International Perspectives on Migration 17
Päivi Armila · Marko Kananen Yasemin Kontkanen Editors
The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship Somali Communities in Finland and the United States
International Perspectives on Migration Volume 17
The series publishes original scholarly books that advance our understanding of international migration and immigrant integration. Written by academic experts and policy specialists, each volume addresses a clearly defined research question or theme, employs critical analysis, and develops evidence-based scholarship. The series includes single- or multi authored monographs, volumes, and edited collections. The scope of the series is international migration and integration research. Topics include but are not limited to thematic and current issues and debates; comparative research of a regional, national, or international nature; the changing character of urban areas in which migrants or refugees settle; the reciprocal influence of migrants/ refugees and host communities; and issues of integration and social inequality as well as policy analysis in migration research. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8811
Päivi Armila • Marko Kananen Yasemin Kontkanen Editors
The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship Somali Communities in Finland and the United States
Editors Päivi Armila Department of Social Sciences University of Eastern Finland Joensuu, Finland Yasemin Kontkanen Department of Social Sciences University of Eastern Finland Joensuu, Finland
Marko Kananen Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences Mikkeli, Finland
ISSN 2214-9805 ISSN 2214-9813 (electronic) International Perspectives on Migration ISBN 978-3-319-94489-0 ISBN 978-3-319-94490-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018951711 © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Prologue
I’ve lived in twenty-two different countries, I speak three different languages. I’m a proud American, and a son of a great Somali. I am a faithful Muslim, and a proud marine. No matter where I go, I see one thing that is constant: we need a change. We can either let change change us, and adapt to what’s going on today, or be the change that can actually bring possibilities for a better tomorrow. – Shirwa Hersi1
With two million individuals living outside of their country of birth, Somalis form one of the most prominent diaspora populations of today. Although many Somalis have sought refuge in the neighbouring countries, many of them have also made a long journey to distant destinations, such as the United States and Finland. Through a multifaceted collection of articles, this book explores how Somali migrants in these two countries experience and explore their identities and belongings and how they strive for participation as (diaspora) citizens of their sending and receiving societies. As such, this book contributes to the rich and complex discussion around immigration, emigration, diaspora and (trans)nationalism that has perplexed social sciences for the past decades. Both contexts of this book – Finland and the United States – are currently going through an ideological climate change around the issues of global migration. The signs of both hot and banal nationalism have become strong and apparent after few decades of intentional and articulated tendencies towards multiculturalism, anti- nationalism and postnational and multi-ethnic citizenships. This climate change does not concern only these two countries, but it reflects a broader discourse that promotes the idea that all the people have one ‘natural’ place or territory on the globe, where they rightfully belong – and where they should stay. Descriptive of this new climate is that in addition to the one highly publicized building plan, around 70 countries across the globe have already erected new walls to protect their borders.2 1 Shirwa Hersi (2012). The Revolutionist. http://thepoetnation.com/2012/12/19/ hersi-the-revolutionist/ 2 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3205724/How-65-countries-erected-security-wallsborders.html
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These ideological waves are not just abstract moves of collective minds or state- level discussions, but they affect diaspora people’s social and individual existence. In the end, processes in local spaces are variations of global processes, and abstract politics become very real in the practices of everyday life. For example, in the United States, members of the Somali diaspora have been faced with the consequences of the expanded surveillance and control over the Muslim communities. The short-lived travel ban assigned by President Trump was just the most recent example of cases, in which the most basic human and civil rights are overhauled in the name of national security and protectionism. Many of the Somalis we met while collecting material for this book are multiple citizens and plan their future considering the possibilities that this special citizenship position offers. Possession of a Western citizenship is crucial for their mobility, as the Somali passport is treated with suspicion at many national borders across the globe. In Finland, two opposing rationales – suspicion and human rights – dominate the current debate about the dual citizenship. After a few decades of supportive attitudes, individuals with more than one passport have yet again been portrayed as possible threats to national security. Limiting the rights of dual and multiple citizens would thus severely affect the global Somali diaspora. These examples highlight how the fate of the Somalis as a global diaspora is routinely intertwined with the changes in the global political climate and the state- level political processes reflecting it. The suspicions that are currently casted over Somalis due to their ethnicity, race, religion and status as migrants from the Global South make their position and possibilities uncertain and vulnerable. Furthermore, it is estimated that the number of displaced Somalis will keep growing. These problematic conditions imply that the Somali diaspora must remain at the focus of transnational migration research. In addition to research that can generate new perspectives and analytically sound insights, we also need research that can empower and, as put by young Somali-American poet Shirwa Hersi, ‘bring possibilities for a better tomorrow’. This collection of articles is based on a 4-year (2012–2016) research project, Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship – Transnational Networks, Social Participation and Social Identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S., which was funded by the Academy of Finland. With this book, we would like to express a great gratitude to all the people, who have helped us along the way. Especially, we want to thank all of our Somali participants in Finland and in the United States, who were kind enough to share their stories with us. We would also like to thank all those people working with Somali integration, who have provided their insights for us. Finally, we would also like to thank all the researchers who we have met during this journey.
Contents
Part I Perspectives to Diaspora Citizenship: Contexts 1 Facts and Figures: Somalis in Finland and in the United States �������� 3 Marko Kananen and Ville-Samuli Haverinen 2 The Newest African-Americans?: Somali Struggles for Belonging�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Cawo Mohamed Abdi 3 Mainstream or Margins? How Somalis Perceive Their Status and Possibilities in Finnish and American Societies? �������������������������� 33 Marko Kananen 4 The Call of the Homeland: “My Relationship to Somalia Is Difficult to Explain”���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 53 Marko Kananen Part II Acting As Diaspora Citizens: Agencies 5 Subject, Object, Predicate? Somali Migrants’ Subject Positions in a Local Finnish Integration Scene������������������������������������������������������ 69 Päivi Armila and Yasemin Kontkanen 6 Somalis in America’s Heartland: Columbus, Ohio������������������������������ 89 Stefanie Chambers 7 Integration, Finnish Somalis and Their Right to Everyday Life�������� 111 Tiina Sotkasiira 8 Somali Diaspora Women and Sense of Identity and Belonging���������� 129 Habon Abdulle 9 Diaspora Citizenship: Silenced, Stigmatized, Outlying – And Campaigning ���������������������������������������������������������������� 151 Päivi Armila and Yasemin Kontkanen vii
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10 Proximity to Natives: A Frame, a Resource and a Platform for Somali Entrepreneurs������������������������������������������������������������������������ 167 Yasemin Kontkanen Part III Studying Diaspora Citizenship: Theoretical and Methodological Notions 11 Of Premises for Cross-National Comparisons�������������������������������������� 191 Ville-Samuli Haverinen 12 Notions About Cross-National Comparative Social Sciences and the Societal Role of Researchers����������������������������������������������������� 221 Päivi Armila and Jussi Ronkainen Epilogue������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 229
Contributors
Cawo Mohamed Abdi University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA Habon Abdulle Women Organizing Women (WOW) Network, Minneapolis, MN, USA Päivi Armila Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland Stefanie Chambers Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA Ville-Samuli Haverinen Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland Marko Kananen Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre, SouthEastern Finland University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland Yasemin Kontkanen Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland Jussi Ronkainen Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre, South Eastern University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland Tiina Sotkasiira University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland
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About the Authors
Cawo Mohamed Abdi is associate professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota and a research associate at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He is the author of Elusive Jannah: The Somali Diaspora and a Borderless Muslim Identity (2015).
Habon Abdulle, PhD (University of Sussex, United Kingdom), is the executive director and founding member of the Women Organizing Women (WOW) Network, a non-profit organization committed to breaking barriers and fostering an environment in which women are encouraged to lead and to advocate for policies that positively impact their communities. She has over 25 years of experience in gender and politics. Her research interests are critical gender studies, diaspora studies, transnational political studies, critical Muslim studies, Somali diaspora women, culture and politics, Third World feminism, Islamic feminism, cultural theory, race, ethnic and religion. Habon is a scholar-activist and committed to gender equality.
Päivi Armila, PhD, works as a university lecturer for sociology at the University of Eastern Finland and as an adjunct professor for sociology of education at the University of Tampere. Her research interests deal with social inequality defined by age, ethnicity and place of residence.
Stefanie Chambers is a professor of political science at Trinity College, Hartford. Her research and teaching focus on migration, mayoral leadership, urban education, racial and ethnic politics, gender and politics and environmental justice. Her books include Somalis in the Twin Cities and Columbus: Immigrant Incorporation in New Destinations (Temple University Press 2017) and the coedited volume The Politics of New Immigrant Destinations: Transatlantic Perspectives (Temple University Press 2017) and Mayors and Schools: Minority Voices and Democratic Tensions in Urban Education (Temple University Press 2006). Beyond her scholarship, she is actively engaged in community service in Hartford. Stefanie received her PhD at the Ohio State University in 1999.
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Ville-Samuli Haverinen, MSSc, works as a project researcher in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Eastern Finland. He is a member of the research group Migration, Everyday Security and the Resilience of Finnish Society. The group is a part of the larger research consortium Multilayered Borders of Global Security (GLASE) funded by the Strategic Research Council at the Academy of Finland. Haverinen’s interests in research are in the areas of migration and immigrant integration and diversity policies.
Marko Kananen, PhD (University of Vienna), is a researcher at Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre at the South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences. His research interests include immigration, civic participation and transnational identities.
Yasemin Kontkanen is a PhD candidate in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Eastern Finland. Her current research focus is Somali entrepreneurs in Finland and in the United States where her research interests are societal membership of immigrants, diasporic identities and entrepreneurship.
Jussi Ronkainen, PhD, is a director of Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre at the South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences. His research interests include new forms of citizenship, transnationalism and multidisciplinary youth research. He is currently leading the Academy of Finland’s research project Citizenship Constellations – Young Finnish-Russian Multiple Citizens as Societal and Transnational Actors.
Tiina Sotkasiira, PhD and MA (University of Eastern Finland) and MSc (University of Leicester), is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Eastern Finland. She has published a book, several articles and book chapters on migration and ethnic relations in post-Soviet Russia and Finland. Sotkasiira received her PhD from the University of Eastern Finland in 2013 and is currently researching local and national context of immigrant integration, with focus on migration as a key social process in contemporary rural change.
Introduction: About This Collection
During over two decades of diaspora triggered by the civil war, around two million Somali refugees have migrated across the globe and resettled in contexts ranging from urban metropolises to small rural towns. In these diverse contexts, Somali communities have taken different shapes and followed different paths. This book pays special attention to the status and opportunities of Somalis in two very different societies: the United States and Finland. This comparative approach between the two contexts that differ significantly in terms of their social system, migration history and integration policies provides an opportunity to explore how different social, political and legal orders influence the life courses and wellbeing of one migrant population.
A Statement of Aims Somali migrants have been subjects of versatile studies, including some comparative research settings between different diaspora contexts (e.g. Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004; Valentine 2007; Mezzetti et al. 2010; Abdile et al. 2011; Hammond 2011; DIASPEACE1). Nevertheless, the apparent challenges of Somali integration in both of the countries of this book signify a need for a multilayered research and a comparative approach in these special contexts. In Finland, the increased criticism against immigration focuses on Muslims, people of colour and humanitarian migration – i.e. to Somalis, who form the most general reference of the national immigration discourse. Also in the United States, Somalis face a bundle of stigmas as anti-immigration attitudes intertwine with questions of race and Islam. Further, public discourses both in the United States and in Finland have recently associated Somalis with international terrorism, which is a new and consequential turn. Somali migrants’ struggle for inclusion and belonging is thus intimately linked to some of
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the most pressing issues of today, such as racial disparity, marginalization of migrant youth and the status of Muslims in the post-9/11 era. Somali migrants have most commonly been researched as religious and cultural minorities, but their role as citizens have remained widely untreated. In order to fill this gap, this book turns the perspective on Somali migrants as diaspora citizens. Empirically, it compares the interplay of social participation, transnational practices and social identification of Somalis living in Finland and the United States. Different parts of this book are conceptually linked together through the notions of transnational or diasporic citizenship and citizenship as status and practice. The main argument is that citizenship as a juridical position can differ a lot from citizenship as a lived reality. However, diaspora experiences can also be interpreted as examples of transnational or postnational citizenship: a more open-minded and mobile view to define societal membership than the conventional and holy state-territory-ethnicity trinity. As such, the comparative approach of this book, which relies on a broad set of data ranging from legislation and policy documents to welfare indicators and interviews, provides an opportunity to identify how different laws, policies and practices of Finnish and American societies promote and/or hinder Somalis’ diasporic participation in both the sending and the receiving societies. Our analysis plays out in a state-level, because state is one of the relevant components affecting the life courses of global diasporas. For example, welfare policies are strongly guided by implicit presuppositions and ideas about good and decent life in a certain national context. These policies, in turn, have coercive power in their citizens’ everyday lives and life courses, as they make us grow up, think, behave and treat others in certain ways. Their impact also reaches beyond the state borders, as many national policies can enable or hinder possibilities for transnational living. That being said, we also acknowledge and underline our critical stance towards methodological nationalism. Instead of treating citizenship as a taken-for-granted membership of a nation-state, our project builds on the concept of diaspora citizenship. By this, we aim to bring forth also those multiple factors that influence, shape and express the life courses of Somali migrants but that do not fit into the traditional state-level national order. Therefore, rather than emphasizing either the state or the global level, our case studies highlight the dialectical relationship between these two levels: the fate of the Somalis as diaspora citizens is routinely intertwined with the changes in the global political climate and the state-level political processes reflecting it. Comparative cross-national research has meant in our research setting an aspiration to understand and analyse the contents and contexts of diaspora citizenship for Somalis in Finland and in the United States. By studying two contexts that are culturally, politically and historically very different, we are able to gain richer and more varied knowledge about the Somali diaspora and the impacts that different sociocultural settings have on their diaspora citizenship. It should, therefore, be highlighted that the purpose of our research setting is not so much to compare Finland and the United States in a strict sense but to optimize the possibility of producing a variety of findings that reflect the variety within the global Somali diaspora. This book further acknowledges the often overlooked diversity within an ethnic group by analysing the participation and identifications of Somalis from many angles. Somali communities in Finland and in the United States provide also an
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opportunity to analyse different aspects of transnationalism. For example, many diaspora Somalis contribute to the rebuilding process of their homeland either through remittances or more concrete means of participation. Somali diaspora thus creates a manifold and interesting global context in which local, national and transnational forms of interaction and participation create a network for Somalis’ mutual interaction and their integration to their new and old homes. This book ponders also theoretical approaches, practices and methods of comparative immigration research. By paying attention to transnational processes and comparative perspectives, it takes – even maybe in a paradoxical way – a critical stance towards methodological nationalism. It also explores the methodological challenges of comparative research, such as the impacts that different contexts have on research. In addition to national and transnational processes, this book acknowledges the importance of local contexts.
Chapter Synopsis Facts and Figures: Somalis in Finland and in the United States Although Finland and the United States have very different immigration histories, their experience with Somali migrants is equally long. The large-scale arrival of Somalis started in both of these places around 1990, following the civil war. Despite of their long-term presence in Finland and in the United States, the integration of Somalis has not succeeded as anticipated. In both countries, Somalis are overrepresented in the unemployment statistics and their level of education and language skills are seen as insufficient. This chapter provides a detailed look on the status of Somali communities in Finland and the United States and elaborates the similarities and differences in their situation.
he Newest African-Americans? Somali Struggles T for Belonging The chapter historicizes Somali migration and the context and content of the 1990s Somali influx to the United States (US). It locates Somali migration experiences within the wider debates of integration and citizenship in the highly racialized US context. The chapter highlights some of the key challenges Somalis are experiencing in urban America and their implications for settlement and belonging. Somali refugees’ limited human capital and their ongoing financial obligations to families left behind are two key factors that are shaping their settlement in the United States. These entail significant implications for citizenship and the future of Somali American as this new community reaps some of the benefits associated with migration while becoming further entrenched in inner-city segregated urban America.
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ainstream or Margins? How Somalis Perceive Their Status M and Possibilities in Finnish and American Societies? Immigrant inclusion is typically measured on the socioeconomic scale of wellbeing. Both United States Refugee Act (1980) and Finnish Integration Act (2010) depict economic self-sufficiency, employment and language skills as the goals of immigrant inclusion. However, inclusion can also be perceived subjectively as feelings of belonging and acceptance. This article examines how the Somali migrants in Finland and in the United States perceive their status and possibilities in Finnish and American societies. Do they see themselves as equal members, or do they experience conflicts between their ways of being and the requirements of the mainstream society? Although these social identifications alone do not cause or prevent marginalization, they nevertheless play an important role in encouraging or discouraging individuals and providing information about the barriers and possibilities of inclusion.
he Call of the Homeland: ‘My Relationship to Somalia Is T Difficult to Explain’ Somali migrants especially in Minnesota are actively involved in the American society through education, employment, entrepreneurship and political participation, but they also remain connected to and invested in their homeland through kinship, economic, religious, political and cultural ties. Although the contemporary communication technologies have made these connections more accessible, the relationship to the country of birth is nevertheless not an easy one. This chapter explores how Somali migrants in Minnesota comprehend their relationship to Somalia. By paying special attention to the differences between the first and the second generation migrants, this chapter contributes to the ongoing debate about the transmission of transnationalism from one immigrant generation to another.
ubject, Object or Predicate? Somali Migrants’ Subject S Positions in a Local Finnish Integration Scene When an immigrant comes to Finland, he or she enters a Nordic welfare society with its wide and tight service structures. Especially asylum seekers find themselves quickly in the middle of encounters with officials and a multitude of controlling practices. This chapter examines how Finnish authorities and civil society activists working in different immigrant integration projects discuss and define integration work with Somali immigrants, as well as the organizing of Somalis’ everyday lives and social interaction and relations in their new home locality. Also the challenges that still are connected to
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integration of immigrants with an African origin are under scrutiny here. The aim of this examination is to trace the variety of subject positions that are possible to Somalis who form a very special immigrant minority in the Finnish context.
Somalis in America’s Heartland: Columbus, Ohio Columbus, Ohio, is home to the second largest Somali immigrant population in the United States. The influx of refugees started in the 1990s and has continued to increase at a significant rate. Much of the scholarship on Somali communities in the United States focuses on Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Lewiston, Maine. This chapter examines the role of the local and state government policies to determine the impact they have on Somalis’ migration to Columbus and incorporation into the city. In addition, this chapter builds upon the bureaucratic incorporation literature by shedding light on the city of Columbus’ efforts to incorporate Somalis in the community. Interviews with local policymakers, Somali leaders and Somali parents provide a lens to view how government policies have affected the Somali community. It concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at increasing Somali incorporation in Columbus, Ohio.
Integration, Finnish Somalis and Their Right to Everyday Life Within the public discourse of immigration, migrants who arrive in Finland as refugees or as asylum seekers, and particularly those coming from the African continent, are often singled out as the most ‘different’ in terms of their culture and background. Finnish Somalis, the majority of whom arrived in the country already in the early 1990s, are still recognized as a group that faces challenges with regard to their integration and citizenship. While the focus on the ways in which citizenship is negotiated as part of everyday interaction offers an important perspective for understanding the positioning of migrants, this chapter claims that research also needs to pay attention to the everyday in itself. This chapter intends to contest the understanding of everyday as something that we all somewhat self-evidently possess and reviews the routines and everyday practices of integration efforts. What kind of everyday is being taught to Somali migrants involved in integration activities?
Somali Diaspora Women and Sense of Identity and Belonging This article takes an intergenerational perspective to investigate how senses of identity and belonging are constructed in the diaspora. More specifically, the article explores the ways in which the Somali diaspora women of Minneapolis, Minnesota,
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express their sense of belonging and convey both transnational and cosmopolitan identities. This aim is particularly crucial given the increasing rates of migration and mobility worldwide, which has resulted in growing acknowledgment across a number of disciplines of the importance to examine the experiences of diaspora and how ethnic identities are reconstructed across generations. Despite this recognition, research on Somali diaspora women remains limited. To address the literature gap, the present review will examine how two generations of the Somali diaspora women articulate feelings of identity and belonging and engage with transnational practices. It does so through exploring findings from 20 qualitative interviews and participant observations undertaken in Minneapolis between 2011 and 2012. The findings demonstrate how constructions of ethnic identity change across the generations as younger generations of Somali Americans are situated between various conflicting cultural reference points. The influence of the family in creating a sense of belonging is also revealed as well as the fluid and evolving nature of familial relationships.
iaspora Citizenship: Silenced, Stigmatized, Outlying D and Campaigning Somali diaspora can be seen as a type of consciousness and positioning marked with a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, Somalis form significant immigrant minorities in many countries of their diaspora, being targets for many socio-political strategies and SCO programmes, as well as immigrant integration policies. On the other hand, many statistics show that in spite of their societal significance as minorities, they do not have equal possibilities to reach full membership at different arenas (schooling, labour markets, etc.) of their current states. In this chapter, diaspora citizenship is approached in terms of certain citizenship positions, in which Somalis in Finland identify either themselves or diaspora Somalis more widely. Diaspora citizenship is seen as a consequence of moves and characterized with the attributes of threatened, temporary, silenced and outsider citizenship and also as open-minded and widely experienced membership, seeking for occasions to bring special diaspora understanding – ‘newness’ – to socially and politically recognized arenas.
roximity to Natives: A Frame, a Resource and a Platform P for Somali Entrepreneurs The purpose of this article is to magnify how proximity to natives, as a social location hold by migrants, can reveal and generate resources which influence the ‘perceptibility’ of resources and opportunities existing in an environment. Proximity refers to being in close distance to natives in this analysis, and it is approached from three different angles: a frame, a resource and a platform. Through these angles, this
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article explores how proximity to natives, as a social location hold by migrants, can define migrants’ understanding of own entrepreneurial possibilities and how it can influence their business entry decisions. The empirical background of this examination comes from 14 qualitative interviews which convey the experiences and insights of Somali migrant entrepreneurs living in Finland and the United States (states of Minnesota and Maine). Through the analysis, the shortage of this proximity is marked as a possible setback in entrepreneurial activities of migrants – as it results in a diminished capacity to recognize available resources and opportunities existing in an environment.
Of Premises for Cross-national Comparisons The chapter contributes to the discussion about theoretical approaches, practices and methods of comparative immigration research by bringing the presented comparative setting between the United States and Finland, with a special attention to the status and opportunities of Somalis in these two very different societal contexts, in a theoretical and methodological sense. The endeavour is to chart premises for cross-national comparisons in immigration research and review the conceptual and methodological possibilities and limitations of employing national models of integration in comparative research on the incorporation of immigrants. By outlining some theoretical and methodological perspectives for an examination, the chapter attempts to bring into question in what extent national models of integration can provide an explanation of reality of different political-juridical surroundings in Finland and the United States. To provide an overview of these surroundings, perceptions regarding features of immigrant integration in both contexts will be brought out by identifying some relevant key themes associated to the national models thinking.
otions About Cross-national Comparative Social Sciences N and the Societal Role of Researchers Four years of comparative research with Somali populations in Finland and the United States have brought along many insights and also questions relating to the different opportunities, challenges and obstacles that different contexts with their own mentalities and public attitudes create for integration. This chapter examines the problematic aspects of conducting comparative research with vulnerable populations. In addition, the chapter discusses our positionalities as researchers. How do the questions we ask and the knowledge we produce impact those who we are studying and vice versa? In addition to these questions of politics and ethics of research in this field, this chapter reflects the current situation in Finland, in which immigration researchers are subjected to threats by the anti-immigrant and monocultural circle.
Part I
Perspectives to Diaspora Citizenship: Contexts
Several studies have shown how Somali communities in different diasporas share and express a considerable number of social similarities, such as high level of social commitment, ambition towards societal activities, as well as transnational networking capabilities and capacities. But there are also a number of relevant distinctive contextual factors that make their positions different (DIASPEACE1; see Abdile & Pirkkalainen 2011). In this section of the collection, we examine how certain formal civil and political rights – such as legal and social equality – become (or do not become) real in the two contexts of our analyses. In addition, we aspire to trace the dynamics of engagement in these two culturally, politically, and historically different countries. Citizenship, also in diaspora, is a legalized status constructed by many abstract and even universal principles of fairness and by numerous different legislations2 – but also by many ideological, systematic, structural, and cultural demands that make citizenship as a lived practice quite different from the formal ideals. In the articles of this part of the book, we can recognize the Habermasian (1981) dialectics between the system and the lifeworld (die Lebenswelt), where the two dimensions of individual experience can intertwine but also remain separate. The system-level citizenship legalities aim at granting manifold societal participation possibilities to all members of the state community, but ideological discourses, especially the discriminative ones, often overpass them and impact the everyday life and encounters of the individuals. The system of societal mainstreams and margins becomes visible in the analyses of different state level statistics. However, the way this system is lived and experienced by the individuals, can be explored only through analysis based on observations and discussions with the individuals themselves. In the dialectics between the system and the lifeworld, formal status and real-life practices can mold in many different ways. In diaspora, the universal promise of citizenship does not always materialize especially for those individuals who are located in societal otherness. Possibilities https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/handle/123456789/36874. In Finland, for example, migration policies are regulated by Constitution, Nationality Act, Local Government Act, Aliens Act and Integration Act. 1 2
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of inclusion therefore not only relate to individuals’ formal legal status and the rights it grants, but also to factors such as race, age, gender, ethnicity or religion, over which they have very little or no control. As such, diaspora citizenship turns our notions also towards questions of identity and identifications with the fellow citizens of the host society. Who can rightfully claim to be part of the social and cultural core of the society, and consequently enjoy the status and opportunities it brings along? Lastly, the diaspora citizenship also relates to the questions of places and belonging. Traditional understanding is that people attach themselves to certain locations with emotional ties. However, diaspora as an expressive concept contains connotations of attachments to many places – or to no place at all. As put by Avram Brah (1996), home can also refer to essentially placeless “desire in the diasporic imagination”. The role that Somalia plays in the minds and actions of the diaspora members can therefore differ greatly, as the diaspora communities do not constitute one entity with common aims and interests, but diversified groups of individuals. For some, the call of the homeland can be empowering, for some others destructive.
Chapter 1
Facts and Figures: Somalis in Finland and in the United States Marko Kananen and Ville-Samuli Haverinen
Finland and the United States have very different experiences with immigration, and their immigration and integration laws and policies differ greatly. In Finland, there is a great deal of political effort to try to manage the new situation, whereas in the United States, the integration of immigrants has historically been carried out by members of the local community, rather than by state or federal authorities. Although Finland and the United States have very different immigration histories, their experience with Somali migrants is equally long. The large scale arrival of Somalis in both countries started around 1990 following the civil war in Somalia. Despite of their long-term presence in Finland and in the United States, the integration of Somalis has not succeeded as anticipated. In both countries Somalis are overrepresented in the unemployment statistics and their level of education and language skills are seen as insufficient. This chapter provides a detailed look on the status of Somali communities in Finland and the United States, and particularly in the state of Minnesota, and elaborates the similarities and differences in their situation.
M. Kananen (*) Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre, South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] V.-S. Haverinen Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_1
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1.1 Introduction The Somali Civil War, which began in the late 1980s, has forced more than one million Somalis and their descendants to seek refuge outside Somalia. One of the most significant events in the history of immigration to Finland took place in 1990, when over one thousand Somali asylum seekers arrived unexpectedly in the country. “The flood of the Somalis”, as it was depicted in the media, surprised both the Finnish laymen and authorities. Until then it was thought that remote Finland would receive only UNHCR-designated quota refugees. The surprising arrival of Somalis can be explained through Finland’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union. When the Somali Civil War broke out, Somalis studying in the Soviet Union represented a pull factor for other Somalis who were seeking asylum. As the Soviet Union later collapsed and was no longer capable to host the Somalis, Finland was the closest Western country. It has, however, been suggested that the majority of Somalis who entered Finland between 1990 and 1992 did not consider Finland as their primary destination, but was planning on continuing their travel to Sweden and other countries (Tiilikainen 2003, 51–52). In addition to being the first large ethnic group to arrive in Finland as spontaneous asylum seekers, Somalis were the first significant population group with African background, and the largest Muslim group. To make their situation even more challenging, the beginning of the large scale Somali immigration coincided with a severe economic depression that caused uncertainty and anxiety in the Finnish society. These factors have at least partially caused Somalis to become the subject of fervent public debate and publicity, which has been often sensational, problem- oriented, and emphasized authoritative perspectives (Sarlin 1999; Tiilikainen 2003, 52; Aden 2009, 25–26; Vehmas 2012, 127; Open Society Foundations 2013, 117; Pirkkalainen et al. 2016, 69–70). Today, Somalis are the fifth largest foreign-born minority in the country after Estonians, Swedes, Russians, and Iraqis. In 2015, almost 17,900 people reported Somali as their first language, making it the third largest minority language in Finland after Russian and Estonian (Statistics Finland 2016a). In the United States, small communities of voluntarily migrated Somali students and professionals have lived across the country since the 1960s. However, the vast majority of Somali immigrants have arrived as refugees following the civil war. The first Somali refugees arrived in the United States in 1990 and most of them were resettled in San Diego, southern California. The arrival of Somali refugees started slowly, as only 25 Somali refugees were resettled in 1990. But the numbers grew rapidly, and five years later already ten thousand Somalis resided in the country. The resettlement of Somalis has turned out to be one of the largest refugee resettlement programs in the United States’ history. With over 100,000 refugees resettled by 2012, Somalis are the largest African refugee population in the United States (Yusuf 2012; Abdi 2011; Office of the Refugee Resettlement 2015). The state of Minnesota has admitted more Somali refugees (17,863) than any other state. Compared to Finland, the situation in Minnesota was favourable for the
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arrival of Somalis. Since of the previous experience with resettlement, all the necessary services and know-how were already in place. In addition, Minnesota offered employment opportunities for newcomers even with limited education and language skills, and the religiously and ethnically diverse society made it easier for Somalis to settle in. As a result, Minnesota quickly became a common target for secondary migration among the Somalis in the United States. According to the latest census numbers, there are around 32,500 Somalis in Minnesota, which constitutes almost one-third of the total Somali population of the United States. Minnesota is sometimes referred to as the best practice example of Somali integration, but the story also has a flipside, as poverty, discrimination, and alienation are pushing Somalis to the margins of the society (Abdi 2011; Yusuf 2012; U.S. Census Bureau 2012a, b; Mulligan 2009; Mattessich 2000; Bernard 2006; Brown 2011). The integration of Somalis – as well as other migrant groups – to their new home country is affected by several different factors. As well as individuals’ own attributes, traits, motivation, and desire to commit, the integration process is also inflected by measures taken by public authorities to promote adjustment of the society and its service systems to new changing ethnic and cultural conditions. The integration of immigrants can thus be seen as a two-way process as newcomers’ quality of life is affected by, among various other things, attitudes of the surrounding community, available support, and possible experiences of racism and discrimination. This chapter provides a brief but extensive overview on the status of Somali communities both in Finland and in the United States, with a special focus on the state of Minnesota, by a contextual collection of general information and demographic statistics concerning, for instance, legal status, employment, education, housing, health and access to health care, economic well-being, and participation in decision-making communities and organizations. The gathered key facts and figures are primarily derived from the existing data provided by different statistical offices, immigration services, and relevant literature on the field, and they form the basis for context and collection of other research data presented in this volume by covering some essential core areas of immigrant integration (cf. Huddleston et al. 2015; OECD 2015). The chapter will begin with a summary on the conditions of integration in Finland and the United States by taking a look on legal status of Somali arrivals in both countries, and on the outlines of integration policies and practices implemented.
1.2 Legal Status Legal status with its rights and responsibilities plays an important role in the integration process. It can improve migrants’ situation by providing opportunities and security, but also hinder integration by putting immigrants in vulnerable positions. When looking at the opportunities of Somalis to settle in to the United States, it is important to bear in mind that the vast majority of them have arrived as refugees, which means that they have had a better access to the American society than
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temporary migrants or asylum-seekers. Refugees are permanent residents, they are allowed to work and study, they are entitled to some of the public benefits, and they go through the resettlement program that helps them to get accustomed to their new home. In addition, refugees are on the pathway to U.S. citizenship, which in the United States is important, as citizens have significantly more rights than legal permanent residents. According to the latest census numbers, 27% of Minnesotan Somalis are U.S. citizens by naturalization. In addition, 33% of Minnesotan Somalis are citizens by birth. 40%, however, do not have U.S. citizenship (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a, b; Office of the Refugee Resettlement 2015; Department of Homeland Security 2015). As legal permanent residents and later as U.S. citizens, Somalis have had the right to reunite with their families. Family ties were the second most common reason for legal permanent residences granted to Somalis between 1996 and 2011. It has, however, become harder for a citizen or legal permanent resident to sponsor a visa for family members. For example, the embassy in Kenya has started to require a special refugee ID as a precondition for the family visa application, and DNA tests slow down the process significantly. Furthermore, the number of legal permanent residences granted to family members outside the immediate family is extremely low. In 2011, it was 1% of all the legal permanent residences granted for Somalis (Office of the Refugee Resettlement 2015; Yusuf 2012). In Finland, the first Somali arrivals were predominantly asylum seekers. This means that their status was more vulnerable and uncertain than UNHCR-designated quota refugees. Before the asylum application is processed and asylum granted or denied, asylum seekers lack the long-term security and perspective. In the case of granted asylum (or international or subsidiary protection), the applicant will become a legal permanent resident. In Finland, the rights of legal permanent residents are more or less equal to those of citizens. They can cast a vote in local and regional elections and they qualify for public benefits. Residence permits can however be lost on various grounds, such as fraud, security threats, and serious offenses. Despite this relatively strong and secure status, many Somalis have applied for Finnish citizenship. Between 1990 and 2015, Somalis were the second largest immigrant group (8490) to receive Finnish citizenship after Russians (28,296). According to Statistics Finland (2016b), in 2015 there was almost 3600 Finnish citizens with holding also Somali citizenship (Statistics Finland 2016b). Legal permanent residents and citizens can sponsor family reunification in Finland. Sponsors with other than granted refugee status must, however, have a basic subsistence livelihood according to Finnish standards, and the amount may seem high for a newcomer. Somalis have sought residence permits in Finland predominantly through family reunification channels. In Finland, family members have a right to work and study and to take needs-based introduction programs, but otherwise they only have some basic residence rights and security. Their status has thus been significantly weaker than the status of those Somalis who reunited with their families in the United States, where the family members receive permanent resident status with all its rights. Furthermore, the number of residence permit applications based on family ties has decreased significantly during the past couple of years. This
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is largely due to the 2012 amendment to the Aliens Act (301/2004), which makes it impossible for a person already living in Finland to file the family reunification application. Instead, the family member wishing to immigrate has to submit the application to the closest Finnish diplomatic mission, which in the case of Somalia is either in Kenya or Ethiopia. Also, these applications are rejected far more often than accepted. In 2013, for instance, around 74% of the applications were declined – an amount significantly higher than with any other large immigrant group (Finnish Immigration Service 2014).
1.3 Integration The policies and practices of immigrant integration differ greatly in the United States and Finland. In the United States the integration of migrants is carried out by local communities, rather than by state or federal authorities. The only federal program is the 30-day long refugee orientation that provides short-term cash and medical assistance to new arrivals, as well as case management services, English as a Foreign Language classes, and job readiness and employment services. Otherwise the American approach to integration relies on strong labour market that offers entry-level openings for newcomers (Fix 2007). In Finland, in turn, the objective has been to provide measures and services promoting integration for all immigrants regardless of a duration of their stay in the country. According to the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (1386/2010), all immigrants are entitled to receive information about their rights and obligations in Finnish working life and society. Further, an immigrant has the right to an integration plan in case he or she is an unemployed jobseeker or receiving social assistance on a non-temporary basis. An integration plan may also be drawn up for other migrants if, on the basis of the so-called initial assessment,1 they are determined to require a plan to promote integration. An integration plan is a personalized blueprint prepared for an immigrant consisting the measures and services, the aim of which is to support to acquire a sufficient command of the Finnish or Swedish and other skills and knowledge needed and to promote opportunities to play an active role in society as an equal member. The first integration plan should be prepared no later than three years after the issue of the first residence permit or residence card or the registration of the right of residence. The plan is drawn up for a maximum period of one year. Even though the duration of the migrant’s integration plan is defined on the basis of migrant’s own objectives and employment and training history and the measures planned and provided for him or her, the maximum 1 The so-called initial assessment is the preliminary assessment of the migrant’s preparedness in regards to employment, study as well as other aspects of integration and the need for language training and other measures and services promoting integration. The initial assessment involves the examination of the immigrant’s former education, training, employment history, and language skills and, if needed, other matters influencing employment prospects and integration.
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period entitling to a plan is, nevertheless, three years from the signing of the first plan. The integration plan is prepared jointly by the immigrant, the municipality, and the employment and economic development office. Once the integration plan has been drawn up, the immigrant should adhere it and regularly attend a Finnish or Swedish course provided as part of the plan and participate in other measures and services agreed on a regular basis. If the immigrant refuses to take part in measures and has no valid reasons for refusal, the benefits paid as integration assistance may be restricted.
1.3.1 Employment Citizenship positions and hierarchies of Western societies are commonly defined by educational and working life success. That is why it is not surprising that employment is presented as the backbone of immigrant integration both in Finland and the United States. The Finnish Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (1386/2010) defines integration as “the personal development of immigrants, aimed at participation in working life and society”, whereas the U.S. Refugee Act (1980) emphasizes rapid economic independence as the goal of immigrant integration. The legal permanent resident status and the U.S. citizenship give Somalis the same chances in the labour market as native-born Americans, they are entitled to work, start a business, get help from the government in their job hunt, and expect the same kinds of working conditions. But still, Somalis have faced difficulties trying to access the American labour market. In the state of Minnesota, the unemployment rate among the Somali population is significantly higher than the state’s average. According to the 2010 Census data, 47% of Somalis (16 and older) are employed, 13% are unemployed, and 40% are not part of the workforce. The unemployment rate among the general population is 5%. The unemployment rate among the Somali population is also higher than the unemployment rate of Minnesota’s whole foreign born population (6%), as well as the unemployment rate of state’s other large populations, such as Mexicans (8%), Hmongs (7%) and Vietnamese (5%). The unemployment rate of Somalis is however lower in Minnesota than in any other major Western Somali hubs, such as London or Toronto (United States Census Bureau 2012b; The London’s Poverty Profile 2014; Statistics Canada 2013). Minnesota’s Somali community is also known for its high number of small businesses. A survey identified 375 businesses that were owned by Somalis. The Somali community itself estimates the number to be around 700–1000. Most of the Somali businesses are in retail and whole sale as well as services. A typical example of a business is a small shop in one of the bazaar-like Somali malls in Minneapolis. The fact that makes the high number of Somali businesses even more impressive is that although in the United States immigrants generally are more likely to own a business than the native born population; in Minnesota the situation is opposite. According to the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce, immigrants are 20% less likely
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to own a business (Golden et al. 2010; Samatar 2004; Minnesota Chamber of Commerce 2013). In Finland, immigrants in general have problems entering the labour market. For example, in the year 2013 the unemployment rate among all foreign-language speakers was 33%. The situation of Somalis is even worse. At the end of the same year, 25% (1883) of Somali citizens residing permanently in Finland were part of the workforce, of which 62% were men. Around 31% (592) of the workforce was currently employed. The share of employed women was only 22%. Out of those who have stated Somali as their first language, 26% were part of the workforce in 2013. The share of those with employment (47%) was higher in this category. The share of employed women (32%) was again lower than men. All in all, this category entails 32 (28 men and 4 women) entrepreneurs. Somali men typically work in the transport and storage sectors, whereas Somali women are often employed in health and social services. Both men and women also work in technical and support service activities. In addition to massive unemployment, around 30% of Somalis aged 15 and older are not part of the workforce for reasons other than being a student or a retiree (Statistics Finland 2015). One common explanation for the high unemployment of migrants in Finland is that there are only few entry-level jobs that would require little or no education, work experience, and language skills. When even so called simple jobs have high requirements, immigrants are having hard times entering the labour force. Especially in the public sector, where around 30% of the jobs are, language requirements may disproportionately exclude the foreign-born population. Also discrimination cannot be ruled out. Several studies have found that among immigrant groups applying for jobs in Finland, Somalis experienced the most discrimination due to their ethnic background. Also the number of Somali businesses is very low in Finland. According to a study (Joronen 2012), none of the Somalis who had migrated to Finland between the years 1999 and 2007 were entrepreneurs. All the existing Somali entrepreneurs had moved to Finland during the first wave of immigration in the early 1990s. According to Annika Forsander (2002), Somalis arriving during the first wave were more educated and therefore had perhaps more resources to start a business. The low number of Somali entrepreneurs might also be due to the economic conditions that prevailed during their arrival. In the early 1990s, Finland went through a severe economic depression and the unemployment rate was historically high. Since employment opportunities were scarce, immigrants were encouraged to seek education. Instead of entrepreneurship, they have thus chosen a different path towards employment. Further, the role of racial discrimination should not be ignored (Joronen 2012). It is also possible to argue that the difference is due to the different kind of labour market and economy. In the United States, small businesses are the largest employer, and starting a business is easy and accepted. In Finland, in turn, the public sector is larger and the number and role of small businesses is not as significant.
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1.3.2 Education The educational attainment of Minnesota’s adult Somali population (18 and older) is remarkably lower than the state’s average. According to the 2010 Census, 28% of Minnesota’s Somalis have a high school degree and 11% a college degree. It is also noteworthy that 26% of the Somalis have attended less than nine grades of school, among the general population, only 3% has completed less than 9 grades. In general, the educational attainment is lower among women: as many as 35% of the Somali women have completed less than 9 grades of formal schooling. Age is also an important factor, as the educational attainment is lower among the older age groups (45 and older) and the number of college graduates higher among the younger age groups (18–44). According to the 2010 Census, 13% of the Somali population over 18 was currently enrolled in college or graduate school. Further, young Somali women are bridging the gender gap in educational attainment, as the share of men and women currently enrolled in college is the same (13%) (United States Census Bureau 2012a). Also in Finland, the educational attainment of Somalis is low. Of all the 15- to 64-year-old Somalis in 2010, even 89% (4088) had completed only the intermediate school education or the level of education was unknown. Less than 10% had completed secondary education and only 1.5% college/university education (Statistics Finland 2012). A survey study (Castaneda et al. 2012) conducted by the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare confirms the low level of education among Somalis. Out of all the 18 to 64-year-old Somalis who were interviewed between 2010 and 2012, one-fourth of the men and as many as one-third of the women had no formal education. Forty-nine percent of the Somalis had completed primary education or lower secondary education (or part of it) while 26% had completed general upper-secondary education (or part of it). The highest educational attainment differs according to gender: 40% of the men and only 16% of the women had studied at the general upper-secondary education level. This gender gap was widest among the older age group (45–64), whereas among the younger ones (18–29) there was no difference. Also, the time spent in Finland matters. Among those who had spent less than six years in Finland, only 15% had completed a general upper-secondary education, whereas among those who had spent more than 14 years in Finland the share was even 41%. All in all, studies have found that Somali children have the lowest level of educational achievement compared with other immigrant children in Finland (Kilpi 2010). Somalis are about 10% of the whole immigrant population in general secondary schools, about 7% of those in vocational training, and 2% of the immigrant students in the polytechnics and universities of applied sciences. There is only handful of Somali students at the university. It is also found that Somali students were the most likely to drop out compared with other migrant groups. As a result, almost 40% of young Somali men aged 15–29 in the greater Helsinki area are currently neither studying nor working (Myrskylä 2012).
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1.3.3 Economic Well-Being Despite of relatively high level of employment and an active business scene, Somalis in Minnesota have not been able to escape poverty. According to 2010 Census, 61% of Minnesota’s Somali families live under the official poverty level. This means that out of the 32,419 Somalis, over 20,000 lives in poverty. Especially those households that were run by a single-mother were prone to living under the poverty level. The large number of families living in poverty can be partly explained due to the fact that Somalis tend to have jobs that are low-paying. In fact, the difference in earnings is drastic between the Somali population and the general population. Among the Somali population the median annual income is 15,000 dollars, when among the general population it is 44,000 dollars. Only 15% of the Somalis in Minnesota earn the state average or more (United States Census Bureau 2012b). It is noteworthy that even though the unemployment rate is extremely high and entrepreneurship practically non-existent, Somalis in Finland are not doing economically worse than Somalis in Minnesota. It has been studied that in Finland around 60% of Somali households are above the low-income level.2 Although many Somalis are not employed, they escape poverty because of the comprehensive welfare system in Finland is based on residence and not on previous employment. Hence all residents are entitled to social security and welfare services.
1.3.4 Health and Health Care Access Immigrants are often defined as a ‘vulnerable population’, a group at increased risk for poor physical, psychological, and social health outcomes and inadequate health care. This vulnerability is shaped by many factors, including political and social marginalization and a lack of socioeconomic and societal resources (Health Disparities & Inequalities Report). A study conducted in 2008 reported that Somali immigrants participate in preventive care, such as vaccinations and screenings significantly less than other patients (Morrison et al. 2012). In a similar fashion, the Minnesota Department of Health has reported that Somali refugees in Minnesota are among the least served by Minnesota’s health and social service systems (MDH 2005). Few reasons have been identified. First of all, lack of health insurance and difficult payment systems often discourage immigrants from seeking needed health care. Studies (e.g. Scuglik et al. 2007) have also reported that health care professionals whose ethnic backgrounds often differ from most of their immigrant patients are frequently unaware of communication barriers that make comprehension and adherence to medical treatments very difficult for immigrant groups.
2 In the survey study (Castaneda et al. 2012), the low-income level was defined as maximum of 850 euros per month.
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According to a report based on results of a survey study by the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare, Somali immigrants use health care services in Finland less frequently than the entire population (Koponen et al. 2012). Nevertheless, at the same time, they seem to be satisfied with the service they receive: more than four out of five (83%) interviewees trusted the public health care quite a lot or fully. Especially 18–29 years old Somali men were particularly trustful. It is remarked that this tendency may be explained partly by their relatively low usage or need of public health care services (Rask et al. 2012). It is also important to notice, that the previous research on the field has brought out problems related to the usage of services among Somalis and on how the services respond to their needs and expectations (Dayib 2005; Pavlish et al. 2010; Koponen et al. 2012). Traumatic experiences witnessed in the former home country and their impact on individual’s well-being are a significant part in Somali population’s life both in Finland and in Minnesota. In Finland, over half (57%) of all Somali immigrants who were interviewed in the survey study (Castaneda et al. 2012) by the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare told that they had experienced some kind of significant traumatic event in Somalia. The most common experiences were living in the midst of war and witnessing how another person dies violently or is wounded badly. In Minnesota, Jaranson (2004) conducted a broad epidemiological study about the traumatic experiences of over 600 Somali refugees residing in Twin Cities. According to this study, 47% of the Somali women and 25% of the Somali men had experienced torture. PTSD-symptoms like anxiety, depression, and sleep disturbances were more common among these men and women. In another survey (Halcon et al. 2004) conducted among young Somali refugees in Minnesota, 44 percent of female and 50 percent male participants reported founding American life hard to understand. Over one-third (39%) of these young Somalis reported feeling alone in the United States. In Finland, in turn, every tenth less than 30-year-old Somali immigrant has told in the survey study (Koskinen et al. 2012) experiencing loneliness at least quite often, which can sign difficulties of young adults to find their own place and circle of friends between two cultures.
1.3.5 Housing Housing and living environment plays an important role in immigrants’ wellbeing and settling in. It can affect both physical and mental health, as insufficient living conditions can subject tenants to mold, dust or lead, and restless neighbourhood can create fear and security threats. Further, crowded living conditions can create tensions and high living costs unbearable financial burden. Also the immediate neighbourhood with its services, networks and opportunities serves as an important stage of living and integration. Although sharing a neighbourhood with fellow countrymen and -women can make settling in easier and create opportunities, it can also isolate from the mainstream society, create stigmas and make settling in even harder.
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The quality of housing can be measured through many indicators, such as the type and size of the accommodation, space available per person, share of living costs from total income and the reputation of the neighbourhood. Based on these indicators, the situation of the Somali community in Minnesota is challenging. According to the 2010 Census data, Somali households live most commonly in rental apartments in high-rise buildings. Further, they tend to have less space per person than the average households in Minnesota. Over 20 percent of the Somali households have more than one person per room; whereas among the general population less than 2% of the households have more than one person per room. In terms of neighbourhoods, Somali households tend to be located in areas and/or buildings, in which the average rent (528 dollars) is significantly lower than the state average (787 dollars). However, despite of living in low rent apartments that tend to be too small, the majority of the Somali households (63%) spend more than 30%3 of their total income for rent, which the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development defines as unaffordable. In a comprehensive study about the living conditions of Somalis in Minnesota, the most common complaint of the participants related to not having enough space. Due to high rents, many Somalis have to live in places that are too small, or share their apartments with friends and families. In some cases, families have been forced to live in different apartments. Another common complaint related to the condition of the apartment. Third point related to the neighbourhood, which many participants considered to be dangerous and not a safe place for their children (United States Census Bureau 2012b; Shio 2006; Dischinger 2009). Also in Finland Somalis’ living conditions are substantially debilitated by cramped rental apartments (Juntto 2005). It is suggested that the housing situation is caused partly by relatively large Somali households and partly by their scarce financial resources. The prevailing housing conditions can be explained also by an uncertainty in regards to the duration of staying in Finland, a lack of knowledge concerning housing markets, and discrimination (Kauppinen and Castaneda 2012). According to a survey study conducted in 2008 by European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 12% of Somalis residing in Helsinki area had experienced discrimination in the housing markets during the past year (FRA 2009).
1.3.6 P articipation in Decision-Making Communities and Organizations Originally the concept of citizenship had a lot to do with power, equality, and collective decisions. In the historical course of modernity these principles have found their forms in democracy and parliamentarism. ‘One man, one vote’ has been an 3 According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2009), cost of living shouldn’t exceed 30 percent of the monthly income, which means that on average, an affordable rent for a Somali family would be around 400 dollars. First of all, the average rent among Somalis is higher than that, and secondly, the share of rental apartments with such a low rent is tiny.
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important formal (though ideal) yardstick of civic equality for a couple of centuries. Despite this, immigrant members in different parliamentary organizations are still quite rare in many democratic societies. In the United States, immigrants without citizenship have very few formal opportunities in democratic life. For example, in Minnesota permanent residents without citizenship do not have voting rights, which rules almost 10,000 Somalis outside the democratic decision-making. Several Somali candidates have run for public offices in Minnesota with varying success. The first candidate was Mahamoud Wardere, who ran for Minneapolis mayor in 2001. Minnesota’s and nation’s first elected public official with a Somali background was Hussein Samatar (now deceased), who was elected to the Minneapolis School Board in 2010. In 2013, Abdi Warsame became the first Somali American to be elected to the Minneapolis city council. Although the success of Somali candidates has remained modest, Minnesota’s Somali community has proven to be a political force that can be mobilized for political participation. In the Cedar-Riverside neighbourhood, which has a very large Somali community, the voter turnout in primary elections grows drastically when Somali, or otherwise preferable, candidates are running (Vote.minneapolismn. gov 2016). According to the previous surveys and research (e.g. Saksela-Bergholm 2003, 252–254; Pirkkalainen 2013; Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 2013, 58), Somalis residing in Finland are societally and politically active as actors in different associations and as voters in elections as they have adopted relatively high level of electoral participation compared to the other immigrant groups in Finland (Pirkkalainen et al. 2016, 73–74). However, even there have been some Somali municipal politicians, their participation overall in decision-making offices has been rather low. In the latest municipal elections in 2012, there were 29 Somali candidates. They represented in total 0.4% of Somalis with the right to be elected. There have not been any Somalis in the Finnish Parliament, but Zahra Abdulla was the second runner-up in the 2007 parliamentary elections. In the parliamentary elections held in 2015, there was one Somali candidate, Abdirahim Hussein, but he was not elected either. It is noteworthy to remark that currently there are only two foreign-born Members of Parliament in the country. They are also the first ones in the history of Finnish Parliament who have not born in the neighbouring countries of Finland.
1.4 Conclusions Measuring social relations and changes occurring within them, such as integration of immigrants, is notoriously difficult and in the field of immigration studies there have not been in use general and universal indicators for this. Instead, researchers have typically chosen to use indicators which they, at the time, find most practical for their study. As an outcome of this, the ‘success’ of integration of a given immigrant group in a given country has been traditionally measured by using indicators
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such as employment rate, income level, housing and living conditions, language skills, received education, (un)usage of health and social services, life satisfaction, experienced discrimination, maintenance of one’s own cultural identity and language, acquired social networks, committed crimes, naturalization rate, participation in decision-making offices, and so on. In Finland, for instance, the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of immigrant integration has been conventionally measured rather narrowly by focusing particularly on indicators such as employment rate, skills in Finnish or Swedish, and acquired social networks, especially with the so-called original population. Also the “contextual collection of general information and demographic statistics concerning, for instance, legal status, employment, education, housing, health and access to health care, economic well-being, and participation in decision- making communities and organizations” or, in other words, indicators for the status of Somali communities in Finland and the United States presented in this chapter represent quite traditional instruments and methods employed by numerous studies before. Even though the indicators used in here are able to provide a somewhat detailed look on the status of Somali communities in Finland and the United States, and particularly in the state of Minnesota, and elaborate the similarities and differences in their situation, it is essential to be conscious of the limits of such “key figures and facts” as they are unable to reach and describe individuals’ everyday life with the required depth and sensitivity. In Finland, for instance, it is quite common to label Finnish Somalis as poorly integrated ethnic minority by referring to their alleged significant cultural dissimilarity and variety of statistics concerning, among other things, high unemployment rate and notable amount of committed crimes. As a consequence, there is a very one-sided understanding of Finnish Somalis prevailing in the public discourse which ignores their vivid social participation and also affects the attitudes of the ‘original population’ towards them (Open Society Foundations 2013; Pirkkalainen et al. 2016). The fact, however, is that the Somali population in Finland is not a homogenous group but consists of individuals with different life situations, occupations, and social networks, and who are related by anxiety about livelihood, experiences on discrimination, and fear of social exclusion of the young people (Pirkkalainen et al. 2016). As the recent development in global immigration movements implicates, the Somali community in Finland will continue to grow in future and Somalis’ role in the society will also constantly increase. However, in spite of their long-lasting duration in Finland, it is reported that they have faced a number of challenges to integration when estimated in certain core areas as brought up briefly in this chapter. While the state and local governments have developed multifaceted policies to help migrants find their way in Finnish society, there are still barriers, especially in finding employment and in the education sector. Furthermore, discrimination is considered major impediments to their integration process. The situation of Somalis in Minnesota reflects the overall situation of immigrant integration in the United States. In general, migrants tend to locate at the both extremes of the American society. In a similar fashion, some Somalis are integrating extremely well, whereas others struggle with marginalization. It is worth noting that
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Somalis have managed to enter the labor market in Minnesota better than in any other significant Somali hubs of the western world. But despite of that poverty is still very much present at the community, which also struggles to find adequate and affordable housing. And although the political participation and power of Somalis has increased significantly, the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ nevertheless creates distrust and discrimination. This polarity between integration and marginalization is especially present among the Somali youth. The number of young Somalis with college degrees keeps growing while at the same time other Somali youngsters end up with ethnic crime gangs or terrorist organizations.
References 301/2004: Aliens Act. 1386/2010: Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration. Abdi, C. M. (2011). The Newest African-Americans? Somali struggles for belonging. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 11(12), 90–107. Aden, S. (2009). Ikuisesti pakolaisina? Maahanmuuttokeskustelu Suomen somalialaisten näkökulmasta. In S. Keskinen, A. Rastas, & S. Tuori (Eds.), En ole rasisti, mutta… Maahanmuutosta, monikulttuurisuudesta ja kritiikistä (pp. 25–32). Tampere: Vastapaino. Bernard, D. L. (2006). Relations between Federal Law-enforcement and Muslims in Minnesota: Analysis and recommendations for improvement. Minneapolis: Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Brown, C. (2011). Gangs and terrorist. Dangerous classmates in Minnesota’s Somali community. Journal of Terrorism Research, 2(1), 78–80. Castaneda, A.E., Rask S., Koponen P., Mölsä M., & Koskinen S. (Eds.). (2012). Maahanmuuttajien terveys ja hyvinvointi. Tutkimus venäläis-, somalialais- ja kurditaustaisista Suomessa (Report 61/2012). http://www.julkari.fi/handle/10024/90907 Dayib, F. (2005). The experience and perceptions of Somalis in Finnish primary health care services. In K. Clarke (Ed.), The problematic of well-being: experiences and expectations of migrants and new Finns in the Finnish welfare state (Research reports series: A/9, pp. 21–75). Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto. Department of Homeland Security. (2015). Yearbook of immigration statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. Dischinger, J. (2009). Housing issues facing Somali refugees in Minneapolis, MN. Minnepolis: Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Forsander, A. (2002). Luottamuksen ehdot: Maahanmuuttajat 1990-luvun suomalaisilla työmarkkinoilla. Helsinki: The Family Federation of Finland. FRA. (2009). European Union minorities and discrimination survey (Main Results Report). http:// fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/663-FRA-2011_EU_MIDIS_EN.pdf Golden, S., Heger Boyle, E., & Jama, Y. (2010). Experiences of Somali Entrepreneurs: New evidence from the Twin Cities. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 10, 89–102. Halcon, L., Robertson, C., Savik, K., Johnson, D., Spring, M., Butcher, J., Westermeyer, J., & Jaransson, J. (2004). Trauma and coping in Somali and Oromo refugee youth. Journal of Adolescent Health, 35(1), 17–25. Finnish Immigration Service. (2014). Statistics. http://www.migri.fi/about_us/statistics Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. (2013). Maahanmuuttajabarometri 2012 (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment reports 11/2013). http://www.tem.fi/ files/35826/Maahanmuuttajabarometri2012_11_2013.pdf
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Fix, M. (2007). Securing the future: US immigrant integration policy: A reader. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Jaranson, J. (2004). Somali and Oromo refugees: Correlates of Torture and Trauma History. American Journal of Public Health, 94(4), 591–598. Joronen, T. (2012). Maahanmuuttajien yrittäjyys Suomessa. Helsinki: City of Helsinki Urban Facts. Juntto, A. (2005). Maahanmuuttajien asuminen – integroitumista vai segregoitumista? In S. Paananen (toim.), Maahanmuuttajien elämää Suomessa. Helsinki: Statistics Finland. Kauppinen, T. M., & Castaneda A. E. (2012). Asuminen ja toimeentulo. In A. E. Castaneda, S. Rask, P. Koponen, M. Mölsä, & S. Koskinen (Eds.), Maahanmuuttajien terveys ja hyvinvointi. Tutkimus venäläis-, somalialais- ja kurditaustaisista Suomessa (Report 61/2012). http:// www.julkari.fi/handle/10024/90907 Kilpi, E. (2010). The education of children of immigrants in Finland. DPhil. Oxford University. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/ora:4040. Koponen, P., Kuusio, H., Mölsä, M., & Keskimäki, I. (2012). Terveyspalvelut ja kuntoutus. In A. E. Castaneda, S. Rask, P. Koponen, M. Mölsä, & S. Koskinen (Eds.), Maahanmuuttajien terveys ja hyvinvointi. Tutkimus venäläis-, somalialais- ja kurditaustaisista Suomessa (Report 61/2012). Koskinen, S., Sainio, P., & Rask, S. (2012). Sosiaalinen toimintakyky. In A. E. Teoksessa Castaneda, S. Rask, P. Koponen, M. Mölsä, & S. Koskinen (Eds.), Maahanmuuttajien terveys ja hyvinvointi. Tutkimus venäläis-, somalialais- ja kurditaustaisista Suomessa (Report 61/2012). http://www.julkari.fi/handle/10024/90907 Mattessich, P. (2000). Speaking for themselves. A survey of Hispanic, Hmong, Russian, and Somali immigrants in Minneapolis-Saint Paul. Saint Paul: Wilder Research Center. Minnesota Chamber of Commerce. (2013). The economic contributions of immigrants in Minnesota. Minneapolis: Minnesota Chamber of Commerce. Minnesota Department of Health. (2005). A call to action. Immigrant health recommendations from the Minnesota immigrant health task force. Minneapolis: Minnesota Department of Health. Morrison, B., Wieland, M., Cha, S., Rahman, A., & Chaudhry, R. (2012). Disparities in preventive health services among Somali immigrants and refugees. Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health, 14(6), 968–974. Mulligan, S. (2009). Radicalization within the Somali-American Diaspora: Countering the homegrown terrorist threat. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School. Myrskylä, P. (2012). Maahanmuutto ja nuorten syrjäytymisriskit pääkaupunkiseudulla. Kvartti, 2/2012, 14–22. OECD. (2015). Indicators of immigrant integration 2015. Settling In. https://doi. org/10.1787/9789264234024-en. Office of the Refugee Resettlement. (2015). Refugee arrival data. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ programs/orr/resource/refugee-arrival-data Open Society Foundations. (2013). Somalis in Helsinki. At home in Europe. Open Society Initiative for Europe. London: Open Society Foundations. Pavlish, C. L., Noor, S., & Brandt, J. (2010). Somali immigrant women and the American health care system: Discordant beliefs, divergent expectations and silent worries. Social Science & Medicine, 71, 353–361. Pirkkalainen, P. (2013). Transnational responsibilities and multi-sited strategies. Voluntary Associations of Somali Diaspora in Finland. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 489. Thesis PhD. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. Pirkkalainen, P., Wass, H., & Weide, M. (2016). Suomen somalit osallistuvina kansalaisina. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, 81, 69–77 http://www.julkari.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/129972/ YP1601_pirkkalainen.pdf?sequence=2.
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Rask, S., Martelin, T., Nieminen, T., & Solovieva, N. (2012). Osallistuminen ja luottamus. In Castaneda, A.E., Rask, S., Koponen, P., Mölsä, M. & Koskinen, S. (Eds.), Maahanmuuttajien terveys ja hyvinvointi. Tutkimus venäläis-, somalialais- ja kurditaustaisista Suomessa. In Report 61/2012. Saksela-Bergholm, S. (2003). Mångkulturella organisationer och invandrarorganisationer i Finland. In M. Flemming (Ed.), Indvandrerorganisationer i Norden (275–281). Copenhagen: The Nordic Council of Ministers. Samatar, H. M. (2004). Experiences of Somali Entrepreneurs in the Twin Cities. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 4(2004), 78–91. Sarlin, T. (1999). Muslimit päivälehtien sivuilla. In T. Sakaranaho & H. Pesonen (Eds.), Muslimit Suomessa (pp. 128–134). Helsinki: Yliopistopaino. Scuglik, A., Lapeyre, W., & Logan, K. (2007). When the poetry no longer rhymes: Mental health issues among Somali immigrants in the USA. Transcult Psychiatry, 44(4), 581–595. Shio, T. (2006). Housing experiences of Somali immigrants in the Twin Cities, Minnesota: A Housing Careers Perspective. Thesis PhD University of Minnesota. Statistics Canada. (2013). National Household Survey (NHS) Profile. 2011 National Household Survey. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 99-004-XWE. Ottawa. Statistics Finland. (2012). Ulkomaalaiset ja siirtolaisuus 2011. http://www.stat.fi/tup/julkaisut/ tiedostot/julkaisuluettelo/yvrm_ulsi_201100_2012_6360_net.pdf. Statistics Finland. (2015). Employment. http://www.stat.fi/til/tyokay/index_en.html Statistics Finland. (2016a). Population structure. http://www.stat.fi/til/vaerak/index_en.html Statistics Finland. (2016b). Citizenships granted. http://www.stat.fi/til/kans/index_en.html The London’s Poverty Profile. (2014). Worklessness by country of birth. http:// www.londonspovertyprofile.org.uk/indicators/topics/work-and-worklessness/ worklessness-by-gender-and-country-of-birth/ Tiilikainen, M. (2003). Arjen islam. Somalinaisten elämää Suomessa. Tampere: Vastapaino. United States Census Bureau. (2012a). Sex by college or graduate school enrollment by type of school by age for the population 15 years and over. 2006–2010 American Community Survey. U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey Office. United States Census Bureau. (2012b). Selected economic characteristics. 2006–2010 American Community Survey. U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey Office. Vehmas, S. (2012). Maahanmuuttokirjoittelu sanomalehdissä. In M. Maasilta (Ed.), Maahanmuutto, media ja eduskuntavaalit (pp. 116–135). Tampere: Tampere University Press. Yusuf, A. I. (2012). Somalis in Minnesota (People in Minnesota). Minneapolis: Minnesota Historical Society Press.
Chapter 2
The Newest African-Americans?: Somali Struggles for Belonging Cawo Mohamed Abdi
America is God’s crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming!... The real American has not yet arrived. He is only in the crucible, I tell you – he will be the fusion of all races. ~Israel Zangwill Not merely a nation but a nation of nations. ~Lyndon B. Johnson
This article historicizes Somali migration and the context and content of the 1990s Somali influx to the United States (U.S.). It locates Somali migration experiences within the wider debates of integration and citizenship in the highly racialized U.S. context. The article highlights some of the key challenges Somalis are experiencing in urban America and their implications for settlement and belonging. Somali refugees’ limited human capital and their ongoing financial obligations to families left behind are two key factors that are shaping their settlement in the U.S. These entail significant implications for citizenship and the future of Somali-American as this new community reaps some of the benefits associated with migration while becoming further entrenched in inner city segregated urban America.1
Originally published in Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 11(1):90–107.
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C. M. Abdi (*) University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_2
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2.1 Introduction Migration anchors the essence of what it means to be an American. The “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) is made up of individuals, their parents, grandparents or even great-grandparents, who crossed oceans to seek better pastures for their families. In other words, America is synonymous with migration. In its core, it remains characterized by the different waves of immigrants from across the world who, over the last five centuries, sought their fortunes and fates in this land. However, being an American is also a contested notion, one that over its long history too often failed to measure up to its ideals. The slavery of Africans as well as the brutal treatment and extermination of many Native Americans also anchor the idea of belonging to this nation. From the founding of the nation at the end of the eighteenth century, cracks and contradictions in its ideals continue to manifest themselves through institutionalized discrimination and the exclusion of certain groups within its diverse population. It is this history of racial and class division and how it shapes the settlement experience of the latest waves of migrants today that will be the focus of this article. Drawing from years of primary research with Somalis in Minnesota and Ohio and other regions of the globe as well as secondary data, I want to locate Somali migration experiences within the wider debates about integration and the path to citizenship. My aim is to provide a portrait of some of the key challenges Somalis are experiencing in urban America and their implications for settlement and “belonging.” I argue that this community is reaping some of the benefits associated with migration while also becoming entrenched in inner-city, segregated urban America and is thus not enjoying full citizenship. The first part of the analysis provides a review of the assimilation debate and its iterations over the last century. I find that understanding this concept and the critiques leveled against it are essential for new migration streams into the United States. The second part of the article historicizes Somali migration and the context and content of the 1990s Somali influx into North America. This will be followed by a discussion of two key factors that I identify as being the bedrock of Somali experiences: Somali refugees’ limited human capital and their ongoing financial obligations to families left behind. These factors are vital to Somalis’ physical and emotional survival everywhere, while they also impede their settlement in America. The conclusion assesses the theoretical and policy implications of these challenges for citizenship and future Somali-American prospects.
2.2 M igration Waves: Assimilation, Alienation, and In-between The earliest scholars of migration explored the questions of identity and belonging, and the process of settlement and integration into the American community. These scholars, however, exclusively focused on the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century European newcomers in metropolitan American cities. The Holy
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Grail in migration studies as to how to understand the Americanization process centers on the notion of assimilation. One 1921 definition of this concept came from the Chicago School, where Robert Park and E. W. Burgess defined it as “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in common cultural life” (Park and Burgess 1921). This concept attempts to capture the process in which migrants take on the economic and socio-cultural characteristics of the majority population that they joined (Brown and Bean 2006). Early studies on these ethnic groups found that assimilation was definitely a process that took generations. As Alba and Nee put it, “[It] was only with the third, and in some cases, the fourth generations that the powerful undercurrent of assimilation came unmistakably to the surface” (Alba and Nee 1997). The dominant framework was that European migrants would, over a mere few generations, “melt” into the American mainstream or become acculturated into what some scholars called American “core culture” (Gordon 1964). Milton Gordon’s view was in fact normative in that it idealized the white Protestant and Anglo-Saxon middle-class economic and socio-cultural model as representing the culmination of assimilation in its full cycle (ibid.). The political context in which this debate occurred explains the attractiveness of assimilation, or what Israel Zangwill called the ideal of the American “Melting Pot” of all races. This “offered an idealistic vision of American society and identity as arising from the biological and cultural fusion of different peoples” (Alba and Nee 1997). This nationalist vision attempted to erase or undermine ethnic attachments to distant lands and was in line with nationalist discourses in war times. Different European groups, however, arrived at “assimilation” via different routes. For instance, unlike the earlier waves of Northern and Western European migrants, those from Eastern and Southern Europe experienced discrimination and even racialization that stigmatized them as inferior to the Anglo-Saxon stock in America (Schuck 1984). The newest European immigrants still strove to distinguish themselves from the African-Americans, who occupied the lowest rungs in the racial hierarchy in America (Ignatiev 1995). Their exclusion from the “core culture” was accompanied by their assertion of difference and superiority to African- Americans during the Jim Crow era. Despite their early experiences of racial and religious bigotry, these stigmatized groups eventually became part of the dominant “white” groups in America, as they integrated through socioeconomic mobility and intermarriage as well as residential integration. Other groups remained excluded from the assimilation debate. Illustrating their Eurocentricism in who they was deemed capable of assimilate, early proponents of this position wrote: In America it has become proverbial that a Pole, Lithuanian, or Norwegian cannot be distinguished, in the second generation, from an American born of native parents…As a matter of fact, the ease and rapidity with which aliens, under existing conditions in the United States, have been able to assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of American life have enabled this country to swallow and digest every sort of normal human difference, except the purely external ones, like color of the skin. (Park and Burgess 1921).
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Similarly, even scholars writing in late twentieth century presented the inevitable “truth” of the racial dynamics in America already acknowledged by Park and Burgess (ibid.). In this vein, Alba and Nee wrote in 1997 that: The most intractable racial boundary remains that separating those deemed phenotypically black from whites. This boundary is likely to exert a powerful influence on the adaptation possibilities of immigrant groups, depending on where they are situated with respect to it …. (Alba and Nee 1997)
Understandably, then, the assimilation paradigm of the first part of the twentieth century came under fire with the civil rights movement and the 1965 immigration law reforms, which transformed the source and the characteristics of immigrants. Prior to this time, American immigration laws curtailed non-European migration with discriminatory quotas that were only favorable to Europe (Delgado 1997; Center for Immigration Studies 1995). Hence, 1965 immigration policy reforms represented progressive attempts in line with the civil rights debates of the day and eliminated the legal discrimination embedded in earlier quota systems. These developments not only transformed policies dealing with American race relations, but also ushered in a new direction for assimilation debates. Scholars focusing on post-1965 migration, which was dominated by non- Europeans, highlight how race and ethnicity factor into the Americanization experience. The former disregard or even attempt to explain the experiences of African-Americans, as well as the diversity of the Asian and South American dominated migrations, undermined the old straight-line conceptualization of assimilation. The emerging discourse on migrant settlements analyzed the structural barriers intrinsic in American racial stratification and its consequences for migrants of color. Scholars such as Glazer, Moynihan, and Portes highlighted how racial stratification and structural conditions in America can block assimilation outright. This racial and ethnic disadvantage perspective brings to the fore how factors other than agency and social capital can play a pivotal role in whether groups integrate economically, residentially, and politically. This is not to say that race or ethnicity is solely a burden, but rather that these can be both resources as well as burdens in migrants’ pursuit of mobility (Glazer and Moynihan 1970). A more recent extension of this debate combines the straight-line assimilation arguments with the ethnic/racial disadvantage paradigm. Portes’ and Min Zhou’s formulation of “segmented assimilation” underscores that while assimilation defined as upward mobility and integration of newcomers holds true for some skilled migrants enjoying high levels of human capital, the opposite is true for the majority of labor migrants of color, who also assimilate, but join those on the margins of American racial and socioeconomic stratification (Portes and Zhou 1993). Attention to the structural barriers that Americans on the margins—as well as millions of labor migrants with extremely limited human capital—confront in America is key to understanding the type of assimilation that occurs and how race and class factor into this process. This formulation pays attention to “the contextual, structural and cultural factors” that lead to divergent paths of assimilation (Brown and Bean 2006).
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2.3 Portrait: Somali Migration to America Somalis are part of an increasing African migration trend that commenced in the 1970s. Though migrants and refugees categorized as “Black” in the American racial scheme remain numerically small when compared to Asians and Latin Americans, this group nevertheless represents a significant segment of the American ethnic mosaic. According to the Population Reference Bureau, immigration accounted for “at least one-fifth of the growth in the U.S. black population between 2001 and 2006” (Kent 2007). Those from the African continent accounted for one-third of the foreign-born blacks in America in 2005 (ibid.). The African presence in the United States is intrinsically tied to the founding of this nation, when millions of enslaved Africans were transported for plantation work. Following the abolition of slavery in the early nineteenth century, there was virtually little or no migration from the African continent to the Americas. Black migration to the United States in the first part of the twentieth century only consisted of small numbers originating in the Caribbean. This changed with the liberalization of immigration laws, which also coincided with technological advancements in travel as well as the independence of many African nations and subsequent economic and political turmoil in post- colonial Africa. It is within this historical context that the political catastrophe in Somalia triggered one of the largest refugee resettlement programs in the United States. In fact, Somalis are the largest African refugee population in the U.S. today, accounting for 5.5% of all refugees admitted between 1983 and 2000, but 25.4% of those admitted between 2001 and 2005 (ibid.). For the latter time frame, only Cuba has sent more refugees to the U.S. (31.4%). The state of Minnesota has become home to two of the largest refugee populations in recent history: the Hmong in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Somalis since the early 1990s. The Somali refugee presence in Minnesota owes much to the strong voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) in this Midwestern state. These organizations sponsor and assist refugee resettlement programs. A combination of the very strong Minnesota economy in the early 1990s (with unemployment dipping to around 2% in the late 1990s, the lowest rate in the whole country2) and the presence of the robust refugee assistance network largely explain the Somali concentration in Minnesota. Chain migration naturally follows once you have a large enough number of any group establishing itself in a given metropolitan setting, with newcomers benefitting from the settlement experiences of earlier migrants, with their accumulated knowledge of local practices and institutions. Somali migration to America is hence a recent phenomenon and only took off following the collapse of the Somali state in the late 1980s. Close to 100,000 Somalis have been granted refugee status since 1990. This number excludes those born in the United States, which is probably a significant population given this community’s high birth rate (Ronningen 2004; Minnesota Department of Human 2 Minnesota’s Job Market: Land of 1000 Opportunities. The Economist (1999, May 27) at http:// www.economist.com/node/208084
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Services 2009). A small number of Somali students came to the U.S. in the 1960s through the 1980s. Some of these students returned once they completed their education, whereas some had no choice but to stay on in America, with a change in immigrant status from student to asylee or refugee. Thus, the analysis of Somali migration to America over the last two decades covers an extremely narrow span of time, and mostly involves data collected from the first generation and their children. The analysis and conclusions presented on Somali settlement thus represent reflections on the trajectory of this emerging community in its relations with other groups in America as well as its adjustment to its new home.
2.4 Refugee Status, Family Obligations, and Relative Poverty Two key factors integral to understanding Somali settlement experiences in America are the limited human capital that they came with and their financial obligations to kin left behind. First, human capital refers to Somali refugees’ overall educational levels and language and other knowledge and skills. While Somalis who came to the U.S. prior to the collapse had higher educational levels, the majority of newcomers had very low levels of formal schooling. The opportunities available to the majority of Somali youth to acquire formal education in a predominantly nomadic society were severely limited. Except for a small number who were educated through an English curriculum in the Northern parts of Somalia and another group that were educated either in Italian or Arabic in the South, formal educational institutions were non-existent in colonial Somalia. Positive legacies of the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre were the Somali script in the early 1970s and the expansion of educational opportunities to a larger segment of the population in towns and cities. Educational opportunities involved primary and secondary education in Somali, with limited post-secondary educational prospects. Consequently, even Somali refugees who had some post-secondary education in the home country came to the Western world with very limited English language skills and with educational credentials that were difficult to transfer to American labor markets. This limited human capital has great ramifications for their settlement in America. The second factor that is instrumental in our understanding of the Somali settlement experience involves the collapse of the Somali state in the late 1980s and the resulting displacement and impoverishment of millions whose physical and material security was utterly compromised. More than a million Somalis fled to Kenya and Ethiopia and in fact hundreds of thousands of them remain in a protracted refugee condition. Those who made it out of these difficult circumstances and who arrived in the developed world have left their immediate and extended family members in these precarious situations. Strong family ties inherited from Somali culture and the Islamic faith promote a commitment to support and provide for dozens or even hundreds of kin left behind. Such obligation is significant for Somali migration and settlement strategies and has real consequences for their socioeconomic tactics and attitudes toward their new society.
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2.5 Federal and State Refugee Assistance Laws Understanding the refuge experiences of survival in a context of dispersion and settlement in different parts of the globe is crucial in order to appreciate refugee agency while remaining cognizant of entrenched structural barriers migrants and refugees confront in America. The social and economic challenges Somali refugees are experiencing in the United States remain steep. In contrast to labor migrants, refugees automatically qualify for numerous types of federal, state, and local support to assist them in their settlement and integration process. Though refugee assistance in the form of cash that VOLAGs provide is limited to less than year, the majority of refugee families qualify for cash assistance, food stamps, and subsidized housing, as well as medical care, through their federal and state human and health services departments. This provision remains vital for poor refugees’ economic and survival strategizing. My ethnographic work within this community leads me to conclude that social services remain a crucial part of the economic survival of Somali refugees in America as well as other developed nations. A large segment of this refugee community, including intact families who have at least one parent working, depends on these services. State assistance is crucial for these families since one parent’s salary is unlikely to meet the subsistence needs, the market price housing rental, and the skyrocketing private healthcare insurance required for a family. This holds true for most Somali men and women who either work in low-paying jobs in which healthcare is not provided, or work as taxi or truck drivers, or run small family stores that only cater to their co-ethnics. There is rich scholarship that details the marginal economic opportunities available to low-skilled refugees in American metropolitan areas in the current post- industrial economy (Wilson 1995; Waldinger and Lee 2001). Access to state and federal support, which are reduced over a longer stay in the country, continues to be essential for refugee families whose decisions and economic strategizing require them to maximize public benefits as well as employment income. Like many other poor Americans, Somalis often combine work and public assistance, and thus benefit from many state and federal services as well as local charity organizations while pursuing educational and employment opportunities. Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) data from the Minnesota Department of Human Services shows that an important segment of the Somali population relies on public assistance for their everyday survival. MFIP helps low-income families with children to meet their basic economic needs, through cash grants for a limited term of 60 months, as well as with food stamps. This program also assists individuals in accessing skills and language training. Utilizing these services does not mean that these individuals are not in the labor force. On the contrary, Somalis on MFIP have higher average reported earned income than whites and other African-Americans on this program, with an average monthly earning of $1065, second only to Asian-American income (Minnesota DHS 2009). Urgent demands to support families left behind in conflict zones, whose needs take precedence over attempts to pursue educational and skills
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development, can hinder these commendable efforts. Stretching an income that is already low relative to the mainstream standard in order to meet the basic needs of multiple families has major consequences for the refugee household in America (Abdi 2006). This cycle of work, public assistance, and financial remittances to families elsewhere diminishes the ability of individuals and families to save and to execute long-term financial planning for them and their children. Many resort to survival techniques that involve planning from month to month, placing them in a precarious socioeconomic position. Consequently, Somalis accounted for over 6% of all MFIP eligible adults in Minnesota from 2003 to 2009. This group is thus overrepresented on public assistance rolls and has lower levels of success in welfare-to- work efforts than all other groups, including Hmong refugees and African-Americans (Minnesota DHS 2003). The overall level of human capital in this refugee population in part explains the high dependency on government support. For example, Somalis have one of the lowest rates of high school completion of MFIP participants (Minnesota DHS 2009). Overrepresentation in government assistance ranks and its consequences also emerge from the recent American Community Survey, which highlights Somali refugees’ marginal socioeconomic position within the larger American society. This report found that Somalis experience extreme poverty rates when compared to all groups, including other African migrants, other black migrants from the Caribbean, and African-Americans. The 2007 American Community Survey found Somalis to have the highest poverty rate of all newcomers to America, closely followed by those born in Iraq and the Dominican Republic. At a 51% poverty rate, this level of poverty was in fact four times the national rate in the U.S. for that year, and double that of other African-Americans (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). This high poverty rate is in stark contrast with the average median income of Muslims in America, a group hailed as “Middle Class and mostly mainstream” by a recent Pew Research Center Report. Muslim Americans on average compare well to the U.S. public in terms of education and income, with 41% of Muslim families having an average median income of $50, 000 or more annually (compared to 44% of the general population) (Pew Research Center 2007). Consequently, Somalis arguably stand in an extreme position when compared to other Muslims in America, as well as to the African- American population, which on average fares worst in all social-economic indicators. Going back to our earlier theoretical discussions of how new groups might be integrated into their new societies, high poverty rates translate to Somali integration into the lowest strata in the racial and economic stratification in America. This statistical data relating to welfare dependency, as well as the findings from the American Community Survey, are consistent with my findings from ethnographic work with the Somali community. What emerges from this research is the difficulty of securing sources of income that are sufficient to permit them to get off public assistance. This is especially the case for women with children, who in the Minnesota case account for 84% of Somali families on MFIP (Minnesota DHS 2009). Most of these individuals have very limited language and training skills, and thus have an extremely difficult time joining the labor force for any length of time. While pressured by MFIP to train and seek employment, dozens of Somali women
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that I have interviewed report that they fail to let go of this safety net. Their only employment options are often in sectors like janitorial services that require them to work at night when they have childcare commitments. A small number of these women end up seeking strategies to extend their 60-month eligibility on the grounds of health and disability. Again, while the trauma of civil war and the violence that followed probably explains some of these requests, such applications are often made out of desperation for the need for public assistance, which is critical to both their survival and the survival of their kin back in Africa. In addition to income insecurity, access to decent housing remains an integral part of immigrants’ integration. Consistent with the persisting racial and economic segregation in America (Wilson 1995; Massey 1995; Jargowsky 1996; Goldsmith 2002; Charles 2003), refugee newcomers become part of the American socioeconomic stratification that separates inner-city dwellers from those in suburbia. Inner-city America continues to be dominated by racially marginalized groups that are mostly composed of African-Americans and Hispanics (ibid.). Moreover, inner-city areas are often plagued by crime, violence, and poorly performing schools. Refugees and many labor migrants of color who cannot afford high rental prices come into direct contact and competition with those in the lowest socioeconomic strata in the American community. These groups’ inclusion into inner-city America supports the segmented assimilation approach that Portes and Zhou (1993) postulated, and results in the racialization of newcomers of color into the Black American category. Somalis distinguish themselves from African-American inner-city residents. Their low level of human capital and their financial obligations to kin left behind, however, promote their active pursuit of affordable public housing. This produces the strong intra-ethnic resource of a highly developed Somali network to share information about public housing across the nation. Some families even travel to faraway places that do not have large refugee populations, such as North Dakota or Nashville, to secure public housing with the plan to eventually return to their original state. Clearly this testifies to the desperation for affordable housing that many refugees experience. Market costs of $1000–$1500 for apartments and houses remain out of reach for many who are reliant on government subsidies often combined with low-paid, unskilled work. That this income is shared with dozens of immediate and extended family members elsewhere and is thus stretched beyond its limits further makes public housing demand within this community understandable. The stigma mainstream Americans attach to inner-city housing was non-existent for Somali refugees when they got here. This is changing, however. Recent media coverage of Somalis living in very dangerous public housing complexes in Omaha, Nebraska, illustrates the discrepancy between the security concerns of these refugees, who fled from civil war, and the crime and drug problems that plague some of these inner-city areas. Somali families in this public housing became so terrorized by the constant threats and crime in their neighborhood that they stopped coming out of their houses, and even stopped sending their children to school.3 3 Security Stepped Up at Southside Terrace. Action 3 News (2011, January 28) at http://www.wardheernews.com/News_2011/Jan/28_security_stepped_up_at_south_side_terrace.html
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In states with significant numbers of Somalis, one can find whole public or subsidized housing complexes that are now predominantly Somali residential areas. Examples of these include the Cedar-Riverside area in Minneapolis, the Lexington complexes or Afton View apartments in St. Paul, and the Capital Park apartments in Columbus, Ohio. Some of these housing complexes were formerly African- American areas, but these have been replaced by a flow of Somalis who share information about the units and their availability, and thus create a “chain” replacement and concentration, or segregated, area. One positive consequence is the creation of a community niche within these alien urban centers where Somalis find psychological security within their own group. Moreover, these areas provide business opportunities for a small number of these refugees, with halal groceries and clothing stores. But the overall depression that plagues these areas with low-performing schools and high crime rates persists and negatively impacts newcomers. Somalis are now becoming more apprehensive about the consequences of this type of housing for them and their children, but most continue to view affordable housing, no matter where this might be located and no matter its stigma, as a requirement in order to survive while fulfilling their multiple commitments to family members in different parts of the world. Public assistance and public housing are indisputably necessary for the initial survival of newcomers. Yet potential ramifications for the prospect of success of the “1.5 generation,” as well as the second generation and beyond, require attention. Research on black Caribbeans in the U.S. shows that most first-generation Caribbean parents brought with them strong cultural and human capital. This group resisted American racialization schemes with concerted efforts to distinguish themselves from the African-American population─through overt usages of accent, through claims of having a better work ethic, through assertiveness that differs from that of African-American employees. Many of their children nevertheless became integrated into the African-American inner-city cultural attitudes toward mainstream society as well as institutions. This represents “segmented assimilation,” or the integration of different groups into various sectors of society, with the expectation that those immigrants whose socioeconomic and human capital most resembles those of African-Americans will fare worse than others (Portes and Zhou 1993; Gans 1992). Mary Waters, who has done extensive work on this topic as it relates to West Indian migrants, cogently argues that these parents’ strong cultural and human capital cannot compete with the institutionalized American racial discrimination (Waters 1999). She shows how “residential segregation and de facto educational segregation” influence the life chances and future prospects of many in the second generation (ibid.). The second-generation Caribbeans identify with their African-American peers with a perspective informed by a sense of exclusion, “outsiderness,” and of not benefiting from the American dream. The experiences of “Black” immigrants are important for our Somali case study and especially for the prospects of the younger population in this group. Data from the Census Bureau shows that Somalis constituted the group with the youngest population of all foreign-born groups, with
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a median age of 26.8 – compared to an average median age of 36.7 for all U.S. residents (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). How the 1.5 generation as well as the very young first generation fare in the educational and employment spheres will influence the trajectory of Somalis either as part of the lowest strata in American society or as part of an integrated Muslim-American community, maintaining its cultural and religious identity while integrating into mainstream America. Finally, integration in America entails enjoying the rights granted to all citizens, which intrinsically brings to the fore the role of the nation-state in allocating rights and responsibilities to its members. These rights include civil rights (rule of law, free speech, etc.), political rights (participating in the political process, elections, voting, etc.), and social rights (provision of welfare, health care, unemployment insurance, disability insurance, etc.). The degree of provision of any given right, however, differs from country to country in most developed Western democracies. For example, the social rights provided to Canadians or to the British, such as universal health care, continue to be contested in the United States. Also, accessing federal public services is highly stigmatized in the American context, in which social citizenship debates lag those of Europe (Lawson and Wilson 1995). Fraser and Gordon (1998) point out that in the United States: Receipt of welfare is usually grounds for disrespect—a threat to, rather than a realization of, citizenship. In the area of social services, the word ‘public’ is often pejorative. Public hospitals are institutions of last resort, sites of stigma, not solidarity. The connotations of citizenship are often positive, powerful, and proud, while those of welfare are so negative, weak, and degraded that social citizenship here sounds like an oxymoron.
Fraser and Gordon’s discussion of this stigma highlights a key challenge Somalis confront to full citizenship in the American context. Of course, other poor and marginalized groups also experience this challenge, which involves how individuals in any given society actively engage in shaping their nation-state. As Isin and Siemiatycki (1999) put it, “citizenship is not a static experience: citizens actively struggle to change both the meaning and boundaries of citizenship itself”. Thus, citizenship becomes a practice, a lived experience, in which members of a given society shape and are also shaped by full engagement with the social, economic, and political institutions that prevail in a given historical moment (ibid.). Somali migration at its core was due to a failure of the freedom to practice citizenship, with dictatorial rule that limited all rights and then with myopic warlords that toppled one dictator to subject people to multiple forms of terror. One can argue that the notion of citizenship in both its legal and sociological varieties is a new concept for Somalis living in the American context. Access to public services, protection from violence, and the ability to vote (once naturalized) are all common rights that Somalis are accessing. But Somali experiences of pervasive poverty and segregation, as well as their classification as a pariah public burden—or what Fraser and Gordon (1998) call “charity cases”—can curtail their full exercise of citizenship.
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2.6 Conclusion This article has two conceptual and two policy implications that I would like to emphasize. It is important to reiterate the very short time span that has passed since Somalis settled in the United States in large numbers. Their struggles are in many ways consistent with what earlier groups with similar socioeconomic and educational backgrounds endured. Hence, one should not read this analysis as a suggestion that their current condition is their destiny. Theoretically, the Somali case reinforces the trends observed in earlier analyses, such as Portes’ and Zhou’s (1993), which point out the barriers to integration that unskilled, post-1965 migrants of color confront in the American arena. This case study shows how Somalis’ low level of human capital contributes to their marginalization in the United States. However, there is a dual process at play in this case: while segmented assimilation stresses the process of new groups with low human capital joining those on the margins of society, this Somali case study shows how they voluntarily segregate and distinguish themselves from African-Americans. This group is also involuntarily being segregated from mainstream white America by socioeconomic imperatives pushing them into public housing. Thus, the nature of the Somali location in the American stratification system testifies to this refugee groups’ agency in rejecting American racialization schemes, while structural conditions place them in marginal inner-city ghettoes. Given the recent nature of Somali migration, it is difficult to know how the 1.5 generation and the second generation will fare, but trends observed in the schooling and resources available in the areas in which Somalis are concentrating indicate a continuation of this segregation and further marginalization within the wider American society. A second conceptual implication relates to the exercise of citizenship. While segregation might provide a certain level of security for a group thanks to ethnic cooperation and shared resources, its long-term impact is detrimental for all of society. It undermines shared interests across racial and class divisions. Moreover, limited contact across groups entrenches prejudices and separation, with some groups becoming further excluded from belonging to the imagined community (Goldsmith 2002). The irony is that while Somalis’ co-ethnic interdependency in America, as well as with their kin elsewhere, represents the ultimate citizenship ideal of common destiny and mutual obligation and solidarity, their exclusion and limited resources in America place them on the margins of mainstream America’s understanding of social rights. That view is intrinsically based on the “contractual” agreement whereby only those who contribute to the pot may draw benefits from the social contract (Fraser and Gordon 1998). Somalis contribute to different pots: one in Somalia, where millions of people are surviving thanks to remittances from low- wage and low-prestige employment in America, often combined with American social service benefits. They also contribute to an American pot in the form of cheap labor. These contributions, however, are viewed as incommensurate with what they draw out, which can generate resentment from mainstream Americans who stigmatize them as burdensome and parasitic.
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This article also provides two important policy ideas. A community that is relatively new and relies heavily on public provisions is bound to face a backlash on the policy front. Similar to some European nations, the current economic recession the United States is pushing for severe austerity measures that include restrictions on public assistance. Despite this environment, understanding the multiple competing obligations that migrants and refugees negotiate everyday can help policymakers better address the challenges migrants confront in their integration process. For migrants to reap the myriad opportunities America provides, there needs to be a more concerted effort to incorporate them into the American fold, through better- funded programs to build migrant and refugees’ meager human capital. Such investment enriches the American mosaic and the American economy, with newcomers fostering a rich, diverse, and productive American labor force. Second, an investment in programs that promote a better understanding of what it means to be an American, with knowledge of the beauty as well as the ugly scars in the history of this great nation, can also accelerate the newcomers’ process of integration. Such understanding would permit newcomers to appreciate the long struggles of minorities, such as African-Americans, as well as the contentious dynamics of nation building in which Americans of all races participated. Such an investment would support new immigrants in better understanding their citizenship rights as well as obligations. The absence of such policy-level efforts will lead to limited immigrant engagement with the greater society and with American institutions. This can only further entrench their marginalization and undermine their participation in the political process. Remaining on the margins of society entails devastating long-term repercussions for future Somali-Americans, and we all have an obligation to prevent such a calamity.
References Abdi C. (2006). Diasporic lives and threatened identities: Gender struggles of Somalis in America. PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Sussex, East Sussex, UK. Alba, R., & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration. International Migration Review, 31(4), 826–874. Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Brown, S. K., & Bean, F. D. (2006). Assimilation models, old and new: Explaining a long-term process (Migration information source, pp. 3–41). Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Center for Immigration Studies. (1995). Three decades of mass immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 Immigration Act. Retrieved online at https://macaulay.cuny.edu/eportfolios/aries15/ files/2015/01/cis.org-Three_Decades_of_Mass_Immigration_The_Legacy_of_the_1965_ Immigration_Act.pdf Charles, C. Z. (2003). The dynamics of racial residential segregation. Annual Review of Sociology, 29(1), 167–207. Delgado, R. (1997). Citizenship. In J. F. Perea (Ed.), Immigrants out!: The new nativism and the anti-immigrant impulse in the United States (pp. 318–323). New York: New York University Press.
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Fraser, N., & Gordon, L. (1998). Contract versus charity: Why is there no social citizenship in the United States?. In G. Safir (Ed.), The citizenship debate: A Reader (pp. 114–137). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gans, J. H. (1992). Second-generation decline: Scenarios for the economic and ethnic futures of the Post-1965 American immigrants. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 15(2), 173–192. Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. P. (1970). Beyond the melting pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Goldsmith, W. W. (2002). From the metropolis to globalization: The dialectics of race and urban form. In S. S. Fainstein, & S. Campbell (Eds.), Readings in Urban theory (pp. 129–149). Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell/Blackwell Publishing. Gordon, M. M. (1964). Assimilation in American life. New York: Oxford University Press. Ignatiev, N. (1995). How the Irish became white. New York: Routledge. Isin, E. F., & Siemiatycki, M. (1999). Fate and faith: Claiming urban citizenship in immigrant Toronto (Working Paper No. 8, Working Paper Series). Toronto: Joint Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement. Jargowsky, P. A. (1996). Take the money and run: Economic segregation in US metropolitan areas. American Sociological Review, 61(6), 984–998. Kent, M. M. (2007). Immigration and America’s Black population, 62 (4). Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau. Retrieved at http://auth.prb.org/pdf07/62.4immigration.pdf Lawson, R., & Wilson, W. J. (1995). Poverty, social rights, and the quality of citizenship. In K. McFate, R. Lawson, & W. J. Wilson (Eds.), Poverty, inequality and the future of social policy (pp. 150–169). New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Massey, D. S. (1995). The new immigration and ethnicity in the United States. Population and Development Review, 21(3), 631–652. Minnesota Department of Human Services. (2003). Measuring Minnesota family investment program performance for racial/ethnic and immigrant groups (Study brief #7). Minnesota Department of Human Services. (2009). Racial/ethnic and immigrant groups participating in the Minnesota family investment program and the diversionary work program (REIS #15). Park, R. E., & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Introduction to the science of sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pew Research Center. (2007). Muslim Americans: Middle class and mostly mainstream. Retrieved online at http://www.pewresearch.org/2007/05/22/ muslim-americans-middle-class-and-mostly-mainstream/ Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 530(1), 74–96. Ronningen, B. (2004). Estimates of selected immigrant populations in Minnesota: 2004. Population Notes, Minnesota State Demographic Center. Retrieved online at http://www.healthadvocates. info/IMG/articles_litreview/MNimmigrant_estimate.pdf Schuck, P. H. (1984). The transformation of immigration law. Columbia Law Review, 84(1), 1–90. U.S. Census Bureau. (2008). Income, poverty, and health insurance coverage in the United States 2007. Retrieved online at https://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf U.S. Census Bureau (2009). Census Bureau data show characteristics of the U.S. Foreign-Born Population. Retrieved online at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/american_ community_survey_acs/cb09-cn01.html Waldinger, R., & Lee, J. (2001). New immigrants in urban America. In R. Waldinger (Ed.), Strangers at the gates: New immigrants in Urban America (pp. 30–79). Berkeley: University of California Press. Waters, M. C. (1999). Black identities: West Indian immigrant dreams and American realities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wilson, W. J. (1995). Jobless ghettoes: The disappearance of work and its effect on urban life. New York: Knopf.
Chapter 3
Mainstream or Margins? How Somalis Perceive Their Status and Possibilities in Finnish and American Societies? Marko Kananen
Immigrant inclusion is typically measured on the socioeconomic scale of wellbeing. Both the Refugee Act of the United States (1980) and the Finnish Integration Act (2010) depict economic self-sufficiency, employment and language skills as the goals of immigrant inclusion. But inclusion can also be perceived subjectively as feelings of belonging and acceptance. This article examines how Somali migrants in Finland and in the United States perceive their status and possibilities in Finnish and American societies. Do they see themselves as equal members or do they experience conflicts between their ways of being and the requirements of the mainstream society? Although these social identifications alone do not cause or prevent marginalization, they nevertheless play an important role in en- or discouraging individuals, and providing information about the barriers and possibilities of inclusion.
3.1 Background and Introduction Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2009) define mainstream as the majority that sees itself as the core of the nation. As the mainstream status is accompanied with structures of opportunity and powerful socioeconomic incentives, the question of its entry requirements is not irrelevant. Who can successfully claim to be part of the mainstream and consequently enjoy the status and opportunities it brings along? This demarcation between the insiders and the outsiders of the society is especially
M. Kananen (*) Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre, South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_3
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prominent for migrants, who are trying to establish memberships in their new homes. As put by Chang and Aoki (1997), long after crossing the geographic borders of the receiving society, migrants still have to face the ‘borders within’ that regulate their transition from margins to mainstream. These ‘borders within’ do not treat the newcomers equally, as some migrants seem to cross them with relative ease, while some others remain in the margins. In a big picture, immigrant inclusion into the mainstream has commonly happened ‘vertically’ through an upward mobility. Skilled and educated newcomers have generally managed to enter the mainstream more easily, whereas migrants with limited financial, human and social capital have struggled with exclusion (e.g. Massey and Sanchez 2010; Portes and Zhou 1993). But inclusion can also happen ‘horizontally’, as the social and cultural norms of the society change and new ways of being are accepted as part of the mainstream. For example, in the United States Catholicism and Judaism were once perceived with suspicion before being included as religions of the mainstream America (Alba and Nee 2009). In this two-dimensional model of inclusion (Hocschild 2013), vertical inclusion thus refers to a socioeconomic status and it materializes among others in labour market incorporation, income level and residential integration. Horizontal inclusion, in turn, refers to the categorical distinction between the ways of being that can be incorporated under the banner of ‘Finnish’ / ‘American’ and, those that are labelled as ‘foreign’. Barriers and possibilities of inclusion therefore not only relate to migrants’ capitals and skills, but also to factors such as race, age, gender, ethnicity or religion, over which they have very little or no control. Further, these two dimensions of inclusion do not necessarily coincide. A person can be vertically included into the mainstream, have a good job and live in a wealthy neighborhood, but still feel like he or she is not at home or accepted as an equal member. As the ‘Facts and Figures’ article of this book details, the majority of the Somalis both in Finland and United States seem to struggle on the vertical axis of inclusion. The educational attainment among Somalis is low, the unemployment rate is high, and as a result, poverty is a common problem among Somalis in both countries. In order to complement the picture of Somali inclusion, this chapter pays attention to the horizontal boundaries that Somalis face in Finnish and American societies. Building on Alba and Nee (2009), who define social boundary as a categorical distinction that the members of a society recognize, and that affects their mental orientations and actions toward one another, and Morawska (2011), who writes about the ‘dynamic limits of the possible and the impossible’ within which people conduct their activities, this analysis explores how the Somali participants perceive their status and possibilities in Finnish and American societies. Do they see themselves as members of the mainstream or do they experience conflicts between their ways of being and the requirements of the mainstream society? Additionally, how do they negotiate the boundaries they experience, and what are the (intended and unintended) consequences that these negotiations have on the horizontal boundaries of Finnish and American societies?
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The importance of analysing the horizontal boundaries of inclusion follows the fact that they greatly impact the opportunities of vertical inclusion as well. As noted among others by Mary Waters (1994), the societal perception of individual’s or group’s status not only influences the way opportunities and resources are d istributed, but also the way individuals comprehend their place and possibilities in that society. Similarly, Alba and Nee (2009) have emphasized the importance of these mental orientations. For example, in the United States, those second-generation migrants, who see themselves remaining in their parents’ status at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, are more likely to drop out of school and join the socioeconomic underclass than those, who can imagine themselves rising in the socioeconomic hierarchy. And although these upward or downward adaptions, as entailed in Portes and Zhou’s (1993) seminal concept of ‘segmented assimilation’, do not cause or prevent marginalization by themselves, they nevertheless play an important role in en- or discouraging individuals and widening or narrowing the ‘limits of possible’ (Morawska 2011) within that society.
3.2 Questions, Data and Methodological Considerations The focus of this article is on those horizontal boundaries of inclusion that separate insiders from outsiders. Unlike the vertical status, which can be measured e.g. through employment, income level or residential integration, the different stages of horizontal inclusion are far more difficult to capture. Following Alba and Nee (2009, 11), this chapter defines horizontal inclusion as a condition, in which individuals do not “sense a rupture between participation in mainstream institutions and familiar social and cultural practices”. In other words, the mainstream status of a horizontally included individual is not questioned or denied, and he or she does not have to modify or justify his or her ways of being and belonging in order to fit in. All the others, in turn, might occasionally have to employ different strategies of identifications and dis-identifications in order to ‘prove their worthiness’ and to avoid being labelled as foreign. For example, in Nazli Kibria’s (2000) study, the second generation Asian Americans tried to secure their status within the realms of the mainstream society by striving to speak unaccented English. Building on the notion that excluded or ‘questionable’ minorities have to modify their ways of being in order to be included, Fredrik Barth (1969) has argued that minority identities are formed through processes of ascription (negative labelling and boundary work done by the mainstream) and self-definition (positive labelling and boundary work done by minorities). According to Barth, the newcomers learn over time the stereotypes that the members of the mainstream have about their group, and embrace those that advance their interests and resist those that justify their exploitation and exclusion. For example, in Mary Water’s (1994) seminal study about the identifications of the second-generation black migrants in New York
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City, some participants adopted a strong Caribbean identity in order to avoid the negative consequences of being labelled as African Americans. However, it is important to be aware that attempts to fit in are not the only possible response to the horizontal boundaries. Among others, Massey and Sanchez (2010) remind us that negative labelling can also lead to opting out and to adoption of an identity, which explicitly rejects any identification with the mainstream society. The way the migrants comprehend and negotiate the labels they encounter matters greatly, because as Ewa Morawska (2011) has noted, migrants actions can have both intended and unintended consequences to the horizontal boundaries of the society. For example, by staying committed to labels that challenge their status as mainstreamers, included migrants can try to contest and change the existing boundary; and vice versa, by distancing themselves from contested labels they leave the boundary untouched. For analytical purposes, Alba and Nee (2009) have distinguished three boundary-related processes: crossing, blurring, and shifting. Boundary crossing corresponds to the classic version of individual-level assimilation: someone moves from one group to another without any real change to the boundary itself. Boundary blurring, in turn, implies that the social profile of a boundary has become less distinct, and the clarity of the social distinction involved has become clouded. The final process, boundary shifting, involves the relocation of a boundary so that a group once situated on one side are now included on the other. To summarize, this article, firstly, looks at how the Somali migrants experience the horizontal boundaries of the American and the Finnish societies. Do they see themselves as members of the mainstream or do they experience conflicts between their ways of being and the expectations of the mainstream society? Secondly, how do they negotiate the boundaries they experience? Do they (have to) jettison their contested ways of being in order to fit in, or do they rather keep distance to the mainstream society. Thirdly, what are the intended and unintended consequences of these negotiations to the horizontal boundaries of inclusion? Do the participants manage to challenge the boundaries in a way that would improve the ‘limits of the possible and the impossible’ (Morawska 2011) for Somalis, and consequently enhance their inclusion in Finnish and American societies? In order to understand how the Somali migrants in Finland and in the United States experience and negotiate the horizontal boundaries of inclusion, this chapter relies on interviews conducted with Somalis in Finland and in the United States. Interview questions revolved around participants’ life trajectories, their feelings of identifications and belonging, as well as the difficulties they have encountered as migrants in Finland and the United States. Interview data were analysed through a method of dialogical thematization (Koski 2011), a process of deconstruction and reconstruction. Firstly, statements that could be interpreted as expressions of (dis) identifications, ways of (not) being and feelings of (not) belonging were sought out of the data. After this deconstructive phase, these findings were arranged into wider themes according to their common denominators.
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3.3 D iscrimination against Somalis According to Existing Research and Statistics Finland is traditionally portrayed as a calm Nordic welfare society with no strong and visible political conflicts between divergent population groups. In recent years, however, the dividing lines in Finnish society have deepened and a heated public debate has sprung up focusing on immigration and integration policies. Although refugees and asylum-seekers in general are facing increased criticism, hardships and even violence (e.g. Lehti et al. 2014), the situation of Somalis seems to be especially challenging. According to the official figures, Somalis are the most common target for racist crimes and discrimination in Finland (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009; Niemi and Sahramäki 2012). Also in the United States, Somalis experience discrimination and harassment in schools, workplaces and on free time. In terms of employment discrimination, the statistics of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2013) show that the number of religion-based discrimination charges involving Muslims is increasing nation-wide. Somali employees have also filed several discrimination cases against their employers. In the field of education, federal investigations into allegations of harassment toward Muslim students of Somali origin have been launched against school districts in the state of Minnesota. Further, in a survey Somalis reported that they feel that law enforcement officials treat them with suspicion and special scrutiny because of their ethnic and religious identities (see e.g. Bernard 2006; Yusuf 2012). Existing research seem to suggest that Somalis are especially vulnerable for discrimination and exclusion as they carry with them many of the most stigmatized identity labels. Firstly, as migrants they are prone to the common stereotypes of an uneducated and -skilled group living on welfare (e.g. Pew Research Center 2015). However, as noted by Nazli Kibria (2011), migrants’ reception reflects also the status and the reputation of the state of origin, and its relationship with the receiving society. In the case of Somalia, the long-lasting civil war and instability, as well as the unsuccessful US-led military operation of the early 1990s and the adjacent Hollywood blockbuster Black Hawk Down, and more recently the rise of islamistic Al-Shabaab and the piracy at the Gulf of Aden have ensured that the ethnic label ‘Somali’ is not a neutral one either in Finland or the United States (e.g. Collins 2012; Yusuf 2012). Secondly, upon arrival, Somali immigrants enter a racialized space in which they are often for the first time in their lives constructed and treated as Blacks (Ibrahim 1999). In addition to feelings of being mislabelled and -presented, this racialized identity can create many social, cultural and institutional barriers (e.g. Lewis 2004; Bigelow 2008). For example, in Minnesota, Somali pupils and students have reported that teachers lower expectations for them because of their race (Basford 2010). Further, the fact that many young Somalis have ‘become Black’ (Forman 2001) and engaged in hip-hop culture and fashion, has caused tensions not only with their African American peers, but also with Somali parents and elders (Abdi 2011;
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Bigelow 2010; Tiilikainen et al. 2013). As a result, young Somalis forced to navigate the racialized system face a risk of a triple-marginalization, a situation in which institutional discrimination coincides with rejections from home and the African American peers. In order to avoid these difficulties, many Somalis have consciously distinguished themselves from African Americans. Research suggests that this is commonly done by emphasizing a religious identity as Muslims (e.g. Berns McGown 1999; Shepard 2008; Sheikh Omar 2012). Although visible identification with Islam can help to avoid the racialized identity, it brings along a whole new set of challenges. According to several studies, Somali boys and men are being accused of being terrorists and un-patriotic, whereas Muslim girls are being stereotyped as oppressed (Asher 2008; Leet-Otley 2012). As a result, Somali communities commonly feel like being under surveillance and being treated with suspicion and special scrutiny because of their religious identity (Ajrouch and Kusow 2007; Sirin and Fine 2007; Bernard 2006). Somalis thus negotiate and contest various cultural, racial and religious discourses of American and Finnish societies. The findings section looks more closely at how the Somali participants experience these different labels in their daily lives. Firstly, it examines the subjective levels of identifications by asking how the participants define their identifications and their ways of being and belonging. But because identities are not simply assumed, but also declined and imposed, I analyze also the structural level of identity work by asking what kind of tensions the participants experience between the social perception of their status and their own sense of self and belonging, and the ways they deal with these tensions.
3.4 Findings 3.4.1 I dentifications: I’m Somali/I’m Going to Make This Country Home In the legislation and public discourses, immigrant inclusion is measured predominantly on the vertical axis of inclusion. For example, both the Refugee Act in the United States (1980), and the Integration Act of Finland (2010) depict economic self-sufficiency, employment and language skills as the goals of immigrant inclusion. But inclusion can also be perceived subjectively as feelings of identifications and belonging. When asked about their identities and identifications, the participants of this study both in Finland and in the United States perceived themselves first and foremost as Somalis. In the following excerpt, a young Somali woman in Finland expresses this view in a typical, self-evident manner. Oh my gosh. Somali is my, I don’t know, it’s my people, I’m Somali, I love Somali people because they understand me. We are with the same culture, we understand everything. And I love Somali. And everybody love his country to stay with her, with it. But if there is no peace, you are not feeling that you will be alive tomorrow. You can go another country that is better than. So we love our country, our people, Somali and I’m proud being Somali.
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Unlike the young woman of the excerpt, who came to Finland very recently, many of the participants of this study have left Somalia at an early age. But although they do not have any or many personal memories or experiences of their country of birth, the Somali identity is nevertheless important for them. In the following excerpt, young Somali woman from Minnesota, who came to the United States when she was three years old and has not been to Somalia ever since, reflects on her identifications with Somalia and the United States. Despite of growing up in Minnesota, she sees herself firstly as a Somali. I am very proud of my culture. I wouldn’t deny it. If somebody told me, “What are you?”, first I would say Somali and then American. We’re all immigrants from somewhere, so being labelled Somali is something I’m very proud of.
These two reflections align with several studies (e.g. Kapteijns and Abukar 2004; Bigelow 2008) that acknowledge the strong sense of cultural confidence and pride that Somalis in diaspora tend to have. In general, the participants of this study define their Somali identity through a shared heritage and culture, common language and faith, as well as commitment and connectedness to people who share these characteristics. But in addition to the feelings attached to their Somali identities, the participants express also identifications with their current places of residences: Finland and the United States. In the following excerpt, a young man from Minnesota, who earlier in the interview described himself as a Somali, expresses the pride that he feels about being part of the American society. I live here in the States and I’m really proud to be part of this society and I mean, if I’m going to make it in this country, I’m going to make this country home […] I actually don’t know why would someone leave here? It’s the best country in the world, I think.
In a similar fashion, some of the Somali participants in Finland express their proudness about being Finns and their willingness to contribute to the Finnish society. I’m very proud to be Somalian and I’m also very proud to be Finnish, Finn citizen. I live with this Finnish society, and also I don’t like to come here to benefit from the Finnish society but we like to bring our good, pass to this Finnish society.
The extract above reveals one noticeable difference in the ways the participants define their American/Finnish identities and their Somali identities. Instead of ethno-cultural elements or similarity between the people, the participants define themselves as Americans and Finns foremost through their participation in that society. Especially working and paying taxes, and in general contributing to the society was often presented as the core of their Americanness/Finnishness. At the end of the day, it’s about making the place where you are living at that moment better. If the economy of this country is bad, it’s me who’s suffering and if the economy of this country is good, it’s me who’s getting an advantage from that. […] When it comes to the betterment of the environment that you’re living, I think everyone is responsible to do their share and to be part of a society.
As such, the participants define their American / Finnish identities in accordance with the civic republican spirit. According to Deborah Schildkraut (2007), the civic
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republican interpretation of a national identity emphasizes the responsibilities of individuals – everyone should be involved in social and political life and pursue ends that serve the public good. An important aspect of this kind of civic republicanism is that it is not in conflict with the ethnic, cultural and religious identifications that the participants express in connection to their Somali identity. As noted by Schildkraut (2007), the only normative boundary that civic republicanism places on membership in the receiving society is the demand to be involved in public life. In the United States, this distinction between ethno-cultural and civic identifications was occasionally elevated as the epitome of the American way of life. I think the fundamental process of any community is to live better, live with your neighbors in a good way, and pursue your life in a way best that you feel in. You can go to your Mosque and pray. Keep your religion perspective. Keep your cultural background, your language, and your upbringing. At the same time, be a part of the society. Contribute back. We want people to succeed, to live to their full potential and, at the same time, contribute to society. That’s the American way of life.
This combination of ethno-cultural Somali identity and the civic American/ Finnish identity forms the common constellation among the participants. In this constellation, being an American/Finn falls under the sphere of vertical inclusion (employment and participation) whereas Somali identity relates more to the horizontal inclusion (different ways of being). But the remaining question is whether it is possible to maintain this kind of cultural and communal distinctiveness and still enjoy the advantages of the mainstream status, or does the ethno-cultural identity hinder the mainstream participation? The remaining parts of this section pay attention to the tensions of living in these two belongings, and the strategies that the participants use to solve them.
3.4.2 I mmigration: We all Came from Somewhere / you Still Remain Immigrant Heated debates around immigration and immigrants are commonplace both in Finland and in the United States. Although practically all U.S. residents are descended from immigrants of one kind or another the opposition to immigration is nothing but rare (e.g. Pew Research Center 2015). Also in Finland, immigrants face currently harsh criticism. In the interviews, the Somali participants in both countries express their concerns about the prejudices that the label ‘immigrant’ brings along in Finnish and American societies. Especially the persistent stereotype of immigrants being unemployed and living on welfare is widespread in both countries. In the excerpts below, Somali participants from Minneapolis and Helsinki talk about this stigma. Some of the stereotypes we have to fight against here is that we are on welfare. We keep collecting taxpayers’ money. […] So they’re seeing that people are using the welfare system for temporary support and they plan to get out of it, but initially when everyone was going to the DHA’s office, there were so many stereotypes.
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I’ve been in Finland for 18-years now, and I’ve never met a person, especially a Somali person, who would say that ‘I don’t want to work’. But then if you look at how people talk about the Somalis: we live on welfare, we want to life on welfare, and that we are good for nothing. I think it’s really sad, and it disturbs me from time to time.
Related to the stigma of immigrants being unemployed and living on welfare is the fact that educated Somali professionals in both countries tend to face belittling and mistrust concerning their expertise and knowledge. In the excerpt below, a counsellor from Minnesota talks about the confusion that the people entering his office commonly experience. So when people come here, they will look at me here and say, “Okay, where is the counsellor?” and I say, “It’s me.” “Oh, no, we are looking for the counsellor.” That happens many times to me. So that is one thing, but I don’t get mad. […] I say “I am the counsellor and I can help you. So come here and sit and I’ll work with you. I might still have an accent on my English and I might be a Somali, but I’m the person who is in this office.
Somali professionals in Finland are also familiar with this phenomenon of belittling and questioning of their expertise. In the excerpt below, one of our participants talks about an occurring incident during his candidacy at the Finnish municipal elections. As a professional of social work, he was eager to talk about the current issues of social politics in the debates organized for the candidates. However, he was constantly faced with surprised reactions and mistrust concerning his expertise on that field. When I am taking part in a debate or a panel discussion, or when I talk about the social welfare reform, people give me strange looks. They are trying to figure out who I am. It is really hard for them to accept that I know what I’m talking about and that I know what I’m doing, even though I’m not a native-born Finn.
Although Somalis in Finland and in the United States face similar stigmas related to their background as migrants, their reactions differ greatly. In the United States, the Somali participants attempt to turn over the negative connotations of the label by drawing a connection between themselves as migrants and the current members of the mainstream society as the descendants of migrants. Everyone came from somewhere. If someone asks you and you tell them you’re from Somalia, he’s going to go, “Oh yeah, I’m originally from Germany. My grandma is from…” So even though everyone is crazy about being an American and all that, when it comes to the reality, people talk about their roots, whether they’re from Sweden or Germany or Finland or Africa.
It is noteworthy that instead of building a connection to other refugee populations that have arrived to the U.S. during the same time span as Somalis (such as Vietnamese, Iraqis or Liberians), the Somali participants see their situation to be similar with the second and third wave of the so called European immigration (1840–1914). During that period, immigrants from Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia and Southern and Eastern Europe arrived to the U.S and eventually took their place at the American mainstream (Alba and Foner 2006). As the excerpts above and
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below show, Somalis in Minnesota see themselves following the same path as their European precursors did over a century ago. This is how the Irish did it when they came here first. This is how the Germans did it. This is how every community, the Italians, how they did. This is it. This is the good part of the history of this country and that’s what helps us to be who we are.
The fact that the participants hold the European immigration as their point of reference reveals an upward adaption concerning their status and possibilities in the American society. As noted by Alba and Foner (2006), the European immigration is usually portrayed as the one making upward progress and achieving success. This is then contrasted against the post-1965 immigration, which mostly came from Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, and which many observers consider to be facing far more uncertain and gloomy prospects. Therefore, for the Somali participants, the identification with the European immigration is not only an attempt to give a positive twist on the stigma of being an immigrant, but it is also as a source of hope and empowerment about their possibilities in the American society. The Somali participants in Finland, in turn, are struggling to turn over or evade the negative stigma of an immigrant, and the exclusion and lack of opportunities it brings along. In the Finnish immigration history, the arrival of the first Somalis in the early 1990s marks not only the beginning of the large scale immigration, but also the fervent and often sensational and problem oriented public debate about immigration (see the ‘Facts and Figures’ article of this book). As a result, Somali immigrants have involuntarily become the faces of this negative discourse, and therefore it is extremely hard for them to distance themselves from the label or to draw from historical examples of successful inclusion. On the contrary, as one of our participants elevates below, the label ‘immigrant’ effectively and permanently draws the line between the insiders and the outsiders of the Finnish society. There is a difference when we compare it to the North America. Because they are all immigrants. But here the difference is that even if you stay a hundred years, you still remain immigrant. This is the Finnish society. So, it is not very good.
In Finland and in the United States, the different immigration histories and the discourses around them thus enable different adaptions concerning the status and possibilities of immigrant populations. In the United States, the Somali participants build on stories of upward mobility and inclusion of the previous European immigration, where as in Finland, the Somali participants recognize exclusion as the main motif of the Finnish immigration story. It is the Finnish culture, I don’t know, it comes from the history and culture, the history that the Finns have gone through, wars and everything. That is why everything that is foreign is strange for the Finns. The foreign has always come here to take over and to rule. So maybe that’s why you are always rejected if look different or if you come from somewhere else.
It should be once more noted that these adaptations alone neither explain the differences in the life courses among the migrants, nor necessarily reflect their actual
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opportunities in that society. They do, however, provide valuable information about the different ways that the individuals of a given society recognize the categorical distinctions between different groups, and the different limits of possible and impossible under which these groups conduct their daily lives. The fact that the American Somalis can imagine themselves as equals with the current members of the mainstream does not abolish the struggles that many migrants face in the U.S., but it can make a difference on the level of personal grit and empowerment. And on the contrary, the fact that for the Finnish Somalis the label ‘immigrant’ resonates with rejection and exclusion can cause discouragement and alienation.
3.4.3 Race: It’s Up to You/I’m Not Blonde Race is a highly important and sensitive topic especially in the United States. In addition to the statistics and social and economic indicators documenting the racial disparities that reach from education and employment to income, health and personal safety, the recent Black Lives Matter -movement have indicated that the racial tensions in the United States are far from over even 151 years after the abolishment of slavery. Among the Somali participants of this study, there is an acknowledgement about the racial barriers and discrimination that takes place both in the United States and in Finland. You have the same rights as anyone else, but you still are living this life of discrimination. That doesn’t change. There’s a problem. I mean, when you read a story about someone who was fired because of his skin colour or someone who wanted to buy something from a store but he was followed by the store owner because they thought he was going to steal and all that, when you see all that around you, it’s hard to feel at home. The problem is that the Finnish people, or maybe I can say that in Lieksa, people, it was strange for them to see black people here. So this is all, it was remote area so they didn’t know so that it was a kind of a surprise them to see them here. And a place, a small town like Lieksa so it was, first years was difficult. People were trying to abuse us, to say that ‘you are…’ you know what.
The way the participants in Finland and in the United States deal with racial tensions and the label ‘Black’ differs significantly. In the United States, the participants, on the one hand, acknowledge that there are racial tensions and discrimination in the American society but, on the other hand, they present it as something impacting only the African American community and not the Somali community. In the excerpt below, one of our participants from Minneapolis presents this distinction between the Somalis and the African Americans. African Americans, especially the ones that are poor, they feel that they have this anger. They’re angry because they’ve lived in this country, they feel like they’re entitled to something, but they’re still poor. […] To us, Blacks and Whites are the same. We don’t have that Black and White mentality. We don’t have that, I would say, inferiority complex. That’s why you see Somalis successful in business. They don’t feel at any time that this Finnish guy or American guy is better than me.
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The fact that the participants are renouncing the impacts of racial discrimination on their lives can be interpreted as an upward adaption towards the mainstream status. This is in line with the findings of Ajrouch and Kusow (2007) who, based on their study with Lebanese and Somali immigrants in the United States and Canada, suggest that those migrants who see themselves as members of the mainstream do not (have to) acknowledge the structural discrimination in a same way as the marginalized groups do. The following excerpt from an entrepreneur from Minneapolis portrays this alleged difference in the mental adaptions between the Somalis as members of the mainstream and the African Americans as members of the socioeconomic margins. So the African American community here, they lived there for hundreds of years before Somalis come but to today, they say they still see racism. To Somalis, racism, “What is that?” It’s something that doesn’t cross their mind, doesn’t come to cross their path. […] If I did feel like, okay, the whole system and everything is against me, I would feel like the African American community here. If they’re always against you, why put up with anything? So you rebel, right?
The key point of this excerpt is the notion that if the participant would believe that he is being discriminated against because of his race, he would act and think very differently. “If they’re always against you, why put up with anything? So you rebel, right?” This underscores the importance of the mental adaptions about one’s status and possibilities in a given society. Through disassociation with the African American community, the Somali participants distance themselves from the stigma and the negative connotations attached to their race. Instead of the well-documented structural problems related to race in the United States, the Somali participants emphasize individual agency as the key factor for success in the American society. They commonly refer to Barack Obama as the ultimate example of how even for Black people everything is possible in the United States. However, although the story of Obama, a son of a Black immigrant who became the leader of the country, is true and compelling, it does not abolish the other side of the story. According to many social and economic indicators, the situation of Black people has consistently got worse over the past years. Nevertheless, out of these two stories, the Somali participants seem to be adapting to the one emphasizing hope and possibilities instead of the one emphasizing struggle and exclusion. In Finland, these kinds of disassociations and distinctions within the label of Black seem to be unavailable for the Somali participants. As one of our participants elaborates in the following extract, the physical appearance of Somalis serves as an indicator of their foreignness and un-Finnishness. In Finland, being Black thus seems to lump people of colour together and place them behind the horizontal boundary of the mainstream Finland. When you are walking on the street, for example me, when I’m walking on the street, I’m just a foreigner. No matter how long I have been here. No matter if I was born here or not. Just you know. I’m just, according to physical appearance, I’m not blonde and blue-eyed and such a thing. And it does take, I think it takes a very take long time so that the Finnish people understand that we are living here, same vote, same situation.
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3.4.4 Religion: It’s a Bad Time/Such a Contradictory Topic Although the Somali participants in the United States seem to adapt themselves upward to the mainstream society, there is an aspect of their identity that severely challenges this status. Indeed, many participants emphasize how the fact that they are Muslims causes constant tensions between their Americanness and Somaliness. The burden we are carrying with is the religion. The stigmatization spells out the religion. If there was a Somali Christian, they won’t be stigmatized, trust me. […] The burden we are carrying, and we don’t hide our religion, that’s the difficult part. We don’t know how to hide or how to do it not in the forefront. We just put it in the front whether you like it or not. That’s the part where you have the difficulties. After September 11th, things got very difficult for us. So I used to have my mat and wherever I go, I just pray. People did not expect me to be a terrorist or something. But right now if I do that, people will suspect, “What is he doing? Is he one of the people blowing up themselves?”
For the female participants the misconceptions related to Islam are even more salient, as they all wear hijabs and are therefore visibly announcing their religious identity. In the following excerpt, one our participants describes a recurring situation, in which her religious identity as a Muslim has caused her to be othered, and where her self-identified status as an American has been (at least temporarily) contested. The only area where sometimes it’s challenging is when people walk up to me, and it’s funny because that’s the identity that I mostly identify with is my American identity, where people are like, “Oh, you sound real American.” I’m like, “What do you mean I sound real American? What is that supposed to mean?” Oh yeah and then I think of my attire and the way I look and I’m like, “Oh yeah, that makes sense.”
Ajrouch and Kusow (2007) have discovered similar challenges in their research with Lebanese and Somali Muslims in North-America. Especially for the Lebanese women, who based on their race are part of the white mainstream, the introduction of Islam as a part of their identity represented an instance where this majority group membership is threatened. In the excerpt above, our participant’s ability to speak fluent English i.e. to ‘sound real American’ deflected the otherness related to Islam and allowed her access back to the mainstream (see also Kibria 2000). But later in the interview, she also elaborates on cases in which this othering has caused more concrete harm. I interviewed for like 50 jobs and I genuinely believed at some point that I was not getting hired because of the way I dressed. I had people tell me, “Take your scarf off. Just wear a suit for the day of the interview. Then shock them on the first day.” I was like, “I don’t want to shock them on the first day. I’m not trying to give people heart attacks”, you know?
It is important to acknowledge that the participants’ reactions to racial and religious othering are very different. The racial boundary of inclusion is crossed through disassociation with the African Americans and through the emphasis on individual agency and opportunities. Religious boundary, in turn, is acknowledged as something that affects their everyday lives and limits their opportunities. And instead of
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crossing this boundary, the participants try to change it. They want to participate in the mainstream society visibly as Muslims and, as put by our participant above, not “give people heart attacks”. In other words, the Somali American participants of this study are hoping that through their example the stigma that is currently attached to Muslims would blur in future. Compared to the United States, the question of Islam is brought up relatively rarely in the interviews conducted in Finland. Unlike in the U.S., where it is clearly acknowledged as the most difficult label to overcome, in Finland it seems to blend in with the all-embracive label of a foreigner or a non-Finn. However, there is some evidence that also in Finland Islam is an especially fiery topic. In the following excerpt, one of our participants talks about the reactions he received after he suggested publicly that a mosque should be built in the city of Helsinki. Islam is an important issue for me, and I have tried to take a stance, but it has always caused such a big stir. For example, I wrote a blog, in which I argued why we should build a mosque in Helsinki. So many people read and commented it that it became a news. I got so much feedback. Even good people were advising me to not to talk about topics like this, because then people wouldn’t vote for me. Even my closest friends told me to drop such a controversial topic. Otherwise, people think that I am trying to convert the whole Finland and turn all the Finns as Muslims.
This excerpt serves as an indicator of the role and the space that Islam has within the Finnish mainstream society. The participant writing the blog entry has been relatively successful in Finland. He is involved in local politics and he has gained recognition both within his party and the city officials. In a way, he has managed to escape the all-embracive stigma of a foreigner and the exclusion it tends to brings along. But even for a person, who has been approved and recognized within the Finnish mainstream society, the attempt to discuss the role and space of Islam in Finland is considered at best as controversial, and at worse as something that would make people question his inclusion into the Finnish mainstream.
3.5 C oncluding Remarks: You Just Work Hard / Find a Solution Together The findings section of this analysis began with an observation that the Somali participants in Finland and in the United States attempt to both retain their ethno- cultural distinctiveness as Somalis, but simultaneously attain a full membership in the American and Finnish societies. However, as the latter parts of the section have illustrated, their quest for inclusion is challenged by many boundaries that are based on their ethnicity, race, religion and their status as immigrants. The participants in Finland and in the United States react to these boundaries in different ways ranging from dissociation to disputing. This final part of the findings section attempts to aggregate these reactions and to scrutinize their impact on the horizontal boundaries of the Finnish and the American societies. Do the reactions of the participants
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improve or decrease the limits of possible within the Finnish and American societies? In the United States, the participants’ reactions to racial, religious and immigration boundaries are all different, but they share a common underlying assumption. Namely, the right to be different within the mainstream America can be redeemed by working hard and rising in the socioeconomic hierarchy of the society. In the following excerpt, a young Somali American man from Minneapolis presents these challenges and the way to overcome them. Then how about if you are a Black, then a Muslim, then an immigrant? That’s the worst scenario and that’s me, you know? Even despite that, I think, I mean, it’s everybody’s responsibility to, we can’t just be sitting down and be like, “I’m doomed. I can’t really move a finger.” So you can’t say that. You just work hard and work ten times harder than other people and you’re going to make it.
The logic of this statement is that in order to overcome all the labels of foreign (in this case Black, Muslim and immigrant) outsiders have to work hard – ten times harder than the insiders. Through this hard work, the social boundary separating the insiders from the outsiders eventually loses some of its importance and it becomes possible to join the mainstream despite of carrying some of the identifiers of foreign. This aligns with Alba and Nee’s (2009) notion about the ‘culturally codified notions of appropriate behavior’ as a way to overcome the boundaries between the migrants and the mainstream. By signaling behavioral attributes that seem familiar and trustworthy, it attenuates the effects of the boundary despite of the persisting physical, social and cultural differences. In the following excerpt, a young woman from Minneapolis uses this logic to explain how Somalis can counteract the negative stereotypes. We’re very out there. We’re very colorful. We’re very traditional. We walk the streets. But we also own businesses. We contribute financially. People see that and so, because of that, whatever negative perception they may have had, there’s someone there that’s going to counteract that. So if someone believes Somali women are housekeepers that never had a job, they will have someone like me as a co-worker, you know what I mean?
In this constellation, the colourful and traditional Somali women redeem their right to be different by working, owning businesses and contributing financially. Statements like these fit well together with the popular image of the United States as a society that values the ideal of a self-made (wo)man who is able to take care of oneself rather than relying on government or welfare. Building on this ideal, the participants commonly emphasize how their ethnicity as Somalis is not only compatible, but in fact highly beneficial for the demands of the American society. Because of the long history or nomads and successful entrepreneurs, Somalis are able to take care of themselves and to flourish in the United States. The Somali participants in the United States are thus building the culturally codified notion of appropriate behavior around the grand narrative the American Dream (Adams 1931), i.e. the ability to achieve upward mobility regardless of social class or circumstances of birth.
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This commitment might seem surprising considering, firstly, that among the general population, the support of the American Dream is on decline,1 and secondly, that for the vast majority of Somalis in the United States this dream is far away from reality. Furthermore, although this chapter has emphasized the positive impacts that the ‘upward adaptation’ has for individual’s grit and perseverance, it is important to note that these individual reactions also have a collective effect. By emphasizing individual effort as the key to upward mobility, the blame for possible failure becomes individualized as well, and as a result, marginalized individuals are stigmatized even further. This relates closely to the model minority myth,2 with which the Asian American community in the United States is struggling with. As the assumption that hard work alone guarantees certain socio-economic status does not correspond with reality (about meritocracy myth, see e.g. Rowman & Littlefield 2004), the idea of upward mobility and socio-economic status as preconditions of inclusion only fortifies the inequality of the American society. As such, it ignores the structural problems that keep many Somalis in the socio-economic margins, and rather than lowering the boundaries of inclusion, it actually makes the upward mobility even harder for the majority of the Somali community who currently live in the socioeconomic margins. In Finland, the situation is very different. In a way, it seems like the horizontal boundary that Somalis face in Finland is so comprehensive, that it is very hard to claim any membership in Finland or any ownership of Finnishness. Unlike in the United States, where the participants can draw distinctions within racial categories, build connections between migrants and the mainstream, and in general, claim a membership in the mainstream America, in Finland the demarcation between the mainstream and margins seem to follow a binary logic of Finns vs. foreigners. The Finnish Somali participants also acknowledge this difference between the United States and Finland. They are so much ahead of us. They call themselves American Somalis. But when you meet a Somali in the Nordic countries, they say “I’m a Somali”. Only very rarely you can hear somebody saying “I’m Swedish Somali”. You are either a Somali or an immigrant. You can pick one. When I was in Minnesota, I wondered that. I asked “how do you identify yourselves”. And one of them answered for all “We are American Somalis”, and that’s it.
Later in the interview, the Somali man quoted above acknowledged that the fact that Somalis in Finland cannot claim Finnishness for themselves is not a matter of rhetoric, but it also affects the way they see themselves and their possibilities in Finland. For him, the experiences of exclusion and the constant need to explain and
1 In 2014 American Values Survey, nearly half of Americans who once believed in the American dream think it no longer exists. 2 According to the model minority stereotype, Asian American students are academically and economically successful because of their Asian cultural norms. Those students that are able to live up with the standards are held up as examples for others to follow, and those unable to meet them are deemed failures or substandard for their race (Lee 2009).
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justify his existence in Finland are not just causes of personal frustration, but one of the key problems of immigrant inclusion in Finland. Even after 20 years, I still have to explain why I’m here. I hear that question all the time. They ask people “why are you here” and they send them 20 years back just when they are trying to look forward. It is this identity problem. If we could solve it, this country would take a giant leap forward.
Unlike the Somalis in the United States, who are trying to attach themselves to the mainstream by adopting a super-American attitude of hard work and meritocracy, the Somalis in Finland struggle to find a way to be Finns outside of the traditional ethno–cultural definition. As a result, the only way available for them seems to be to try to get the mainstream society involved in a dialogue and negotiations about the definitions and the boundaries of Finns and Finnishness. If we talk about multicultural society, we have to involve immigrants and people who have come from different places into the common dialogue. We have to try to find solutions together. You can’t just talk on our behalf, or talk against us. We have to be around those tables where these issues are discussed. Only that way we can create a healthy multicultural society.
Although the Somali participants’ attempts to widen the boundaries of the Finnish mainstream through negotiations align well with the Finnish political culture that emphasizes compromises over confrontations, they do not challenge the binary logic of ethno-cultural Finns and the foreigners. Rather than seeing themselves as equal and undisputable members of the mainstream society as the Somali Americans do, the Somalis in Finland unintentionally renew their status as half- Finns, as someone who need to be approved by the mainstream society. Therefore, in terms of the adaptions of the Somali participants, the American society seems to be producing immigrants that are (almost) too encouraged about their opportunities, whereas the Finnish society seems to producing immigrants that are (almost) too discouraged about their opportunities.
References 1386/2010: Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration. Abdi, C. M. (2011). The Newest African-Americans? Somali struggles for belonging. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 11(12), 90–107. Adams, J.T. (1931). The epic of America. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Alba, R., & Nee, V. (2009). Remaking the American mainstream: Assimilation and contemporary immigration. Boston: Harvard University Press. Alba, R., & Foner, N. (2006). The second generation from the last great wave of immigration: Setting the record straight. Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ second-generation-last-great-wave-immigration-setting-record-straight Asher, N. (2008). Listening to hyphenated Americans: Hybrid identities of youth from immigrant families. Theory Into Practice, 47(1), 12–19. Ajrouch, K. J., & Kusow, A. M. (2007). Racial and religious contexts: Situational identities among Lebanese and Somali Muslim immigrants. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(1), 72–94.
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Pew Research Center. (2015). American trends panel survey. Washington, DC. Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 530, 74–96. Schildkraut, D. (2007). Defining American identity in the twenty-first century: How much “there” is there? The Journal of Politics, 69(3), 597–615. Sheikh Omar, Y. (2012). Social integration and the sense of hope among Somali youth in Australia and the United States. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 12(9). Shepard, R. M. (2008). Cultural adaptation of Somali refugee youth. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. Sirin, S., & Fine, M. (2007). Hyphenated selves: Muslim American youth negotiating identities on the fault lines of global conflict. Applied Development Science, 11(3), 151–163. The United States Refugee Act of 1980 (Public Law 96–212). Tiilikainen, M., Ismail, A., & Tuusa, E. (2013). Somalis in Helsinki. New York: Open Society Foundation. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (2013). Religion-based charges. http://www. eeoc.gov/eeoc/events/9-11-11_religion_charges.cfm Waters, M. (1994). Ethnic and racial identities of second-generation black immigrants in New York City. International Migration Review, 28(4), 795–816. Yusuf, A. I. (2012). Somalis in Minnesota (People in Minnesota). Minneapolis: Minnesota Historical Society Press.
Chapter 4
The Call of the Homeland: “My Relationship to Somalia Is Difficult to Explain” Marko Kananen
Somali migrants in Minnesota are actively involved in the American society through education, employment, entrepreneurship and political participation, but they also remain connected to their homeland through kinship, economic, religious, political and cultural ties. Although the contemporary communication technologies have made these connections more accessible, the relationship to the country of birth is nevertheless not an easy one. This chapter explores how Somali migrants in Minnesota comprehend their relationship to their distant homeland. By paying attention to the differences between the first and the 1.5-generation migrants, this chapter contributes to the ongoing debate about the transmission of diasporic orientations from one migrant generation to another.
4.1 Introduction Rapid technological development, global trade and increased migration has made it significantly easier for migrants to maintain strong and viable relations to their distant homeland (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Faist 2000). As a result, migrants can live and work in one country but, at the same time, remain emotionally, politically and economically connected to other places and communities. Because of these pervasive connections across the borders, the questions of home and belonging have become more complex. According to Walker Conner (1986, 16), ‘ethnic homeland is far more than territory’ for migrants living in diaspora. As evidenced by the common use of terms such
M. Kananen (*) Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre, South-Eastern Finland University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_4
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as the motherland and the fatherland, this territory has a strong emotional dimension. In a similar fashion, William Safran (1991, 83–84) has emphasized the ‘authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty’ that the concept of ‘home’ evokes in migrant communities. In the diaspora literature, home can generally refer to both a physical location and an imagined space. For Safran, it is the former. According to him, diaspora communities regard their homeland as their true home to which they and their descendants should eventually return, and they remain committed to its safety and prosperity. Avtar Brah (1996, 192), in turn, perceives ‘home’ as a ‘mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination’. In this second rendition, home does not necessarily refer to the actual place of origin, and diasporic consciousness does not require a concrete involvement with the country of birth. In Brah’s understanding of diaspora, the concrete ‘homeland’ is replaced by an essentially placeless ‘homing desire’. Another significant difference is that while the ‘Safranian’ interpretation of the concept generally implies that the members of the diaspora community do not fully integrate into the country of settlement, the ‘Brahian’ interpretation emphasizes cultural hybridity. Rather than remaining exclusively committed to the country of birth, diasporic identities can take elements from both the homeland and the host society, and that is why exclusive attachment to the homeland or the willingness to return should not be used as the only criteria for diasporic identity (Levy and Weingrod 2004). Rather, the way migrants feel about their country of birth depends also on the processes of social inclusion and exclusion that take place in the country of residence (Tsagarousianou 2004). Despite of the flexibility of the definition, the concept of diaspora is nevertheless criticized for essentializing a highly diverse group of people, and ignoring its internal divisions (see e.g. Kalra et al. 2005). As put by Abdile and Pirkalainen (2011), diaspora communities do not constitute one entity with common aims and interests and with solidarity and cohesion with one another, but diversified groups with diverse positions and interests. Especially relevant this notion is in relation to different migrant generations. Although researchers are divided on whether diasporic involvement is important only for the first generation (e.g. Kasinitz et al. 2002), or whether the parents’ country of origin will be important also for their children (e.g. Purkayastha 2005), there seems to be a common understanding that for the younger generations the issue of ‘home’ is more problematic. For the first generation, the role of the ‘homeland’ is based on previous ties and experiences, but in the lives of the second generation, the tie is more abstract and indirect (e.g. Kelly 2015, 5). This article contributes to this debate by exploring the role that Somalia (as a physical and/or placeless space) plays in the lives of the first and 1.5-generation1 migrants in Minnesota. Although studies on migrant populations tend to concentrate 1 First generation refers to those migrants who have left their country of birth as adults and second generation to their children born in the country of residence. 1.5-generation, in turn, usually refers to those children, who came to the US between the ages of eight and twelve (Rumbaut 1994). In this article, the scale of 1.5 is wider (). For that end, it would be more accurate to talk about 1.25–1.75 -generation.
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on the experiences of adults (the first generation) or children born in the receiving countries (second generation), the experiences of the 1.5-generation can provide important insights on the struggles and rewards of living in multiple belongings. Due to the in-betweenness resulting from their early socialization in the country of origin, followed by their formative adolescent years taking place in the country of residence, the 1.5-generation migrants are (expected to be) able to operate successfully in both of the cultures (Kebede 2010; Park 1999). At the core of the scrutiny are the different ways that the diaspora migrants experience the ‘call of the homeland’ – i.e. the ‘authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty’ (Safran 1991, 83–84) that the homeland exposes on them. In this paper, the call is understood in a broad sense. For example, it can refer to concrete measures of the government or the civil society to promote the cooperation between the diaspora and the homeland, but it can also be understood as abstract feelings of loyalty and identifications towards the homeland. Furthermore, it should be noted that the call may not always have positive impacts, but due to the civil war and the decades-long unrest, associations with Somalia might also be unpleasant or even destructive. In order to explore the different aspects of the call and the differences between the two generations, this article builds on interviews conducted with 30 Somali migrants in Minnesota. Thirteen of them are part of the first generation migrants and 17 of them can be defined as members of the 1.5-generation. The first step of analysing and arranging the interview data was to sort out all the incidents that could be interpreted as ‘calls of the homeland’. Secondly, after a more detailed reading of the calls, they were further divided into three types: constructive, utopian and destructive. Thirdly, also those reasons that kept the participants from answering homeland’s call were analysed and categorized. This meant, for example, looking at the reasons why the participants were not participating in the rebuilding process of Somalia despite of hearing the call. As the final step of the analysis, different experiences of the call and the reasons for not answering them were arranged in accordance with the migrant generation of the participants.
4.2 Findings 4.2.1 The Call of the Homeland The participants have all born in Somalia but left the country as refugees as either children, adolescents or grown-ups. The age of departure differs greatly, as the youngest one left Somalia at the age of three and the oldest age of departure was 42. This difference is important to take into consideration, as those who have left the country as small children lack the personal experiences and memories of those who have spent significant part of their life in Somalia. However, despite of this difference in personal experiences, all the participants identify themselves primarily as Somalis, and take a great pride in their background. The main difference between
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the first and the 1.5-generation is that those who have left Somalia at an older age tend to have more often positive associations with their country of birth. For example, they commonly talk about their childhood in Somalia and the fond memories related to it. Somalia, I think if I use the analogy, it’s a home far from home. It never goes away. I miss home. I feel missing home emotions. Your childhood, the way you’re born, you have that memory, you play around as a kid, run without your shoes playing soccer all day long. Yeah, for example, my family is now staying not in where I was born. I was born in Mogadishu. They are now in east Somalia. I don’t have that connection with where they live now but Mogadishu is home to me.
However, for the 1.5-generation the relationship to Somalia is more complicated. Because of the civil war and the unrest, their memories of childhood in Somalia are not only positive. On the contrary, several participants talk about the traumatic experiences and negative associations relating to their childhood and youth in Somalia. In the extract below, one of the participants goes through the events that occurred during his last day in Somalia. It was just like any other day; we got ready for school and got driven to school. Everything was normal and in a matter of hours, everything changed and we started hearing thunders and the guns and noises. I was 9 years old. After several hours of hearing guns like right outside of our school barricades, we fled the school. My brother was in a different building and he came to locate me, and he held my hand. Where we lived was the direction everybody was fleeing away from. That was where all the action was happening. So we went with the crowd. […] So my relationship to Somalia is difficult to explain because I have happy memories, but the last one frightens me.
This ambivalence might be a specific feature of the homeland relations of the 1.5-generation migrants and refugees from troubled areas. Unlike the first generation, who can more easily differentiate between the times before and after the civil war, or the second generation, who have neither good nor bad personal memories from Somalia, many young Somali adults today carry the unrest and negative feelings as their last memories from their country of birth. However, it is important to note that despite of these ambivalent or even negative memories, members of the 1.5-generation still hear the call of the homeland and feel attached to Somalia. I don’t have a lot of recollection back home, the only recollection I have is the Civil War, that running around, but I feel like there is part of me that is still in Somalia because I have my uncles, my brothers, are still there. They call me every day and just hearing what my parents, the elders talk about the way it was before the Civil War and so it’s just, yeah, so I’m a U.S. citizen but I’m also, I was born in Somalia and so that’s why I have both of them in here.
The strength of the call is underscored by the fact that even those participants, who did not have any personal experiences or memories from Somalia, shared the feelings of belonging and attachment towards their distant country of birth. I was four years old when I left and I don’t remember nothing about it, but I like it. It’s beautiful. I know there’s a war and things going on, but it’s really beautiful. They have beautiful weather, nice weather over there. You know, part of me is here. I’ve been grown up here. I got educated here, but still, part of me wants to live in Africa. I don’t know what it is, but something, yeah.
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For the participants of this study, Somalia is thus ‘far more than territory’ (Conner 1986, 16). As noted in the extracts above, the participants perceive themselves primarily as Somalis and feel a strong sense of attachment to their country of birth. The intensity of this attachment can vary from abstract feelings of belonging to deeper connections created by concrete experiences and ties from the past. The important thing to notice is that the call is not real only for those first generation migrants who have spent significant part of their life in Somalia, but even individuals with no personal memories or experiences from Somalia could feel it. The next part of the findings sections deals with the different types of calls in a more detailed manner.
4.2.2 The Constructive Call Rainer Bauböck (2010) has stressed the political nature of the concept of diaspora. According to him, diaspora communities orient themselves strongly towards an external homeland, and can quite easily be mobilized for political projects relating to its future. In the case of Somali diaspora, the cooperation between the diaspora and the homeland has been promoted in many official and unofficial ways. For example, in 2013 the president of Somalia of that time, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, visited Minneapolis and appealed the diaspora Somalis to return home and become part of the country’s reconstruction (Hirsi 2003). Although the participants of this study are not personally involved in the rebuilding efforts in Somalia, they nevertheless contribute from Minnesota by paying remittances. The strength of this commitment is apparent in the fact that in addition to the first generation sending money back home, also the members of the 1.5-generation pay remittances to distant relatives they do not necessarily even know. A lot of us wire money back to Somalia because we have relatives that are poor that we send money to. I do what I do for my family. My mom would call me and say, “Hey, there’s someone. Their father died. They’re poor.” So then I’ll send them 100 dollars every month for like a year and then that family will probably get on their feet and someone else will pop up.
In addition to paying remittances, some participants of this study also contemplate about the possibility to return to Somalia to help more concretely with the rebuilding process. Maimuna Mohamud (2014) has referred to these contemplations as the “ideal” form of return. According to her, especially highly educated Somalis return to Somalia in order to give back and contribute in the reconstruction efforts of the country. Often times, these motivations are articulated as being ideal forms of contributions, and framed as sacrificial. Also in the interview data of this study, the possible return is often articulated around the collective needs and suffering of the Somali people. I would really like to be part of the people who go back and help, especially kids and women, yeah. I would like to go and help other women and help the youth. My dream in life is going back home and taking those kids from the warlords and I mean it. I always ask my kids, “Can you support me if I go back and have a little farm and take all the boys and teach them stuff?”
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In addition to the altruistic plans of helping out the Somali people back home, some participants from the first generation have concrete plans of starting businesses in Somalia. In this constellation, the willingness to help in the rebuilding process coincides with economic self-interest. I would love to. It has never materialized but I have different dreams with going back to Somalia. I want to help but I want to help in a business way, take something that’s useful for the country, so help people, create jobs, change mentality, whoever you can get to, and on the way make some money.
The members of the 1.5-generation have more mixed and vague thoughts concerning the possible return to Somalia. Although some young Somali adults rule out the possibility of retuning to Somalia altogether, some of the participants are open to the idea of using the skills and knowledge that they have acquired in the United States to help in the rebuilding process. But unlike the members of the first generation, who often envision a permanent move to Somalia, the young adults of the 1.5-generation talk only about short visits to their country of birth. I may try [to go back] this summer, but I’m not 100 percent sure. It all depends. I think Mogadishu, to me, is a lost cause. […] but I think small towns with 5000 to 6000 people, I can go there, go to their local school, train their teacher, take some books, give there.
In addition to altruistic plans of helping out and contributing to the collective welfare of the Somali people, personal motives are thus also involved in the contemplations of a possible return. For the members of the first generation, these motives relate often to plans of opening businesses and making profit at their country of birth, whereas for the members of the 1.5-generation personal motives connect more to career advancement. Young Somali adults of this study perceive participation in Somalia as an important work experience (see also Abdile 2010; Tiilikainen 2016).
4.2.3 The Utopian Call The ‘constructive’ call thus revolves around diaspora members’ participation in the rebuilding process of Somalia. As such, it aligns with the ‘Safranian’ understanding of diaspora, in which diaspora communities remain committed to the maintenance or restoration of their homeland and to its safety and prosperity. However, in addition to these (more or less) concrete plans and aspirations of contributing to the collective welfare of Somalia and the Somali people, the participants of this study have also more emotional and individualistic attachments to their homeland. This second rendition of the call aligns more with the ‘brahian’ understanding of diaspora, in which Somalia becomes a ‘mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination’. For example, for the first generation of Somali migrants, the prospect of retiring in Somalia, far away from the cold winters of Minnesota, is a common instance of an emotional homeland attachment.
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As long as the politics settle down and there is a stable government with not a lot of oppositions and rebels and things, then it’s really good. It’s really where I’d like to retire to. I don’t want to retire in Minnesota and this weather. I want to sit under a palm tree on the beach and have my house and see my kids and grandkids running around. So that’s a long term goal. In the next 20 years, probably, it’ll be here.
In this utopian call, Somalia as the ‘mythic place of desire’ is often juxtaposed against the hard realities of living in Minnesota. For example, in the extract below, a member of the first generation explains how life in Somalia is easy and peaceful compared to the struggles of making ends meet in the highly competitive American society. They want that easy life. It’s a little bit less hectic. Even the air is relaxing. I don’t know if you’ve been to Africa, but it’s less stress. Here, you could have everything but there’s just that feeling of competition or running or bills every day and bills and bills and mortgages. With Africa, it’s a little bit relaxed. It’s cheap labor. You get a lot of things easy, the weather, the food, the culture. So once you’re from there, you feel like you’re in a holiday when you’re living there.
Related to the notion that living in Somalia is less stressful and competitive, the participants of this study also talk about the easiness of building a successful business in Somalia. Especially among the first generation of Somali migrants, the prospect of opening a successful business is visible in the interview data. Unlike in the constructive call, where the business plans are often more concrete and framed as a contribution to the collective wellbeing of Somalia and the Somali people, the business aspirations of the utopian call focus more on individual success. I’d like to go back and open a business. Now I have the experience. American style, I’d like to show them. I talk to my friends, some from London and Canada who went back. When they go back, they own a company, company that makes water, company that makes juice. They just bring a machine and have lot of success.
In general, the utopian call entails stories from Somalia that highlight the easy, successful and prosperous living at the Horn of Africa. As such, it stands in a visible contrast to the constructive call, which focuses more on the struggles of Somalia and the Somali people. For example, in the following extract, one of the members of the 1.5-generation converses on the changes that have taken place in her sister’s life after she moved from Minneapolis to Mogadishu few months ago. There are positive sides. Like our beach is back open. There’s high security. You can go to the beach, there are restaurants, there’s an area for the Diaspora members who go back. My sister lives in a gated community. Her husband’s business is booming. He’s doing construction. So of course, rebuilding the country, a country that’s been literally destroyed and being in construction, it’s like the best business to start. So he’s doing that and she loves it. She’s not cooking anymore. She has maids, four or five maids. She’s like, “I love it here.”
4.2.4 The Destructive Call The call of the homeland can thus create willingness to contribute to the collective wellbeing of Somalia and the Somali people, but it can also cause more individualistic and utopian life-goals back at the country of birth. However, the call of the
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homeland does not have only positive outcomes. The third type of the call, the destructive one, refers to a situation, in which the attachment and connection to Somalia ends up having negative consequences either for the individual or the whole diaspora community. Perhaps the most common example of this negative impact of the homeland relates to tribalism. Especially, the members of the 1.5-generation are highly critical towards the impact that the clan relations that originate from Somalia have within the diaspora community in the United States. Whatever happens in my village today, I’m going to know it in a minute. They have cell phones everywhere. Also if someone was killed, who was killed? That’s the first question I’m going to ask. They’re not going to say the name. They’re not going to say “George”, they’re going to say “Tribe so-and-so.” That has a huge impact in what happens in the western countries and the connection or relationship people have in here.
The participants of this study are commonly concerned about the way the younger generations of Somali Americans comprehend and interpret the traditional aspects of Somali culture, such as tribalism. Many of them emphasize that the younger generations do not necessarily understand the historic meaning behind the clan relations, and that is why they might end up having a negative impact in their life. For example, in Minnesota, young Somali Americans have formed several gangs that have been involved in crimes and acts of violence. In the excerpt below, one of the participants enlightens the connection between the traditional tribes originating from Somalia and the street gangs operating in Minneapolis. Her views highlight the misunderstood nature of the destructive call: the young boys born in the United States do not understand the original purpose of the clans and therefore end up misusing them. Even gang stuff has become more tribal and conflicts have become more tribal. So these are 15 or 16 year old kids, born in the United States, never set foot in Somalia, never faced the struggles that my mom has faced or some of the things that I even saw as a kid, who have these very strong opinions on whose side they will join, but these kids, they’re not joining this to protect their people. They’ll go with the one with the ten last names closer to them over the fifteen last names. It may not even start with tribes. It could be a very simple personal issue, but it would boil down to tribes.
In the interview data, the destructive call of the homeland is also present in the discussion around the so-called radicalization of the Somali American youth. Since 2007, over 30 young men from Minnesota have left for the Horn of Africa, allegedly to take up arms and join Al-Shabaab, a radical Islamic militia group. Some participants talk at length about how the original reason behind the return was not a religious one, but rather a nationalistic motivation to protect their distant homeland. When the Ethiopian troops entered Somalia in 2006 in order to help the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, it was depicted in diaspora as Somalia being occupied by its Christian adversary. So being young and Muslim, an incident that was going on in Somalia was depicted as, “Oh, your brothers and sisters were attacked by Ethiopians.” It’s a Christian nation. What are we doing here, you know? Personally, I think it was more nationalism than anything else, but then when they went to Somalia, things did not work out the way that they thought, they were expecting these big Somali people fighting against Ethiopia which could be translated as nationalism, but that didn’t happen.
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Related to the idea of young Somali Americans misunderstanding the call of the homeland is the notion that because some of them have difficulties finding their place in the American society, they start to project unrealistic expectations towards Somalia and their membership and role within the Somali nation. The call of the homeland thus interferes with the struggle of social inclusion within the country of residence. In the following excerpt, one of the participants interprets the wish of the young men to return to Somalia to fight as an illusion of belonging that is born out of social exclusion in the United States. You are not accepted and you can’t speak English well or because of how you look and you’re an immigrant or you’re a refugee and all that, I mean, that could be a pressure too. The person could think, “Well, where is a better place for me?” and you hear this news that people in Somali are fighting and then they have this good image where they can be part of those people and kill these other people, all those images that were not really there. It’s more of an illusion, you know? All those things are things that could contribute to them going back to Somalia to fight with Al-Shabaab.
In the elaborations of the participants, the destructive call of the homeland generally boils down to the confusion that the younger generations of Somali Americans experience concerning their memberships in the United States and Somalia. According to the participants, the younger generations experience a clash between the Somali culture that they experience at home, and the American culture that they encounter on school and free time. In addition to the struggles of social exclusion, this clash also causes difficulties within the Somali families and makes it harder to transfer the Somali culture from one generation to another. They’re confused. They’re totally confused. When they are home, they’re trying to speak English. Some of them don’t even understand their mothers and fathers. There’s a gap between them. There’s a cut between them. No mother is happy about not being able to talk to her daughter and even the daughter, they know because it’s this culture that says, okay, the wisdom has nothing to do with education in a sense, but the experience, the wisdom is in your mother or father or grandfather. That’s the culture we have.
4.3 The Antidotes of the Call Somalia has slowly reached a certain level of stability, and especially the northern parts of the country have been relatively safe. Therefore, many Somalis have started to visit Somalia and even to repatriate in order to take part in the rebuilding process. As already noted, also the participants of this study ponder with the possibility of repatriation. However, despite the fact that the call of the homeland is present in their lives, they all still live in the United States. This final part of the findings deals with the antidotes, those reasons that keep the participants in Minnesota and prevent them from answering the call of the motherland. The most common reasons for not returning to Somalia relate to the day-to-day life and its challenges and rewards. For example, many of the participants of this study emphasize that they would not have the same opportunities in terms of education, career, income and status in Somalia, and that is why repatriation is not a viable option for them.
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M. Kananen When I compare living in Somalia and here in the United States, I would prefer to live in the United States. I have more opportunities for me and for my family in the United States. […] I’m professional out here. People that work here like me. I love my job. I got this office because of my status. I feel very good when I come to work every day. I’m not going to have that if I go back to Somalia. Nobody cares about me, you see? […] I was trained to work here in the United States and that’s the reason that I enjoy what I do here, but that’s not going to happen if I go back to Somalia.
Comments like these underline that even in a transnational era, in which connections across the borders are easier to establish than ever before, migrants have to make decisions on how much time, money and energy they invest in their homeland ties and how much on their life in the current place of residence (see Kivisto 2001). Education and career opportunities tie especially the members of the 1.5-generation to the United States. In the following excerpt, a young Somali man explains how he is consciously turning down offers to participate in the rebuilding process in order to prioritize his studies. A lot of people ask me about that but I say that is one step at a time because like I don’t want to get involved in a lot of international organizations that wanted me to be part of it. I have a goal and my goal is not to put my education aside. I know if I put my time in international, that requires a lot time and a lot of things and it’s going to take away from my education. I just blocked that for now and once I have my Master’s, maybe. Right now, it’s not on my list.
In addition to the career and education opportunities, also the long distance between Minneapolis and Mogadishu makes it hard to establish and maintain transnational ties. Many of the participants also remarked that the sheer costs of travelling makes repeated visits to Somalia practically impossible. Furthermore, although some members of the first generation would be willing to return to Somalia, their children keep them grounded in Minnesota. In cases like the one below, the United States is referred to as the home of the children. I’ll say I’m from Minneapolis, Minnesota because this is home. Yeah, if anybody asks me, that’s where home is. This is where my children are born. This is where they’ll be growing. So for them, for me to say I’m from somewhere else and they’re from Minneapolis, Minnesota, it doesn’t go well. So it’s more of, this is where we belong as a family.
Although the practicalities of everyday life are the most common reason hindering the plans to return to Somalia, in some cases participants also raise the conflict between the values that they have acquired in the United States and the traditional values of Somalia as a reason for their limited involvement with the homeland. I think Somalia is not ready for me and I think I’m not ready for Somalia. I think we’re transitioning. It’s like a lot of, it’s like antagonistic to my American ideals, put it that way. I think after the war, things have just become very corrupt and people are corrupt and everything is not fair. I’ve gotten used to the very linear. Yeah, there are inequalities here but there’s a linear way of life where things are fair. I don’t go bribe people. I don’t know why you would bribe anyway, but bribery’s really big in Somalia and everything is very tribal and I don’t understand or comprehend that.
In a bigger picture, these ideological differences relate to studies highlighting a problematic relationship between the Somalis of (especially) Western diaspora and those who have stayed in Somalia (e.g. Allen 2014; Galipo 2011, Abdile 2010).
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According to these studies young Somalis who have returned to Somalia have had alienating experiences in which they were made to feel out of place by local people because of the way they dress and behaved. The perception that diaspora members have stayed abroad a long time and adopted other cultures, habits and ways of life that are different from those in Somalia has earned the reputation of being socially and culturally different. Finally, in relation to the destructive call, the participants emphasize the importance of knowledge and awareness of the Somali culture. Many of the participants talk about how important it is that the future generations have an opportunity to learn about the Somali culture and the history of Somalia. That would equip them to resist the destructive call of the homeland. In the following excerpt, one of the participants elaborates on how the fact that the young boys and men who returned to Somalia to fight did not really know Somalia, caused them to be easy targets for the recruiters and the destructive call. I feel those boys, the Somali community, we failed them and I feel like we’re a failure and I think about it every day and say, “This should not continue. One more boy should not go back to Somalia.” Those boys are not people like me. I came here, like I say, I graduated from high school, so I knew Somalia. But those people were not like that; they didn’t know Somalia. So they will videotape something and say, “This is paradise.” This is not paradise. Killing people and dying, it’s not paradise. They were brainwashed.
Further, in addition to the importance of knowing Somali culture and the history of Somalia, especially the participants with children highlight the need of the younger generations to find their way also within the American society and culture. If they feel that the United States is truly their home, the incentives to answer the destructive call diminish. In the following excerpt, one of the participants talks about the challenges of living in two cultures and the importance of providing guidance. The ones who fall are, of course, the youth and that’s what has happened here. So a lot of youth kind of fall through the cracks of the two cultures clashing. They come home to different expectations sort of and then when they go outside the house, it sort of feels like they’re being pulled into the American but between the two, I think, that’s where they fall through the cracks and if there isn’t anyone to assist or walk them through that.
4.4 Concluding Remarks The findings of this chapter align with Walker Conner’s (1986, 16) notion that ‘ethnic homeland is far more than territory’ for migrants living in diaspora. For the Somali participants of this study, Somalia serves as an ‘authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty’ that evokes both concrete aspirations to contribute to its wellbeing, as well as more abstract ‘homing desires’. In the former sense, the participants of this study send money to relatives back home, develop business ideas and plan ways to use the skills they have acquired in the United States for the benefit of their country of birth. In the latter sense, the image of Somalia serves as a
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paradise-like haven that stands against the cold realities of making ends meet in the highly competitive American society. However, the call of Somalia can also be destructive: many young men have lost their lives in the streets of Mogadishu and Minneapolis while defending the homeland and its traditions. Although the homeland is calling its diaspora members, there are many things standing in the way of repatriation. Most importantly, even in the era of immigration and transnational mobility, people are kept in place by the routines, rewards and challenges of their day-to-day life. The participants of this study have their employment, studies and social circles in Minnesota, and leaving those behind is not easy. Especially for those participants, who have children born in the United States, Minnesota appears as a place where they belong as a family. Furthermore, diaspora citizens’ loyalty and sense of belonging are often divided between the country of birth and the country of residence. Despite of seeing themselves as Somalis, the participants from both generations feel at home also in Minnesota. But also, the values and customs they have acquired in the United States might not always coincide with the ways of being and belonging that are expected back in Somalia. Finally, this chapter wanted to add a contribution to the ongoing debate about the transmission of diasporic involvement and identifications from one immigrant generation to another. So far, empirical studies have left researchers divided in their conclusions. Some argue that that the homeland is important only for the first generation immigrants, whereas others predict that the parents’ country of origin will be important also for their children. Based on the interviews with Somalis from two generations, it appears that Somali identity matters also for those participants who do not have (m)any personal memories with Somalia. However, it is important to note that the participants of this study promote the idea of multiple homelands. Especially participants with children emphasize the importance of future generations having access to both Somali and American culture. By feeling home and at ease in both places, they are better equipped to resist the destructive call of the homeland.
References Abdile, M. (2010). Diasporas and their role in the homeland conflicts and peacebuilding: The case of Somali diaspora (DIASPEACE, Working Paper No.7). Abdile, M., & Pirkkalainen, P. (2011). Homeland perception and recognition of the diaspora engagement: The case of the Somali diaspora. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 20(1), 48–70. Allen, R. (2014, April 2). The Somali Diaspora’s role in Somalia: Implications of return. Presentation at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Bauböck, R. (2010). Cold constellations and hot identities: Political theory questions about transnationalism and diaspora. In R. Bauböck & T. Faist (Eds.), Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods (pp. 295–323). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Brah, A. (1996). Cartographies of diaspora: Contesting identities. London: Routledge. Conner, W. (1986). The impact of homelands upon diasporas. In G. Sheffer (Ed.), Modern diasporas in international politics (pp. 16–45). London: Croom Helm.
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Faist, T. (2000). The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Galipo, A. (2011). Diaspora and peacebuilding in post-conflict settings: Insights from Somaliland. Paper submitted for the 4th European conference on African studies Uppsala, Sweden, 15–18 June 2011 “African engagements: On whose terms?” Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1992). Toward a transnational perspective on migration: Race, class, ethnicity and nationalism reconsidered. New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Hirsi, I. (2003). Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud delivers message to Minnesota Somalis. Twin Cities Daily Planet. https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/ somali-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud-and-minneapolis-congressional-representative/ Kalra, V., Kaur, R., & Hutnyk, J. (2005). Diaspora & Hybridity. London: Sage Publications. Kasinitz, P., Waters, M., Mollenkopf, J., & Anil, M. (2002). Transnationalism and the children of immigrants in contemporary New York. In P. Levitt & M. Waters (Eds.), The changing face of home: The transnational lives of the second generation (pp. 96–122). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Kebede, S. (2010). The struggle for belonging: Forming and reforming identities among 1.5-generation asylum seekers and refugees (RSC Working Paper Series NO. 70). Oxford University. Kelly, P. (2015). Transnationalism, emotion and second-generation social mobility in the Filipino- Canadian diaspora. The Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography Lecture and Commentaries, 36(3), 280–299. Kivisto, P. (2001). Theorizing transnational immigration: A critical review of current efforts. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24(4), 549–577. Levy, A., & Weingrod, A. (2004). Homelands and diasporas: Holy lands and other spaces. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Mohamud, M. (2014). The “ideal” return. Horn of Africa, 2012(2). http://afrikansarvi.fi/ issue8/82-artikkeli/223-the-ideal-return. Park, K. (1999). ‘I really do feel I’m 1.5!’: The construction of self and community by young Korean Americans. Amerasia Journal, 25(1), 139–163. Portes, A., Guarnizo, L., & Landolt, P. (1999). The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2), 217–237. Purkayastha, B. (2005). Negotiating ethnicity: Second generation South Asians Americans traverse a transnational world. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Rumbaut, R. (1994). The crucible within: Ethnic identity, self-esteem, and segmented assimilation among children of immigrants. International Migration Review, 28(4), 748–794. Safran, W. (1991). Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return. Diaspora, 1(1), 83–99. Tiilikainen, M. (2016). Somalialaisten ylirajainen liikkuminen [Transnational Mobility among Youth of Somali Descent]. In A. Kivijärvi, & M. Peltola (Eds.), Lapset ja Nuoret Muuttoliikkeessä. Nuorten elinolot vuosikirja 2016 [Children and young people on the move. Young People’s living conditions yearbook 2016] (pp. 119–132). Helsinki: Nuorisotutkimusseura. Tsagarousianou, R. (2004). Rethinking the concept of diaspora: Mobility, connectivity and communication in a globalized world. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 1(1), 52–65.
Part II
Acting As Diaspora Citizens: Agencies
This part of the book turns our attention to diaspora as a context of social agencies. After all, the possibilities of a full and equal societal membership are tested in the banal surroundings and interactions of everyday life. In the following articles, the Somali participants of our research can be perceived as active agents, who negotiate and campaign for recognition as citizens (in practice), but also as victims, who suffer from condemnations and mistrust. Within a restrictive circle of mistrust and misunderstandings, many personal aspirations are silenced, and many opportunities to act as citizens hidden. Being a citizen (as a status) is a form of being political and “legal” (Helen 2014, 3), but for diaspora people it can also mean continuous struggle for attaining recognition, belonging and banal citizenship rights. Discourses that emphasize migration as a ‘national or international crisis’ have deep effects on individual attitudes and experiences – but what is even more important to recognize, is that definitions of ‘crisis’ have always their geo-political bases and directions. Migrants that move from one industrialized country to another are not part of the ‘crisis’ discourse, and they do not carry the same stigma as the individuals who, like Somalis, move from the Global South to the Western world. Othering discourses create an atmosphere that can enhance “minority stress” (Meyer 2003). Although the networks of the diaspora Somalis have many ways to create social capital for them – e.g. by settling down near each other or keeping continuous interaction with the ‘same’ – the resources within the diaspora community alone are not enough to challenge the structural barriers and disadvantages that often push Somalis to societal margins. One of these disadvantages relate to the refugee label (‘the unwanted quest’), which often leads to discrimination. This, in turn, can act as a catalyst for the Somalis to avoid the mainstream community altogether. Despite of the often traumatic or conflictual life histories of Somali refugees, diaspora citizenship can also offer them possibilities to intentional life plans and life politics. Relatives and family members scattered to different countries can – in the best-case scenario – provide a strong transnational network and social capital to
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lean on with different life choices. In fact, it is interesting how many of our Somali informants talked about the diaspora as a subject: as an actor and agent, who ‘does things’, ‘has power’ or ‘becomes tired’. Those migrants who possess multiple citizenships (as a status), can ‘use’ their citizenships fluently when deciding where to live and travel, where to establish their businesses, and where to cross the state borders. In other words, they get benefit from their multiple citizenships (as a status) for their citizenships as a practice. Diaspora citizenship is both a political, life-political, and experienced category of social (co)existence. In a way, it represents an example of a post-national mode of citizenship: a more open-minded and mobile view to define societal membership than the conventional and holy state-territory-ethnicity trinity. However, the articles of this part of the book highlight how there are still many contextual structures and rationales, as well as informal moralities, which frame and limit the actual scope of this widened understanding of a state membership.
Chapter 5
Subject, Object, Predicate? Somali Migrants’ Subject Positions in a Local Finnish Integration Scene Päivi Armila and Yasemin Kontkanen
The aim of this article to reflect identities or subject positions offered for Somalis who live in a small-town context of Finland. The presented membership positions are hermeneutically interpreted from interviews collected among native people whose work is to put into practice the Finnish immigrant integration principles. The analysis leans on the idea that it is not indifferent how those who have administrative power talk about people and the targets of their work. Vice versa: ways to define people concretely effect on their positions to act among the others, as well as to their self-identifications.
5.1 Introduction In this article we examine how Finnish authorities and civil society activists working in different immigrant integration projects talk about Somalis and their work with Somali immigrants in a small town context. Through this examination our aim is to trace the variety of subject positions that become available to Somalis who still form a very special minority in the Finnish context. Somalis in Finland are marginalized in many ways as they have been targets for exclusive practices and attitudes. This tendency is easily seen and calculated in statistics but can be traced also in analyses where the aim is to catch the nature of discourses around minorities. It is not meaningless how minority people are defined in their communities: one easily starts perceiving the world through the glasses of this particular position (Davies and Harré 1990). For example, it is not easy to take autonomous and active space in a social setting that continuously talks about you as an outsider.
P. Armila (*) · Y. Kontkanen Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
[email protected];
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_5
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The methodological perspective of this scrutiny is derived from critical discourse analysis (see, e.g. Fairclough 2001; van Dijk 2008). Following this, definitions given from certain powerful positions are seen to have power to concretely frame the social space and positions of phenomena and/or other people. Experts and professionals, for example, in their work, opinions, and definitions have power to construct identities and subject positions to different people, which then become lived everyday realities and frame the subjects’ social action possibilities and their social agencies. The data for this analysis consist of 10 qualitative interviews collected in a small town in Eastern Finland during the winter 2013–2014. In this data, state and municipal authorities whose work responsibilities are connected with local immigrant integration projects or programs (e.g. municipal welfare services, educational supply, security control, or different permission issues) are discussing their work among Somali immigrants. In addition, in the data there are interviews from actors of diverse civil society organizations that campaign to promote multiculturalism and anti-racism in a local atmosphere that is not only welcoming. Some of the NGOs also work to help forward immigrants’ employment and their general everyday life coping in a new reality. During the interviews, we talked about the interviewees’ work, their experience and knowledge about their Somali clients, the significance of Somalis for the local town community, and the readiness of the Finnish society to offer material, social, and attitudinal circumstances that are needed for successful immigrant integration and homing. For this analysis, the interviews have been read through in a detailed way. All expressions of the interviewees that, according to the epistemological principles of phenomenological hermeneutics (Husserl 1995/1907), can be interpreted as discursive or contra-discursive definitions of Somali immigrants’ subject positions have been marked, categorized, and conceptualized. Somali immigrants are in a special focus of this analysis for two reasons. Firstly: the data have been gathered in a research project Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship – Transnational Networks, Social Participation and Social Identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. (Academy of Finland, 2012–2015). Secondly: Somalis as immigrants in Finland are a very special minority – and the attitudes towards them mirror many wider cultural and political representations of asylum seekers and other migrants. In the ‘big picture’ we, however, can see that on each field of the society (e.g. labour market, education, leisure organizations) Somali immigrants in Finland are located in the most marginalized positions (e.g. Harinen and Sabour 2013). Besides, Somalis who have come to Finland have mostly been refugees and asylum seekers, which make their positions vulnerable and unsure, as refugee position is often linked with traumatic life experiences and memories (Dlamini and Wolfe 2009). In the following chapters, at first, we present the conceptual frame for our analysis within the relation between subject positions and local hegemonies. We also shortly describe the socio-political context where Somalis have entered when they came to Finland. This context frames the integration services offered to them, as well as a characterization of the certain and unique locality these people live in. In
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the analysis, subject positions given to Somali immigrants by different professionals are examined. It seems that these subject positions differ a lot when Somalis are seen on different levels of sociality: as individuals, as family members, as new town inhabitants, as members of the global diasporic Somali community, or as non- individual carriers and even prisoners of the ‘Somalian culture’.
5.2 The Frame: Welcome to My World…? When entering Finland, in one way or another, an immigrant comes into a Nordic welfare society with its wide and simultaneously tight service structures. Especially asylum seekers and refugees find themselves quickly in the middle of authorities working with immigrants’ reception. Asylum seeking contains encounters with officials, many kinds of controlling practices, non-voluntary answerableness, and so on. These encounters contain a lot of requirements to reveal one’s personal life in front of an asking authority. From the perspective of the welfare society, these kinds of new-comers need welfare services and are also entitled to them as clients of the welfare professionals. The Finnish welfare system was raised by professionals and gives space to professionals. Welfare professions lean on professional education and expert knowledge. Professions are connected with the mechanisms of normative power and management – at least from the viewpoint of the critical social theory (Foucault 1972; 2003). Professionals have a lot of formal and informal authority within which they can define identity categories (e.g. ‘troublesome teenagers’) and/or subject positions to different people or groups of people (e.g. ‘under-employed academics’). They also mediate ‘decent citizenship’ and ‘normal’, expected ways to act and live as a Finnish citizen or a competent town resident. In the case that we present in this article, public sector authorities are not the only ones whom refugees meet in the small town context examined here. In the Nordic welfare societies, more and more welfare work is now carried out through NGOs that have been called to administrate different interventions concentrating to help people in coping with their everyday life problems (Rantala and Sulkunen 2007). When it comes to immigrants’ integration, NGOs can offer action that, for example, teaches refugees to clean, make food, sew, learn Finnish and local habits, or to fill different application forms. From the perspective of this analysis it is essential that also NGO actors work as experts of ‘normality’ whose aim is in bringing people, whose way of life or circumstances are defined as problematic, to the ‘proper’ societal (co-)existence. Both groups of experts, however, have also possibilities to speak against the restricting, normative and even racist subject positioning of immigrants, if they choose so. Conceptually, in our approach we are interested in socially and culturally constructed subject positions (Hall 1990; Ewing 2004; Foucault 2006). Through our empirical data our aim has been to demonstrate how Somali immigrants’ subject positions are constructed – or rejected – from the discursive power of authorities’
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subject positions in a particular context. This reproduction is intrinsically relational to power dynamics. Thus, hegemony is one crucial notion to comprehend in this conceptual frame. Understanding its relation to subject positions is significant in order to recognize the covert acts of domination which exist in social relations. Accordingly, we categorize the subject positions in the given context as follows: The ones that possess societal power and the ‘others’ who are defined by the ones who hold the power. In this context, we understand positioning as a “discursive process whereby selves are located […] in jointly produced story lines” (Davies and Harré 1990). The idea of normality in a certain social context can be interpreted also within David Howarth’s (2010, 323) conceptualization of social fantasy which “organizes and shapes our desires so that an order, practice or policy may be sustained with little or no challenge”. We follow one of Howarth’s examples and emphasize that for dominant majorities immigrants may represent not only unconventional others, but also can be seen as a threat against the conventional set of ideals of a certain community. Social fantasies easily become lived, unequal and hierarchical realities as they are sedimented and naturalized in practices, institutions, images and encounters (ibid.). Within these frames we see that the reception of immigrants is a challenging phase for immigration officials. Even though the good will, benevolence and idea of support are associated to their task, the relations between the subjects are built on the hegemonic dichotomies and dominant social fantasies, often even in an unconscious way. Sharing the common goods, allocation of prevailing limitations and allowances, creates situations where one has to question and the Other has to respond; one has to teach and the Other has to learn – and one decides when the Other becomes conventional for the existing societal fantasy. Refugees’ entering to the Finnish professional system activates and cumulates critical professional discourses – even though in the spirit of benevolent support, service, and help. Immigrant integration work (or other analogous integration activities) offers a good field for a seeker of examples of how the welfare professions work – how actions that have good and human purposes also often name, define, and restrict the social space, action space and identity-layers of welfare clients. Professional perceptions follow policy lines of the welfare society but get concrete forms in local encounters. The data for this analysis have been gathered in Eastern Finland, in a small town located far from the southern cities where immigrants in Finland usually live.1 The town locates in a periphery area that has suffered from population loss and economic problems. Empty and cheap apartments have tempted new-comers, among whom there have been hundreds of Somalis with residence permits in Finland. In this small town Somalis have formed a very visible and conspicuous minority who has raised a lot of local pro-and-against discussion and definitions, also in the professional scene. In the next chapters our aim is to open
1 http://www.vaestoliitto.fi/tieto_ja_tutkimus/vaestontutkimuslaitos/tilastoja-ja-linkkeja/tilastotietoa/maahanmuuttajat/maahanmuuttajien-maara/
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these definitions, as well as some counter decisions, and their variety, depending on the interpretation frame in which they are talked about.
5.3 With Me or Under My Rule? Altogether 10 professional interviews were selected for this analysis.2 Three of the interviewees work on the NGO field and seven as state or municipal officials in the small town. Two of the interviewees are male and eight female. All of them have work responsibilities that concentrate on Somalis’ integration into their new home town. The context is not easy and puts officials to work in a hot atmosphere: rural towns in Finland suffer from high unemployment, scarce educational possibilities, and cutbacks in public financing. This means that attitudes towards people who need public (material) support are not always welcoming, and the people working with them are also often attacked with a negative feedback. (see, e.g. Armila et al. 2017) This, obviously, can make them cautious when discussing immigrants and immigration. State and municipal officials’ work consists of, among other things, firming their clients’ wellbeing in terms of security, social security money, accommodation, education, day care, and health care. The interviewed NGO activists have worked with Somalis, for example, by offering them possibilities to do their internship periods (linked with education or employment) in the NGO sector. They also have created social occasions in which the new-comers can gather together and also meet ‘ordinary’ town residents, or arranged free baby-sitting so that immigrant mothers can learn Finnish in gatherings led by a NGO worker. Officials have met Somalis in more formal situations and often in their offices, within a limited appointment time: as policemen, as social workers, as teachers. In the following chapter the different subject positions defined for Somali immigrants in a small town context and from different professional positions are classified. The interviewees – from the position of welfare professionals – mostly give positions to Somalis as their clients and thus also objects, who somehow act wrongly or lack proper knowledge and capabilities. In some positively toned definitions Somalis are also defined as subjects who have capabilities, rights and autonomy to make own decisions concerning their lives and relations with the ‘ordinary’ town residents. It is also worth noticing that the data consist of some notes against the general negative attitude of the social environment in question, and a critical stance towards it. These are presented in the first sub-chapter of the following analysis.
2 The interviews were done in Finnish, and we have translated the quotations used in this article into English. This, of course, means that all expressive, local phrases of the vernacular cannot be caught as such, in their linguistic richness.
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5.4 A New Member of the Local Town Community: Tension in the Shared Environments The small town that forms the empirical context for this analysis is located in a sparsely populated rural area with about 12,000 inhabitants, long away from other towns. It has a history of geographic and social isolation, has created and maintained its own economy and population composition, as well as its own local culture and attitude climate – its social fantasy. In this certain context, then, Somalis form a significant minority and are mostly discussed as unfamiliar people of ‘our’ social and physical landscape. We define this way to talk as the hegemonic discourse (Davies and Harré 1990) with its wideness and manifoldness, of our analysis. This discourse seeks reference material from references to I) municipal economy and local politics, as well as to II) difference, racism and mistrust, and to III) Somalian culture as an essential and inner part of Somalis.
5.4.1 Municipal Economy and Politics In 2010, about 500 Somalis have moved to the small town in question, and in this environment they can be defined as a very significant group of new-comers. Almost all of them have been clients for municipal social services, as the legislation obligates also them to be active participants of the integration process and thus forces them to co-operate with public sector officials (Act of the Promotion of Immigrant Integration 1386/2010).3 This, a relatively big group of new-comers in this context, then, has often been given a collective social position of an extra burden for the local welfare professionals – and thus also for the local public economy. The public economy depression of the 2010s has made the local municipal economies poor and challenges municipal welfare officials in many ways. One of their tasks is to deliver material assistance and other social benefits to all local residents, and in the middle of economic scarcity this task is difficult. Officials, however, have official authority to use their own deliberation when defining the amount of given support to individual clients. When defined as a cause for local tensions, Somalis are talked about as a ‘stream’ that populates the small town too heavily. This stream of new clients for social services is seen to make the officials go out of breath – as was the case also with the wider town population. Then, at the beginning, when they came as a bigger cluster, we were totally unprepared here, in principle. We had to do everything from nothing, from the start (…) and then, so, came the crash with the local population because we had to arrange apartments and social benefits and all these for Somalis. And then the schism [among locals] was ready. [a municipal official.]
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2010/en20101386?search[type]=pika&search[pika]=im migrant%20integration.
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In this interpretation repertoire, on one hand, Somalis are given social positions of ‘ordinary’ support recipients but sometimes also welfare shoppers who have come to the town just hoping for good and easy social security benefits. This latter positioning has, then, offered a fruitful basis for local, informal control consequences: many town inhabitants, who are against immigrants and seek evidence for their resistance, have been quite busy in their detective work – following Somali immigrants in their everyday routes, assessing the value of their cars or bicycles, seeking for their bank account information from garbage cans, and so on. Somalis who have received social benefits have caused a lot of envy among many local natives who see that social security support should belong to only Finns. This, however, seemed to be too much also for the officials, who reported these occasions with a critical, even ironic tone: [Some local inhabitants] always ask, doubt that Somalis get more social security money and for different purposes than the local natives. For bicycles… and someone goes and checks if some Somali has bought a coat, he goes to a shop and checks the price and then sends a message to me that a Somali cannot afford this expensive coat, the coat surely is bought with municipal money. [a municipal official.]
In this certain town there has been a general wish for new, active-aged inhabitants, so that the economics of the area could turn into a rise. However, Somalis have been seen as an answer to that wish only occasionally – which, then, confuses those who would like to see the possibilities of future vitality for this certain community from the presence of so many new-comers. In this, the interviewees also were talking against the general rejection and declared a wish for a more open social climate: The biggest threat for periphery, for many small municipalities is that there will be no people, people are the most important, not the colour of their skin. Our population decreases all the time, we lose, it’s difficult to understand [why Somalis are resisted] because it’s obvious that new people, be they immigrants or else… benefit local business life because shopping is done near here and money stays in local shops. New babies are born, natural increase of population, and even though these Somali parents don’t find work, the growing generation becomes like Finns, go to school very eagerly, get vocations, and are then productive citizens, most of them surely. [a municipal official.]
From our data we can see that when Somalis are seen as town inhabitants, their ‘economic value’ is mainly discussed from a perspective where integration policies around these new-comers are defined as a highly expensive system that makes the already difficult municipal economics miserable even further. The counter discourse, then, highlights the future advantages that can follow the current ‘sacrifices’. However, in the data there are also some expressions where the social fantasy of this community is not seen in terms of financial criteria: Q: What do you think about the way to discuss your clients in euros, meaning, how much they bring, how much they take? This money talk? A: I think they try to get acceptance by talking how much material good comes to town, money, so that people would tolerate [Somalis]. They try to sell this idea. Q: Do you think it’s a good idea?
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A: Actually not, it’s a bit dangerous to think like that. That you put a price tag in a person, what is her or his price. We should emphasize that they are ordinary members of this municipality, Finns like us. And belong to this society. [a NGO worker.] The quite sharp definitions of ‘trouble’ have posed Somalis as targets and tools for quarrels and discussions in which they are not necessarily actively involved. This shows that diaspora Somalis as a social entity can easily be objectified in professional speech and practices. In this discourse Somalis can be made explicit objects also for local politics, and used as an overt tool in the local campaign before municipal court or national parliament elections. Politics… it is here, and in some people’s agenda it is number one. In this way [criticizing Somali immigrants in the town] they [court candidates] fish for votes, do election business by raising these issues to the agenda. And they have got concrete examples here… that there really is one place like this where immigrants are pampered… and then, of course, we have a big group of True Finns4 in the municipal council, eight people, who clearly have presented that we don’t want immigrants here. They say, in the old way, that we have and should concern our own poor ones as well. They actually have said out loud that the more immigrants come here, the more these politicians have support. [a municipal official.]
All examples of this sub-chapter reflect a situation where Somali immigrants were presented to us as something that disturbs the social fantasy of this town, even though the interviewees themselves seemed to locate themselves out from this debate. Some of them even reported a wish to see these immigrants as active developers of local politics. In a small town context a group of even only some hundreds representatives can have huge political power if they only realize to unite themselves as a politically active team. In this context, not so many votes are needed to get an ‘own’ member to the municipal court. Among NGO workers there can be recognized a clear push for Somalis to create a formally organized campaign in order to be able to become a seriously taken partner, a subject and a predicate, in local political discussions and decision making. In this town there is one Somali association already, their own, they are entering local politics as well. We already have one Somali politician. They are very active. They sit there, in municipal court meetings, listening to the decisions that are made. Those local politicians, they become scared when I begin to think that hell… when we have four hundred immigrants and soon six hundred and as they are extremely active voters, when they have one candidate, we’ll soon have a Somali as the chair of our municipal court. [a NGO worker.]
5.4.2 Difference, Racism, and Mistrust [A certain official] could tell you how long it takes that a family with many children can adjust living in an apartment house. They might have ten children in one family. And in summer time when sun is not setting, children jump and shout and run in stairways, the 4 True Finns is a registered political party with an ideology emphasizing nationalism, anti-migration, and patriotism.
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Finns don’t realize it. Or using the laundry, wasting washing powder. Or cleanings when water flows on the floor. They can spoil the apartment with water. [Native] people are so tired to that. They [Somalis] really are living at nights. People can’t sleep, there is no peace, not at nights, not during days. And you cannot call to police because they don’t drink or fight. They are just making noise with their friends. But if it continues and continues… [a NGO worker.]
In the course of discussions, personal – though also shared – perceptions of our interviewees appeared. One dominant frame of positioning can be crystallized with a term “difference” (cf. Ahmed 2000). It contains definitions of the concerned Somalis as a community with a certain social life style. The local Somali community gains heavy local meanings and positions as a culturally different counterpart, with very strange manners, for ‘ordinary’ town residents, as a threat for the previous and usual flow of their everyday lives and night’s sleep. In this negatively toned discourse Somalis are seen as visible disturbers who make noise in the streets, occupy available apartments, enlarge groups in kindergartens and school classes. In this, they are perceived as the unconventional part in the given, aimed social fantasy. The socio-cultural illiteracy of Somalis as newcomers has appeared as a problem to be solved and an obstacle to be overwhelmed so that they could fit into existing socio-cultural structure. This negative positioning of Somalis also seems to be not only the source of reproduction of hegemony, but also the source of continuation of this same discourse. This is a strong definition that also has heavy consequences, while keeping the different groups of town residents apart. Even in summer time… you know we have good fields [for football] here, Somalis are with themselves only. And another notion I have also made, as my office is near the school, I have noted… It is still so that Somali pupils walk from school also only with themselves. [a municipal official.]
Even though Somalis in this discourse are both in the middle and at the margins of the discussion at the same time, it can be reasoned that they have effected on the social atmosphere of this community extremely strongly. This can be seen both in the discursive atmosphere of the town and in crime statistics, concretely. The racist attitudes and structures of this rather isolated Finnish community have resurfaced even in violent ways. These very concrete reactions have kept the local police busy. During the first years [when Somalis came] there were violent abuses [towards Somalis], crimes targeted to individuals, but now, lately, they have been mostly civil wrongs, broken cars mainly. Almost all racist crimes done in region have been done here. Absolutely. [a state official.]
In these concrete reactions Somalis are posed as victims of local attacks. In this social fantasy Somalis cannot, as well, be seen in positions where they themselves could ‘take the lead’ and authority. In an interview, the official cited above was challenged in the following way – but he could not see that change would be possible, yet: Q: Elsewhere, there are campaigns where immigrants have been recruited especially to work as policemen. Also in Finland. Do you think there is a need for that?
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A: It’s a bit difficult to guess. I think, I don’t even know if there are policemen with Somalian background in Finland, maybe I’ve heard something but I’m not sure… But let’s say, there will be in the future. But maybe this would be easier to start in bigger places, where they are more used to foreigners. I could imagine that if some newcomer, Somali man or woman comes to work as a police, it might be very difficult. I don’t mean reactions of people, the public, but a part of our clients, there might be some kind of slur. One should be a strong person to get oneself accepted in people’s eyes. [a state official.] The quotation above shows how difficult it is for a ‘different Other’ to reach social reliability and validity in a prevailing, locked social fantasy. This mistrust towards difference is seen in our data also in expressions where Somalis themselves are referred to as possible criminals in the local social scene. In this discourse Somalis on of this small town with sparse labour possibilities can also be defined as ‘bricks’ whose exclusion from labour markets is easily justified – a notion that is presented to us in a critical way: I have been wondering how also business people… we have shops here which immigrants buy a lot from, big families who buy a lot of food and I’ve been waiting that someone reacts in a positive way. But vice versa, I received phone calls… about suspects that immigrants may steal something from them. [a municipal official.]
Consequences of the ‘trouble’ position discussed in this sub-chapter can be interpreted within van Dijk’s (1996, 90–95) thoughts, when he notes how the reproduction of hegemony is dependent on the access to discourse: on the ability to produce discourses or to speak oneself inside them – and not just to become defined by some others. Van Dijk remarks that in the case of immigrants, refugees or ethnic minorities “social power is being enacted […] in one major domain of dominance”. The lack of access to political discourse, media, academia, labour market, and corporate discourse limits the possibilities and opportunities of these groups. Although these groups provide numerous topics for political and academic discussions and news headlines, they are usually not actively involved in these processes but become objects in processes which are constructed to favour ‘us’ and problematize ‘them’. In this process general mistrust and the agitation of it seem to be one discursive cornerstone – with many concrete and embodied consequences.
5.4.3 Incarnation of the ‘Culture’: Good and Bad Somaliness Somehow [Somalis would be accepted]… if they just could find jobs… and, of course, change their own behaviour because they, inevitably, represent different culture, are noisy, talk a lot when they gather together. This is something that is not appropriate here, going there, around the streets and twaddling. Drawing attention. Of course, they have their own cultures and habits [to be understood]. [a municipal official.]
In the contemporary critical sociological discourse we can identify aspirations to get rid of the classical notions of culture and cultural differences. This is partly because emphasizing culture has led to emphasizing difference as a challenge for
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social interaction, and also as a means to maintain many social hierarchies and inequalities (e.g. Könönen 2011). This debate seems to split social scientists to two opposite camps: to those who still ‘believe in culture’ and those who do not. The professionals interviewed for this analysis can be classified as supporters of the former camp, as references to culture are strongly present in the interview data. It penetrates the whole data and is emphasized by each informant. It also can be seen as a strong discourse covering the interpretation frame of difference presented above, and that of family memberships discussed below. However, in here the references are not directed to just manners and life-style but also to some inner characteristics of Somalis, as ‘natural’ and essential features of Somaliness. This discourse transforms the individual actor as a quite passive adapter and mediator for his or her national culture and ethnicity. The definitions in this frame can be either negative and condemning or positive and thanking. In this perspective, Somalian culture makes individual people of certain type – some of whom should be reproved and taught so that the local surroundings and their social fantasy remain peaceful (Somalian culture has to be ‘rooted out’ from them), and some of whom actually could help in improving many bad Finnish habits (Somalian culture should be ‘released’ for useful purposes). Stressing the distance between the cultures of Somalis and Finns has provoked an unconsciously built inequity with concrete consequences. The discourse of cultural differences is not only condemning Somalis to social positions of ignorance and oddness. In this interpretation frame, it is seen that culture can make Somalis a bit disloyal and nonchalant, difficult, and non-foreseeable co-workers – but also caring and warm care givers, and this is something that the Finns seem not to be: If I think about vocations that could be defined as natural for Somalis… here in my work with them I have always stumbled upon a notion, for example, that their reaction towards old people is somehow naturally extremely beautiful, among many, and they could act as workers who produce good mood and replace many pills. [a NGO worker.]
Also a given position as a ‘body of culture’ is partly challenged in our data. Another NGO worker of our data, on her part, resists thinking about Somalis as representatives of some foreign culture. This definer emphasizes social positions of unique individuals and tells how she has: […] wanted to avoid definitions given from outside, when a person comes, might she be Fadumo or Fiifi, just a person in a certain situation with a certain thing in mind she wants to ask, I just want to be with that person.
5.5 An Ignorant Member of a Weird Somalian Family Local public sector authorities reflect and realize general welfare politics, as well as integration programs. This is the case also within family policy which in Finland still has a very moralistic and controlling nature (Vuori and Nätkin 2007; Yesilova
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2009). ‘Decent families’ often form a moral corner stone of a communal social fantasy, and this moralism grabs also immigrant families inside itself. In this moral light differing ways to live family life become defined as problematic and something to be profoundly changed (Peltola 2014). In a small town context Somalis cannot escape the moralistic look that is turned towards them and their family life patterns. Then… they [Somali parents] can even agitate children… in school classes, that it is not obligatory to go there [to certain classes] …or that you can behave as you like, it has happened. Or you can behave badly, with the parents’ permission. That the children have not to obey their teacher. [a municipal official.]
This frame of interpretation that poses people as family members gives Somalis in question a problematic position. It also allows us to trace how the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is relevant in the given context. Although the representation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ seem to reveal itself in individual forms in our analysis, they refer to wider socio-cultural interpretations. In here, Somalis represent the ‘they’ who need to give up ‘their’ ways and learn ‘our’ ways. Particularly, it is laid on an idea of decent Finnish family life that should be taught to Somali immigrants. The discourse is constructed in talks about everyday home-life duties: mother’s responsibilities, child up-bringing, cleaning, sanitation, garbage disposal, and so on. Within this stress of motherhood subject positions given to Somalis become also gendered – widening them into general gender relations, even though both women and men are defined as learners of proper everyday life and trainees of ‘normality’, under the Finnish professionals’ command. Professional talk concerning especially gender or generational relations contains a lot of moral blame that cries for change. On one hand, Somalis are, however, also ‘understood’ in this sense, as they are seen as ignorant, almost ‘primitive’ – actually it is astonishing, almost comical, to notice how educated professionals in Finland still may think that African immigrants ‘come from the jungle’. On the other hand, the talks about parenthood and issues of child rearing determine Somali parents as wrongly acting care takers – parents who use spoiling educational activities and whose ‘agitating’ practices can question and even disturb the flow of the conventional routines in school classes and kindergartens. This, then, seems to give a ‘natural’ reason why Somali children are defined as very different from their Finnish fellows. A: And then… about day care and school… If I say it in a generalizing way… as they come direct from the jungle… of course… [they do not manage] any of our local habits, how to behave in classroom situations, their behaviour can be very fluttery and takes a lot of resource from the school personnel. That they have to be taught that here is a door, here we go, here we wash hands (…) in kindergartens they have to be taught, from the start, that now we have to go to bathroom, and now we eat with forks and knives. Because they at home often eat from one pot only with their hands. So we have to start from the very start. [a municipal official.]
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However, in our data we can see also a counter discourse where the questioning of Somalian parenthood is questioned. Somali families can have many children, which is seen to be have a good effect on the populations’ age structure of the town, without burdening the local welfare officials working with child protection issues – because Somali women as house-wives take care of their children at home and are not in need of municipal day-care services: And if we think about productivity, Somali parents are productive because they take care of their children, there has been no extra burden in the child protection office because of them, even though this was a suspect. [a municipal official.]
Another kind of counter speech in this certain context can also be recognized. The NGO workers of this analysis talk a lot about the need to teach Somalis different things in order to cope in their new locality. The tone and intention of this teaching is different, rather aiming at mutual understanding, as well as empowering Somalis, than trying to ‘teach them manners’ and make them ‘as Finnish as possible’: I have learned foreign language by being informally with people, doing something, I think it’s the easiest way to teach. When we meet here each other and try to speak and clarify. Here we have cried and laughed. Or they may come, have received a letter and don’t understand if they have received money or do they have to send money and what’s it all about. This has been an easy place to ask. [a NGO worker.]
5.6 A Member of a Diasporic Somali Network: Controlling the ‘Own’ Ones and Controlled by Them Welfare work is not just supporting people who are in need but also controlling their lives (e.g. Pirttilä et al. 1996). Professional positions contain a lot of formal and informal power – and those who want support have to surrender, to obey, and to participate in the sempiternal trade between social security and personal freedom. In this relation, with Somali immigrants of our analysis, there seems to be an extra challenge: Somalis’ dispersion inside Finland has not cut strong ties between them. From the viewpoint of many welfare professionals this network is seen as an opponent: as a facet that also campaigns for the control over Somalis’ everyday lives. In Finland, there is not much general knowledge and understanding about the clan system that seems to have had a huge political meaning in Somalia. Clan relations are not also discussed eagerly in interview situations with Somalis. However, there exists a kind of ‘public suspicion’ that some invisible clan-based, coercive social ties, relations, and duties are toning lives of Somalis also in this certain context very far away from Somalia and its political history. This suspicion puzzles our informants in their daily work, and puts them in a combatting position: these officials are not ready to negotiate with a system that they see as strange. We offer everyone what we are able to. But we do it on our conditions. Because…the Somali population, at least the older ones, they have these certain clan systems, these clan
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The clan system is noted also among NGO professionals of this analysis. These, however, do not define clan-based tensions and ties as enemies for their work but rather see them as strings that can make some local Somalis, who must live near each other, also to tease each other: Q: Do you think that hierarchies are a heritage from Somalia that effect here… or have they created these hierarchies here? A: I think it’s created here… and then it seems that it has been some kind of clan schism also here. We effected on it also ourselves, taken people from different clans [to different social activities]. And then it began… that Somalis made different kinds of compliments concerning representatives of different clans. A kind of teasing. [a NGO worker.] In this interpretation repertoire the local Somali community and its members are given a subject position in an invisible, sometimes also visible and penetrating, diaspora Somali network with its own action logic, its own strict hierarchies, its own internal knowledge and information mediation. The critics towards Somalis here are very similar than in the ‘weird-family-culture’ talk presented in the previous sub- chapter. From the point of view of the welfare professionals, Somali network that has visible and invisible strings that try to penetrate into their work forms a strange world and disturbs their integration efforts. Thus, the social dominance of this network over Somalis in different localities is faced with heavy criticism and resistance. In the welfare service work it can be seen as a contestant to be won, as something not to be allowed to disturb the local aspirations for integration. In this talk about internal control there can be recognized, at least between the lines, also pleasure and exultation because living in Finland; and according to the Finnish policy rules, seems to change Somalis’ gender order and generation structure, understood as a heritage from Somalia, in this local environment. This schism among Somalis is welcomed as it, at the end, is seen to bury traditional hierarchies defined as unfair from the point of view of a late modern welfare society – and from a point of view of a female, professional official. I have noticed that there is schism… I mean these young Somali men who want to be in Finland, in a way how it should be here and how we are here… and then …between them and those older tribe elders who want to maintain their own habits and are afraid that when women go to school and become free, that they [these men] totally lose their authority. That they cannot command their wives, cannot say that you are doing exactly like I say. [a municipal official.]
In the talk of Somalis’ social relations we can recognize also a counter discourse stressing immigrants’ lack of ‘own people’ or social ties to them in diaspora. This
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can be seen especially in talk of NGO actors, maybe as evidence with which one’s own role as a helper, and one’s own intervention in integration work is justified: We actually help, it is so called neighbourhood assistance, if you think that a person moves here, they have no relatives, aunts, grandmothers, godparents like we do. When they have to learn how to sew, for example. So they come to me. And they don’t even have sewing machines. They have no neighbour networks, so I feel I’m the neighbour who… [a NGO worker.]
5.7 An Autonomous and Competent Individual Q: So, how much background information you have about these people… If we think for example those coming as trainees into your organization? I mean about the Somalis…do you know about the backgrounds, about their personal lives and…? A: Well, it depends on how much they’re willing to tell, they themselves. It is not so that we at first [grill] all that you have experienced, but the person, the human, can tell himself or herself what (s)he wants. [a NGO worker]. The quotation above is from an interview of a NGO worker, who during her working days has possibilities to spend time with her ‘clients’ also in an informal way. Doing things together, even though the other one might be just a temporarily hired trainee, opens possibilities to mutual feelings of friendship and confidence. This talk about real encounters reflects respect, space giving and trust – attributes that have been seen obvious for successful co-existence in many socio-philosophical analyses (see, e.g. Honneth 1995). In this interpretation frame Somali immigrants are defined as individuals, persons with unique and personal names. The tone of the talk is positive and welcoming: the Other is seen as a competent actor who wants to meet local people in a personal level and who is respected as such, as a person (s)he is. This definition gives Somali immigrants space to define what is good for them, and also gives them authority to decide to what extent they, for example, open their personal lives to the actors that aim to help them. Within this frame of interpretation, co-existence and integration are not processes governed by the dominant understanding and professional knowledge representing the hegemony. The social fantasy behind this kind of positioning is open for individual difference and cultural newness (see Bhabha 1994). When Somali immigrants are defined as special and respected individuals, they are given social positions of open contact seekers and callers for kin spirits that cross prevailing preconceptions. The unemployment situation of Somalis that leads them into a need of social security money, is seen as a problem caused by dominant employer attitudes for instance: Somalis are perceived as hard working and capable workmates who only need possibilities to prove these attributes and not as a threat to the existing social fantasy in this sense. These kinds of individuals may become, however, also victimized: defined to positions where they have experienced and still
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experience manifold traumatizing unfairness, without their own reason – and thus also need people who are on their side in the campaign between justice and i njustice. This also indicates that Somalis in this town are very conscious about their meaning as dividers of attitudes among the natives. I think that they [Somalis in this town] probably, they always want to meet a person as a human being, they are interested in people that they experience helpful… somehow being on their side. [a NGO worker.]
The quotation above can be read as a critical and consciously formed notion towards the general speech concerning cultural differences but it contains also critics directed towards the resisting attitudes of many local inhabitants against immigrants in this certain context. In this environment, Somali minority has divided the native population into two opposite attitude parties. NGO professionals, who have possibilities to meet Somalis intensively through their work, easily talk themselves to the side that favors these often rejected people. In this, they also challenge the hegemonic social fantasy that aims at maintaining the cultural and demographic status quo of this small local community.
5.8 Concluding Remarks It is so… that when one begins to doubt and lurk, stalk… everything that the others do begins to seem suspicious. If an immigrant has a better bike than me he has got it in a dishonest way and so on. It’s unbelievable, all these… looking for immigrants’ receipts from garbage cans, and whatever. [a municipal official.]
The empirical data for this analysis have been collected in a unique small town as a context of immigration policy and integration work. When examining a small town, where a relatively high number of Somalis are resettled in, our aim has been to show to what extent Somalis are treated, accepted, or resisted as a part of the ‘conventional’ – in terms of being a part of town’s social fantasy. According to the principles of discourse theory we, however, can reason that this local context with its special actors also reflect the wider national immigration political discourses (Foucault 1972; Fairclough 2001). Furthermore, the way to talk about and attribute immigrants is not without concrete local consequences in the subjects’ lives. In this analysis the voice has been given to different professionals working in diverse socio-political posts. Various ways to discuss immigrant issues and positioning of Somali immigrants in the local context can be distinguished in their talk about integration work, immigrants’ ways of life, or relations with the local natives. In this case, the talk has concerned Somalis who in this certain context form a locally special and significant immigrant minority. When discussing their work and encounters with Somalis, these people also repeat the general grammar of Finnish migration discourses; making immigrants either subjects or objects, or sometimes even predicates of their sentences. They, however, are also talking about ‘their own Somalis’, a concrete and visible group of town residents. In our data, we have
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noticed tendencies where Somalis have mainly appeared as a problematized social entity and where the covert distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ continuously exists, also among people who actually do a lot of their work with Somali clients. Their talk about Somalis, however, is very contradictory: at some moments they heavily criticized the general negative town atmosphere, and at some other ones they themselves began to produce negative definitions concerning these new town inhabitants. Discursive definitions reflect the general societal, often abstract, aspirations but they also have power in causing real life consequences (Fairclough 2001). Talk is not just talk – if subject positions to people are given from other subject positions having societal power, they begin to formulate, frame and restrict people’s social space and action possibilities. If immigrant integration work is carried out in frames of repressive constructions and without recognition of the Other as nothing else than a curious object, the atmosphere remains suspicious. In this certain empirical case we can see this mistrust in local tensions that, continuously, seek mistakes in the behaviour of the new-comers. Here we can also see how immigrants may become objects who work, although non-directly and without their own intention, as suitable tools or even weapons for local politics, which can even harm a lot many integration aspirations. What comes to the nature of the interviewed professionals’ work, one can – cautiously – figure that in the NGO work encounters with immigrant ‘clients’ offer more fruitful occasions for personal recognition and positive space giving to the Other as a subject. In this kind of frame also an immigrant, even though (s)he is a target of professional work, gets a position of an autonomous and respected individual. The work of municipal officials, then, is usually comprised of numerous but temporary office meetings with immigrants and seems easily to produce and maintain discourses where immigrants are induced under official rule – often as a cluster of strange and challenging cases. The discourse of embodied culture is a strong one in the analyzed data. Within it, Somalian culture is the real subject that works through Somalian people. Somalian culture is seen as something obscure that disturbs effective integration and makes Somali immigrants act in many non-proper ways in their new home context. Discourse of culture covers the discourse of difference, and mostly has a negative, condemning tone. Only in some rare expressions of NGO workers Somalian culture gains positive meanings, especially when Somalis’ care giving ‘proclivities’ are mentioned. One aim of the research project Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship – Transnational Networks, Social Participation and Social Identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S., within which the data for this analysis have been gathered, has been to find ways to promote more positive discourses of immigration. This can be seen as an important mission in a societal context and among professionals who still – even though often with good and guileless purposes – have difficulties to get rid of definitions of ‘strange challenge’ when encountering immigrants and working with them. Targeting people by giving them problematizing subject positions creates distinctions with concrete distinctive consequences.
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The whole discursive climate – the social fantasy – of this small town, however, is not just condemning differences and newcomers, as we already have noted from some opinions in our data. In some interviews we found a social fantasy, a future utopia, of a multicultural, lively town with different kinds of inhabitants sharing same environments and walking to a same direction. Some hints towards that can already be recognized and noted with satisfaction: I found it so nice when, because there are many immigrant children in that school, and when the children go, here and there, they went to church, or where did they go… a long line, and in-between there were immigrant children, it’s so amazing to see, and also when parents go to collect the little ones …because every year these families get new babies. I have a huge… I must say that I’m a bit proud because only a few people have had possibilities to effect on the composition of this kind of community. It’s four percent of the population [of the town]. Though no-one has given positive feedback, still these people have got along here. [a municipal official]
References Ahmed, S. (2000). Strange encounter: Embodied other in post-Coloniality. London: Routledge. Armila, P., Rannikko, A., & Sotkasiira, T. (2017). Invading formal education by anti-racist cam- paigning. In A. Aminkeng (Ed.), Antiracism education in and out of School. Switzerland (pp. 125–150). Cham: Palgrave McMillan. Bhabha, H. K. (1994). The location of culture. New York: Routledge. Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 20(1), 43–64. Dlamini, S. N., & Wolfe, B. (2009). Engaging the Canadian diaspora: Youth social identities in a Canadian Border City. McGill Journal of Education, 4(3), 405–433. Ewing, K. P. (2004). Migration, identity negotiation, and self experience. In J. Friedman & S. Randeria (Eds.), Worlds on the move: Globalisation, migration and cultural security (pp. 117–140). London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. Fairclough, N. (2001). Language and power. London: Longman. Foucault, M. (1972). Archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language. New York: Pantheon Books. Foucault, M. (2003). Abnormal. London: Verso. Foucault, M. (2006). Hermeneutics of the subject. New York: Picador. Hall, S. (1990). Cultural identity and diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), Identity, community, culture, difference (pp. 222–237). London: Lawrence & Wishard. Harinen, P., & Sabour, M. (2013). Finland. In P. A. J. Stevens & G. A. Dworkin (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of race and ethnic inequalities in education (pp. 308–327). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Honneth, A. (1995). The struggle for recognition. The moral grammar of social conflicts. New York: Polity Press. Howarth, D. (2010). Power, discourse, and policy: Articulating a hegemony approach to critical policy studies. Critical Policy Studies, 3(4), 309–335. Husserl, E. (1995/1907). Fenomenologian idea. Viisi luentoa. Helsinki: Loki-kirjat. Könönen, J. (2011). Palvelualan työnantajat ja joustavat ulkomaalaiset työntekijät. Maahanmuuttohallinnon merkitys prekaarin työvoiman tuottamisessa. Janus, 19(1), 52–67. Peltola, M. (2014). Kunnollisia perheitä. Maahanmuutto, sukupolvet ja yhteiskunnallinen asema. Helsinki: Nuorisotutkimusverkosto.
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Pirttilä, I., Konttinen, E., Nuotio, J. & Turjanmäki, E. (1996). Asiantuntijuuden anatomia. Joensuu: Pohjois-Karjalan Ammattikorkeakoulun julkaisuja B. Rantala, K., & Sulkunen, P. (Eds.). (2007). Projektiyhteiskunnan kääntöpuolia. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. van Dijk, T. (1996). Discourse, power and access. In R. C. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.), Texts and practices: Readings in critical discourse analysis (pp. 84–104). London: Routledge. van Dijk, T. (2008). Discourse and power. Contribution to critical discourse studies. Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan. Vuori, J., & Nätkin, R. (Eds.). (2007). Perhetyön tieto. Tampere: Vastapaino. Yesilova, K. (2009). Ydinperheen politiikka. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Chapter 6
Somalis in America’s Heartland: Columbus, Ohio Stefanie Chambers
Columbus, Ohio is home to the second largest Somali immigrant population in the United States. The influx of refugees started in the 1990s, and has continued to increase at a significant rate. Much of the scholarship on Somali communities in the United States focuses on Minneapolis, Minnesota and Lewiston, Maine. This article examines the role of the local and state government policies to determine the impact they have on Somalis’ migration to Columbus and incorporation into the city. In addition, the article builds upon the bureaucratic incorporation literature by shedding light on the city of Columbus’ efforts to incorporate Somalis in the community. Interviews with local policymakers, Somali leaders, and Somali parents provide a lens to view how government policies have affected the Somali community. It concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at increasing Somali incorporation in Columbus, Ohio.1
6.1 Introduction Although large American cities have historically been the primary destinations for those from around the globe seeking greater economic opportunities and escaping conflict, a growing trend is for such immigrants to seek smaller cities. For Somali immigrants, one of the “new destinations” is Columbus, Ohio. Somalis started their
1 This article is based on Stefanie Chambers’ recently published book Somalis in the Twin Cities and Columbus: Immigrant Incorporation in New Destinations (Temple University Press, 2017).
S. Chambers (*) Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA e-mail:
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migration to Columbus in the 1990s. Although the Midwestern city does not conjure up images of international diversity, and has not been viewed as a traditional destination for immigrants to the United States, Columbus is the second largest home for the Somali Diaspora in the United States. Although precise numbers are not available, city officials estimate that there are between 30,000–45,000 Somalis living in Columbus today, a city with a population of approximately 850,000 according to 2015 U.S Census records. This article examines local and state government policies to determine the impact they have on Somalis’ migration to Columbus and incorporation into the city. Interviews with policymakers, local Somali community leaders, and Somali parents provide a lens to view how government policies have affected the Somali population, specifically in terms of education, economic stability, and housing. These policy areas are the most important to Somali residents interviewed for this study and are at the top of the list of issues addressed by the city’s New American Initiative, an office within the city’s Community Relations Commission. The New American Initiative office is responsible for providing information and services to immigrants and refugees as they transition to life in Columbus. Understanding the significance and effect of this office is a central component of this study. The reasons Somalis are attracted to the city, and the extent to which Columbus has welcomed this community are also discussed. By shedding light on the role of city officials in governmental policymaking, this chapter also builds upon the bureaucratic incorporation literature (Jones-Correa 2006; Marrow 2009; Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005). More importantly, this article offers scholars and policymakers with important theoretical and practical findings that could help Somalis and other new immigrants thrive in urban America.
6.2 Methodology The genesis of this analysis was an interview conducted with Columbus’ Mayor Michael Coleman in June 2012 as part of a different research project by the author (Chambers and Schreiber-Stainthorp 2013). Coleman was elected in 1999, a period when Columbus was experiencing a steep increase in Somali residents. In 2005, Mayor Coleman launched the “New American Initiative” as a division of his Community Relations Commission. The mission statement of this new division reads: Mayor Coleman’s New American Initiative was created to give all immigrant and refugees living in Columbus access to city services and programs to help improve their lives. This initiative gives equal opportunity to all refugees and immigrants and allows them to become responsible, productive residents of Columbus. The growing new American populations contribute to the cultural richness, and enhance the economic growth and development of the city. In order to ensure a smooth transition and seamless integration process, a comprehensive strategy of resource distribution needed to be established. The growth rate of the immigrant/refugee population in Columbus has also posed certain challenges for the city
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infrastructure in meeting the basic living necessities in a culturally sensitive manner. Some of these challenges include language barriers and education, fair and affordable housing, healthcare and employment.2
Mayor Coleman hired two individuals to run this new office, one from the Somali community and the other from the Mexican community. Although other cities, such as Minneapolis, created commissions intended to help “new Americans,” Columbus was the first city to create a permanent division within the mayor’s office to serve the needs of recent immigrants. Understanding this office is particularly important because the literature on the Somali community is sparse, specifically as it relates to their incorporation in Columbus. Indeed, to date most of the scholarship on Somali communities in the United States has focused on Minneapolis, Minnesota (Ali 2011; Roble and Rutledge 2008) and Lewiston, Maine (Ellison 2009; Rector 2008; Voyer 2013). This article relies heavily on thirty-one interviews with Somali-Americans in Columbus by the author between June 2013 and July 2013. A review of articles in the Columbus Dispatch garnered a list of names of noteworthy Somali leaders. A list of executive directors of Somali community groups was also compiled. During initial phone interviews, a snowball sample was used to narrow the list of Somali leaders who would willingly participate in this project. One Somali city bureaucrat was invaluable to this process. His willingness to contact community members, establish trust, and organize interviews was a key factor in the willingness of so many Somalis to participate in this study. An effort was made to include a large number of Somali parents in this study. Education policy is a key area in the upward mobility of a community, thus finding respondents able to discuss education issues, economic mobility, and housing concerns was important. These are central concerns of the Mayor’s New American Initiative office and the same policy areas respondents identified as some of the most pressing areas of concern. Somali respondents include seven parents of school age children, ten parents who also identified themselves as community leaders, three community leaders without children or who send their children to suburban schools, two media representatives, two former teachers, two recent public school graduates, one business leader, and one religious leader. Four city bureaucrats were interviewed for this study, including two Somalis. The majority of the interview participants were men. Two respondents were married to one another. Eighty percent of respondents were English language proficient. Those who did not speak English answered questions through an interpreter. In addition to analysis of interview data, a literature review on Somali integration in US cities, including Columbus, was conducted as part of this project. The literature on Somalis in Columbus is extremely limited (Waters 2012), so expanding to the cities where Somalis also make-up a sizable population was necessary. A review of newspaper articles from the Columbus Dispatch between 1996 through 2013
http://crc.columbus.gov/content.aspx?id=29033 8/1/2013.
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provided a contextual overview of the local media’s perspective on this community. Documentaries on Somalis in the United States and one specifically on Somali women in Columbus were also analyzed prior to conducting fieldwork in the city (Nasro’s Journey 2011; The Letter 2003).
6.3 Bureaucratic Incorporation Literature Minority politics scholars have focused much of their attention on the role of elected officials in the incorporation of racial and ethnic groups in the United States. These elected officials can advocate for policies that respond to minority group needs and interests, or representatives from the groups themselves can gain elected positions and push for responsive policies. Less scholarly attention has focused on the role of street-level bureaucrats in the incorporation of racial and ethnic minorities. These street-level bureaucrats are employees who are responsible for the delivery of services to community members and often have the most contact with residents. The work of several prominent scholars has shed light on the role of street-level bureaucrats and their role in the incorporation of new immigrant communities in urban America (Jones-Correa 2006; Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Marrow 2009). This research plays an important role in understanding incorporation of Somalis in Columbus. Traditional political science suggests that bureaucratic incorporation “takes place only as immigrants accumulate resources and are able to mobilize (or be mobilized) effectively in the political arena” (Jones-Correa 2006, 14). Much of the literature suggests that bureaucracies are impediments to democratic participation and politically corrosive as they “co-opt minority activists, shifting their energies away from direct mobilization” (Jones-Correa 2006, 14). This more recent bureaucratic incorporation literature finds that bureaucrats play a critical role in minority incorporation. As Marrow explains (2009, 758): The novel finding suggests that traditional political incorporation theories may be misguided in seeing electoral mobilization as the primary, if not only, way for newcomers to gain substantive representation over time, in viewing bureaucracies as mere “impediments to democratic incorporation” and in “ignoring agencies as a possible focus of incorporation.
In fact, some of these studies find that bureaucratic values play an even more important role in incorporation than political factors such as the ideology of elected officials (Meier and O’Toole 2006). Other important contributors to the bureaucratic incorporation literature include S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Paul G. Lewis (2005), who analyze the bureaucratic incorporation of immigrants in California’s destination cities. Focusing on 299 metropolitan areas where foreign-born individuals make up 15 percent of the population, as well as five additional areas where at least 10,000 of these newcomers are documented, Ramakrishnan and Lewis examine whether immigrants are reshaping the routines of the city or are largely unnoticed. They also attempt to assess the political relevance of immigrants to city
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officials, communication between immigrants and local officials, and the policy responsiveness by local officials to immigrants. Not surprisingly, immigrant influence on city government is found to be more positive when more immigrants live in a specific area. Metropolitan bureaucrats in areas with higher numbers of foreign-born constituents are more likely to report that they communicate with local immigrants; and are more likely to say that immigrant- related issues have been topics of local political debate. These officials are also more likely to advocate higher levels of ethnic representation on boards and commissions and to recognize the cities’ increasing efforts to provide interpreters, translate public documents, create human relations commissions, use community policing techniques, and accept Mexican consular ID cards as valid identification. The authors also note that the political culture and the ideology of elected officials also shapes government choices. Among their most interesting finding, Ramakirshnan and Lewis identify the police as some of the bureaucrats who best incorporate immigrants in the community. While police officers have an exceptionally challenging job in high-immigration cities where there is a high potential for language barriers and general distrust of the police. For example, California police officers are more likely to accept Mexican consular IDs as a valid form of identification and do not report the presence of suspected undocumented immigrants. They also introduce community-policing techniques, such as meetings between neighborhood groups and police officers to support immigration in destination cities. Ramakrishnan and Lewis recommend that cities consider a more proactive and long-term approach in reaching out to local immigrants, specifically through appointments on boards and commissions. They go on to suggest that intermediary groups, such as churches and community-based organizations, can serve as an effective liaison to learn more about the policy interests of immigrant populations and to promote political participation. Building upon this scholarship, Michael Jones-Correa (2006) examines the simultaneous growth and bureaucratic incorporation of minority populations in suburban Washington, D.C. Drawing on demographic trends reflected in the expanding suburbanization of native-born, racial minorities, and new immigrants since the 1970s, Jones-Correa evaluates the implications of these changes for suburban governments. In his analysis, Jones-Correa assesses the “bureaucratic ethos” -- the intersection of professional norms with bureaucratic tasks -- within government and non-government agencies alike. Jones-Correa identifies systematic variation across bureaucratic agencies depending on whether they are service or regulatory bureaucracies. Service bureaucracies create personal relationships with constituents. They seek to create community adjustments that often precede any electoral pressure for change. In this sense, service bureaucracies themselves can become agents or advocates for change within the political system, pressuring for more sustained, or concerted response to the presence of immigrants and minorities. For service bureaucrats, minority incorporation is partly a matter of task and partly a matter of professional ethos. In contrast, regulatory bureaucracies maintain impersonal relationships with constituents.
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Interactions are often limited and generally unresponsive to demographic changes and barriers. As observed by Jones-Correa, professional norms reinforce the idea that their task is an impartial policing of rule. Jones-Correa’s most relevant finding as it relates to this research, is that different bureaucratic cultures lead to different outcomes for immigrant incorporation. And while there are still prevalent barriers to incorporation, there is an increasing response to demographic diversity. Helen Marrow (2009) investigates the adaptation of natives and bureaucratic institutions to newcomers in rural America’s new immigrant destinations in the south. Marrow examines the experiences of Hispanic migrants from 2003 through 2004 in two North Carolina counties with divergent economic and demographic contexts, in an attempt to determine whether bureaucrats are responsive to the interests of immigrants. Marrow pays particular attention to undocumented immigrants. Through 129 semi-structural interviews with Latino immigrants and bureaucrats, Marrow examines how bureaucracies address the needs of immigrants in the areas of elementary and higher education, social welfare and medical services, and law enforcement and court systems. Marrow determines that bureaucratic incorporation in rural areas is met by public service bureaucrats, rather than elected officials, but is limited by both legal and participatory dimensions: undocumented immigrants cannot naturalize, vote or engage in electoral politics and those who are documented have fewer resources and points of entry than would be available in urban areas. As such, in early periods of settlement, immigrants experience substantive representation, representation of their interests by political actors who do not reflect their race or ethnicity, as opposed to descriptive representation, where representatives share demographic characteristics with their constituents. Consequently, interaction between immigrants and the state government is conducted through bureaucrats. Public service workers, or “street-level bureaucrats” have substantial discretion. They consider it their professional responsibility to dispense resources in the name of promoting equity and community well-being. However, while street-level bureaucrats respond better to Hispanics than state and local politicians, some bureaucrats themselves are more inclusionary than others. For example, public elementary school and emergency medical service bureaucrats tend to better incorporate immigrants than law enforcement and court system bureaucrats. Like Jones-Correa (2005), and Ramakirshnan and Lewis (2006), Marrow finds that bureaucrats’ professional missions, orientations and goals influence their decisions independent of government policies and electoral pressures. Marrow adds to contemporary incorporation theories by analyzing the perception that external government policies exert both direct “control” and indirect “influence” over bureaucrats’ interpretation of their professional responsibilities. Thus, bureaucratic responsiveness is influenced by a bureaucrat’s own interpretation of his/her responsibilities. Hispanic newcomers undergoing the process of incorporation in rural America are met by both inclusive government policies which enhanced bureaucrats’ interest in helping clients, as well as restrictive policies which amplify regulator roles.
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6.4 Somalia to Columbus: Adaptation and Discrimination The majority of Somalis in Columbus are United States citizens and came to the country as political refugees in the mid-1990s. To appreciate the journey from the northeastern coast of Africa to the Midwestern United States, one must first understand the political, economic and social situation of the Somali refugees. In 1960, Somalia was carved out of former Italian and British colonies. During the Cold War, it served as a proxy for both the United States and Soviet Union in the bitter battle to control the strategic Horn of Africa (International Crisis Group 2008). While he was in power from 1969 to 1991, long-time leader Mohamed Siad Barre’s kinship group benefitted from widespread corruption fueled by foreign aid, which inspired frustration and envy among rival groups. Siad Barre’s brutal suppression of uprisings in turn led to his eventual ouster in January 1991 (International Crisis Group 2008). The ensuing vacuum was rapidly filled by rival “political faction leaders- turned-warlords” (International Crisis Group 2008). The United States led an attempt in 1992 to protect food provisions for famine victims and to eventually oust the dominant faction leader, Mohamed Farah Aideed. The United States withdrew in late 1993 after a botched military operation resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. service members and a tragedy that horrified the American people and haunted American military and intelligence forces. The United Nations led unsuccessful missions in cooperation with the United States, but eventually withdrew in March of 1995. In 1991, thousands of Somalis fled their home country to seek refuge in the United States. By 1994, many found themselves in Columbus, Ohio. Others relocated to various, seemingly random towns and cities throughout the country. Among these areas were, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Norfolk, Virginia; Seattle, Washington; and Lewiston, Maine. When Somalis first started to immigrate to the United States, the majority of refugees relocated in Minnesota and Virginia. The former remains a stronghold. Somalis in Virginia, however, found the cost of living in Virginia high and had trouble finding jobs. In contrast, Columbus had available factory and warehouse jobs, coupled with lower rental rates. A small number of Somalis moved to Columbus and shared news of their improved living situation with friends and family. One of the first Somalis to move to Columbus noted: I left Virginia in the early 1990s because it was so expensive. Columbus had warehouse jobs. I didn’t want any handouts, so I took a job immediately and told my brothers this was a good place to live. There were apartments large enough for Somali families… they are large, sometimes six to eight people. We could get these apartments for under $500 a month. Some Somalis were here earlier because they went to University at OSU (Ohio State University). They also told people that this was a good place (Columbus community leader interview A, July 26, 2013).
Before long, Columbus was one of the foremost destinations for Somali refugees. Today, Columbus ranks second in size of Somali population behind Minneapolis and ahead of Lewiston. Estimates vary immensely regarding how many Somalis have made Franklin County, Ohio their home. According to the
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United States Census, fewer than 10,000 Somalis are in Columbus. The book, The Somali Diaspora, reports that roughly 45,000 Somalis call Columbus home (Roble and Rutledge 2008). One Somali community organization asserts that upwards of 80,000 Somalis live in the city (Community Research Partners 2009). The precise number of Somalis matters less for the purposes of this research than the fact that a sizable population exists. Virtually all Somalis living in Columbus are Muslim. About a third of all Somali households are run by women, many of whom are single mothers as a result of the loss of their husbands in Somalia’s civil war. A significant number of adults have limited to no English language skills. These realities contribute to pervasive social isolation and alienation of the Somali refugee population and to the challenge of political and economic incorporation for this community. The government is tasked with creating public policy that is inclusive for an immigrant population whom the larger population misunderstands, distrusts, and sometimes resents. Regardless of the destination, immigrant groups and the receiving municipality often face a wide range of challenges in terms of incorporating the new population socially, politically, and economically. Tackling these relocation issues is an enormous responsibility for local and state governments. The first -- and perhaps most pervasive and ongoing obstacle -- lies in social incorporation. In this area, Somalis have struggled. Anita Waters’ research on Somalis in Columbus documents their unique discrimination as Africans, immigrants, and Muslims (2012). Respondents in this study were reluctant to complain about discrimination, but when asked what could be done to help Somalis in Columbus, many respondents offered thoughts that aligned with Waters’ research in terms of Somali discrimination. One respondent said: The city has made efforts to help service providers, like the police, fire, teachers, understand Somali culture, family structure, religious traditions. This has helped, but there are still some very serious misconceptions. [Such as] …that we are not American citizens, that we don’t pay taxes, that we want government handouts, that we’re terrorists, or that we’re pirates. The post-9/11 world made things more challenging for us, but we don’t complain (Columbus community leader interview June 27, 2013).
Another respondent commented on the work he has done at the city-level to increase cultural understanding, and also to respond to claims of religious discrimination. He explained: I sometimes help employers understand how to comply with the law concerning the free exercise of religion. Many Somalis need space and time for prayer. When an employer refuses to comply, I can assist with mediation… It’s not always a case of discrimination, sometimes it’s a misunderstanding of religious practices (Columbus city bureaucrat interview June 17, 2013).
Discrimination by employers and accusations of profiling and abuse by police were mentioned by some male respondents. Female respondents were less likely to identify discrimination, which could be a gendered perception or a reluctance to complain about abuse to an outsider. What both men and women regularly alluded to were challenges related to affordable housing. Discrimination was not used to describe the challenges, but many mentioned that affordable rentals for large
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families are not available or not on the list of priorities for builders in Columbus. One respondent said: We have large families and we have trouble finding good communities where rent is affordable and the apartments are large enough for our families (Columbus parent interview C July 24, 2013).
The fact that the housing needs of Somalis is not a major policy focus in Columbus is complex and will be discussed later in this chapter. What is particularly noteworthy is that few respondents identified the school system as a policy arena where discrimination is a factor. Respondents were uniformly in agreement that more should be done to help English language learners in the public schools, and in the community for adults who are not proficient. This was not viewed as discriminatory policy, but an area where more attention could improve the lives of Somalis.
6.5 G overnment Incorporation: A Challenge for State and Municipal Governments The state of Ohio and the city of Columbus have struggled to fully integrate the Somali refugee population through political and economic incorporation. Ali (2011, 83) muses that Somali refugees arrived in the United States at an inopportune time: Since the 1990s they have arrived in the thousands, many as penniless refugees in the midst of an anti-welfare movement, as hijaab-wearing Muslims in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and as taxi drivers and hotel staff in a period of competition over low-wage and “illegal” labor”.
Somalis were added into a social equation that did not value their inclusion. The real puzzle for government officials is that they must reconcile an allegiance to their electoral base along with their job of limiting the isolation faced by a struggling immigrant population. Some local governments have done better than others resolving this tension. Those skeptical that refugees could possibly benefit the community need look no further than Lewiston, Maine. A Somali family discovered Lewiston in 2001 and began spreading the word about affordable housing and the prospect of starting a better life in peace. Previously, this small Maine community was struggling. The population had been shrinking since 1970 and for residents the center of town was known as “the combat zone” (Ellison 2009). The arrival of Somalis transformed Lewiston. The per capita income has drastically increased, while crime rates have decreased. It was named one of the best places to do business in America by Inc. magazine in 2004 and titled an “All-American City” by the National Civil League in 2007. Despite fears that Somalis would take jobs from townspeople in an already limited economy while simultaneously soaking up social service benefits, they -- along with Sudanese, Congolese, and other Africans -- were drawn to Lewiston and have injected new life into the economy. The former “combat zone” is now lined with
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shops owned and operated Somalis, who traditionally have strong trading links and small business skills (Ellison 2009). Enrollment rates at local universities, which were on the decline, have increased. While natives to this Maine town were initially critical of their new neighbors, sentiments have since shifted. A noteworthy difference between Lewiston and Columbus is that Columbus’ Somalis play an important role in the Ohio electorate. Ohio’s status as a swing state and the process of Somali political socialization make their vote particularly valuable in municipal, statewide and national elections. Citizenship courses emphasize the important responsibility of voting, and Somalis appear to take this to heart. Unlike other racial / ethnic groups in Columbus, voter turnout is high among Somalis. While precise numbers are impossible to confirm, several respondents suggested that 80–90 percent of eligible Somalis vote. According to SomaliCAN, a community outreach organization based in Columbus, David Robinson, an unsuccessful candidate for the 12th Congressional seat in Ohio, relied heavily on the support of Somalis in the area in his 2008 bid for election. He told National Public Radio: It’s an important number of votes. We figure there’s probably going to be somewhere between 350,000 and 400,000 votes cast totally for the 12th Congressional Seat, so 10,000 votes or so is an important constituency” (Robinson quoted in Hirsi 2009).
W. Carlton Weddington, the 27th District Representative in the Ohio House of Representatives, successfully campaigned in the Somali community on his 2008 campaign trail, citing that he recognized the size and political influence of this community. Weddington was responsible for raising the Somali flag outside the Ohio State House to commemorate the 49th anniversary of Somali independence. For what SomaliCAN describes as the “first time,” Somali refugees actively participated in the 2008 presidential election. This underscores the fact that the Somali population is large, still growing, and therefore a key constituency in electoral politics. Although approximately half of all respondents in this study made reference to politicians only showing up when they wanted the Somali vote, they still remain committed to participating in elections. Aspirations of holding office were rarely reported by respondents, even among the most visible community leaders. Unlike Minneapolis, where Somalis are serving in elective office and on appointed commissions at the city and state level, Columbus has never had a Somali elected officials, and there are very few Somalis appointed to city or state commissions. This is an area where street-level bureaucrats in the New American Initiative are concentrating much of their effort by helping Somalis increase their leadership capacity and by encouraging the mayor and other elected officials to consider Somalis for positions (Columbus city bureaucrat July 18, 2013). An additional challenge in Columbus is the at-large election structure for city council and school board seats. Unlike Minneapolis, where Somalis have either been elected in their ward-based system or are launching competitive campaigns, Columbus’ Somalis have been absent from electoral politics. Scholars of racial and ethnic politics have long argued that when minorities run in city-wide contests, they have a limited chance of victory (Browning et al. 1984; Eisinger
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1973; Judd and Swanstrom 2015). In contrast, when elections are held at the district or ward level, minorities have a better chance of electing a member of their own racial or ethnic group because their vote is not diluted by the city’s majority racial group. In other words, the majority groups are consciously or unconsciously reluctant to vote for someone from a racial or ethnic minority group. Residential segregation of racial and ethnic minorities increases the chance that a minority can be elected in a district-level race. In an ideal situation, this elected official can substantively and descriptively, represent their constituents.
6.6 E conomic Policy: Somali Position in Columbus’ Economy Meaningful economic contributions from the Somali population in Lewiston helped alter perceptions of Somalis as a menace to a group of productive stakeholders. This change in perception has contributed to the refugee population’s successful incorporation into society. Columbus respondents in this study consistently mentioned economic opportunities as an area where they could use more support. Exploring the Somali position in the economic fabric is therefore important. According to SomaliCAN the city is home to more than 400 Somali owned businesses. The size and scope of these businesses vary and the goods and services they provide are diverse. These include restaurants, which range from serving traditional Somali cuisine to serving American fare. Somali business owners run marketplaces and grocery stores, cleaning companies, travel agencies, car dealerships, home healthcare agencies, barbershops, and employment service agencies. These examples represent a sliver of the small businesses owned and operated by Somalis. In order to cover the costs of starting businesses, some engage in a system that pools resources known as “Ayuuto” or “Shaloongo.” According to respondents in this study, women are the primary Ayuuto participants and often use the money to start small businesses or purchase essentials like used cars. Ayuuto networks usually consist of 10–15 individuals who save a portion of their incomes every month or pay period. The combined amount is given to one person who is ready to start a business or invest the money. This process goes on for as many months as there are individuals in the group. For example, if the Ayuuto is comprised of 15 people, it will persist for 15 months so that each individual yields the benefit of the total contributions each month. Alternatively, the members of some Ayuutos will choose to pool all of their monthly savings together to make a common investment or start a small business together. In addition to providing goods and services to Franklin County, the Somali population funnels their income back into the local economy. SomaliCAN estimates that Somalis spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually on goods and services from local businesses (SomaliCAN 2009). They also purchase properties, cars, and other high-priced commodities. They are subject to all federal, state, and local taxes on
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their incomes and their purchases. This information suggests that the Somali population is contributing significantly to the economic livelihood of Franklin County. Somalis also send remittances back to their home country. According to a 2013 Oxfam report, 16 percent of the $1.3 billion a year that flows to Somalia in the form of remittances comes from the United States (Orozco and Yansura 2013). As Waters (2012, 56) explains: … many transnational migrants retain ties to their homeland through political participation, remittances, and communication…. This transnational character may affect the reception of Somalis by casting doubts on their commitment to remain in the United States or their ability to fulfill their duties as citizens.
The commitment to supporting family members in Somalia or other countries of the Diaspora, is a high priority for the majority of respondents in this project. Some expressed concern that younger generations might not feel the same commitment, especially those who are born in the United States. Even with the financial support Somalis send to family overseas, they simultaneously play a significant role in Columbus’ local economy. Despite Somali contributions to the economic vitality of Columbus, a lingering question is whether the government has any special responsibilities to help Somali refugees economically. A federal program called the United States Refugee Resettlement Program has a goal “to provide for the effective resettlement of refugees and to assist them to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible” (Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 2009). In conjunction with this program, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services has sought to achieve the goal by establishing employment services and English language training to assist refugees. The Somali refugee population in Columbus receives these governmental services as an extension of the federal and state programs. According to The Ohio Refugee Services Program Handbook, many Somali refugees receive a stipend from the state called Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA). The RCA comes with a condition that mandates their participation in employment services. These services include the creation of a family self-sufficiency plan to address the employment-related service needs of the employable members of the family as well as an employability plan for each individual who is eligible to work. From there, a series of programming ensues with the intended result of finding the earliest possible employment for the refugee. English learning training is the second priority. As part of an employability plan, a refugee is referred for an English language test and then placed in appropriate courses for language learning. Employment remains the primary goal and language learning is considered separate and secondary. Thus, if the two are at odds, employment opportunities take precedence. Based on a close reading of The Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services Refugee Handbook and a comparison to the general profile of Somalis living in Columbus, it is apparent that while these services are institutionalized and offered, they are evidently not effective or pervasive enough. One can speculate that the hierarchy of priorities in the program’s goals is one problem. A rudimentary knowledge of the English language is paramount in order for individuals and fami-
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lies to achieve economic security. Due to the social stigma that Somalis carry with them, the inability to speak any English is yet another strike against people who already have the odds stacked against them in seeking employment. In addition, Somalis residential segregation is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, living in close proximity to other Somalis has provided opportunities for small business developed by and marketed for Somali residents. It is also an ideal way to retain cultural and religious ties in a new community. On the other hand, isolation diminishes the need for English language skills. Among the top educational concerns of respondents in this study is that English language courses for adults are not easily accessible. Those who take advantage of local economic structures like Ayuutos may succeed in opening and operating small businesses. However, they are largely limited to business endeavors for the Somali clientele. Attention to these businesses is certainly important and potentially lucrative, but expanding a business beyond a single community is difficult. Furthermore, adhering to city, state, and federal regulations that exercise control over commerce is challenging without proficiency in English. Gaining employment and maintaining employment is a major challenge for refugees who lack knowledge of the native language. For these reasons, one could argue that language learning coming second to job placement is counter-intuitive. One respondent expressed concern with the lack of English learning opportunities for working parents, and the impact that this has on Somali children: Parents who are not English proficient cannot properly advocate for their children. I fear that the schools are underresponding to the high dropout rate of Somali children. Those who graduate are being trained to be the next generation of low-skilled workers (Columbus community/parent interview June 19, 2013).
This sentiment is particularly relevant since education is tied to social and economic mobility. Moreover, researchers contend that improving students’ educational outcomes depends in part on parental satisfaction and involvement in school practices and reforms (Henderson et al. 2007; Lawrence-Lightfoot 2004). Therefore, the low level of Somali parent engagement could be the byproduct of the challenges associated with adult English language learning opportunities. Another clause in the Refugee Handbook details the “social adjustment services” provided by the government for those refugees who receive Refugee Program Grants. These services may include “home management” services (Ohio Department of Job and Family Services 2009). The Community Research Partners profile states that one third of Somali households in Franklin County are run solely by women. These home management services, which include assistance and referrals for childcare, are extremely important if the female head of household is simultaneously providing a household income. Many refugees are unable to access home management services and those who do are only eligible for the first sixty months they are in the United States. Lack of childcare is an enormous obstacle particularly for single mothers, but also for parents who need the income provided by two full-time jobs. The Somali refugee population is enormously disadvantaged when it comes to economic integration. A deficit in childcare services and language learning services
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contributes to the difficulty Somalis have in gaining employment and achieving economic security. Columbus is also host to a large number of very profitable national and international companies. Few Somalis are able to obtain middle to upper-level management positions in these corporations. One respondent suggested: We understand that the city and state are unable to force the private sector to create jobs for Somalis. At the same time, there are probably ways that Columbus’ business community could become more open and accepting of hiring Somalis for jobs that pay a living wage for a family. Warehouse jobs are not what Somalis need. They need a chance to prove their potential and climb the employment ladder (Columbus community leader interview June 27, 2013)
Beyond the private sector, few Somalis hold positions at the city or state level. There are a small number of noteworthy exceptions, but Columbus lags far behind Minneapolis in municipal and state employment (Chambers 2017). This being said, it is also evident that Somalis are actors in the Columbus economy, whether they own small business or have found other professional success. In light of the shortcomings of the local and state government policies, some community organizations have attempted to fill the gaps.
6.7 The Role of Community-Based Groups Along with the state and local governments, community-based organizations can also play an important role in Somali economic and political incorporation. At first glance, the number of Somali community organizations is large. In fact, the city’s website lists twenty-two Somali and African organizations in the city. Despite the large number of such organizations, competition among groups for resources has prevented widespread community mobilization. According to several community leaders, the disunity among Columbus’ Somali organizations contrasts the unification among Somalis in Minneapolis. Moreover, not all of the Somali community organizations are 501 (c) (3) non-profits. According to one respondent, the lack of non-profit status limits the capacity and effectiveness of these organizations (Columbus city bureaucrat interview July 26, 2013). The New American Initiative employees, along with members of the Community Relations Commission and Somali community leaders, have spent considerable effort to reach consensus and create an umbrella Somali non-profit organization. This has proved impossible due to the tension between groups and their competition for limited resources. Nevertheless, two community organizations appear to be most prominent in the community: the Somali Community Access Network (SomaliCAN) and the Somali Community Association of Ohio (Somali Community Association of Ohio 2009). SomaliCAN and SCAO are 501(C)(3) non-profit organizations serving the Somali population in Columbus (SCAO 2009). They provide relocation support as
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well as comprehensive programming to help with economic incorporation and political integration. In an effort to improve the likelihood of economic security, SCAO has implemented a job assistance program that addresses many of the shortcomings of the state’s Refugee Handbook. It is run by a trained and multi-lingual staff with a focus on language skills, the cultivation of skills for the workplace, coaching for those looking to start or expand small business, and other more individually-tailored solutions (Somali Community Association of Ohio 2009). SomaliCAN acts as an advocate that speaks for the refugees’ needs in a policy setting when Somalis themselves cannot do so. This is an example of an intermediary group referenced by Ramakrishnan and Lewis in their suggestions for improving political incorporation and participation (2009). SomaliCAN plays a crucial role in helping immigrants to connect with and understand civic affairs, which is crucial to this population’s political incorporation and participation. SCAO and SomaliCAN are important in the economic and political integration of the Somali refugees into society and they are “watchdogs” in protecting their interests. However, these groups do not coordinate their efforts, thus reducing the potential power at the city and state level.
6.8 E ducation Policy: The Somali Experience with Education in Columbus Many Somali families arrived with extremely limited English skills. Moreover, the initial waves of children were prevented from acquiring any significant formal education in their war-torn country or in the refugee camps where they often lived for years. On the one hand, parents expressed immense gratitude for the educational opportunities offered their children upon arrival in Columbus. On the other, some very clear areas emerged as where the city schools could improve: the dropout rate among Somali boys, a lack of attention to Somali language, history and culture, and concerns about English learning practices.3 It is difficult to estimate Somali graduation rates because Somalis are grouped with Blacks. Most respondents mentioned the correlation between Somali boys dropping out of school and their increasing rates of incarceration. Others touted the high levels of Somali graduation rates compared to the native-born Black population of Columbus. Even with these different perceptions, city schools have had an average graduation rate in the 70 percent range for the last decade. Somalis are just one of the communities that are served by a school system that struggles to improve. Many respondents claim that the English as a second language (ESL) services provided to Somali children are inadequate. These same respondents claimed that
3 In the interest of full disclosure, none of the parents interviewed for this study had children who dropped out of school.
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new students are placed in grades based on their age with no attention to their English language skills. Upon further research, this claim appears to be somewhat inaccurate. According to the Columbus Public Schools website, their ESL services offer immersion and ESL classroom opportunities at numerous schools at all levels of education. The district also launched the Columbus Global Academy in 2009 to specifically meet the needs of new immigrant students (Cano 2010). Somalis are the largest group at the school. Before the school was formed, three “welcome centers” existed in the city that were intended to help transition students for six months before they enrolled in a traditional school. These centers were open to all new immigrants. The Columbus Global Academy is now a 6–12 school where English language learners are supported in a multitude of ways. Two parents with children at the school indicate that it is extraordinarily supportive of refugees and immigrant children (Columbus parent/community interview B July 24, 2013; C July 24, 2013). School officials have also sent groups of educators to Minneapolis to receive training in “best practices” for educating Somali refugees (Columbus city bureaucrat interview July 18, 2013). The mismatch between what appears to be happening in the school system and the perception among parent respondents in this study suggests that better methods of communication about education policy would improve parental satisfaction and understanding between key stakeholders in the education of Somali-America children. Another area identified for improvement by Somali parents and two former educators, is the need for more Somali teachers. The district has created a program to help certify Somali classroom aids, but many commented that more are needed. Because there are so many Somali students in the school system, several respondents connected the need for more Somali teachers with classes on Somali history and language. Many respondents also mentioned that having Somali teachers in schools with few Somali children could also increase cross-cultural understanding in Columbus. Several male respondents explained that the cultural clash between traditional Somali beliefs, and trends in US education create problems. For example, one man complained that sex education should not be taught in school, but left to the discretion of families (Columbus community member interview July 25, 2013). Again, communication between the district and parents about the option of excluding children from sex education curriculum could increase a sense of cross- cultural respect. Interviews revealed that although parents are reluctant to criticize the schools, there is somewhat limited contact between the schools and Somali parents. Women are the primary participants in school-based governance, but even their participation and membership in school leadership posts is very limited (Columbus city bureaucrat interview July 24, 2013). Some of this is probably due to limited English proficiency among many parents, the economic challenge faced by single-parent households, and the need for more attempts by the district to encourage or incentivize participation. As noted earlier, the incorporation of parents in education policy is known to have important consequences on the opportunities their children have (Henderson et al. 2007; Lawrence-Lightfoot 2004).
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6.9 Housing Policy: A Clash of Cultures Somali homeownership in Columbus is estimated around five percent (Chambers 2017). Most Somalis live in discrete areas of the city, often where Somalis and Blacks reside. Rental units are typically small and inadequate for large Somali families. Although some Somalis have moved to rental units in some of Columbus’ inner ring suburbs, largely in search of better education for their children, the majority remain in Columbus’ poor neighborhoods. When Somalis do own homes, many have taken advantage of the high rate of foreclosure following the housing crash in 2008 (Columbus community leader interview A July 26, 2013). The low rate of home ownership is also tied to religious beliefs prohibiting “riba,” often translated as usury. Those who strictly apply these prohibitions are unable to open savings accounts that earn interest, take out mortgage loans, or use credit cards. The implications of these religious beliefs are at odds with many tenets of American capitalism. In some respects, an aversion to excessive interest could liberate many Americans from the clutches of consumer debt. However, on the more controversial side of the Somali inability to take out mortgages, the larger community is unable to benefit from any of the home ownership incentives that many Americans use to secure their financial futures. Paying rent to a landlord who may charge high rates for inadequate housing could be viewed as more ethically problematic than paying a small amount of interest on an investment that would lead to personal or communal profit.
6.10 Bureaucratic Incorporation and Somalis in Columbus The findings of the bureaucratic incorporation literature are helpful in understanding the position of Somalis in Columbus. The community has voting power, but the at-large system of elections, combined with the discrimination they face (Chambers 2017; Waters 2012), diminishes opportunities for descriptive representation. Consequently, there are enormous hurdles associated with political, economic, and social incorporation for Somalis. Another challenge to Somali incorporation is that few Somalis are employed by the city or state, with the exception of low-level civil servants who provide translation services and work in public service offices (Chambers 2017). There is a small number of Somali city and state bureaucrats who are dedicated to increasing opportunities for members of the Somali community. There are also several non-Somali service bureaucrats who work in specific policy areas such as education, who are dedicated to opening doors for Somalis. These individuals fall into the “service bureaucrat” category discussed by Jones-Correa (2006), or the “street-level bureaucrat” discussed by Marrow (2009). It is worth noting that all four of the city bureaucrats interviewed for this project mentioned the importance of advocating for Somalis, and other new refugee and immigrant groups in Columbus. It is also important to understand that none of these state and city level
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bureaucrats are specifically tasked with working for the Somali community. Rather, they hold positions that involve policies that affect the lives of refugee and immigrant groups broadly. Still, even with their broad focus, all expressed views that would lead one to believe that responding to Somali needs and interests within the government is of paramount interest to them personally and professionally. Each also reflected the bureaucratic culture discussed by Jones-Correa (2006) that leads service bureaucrats to respond positively to diverse communities. Respondents were overwhelmingly critical of the responsiveness of elected politicians at the city and state level, at the same time that they were largely pleased with the work of a small number of street-level bureaucrats. This finding is similar to Marrow’s (2009) finding that service bureaucrats in rural areas are often more effective than elected officials in assisting in immigrant incorporation. One community leader offered a critique that was shared by ten other respondents: Elected officials come visit us when they want our vote, otherwise, we don’t see them. We don’t bother going to city hall because they don’t care (Columbus community leader interview A July 26, 2013).
A similar complaint was raised by a few of these respondents that former Mayor Coleman, an African American himself, and other elected officials are only concerned about the Black community in Columbus. Another respondent went further in criticizing the mayor for taking credit for the creation of the New American Initiative office: The New American Initiative was pushed for by a Somali coalition who wanted access to the city. Those of us who had been here for a long time will challenge authority. Coleman knew Somalis would be an important voting bloc. It wasn’t an act of kindness by Coleman that created that office (Columbus community member interview June 19, 2013).
In an interview with Mayor Coleman, he was emphatic about his interest in helping Somalis from the moment he entered office (Coleman interview, June 26, 2012). Street-level bureaucrats in this study also indicate that Coleman is responsive to their requests when it comes to Somali integration. This finding is not at odds with the bureaucratic incorporation literature. Regardless of Mayor Coleman’s motivation, he did launch the New American Initiative and hire two street-level bureaucrats to run the office. These individuals, more than the mayor, are largely seen as important to the Somali community. Many praised Mayor Coleman for appointing a Somali to co-direct the New American Initiative office. The majority of respondents believe that the individuals in this position are responsive to Somali concerns about housing, job discrimination, the criminal justice system, and family reunification. This is in line with the bureaucratic incorporation scholarship with regard to bureaucrats’ influence on the integration of new immigrant communities. The community leaders who support the work of these service bureaucrats also explained that they have accomplished much in educating the broader Columbus community about Somali culture and tradition. More importantly, these leaders have worked for several years to unify the different community organizations so they can mobilize more effectively and influence policy. One community leader said:
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[He] has tried to explain that if we work together we can get more help from the city and state, but it hasn’t worked. People are skeptical about others’ motives and we have been unable to convince the other leaders creating a unified center or umbrella will help us all (Columbus community leader interview A July 26, 2013).
One New American Initiative representative explained that they have attempted to demonstrate that city, state, and foundations are more likely to support a unified community group. This has apparently occurred in Minneapolis and the New American Initiative and Community Relations bureaucrats have offered their support to help make this happen in Columbus. It remains unclear whether this will happen, but given the large number of Somali community groups competing for limited resources, it appears to be a worthwhile effort. The New American Initiative office is clearly the central clearinghouse for Somali advocacy within the city government. The office has a staff of two and a small annual budget (Columbus city bureaucrat interview July 26, 2013). Members of this office, along with the Community Relations Commission, and other bureaucrats such as the school system’s ESL director, are the most frequently referenced street-level bureaucrats who care deeply about the upward mobility of refugees, and Somalis in particular. These service bureaucrats report that the mayor is responsive to their suggestions and genuinely cares about the position of Somalis in Columbus. At the same time, some of these same bureaucrats mentioned that limited resources and budget concerns severely limit their ability to do more for Somalis.
6.11 Recommendations for Increasing Somali Incorporation According to nearly all respondents, English language opportunities for adults must be expanded. Although a variety of city, state, and community organizations have programs aimed at improving English language skills among Somalis, there are significant costs associated with the time it takes to improve or learn English. Many Somalis must work low-paying factory jobs to support their families. Although it is hard to estimate the official number, many Somali women must balance multiple minimum wage jobs, a lack of transportation, and caring for their children (Columbus community/parent interview June 19, 2013; Nasro’s Journey, 2011). Learning English under these circumstances is a tremendous hurdle. Incentives involving childcare and a modest stipend could help adults who desire English skills, but are unable to prioritize due to competing obligations. These skills are not only important for economic mobility, but would allow Somalis to better advocate for themselves and their families in all areas of public policy. In addition to adult education opportunities, increasing the number of Somali teachers in Columbus could address some of the concerns raised by respondents about the need for more Somali related curriculum in the schools. This would also provide opportunities for Somalis to hold better paying city jobs. Expanding existing programs for Somali (and other refugee groups) to receive teacher certification would benefit the school system. In fact, broadening these opportunities and having
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Somali teachers in all public schools could improve cross-cultural respect and understanding among the youngest Columbus residents. Many Americans have built family wealth and equity based on home ownership. In contrast, Somalis are largely absent from the financial opportunities associated with home ownership. Instead, the majority of Somalis in Columbus rent apartments. Respecting religious beliefs about usury is important, but exploring Islamic law as it may be applied to the various types of housing payment structures available in the United States today could help Somalis find an alternate approach to housing that accommodates their families, comport with their religious views, and provide an opportunity for investment (Caeiro 2004). Beyond expanding educational and home-ownership opportunities, enlarging the staff of the New American Initiative could significantly help Somalis and the many other new arrivals to Columbus. The New American Initiative, and the Department of Community Relations more broadly, has an admirable list of goals and includes an impressive list of accomplishments. At the same time, the two street-level bureaucrats in the office are tasked with an enormous responsibility given their modest budget. Mayor Coleman’s decision to create the New American Initiative and staff it with two dedicated individuals demonstrates his interest in helping new immigrants and to increasing descriptive representation in City Hall. The New American Initiative bureaucrats have dedicated much time to advocating more appointments to city commissions and to affirmative action programs that can advance the position of all new immigrants, regardless of their country of origin. These individuals are also involved in recruiting a more diverse pool of fire fighters, police officers and other municipal employees. All of this is incredibly important, but a larger staff and budget could magnify the impact of their efforts. Related to expanding the size of the New American Initiative office, more efforts could be made at all levels to open doors for Somalis (and other new immigrant groups) in appointed and elective office. This recommendation is in line with recommendations made by Ramakrishnin and Lewis (2005). Political parties could play a vital role in this area. Although Somalis have been a reliable Democratic bloc, many have social positions that align with Republican positions. For this reason, both parties could do more to extend a hand to this community. Appointments to boards and commissions is a less formal process, but one where connections can improve one’s chances of being selected for visible positions. The commitment to increasing descriptive representation in the city and state of Ohio should be expanded. Between 1990 and 2010, the state of Ohio has seen an increase of 81 percent in their foreign-born population (Fennelly 2012). The state has the opportunity to be an example for other Midwestern states and cities that are becoming home to large and diverse new Americans. This requires a deliberate attempt to create opportunities for new groups, and a delicate approach to addressing tension between native-born groups who have been marginalized historically. Cultural brokers, like the street-level bureaucrats in the Community Relations Commission, have the opportunity to increase cross-cultural understanding and appreciation with more support. Their ability to run cultural understanding programs, shape the bureaucratic ethos in the city, and encourage businesses with city contracts to increase
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opportunities for newcomers could improve opportunities for all new immigrant groups. With regard to Somalis themselves, the role of non-profit community organizations has been identified as an important factor in improving the integration of new immigrant groups (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2009). The disunity among many Somali organizations limits their potential power. Despite the efforts of some Somali community leaders and the street-level bureaucrats in the New American Initiative office, forging an umbrella Somali organization has not occurred. This is a key area for building Somali capacity. Given the many important services provided by these organizations (citizenship classes, adult ESL classes, job training etc), uniting would help create a more powerful voice and increase opportunities for government and foundation grants. These organizations, along with street-level bureaucrats, and political parties, could help prepare new groups of Somalis for leadership in the community. Implementing these recommendations would increase Somali incorporation and help reduce the isolation of this vibrant community. One of Columbus’ attributes is that it is an exciting new immigrant destination. This should be celebrated and promoted through greater Somali incorporation.
References Ali, I. (2011). Staying off the bottom of the melting pot: Somali refugees respond to a changing U.S. immigration climate. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 9(11). Browning, R. P., Marshall, D. R., & Tabb, D. H. (1984). Protest is not enough. Berkeley: University of California Press. Caeiro, A. (2004). The social construction of sharia; Bank interest, home purchase, and Islamic norms in the West. Die Welt des Islams, 44(3), 351. Cano, R. G. (2010, November 23). School Caters to immigrants. Columbus Dispatch. Chambers, S. (2017). Somalis in the twin cities and Columbus: Immigrant incorporation in new destinations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Chambers, S., & Schreiber-Stainthorp, W. (2013). Michael Coleman: The Midwestern Middleman. In R. Perry (Ed.), 21st century Urban race politics. Bradford: Emerald Press. Community Research Partners. (2009). Counting the Franklin County Somali population. [Data file]. Accessed from www.communityresearchpartners.org/.../DataByteNo2_SomaliPopulation.pdf Eisinger, P. K. (1973). The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. American Political Science Review, 67(1), 11–28. Ellison, J. (2009). The refugees who saved Lewiston: A dying Maine mill town gets a fresh burst of energy. Newsweek. Fennelly, K. (2012). Immigration in the Midwest. Scholars Strategy network. www.scholarsstrategy network.org 8/1/13. Henderson, A., Davies, D., Johnson, V., & Mapp, K. (2007). Beyond the bake sale: The essential guide to family-school partnerships. New York: New Press. Hirsi, J. (2009, August). The Somali community is a promising economic powerhouse in Ohio. SomaliCAN Outreach Newsletter. Available at http://somalican.org/yahoo_site_admin/assets/ docs/Somali_Community_in_Ohio.20374400.pdf International Crisis Group. (2008). Somalia conflict history. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/somalia.aspx
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Jones-Correa, M. (2006). The bureaucratic incorporation of immigrants in suburbia. Presented at the conference on “Immigration to the United States: New sources and destinations,” Russell Sage Foundation, New York; February 3–4, 2005. Judd, D. R., & Swanstrom T. (2015). City politics. London: Routledge. Meier, K. J., & O’Toole, L. J. (2006). Political control versus bureaucratic values: Reframing the debate. In Public Administration Review March / April. Lawrence-Lightfoot, S. (2004). The essential conversation: What parents and teachers can learn from each other. New York: Ballantine Books. Marrow, H. (2009). Immigrant bureaucratic incorporation: The dual roles of professional missions and government policies. American Sociological Review, 74(5), 756–776. Nasro’s Journey. (2011). The Somali documentary project in partnership with WOSU and women war and resettlement. http://vimeo.com/30980656 Ohio Department of Job and Family Services. (2009). Ohio refugee services program – Refugee handbook. [Data file]. Accessed from http://jfs.ohio.gov/refugee/1RefugeeHandbook.pdf Orozco, M., & Yansura, J. (2013). Keeping the Lifeline Open: Remittances and Markets in Somalia. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/somalia-remittance-report-web.pdf Ramakrishnan, S. K., & Lewis, P. G. (2005). Immigrants and local governance: The view from city hall, Public Policy Institute of California. San Francisco. Rector, A. (2008). An analysis of the employment patterns of Somali immigrants to Lewiston from 2001–2006. Lewiston: Center for Workforce Research and Information, Maine Department of Labor and Maine State Planning Office. Roble, A., & Rutledge, D. (2008). The Somali diaspora: A journey away. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. SomaliCAN. (2009). The Somali community is a promising economic powerhouse in Ohio. [Data file]. Accessed from http://somalican.org/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/Somali_Community_ in_Ohio.20374400.pdf Somali Community Association of Ohio. (2009). What is SCAO? Accessed from http://www. somaliohio.org/about_us/index.htm Voyer, A. M. (2013). Strangers and neighbors: multiculturalism, conflict, and community in America. New York: Cambridge University Press. Waters, A. M. (2012). Racial formation and anti-Somali ideologies in Central Ohio. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 12, 10.
Chapter 7
Integration, Finnish Somalis and Their Right to Everyday Life Tiina Sotkasiira
Within the public discourse of immigration, migrants who arrive in Finland as refugees or as asylum seekers, and particularly those coming from the African continent, are often singled out as the most ‘different’ in terms of their culture and background. Finnish Somalis, the majority of whom arrived in the country during the early 1990s, are still recognized as a group that faces challenges with respect to integration and citizenship. While focusing on the ways in which citizenship is negotiated as part of everyday interaction offers important perspectives for understanding the positioning of migrants, this chapter claims that research also needs to pay attention to the everyday in and of itself. Thus, this chapter works to challenge the idea of the everyday as something that we all possess self-evidently, while also reviewing the routines and quotidian practices embedded in integration efforts. Fundamentally, this chapter asks, what kind of everyday is being taught to Somali migrants involved in the state-induced integration activities?
7.1 Introduction In Finnish integration policy discourse, the neoliberal turn has brought about a political consensus on the need to efficiently integrate migrants into Finnish society (Nordberg 2015; Sotkasiira 2017). Within the public discourse of immigration, migrants, who arrive in the country as refugees or as asylum seekers, and particularly those coming from the African continent, are singled out as the most ‘different’ in terms of their culture and background (on ethnic hierarchies see Haikkola 2012, 21–22). Finnish Somalis, the majority of whom arrived in Finland already during
T. Sotkasiira (*) University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_7
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the early 1990s, are still regarded as a group that faces significant challenges with regard to their integration (Open Society Foundations 2013, 26). Jaana Vuori (2015, 395) describes integration in a Finnish context as the work of social nature, which aims to guarantee that all migrants receive sufficient services to ensure the material conditions for their livelihood and everyday living in the beginning of their stay in the country. According to Vuori (ibid.), migrants, who become part of the Finnish integration system, are guided towards local societal practices and services, while they are also provided with information they need to function in society. Besides the legal framework and official integration measures, which are considered primarily as a task for the state and municipalities, there exist non- governmental activities and voluntary organizations to promote the integration of immigrants into the Finnish society. This chapter considers interlinkages of the Finnish integration system and paths to citizenship from an everyday perspective. Vuori (2015) suggests that the concept of everyday citizenship can be particularly useful as it focuses attention on the day- to-day experiences of being a citizen, which many researchers see as particularly relevant to substantive and lived citizenship. Lived citizenship refers to the meanings that citizenship actually obtain in people’s lives and the ways in which social and cultural backgrounds and material circumstances affect people’s lives as citizens (Hall and Williamson 1999, 2; see also Lister et al. 2003). Everyday aspects of citizenship are especially significant for those migrants whose access to formal and public opportunities for participation in society remain constrained (Lister 2007; Open Society Foundation 2013, 102–114). Previous research has focused on the everyday as a site in which migrants contest their marginalization and struggle for their right to act as citizens (Isin 2008, 2009; Nyers 2015). Their enactment of citizenship may be restricted and conditioned, for example, by discrimination and racism (Sotkasiira and Haverinen 2016). While the focus on the ways, in which citizenship is negotiated as part of everyday interaction, offers an important perspective for citizenship studies, this chapter claims that research also needs to pay attention to the everyday in and of itself. Hirsiaho et al. (2011) have taken a step in this direction by arguing that, for example, migrants, those who belong to sexual minorities and those who do not find their place in working life, may never obtain a position in which everyday life is self-evident, natural and unassailable. These are all attributes commonly associated with everyday life from the perspective of the majority. For minorities, everyday life together with its routines and habits may be a painful, alienating, and even cruel experience. Therefore, instead of taking everyday realities for granted, researchers should consider everyday life as a right, or as a privilege, as Hirsiaho et al. (2011) suggest. This chapter intends to contest the understanding of the everyday as something that we all possess self-evidently. It does this by focusing on the ways in which the national-specific conventions of everyday life figure into the lives of Finnish Somalis in the form of state-induced integration programmes. I draw on the fieldwork conducted in 2013–15 as part of the research project Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship – Transnational Networks, Social Participation and Social Identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. (Harinen et al. 2014; Armila and Sotkasiira 2016). This
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fieldwork included ethnographic observation and interviews with Finnish Somalis as well as with people who are involved variously in efforts to integrate Somalis into Finnish society (i.e. the ‘integrators’). The chapter also claims that the everyday is a largely unspoken, but critical dimension of the creation and management of an ‘integrated immigrant’. It considers the ideological construct of normality and everyday in the field of immigrant integration, as well as the implications this has for integration as a practice. The chapter goes on to argue that while all participants of integration programs are implicitly placed in the position of children as a result of being required to ‘go back to school’ to learn about their ‘rights and obligations in Finnish working life and society’, as the Integration Law (The Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration 2010) states, the Somalis can be overtly infantilized and othered in the process. The chapter further suggests that Finnish integration systems re-enforce a particular, although perhaps not very deliberate, understanding of ‘how things are in Finland’, which may work against the ideal of integration as a dynamic two-way process (Haverinen 2016).
7.2 Theoretical Framework: Everyday as Contested The everyday is a fuzzy and multifaceted concept that is often used without an explanation of what is meant. The research conducted on international migration in Finland has discussed the everyday in at least three distinct ways. First, there is research, which deals with the everyday of specific migrant groups, such as elderly migrants, migrant women, or migrant youth (Haikkola 2012; Heikkinen 2015; Pöllänen 2013; Tiilikainen 2003). Thus, researchers analyze how everyday life is constructed in the new place of residence in comparison to everyday practices experienced in the previous home country. Alternatively, they examine how old and new practices intertwine and merge with one another, while producing new, hybridized practices and identities. Secondly, the concept of the everyday is aligned with the concept of racism to produce knowledge and insights into the experiences of everyday racism (Puuronen 2003; Rastas 2007; Souto 2011; Toivanen 2014). Philomena Essed (1991) uses the concept of everyday racism as an analytical tool to explore the processes by which socialized, political, and scholarly racist notions are integrated into everyday practices. In her view, racism is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, which manifests itself as an ideology, structure, and process. When performed repetitively, racist practices become familiar, customary, and part of the normality. Therefore, they are converted into parts of the expected and unquestioned realm of everyday life, and that which the dominant groups consider normal (see also Hällgren 2005, 322). Additionally, the everyday is a relevant concept also for the researchers of citizenship (Vuori 2012, 2015; Wood 2014). Anu Hirsiaho and Jaana Vuori (2012, 233) employ the concept of everyday citizenship to highlight the processual nature of
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citizenship and to stress the cultural and social aspects of membership within larger societies. They also highlight horizontal relations rather than ‘big democracy’ (cf. Skjeie and Siim 2000, 346). Hirsiaho and Vuori (2012) argue that besides civil, political, and social rights and responsibilities (Marshall 1950), citizenship should be conceptualized in relation to social participation and belonging (e.g. Kivisto and Faist 2007). Consequently, it is important to analyze how citizenship becomes possible, and how it is contested in routine situations. When approached from this perspective, everyday citizenship comes into view as an ongoing and dynamic process. It is not possible to apply for it or receive everyday citizenship as is the case with official citizenship, residence permits and gainful employment (Vuori 2015, 395). Importantly, focusing on everyday citizenship casts light on gendered and racialized inclusions and exclusions, with respect to terms of policy and from the viewpoint of women’s and men’s experiences and lives (Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999; Lister 2003; Lister et al. 2007; Keskinen and Vuori 2012). In the field of everyday sociology, the everyday is not analyzed only as a site of interaction, but also as an object of study in its own right (Bennet and Silva 2004; Koski and Harinen 2008; Felski 2000; Jokinen 2003, 2016). Researchers often begin their work by stating how ambivalent the everyday is, and how difficult it is to comprehend and grasp the ‘everydayness’ of various phenomena. Ben Highmore (2002, 1) outlines this ambivalence: On the one hand it [everyday] points (without judging) to those most repeated actions, those most travelled journeys, those most inhabited spaces that make up, literally, the day to day. This is the landscape closest to us, the world most immediately met. But with this quantifiable meaning creeps another, never far behind: the everyday as value and quality – everydayness. Here the most travelled journey can become the dead weight of boredom, the most inhabited space a prison, the most repeated action an oppressive regime. Here the everydayness of everyday life might be experienced as sanctuary, or it may bewilder or give pleasure, it may delight or depress. Or its special quality might be its lack of qualities. It might be precisely, the unnoticed, the inconspicuous, the unobtrusive.
In this way, everyday life is presented as a contradiction and a source of such things as security, delight, boredom, and even opression. Eeva Jokinen (2003) refers to Rita Felski (2000), who names routines, habits, and a sense of home as forming the critical dimensions of everyday life. Jokinen herself has developed an analytical map of the everyday by adding two more aspects to Felski’s theoretical groundwork. According to Jokinen (2003), facets of everyday include: time (routine); space (sense of home); pace (a central embodied individual sensation); as well as the social configuration and the gendered structures in which domestic and private spheres of the everyday are connected to female modalities and public spheres of the everyday are connected to male modalities. The concept of the everyday cannot be fully understood by covering these aspects alone, but these dimensions do provide hints as to where to look when trying to grasp the particularities of everyday life in the field of integration. Following Anna Rastas (2007), I recognize research fields as those places that have been visited by a researcher as well as that ‘entity’, whose borders are demarcated through the establishments of research questions. The field of integration is both expanding and contracting as public debates, political
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decision making, and innovative research bring new phenomena into the field, while certain ideas and conceptions are inevitably ruled out.
7.3 Fieldwork Context and Methods Somalis in Finland are a diverse and numerous minority with various national, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds and life histories (see the ‘Facts and Figures’ chapter in this book; Mubarak et al. 2015). They started to arrive in Finland as spontaneous asylum seekers in the 1990s following Somalia’s breakdown and the chaos unleashed by civil war (Open Society Foundations 2013, 25–27). Currently, the majority of all Somalis reside in the southern part of the country in the capital region surrounding Helsinki (City of Helsinki Urban Facts 2014; Statistics Finland 2014). On the other hand, smaller communities have also been forming across Finland, often in municipalities that host or hosted refugee and asylum centres. In North Karelia, where this study was conducted, Somalis are the second largest group of foreign origin (n = 478) after Russians (Statistics Finland 2015). North Karelia is Finland’s easternmost region, which shares a 296 km stretch of frontier with Russia. The close proximity to the border helps explain the high number of Russian-speakers living in the region. The regional centre of Joensuu has a population of 73,000. In 2015, 3,229 residents in Joensuu were born outside of Finland (Statistics Finland 2015). There are also a few smaller municipalities in North Karelia with significant migrant populations that include Kontiolahti, Lieksa and Tohmajärvi. We started our research in North Karelia by conducting interviews with the active members of the Somali community and individuals who are either professionally or voluntarily involved in integrating and assisting immigrants. The informants were selected to cover all major organizations involved in immigrant integration in the region and they included employees and volunteers of civic associations, immigrant advisors to local authorities, police officers, and officials in the state-run Employment and Economic Development Office. The majority of interviewed integrators were native-born Finns, although there were also a couple of people with Somali backgrounds included in the sample set. Currently, in North Karelia, it is increasingly popular to employ people with migrant backgrounds to work in the field of integration. Also, it is important that the interviewed Somalis were active in civil society, they participated in integration efforts by organizing them, or took part in the courses and trainings aimed at immigrants. During the interview period, I became acquainted with the actors in the field, who invited me to take part in integration activities in one of the smaller municipalities of North Karelia. In fact, the main empirical data used in this chapter consists of the field notes that I composed while working in this particular municipality. I moved around in different places, including people’s homes, hobbies, as well as
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their municipal buildings and multicultural meeting places, in order to take photos, listen, and talk with people. I have written down excerpts of discussions from various meetings and training sessions, and described interactions between different actors, while attempting to find out what kinds of practices support the citizenship of Somalis in these situations and which practices work against their citizenship (see also Sotkasiira and Haverinen 2016). I also observed how social interaction is organized by taking notes with respect to who talks, who is silent, and whether or not certain people are silenced in these situations. When working in the field I came to understand what Rita Felski (2000) meant when she noted that the everyday ‘escapes’ the gaze of a researcher. Quoting Maurice Blanchot’s (1987) text on everyday speech, Felski (2000, 15) argued that, at first glance, the everyday seems to be everywhere, and then, as soon as you start searching for it, it ceases to exist. As part of my research, I have participated in numerous situations during which I have interacted with people who themselves or whose parents have left Somalia and moved to Finland. Still, I would find it impossible to explain what the everyday is like for our research participants, and Finnish Somalis as a whole as I have not followed them around all the time. Instead, I have focused my gaze on situations in which the Somalis are encountered by Finnish society as participants in, and targets of, integration efforts. I have conducted institutional ethnography (Smith 1987, 2006) in order to account for the effects of integration measures on those who are subjected to them (see Billo and Moutz 2016). In the field, I have sometimes felt that people forget my role as a researcher. However, this does not change the fact that the mere presence of a researcher impacts a given situation. At certain levels, I can work to minimize the effects of my presence, but I cannot remove myself completely from the scene without risking the success of the research. Therefore, instead of trying to hide myself, and my role as a researcher, I have taken this as an opportunity to become increasingly aware of my own privileged position in integration processes, while further focusing my analysis on my personal recollections of the disruptions to the everyday routines in the context of immigrant integration. For example, these include situations in which I can be invisible because I look and dress like the majority of people in Finland or I can stick to my own ‘Finnish’ routines while the routine-like behaviour of Somalis taking part in integration measures is called into question. On the other hand, my notes also include narratives of situations in which I have felt particularly visible. One example of this is when I have walked around the town centre with women wearing the hijab or niqab. People have stared at us and made racist comments. These are examples of encounters in which the cruelties that minorities face on a daily basis become plainly visible to me, even if, as a white Finnish woman I could ignore these realities, if I chose to do so. One approach that combines characteristics from ethnography and autobiography, is called autoethnography (Burnier 2006, 414; Ellis and Bochner 2000, 739, 742; Spry 2001, 710). Ellingson (2006, 31), who knows this method particularly well, has requested researchers to become more reflexive of their own positionality. She asks scholars to break from research practices that leave our own bodies ‘unmarked – and hence naturalized as normative’. According to Ellingson (2006)
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autoethnography may help in doing just that. Autoethnography, which is attentive to relations of power, is well suited for observing practices of discrimination and everyday life that concern minorities (ibid.). According to Johanna Uotinen (2010, 88), this method is at its best in examining practices that have become invisible due to repetition and routine that goes under-examined (see also Uotinen 2008, 11–13). In what follows, I aim to review the routines and everyday practices of integration efforts while asking what the everyday life of Finnish Somalis is like in the field of integration. I start by presenting three examples from my autoethnographic writing that highlight the importance of the everyday to immigrant integration, and the practices of othering and infantilization that one may come across in integration efforts. Finally, I discuss these experiences in light of theoretical insights in the everyday as contested and controversial phenomenon before finishing with my conclusions.
7.4 Integration into Finnish Everyday I volunteer as one of the coordinators of the Somali women’s peer group, which ideally have one immigrant and one native coordinator (The organisers of peer group activities explained this to us in the training for coordinators). We meet with the participants on weekly basis to socialize and discuss various issues like children’s nutrition, Finnish and Somali history and so forth. Once we took up the issue of how people should dress for Finnish winter. The women of the group were not concerned about the temperature and cold as they often wear various layers of clothing. Instead, they were curious about how to find good quality, yet, not too expensive winter boots as good shoes are expensive in Finland. We talked about buying shoes with ice studs and agreed that they are good when the roads are icy but useless indoors. We concluded that people are not even allowed to use such shoes inside. After the meeting, I pondered how hard it must be to learn to walk on ice as an adult if you have lived your life in a warm and sunny place. I realised that the ability to move on icy surfaces, which seems so natural and easy to me, is a specific skill that I possess, while many others do not. In our town centre, we have a pedestrian road that is heated and snow- free during winter. Up until now, I have considered it a waste of money to heat streets, when there are minus degrees outdoors. After talking with Somali ladies I understood that for the elderly and for those who are not used to ice and cold, a heated road is much safer and more comfortable than a slippery surface. Thus, the ‘smoothness’ of their everyday depends on such things as heated roads.
This reminiscence from the field exemplifies how invisible and in some ways meaningless everyday amenities are for those who are able-bodied and ‘native’, i.e., knowledgeable of all things local. When the everyday runs smoothly, a person is not concerned with or particularly interested in it. One simply goes on with their life while imagining others do the same. As Essed (1991) points out, we only wake up when something unexpected happens. For example, when we realize that rules that we are expected to follow, are only relevant to some of us and not to others, or understand that we are particularly fortunate or unfortunate in some respect. According to Silva Tedre (2000, 521), everyday life is filled with duties that we expect all adults to be able to conduct. In the field of integration, this perception
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tends to lose its self-evident character. On the contrary, in this context, everyday life that includes, for example, ways to eat, clean, and socialize, come into view as something quite different. Therefore, everyday life is something that adults, the majority of whom have been cleaning, cooking, and socializing since their childhood, need to learn again as part of their integration process. Learning about Finnish everyday life is in fact an integral part of the official integration curriculum. For example, the labour market trainings intended for migrants include courses on taking care of oneself and managing one’s daily life. This training content is called everyday skills. The website Infopankki.fi, which receives funding from the state and the Infopankki member municipalities, aims to provide immigrants with useful information on Finland. It contains information about everyday life in Finland as well as, for example, everyday life in a Finnish workplace. Under the title ‘Everyday life in Finland’, migrants are provided with information on banking, insurance, the use of telephone and internet, the climate, clothing, and so forth. Also many organizations and associations run courses for migrants about everyday life (Haapanen 2013; Havunen 2016). In North Karelia, for instance, I have seen advertisements inviting migrants to take part in activities such as berry picking, Finnish cooking, cycling and Finnish social dancing. All of these activities are constituted as chances to learn about Finnish everyday life. In my research location, for example, a housing company had appointed a specific housing counsellor to teach migrants how to live in their apartments. They also organised a course during which a Somali-man with professional qualifications in cleaning services taught other Somalis how to clean their own homes.
7.4.1 Learning to Walk, Talk and Eat During my fieldwork, I also participated in a study visit, which was conducted in order to familiarize migrants with different forms of entrepreneurship, such as co- operatives, that encourage them to become entrepreneurs. The visit contained hours of official program during which we called on several companies and co-operatives, listened to numerous experts and visited a local Somali association. On the other hand, the majority of the time was spent doing mundane activities, like sitting in a bus, eating, sleeping and moving from one place to another. From the point of view of the official integration program, this free time might seem like time wasted since nothing much seemed to happen when people were ‘just’ sitting or hanging around. However, by listening to conversations and observing the gestures of integrators that took place during the so-called free time, I became aware of the ways in which also these seemingly uneventful everyday situations were organized and ordered by those conducting integration. In fact, participants were constantly surrounded with information about how different everyday routines should be performed in Finland. My field notes contain descriptions of how such information was transferred from organizers to participants as we travelled to our destination by bus:
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When we started off, one of the organizers notified us that we must keep our bus tidy. While speaking on the microphone, she wondered aloud to herself if she should ban all eating on a bus. Then she decided that we were allowed to eat as long as we did not make a mess and took any litter with us as we left the bus. During the travel we had breaks and passengers could leave the bus. Some of us bought something to eat, like crisps. When the travel continued the integrator moved around the bus before returning back to the front complaining that Somalis were making a mess in the back. Apparently, a Somali man had put some crisps on the seat and a Somali woman had put a pile of crisps on her lap. The organizer returned to the back of the bus to tell off the man who then quickly removed the crisps from the seat and wiped the crumps onto the floor. The organizer again returned to the front and discussed the issue with the driver while focusing on the fact that the man wiped the crumps to the floor and not into the wastebasket. I was sitting right next to her during this time, confused because I knew that many times I and my friends had wiped the crumps onto the floor thinking that someone else would clean them up later. I know it is not good to do that but this is how we often do things in Finland.
During the study visit I also observed how participants were, for example, told how to cue (i.e., ‘stand on line’, ‘do not rush’), how to walk (‘walk in line, not one next to another’), how to eat (‘be swift’, ‘do not loiter or make a mess’) and participate (‘always be on time and do as written in the program’). By constantly monitoring the behaviour of participants and giving them directions as how to behave, the integrator made it known that, in her mind, the participants did not function well in these everyday encounters. At times, these directions were given as direct advice, but quite often, they were expressed in the form of unconscious mumbling or indirect verbal commentary of someone’s behaviour. Such commentary was heard by those present, but it was not directly addressed to the person with whom it concerned. For me, these moments when the participants in the study visit, who were all over the age of 18, were told how to behave, presented instances of discomfort. I could see the integrator’s good-willed intentions as she wanted to avoid situations in which her group would cause disturbances. Still, I became acutely aware of a difference between her advice and my own understanding of how Finns usually behave in similar circumstances. It appeared to me that migrants were not being taught, how to conduct themselves as ‘the average man on the street’. Rather they were ordered towards the ideal behaviour in the same way that I was taught as a child by my parents and teachers.
7.4.2 Internalising the National Order of Things As previously explained I used to coordinate a Somali-women’s peer group together with a Somali friend. We would convene in Friday afternoons at a humanitarian organisation that conducts multicultural activities. Friday was a convenient day for the participants because their Finnish language courses finished earlier that day, but it was also a special day for Muslims as participants found it important to pray as part of our meetings. Usually at that time on Friday, there were few people around,
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so when it was time to pray, women just took out their scarves, kneeled down in one of the meeting rooms and did their prayers. One time, however, a participant, who was also doing her language training at the organisation, told us that praying is not allowed in the premises. We then had to decide what to do and how to proceed. Should we continue as usual since no one would really know about our ‘misconduct’, or was it better to stop our meeting to allow the women to go the mosque nearby and pray there? Interestingly, the issue of praying also came up during the interviews with integrators. Our interviews included a question that asked if any ‘cultural’ issues ever came up as part of their work. One non-governmental organization worker replied: Well, surely, let’s say that quite often we talk about equality issues with Somalis. It is quite a central theme because Finnish society is quite gender … well, neutral, and Somali society is not. We talk about this quite a lot. Also with those who don’t speak much Finnish, regardless we talk about this topic. That is a major topic, and another one is religion. You know that according to Islam you are supposed to pray five times a day, even when they are here with us, when new Somalis come they think that ok I can start to pray because it is the prayer time. Then we tell them that unfortunately we do not accept religious or political opinions. This question comes up from time to time. We have a Somali here who always explains to others, ‘remember that it is different here’. I think this will be a problem in working life too because there you have to work. You cannot just leave, go home to pray, or to church, mosque or wherever. This is a difference. Finns make a difference between our beliefs and our professional or some another sphere of life.
For me, this was in insightful commentary because the interviewee did not only present us with her understanding of cultural differences, but she also explained her view on what is ordinary and commonplace in the workplace. She first tells that praying is forbidden because her organization does not ‘accept religious or political opinions’, but then continues to explain that, in fact, the motivation to ban praying in their centre stems from the importance of learning the rules and work ethics of Finnish society. For her, the issue at hand is about re-enforcing the principles of Finnish society, according to which religion belongs with the private sphere of an individual, and not, for example, on the workplace. This idea of Finnish society being divided into private and public, and defining religion as part of the private sphere, is an example of an understanding that is then reflected in the contents and methods of integration work conducted by this organization. In my field notes, there are several examples of perceptions concerning what is normal and ordinary in Finnish society that many of the integrators share. Consequently, these perceptions could be analyzed as hegemonic discourses, because their accurateness or commonality are taken for granted while scarcely being questioned by anyone present in the situation (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 32, 186). Such discourses include, for example, an understanding that in order to succeed in Finland one needs to know the Finnish language (with the exception of highly qualified specialists who can operate in English), the idea that Finns are not overtly religious, and the sense that it is essential that migrants also learn to control and limit their actions and beliefs that are rooted on religion. Many integrators also claim that it is essential for migrants, especially migrant men, to learn to control their behaviour particularly when it comes to expressing sexuality. Furthermore, the
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importance of finding employment as a marker of success and the idea of Finland being an exemplary case of gender equality are also shared by the majority of integrators. According to Vuori (2009), the same ideal of gender equality pertain in the written materials intended for migrant readers. The interviewed Somalis often agree with integrators on the accuracy of such views. The idea here is not to represent the views held by Finnish integrators and Somali immigrants as opposite to one another. Rather, the aim is to highlight how the field of integration is filled with common-sense understandings regarding how Finns conduct their everyday lives, and how these taken-for-granted notions of the Finnish everyday are turned into models and targets of integration without much critical reflection. Also, these ideals have strong directive power because they are part of the everyday understandings, which means that they are rarely evaluated on a critical level. Common-sense truths have power because they do not need to be justified. Thus, the meaningfulness of such activities and ideas derives from their enduring popularity. Acting and thinking otherwise would be to invite responsibility for justifying one's social interactions and commentary. For example, directives to speak Finnish instead of one’s mother tongue, and refraining from praying publicly make sense on a non-critical level simply because they are represented as customary features of life in Finland. The value of such actions and attitudes is justified by commonality and ordinariness, which often represent a distinctively conservative and rigid set of social norms.
7.5 Discussion and Implications Previous research has discussed integration programs as spaces where social issues are fought over, and where people can work towards social change (see, for example, Martin 1999; 2003). In Finland, the state offers adult migrants second language courses and trainings so as to ease their access and integration to the new home country. Communication skills in the language spoken by the majority of the population is a key to greater empowerment and inclusion as well as a means for migrants to fight against socio-economic exclusion (Papageorgiou 2012, 142). Thus, as Minna Intke-Hernández and Gunilla Holm (2015, 75) argue, integration programs may assist migrants in obtaining autonomous adult positions both economically and socially. However, the examples above and the examples by Intke-Hernández and Holm (2015, 77–80) reflect the findings from other research regarding policy-makers’ and practitioners’ concern for migrants’ ability to be good and capable citizens. For example, Nordberg (2015), who has studied integration measures directed at migrant mothers, has found that despite their good intentions, local welfare authorities and practitioners are inclined to misrecognize the agency and self-realization of migrant background mothers. The mothers are treated as passive and socially disengaged women, and they are distinguished from a citizenization processes. Intke-Hernández and Holm (2015, 81), whose focus has been on the integration and language course
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for stay-at-home migrant mothers and their young children, conclude that instructors at the course, who aim to introduce the participating women to Finnish traditions and ways of thinking, may do so without being able to take the perspective of the participants. In their opinion, integrators themselves may lack the necessary education that would actively bring the participants into the learning process. The existence of websites, courses and services focusing on ‘everyday skills’ illustrates that a need has been identified by the ‘host’ society to teach the newcomers the basics of everyday life in Finland. Moreover, integration efforts by non- governmental organizations and educational institutions, such as schools and kindergartens, include activities during which Finns get to peek into the everyday realities of foreign cultures (Holm and Londen 2010). In this way, various multicultural events are organized to better familiarize Finns with everyday life in foreign countries, often by cooking and sharing meals together. From a migrant’s perspective, integration is not just about participation in activities that are purposefully designed for passing on knowledge and skills to survive in new, everyday surroundings. It also means obtaining tacit knowledge that provides useful insights into how society functions. This form of tacit knowledge refers to wisdom that is difficult to transfer to other people through writing and verbalization, but is visible in social actions, interactions, routines, practices, and sensations (Polanyi 1966). Based on my ethnographic observations conducted in North Karelia, I would argue that those who are subjected to integration measures are also required to re-configure their everyday lives, while also learning new kinds of routines as they replace or complement their previous everyday with new ones. The meaning of integration efforts is anchored in the idea that the world is divided into distinct national units each of which is connected with a particular geographic space, language, culture and population group. Nation-states then relate to one another in a certain conventionalized manners forming what Liisa Malkki (1995) calls the national order things. In the context of immigrant integration, the national order of things is concretized in the idea that when a person moves from one national unit to another s/he needs to assume the language, culture, and values of his/her new home country. In integration theory, new cultural knowledge complements the old cultural knowhow while the idea of assimilation stems from an understanding that in the process of acculturation new skills and knowledge incrementally replace the previous understanding and practices. Migration from one country or region to another in and of itself breaks daily routines. Most Somalis have migrated into Finland as refugees or asylum seekers meaning that their everyday lives have been insecure and tenuous for a long time (Tiilikainen 2015). The same applies for those who have waited long periods of time for decisions regarding family reunification. Informants have told us that their lives only begin when all family is united and they no longer need to worry about the safety of their loved ones. Time spent in Finland waiting for one’s family to arrive is time spent in limbo, so to speak. Although these people are not personally at risk, per se, they still are not able to establish roots and work towards normality, because they cannot be sure of the safety of their family and others. From this perspective, the ability to uphold routines and peacefully deal with one’s everyday issues is a
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privilege, which for many requires negotiation and overtaking serious personal and political obstacles. On the other hand, our research has also revealed that Finnish society does not allow those Somalis who have already settled in to quietly go about their lives. Therefore, the ways in which Somalis organize their everyday lives while securing livelihoods and forms of subsistence, are of continuous interest to many Finns (Sotkasiira and Haverinen 2016). In our research location, the Somali residents have been recurrently targeted with various forms of harassment in their everyday life. For example, a group of locals have photographed Somali residents and posted pictures on-line as part of their anti-immigration propaganda. Photographs of houses where some Somalis live together with pictures of Somali residents walking in the town as well as mothers taking their children to daycare are found on websites that oppose immigration. Also, a bank statement has been dug out of a wastebasket to intrusively identify how Somalis spend money or, for example, receive benefits from the state. When such incidents are reported to the police, they have concluded that it is not illegal to photograph people in public spaces (Yle 2014a, b). Thus, the right to have a ‘normal’, in the meaning of undisturbed, life is not protected by law. This means that for those targeted with xenophobia and racism the everyday is fragile and in this sense open to perpetual outside interference.
7.6 Conclusions Traditionally, citizenship has been concerned with the relationship between individuals, communities, and the nation-state, as well as the ways in which rights and responsibilities are distributed (Spinney et al. 2015, 325). This chapter has attempted to explore the distribution of rights and responsibilities from the point of view of everyday life, and within the realm of the Finnish integration system. In contrast to the works that consider the everyday as a site where citizenship is negotiated (Keskinen and Vuori 2012), here the everyday is conceived of as an object of study and inquiry in its own right. Indeed, as Hirsiaho et al. (2013) argue, research needs to question the invisibility and obviousness of everyday life and review it as a privilege denied to many. Central to these struggles is the inability of those who are situated with the dominant culture to see and acknowledge the ‘petty cruelties’ of everyday life that concern minorities (ibid.). In the context of exploring the construction of the everyday as part of immigrant integration, three practical conclusions and suggestions can be made drawn from this study. First, while a need to provide migrants with everyday skills is identified as an essential part of the curriculum of the integration programs, the content and methods of such studies are rarely discussed in open forums. On the contrary, it seems that integrators tend to base their teaching about everyday life on generalizations and their own subjective experiences, while not taking into account the multicultural reality of Finnish society or the variety of life experiences and circumstances among their students (see also Intke-Hernández and Holm 2015, 77–78). Based on
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this critical insight, I suggest further work needs to commence into understanding and conceptualizing everyday life in the context of integration systems. Subsequently, sharing ideas and gaining knowledge about theoretical perspectives of the everyday could help integrators in developing a more in-depth and nuanced understandings of the everyday. Second, the ‘Finnish everyday’ that is taught to immigrants in integration programs does not consist of the multiple ways in which people in Finland conduct themselves in normalized social situations. More often, the Finnish everyday is presented as an ideal, text-book version of Finnish culture and habits (see Vuori 2009). Further, Intke-Hernández and Holm (2015, 77–78) conclude that integrators often find it difficult to renounce their own ethnocentrism in favour of more empowering perspectives. Here it might be helpful to analyze the discourses that underpin the simplistic conceptions of Finnish everyday life as a form of banal nationalism (Billig 1995). In the field of integration, the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not necessarily a teacher standing in front of a class teaching Finnish or Swedish to a given group of people who have just moved into Finland, but one of an integrator mumbling to her- or himself about the student tardiness and the non-discretion of religious ideals that all Finns seemingly embrace. Third, we should recognize that allusions to infantilism persist in practices of integration as they relate to Finnish Somalis. From the perspective of citizenship, this is problematic as it positions the people participating in integration programs in the position of a child, which assumes that they are unable to function as capable adults in control of their own everyday lives. This goes against the idea of integration being a process, which enables migrants to function in Finnish society as autonomous subjects. Instead of enhancing these qualities, being treated as a child strengthens the social experiences of inability, alienation and non-belonging. If society shatters the personal autonomy and the rights of Finnish Somalis in their everyday lives, it also undermines their experiences of belonging, and political participation, thus hindering also the public aspects of citizenship (Sotkasiira and Haverinen 2016).
References Armila, P., & Sotkasiira, T. (2016). Johdanto. In P. Armila, T. Sotkasiira, & V.-S. Haverinen (Eds.), Iska Warran – Mitä kuuluu? Somalialaisdiaspora meillä ja muualla (pp. 10–13). Joensuu: University of Eastern Finland.. Bennett, T., & Silva, E.B. (2004). Everyday life in contemporary culture. In E. B. Silva, & T. Bennett, (Eds.), Contemporary culture and everyday life (pp. 21–36). Durham: Sociology Press. Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage. Billo, E., & Mountz, A. (2016). For institutional ethnography: Geographical approaches to institutions and the everyday. Progress in Human Geography, 40(2), 199–220. Blanchot, M. (1987). Everyday speech. Everyday Life, 73, 12–20. Burnier, D. (2006). Encounters with the self in social science research – A political scientist looks at autoethnography. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35(4), 410–418.
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Lister, R. (2007). Inclusive citizenship: Realising the potential. Citizenship Studies, 11(1), 49–61. Lister, R., Smith, N., Middleton, S., & Cox, L. (2003). Young people talk about citizenship: Empirical perspectives on theoretical and political debates. Citizenship Studies, 7(2), 235–253. Lister, R., Williams, F., Anttonen, A., Bussemaker, J., Gerhard, U., Heinen, J., Johansson, S., Leira, A. (2007). Gendering citizenship in Western Europe. New Challenges for Citizenship in a Cross-National Context. London: Policy Press. Malkki, L. (1995). Refugees and exile: From “refugee studies” to the national order of things. Annual Review of Anthropology, 24, 495–523. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, I. (1999). Lifelong learning for democracy: Stretching the discourse of citizenship. Scottish Journal of Adult and Continuing Education, 5(2), 89–103. Martin, I. (2003). Adult education, lifelong learning and citizenship: Some ifs and buts. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 22(6), 566–579. Mubarak, Y. M., Nilsson, E., & Saxén, N. (2015). Suomen somalit. Helsinki: Into. Nordberg, C. (2015). Invisibilised visions. Migrant mothers and the reordering of citizenship in a Nordic welfare state context. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 5(2), 67–74. Nyers, P. (2015). Migrant citizenships and autonomous Mobilities. Migration. Mobility, & Displacement, 1(1), 23–39. Open Society Foundations (2013). Somalis in Helsinki. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ sites/default/files/somalis-helsinki-20131121.pdf. Acessed 3 Mar 2018. Papageorgiou, I. (2012). Second language learning in campaign organisations: Means for endorsing students’ social involvement. Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 10(1), 142–155. Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimension. New York: Doubleday & Co. Pöllänen, P. (2013). Hoivan rajat. venäläiset maahanmuuttajanaiset ja ylirajainen perhehoiva. Helsinki: Väestöntutkimuslaitos. Puuronen, V. (2003). Arkipäivän rasismi Suomessa. In: R. Simola & K. Heikkinen (Eds.), Monenkirjava rasismi (pp. 193–210). Joensuu: Joensuu University Press. Rastas, A. (2007). Rasismi lasten ja nuorten arjessa. Transnationaalit juuret ja monikulttuuristuva Suomi. Tampere: Tampere University Press & Finnish Youth Research Network. Skjeie, H., & Siim, B. (2000). Scandinavian feminist debates on citizenship. International Political Science Review, 21(4), 345–360. Smith, D. (1987). The everyday world as a problematic: A feminist sociology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Smith, D. (2006). Introduction. In D. Smith, M. Campbell, M. Devault, & T. Diamond (Eds.), Institutional ethnography as practice (pp. 1–11). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Sotkasiira, T. (2017). Inkluusiota kiihdyttämässä. Havaintoja kotouttamisen kentältä. In T. Eskelinen, H. Harjunen, H. Hirvonen, & E. Jokinen (Eds.), Tehostamistalous (pp. 120–139). Jyväskylä: SoPhi. Sotkasiira, T., & Haverinen, V.-S. (2016). Battling for citizenship. A case study of Somali settlement in Lieksa, Finland. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 6(2), 115–123. Souto, A.-M. (2011). Arkipäivän rasismi koulussa. Etnografinen tutkimus suomalais- ja maahanmuuttajanuorten ryhmäsuhteista. Helsinki: Finnish Youth Research Network. Spinney, J., Aldred, R., & Brown, K. (2015). Geographies of citizenship and everyday (im)mobility. Geoforum, 64, 325–332. Spry, T. (2001). Performing autoethnography: An embodied methodological praxis. Qualitative Inquiry, 7(6), 706–732. Statistics Finland (2014). Population structure. http://tilastokeskus.fi/til/vaerak/2013/ vaerak_2013_2014-03-21_ tie_001_en.html. Accessed 3 Mar 2018. Statistics Finland (2015). Population structure. http://www.stat.fi/til/vaerak/2014/ vaerak_2014_2015-03-27_tie_001_en.html. Accessed 3 Mar 2018. Tedre, S. (2000). Hoivaa jokapäiväisten toistojen maailmassa. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, 65, 520–526. The Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration 1386/2010.
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Tiilikainen, M. (2003). Arjen islam. Somalinaisten elämää Suomessa. Tampere: Vastapaino. Tiilikainen, M. (2015). Looking for a safe place. Security and transnational Somali Muslim families. Journal of Religion in Europe, 8(1), 51–72. Toivanen, M. (2014). The visual lexica of (national) belonging and non-belonging in the accounts of young Kurds in Finland. Nordic Journal of Migration, 4(4), 192–200. Uotinen, J. (2008). Autoetnografia, digi-tv ja kone, joka sanoo PING! Naistutkimus, 21(4), 5–13. Uotinen, J. (2010). Aistimuksellisuus, autoetnografia ja ruumiillinen tietäminen. Elore, 86–95. Vuori, J. (2009). Guiding Migrants to the Realm of Gender Equality. In S. Keskinen, S. Tuori, S. Irni, & D. Mulinari (Eds.), Complying with colonialism: Gender, race and ethnicity in the Nordic region (pp. 207–224). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Vuori, J. (2012). Arjen kansalaisuus, sukupuoli ja kotouttamistyö. In S. Keskinen, J. Vuori, & A. Hirsiaho (Eds.), Monikulttuurisuuden sukupuoli. Kansalaisuus ja erot hyvinvointiyhteiskunnassa (pp. 235–262). Tampere: Tampere University Press. Vuori, J. (2015). Kotouttaminen arjen kansalaisuuden rakentamisena. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, 80(4), 39–404. Werbner, P., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1999). Women and the new discourse of citizenship. In N. Yuval- Davis & P. Werbner (Eds.), Women, citizenship and difference (pp. 1–38). London/New York: Zed Books. Wood, B. E. (2014). Researching the everyday: Young people’s experiences and expressions of citizenship. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 27(2), 214–232. Yle (2014a). Poliisin työt Lieksassa jatkuvat: Nyt netissä leviävät somalimiehen tilisiirrot? http:// yle.fi/uutiset/poliisin_tyot_lieksassa_jatkuvat_nyt_netissa_leviavat_somalimiehen_tilisiirrot/7116931. Accessed 3 Mar 2018. Yle (2014b). Lieksalaisista maahanmuuttajista puskakuvia Facebookiin – poliisi selvittää. http:// yle.fi/uutiset/lieksalaisista_maahanmuuttajista_puskakuvia_facebookiin__poliisi_selvittaa/7173865. Accessed 3 Mar 2018
Chapter 8
Somali Diaspora Women and Sense of Identity and Belonging Habon Abdulle
This article takes an intergenerational perspective to investigate how sense of identity and belonging are constructed in the diaspora. More specifically, the article explores the ways in which the Somali diaspora women of Minneapolis, Minnesota, express their sense of belonging and convey both transnational and cosmopolitan identities. This aim is particularly crucial given increasing rates of migration and mobility worldwide, which has resulted in growing acknowledgment across a number of disciplines of the importance to examine the experiences of diaspora and how ethnic identities are reconstructed across generations. Despite this recognition, research on Somali diaspora women remains limited. To address the literature gap, the present review will examine how two generations of the Somali diaspora women articulate feelings of identity and belonging and engage with transnational practices. It does so through exploring findings from 20 qualitative interviews and participant observations undertaken in Minneapolis between 2011 and 2012. The findings demonstrate how constructions of ethnic identity change across the generations as younger generation American Somalis are situated between various conflicting cultural reference points. The influence of the family in creating a sense of belonging is also revealed as well as the fluid and evolving nature of familial relationships.
H. Abdulle (*) Women Organizing Women (WOW) Network, Minneapolis, MN, USA e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_8
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8.1 Introduction Two days before the 2016 Presidential Election day, the then-candidate Donald Trump held a rally at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport before thousands of excited supporters. During his campaign, Donald Trump promised that if he was elected he would approve policies deemed by many to be controversial, including stopping refugee admissions and banning Muslims from entering the United States. To back up his anti-refugee and anti-Muslim rhetoric, Trump’s speech at Minneapolis-St. Paul airport repeatedly made references to the large Minnesotan Somali community a majority of whom had arrived as refugees. Trump, in his speech described Somali immigration and settlement as a “disaster taking place in Minnesota,” and pledged that he “will not bring in any refugees without the support of the local community”. In America, public attitudes towards refugees and migrants from non-European countries is changing and not in a positive way. Central to anti-refugee and anti- immigrant views and politics has been the argument that the values and identities of non-white immigrants, particularly Muslims (Somalis are black and Muslims), are not only incompatible with Western society but a threat to it (Huntington 2004; Okin 1999). Due to their visible clothing and the hijab, Muslim women report being perceived in as ‘outsiders’ and have become easy targets of discrimination (Read 2007). Moreover, Minnesota’s Somali-American community has been accused of crime and terrorism, and Somalia is among the list of countries whose citizens had been banned from entering the United States. Despite claims that Somalis are unable to identify with and fit into their new society, they settle in a cohesive and inclusive way into cities and neighborhoods. Large numbers of Somalis consider themselves Minnesotan (although articulated in different ways) and are contributors to their new society, neighborhood and cities, making Minneapolis their home and a cosmopolitan city. Case in point, the same day President Donald Trump was elected, Ilhan Omar, the first Somali Muslim legislator, was elected as the Minnesota State Representative in district 60B. Many Somali Minnesotans and other Muslim community members have taken pride in Ilhan’s election and the ways the Somali community is participating in making of their city a progressive city. My research in this article concerns the attitudes, aspirations and sense of belonging of the Somalis living in Minneapolis. This aim is particularly crucial given increasing rates of migration and mobility worldwide, which has resulted in growing acknowledgment across a number of disciplines of the importance to examine the experiences of diaspora and how ethnic and non-ethnic identities are reconstructed across generations. Despite this recognition, research on Somali diaspora women remains limited. To address the literature gap and to demonstrate the heterogeneity of Somalis, the present review will examine how two generations of the Somali diaspora women articulate feelings of identity and belonging and engage with transnational and cosmopolitan practices. It does so through exploring findings from twenty qualitative interviews and participant observations undertaken in
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Minneapolis between 2011 and 2012 with older generation participants, or, the first generation, and younger respondents, comprising those who arrived in Minneapolis as children and fit into the 1.5 generation category (Rumbaut 2004). In terms of structure, the article is divided into six sections: the first section discusses the methods and participants data. Section two reviews perspectives on cosmopolitan and transnational approaches so as to establish how these two concepts influence the identities, values and sense of belonging of the participants. Section three presents the Somali community’s migration to Minnesota and factors that facilitated their move to Minnesota and Minneapolis. Section four introduces the first generation experiences and key findings of their encounters. Section five talks about the 1.5 generation and their responses to prejudices. The article ends with a conclusion summing up the results of the analysis.
8.2 The Study and Participants The material presented below is based on interviews of 20 Somali women taken in Minneapolis between 2011 and 2012. To recruit the respondents, I visited several organizations, cultural/religious centers, community gathering areas, and colleges and universities with large Somali populations. During the interviews I realized that generational divisions were important and, thus, decided to deepen the project in order to capture the experience of younger generations while also researching the lives of more mature diaspora women. First generation respondents were contacted through Somali community organizations that provide social services to the Somali community, as well as through mosques and, subsequently, via a process of snowballing. These respondents preferred a less formal interview. Some of the potential informants first contacted were hesitant to sign the consent form but ultimately agreed to sign the document. Others refused to have their interview taped, so I took notes. Cultural and contextual factors influenced the reaction of the potential informants to the consent form and the audiotape record. A lack of trust arose from both past and present experiences, as well as the strange request from their perspective to sign a permission document, when they had already agreed to share their life’s story. Somalia experienced a very oppressive dictatorship (Samatar 1988), and that is not surprising that immigrants from a brutal dictatorship, where the regime spied upon and intimidated its citizens, would be resistant to signing a consent document or to having their interview taped for research purposes. Many of the first generation members have, for most of their adulthood, dealt with a government that wiretapped and scrutinized their lives. In addition, the War on Terror and its Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act ratified in 2001 by President George W. Bush (Cole and Lederman 2006) provided Muslims with another reason to be suspicious. The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) stated that there is a developing sense of
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paranoia among Muslims about surveillance, signing documents, and having their conversations taped (ISPU 2004). The 1.5 generation participants were recruited through community gathering areas, and through colleges and universities with large Somali populations. I randomly approached young women at these sites and asked if they wanted to take part of my research. If they had time and were willing to be interviewed the same day, I found a place to sit and conduct the interview. If their schedules did not permit this, I provided them with my phone number and asked them to contact me so we could schedule an interview. Because the semi-structured interview is the principal format of qualitative research (Patton 2002), I opted to use the semi-structured interview as the data collection means for my study. I conducted face-to-face interviews, because this method best captures all relevant data. This approach allowed me some control in the preparation of the list of questions and oversight as I “owned” the questions (Barbour 2008, 120). I began each interview by introducing myself and the research project and explained that I was most interested in learning about the respondent’s life experience around themes of identity, belonging, growing up, education and raising family in a new country. The ten first generation women I interviewed were between ages 48 and 65 and grew up in a homogenized culture in Somalia. They left the country either just before or just after the civil war. Before resettling in Minneapolis, they stayed in different countries as refugees. In Minneapolis, they live largely Somali-populated areas, their circumstances can be described as modest. This group included women who could not communicate fully in English. Because I wanted to incorporate their perspectives in my study, I knew that I had to interview them in Somali. In contrast, the 1.5 generation women were between the ages of 20 and 30 and preferred I interview them in English, because they regarded themselves as more fluent in English than Somali. This also served to highlight their multiple identity. Clearly, they could have used Somali, as they spoke it at home, but they were more comfortable using the language they used in their daily lives. Also, the younger generation participants did not have issues with other research methods and data gathering. The same topic guide was used in all interviews.
8.3 Transnational and Cosmopolitan Concepts This study argues that a transnational lens is necessary to understanding the experiences of first generation respondents, and that a focus on first generation diaspora women’s participation in the preservation of traditional values and practices in the resettled location needs to be incorporated into studies of transnationalism. Transnationalism is defined as, “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1995, 7). In their intervention, Schiller and colleagues have contested the concept that migration is a linear project that predicts
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a steady, generational transition in which immigrant groups distance themselves from their country of origin and assimilate in the new country, taking on the demographic, economic, and cultural characteristics of natives. The concept of transnationalism can be viewed in two ways. ‘Transnationalism from below’ theorizes migrant practices of connecting to their country of origin in various ways (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et al. 1999); whereas, ‘transnationalism from above’ explains the home country policies that channel the transnational activities of migrants (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Itzigsohn 2000). In this study, I am mainly interested in ‘transnationalism from below’, and in particular, the ways in which diaspora women take responsibility towards people left behind or children sent back. The approach of ‘ways of belonging,’ the identities and sense of self that develops from ties to different places forwarded by Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), is particularly relevant to understanding the experiences of the older generation. To discuss the 1.5 generation sense of belonging I will use a cosmopolitanism approach. That is because the respondents’ multiple identities challenge ethnic boundaries and due to their feelings of solidarity with various categories of people, they feel it is easier to change their society and make it more open to other cultures. Cosmopolitanism has been the buzzword of the past two decades. A proliferating interdisciplinary literature shows that there are a variety of different ways in which the notion of cosmopolitanism has been used (see Benhabib 2006; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Hayden 2005). As a concept, cosmopolitanism refers to social condition, that is, an openness towards cultural difference; it is an ethical normative that recognizes the moral worth of the individual regardless of background, and a political project that addresses the limitations of the nation-state in a globalizing world. In this study, I am focused on cosmopolitanism as social circumstances that encourage people of diverse backgrounds, national, or racial affiliations to connect, work, and live together. These processes lead to diminishing cultural homogeneity in favor of diversity and plurality of cultures, religions, and lifestyles. For a long time cosmopolitanism was associated with privileged, upper-class citizens who travel a lot for pleasure and/or business (see Calhoun 2002; Hannerz 1990). However, there is a strand of contemporary cosmopolitan literature that does include migrant subjects as cosmopolitans by considering that the experience of movement—whether the mobile subject is an expatriate, elite wealthy traveler, visitor, student, asylum seeker, or refugee—generates cosmopolitan competencies and views. This type of cosmopolitanism suggests that mobile subjects gain a distinctive set of emotional, and behavioral competencies and skills that distinguishes them from those who have not traveled (Glick-Schiller and Irving 2014, 107; Skrbis et al. 2004, 200; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). Expanding this literature, diaspora and transnational migration scholars have established an approach to concepts of ‘vernacular’, ‘ethnic’ and everyday cosmopolitanism (Sinatti 2006; Werbner, 1999; 2006; 2008). Situated within debates on everyday multi-culture, lived diversity, vernacular and critical cosmopolitanisms (Radford 2016; Werbner 1999; 2006), this analysis
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presents how the younger generation practices ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’ as a strategy to build a more an open society. It draws attention to various forms of cosmopolitan interactions performed by the 1.5 generation Somali diaspora women in their daily lives in Minneapolis. To prevent biases related to the convenience of ethnic or diasporic homogenization, which can lead to groupist assumptions (see Brubaker 2005; Nowicka and Ryan 2015), my intention is not to homogenize all first generation Somali as transnational or 1.5 generation as cosmopolitan, but to emphasize the variety of viewpoints that exist within the Somali diaspora women of Minneapolis.
8.4 Situating the Somali Diaspora in Minneapolis This study focuses on diaspora women who arrived in Minneapolis at different ages. Although it centers explicitly on the experiences of Somali diaspora, similar patterns can be found among diaspora from other African and Muslim women who resettled in United States. Those at the heart of this study are the Somali refugees who fled the country after the 1991 civil war. Due to the country’s political disintegration and humanitarian crisis, a large number of Somalis migrated to Europe, North America and Australia (Decimo 2007). The Somali refugee flows into Western countries have been enabled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) third-country resettlement program. This is a sponsorship program where nations take part in the UNHCR resettlement programs, accepting refugees in quotas on an annual basis. Based on the UNHCR (2011) report, the United States was the first resettlement country of the 25 resettlement countries to accept the most placements annually; Australia, Canada and the European countries also welcomed considerable number of refugees in their countries. Minneapolis is the largest city in the state of Minnesota. With the arrival of refugees from Africa and Asia, Minnesota experienced another chapter in its story of migration. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, immigration to Minnesota was dominated by people from Scandinavia, Ireland, and Germany who predominantly practiced various expressions of Christianity (Atkins 2009). Now, immigrants and refugees from Asia, Africa, and Mexico also call Minnesota home. Minnesota has the largest Somali community in the United States, both for new refugee groups and relocated migrants (Goza 2007), and Minneapolis has the largest congregation of Somalis in the USA (Abdi 2015; Horst 2007). The large presence of Somalis in Minnesota is due to employment opportunities, reputable social services and the existence of Voluntary Agency (VOLAG) (Abdi 2011). While the United States federal government decides who should be accepted and approved as a refugee into the country, the process of resettling the refugees is a local process and is managed by VOLAGs. These organizations sponsor and support the resettlement of the refugee newcomers in their new country (Nawyn 2005).
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Some of the largest national VOLAG organizations, such as Catholic Charities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota, and World Relief Minnesota, are based in Minneapolis.
8.5 T ransnationalism Identity and Belonging: First Generation Identity, sense of belonging, homeland versus resettle-land and connections between these two places were central in the respondents’ narratives. The terms “identity” and “belonging,” which I use throughout this chapter, reflect a complex association between the two concepts, that is, a sense of belonging is understood as a central part of identity. The basic meaning of identity refers to the needs that collectives or individuals express to establish their social existence; it is a central aspect of how we define who we are. Although we value our individuality, it is our membership in particular ethnic groups that is most important in constructing a sense of identity. For first generation respondents, like many other Somalis in their cohort, identity is a given and not constructed (Kusow 2003). For them, identity is more relational. This is because in Somalia everyone is identifiable as Somali and Muslim. If there is interest in becoming more familiar or determining someone’s relationship to another, then the common practice is to ask about clan affiliation. All ten first generation respondents reported that in their migration journey they anticipated both positive and negative reception. This projection informed their attitudes, including how to deal with tough environments. However, they did not expect that their Somali and Muslin identities would be perceived problematic by many in Minneapolis. Though not fully accepted and considered as cultural outsiders, these women created new ways of belonging and new expressions of citizenship, and pushed our thinking about what integration and belonging means.
8.6 Establishing Patterns of Settlement – Building Mosques Through institutions such as the Mosque, religious schools and Somali cultural communities, the older generation and parents attempt to instill a cultural respect and pride in their children. Some respondents spoke about the struggle they went through to build these institutions in Minneapolis. In the early 1990s, when Somali refugees arrived in Minneapolis, many Minneapolitans were unfamiliar with the norms, values, and practices of Islam. Consequently, “[th]ere has been a long period of adjustment as Somalis have sought to educate Minnesotans about Islam and Minnesotans have gained more familiarity with Muslim religious practices” (Arnold 2015, 426).
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Basra, my informant and a community coordinator, echoed Arnold’s (2015) statement, commenting on the Judeo-Christian-inspired cultural orientation to which Somalis had to adjust when they first arrived in Minneapolis. She said: Somalis were the first community who championed multiculturalism in Minnesota. At the beginning this was hard. We were treated very badly; many Somalis were fired because they prayed on the job or were wearing the head-to-toe Muslim garment, jilbaab. We couldn’t have recognized mosques and Quran schools. Now we have county- and state-supported multicultural policies. There is public financing for multicultural programs. Certainly, we succeeded in affirming our culture and religion and we set history, but there is still a lot to be done. We will continue to use multiculturalism as a form of anti-racism.
Although the Somali immigrants’ resettlement in Minneapolis had a formative effect on the city’s Muslim culture, charting the course of Somali Muslims’ future in Minneapolis was challenging, to which the negative reactions to the establishing of mosques attest. My informants Ambaro, Daleys, and Jawahir, who actively championed the cause of mosques’ establishment in the 1990s, certainly know this, as they talked about the shifting role of women in the mosque and the Somali community’s struggles in planting their religion tradition in Minneapolis. The interviewees explained that in the 1990s, when the Somali refugees’ presence increased in Minneapolis, community religious leaders who wanted to form formal and permanent mosques in the Somali-populated neighborhoods engaged them about the role women should play in the initiative. Because the mosque is held in high regard by women, who see it as a place of spiritual inspiration and learning and a gathering point for the community, male religious leaders often requested aid from women to raise funds with which to build mosques or to pay off debt. In fact, the respondents asserted that women took the primary responsibility for raising money and pushing for the building of more mosques. Jawahir wanted to stress the paradox of Americans’ emphasis on the right of freedom of religion and the disturbing wave of bigotry and outright hostility that Somali Muslims experienced: At the refugee camp, humanitarian officials would remind us how lucky we were in resettling in the US because America was a pluralist country that is founded on the idea of religious freedom. I never thought that we would have any problems with our religion, but with all the negativity and unfair targeting of Muslims for exercising their right to religious liberty, it feels as if Muslims are excluded from this freedom. When the Minneapolis government agreed to let us resettle here, [the officials certainly would have been aware of] our religious affiliation and that eventually we would need to practice our religion, unless they thought that once we were in Minneapolis we would stop being Muslims.
Jawahir’s disappointment echoes that of many Somalis who confused the city’s offer to resettle with acceptance. Instead, they confronted obstacles to their freedom to worship and observance, and the public and government stymied their efforts to become something other than unwanted Muslims and second-class citizens. The shaping of Somali diaspora immigrant identity is also transmitted through establishing Qur’anic schools and charter schools where Islam values and Somali culture is emphasized. This is articulated by Sahro’s remark:
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I know that there are things that I cannot pass onto my children like many mothers do here. My children and I won’t share similar childhood experiences such as the games I used to play when I was a kid. I can’t try to convince them to go to the same high school as I did. Even basic things like telling the stories my mother used to recite in the evenings because the children need the background to understand these Somali stories. But I will take any opportunities we have here to teach them Islam and Somali culture. That is why I am proud that I raised money to contribute to the developing and sustaining of various charter schools and Islamic centers in Minneapolis. As mothers, at least we will strive to have physical representation of the elements of our culture and religion so our children and grandchildren will have the legacy of their Somali American identity.
Sahro, though she is concerned with mothering in a different society and culture, demonstrates a sense of obligation to ease the challenges that her children will encounter if they do not have legacy. Thus, she is on a mission to create a symbolic and cultural legacy for her children by giving her efforts to the building of mosques, the construction of Somali malls, and the development of bilingual schools and daycares. She defines the meaning of Somali-American by her portrayal of a diaspora who is adjusting and contributing to their new country. Many other Minneapolitan Somalis are also proudly replacing the notion of a disenfranchised community and laying the groundwork for the formation of a strong community that will maintain their ethnic existence and cultural heritage. The fear of diaspora members is that the familiar traditional cultural values might disappear and be reduced to memory and figments of the imagination. Immigrants usually experience subcultural status in the new territories: a reduced role that is frequently difficult to accept. Thus, establishing physical spaces like Somali shopping malls as well as other spaces that resembles their homeland is claiming some type of belonging. As Shacni said: Many mainstream Minneapolitans cannot understand the emotional comfort we found in going to [the] Somali shopping mall [to] buy merchandise and negotiate in Somali language without the need of [an] interpreter, and meet friends[,] chat and remember the good old days in Mogadishu, or to shop in halal stores and buy products we used to use back home.
Respondents claimed a sense of belonging in various ways. Cajabo, a volunteer in a Somali community organization, told me that in order to expose the mainstream community to her culture, she participates in activities of Somali and non-Somali associations. This included a parade in which she wore a traditional costume and carried American and Somali flags. She added, “I am glad that both Independence Days for Somalia and America are only 3 days apart so we can celebrate both holidays in one weekend.” The narratives of the respondents represent the experiences of a generation of women who found themselves in a foreign land into which they did not necessarily intend on settling permanently. Realizing that they would not be returning to Somalia anytime time soon, they attempted to reproduce their customs and the traditions of the homeland.
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8.7 Remaining Connected Diaspora women are immersed in creating opportunities for their children, family and relatives in the settled country. However, these women’s family responsibilities and connections are not limited to those living with them or in the same city. They are still very involved in the lives of family members either still living back home, who at times become their emotional resources, or who are in another diaspora locations. Hence with varying degrees, they continue to maintain multidirectional relationships across countries. Ijaba, a grandma with a scattered family said: I call often my relatives and friend who live in Somalia, Nairobi and Sidney.
While the Somali diaspora women have global ties, the homeland is where the majority of the first generation Somali diaspora women act as advocates and development agents, translating needs (Kusow and Bjork 2007). This transnational capacity is recognized within Somali Minnesotans (Abdi 2015; Horst 2007) who assume a pivotal role in drawing much-needed attention to the crisis in Somalia. Cadar and Shamso of my analysis shared that they have participated in many of the humanitarian fundraising that often takes place in Minneapolis. Both respondents remember that in 2009 they took the initiative to convince Somali businesses, such as halal grocery stores, restaurants and malls, to participate in fundraising for the 2009 drought—which was one of Somalia’s worst droughts—by having a donation box so that their customers could donate. Other respondents discussed the importance of remittance money, which is the only resource for their families, friends and wider community in need. They shared that beside their families, also orphanages, schools, and hospitals had been the beneficiaries of their remittance money. Diaspora communities have demonstrated that they are a major source of revenue for the Somali economy and livelihoods through remittances, philanthropic support, and participation in rebuilding efforts (Hammond 2007). What is exceptional about the remittance system is how consistently Somalis wire significant amounts of money, despite their relatively low incomes to their diaspora locations (Abdi 2015). Dahabo articulated this attitude and that remittances sent by first generation diaspora women is more frequent, regular and reliable even when a large number of them struggle financially: Some of us collect social security benefit and when we receive phone calls from relatives we never say no we send what we can.
All respondents reiterated the expectation of the sense of altruism, morality, and duty that diaspora members are expected to have. The literature of the economic remittance has amply documented the generosity of the senders and the conspicuous capital transfer made by migrants, but a certain pressure and stigma surrounds the act of sending money and those who fail to remit are labeled as greedy and careless about keeping to traditions and social duty. Therefore, many diaspora subjects commit to sending money to relatives, even if this places a heavy financial burden on them (Abdi 2015).
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It is important to highlight that transnational social space is in many ways gendered (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Salih 2013), for example, due to the changing dynamics of the composition of the traditional Somali family, that is, an increase in divorce and single mother households (Affi 2004). As a ramification, youth issues and intergenerational conflicts have been mounting in the Somali diaspora communities. In order to have peace of mind and preserve cultural tradition and family harmony, many women have turned to transnational networks and emotional resources. This expands the notion of transnational motherhood (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997), for Somali women are not only leaving children behind (civil war have separated families), but also sending teenaged children back to Somalia for dhaqan celis (cultural reorientation). Salaado, an entrepreneur, explains her transnational family dynamic claiming that she has two homes: one in Minneapolis and another in Garowe, Somalia. The house in Garowe is where her mother, father and the youngest of her children, a 17 year-old son, have been living for the last 2 years. Her son got into trouble in Minneapolis and she sent him to Garowe, because she wanted him to experience another lifestyle. Salaado spends the month of Ramadan and other holidays with them: I thought if he [her son] stays there for a while with my parents he might get his life around and learn the values of respecting parents and community.
Salaado is the breadwinner for her family both here and there and during the interview she often highlighted the difficulties her family back home would experience without her help. She suggested that to channel remittances to the transnational family, Somali incorporation in Minneapolis, as well as their mobilization capacity, is crucial. For example, when financial banks such as Wells Fargo, announced they were considering closing their accounts with Somali Money Service Businesses (MSBs), many respondents protested on the streets of Minneapolis demanding the American government to intervene and stop the closure of the MSBs accounts. From the narratives of the respondents transpires that there are many possible ways by which people can organize and construct their relationships and identities in both a new land and homeland. However, this transnational social practice, as well as the ideas of fixed and assured identity, is not the experience of the younger generation. Somali youth often find themselves caught between two worlds and identities. They are here to stay. In contrast to the first generation, who continue to hold on to dreams of returning to their homelands one day, Minneapolis is the younger generation’s home.
8.8 1.5 Generation Experience Scholarly speaking, the 1.5 generation is usually combined with the second- generation (Levitt and Waters 2002; Park 2008). This can be contested. While it is plausible that members in these two categories share similar characteristics and
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experiences, there are significant differences. Thus, lumping together the 1.5 generation with the second generation (or the first-generation as it is done at times) homogenizes experiences and undermines the uniqueness of each group. In this chapter, I discuss that the 1.5 generation has a unique experience and perspective that merits special attention. When discourse on identity is presented, it becomes apparent that the 1.5 generation may experience greater ambiguities in their process of identity formation. While first generation respondents have migrated at mature ages with well- developed self-identities and senses of belonging, the process is totally different for the younger generation and they are not alone in this predicament. For example, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) explain that young Latino immigrants were not aware of being Hispanic until they arrived in the United States where they became exposed to otherness and categorization as ‘outsider Latinos’. Consequently, Latino adolescents learned group identification. The in-group belonging also shaped their attitude toward citizenship, discrimination and the value they assign to political engagement. These facts are relevant to this study. The 1.5 generation respondents shared that they did not know of their Muslim blackness until they realized their “otherness” in the Minneapolis socialization processes. Even growing up in Minneapolis and speaking accent-less English did not help them achieve full social acceptance. Their parents, though they were mindful about possible challenges in the destination country, did not have any experience with the social context of race-based discrimination (perhaps they are more versed in tribe and clan issues). Nor were they knowledgeable about the inferences of certain biases and the effect of the interrelatedness of certain social conditions (low income and crime), which became a measurement to determine societal worth in Western countries. Let alone that geographic clusters are synonymous with ghettoization. The parents’ only neighborhood before immigrating was one of high-density blackness. In other words, their upbringing dealt with other sort of issues, and they were unable to prepare their children to deal with prejudice. Children were left to face discrimination shaped by pre-existing attributions of race and were not insulated from stereotypes or taught to deal with racism.
8.9 Strangers in Their Own Home Coming of age during immigration and ethnic minority debates forced this generation to deal with the challenges of integration and what it means to be American (Jones-Correa 2004). They consider themselves Americans but are aware of not being accepted. Interviews revealed experiences ranging from indifferent behavior to rejection. Thus, overcoming ‘outsiderness’ was an issue for these young women. According to them, a high expectation exists that dictates that they embrace society’s dominant practice and standard and embrace assimilation (Salins 1996). They reported of being outraged that even when they endeavor to assimilate, the bar
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would get raised higher and so there is always a reason to keep them out. The mantra of ‘learn the language, get American education and recognize America as their country’ did not work for them, because even after they did all of that, they were still not fully accepted. They expressed frustration in figuring out what else immigrants could do to prove their absolute integration in the new society (Grillo 2007). Rabica describes her integration experience as an unequal relationship. She has been in Minneapolis for 17 years. She is Muslim, but she does not wear a headscarf or any dress that invokes a specific group identity. Yet, she describes how she felt disqualified from Americaness: I was eight years old when I came to Minneapolis. I grew up here. The only culture I know best is the American culture. I went to school here; all my friends are from south Minneapolis. I consider English as my primary language, yet wherever I go, I am asked ‘where are you from?’ The same question is not asked to my white immigrant friends because it is always assumed that they could be from America. The same cannot be projected for a dark-skinned woman. I have to prove that I am from here because I am from here.
Rabica’s discontent highlights the dilemma of other respondents and all non- White newcomers that want to be accepted with their diversity. The feeling of those who will always be categorized as others (Said 1993; Hall 1997), no matter how much they try to adopt integration models and achieve success standards in education, language proficiency and cultural acquisition resonates with her. This dilemma highlights the complex politics of race relations. Proving to other Americans that she is an American and one of them is the quest that Warsan, a young professional, has been dealing with for some time now. Warsan wants to be accepted and her diversity appreciated. Her hope was that the United States, the country that is proudly built on the historical appreciation of the immigrant, where for centuries immigrants sought their dreams and fates would measure up to its ideals and unconditionally accept her. She said: The day of my naturalization oath I was so happy that I couldn’t contain my excitement. I truly thought that from that day on I was going to become an American in every sense of the word. That I will be honored as a new citizen just as it is said in the pamphlet given to us during the naturalizations ceremony. No longer was I a second-class citizen where my loyalty toward the country that gave me the opportunity to have education, home and life is constantly questioned. But nothing has changed. Would I be more accepted as a real American if I wear a miniskirt instead of headscarf? Wallahi (I swear) the whole predicament is exhausting.
For many diaspora women, the headscarf or hijab represents an identifier of their Muslimness. Warsan contends that identity formation is not limited to the ways in which she relates and portrays herself to the society as Muslim and American. It is also contingent on the fact that others in the society perceive her as non-American because she does not fit their characteristic of an American. Warsan’s frustration is shared by many other young Muslim-Americans who endure the pressure of living in a country—which they call home—that demonizes them for their faith, associates Islam with radicalism, and labels them terrorists or submissive (Mahmood 2005).
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Currently in American society, a woman with a hijab does not fit the American standard of freedom of choice. These women are seen as oppressed, as others who need to be liberated from their cultural and religion restrictions (Bullock and Jafri 2000; Mahmood 2005). Contrary to the Western portrayal of Muslim women as meek, powerless and oppressed, Muslim women are active actors engaging in and reforming existing social institutions to address their particular concerns. Thus, the fixed and static image representing a covered woman as unliberated conflicts with the reality of Muslim women’s efforts and experiences (Bullock and Jafri 2000). Although, the prejudices experienced in everyday were hard to deal with for the respondents, the worst experiences that had impacted their lives in many ways happened at school.
8.10 Discrimination in Primary School and Beyond For years, theorists have claimed that education has been used as a tool of oppression, indoctrinating minorities that their culture is inferior to the dominant white culture (hooks 1994). bell hooks argued that the power structures inherent in the classroom disseminates to both blacks and whites the belief that blacks are of lesser value. She asserts that, for many, education was used to maintain white dominance by socializing whites to experience their ‘superiority’. Immigrant children are subjected to unfair treatment from various institutions including schools. Danico (2004) has explained the effect that feelings of alienation and intolerance at school had on the academic performance of Korean children in Hawaii. This discrimination resulted in a high rate of high school dropouts among Korean students. Saran (2015) claimed that even Asian youth, the model minority when speaking of education, are not safe from racism and face biases and marginalization in schools and colleges. The 1.5 generation of my study reported similar discrimination and stigmatization experiences. According to Baydan, her early exposure to discrimination came from the imposition by some teachers of their white cultural dominance and how they highlighted the immigrant students’ status as outsiders. Often these teachers spoke in derogatory terms about ethnic groups and cultural backgrounds. Baydan explained she never thought the society, let alone her teachers, would categorize someone who had grown up in Minnesota as being an outsider. This disjunction between Baydan’s understanding of belonging and the teachers’ opinions ignited her anger, then created a burning challenge which ultimately led to her emergence as an activist and advocate for minority rights at school. She stated: When you are young you have certain expectations of your teachers; that of being treated well, having your talents uplifted and building your self-esteem. Instead, my experience with some teachers was the opposite…it was frustrating, because they never hid their disparaging attitude. I hated hearing comments like, “you people,” or “These Somalis and their parents don’t understand our education system,” or “poor kids, it’s not their fault if they have been culturally deprived,”…or things like, “of course that they are late, just imagine
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the time they spend in getting ready with all the religious clothing they have to wear.” As someone unfamiliar with discrimination, I couldn’t step in and defend the mistreated because I felt powerless. I thought to myself, “I need to do something about this and soon I will learn how”. I can now participate in Minneapolis politics and change society in a profound way because it is through policy development that major societal change happen[s].
From Baydan’s testimony, it is evident that her American teachers saw her Somali Muslim identity as fundamentally flawed and thus of lesser value than a Western identity. This hegemonic stance that privileges Western culture (hooks 1994) and the school as the structural context within which the discrimination took place motivated Baydan to confront the power dynamic between white/teacher and black/Muslim/female/student. Racism and stigmatization were also reported by others. Carawelo and Mulki, both college students, spoke about the way their Muslim and African identities were used to make them feel inferior and that this bigotry shaped their political involvement. Carawelo said: I remember that often at school, the cafeteria food servers became annoyed when we would ask if there were pork products in the food. One day I overheard one of them saying “Where they came from, people are dying of hunger and here they want special food!” I thought how ignorant and racist that is!
Other respondents asserted that even their ability to speak English was an issue for some schools. Ilhan and Sahara, both professionals who grew up in Minneapolis and are fluent English speakers, revealed that school officials made many assumptions about their language skills because they did not fit the image of an English- speaker. Each time they attempted to enroll in a new primary school, officials made them pass the English as a Second Language (ESL) test to continue taking regular classes. The registration office explained that this was necessary because they were from Somali households. Some respondents spoke of unintentional incidents of otherness where they were perceived as outsiders when their perspective was not considered. Mulki, a college student said: Last year in my global culture class I noticed that in the class discussions some of my liberal friends, in their attempt to make my point relevant, would say something like for example: “Mulki, who is an African, may have a different view from us Americans.” I know that they did not have hostile feelings or contentions, yet they couldn’t comprehend that their statement was casting me as an outsider. They did not consider that my views could be closer to their own. That my views are American rather than those of a young African woman living in Africa.
Mulki indicates that others regarded her as more African then she herself felt. She points out that, as much as she tries to anchor her belonging to a place or a society, it is hard to control the degree to which others with their social constructs will define her identity. Her classmates made statements based on their assumption of her ethnic identity and the beliefs and values that they think should be associated with that membership and therefore projected their perception of who she is. She conveys that for minorities in America, the engagement in self-definition must confront the controlling assumptions by others of what it means to be American and
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that standard leaves out much of the immigrant population. Mulki, in other words, is sharing that her outsider status is permanent because her background and visible minority heritage will always be a deterrent from her fitting into the American mainstream. She highlights an inherent paradox of American society that demands assimilation, expecting the black immigrant to assume the American lifestyle and yet, the general attitude suggests that all nonwhite people are foreigners, outsiders and not ‘real’ Americans when compared to their white counterparts. For these young respondents, whether consciously or unconsciously, when the situation becomes ‘them versus us,’ they know that group boundaries have been drawn. Their response is “ask me who I am; don’t just assume you know me.” They are dismissing the notion that they are unsuited as ‘Minneapolitans’ as they question what that really means. After all, they have grown up in Minneapolis and have Somali roots, yet their identity is both and more. This hybrid identity is obvious in the way they assert themselves as members of the future post diaspora.
8.11 Everyday Cosmopolitanism Above I presented the discrimination that the 1.5 generation experienced through school and everyday life. These difficulties shaped the possibilities for and the conditions of challenging social exclusion. In this context, what then are the prospects to finding a concept that allows them to broaden diversity and make their city a more accepting place? Do they measure up to the scholarly valorization of non-elite citizens practicing everyday cosmopolitanism and the abilities of the 1.5 generation? As mentioned before, and as is acknowledged in many of the literature on 1.5 generation migrants (Bartley and Spoonley 2008; Lee and Park 2008), respondents often had considerable intercultural competencies in the form of language skills and familiarity with different social practices. While they face barriers to be accepted, these competencies sometimes made it possible to negotiate their acceptance in their new society. For many interviewees, cosmopolitan practices emerged through conscious efforts to situate their identities and create inclusive discourse. Sulekha provided an example: My friends are from different background. Often our discussions center on ways to make our neighborhoods and the city a more welcoming places for everyone. We are learning other cultures’ practices and rule[s] of engagement; we want everyone’s background to be valued and respected equally. We are against a hegemonic cultural. The only way this can be achieved is to transform the city and make it more open to all.
Sulekha makes her comment in the context of an argument for a more open and welcoming city that belongs to everyone and not to ‘mainstream’. According to her, it is part of her duty as a citizen to create a dialogue between all citizens, both newcomers and established communities. The notion of a more open and accepting city coincides with Amina’s desire to one day see Somali surnames like Farah, Abdi or Mohamed recognized as Minnesotan names. Other respondents suggested that
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immigrants and refugees helped transform Minneapolis from an unknown Midwestern city to a vibrant, cosmopolitan and multilingual city. Carawelo in emphasizing the multilingual aspect of the city states: Now Somali language is taught at UMN [University of Minnesota] and there is a high school in the public school system that offers Somali heritage language classes. Several adult community education programs offer the Somali language along with Russian, Lakota and Swedish. This shows how far the Somali and other communities have progressed [in] changing the city’s cultural landscape.
Ilhan and Baydan also shared their cosmopolitanism and attributed this attitude to K’naan, the famous Somali Canadian singer. Ilhan asserted that she is proud of K’naan and his ability to be a world citizen without forgetting his roots: “He is my hero and I am practicing his open-mindedness and love to humanity”. Baydan, the young activist cited earlier, also explained that K’naan influenced her activism and ability to challenge racism and bigots: “He is my role model,” she said. In high school and university, Baydan took on leadership roles while advocating for cultural diversity and social justice. As an artist who mixes Somali poetry narration with rap, Baydan taught others the history and practice of Somali oral literature while working with Somali American community organizations. She cowrote a play chronicling the journey and experiences of Somali immigrants in Minneapolis. She stated that becoming socially and politically conscious allowed her to develop creatively and live beyond the limitations set by society. K’naan, a Somali-Canadian hip-hop artist, is an example of a diaspora subject who exercises hybridity effortlessly by constantly overlapping various identities. This reflects his desire to interject his Somali background, Canadian citizenship and diaspora experience in the mainstream popular culture through his songs. K’naan is liked by many because being politically conscious he uses music to communicate his refugee experience as well as his unconventional success which implicitly is the struggle and achievement of diaspora subjects. He is known for blending Somali cultural themes (recited in Somali language) with hip-hop. In doing so, he is unapologetically trying to undo preconceived notions of minority by use of the empowered language, so the possibility of a culture neutral grounds or cosmopolitan space can be created.
8.12 Conclusion The standard account of American immigration focuses on the acculturation and assimilation of immigrants and their offspring to American society. This analysis tends to emphasize marginalization and separation and typically discounts the significant contributions of immigrants to the creation of American society that can be more open and just. My study highlights the contribution of diaspora members. This research was about comparing two generations of Somali diaspora women of Minneapolis and finding the differences between the two generations. The article
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analyzed the ways respondents establish community as they negotiate the c omplex and power-laden social landscape of Minneapolis. To examine the identity and sense of belonging of the two generations, insights from transnationalism and cosmopolitanism studies were utilized. In doing so, the research demonstrated the different ways the respondents construct their contingent sense of belonging in relations to both racism and hope to return to the imagined home. My findings demonstrate how constructions of ethnic identity change across the generations as younger generation respondents are situated between various cultural reference points. The analysis has shown that the first generation respondents express transnational identity and behavior, as they have strong connections to their homeland and other diaspora locations. These transnational connections provide them emotional and practical resources. Reflecting the findings of Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) some of the first generation respondents I interviewed asserted practicing transnational motherhood and revealed that their networks in geographical distance allow them to continue to mother their children. The attitudes and practices of the respondents’ mothering from a distance suggests a commitment to transnationalism from below and strong advocacy of remittance flows. The first generation experiences also show that they are contributing to building in Minneapolis a community that will preserve their religious and traditional culture, as this can be a bridge that connects intergenerational families. Another study has demonstrated that Somalis have an established community in Minneapolis in which they have created an economy that allows them to carve out their own space with ethnic shops, grocery stores, malls, restaurants, beauty salons, religious centers, and schools (Horst 2007). Nevertheless, I demonstrated that carving out this ethnic space was not easy. When Somali refugees first arrived, they experienced strong othering attitudes from the general public. Much of this hostility was directed at their faith, as most Somalis are Muslim. As devout Muslims adhering to religious codes of conduct, the Somali presence in Minneapolis and the need for accommodations for their religious rites, such as halal food, the construction of worship spaces, and the use of public spaces for prayers, as well as the loosening of workplace dress codes, challenge both secularism and the norms of a Christian nation. Hijab-wearing Somali women have experienced more animosity than their male counterparts. Yet, Somali diaspora persevere and maintain a stable community adding their culture and religion to the existing culture which results in the noticeable diversity of Minneapolis while simultaneously remaining connected to the homeland. Regarding the 1.5 generation respondents, my study argued that while the young respondents experienced racism and othering, yet these barriers did not diminish their ability and desire for engaging in cosmopolitanism. Thus, reinforcing Werbner’s (1999) argument that cosmopolitanism is not a prerogative of elite and wealthy business people, but a concept practiced by diaspora members as well. In regard to belonging, the two generations believe they belong to two countries but the 1.5 generation emphasized that they feel they belong to America rather than to
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Somalia, and therefore are engaged in changes that can have long-term effects. In this sense, Minneapolis has the potential to represent a cosmopolitan city in that it provides opportunity for divergent parties to come together and experience trust for the overall good.
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Hammond, L. (2007). Obliged to give: Remittances and the maintenance of transnational networks between Somalis “at home” and abroad. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 10, Art. 11. Hannerz, U. (1990). Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture. Theory, Culture & Society, 7, 237–251. Hayden, P. (2005). Cosmopolitan global ethics. Aldershot: Ashgate. Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., & Avila, E. (1997). “I’m here, but I’m there”: The meaning of Latina transnational motherhood. Gender and Society, 11, 548–571. hooks, b. (1994). Teaching to transgress: Education as the practice of freedom. New York: Routledge. Horst, C. (2007). The Somali diaspora in Minneapolis: Expectations and realities. In A. Kusow & S. Bjork (Eds.), Mogadishu to Dixon: The Somali diaspora in a global context (pp. 275–294). Trenton: The Red Sea Press. Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who are we? The challenge to America’s national identity. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISPU. 2004. The SA PATRIOT ACT impact on the Arab and Muslim American Community Analysis and Recommendations. Available at: https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/theusa-patriot-act_farid-senzai.pdf Itzigsohn, J. (2000). Immigration and the boundaries of citizenship: The institutions of immigrants’ political transnationalism. International Migration Review, 34(4), 1126–1155. Jones-Correa, M. (2004). Understanding immigrant politics: Lessons from the U.S. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/understanding-immigrant-politics-lessons-us Kusow, A. M. (2003). Beyond indigenous authenticity: Reflections on the insider/outsider debate in immigration research. Symbolic Interaction, 26(4), 591–599. Kusow, A. M., & Bjork, S. R. (2007). From Mogadishu to Dixon. Trenton: The Red Sea Press. Lee, Y., & Park, K. (2008). Negotiating hybridity: Transnational reconstruction of migrant subjectivity in Koreatown, Los Angeles. Journal of Cultural Geography, 25(3), 245–262. Levitt, P., & Glick Schiller, N. (2004). Conceptualizing simultaneity: A transnational social field perspective on society. International Migration Review, 38(3), 1002–1040. Levitt, P., & Waters, M. C. (2002). The changing face of home: The transnational lives of the second generation. New York: Russell Sage. Mahmood, S. (2005). Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nawyn, S. J. (2005). Faithfully providing refuge: The role of religious organizations in refugee assistance and advocacy (Working Paper 15). San Diego: University of California, San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. Nowicka, M., & Ryan, L. (2015). Beyond insiders and outsiders in migration research: Rejecting a priori commonalities. Introduction to the FQS thematic section on “Researcher, migrant, woman: Methodological implications of multiple positionalities in migration studies.” Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Qualitative Social Research, 6(2), Art. 18. Available at: http://nbnresolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs1502183 Okin, S. M. (1999). Is multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The politics of migrants’ transnational political practices. International Migration Review, 37(3), 760–786. Park, J. Z. (2008). Second-generation Asian American pan-ethnic identity: Pluralized meanings of a racial label. Sociological Perspectives, 51, 541–561. Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. E., & Landolt, P. (1999). The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2), 217–237. Portes, A., & Rumbault, R. (2001). Legacies: The story of the immigrant second generation, University of California Press. Berkeley. Radford, D. (2016). Everyday otherness’ – Intercultural refugee encounters and everyday multiculturalism in a South Australian rural town. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(13), 2128–2145.
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Read, J. G. (2007). More of a bridge than a gap: Gender differences in Arab-American political engagement. Social Quarterly, 88(5), 1072–1091. Rumbaut, R. G. (2004). Ages, life stages, and generational cohorts: Decomposing the immigrant first and second generations in the United States. International Migration Review, 38(3), 1160–1205. Said, E. (1993). Culture and imperialism. New York: Knopf. Salih, R. (2013). Gender in transnationalism: Home, longing and belonging among Moroccan migrant women. London: Routledge. Salins, P. D. (1996). Assimilation, American style. New York: Basic Books. Samatar, I. A. (1988). Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and reality. New York: Zed Books. Saran, R. (2015). Navigating model minority stereotypes: Asian Indian youth in South Asian diaspora. New York: Routledge. Sinatti, G. (2006). Diasporic cosmopolitanism and conservative translocalism: Narratives of nation 607 among Senegalese migrants in Italy. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 6(3), 30–50. Skrbis, Z., Kendall, G., & Woodward, I. (2004). Locating cosmopolitanism: Between humanist ideal and grounded social category. Theory, Culture & Society, 21(6), 115–136. Smith, M. P., & Guarnizo, L. (1998). Transnationalism from below: Comparative urban and community research (Vol. 6). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. UNHCR. (2011). UNHCR projected global resettlement needs 2012. Retrieved from http://www. unhcr.org/4f0fff0d9.html Vertovec, S., & Cohen, R. (2002). Conceiving cosmopolitanism: Theory, context and practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Werbner, P. (1999). Global pathways: Working class cosmopolitans and the creation of transnational ethnic worlds. Social Anthropology, 7, 17–35. Werbner, P. (2006). Vernacular cosmopolitanism. Theory, Culture and Society, 23(2–3), 496–498. Werbner, P. (2008). Introduction: Towards a new cosmopolitan anthropology. In P. Werbner (Ed.), Anthropology and the new cosmopolitanism (pp. 1–31). Oxford: Berg.
Chapter 9
Diaspora Citizenship: Silenced, Stigmatized, Outlying – And Campaigning Päivi Armila and Yasemin Kontkanen
In the case of diaspora people, becoming active citizens and attaining participation possibilities in the country of residence are relevant to engagement and adaptation to a specific territory. However, experiences of actors are not limited to this single territory in diasporic conditions. In this chapter we analyze the phenomenon of diaspora citizenship via experiences of Somali refugees living in Finland. We approach Somali diaspora as a type of consciousness and positioning which can be marked with its paradoxical nature. We ask how Somali immigrants in Finland see their positions and possibilities as members of their current societies. Organization of the data has been done in a dialogue with the existing social scientific understanding, conceptualization, and knowledge of diaspora experience and transnational Lebenswelt. We mark diaspora citizenship in terms of certain citizenship positions, in which these refugees identify either themselves or diaspora Somalis more widely. Diaspora citizenship is seen as a consequence of moves and characterized with the attributes of threatened, temporary, silenced, and outsider citizenship – but also as open-minded and widely experienced membership, seeking for occasions to bring special diaspora understanding – ‘newness’ – to socially and politically recognized arenas.
9.1 Introduction Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2011) define the recent decades with a phrase ‘age of migration’, meaning that in the contemporary globalizing Zeitgeist migration gets more and more manifold, distinctive and unique features. During the first sections
P. Armila (*) · Y. Kontkanen Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
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of the twenty-first century migration, still, consists of both voluntary and forced dispersions – wanted or non-wanted changes of home countries of individual people or groups of certain people (Ahponen et al. 2014; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009). In analyses of migration this division of positively or negatively felt emigration is important to note. When we are discussing refugees, asylum seeking or diaspora, we are discussing the non-voluntary side of the phenomenon. In this article, we focus on experiences of asylum seekers who have been forced to leave their homes and have – at least this far – found their destination in Finland. We ask how Somali immigrants in Finland see their positions and possibilities as recognized or non- recognized members of their current societies, as well as their aspirations to be part of different developmental missions in countries that they define as meaningful for themselves. Diaspora is a term that traditionally has been used to describe the world-wide dispersions of Jewish people. Today, however, the concept has been taken into use especially when the special feature of Somalian emigration is under scrutiny. Currently, that is, in the 2010s, about a million Somalis live as refugees in Somalia’s neighbouring countries1 and hundreds of thousands have travelled further – to the U.S., to Europe, to Australia, and to Russia as well. As the large families have often pervaded all over the globe, Somalis also tend to move again, to get near their relatives (Auburn City Council 2013). In spite of the national and international efforts for improving the societal development of Somalia, frequent headlines highlighting the ongoing political and humanitarian crises in Somalia allude that the mobility of Somalis can increase even further. These problematic conditions imply that the Somali diaspora will and must stay in the transnational migration research with new perspectives and openings. Returning to Somalia is not an obvious or possible option for most Somalis living in diaspora (Hautaniemi et al. 2013). This is one reason why the analyses of Somali emigrants’ possibilities to become active citizens of their current countries of residence are in the focus of social scientists who strive for social equality in the contemporary multi-ethnic states. Besides equal participation possibilities in the country of residence, where people have interests and relationships to more than just one society, societal equality means immigrants’ possibilities to maintain transborder contacts, as well as participate in transnational issues they feel important. We analyze and interpret the phenomenon of diaspora citizenship via different experiences of Somali refugees who have settled down in Finland and seek their social positions among different local communities and at the same time emphasize the importance of connections with Somalis elsewhere, as well as with Somalia as a shared target for emotional and political aspirations. In our analysis Finland represents a constitutional state, a Nordic welfare society with its policy principles of universalism and equality. Finland forms a distant and different context than Somalia in terms of climate, language, culture, politics, policies, and economics. By focusing on experiences of Somali asylum seekers, we aim to reach different meanings of diaspora life-course and citizenship and portray their attachment to societal http://refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/africa/Somalia
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p articipation, as well as transnational relations and exchanges – in this case especially to the extra wisdom and patience our informants identify in themselves when talking about the participation-potentiality they have. Even though the main part of migration research concentrates on problems and challenges, we pay attention also to diasporic ‘newness’ (Bhabha 1994): to the vivid ways of life and plenteous social locations of Somalis in their manifold spatial localities – or at least their wish for these. Diaspora is seen, besides as an oppressed social space, also a dynamic space for de-territorialized identities (Hautaniemi et al. 2013, 16). We mark diaspora citizenship in terms of certain citizenship positions, in which these refugees identify either themselves or diaspora Somalis more widely. Our analysis leans on thematic interviews where life-histories, current life- experiences and future expectations of Somalis in Finland have been discussed. The data are collected in a research project Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship – Transnational Networks, Social Participation and Social Identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. (Academy of Finland, 2012–2016), the aim of which has been to recognize and develop societal opportunity structures that give space to transborder citizenship of diaspora inhabitants. In this article we proceed by building conceptual frames for our scrutiny within the terms of transnationalism and diaspora firstly. This is followed by a description of the Somali population in Finland, and of our informants more specifically. We also shortly present our data and methodological commitments before moving on to results and concluding remarks.
9.2 T he Conceptual Frame: Transnationalism and Diaspora as Contexts for Societal Memberships Migration is a complex research area where not only the flow of people is significant, but also the quality of this flow is in question in terms of its human dimension. Although the activities of diaspora populations have recently become a prevalent research area, these activities have always been predominant in the course of history. Sephardic Jews, for instance, who expelled from Iberian Peninsula in the fifteenth century, resettled throughout Ottoman Lands. The majority of them accommodated in Salonika and had an opportunity to participate in several businesses rendered by the city. These opportunities engendered initiatives, which then created trade possibilities resulting in salutary effects for the sake of Salonika. Salonika was not only economically developed, but it flourished also socio- culturally; along with the several consumer products, Sephardic Jews imported new teaching methods and improved the intellectual environment of the city. Irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, diaspora populations have common characteristics such as more than one language, more than one home in more than one country, and a way of living through often continuous and regular contacts across national borders (Portes et al. 1999, 217). Although there has been a momen-
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tous tendency to read the notion of diaspora through a traumatic tradition in the literature (Dlamini and Wolfe 2009, 407), nowadays the notion refers to several dispersed groups regardless of the pushing factors for their migration. Accordingly, new references such as Somali, African or Turkish diaspora, based on “bond of locality, culture, and common ancestry, which extends beyond the narrow boundaries of a group’s country of origin” (ibid.), have emerged. Recognition of transnational activities and their consequences throughout the history might provide an additional view to the analysis of diaspora citizenship (Portes 2003), but the examination of early diaspora activities is difficult to track and obscure (Bhabha 1994; Portes 2003). This cul de sac might create oblivion from researchers in the course of examination unless the employed cogent theoretical perspective is clearly defined. Diaspora activities do not provide any novel phenomenon and the concept is disoriented in the theoretical entanglements until there is an academic consensus on the novelty of the employed scope, as Portes underlines (2003, 875). This scope, referred as transnationalism, is the magnifier of diaspora populations’ activities in the current academic era. As reflected by Brinkerhoff (2009, 30), members of diaspora in general share a self-awareness or ‘diasporic consciousness’. This comes through the continuing common ties to the homeland and others who have settled in other countries, and it facilitates identifying oneself as a ‘member of a dispersed identity group’ (ibid.). Many contemporary diaspora people are feeling to be members of two (or more) different societies at the same time (Ronkainen 2009). Their hopes and struggles are not limited to building a new life in a new environment. The struggle is also to gain a recognized social position in a totally new social structure on one hand, and to keep the former positions as they are on the other. Accordingly, diaspora people also transform their homeland and new homeland into a new sphere through goods, cultural ideas and values which are in flow (Bhabha 1994; Vertovec 1999b, 2001; Anthias 2009). Besides, consequences of their activities have noteworthy impacts even for macro-level structures as Portes (2003, 877) underlines: “a social process of significant economic and social impact for communities, even nations”. For us diasporic space refers to where several substantive experiences of diaspora people take place. Although these are mainly associated with home-and-host-land, they also have attachments to unknown-lands hosting relatives. Accordingly, even though becoming active and credible citizens and attaining equal participation possibilities in current countries of residence are relevant to engagement and adaptation to a specific single territory, actors’ experiences are not limited to single territory. Eventually, the position one can hold in the diasporic conditions has no borders limited to one territory. It is necessary to indicate that we approach to Somali diaspora in Finland as a type of consciousness and positioning which can be marked with its paradoxical nature (Clifford 1994; Vertovec 1999a). It is a dual awareness of being ‘here and there’ (Vertovec 1999a, b), inclusion and exclusion (Soysal 2000), hopes and losses (Clifford 1994). This ‘awareness of multi-locality’ is the main bond of the ones sharing the same ‘routes’ and ‘roots’, according to Vertovec (1999a). However, the idea of shared roots does not mean that the destinies and social locations of diaspora
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Somalis in Finland resemble each other; the general polarization toning societal memberships can also be recognized inside diaspora communities where some individuals push themselves to effective social positions, the others remain in silent and even ignorant margins.
9.3 Diaspora People of This Article: Somalis in Finland Somalis form a measurable population in Finland. According to Statistics Finland, about 19,000 people speak Somali as their mother tongue in the country. Existing literature associated with Somalis in Finland shows that most of them have settled in Finland with a refugee status or arrived through family reunification. Finland was not the original aim and primary destination for Somali refugees and emigrants. Still, Somalis started to enter Finland in the early 1990s as asylum seekers, and one important factor linking Somalis to Finland was its geographic proximity to the Soviet Union. When the Somali civil war broke out, Somalis studying in the Soviet Union represented a pull factor for their national fellows seeking asylum. When the Soviet Union collapsed and became a difficult place for Somalis, Finland was the closest western country to choose (Harinen et al. 2013, 83–84). The arrival of the first Somali asylum seekers in the early 1990s forms a remarkable milestone in the Finnish history and discussion of immigration. Somalis were the first large ethnic group that arrived in the country as spontaneous asylum seekers. ‘The flood of Somalis’, as it was depicted in the media, confused common people and Finnish authorities. From that on, the number of Somalis grew rapidly and by the year 1995, over 4000 Somalis resided in Finland. After that Somalis have been the largest population group with an African background and the largest Muslim group in Finland where over 75 percent of the dominant population are Christians. These attributes have partially affected why Somalis have become a subject of fervent public debate (Harinen et al. 2013, 84). The publicity around Somalis has been sensational and problem-oriented. Besides, economic depressions of the recent decades have increased negativity towards immigration. National statistics show how Somalis fall in societal margins in many relations: their unemployment rate is highest, and their educational level is the lowest in Finland. They have only seldom been selected or elected as members of political or economic courts, and are not able or willing to start own businesses (Harinen and Sabour 2013). This is important to note, as Finland is a wealthy Nordic welfare society with a manifold educational supply, a huge apparatus of employment services, and legislation that pays attention to immigrants’ integration (Act of the Promotion of Immigrant Integration 1386/2010).2 In fact, when a refugee or asylum seeker comes to Finland, (s)he is soon surrounded by a network of officials
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who begin to take care of his/her issues, as well as demanding him/her to take part in an intensive personal integration program. Finland is a sparsely populated country, and immigrants in Finland live mainly in the big cities of Southern and Western Finland.3 This is the case also among Somalis, even though there is one interesting exception: One small town located near the Russian border has recently managed to diminish its population loss by getting hundreds of Somali inhabitants. We have interviewed Somalis whose places of residence and social positions differ. Some of them live in Southern Finland and are societally active, some of them live in the above mentioned eastern town, a couple of them have higher education, some of them are just starting their language learning education, and so on. A short description of the interviewees is below, however, lacking all the information that might make them recognized. • Five housewives with children, one of whom has come to Finland only recently in a family reunion process, all living in a small town in Eastern Finland. • Six ‘free-time politicians’, three men and three women, working in different official positions of the public sector (e.g. social workers) in Southern Finland, lived in the country already for years. • One man working as a school assistant in Eastern Finland, locally active mediator between Somalis and Finns. • Two male entrepreneurs whose business establishments differ in age, sector and the city of establishment.
9.4 Diaspora Citizenship: In, Out, and In-Between We have analyzed 14 interviews, concentrating in expressions where the interviewees talk about issues that can be interpreted as expressions of experiences of and meanings given to Somalis’ special positions as diaspora people, and as citizens or residents of a constitutional state named Finland. Our methodological orientation is phenomenological and hermeneutic: the organization of the data has been done in a dialogue with the existing social scientific understanding, conceptualization, and knowledge of diaspora experience and transnational Lebenswelt. Within the ideas of phenomenological reduction we, however, have tried to be open-minded in front of this data. The fact that we represent different nationalities than the informants and have grown up to different cultural understanding might have been helpful in this aspiration (Husserl 1964; see Koski 2011). In this part we present different citizenship positions where these diaspora people locate either themselves or diaspora Somalis more widely. The term citizenship refers to ideas of social and societal membership at large – not only to formal participation possibilities guaranteed by the National Act of Finland (2003). We 3 http://www.vaestoliitto.fi/tieto_ja_tutkimus/vaestontutkimuslaitos/tilastoja-ja-linkkeja/tilastotietoa/maahanmuuttajat/maahanmuuttajien-maara/
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u nderstand diaspora citizenship as transborder citizenship (Glick-Shiller 2005): a form of membership provided by a special life-history containing living in more than one country and forming meaningful bonds to more than one society. With the term transnationalism we refer to diasporic relationships, identifications and orientations as consequences of transborder citizenship towards societal issues defined as significant. The following chapters present our analysis where, at first, the life-historical experiences with their consequences are pondered from the perspective of our interviewees. None of them has been born in Finland; they all have entered the country via refugee camps from Somalia’s neighbouring countries and through moves to other destinations before Finland. Diaspora citizenship is seen as a consequence of these moves and can be characterized with the attributes of threatened, temporary, silenced, and outsider citizenship – but also as open-minded and widely experienced membership, seeking for occasions to bring special diaspora understanding – ‘newness’ – to socially and politically recognized arenas.
9.5 T ransborder Life-Histories: Traumas, Exclusion and Transnational Knowhow For Finns, Somalis form the strangest group of latecomers (see Bauman 1996), and maybe this is why the public discussion around them is creating prejudices, stereotypical representations and discriminating images – in spite of the general acceptance that is felt towards refugees coming from miserable conditions. Almost the whole contemporary generation of living Finns have never experienced war, environmental catastrophes, or other widely and collectively shocking events. In the contemporary Finnish context Somali immigrants’ life-histories are unique and make local people who should meet Somalis unsure and indecisive, often avoiding. This uncertainty also creates a situation where there are many locally isolated Somali communities. Societal integration and emotional homing arise from belonging to local communities and from a commitment to the territory (Ronkainen 2009). In diaspora conditions homing is not easy. Unstable life-histories of diaspora people in an environment where they are different, are identified by our informants as sources for eternal life-course instability that can lead to for-ever-temporary residents and to minds who do not feel at home anywhere. Meanings given to traumatic life events and moves from one country to another, and also from one locality to another even in the final destination state, are linked with a threat of total exclusion. According to the informants, life events that no-one native really understands, as well as temporary living in different places, can make people fragile. Metaphorically, these expressions figure images of human shells, maybe empty inside, maybe full but hiding bitter emotions and non-fulfilled hopes. Accordingly, resentfulness challenges resettlement because the core of the process, which is to feel home, lacks in
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their case. Their social locations remain lose, and this can mean voluntary withdrawal from societal arenas where shared issues are discussed and developed. I know many people who moved to England and back, moved to Sweden and back, moved to America and back to Finland. They are attached to nowhere. They are lost all the time, they are moving all the time… Their bodies just move here but their heads are not with them.
The threat of complete exclusion is emphasized especially by the societally active Somalis of this study. In their thoughts, this resentfulness can lead to condemning those diaspora parents who continuously seek for better environments and plan to change their country of residence according to their own benefits. According to some Somalis’ views and experiences, defined from a perspective of a growing child, transnational life is a risk for personal development. In this case, however, the quoted informants also clearly make a distinction between themselves and other diaspora Somalis – this is something they have noted but not adhered. Many adult immigrants do not understand that (immigration) is a big change, for kids… That they go to new environments, learn new language, seek friends. Loneliness and all this. They don’t understand that it disturbs their mental health… Immigration is a big change, not any small issue… one has to think carefully, think about all pains and gains.
When interpreted within conceptualizations of citizenship, the above described orientations towards and perceptions of diaspora life-courses can be linked with citizenship positions marked by eternal exclusions and outsiderness. Accordingly, participation in societal issues or effecting on one’s living environment becomes a meaningless mission. However, a position of an outsider citizen can get also positive contents – at least in this kind of case where the cause of outsiderness is based on speciality of world-views and life-experiences. Outsider-citizen does not always feel as sadly excluded. For some informants, transnational cultural capital appears as a dominant and mind-opening source in understanding the contemporary world (see Bauman 2000). Transborder life-histories with their disadvantages can lead to transnational understanding with its advantages, sustaining this duality even in the individual interpretations of it. Although diaspora experiences can be seen as a risk in one hand as shown above, they can also be used as a source for personal development, especially as a meaningful source for a positive development of the country of residence: We have to encourage the native people to go to the world, to get new ideas, to see the world as a richness, to seek new means and to get new perspectives. Then they return to Finland and make this country rich, further… In this way, a person sees the world differently. This is capital that is not reachable otherwise.
Thus, the extensive life experiences faced by our diaspora informants have not always just emptied, marginalized and traumatized these people. In some cases refugees’ traumatic experiences, such as facing death, pain and loss, turn into a code of conduct in which these people learn how to survive and to be patient with the
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everyday challenges they face in the current countries of residence. In this frame of interpretations ‘Somalia in me’ represents strength rather than loss – bringing relativity and reasoning to latter difficult life situations. I’ve been in war; I’ve collected dead bodies as a young man, much, there in Somalia, and seen much. But it hasn’t left any trauma in me… I sometimes think that it surely has somehow strengthened me… sometimes when sitting at home I think all I’ve been through. And then, okay, if I have survived those situations, I’ll survive also these new ones.
Social positions experienced as above can be named as experiences of outsider citizenship. However, as mentioned, outsider citizenship is not just a negative content of meaning. If one is mentally strong, he/she can define an outsider citizenship position as a position of extra wisdom and wide perspective. This position can, according to our politically active interviewees, give understanding to its holder. According to the interviewees the experiences of outsider citizenship could be used in a constructive way. In their own words, Finnish society would benefit from this additional perspective if the outsiders only were listened to and taken seriously.
9.6 F ormal Citizenship Status: A Paper with Promises and Cheats This citizenship issue… it means that a country like Finland, with over 5 million people, recognizes this person as one of them… It gives an identity of a citizens, he cannot be seen as just like anyone… And has rights, for example, in Arabic countries… I get more recognition… as a citizen of Finland than just as just a citizen of Somalia… I was surprised when… in front of me in Arab Emirates… one guy showed African passport and they asked him to move somewhere and wait…but I showed a passport telling about Finnish citizenship and they just ‘welcome’, even though two people who look the same, he was from Somalia as well… Yes, the meaning of citizenship is huge, at least if you travel.
The quotation above describes widely the meaning of Finnish citizenship for most of our Somali informants – all of whom have also applied for it. Gaining a Nordic constitutional state citizenship implicates many legal, practical consequences linked with social security benefits, bank account issues, travelling possibilities both concretely and mentally, in terms of check point treatment and a deeper feeling of trust and safety. The emotional rewards of identification and recognition as a member of a nation mean emancipation from concretely and materially restricted lives, promising formal stability – and also easy leavings – in diaspora. For these diaspora people the formal turn from an alien to a citizen is meaningful not only on a residential level but in the international context as well. But if you have the Finnish passport you’ll always get help from somewhere. Also from some other European country you can get, help.
After unstable life courses, the new formal citizenship is seen as a calming element giving reasonable choice in the set of different homing possibilities: now we maybe stay here. This ‘now we maybe stay here’ brings hopes, wishes and homing
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expectations in its train. The formal and informal promise that the legal state membership brings to diaspora people can appear more promising than it actually provides. Citizenship as a status written on a paper can differ a lot from citizenship as a practice with social and societal encounters (see also Ronkainen 2009). In the case of diaspora Somalis, everyday encounters with native fellow citizens can lack totally or may be filled with more or less visible discrimination patterns. But the emotional ‘welcome’ is missing… And now when we talk about immigrants, I say excuse me but it’s not relevant that we talk about immigrants, they are inhabitants of different municipalities… with same kinds of needs, living in same neighbourhoods, their children go to public schools with the others; I don’t understand why they should be named as immigrants… I myself, as an immigrant, have tried and tried to take responsibilities, and rights as well, but sometimes it feels that you are stigmatised… So I think why they give us possibilities to come in Finland if it’s so negative, if immigrants make people so anxious. It’s contradictory, it’s good that people discuss but this never seems to end.
Expressions consisting of negative citizenship experiences in the data can be interpreted within the attributes of stigmatized and silenced citizenship. In the case of Somalis, ostensibly recognized citizens often become targets of misinterpretations against which they have to conduct a continuous fight – or withdraw themselves from the local social scenes. This stigmatization and silencing has a lot to do with the huge unemployment rate of Finnish Somalis (around 40%4), which means that Somalis are often seen just as receivers of the ‘common money’, charging ‘the ordinary tax payer’ and the welfare state authorities. This exclusion from labour market can also mean that the only contacts Somalis have with locals are formal and official. The main reasons for diaspora Somalis’ societal exclusion are structural and institutional (Hautaniemi et al. 2013), but it is also both interesting and sad that these people have learned to blame themselves: Our network contains teachers, social workers, places where we take care of our… business, officials and such… We lack language skills; that’s why.5
Experiences of stigmatization make people quiet. Silenced citizenship can be maintained by diaspora people themselves but its origin is external, in the discriminating patterns of labour market (Könönen 2015). An interviewed Somali activist crystallizes how the promised citizenship suffers from lacks in practice and how it confines many people into silence: Ask any Somali man or woman, when (s)he comes to Finland, ask during the first three weeks of the stay, (s)he is so eager, wants to start working, wants to learn, work, do this and that, (s)he has long-term plans what (s)he wants to do. And after half a year, (s)he is so depressed and passive, not even wanting to dream of those issues (s)he used to dream of.
4 http://www.eva.fi/tyotjatekijat/maahanmuuttajien-tyottomyysasteet-kansalaisuuden-mukaan2000-2013/ 5 The way how our informants blame themselves is obscuring as we as researchers and non-Somalis have never had any difficulties to interact with them, in spite of the lack of shared mother language.
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When the legal citizens’ autonomy and identity are ignored and when citizens are made ignorant, they can remain eternal guests whatever their formal position within a state is. In this case, a negatively defined step-out from the society is possible and even obvious. Petri Hautaniemi et al. (2013, 37) have noted that personal frustration in the life conditions are hard for Somali men in diaspora because they often lose their statuses in labour market. Different people have different ways to step out, to become outsiders – in our data we see this especially in the lives of housewives who turn their eyes into their families and religion when there is no social space for them in the wider environments of diaspora: I put my energy to my family. God knows the future… I’ve met mothers who have lived in Finland for 20 years, totally outside the society… They are here, but not mentally here. Somehow the integration always remains scarce… though the officials plan so much for us the methods for survival here…they still have their own world. Eating own food, Somalian food, looking at Somalian TV, reading Somalian books, but you still live here, you need the language, need to understand the culture. I think it’s a long time, 22–23 years and you only know where Alepa (shop) is. And when to fill applications (for social security money). Money comes from walls; you don’t know where they give it to you.
For better or worse, interestingly, formal residential citizenship can bring – besides stability possibilities in diaspora – also mobility chances for people who feel not fixed to one territory. For diaspora people feeling cosmopolitan or seeking possibilities to effect in transnational politics or policies – or maybe liking to settle nearer their relatives in some other country – moving away from the current home country is not a difficult option: But, you see, life is full of choices and if I’m not satisfied so I’ve to change the landscape. And it depends on my will. And if I’m not satisfied with this country, yes, of course, I have the Finnish passport and I’ve education… I just sell my apartment and move away.
9.7 T ransnational Aspirations: Peacemakers for Different Environments Transborder life histories, transnational relations, traumatic experiences and understanding of how miserable social problems can be have provided many diaspora Somalis with a will to be a pushing force for societal changes in many levels: locally, nationally and transnationally. Especially those politically active ones are calling for a change – be it an issue of their immediate environments, of wider Finland, of Somalia, or of global human development. In the nearest, immediate and everyday life levels our informants long for treatment that takes them seriously, as inhabitants of their municipalities and as citizens of Finland. Some of them feel that they have reached this stage of membership, at least partly: …there’s a good side in this party that there I’m not an immigrant but I’m (the name of the informant) and a candidate for (a name of a city) municipal court. And I have competence for that…they don’t see me… this big party… with power, feels that I, a tiny person from Africa, just received education here, feels my sayings so important that it’s published in a
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nation-wide political manifest. I’m allowed to effect in politics, and after being here for a year the youth suggested me as a director for (a name of the city) youth. No-one considered me as a black man, as a Somali, as a Muslim…I’m a member of the party… I’ve been seeking this feeling elsewhere in Finland, so that the Finns would see me as a Finn, there’s no need to see me asking where you come from and what you do here. 20 years I’ve been answering this same question, so couldn’t you please ask a new question so that I wouldn’t feel outsider.
A more global sight in the speech of our informants gives a picture of peace- makers and equality-seekers taking the issues of general human rights seriously and arguing them with their own experiences. When one has experienced war, fear and hunger, a consequence can be an active call for general equality and welfare development. Some of our informants plan a future career in international organizations aiming at developmental work either in Somalia or somewhere else. Somalia as an important place for them is present in the data as a country in need of intensive interventions, in order to face a future that is much better than her past. In these aspirations diaspora Somalis identify themselves as representing both Somalia and Finland – differently in different action contexts, and sometimes even emphasizing their ‘alien-ness’ in Finland in a promoting way. My political dream in Finland is to become an ambassador…representing Finland. It’s a profession that I’ve wanted since being a young boy… now I’m 34… and if… I gain that much wisdom and experience for politics, so I definitely begin to ask for a possibility for this kind of PR-work… I believe, internationalism… My political career, my dream is that I could effect on issues also elsewhere than in Finland, also in my expatriate country Somalia, Africa, especially women’s position, women’s and girls’ participation in politics, especially immigrants’ participation… And it’s also important that African, Asian people, who have received high education in Finland… could find work. I have been fighting for open doors in Finland for foreign students, who live here five years, six years, got graduated and then they here that there is nothing for them.
Somalia is ranked as the fourth country among the most unequal societies in the world, in terms of gender – women are treated badly, and their societal positions are week (Hautaniemi et al. 2013, 54–55). Diaspora conditions seem, to some extent, question and aim at changing the traditional Somali gender order and generation relations. The change of those is not resisted in our data – vice versa: young and active diaspora Somalis, be they men or women, stress the importance to tempt especially young women to participate and to make space for the young generation in creating Somalia’s (or Somaliland’s) future. Now when there is peace in Mogadishu, I visited it…next summer I’ll go there and we’ll organise a big seminar and I definitely want a political perspective to it, activating women, so that women cooperate and learn to support young women’s participation… In diaspora…we have developmental cooperation, we have almost 25 member organisations doing developmental cooperation into Somalia from different parts of the world, I’m the chair in this, it’s interesting and challenging, I’ve been there from the very beginning, I’m the only woman been there…
Peace as a wanted goal, however, is defined in different ways and spheres in our data. For some informants war memories and refugee experiences are sources for efforts to global-scale improvements, but for some others peace means just quiet
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and peaceful family-life with one’s own family members. For those feeling tired of war and suffering from intimate losses home in Finland represents physical and mental safety. For them being citizens of Finland means something we interpret as stableness-seeking citizenship. The main aim of those diaspora individuals is to build their personal everyday-lives in peaceful environments with those family members who still are alive and reachable. A woman, who has come to Finland recently via a family reunification process, expresses no aspirations for a political career, but just to live in peace with her husband. Always if you get married you like to live with your husband, not apart. If you get apart, life isn’t becoming cool without your husband. So when we get our marriage in 2004. And then Al-Shabaab killed his father, my husband’s father and they said that they want to kill him. And he decided to go a peaceful country… We didn’t see or hear him… couple of years.
9.8 D iaspora Possibilities: If There Only Were Space and Recognition On the idealistic level of definitions, transborder space and transnational relationships allow people to communicate; exchange and share with others, as well as change, adapt and identify themselves. For Somalis who in Finland form the most marginalized group of refugees according to the formal measures of ‘integration’ (success in education, labour possibilities, political chances, Statistics Finland 2012), diaspora citizenship means campaigns that demand personal courage, as well as strong belief for the future. If a diaspora person has these kinds of mental capitals connected with educational capital, (s)he can turn outsiderness as personal strength, as political awareness and as extra wisdom that has much to give in different environments. Without these symbolic capitals one, however, remains on societal edges and becomes excluded from several spheres of society. The situation is especially challenging for diaspora Somalis in the Nordic context where they meet both structural and everyday level resistance and discrimination. Petri Hautaniemi et al. (2013, vi–vii) have named this kind of diaspora exclusion with a term ‘double absence’. Diaspora citizenship is a position with many substantive experiences taking place and gaining meaning. This position can be an umbrella position for far- reaching engagements and activities. The debates on societal membership of diaspora people extend the borders of one single territory and make new questions concerning transborder citizenship viable. The examination of transborder citizenship provides a novel perspective to the membership debates as the adaptation of diaspora populations is not limited to the one that happens in the confined territories of countries of residence. Where there are unstable political conditions in the original state, many emigrants want to effect on its development in some way: for example, educating women and changing women’s positions and awareness in Somalia is one popular means suggested by the diaspora people of this article. But this is not the only picture presented: for some diaspora Somalis Somalia is a hell to be stayed away as far as possible.
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Our informants have escaped from difficult circumstances which include war, death, threats and loss. In many cases, they celebrate their life in Finland for having the possibility to be safe. They, however, do not neglect the challenges of this new life. Our data shows that they want to feel at home, to make a home in Finland. Many also want to actively participate in societal development of their municipalities, states, and human race more widely. Gaining citizenship of the country of residence brings safety, relief and globally open doors for diaspora people. However, the practical gains do not entirely alter the challenges that especially Somalis in the Nordic diaspora can face in everyday life. It is noteworthy and interesting that every now and then the interviewed Somalis talked to us about their own lives, experiences, and then stepped aside talking about Somalis as them or those people – wanting to describe themselves as something different, maybe out from the cultural representation of a Somali immigrant which in Finland is not very flattering. Diaspora people with transnational relations and knowhow have a huge ‘citizenship potentiality’ if there only were opportunity structures giving space to it – and if they would be allowed to be Somalis in diaspora, proudly and calmly.
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Harinen, P., Haverinen, V-S., Kananen, M., & Ronkainen, J. (2013). Contexts of diaspora citizenship. Citizenship and civic integration of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 13(8). http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/ vol13/iss1/8. Hautaniemi, P., Juntunen, M., & Sato, M. (2013). Return migration and vulnerability: Case studies from Somaliland and Iraqi Kurdistan. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies. Husserl, E. (1964). The idea of phenomenology? The Hague: Nijhoff. Könönen, J. (2015). Tilapäinen elämä, joustava työ: Rajat maahanmuuton ja työvoiman prekarisaation mekanismina. PhD dissertation, University of Eastern Finland. Koski, L. (2011). Teksteistä teemoiksi: Dialoginen tematisointi. In A. Puusa & P. Juuti (Eds.), Menetelmäviidakon raivaajat: Perusteita laadullisen tutkimuslähestymistavan valintaan (pp. 126–152). Helsinki: JTO. Portes, A. (2003). Conclusion: Theoretical convergencies and empirical evidence in the study of immigrant transnationalism. International Migration Review, 37(3), 874–892. Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. E., & Landolt, P. (1999). The study of transnationalism: Pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2), 217–237. Ronkainen, J. (2009). Väliviivakansalaiset. Monikansalaisuus asemana ja käytäntönä. PhD dissertation, University of Joensuu. Soysal, N. Y. (2000). Citizenship and identity: Living in diasporas in post–war Europe? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(1), 1–15. Vertovec, S. (1999a). Three meanings of “Diaspora”, exemplified among South Asian religions (Transnational Communities Programme Working Papers Series). http://www.transcomm. ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/diaspora.pdf. Accessed at 21 Mar 2018. Vertovec, S. (1999b). Conceiving and researching transnationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22(2), 447–462. Vertovec, S. (2001). Transnationalism and identity. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4), 573–582.
Chapter 10
Proximity to Natives: A Frame, a Resource and a Platform for Somali Entrepreneurs Yasemin Kontkanen
The purpose of this article is to magnify how proximity to natives, as a social location for migrants, can reveal and generate resources that influence the ‘perceptibility’ of resources and opportunities existent in different environments. In this analysis, proximity refers to being in close distance to natives and it is approached from three different angles, namely; a frame, a resource, and a platform. Through these distinct angles, this article explores how proximity to natives, as a social location held by migrants, can define migrants’ understanding of their own entrepreneurial possibilities, and how it can also influence their business entry decisions. The empirical background of this examination comes from 14 qualitative interviews that convey the experiences and insights of Somali migrant entrepreneurs living in the Republic of Finland, as well as in the states of Minnesota and Maine in the United States of America. In order to highlight the structures that exist between and mong people J. Coleman’s (1990) conceptualizations of social capital, and to present how social locations relate to these structures M. P. Fernández-Kelly’s (1995) readings of social capital are utilized. Through this analysis, the lack of proximity to natives is identified as a possible setback in the entrepreneurial activities of migrants as it results in diminished capacity to recognize available resources and opportunities that are available in a given environment.
10.1 Introduction Since the labour markets of Western economies have evolved and experienced fundamental changes during the last three decades, entrepreneurship has become a desired occupation for many migrants (Volery 2007, 30). Migrants’ entrepreneurial Y. Kontkanen (*) Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
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activities represent their socio-economic participation to their respective societies. As these activities are time and place specific (Kloosterman 2010, 26), it is not possible to omit the influence of environment, be it societal and/or market-based, concerning these activities (Morrison 2000, 64). Migrant entrepreneurs, who are members of measurable ethnic communities, are usually examined with reference to their own community (i.e. Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Ram 1997; Pecoud 2004; Lassalle 2008). On the other hand, these entrepreneurs’ relation to mainstream society is often presented through the discussions of ‘self-help’ that identify possible achievements on the path of entrepreneurship, including; employment, economic stability, social status, self-respect, and recognition from the mainstream society (i.e. Kupferberg 2003; Wahlbeck 2008; Sabour 2011). This article aims to add to the existing debates by directing attention to a particular social location migrants can hold; proximity to natives. In this analysis, proximity refers to being in close distance to natives and it incorporates notions of both physical and social closeness. Subsequently, proximity is approached from three different angles; a frame, a resource, and a platform. Through these angles, this article explores how proximity to natives, as a social location for migrants, can define migrants’ understanding of their own entrepreneurial possibilities, and how it can influence their business entry decisions. The empirical background of this examination comes from the experiences and insights of Somali migrant entrepreneurs living in Finland and the two states – Minnesota and Maine – in the United States. Contemporary literature on migrant entrepreneurship suggest that having a good business acumen is not enough, if different paths to entrepreneurship are obstructed by legal, bureaucratic or institutional barriers (see Ojasalo 2003; Aaltonen and Akola 2012; Volery 2007). Also, resources that are positioned to be mobilized will similarly be insufficient when attempting to establish a business if migrants lack certain necessary socio-cultural resources (see Jack and Anderson 2002; Deakins et al. 2007; Lassalle 2008). Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993, 1322) underline the idea that migrants’ economic destinies are dependent on how they become incorporated into the structures of their resettlement societies. Accordingly, ‘embeddedness’ is one important dimension to magnify regarding migrant entrepreneurship as it is a process in which one’s capacity to access various resources and opportunities is determined through her/his social relationships and networks (McKeever et al. 2014, 227). Social location of an individual is a determining factor in access to resources and opportunities that exist in a particular environment (Aldrich 2005, 460); since it characterizes the size, density, and multiplexity of one’s social relationships. Eventually, this factor determines not only the nature of social networks, but also the nature of resources which can be gained through these networks (Fernández- Kelly 1995, 217). For instance, in a society where the majority of people are xenophobic, being a migrant positions individuals in less favourable social locations that already lack access to various types of opportunities, knowledge and understanding of ‘know-how’. Although this does not necessarily reduce the ‘availability’ of resources and opportunities that exist in an environment, the ‘per-
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ceptibility’ of these resources and opportunities diminishes in the case of migrants. Due to this, it is necessary to perceive the questions concerning migrant entrepreneurship in a wider context in which questions of inclusion and exclusion become plausible not only at economic and bureaucratic levels, but also at societal levels. Theoretical lens of this analysis is grounded on a multidisciplinary perspective that moves across the disciplines of entrepreneurship studies, economic sociology and sociology of migration. Since social capital is one of the main explanatory mechanisms to present the process of embeddedness (Portes 2010, 27), in order to highlight the structures that exist between and among people Coleman’s (1990) conceptualizations of social capital, and to explain how social locations relate to these structures Fernández-Kelly’s (1995) readings of social capital are utilized in this article. Before proceeding to the theoretical conceptualization, that is followed by data analysis and discussion, the significance of the research population is outlined in relation to their respective contextual settings. This outlining provides the tangible frame of everyday experiences of Somali migrants living in Finland, as well as in the states of Minnesota and Maine in the United States. In other words, it details the background in which the entrepreneurial activity of Somali migrants has emerged.
10.2 Background: Somalis in Different Domiciles Somali entrepreneurs, whose experiences are under scrutiny in this article, are part of a migrant group whose members are known to be displaced internally within Somalia1 and also scattered all around the world with a population over a million people. This is mostly due to drought, famine and political conflict that has been a reality in Somalia during the last decades.2 With this in mind, Somalis represent the first, large ethnic group that arrived as refugees to Finland, and they also constitute the largest Muslim community with an African background in the country (Tiilikainen et al. 2013, 25). According to the statistics, there were 19,059 people speaking Somali as their mother tongue in Finland in 2016.3 Due to the fact that Finland continues to have a relatively homogenous population structure, the Somali community there has played a significant role in defining the procedures and processes of migrant integration since the beginning of their arrival in large groups in the 1990s. Concerning these procedures and processes, the practical challenges encountered in Finland can be listed as generating solutions on the accommodation of such 1 https://www.refugeesinternational.org/advocacy-letters-1/somaliastabilitytestimony?rq=som ali%20 2 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora/ 3 http://vertinet2.stat.fi/verti/graph/Graphserver.aspx?ifile=quicktables/Maahanmuuttajat/kieli_2& lang=3&gskey=2&mimetype=htm
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a large migrant group, creating tools and programs in order to facilitate the group’s language learning, and providing possibility of employment and access to education (Tiilikainen et al., 25–67), and finding resources for all of these different necessities. However, Somalis’ integration to Finland, has not been limited to these practical realities and integration mechanisms as social encounters of Somalis have been challenging. For instance, discrimination, including street harassment and labour market blockage, have been among the everyday experiences of Somalis (Tiilikainen et al. 2013, 44). As Aallas notes, Somalis have suffered not only from cultural and structural racism (2013, 158), but also from “loneliness, a longing for home, problems with family, unemployment, resignation and mental illness” in Finland (2013, 157). As the questions concerning migrant integration have become a prominent focus within the Finnish academy during the last three decades, the Somali population has been approached as a research subject (i.e. Tiilikainen 2003, 2015; Pirkkalainen 2013; Harinen et al. 2014; Sotkasiira and Haverinen 2016). Following the extensive research that has been produced on this subject, it is now possible state that religious and cultural practices, norms and differences, family ties and relations, questions concerning identity and belonging, and everyday experiences of Somali population have been explored in these examinations. While migrants constitute more diverse populations in the United States when compared with Finland, the reasons they move to the United States are equally diverse. Migration can be profiled in various ways as the history of United States presents distinct phases of migration depending on the decade it relates to (Portes and Rumbaut 2014, 1–47). However, the arrival of Somalis in the United States in large groups can be traced back to 1990s, similar to the case of Finland, as thousands of Somalis sought refuge in the United States in these years (Abdi 2011; Huisman 2011). As Abdi notes (2011, 95), the number of Somalis who were granted refugee statuses is estimated to be close to 100,000 during these years. Minnesota State Demographic Centre (2000) reports that migrants in general constitute a mobile population even after their entrance to the United States. They move to different parts of the United States for several reasons, including; better job opportunities, increased access to social services that facilitate resettlement, as well as being closer to other family members and kins (ibid). Although it is difficult to track migrants after their entry to the United States, school data allows an opportunity to locate migrant groups (ibid.). Somalis have been mainly resettled within the United States in: Minneapolis, Minnesota; Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus, Ohio; and Maine, Portland and Lewiston (Huisman 2011, 24). Overall, Minnesota hosts the largest Somali community as its east African population has increased by 61 percent according to the recording of 21,000 Somalia-born persons having arrived between the years 2008 and 20124. According to a survey conducted by Wilder Research Centre (2000, 7), for the majority of Somalis living in Minnesota, this location has been a secondary resettlement location due to better job opportunities and closeness to family members and kin. The state of Maine (especially the cities of Lewiston and Portland) is another destination that Somalis https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr12-16.pdf
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have shown interest in after 2000. Somalis’ secondary migration to Maine relates to a period of population decline and an increase in housing possibilities in the city of Lewiston (Huisman 2011, 25). Huisman (2011, 27) marks economic incentives, however, as out of question in this secondary migration due to the “extremely limited job opportunities of the area” (ibid.). Still the number of Somalis residing in Maine was estimated to be already over 6000 in 2011 (Huisman 2011, 23). There has been speculation that suggests better state welfare benefits have been a determining factor in the case of Maine, but no evidence was found to support this argument (Nadeau 2003, 13; Huisman 2011, 29). As pointed by Kananen and Haverinen (in chapter ‘Facts and Figures’), poverty is one important aspect to consider concerning the everyday experiences of Somalis in both countries of resettlement – Finland and the United States. Even though Somalis enjoy a degree of legal standing by receiving “access to public services, protection from violence, and the ability to vote (once naturalized)” (Abdi 2011, 102), Abdi notes that poverty and segregation confine them to lower socio-economic positions within the United States (ibid). Somalis living in Finland encounter similar obstacles due to their vulnerability5 and discrimination in labour markets (Tiilikainen et al. 2013, 60–73). In general a lack of education, as well as a lack of qualifications or possession of qualifications which are not transferable to resettlement countries often prevent migrants from gaining access to several job opportunities in the countries of resettlement. For instance, assuming that any language barriers are minimized, being a teacher, an engineer, a doctor or even a plumber, a cook or a cleaner in Somalia does not asist Somalis when they apply for similar vacancies in Finland. Thus, the emphasis placed on ‘expertise’ becomes one of the main challenges migrants perpetually face when applying for gainful employment in Finland. Kananen and Haverinen (in chapter ‘Facts and Figures’) similarly note that the lack of entry-level job opportunities is an obstacle to migrant employment in the country. Also, there is the data available from the Open Society Foundation, which underlines the fact that acquiring the necessary education and language qualifications ‘do very little’ for Somalis to overcome exclusion from the labour markets in Finland (Tiilikainen et al. 2013, 66). Despite the fact that education level and language skills of migrants vary greatly in general, educational attainment and labour market participation of Somali population are low in both contexts. Entrepreneurial activities of Somalis, however, reveal different realities in these different resettlement societies. In comparison to other migrant groups, the registered number of Somali entrepreneurs and self-employed Somalis has always been notably small in Finland. In 2012 there were only 36 Somali-speaking entrepreneurs in the country (Joronen and Mohamed 2015, 48). In spite of the extensive research on Somalis in Finland, Somali entrepreneurs have long been a neglected research population as their activities were obscure to many researchers. The first intriguing discussion concerning the entrepreneurial activities of Somalis in Finland was carried by Joronen in 2014. 5 The term ‘vulnerable’ denotes the less qualified migrants for several career opportunities (See 2020 Action Plan, European Union).
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In contrast, 550 of Minnesota Somalis were reported to be self-employed in the beginning of 2004 (Joronen 2014). Also, in the following spring of 2005, there was a considerable increase in this number as the records show 800 self-employed Somalis in the region at that time (ibid). As the media has directed its attention to these Somali businesses in Minnesota beginning in 20076, the experiences of these entrepreneurs were also examined by Samatar in 2004 and by Golden et al. in 2010, and presented by the Minnesota Chamber of Commerce in 2013. Comparatively speaking, Somalis’ contribution to Maine has not been limited to new cultural, lingual and religious offerings as noted by Nadeua (2003, 30). New businesses such as halaal stores and restaurants have equally played important roles in changing the face of Maine (ibid.). Following both media and literature on entrepreneurial activities of Somalis in Maine and Minnesota, it is possible to suggest that Somali migrants have remarkable potential for migrant entrepreneurship. However, the facts and figures from Finland fail to match this expectation. Regarding this potentiality, Joronen (2015) underlines that Somalis need to “pool their resources with native Finns” in order to overcome the obstacles such as scarcity of capital, clientele and certain resources. This article adds to Joronen’s findings by addressing the need of social and physical proximity to natives in the case of migrants. The experiences of Somali entrepreneurs living in Finland, Minnesota, and Maine demonstrate that these proximities can be resourceful in various ways.
10.3 Translating Social Location to Social Capital Recognition of individuals as socialized actors, in terms of affecting and being affected by the context, remains a ‘seminal argument’ employed in research focusing on entrepreneurship (Thornton 1999, 21). McKeever et al. (2014, 222) state that this recognition has become a welcomed approach receiving increasing attention since the 1980s –especially from the scholars who were dissatisfied with neo- classical economic models. Since Polanyi (2001 [1944]) stated that “the outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships” (2001, 48), influence of others has prominently been taken in consideration when explaining motives and behaviours of economic actors (Portes 2010, 14). Granovetter (1985, 487) articulated it succinctly by writing that actors’ behaviours and decisions are “embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations”. Granovetter’s thesis, known as social embeddedness, has been a useful approach in defining how socio-cultural influences determine economic action, but it has also been criticized for enduring theoretical ambiguity (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, 1321; McKeever et al. 2014, 226). http://www.mndaily.com/2007/11/12/somali-businesses-growing-locally http://womensenews. org/story/entrepreneurship/071223/somali-women-make-minneapolis-their-business
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One way of avoiding this ambiguity is by concentrating on how social structure can facilitate, diminish or derail the goal-seeking behaviour of individuals rather than focusing on how economic action is embedded in a given structure (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, 1321). To accomplish this, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) mark social capital as the “more systematic understanding of the different sources” (ibid.). In order to find out how a particular social location, proximity to natives, can facilitate, diminish or derail the entrepreneurial behaviour of Somali migrants, a similar lens is employed in this analysis; and Coleman’s (1990, 302) theoretical orientation, which introduces social capital as a conceptual tool, is followed. Socio-cultural resources of a migrant or a migrant group are highly important to consider in the discussions of migrant entrepreneurship (Light and Rosenstein 1995, 166). Regarding the key theoretical perspectives that are presented in economic sociology, social capital is one of these resources (Portes 1995, 3–17). According to Coleman (1990, 302), social capital should be understood as “a variety of different entities” consisting aspects of social structure and should be defined “by its function” generating possibilities to achieve certain ends, which are not attainable in the absence of these entities. When considering social capital as entities that are definable by their function, Coleman (ibid.) underlines that social capital is the natural component of each and every social relationship; and each and every social relationship has its own essence, meaning, and value. As he clearly describes: The function identified by the concept “social capital” is the value of those aspects of social structure to actors, as resources that can be used by the actors to realize their interests (Coleman 1990, 305).
The concept of social capital provides a lens to qualitative analysis to explain both system-level and individual-level behaviours by showing how social relations can generate resources to mobilize individuals (Coleman 1990, 306). Social capital is not limited to the discussions concerning mutuality in this article, as mutuality is not necessarily the main force driving particular expectations in wider structures (Portes 1995, 13). For Coleman (1990, 305) identifying “certain aspects of social structure by their function” is important to highlight in the discussions of social capital. He also notes that social capital is not ingrained in people, but instead exits in structures that exist between and among people (1990, 302). This means that there is no way of possessing social capital without being connected or related to others (Portes 2010, 32). It is noteworthy to underline here that acquiring socio-cultural resources is a context specific process; since these resources are obtainable through social relationships varying in types, ways and locations (Ryan 2011, 711; Fernández-Kelly 1995, 217). The value and usefulness of the resources obtainable through social relationships have been discussed in relation to the strength, diversity and multiplexity of the ties existing in the structures (i.e. Granovetter 1983; Lin 1999; Jack 2005). A vast body of literature exists with respect to entrepreneurs in general and migrant entrepreneurs in particular, which proves that social capital facilitates access to and acquisition of other tangible and intangible resources and opportunities existing in a given environment (see Zhou 2004; Pécoud 2004; Deakins et al.
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2007; Lassalle 2008; Jack and Anderson 2002). Since literature on migrant entrepreneurship adds additional emphasis with respect to character of migrants' own ethnic communities in the discussions of social capital, in this analysis it is aimed to direct attention to the structures that exist between migrants and natives. It is, however, important to note that in general social capital has been presented as “the capacity of individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures” (Portes 1995, 12) in the literature. Fernández-Kelly (1995), in her research examining how social capital relates to cultural capital, suggests reading social capital as a process rather than a “concrete object appropriated by individuals or networks” (218). According to her, social relationships are not limited to a ‘capacity’ gained from them as if social capital represents only a ‘quantifiable feature’: Individual choices depend not only on the availability of the material and intangible assets in the society at large but also on the way in which interpersonal contacts shape information and relate to structures of opportunity (Fernández-Kelly 1995, 219).
In this analysis, in its general terms social relations between Somali migrants and mainstream society is magnified. As the structures between these two ends would be various depending on the numerous social relationships and because these social relationships would eventually possess different essence, value and meanings, the main focus has been directed to a particular social location; proximity to natives. The question of social location has become inevitable in the discussion for two main reasons; first not all social relationships are useful to achieve certain ends, and second, resources obtainable through social relationships depend on different memberships in various structures (Ryan 2011, 711; Fernández-Kelly 1995, 217). Aldrich (2005, 460) marks the notion of social location as highly important regarding access to opportunities and essential resources in the case of nascent entrepreneurs. This remark is irrefutably relevant to migrant entrepreneurs as well. For instance, Kananen in the chapter ‘Mainstream or Margins’ shows that migrants’ obstacles and possibilities are not always limited to their social and human capital, but are also determined by the factors defining their social locations in their respective societies. Social locations, as the sum of individual attachments, determine individuals’ place in a given social structure. These attachments obtain their meanings from various connectedness relevant to social class, race, education, and status in terms of being migrant or native for instance. They are similarly descriptive in presenting how individuals’ activities, be it political, societal or economic, are embedded in their respective societies. Therefore, social locations play a significant role in access to tangible and intangible resources (see Jack and Anderson 2002; Aldrich 2005; Fernández-Kelly and Konczal 2005; Aldrich and Kim 2007). Eventually, they can either be the generator of abundant socio-cultural resources or translate into a significant lack of them. Fernández-Kelly (1995, 219) exemplifies this latter option through a high school graduate who has grown up in an extremely poor neighbourhood. She notes that this person would likely lack the essential knowledge to complete an effective job application (1995, 219). According to her, this cannot be read entirely as a consequence of inefficiency of public education (ibid.), because it also
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points out that this impoverished high school graduate “lacks the knowledge derived from sustained contact with groups familiar with the informal rules of the labour market” (ibid.). In other words, people benefit from resources available to them through the deployed social capital to achieve certain ends and this occurs within their given circumstances (Fernández-Kelly 1995, 235). Further analysis provided below aims to demonstrate that proximity to natives translates into a significant resource for migrants; a resource that defines not necessarily the ‘availability’ of opportunities existing in a structure, but rather the ‘perceptibility’ of them.
10.4 C oncerns with Content: Methods and Data, Findings and Discussion 10.4.1 Data and Methodology The data for this analysis7 consist of 14 qualitative interviews conducted with Somali entrepreneurs, collected between 2014–2017. Consequently, 6 are from Finland and 8 are from the United States, 12 are men and 2 are women. Also, 12 of these interviews were recorded and transcribed with the interviewees’ consent, while 2 interviewees, one from each country, have required the interviewer to ‘make notes’ during the interview rather than recording the whole conversation.8 Since the language of the interviews is English for both countries, there has been no need for translation. The common language used for interviews has also provided an additional tool for deeper understanding of expressions employed by the interviewees. The methodological orientation of this analysis is phenomenological and hermeneutic. This orientation provides the possibility to gain understanding with respect to how these Somali entrepreneurs are embedded in the general structures of their respective societies. Meaningful analysis emerged from the interviews, which are designed as semi-structured theme interviews. This occurred by looking at how the interviewees make sense of their societal participation in general (inclusion and exclusion) and their economic activity in particular (obstacles of and opportunities for entrepreneurial activity), and how they locate and define themselves as (Somali) entrepreneurs in the relevant resettlement societies. Although the main focus has been directed to migrant entrepreneurship and the contextual obstacles and opportunities, the interview discussions had no strict limitations in order to allow space for the emergence of new themes. Accordingly, Somali entrepreneurs talked about their resettlement in the countries of question while also vocalizing their experi7 The data is collected in the research project Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship: Transnational networks, social participation and social identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. (Academy of Finland, 2012–2016) 8 Since all the respondents are part of a Muslim community, it is necessary to note that for some Muslims recording human voice or look is not/might not be welcome.
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ences in terms of their refugee status, citizenship, education, previous employment, relation to natives, entrepreneurial background, businesses, as well as themselves and other Somalis as ‘entrepreneurs’. Methodologically there is no comparison of these two different settings, as Finnish and American entrepreneurial contexts and migration histories are significantly different from each other. Nevertheless, the main goal has been to discover and describe how the same phenomena can be perceived and experienced by migrants in different contextual settings. The overall experiences of Somali entrepreneurs provide insights on how migrants’ economic decisions and activities relate to a wider reality than the realm of economic consequences. They also provide the possibility to emphasize how particular social locations can enable migrants’ engagement in entrepreneurial activity.
10.4.2 Profiling Somali Entrepreneurs In order to establish a framework for the terminology in use, it is important to note that entrepreneur is defined as “a person in effective control of a commercial undertaking for more than one client over a significant period of time” (Rath and Swagerman 2011) and the ‘category of self-employed without personnel’ is left out in this study. Following the data of this analysis and the earlier literature concerning Somali entrepreneurs, it is necessary to note that there is no particular ethnic niche business to consider that is similar to Turkish kebab in Europe or Chinese food throughout world which is utilized by these entrepreneurs. Somalis living in Finland and the United States engage in entrepreneurial activity in different fields of businesses such as logistics, catering, interpretation and translation services, grocery, food wholesale, money transfer services, restaurant, private day-care and so on. In order to find out in what ways these entrepreneurs are similar to each other, drawing a base profile has been necessary. This profile, presented shortly below, provides a general background information on these entrepreneurs. From the interviews collected, it was possible to find five different features defining these Somali entrepreneurs: family or earlier engagement in business, good level of educational attainment, work experience, perceiving self-employment as ‘freedom’ and recognizing failure as ‘a lesson’. Even though these features differ from each other in terms of their importance on the individual levels, they also appear in both Finland and the United States. Portes and Rumbaut (2014, 138) emphasize that previous experiences, skills already acquired and earlier business engagement may easily remain inactive until migrants get familiar with the language, labour market and host economy of the country they resettle in. It is accordingly necessary to add that all interviewees have sought and received refuge from their societies of resettlement and spent at least 10 years in these respective resettlement societies with residence permits and/or through the acquisition of citizenships. Following these primary outlines of Somali entrepreneurs, it is possible to suggest that, regarding who they are in relation to their entrepreneurial engagement, these Somali entrepreneurs present a social location that every entre-
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preneur would fit in. High educational attainment, experiences in labour market, earlier familiarity with business and the ways in which freedom and failure are understood generate a foundational image of an entrepreneur who is welcome in both and in all contextual settings.
10.4.3 Somali Entrepreneurs Contextualizing The main focus of this analysis is concerned with how proximity to natives (as a social location) can define migrants’ understanding of their own entrepreneurial possibilities. This particular social location opens in the data in relation to context, and through this proximity interviewees generate meanings to interpret the respective resettlement societies. Through these meanings interviewees do not only interpret their contexts, but create a frame in which they define their own entrepreneurial opportunities and possibilities. Inevitably, the question of ‘where is my place?” strongly appears in the data not only as a dimension of social location, but also as a dimension of context. It is repeatedly contextualized by the interviewees as ‘home’. This perception appears to have significant importance when interviewees talk about themselves, their relations to natives and their entrepreneurial opportunities in their respective societies. “I feel absolutely at home. I feel like I belong here. Actually, I feel more than home” says one of the proud and joyful interviewees from the United States. This strong expression, which denotes a meaning to the bond built with the resettlement country, is particularly seen in the case of the United-States. Interviewees repeatedly define themselves as ‘American’ and define America as ‘home’ in this context. On the other hand, Finnish-Somalis state that they are proud to be Finnish citizens. However, being ‘Finnish’, during these presentations of self, does not attain the same emphasis when compared with the ‘American’ interviewees within the context of the United States. Although this does not alter the fact that Finland is ‘home’ to Finnish-Somalis, the different tone attributed to the respective bonds should not be overlooked. Recognizing the homogenous social structure of Finland on one hand, and the United States’ long history of migration on the other, is one way to approach this difference. However, after analysing the interviews it is also possible to state that interviewees’ proximity to natives does play a significant role in determining the extent of the bond built with the resettlement country. This acknowledgment also provides a perspective to understand why in one case interviewees cannot think themselves separate from the context, and in the other they are continuously w orking to promote themselves as ‘a part’. The following statements manage to clarify this point: …I’m very lucky to be here, very lucky. I’m grateful. The community, it hosted very well and that’s the things about the Americans, the community. They want to get to know me. (interviewee 1 from the United States) …when I am walking on the street I’m just [a] foreigner. No matter how long I have been here….I think, it is very long time so Finnish people understand that we are living here, same vote, same situation. (interviewee 1 from Finland)
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10.4.4 Proximity as a Frame The blessing of proximity to natives reveals in various forms in the data. The data from Finland shows that having social relationships with native-Finns benefits Somalis while they acquire knowledge on the values and norms of the Finnish society. As these values and norms are highlighted in relation to different experiences of these interviewees, they denote not only to what is accepted or expected from people, but also what is available to people in the respective society. In this general form, this acquired knowledge represents the understanding of the native ways, native rules, and native limits and so on, which will be referred as ‘native mind-set’ from this point on. Accordingly, having social relationships with natives provides not only a wider network for Somalis, but also a better understanding of the ‘native mind-set’ in the Finnish case. Due to this fact, learning and adapting to the culture that one moves into is presented not only as a ‘need’, but also as a ‘must’ when migrant entrepreneurship is discussed in the data from Finland. This interpretation opens itself especially when the interviewees highlight the importance of understanding culturally accepted behaviours that exist in a society. Several examples are utilized to demonstrate this emphasis in relation to business; creating good business relationships in Ethiopia might require a cheerful character for instance, whereas in Finland being calm, kind, and getting along with people are expected from entrepreneurs. Migrants’ own readiness to learn and adapt to the respective resettlement society is marked as the initial requirement of entrepreneurial activity eventually: If you are not ready to integration with the Finnish people, it’s hard to get, it’s hard [to] become [a] businessman. You have to forget that. Business is suhde. Suhde, relation. (interviewee 4 from Finland)
This insight calls “more support for integration” in order to increase Somalis' engagement in entrepreneurial activities in Finland. Integration, however, is a vague notion to include in here if it is not clearly described through the perspective of these Somali entrepreneurs. Integration appears to be the sine qua non for ‘knowing each other’ to these interviewees. The need of various connectedness between native populations and Somalis is underlined in relation to ‘knowing each other’. This is marked ‘achievable’ by working in the same workplaces; offices, companies, institutions, etc. Sharing the same physical space is one dimension to highlight here, but the emphasis is not limited to sharing physical spaces. Communicating, learning about and from each other is also understood as a path to ‘knowing each other’. Accordingly, proximity to natives can be characterized with reference to having direct contact to natives in the Finnish context. It is important to note that ‘being in contact’ denotes continuous acts of communication as it requires sustained action and interaction over a period of time. This regularity connects people and generates a better understanding of ‘native mind-set’, which simultaneously contributes to the meanings attributed to the resettlement society. With a better understanding of ‘native mind-set’, these entrepreneurs feel “more like Finns” and perceive themselves more “at home” according to the data.
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However, in the case of the United States, placing emphasis on the direct contact with natives in learning existing structures is not as strong as it appears in Finland. In contrast, learning from one’s own community is highlighted in the data from the United States. This does not mean that Somalis’ relations to natives lack importance in this context. American-Somali entrepreneurs often talk about their native friends, acquaintances, ex-colleagues, teachers, and classmates. This shows that their social relationships extend beyond their own community. Even though learning from natives is rarely mentioned in these interviews, the general perceptions of these American-Somali entrepreneurs show that that they feel welcome in the United States. In their presentations of Somalis as migrant entrepreneurs and themselves as Somalis, social proximity to natives reveals a great deal. They perceive themselves as “well-accustomed” to the ways of America in terms of being aware that they need to excel in different ways, while also learning new things that will allow them to better fit into society. The recognition of being accepted and understanding of ‘native mind-set’ appear to provide American-Somalis with the perception; I am ‘at home’. As a consequence, they also strongly believe that the competition between native and migrant entrepreneurs occurs on an equal ground. For instance, one interviewee notes: I recently consulted for one guy who wants to open up a Somali-owned coffee shop inside the public library….He has the first Somali coffee shop that opened in the public library… the major building…. They didn’t give him any sort of special. They said, “We’ll look into it and see who fits the best.” It was amongst others, of course. They chose him. (interviewee 7 from the United States)
10.4.5 Proximity as a Resource Considering both cases, proximity to natives, whether it is physical and/or social, creates a significant resource; the ability to understand and utilize the ‘native mind- set’. According to the data of this analysis, through this proximity, Somalis perceive themselves also ‘like others’ or ‘similar to others’. Being a Somali, being a migrant, being a black African, being a Finnish-Somali or an American-Somali is not drifted apart from being an entrepreneur in the case of Somali entrepreneurs, because the everyday challenges of Somalis originate from these different social locations marking them as ‘outsiders’. However, locating the self ‘like others’ neutralizes the ways challenges and obstacles are perceived and taken. None of the interviewees differ or distinguish themselves from natives or other migrant groups when referring to the obstacles of entrepreneurship in their respective societies. In contrast, additional emphasis is put on encountering difficulties and burdens which are similar to natives’. Still, it should be recognized that Somali migrants face significant obstacles concerning several procedures of entrepreneurial activity, including; raising capital, getting credit, and gaining legitimacy due to social locations that marks them as ‘migrants’ (Samatar 2004; Golden et al. 2010; Joronen 2014). However, in this
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study, the feeling of ‘otherness’, which is a tenacious part of Somalis’ everyday experiences, diminishes when Finnish-Somalis articulate the notion that having a business is difficult for anyone in Finland regardless of the background. Also American-Somalis agree that hard work is ‘a must’ if one, regardless of the background, wants to make a living in the United States. The additional emphasis placed on the ‘shared obstacles’ carries a clear announcement: I am like them (i.e. the natives)! In addition, recognition of ‘shared obstacles’ generates a deeper connectedness in terms of perceiving the self as a part of a construction or a building process. When a migrant recognizes that path to entrepreneurship is obstructed not only to specific groups, but to all wishing to start a business, they become more willing to encounter existing challenges and obstacles. Following Coleman (1990), it is possible to suggest that this kind of knowledge reveals to migrants as a component of the existing structure ensuring that no one is disadvantaged on the path to entrepreneurship. This can even be marked as ‘an available social capital’ to migrants, who are potential entrepreneurs. In this analysis, what is identified by social capital is similar to what Fernández-Kelly (1995) presents; a process. Following Coleman (1990), it is a process which takes its value and essence from its function(s). Accordingly, the social capital that is available to Somali migrants is defined as a process in which its functions are recognized and utilized when engaging entrepreneurial activity. In order to recognize and utilize the available resources and/or obligations (i.e. functions of available social capital), a migrant first needs to understand the particular aspects of the structure. The internalization of norms creating behaviours that are “appropriable by others as a resource” has already been criticized in previous research (Portes 2010, 32). However, whether they are ‘appropriable as resources’, or not, being able to recognize the function and its value that exists in a given structure is important to highlight. Through proximity to natives, migrants locate themselves ‘like others’, which simultaneously involves and evolves to the idea of having responsibilities and opportunities similar to ‘theirs’. When one perceives her/himself as a part of a larger construction, a sense of responsibility develops whereby one seeks one's own goals for contribution to the whole, or greater good. Perceiving the self as ‘a part of a whole’ does not only ease the certain pressures and challenges Somali entrepreneurs face, but it also often provides them with an increasing willingness to add value—be it economic, political or social—to the existing structure. Different interviewees articulate this idea: …my dream is for Minneapolis to be the best city in the world and honestly, I believe that. Who’s going to gain first? It’s me, you know? So I have to work hard to be able to become the best city in the world because that’s my city. (interviewee 1 from the U.S.) …I’m very proud to be Finnish, Finn[ish] citizen….I don’t like to come here to benefit from the Finnish society but we like to bring our good…to this…society. (interviewee 1 from Finland)
Concerning the case of Finland, interviewees’ additional efforts in explaining themselves can be noticed. There is a clear attempt to present their desire to bring
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good things into Finnish society, as well as a strong need to justify this in the interviews. To some extent, these justifications appear to be directed to someone who would argue the opposite. Accordingly, it is no surprise that strong emphasis is attached to being in direct contact with natives in the Finnish context, whereas interviewees from the United States convey a strong awareness of their positive social location as migrants regardless of what others might think or argue. Since these American-Somali entrepreneurs perceive the country as an ‘ethnic mix’ from the beginning, they also find it easier to ‘fit in’ as Somalis or migrants. Two interviewees suggest: I was born in Somalia but I am American today and I wholeheartedly accept it because this is my identity….So I shouldn’t feel like a second class citizen….There will always be a conflict unless things are addressed and brought to the table and discussed thoroughly. (interviewee 7 from the U.S.) No one can do everything he wants. There is a law and order. So discrimination doesn’t matter if you are working. So I don’t feel that [discriminated]….I come here, they give me everything. (interviewee 4 from the U.S.)
It is noteworthy to underline that these perceptions are not a reflection of individual feelings. They represent the acquired knowledge gained through proximity to natives. People acquire knowledge and information from their context which consists of “physical spaces” and “interpersonal network occupying proximate spheres of intimacy” (Fernández-Kelly 1995, 215). As Fernández-Kelly (1995, 218) clarifies: the way an individual is connected to a group, the position that individual holds in the existing hierarchies of relation in terms of social distance to power, and where the interactions physically take place define the “toponomical features of social capital”. Since these features relate to the whole surrounding of an individual, they consist of various elements that are physical, social, cultural and psychological. In this analysis, recognition of these ‘toponomical features’ presents an opportunity to further unpack the main point of consideration concerning this study. However, explanations based on cultural and historical differences between the resettlement countries remain outside of the purview of this particular critique. On the other hand, channelling the attention to the questions of inclusion and exclusion becomes relevant when interpreting the differentiating experiences of these entrepreneurs.
10.4.6 Proximity as a Platform of Inclusion and Exclusion It is necessary to understand that how individuals locate themselves in a given context (i.e. as an outsider, a migrant, stranger, part of a whole, or as a member of a group) is not only determined by their social locations, but also in accordance with their resources, expectations, prospects, and any determination to progress variously. Fernández-Kelly (1995, 217) sheds light on how norms of inclusion and exclusion (original emphasis) relate to social capital, while also noting that available resources through the deployed social capital differ even within the groups
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depending on the ‘ascriptive criteria’ of the individuals. The data of this analysis designates that proximity to natives generates a resource through which the respective resettlement society is contextualized as ‘home’ and the self is perceived as ‘similar to natives’. The more migrants perceive themselves as being close to natives—while also being aware of this proximity and its functions—the more they emphasize their own capabilities, ‘can do’s, responsibilities to the structure, and the more they recognize the opportunities and resources existent in that structure: I’m reserved, I’m shy, all that, foreigner. I was holding tight, but the environment said: No, you don’t have to. Open up. Dream. Do whatever you want…. if there hadn’t been America, I could have been today somewhere else doing nothing. My nature…it’s changed. (interviewee 1 from the United States)
For some, these lines can be read through the notion of ‘American dream’. It is still significantly important to highlight how the interviewee has learned the native mind-set and acknowledged the existing structure’s power in changing her/him. In addition, without building a positive connection between one’s own social location and the context, welcoming the change and turning this change into a resource would not be possible. Even in the case of living the ‘American dream’, norms of inclusion and exclusion influence the ways migrants perceive opportunities and possibilities existing in a structure. As Portes and Rumbaut (2014, 148) emphasize in Immigrant America: the most hardworking individuals may end up in poor jobs simply because they perceive no alternatives or are offered none; others may rise to the top by riding in the wake of a lucky set of external circumstances.
It is also noteworthy to underline the idea that the norms of inclusion and exclusion do not only influence the way migrants’ perceive their possibilities that exist in a particular structure, but equally frame the socio-economic platforms migrants can engage with and operate in. Wahlbeck’s (2007, 553–554) examination, concerning entrepreneurs coming from Turkey, clearly describes how Finnish employment offices guide the path of these entrepreneurs to an ethnic economy, for instance. He explains that Finnish employment offices support the ethnic pattern by sending Turkish unemployed migrants for training to the companies owned by Turkish migrants. This is one explanatory example that shows how the borders of the platform of socio-economic participation of migrants can be drawn and pre-defined by the authorities. Also, Wahlbeck states that these entrepreneurs are mainly occupied in the fast-food sector as it is one of the few sectors in which migrants might have the possibility to compete with the native entrepreneurs in Finland (ibid, 550). This additional remark demonstrates that the same platform can be narrowed down by the mainstream society. In general, most of the opportunities are available to potential entrepreneurs regardless of their backgrounds (Heinonen et al. 2007; Hermes and Leicht 2010). Still, migrants often choose different lines of businesses in comparison to natives due to receiving different types of support, and facing different obstacles and restrictions in their resettlement societies (Hermes and Leicht 2010, 5). Norms of inclusion and exclusion relate to both societal and bureaucratic levels concerning the
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experiences of migrant entrepreneurs. As one of the interviewees from Finland clearly puts it by referring to natives: Some people, they are excited [that] the immigrant people make business, but they also make the decision. This is your area, this is my area. (interviewee 4 from Finland)
10.5 Concluding Remarks Entrepreneurial behaviour is usually conceptualized “within the context of distinct institutional orders – the family, the religions, the market, the professions, the state and the corporation” (Thornton et al. 2011, 109). Also, activities of migrant entrepreneurs are not free from these same “institutional orders”. Debates concerning migrants’ entrepreneurial activities tend to emphasize the importance of not only the entrepreneur, but also the context (institutions and organizations) and the community (social networks and social capital) in the contemporary literature. In this analysis, Somali migrant entrepreneurs’ understanding of entrepreneurial opportunities that exist in their resettlement societies have been explored in relation to these entrepreneurs’ proximity to natives. The focus has been directed to the process in which opportunities are perceived rather than defining the opportunities as perceived. Understanding of ‘native mind-set’ appears as one of the most significant resources Somalis utilize when engaging entrepreneurial activity in their respective societies. The process of gaining this ‘resource’ is marked through social and physical proximities to natives. Experiences and insights of Somali migrant entrepreneurs, living in Finland, as well as Minnesota and Maine in the United States, have shown that proximity to natives translates into a social capital resulting in migrants perceiving themselves ‘similar to others’. This equally denotes diminished ‘otherness’ for these entrepreneurs, thus they feel more at ‘home’ regardless the social locations marking them as migrants, Somalis, or outsiders in their countries of resettlement. This acknowledgment simultaneously builds the ‘frame’ in which these migrants interpret their environments including both challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, the norms of inclusion and exclusion cannot be overlooked in the examinations of migrant entrepreneurship. Since the form of economic activity, its field and its resources, can be prescribed in the case of migrants by both authorities and the mainstream, questions concerning inclusion and exclusion should be directed to the platform generated by proximity to natives at both societal and bureaucratic levels. As social relationships do not only determine resources, but also generate behavioural outcomes due to their availability or shortage (Fernández-Kelly 1995), it is plausible to conclude that proximity to natives (physical and/or social) eases the ways entrepreneurial obstacles are perceived in the case of migrants. As presented through this analysis, this proximity obtains meanings as a resource, a frame and a platform on the path to entrepreneurship. As an overall process, this provides a pos-
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sibility to mark ‘opportunity recognition’ as a resource obtainable through proximity to natives for potential migrant entrepreneurs. Eventually, the shortage of this proximity can be marked as a possible setback in entrepreneurial activity for migrants as it could result in “a diminished capacity to gain access to resources” (Fernández-Kelly 1995, 215), which are controlled by natives, as well as in a diminished capacity to recognize available resources. Proximity to natives plays an important role in revealing and generating resources that influence the ‘perceptibility’ of resources and opportunities existing in a particular environment. Accordingly, countries which are home to measurable migrant groups need to direct attention regarding how to generate regular contact between natives and migrants. In both countries, Finland and the United States, policy- makers, local, national, and international organizations and various government entities have already directed close attention to the social context in which entrepreneurial activity can emerge. As a result, numerous entrepreneurship unions, as well as mentoring and consulting agents focusing on migrant entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial education, have been established. It would be beneficial for both migrants and resettlement societies if these agents and unions provide services constructed within the frames of more recognizable realities. Practices and activities demonstrating how to make business plans, accounting etc. should also be supported by practices and activities that teach the mind-set of the resettlement societies to migrants. These supporting practices and activities can, for instance, aim to teach how to direct natives’ attention to a foreign product, and what type of cultural patterns and behaviours are common in the mainstream market. Through these channels natives could also share opportunities with migrants, and what obstacles entrepreneurs encounter regardless of background in a particular city, region, and country. This would, at least, support and widen the employment prospects for migrants who actively seek possibilities within the field of entrepreneurship, but recognize few or none within their resettlement societies.
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Deakins, D., Ishaq, M., Smallbone, D., Whittam, G., & Wyper, J. (2007). Ethnic minority businesses in Scotland and the role of social capital. International Small Business Journal, 25(3), 307–326. Fernández-Kelly, M. P. (1995). Social and cultural Capital in the Urban Ghetto: Implications for the economic sociology of migration. In A. Portes (Ed.), The economic sociology of immigration. Essays of networks, ethnicity, and entrepreneurship (pp. 213–247). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Fernández-Kelly, P., & Konczal, L. (2005). “Murdering the alphabet” identity and entrepreneurship among second-generation Cubans, west Indians, and central Americans. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(6), 1153–1181. Golden, S., Boyle, E. H., & Jama, Y. (2010). Achieving success in business: A comparison of Somali and American-born entrepreneurs in Minneapolis. Cura Reporter, 40(1–2), 41–51. Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited. Sociological Theory, 1, 201–233. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481–510. Harinen, P., Haverinen, V.-S., Kananen, M., & Ronkainen, J. (2014). Contexts of diaspora citizenship. Citizenship and civic integration of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 13(8), 80–101. Heinonen, J., Hytti, U., & Entre, T. S. E. (2007, August). An analysis of differences and similarities between native and non-native Finnish entrepreneurs and the need for support in these groups. In 19th Nordic Academy of Management Conference, Bergen. Hermes, K., & Leicht, R. (2010). Scope and characteristics of immigrant entrepreneurship in Europe: A cross-national comparison of European countries (Working Paper, pp. 1–22). Huisman, K. A. (2011). Why Maine? Secondary migration decisions of Somali refugees. In K. A. Huisman & M. Hough (Eds), Somalis in Maine: Crossing cultural currents (pp. 23–47). Berkeley: North Atlantic Books. Jack, S. L. (2005). The role, use and activation of strong and weak network ties: A qualitative analysis. Journal of Management Studies, 42(6), 1233–1259. Jack, S. L., & Anderson, A. R. (2002). The effects of embeddedness on the entrepreneurial process. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(5), 467–487. Joronen, T. (2014). Somalialaisten maahanmuuttajien työllistymisessä ja yrittäjyysaktiivisuudessa maiden välisiä eroja. Kvartti, 2. http://www.kvartti.fi/fi/artikkelit/somalialaisten-maahanmuuttajien-tyollistymisessa-ja-yrittajyysaktiivisuudessa-maiden. Accessed at 12 Mar 2018. Joronen, T. (2015). Somalis in Finland have entrepreneurship potential. Kvartti, 3. http://www. kvartti.fi/en/articles/somalis-finland-have-entrepreneurship-potential. Accessed at 12 Mar 2018. Joronen, T., & Mohamed, A. H. (2015). Kauppakansa pakosalla: Somaliyrittäjät meillä ja muualla. Helsingin kaupungin tiedokeskus. https://www.hel.fi/hel2/tietokeskus/julkaisut/pdf/15_03_19_ tutkimuksia_1_joronen.pdf. Accessed at 13 Mar 2018. Kloosterman, R. C. (2010). Matching opportunities with resources: A framework for analysing (migrant) entrepreneurship from a mixed embeddedness perspective. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 22(1), 25–45. Kupferberg, F. (2003). The established and the newcomers: What makes immigrant and women entrepreneurs so special? International Review of Sociology, 13(1), 89–104. Lassalle, P. (2008). Ethnic minority entrepreneurs: Communities, social capital, actors’ strategies. Workshop at Loughborough University: EU Nationals in the UK Labour force: Economic Migrants or Free-Moving citizens of the EU? Light, I., & Rosenstein, C. (1995). Expanding the interaction theory of entrepreneurship. In A. Portes (Eds.) The economic sociology of immigration: Essays on networks, ethnicity and entrepreneurship (pp. 166–213). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lin, N. (1999). Social networks and status attainment. Annual Review of Sociology, 25(1), 467–487.
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McKeever, E., Anderson, A., & Jack, S. (2014). Social embeddedness in entrepreneurship research: The importance of context and community. In E. Chell & M. Karatas-Özkan (Eds), Handbook of research on small business and entrepreneurship (222–236). Thousand Oaks: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Minnesota Chamber of Commerce. (2013). The economic contributions of immigrants in Minnesota. Minneapolis: Minnesota Chamber of Commerce. Minnesota State Demographic Centre. (2000). Immigrants in Minnesota: An increasingly diverse population (Population notes). St. Paul: Minnesota State Demographic Center. Morrison, A. (2000). Entrepreneurship: What triggers it? International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 6(2), 59–71. Nadeau, P. (2003, August). The Somalis of Lewiston: Community impacts of rapid immigrant movement into a small homogeneous Maine city. In Conference paper, Brown University Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity. Ojasalo, J. (2003, March). Obstacles to being an entrepreneur in Finland. Results of an empirical study. In Proceedings of the Annual Conference of ASBE Association for Small Business & Entrepreneurship, ASBE, Houston, TX. Pécoud, A. (2004). Entrepreneurship and identity: Cosmopolitanism and cultural competencies among German-Turkish businesspeople in berlin. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1), 3–20. Pirkkalainen, P. (2013). Transnational responsibilities and multi-sited strategies. Voluntary Associations of Somali Diaspora in Finland. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 489. Thesis PhD Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. Polanyi, K. (2001). The great transformation. Boston: Beacon Press (original work published 1944). Portes, A. (1995). Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: A conceptual overview. In A. Portes (Ed.), The economic sociology of immigration: Essays on networks, ethnicity and entrepreneurship (pp. 1–42). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Portes, A. (2010). Economic sociology: A systematic inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2014). Immigrant America: A portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press. Portes, A., & Sensenbrenner, J. (1993). Embeddedness and immigration: Notes on the social determinants of economic action. American Journal of Sociology, 98(6), 1320–1350. Ram, M. (1997). Ethnic minority enterprise: An overview and research agenda. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 3(4), 149–156. Rath, J., & Swagerman, A. (2011). Promoting ethnic entrepreneurship in European cities. Luxemburg: Publications Office of the European Union. Ryan, L. (2011). Migrants’ social networks and weak ties: Accessing resources and constructing relationships post-migration. The Sociological Review, 59(4), 707–724. Sabour, M. (2011). Entrepreneurship and cultural diversity in a ‘homogenous’ society: The case of Finland. In M. Koch, L. Mcmillan, & B. Peper (Eds.), Diversity, standardization and social transformation: Gender, ethnicity and inequality in Europe (pp. 155–172). London: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Samatar, H. M. (2004). Experiences of Somali entrepreneurs in the Twin Cities. Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, 4, 78–91. Sotkasiira, T., & Haverinen, V.-S. (2016). Battling for citizenship. A case study of Somali settlement in Lieksa, Finland. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 6(2), 115–123. Thornton, H. P. (1999). The sociology of entrepreneurship. Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 19–43. Tiilikainen, M. (2003). Arjen islam. Somalinaisten elämää Suomessa [Everyday Islam: The life of Somali women in Finland]. Tampere: Vastapaino. Tiilikainen, M. (2015). Looking for a safe place, security and transnational Somali Muslim families. Journal of Religion in Europe, 8(1), 51–72.
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Part III
Studying Diaspora Citizenship: Theoretical and Methodological Notions
As researchers of migration and phenomena connected with it we close our examination by pondering the difficulties of studying diasporic circumstances and experiences. The conventional theories and methodologies of social sciences have been constructed to catch ‘stills’: stable positions, stable conditions, stable groups of people with stable experiences and life-styles. It is hard to catch, analyse, and categorize the mobile nature of life, especially the diasporic dimension of it. However, state regulations seem to lean a lot on different ideal-type ‘models’ that aim at systematize the experienced richness of human Lebenswelt (Habermas 1981). Diasporic life does not settle down as ‘stills’ for politicians, officials, authorities, and researchers. It is also impossible to conceptualize it on such an abstract level that ‘a theory for diaspora’ could be created and locked. This part of the book is born from our notions and aspirations as social scientists who are looking for ways to promote societal equality. We have been wondering, is it possible to pick up proved and effective integration practices from one socio-political context and move it to another one, and would it be possible to construct one analytically argued model wherein we could squeeze all the important knowledge about living in diaspora. The following articles disentangle these wonderings, as well as the methodological ponderings about the pitfalls of cross-national comparative analyses. Research of migration touches often a very hot socio-political topic. For a social scientist, quite a ‘natural’ science-political orientation is the one emphasizing equality, humanism, anti-racism, and anti-nationalism. This means that people who are against migration are also often against its research (see Ronkainen 2017). Basically, the question of researchers’ societal responsibilities is hard to answer. In this discursively heated atmosphere, however, we see that the reply is simple and easy: social scientists that have faith in the values of their science, can and have to take their side beside those who are continuously sliding to societal margins and feel uncomfortable there.
Chapter 11
Of Premises for Cross-National Comparisons Ville-Samuli Haverinen
This chapter is a contribution to the discussion about theoretical approaches, practices, and methods of comparative immigration research, and bring the presented comparative setting between the United States and Finland with a special attention to the status and opportunities of Somalis in these two very different societal contexts to a more general level in a theoretical and methodological sense. The endeavour in here is to chart premises for cross-national comparisons in immigration research by reviewing recent literature concerning conceptual and methodological possibilities and limitations of employing national models of integration in comparative research on the incorporation of immigrants. The objective is hence to outline some theoretical and methodological perspectives for an examination in what extent national models can provide an explanation of reality of different political- juridical surroundings in Finland and the United States. The presented viewpoints emphasize the need to move beyond a conceptualization that is restricted solely to national level politics and its institutional arrangements as it could be conceptually and factually specious or incorrect to refer to a single, national, model responsible for the formulation of immigration and integration policies and legislation in a given country.
11.1 Introduction During the past half century, immigration has transformed Europe and the United States, and affected the societal construction of ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, and reshaped political, public, and academic discourses on citizenship and
V.-S. Haverinen (*) Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_11
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common belonging. Even though a lot has been debated about the effect of immigration in Europe and the United States, there has, nevertheless, been relatively small reflection on comparing processes of change in both contexts, with some exceptions (e.g. Joppke 1999). Transatlantic comparisons on immigration issues stay loosely organized, and conceptual and methodological challenges have not been addressed in depth (Foner and Bertossi 2011, 1535–1536). However, in Europe, since the 1980s, a comprehensive literature in comparative sociology and political science has developed around a highly popular notion of national models of integration. Over time, these models have also become omnipresent in public and political discourses on how different West European countries address the presence and integration of immigrants and minority groups. Since the turn of the century, however, an emerging amount of scholars have begun to bring into question these national models considering them, for instance, normatively and theoretically problematic, and suffering from the fallacies endemic that have been termed methodological nationalism (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 247; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 233–236; Schmidtke 2014, 79). Later, these critical debates have metamorphosed into principled arguments, focused on whether it is conceivable at all to identify national models of integration, while simultaneously widely neglecting discussions on whether there might be more constructive ways to utilize these models in comparative research (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 232). The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the discussion about theoretical approaches, practices, and methods of comparative immigration research, and bring the presented comparative setting between the United States and Finland with a special attention to the status and opportunities of Somalis in these two very different societal contexts to a more general level in a theoretical and methodological sense. The endeavour in here is to chart premises for cross-national comparisons in immigration research by reviewing recent literature concerning conceptual and methodological possibilities and limitations of employing national models of integration in comparative research on the incorporation of immigrants. The objective is hence to outline some theoretical and methodological perspectives for an examination in what extent national models can provide an explanation of reality of different political-juridical surroundings. To provide an overview of these two surroundings, perceptions regarding features of immigrant integration in both contexts will be also brought out by identifying some relevant key themes associated to the national models thinking. The presented viewpoints emphasize the need to move beyond a conceptualization that is restricted solely to national level politics and its institutional arrangements as it could be both conceptually and factually specious or incorrect to refer to a single, national, model responsible for the formulation of immigration and integration policies and legislation. Largely owing to the formative role of national identities immigration studies have traditionally relied in a rather relentless way on the nation state as the exclusive frame of reference for comparative research (Wimmer 2008; see Schmidtke 2014, 79–80). It is essential to emphasize that the vantage points and features presented in the chapter are perceptions derived from the existing immigration research literature. That is to say, the objective in here is not to strive to present how things or p henomena
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appear to be (in reality) since the propositions in question are not empirical observations made by the author. Instead, the focus is on how things are represented and discussed in the relevant literature. The primary literature for this chapter was identified by searching electronic journal article databases which were related to the field of sociology and political science, and accessed through the library databases of the University of Eastern Finland. Searches were performed by using keywords such as integration, model, cross-national, comparison, and immigration. The chapter is divided into six main sections as follows. The first two sections, after the introduction, deal with the theoretical and methodological starting points for this study and the origins of national models of integration in the migration research literature. The attempt in the latter section is specifically to bring out the reasoning and logic behind these models through a few associated example countries before the following two sections which are dedicated to general overviews on features of immigrant integration in the United States and Finland by identifying some relevant key themes in both contexts associated to the national models thinking. The chapter will be concluded in the last sixth section with some theoretical and methodological viewpoints on premises of using national models in comparative cross-national research.
11.2 G rounds and Caveats: Modelling the United States and Finland A comparative, cross-national approach is essential for understanding the complex changes that have been caused by migration on both sides of the Atlantic. Finland and the United States have very divergent experiences with immigrants, and the countries’ legislation and policies on immigration and integration stand out considerably. Although there was a great deal of international mobility during the era of the Grand Duchy, as an independent country, Finland has never been a major destination of immigration movements. On the contrary, many Finns have emigrated, especially to North America in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and to Sweden after the Second World War (Leitzinger 2008, 165–170; Saukkonen 2013a, 272). One of the main reasons for this outflow was that Finland remained for a proportionally long time as a rural society, the process of urbanization beginning in there later than in other Nordic countries. Furthermore, in the Cold War era, Finland was a rather closed society and its immigration policies were relatively restrictive compared to the Western Europe. Consequently, Finland stayed for a long time after gaining its independence in 1917 as an ethnically homogenous country of emigration, virtually untouched by either global or intra-European migration movements (Salmio 2000, 4; Kyntäjä 2003, 189; Sagne et al. 2007, 99). Since the late 1980s, however, immigration to Finland has increased substantially, and it has diversed the ethnic and cultural landscape, particularly in the Helsinki Capital Region (Saukkonen 2013a, 272). Nonetheless, the total number of foreign-born population residing in
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the country is still remarkably low. According to Statistics Finland (2014), there were in total 304,279 foreign-born persons at the end of 2013. Although the number has increased over fourfold since 1990 (n = 64,922), it represents only 5.6 percent of Finland’s total population. This constitutes one of the lowest figures in the European Union (Eurostat 2015). Contrary to Finland, the United States has a considerably long history of immigration as it were populated by immigrants over several centuries, while countries in Western Europe have experienced significant inflows, other than intra-European, for a much shorter period, essentially after the Second World War (Joppke and Seidle 2012, 4). It can be said that the United States is known, in the collective imagination of its citizens and by many people around the world, as the quintessential nation of immigrants which has incorporated millions of migrants over its history. Furthermore, the fact that so many in the United States trace their ancestry to immigrants has shaped the country’s national self-understanding and even the arguably most recognizable national symbol – the Statue of Liberty – is directly associated to immigration in the national consciousness (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 1; Jiménez 2011, 2). In the United States, immigrants, once in general from Europe, now arrive in main from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (Migration Policy Institute 2015). It is reasonable to point out that the United States and Finland do not fit straightforwardly into national models of integration, which have developed originally in Western Europe as concepts which grew into models that were closely associated with particular countries. Regarding to such models, how immigrant integration is defined and acted upon varies mainly according to particular national histories, distinctions in national identity, and divergent outlooks of the role of the state. A main feature of such models is that they presume policies to be formulated and devised in a very state-centered way as they mirror national politics and institutional legacies, and public perceptions of national identity (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Loch 2014, 623–624; Bertossi et al. 2015, 59). As such, the French Republican model, the Dutch and British multicultural model, and the German ethnic model have become part of the discipline’s general knowledge. (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 232; Castles and Miller 2014) The reasoning and logic behind these classic instances of models will be brought up in the next section of this chapter before more careful examination on features of immigrant integration in the United States and Finland. Despite the origins of the notion of national models, it is possible to identify some relevant key themes or features in the United States and Finland. The United States, for instance, is occasionally considered as multiculturalist since there are no legislation and policies that directly promote assimilation and tolerates numerous languages,1 as well as many other manifestations of cultural origins, even though the country also occasionally is defined as assimilationist (Castles and Miller 1998, 42; Alba and Nee 2003; Schain 2010, 214–215; Alba and Foner 2015, 269). Finland, at the same time, can be characterized also as an ethnically and culturally diverse Even though their survival times are usually short.
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society, and as a state which, moreover, officially recognizes this diversity and strive to preserve various cultural communities within its territory (Saukkonen 2013a, 270).2 However, under the surface of this multiculturalist commitment, it is conceivable to find traces of a much more cautious approach towards diversity and rights of different minority groups. Even though multiculturalism is not just something that is limited to the legal framework and political rhetoric, Finland is a country where an exclusive form of nationalism has had a dominant role in the nation-building process and where national identity has by tradition underlined more the cultural homogeneity than diversity of the state (Kyntäjä 2003, 187; Saukkonen 2013a, 270, 290; 2013b, 190–191). It has been fairly contended that immigrant integration can present particular challenges toward federal countries, such as the United States (Joppke and Seidle 2012). The United States Constitution provides for a division of powers between the federal and state governments. The government responsible for a certain field both approves laws and administers the associated programs. This model has been termed as divided federalism. The federal government has no particular legislation or policy on migrant integration. Instead, as for integration policies, individual state governments play a significant role in program development and implementation. Consequently, among the fifty states in the country, there is substantial variation in both migrant-specific (e.g. language courses) and general programs that benefit considerable amount of newcomers (e.g. social assistance). Funding for these programs, however, is increasingly dependent of the federal government. Various integration activities are also based on public-private collaboration, and non-profit organizations have a noteworthy role (Freeman and Tendler 2012). The outcome of all this is what Gary Freeman and Stuart Tendler (2012, 215–216) have described as a “dense web” of activities that constitute “what amounts to a slightly chaotic but substantial integration program”. Even though Finland is a unitary state, contrary to the United States, it is possible to find partly similar challenges in organization of immigrant integration at the subnational level as mentioned above. Finland is a parliamentary republic with a central government based in the capital Helsinki, local governments in 317 municipalities, and an autonomous region, the Åland Islands. Finnish municipalities have general and coordination responsibility for the development, planning, and monitoring of immigrant integration at the local level by creating, implementing, and developing 2 According to the Multiculturalism Policy Index (see Kymlicka 2012), which is a research project that monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western democracies at three points in time (1980, 2000, and 2010), Finland received in 2010 a total of six points out of a possible eight and hence ranked as having adopted the fourth broadest multicultural policies after Canada, Australia, and Sweden. It is noteworthy to remark that at the same time Finland’s proportion of foreign born population was significantly lower than in the other three countries. In turn, the United States received only a total of three points, which is also a bottom limit for adoption of modest multicultural policies. The Multiculturalism Policy Index results suggest that whereas Finnish approach to multiculturalism has expanded substantially during the last few decades, there has not occurred as much development in the United States, as its multicultural policy score has remained unaltered year after year.
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an integration program, as well as monitoring the realization of the program and its effects. The function of these local integration programs is to support the integration planning in the municipalities and to coordinate the provision of integration services. The preceding Finnish legislation (493/1999) did not allow the state to give compelling instructions about the content of the integration programs nor about how they should be prepared. As an outcome, there has been significant variation between different municipalities in the preparation and status of the programs. It has been assumed, that the Finnish model of dealing with immigration and integration issues is too scattered, since there is no consistency in policies at different levels and different authorities can have divergent, sometimes even contradictory objectives (Saukkonen 2013a, 277–278; 2013c, 94). The above-presented perceptions regarding the intra-national variation in Finland and the United States bring forward one of the most debated issue concerning the usage of national models of integration in comparative research: policy practices have a tendency to be much more diverse than most policy models would suggest. There have been several references (e.g. Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Caponio and Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013) to differences between how policies are formulated at the national level and how they are executed at the local level (see Bertossi et al. 2015, 4). This perception is supported by the fact how cities and regions have become significant places for developing and implementing immigration and integration policies (Vasta 2007; see Schmidtke 2014, 79). In Finland, for instance, although there was not an officially defined national level immigration and integration policy before 1997, at the municipal level, the capital city of Helsinki took steps to develop policies related to immigrant integration as early as 1991. Apart from the argued intra-national oversimplification and overemphasization of the alleged consistency of policies, another often-raised issue related to the models is the idea of convergence, which emphasizes the increasing similarity among nations on both sides of the Atlantic rather than ways they differ from each other (Alba and Foner 2015, 272–273). In explaining emerging convergence in state policies regarding immigrants, particularly citizenship policies, cultural practices, and social welfare benefits, the emphasis seems to be on common domestic and international pressures, societal structural features, and on mutual borrowing (e.g. Weil 2001; Joppke 2010; Kolb 2014). Researchers within the field of convergence have pointed to the basic principles of liberal democracies in the context of mass immigration; the emergence, especially within Europe in light of the EU’s increasingly significant role, of transnational and post-national norms and laws reducing the importance of the system based on nation states; and the need to manage with alike issues arising from having to deal with the problems of integrating the emerging amount of newcomers and their descendants (Alba and Foner 2015, 272–273). As a result, the development in Europe has engendered the hypothesis that national integration policies have converged to a supranational standard of civic integration (Joppke 2007; see Loch 2014, 625). That is to say, Finland among other member countries of the EU has taken steps toward a shared approach to immigrant integration. One of these steps was the European Council’s unanimous adoption in 2004 of
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“Common Basic Principles for (CBPS) for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union”.3 The comparative, transatlantic study of the social, policy, and institutional processes related to immigrant integration in the United States and Finland has potential to give rise novel insights into these themes in each context and eventually deepen our theoretical understanding of the institutions and dynamics being compared. In spite of the many issues and limitations within national models, which will be elaborated more carefully in the last section of this chapter, it is contended that one of the main reasons why models still remain relevant in research is that they help diminish unstructured complexity of the otherwise highly contested matter of immigrant integration. At the same time, however, one of the most significant perils is that they are not just taken as tools for cross-national comparisons. That is to say, if national models tend to be taken as a substitute for reality, it is essential to be aware of the diverse uses of these models and the negotiations in which they figure. In this regard, models should not be studied as if they exist in a stable and consistent normative, cultural, historical, and institutional context (Bader 2007, 875–879; Bertossi 2011, 11–14; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 235–236).
11.3 O n the Origins of Discourse of National Models of Integration The emergence of national models in the literature about immigration can be traced back to the end of the 1980s and the 1990s. Since then the concept has had a vibrant career in comparative research on the incorporation of immigrants and their descendants. Furthermore, models have become embedded in popular imagination and they have also a part in political debates: making and representing the world at one and the same time. By fulfilling a double role, models help people to make realities, as they inform normative presumptions about what is good and right, and to represent realities as they embody a variety of phenomena (Van Reekum et al. 2012, 417–418). In general, it has been believed (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995) that immigration policies in different countries are modeled by institutional practices and develop in accordance with states’ “traditions of nationhood” (Brubaker 1992). Stephen Castles (1995, 293) has elaborated upon this topic, suggesting: “beyond structural 3 These main principles have been divided (Huddleston et al. 2015; see Joppke and Seidle 2012, 7) into three following categories: First, immigrant rights include equal treatment and non-discrimination, as well as the right to practise diverse cultures and religions. Another principle is that efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society. Second, immigrant obligations include acquiring a basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions and not engaging in cultural or religious practices that conflict with other inviolable European rights or national law. Third, a host society obligation involves enabling immigrants to acquire basic knowledge about the receiving society.
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similarities, there are considerable differences in policies, attitudes and behaviours towards immigrants in different countries.” According to this logic, national integration policy models incorporate political ideas and relevant institutional practices: the conditions that regulate immigrants’ access to rights, delineate their duties, and shape the institutional arrangements that control their social, economic, and political integration (Anghel 2012, 321). The first notable studies that systematized classifications of nationally distinct conceptions of citizenship and integration sometimes performed so without using the notion of models. Rogers Brubaker’s (1992) analysis of French and German nationhood endures as an influential work within this field. Instead of employing one comprehensive term for a national model, Brubaker writes about “politics of citizenship”, “citizenship policies vis-à-vis immigrants”, “idioms of nationhood”, as well as “schemes of (national) self-understanding” that range from a state- centered and assimilationist understanding in France and a Volk-centered and differentialist understanding in Germany. In the course of time, other researchers have used terms as, for instance, “philosophies of integration” (Favell 1998), “national syndromes of incorporation” (Freeman 2004), and “configurations of citizenship” (Koopmans et al. 2005) to describe and explain the complexity of integration processes and their national peculiarities. All these concepts strive to show how societal reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about a nation’s self-understanding, and how such ideas frame social interaction, institutional arrangements, social movements, and policy outcomes (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 238–239; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 233–235; Bertossi et al. 2015, 60). The fact that scholars have developed divergent terms for national models implicates how difficult it is to construct a theoretical comparison in the social sciences without utilizing some kind of typology. As Claudia Finotelli and Ines Michalowski (2012, 235) have encapsulated, this is one of the reasons why criticism toward national models has not led to an end of the use of them, and why models have been revived time and time again in other forms. Contrary to, for instance, Roger Brubaker, Stephen Castles and Marc Miller (1998) have provided compact labels to national citizenship regimes associated with particular countries. Describing these regimes as “ideal-types of citizenship” or just plainly “models”, they discern between the exclusionary model, the republican or the assimilationist model, and the multicultural model. These very labels have retained in use consistently in the literature over the time and can hence be considered as classic instances of national models of integration (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 233). Within this classical perspective, the first integration model is defined in the literature by exclusionary immigration policies and legislation aiming to constrain family reunification, facilitate permanent residency, and to restrict access to naturalization. Moreover, exclusion induces that newcomers are incorporated solely into specific areas of society (i.e. the labor market) while they are simultaneously denied access to others (i.e. citizenship, political participation, and welfare services). In consequence, immigrants become part of civil society as workers, consumers, and parents, but are at the same time excluded from full membership in social, cultural, economic, and political areas, and hence from becoming citizens.
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(Castles 1995; Castles and Miller 1998, 244–245; Sardinha 2009, 43.) For instance, in Germany nationality can be acquired based on jus sanguinis principle, making it quite difficult to obtain. The policy ambition favors the provisional presence of immigrants and attempts at inhibiting settlement. In addition to Germany, the exclusionist (or ethnic or guest worker) model is traditionally associated in the literature with Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria, the former guest worker recruiting countries of Western Europe. The second integration model is what some researchers refer to as the republican or the assimilationist model (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994; Castles and Miller 1998). In some European countries, for instance, immigrant integration is thought of in individual terms, while the cultural and ethnic disparities are offered up to defend the idea of equality, leading eventually to a failure to recognize racial discrimination and to the cultural exclusion of minority groups. Furthermore, this second model has the jus soli principle as a standard which, in turn, suggests that acquiring nationality would be a relatively simple process (Sardinha 2009, 43). The assimilationist country strives to incorporate immigrants, but only on condition that the newcomers are willing and capable to imbibe the cultural and linguistic features of the nation. Granted that all immigrants experience segmentation in the labor marker, the model implies that those immigrants who are capable to individually fulfill the requirements of assimilation are also able to move more freely in the society. Social policies promote adult immigrants’ language learning and mainstreaming their descendants into the school system, in order to adopt the social mores of the society (Money 2010, 11–12). France is usually cited in the literature as an assimilationist country, whose national identity is based on a universalistic public philosophy contrary to an ethnocultural national identity as, for instance, in Germany. In turn, since France is a republican country, its notion of the Republic is understood as all-including as it organizes the segregation between public and private realms through a strict color blind approach to ethnicity and race, and between the state and the church, and emphasizes the particularly French political, open definition of citizenship and migrant incorporation through nationality (Brubaker 1992; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Joppke 2009; see Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 239). The third integration model, multiculturalism, is one where the state either tolerates or promotes group or ethnic communities, and provides measures and services to immigrants to ensure they have access to the means they need to integrate and become full members of the society. Unconditional jus soli for the descendants of immigrants is usually the norm and naturalization process is rather easy. Occasionally, states allow dual citizenship, permitting newcomers to retain citizenship of their country of origin while becoming also full members of the new home country (Money 2010, 12). According to Will Kymlicka (1995), the desired outcome of multiculturalism is a polyethnic state, which contains non-predominant ethnic or cultural communities arisen from individual or familial migration. Multiculturalism permits for coexistence between cultures, religions, and values and it requires a lower adjustment of immigrants to the new home country. The rationale behind this multiculturalist approach is argued to be twofold since it could either be developed from a pragmatic reasoning in countries where assimilationist
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approach is found to be as unfeasible or counter-productive, or it could be validated by a general willingness and commitment to cultural pluralism (Boswell 2003, 75). Multiculturalism is typically associated with the Anglo-American model of the liberal pluralist state, which values the individual freedom of its members, permits scope for a prominent degree of cultural diversity, and embraces only a minimal concept of shared identity between inhabitants (Boswell 2003, 76). Different countries have absorbed various strategies for accommodating polyethnicity within a consistent social structure. This has been argued to be the case especially in Canada, Australia, and Sweden, even though the multicultural model has also some influence in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Sardinha 2009, 42). Castles and Miller (1998) have elaborated upon this topic and described two primary approach variations adopted in different countries. First up, they refer to a specific laissez-faire approach, characteristic to the United States, which is a quintessential country of immigration that has long time defined itself as having been built by successive waves of immigrants. The approach means that cultural differences and the existence of ethnic communities are accepted, occasionally even celebrated, but it is not seen as the task of the state to secure social justice or to promote the maintenance of ethnic cultures (Castles and Miller 1998, 42; Schmidt 2007, 114; Sardinha 2009, 42; Schain 2010, 214–215; Foner 2012, 486).
11.4 Laissez-Faire Multiculturalism and the United States Even though the United States has a much longer experience with the settlement of immigrants than most of the countries, for instance, in Europe, the ownership and traits of its integration policies and legislation are characteristically less explicit and organizationally consistent than those in the other states (Freeman and Tendler 2012, 192). The alleged laissez-faire approach means that newcomers are mainly expected to use their own resources, family, friendship networks, and the aid of local community organizations rather than state or federal authorities to survive and thrive in the United States. The lack of coordinated national integration policy also means that there is no official definition of immigrant integration, at least at the national level (Schain 2010, 220; Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 1–2). As Will Kymlicka (2007, 71) has stated, the United States has, during its history, once had an assimilationist approach to incorporation of newcomers: “Immigrants were encouraged and expected to assimilate to the pre-existing society, with the hope that over time they would become indistinguishable from native-born citizens in their speech, dress, recreation, voting patterns, and way of life generally”. After the 1960s, however, two major changes have taken place in the country. First, the United States adsorbed race-neutral admission criteria for immigrant selection. Second, the country shifted to a “more ‘multicultural’ conception of integration, one which expects that many immigrants will visibly and proudly express their ethnic identity, and which accepts an obligation on the part of public institutions […] to accommodate these ethnic identities” (Kymlicka 2007, 72; see Joppke and
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Seidle 2012). Hence a typical characterization of the United States is that it is a country that regards all newcomers as potential members of the nation and is also prominently fast to expand the identity as ‘American’ to immigrants and their United States-born descendants without expecting their complete adaptation to American mainstream and its norms (Foner 2012, 486). According to Roger Waldinger (2007, 141), adherence to earlier identities and cultures is acceptable in the country as long as they are solely additions to an essentially American core. This means that New Americans are allowed to keep what they want of the old home country but at the same time they must be willing and capable to “master the native code” (Ibid.). In this sense, ethnicity is not hence an obstacle to integration, but reconcilable with obtaining a new American identity (Joppke 1999, 148; Foner 2012, 486–487). The United States has a federal system of government, with legislative and administrative powers divided between one national government, fifty states, and close to 20,000 municipalities. The generally received constitutional interpretation of United States’ divided federalism is that border control, the prerequisites governing residency, and the immigrants’ naturalization process are the exclusive privileges of the federal government. Integrating newcomers into society, by contrast, is primarily a state and local issue assuming that it is not to be left to the private and non-profit sectors. The outlines of integration policy are drawn by the federal government, but the decision about whether to put them into operation is out of its direct control. Even though integration is primarily left to the responsibility of state and local governments, they are, however, constrained by constitutional and statutory guidelines and regulations governing civil rights and race relations (Freeman and Tendler 2012, 192, 215). Freeman and Tendler (2012, 215) have contended that at the national level the interest for an activist, centralist, and consistent integration policy has been quite modest in the United States. However, while the implementation of integration programs has been decentralized, the federal government has been taking increasingly part by financial support and also on more substantive matters. As an overall picture, immigrant integration in the United States appears as a public-private collaboration, wherein the public sector usually has an agenda-setting, coordinating, and implementing role, while enterprises and non-profits provide financial, technical, and administrative support, and non-profits operate as the main actors delivering services. As a result, states and localities have been drawn into a dense web of federal, state, local, and voluntary activities that formulate a bit disordered but still considerable integration program (Freeman and Tendler 2012, 192, 215–216). The United States federal government’s interest in immigrant integration is focused primarily on training, education, coordination, and public outreach. The broad approach has been to provide financial support to local governments and to coordinate a conjunctive framework of integration concentrated on language acquisition, civic acculturation, and naturalization. Although local communities have been traditionally left to their own devices, the federal government has during the last decade involved itself in immigrant integration by some measures. One of the most notable change occurred when the Office of Citizenship, established in 2003 within
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the United States Department of Homeland Security, became the federal governments’ first unit dedicated to integration issues. The office works to “provide federal leadership, tools, and resources to proactively foster immigrant integration […] [and] engage and support partners to welcome immigrants, promote English language learning and education on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and encourage U.S. citizenship”. In these efforts, the office has had a relatively minor role, with its most visible initiatives being a web portal for providing information for arriving immigrants, the New Americans Project for encouraging community volunteerism, and the Civics and Citizenship Toolkit containing a variety of educational materials. The toolkit was distributed to libraries and organizations serving migrants across the country (Jiménez 2011, 18; Freeman and Tendler 2012, 199). The Task Force on New Americans report (United States Department of Homeland Security 2008) from the year 2008 represents one of the most authoritative statements of the federal government’s thinking on immigrant integration. The Task Force was established in 2006 by Executive Order by the President of the United States to develop a coordinated national framework to assimilate legal newcomers into the United States. The Task Force was set to follow two main principles: “Diversity with Unity” and “Citizenship Is an Identity”. Since American civic identity is defined in the report as political and it does not rest on ethnic or cultural attributes, civic identity is able to exist together with cultural and religious diversity. This identity is defined by three elements: embracing the principles of American democracy, identifying with American history, as well as communicating in English. As for “Citizenship Is an Identity”, the principle requires that integration cannot be defined solely by the naturalization process. Therefore, successful citizenship promotion encompasses not only naturalization but also civic integration. By denoting that the cultural sphere, implying traditions and religion, is up to the individual and consequently beyond the scope of government, the Task Force constrained itself to political assimilation (United States Department of Homeland Security 2008, ix, 2, 44; Freeman and Tendler 2012, 199–200). The Task Force report suggested utilizing state and local governments, businesses and the private sector, public libraries, adult educators, and different civic, philanthropic, and faith-based organizations in the immigrant integration effort. In regards to the federal government’s particular role, the report called for the fostering and promotion of a common civic identity, acquisition, development, and dissemination of educational and technical resources and training, coordination of best practices across different sectors, and provision of overall leadership for a national Americanization movement. In conclusion, the Task Force remarked that even though the federal government has the jurisdiction over immigration affairs, immigrants do not settle in the federal sphere, but rather in cities and local communities, and therefore community groups are the primary agents of integration process (United States Department of Homeland Security 2008; Freeman and Tendler 2012, 199–201). As implicated above, despite the lack of a coordinated and consistent national level integration policy, there are, beneath the predominant laissez-faire outlook, examples of federal, state, and municipal policies aimed at immigrant integration. Migrants can also benefit from programs seeking the integration of all United States
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inhabitants, and naturalized immigrants are eligible to access the same programs as citizens. Subnational governments, such as states and municipalities, are also increasingly the site of integration debates. The United States, with its history of slavery and second-class citizenship for its African-American population, has also a selection of policies and programs directed to ethnic and racial minorities. Such policies include, for instance, preferential hiring and contracting policies and anti- discrimination protections both in housing and at the workplace (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 12–13; 2012). These policies, which were originally created to deal with race relations, rather than integration, have been essential in shaping integration of immigrant communities since the 1960s by affording a robust national anti- discrimination structure (Schain 2010, 220). The mission statement of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (2015) is to “secure America’s promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration system”. Although there is no coordinated or consistent federal integration policy, which also means that there is no official, national level definition of integration in the United States, it is claimed to be possible to find an implicit definition of integration from the formal documents employed by government authorities to grant legal residence or United States citizenship. The documents assess whether applicants contribute economically by working or school-going, paying taxes, and not using welfare benefits; they evaluate migrants’ “good moral character” by verifying they have not committed any crimes and that males between the ages of 18 and 25 have signed up for the selective military service. The implicit message of these official documents is that integration means obeying the law and making an economic contribution to society. For those who want to be naturalized, it is also required to have a basic knowledge about the English language, United States government, and American history. To the extent that the national glue keeping the country together is made of attachment to the United States Constitution, appropriate political values, and free-market capitalism, immigration authorities reiterate these values in their forms, and in the naturalization exam (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012, 47). The tolerance toward cultural and religious diversity in the United States is not promoted by a national multicultural policy. Instead, it is embedded into American history and educational curricula that embrace minority groups. Unlike in an increasing amount of countries in Europe, policy makers in the United States have not made any serious proposals for immigrants’ cultural integration since their cultural and religious diversity has not raised as much concern as in Europe (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 30). It has been claimed that Islam, for instance, has not posed the same challenges to integration policy in the United States than in Europe. There are few particular reasons for this. First of all, most Arabs in the country are not Muslims. In addition, at least a third of American Muslim population is not immigrants at all since they are African-Americans. Another significant reason is that the Muslim immigrant community in the United States is relatively small and consists
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mainly of middle class people. Therefore, the community does not have much influence on thinking about integration policies (Schain 2010, 219). The United States’ comparatively strong anti-discrimination structure and Americans’ social acceptance toward cultural and religious diversity assure that the descendants of today’s immigrants will become part of an American mainstream where their background has only little effect on their lives (Alba and Nee 2003; see Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012, 215). This quite optimistic viewpoint is however questioned by other researchers who have deduced that the prospects of the growing second generation are “mixed at best, and dim for many” (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012, 215). One of the most significant challenge is living in the era of post-industrial economy. Formerly, a strong industrial sector in the United States with many job opportunities and proportionally good salary offered an economic ladder to successive immigrant generations. The post-industrial economy, however, rewards those migrants with higher education, but simultaneously traps those with less human capital in a low-wage service economy. Despite the robust anti-discrimination infrastructure in the country, the economic obstacles are still also exacerbated by racism. Scholars have suggested that though some second generation migrants will succeed by integrating into the white American mainstream or employing their human, social and cultural capital to flourish, at the same time a large proportion faces limited educational success and bleak job opportunities (Ibid). In spite of the absence of a coordinated and coherent national integration policy in the United States, it is instead possible to identify a consistent refugee resettlement policy that is accompanied by widespread agreement that the federal government should involve in refugee integration effort. Originally, the role of the federal government in resettlement was temporary and fragmented in the years after the Second World War. The role, however, grew modestly through assistance to refugees from Cuba in the 1960s, and later on the intervention broaden more with the arrival of Southeast Asians in the 1970s and through aid programs for the Eastern Bloc refugees. In the early 1980s, the Refugee Act combined the battery of scattered domestic resettlement programs finally into a single program to all refugee groups and also institutionalized the public-private partnerships that had a long time existed between the federal government and various religious institutions and voluntary resettlement agencies. At present, although the government provides the generality of the funding for integration, civil society organizations involve in most of the service work that helps refugees with both short-term settlement and more long- term integration. As opposed to other immigrants, official refugees have since 2009 been also eligible for federally-funded public benefits right away after arrival in the United States over their first five to nine years in the country. They are also entitled to benefit from federal resettlement programs funded by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 30–31). The federal structure influences nearly every aspect of United States immigration. However, illustrating how the experience in immigrant integration could be different if the United States were a unitary state like Finland or if integration policy were the exclusive domain of the federal authorities or alternatively of the individual states is quite challenging because of unceasing revision, the patchwork-like
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nature, and substantial variety of policies across the country (Freeman and Tendler 2012, 192). If the significance of the American divided federal system is apparent in the decentralized, collaborative, and uneven character of immigrant integration policies and programs, it is also challenging to extrapolate as to what concrete systematic consequences for the integration this system has in the United States. According to Freeman and Tendler (2012, 216), one effect of the federal system is to bolster customized policies to the specific needs of states and localities, which seems to promote experimentation and is, at least on paper, more efficient when compared to a national policy imposed consistently across the all fifty states. On the question whether the United States integration policy is more generous or harsh depending on which level of government leads it, Freeman and Tendler (ibid.) are able to give only a partial answer: “There is no question that if left to their own devices, certain states and localities would adopt unapologetic legislation demanding integration policies that would require immigrants to fully assimilate to the native society.” Nevertheless, it is also similarly evident that authorities in the United States think both that the federal government should not have an active role in integration effort and that there is no alternative to helping underwrite its mass immigration policies. Harsh, assimilative legislation is more probable to rise from the subnational level than it is from the federal government, but similarly are also more multicultural and accommodative approaches. Despite the United States government’s alleged laissez-faire philosophy and prevailing public reservations toward immigration (e.g. Telles and Ortiz 2008; see Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012, 44), social scientists have reported that a substantial proportion of migrants and their descendants are integrating successfully into the labor market, educational system, popular culture, and to a lesser extent politics. This development, however, proceeds unevenly, since patterns of inclusion are stratified by various factors, such as economic and educational resources, discrimination, and legal status, which restrain many newcomers from coming full members of the society. Given that refugees, who are the only immigrant group in the United States eligible to receive some aid from the federal government with their integration, have often better outcomes than identically situated other migrants, it is suggested that patterns of successful integration in the country occur despite, rather than since of, the national laissez-faire philosophy (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 3).
11.5 Multiculturalism as a State Policy in Finland The second variant of multicultural model of integration is multiculturalism as state policy. According to this view, multiculturalism implies both the willingness and commitment of the majority to accept cultural differences, and state action to secure equal rights to different minority groups (Castles et al. 2014, 270). From this perspective, Finland can be considered as an ethnically and culturally diverse society, and as well as a state which, moreover, officially recognizes this diversity and strive to preserve various cultural communities within its territory (Saukkonen 2013a, 270).
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Simultaneously, nevertheless, it is contended that Finland is a country where an exclusive form of nationalism has had a dominant role in the nation-building process and where national identity has by tradition underlined more the cultural homogeneity than diversity of the state (Kyntäjä 2003, 187; Saukkonen 2013a, 270, 290; 2013b, 190–191). Finnish immigration policy is claimed to be developed primarily as an outcome of external pressures, such as international agreements, or on the basis of idea of ethnic loyalty (Forsander 2002, 56). In consequence, it has traditionally been by its nature restrictive and immigration itself rather limited. For instance, in the late 1980s, policies were primarily focused on questions of remigration. At the same time, residence and work permits were very restrictively granted. Until the end of the 1980s, the generality of immigrants were Finnish returnees from Sweden and their families. In the 1990s, however, already more than half of the immigrants were born in a foreign country. In the year 1980, the number of foreign citizens residing in Finland was approximately 13,000, but it exceeded 80,000 in 1997. The steepest annual rise was in 1991 with over 13,000 foreigners entering the country. During that same period, the number of foreign born inhabitants increased from 39,000 to about 117,000 in Finland. The largest groups were from the former Soviet Union and refugees from Somalia (Kyntäjä 2003, 189–191). The reasons for growing immigration to Finland can be seen as partly international and partly domestic: the dissolution of the socialist countries, civil war in Balkans, and developments in Asia and Africa (Kyntäjä 2003, 191). A labor shortage at the end of the 1980s also had some effect on immigration, but since of a severe economic depression in the early 1990s, the impact was quite short-lived. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of year 1991 and Finland’s membership in the European Union in 1995 accelerated country’s transition from a country of emigration to a country facing immigration (Salmio 2000; Kyntäjä 2003, 191). At that time, the Finnish Government set up a committee on immigration and asylum policy, affiliated to the Ministry of Labour, which later on led to the formulation of a Programme on Immigration and Refugee Policy (Finnish Government 1997a) for immigration and refugee affairs in 1997. Finland did not have an officially defined immigration and integration policy before this program since the practice was primarily based on legislation, and instructions and decisions made by different ministries and authorities (Lepola 2000, 108–109; Salmio 2000, 6–7; Kyntäjä 2003, 199–200). As migration to Finland began to grow in the 1990’s, it shortly became evident that the great proportion of immigrants would not have any intent of going eventually back to their countries of origin. Instead, they would stay in Finland permanently. The Finnish response to this development was a specific principle that conflates the integration of individuals into society with the collective rights of communities to retain and maintain their own language and culture. In a decision-in- principle made by the Finnish Government in 1997 with regard to tolerance and racism, cultural minorities were given the right to choose their own methods for maintaining cultural identity (Finnish Government 1997b). Authorities in Finland were also presumed to accept the rank order of the traditional ways and forms of culture expressed by ethnic or cultural communities. One of the key reasons behind
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these collective cultural rights was instrumental, however, since the approach was considered beneficial both for the newcomers and for Finnish society in general (Saukkonen 2013a, 274). The Finnish Government agreed on the Programme on Immigration and Refugee Policy in principle in the year 1997. The defined objective of the policy was to support the integration of migrants whose residence in Finland was considered to be legal and permanent, and who had entered in the population register. Immigration and refugee affairs fall within the scope of different national officials, of which the Ministry of Labour carried most responsibility. According to the program, the objective of Finland’s immigration policy was the “flexible and efficient integration of all immigrants, i.e. migrants, returning migrants and refugees, into society and working life”. Integration of immigrants was defined as their “participation in the economic, political and social life in society”. The program declared as well that the “adoption of the language and the rules of the game in society are the precondition for success in Finland”, and that the “advantage to Finnish society and the immigrants living here is the fact that they can maintain their language and cherish their culture”. On the basis of the committee’s work, the Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (493/1999) came into force in May 1999. In this act, integration was defined as a two-dimensional process involving the “personal development of immigrants, aimed at participation in work life and the functioning of society while preserving their language and culture”. Since the concept of integration was seen to include normative assimilatory associations where the newcomers would be forced to lose their identity, the Finnish Language Office was requested to create a new term for integration, kotoutuminen,4 which remain still in use both in official contexts as well as in colloquial Finnish (Länsimäki 1999; Paananen 2005, 177–178; Finnish Government 2008, 15). The Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers was afterwards revised, and the new Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (1386/2010) entered into force in September 2011. Compared to the preceding legislation (493/1999, 1215/2005), although there are some minor changes in terminology and definitions, the basic tenets have remained immutable in the new Act (1386/2010): “Integration means interactive development involving immigrants and society at large, the aim of which is to provide immigrants with the knowledge and skills required in society and working life and to provide them with support, so that they can maintain their culture and language.” Furthermore, “integration also means the multi-sectoral promotion and support of integration […] using the measures and services provided by the authorities and other parties”. Finnish nationality law is based on the principle of jus sanguinis. The legislation has traditionally been closely connected to the general immigration policy. With the adoption of the Nationality Act (359/2003) in June 2003, Finnish citizens are enti4 The neologism was invented already in 1996 and used in other official contexts before the Act of the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers (493/1999). The term can be seen as referring to the word kotiutua which can be translated as ‘start to feel at home’ or ‘put down roots’ (Länsimäki 1999; Lepola 2000, 175).
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tled to hold dual citizenship. Citizenship can be acquired on the basis of birth, by application or by notification. Children receive Finnish citizenship at birth if, among others, the child’s mother is a Finnish citizen, if the child’s father is a Finnish citizen and the mother foreign and the parents are married to each other, or if the child is born in Finland and is unable to acquire the citizenship of any other country at birth. Foreigners may apply for Finnish citizenship if they have reached the age of 18, have lived in Finland long enough before submitting an application, have a secure income and are proficient in one of the national languages: Finnish or Swedish. The obtaining of citizenship via notification is easier than via the application procedure. Notification is possible, for instance, for children whose father is a Finnish citizens and whose mother is a foreigner, but who are not married to each other, for adopted children of Finnish citizens and for former citizens of Finland. In Finland, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy has been since the beginning of 2012 responsible for the preparation, the monitoring, and the managing of integration, as well as ethnic relations, but the actual tasks for implementing practical integration measures are divided between several other ministries and authorities both at the state and the municipal level. The government also cooperates with various non-governmental organizations on integration matters. The focus areas of the government’s integration policy include, for instance, “fostering a sense of solidarity and belonging to society among immigrants, along with two-way integration, supporting immigrant families and promoting the employment of adult immigrants, particularly by developing the teaching of Finnish and Swedish” (Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2014). In addition, “the integration policy emphasizes the integration of immigrants as municipal residents and the smooth and controlled direction of people under international protection towards municipalities, as well as good cooperation between the state and municipalities. Inclusion of civil society in integration efforts is also an important foundation of integration policy” (ibid.). Since the end of the 1990s, the main instruments for the implementation of the Finnish integration policy have been the individual integration plan for migrants, financial assistance paid by the Social Insurance Institution of Finland or the municipality to ensure that the person has secure means of support for the duration of the integration plan, integration training, as well as local integration programs. The integration plan is a personal blueprint for individual immigrants covering the measures and services to promote their prospects to learn the national language(s), receive complementary training and education, enhance employment skills, and improve their overall settlement in the country. The right to a plan was originally limited to those newcomers who were unemployed job seekers, dependent on income support, or under 18 years old and without a guardian in Finland. The new act (1386/2010) in 2011, however, introduced a new policy measure, the so-called initial assessment, for all who were willing to have the assessment performed. The idea behind the initial assessments is to expand the focus group so that more immigrants could benefit from the measures and services defined in the integration plan, and simultaneously to determine who is in need of the plan. Once the plan has been prepared, the immigrant has the responsibility to participate in the procedures
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agreed in it or alternatively lose part of the granted financial assistance. Measures concerning to the maintenance of one’s own language and culture are not typically included in the integration plan (Makkonen and Koskenniemi 2013, 78–79; Saukkonen 2013a, 277; Koskela 2014, 9). Municipalities in Finland have general and coordination responsibility for the development, planning, and monitoring of immigrant integration at the local level. Within their area, the municipalities are responsible for creating, implementing, and developing an integration program, as well as monitoring the realization of the program and its effects. The function of these local integration programs is to support the integration planning and to coordinate the provision of integration services in the municipality. The emphasis in the programs is typically on the challenges and activities related to the narrowly specified integration process of newcomers. Especial attention in the programs is directed to the participation on an equal basis in the local community and in Finnish society, as well to the prerequisites for that participation, such as acquired knowledge of national languages and Finnish society. The basic principle in the service provision system in Finland has been the normal services approach. It means that special arrangements for newcomers and minority groups should be established solely if it is needed. However, institutions providing services ought to be developed so as to further equal access to services regardless of ethnic or cultural background (Saukkonen 2013a, 277–278). As Pasi Saukkonen has remarked, multiculturalism and cultural diversity are concepts that can be found in the local integration programs in general terms, but the actual meaning of these notions is rarely if ever particularized. This perception implies that immigrants’ right to retain and maintain their own language and culture is clearly in a secondary role, if not almost non-existent in some cases. However, the prospect for immigrants’ children to receive native-language instruction at school is generally brought out in the programs. Typically, the rest of the preservation of newcomers’ own culture is regarded as belonging to their own voluntary associations and organizations which are eligible to apply financial assistance from the municipality (Joronen 2005, 72–74; Saukkonen 2010; see 2013a, 277–278). The Finnish refugee resettlement and reception policies concentrate on integration of refugees into the society through a comprehensive program of language training and orientation courses. The emphasis in these programs is often on finding employment. Although there is also a certain kind of multicultural ethos built into the official resettlement policies, Finnish policies seem to be contradictory as it is claimed that they are based on liberal pluralist ideas, but the policy recommendations are still universalistic. This discrepancy between theory and practice has been observed to exist in other Nordic countries as well (Matinheikki-Kokko 1997; Kyntäjä 2003, 198). It has been contented that, in practice, Finnish refugee resettlement policies are commonly based on quite unrealistic expectations of a relatively fast integration or even assimilation of newcomers (Wahlbeck 1996, 5). At the same time, however, it is also suggested that refugees can be handled as someones who have lost everything, in terms of material, social, and cultural capital. As an outcome, they can be infantilized and treated in the same way as small children: persons who need to go
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through a certain kind of slow re-socialization into Finnish society (Liebkind 1995; Matinheikki-Kokko 1997; Wahlbeck 1996; see Kyntäjä 2003, 198). One particular policy which has been criticized by researchers (e.g. Matinheikki-Kokko 1997; Wahlbeck 1997) is the policy to dispersal refugees by resettling them in small groups throughout the country. It is fairly claimed that the policy does not support the establishment of cultural communities among refugees. In addition, it does not take into consideration the resources which exist within their own social networks. It has been also suggested that scarcity of cultural communities can plausibly affect deleteriously the psychological well-being of refugees in Finland. Moreover, the Finnish resettlement system has not taken into account the transnational networks and the diasporic nature of refugees’ experiences. Instead, the resettlement system has been predominated by officials’ preoccupation with integration issues (Liebkind 1996; Wahlbeck 1997; Kyntäjä 2003, 198). As implicated earlier, the Finnish integration policy has an ambivalent character. Essentially, integration has deliberately been delineated as a holistic process in where migrants are expected to participate on an equal basis in Finnish society while retaining and maintaining their own language and culture. At the same time, the society is also presumed to adjust more diverse conditions. Even though integration therefore contains both the participation on equal terms and the maintenance of collective cultural identity, at a more practical level, however, the process is commonly constricted down to finding of one’s place in the mainstream Finnish society and culture. The exercised integration policy is hence, in reality, substantially less multiculturalist than it appears to be at first sight since policy practice focuses almost solely on the immigrant’s personal development in the Finnish social, economic, political, and cultural systems, and in particular in the labor market. Consequently, migrants’ success in integration is measured usually by such indicators as employment rate, acquired skills in national language(s), (in)dependency of social security services, and an amount social interaction with mainstream Finns. The integration process thus denotes only the adjustment of newcomers into Finnish society, not the adaptation of the so-called natives and the Finnish institutions to new, changing conditions as losing one’s original or parent’s language, culture, or ethnic identity is not regarded as a failure in the process (Saukkonen 2013a, 285; Koskela 2014, 8). As regards Finland’s so-called official philosophy on immigration, integration in cultural terms is defined as an option as newcomers may maintain their own culture and language, while simultaneously adapting to the Finnish society. The prevailing integration policy in the country strives to combine the rights and duties in the spirit of communitarianism, which is new for the Nordic universalistic welfare state. In spite of these official efforts, people with migratory background, expect those from the Western countries, are commonly at risk of being stigmatized in Finland, due to their reasonably high unemployment rate and as well the rather negative attitudes of Finns’ toward newcomers. Migrants are also frequently blamed for living on social benefits and misusing the welfare system. As the social security system in Finland, like in other Nordic countries, is based on residence rather than previous employment, all inhabitants are eligible to welfare services and social security. It has been
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stated, however, that the present social welfare system may in some cases contribute to keep people in dependency by transforming, for instance, active adult refugees into passive clients, instead of supporting their integration into the labor market (Wahlbeck 1997, 101; Sagne et al. 2005; Borkert et al. 2007, 10–11).
11.6 Of Premises for Cross-National Comparisons The chapter will be concluded with some notable vantage points on premises of using national models of integration in comparative cross-national research. Despite the many issues with national models, which will be elaborated in here next, it has been suggested (Bertossi 2011; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Bertossi et al. 2015) that models can be useful for comparative studies of immigrant integration on the condition that what researchers construct as national frameworks are a reflection of empirical reality. This includes also the cases where the constructs are an official version of this reality. That is to say, to conduct a debate about the usability of an exclusionism, republicanism or multiculturalism as models of a certain country, it is necessary at first to find an adequately stable definition of, for instance, republicanism in France or multiculturalism in the United States or in Finland as normative value systems to employ such models as explanatory tools (Bertossi 2011, 8). This required normative consistence of national models can, however, be troublesome to reach if we take a look back in the history of politics and policies of integration in different states. In reality, as Christophe Bertossi (2011; see also Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012) has shown, these highly stylized national models, as such we commonly picture them, have never existed, inasmuch as they are not institutionally consistent, normatively coherent, culturally defined, or historically stable. Instead, this kind of vagueness concerning the origins of the discourse of national models provides a representation of a social world with no agency but a top-down elite-driven structure, with no real historicity but a persistent path dependency, and in which ideas have paramount power, without, however, an elaborate account of where this power is from, and the processes through which they shape societal reality and are approved and employed by numerous actors in distinct societal contexts. As a result, as Bertossi (2011, 3) distills, “to accept the relevance of the notion of national models of integration one also has to accept self-evidently the pre-existence of national public philosophies with sufficient influence to shape a whole society”. In spite of its alleged multiculturalist laissez-faire approach, American society and the federal government, for instance, have not always been so non-intervene concerning immigrant integration. In the early twentieth century, private groups of citizens, settlement houses, social workers, enterprises, and some government agencies strived to ‘Americanize’ immigrants by encouraging them to renounce their Old World customs and ways. By doing this, it was assumed that newcomers’ adjustment into an industrial economy and a democratic political system would speed up. The ‘Americanization’ effort was clearly visible, for instance, in the way how the United States Department of Education together with local school boards
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provided textbooks to teach children and adult immigrants about United States citizenship, and how businesses organized language classes for their employees. Even though in some instances helpful, many of these practices also disparaged migrants’ cultures by attempting to promote a unilateral, one-way process of assimilation (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 13–14). Today, even there is no consistent or coordinated national level integration policy, which simultaneously means there is no official definition of integration in the United States, it is, however, possible to identify a widespread view of integration (or assimilation) from public and academic discussions that can be framed as follows: “social integration is achieved when we see an absence of significant difference between immigrants and the native born in, for example, their language use, their labor market participation, or their political viewpoints” (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 2). According to Irene Bloemraad and Els de Graauw (ibid.), such common view can be by its nature normative, meaning that immigrants should become like native born Americans, or alternatively it can be an empirical statement of inter-generational outcomes (e.g. Alba and Nee 2003). More often than not the former perspective also highlights newcomers’ cultural assimilation, whereas the latter envisions more space for cultural pluralism within a general pattern of economic, social, and political convergence. Along with the above-described issue of self-evidency, another well acknowledged problem with national models is that the notion employed by scholars is borrowed from the discourse of a variety of stakeholders in political, media, and academic spheres. Analytical ideal types of specific models associated with specific countries are akin to political stereotypes, often held in public and political debates. In other words, when researchers and scientists from different fields discuss about models, they are not actually saying anything different from what politicians and journalists talk, although researchers discuss about them in a distinct manner. Therefore, academic discussions on models are penetrated by normative and political interests, which originates from ideological debates in the public in which researchers also contribute (Bowen 2007; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 3). The actual issue is the scale or extent to which notions of models reflect and are influenced by public debates, which in turn are structured by predominant, elite-shaped frames. This normative dimension is evident especially in the emerging literature that has addressed the issue of a possible crisis of national models of integration in Europe from the beginning of the new millennium (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; see Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, 3). Study on the integration of immigrants has hence turned into discussions on the success or failure of traditional integration policies. At the same time, it has focused on the legitimacy of claims made by ethnic minorities, especially when these claims are made by Muslims (Joppke 2009; Bertossi 2011; see also Finotelli and Michalowski 2012). Another criticized problem associated with the notion of national models is its tendency to merge social, institutional, and political facets of citizenship and the integration of newcomers’ into one while treating these different aspects as a cultural totality even if academic discussions of models are nuanced (Bertossi 2011, 4). It has been contended that this feature hinders our understanding of diversity and immigrant integration since discussions about racial, ethnic, or religious discrimi-
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nation, or the integration issues in a given country, have tendency to be restricted to considerations of the comparative (dis)advantages of the different models (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Koopmans et al. 2005; Bertossi 2011). Simultaneously, it affects the selection of and analytical significance given on distinct indicators that researchers employ to understand disparities among national contexts. The common tendency to aggregate integration policies within the vessel of the nation-state requires also more illuminating. From the viewpoint of policies, the tendency in question seems rather self-explanatory, if the whole function of immigrant integration policies is the idea that newcomers are required to be lead into a national fold. As Rogier Van Reekum et al. (2012, 418) have expressed it: “That policies should somehow add up to a coherent and stable construct of national citizenship is almost inherent in the very idea of their development.” Adrian Favell (2003, 7; see Bertossi et al. 2015, 60–61) in turn has suggested that national models of integration are commonly the product of the exclusively internal national political dynamics or self-sufficiency of debates on integration in both politics and in immigration research. Hence the development of these national paradigms must be seen as a result of the centricity of the nation state in policy and academic discourses, not as accurate representations of the uniquely national character of integration policies. As a consequence, it is contended that national paradigms have skewed international comparative research and lead to a self-justificatory discourse (Favell 2003; Bommes and Morawska 2005; Bommes and Thränhardt 2010). All in all, to give answers to certain political concerns, scholars have often studied immigration and diversity issues while taking for granted the existence and preservation of nation-states. As long as the often implicit research question has a tendency to be the scale or extent to which nation-states are capable to preserve themselves under circumstances of both increasing and intensifying migration and transnationalism, the identification of national models is relevant in methodological sense. Therefore, researchers have shared in this methodological nationalism instead of bringing into question the ‘national’ in ‘national models’ (van Reekum et al. 2012, 419; Bertossi et al. 2015, 60–61). In addition to the above-mentioned issues, another problem concerning the usage of national models of integration in comparative immigration research is that they tend to oversimplify and overemphasize the alleged consistency of policies (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Bertossi et al. 2015, 61). The proposition is supported by a mounting empirical evidence of an increasing heterogeneity of immigration and integration policies, not only across but within nation-states (Baraulina 2007; see Schmidtke 2014, 79–80), and by an emerging literature about how local outcomes often stand out remarkably from national ones (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008; Scholten 2013). As for integration policies at the national and local levels, it has been discussed about distinctly divergent logics of national and local integration policies (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). Similarly, it has been also contented that academic and political discourse popularizes notions of coherent national models that are defined empirically by a significantly greater amount of internal diversity and variation in policy formation and in program development (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Schmidtke 2014, 77–80).
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In regarding to this issue of alleged consistency of policies, in Finland, for instance, municipalities are responsible for the coordination, development, and monitoring of measures and services aimed at promoting immigrant integration at the subnational level. As the previous legislation (493/1999) freed municipalities to a certain degree to decide how they fulfil national demands for integration in practice, there has been traditionally a substantial variation between different municipalities in the preparation and status of the integration programs. Consequently, it is contended in public and political discussions that the Finnish integration model is too scattered, since there is no real consistency in policies at different levels with divergent and sometimes even contradictory aims. However, in 2006, almost all municipalities that had a significant immigrant population, such as the cities in the Helsinki Capital Region, had an integration program (Saukkonen 2013a, 277–278, c, 88). Although the new legislation (1386/2010) allows the state to give more binding instructions about the content of the local integration programs and demands also that the Finnish Government must decide on the national development of integration by preparing a government integration program for its term of office, covering the integration objectives and measures, in practice, it is still possible to find sizeable differences in measures and objectives promoting immigrant integration between municipalities. It has been argued that this implementation issue between the national and local level is even more visible in Finland than, for instance, in Sweden and Netherlands, and indicates that there are, in addition to various local circumstances and amounts of available resources, different kinds of attitudes and values prevailing across the country (Saukkonen 2013c, 88). Latterly, it is also reported on some concerns whether or not all Finnish municipalities are able to offer all the required integration services to a high enough standard (e.g. enough language courses and internship positions) (Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2012, 2013). As brought up earlier in this chapter, the intra-national variation is an essential feature in the United States and it has been criticized that the federal “confused patchwork of policies and programs” (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2012, 50) does not form a coherent response to the issue of integration, since immigrants can be treated very differently across political jurisdictions. Even though there has been some effort at the national level to provide support for refugees, the federal role is argued to be minimalist. As states and localities across the country challenge the federal government’s primacy around immigration, this also becomes a contest over who belongs, and to which political jurisdiction. Moreover, not all policies seek inclusion. Instead, some strive to exclude newcomers from certain areas of society (e.g. social services, education, and the labor market). It is claimed that this variation at the subnational level in integration approaches is growing and the move toward exclusion intensifying (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2011, 2–3). As implicated in this chapter, the case of the United States and Finland simultaneously emphasizes the need to analyze not only programmatic integration discourse at the national level but also arrangements and practices at the local level, and expose the limits of the idea of unequivocally ‘national’ integration models. As the subnational level of governance has become a significant arena of political
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debate and policy formation in the field of integration policy, it is essential to acknowledge the need to move beyond a conceptualization that is limited solely to national level politics and its institutional arrangements as it could be both conceptually and factually fallacious to refer to a single, national, model responsible for the formulation of immigration and integration policies and legislation in a given country. Certainly, at the subnational level, states, regions, localities, and cities have become major test sites for developing and implementing integration policies, as well as important places of innovation often in open contrast to the lack of consistent policy formation at the national level (Vasta 2007; Schmidtke 2014, 79; Schmidtke and Zaslove 2014). As major political, institutional, and cultural structures define national contexts in systems of multilevel governance, it is essential to conceptualize the subnational level as constitutive of public policy formation and the practice of immigrant integration. Largely owing to the formative role of national identities immigration studies have traditionally relied in a rather relentless way on the nation state as the exclusive frame of reference for comparative research (Wimmer 2008; see Schmidtke 2014, 79–80). In this volume, however, the authors strive to meet the challenge of this methodological nationalism by acknowledging the importance of local contexts in their approaches. While the majority of the existing local level research on immigrant integration has traditionally focused on urban cities, the volume provides also much needed effort to understand the unique challenges and opportunities that immigration brings to small towns in more rural settings both in Finland and the United States. In response to the broadly covered criticism in this chapter towards national models of integration, some researchers within the field of comparative migration studies have avoided discussing national models altogether. It is, however, contended that one of the main reasons why criticism has not led to a complete end of the use of models and why they have been revived time after time in one form or another is that they help to diminish unstructured complexity of the otherwise highly contested matter of immigrant integration (Bader 2007; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 235; Bertossi et al. 2015, 61–62). That is to say, models can help out to find and identify startling differences between countries that have implemented distinct policies and absorbed contradictory public conceptions of citizenship. Furthermore, by comparing ideal-typical models with particular time periods, modelling has potential to create a better understanding of the dynamics of immigrant integration policies in a country’s history (Bertossi et al. 2015, 61–62). One of the most major perils within models is that they are not just taken as tools for cross-national comparisons. If national models tend to be taken as a substitute for reality, it is essential to be aware of the diverse uses of these models and the negotiations in which they figure. In this regard, models should not be employed as if they exist in a stable and consistent normative, cultural, historical, and institutional context (Bertossi 2011, 11–14). Additionally, as the here presented case of the United States and Finland has partly shown, in examining any public policy, we should not be satisfied with laws, policy documents or discursive material alone, as in all policy fields, there is some kind of gap among general principles and objec-
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tives, and the implementation of laws, programs, and plans (Saukkonen 2013b, 193). This implicates that national models are an inappropriate tool for the comparative study of integration inasmuch as the ambition of such research is to evaluate the success or failure of a national approach to integration of newcomers. Instead, it is possible to employ models, for instance, as an object of analysis, that is to say, as a dependent variable that needs to be explained. Given the fact, that politicians and other public actors produce models that are explicitly normative, the task of social science is therefore to describe and explain these dominant and oppositional normative institutional and policy models, as well as their actual impact on policies (Bader 2007, 879; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 235–236). In the end, the question concerning the usage of national models in immigration research is hence fundamentally an empirical one.
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Loch, D. (2014). Integration as a sociological concept and national model for immigrants: Scope and limits. Taylor & Francis Online. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10702 89X.2014.908776 Länsimäki, M. (1999). Kotoutuuko maahanmuuttaja? Institute for the Language of Finland. http:// www.kotus.fi/nyt/kolumnit/kieli-ikkuna_(1996_2009)/kotoutuuko_maahanmuuttaja Makkonen, T., & Koskenniemi, E. (2013). Muuttoliikkeen ja maahanmuuttajien aseman oikeudellinen käsittely. In T. Martikainen & P. Saukkonen (Eds.), Muuttajat. Kansainvälinen muuttoliike ja suomalainen yhteiskunta (pp. 55–80). Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Matinheikki-Kokko, K. (1997). Challenges in working in a cross-cultural environment. Principle and practise of refugee settlement in Finland. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä. Migration Policy Institute. (2015). Frequently requested statistics on immigrants and immigration in the United States. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequentlyrequested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#CurrentandHistori cal Money, J. (2010). Comparative immigration policy. In R. A. Denemark (Ed.), The international studies encyclopedia. Chister: Wiley-Blackwell. Multiculturalism Policy Index. http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/ Paananen, S. (Ed.). (2005). Maahanmuuttajien elämää Suomessa, Statistics Finland. Helsinki. Poppelaars, C., & Scholten, P. (2008). The worlds apart. The divergence of national and local integration policies in the Netherlands. Administration & Society, 40(4), 335–357. Sagne, S., Saksela, S., & Wilhelmsson, N. (2005). Active civic participation of immigrants in Finland. Oldenburg. http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Finland.pdf Sagne, S., Saksela, S., & Wilhemsson, N. (2007). Finland. In A. Triandafyllidou, & R. Gropas (Eds.), European immigration (A sourcebook). Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Salmio, T. (2000). Kylmän sodan loppuminen ja EU-jäsenyys muuttivat Suomen maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa. Siirtolaisuus-Migration, 2, 21–26. Sardinha, J. (2009). Immigrant associations, integration and identity. Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European communities in Portugal. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Saukkonen, P. (2010). Kotouttaminen ja kulttuuripolitiikka: Tutkimus maahanmuutosta ja monikulttuurisuudesta suomalaisella taiteen ja kulttuurin kentällä. Helsinki: Cupore. Saukkonen, P. (2013a). Multiculturalism and nationalism: The politics of diversity in Finland. In P. Kivistö & Ö. Wahlbeck (Eds.), Debating multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States. Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Saukkonen, P. (2013b). Multiculturalism and cultural policy in Northern Europe. Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidskrift, 2, 178–200 https://www.idunn.no/nkt/2013/02/ multiculturalism_and_cultural_policy_in_northern_europe. Saukkonen, P. (2013c). Erilaisuuksien Suomi. Vähemmistö- ja kotouttamispolitiikan vaihtoehdot. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Schain, M. (2010). Managing difference: Immigrant integration policy in France, Britain and the United States. Social Research. An International Quarterly. http://socialresearch.metapress. com/media/e39xljqqxrcqx9j3kg0v/contributions/6/6/6/2/6662545w72nw5643.pdf Scholten, P. W. A. (2013). Agenda dynamics and the multi-level governance of intractable policy controversies: The case of migrant integration policies in the Netherlands. Policy Sciences, 46(3), 217–236. Schmidt, R. (2007). Comparing Federal Government Immigrant Settlement Policies in Canada and the United States. Taylor & Francis Online. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1080/02722010709481802 Schmidtke, O. (2014). Beyond national models? Governing migration and integration at the regional and local levels in Canada and Germany. Comparative Migration Studies, 2, 77–99. Schmidtke, O., & Zaslove, A. (2014). Multilevel party politics of immigration in Germany and Italy. In E. Hepburn (Ed.), The politics of immigration in multi-level states: Governance and political parties. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
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Sniderman, P., & Hagendoorn, L. (2007). When ways of life collide: Multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands. InPrinceton. Princeton University Press. Statistics Finland. (2014). Population structure 2013. http://tilastokeskus.fi/til/vaerak/2013/ vaerak_2013_2014-03-21_tie_001_en.html Telles, E. E., & Ortiz, V. (2008). Generations of exclusion: Mexican Americans, assimilation, and race. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2015). Mission statement. https://www. uscis.gov/aboutus United States Department of Homeland Security. (2008). Task force on New Americans (Building an Americanization Movement for the Twenty-first Century: A report to the President of the United States from the Task Force on New Americans). Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20 of%20Citizenship/TaskForceonNewAmericansReport.pdf Van Reekum, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Bertossi, C. (2012). National models of integration and the crisis of multiculturalism: A critical comparative perspective. Taylor & Francis Online. http:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0031322X.2012.718162 Vasta, E. (2007). Accommodating diversity: Why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point (COMPAS Working Paper Series 39). Oxford: University of Oxford, COMPAS. Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2010). The multiculturalism Backlash: European discourses, policies, and practices. London: Routledge. Wahlbeck, Ö. (1996). Diasporic relations and social exclusion: The case of Kurdish refugees in Finland. Siirtolaisuus-Migration, 23(4), 7–15. Wahlbeck, Ö. (1997). Kurdish refugee communities: The diaspora in Finland and England. Coventry: The University of Warwick. Waldinger, R. (2007). Transforming foreigners into Americans. In M. Waters & R. Ueda (Eds.), The New Americans: A guide to immigration since 1965. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Weil, P. (2001). Access to citizenship: A comparison of twenty-five nationality laws. In T. A. Aleinikoff & D. B. Klusmeyer (Eds.), Citizenship today: Global perspectives and practices. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Wimmer, A. (2008). The making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries: A multilevel process theory. American Journal of Sociology, 113(4), 970–1022.
Chapter 12
Notions About Cross-National Comparative Social Sciences and the Societal Role of Researchers Päivi Armila and Jussi Ronkainen
The aim of this final article of this collection is to ponder the societal significance, as well as epistemological challenges, of research dealing with issues of social inequality in different societal contexts. The scrutiny is based mainly on our experiences as researchers of the project Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship: Transnational networks, social participation and social identification of Somalis in Finland and in the U.S. (2013–2016, Academy of Finland). We start our examination by bringing forth the contemporary critics towards methodological nationalism that guides social policies and social sciences in many implicit ways. After that we move to discuss cross-national research settings and their epistemological challenges. Finally, we end up to ask: What social scientists can actually do when aiming at contribute in social political discussions concerning improvement of different minorities’ positions within unequal societal and cultural structures?
12.1 Critics Towards Methodological Nationalism “The age of migration”, as named by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer in 2011, has during the recent decades raised a lot of both discourses of and criticism towards nationalistic ideologies and structures as taken-for-granted premises in developing and making social policies (e.g. Ahponen et al. 2014). Until
P. Armila (*) Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] J. Ronkainen Juvenia – Youth Research and Development Centre, South Eastern University of Applied Sciences, Mikkeli, Finland e-mail:
[email protected] © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6_12
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now, we can argue, social welfare is very much defined and welfare policies strongly guided by implicit presuppositions and ideas about good and decent life in a certain national context. In Nordic welfare states, for example, this has been seen in family policies, curriculum policies, eldercare policies, migration policies, and so on. The traditional model of heterosexual nuclear (and Christian) family structure is supported by many family services (Peltola 2014; Ebot and Harinen 2016), curricula are modified by contents of patriotism and “banal nationalism” (Souto 2011, about the concept see Billig 1995) and eldercare policies pay hardly any attention to the multicultural backgrounds of old people in the country (Antikainen 2010). These are only some examples but highlight the need of critical rethinking and updating of societal existence through lenses of multiplicity, multiculturalism, and multiethnicity. In welfare societies welfare policies have coercive power in their citizens’ everyday lives and life-course destinies more widely. The policies make us grow up, think, behave and treat others as, for example, ‘Finns’, and also make us to expect this learned, familiar social orientation from others. In terms of social sciences we can name this life-disposition dimension (about the concept of disposition see Bourdieu 1984) as identity, as culture, as habitus, or as ethnicity – whatsoever, but behind it there is an assumption of social sameness that forms the bases for social political solutions (Ahponen et al. 2014). This methodological nationalism is present also in immigrant integration policies, in their consequences and practical evaluations. Within this tendency a structural marginalization is targeted towards those who represent ‘difference’ and late-coming. National statistics easily show us this methodological nationalism of integration policy principles and practices, as proved in several articles of this book. In spite of the facts we can see from welfare statistics there has been a strong belief that the national welfare policy principle guarantees a certain level of equality for all citizens, at least the equality of opportunities for struggling on fair positions in society (Ahponen et al. 2014). Failures, then, have been turned to faults of individuals or their cultures: of ‘difference’. Methods seeking for positive solutions suggest supporting (and often also changing) the individual: teaching, integrating, and changing a person in order to fit him or her into the given-for-granted environments. This mission, however, has proved to be an impossible one as can be seen from the group-based nature of social margins. What does methodological nationalism, then, have to do with sociological studies of citizenship? Nation-state has been often seen as the self-evident and basic category of ‘truth’ – a norm that must not be bended under scrutiny – and an unquestioned foundation for sociological research. The concept of society has been more or less narrowed down and made synonymous with nation-state. Citizenship has therefore remained as a taken-for-granted membership of this nation-state society (Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 15; Beck 1999). When studying such issues as diaspora citizenship it is easy to share the view of Ulrich Beck (1999), that modern sociology’s way to border society as a separate national state system, and its interest of research, forms an old-fashioned view which is incapable to cope with and un- veal the multiple phenomena that does not fit into this national order. Thus, it seems
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that the concept of citizenship in social sciences has been one of the ground-stones to promote methodological nationalism. Policies are not the only agenda to be blamed for banal nationalism, and the taken-for-granted premises and presuppositions of social scientific research have also to be taken under an analytical magnifier. Criticism towards methodological nationalism of social sciences as linked with migration was brought into strong light by Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller in 2002, as well as by Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim in 2008. One task that is often posed to social sciences is to produce analytical understanding: knowledge that has empirical value in promoting social policies and thus wellbeing for many different groups of people in many different circumstances. However, in spite of some shared, even universal, doctrines and classics, social scientific academies are basically national institutions serving nationalistic aspirations (see, e.g. Harinen and Kivijärvi 2016) – even though often claiming to be critical and counter-flowing. Within this ‘colour blind’ and implicit methodological nationalism, social scientists have (for example) developed generalizing National Barometers to clarify “how ‘the nation’ lives and feels”, planned research settings to “solve the problems of immigration”, and named members of social minorities as “in-between-people”. In doing so they have, on their part – even though mostly unconsciously and unwillingly – held methodological nationalism as their precept also in studies of migration and minorities. Methodological nationalism comes apparent in several different ways in research: in contextualizing social phenomena and understanding societal issues. Methodological nationalism is shown, first of all, as ignoring other points of views than those promoting national context. This means especially political aspirations and methodological solutions in research. Methodological nationalism is also visible in seeing nation-state as a” natural” environment for processes and things, and research is usually narrowed down geographically to concern only internal issues of a certain nation (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; see also Martikainen 2009). Although this could be a relevant contextualizing of a certain research, it ignores that we live in a globally interconnected world that affects the national level. Thus, for example Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2008) have called for cosmopolitan sociology to take the global multiplicity of social life seriously and to substitute or at least challenge the emphasis of methodological nationalism by methodological cosmopolitanism. This view highlights two points: the scientific observer works in a global frame of reference, and active research subjects more often may see themselves in a global – or at least transnational – frame of reference. This far, it has been politically understandable that nation-states as administrative and governmental units collect and carry out nation-based data. This pattern forms the basic foundation for social engineering: following socio-economic development, demographics, or values and views of citizens/inhabitants that are important for socio-political decision making inside a single nation-state regime. There are also several international and transnational longitudinal surveys that measure (and compare), for example, attitudes of citizens about different issues or socio- demographic development. In these studies people are, nevertheless, categorized mostly as members of one country only, based on citizenship or at least by their
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main residence – even though they might have transnational relations and connections, properties, or even residence in several states. They (especially multiple citizens) may also have broad citizens’ rights in several states that they also use. For example, dual citizens or expatriates – or diaspora people more generally – can be authorized for social, political and economic rights in a country where they do not live (Ronkainen 2011). They also may use political rights or social benefits or may want to influence into several aspects of the nation-state where they do not permanently live. If these people are not included in data collection of national barometers, their reality is more partial than it is in every other study. New forms of societal membership – such as transnational citizenship, post- national citizenship, global citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, dual citizenship, de-national citizenship, or diaspora citizenship – have all at least one thing in common: Because of their ‘exceptional’ nature, they all easily highlight the ‘natural’ nature of citizenship as The Membership of a specific nation-state. Referring to the modern political theory, this is because citizenship means a membership status of and a relation to a state. However, the etymological examination of the term citizenship brings us to references of memberships of towns or city-states. One question we would like to arise is: Would it be possible to sign out from understanding citizenship only within the conceptualizations and policies of a nation-state and bind it more to the everyday level environments – also to the diasporic ones – where people live their unique lives and where citizenship really can become practice?
12.2 C ross-National Research or Comparative Cross- National Research? In frames of the conventional political theory, and in those of the agreed (and also conventional) scientific methodology, many analytical challenges arise when one is trying to carry out cross-national or even comparative cross-national research. Comparative cross-national research has meant in our research setting an aspiration to understand and analyze the contents and contexts of diaspora citizenship for Somalis in Finland and Minnesota. We have asked, for example, what kind of connections they have to Somalia, and how the socio-political (and thus national) frameworks and contexts affect to their societal possibilities in transnational and diasporic contexts. In these cases we have faced the challenge of national research setting and also how we profoundly – and narrowly – tend to understand the concepts of citizenship, membership, and wellbeing. We also have crashed towards the epistemological problems of scientific interpretation in analyses of cross-national data. Today, in the waves of globalization, migration, and transnationalism, social scientific research has been challenged (and funded) to participate in the political ‘bee’ by supranational institutions with political aspirations. European Union can be shown as a crystallized example in these kind of aspirations. In the European level
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there exists a political concern for non-unity of the Union citizens; for a lack of shared identifications as ‘Europeans’ and for a lack of willingness to commit to develop ‘Europeanism’ as a political, identity-political, and economic program (see Toropainen et al. 2007). This is one reason why the EU has funded a lot of research where scientists from different countries work together in joined projects and seek for solutions to shared research tasks. Transatlantic co-operation, then, is more rare – maybe because there has been no such concern and political need to unite people across the Atlantic Ocean than in Europe (that is to say: in European Union). As a term, definition, and model, cross-national research has meant studies where same kind of data collections have been conducted in different countries (e.g. Pitkänen et al. 2005; Sipos and Pilkington 2015). The data have been either quantitative or qualitative, collected usually from policy documents, legislations, statistics, or individuals. Depending on the amount of participating countries, quite wide data sets have been managed to collect and combine – for example, in a project MYPLACE (Sipos and Pilkington ibid). analyzing European youth’s political aspirations and nativism more than 900 semi-structured interviews were done in 15 countries (ca. 60 in each). This kind of qualitative data form a methodological challenge for researchers: One researcher cannot conduct phenomenological analysis with 900 interviews alone, and if the analysis task is divided within a cooperative team of different scientists, the epistemological problem of qualitative comparisons is faced: How one can put into a systematic, objective comparison results that are constructed by hermeneutic, interpretative, and subjective processes of different researchers (cf. Husserl 1964)? In this kind of cases, only descriptive, loose, cautious, and guessing comparison seems to be reliable and valid. One, nevertheless, has to ask, why do we think that research is more valid when analyses are carried out by a single researcher or a team of few researchers. Is there a solid reason or is it just something that we are used to believe in? The main problem is that when 10–20 researchers try to do systematic analyses, it seems to raise more challenges than solutions. Thus, we need to develop research design to tackle this challenge. Other than that, it is unclear why large teams could not do valid research. Cross-national research projects also use most of the time to produce nationally relevant research and results. Cross-national approaches seem to be only secondary aims and there is never enough time to develop it. This might highlight the tradition of methodological nationalism and research design that is more convenient and familiar for the researchers. First aim in developing research should thus be to make the cross-national design the priority task in the beginning. Comparative cross-national research certainly forms its own epistemological landscape. In Marko Kananen’s and Ville-Samuli Haverinen’s article of this book, we present a trans-Atlantic comparative analysis based on reading statistical information concerning diaspora Somalis’ societal positions and possibilities in two very different state contexts. When comparing national statistics we can reach knowledge about the impact of different contexts on different opportunity structures – if the data collections have followed same kind of methodological logics, of course. As social scientists we believe that statistical knowledge shows us the main societal structures and their developmental lines in a big picture, and they surely reveal the
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abstract in a very concrete and tight way. General structures, when circling individuals, turn to opportunity structures within which life-courses, then, turn to lived realities: everyday activities, formal and informal human relationships, life-plans, dreams, experiences, emotions, loves and sorrows. In order to understand these we have to go near to people; listen to their life-stories, observe how they are treated in micro-level gatherings, and taking their experiences seriously. Statistics thus show us where to pay a more detailed attention to. This has been one strong string we have followed when collected texts for this book.
12.3 What Social Scientists Can – Or Have to – Do? Among social scientists there exists a wide range of differentiation in opinions about their socio-political space and responsibilities. For example, Pierre Bourdieu (1994) emphasized the practical function of reason (ratio), and Michel Foucault (1970), then, saw that scientific knowledge forms the crucial basis of societal power. However, status campaigns inside social sciences often contain arguments with an idea that “real, serious, and pure sociology” takes a clear distance from social policies and ensures its status by neglecting participation in the political discourse (Hokka 2016). The sociological research project behind many articles of this book, nevertheless, has had an explicit socio-political mission. When we committed ourselves with this process we shared a belief in researchers’ capabilities to carry, deliver, and disseminate knowledge, and in their task to challenge the public opinion to learn – also from knowledge and experiences (the know-how) from overseas. Our emphasis is that the scientific community around such issues as migration, transnationalism, diaspora, and border crossings, cannot split itself and lock these slides in national frames from which these phenomena are then scrutinized. The relevance of knowledge that is based on contextual comparisons forces researchers to take into account very different circumstances – which fact already an sich can widen their scientific lenses and understanding. However, the methodological considerations do not touch only the demands posed for researchers to understand the often invisible dimensions of societal structures in many contexts. They call for different, non-conventional space to research subjects as well. It is, for example, important that informants and interviewees can participate in research by using their own languages. Challenges arise when interviews are carried out in different languages and then transcribed and translated into common academic language, usually English. No matter how well the cross-national research design is planned and carried out, linguistic and cultural differences raise question marks for interpretation and analyses. This is a challenge for both qualitative and quantitative empirical research that is usually not avoidable especially in cross-national research – not until we manage to develop new research strategies that pass the methodological fetishism criticized by C. Wright Mills already in 1950s (1959). If researchers treat multilinguistic and multicultural data collection as a major problem, they reproduce the methodological nationalism in research. A need for
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c ross-national research is evident and we need to develop methodologies to grasp this challenge. Same struggles have already been faced in truly multidisciplinary research. Maybe there is something to learn from? To sum up: As (also western) societies differ profoundly historically, politically, culturally, by legislation, comparative or cross-national analyses dealing with their inhabitants membership positions and possibilities consist of several methodological risks. However, today we cannot make social scientific research only by looking from a narrow, national(istic) perspective. A sight must be widened across methodological nationalism, especially when such a matter as diaspora with its transnational dimensions in under consideration – and when the research aims at developing integrative social political principles that pass the nationalistic expectations of national sameness as a criteria for citizenship in practice. All this means that seriously taken methodological transnationalism must be planned and resourced extremely well.
References Ahponen, P., Harinen, P., Honkasalo, V., Kivijärvi, A., Pyykkönen, M., Ronkainen, J., Souto, A.-M., & Suurpää, L. (2014). New challenges for Nordic welfare services: Emerging cultural diversity in Finnish Youth Work. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 4(1), 30–39. Aleinikoff, T.A., & Klusmeyer, D. (2011). Citizenship policies for an age of migration. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Antikainen, M. (2010). Matkalla suomalaiseksi ja hoiva-alan ammattilaiseksi? Venäläis- ja virolaistaustaisten naisten ja suomalaisuuden kohtaamiset kuulumista rakentamassa. Helsingin yliopisto: Käyttäytymistieteiden tiedekunta, tutkimuksia 317. Beck, U. (1999). What is globalization? Cambridge: Polity Press. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2008). Global generations and the trap of methodological nationalism for a cosmopolitan turn in the sociology of youth and generation. European Sociological Review, 25(1), 25–36. Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage. Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction. A social critique of the judgement of taste. London: Routledge. Bourdieu, P. (1994). Järjen käytännöllisyys. Toiminnan teorian lähtökohtia. Tampere: Vastapaino. Ebot, M., & Armila, P. (2016). Contested fathering. Cameroonian fathers facing parenthood in the Finnish Welfare State. Sosiologia, 2(2016), 138–155. Foucault, M. (1970). The order of things. An archaeology of human sciences. London: Tavistock Publications. Harinen, P., & Kivijärvi, A. (2016). Which side? Young multicultural generation facing nationalistic research frameworks. In P. Ahponen, P. Harinen, & V.-S. Haverinen (Eds.), Dislocations of civic cultural borderlines: Methodological nationalism, transnational reality and cosmopolitan dreams (pp. 57–70). Cham: Springer. Hokka, J. (2016). Illuusiot suomalaisen sosiologian kentällä. Sosiologia 3/2016, 239–257. Husserl, E. (1964). The idea of phenomenology? The Hague: Nijhoff. Martikainen, T. (2009). Eettisiä kysymyksiä maahanmuuttotutkimuksessa. Elore, 16(2), 1–9. Mills, C. W. (1959). The sociological imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pakkasvirta, J., & Saukkonen, P. (2005). Nationalismi teoreettisen tutkimuksen kohteena. In J. Pakkasvirta & P. Saukkonen (Eds.), Nationalismit (pp. 14–45). Helsinki: WSOY. Peltola, M. (2014). Kunnollisia perheitä. Maahanmuutto, sukupolvet ja yhteiskunnallinen asema. Helsinki: Finnish Youth Research Network.
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Pitkänen, P., Ronkainen, J., & Harinen, P. (2005). Multiple citizenship in Finland. In C. Mengelkamp, Y. Schröter, & R. S. Jäger (Eds.), Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft – eine gesellschaftlicher Diskurs über Mehrstaatigkeit (pp. 256–267). Landau: VEP-Aktuell. Ronkainen, J. (2011). Mononationals, hyphenationals, and shadow nationals. Multiple citizenship as status and practice. Citizenship Studies, 15(2), 247–263. Sipos, F., & Pilkington, H. (2015). WP5: Interpreting participation (interviews). Deliverable 5.4: Cross-national report. Draft. MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement). http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/documents/D4_6/D5.4Crossnational%20 report%20final.pdf Souto, A.-M. (2011). Arkipäivän rasismi koulussa. Etnografinen tutkimus suomalais- ja maahanmuuttajanuorten ryhmäsuhteista. Helsinki: Finnish Youth Research Network. Toropainen, P., Harinen, P., Rautopuro, J., & Tsitselikis, K. (2007). Between the old and the new: Different perspectives on dual citizenship and European citizenship. In D. Kalekin-Fishman & P. Pitkänen (Eds.), An emerging institution? Multiple citizenship in Europe – Views of officials (pp. 243–269). Bern: Peter Lang. Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: Nation- statebuilding, migration and the social sciences. Global Networks, 2(4), 301–334.
Epilogue
This collection of articles has moved through different levels of human realities and from structures to individual experiences. Social and selective opportunity structures, may they be political, ideological, economic or cultural, penetrate all levels of societal interaction and offer different citizenship positions to different inhabitants of the state. On one hand, the oppressive power of statuses and discourses is filtering and selecting and has many both material and emotional consequences. However, and on the other hand, even though many statuses might also tend to break down selective policies and practices and strive for civic equality, everyday encounters can be toned by cultural tensions and prejudice. Thus, citizenship as a practice often varies a lot from citizenship as a status. Ethnicity as a structure regulates interaction and often seems to be a much stronger marker of membership than citizenship. Analyses of diaspora citizenship show how people living in the same nation-state territory can be more citizens or less citizens (or semi-citizens, as Helen 2014, 6 has pointed). The position on Somalis both in Finland and in the United States – as well as in many other state contexts – reflect the big, global, and geopolitical picture of racism where the Western Whiteness (as a norm) draws the lines for social hierarchies and maintains restriction and suppression of diaspora people’s rights – and where also the local knowledge is defined as a privileged authority. For example, in the case of Somalis in Finland, family reunion legislation with demands of DNA- testing to prove one’s family connections is one example of means to widen the social gap between state inhabitants while bringing the biological criteria into evaluations of the possibly accepted or non-accepted state-members. Thus after some more tolerant decades, citizenship as a status, again, becomes loaded by bio-political dimensions (Helen ibid., 12). However, in spite of the hardening Zeitgeist, an important question for social scientists and socio-politicians is: Is it possible to develop more positive and open discourses around diaspora citizenship than those of suspicion and prejudice pushing diaspora people in societal margins? Diaspora position means a post-refugee status for many Somalis of this book, but they are still sanguine and hopeful. Some of them stretch towards the future in diaspora, and some plan active membership in © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 P. Armila et al. (eds.), The Contexts of Diaspora Citizenship, International Perspectives on Migration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94490-6
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the rebuilding work of Somalia (see Armila et al. 2017). At the moment, many also wish to see diaspora as a social force: bridge-builder that shapes interactions between countries, regions and continents. Concrete and life-level realities – business networks, ‘mobile homes’, intensive and often easy interaction with the ‘own ones’ all over the Western globe – train diaspora citizens to become experts in transnational relations and coping. Diasporic Lebenswelt offers them social capital that could offer a potentiality of newness to many local communities, in order to improve their social and cultural vitality. If this newness is allowed, the identity of a place can change a lot with new-comers, as new people bring new styles, new things, new voices, and are visible in the landscape (see Bhabha 1994). New-comers, when they are recognized and accepted, can broaden local professional fields, foster new social and cultural opportunities, as well as assist regional growths. It has also been claimed that diaspora groups can foster peace and development in their countries of origin (DIASPEACE1). Making visible those dynamics – structures, as well as individual resources and capabilities – that regulate what is available for whom in societies is thus extremely important. Lack of recognition, may it deal with credentials, education, skills or experiences, is a barrier for acting and belonging. Generally, for people localities are the most significant environments where citizenship as a practice becomes concretely felt. Belonging, feeling at home, is an emotionally important aspect of human existence. Places are parts of our identities – also places of our past: ‘the places as they were’. Within a diasporic life- course practical living environments can change often, but the emotional longing for feeling at home apparently does not disappear. Somalis who do not feel culturally at home in their current residence states or localities, are often stressed by tensions between settling down, moving in diaspora, and repatriation. The symbolic value of home place in diaspora becomes manifold and visible – as it is something that hardly ponders people with a stable residential history. Diaspora is strongly framing the concept of home (Fink-Nielsen et al. 2004), and diaspora-homeland interaction is not easily forgotten (see also Abdile and Pirkkalainen 2011). Feeling at home contains matters that are both informal (friendships) and formal (career possibilities, participation rights and access). Feeling at home should, also, be built in circumstances where ethnic concentration and enclaves – isolated and spatially segregated outsiders – would mean the only forms of social capital for diaspora people. Feeling at home insists being able to rely on others and recognition of a persons’ human capital an sich. Somali people’s positions and experiences in diaspora can be seen as crystallized examples of consequences of conflict-related migration. Their messages – delivered also via this book – contain references to emotions, insecurity, preferences that raise from their special life-histories and call for socio-political protection and support, as well as for a change in the often racist atmospheres they have to live within. Security refers often to state-centric policies, even though human security tends to lean on individuals, families, social groups, and dignities (Tiilikainen 2017). As the political and humanitarian crises in Somalia imply that the Somali diaspora will https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/handle/123456789/36874.
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stay in the focus of transnational migration research we also have to ponder what is the part of researchers in striving for diaspora citizenship where making and remaking diasporic identities, positions, and memberships would respect human rights – even though it must be admitted that the wide spectrum of Somali diaspora is impossible to reach with single analyses.