence within the Church” (Konstan, “Review: Foucault’s On the Government of the Living,” 267). 28  See Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism and Plutarch’s discussion of “How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend” (Philodemus et al., On Frank Criticism; Plutarch and Babbitt, Plutarch’s Moralia, 264–395).

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Index of Ancient Sources Hebrew Bible Genesis 5:1 58 7:8 182n13 17:1 182n13 21 136 21:25 129 21:27 129 21:32 136 26 131n44, 136 26:27 129 26:31 129, 136 27 131n44 37:17 4 49 131 49:1 128 49:3 128 Exodus 19:6 227 20:16–17 9 20:18–19 227 21:1 223 21:24 60, 223–224 23:1–3, 6–9 9 Leviticus 5:1 79 19 6–7 19:1–2 223n36 19:11–18 8, 10, 15–16 19:14 13n43 19:15 9, 15–16, 42 19:15–18 19, 33n10, 42, 74, 77, 80n70 19:16 8–9, 21, 23, 65, 69, 74, 80n71, 85–87, 192 19:16–18 84 19:17 1–20, 23–25, 29–49, 55–66, 69, 72–74, 77–80, 82–87, 91, 94–103, 105, 109–115, 124, 133–135, 138, 171–173, 176–179, 183–185, 187–192, 204–206, 210–220, 223, 226, 230–231, 234–236 19:18 7–15, 19, 23, 31–33, 35–39, 45–49, 55–64, 74, 82–84, 86, 107, 109n56

19:23 223n36 19:33 42 19:33–36 9 25:35–38 224n38 Numbers 12:3 185n21 20 226 20:10–12 226 Deuteronomy 1:1 116–128, 137n56, 227 1:3 128–129, 137n56 1:5 118 1:17 224 10:12 216 17:18 117n8 19:15 37n30 28 119n12 28:15 119n12 32 119 32:10–14 119 32:15 117, 119 34:3 114 Joshua 24:15 129 24:21–22 129 1 Samuel 12:3–5 129 12:7 191 17:34–35 83n83 20 212 20:28–29 188n30 20:30 189, 190n37 20:33 189, 190n37 1 Kings 2:1–2 129 2:3 138n57 10:15 9n31 Isaiah 2:4 65n2 3:14 218 61:1 185n21 11:3–4 65n2 26:16 65n2 28:26 65n2 29:22 102n43

266 Jeremiah 2:30 65n2 26:1 199–200 30:11, 14 65n2 46:28 65n2 Ezekiel 9 218–219 9:6 222 17:4 9n31 21:8 209n16, 219 27:13 9n31 Hosea 7:12 65n2 Micah 4:3 65n2 Nahum 1:2 32, 49 Psalms 6:2 65n2 24:6 199 38:2 65n2 39:12 65n2 50:8 65n2 50:21 65n2 94:10 65n2 94:12 65n2 101:6 219 118:18 65n2 141:5 65n2 Proverbs 1:3 71n26 1:7 67n16 1:8 67n15 1:20–23 67n16 1:23 67n15 1:24 68n20 1:30 68n20 3:11 67n15 3:12 68n20, 70n26 4:1 67n15 4:13 67n15 5:13 71n26 6:23 67n14, n15 8:33 67n15 9:7–8 67 9:8 107, 111n60, 125–126, 176, 227

Index of Ancient Sources

Job

10:8 67n15 10:10 71n26 10:17 67n15, 71n26 10:17–18 81, 83 10:17–19 69–70, 85 12:1 67n16 13:1 67n16, 71n26 13:8 67n16, 68n18 13:12 71n26 13:18 67n15 13:24 68n19 15:5 67n16, 70n26 15:10 67n16, 70n26 15:12 67n16, 70n26 15:31 226 15:31–32 67n15 15:33 68n20 16:22 66 18:17 71n26 19:18 68n19 19:20 67n15 19:25 68 19:27 68n19 22:15 68n19 22:23 67n13 23:12 67n15 23:13 68n19 23:23 67n15 24:25 219–220 25:1 71n26 25:10 71n26 25:12 67n16, 71n26 26:24–25 69n23 27:5 67n15, 110n60 27:6 228 28:23 219–220 29:1 68n21, 123n21 29:15 67n15 29:17 68n19 29:19 68n18

5:17 66n10 6:24–26 65n2 13:6 65n2 19:5 65n2 Nehemiah 3:31 9n31

267

Index of Ancient Sources Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha Ben Sira 5:15 71n28 6:18 71n30 6:22 71n27 6:32 71n27 7:23 71n30 8:5 71n27 18:14 71n30 18:18 71n27 19:4–17 79n65 19:5–12 74, 80 19:5–20:8 81n75 19:7 79n66, 80 19:8 79–80 19:9 74, 80 19:13 80 19:13–14 73, 76 19:13–17 72–81, 83 19:14 80 19:15 78, 80 19:16 78n62 20:1 72, 79 20:1–8 79n65, 79n67 20:2 71 20:15 71n27 21:6 71 22:20 71n27 30:1–2 71n30  31:19 71n27 31:31 72 32:14 71n30 37:23 71n27 42:8 72 51:26 71n30 Testament of Gad 1 84, 85n91 1:9 82 2:1 83 3:2 84n85 3:3 83n82 4 84, 85n91 4:3 84 5 84n88 6 84

Wisdom of Solomon 1:3 65n2 12:2 65n2 Dead Sea Scrolls Damascus Document (CD) 6:20–21 51 6:20–7:3 30–32, 34–36, 43 7:3 32 9:2–8 30, 32–36, 38, 43, 47 9:5 49 9:6 31 9:8 34n15 Pesher Habakkuk (1QpHab) 5:10 30n2 Community Rule (1QS) 1:3–4 48 1:9–11 48–49 1:10–11 53 1:11 49 5:24–6:1 30, 34–36, 47 6:1 35, 47n5 7:15–17 8n28 9:16–18 46, 48 Hodayot (1QH) 17:8–9 30n2 17:11 30n2 22–24 30n2 List of Rebukes made by the Community (4Q477) 34n13, 45, 50–54 Early Christian Literature Mark 12:31 7n22 Matthew 5 87, 203n64, 236 5:23–24 55 5:38–44 59–61 5:38–46 55 5:43 61 5:43–47 55 7:1–5 36, 41–43, 55n32, 62–63 7:3 157 18:15–17 36–41, 43–44, 55n31, 62, 170

268 Luke 6 87, 203n64, 236 6:27 59 6:30 59 6:27–35 58–59, 61 6:27–42 55 6:37–42 63–64 17:1–4 36, 39–41, 43, 55n32 17:3 43 Romans 13 173n113 14:1–10 172 14:14 173n113 14:19 173n113 Didache 1.3b–2:1 55n33 Rabbinic Literature Mishna Shabbat 18:1 100n37 Rosh Hashana 2 106–7 Ketubot 3:7 101n42 Sotah 9:15 101n42, 101n43 Bava Qamma 8:1 101n42 8:6 99, 100n35 Bava Meẓia 8:1 102n44 Sanhedrin 7:1 99n31 7:4 99n31 11:1 99n31 Avot 3:11 101n43 Arakhin 3:4 101n42 3:5 192 Tosefta Bava Qamma 9:12 101n42

Index of Ancient Sources Avodah Zarah 5:7 99n31 Zevaḥim 1:8 104n45 Tannaitic Midrashim Mekhilta de–Rabbi Ishamel Pisḥa 1 93 Shabta 1 93 Horowitz ed. 261 99n32 325–26 101n40 Lauterbach ed. 1:179–81 118n10 Sifra Shemini 1 114 Shemini 2:7 115 Qedoshim 4 7n22, 55–58, 61–62, 94–114, 124–125, 179–180, 194–195, 210–211, 213–215 Weiss ed. 89a 99n32 Sifre Bemidbar Pisqa 99 115 Horovitz ed. 129 104n45 Kahana ed. 1:246 116n2 Sifre Zuta 12 101n43 Sifre Devarim Pisqa 1 116–128, 137–139, 194–195 Pisqa 2 118n10, 128–139 Pisqa 3 127 Pisqa 16 125 Pisqa 41 132n45 Pisqa 54 130n41 Finkelstein ed. 11 137n56 32 116n3 20 121n17 53 130n39 85 132n45 122 130n41 226 115n1 231 101n42 267 115n1

269

Index of Ancient Sources Midrash Tannaim (Hoffman ed.) 4 118n11, 127, 137n56 24 130n39 46 130n41 118 101n42 168 101n42 210 101n42 Amoraic and Late Midrashim Genesis Rabbah (Theodor-Albeck ed.) 429 116n2 646 110n58 Exodus Rabbah 27:6 225n39 42:6 110n58 51:8 225n39 Leviticus Rabbah (Margalioth ed.) 265 99n32 271 116n2 Numbers Rabbah 15:12 225n39 15:21 225n39 23:6 110n58 Deuteronomy Rabbah Printed ed. 1:1 220n31 1:2 225n39 1:8 225 1:9 227 7:3 226 Lieberman ed. 3 227 9 227 12–13 220n31, 227 Esther Rabbah 4 99n32 Pesiqta de–Rav Kahana 13:7 116n2 Pesiqta Rabbati 4 225n39 7 224n39 10 223n35 Tanḥuma Printed ed. Genesis 9 110n58 Mishpatim 7 206–224 Qoraḥ 12 216 Masaei 4 110n58

Buber ed. 2:35 110n58 2:163 110n58 Midrash Leqaḥ Tov Exodus 5:22 110n58 Midrash Sekhel Tov Exodus 16 102n43 Yalkut Mekhiri Tehillim 106:18 116n2 Yalkut Shimoni Yehoshua 34 133n48 Palestinian Talmud Peah 1:1 192 Shabbat 8d 99n32 Babylonian Talmud Berakhot 31b 181n10, 182n15 33b 182n14 43b 182n14 Shabbat 54b–55a 209, 218–219, 221–222 55a 176 64b 182n14 Pesaḥim 3a 181–182 56a 182n14 Megillah 16b 99n32 25a 182n14 Yevamot 65b 176 Ketubot 46a 192 Nedarim 32a 181–182 Qiddushin 41a 181n12 Bava Meẓia 31a 177, 209, 217 58b 102n43 Bava Batra 15b 183n17 123a 182n14

270 Sanhedrin 58b 99n32 92b 99n32 93b–94a 182n14 99a 102n43 Avodah Zarah 4a 209 20b 184n20–185n21 Menaḥot 35a 182n14 Arakhin 15a 191 16b 104n46 16b–17a 177–204, 208–215 Tamid 27b–28a 219–220 28a 209, 222 Niddah 17a 181n12 25b 99n32 30b 99n32 Geonic Works Halakhot Gedolot 50 235n89 Greek Literature Plutarch Moralia (Babbitt ed.) 264–395 22, 244n28 Monastic Literature Evagrius (Sinkewicz ed.) 32 148n14 43–44 148n14 51 148n14 Abba Isaiah of Scetis (Chryssavgis and Penkett ed.) 41 148n14 53 148n14 69 148n14 91–92 148n14 123 148n14

Index of Ancient Sources Book of Paradise (Syriac; Budge ed., v. 2) 432–31 169 432–448 162n73 442 162n79 443 161 446 162 461–60 169 486 162 508 159, 156n51 515 169 519 170 525 162n77 563 156n49 581 171 630 170 632 158 639 168 647 156n49 663 157 665 161 668 162n77, 162n79 677 156n49 678–79 159 703 163 705 163 715 157n52 725 156n49 Sayings of the Fathers (Greek) Patrologia Graeca 65 192 174 269 164 284 153 328 170 332 162 333 162 352 150, 156n51, 157 353 164 360 157 405 173n111 Wortley ed. (Anonymous Sayings) 96 168 152 167n93 202 166 210 166 220 156n49, 167n94 272 167n93

271

Index of Ancient Sources 276 167n93 290 161 292 167n94 296–98 165 306 172 312 167n93 342 156n49 364 167 398 166 416 166 472 167n93 488 156n49

498 170 542 166 564 166–67 Islamic Literature Quran 3:114 231 5:79 231, 233n77 5:105 234 7:157 230 7:163–66 231

Index of Modern Scholars Adams, Jay 37 Akiyama, Kengo 7 Albeck, Chanoch 99, 110, 116, 187 Albright, William F. 55 Alcalay, Reuben 110 Alexander Philip S. 29, 52 Allen, Willoughby 37, 55, Allison, Dale C. 183 Alter, Robert 4 Altham, J. E. 2 Aminof, Irit 132 Amit, Aaron 146 Arnold, Bill T. 12 Artman-Partock, Tali 20–22 Assis, Elie 112 Aumann, Jordan 151–152 Babbitt, Frank Cole 22, 244 Bacher, Wilhelm 106 Bakhos, Carol 132, 230 Baldick, Chris 4–5 Balla, Ibolya 72 Bar–Asher Seigal, Michal 146, 148, 171, 232 Bartelink, G. J. M. 22, 243 Basser, Herbert W. 93, 104, 123, 133–134 Baumgarten, Joseph M. 29 Beentjes, Pancratius C. 70–71, 79 Belser, Julia Watts 21 Ben-Ḥayyim, Ze’ev 70 Bernsen, Charles 187 Betz, Hans Dieter 60 Blankovski, Yuval 185, 198 Bolle, Menachem 17–18 Bovon, Fançois 40 Boyarin, Daniel 93 Bregman, Marc 205–206, 208–209, 230 Brock, Sebastian P. 148–149 Brockelmann, Carl 75–76 Brody, Robert 208, 232 Brown, Peter 22, 151, 154, 239–240 Brownlee, William Hugh 38 Buber, Salomon 110, 205–206, 208–209, 223 Burton-Christie, Douglas 147–148, 153–154, 160, 162 Byrne, Brendan 172

Callaham, Scott N. 16 Carmody, Timothy R. 33, 38–39 Catchpole, David 38–39, 55 Chandler, Christopher 9, 37, 41–42, 74, 77, 80, 83–85 Charlesworth, James H. 29 Chernus, Ira 216 Chryssavgis, John 148, 156 Clark, Elizabeth A. 151 Coggins, R. J. 70, 75 Cohen, Norman J. 211, 223 Cohen, Shaye 92 Cohen, Stuart 140 Collins, John J. 65, 70, 82 Cook, Michael 21, 230–234 Crane, Jonathan K. 102 Cranfield, C. E. B. 172 Cross, Frank Moore 8 Dahood, M. 109 Danby, Herbert 99–100 Davies, William David 183 Davila, James R. 82 Deacon, Roger 241 De Jonge, M. 82, 84 Derrett, J. Duncan M. 41, 43, 55, 60, 151, 183 Dietz, Maribel 153 Di Lella, Alexander A. 70–72, 78–79, 81 Dimant, Devorah 31, 33 Doering, Lutz 145 Doeve, J. W. 41, 60 Dowd, Sharyn 36–37, 55 Draguet, René 149 Duling, Dennis C. 37–38, 40, 60, 78 Dunn, Peter Wallace 37–39, 53 Eissfeldt, Otto 75 Elbaum, Jacob 206–207 Empson, William 4–5 Epstein, Jacob Nahum 57, 95, 100 Eshel, Esther 29, 52–53 Finkelstein, Louis 101, 104–106, 115–118, 120–121, 125, 129–130, 132–133, 135, 137 Fitzgerald, John Thomas 238

273

Index of Modern Scholars Fitzmyer, Joseph A. 39–40 Forkman, Göran 37–41, 55 Foucault, Michel 20–22, 24, 237, 241–244 Foulcher, Jane 160–161, 202 Fox, Michael V. 66–69, 123 Fraade, Steven D. 92–93, 137 Fraenkel, Jonah 111–112 Friedman, Shamma 130, 208 García Martínez, F. 37–40 Garrow, A. J. P. 59 Gero, Stephen 146 Gilbert, Maurice 70 Ginzberg, Louis 121, 131–132 Glad, Clarence E. 21, 237, 239 Goehring, James E. 152 Goldberg, Abraham 130 Goldstone, Matthew 55, 57–58, 67, 97–98, 135 Goodman, Martin 140 Gottlieb, Isaac Boaz 116 Gould, Graham 147, 152–153, 161 Greenspoon, Leonard J. 70 Gregory, Bradley 71–72, 78 Gros, Frédéric 241 Hagner, Donald Alfred 37, 42–43 Halivni, David Weiss 207–208 Hammer, Reuven 92–93, 104–105, 116–118, 123, 127, 130 Hanhart, Robert 75 Harmless, William 152–153 Harrington, Hannah K. 5, 7 Hayes, Christine Elizabeth 114, Hempel, Charlotte 52 Henshke, David 188 Herr, Moshe David 132 Hezser, Catherine 139–140, 146 Hidary, Richard 107, 140 Hieke, Thomas 12–13 Hoffman, David 99, 101, 118, 127, 130, 137 Hollander, Harm W. 82, 84 Holmberg, Bo 149 Horovitz, H. S. 99, 101, 104, 107 Horsley, Richard A. 60 Hultin, Jeremy Foreman 81 Hurovitz, Victor A. 69

Jaffee, Martin S. 92 Jassen, Alex P. 49 Jebb, John 112 Jewett, Robert 172–173 Kahana, Menahem 56, 116–118, 223 Kalisch, Marcus Moritz 6 Kalmin, Richard Lee 140 Kampen, John 36 Kena’ani, Ya’akov 110 Kensky, Allen David 205–207, 209, 223 Kensky, Meira Z. 219 Kieweler, Hans Volker 79 Kister, Menahem 29, 37–38, 52, 77 Ḳlaʼus, Natan 93, 112–113 Kloppenborg, John S. 55 Koleditzky, Shachne 104, 123, 134–135 Konstan, David 20, 22, 237–238, 244 Kraemer, David 140 Kugel, James L. 5, 12, 14–15, 17, 33–35, 37–38, 49, 55, 61, 69, 72–74, 77, 82–85, 94, 101, 109 Lagarde, Paul de 75, 80 Lamm, Norman 198 Laney, Carl J. 37 Langer, Gerhard 132 Lapin, Hayim 106, 139–140 Lauterbach, Jacob Zallel 118 Levine, Baruch A. 9 Levine, Lee I. 139 Lewis, Charlton Thomas 75 Lewis, Shmuel (Richard) 186–187, 197–198, 202 Lieberman, Saul 220, 225, 227 Lightstone, Jack N. 92 Longman, Tremper 69 Lund, Nils 109, 111, 113 Luz, Ulrich 36, 41–42 Macintosh, A. A. 67 Macnamara, Coleen 2–3 Magonet, Jonathan 8, 11–12 Maher, Michael 116 Malamat, Abraham 12 Mann, C. S. 55 Marböck, Johannes 79 Margalioth, Mordecai 99, 116

274 McGuire, Brian Patrick 152 Melamed, E. Z. 57, 95, 100 Mermelstein, Ari 45, 47, 47–49, 51 Metso, Sarianna 52 Mignard, James Edwin 36 Milgrom, Jacob 6, 8–11, 16–18 Milikowsky, Chaim 223 Miller, Stuart S. 139 Milligan, George 76 Mirsky, Samuel K. 205–206 Momigliano, Arnaldo 22 Moss, Joshua L. 124 Moulton, James Hope 76 Murphy, Roland E. 69 Nelson, Milward Douglas 75 Neufeld, Dietmar 2 Neusner, Jacob 92, 95 Neuwirth, Oriel 198 Newsom, Carol 16 Nitzan, Bilhah 29, 31 Novick, Tzvi 100–101, 111, 117, 128 O’Leary, Timothy 242 Pearson, Joseph 20–22, 241–242 Penkett, Pachomios 148 Pfann, Stephen J. 52 Phillips, Elaine A. 93 Polonsky, Pinchas 198 Pope, Marvin H. 66 Porter, J. R. 6, 9, 15 Rabin, I. A. 99, 101, 107 Rabinovitz, Alexander 106 Rahlfs, Alfred 75 Rapp, Claudia 152, 155–156 Reed, Stephen 52 Regev, Eyal 30, 50, 54 Reif, S. C. 67 Robertson, A. T. 76 Roller, Matthew B. 117 Rosenblatt, Samuel 101 Rosenfeld, Ben Zion 140 Rothstein, David 31, 35 Rousseau, Philip 149, 151–155, 160, 162 Rubenson, Samuel 147, 149, 151, 165

Index of Modern Scholars Rubenstein, Jeffrey L. 130, 201, 223 Russell, Norman 154 Sagiv, Yonatan 57, 95 Saldarini, Anthony J. 130 Sanday, W. 172 Sanders, Jack T. 80–81 Sandmel, Samuel 145 Sarfatti, Gad 116 Satlow, Michael L. 146 Schechter, S. 70, 130 Schenk-Ziegler, Alois 36 Schiffman, Lawrence H. 15, 31–35, 46, 53–54 Schnabel, Eckhard J. 77, 79 Schreiner, Josef 72 Schwartz, Baruch 8, 10–13, 15–16, 18–19 Schwartz, Seth 140 Scott, R. B. Y. 69 Secunda, Shai 146 Segal, Moseh 70–71, 72, 74–75, 79 Sharvit, Shim‘on 102, 107 Shemesh, Aharon 17, 31, 97, 106, 125 Short, Charles 75 Simon-Shoshan, Moshe 91, 96, 107, 126 Singer, Simeon 70 Skehan, Patrick W. 70, 72, 78–79 Smend, Rudolf 72, 74, 76 Smith, Jonathan Z. 146 Smith, Morton 55 Smith, Robert Payne 164, 170 Sokoloff, Michael 75–76, 181 Stemberger, Günter 57, 95, 117, 205, 225 Stewart, David Tabb 6 Strack, Hermann Leberecht 57, 117, 205, 225 Strecker, Ivo A. 113 Swan, Laura 147 Talmon, Shemaryahu 8 Ta–Shma, Israel M. 206 Taylor, Charles 70 Theodor, J. 110, 116 Thompson, Stith 130 Thompson, William G. 55 Thomson, Ian H. 108–109, 112, 126 Tigay, Jeffrey H. 117, 119 Tucker, Ethan Moses 91

275

Index of Modern Scholars Ulrich, Eugene 7 Vattioni, Francesco 75, 80 Vermes, Geza 29 Vööbus, Arthur 151, 153 Waddell, Glenn G. 37 Walfish, Avraham 91 Walzer, Arthur E. 241 Wang, Emily 160 Ward, Benedicta 147, 150, 153, 156–159, 162, 164, 166, 170, 173–74 Warning, Wilfried 19 Watson, Gary 2 Weinfeld, Moshe 33, 35 Weinstein, Mordechai 102 Weiss, Dov 21, 65, 201, 205–208, 228–230 Weiss, Isaac Hirsch 95, 99

Welch, John W. 93, 108–109 Wengst, Klaus 160 Wenham, Gordon J. 15 Wevers, John William 13, 15, 37 Wink, Walter 56 Winter, Michael M. 75 Wipszycka, Ewa 155 Wortley, John 147, 150, 153, 156–157, 159, 161–162, 164–168, 170, 172–174 Wright III, Benjamin G. 73–74, 77 Yadin, Yigael 72 Yadin-Israel, Azzan 91, 97 Youngquist, Linden Eric 55 Zellentin, Holger M. 146 Ziegler, Joseph 76, 79

Subject Index Abba, Rabbi 176 Abimelech 129–131, 136, 137 Abraham 129–131, 136–138, 181, 182, 190, 216 agape 153 Akiva, Rabbi 7, 56–58, 100, 101, 103–111, 113, 124–127, 131, 180, 193–197, 199, 214 ambiguity 2, 4–8, 14–19, 23, 25, 79, 81, 94–97, 104, 123, 124, 196, 203–205, 227 amei ha’areẓ 139–140, 182 Amos 116, 118 anchoritism 152–155, 160, 162, 165, 169, 243 angels 166, 222 anger 3–4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 32–35, 47, 49, 68, 71, 82–84, 96–98, 103, 105, 109, 111, 127, 131, 132, 158, 162–164, 171, 173, 188–190, 198, 200, 201, 240 animals 83, 181, 182 bear 83 cow 119, 122 lion 83 ox 83 sheep 39, 82, 83 antitheses, Matthean 59–61, 150 asceticism 147, 148, 151, 152, 154, 155, 160, 165, 166, 202, 243 authority 39, 57, 85, 106, 107, 140, 151, 152, 155, 163, 179, 216, 217, 233, 240 axe 57, 59 Babylonia 205, 206, 209, 232 beam (see: log) Ben Azzai 58, 188 Betimius, Abba 171 blame 2, 75, 166 blessing 45, 58, 62, 119, 130, 131, 219, 222, 227 blindness 13, 63 body 181, 238 carnal 152, 153 cheek 45, 58, 60, 62 countenance 56, 95, 98, 101, 102, 109, 113, 180, 211, 213 ear 82, 226 eye 41–43, 60, 63, 82, 149, 150, 157, 180, 182, 183, 190, 193, 194, 214, 219, 221, 234 face 99, 101, 102, 104, 158, 186

hand 99, 169, 186, 187, 199 head 99 heart 1, 7, 8, 10–13, 34, 47, 56, 59, 76, 84, 94–97, 109, 134, 135, 162, 166–168, 179, 181, 189, 210, 213, 236 mouth 83, 99, 140, 228, 229 neck 34, 35, 40, 47, 68 boundaries 23, 39, 45, 46, 49, 50, 54, 62, 64, 85–87, 93, 136, 191, 237 brother 12, 15, 16, 30, 31, 37, 41, 43, 44, 50, 51, 55, 62, 83, 84, 94, 129, 131, 132, 148–150, 153, 156–159, 161–164, 167, 168, 170–172, 174, 217, 238 bystander 218 Byzantine period 205, 229 celibacy 151 cell, monastic 152–154, 156 chiasmus 10, 93, 108, 109, 111–114, 126 child 59, 68, 71, 83, 131, 136, 186, 187, 199 Children of Darkness 48–50 Chrysostom, John 22 coenobitism 154, 161 conflict 23, 25, 35, 54, 78, 112, 114, 137, 161, 165, 176, 179, 191, 193, 201, 236 Coptic (Language) 147 curse 3, 45, 56–59, 62, 95–97, 99, 100, 103, 109, 113, 119, 179, 181, 183, 188–190, 210, 213 daughter 127 David, King 83, 93, 116, 118, 129, 130, 138, 188, 189 death 20, 84, 99, 114, 118, 128, 130–136, 138, 139 demon 149, 150 desert fathers 145, 147–149, 153, 155, 156, 159, 161, 166, 174, 175, 202, 203 deviance 45, 49–51, 53, 54, 86 devil (see: demon) disciple 40, 63, 139, 140, 147, 154, 155, 174, 177, 205, 213, 215, 217, 221, 224–227, 233, 238 discipline 63, 66–69, 71, 72, 155, 226, 227 lashes 103, 106, 107, 109, 125, 180, 199, 214

277

Subject Index eating 82, 83, 169, 172 Egypt 145, 148, 154 Egyptian Monasticism 147, 148, 151, 152, 155, 174, 232 Elazar, Rabbi 192 Elazar ben Azariyah, Rabbi 103, 104, 109, 124, 180, 193–196, 214 Elazar ben Shimon, Rabbi 176 Eliezer, Rabbi 188, 190, 216, 219 embarrassment 16, 18, 56, 98, 101–105, 111, 112, 131, 133, 134, 186–188, 191, 199, 201, 215, 218 emotion 3, 11–13, 33, 35, 47–49, 51, 54, 96, 103, 109–113, 122, 163, 164, 243 enemy 23, 32, 45, 46, 49, 55, 58–64, 79, 80, 87, 172, 173, 233 eremitic (see: anchoritism) Esau 129, 131, 132 Evagrius 148 evil 48, 54, 60, 75, 76, 78, 84, 158, 159, 161, 178, 179, 185, 187, 191, 219, 220 evil speech 178, 179, 185, 187, 188, 191, 192 Exilarch 176, 218 family 1, 31, 139, 151, 221 father 82, 83, 147, 154, 156, 163, 170, 174, 184, 187 fear 13, 68, 128, 131, 132, 138, 139, 155, 167, 168, 181, 182, 215, 224–226, 234, 240 flattery 20, 22, 220, 239, 241 forgiveness 40, 63, 161, 166 friendship 18, 21–23, 46, 60, 62, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78–80, 87, 171, 237–241, 243, 244 Gamliel, Rabban 103, 106, 107, 109, 114, 140, 180, 214 Gentile 22, 37, 55, 170 God 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, 21, 32, 48, 49, 53, 65, 68, 119, 120, 138, 159, 160, 163–168, 171, 172, 182, 200–204, 219, 222, 224–232, 234, 238 gossip 2, 8–10, 17, 21, 23, 65, 66, 69, 70, 74, 76–87, 187, 192, 236, 239, 241 Greco-Roman world 21, 22, 239, 240 Greek (Language) 3, 15, 21, 22, 40, 65, 70–72, 74–79, 83, 117, 125, 147, 149, 150, 152, 156, 157, 161, 167, 172, 202, 206, 242

Ḥanina, Rabbi 218 hatred 1, 7, 8, 10–15, 17, 19, 30, 32–35, 37, 38, 47–51, 53, 55, 56, 58–62, 64, 69, 71, 73, 74, 80, 82–85, 94–98, 109–114, 125, 134, 139, 163, 176, 179–181, 210, 213, 214, 227, 236 heaven 103, 109, 180, 214, 219, 220, 222 Hebrew (Language) 3, 4, 9, 14, 15, 18, 29, 33, 36, 40, 56, 65–67, 70, 71, 73–75, 77, 78, 86, 87, 95, 99, 116, 176, 206, 226 hesychia 153, 160 Ḥisda, Rav 181 Ḥiyya 186, 187, 199, 227 humiliation 18, 32, 56, 67, 71, 81, 98, 100–103, 105, 112, 113, 134, 139, 150, 170, 187, 188, 189, 191 humility 24, 34, 35, 47, 155, 159–163, 165–168, 173–175, 178, 184–188, 191, 192, 197–199, 201–203, 208, 216, 220, 233, 236, 238, 243 Huna, Rav 186, 187, 191, 199 husband 4 Ila’ah, Rabbi 176 impurity 30–32, 34, 50, 181, 182, 193 Isaac 129–131, 136–138, 190, 216 Isaiah, Abba 148 Jacob 85, 118, 128–133, 137–139, 190, 199, 216, 225 Jehoiakim, King 199, 200 Jesus 40–43, 55, 60, 72, 75, 76, 79, 151, 153, 160, 170, 183, 202, 238 Joseph 4, 82–84 killing 83, 84 Kūfa 231, 232 lashon hara (see: evil - evil speech) Latin (Language) 75, 206, 231 lending 56–60, 224 log 41–43, 63, 64, 157, 180, 183, 184, 190, 193, 194, 214, 221, 234 Macarius, Abba 164, 170 meals 50, 153 memory 51–53, 108, 168 monasticism 146–148, 151, 152, 154, 155, 160, 202, 232, 243

278 Moses 93, 114–130, 132, 137–140, 175, 185, 225–228 Moses, Abba 153 Naḥman bar Yiẓḥak 188 narrativity 96, 98 neighbor 7, 32, 41, 43–45, 55, 60, 61, 63, 72–74, 76, 78–80, 84, 107, 139, 140, 152, 153, 157, 162, 164, 169, 171 oaths 32, 104 offender 2, 3, 10, 13, 16–18, 24, 31, 34, 37–40, 43–45, 50, 51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 62, 68, 71, 72, 76, 78, 80, 85, 86, 98, 100, 102, 105, 110, 122, 131, 135, 136, 156–158, 161, 166, 169–171, 183, 184, 189–191, 218 Pahlavi 146 Palladius 147, 148 Pambo, Abba 162 Papa, Rav 218 parent 99 parrhesia 20–22, 24, 229, 237–244 Paul 151, 172, 173 Persian Empire 146, 148 piety 165, 169, 184, 185 Plutarch 22, 244 Poemen, Abba 150, 156–158, 161, 162, 164, 169–171 praise 22, 154, 157, 162, 172, 182, 227, 239 prayer 58, 60, 62, 165–167, 171 prophet 65, 116–118, 121, 129, 137, 182, 185, 225 Pumbedita 232 punishment 2, 8, 13, 18, 31, 32, 39, 50, 51, 54, 66, 68, 84, 99, 106, 164, 210, 219, 222, 223, 225, 226, 231–233 purity 35, 50, 51 qapdanut 198, 201, 202 Quran 230, 231, 234 Rav 181, 184, 186–188, 199 Rava 177, 188, 217 refuge 131, 151, 153 repentance 37, 39–41, 43, 105, 161, 162, 166, 167, 170, 190 Roman Empire 22, 131, 132

Subject Index Saul, King 83, 188–190 self-emptying 160, 162, 202 self-improvement 155, 174, 178, 193, 202 self-perfection 64, 152–154, 156, 159, 160, 163–166, 168, 173–175, 202, 221, 236 self-rebuke 166–168, 174 Septuagint 9, 13, 15, 37, 40, 70, 71, 75, 80, 101 sexuality 4, 150, 151, 181 Shimon ben Pazi, Rabbi 184 Shmuel 186–188, 199 Shmuel bar Naḥmani 219 sickle 57, 59 silence 17, 31–33, 72, 78, 79, 81, 153, 155, 158, 162, 165, 168, 173, 186 Simon, Rabbi 176, 225, 226 sin 1, 4, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17–20, 23, 24, 30–32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, 52–54, 56, 73, 76–80, 82–84, 91, 94, 98–105, 113–115, 134, 135, 149, 156, 157, 159, 163, 164, 166–173, 182–187, 190, 198, 215, 218, 219, 221–224, 232–234, 236, 238, 244 sinner (see: offender) slander (see: gossip) slapping 56–60, 62, 95–97, 99–101, 103, 109, 113, 179, 181, 183, 189, 190, 210, 213 slave 4, 68 son 32, 71, 121, 127–131, 133, 136, 138, 139, 166, 184, 188, 189, 197, 199 speck 41, 43, 63, 64, 157, 180, 183, 190, 193, 194, 214 student (see: disciple) Sura 232 Syriac (Language) 3, 72, 74–78, 80, 148–151, 156, 158, 170, 202, 229, 231, 232 Tarfon, Rabbi 103–105, 109, 124–127, 180, 193–195, 214 targumim 116 Pseudo-Jonathan, Targum 18, 56, 116, 119 Theodore, Abba 169, 174 vengeance 10–14, 18, 20, 31–33, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 61, 64, 83, 84, 109, 120, 121, 191 violence 2, 24, 50, 56, 101, 123, 179, 190, 201

279

Subject Index weakness 105, 172, 173 wife 4, 131, 181 woman 114, 149, 150, 159, 181, 182, 189 Yehoshua, Rabbi 188 Yehoshua ben Levi, Rabbi 182, 184, 185, 227 Yehoshua ben Qorḥa 224 Yehuda, Rav 181, 184 Yehuda ben Shimon, Rabbi 184, 197 Yehuda haNasi, Rabbi 219

Yehudah Nesiah, Rabbi 199 Yoḥanan, Rabbi 188, 199 Yoḥanan ben Nuri, Rabbi 103, 106–111, 113, 114, 125, 126, 128, 140, 180, 195–197, 214 Yonatan, Rabbi 219, 220 Yosef, Rav 209 Yudan, Rabbi 227 Zedekiah, King 199, 200 Zeira, Rabbi 176