The Cold War (1945-1991)

(1945-1991)

DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The Cold War

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DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The Cold War (1945-1991)

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DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AM MERICAN HISTORY

(1945-1991)

DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The Cold War (1945-1991) Editor Michael Shally-Jensen, PhD

VOLUME 1

SALEM PRESS A Division of EBSCO Information Services Ipswich, Massachusetts

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Copyright ©2016, by Salem Press, A Division of EBSCO Information Services, Inc., and Grey House Publishing, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. For permissions requests, contact [email protected]. ∞ The paper used in these volumes conforms to the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48 1992 (R2009).

Publisher’s Cataloging-In-Publication Data (Prepared by The Donohue Group, Inc.) Names: Shally-Jensen, Michael, editor. Title: The Cold War (1945-1991) / editor, Michael Shally-Jensen, PhD. Other Titles: Defining documents in American history (Salem Press) Description: [First edition]. | Ipswich, Massachusetts : Salem Press, a division of EBSCO Information Services ; [Amenia, New York] : Grey House Publishing, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: ISBN 978-1-61925-858-7 (set) | ISBN 978-1-68217-391-6 (vol. 1) | ISBN 978-1-68217-392-3 (vol. 2) Subjects: LCSH: Cold War--Sources. | United States--Politics and government--1945-1989--Sources. | United States--Foreign relations--Soviet Union--Sources. | Soviet Union--Foreign relations--United States--Sources. | World politics--1945-1989--Sources. Classification: LCC E813 .C65 2016 | DDC 973.918--dc23

FIRST PRINTING PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Table of Contents Publisher’s Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Editor’s Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

VOLUME 1 Postwar Cold War Potsdam Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Truman Doctrine Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Speech on the Marshall Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 “The Sources of Soviet Content” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Vyshinky’s Speech to the UN General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 NATO Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Memorandum on Lifting the Soviet Blockade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Dean Acheson on the “Loss” of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Atomic Explosion in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 International Control of Atomic Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Report to the American People on Korea and US Policy in the Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Statement by President Truman upon Signing the Mutual Security Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 A “New Look” at National Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 “Atoms for Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Balkan Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138 President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Baghdad Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 President Sukarno's Address at the Bandung Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 Warsaw Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 v

Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176 Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .186 Launching of the Sputnik Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195 Eisenhower on Science in National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .199 “Communism in the Americas” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206 Fidel Castro’s Speech at Twenty-One Nations Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 Nixon and Khrushchev: The Kitchen Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224

Red Scare Executive Order 9835 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233 Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241 Ronald Reagan’s Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .246 Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251 Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .256 Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Speech to the Republican Women's Club of Wheeling, West Virginia . . . . . . . .262 “Declaration of Conscience” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .266 Rosenberg Case Excerpts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272 In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .280 Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287

VOLUME 2

Escalation and Détente The U2 Spy-Plane—Excerpts of a Speech by Khrushchev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293 Eisenhower’s Farewell Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .298 Telegram from the US Mission in Berlin regarding the Sealing-off of East Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303 Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .307 JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311 JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316 vi

JFK: “A Strategy of Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .322 JFK: “Ich bin ein Berliner” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .329 Televised Interview with President Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .333 Limited Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339 On Alleged Soviet and Cuban Connections with Lee Harvey Oswald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .347 LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .351 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358 The “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .364 Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .368 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378 Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .384 Nuclear Accidents Measures Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .391 Documents Relating to Normalization of Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China . . .395 Biological Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406 Jackson-Vanik Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .412 Helsinki Accords (Excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .416 Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .419 US Contingency Plans in Light of Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .426 Charter 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .431 SALT II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .436

End Game Documents Relating to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .443 CIA Cable on the Situation in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .448 Ronald Reagan's “Evil Empire” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .452 Able Archer ‘83: The Soviet “War Scare” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .459 Ronald Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .467 Ronald Reagan's “Tear Down This Wall” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .471 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .478 Mikhail Gorbachev's UN Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .490 US Embassy Cables Concerning the Crackdown on Tiananmen Square . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .498 Egon Krenz Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .503 Gorbachev’s Farewell Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .506

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Appendixes Chronological List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .513 Web Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .516 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .519 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .529

Publisher’s Note Defining Documents in American History series, produced by Salem Press, consists of a collection of essays on important historical documents by a diverse range of writers on a broad range of subjects in American history. This established series offers nineteen titles ranging from Exploration & Colonial America to the present volume, The Cold War (1945 to 1991). This 2-volume set, Defining Documents in American History: Cold War (1945-1991), offers in-depth analysis of a broad range of historical documents and historic events related to the Cold War era, starting with Potsdam Accords in 1945 at the end of World War II and Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946. The 1950s and 60s saw the United States struggling to deal with fears related to Communism, starting with the trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to the Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The McCarthy era “witch hunts” and testimony before the House UnAmerican Activities Committee define the Red Scare in the United States. An era of negotiation that led to détente and a de-escalation of the Cold War began with the brinksmanship of the Able Archer exercises and ended with the opening of the Berlin Wall. This set covers all this and more, with the close study of eightysix primary source documents to delivers a thorough examination of the Cold War and its effect on the U.S. from 1945 to 1991. The material is organized under four broad categories:

historians and teachers, that includes a Summary Overview, Defining Moment, Author Biography, Document Analysis, and Essential Themes. Readers will appreciate the diversity of the collected texts, including letters, doctrines, memos, speeches, executive orders, treaties, laws, government reports, and national security orders, among other genres. An important feature of each essay is a close reading of the primary source that develops evidence of broader themes, such as the author’s rhetorical purpose, social or class position, point of view, and other relevant issues. In addition, essays are organized by section themes, listed above, highlighting major issues of the period, many of which extend across eras and continue to shape life as we know it around the world. Each section begins with a brief introduction that defines questions and problems underlying the subjects in the historical documents. Each essay also includes a Bibliography and Additional Reading section for further research. Appendixes

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Chronological List arranges all documents by year. Web Resources is an annotated list of websites that offer valuable supplemental resources. Bibliography lists helpful articles and books for further study.

Contributors

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Post-War Cold War--an examination of the events following World War II that led to the Cold War Red Scare--from loyalty screenings to the Senate’s censure of Joseph McCarthy Escalation and Détente--the downing of a U2 spy plane to SALT II End Game--starting with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and ending with Gorbachev’s farewell address

Salem Press would like to extend its appreciation to all involved in the development and production of this work. The essays have been written and signed by scholars of history, humanities, and other disciplines related to the essays’ topics. Without these expert contributions, a project of this nature would not be possible. A full list of contributor’s names and affiliations appears in the front matter of this volume.A full list of contributor’s names and affiliations appears in the front matter of this volume.

Essay Format

The Cold War is a two-volume set that contains 86 primary source documents—many in their entirety. Each document is supported by a critical essay, written by

ix

Editor’s Introduction For more than 45 years following the end of World War II, the Cold War dominated political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as with many other nations of the world. It cast, moreover, a long shadow over the American domestic scene and became a central part of life in the Soviet Union and other communist nations. The state of political tension and military rivalry that was the Cold War, while it did not result in outright combat between the two principals, spawned numerous proxy wars and international incidents. It was a “war” like no other. Arising out of the chaos of postwar Europe and from US and USSR foreign policy aims, the Cold War was responsible for the nuclear arms race, the division of the world into Communist and non-Communist states (along with non-aligned states), violent conflicts in the developing world, and the polarization of political ideologies and wills. It created population shifts, major economic disruptions, and vast changes in the social, cultural, and intellectual landscapes of many of the nations involved. It loomed so large in the second half of the twentieth century that few, if any, of the world’s inhabitants escaped its reach.

ritorial claims and prestige as a result of the role it had played in defeating Nazi Germany. It quickly imposed an “iron curtain,” as Churchill (and some before him) memorably phrased it, around the areas it controlled in Central and Eastern Europe, namely, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. (Yugoslavia became communist but kept its distance from Moscow; Albania, also communist, was aligned with the USSR.) Although these states were not comparable in their military-industrial potential to those in the west, the Soviets and their protégés made the most of what they had and sought to challenge Western claims to dominance, at least. The fact that movements inside countries such as Greece, Italy, China, Vietnam, and France were inspired by communist models of progress helped lend weight to the Soviet experiment. The Chinese Revolution of 1949, in particular, threw many Western observers for a loop. (Accusations over the “loss” of China remained a political staple for decades.) Inside the Soviet Union, technological advances came quickly enough to permit the testing of an atomic bomb in 1949. The arms race quickly advanced to the next level: development of a “super” bomb based on nuclear fusion and featuring greatly increased explosive power. The United States obtained such a weapon by 1952, and the Soviet Union by 1955. Thus, through a combination of jostling for power in an unsettled postwar environment and seeking superiority in arms, US and Soviet leaders unleashed on the world the decades-long struggle known as the Cold War. Almost from the start, American officials came to rely on a policy of containment, meaning resistance on every front to the apparent expansionist goals of the Soviet Union. For their part, Soviet officials often found themselves constrained by the need to support or fight battles they would not have chosen on their own. For every communist uprising abroad there arose the need to provide backing for it and, therefore, to adjust Soviet strategy accordingly. The same type of constraining action also impacted US policymakers as the Korean and Vietnam wars, with all their pitfalls, gave clear witness. Sadly, too, the Cold War gave Communist leaders the means to justify their repressive internal policies by arguing that those policies were a necessary response in the face of a dangerous external enemy. A similar kind of ideological narrowing occurred in the United States,

Emergence

At the start of World War II, six great powers existed in the world: Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States. By the end of the war, none but the United States retained the kind of economic and military might that qualified it as an undisputed global power. That status was reinforced by the fact the only the United States possessed—and had used—atomic weapons. America also had enormous manufacturing capacity, vast domestic and foreign oil reserves, and had endured none of the devastation of its homeland that the other countries had. The US-sponsored Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Western Europe, and the subsequent US-led North American Treaty Organization (NATO), meant that key centers of political and economic growth and development were aligned with the United States against the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc of communist states. Japan, too, operated as a US client state during the postwar period and after. The Soviet Union, despite having been hard hit by the war, entered the postwar period with significant terxi

particularly in the immediate postwar years when the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senator Joseph McCarthy succeeded in whipping up a great Red Scare, or anti-communist frenzy, across the nation. Many lives were ruined as a result.

the contra movement in Nicaragua, aimed at felling the leftist Sandinista government there. Policy-wise, there were ups and downs. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States enjoyed a brief period of improvement after the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953. This was evident during the Nikita Khrushchev–Dwight Eisenhower years in the form of the Geneva Summit of 1955 and the “spirit of Camp David” meeting of 1959, though neither encounter produced much of substance. In the later Khrushchev years a strategy of “peaceful coexistence” was followed, yielding two arms-control agreements—a partial nuclear test-ban treaty and a compact regarding the use of a crisis hotline—with the administration of John F. Kennedy. During the Leonid Brezhnev–Richard Nixon years a policy of détente prevailed, producing several notable arms-limitation agreements and a string of Soviet-American summit meetings. The most important of the détente agreements was SALT I, which banned certain anti-ballistic missile defense systems and imposed a five-year moratorium on the building of new strategic ballistic missiles (ground-to-ground and sea-to-ground missiles).

Entrenchment

Throughout the Cold War, relations between the Soviet Union and the West alternated between periods of tension and crisis followed by periods of lessened tension and modest cooperation. Such crises included the Soviet blockade of Berlin (1948–49), US and USSR (as well as Chinese) involvement in the Korean War, Soviet threats to cut off access to West Berlin (1958), the erection of the Berlin Wall (1961), the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1962–75), and crises in the Middle East (1970, 1973). Although the two superpowers never engaged each other militarily, the Soviet Union and the United States both were involved in conflicts aimed at either drawing smaller states to their side or preventing them from going over to the other side. The Russians, for example, sent troops into Berlin (1953) to halt a workers’ revolt, into Hungary (1956) to quash a popular uprising, into Czechoslovakia (1968) to topple a reformist government, and into Afghanistan (1979) to fortify a faltering Soviet puppet regime. In the mid-1970s, Moscow assisted the Cubans in sending in troops into Angola and Ethiopia to prop up Marxist governments. In the early 1980s, the Soviets threatened to use force to quell the Solidarity movement in Poland and to keep a weakend communist leadership in place. On the American side, the situation was not entirely different, even though the ostensible goal there was the preservation of democracy rather than the spreading of communism. The United States aided the overthrow of progressive or leftist governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), supported a failed effort to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba (1961), sent troops to the Dominican Republic (1965) to prevent a communist government from taking power, and assisted in a military coup against a popular leftist government in Chile (1973), resulting in its replacement by a right-wing dictatorship. In 1983 the Reagan administration authorized the invasion of the tiny island nation of Grenada on anticommunist grounds, an action that took place just two days after the bombing of a US military barracks in Beirut. Critics viewed the Grenada attack as cover for an embarrassing US pullout in Beirut. The same administration also helped organize and maintain

Extinction

One key precedent to the SALT concord was President Nixon’s visit to China in early 1972, followed by his visit to Moscow. That strategy, aimed at playing the two communist nations off against one another and setting up the United States as a potential third-party friend (within limits), was itself made possible by an earlier Sino-Soviet split. Beginning in the 1960s, the Chinese and Soviets went their separate ways ideologically, and in 1969 even engaged in a brief border war. Their increasingly divided positions made possible Nixon’s “opening” to China and subsequent discussions with the Soviets regarding mutual arms limitations. The consequent global arrangement contributed to a period of relative calm (with exceptions) during the 1970s. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, however, and the election of conservative Ronald Reagan as US president in 1980, the Cold War seemed back on track. Troubles in Poland in 1980–81 added to that picture, even as some new twists occurred, such as the emergence of the first trade union, Solidarity, not controlled by the Communist Party. Reagan fell back on describing the Soviet Union in biblical terms as an “evil empire” that surely must succumb to the righteous forces of the West. He proposed a space-age Strategic xii

Defense Initiative toward ensuring that outcome, but the idea of sealing off the United States from missile attack was never accepted by the Soviets and proved technologically unfeasible in any event. Partly as a result of the war in Afghanistan, and definitely as a result of the arms race and the need to maintain its vast military, the Soviet Union found itself in a technological and economic downswing by the mid-1980s. The incoming premier at the time, Mikhail Gorbachev, undertook to implement major reforms, suggested by the bywords perestroika (reconstruction), glasnost (openness), and democratization. Gorbachev partnered with Reagan in 1986–87 to abolish all intermediate-range nuclear missiles; he pulled out Soviet forces from Afghanistan; he scaled-back or ended Soviet support of regimes in conflict situations worldwide; and he announced a brand of “new thinking” under which old rivalries and stale political formulas were to be abandoned in favor of a new era of ideological pluralism and positive international relations. All of this was unprecedented in Soviet—and world—history. In reaction to Gorbachev’s loosening of central control, a series of popular uprisings occurred in Eastern and Central Europe between 1989 and 1990. Poland ended 40 years of Communist rule in August 1989 as a newly elected government came into power. Hungary, having permitted thousands of East German “holiday visitors” to pass through its territory on their way (covertly) to West Germany, then declared itself a democratic republic. In East Germany, after initially unleashing a hard-line response to popular disturbances, authorities relented and allowed citizens to exit the country; Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate was opened on December 22 and the Berlin Wall soon came down. Likewise, hundreds of thousands of Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians joined hands in a human chain stretching across the three Soviet republics—and won their freedom. Elsewhere, Georgians, Ukrainians, Czechoslovaks, Romanians, and numerous other peoples across the Soviet Bloc pushed for radical reform, and got it. In Russia itself, voters brought in a group of reform candidates

to a newly reconstituted parliament in 1989; after two additional years of great political upheaval, the Soviet Union was finally dissolved. Only in China was a student revolt (June 1989) in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square put down permanently and a full-scale crackdown implemented to preserve complete Communist Party control. (In contrast, North Korea and Cuba, among other Communist states, never experienced—or allowed—unrest.) The Cold War ended with the extinction of the Soviet Union and, along with it, the competition between the two superpowers. The world suddenly became a more complex, multifaceted place in which the United States remained the sole global power. American politicians touted this as a “victory,” even while the Soviet collapse was more likely a combination of external political pressures and internal social and economic factors. Despite the Cold War’s end, however, no “calm and sober world” was forthcoming. Instead, new challenges and threats arose, including ethnic violence and the spread of terrorism. Russia under Vladimir Putin took a hard turn away from any rapprochement with the West, making moves to capture Eurasian territories reminiscent of the Soviet Union. While there may no longer be a Cold War today, there is certainly no widespread peace and prosperity, either. —Michael Shally-Jensen, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Brown, Archie. The Rise and Fall of Communism. New York: HarperCollins, 2009. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005. Leffler, Melvin P. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New York: Hill & Wang, 2007. Nogee, Joseph L. and Robert H. Donaldson. Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II, 4th ed. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Print. Painter, David S. The Cold War: An International History. New York: Routledge, 1999.

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Contributors Michael P Auerbach, MA Marblehead, Massachusetts

Kevin Grimm, PhD Regent University

William E. Burns, PhD George Washington University

Laurence Mazzeno, PhD Norfolk, Virginia

Steven L. Danver, PhD Walden University

Scott C. Monje, PhD Tarrytown, NY

Amber R. Dickinson, PhD Oklahoma State University

Michael Shally-Jensen, PhD Amherst, MA

Tracey DiLascio, JD Framingham, MA

Robert Surbrug, PhD Bay Path University

Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Historic New England

Vanessa Vaughn, MA Chicago, Illinois

Nettie Farris, University of Louisville

Anthony Vivian University of California, Los Angeles

Ashleigh Fata, MA University of California, Los Angeles

Donald A. Watt, PhD Middleton, ID

Gerald F. Goodwin, PhD Bloomington, IN

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DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The Cold War (1945-1991)

POSTWAR COLD WAR T

roubles giving rise to the Cold War emerged early on in the post–World War II environment. The Russians, after agreeing to general elections in Poland, imposed a communist government there instead, upsetting the Americans, British, and French (not to mention the Poles). The Western Allies looked to assist in the rebuilding of Germany, and hoped to revisit plans regarding Berlin. The Soviets, in contrast, used whatever they could find in Germany to begin rebuilding Russia, and had no interest in further discussions about Berlin. Elsewhere, as in Iran, the British and Americans removed their forces promptly per their agreement with Moscow, but the Soviets dragged their feet and felt no need to offer an explanation. It was in this context that Winston Churchill arrived in the United States, in March 1946, to warn of an “iron curtain” going up around Soviet-controlled areas of Europe and the need for the West to display strength rather than weakness. For US diplomat George Kennan and the policymakers he persuaded (which was just about everyone), the appropriate strategy was that of “containment,” or long-term frustration of Soviet designs to expand communist influence. In line with the policy of containment, therefore, the Americans shaped the Marshall Plan to serve the purpose not only of reconstructing war-torn Europe but of stopping the spread of communism there. When in 1947 Walter Lipmann published a book of commentaries entitled The Cold War, readers knew what he was talking about and the phrase stuck. A 1948 Soviet blockade of Berlin seemed to confirm that the Kremlin might be willing to go to war over postwar arrangements, but a US airlift into the city produced a stalemate and, the following year, the blockade was abandoned. By then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been authorized, causing alarm in Moscow. In China, meanwhile, by October 1949 the Communist Party had proclaimed a people’s republic after defeating US-supported nationalist forces. Despite

much fingerpointing in Washington over the “loss” of China, the Americans kept their main focus on the Soviet Union as its Cold War adversary. It was the Soviets, not the Chinese, who initially backed the North Koreans in the latter’s invasion of South Korea in the summer of 1950, although within a few months Chinese forces had crossed the Yalu River and entered the war. The Cold War was now definitely a hot situation. On the arms front, too, things were heating up. Having exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, the Kremlin soon would catch up with the United States in possessing the hydrogen bomb, or “super.” The Cold War was, among other things, a growing fear that nuclear conflict might decimate the planet. Hence the need, in the minds of the two superpowers’ military planners, to maintain weapons parity at all costs. There was also organizational parity, to a degree—in the form of the Warsaw Pact, intended as a Communist counter to NATO. With Dwight Eisenhower replacing Harry Truman in the White House in 1952, the Cold War rumbled on. The Korean War was brought to a halt, or armistice, even though simmering hostilities remained between the North and the South. In Indochina, a similar North-South conflict between Vietnamese communists and pro-Western forces was just beginning, following a 10-year war there against French colonialists. Eisenhower pledged support to the South, on the assumption that if any country fell to communism its neighbors were at risk of toppling too, like “dominos.” Meanwhile, deliberate efforts to topple governments were undertaken by the CIA in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), with “success” achieved in each case. (The populaces of those two countries, of course, tended to see the matter differently.) Between war involvements and military coups, a pattern was now set that would guide the US security apparatus for decades to come. By the end of the 1950s, the Cold War would spread even to space, as Soviet and American scientists raced to demonstrate control of regions beyond the earth’s surface. 1

 Potsdam Agreement Date: August 1, 1945 Authors: Governments of the United States, Soviet Union, China, and United Kingdom Genre: government document Summary Overview

Shortly after Germany surrendered to the Allies on May 8, 1945, US president Harry S. Truman, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin met at the Potsdam Conference to complete an agreement on the treatment of postwar Germany. The leaders agreed to completely dismantle the Nazi Party (the National Socialist Party) and Germany’s military in order to prevent that country’s potential for remilitarization. Furthermore, the Potsdam participants established an agreement, in principle, for the division of Germany and the reestablishment of previously conquered European, Middle Eastern, and North African nations, as well as a plan of action for dealing with Japan once it was defeated.

soon come to a close now that the Allies were gaining momentum. On May 7, with Adolf Hitler dead and his Nazi regime disintegrated, German officials signed the instrument of surrender at Reims in northwestern France, and the terms of the surrender came into effect on the following day. The groundwork laid at the Yalta Conference now required rapid and comprehensive development. At this point, however, the complexion of the Big Three had changed as well as the political conditions in which they met. In March, Soviet troops finally expelled German forces from Poland, leaving the Soviet Union with a sizable spoil before the war was officially over. On April 12, Roosevelt suffered stroke and died, and his vice president, Harry S. Truman, assumed the presidency. Meanwhile, Churchill, who was an integral leader in the wartime coalition, had been replaced in the 1945 election by Labour Party leader Clement Attlee. Finally, Truman was preparing to end the war in the Pacific theater by dropping the first atomic bomb on Japan. When Truman, Attlee, Churchill (who attended the conference for a week before being replaced by Attlee), and Stalin convened at Potsdam, theirs was a monumental and highly complex task. The principal item on their agenda was a discussion of how to treat the defeated Germans, including the complete dismantlement of the Nazi regime and military in such a way that prevented future incarnations of Nazi-style nationalism. Also pressing was the resettlement of millions of refugees, who had scattered across the globe in search of refuge from war and persecution. Furthermore, after the Axis forces invaded and annexed sovereign nations, there remained a question of how to redraw the borders of Europe’s nations.

Defining Moment

By the spring of 1945, fighting in the European theater (which included portions of North Africa and the Middle East) came to an end with the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. Approximately thirty-nine million soldiers and civilians died in this theater alone, while fighting, destruction, and casualties continued in the Pacific theater. The conflict left the entire region in a state of near chaos. Toppled governments left leadership vacuums, and long-standing borders had been erased. National economies had collapsed. Millions of displaced civilians, escaping the battlefield as well as Nazi persecution, sought new places in which to reside when hostilities came to an end. Having gained an advantage against the Axis in Europe by early 1945, the “Big Three”—US president Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill—had met in February at the Crimean resort town of Yalta to discuss how to rebuild after the war and how to treat the vanquished enemy. To be sure, war continued in Japan, but the three leaders anticipated that that war would

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HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Protocol of the Proceedings, August l, 1945 The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions: I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements: “(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. “(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers. “ (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time. “ (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. “(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for

Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. “(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments. “(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. “(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.” B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows: Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France. “The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it. “The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows: “In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U.S.S.R., His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of

Potsdam Agreement

China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty’s Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation.” C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved. II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. 1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

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2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany. 3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are: (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:— (a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; (b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or

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resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. 9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end: (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation; (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government; (iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES. 11. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. 13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: (a) mining and industrial production and its allocation; (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing; (c) wages, prices and rationing; (d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; (f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential; (g) transportation and communications. In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: (a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament,

Potsdam Agreement

demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. (b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.). (c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. (d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. (e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities. 16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 17. Measures shall be promptly taken: (a) to effect essential repair of transport; (b) to enlarge coal production; (c) to maximize agricultural output; and (d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

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19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement. III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY. 1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., and from appropriate German external assets. 2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets. 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: (a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. (b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within

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two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6. 8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below. 9. The Governments of the U.K. and U.S.A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria. 10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany. IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed: (1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.A. (2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the tech-

nical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government. (3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.A. for experimental and technical purposes. (4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships. (5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located. (6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission. B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:— (1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A.

Potsdam Agreement

The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland. (2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority. (3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1). (4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers. (5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located. V. CITY 0F KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA. The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay

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of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia. The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier. The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. VI. WAR CRIMINALS. The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September. VII. AUSTRIA. The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna. It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria. VIII. POLAND. A. DECLARATION. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accor-

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dance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated. The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND. In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland

and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories cast of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. IX. CONCLUSION on PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views. For their part the three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace

Potsdam Agreement

Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries. The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that: 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; 2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above. The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. X. TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP. The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in

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the Charter of the United Nations Organization. After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. XI. REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY. The three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government’s proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. (Annex I) XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS. The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible

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the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany. The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council. XIII. OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA. The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot. XIV. IRAN. It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945. XV. THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER. A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached: Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international. The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

XVI. THE BLACK SEA STRAITS. The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. XVII. INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS. The Conference considered a proposal of the U.S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. XVIII. EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT CONFERENCE. The British and U.S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U.S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference. XIX. DIRECTIVES TO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY. The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties. XX. USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELLITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES. The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels. XXI. MILITARY TALKS. During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest.

Potsdam Agreement

ANNEX I TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. AND U.K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN HUNGARY. In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission [ACC] in Hungary. 1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need. Directives of the ACC on questions or principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives. 2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions 3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys. 4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week. 5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with

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the President of the ACC. I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future. ANNEX II USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES 1. The burden of reparation and “war trophies” should not fall on Allied nationals. 2. Capital Equipment—We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, “war trophies,” or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals. The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U.S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment. These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U.S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation. 3. Current Production—While the U.S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations. We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately- modify

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any existing arrangements which may have that effect. (b) Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945 (1) We—The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. (2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist. (3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, All mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. (4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason. (5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. (6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is

GLOSSARY potash: potassium carbonate tripartite: divided into or consisting of three parts

driven from the world. (7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. (8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. (9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. (10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established. (11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. (12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government. (13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Potsdam Agreement

Document Analysis

After Germany formally surrendered in May 1945, President Truman, Premier Stalin, and Prime Ministers Churchill and Attlee were able to build on the groundwork that had been laid at Yalta when they convened at the Potsdam Conference in July. The main areas of focus of the Potsdam Agreement are the establishment of a council that would resolve latent territorial and security issues from the war, addressing postwar Germany and redrawing national borders (including establishing areas of influence) that had been erased during the war. The first focal point the Potsdam Agreement addresses is the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. This council is to be comprised of representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, as well as China and France (neither of which were represented at Potsdam and, therefore, required an invitation to join). This organization is to meet periodically to address unresolved territorial disputes and formalize treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Finland. The council will also serve as the successor to the European Advisory Commission, which had already divided Germany into zones occupied by the Allies; the Potsdam Agreement concludes that the European Advisory Commission is to be summarily dissolved. The agreement also addresses territories gained or liberated by the Allies during the war, including Soviet-acquired territories extending westward to (and including) the easternmost German city of Königsberg in the Baltic region. One of the most pressing issues facing the Potsdam Conference was the question of Germany. The Potsdam Agreement supports the Agreement on Control of Machinery in Germany, which had been signed at the European Advisory Commission in July 1945, and divides Germany into four separate zones of occupation, overseen by United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. The agreement states that Germany’s military, economic, and political infrastructures be either fully dismantled or redirected in such a way that they prevented any future resurgence of Nazi groups or other nationalistic, militaristic trends in that country. The document lays plans for Germany’s military (including the navy and merchant marine, in particular) to be completely dissolved, with weaponry destroyed, and for the Nazi Party to be fully abolished, with its members purged from government and replaced with democratically-elected leaders. Furthermore, the agreement calls for German war criminals to

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be captured and placed on trial for their actions. On the economic side, the Potsdam Agreement outlines plans for Germany’s main industries to be strictly regulated, with an emphasis placed on traditional, nonviolent areas such as agriculture, fishing, and forestry. Finally, the agreement establishes a system by which German reparations should be paid to the Allies. In addition to the aforementioned issues surrounding Germany and territories gained by the Allies, the Potsdam Agreement addresses the establishment of a Polish provisional government as well as the extension of Poland’s borders to the Oder and Neisse Rivers, known as the Oder-Neisse line. The Potsdam Agreement attempts to compensate for Polish territorial losses in the east to the Soviet Union, which had been agreed upon at the Yalta Conference, by extending the Polish borders westward into Germany. Poland had been invaded in September 1939 by Germany from the west and the Soviet Union from the east and remained a major postwar issue in terms of rebuilding that nation’s government. Questions also remained about Soviet-occupied territory and resettling the millions of Poles who had either fled or were deported from their homeland after these invasions. The Potsdam Agreement asserts that Poles returning to their home country “shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.” The agreement also establishes rules for the conduct of the occupying powers. Those forces that destroyed property or natural resources, as well as those who took “war trophies,” while serving in occupied territories would be expected to account for and compensate the governments of those territories. Similarly, any war trophies regained by the Allies from defeated Axis forces should be returned. Finally, the Allies used Potsdam as a platform to offer Japan terms for its unconditional surrender. The European victory, the leaders said, should send a message to the Japanese emperor that his own country’s defeat was imminent. The Potsdam Agreement calls upon Japan to immediately disarm and return any illegally conquered lands. Such a step would be toward international peace, the leaders advised; refusal to agree to the Allied terms of surrender, on the other hand, would result in Japan’s “prompt and utter destruction.” Essential Themes

The Potsdam Conference convened in the wake of the surrender of Germany in the spring of 1945. The con-

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ference’s main three participants—US president Truman, Soviet premier Stalin, and British prime ministers Churchill and then Attlee—used the opportunity to build on the foundation laid at the Yalta Conference earlier in the year. With what the participants saw as an inevitable victory over Japan, the conferees set out to create a framework to dissolve German military forces and Nazi organizations, to address latent security and territorial issues, and to establish a plan to repatriate millions of wartime refugees. Central to addressing a wide range of wartime and postwar security and territorial issues was the Council of Foreign Ministers, which this agreement established would be comprised of the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom, as well as France and China. Other issues—such as the Baltic territories acquired by the Soviet Union during the war and the Polish question—were given significant exposure at this conference, although the Soviet Union’s established presence and clout in these regions largely rendered such issues moot. Many historians point to the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences as the groundwork for the subsequent Cold War, particularly for the decision to

divide Germany into separate zones of occupation and for granting British and American recognition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe. For example, although the Potsdam Agreement asserted that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would hold “free and unfettered elections as soon as possible,” these elections were postponed and manipulated by Soviet and Polish Communists. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Dobbs, Michael. Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman—From World War to Cold War. New York: Vintage, 2013. Print. Piotrowski, Tadeusz, ed. The Polish Deportees of World War II: Recollections of Removal to the Soviet Union and Dispersal throughout the World. Jefferson: McFarland, 2004. Print. Plokhy, S. M. Yalta: The Price of Peace. New York: Viking, 2010. Print. “The Potsdam Conference, 1945.” Office of the Historian. United States Dept. of State, n.d. Web. 7 Jan. 2014.

Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946

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 Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946 Date: February 9, 1946 Author: Joseph V. Stalin Genre: Speech Summary Overview

In a campaign speech before his nominal election to the Supreme Soviet (legislature), Joseph Stalin warns the Soviet people that the post-World War II era would not bring the relief from austerity and regimentation as they had been led to believe was coming. Moreover, he predicts a new war on the horizon because of what he sees as the inherent characteristics of capitalism in the imperialist era. Defining Moment

The 1930s had been a time of collectivization, deprivation, and forced industrialization. Historian V. Zubok has summed up the popular view of the five-year plans of the 1930s this way: “Extreme tension, no luxury, no consumer goods, everything for defense, people sleeping five hours, working for fifteen hours, stuff like that.” On top of that came strict social control and almost random arrests, incarcerations, and executions. World War II, which the USSR entered with the German invasion of June 22, 1941, was also a time of deprivation, suffering, and death. Roughly 27 million Soviet citizens died, more than half of them civilians. Even after the victory, famine endured. Yet the war saw a loosening of social controls, and expectations grew of a greater easing once the war had ended. The war had been fought in alliance with the “Western bourgeois powers,” the United States and the United Kingdom, against Nazi Germany, three countries that Stalin had once lumped together as essentially the same. The future of that alliance was one of the great unanswered questions of the immediate postwar period. Through the end of 1945, Soviet leaders had continued to speak optimistically, if cautiously, of the continuing relationship. There was still a hope of achieving Soviet foreign policy goals without disrupting ties with the West. The term “Alliance” was still used. Plans for expanding cultural and scientific contacts remained in place. Nonetheless, tensions were already

emerging over, for example, the United States’ sudden revocation of Lend-Lease on the day the war ended, the US refusal to grant Moscow a loan for reconstruction, and Western objections to the USSR’s behavior in the East European countries that it had occupied during the war. Although he expressed equanimity before foreign officials, Stalin was also concerned about the Western monopoly on atomic weapons. He assumed that the bombing of Hiroshima was intended to intimidate the Soviet Union and proceeded to launch his own crash program to develop the bomb on top of the existing challenges of reconstruction. Stalin was not known for soaring oratory. Preferring to work alone or in small groups, often late at night, he was not given to making public speeches at all. Moreover, he certainly had no need to campaign for his “election” to the Supreme Soviet, the USSR’s nominal legislature, in 1946. (The official—and only—slate, which included a token sampling of people who were not party members, received 99.2 percent of the vote.) So his decision to make a campaign speech at the Bolshoi Theater on the eve of election day suggested that he had something important to say. Author Biography

Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (1878–1953), who had adopted the revolutionary pseudonym Stalin (from the Russian word stal’, steel, and a common name ending), was a formative leader of the USSR. In 1922, his patron, V. I. Lenin, appointed him to the new position of general secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for party records and administration. After Lenin died, Stalin used the office to curry favor with lower and mid-level party officials, place his supporters in key positions, and generally outmaneuver his rivals in the ruling Politburo. Starting in the late 1920s, he launched the “revolution from above,” forcing peasants into party-controlled collectives, funneling investment into the building of heavy industries, expanding the po-

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lice apparatus, and purging the party, state, economic, and military leadership at multiple levels. His style of governing in this period has been described as “random terror.” Yet many Russians later credited him with the

victory over Nazi Germany in World War II (or, as Russians now call it, the Great Patriotic War), giving him an ambiguous role in Russia’s collective memory.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Chairman:Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin has the floor. (Comrade Stalin’s appearance in the rostrum was greeted by the voters with loud cheers lasting several minutes. The entire audience in the Bolshoi Theatre rose to its feet to greet Comrade Stalin. There were continuous cries of “Cheers for great Stalin!” “Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!” “Cheers for our beloved Stalin!”) Comrade Stalin: Comrades! Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This has been a period replete with events of a decisive nature. The first four years were years of intense labor on the part of Soviet people in carrying out the Third Five-Year Plan. The second four years covered the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors—the events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the war was the main event during the past period. It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of a general crisis and military conflicts, that, in view of that, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute “spheres of influence” in its own favor— by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capital-

ist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them. Perhaps catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development. Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, the First World War broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the Second World War broke out. This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War differed substantially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states—Germany, Japan and Italy—destroyed the last remnants of bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of the sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory, and shouted from the housetops that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis Powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the freedom-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis Powers, unlike the First World War, assumed from the very outset the character of an antifascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis Powers could only augment—and really did augment—the antifascist and liberating character of the Second World War. It was on this basis that the antifascist coalition of the

Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946

Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the Axis Powers. That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the Second World War. Everybody, perhaps, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or lightning war. As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most arduous ever fought in the history of our Motherland. But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school which examined and tested all the forces of the people. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that concealed the actual features of states, governments and parties, and brought them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and merits. The war was something in the nature of an examination of our Soviet system, of our State, of our Government and of our Communist Party, and it summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and organizations, their life and work scrutinize them carefully and treat them according to their deserts. This is one of the positive sides of the war. For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us quickly and impartially appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports of the representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up the results, and so, forth. This is a complicated and laborious job, and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders and has summed it up. It is now much easier for us to examine it, and arrive at correct conclusions. And so, what is the summation of the war? [Here, in 15 paragraphs, Stalin argues that victory in the war proved the validity of the Soviet social system, the Soviet multinational state, and the Soviet military.]

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Such, in the main, is the summation of the war. It would be wrong to think that such a historical victory could have been achieved without preliminary preparation by the whole country for active defense. It would be no less wrong to assume that such preparation could have been made in a short space of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow of such an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in, sufficient quantities, elementary things such as: metals—for the production of armaments, equipment and industrial machinery; fuel—to ensure the operation of industry and transport; cotton—to manufacture army clothing; grain—to supply the army with food. Can it be said that before entering the Second World War our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three five-year plans of national-economic development. It was these three five-year plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the Second World War, in 1940, than it was before the First World War, in 1913. What were the material potentialities at our country’s disposal before the Second World War? To help you understand this I will have to make you a brief report on the activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active defense. If we take the data for 1940 the eve of the Second World War—and compare it with the data for 1913—the eve of the First World War—we shall get the following picture. In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,000 tons of steel, 29,000,000 tons

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of coal, 9,000,000 tons of oil, 21,600,000 tons of market grain and 740,000 tons of raw cotton. Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the First World War. This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war. As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country: 15,000,000 tons of pig iron, i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel, i.e., four and a half times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons of coal, i.e., five and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of market grain, i.e., 17,000,000 tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913. Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the Second World War. This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war. The difference, as you see, is colossal. This unprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country. This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three five-year plans, beginning with 1928 with the first year of the First Five-Year Plan. Up to that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted upon us by the First World War and the Civil War. If we take into consideration the fact that the First Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years, and that the execution of the Third Five-Year Plan was interrupted by the war in the fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country took only about thirteen years. It cannot but be admitted that thirteen years is an incredibly short period for the execution of such a gigantic task. It is this that explains the storm of debate that was roused in the foreign press at one time by the publication of these figures. Our friends decided that a “miracle” had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us pro-

claimed that the five-year plans were “Bolshevik propaganda” and “tricks of the Cheka.” But as miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the laws of social development, “public opinion” abroad was obliged to resign itself to the facts. By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material potentialities in so short a time? First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country. The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization usually starts with light industry. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital turnover is faster, and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light industry becomes the first object of industrialization, in those countries. Only after the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in the banks, only after this, does the turn of heavy industry come and accumulation begin gradually to be transferred to heavy industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its expansion. But this is a long process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this path. The Party knew that war was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly as possible, and that to be belated in this matter meant courting defeat. The Party remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the “ordinary” path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationalization of industry and the banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy industry. There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to transform our country into an indus-

Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946

trial country in so short a time. Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture. To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with the largest possible amount of market grain, cotton, and so forth, it was necessary to pass from small peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can employ modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of market produce. But there are two kinds of large-scale farming— capitalist and collective. The Communist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an exceedingly long process of development and requires the preliminary ruination of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural laborers. The Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into collective farms. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progressive method not only because it did not call for the ruination of the peasants, but also, and particularly, because it enabled us in the course of several years to cover the entire country with large collective farms capable of employing modern machinery, of utilizing all the achievements of agricultural science and of providing the country with the largest possible quantity of market produce. There is no doubt that without the policy of collectivization we would not have been able to put an end to the age-long backwardness of our agriculture in so short a time. It cannot be said that the Party’s policy met with no resistance. Not only backward people, who always shrink from everything new, but even many prominent members of the Party persistently tried to pull our Party back, and by every possible means tried to drag it onto the “ordinary” capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the Trotskyites and of the Rights, all their “activities” in sabotaging the measures of our Government, pursued the one object of frustrating the Party’s policy and of hindering industrialization and collectivization. But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything. It is to the Party’s credit that it did not adjust itself to the backward, that it was

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not afraid to swim against the stream, and that all the time it held on to its position of the leading force. There can be no doubt that if the Communist Party had not displayed this staunchness and perseverance it would have been unable to uphold the policy of industrializing the country and of collectivizing agriculture. Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities created in this way for the purpose of developing war production and of supplying the Red Army with the armaments it needed? I think it was, and that it did so with the utmost success. Leaving out of account the first year of the war, when the evacuation of industry to the East hindered the work of developing war production, we can say that during the three succeeding years of the war the Party achieved such successes as enabled it not only to supply the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine guns, rifles, airplanes, tanks and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves. Moreover, as is well known, the quality of our armaments, far from being inferior, was, in general, even superior to the German. It is well known, that during the last three years of the war our tank industry produced annually an average of over 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored cars. (Loud applause.) It is well known, further, that in the same period our aircraft industry produced annually up to 40,000 airplanes. (Loud applause.) It is also well known that our artillery industry in the same period produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibers (loud applause), up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns (loud applause), over 3,000,000 rifles (applause) and about 2,000,000 automatic rifles. (Applause.) Lastly, it is well known that our mortar industry in the period of 1942-44 produced annually an average of up to 100,000 mortars. (Loud applause.) It goes without saying that simultaneously we produced corresponding quantities of artillery shells, mines of various kinds, air bombs, and rifle and machine-gun cartridges. It is well known, for example, that in 1944 alone we produced over 240,000,000 shells, bombs and mines (applause) and 7,400,000,000 cartridges. (Loud

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applause.) Such is the general picture of the way the Red Army was supplied with arms and ammunition. As you see, it does not resemble the picture of the way our army was supplied during the First World War, when the front suffered a chronic shortage of artillery and shells, when the army fought without tanks and aircraft, and when one rifle was issued for every three men. As regards supplying the Red Army with food and clothing, it is common knowledge that the front not only felt no shortage whatever in this respect, but even, had the necessary reserves. This is how the matter stands as regards the activities of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the beginning of the war and during the war. Now a few words about the Communist Party’s plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new five-year plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new five-year plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the prewar level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future (loud and prolonged applause), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumers’ goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities (loud and prolonged applause), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind (applause) capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. (Loud applause.) I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. (Prolonged applause.) As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful upswing of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of prewar industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron (prolonged applause), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel (prolonged applause), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal (prolonged applause) and up to

60,000,000 tons of oil (prolonged applause). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. (Loud applause.) This will need, perhaps, another three fiveyear plans, if, not more. But it can be done, and we must do it. (Loud applause.) This, then, is my brief report on the activities of the Communist Party during the recent past and on its plans of work for the future. (Loud and prolonged applause.) It is for you to judge to what extent the Party has been and is working on the proper lines (applause), and whether it could not have worked better. (Laughter and applause.) It is said that victors are not judged (laughter and applause), that they must not be criticized, that they must not be enquired into. This is not true. Victors may and should be judged (laughter and applause), they may and should be criticized and enquired into. This is beneficial not only for the cause, but also for the victors (cries of approval and applause); there will be less swelledheadedness, and there will be more modesty. (Laughter and applause.) I regard the election campaign as the voters’ judgment of the Communist Party of our country as the ruling party. The result of the election will be the voters’ verdict. (Loud cries of approval and applause.) The Communist Party of our country would not be worth much if it feared criticism and investigation. The Communist Party is ready to receive the verdict of the voters. (Loud applause.) In this election contest the Communist Party does not stand alone. It is going to the polls in a bloc with the non-Party people. In the past Communists were rather distrustful of non-Party people and of non-Party-ism. This was due to the fact that various bourgeois groups, who thought it was not to their advantage to come before the voters without a mask, not infrequently used the non-Party flag as a screen. This was the case in the past. Times are different now. Non-Party people are now separated from the bourgeoisie by a barrier called the Soviet social system. But on the other side of the barrier the non-Party people are united with the Communists in one, common, collective body of Soviet people. Within this collective body they fought side by side to consolidate the might of our country, they fought side by side and shed their blood on the various fronts for the sake

Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946

of the freedom and greatness of our Motherland, and side by side they hammered out and forged our country’s victory over her enemies. The only difference between them is that some belong to the Party and some don’t. But this difference is only a formal one. The important thing is that all are engaged in one common cause. That is why the bloc of Communists and non-Party people is a natural and vital thing. (Loud and prolonged applause.) In conclusion, permit me to express my thanks for the confidence which you have shown me (loud and pro-

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longed applause. A voice: “Cheers for the great leader of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!”) by nominating me as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. You need have no doubt that will do my best to justify your confidence. (All rise. Loud and prolonged applause rising to an ovation. Voices in different parts of the hall: “Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!” “Cheers for the great leader of the peoples!” “Glory to great Stalin!” “Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire people!” “Glory to the creator of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!”)

GLOSSARY Cheka: the first Soviet secret police organization (1917–22) and, thereafter, a generic term for such organizations (sequentially, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, NKVD again, NKGB again, MGB, MVD, and KGB) five-year plans: a series of centralized economic plans, first introduced in the USSR in 1928; especially in the early years, they funneled investment into heavy industry, including defense-related industries, and neglected consumer goods

Document Analysis

The analytic portions of Stalin’s speech were based on Lenin’s book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917). Lenin argued that the advanced capitalist countries had been able to postpone the inevitable crisis of capitalism, predicted by Karl Marx, by establishing large colonial empires, dominating their markets, and exploiting their resources. Because capitalist powers develop at different rates, conflicts will erupt as rising capitalist powers (e.g., Germany) demand that the world be re-divided in their favor, which the established countries (e.g., France and the United Kingdom) will resist. Lenin believed that this was the cause of World War I. Stalin was now applying the theory to World War II and predicting that the same process would produce a new war in about 15 years. Note that in this point of view, the USSR cannot be responsible for war. Stalin was predicting that the USSR would be the victim of a war that started among capitalist powers. That assumption was not shared by Western leaders. Soviet statements regarding East-West relations after the war had remained cautiously optimistic up to this time. In this speech, however, Stalin dropped all references to cooperation and common goals. The West was depicted only as a potential threat, and the USSR was seen as having to assure its security unilaterally,

through the mobilization of domestic resources, belt tightening, and rearmament. Essential Themes

Stalin’s speech had implications for both domestic policy and foreign policy. The lengthy recitation of economic production figures were intended to show the success of the unpopular five-year plans of the 1930s and the vital role that they had played in preparing the defense of the USSR in World War II. Now he was saying that it would be necessary to return to that. In the eyes of some, the new goals (together with the construction of atomic industry from scratch) amounted to a new revolution from above. Although Stalin suggests that it was well known that there would be further five-year plans, the announcement came as a shock to many Russians. State propaganda during the war had encouraged the belief that life would get easier once victory had been achieved. Stalin’s reference to people being held accountable for mistakes, no doubt, also had a chilling effect, as it echoed the sort of language used during the purges. Regarding foreign policy, the speech marked a turn away from wartime cooperation. Soviet leaders already viewed the West as increasingly hostile. (That included Western press reports, which they assumed were di-

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rected by the governments.) Also the U.S. Army was not withdrawing from Europe as rapidly as expected, which they found suspicious. We do not know how literally Stalin meant his analysis. Did he really expect a war in 15 years, or did he want to be prepared just in case, or did he think that rebuilding the country’s defense capabilities would make it easier to deal with the West as an equal and that talk of war was necessary to mobilize a tired people for the effort? Western leaders, for their part, viewed the speech apprehensively, with some calling it the declaration of World War III. Stalin’s speech prompted—and was one of the events that made Washington receptive to—George Kennan’s “long telegram,” which arrived from the Moscow embassy two weeks later (and which was later reprinted in Foreign Affairs as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”). As was generally the case with speeches by Soviet leaders, the audience reactions (applause, laughter, etc.) were already included in the script before the

speech was given. Someone would be assigned to make sure they happened on cue. —Scott C. Monje, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York: Penguin P, 2011. Print. Pechatnov. Vladimir. “Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945– 47.” Cold War History 1:2 (January 2001), 1–27. Print. Sebestyen, Victor. 1946: The Making of the Modern World. New York: Pantheon Books, 2014. Print. Taubman, William. Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982. Print. Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1996. Print.

Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

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 Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech Date: March 5, 1946 Author: Winston Churchill Genre: speech Summary Overview

Former British prime minister Winston Churchill, in 1946, described the Soviet Union’s growing control over the countries of Eastern Europe behind an “iron curtain.” He called on the United States to join the United Kingdom in a “fraternal association of Englishspeaking peoples,” which in his view would be capable of deterring Soviet expansionism and securing world peace. Defining Moment

Winston Churchill was lauded as one of the great leaders of World War II. In May 1945, the month in which Germany surrendered, his approval rating in public opinion polls stood at 83 percent. In July, however, he was voted out of office in one of the most lopsided— and surprising—electoral outcomes in British history. This did not reflect dissatisfaction with Churchill’s past performance so much as the fact that Labour promised social reforms, including national health care, full-employment policies, social security, and housing, whereas Churchill spoke of war with Japan and asserted that Labour reforms would lead inevitably to a police state. (Rumors, even then, held that he was also planning war with the Soviet Union.) In 1944–45, as the Soviet army pressed the German army back into Germany, it occupied the nations of Eastern Europe, some of which had been occupied by Germany while others were German allies. Stalin did not yet have a precise plan for this region, but he clearly insisted that they have governments that were “friendly” to Moscow, lest they once again become a platform for invasion. At Yalta Roosevelt and Churchill had elicited from Stalin a promise to hold free and fair elections throughout the region, but they did not have high hopes. While they did not want to see these countries fall under Soviet domination, they were not prepared to threaten another world war to prevent it. (Even though Allied leaders had been suspicious of the Sovi-

ets throughout World War II, threatening war against their wartime ally would have been confusing to voters back home.) As prime minister, Churchill’s private advice to the London-based Polish government-in-exile had been that the need for peace and the realities on the ground in Eastern Europe required that the Poles learn to get along with Stalin. When the Polish leader objected to the Soviet demand for the annexation of Poland’s eastern territories, Churchill responded: “Our relations with Russia are much better than they have ever been, and I intend to keep them that way. . . . Unless you accept the frontier, you’re going to be out of business forever. The Russians will sweep through your country and your people will be liquidated. You’re on the verge of annihilation.” Presumably, Churchill hoped that cooperation would prevent these outcomes. His view of the Soviet Union darkened over the winter of 1945–46. Having lost the 1945 election and given consideration to retiring from politics (he was 71), Churchill took a three-month vacation in Florida in 1946. Shortly before leaving for America, he received an invitation to speak at Westminster College—a small and littleknown institution in the small and little-known city of Fulton, Missouri—and would have politely declined, but Harry Truman, a Missourian, personally appended a note to the invitation praising the college and offering to introduce him. The prospect of spending time with the new U.S. president, and of sharing the podium with him while airing his views on recent events, turned the obscure invitation into an opportunity to return to the world stage. He titled his speech, “The Sinews of Peace,” and even though only a small portion related to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, he knew that was the part that would generate attention.

Author Biography Winston Churchill (1874–1965) was prime minister of

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the United Kingdom during most of World War II. After serving as a soldier and a journalist, he entered Parliament in 1900, at the age of 25. A Conservative (except when he was a Liberal, 1904–24), he served as Home Secretary (responsible for internal affairs, including the police) in 1910–11, First Lord of the Admiralty (i.e., Secretary of the Navy) in 1911–15, and Chancellor of the Exchequer (i.e., Secretary of the Treasury) in 1924– 29. The 1930s were a period of reduced influence, Churchill’s “wilderness years,” yet he was still viewed as a potential alternative leader of his party. During this

period he warned of the German threat, advocated rearmament, and opposed appeasement. Churchill was prime minister in 1940–45, leading an all-party coalition, and again in 1951–55. Between those two periods, he was leader of the opposition in Parliament and, in his spare time, wrote a six-volume history of World War II. (As he famously quipped, “History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.”) Churchill warned of the Soviet threat after the war. He later sought to mitigate the Cold War through personal diplomacy.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT I am glad to come to Westminster College this afternoon, and am complimented that you should give me a degree. The name “Westminster” is somehow familiar to me. I seem to have heard of it before. Indeed, it was at Westminster that I received a very large part of my education in politics, dialectic, rhetoric, and one or two other things. In fact we have both been educated at the same, or similar, or, at any rate, kindred establishments. It is also an honor, perhaps almost unique, for a private visitor to be introduced to an academic audience by the President of the United States. Amid his heavy burdens, duties, and responsibilities—unsought but not recoiled from—the President has traveled a thousand miles to dignify and magnify our meeting here to-day and to give me an opportunity of addressing this kindred nation, as well as my own countrymen across the ocean, and perhaps some other countries too. The President has told you that it is his wish, as I am sure it is yours, that I should have full liberty to give my true and faithful counsel in these anxious and baffling times. I shall certainly avail myself of this freedom, and feel the more right to do so because any private ambitions I may have cherished in my younger days have been satisfied beyond my wildest dreams. Let me, however, make it clear that I have no official mission or status of any kind, and that I speak only for myself. There is nothing here but what you see. I can therefore allow my mind, with the experience of a lifetime, to play over the problems which beset us on the morrow of our absolute victory in arms, and to try to make sure with what strength I have that what has been

gained with so much sacrifice and suffering shall be preserved for the future glory and safety of mankind. The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American Democracy. For with primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future. If you look around you, you must feel not only the sense of duty done but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement. Opportunity is here now, clear and shining for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the after-time. It is necessary that constancy of mind, persistency of purpose, and the grand simplicity of decision shall guide and rule the conduct of the Englishspeaking peoples in peace as they did in war. We must, and I believe we shall, prove ourselves equal to this severe requirement. When American military men approach some serious situation they are wont to write at the head of their directive the words “over-all strategic concept.” There is wisdom in this, as it leads to clarity of thought. What then is the over-all strategic concept which we should inscribe today? It is nothing less than the safety and welfare, the freedom and progress, of all the homes and families of all the men and women in all the lands. And here I speak particularly of the myriad cottage or apartment homes where the wage-earner strives amid the accidents and difficulties of life to guard his wife and children from privation and bring the family up in the fear of the Lord, or upon ethical conceptions which often play their potent part.

Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

To give security to these countless homes, they must be shielded from the two giant marauders, war and tyranny. We all know the frightful disturbances in which the ordinary family is plunged when the curse of war swoops down upon the bread-winner and those for whom he works and contrives. The awful ruin of Europe, with all its vanished glories, and of large parts of Asia glares us in the eyes. When the designs of wicked men or the aggressive urge of mighty States dissolve over large areas the frame of civilized society, humble folk are confronted with difficulties with which they cannot cope. For them all is distorted, all is broken, even ground to pulp. When I stand here this quiet afternoon I shudder to visualize what is actually happening to millions now and what is going to happen in this period when famine stalks the earth. None can compute what has been called “the unestimated sum of human pain.” Our supreme task and duty is to guard the homes of the common people from the horrors and miseries of another war. We are all agreed on that. Our American military colleagues, after having proclaimed their “over-all strategic concept” and computed available resources, always proceed to the next step— namely, the method. Here again there is widespread agreement. A world organization has already been erected for the prime purpose of preventing war, UNO, the successor of the League of Nations, with the decisive addition of the United States and all that means, is already at work. We must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words, that it is a true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung up, and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel. Before we cast away the solid assurances of national armaments for self-preservation we must be certain that our temple is built, not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but upon the rock. Anyone can see with his eyes open that our path will be difficult and also long, but if we persevere together as we did in the two world wars—though not, alas, in the interval between them—I cannot doubt that we shall achieve our common purpose in the end. I have, however, a definite and practical proposal to make for action. Courts and magistrates may be set up but they cannot function without sheriffs and con-

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stables. The United Nations Organization must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force. In such a matter we can only go step by step, but we must begin now. I propose that each of the Powers and States should be invited to delegate a certain number of air squadrons to the service of the world organization. These squadrons would be trained and prepared in their own countries, but would move around in rotation from one country to another. They would wear the uniform of their own countries but with different badges. They would not be required to act against their own nation, but in other respects they would be directed by the world organization. This might be started on a modest scale and would grow as confidence grew. I wished to see this done after the first world war, and I devoutly trust it may be done forthwith. It would nevertheless be wrong and imprudent to entrust the secret knowledge or experience of the atomic bomb, which the United States, Great Britain, and Canada now share, to the world organization, while it is still in its infancy. It would be criminal madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world. No one in any country has slept less well in their beds because this knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it, are at present largely retained in American hands. I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and if some Communist or neoFascist State monopolized for the time being these dread agencies. The fear of them alone might easily have been used to enforce totalitarian systems upon the free democratic world, with consequences appalling to human imagination. God has willed that this shall not be and we have at least a breathing space to set our house in order before this peril has to be encountered: and even then, if no effort is spared, we should still possess so formidable a superiority as to impose effective deterrents upon its employment, or threat of employment, by others. Ultimately, when the essential brotherhood of man is truly embodied and expressed in a world organization with all the necessary practical safeguards to make it effective, these powers would naturally be confided to that world organization. Now I come to the second danger of these two marauders which threatens the cottage, the home, and the ordinary people—namely, tyranny. We cannot be

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blind to the fact that the liberties enjoyed by individual citizens throughout the British Empire are not valid in a considerable number of countries, some of which are very powerful. In these States control is enforced upon the common people by various kinds of all-embracing police governments. The power of the State is exercised without restraint, either by dictators or by compact oligarchies operating through a privileged party and a political police. It is not our duty at this time when difficulties are so numerous to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries which we have not conquered in war. But we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence. All this means that the people of any country have the right, and should have the power by constitutional action, by free unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of government under which they dwell; that freedom of speech and thought should reign; that courts of justice, independent of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which have received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and custom. Here are the title deeds of freedom which should lie in every cottage home. Here is the message of the British and American peoples to mankind. Let us preach what we practice—let us practice—what we preach. I have now stated the two great dangers which menace the homes of the people: War and Tyranny. I have not yet spoken of poverty and privation which are in many cases the prevailing anxiety. But if the dangers of war and tyranny are removed, there is no doubt that science and co-operation can bring in the next few years to the world, certainly in the next few decades newly taught in the sharpening school of war, an expansion of material wellbeing beyond anything that has yet occurred in human experience. Now, at this sad and breathless moment, we are plunged in the hunger and distress which are the aftermath of our stupendous struggle; but this will pass and may pass quickly, and there is no reason except human folly or sub-human crime which should deny to

all the nations the inauguration and enjoyment of an age of plenty. I have often used words which I learned fifty years ago from a great Irish-American orator, a friend of mine, Mr. Bourke Cockran. “There is enough for all. The earth is a generous mother; she will provide in plentiful abundance food for all her children if they will but cultivate her soil in justice and in peace.” So far I feel that we are in full agreement. Now, while still pursuing the method of realizing our overall strategic concept, I come to the crux of what I have traveled here to say. Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. This would perhaps double the mobility of the American Navy and Air Force. It would greatly expand that of the British Empire Forces and it might well lead, if and as the world calms down, to important financial savings. Already we use together a large number of islands; more may well be entrusted to our joint care in the near future. The United States has already a Permanent Defense Agreement with the Dominion of Canada, which is so devotedly attached to the British Commonwealth and Empire. This Agreement is more effective than many of those which have often been made under formal alliances. This principle should be extended to all British Commonwealths with full reciprocity. Thus, whatever happens, and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves and able to work together for the high and simple causes that are dear to us and bode no ill to any. Eventually there may come—I feel eventually there will come—the principle of common citizenship, but that we may be content

Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

to leave to destiny, whose outstretched arm many of us can already clearly see. There is however an important question we must ask ourselves. Would a special relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with our over-riding loyalties to the World Organization? I reply that, on the contrary, it is probably the only means by which that organization will achieve its full stature and strength. There are already the special United States relations with Canada which I have just mentioned, and there are the special relations between the United States and the South American Republics. We British have our twenty years Treaty of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance with Soviet Russia. I agree with Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that it might well be a fifty years Treaty so far as we are concerned. We aim at nothing but mutual assistance and collaboration. The British have an alliance with Portugal unbroken since 1384, and which produced fruitful results at critical moments in the late war. None of these clash with the general interest of a world agreement, or a world organization; on the contrary they help it. “In my father’s house are many mansions.” Special associations between members of the United Nations which have no aggressive point against any other country, which harbor no design incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, far from being harmful, are beneficial and, as I believe, indispensable. I spoke earlier of the Temple of Peace. Workmen from all countries must build that temple. If two of the workmen know each other particularly well and are old friends, if their families are inter-mingled, and if they have “faith in each other’s purpose, hope in each other’s future and charity towards each other’s shortcomings”— to quote some good words I read here the other day— why cannot they work together at the common task as friends and partners? Why cannot they share their tools and thus increase each other’s working powers? Indeed they must do so or else the temple may not be built, or, being built, it may collapse, and we shall all be proved again unteachable and have to go and try to learn again for a third time in a school of war, incomparably more rigorous than that from which we have just been released. The dark ages may return, the Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science, and what might now

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shower immeasurable material blessings upon mankind, may even bring about its total destruction. Beware, I say; time may be short. Do not let us take the course of allowing events to drift along until it is too late. If there is to be a fraternal association of the kind I have described, with all the extra strength and security which both our countries can derive from it, let us make sure that that great fact is known to the world, and that it plays its part in steadying and stabilizing the foundations of peace. There is the path of wisdom. Prevention is better than cure. A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain—and I doubt not here also—towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone—Greece with its immortal glories—is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful

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inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of Occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westwards, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of 150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered. If now the Soviet Government tries, by separate action, to build up a pro-Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the British and American zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts— and facts they are—this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. The safety of the world requires a new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in Europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. Twice in our own lifetime we have seen the United States, against their wishes and their traditions, against arguments, the force of which it is impossible not to comprehend, drawn by irresistible forces, into these wars in time to secure the victory of the good cause, but only after frightful slaughter and devastation had occurred. Twice the United States has had to send several millions of its young men across the Atlantic to find the war; but now

war can find any nation, wherever it may dwell between dusk and dawn. Surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe, within the structure of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. That I feel is an open cause of policy of very great importance. In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other causes for anxiety. In Italy the Communist Party is seriously hampered by having to support the Communist-trained Marshal Tito’s claims to former Italian territory at the head of the Adriatic. Nevertheless the future of Italy hangs in the balance. Again one cannot imagine a regenerated Europe without a strong France. All my public life I have worked for a strong France and I never lost faith in her destiny, even in the darkest hours. I will not lose faith now. However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. These are somber facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy; but we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains. The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in Manchuria. The Agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when the Japanese war was expected to last for a further 18 months from the end of the German war. In this country you are all so well-informed about the Far East, and such devoted friends of China, that I do not need to expatiate on the situation there. I have felt bound to portray the shadow which, alike in the west and in the east, falls upon the world. I was a high minister at the time of the Versailles Treaty and a close friend of Mr. Lloyd-George, who was the head of the British delegation at Versailles. I did not myself agree with many things that were done, but I have a very

Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

strong impression in my mind of that situation, and I find it painful to contrast it with that which prevails now. In those days there were high hopes and unbounded confidence that the wars were over, and that the League of Nations would become all-powerful. I do not see or feel that same confidence or even the same hopes in the haggard world at the present time. On the other hand I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are still in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have the occasion and the opportunity to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here to-day while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If however they become divided or falter in their duty and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all. Last time I saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own fellow-countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind. There never was

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a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented in my belief without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be powerful, prosperous and honored to-day; but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool. We surely must not let that happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the world instrument, supported by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections. There is the solution which I respectfully offer to you in this Address to which I have given the title “The Sinews of Peace.” Let no man underrate the abiding power of the British Empire and Commonwealth. Because you see the 46 millions in our island harassed about their food supply, of which they only grow one half, even in war-time, or because we have difficulty in restarting our industries and export trade after six years of passionate war effort, do not suppose that we shall not come through these dark years of privation as we have come through the glorious years of agony, or that half a century from now, you will not see 70 or 80 millions of Britons spread about the world and united in defense of our traditions, our way of life, and of the world causes which you and we espouse. If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealths be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security. If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of the United Nations and walk forward in sedate and sober strength seeking no one’s land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary control upon the thoughts of men; if all British moral and material forces and convictions are joined with your own in fraternal association, the high-roads of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not only for our time, but for a century to come.

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Document Analysis

Churchill’s speech was printed in full by all the wire services and carried live by radio. The reaction to the speech was swift. An editorial in Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, denounced Churchill as a warmonger. A few days later, Pravda published a rare interview with Stalin (for which he wrote both the questions and the answers) in which he labeled the speech a call to war against the Soviet Union. Churchill seemed to believe, Stalin asserted, that the English-speaking peoples deserved to reign over the rest of the world, a racist theory that Stalin deemed worthy of Hitler. Truman, even though he had had advance knowledge of the speech’s contents, backed away from endorsing Churchill’s sentiments at first, not wanting to antagonize a major power needlessly. He even invited Stalin to come and give his own speech, which he would also introduce. Speaking again ten days later, in New York City, Churchill softened his message somewhat. He made a point of praising the Soviet contribution to the defeat of the Nazis, and he restated his belief that the Russians did not want war, at least at the present time. Meanwhile, outside the venue, demonstrators chanted, “Don’t be a ninny for imperialist Winnie!” Behind the scenes, Churchill’s words coincided with, and reinforced, reports the State Department was receiving from its Moscow embassy, of which the public, naturally, was unaware. On the very day of the speech, the State Department issued a stern message calling on the Soviets to remove their military forces from Iran. Although the initial public reaction was divided, the contents increasingly fit the American mood, which was beginning to shift against the Soviet Union (although some were still reluctant to identify the United States with British imperialism). Truman apparently viewed the speech as a kind of trial balloon, testing the public’s reaction to a firmer approach toward Moscow. Within a relatively short span of time, the speech would come to be seen as prophetic. Exceptions, however, persisted. Henry Wallace, a leader of the left wing of the Democratic Party, considered it an “attack on a former ally.” Eleanor Roosevelt saw it as an offence against the United Nations and the postwar order that her late husband had struggled to erect. Back in London, the British government initially distanced itself from the speech. Privately, it was better received within the Labour government than it was by Churchill’s Conservative colleagues, some of whom

feared he would link them to some personal crusade against Russia. In Moscow, the speech immediately became a central theme of Soviet propaganda, and Churchill became a spectral presence at propagandists’ meetings. Internally, the Soviet reaction was a bit more nuanced. Despite their interpretation of Churchill’s hostile intention, Soviet leaders did not initially believe that he had succeeded. The Americans, in this view, saw Churchill as seeking to use American power and resources to restore the British Empire. Soviet sources also reported negative reactions to the speech in Poland, Germany, and other European countries. They interpreted American resistance to Churchill’s proposals as evidence that the two capitalist powers did not constitute a united front against the Soviet Union but, instead, were riven by “contradictions.” Stalin hoped to use these contradictions against them, to keep them apart, and if possible to make gains at their expense. Thus, in his published interview, he played up the notion that Churchill’s proclivities ran against the trend of history and needlessly increased the possibility of a new war. His perspective was derived from the Leninist understanding of contradictions in relations among capitalist countries, but it was also consistent with traditional power politics (Realpolitik). Only later, as the Cold War intensified and the prospects for further advances dimmed, did Stalin truly clamp down on the countries behind the “iron curtain” and force them to fully comply with the Soviet Communist model. Essential Themes

The “iron curtain” concept was the most memorable legacy of the speech. It was not the first time the expression had been used. For example, Ethel Snowden, a member of a trade-union delegation, had used it to describe the isolation of Bolshevik Russia back in 1920, Nazi propagandists had used the term several times, and Churchill himself had employed it on occasion. Nonetheless, this was the speech that impressed the term on the American and global psyches and fixed its meaning. In this speech Churchill also coined the term “special relationship” to describe relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. The speech had two basic themes that were implicitly, but never explicitly, linked. The first was a call for the United States to join with Britain in a “fraternal association of English-speaking peoples” to face a common threat posed by war and tyranny. This had echoes of

Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech

the past, for Churchill’s early speeches after becoming prime minister in 1940, when the United States was still neutral in World War II, frequently alluded to the need for the New World to rise up and come to the rescue of the Old. The second theme, and the reason for the first, was the notion that the Soviet Union was expansionist and that this expansionism was a threat to world peace. The speech foreshadowed both confrontation and the future American policies of containment and deterrence. —Scott C. Monje, PhD

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. New York: Columbia UP, 1972. Print. Harbutt, Fraser J. The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. Print. Muller, James W., ed. Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech Fifty Years Later. Columbia, Mo.: U of Missouri P, 1999. Print. Sebestyen, Victor. 1946: The Making of the Modern World. New York: Pantheon Books, 2014. Print. Warren, Spencer. “Churchill’s Realism: Reflections on the Fulton Speech.” The National Interest No. 42 (Winter 1996), 38–49. Print.

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 Truman Doctrine Speech Date: March 12, 1947 Author: Harry S. Truman Genre: speech Summary Overview

Less than two years after the end of World War II, President Harry S. Truman gave a speech in which he articulated a new American foreign policy that would become known as the Truman Doctrine, intended to address the postwar geopolitical climate. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had expanded its reach throughout Eastern Europe and was threatening to spur Communist revolutions in the Middle East. The focus of Truman’s speech was the situation in Greece and Turkey, two nations that were threatened in different ways by the spread of Communism. Though the threats were different, the response, Truman argued, needed to be the same—financial aid to help contain the tide of Communist expansion. The United States was only just becoming accustomed to its new role as a world superpower; in the postwar order, Truman asserted, the United States was the only nation able to provide such aid, and the country had an ongoing responsibility to safeguard the world from the spread of Communism. Defining Moment

In the two years following the defeat of Nazi Germany, US relations with its wartime ally the Soviet Union had changed dramatically. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union had agreed that the nations Germany had conquered during the war should be able to freely choose their governments through democratic elections. Very quickly after the conclusion of the war, however, it became clear that the Soviet Union was doing everything it could to ensure that all of the nations along its borders came under Communist rule. This direct disregard for the Yalta Agreement meant that the United States now had a new foe in a “cold war,” which pitted democracy against totalitarianism. American foreign policy experts struggled to determine the best course of action; George F. Kennan, who

had perhaps the most familiarity with the Soviet government, having served as a US diplomat in Moscow for seven years, articulated what he saw as the reasons for Soviet aggressiveness in his “long telegram” in February 1946. To Kennan, Soviet expansionism was shaped by Russia’s history of imperialistic conquest as well as by Marxist ideology, which saw Communism in an ongoing war against capitalism. He believed the only policy that could stop the Soviets’ expansionist influence was one of containment, which required a commitment by the United States to the long-term limitation of the Soviets to their own sphere of influence. This had dramatic implications for American policy, as Kennan had no doubt that the Soviets would continue their drive to expand for the foreseeable future. The need to articulate a new policy came to a head in February 1947, when the British government, which had suffered far greater economic hardship than the United States during World War II, informed American officials that it would no longer be able to provide economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, both of which were facing important threats related to Communist expansionism. In Greece, leftist rebels, supported by Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, had waged an insurgency against the Greek royal government. In Turkey, the Soviet Union was aggressively seeking to share control over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus straits, which connect the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, where the Soviets had large naval bases. Truman administration officials believed that if Greece and Turkey were overtaken by Communists, the appeasement of Soviet demands would only embolden the Soviets to go further, and country after country would fall to Communism—an idea that became popularly known as the “domino theory.” The only way to stop the dominos from falling—or to contain the Soviet threat to Greece, Turkey, and the rest of the free world—was for the United States to take an active role in international affairs by

Truman Doctrine Speech

meeting Soviet aggression with countervailing political, economic, and military force whenever necessary. With this policy in mind, Truman spoke to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. Author Biography

Following the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945, in the last days of World War II, Harry S. Truman became president of the United States. The peace that followed the war was short-lived, however, as almost immediately, Truman was faced with a new kind of war, a “cold war,” pitting the United States against its wartime ally the Soviet Union. Relations began to

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break down even before World War II had ended, due to the ideological differences between the two nations, with the United States supporting capitalism and democracy, while the Soviet Union championed socialism and an authoritarian form of government. Though these differences had existed since the Russian Revolution in 1917, they took on geopolitical overtones after World War II and became a much more pressing concern for Truman. Much of Truman’s presidency was defined by the nascent Cold War, and in 1947, Truman sought to define what the US government’s response to the Soviet threat would be.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government. Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife. When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had

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almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible. Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery. The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration. The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government’s authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged

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border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government. The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece. We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required. It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish. No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people. The Greek Government has been operating in an

atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now. Greece’s neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations. To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and inde-

Truman Doctrine Speech

pendence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States. The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments. At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giv-

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ing effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war. In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use,

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in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together. This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we

Document Analysis

The Truman Doctrine represents a dramatic turning point in the history of American foreign policy. President Harry S. Truman spoke to a joint session of Congress and announced a new direction in US foreign policy, marking what many consider to be the beginning of the Cold War. In his speech, he speaks directly about the situation faced by Greece and Turkey as they sought to avoid Communist domination. In a larger sense, however, Truman used the speech to articulate a new vision of the United States’ role in the world. According to Truman, the United States could no longer shrink back to an isolated existence as it had at the conclusion of previous wars. A new geopolitical landscape, a new position as a world superpower, and the spread of Communism created the need for a new strategy to deal with the situation. Truman begins by explaining the two crises in Greece and Turkey. The Communist-led insurgency in Greece, funded by the Communist government of Yugoslavia, threatened to overthrow the pro-Western monarchy. Great Britain had been providing financial assistance to the Greek government but, due to their own economic crisis, were unable to continue. Truman asserts that, without American aid, Greece could very well fall to the Communists. In Turkey, the Soviet Union was pressuring the small, weak nation to share control over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. Without assistance

should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain. The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

from the United States, the Soviet Union could dominate the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East. Truman speaks briefly about how he had considered asking the United Nations (UN) to assist Greece and Turkey, as the settlement of international disputes was the very reason for its existence, but he came to the conclusion that the situation needed immediate assistance of a greater extent than the UN could provide. The larger issue, however, was the choice the nations of the world faced between a way of life “based upon the will of the majority” that had free elections and institutions as well as guaranteed protection of individual freedoms, and a way of life “based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority,” where the state is coercive and totalitarian, suppressing individual and social freedoms. The role of the United States in this new world was to contain Soviet expansion by helping nations such as Greece to “become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.” Truman sums up his intentions by stating that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” According to Truman, the United States must meet any challenge put forward by the Soviet Union and its desire to expand Communist control, arguing that “there is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support.”

Truman Doctrine Speech

Essential Themes

The Truman Doctrine outlined the ideas that shaped America’s foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War, particularly the idea that the Soviet Union needed to be contained and that the United States was the only nation in the world capable of doing so. The United States relied primarily on political and economic means, though the fact that the American military was kept on a permanent war-footing demonstrated that armed conflict was always a possibility. Though Congress approved the aid package that Truman requested for Greece and Turkey, not everyone was convinced by Truman’s long-term strategy. Former vice president Henry A. Wallace, who had been the secretary of commerce until he gave a speech in 1946 critical of the Truman administration’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, thought that cooperation with the Soviets would be far more effective. Others thought the Truman Doctrine too soft and argued that the Soviets would only respect military power in equal measure to its own. In retrospect, the results of the aid package to Greece and Turkey were ambiguous. Both countries were able to stand firm in the face of the Communist threats they faced, but the aid did not guarantee a more democratic government in either country, as both saw the rise of authoritarian right-wing governments. However, the die was cast, and the Truman Doctrine inspired the Marshall Plan that, beginning in 1948, provided large amounts of financial aid to friendly governments in Europe, with the idea being that when the people of a nation are not economically threatened, they would be far less likely to succumb to Communist propaganda

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or support an overthrow of their government. The military component of the Truman Doctrine began to take shape with the administration’s approval of NSC-68 in 1950, a document that set in motion plans to strengthen the US military as a counterweight to the massive Soviet military. Though later presidents recast the conflict in ways that suited their own style, the basic ideas contained in the Truman Doctrine formed the basis of the United States’ Cold War strategy from the beginning to the end, and the second half of the twentieth century was to be dominated by the global showdown between the two superpowers. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bostdorff, Denise M. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. College Station: Texas A&M UP, 2008. Print. Jones, Howard. “A New Kind of War”: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. Print. Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print. Offner, Arnold A. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Print. Pechatnov, Vladimir O. “The Soviet Union and the World, 1944–1953.” The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Origins. Vol. 1. Ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad. New York: Cambridge UP, 2010. 90–111. Print.

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 Speech on the Marshall Plan Date: June 5, 1947 Author: George C. Marshall Genre: speech Summary Overview

Growing increasingly worried about the slow pace of economic recovery in Europe after World War II, and concerned that the Soviet Union might take advantage of unrest caused by the continuing impoverishment of many people in Western Europe, US secretary of state George C. Marshall spearheaded an effort to deliver aid to countries in the region. Marshall publicly announced his initiative in a speech delivered at Harvard University in June 1947. During the next nine months, members of the administration of President Harry S. Truman shepherded through Congress legislation that Truman signed into law on April 3, 1948. Though officially designated the European Recovery Program, the initiative quickly became known as the Marshall Plan. Defining Moment

When armed conflict ceased in 1945, the countries of Europe struggled to overcome the devastation caused by World War II. Many teetered on the verge of bankruptcy; food supplies were short and infrastructure severely damaged. The Soviet Union demanded $10 billion in reparations from Germany—a country in no position to send any money outside its borders, given its dire economic conditions. On the other hand, France, Germany’s enemy in three wars over less than a century, was skeptical about any efforts to speed up German recovery. Some leaders in the United States recognized that help from the United States might be needed, but most citizens had little interest in foreign affairs once the war ended. The situation remained unresolved when President Truman appointed George C. Marshall secretary of state in January 1947. The former Army chief of staff, dubbed the “organizer of victory” by British prime minister Winston Churchill, considered it a matter of national security to address problems in Europe. In March, Marshall went to Moscow for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a group established in

1945 by the Treaty of Potsdam to hammer out postwar issues. At the conference he discovered that the Soviet Union had no wish to see Western European nations recover quickly because economic unrest would make conditions more favorable for the rise of Communism in those countries. Marshall’s fears about Soviet intentions were confirmed by George Kennan, the newly appointed head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and a Soviet specialist. A report from Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Will Clayton assured Marshall that his worries about precarious economic conditions in Europe were well founded. Marshall was convinced that long-term economic recovery, not temporary relief, was essential, and that European nations would have to take the lead in developing their own recovery plan; the United States must be seen as assisting, not directing, these efforts. Although Marshall professed no party allegiance, he had been appointed by a Democrat. Knowing that any plan he proposed must get through a Republican-controlled Congress, he was also concerned about how Americans’ apathy toward conditions in Europe might sway legislators. Late in May 1947, Marshall agreed to accept an honorary degree from Harvard University, deciding to use this occasion to make public his ideas about the need for the United States to support European recovery. He had staff members Kennan and Charles Bohlen prepare separate drafts of remarks he might make; from these he composed a brief speech. During commencement ceremonies on June 5 he spoke to a group of Harvard alumni, outlining the principles on which the Marshall Plan would be built. Author Biography

The descendant of an old Virginia family, George Catlett Marshall, Jr. was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, in 1880. He graduated from Virginia Military

Speech on the Marshall Plan

Institute and was commissioned a lieutenant in the US Army in 1902. Marshall served with the American Expeditionary Force in World War I. Rising steadily through the ranks, he became a brigadier general in 1936 and in 1939 was named the Army’s chief of staff. Almost immediately, he began preparing the army for war. Throughout World War II he was one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s closest advisors. He retired in 1945, but was immediately asked by President Truman

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to head a delegation to China to try (unsuccessfully) to broker peace between the Communists and Nationalists in that country’s civil war. In January 1947, Truman named Marshall secretary of state. He stepped down in January 1949, but in September 1950, Truman appointed him secretary of defense, a position he held for a year. In 1953, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on postwar reconstruction in Europe. He died in 1959.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reaction of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world. In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economics. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies and shipping companies disappeared, through the loss of capital, absorption through nationalization or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was

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complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that 2 years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen. There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the foodproducing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

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The truth of the matter is that Europe’s requirementsfor the next 3 or 4 years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question. Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United

States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations. An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibilities which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

GLOSSARY efficacious: capable of having the desired result or effect; effective as a means, measure, or remedy palliative: serving to palliate which is to relieve or lessen without curing; mitigate; alleviate

Document Analysis

Marshall’s speech is directed at multiple audiences: opinion leaders (including the group to whom he speaks at Harvard), the American public at large, leaders of other nations (including the Soviet Union), and members of Congress. As a consequence, although his

speech focuses on economic issues, it contains few statistics. Instead, Marshall relies on broad descriptions of economic conditions and stories that personalize problems so his many audiences can appreciate the gravity of the situation in Europe. Marshall recites a litany of catastrophes to show how

Speech on the Marshall Plan

“the entire fabric of [the] European economy” has been upended by a decade of “highly abnormal” conditions: first the Nazis’ efforts to transform Germany into a war economy, which prompted other countries to do the same, followed by the war itself, which wreaked havoc on infrastructure and destroyed “many long-standing commercial ties” that permitted businesses to function efficiently. The Allies’ inability to agree on a final peace settlement for Germany and Austria has exacerbated problems. This remark is one of several veiled references to the Soviet Union’s intransigence in postwar negotiations. At the heart of his speech, Marshall describes the breakdown of the most basic form of economic exchange: the trade of food produced in rural areas for manufactured goods produced in urban areas. In a long paragraph, he details the changed situation in Europe, dispassionately describing the logical progression of events for both farmer and city dweller to demonstrate that “the modern system of the division of labor” is “in danger of breaking down.” Though expressed in measured language, the message is alarmist—almost apocalyptic. Marshall identifies the crux of the problem in a single sentence: Europe’s needs over the next three or four years exceed “her present ability to pay.” Arguing that problems of this nature are not simply regional but global, Marshall insists the United States should act to alleviate Europe’s plight. In another veiled allusion to the Soviet Union, he insists that US aid is not intended to undermine other nations’ efforts; in fact, the United States would welcome their assistance. He follows immediately with a warning: countries that block recovery efforts may find the United States actively opposing them. Additionally, throughout the speech, Marshall insists that the success of any recovery depends on European nations taking the lead in planning and implementing recovery efforts. This tactic is intended to blunt objections from some in Washington and in the Soviet Union that the United States is attempting to impose its will on Western Europe. Having laid out the problems and potential solutions, Marshall ends on a note of confidence, assuring his audience(s) that Europe can overcome its present difficulties—as long as Americans display the “foresight” and “willingness” to live up to “the vast responsibilities which history has clearly placed upon our country.” This unmistakable call to action signals to the world that the United States is ready to do what is can—and

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must—to aid both its allies and former enemies in returning to economic health. Essential Themes

Marshall’s speech has been compared to Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and is cited as the first visible sign of America’s willingness to assume its role as a superpower in world affairs. Unquestionably, passage of the Marshall Plan had significant impact in the United States and abroad. Between June and December 1947, State Department officials drafted legislation to implement the principles set out by Marshall in his Harvard speech. The plan called for $17 billion in aid over four years for countries that agreed to work jointly to restore industrial production. With the support of Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, the European Recovery Program (the official name of the legislation commonly called the Marshall Plan) was approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Truman on April 3, 1948. During this period of negotiation and debate, a coordinated campaign to convince the American people that aid to Europe was important for US national security turned public opinion in favor of the Marshall Plan. The implementation of the Marshall Plan also exposed Soviet intentions in Europe. Offered a chance to assist in the recovery, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin declined and directed countries in the Soviet sphere of influence to refuse to participate. These actions gave American politicians eager to combat the spread of Communism further cause to champion efforts aimed at curbing Soviet aggression. Western European nations were euphoric over the prospect of American aid. British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin called the Marshall Plan a “life-line.” By the time aid delivered under the Marshall Plan ended in December 1951, infrastructure across Western Europe was being rebuilt and production of important commodities, such as steel and food, had increased substantially. While grants and loans from the United States provided only a small portion of the funds spent on recovery, the psychological impact was significant. Britain, France, those portions of Germany not under Soviet control, and many smaller nations that had suffered from the war knew that the United States was not abandoning them to their fate, as had happened at the end of World War I. The Marshall Plan’s most lasting

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impact may be in preserving Western-style democracy in a number of nations that might have otherwise become socialist states. —Laurence W. Mazzeno, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Behrman, Greg. The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Saved Europe. New York: Free, 2007. Print. Clesse, Armand, & Archie C. Epps, eds. Present at the Creation: The Fortieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan. New York: Harper, 1990. Print. Killick, John. The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945–1960. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997. Print. Mills, Nicolaus. Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America’s Coming of Age as a Superpower. Hoboken: Wiley, 2008. Print. Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Statesman. New York: Viking, 1987. Print.

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”

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 “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Date: July 1947 Author: George F. Kennan Genre: article; editorial Summary Overview

Within two years after the end of World War II, it was becoming increasingly clear in the United States that the nation’s wartime alliance with the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was turning sour. Many in the United States wondered how this could have happened so quickly. One man who not only gave an answer, but also a prescription for what to do about it was America’s chargé d’affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan. Writing in the July 1947 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs, under the pseudonym “X,” Kennan wrote from his firsthand knowledge of the Soviet government. He wrote of the history of Russia’s desire to expand and the ideological backing now given to it by Stalinism, advising a policy that came to be known as “containment”—the long-term limitation of the Soviets to their own sphere of influence and swift attention whenever they tried to exceed that. Defining Moment

As World War II came to an end, Americans became increasingly concerned with the geopolitical aspirations of the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Army still occupying large swaths of Eastern Europe and the nations of that region quickly setting up Communist governments, foreign policy experts in the United States and Western Europe scrambled to figure out the best course of action. Some urged cooperation with the Soviet Union, since the United States and most of Europe had just concluded its second cataclysmic war in less than thirty years. Others, such as US senator James O. Eastland, cited the example of the appeasement of Nazi Germany during the 1930s, which only emboldened Hitler to continue German militarization and expansion. During 1945 and 1946, Communism spread across Eastern Europe at an alarming rate, with East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia establishing Communist governments. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union worked

to foster Communist uprisings in other nations as well. The very first complaint dealt with by the new United Nations had to do with the Soviet refusal to withdraw its troops from Iran after the war. Communists, supported by Yugoslavia, fought nationalists in Greece. In Turkey, the Soviet Union demanded that it be given free access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through the two Turkish straits known as the Dardanelles and the Bosporus; the Soviets staged naval exercises in the Black Sea and sent troops to the Balkans—both actions aimed at intimidating Turkey. As early as February 1946, many in the federal government sought to formulate a coherent policy toward the Soviets. It was at this point that George F. Kennan began to articulate his opinions in what became known as the “Long Telegram.” In it, he made observations about the factors that contributed to the Soviet desire to expand, stating that Soviet actions were shaped both by Marxist ideology and the long tradition of Russian expansionism and imperialism. As such, he argued that the United States could expect Soviet behavior to continue to seek expansion and that the combination of this with the paranoia he asserted to be inherent in Communist ideology was going to pose an ongoing threat to the United States and Western Europe. By mid-1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall had proposed what became known as the Marshall Plan, which gave massive US economic aid to the nations of Europe under the premise that economicallysecure nations would be much less likely to succumb to Communist agitation. But although the Marshall Plan was seen as a part of the American policy to make Soviet expansion more difficult, it still did not deal with how to respond to Stalin’s aggressive plans to foster Communist revolutions around the world when they came to bear in particular nations. It was at this point that Kennan wrote an opinion for Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal, which was published in the journal Foreign

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Affairs under the pseudonym “X” and became the basis for the policy of containment. Author Biography

George F. Kennan was one of the few American diplomats with significant experience in Soviet policy when he wrote “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs. After graduating from Princeton University, Kennan entered the diplomatic corps, being assigned to Moscow in 1933. He spent a number of years in Berlin before the outbreak of World War II and was briefly

interred by Nazi Germany after the United States entered the war in late 1941. He returned to Moscow in 1944 as chargé d’affaires, a key advisory position to the US ambassador. After writing the “Long Telegram,” Kennan was recalled to Washington, DC, where he was appointed chairman of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, and it was in this position that he wrote “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” as an opinion piece at the behest of Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered. It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the “physiognomy of society,” is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitable leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material good produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power

to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution. The rest may be outlined in Lenin’s own words: “Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries.” [Footnote: “Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe,” August 1915, Official Soviet edition of Lenin’s works.] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push be given. For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression—or too impatient to seek it—in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support or their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categoric denial of all

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”

value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxist-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: “From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance of how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud.” And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power. Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which socialism would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of socialism. [Footnote: Here and elsewhere in this paper “socialism refers to Marxist or Leninist communism, not to liberal socialism of the Second International variety.] Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which, according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought: and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power. The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period—the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people—made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with war Communism” and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new

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revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the “capitalistic sector of society” was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer. Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, thought this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin’s position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the RussianAsiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire “rightness,” they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass. And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of “the word.” Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed—and found it easy to believe—that

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they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care. Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. Then powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, “to chastise the contumacy” which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right. Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away, and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact

created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad. This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the “organs of suppression,” meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that “as long as there is a capitalistic encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger.” In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power. By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930s, which indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home. Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopo-

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”

lism of the state. The “organs of suppression,” in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measures the masters of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia’s position, for without it they are themselves superfluous. As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began. But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology. II So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today? Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it. The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for

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Russia’s conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow’s side a sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must inevitably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets it signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin’s conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that “the Russians have changed,” and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such “changes.” But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed. This means we are going to continue for long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de grâce. meanwhile, what is vital is that the “Socialist fatherland”—that oasis of power which has already been won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union—should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, “adventuris-

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tic” revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow. This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit. The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously. On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable—nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental

machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason, which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the “master’s voice.” And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity. But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds a natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior forces. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”

and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time. These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only be intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries—policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself. In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.” While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put

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forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige. III In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community. But if the ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself? The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern techniques to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state. The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, and industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and

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in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers’ goods production, housing and transportation. To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime. In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state. Here only the younger generations can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the over-all capacity of the generation now coming into maturity. In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable

achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russian Communists who speak of the “uneven development of capitalism” should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period one of the great industrial nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled worker of the west. It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically as vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasms and of radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity. Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others. This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin’s pinnacle of pre-eminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself. It is always possible that another transfer of pre-emi nent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”

that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin’s words, one of those “incredibly swift transitions” from “delicate deceit” to “wild violence” which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations. But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia. It must be surmised from this that even within so highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these Party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy. Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of the higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for the membership at large has been exercised only in the practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and

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paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies. Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men of the Kremlin. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel Buddenbrooks. Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared one of those stars whose light shines most brightly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced. IV It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It

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must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival power. Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon he interests of a peaceful and stable world. But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problem of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin’s foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the band wagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs. It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs. Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin’s challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”

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GLOSSARY adroit: expert or nimble in the use of the hands or body; resourceful amorphous: lacking definite form; having no specific shape caveat emptor: “let the buyer beware”; the principle that the seller of a product cannot be held responsible for its quality unless it is guaranteed in a warranty expropriated/expropriation: to take possession of by taking away the title of the private owner glib: readily fluent, often thoughtlessly, superficially, or insincerely intransigence: the state or quality of being intransigent; refusing to compromise or agree; inflexibility physiognomy: the outward appearance of anything, taken as offering some insight into its character proletariat/proletarian: the class of workers, especially industrial wage workers, who do not possess capital or property and who are dependent on their own labor to survive quixotic: extravagantly chivalrous or romantic; impractical; impulsive; resembling or befitting Don Quixote

Document Analysis

In July 1947, former American chargé d’affaires in Moscow George F. Kennan, writing under a pseudonym so as to avoid the appearance of articulating the official policy of the United States, published an article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which put forward a convincing explanation of why the Soviet Union pursued the courses of action that it did and what the United States must do in response, so as to avoid a continuation of the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe during 1945 and 1946. Kennan argues that the main approach of the United States toward its new Cold War foe should not be one of placating the Soviets or trying to work with them to create the new postwar world, but rather that American policy must be one of containment, stating, “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Kennan begins the lengthy article by outlining the seeds of the Soviet drive to expand, in much the same way as he had in the “Long Telegram.” The Soviet Union, and especially Joseph Stalin, had combined the long-term expansionism and imperialism of the Russian past with the ideology of Marxism to form a potent type of Communism that saw itself as the catalyst for successive Communist revolutions in other nations.

To Kennan, only this could explain Stalin’s refusal to honor the agreements made with the other Allies at the Yalta Conference, where the leaders of the World War II Allies outlined what they envisioned happening after the end of the war. Despite their wartime alliance, the Soviet Union and the other Western powers were destined to have a difficult relationship, based simply on the Marxist formulation that socialism (the ideology of the Soviet Union) was destined to do away with capitalism (the ideology of the Western powers). However, Kennan did not see this as an immediate issue, as the basic idea of Marxian socialism was that capitalism would collapse on its own and that the Soviets saw no reason to press the matter. Individual setbacks meant little when the victory of socialism was seen as inevitable. What this meant to Kennan was that the United States needed to apply policies containing Soviet expansionism for the long haul. The Soviets might give up a particular Cold War battle when counterforce was applied by the United States, but they would certainly pursue the same strategies in other locations at other times, and the United States needed to be ready there as well. According to Kennan, following his advice would “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”

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Essential Themes

Although Kennan wrote the article under a pseudonym, it did not take those in Washington and in the press long to realize he was the author. He was already the foremost expert on Soviet policy, and his views on the roots of Soviet expansionism were well known. Though he wrote as “X” in order to avoid the appearance of articulating official American policy, what he wrote basically constituted the Truman administration’s early Cold War strategy. The strategy of containment formed the context for the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the commencement of covert espionage in order to counter Soviet threats wherever they cropped up. Though many cited Kennan’s containment policy as the justification for military responses to Soviet aggression, Kennan himself saw containment as more political and psychological than military. Economic aid, propaganda, and covert operations to change public opinion in countries under threat from Communism were much more in line with Kennan’s philosophies. However, as influential as Kennan was during the first three years of the Cold War, his star fell precipitously at the end of the 1940s. In 1950, the Truman administration produced a new policy document, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), which advocated dramatic increases in the military budget. It also expanded the idea of containment from individual instances responding to Soviet aggressiveness to a worldwide military strategy. Upon his election to the presidency in 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed John Foster Dulles secretary

of state. Dulles viewed both the containment policy and Kennan himself as insufficiently vigilant against Communism and its expansion both abroad and at home. Dulles called for a rolling back of Soviet influence, hoping that the United States’ taking a more aggressive position would eventually lead to the liberation of Eastern Europe from Communist rule. However, Kennan remained influential, as the basic idea of containment remained the basis of American strategy throughout the Cold War, with each successive administration determining its own interpretation of its mandates. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York: Penguin, 2011. Print. Kennan, George F. “Containment: 40 Years Later.” Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations, Spring 1987. Web. 25 Feb. 2015. Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print. Mayers, David. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print. Miscamble, Wilson D. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992. Print. Pechatnov, Vladimir O. “The Soviet Union and the World, 1944–1953.” The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins. Ed. Melvyn P. Leffler & Odd Arne Westad. New York: Cambridge UP, 2010. 90–111. Print.

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 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) Date: September 2, 1947 Author: Rio Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security Genre: Treaty Summary Overview

With World War II having ended only two years prior to the Rio Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security , the new world order was still in the process of becoming stabilized. It was clear through events happening in Europe and Asia that the Communist government of the Soviet Union sought to expand its influence and area of control. The twenty-one republics of the Western hemisphere joined together at a conference in Rio de Janeiro to reaffirm their desire for independence through mutual military support and unity of purpose in opposing any outside intervention in their territories or internal affairs. For the United States, this was a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and an expansion of the foundation for the collective defense of the Americas. For the other nations, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty, could be seen as an attempt to rein in the United States, which, over the years had expanded its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine to include unilateral intervention in the affairs of other nations. All of the nations, however, were unified in the desire to keep the expansion of Communism, and the growing EastWest rivalry, out of the region. Defining Moment

In 1823, President James Monroe proclaimed his doctrine that European nations should no longer attempt to intervene in the affairs of North or South American nations, nor should they try to expand their colonial holdings in the Western hemisphere. While this proclamation was welcomed by the newly independent nations of the Americas, it was a unilateral assertion of power by the United States. Some South American leaders were suspicious that it was only an attempt by the United States to make the countries of the hemisphere into unofficial colonies. In any case, the Monroe Doctrine did signal the end of wholesale European intervention in the Americas. Although that Doctrine

has never been renounced by the United States, in the propaganda war between the Soviet Union and the United States any unilateral statements, such as this, served as easy targets for the other side’s propaganda. Thus, the United States was more than willing to join in a multilateral treaty providing for the common defense of all the independent nations of the Americas. Having joined together for defense, the Latin American members desired fuller cooperation by the United States. Thus, a direct result of this agreement was the establishment of the Organization of American States in 1948. Although there were no threats of massive invasions from any European or Asian country, by 1947 it was clear that the end of World War II did not signal the end to all armed conflict or intense international rivalries. Earlier in the year, the United States had agreed to send large amounts of aid to Greece and Turkey, which were in the midst of civil wars involving Communist and non-Communist forces and factions. The conflict in China, between Communist and Nationalist forces, continued to grow. The global uncertainty that these and other conflicts created made the time ripe for the nations of the Western hemisphere to join in a statement of unity and mutual defense. The group used the founding documents of the United Nations (UN) not only to strengthen the Rio Treaty, but also to assist in having the treaty more widely accepted by the international community. It also signaled the group’s recognition that regions were a part of the global community, as personified by the United Nations, while at the same time it indicated a suspicion of global, versus regional, control of possible international intervention. Author Biography

As noted in the text of the document, the Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security was an outgrowth of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, which

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was held during February-March 1945 in Mexico City. Both conferences were sponsored by the Pan American Union, which traced its history to 1890. There were only twenty-one members in the Pan American Union, because countries which were part of the British Commonwealth, such as Canada, were not considered fully independent, and thus were not eligible for membership.

The members of the Pan American Union were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Ecuador and Nicaragua signed the treaty in 1949 and 1948, respectively, with the other members signing in 1947, when the treaty was completed.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Rio De Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, August 15-September 2, 1947 In the name of their Peoples, the Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, desirous of consolidating and strengthening their relations of friendship and good neighborliness, and Considering: That Resolution VIII of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, which met in Mexico City, recommended the conclusion of a treaty to prevent and repeal threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America; That the High Contracting Parties reiterate their will to remain united in an inter-American system consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and reaffirm the existence of the agreement which they have concluded concerning those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which are appropriate for regional action; That the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their adherence to the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, and especially to those set forth in the preamble and declarations of the Act of Chapultepec, all of which should be understood to be accepted as standards of their mutual relations and as the juridical basis of the Inter-American System; That the American States propose, in order to improve the procedures for the pacific settlement of their controversies, to conclude the treaty concerning the “Inter-American Peace System” envisaged in Resolutions IX and XXXIX of the Inter-American Conference

on Problems of War and Peace, That the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals and to their will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace; That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that juridical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of justice and security, Have resolved, in conformity with the objectives stated above, to conclude the following Treaty, in order to assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them: Article 1. The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty. Article 2. As a consequence of the principle set forth in the preceding Article, the High Contracting Parties undertake

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)

to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. Article 3. 1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken. 3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied. 4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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thence by a rhumb line to a point 35 degrees north latitude, 60 degrees west longitude; thence due south to a point in 20 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 5 degrees north latitude, 24 degrees west longitude; thence due south to the South Pole; thence due north to a point 30 degrees south latitude, 90 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point on the Equator at 97 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 15 degrees north latitude, 120 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 50 degrees north latitude, 170 degrees east longitude; thence due north to a point in 54 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 65 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 168 degrees 58 minutes 5 seconds west longitude: thence due north to the North Pole. Article 5. The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security. Article 6. If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

Article 4. Article 7. The region to which this Treaty refers is bounded as follows: beginning at the North Pole; thence due south to a point 74 degrees north latitude, 10 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 47 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 50 degrees west longitude;

In the case of a conflict between two or more American States, without prejudice to the right of self-defense in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the High Contracting Parties, meeting

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in consultation shall call upon the contending States to suspend hostilities and restore matters to the status quo ante bellum, and shall take in addition all other necessary measures to reestablish or maintain inter-American peace and security and for the solution of the conflict by peaceful means. The rejection of the pacifying action will be considered in the determination of the aggressor and in the application of the measures which the consultative meeting may agree upon. Article 8. For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.

The consultations to which this Treaty refers shall be carried out by means of the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics which have ratified the Treaty, or in the manner or by the organ which in the future may be agreed upon. Article 12. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union may act provisionally as an organ of consultation until the meeting of the Organ of Consultation referred to in the preceding Article takes place. Article 13. The consultations shall be initiated at the, request addressed to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by any of the Signatory States which has ratified the Treaty. Article 14.

Article 9. In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following shall be considered as such: a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State; b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or, arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another State. Article 10. None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations. Article 11.

In the voting referred to in this Treaty only the representatives of the Signatory States which have ratified the Treaty may take part. Article 15. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union, shall act in all matters concerning this Treaty as an organ of liaison among the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty and between these States and the United Nations. Article 16. The decisions of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union referred to in Articles 13 and 15 above shall be taken by an absolute majority of the Members entitled to vote. Article 17. The Organ of Consultation shall take its decisions by a vote of two-thirds of the Signatory States which have

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)

ratified the Treaty.

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Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.

Article 18. Article 24. In the case of a situation or dispute between American States, the parties directly interested shall be excluded from the voting referred to in the two preceding Articles. Article 19. To constitute a quorum in all the meetings referred to in the previous Articles, it shall be necessary that the number of States represented shall be at least equal to the number of votes necessary for the taking of the decision.

The present Treaty shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Pan American Union, when two-thirds of the Signatory States have deposited their ratification. Article 25.

Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced by any High Contracting Party by a notification in writing to the Pan American Union, which shall inform all the other High Contracting Parties of each notification of denunciation received. After the expiration of two years from the date of the receipt by the Pan American Union of a notification of denunciation by any High Contracting Party, the present Treaty shall cease to be in force with respect to such State, but shall remain in full force and effect with respect to all the other High Contracting Parties.

Article 21.

Article 26.

The measures agreed upon by the Organ of Consultation shall be executed through the procedures and agencies now existing or those which may in the future be established.

The principles and fundamental provisions of this Treaty shall be incorporated in the Organic Pact of the Inter-American System. In witness whereof, the, undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers found to be in due and proper form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments, on the dates appearing opposite their signatures. Done in the City of Rio de Janeiro, in four texts in the English, French, Portuguese and Spanish languages, on the second of September, nineteen hundred forty-seven.

Article 20.

Article 22. This Treaty shall come into effect between the States which ratify it as soon as the ratifications of two-thirds of the Signatory States have been deposited. Article 23.

Reservation of Honduras: This Treaty is open for signature by the American States at the city of Rio de Janeiro, and shall be ratified by the Signatory States as soon as possible in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Pan American Union, which shall notify the Signatory States of each deposit.

The Delegation of Honduras, in signing the present Treaty and in connection with Article 9, section (b), does so with the reservation that the boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua is definitively demarcated by the Joint Boundary Commission of nineteen hundred

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and nineteen hundred and one, starting from a point in the Gulf of Fonseca, in the Pacific Ocean, to Portillo de Teotecacinte and, from this point to the Atlantic, by the line that His Majesty the King of Spain’s arbitral award established on the twenty-third of December of nineteen hundred and six. STATEMENTS Argentina: The Argentine Delegation declares that within the waters adjacent to the South American Continent, along the coasts belonging to the Argentine Republic in the Security Zone, it does not recognize the existence of colonies or possessions of European countries and it adds that it especially reserves and maintains intact the legitimate titles and rights of the Argentine Republic to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the South Georgia Islands, the South Sandwich Islands, and the lands included in the Argentine Antarctic sector, over which the Republic exercises the corresponding sovereignty. Guatemala: Guatemala wishes to place on record that it does not recognize any right of legal sovereignty of Great Britain over the territory of Belice, called British Honduras, included in the Security Zone, and that once again, it expressly reserves its rights, which are derived from the Constitution of the Republic, historical documents, juridical arguments and principles of equity which have on appropriate occasions been laid before the universal conscience. Mexico: Only because the Delegation of Guatemala

Document Analysis

Although only a handful of nations from the Western hemisphere were active participants in World War II, they were all involved in attempting to insure that the future would be an era of peace. The twenty-one countries that were signatories to this treaty had participated in the formation of the United Nations as original signatories to the UN’s Charter. Gathering two years after signing the Charter, the Rio Conference drew up a treaty for the mutual defense of all nations within the Americas and a plan for mediation of disputes within

has seen fit to make the preceding declaration, the Delegation of Mexico finds it necessary to reiterate that, in case there should occur a change in the status of Belice, there cannot fail to be taken into account the rights of Mexico to a part of the said territory, in accordance with historical and juridical precedents. Chile: The Delegation of Chile declares that, within the waters adjacent to the South American Continent, in the extension of coast belonging to the Republic of Chile, comprised within the Security Zone, it does not recognize the existence of colonies or possessions of European countries and it adds that it specially reserves and maintains intact the legitimate title and rights of the Republic of Chile to the lands included in the Chilean Antarctic zone, over which the Republic exercises the corresponding sovereignty. United States of America: With reference to the reservations made by other Delegations concerning territories located within the region defined in the Treaty, their boundaries, and questions of sovereignty over them, the Delegation of the United States of America wishes to record its position that the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the territories included in the region defined in Article 4 of the Treaty. (1) Department of State Bulletin of September 21, 1917, pp. 565-567, 572. Senate document, Executive II, 80th Cong., 1st sess. The treaty was ratified by the President on behalf of the United States on December 19, 1947, and the instrument of ratification was deposited with the Pan American Union in Washington on December 30, 1947.

the region. While these are fairly straightforward concepts “based on justice and moral order,” the Conference had many side issues that needed to be included. The preamble to the treaty makes direct, and indirect, reference to the many previous gatherings that had dealt with these issues. The conferences in Havana in 1940, Rio de Janeiro in 1942, and Mexico City in 1945 all had statements about mutual defense and peace within the region. The Act of Chapultepec, signed in Mexico City (1945), called for a formal treaty to be negotiated. The first three articles define the goal of non-aggres-

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)

sion. Reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which grants the right to self-defense, was placed in this treaty, as it had previously been accepted by all the Pan American Union members. In an optimistic vein, the treaty also lists several diplomatic responses that might be used in cases of attack, rather than immediately moving to war. These articles also call for the nations of the Americans to resolve regional conflicts “among themselves,” if at all possible. The “Organ of Consultation,” once established, would be the mediating body. By using this organization, housed in the Pan American Union, greater control of the situation would be given than if the nations immediately went to the UN. This would give the nations of the Americas greater control over their own destinies. Even so, cooperation with the UN is emphasized in Article 5. Most of the treaty is a series of technical statements. The fourth article defines geographically what constitutes the area of concern. Article 9 defines what constitutes an attack, or aggression, toward a member nation. The final seventeen articles are a listing, and defining, of the technical steps by which the treaty shall be implemented. The fact that such a large part of the treaty deals with these issues indicates that those negotiating the document did not have complete trust in one another. In addition, six of the countries adopting the treaty felt it necessary to add “reservations” or formal statements of interpretation to it. This also demonstrates that the goal of the negotiators was to create a document that could be accepted by all republics in the Western hemisphere, rather than trying to work through every detail of what were then current, or past, conflictual issues. It was thought more important to reach a consensus on major points than to risk jeopardizing the agreement by insisting on solving ongoing territorial issues. Essential Themes

Although many differences among the nations of the Americas existed in 1947, the desire for unity against potential outside threats, or interference, allowed them to work together and reach an agreement for an “inter-American peace system.” This treaty was based on the idea of mutual defense and on the use of regional mechanisms for conflict resolution. Although since it was formally adopted several nations have withdrawn from the treaty, and other treaties and organizations have emerged to serve the purpose of the Rio Treaty, the basic ideals that were put forward in 1947 remain

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intact. While the Pan American Union has been replaced by the Organization of American States (OAS), and some of the nations are no longer as closely allied with the United States as they were when the treaty was signed, the desire to halt aggression by nations from other regions of the world remains solid. Although the strength coming from the unity exemplified in the Rio Treaty is no longer the main reason other nations often refrain from certain activities in the Americas, the symbolism of the treaty remains. Moves such as creating the OAS in 1948 were encouraged by the negotiations leading to the Rio Treaty, and sought to take the vision of peace and cooperation a step further. Although the UN had been created about two years prior to the negotiation of this treaty, in many ways it was still a unknown institution. With increasing Cold War tensions causing some doubt as to whether the UN could function effectively, the nations within the Pan American Union decided that vital issues such as war and peace might be better dealt with in a regional context. Thus, there are many references to the UN and its Charter throughout the Rio Treaty, and an intent to work cooperatively with that organization. By attempting to deal with Western hemisphere issues within the region, the nations believed most could be dealt with effectively and with a greater likelihood that an agreeable outcome for all would be reached. Having just seen much of the world torn apart by World War II, and tensions rising from the Communist-Western Capitalist rivalry, the republics that comprised the Pan American Union hoped to remain outside of the conflicts through the unity outlined in the Rio Treaty. —Donald A. Watt, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Garcia-Mora, Manuel R. “The Law of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.” Fordham Law Review, vol. 20. New York: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History, 1951. Web. Schoultz, Lars. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998. Print. U.S. Department of State. “1975 Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).” U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action. Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2016. Web.

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 Vyshinsky’s Speech to the UN General Assembly Date: September 18, 1947 Author: Andrey Vyshinsky Genre: speech Summary Overview

Europe suffered from the aftermath of World War II throughout the 1940s. Many nations faced poverty, unemployment, and housing shortages, but lacked the financial solvency and administrative support necessary to address these issues. Europe was also divided along political lines. Led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Western European governments were mostly democratic. Led by the Soviet Union, the governments of Eastern Europe were mostly Communist. In 1947, the United States established the Truman Doctrine and began formulating the Marshall Plan to provide economic assistance to help European countries rebuild after the war. However, the Soviet Union objected to these plans. In a September 1947 speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Vyshinsky argued that these policies directly contradicted the UN requirement that foreign aid not be “used as a political weapon.” He believed the United States violated this requirement by financing European struggles against Communism under the guise of humanitarian aid. Defining Moment

World War II wrought considerable destruction throughout most of Europe. Although the war officially ended in 1945, Europe continued to feel its destructive effects throughout the 1940s. Nations struggled with a multitude of problems due to poverty, unemployment, housing shortages, and lack of infrastructure. The threat of instability loomed, as governments lacked the resources needed to rebuild economies and infrastructure. On May 22, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the Agreements on Aid to Greece and Turkey, which marked a major shift in US foreign policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine. The United Kingdom had been providing economic and military support to

help the Greek government block a takeover by the Communist Party, but eventually needed to redirect these funds toward its own postwar economic concerns. The United States stepped in to provide $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, hoping to prevent a Communist takeover of Greece and to prevent the conflict from spilling over into neighboring Turkey. In his speech to Congress to advocate for the agreement in March 1947, President Truman emphasized that the “foreign policy and national security” of the United States was at stake any time democratic systems of government were threatened and thus argued that intervention was critical. Although some debate exists, many scholars and historians view the Marshall Plan as following directly from the Truman Doctrine. Officially known as the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan was developed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall after visiting postwar Europe. Marshall saw the widespread poverty, hunger, and unemployment facing Europeans and felt the United States should provide assistance. He also feared that, without immediate economic assistance to rebuild, all of Europe could quickly and easily fall to Communism as the Soviet Union sought to expand its reach across the continent. In a speech made at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Marshall outlined his plan for the United States to assist Europe with the organizational and economic resources to rebuild. Approved by Congress in March 1948, the Marshall Plan was authorized to provide $17 billion (about $90 billion in 2015 dollars) in grants to European countries in order to purchase food, equipment, medicine, and transportation system upgrades. However, the Soviet Union believed the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were thinly veiled attempts by the United States to exert political influence in postwar Europe, in violation of a United Nations resolution stating that relief

Vyshinsky’s Speech to the UN General Assembly

should “at no time be used as a political weapon.” In September 1947, shortly after the announcement of these two policies, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Vyshinsky gave a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, in which he described his government’s interpretation and disapproval of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Author Biography

Andrey Vyshinsky was born on December 10, 1883, in Odessa, Russia. He graduated from Kiev University in 1913 and became a lawyer. He relocated to Moscow to work as an attorney and participate in national poli-

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tics, joining the Communist Party in 1920. He became the prosecutor general of the Soviet Union in 1935 and oversaw many trials that were part of the Great Purge to remove dissenters from the Communist Party. In 1940, Vyshinsky was appointed deputy minister of foreign affairs. In this role, he made numerous speeches to the United Nations and became known for his long, flourishing, and often aggressive rhetoric. He was promoted to minister of foreign affairs in 1949 and served in this position until 1953, when he was demoted to first deputy foreign minister. Vyshinsky died on November 22, 1954.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nation are violated, of the way in which the organization is ignored. As the experience of the past few months has shown, the proclamation of this doctrine meant that the United States government has moved towards a direct renunciation of the principles of international collaboration and concerted action by the great powers and towards attempts to impose its will on other independent states, while at the same time obviously using the economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an instrument of political pressure. This is clearly proved by the measures taken by the United States government with regard to Greece and Turkey which ignore and bypass the United Nations as well as by the measures proposed under the so-called Marshall Plan in Europe. This policy conflicts sharply with the principle expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1946, which declares that relief supplies to other countries “should ... at no time be used as a political weapon.” As is now clear, the Marshall Plan constitutes in essence merely a variant of the Truman Doctrine adapted to the conditions of postwar Europe. In bringing forward this plan, the United States government apparently counted on the cooperation of governments of the United Kingdom and France to confront the European

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countries in need of relief with the necessity of renouncing their inalienable right to dispose of their economic resources and to plan their national economy in their own way. The United States also counted on making all these countries directly dependent on the interests of American monopolies, which are striving to avert the approaching depression by an accelerated export of commodities and capital to Europe.... It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and direct interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries. Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union. An important feature of this plan is the attempt to confront the countries of Eastern Europe with a bloc of Western European states including Western Germany. The intention is to make use of Western Germany and German heavy industry (the Ruhr) as one of the most important economic bases for American expansion in Europe, in disregard of the national interests of the countries which suffered from German aggression.

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I need only recall these facts to show the utter incompatibility of this policy of United States, and of the Brit

ish and French governments which support it, with the fundamental principles of the United Nations.

GLOSSARY bloc: a group of persons, businesses, or nations united for a particular purpose or acting in concert from common interests

Document Analysis

Andrey Vyshinsky opens his speech to the United Nations General Assembly by stating that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are “particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nations are violated.” He says these two policies demonstrate the US government’s “direct renunciation of the principles of international collaboration” by using economic aid to impose its political will on independent nations. Vyshinsky believes this directly violates UN principles and cites a resolution from a session on December 11, 1946, which states that relief to other countries should not be used as a “political weapon.” He also notes that both of these plans effectively bypass the United Nations’ oversight by providing aid and advisement directly to nations such as Greece and Turkey. He asserts the US government is “using the economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an instrument of political pressure.” Vyshinsky argues that the Marshall Plan is simply a more widely applicable variation of the Truman Doctrine. He believes that the United States is relying on the United Kingdom and France to persuade other European nations to give in to political pressure and accept the aid, even though it means “renouncing their inalienable right to dispose of their economic resources and to plan their national economy in their own way.” He also accuses the United States of creating these policies to further its own self-interest in averting an economic depression by exporting goods and money to Europe. Vyshinsky states that “it is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States,” which will lead to the US government directly interfering with those countries’ internal affairs.

Finally, Vyshinsky accuses the United States of using the Marshall Plan to establish its influence over heavy industrial manufacturing in Western Europe, particularly in West Germany. He believes the United States intends to use the region as “one of the most important economic bases for American expansion into Europe” in disregard of the needs of nations that had been only recently freed from German occupation. Vyshinsky concludes that both policies conflict with the fundamental principles of the United Nations and notes the complicity of the United Kingdom and France in the Marshall Plan. Essential Themes

Disputes over postwar revitalization caused a significant rift between the Soviet-influenced countries of Eastern Europe and the American-influenced countries of Western Europe. The United States intervened in Europe’s recovery partly for humanitarian reasons and partly in hopes of quelling the growing Communist influences across the continent. Also at issue was concern that Soviet control over Greece and Turkey would block access to Middle Eastern oil for the United States and the countries of Western Europe. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan marked a significant change in the US government’s historic policy of nonintervention in foreign affairs during times of peace. The $17 billion authorized under the Marshall Plan was an unprecedented sum for the United States to spend on foreign interests during peacetime. The Soviet Union accused the United States of taking advantage of war-torn countries’ desperate need for funding to influence them to choose democracy over Communism and align politically with the United States. In contrast to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s

Vyshinsky’s Speech to the UN General Assembly

more tolerant approach to diplomacy with the Soviet Union, President Truman took a much firmer stance in the face of perceived insolence and lack of cooperation. This change in policy, and particularly the way it was reflected in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, is thought to be a factor that led to the decadeslong Cold War. The idea behind the Marshall Plan was that the European countries themselves would draft and direct their own plan for recovery and the United States would advise and assist, as well as provide the necessary administration and funding. Of the twenty-two nations invited to the Paris conference to draw up recovery plans, sixteen accepted; the Soviet Union did not participate and forbade the countries under its control from participating or accepting aid. US funding for the Marshall Plan ended in 1951. Scholars and policy analysts continue to debate the program’s significance in Europe’s postwar recovery, and some believe its enactment contributed to the tensions that spawned the Cold War. Despite its conflict-

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ing place in American history, George C. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953 for his plan. —Tracey M. DiLascio, JD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bandow, Doug. “A Look behind the Marshall Plan Mythology.” Investor’s Business Daily. Cato Inst., 3 June 1997. Web. 2 Feb. 2015. Behrman, Greg. The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe. New York: Free, 2007. Print. Folly, Martin H. “Truman, Harry S.” Oxford Reference Online. Oxford UP, 2014. Web. 2 Feb. 2015. “For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan.” Library of Congress Online Exhibition. LoC, 2015. Web. 2 Feb. 2015. “History of the Marshall Plan.” George C. Marshall Research Library. George C. Marshall Foundation, 2015. Web. 2 Feb. 2015. Israelyan, Victor. On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador’s Confession. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2003. Print.

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 NATO Treaty Date: April 4, 1949 Author: John D. Hickerson Genre: government document Summary Overview

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, DC, by foreign ministers from Canada, the United States, and ten European nations—Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. Secretary of State Dean Acheson signed the treaty for the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty was a key agreement for the United States, and its fifth article was a mutual defense pact against aggression toward any of the signers, in support of which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established. In the context of a rising Soviet threat, the treaty served to establish a bulwark against any Soviet maneuvers in Europe. Defining Moment

The North Atlantic Treaty was preceded by European agreements that sought to counter a perceived growing threat from the Soviet Union. In the years following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union set up Communist governments in many central and Eastern European states, and tensions were high between the Soviet Union and its erstwhile World War II allies in Western Europe. Though the Soviet Union was a member of the United Nations, the rest of Europe had reason to fear its expansionist goals. In March 1948, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Brussels. Under this treaty, the Western Union Defence Organization was created in September 1948. The United States and Canada were not included in either of these, however, and a broader alliance between Western Europe and North America was soon underway. The North Atlantic Treaty drew on the Treaty of Brussels and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty, for much of its language. (Signed in 1947, the Rio Treaty was an example of a regional agreement among the nations of the Americas.)

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty agreed to mutual defense—an armed attack against any of them would be considered an attack against all. The United Nations allowed for self-defense, and if an attack were to happen, each member nation would be obligated to assist, though there was discretion as to what type of assistance could be offered. The United Nations remained the primary means of dealing with an international crisis; however, the North Atlantic Treaty allowed for self-defense in light of an attack. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which established mutual defense, has been invoked only once, by the United States, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The treaty also allows its members to consult on military affairs without invoking an armed response. This provision, stated in article 4, has been invoked several times in NATO history to seek a resolution to a dispute or to determine a response to a military act. Turkey has invoked the article in conflicts with Syria, and Poland did so in 2014 to determine how to respond to Russian aggression in Crimea. NATO is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, and its membership has grown from twelve to twenty-eight countries. In addition to military security and cooperation, NATO promotes democratic values and international cooperation. Author Biography

John Dewey Hickerson was the US diplomat responsible for much of the North Atlantic Treaty’s language. He was born in Crawford, Texas, in 1898, graduated from the University of Texas, and joined the Foreign Service soon after. Hickerson served in a variety of posts in Latin American and Canada until 1928, when he became the assistant chief of the US State Department’s Division of West European Affairs in Washington, DC. He held this position for twelve years, also serving on the State Department’s Board of Appeals and Review

NATO Treaty

from 1934 until 1941. Hickerson became the secretary of the American section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in 1940 and held this position through the war. He was chief of the State Department’s Division of British Commonwealth Affairs and deputy director of the Office of European Affairs from 1944 to 1947, and he was deeply involved in the establishment of the United Nations. He was promoted to director of

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the Office of European Affairs in 1947, and in this capacity, he led the team that drafted the North Atlantic Treaty. Hickerson was the assistant secretary of state from 1949 to 1953 and then served as US ambassador to Finland and the Philippines. Hickerson retired to Washington, DC, and died in Bethesda, Maryland, in 1989.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: ARTICLE 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. ARTICLE 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

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ARTICLE 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. ARTICLE 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. ARTICLE 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

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ARTICLE 6 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: • on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. ARTICLE 7 The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE 8 Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty. ARTICLE 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. ARTICLE 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. ARTICLE 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

NATO Treaty

ARTICLE 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of

Document Analysis

The North Atlantic Treaty begins with both a reaffirmation of the principals of the Charter of the United Nations and confirmation that this agreement is not a replacement for it. The introduction makes plain that the treaty’s role is as an anti-Communist political alliance. The nations who signed it are protecting “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” The treaty protects the “peace and security” of its adherents, who also resolve to settle disputes peacefully, in agreement with the founding principles of the United Nations. Signers pledge to refrain “from the threat or use of force” in their dealings with other nations. In addition, the signers will promote democracy around the world by “strengthening their free institutions” and encouraging economic cooperation. These countries will be prepared to meet an attack through vigorous self-defense and pledge to consult when “territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty goes to the heart of the alliance. The treaty is one of mutual defense, and, as such, an attack against any one country in the alliance will be considered an attack against all of them. The treaty stops short of requiring that assistance be rendered through armed force and leaves it to the determination of the nations involved to decide how they will respond. If the right of self-defense is invoked, the United Nations Security Council will be immediately informed and will devise a proper response. An armed NATO response is designed to provide temporary defense, while the United Nations remains the ultimate governing body. Article 6 expands the range of the territory covered under this treaty to include areas not in the North Atlantic, but under the control of member states. Article 9 establishes the organization that is to administer the treaty and provides for a way for nations to easily consult with one another. It also calls for the

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the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other signatories.

immediate establishment of a “defense committee,” and invites “any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty” to join NATO. The treaty can be reviewed after ten years, signers can leave after twenty, and the signed treaty is to be deposited in Washington, DC. Essential Themes

The North Atlantic Treaty went into effect on August 24, 1949, when President Harry S. Truman accepted the ratification of the other nations. The primary goal of the treaty was to provide for the defense of Western Europe and North America against the mounting threat from the Soviet Union. Though the United Nations held ultimate responsibility for international peacekeeping, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries were members; therefore, the United Nations could not be relied upon to deter potential Soviet aggression. After World War II, Western European nations sought a strong alliance that would discourage Soviet expansion. With the addition of the United States and Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty became a powerful bulwark against Communism and a political organization for the promotion of democracy. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print. Kaplan, Lawrence S. NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Print. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” National Archives Featured Documents. US National Archives and Records Administration, n.d. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

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 Memorandum on Lifting the Soviet Blockade Date: April 11, 1949 Author: Harry S. Truman Genre: government document Summary Overview

Since the Potsdam Agreement at the end of World War II in August 1945, both the German nation as a whole and its capital city of Berlin had been divided into four zones, each occupied by one of the four victorious Allied Powers. In what became one of the first crises of the Cold War, on June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union began a blockade of the American, British, and French sectors of Berlin, which lay entirely within the Soviet sector of Germany. This resulted in the Berlin Airlift— an unprecedented effort to sustain the food and fuel needs of an entire city. After the blockade had been in effect for nearly ten months, the Soviets showed no signs of weakening resolve, and the Americans showed no signs of ending their flights of supplies. The situation had devolved into a stalemate. At that point, US ambassador-at-large Philip Caryl Jessup contacted Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative to the United Nations Security Council, in an attempt to begin backchannel negotiations that would allow the blockade to come to an end. Defining Moment

Ever since the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France had jointly occupied Germany. Each of the four Allies governed one sector of the country as a whole and one sector of the German capital, Berlin. However, between 1945 and 1948, relations between the Soviet Union and the other three Allies became increasingly strained, as the Soviets showed no inclination to withdraw from the Eastern European nations they had occupied while fighting Nazi Germany. Many of the Soviet leaders were waiting for the other three Allies to end their occupation of Germany, after which time they expected Germany to become a Communist nation. With postwar economic chaos and strong Communist parties in many other Western European nations, the Soviets hoped to foment Communist uprisings throughout Europe.

However, in 1947, US secretary of state George C. Marshall proposed a plan for massive US investment in European economic recovery, while at the same time, the Americans, British, and French tried futilely to convince the Soviet Union that the time had come for German reunification and the establishment of a democratic postwar German government. With the Soviets opposing the end of its occupation of the eastern sector of Germany, the other three Allies began the process of unifying their sectors by reforming Germany’s currency, in essence creating an economic separation from the Soviet sectors of both Germany and Berlin. In response, on June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union had established a blockade in an attempt to force the United States, Great Britain, and France to abandon their sectors of Berlin, which lay entirely within the Soviet sector of Germany. The other Allies immediately responded by beginning a massive airlift that would help keep West Berlin alive. As the months wore on, it became clear to the Soviet leadership that the political and economic gains they hoped would come from the blockade were not going to happen, and that the counterblockade of Western goods needed by East Germany was proving increasingly costly. On January 31, 1949, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin stated that the blockade could be ended if the three Allies ended the counterblockade—making no mention of West German unification or the currency issue. In order to determine if this was, indeed, a softening of the Soviet position, US secretary of state Dean Acheson asked Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup to continue discussions with Soviet UN representative Jacob Malik as to whether talks could commence to end the blockade. Once Jessup was sufficiently sure of the Soviet desire to negotiate an end to the crisis, he informed Acheson, who then briefed President Harry S. Truman, who wrote this memorandum to inform the necessary diplomatic personnel of the talks and the US position

Memorandum on Lifting the Soviet Blockade

regarding the future of West Germany and West Berlin after the blockade. Author Biography

When Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) became president of the United States on April 12, 1945, after Franklin D. Roosevelt died in the waning days of World War II, he had been vice president for less than three months. However, he quickly put his own stamp on American policy in the face of increasing tension between the United States and its World War II ally the Soviet Union. In 1947, he had responded with military

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aid to subdue Soviet-supported Communist uprisings in Greece and Turkey. However, a more direct crisis loomed when the Soviets began the blockade of Berlin in 1948. Truman responded by ordering the massive airlift that helped to supply the city throughout the blockade. While seeking to negotiate an end to the blockade, Truman did not relent in his effort to unify the American, British, and French sectors of Germany, as well as in his determination to create a military alliance between the Western European nations to withstand Soviet aggression.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT MEMORANDUM Mr. Malik, Soviet representative on the Security Council of the United Nations, recently approached Mr. Jessup in a private conversation with suggestions which intimated that the Soviet Government might be prepared to lift the Berlin blockade if the Western Powers would lift the counter-blockade and would agree to a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Malik indicated that the Soviet Government might agree that the lifting of the blockade could precede the convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers, provided a date was fixed for the latter. In light of the extreme delicacy and importance of this matter, I instructed the Secretary of State to have this approach followed up in further private discussions between Mr. Jessup and Mr. Malik, with a view to ascertaining whether it had any real substance. Mr. Jessup was instructed in particular to obtain confirmation of Soviet readiness to lift the blockade prior to the meeting of the Ministers.

Document Analysis

When President Harry S. Truman was notified by Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Marshall’s successor) that the talks between US ambassador at large Philip Jessup and Soviet UN representative Jacob Malik had proven promising and had revealed that the Soviets were willing to end their blockade of West Berlin, he issued a memorandum that first instructed US diplomatic personnel on the matter and then restated the

Pending such clarification I instructed the Secretary of State not to disclose information about this discussion without my authorization. The British and French Foreign Ministers were naturally kept personally informed of the progress of these talks. The discussion to date have now indicated that there is a sufficient degree of seriousness on the Russian side to warrant our proceeding further and entering, if the Russians are willing, on the negotiation of the actual arrangements; and we are now consulting further with the British and French Foreign Ministers on this point. In these circumstances I think it important that Secretary Royall, Mr. Voorhees, General Bradley and General Clay be acquainted with the above, for their strictly personal information, and suggest that you make the appropriate arrangements. Until further notice, I would appreciate it if you would see to it that no other persons are apprised of the matter. I am similarly authorizing the Secretary of State to inform the political representatives of the United States at Berlin and Moscow.

American determination to create a non-Communist German state in the aftermath. At the start, Truman acknowledges the terms that Jessup and Malik have agreed upon: ending the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in return for the end of the Allies’ counterblockade of East Germany, and a meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, the group consisting of the foreign ministers from all four of the victorious World War II allies, that would presumably

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give the Soviets a voice in the ongoing plans for postwar Germany. Given that the Soviets were not insisting upon the cessation of Allied plans to unite the currency of their three sectors, Truman felt that there was sufficient ground to ask for the beginning of official talks to end the crisis. Though he had kept the British and French updated on these developments, he now thought it time to inform others in the American government, including Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Assistant Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees, Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, and US Zone military governor Lucius Clay, as well as members of the US diplomatic corps in Berlin and Moscow. However, he does stress the importance to restricting the information to select individuals only. Truman then discusses the need for the talks between Jessup and Malik to clarify the specific Soviet and Western blockade restrictions that will be lifted— that is, the Soviet restrictions on “communications, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany, and on the other hand by the three powers on communications, transportation and trade to and from the Eastern zone of Germany.” Truman concludes by outlining what the Allies would not compromise, specifically “the continuation of the preparations for the establishment of a Western German Government,” essentially stating that the United States was not willing to compromise its position regarding the protection of non-Communist nations in Western Europe, while basically acknowledging that Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, was a fait accompli. Essential Themes

At the same time that the Berlin crisis was coming to an end, other events were taking place on both sides of what British prime minister Winston Churchill had, in 1946, dubbed the Iron Curtain that would shape much of the emerging Cold War. Most importantly, as Jessup and Malik were negotiating an end to the blockade, the three Allies and the other nations of Western Europe were in negotiations that would result in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949.

On May 12, about a month after this memo, the blockade and counterblockade were lifted. By the end of 1949, the occupation of Germany and Berlin had officially ended, with the establishment of two German governments: the pro-Western German Federal Republic (or West Germany, established on May 23, 1949), with its capital in Bonn, and the pro-Soviet German Democratic Republic (or East Germany, established on October 7, 1949), of which East Berlin was the capital. In the early Cold War years that followed the Berlin blockade, hundreds of thousands of East German residents fled the Soviet-controlled country for the West. In response, in May 1952, the border between East and West Germany was closed and barbed wire fencing erected by the East Germans. However, the border within Berlin remained open until 1961, when the East Germans commenced construction of the Berlin Wall, which served to close off almost all immigration between the east and the west, and also became one of the most recognizable symbols of the Cold War. The status of West Berlin, as it was not technically within the borders of West Germany, was ambiguous until the Berlin Constitution was adopted in August 1950. That document officially added West Berlin to West Germany, though it remained under the protection and jurisdiction of the United States, Great Britain, and France until the reunification of Germany at the end of the Cold War on October 3, 1990. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Harrington, Daniel F. Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 2012. Print. Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print. Shlaim, Avi. The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making. Berkeley: U of California P, 1983. Print. Stivers, William. “The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948–49.” Diplomatic History 21.4 (1997): 569–602. Print.

Dean Acheson on the “Loss” of China

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 Dean Acheson on the “Loss” of China Date: August 5, 1949 Author: Dean Acheson Genre: letter, report Summary Overview

The Chinese Civil War between the conservative Nationalists and the Communists began in 1927 and raged on and off through Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s and World War II, until the victory of Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army in 1949. The Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek was a darling of American conservatives, glorified by over a decade of propaganda from a well organized ‘China Lobby’ in the United States that included politicians, missionaries, and the influential publisher of Time magazine, Henry Luce—who put Chiang on the magazine’s cover more than any other figure. Few Americans knew the degree of despotism and corruption among the Nationalists or the deep support among the peasantry that Mao had cultivated. Thus, when Democratic president Harry S. Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson put out a White Paper in August 1949 detailing the real reasons for the Nationalists’ failure, many in the China Lobby responded angrily that only a lack of support from the Truman administration, if not outright betrayal, could account for the Communists’ victory. Defining Moment

Throughout most of recorded history China has been among the world’s most powerful and advanced civilizations. In the early nineteenth century, the industrializing European nations forced open China and through a series of wars were able to coerce China’s emperor into accepting “Treaty Ports,” coastal cities where only European nations’ laws applied (“extraterritoriality”). As European empires carved up China, the United States. called for an “Open Door” where all could trade freely with China. A weakened China, flooded with opium imported by the British and Americans, was beset by civil wars and anti-foreign rebellions until in 1911 the Qing Dynasty was overturned and a Republic declared. Soon China was again torn apart by regional warlords vying for control.

In the 1920s, the Nationalists and Communists formed an uneasy alliance to try to unify the country. In 1927 the Nationalist Party under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek turned on its Communist allies setting off the Chinese Civil War. The Nationalists were dominated by wealthy Chinese and powerful landlords. Many of their leaders, including Chiang, were Christian converts which made them popular in the United States. The China Lobby in America downplayed the Nationalists’ autocratic nature—Chiang admired fascism—by portraying Chiang as a wise leader seeking to remake China in America’s democratic image. After Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s, Chinese independence became a powerful cause in America. Ultimately, it was the decision of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to embargo oil sales to Japan unless it withdrew from China that led to Japan’s fateful decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Few Americans outside seasoned government officials were aware of the degree to which Chiang used US aid to enrich his inner circle and to fight Mao’s communists instead of the Japanese. (Chiang declared, “The Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart.”) Even fewer were aware of the degree to which Mao, by implementing land reform and seeking to treat the historically scorned peasants with respect, was winning their support. The fact that Mao’s People’s Liberation Army fought the Japanese invaders tenaciously in contrast to the slack Nationalists further strengthened Mao’s legitimacy. After the defeat of Japan, US General George C. Marshall attempted to negotiate a peace between the Nationalists and Communists, but by 1947 the Civil War was once again raging. The venal and unpopular Nationalists were no match for Mao’s disciplined and motivated troops, and in 1949 the defeated Nationalists retreated to Taiwan where they proclaimed the Republic of China, which was recognized by the United

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States as the legitimate government of China. (That changed only in the 1970s.) The “loss” of China set off massive recriminations by Republicans, who accused Truman and Acheson of being soft on communism, and fueled the anti-communist campaign of Senator Joseph McCarthy. It also led to the removal in the State Department of some of its most experienced China hands: Asia experts like John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies and John Carter Vincent all had their careers ruined because they sought to accurately foresee a Communist victory in China. McCarthy smeared Acheson personally as “the Red Dean,” while Richard Nixon decried “the Dean Acheson College of Cowardly Communist Containment.” McCarthy even accused the respected General Marshall of engineering Nationalist China’s defeat in “a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any such venture in the history of man…”

Author Biography

Dean Gooderham Acheson was born in Middleton, Connecticut on April 11, 1893. He attended the Groton School and graduated from Yale University in 1915 and Harvard Law School in 1918. Acheson clerked for US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and then pursued a career in the law. He served as Assistant Secretary of State, 1941-5, Undersecretary of State, 1945-1947 and Secretary of State, 1949-1953. Acheson was one of the major architects of Truman’s policy of containment. He played a central role in the creation of NATO and US policy during the Korean War. He served as an advisor to President John F. Kennedy during the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises. His autobiography, Present at Creation, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1970. Acheson married Alice Stanley with whom he had a son and two daughters. He passed away on October 12, 1971.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The reasons for the failures of the Chinese National Government . . . do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid. Our military observers on the spot have reported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition. The fact was that the decay which our observers had detected in Chungking early in the war had fatally sapped the powers of resistance of the Kuomintang. Its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, its troops had lost the will to fight, and its Government had lost popular support. The Communists, on the other hand, through a ruthless discipline and fanatical zeal, attempted to sell themselves as guardians and liberators of the people. The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated. History has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle. . . . The historic policy of the United States of friendship and aid toward the people of China was, however, maintained in both peace and war. Since V-J Day, the United States Government has authorized aid to Nationalist China in the form of grants and credits totaling approximately 2 billion dollars, an amount equivalent in value to

more than 50 percent of the monetary expenditures of the Chinese Government and of proportionately greater magnitude in relation to the budget of that Government than the United States has provided to any nation of Western Europe since the end of the war. In addition to these grants and credits, the United States Government has sold the Chinese Government large quantities of military and civilian war surplus property with a total procurement cost of over I billion dollars, for which the agreed realization to the United States was 232 million dollars. A large proportion of the military supplies furnished the Chinese armies by the United States since V-J Day has, however, fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists through the military ineptitude of the Nationalist leaders, their defections and surrenders, and the absence among their forces of the will to fight. It has been urged that relatively small amounts of additional aid-military and economic-to the National Government would have enabled it to destroy communism in China. The most trustworthy military, economic, and politic al information available to our Government does not bear out this view. A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative

Dean Acheson on the “Loss” of China

open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of a Government which bad lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. Such intervention would have required the expenditure of even greater sums than have been fruitlessly spent thus far, the command of Nationalist armies by American officers, and the probable participation of American armed forces-land, sea, and air-in the resulting war. Intervention of such a scope and magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been condemned by the American people. . . . The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default. And now it is abundantly clear that we must face the situation as it exists in fact. We will not help the Chinese or ourselves by basing our policy on wishful thinking. We continue to believe that, however tragic may be the immediate future of China and however ruthlessly a

Document Analysis

The document reprinted here is a letter from Secretary of State Dean Acheson that accompanied the release on August 5, 1949 of a 1,054-page State Department “White Paper,” officially named United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944– 1949. Both the letter and the State Department report state that the impending Chinese Communist victory was due to weaknesses among the Nationalists and that nothing the United States could have done, including greater aid, would have forestalled the final outcome of the civil war. Acheson describes the rot from within that brought about the fall of the Kuomintang (the official name of the Nationalists). Acheson accurately diagnoses the reason for the Nationalists’ failure: “Its leaders proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, its troops had lost the will to fight, and its

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major portion of this great people may be exploited by a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism, ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end. In the immediate future, however, the implementation of our historic policy of friendship for China must be profoundly affected by current developments. It will necessarily be influenced by the degree to which the Chinese people come to recognize that the Communist regime serves not their interests but those of Soviet Russia and the manner in which, having become aware of the facts, they react to this foreign domination. One point, however, is clear. Should the Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China’s neighbors, we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted by a situation violative of the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatening international peace and security. Meanwhile our policy will continue to be based upon our own respect for the Charter, our friendship for China, and our traditional support for the Open Door and for China’s independence and administrative and territorial integrity.

Government had lost popular support. The Communists on the other hand, through a ruthless and fanatical zeal, attempted to sell themselves as guardians and liberators of the people.” Acheson then details the “historic policy of the United States of friendship and aid toward the people of China” and the “approximately 2 billion dollars” the United States had invested in the Nationalist cause, as well as many other forms of material aid. Acheson refutes those who argue that a greater infusion of US aid could have saved Chiang Kai-shek, and asserts that the only alternative left to save the Nationalists was a “full-scale intervention” by the US military. In words that seem eerily prophetic of the later US war in South Vietnam, Acheson writes, “Intervention of such a scope and magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people… and would have been con-

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demned by the American people.” Acheson’s realist description of the Chinese communist victory in the first half of the letter gives way to obligatory anti-Communist rhetoric in the last half. He warns Mao not to become a pawn of “Soviet Russia” and declares any “aggression against China’s neighbors” would be met with force by the United States. Thus, the document is an accurate assessment of the past, but it also lays down the blueprint for containment in Asia that would soon lead the United States into armed conflict in Korea and, later, Vietnam. Essential Themes

The Communist ascendancy in China heralded an age of deep US involvement in Asia. After World War II, the Americans and Soviets divided the Korean peninsula into a communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea. When the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950, the Truman administration did not view it as a Korean civil war but rather as an example of Chinese and Soviet expansionism. Acheson advised Truman to take military action. Truman got authorization from the young United Nations to repel the invasion, and the United States led an international coalition in driving back the North Koreans. When Truman made the fateful decision to pursue the communists into North Korea, approximately 400,000 Chinese communist troops swept across the border, and the war became bogged down in stalemate until an armistice in 1953. In 1950 Truman and Acheson decided to vastly increase US military aid to the French in their effort to regain their former colony of Vietnam. Over 75 percent

of the materiel used in the ill-fated French war against the communist-led Viet Minh and their leader Ho Chi Minh was supplied by the Americans. The United States itself descended deeper into the conflict in Vietnam in the 1960s, ultimately fighting a failed and divisive war there for over a decade. The “loss of China” cast a long shadow as a series of US presidents who feared being accused of “losing” South Vietnam, thus opening the door for escalating US involvement there. Furthermore, McCarthyism had purged the State Department of Asian experts, and US policymakers subsequently over-emphasized ideas like the “Domino Theory” and a Moscow-directed global communist conspiracy, and simultaneously underestimated Vietnamese nationalism, historic Vietnamese enmity with China, and the widening Sino-Soviet split. It seemed a recipe for disaster, or at least severe difficulties that might otherwise have been avoided. —Robert Surbrug, PhD Bibliography and Additional Readings

Acheson, Dean. Present at Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969. Print. Beisner, Robert L. Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War. Oxford, New York: Oxford UP, 2006. Print. Bradley, James. The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia. New York: Back Bay Books, 2015. Print. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Print.

Atomic Explosion in the USSR

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 Atomic Explosion in the USSR Date: September 23, 1949 Author: Harry S. Truman Genre: speech Summary Overview

On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union (officially, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) exploded an atomic bomb at a remote site in Kazakhstan, making it the second world power to have atomic weapons. The United States had used two atomic bombs at the end of World War II against Japan, and the Soviet Union had been in pursuit of this technology for a decade. The bomb, code-named First Lightning, produced an eighty-kiloton explosion. On September 3, a specially equipped US plane picked up radiation readings off the coast of Siberia, telegraphing the event. On September 23, US president Harry Truman revealed to the world that the Soviet Union had the bomb. With this announcement came worldwide fear that tensions between the two nations could escalate into a catastrophic event, and the international community scrambled to regulate and control first atomic, then hydrogen-based thermonuclear weaponry. The nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States would be the primary concern of international affairs for the next several decades. Defining Moment

The United States unleashed the greatest destructive weapon ever known when it dropped two atomic bombs, known as Little Boy and Fat Man, on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. These were developed by a team of scientists in the United States through a program dubbed the Manhattan Project. The United States and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained further after the US nuclear advantage was revealed. Indeed, some scholars have theorized that the bombs dropped on Japan were as much a reminder to the Soviet Union of US dominance as a strategic way to end the war. The United States was well aware that the Soviet

Union was in pursuit of the technology needed to produce a nuclear weapon, but intelligence reports estimated in 1946 that the Soviets were four to seven years away. In fact, the Soviet Union had access to German scientists who had been involved in the Nazi atomic program, and a complex network of Soviet spies involved in the Manhattan Project had been providing vital information for years. Scientists had a variety of motivations for spying—some were Communist sympathizers; others believed that the only way to control this deadly technology was to have it shared by opposing powers in order to have a balance of power. During the war, some scientists believed that the Soviets would use it to destroy Nazi Germany. The Soviet weapons program began in earnest in 1943 and leapt forward in June 1945. Detailed information about the Fat Man atomic bomb, then untested, was leaked by Germanborn Klaus Fuchs, a physicist who was instrumental in designing the US nuclear program. The Soviet Union’s single greatest hurdle was its lack of uranium. After the fall of Germany, some uranium was captured. After 1945, uranium was obtained from Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, and eventually in the Soviet Union itself. Secret cities were set up, in which nuclear development, including uranium enrichment, and testing could take place in secret. There were at least four such cities at the time of the first test in 1949. Plutonium for the first Soviet atomic bomb was produced at one of these cities, Chelyabinsk. First Lightning was detonated at 7 a.m. on August 29, 1949, in the remote steppes of northeastern Kazakhstan. Engineers had designed an entire city, including buildings, bridges, even a mock subway, and had filled the area with caged animals to study the effects of an atomic blast. The blast was later found to be eighty kilotons, much more powerful than its originators had expected and initially reported. The mock city was entirely destroyed, and the test animals incinerated. A

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specially equipped US plane picked up radiation readings off the coast of Siberia on September 3; the United States tracked the nuclear fallout and determined that an atomic test had taken place. On September 23, President Truman announced to the world that the Soviet Union had the bomb, marking the most significant development to that time in the new Cold War. Truman’s secretary of state, Dean Acheson, soon called for an evaluation of foreign policy by the National Security Council, which resulted in massively increased military spending and the accelerated push to develop ever more powerful weaponry. Author Biography

Harry S. Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri, in 1884, the oldest of three children. His father, a farmer and livestock dealer, was well connected to the local Democratic Party, and Truman served as a page in the 1900 Democratic National Convention. After graduating from high school, Truman worked as a railroad timekeeper and a bank clerk. Truman served in the Missouri National Guard during World War I, despite very poor

eyesight, and was elected captain by his troops. After the war, Truman opened a haberdasher shop in Independence, Missouri. The shop failed, but Truman was elected a county court judge in 1922 and served in a variety of public offices until he was elected to the United States Senate in 1934. While in the Senate, Truman became known for investigating claims of graft and corruption in military industries. He was nominated to be Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vice president in 1944 and became president of the United States on April 12, 1945, upon Roosevelt’s death. Truman learned about the development of the atomic bomb after he became president, and he made the decision to drop two of them on two cities in Japan in August 1945. Truman oversaw the end of the war, the establishment of the United Nations, and the implementation of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. He supported a policy of containment to control the spread of Communism. Truman won a narrow victory in 1948 for a full term as president, but did not seek reelection in 1952. Truman retired to Missouri and died in 1972.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT I believe the American people to the fullest extent consistent with the national security are entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the following information. We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R. Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us. Nearly four years ago I pointed out that “scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the dis-

Document Analysis

By its brevity, President Truman’s statement emphasizes the serious nature of the news he is reporting. He opens with the reason he is making the announcement. The American people have a right to know about developments in atomic weaponry, as long as the infor-

covery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time.” And, in the three-nation declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and of Canada, dated November 15, 1945. It was emphasized that no single nation could, in fact, have a monopoly of atomic weapons. This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for that truly effective and enforceable international control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority of the members of the United Nations support.

mation does not compromise national security. This announcement was not just intended for the American people, of course, but would inform the world of this frightening new development, and Truman’s speech was carried across the globe. Truman does not explain how the United States got the information, but says that “we

Atomic Explosion in the USSR

have evidence” that there had been a recent explosion in the Soviet Union. This statement was made plainly and without embellishment, underscoring its gravity. Truman argues that this was not an unexpected development, however. Since “man” (by which he meant the Americans) had unleashed this new power, it had been anticipated that another nation would acquire it. In fact, Truman uses this as an opportunity to argue that the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada had agreed as far back as 1945 that nuclear capability could not be held by only one country and that he had known even then that the technology needed to produce an atomic weapon was so similar to that already widely available, that “foreign” research would catch up in time. Truman thus portrays the discovery of the Soviet atomic test as a serious development, but also an anticipated one, downplaying the surprise that they had developed this technology so quickly. Yet despite Truman’s downplaying of the atomic test, it threw the United States into a panic, as the nation was forced to accept that it no longer had a monopoly on atomic weapons. Truman’s tone at the close of this statement is not belligerent, however. He returns the attention of the world to the need for “truly effective and enforceable international control of atomic energy.” This would prove difficult, and mistrust and conflicting ideologies prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from reaching agreements that would control their nuclear arsenal. Both nations, instead, raced to outgun each other, producing more dangerous weapons and stationing them throughout the world.

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Essential Themes

The primary theme of this speech is the impact on the world of the Soviet atomic test. The tone is somber, but not belligerent, and a hopeful note is struck at the end that the world will develop and respect controls on this dangerous weapon. The speech takes as a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union would develop the bomb. In fact, the verification of a successful atomic detonation was very shocking news indeed, as the United States and other Western nations had assumed that the Soviets were several years away from acquiring this technology and, for this reason, hoped to be well ahead in weapons development by then or have worked with the United Nations to ensure that atomic energy could only be used for peaceful purposes. The news of the First Lightning detonation was a turning point in US-Soviet relations and would result in an increasingly hostile arms race between the two superpowers. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Craig, Campbell, and Sergey Radchenko. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven: Yale UP, 2008. Print. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print. Toropov, Brandon. Encyclopedia of Cold War Politics. New York: Facts on File, 2000. Print.

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 International Control of Atomic Energy Date: October 25, 1949 Authors: Representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States Genre: government document Summary Overview

The enormous destructive power of atomic weaponry was made clear when the United States bombed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945, at the end of World War II. Top scientists from across the world had worked in secret on the Manhattan Project, the US-led effort to develop atomic technology. In the years following World War II, the Soviet Union set up Communist governments in most central and Eastern European states, and tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, former Allies, were high. At the same time, the Soviet Union had an extensive spy network within the Manhattan Project and had itself been working to develop atomic weapons. In August 1949, the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb in Kazakhstan, and the world was faced with two powerful opposing nations with nuclear capability. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were members of the United Nations, which had set up an Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 to study the best way to control nuclear technology. In the fall of 1949, the Soviet Union was not interested in giving up the weapon it had worked so hard to develop, however, and talks about control and disarmament were at an impasse. The other members of the Atomic Energy Commission submitted this report to the United Nations, describing the obstacles to an agreement with the Soviet Union. Defining Moment

The United States unleashed the greatest destructive weapon ever known when it dropped two atomic bombs, known as Little Boy and Fat Man, on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The United States and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained further after the superiority of US weaponry was revealed. Indeed, some scholars have theo-

rized that the bombs dropped on Japan were as much a reminder to the Soviet Union of US dominance as a strategic way to end the war. Attempts to control this destructive technology began as soon as the bombs were dropped. The United States was aware that the Soviet Union was working on a nuclear weapon and believed that it would be eight to fifteen years before it had a workable device. Still, the urgency was clear. The United Nations, formally established within months of the bombing of Japan, passed its first resolution on January 24, 1946, establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” UNAEC had six permanent members (the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, and Canada), and within days of the establishment of the organization, the United States had set up a group, whose members included Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority David E. Lilienthal, to study the problem of nuclear weapons; Bernard Baruch was chosen to present the group’s report to UNAEC. Baruch altered the Acheson-Lilienthal report slightly, presenting a plan to establish the Atomic Development Authority, an international body both assigned to manage any facility capable of producing atomic weapons and in charge of inspecting any nuclear research facility pursuing peaceful uses for atomic energy. The Baruch Plan also made possession of an atomic bomb illegal and imposed sanctions on nations who failed inspections. The Atomic Development Authority could impose sanctions on nations who were not in compliance and had the ability to override the veto of any members of the United Nations who disagreed with its ruling. Once the plan was fully operational, Baruch promised that the United States would begin to destroy its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union rejected this plan, insisting that existing weapons be destroyed

International Control of Atomic Energy

before the plan took effect, arguing against international control of its domestic facilities, and stating that it would not release its veto on the UN Security Council. In December 1946, the Baruch Plan was defeated 10–2 with the Soviet Union and Poland (a temporary member) abstaining. These differences—the insistence by the Soviet Union that the United States’ weapons be destroyed, its unwillingness to give up its veto, and its refusal to allow international control of domestic facilities—continued through a series of reports, proposals, and counterproposals over the next three years, with no resolution. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate over the following years. Tension over the fate of Germany remained high, culminating in the Soviet Union’s blockade of Berlin. The Soviet Union initially refused to relinquish territory in Iran in 1946, causing a flurry of activity in the United Nations. As central and Eastern Euro-

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pean nations adopted Communist governments, some by force, the United States grew increasingly worried about aggressive Soviet expansion. In April 1949, the United States and eleven other former Allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In November 1948, the United Nations General Assembly sent the six permanent members of UNAEC back into consultation, charging them with finding common ground in the control of atomic weapons. This group finally met on August 9, 1949. On August 29, the Soviet Union secretly detonated its first atomic weapon, an event that President Harry S. Truman announced to the American public on September 23. In October, the other five nations sent this report to the United Nations General Assembly, detailing the ongoing negotiations and enumerating the points of contention. The failure to reach agreement, as reported in this document, spelled the beginning of the nuclear arms race and the Cold War.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Statement by the Representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, October 25, 1949 On 24 October 1949, the representatives of Canada, China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America agreed to send to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the General Assembly, the following interim report on the consultations of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission: “In paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948, the representatives of the Sponsoring Powers, who are the Permanent Members of the Atomic Energy Commission, namely, Canada, China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, were requested to hold consultations ‘in order to determine if there exist a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.” “The first meeting took place on 9 August 1949. The

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consultations have not yet been concluded and are continuing but, in order to inform the General Assembly of the position which has so far been reached, the six Sponsoring Powers have decided to transmit to it the summary records of the first ten meetings.” It was agreed by the group that any of the representatives of the Governments taking part in these consultations retained the right to submit to the Assembly their observations on the course of the consultations so far. The representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States accordingly submit to the General Assembly this statement, which represents their joint views, in the hope that it may assist the Assembly in its consideration of this problem. BASIS OF DISCUSSION It was found desirable to approach these consultations from the viewpoint of general principles rather than specific proposals which had been the basis of most of the discussion in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. To this end, the representative of the United Kingdom offered a list of topics as a basis for discussion. Included in this paper was a Statement of

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Principles relating to each topic. It was pointed out that the United Kingdom Statement of Principles was based on the plan approved by the General Assembly, but at the same time covered the essential topics with which any plan for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy would have to deal. The list of topics was then adopted as the basis for discussion. The representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States made it clear that their Governments accepted the Statement of Principles set forth in this paper and considered them essential to any plan of effective prohibition of atomic weapons and effective control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They expressed the readiness of their Governments to consider any alternative proposals which might be put forward, but emphasized that they would continue to support the plan approved by the General Assembly unless and until proposals were made which would provide equally or more effective and workable means of control and prohibition. PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS At the request of the Soviet representative, the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons was taken up first. The texts which served as a basis for the discussion were point four of the Statement of Principles, and a Soviet amendment submitted to replace that text. In the course of the discussion, the Soviet representative declared that the representatives of all six Sponsoring Powers were in agreement in recognizing that atomic weapons should be prohibited, and he therefore drew the conclusion that his amendment should be accepted. The other representatives pointed out that it had always been agreed that the production, possession or use of atomic weapons by all nations must be prohibited. But it was also agreed that prohibition could only be enforced by means of an effective system of control. This was recognized even in the Soviet amendment, but the remainder of the amendment contained a repetition of the earlier Soviet proposals for control which were deemed inadequate. The Soviet representative insisted that two separate conventions, one on prohibition and the other on control, should be put into effect simultaneously. The other rep-

resentatives maintained that the important point to be resolved was what constitutes effective control, and that this control had to embrace all uses of atomic materials in dangerous quantities. In their view the Soviet proposals would not only fail to provide the security required but they would be so inadequate as to be dangerous. They would delude the peoples of the world into thinking that atomic energy was being controlled when in fact it was not. On the other hand, under the approved plan, the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons would rest not only on the pledge of each nation, but no nation would be permitted to possess the materials with which weapons could be made. Furthermore, the Soviet Government took an impracticable stand as regards the question of timing or stages by which prohibition and control would be brought into effect. STAGES FOR PUTTING INTO EFFECT PROHIBITION AND CONTROL On this topic, the Soviet representative maintained that the entire system of prohibition and control must be put into effect simultaneously over the entire nuclear industry. The representatives of the other Powers pointed out that this would be physically impossible. The development of atomic energy is the world’s newest industry, and already is one of the most complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight. Control and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of time and by a series of stages. The plan approved by the General Assembly on 4 November 194n (sic.) does not attempt to define what the stages should be, the order i8 (sic.) which they should be put into effect, or the time which the whole process of transition would take. The reason for this is that no detailed provisions on stages could be drawn up until agreement is, reached on what the control system should be, and the provisions, would also depend on the state of development of atomic energy in the various countries at the time agreement is reached. Until then, detailed study of the question of stages would be unrealistic. Meanwhile, the approved plan covers the question of stages in so, far as it can usefully be carried at present.

International Control of Atomic Energy

The plan provides that the schedule of stages of application of control and prohibition over all the many phases of the entire nuclear industry is to be written into the treaty, with the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as the body to supervise their orderly implementation. No other commitment or position on this question is contained in the approved plan. CONTROL (a) Means of Control The Soviet representative insisted, as in the past, that any plan of control, to be acceptable to the Soviet Union, must be based on the Soviet proposals for control, originally put forward in June 1947 (Document AEC/24, 11 June 1947), which provide for periodic inspection of nationally owned plants producing or using atomic materials, when declared to an international control organ by the Governments concerned. The representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States recalled that the nuclear fuels produced or used in such plants are the very nuclear explosives used in the manufacture of weapons. A new situation therefore was created in the field of armaments where the conversion of a peaceful industry into a war industry could take place rapidly and without warning. In dealing with such materials a system of control depending merely on inspection would be ineffective. For ordinary chemical or mineral substances and their processing inspection might provide adequate guarantees, but atomic development presented special problems which could not be solved in this way. Materials used in the development of atomic energy were highly radioactive and could not, therefore, be handled except by remote control. The process of measuring atomic fuels was extremely intricate and, at the present stage of our knowledge, subject to appreciable error. It would be impracticable to rely on the inspection of plants and impossible to check the actual amounts of atomic materials inside piles or reactors against the amounts shown in the records. A system of inspection alone would not prevent the clandestine diversion of atomic materials to war purposes from plants designed for peaceful use and would provide

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no guarantee that, in spite of any treaty, a nation which was determined to continue the secret manufacture of atomic weapons would be prevented from doing so. A plan based on periodic inspection, on which the Soviet Union insists, would be even less adequate than one based on continuous inspection. The Soviet representative dismissed these arguments as exaggerated or non-existent. Since there was evidence that an atomic explosion had been produced in the Soviet Union, the Soviet representative was asked whether he had any new evidence derived from Soviet experience to support his contention that periodic inspection would be sufficient to assure control. No answer has yet been received to this question. The five Powers remain convinced that any system of inspection alone would be inadequate and that in order to provide security the International Control Agency must itself operate and manage dangerous facilities and must hold dangerous atomic materials and facilities for making or using dangerous quantities of such materials in trust for Member States. (b) Ownership During the consultations, the question of ownership, which has often been represented as the real obstacle to agreement on control, was the subject of an extended exchange of views. The Soviet representative argued that international management and operation were equivalent to international ownership; and that neither international ownership nor international management and operation was essential to control. He stated that his Government would not accept either. The representatives of the other Sponsoring Powers refuted the interpretation put by the Soviet representative on ownership, management and operation. For the reasons given they believed that the management and operation of dangerous facilities must be entrusted to the International Agency. Management and operation were clearly among the more important rights conferred by ownership. Since effective control would be impossible unless these rights were exercised by the Agency, the nations on whose territories such facilities were situated would have to renounce important rights normally

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conferred by ownership. This did not necessarily mean the complete devolution of the rights of ownership to the Agency; for example, the Agency would not have the right arbitrarily to close atomic power plants; it would have to conform to national legislation as regards public health and working conditions; it could not construct plants at will but only in agreement with the nation concerned. Moreover, the Agency would not be free to determine the production policy for nuclear fuel since this would follow provisions to be laid down in advance in the treaty. The treaty would also determine the quotas for production and consumption of atomic fuel. Finally, the Agency would hold materials and facilities in trust and would not therefore be able to manage or dispose of them arbitrarily or for its own profit but only for the benefit of Member States. There might well be other rights which would normally be conferred by ownership and which were not specifically mentioned in the approved plan. Their disposition would follow a simple principle. If there were rights, the exercise of which could impair the effectiveness of control, individual nations would be required to renounce them. Otherwise they might retain them. If individual nations agreed to renounce national ownership of dangerous atomic materials and the right of managing and operating plants making or using them, in favor of an International Agency acting for the international community, such agreement would be on the basic principle, and there would be no need to quarrel over terminology. (c) Sovereignty A further argument put forward by the Soviet representative was that to confer on any international agency the powers suggested in the Statement of Principles would constitute a gross infringement of national sovereignty and would permit the International Agency to interfere in the internal economy of individual nations. In answer to this argument it was pointed out that any plan for international prohibition and control must involve some surrender of sovereignty. The representatives of the other Powers argued that it was indefensible to reject a plan for the international control of atomic energy on the purely negative ground that it would infringe national sovereignty. The ideal of international co-operation and, indeed, the whole concept on which

the United Nations was based would be meaningless if States insisted on the rigid maintenance of all their sovereign rights. The question was not one of encroachment on sovereignty, but of assuring the security of the world, which could only be attained by the voluntary association of nations in the exercise of certain rights of sovereignty in an open and co-operating world community. The Soviet representative remarked that, while some representatives had stated that their Governments were prepared to waive sovereignty provided that the majority plan was accepted, the Government of the U.S.S.R. would not agree to do so. BASIC OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AGREEMENT It appears from these consultations that, as in the past, the Soviet Union will not negotiate except on the basis of the principles set forth in the Soviet proposals of June 1947. The essential points in the Soviet control proposals, and the reasons for their rejection by the other five Powers, as brought out in the consultations, are as follows: The Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive atomic materials. The other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials as atomic weapons. The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own, operate and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of such materials. The other Five powers believe that, under such conditions, it would be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials for use in atomic weapons. The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic inspection of facilities the existence of which the national Government concerned reports to the international agency, supplemented by special investigations on suspicion of treaty violations. The other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent clandestine activities. Other points of difference, including Soviet insistence on the right to veto the recommendations of the International Control Agency, have not yet been discussed in the consultations.

International Control of Atomic Energy

CONCLUSIONS These consultations have not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the other five Powers, but they have served to clarify some of the points on which there is disagreement. It is apparent that there is a fundamental difference not only on methods but also on aims. All of the Sponsoring Powers other than the U.S.S.R. put world security first and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international co-operation, national sovereignty and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The Government of the U.S.S.R. put its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty. If this fundamental difference could be overcome, other differences which have hitherto appeared insurmountable could be seen in true perspective, and reasonable ground might be found for their adjustment. ANNEX I List of Topics and Statement of Principles Prepared by the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1. International system of control: (a) There should be a strong and comprehensive international system for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons, aimed at attaining the objectives set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly of 24 January 1946. Such an international system should be established, and its scope and functions defined by an enforceable multilateral treaty in which all nations should participate on fair and equitable terms. (b) Policies concerning the production and use of atomic energy which substantially affect world security should be governed by principles established in the treaty. Production and other dangerous facilities should be distributed in accordance with quotas and provisions laid down in the treaty. 2. International Control Agency: (a) There should be established, within the framework of the Security Council, an international control agency, deriving its powers and status from the treaty under which it is established. The Agency should pos-

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sess powers and be charged with responsibility necessary and appropriate for the prompt and effective discharge of the duties imposed upon it by the terms of the treaty. Its powers should be sufficiently broad and flexible to enable it to deal with new developments that may hereafter arise in the field of atomic energy. (b) The personnel of the Agency should be recruited on an international basis. (c) The duly accredited representatives of the Agency should be afforded unimpeded rights of ingress, egress and access for the performance of their inspections and other duties into, from and within the territory of every participating nation, unhindered by national or local authorities. 3. Exchange of information: (a) The Agency and the participating nations should be guided by the general principle that there should be no secrecy concerning scientific and technical information on atomic energy. (b) The Agency should promote among all nations the exchange of basic scientific information on atomic energy for peaceful ends. 4. Prohibition of atomic weapons: (a) International agreement to outlaw the national production and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of this international system of control. (b) The manufacture, possession and use of atomic weapons by all nations and by all persons under their jurisdiction should be forbidden. (c) Any existing stocks of atomic weapons should be disposed of, and proper use should be made of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. 5. Development of atomic energy: (a) The development and use of atomic energy even for peaceful purposes are not exclusively matters of domestic concern of individual nations, but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions. The development of atomic energy must be made an international co-operative enterprise in all its phases. (b) The Agency should have positive research and developmental responsibilities in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render itself more effective in promoting the beneficial uses of atomic

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energy and in eliminating the destructive ones. (c) The Agency should obtain and maintain information as complete and accurate as possible concerning world supplies of source material. 6. Control over atomic materials and facilities: (a) The Agency should hold all atomic source materials, nuclear fuels and dangerous facilities in trust for the participating nations and be responsible for ensuring that the provisions of the treaty in regard to their disposition are executed. (b) The Agency should have the exclusive right to operate and manage all dangerous atomic facilities. (c) In any matters affecting security, nations cannot have any proprietary right or rights of decision arising therefrom over atomic source materials, nuclear fuels or dangerous facilities located within their territories. (d) The Agency must be given indisputable control of the source materials promptly after their separation from their natural deposits, and on taking possession should give fair and equitable compensation determined by agreement with the nation concerned. (e) Activities related to atomic energy, which are nondangerous to security, such as mining and milling of source material, and research, may be operated by nations or persons under license from the Agency. 7. Means of detecting and preventing clandestine activities: The Agency should have the duty of seeking out any clandestine activities or facilities involving source material or nuclear fuel; to this end it should have the power to require reports on relevant matters, to verify these reports and obtain such other information as it deems necessary by direct inspection or other means, all subject to appropriate limitations.

8. Stages: The treaty should embrace the entire programme for putting the international system of control into effect, and should provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional process over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establishment of international control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons. ANNEX II Amendments Submitted by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Point 4 of the List of Topics Prepared by the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 4. Prohibition of atomic weapons: (a) An international convention outlawing the production, use and possession of atomic weapons is an essential part of any system of international control of atomic energy. In order to be effective such a convention should be supplemented by the establishment of a universal system of international control, including inspection to ensure that the provisions of the convention are carried out and “to protect States observing the convention from possible violations and evasions.” (b) The Atomic Energy Commission should forthwith proceed to prepare a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention on control of atomic energy, on the understanding that both conventions should be concluded and brought into effect simultaneously. (c) Atomic weapons should not be used in any circumstances. The production, possession and use of atomic weapons by any State, agency or person whatsoever should be prohibited. (d) All existing stocks of finished and unfinished atomic weapons should be destroyed within three months of the date of entry into force of the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Nuclear fuel contained in the said atomic weapons should be used for peaceful purposes.

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GLOSSARY clandestine: characterized by, done in, or executed with secrecy or concealment; private egress: opposite of ingress; the act or an instance of going; an exit; a going out envisaged: to contemplate; visualize gross: flagrant and extreme; unqualified; complete impinge: to make an impression; have an effect or impact; to encroach; infinge ingress: the act of going in or entering; entryway

Document Analysis

This report begins with a summary of its purpose: the six permanent members had been sent into consultation by the United Nations General Assembly. Other attempts at negotiation had broken down. The group was asked to meet in November 1948, but nine months passed before it met. In the interim, NATO had been formed, and the Soviet Union was on the cusp of possessing an atomic weapon. Between the meeting and this report, the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic weapon. After ten meetings, negotiations broke down in October 1949, and the other five members of UNAEC sent this report to the assembly. Discussions began with an agreement by representatives of the five countries on the basic principles set forth by the United Kingdom, based on UN agreements. These were accepted as fundamental to “any plan of effective prohibition of atomic weapons and effective control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.” The Soviet Union is silent in this record, though the principals are “adopted as the basis for discussion.” The heart of the disagreement comes in the first broad category for discussion, the “prohibition of atomic weapons.” Though the Soviet representative is in agreement that “atomic weapons should be prohibited,” the Soviet proposal includes controls that the other members feel are “inadequate.” The Soviet position is that weapons should be outlawed and regulations put in place simultaneously. The key issue becomes trust: the Soviet plan relied on the “pledge of each nation” rather than international controls. However, the other five nations assert that, if implemented, the Soviet plan would present a danger in that it would “delude the peoples of the world

into thinking that atomic energy was being controlled when in fact it was not.” Most of the remainder of this report is devoted to disagreements on the matter of control between the Soviet Union and the other five countries. The Soviet Union wants self-regulation and prohibition, effective immediately. The other members view this as impossible and inadequate. The Soviet Union wants periodic inspection of facilities rather than international control of them. The Soviet Union is unwilling to negotiate what it sees as a violation of national sovereignty on this issue, stating that “international management and operation were equivalent to international ownership.” The report concludes that negotiations are at a standstill, as the Soviet Union will not accept any proposals other than its own. A list of Soviet proposals, and the reasons that the other members cannot accept them, is provided at the conclusion of this document. Indeed, the impasse proved insurmountable, and the UNAEC was officially disbanded in 1952. Essential Themes

This report provides an excellent example of the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States after World War II. The United States’ monopoly on atomic weapons ended, and the Soviet Union was firm in its unwillingness to relinquish control of its nuclear facilities. UNAEC conducted its work against a backdrop of mounting international tension, and this report provided detailed proof of the mistrust between the Soviet Union and the rest of the group. The controls proposed by the Soviets depended on trust; however, other nations (particularly the United States) that stood

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to lose their weapons, but might be unable to prevent the Soviet Union from keeping its weapons, were not willing to agree to a system based on trust and selfreporting. For its part, the Soviet Union was unwilling to have what it deemed international ownership of its facilities, viewing such as a violation of its sovereignty. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Craig, Campbell, & Sergey Radchenko. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven: Yale UP, 2008. Print.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print. Kaplan, Lawrence S. NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Print. Luard, Evan. A History of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955. New York: Macmillian, 1982. Print.

NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”

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 NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” Date: April 7, 1950 Author: US Department of State Policy Planning Staff Genre: government document Summary Overview

US National Security Council Paper Number 68, or NSC 68 for short, was a top-secret report presented to President Harry S. Truman in April 1950. It came on the heels of the Soviet Union’s first successful detonation of an atomic bomb the previous year and amid the race to develop hydrogen bombs, whose destructive capacity far exceeded any previous nuclear technology. NSC 68 urged rearmament of conventional and nuclear weapons on a massive scale. The report identified Communism as a system of belief so fundamentally at odds with the United States that it could not be allowed to spread, a policy that became known as “containment.” It argued that steps needed to be taken to protect the United States and its allies from invasion and that the United States would have to lead the world in opposition to the Soviet Union. The document would prove to be one of the greatest influences on US policy throughout the Cold War. Defining Moment

Two major events precipitated the development of NSC 68. The first was the victory of the Communist forces in China and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Another former ally of the United States was now firmly in league with the Soviet Union. The second was the knowledge that the Soviet Union had developed a nuclear weapon. The world first understood the terrible, destructive power of nuclear energy (then known as “atomic” energy) when the United States dropped two nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The United States and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained. After the superiority of US weaponry was revealed, an international race to de-

velop nuclear arms began in earnest. With the United States and the Soviet Union positioned as the world’s two strongest powers after the war (they came to be called “superpowers”), tensions quickly escalated, and the Cold War developed. On August 29, 1949, the first successful test was made by the Soviet Union of a nuclear weapon when “First Lightning” was detonated in the remote steppes of northeastern Kazakhstan. Soviet engineers had designed an entire city, including buildings, bridges, and a mock subway, and had filled the area with caged animals to study the effects of an atomic blast. The explosion was approximately twenty kilotons, similar to the original American tests. The mock city was entirely destroyed and the test animals incinerated. A specially equipped US spy plane detected the radiation, and the United States tracked the nuclear fallout and determined that an atomic test had taken place. President Truman announced to the world that the Soviet Union had the bomb, marking a key turning point in the new Cold War. In the wake of this development, Truman ordered that a top-secret study be made of the most effective way to combat the Soviet Union’s challenge to American dominance. The United States had pursued a thermonuclear weapon since the beginning of World War II. This technology, known as the hydrogen bomb or H-bomb, used a small fission bomb to compress and ignite a powerful secondary blast at very high temperature using a nuclear fusion reaction. The destructive capacity of a thermonuclear weapon far outstripped the original atomic bomb. The US government was aware that the Soviet Union was in pursuit of this weapon as well, and at the time of the NSC 68 report, it was assumed that the Soviets would soon possess this technology, if they did not already. Attempts at international controls on nuclear technology had failed, and the United States

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concluded that within a few years the Soviet Union would be capable of a full-scale nuclear attack on the United States. Three general schools of thought developed: leave the Soviet Union alone and allow economic forces to prevail; strike to destroy Communism and stop the development of ever-greater nuclear weapons; or attempt to contain Communism without directly attacking the Soviet Union. Document Information

NSC 68 was instigated by President Truman, who was interested in revisiting national security strategy in the face of new developments in the Soviet Union’s nuclear capability. Truman asked the State and Defense Departments to examine the current military and se-

curity situation and report back to him. A study group was formed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and chaired by Paul Nitze, director of policy planning for the State Department. In addition to Nitze and Acheson, John P. Davis, Robert Tufts, and Robert Hooker were brought in from the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), along with Soviet expert and diplomat Chip Bohlen, Major General Truman Landon (representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Samuel S. Butano, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other government agencies also had input. The report, which underwent several revisions before being adopted, remained top secret until it was declassified in 1975.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In return, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development. Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system. 15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries. 16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States. a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out. b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or

NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”

through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take. 17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States. 18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal development, important among which are: a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity. b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability. c. Internal political and social disunity. d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures. e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace. f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities. g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics. Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built. The analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures: 19. a. To reduce the power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations.

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To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the U.N. Charter.

In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life. 20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims: a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the U.S.S.R. b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence. c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them. d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. 21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States: a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward

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b.

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the U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative. A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union. Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United State for

leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments. The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program—harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives—is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world. This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our

NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”

objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin—for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up. In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance. The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in

Document Analysis

This selection from NSC 68 offers a summary of the detailed analysis presented in the rest of the document. It argues that the Soviet Union’s nuclear capability makes it the greatest threat to the security of the United States, as it will soon be able to launch a full-scale nuclear attack. All efforts must be made to prepare for such an attack and defend against it. This means expanding intelligence and technological capabilities and supporting “substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war.” The conclusions of the report are based on the belief that the Soviet Union’s “hostile designs” are the greatest security threat confronting the United States in the

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fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained. Recommendations That the President: a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions. b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

world. Though the authors acknowledge that no attack is imminent at the time of the report, it is prudent to prepare for that possibility. The position of the United States in the world depends on its ability to resist the expansion of Communism and the influence of the Soviet Union in the rest of the world. Isolationism is not seen as a viable alternative, as the domination of Europe and Asia by the Soviet Union and China is “strategically and politically unacceptable.” It is not a time for the United States to be “shirking world responsibilities.” Threats from inside the United States are considered as well, including espionage and sabotage followed closely by economic instability and a false sense of security. Perhaps more ominously, “political and social disunity” are identified as internal threats, foreshadowing the threats to free speech that would accompany the hearings of

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Senator Joseph McCarthy, who saw Communist operatives in every corner. The report also details the steps that should be taken, short of war, to weaken the position of the Soviet Union in the world by encouraging resistance to Communist leadership in countries bordering Russia. The Soviet Union would be pressured to conform to “precepts of international conduct” as set forth by the United Nations. A multipronged approach is suggested to protect US national security interests. The United States must be in a state of military preparedness. It must also be able to identify and eliminate internal threats and maintain a thriving economy. It must encourage dissent from within the Soviet Union and within its satellite states. The United States must direct the “steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world.” Essential Themes

The primary conclusion of NCS 68 was that the president needed to drastically increase the pace of weapons development and the quantity of defensive weapons ready to be used against an increasing Soviet threat. An attack could only be deterred if it was clear that the United States held the military advantage and could retaliate with catastrophic consequences if attacked. This conclusion informed Cold War policy for years to come, resulting in a nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and proxy battles throughout the world. The recommendations of NCS 68 were not accepted immediately, however. Truman balked at agreeing to a massive but unspecified increase in military spending. Some diplomats familiar with the Soviet Union believed that despite its possession of the atomic bomb, Soviet military capabilities had been greatly exaggerated. Sev-

eral members of the planning group were convinced that the focus of US policy and spending should be on economic and political initiatives designed to weaken the Soviet Union and lessen its control of other countries in Europe and Asia, rather than military buildup. Truman initially sent the report back for further review and more specific cost estimates. In June 1950, South Korea was invaded by North Korean forces supported by Communist China and the Soviet Union. This erased any lingering doubt on the part of the Truman administration that the Soviet Union was afraid to use military force to press its aims. In addition, popular opinion in the United States became increasingly hostile to anyone believed to have Communist sympathies. Politicians accused each other and the administration of being “soft on Communism.” In response, Truman signed NCS 68 in September 1950, and the United States government began ramping up military spending, nearly tripling defense spending between 1950 and 1954. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Drew, S. Nelson, ed. NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment. Washington, DC: National Defense UP, 1994. Print. Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2006. Print. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope: 1946–52. Vol. 2. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954. Print. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1995. Print.

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 Report to the American People on Korea and US Policy in the Far East Date: April 11, 1951 Author: Harry S. Truman Genre: speech Summary Overview

In April 1951, the Korean War had been underway for nearly ten months, and tensions between General Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the United Nations Command in South Korea, and President Harry S. Truman had been mounting since the beginning of the conflict. MacArthur had operated decisively and, some felt, recklessly since the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea on June 25, 1950, first authorizing arms shipments, then deciding to attack beyond the thirty-eighth parallel that had divided zones of occupation between the United States and Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Many considered this a dangerous provocation of China and the Soviet Union, and MacArthur underestimated the number of Chinese forces north of the Korean border. On April 5, a letter from MacArthur undercutting Truman administration foreign policy was read on the floor of the House of Representatives. It was the last straw for Truman, who decided that MacArthur had to be replaced. This radio report was meant to explain the president’s unpopular decision. Defining Moment

The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when Communist forces from North Korea attacked South Korea. Korea had been part of the Japanese Empire before World War II, and it was divided into two distinct occupation zones by the Soviet Union and the United States after the war. The invasion of South Korea was widely seen as an attempt by the Soviet Union and Communist China to test the willingness of the United Nations to resist Communist territorial expansion. The UN acted decisively, two days later passing Resolution 83, authorizing assistance to South Korea to repel the attack. The South Korean capital, Seoul, fell the next day, on June 28.

General Douglas MacArthur, in command of the postwar Allied occupation of Japan, was a hero to many Americans and had commanded the Pacific theater during World War II, famously, if unsuccessfully, defending the Philippines in the Battle of Bataan. After the war, he was made the supreme commander of the Allied powers and was still the highest ranking commander in Asia in 1950. When North Korea invaded, MacArthur took control of the defense of South Korea, and from the beginning, he took steps that Truman believed overreached his authority. MacArthur committed first supplies and then air and naval operations prior to receiving authorization from the president. On June 30, Truman authorized the use of ground forces, and MacArthur was named the official head of United Nations Command in South Korea. Truman and his advisors were wary of pushing the Soviet Union and China into open conflict, and MacArthur openly challenged him on this, arguing that strong and aggressive defense was the only way to meet the Communist threat in Asia. On September 15, 1950, MacArthur led a daring and highly successful amphibious assault on Inchon, and by September 27, the North Korean army had been driven out of Seoul and the surrounding area. Truman was hesitant to encourage the pursuit of the retreating North Koreans past the thirty-eighth parallel, the original dividing line, as he feared it would invite conflict with the Chinese. MacArthur assured Truman that the Chinese were not going to involve themselves in the war in a meaningful way and convinced Truman to authorize military intervention above the thirty-eighth parallel. However, the Chinese did invade, with two hundred thousand troops on October 25, and the UN forces, having penetrated far into North Korea, suffered a series of military reversals from November to January;

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the Chinese drove them south across the thirty-eighth parallel, ultimately capturing Seoul. MacArthur chafed at restrictions on military activities over the border in China itself, arguing that the Chinese military could be stopped at the source. In March 1951, MacArthur issued a statement giving his views on a proposed ceasefire, in contravention of Truman’s orders (and the American tradition) that military officials avoid making public statements on foreign policy. On April 5, House Minority Leader Joseph William Martin Jr. read a letter from MacArthur asserting that Asia should be the main focus of international efforts to defeat Communism—an implicit critique of the Truman administration’s focus on Europe and another foray by a military official into foreign policy matters. Truman relieved him of command on April 11, 1951. Author Biography

Harry S. Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri, in 1884, the oldest of three children. A farmer and livestock dealer, his father was well connected with the local Democratic Party, and Truman served as a page boy at the 1900 Democratic National Convention. After graduating from high school, Truman worked several cleri-

cal jobs and as a railroad timekeeper. He served in the Missouri National Guard during World War I despite poor eyesight, and he was elected an officer by his men (a custom at that time). After the war, Truman returned to Independence, Missouri, and opened a men’s clothing shop. The shop failed, but Truman was elected a county court judge in 1922 and served in a variety of public offices until he was elected to the United States Senate in 1934. While in the Senate, Truman became known for investigating claims of graft and corruption in military industries. He was elected Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vice president in 1944 and became president of the United States on April 12, 1945, upon Roosevelt’s death. Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bomb on two cities in Japan in August 1945, near the end of World War II. Truman oversaw the end of the war, the establishment of the United Nations, and the implementation of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. He supported a policy of containment to control the spread of Communism. Truman won a narrow victory in 1948 for a full term as president, but he did not seek reelection in 1952. He died in 1972 and is buried in Independence, Missouri.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT My fellow Americans: I want to talk to you plainly tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East. In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war. I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action. It is right for us to be in Korea now. It was right last June. It is right today. I want to remind you why this is true. The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be

clear to everyone that the United States cannot—and will not—sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: What is the best time to meet the threat and how is the best way to meet it? The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze. And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peaceloving nations to act together. If they don’t act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one. If they had followed the right policies in the 1930’s— if the free countries had acted together to crush the aggression of the dictators, and if they had acted in the beginning when the aggression was small—there probably would have been no World War II. If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to the peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the

Report to the American People on Korea and US Policy in the Far East

cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation. This is a lesson that most people in this country have learned thoroughly. This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And, since the end of World War II, we have been putting that lesson into practice—we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war. That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism. The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot. Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency. The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the Communists have yet made. The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia. I would like to read to you from a secret intelligence report which came to us after the attack on Korea. It is a report of a speech a Communist army officer in North Korea gave to a group of spies and saboteurs last May, 1 month before South Korea was invaded. The report shows in great detail how this invasion was part of a carefully prepared plot. Here, in part, is what the Communist officer, who had been trained in Moscow, told his men: “Our forces,” he said, “are scheduled to attack South Korean forces about the middle of June.... The coming attack on South Korea marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia.” Notice that he used the word “liberation.” This is Communist double-talk meaning “conquest.” I have another secret intelligence report here. This one tells what another Communist officer in the Far East told his men several months before the invasion of Korea. Here is what he said: “In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution, we must first unify

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Asia.... Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets.... The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all the countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States.” Again, “liberation” in “commie” language means conquest. That is what the Communist leaders are telling their people, and that is what they have been trying to do. They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin. This plan of conquest is in flat contradiction to what we believe. We believe that Korea belong to the Koreans, we believe that India belongs to the Indians, we believe that all the nations of Asia should be free to work out their affairs in their own way. This is the basis of peace in the Far East, and it is the basis of peace everywhere else. The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East. It was the Soviet Union that trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. The Chinese Communists massed 44 well-trained and well-equipped divisions on the Korean frontier. These were the troops they threw into battle when the North Korean Communists were beaten. The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without a general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without a general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there. That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task. But so far it has been successful. So far, we have prevented World War III. So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding, and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved. We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight, and that they will stand up and fight. Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries

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in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest. In Korea itself there are signs that the enemy is building up his ground forces for a new mass offensive. We also know that there have been large increases in the enemy’s available air forces. If a new attack comes, I feel confident it will be turned back. The United Nations fighting forces are tough and able and well equipped. They are fighting for a just cause. They are proving to all the world that the principle of collective security will work. We are proud of all these forces for the magnificent job they have done against heavy odds. We pray that their efforts may succeed, for upon their success may hinge the peace of the world. The Communist side must now choose its course of action. The Communist rulers may press the attack against us. They may take further action which will spread the conflict. They have that choice, and with it the awful responsibility for what may follow. The Communists also have the choice of a peaceful settlement which could lead to a general relaxation of the tensions in the Far East. The decision is theirs, because the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible. We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war—not to start one. And the best way to do that is to make it plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack. But you may ask why can’t we take other steps to punish the aggressor. Why don’t we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don’t we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China? If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent. If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world. What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a fullscale war with Red China?

It may well be that, in spite of our best efforts, the Communists may spread the war. But it would be wrong—tragically wrong—for us to take the initiative in extending the war. The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union. Our aim is to avoid the spread of the conflict. The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow. First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle. The United Nations forces have put up a tremendous fight in Korea and have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy. Our forces are stronger now than they have been before. These are plain facts which may discourage the Chinese Communists from continuing their attack. Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. In the United States, in Western Europe, and throughout the world, free men are alert to the Soviet threat and are building their defenses. This may discourage the Communist rulers from continuing the war in Korea—and from undertaking new acts of aggression elsewhere. If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open. Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations. I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe

Report to the American People on Korea and US Policy in the Far East

with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course. I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war. A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy. It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is much more important than any individual. The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task. We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace. Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors: One: The fighting must stop. Two: Concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Document Analysis

Truman begins his radio address by reminding the American people in the plainest terms possible why the United States is at war in Korea: “We are trying to prevent a third world war.” The United States was right to be involved and to remain engaged in the fight against the “monstrous conspiracy” of Communism. Truman lays responsibility for the conflict squarely at the door of the Soviet Union, which was seen as the driving force behind Communist movements anywhere in the world throughout the Cold War. Truman argues that if Communism were allowed to spread from country to country through invasion, the United States

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Three: There must be an end to the aggression. A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea. That is our military objective—to repel attack and to restore peace. In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world’s search for a practical way of achieving peace and security. The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace. Free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war. That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming. We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing, we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

would eventually be the next target; thus, he argues, the country cannot allow the aggression against South Korea to go unchecked. “It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze,” he says, adding that if leaders such as Adolf Hitler had been stopped in the 1930s, World War II may have been prevented. Truman lists other conflicts where the intervention of the United States, under the auspices of the United Nations, had successfully checked Communist expansion, including in Greece and West Berlin. Communist involvement in Korea was part of a plan to gain total control of Asia, he argues. The Soviet Union had trained

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North Korean forces, and the Chinese had entered the war in huge numbers, both with the long-term aim of installing Communist regimes in all Asian countries. Truman acknowledges that it may seem tempting to check further Communist aggression by taking the fight to the Chinese on their own soil, as through an air campaign or assisting Chinese anti-Communist forces. However, he again asserts that the ultimate goal is to avoid a general war by defeating discrete acts of Communist aggression in places like Korea. Truman then addresses his decision, issued earlier that day, to relieve MacArthur of his command duties. With regard to the goal of limiting the conflict in Korea, he says, “A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy.” Truman therefore found it necessary, “with deepest personal regret,” to relieve MacArthur so that the US policy against escalating the conflict beyond Korea was clear. Essential Themes

Truman’s goal in his radio address of April 1951 was to foreground his bedrock commitment to checking Communist aggression around the world, while being clear about the limits of his administration’s policy on

the Korean Peninsula. Truman expressed that he had lost faith in MacArthur’s willingness to keep the war in Korea from escalating into a wider conflict with China, and so Truman removed him. In the short term, this was a very unpopular decision, as MacArthur enjoyed probably greater popularity in the United States than Truman, and the president’s popularity sank even further following this announcement. A few months later, a congressional inquiry was launched into Truman’s decision, and it was found that he was within his constitutional powers as president to remove MacArthur, though the decision was a “shock to national pride.” The incident remains a topic of study and debate in the area of civil-military relations in the United States. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon, 1987. Print. McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon, 1992. Print. Perry, Mark. The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur. New York: Basic, 2014. Print.

Statement by President Truman upon Signing the Mutual Security Act

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 Statement by President Truman upon Signing the Mutual Security Act Date: October 10, 1951 Author: Harry S. Truman Genre: speech Summary Overview

In the fall of 1951, US president Harry S. Truman signed into law the Mutual Security Act. The act authorized $7.5 billion in military, economic, and technical assistance for American allies abroad. Upon signing the act, Truman argued that it would help free nations and people around the world by funding the development of their respective militaries, economies, and infrastructures. He acknowledged that the act would entail building arms, but he emphasized that the act was also focused on rebuilding nations devastated by World War II and promoting freedom around the globe. Defining Moment

World War II represented one of humanity’s greatest periods of destruction. Millions of civilian and military lives were lost, while entire cities were reduced to rubble. Despite the immeasurable devastation this conflict caused, Japan’s surrender (which brought the conflict to a close) only ushered in a new, forty-five-year era of global aggressiveness and fear known as the Cold War. During this period, the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as countries under each superpower’s sway, engaged in a global campaign of competitiveness and mistrust. Although no military engagement between the Unites States and the Soviet Union took place during this period, the two actively involved themselves in a number of regional and civil wars. Europe was one of many “battlefields” on which the East and West confronted each other. Each of the Cold War’s participants actively pursued allies in Europe, promising to help them rebuild their war-torn infrastructures, economies, and militaries. On both sides of the Cold War was the perception that the other represented not only a competitor but also a threatening adversary. In an attempt to create a buffer between the Soviet Union and the West, the So-

viets worked diligently to create Moscow-friendly Communist governments in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other nations in Eastern Europe. In East Asia, Russia pushed for regional allies in the Korean Peninsula and China. In 1947, in an effort to publicly bolster US support for nations he viewed as targets for Soviet subjugation, US president Harry S. Truman outlined what became known as the Truman Doctrine. Therein, Truman stated that it was the responsibility of the United States to support the free people of countries in Soviet sights, including Turkey and Greece. In 1948, the Marshall Plan—named after General George Marshall, the secretary of state at the time—generated more than $12 billion in economic aid to war-torn European nations. In 1949, the US led the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to safeguard against Soviet aggression. During the same year, Congress authorized $814 million in military aid to the other nine members of NATO. Adding to the foreign-aid program was Truman’s 1950 “Point Four” initiative (which he introduced during his inaugural speech), promising technical assistance to underdeveloped nations. On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces—endorsed but not physically backed by the Soviets—crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea, starting the Korean War. Still operating in nearby Japan after World War II, the United States responded quickly and, leading an international coalition, pushed the North Korean army back above the thirty-eighth parallel. However, during this push, China became involved, and the conflict continued for two more years. The start of the Korean War created for Truman and Congress a concern about a potential Soviet advance. With US forces seemingly focused on East Asia, US leaders feared Russia might look to renew its push in Europe and elsewhere. Truman offered an expan-

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sive defense bill in the spring of 1951, but Congress whittled down the bill’s price tag to $7.5 billion, which would be spent to support the United States’ international allies. In August 1951, the Mutual Security Act was returned to President Truman’s desk for signature. Author Biography

Harry S. Truman was born in 1884, in Lamar, Missouri. When the United States joined World War I, Truman (then an officer in the Missouri National Guard) helped form the Second Regiment of the Missouri Field Artillery. He served as a captain during the war, ultimately reaching the rank of colonel. After the war, he was

elected judge in the Jackson County (Missouri) court, where he served until 1930. In 1934, he was elected to the Senate, winning reelection in 1940. As a senator, his knowledge of defense earned him national prominence, as he helped develop the country’s national defense infrastructure. In 1944, he was tapped by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to serve as vice president. In April 1945—eighty-two days after he was sworn in as vice president—he assumed the office of president after Roosevelt’s sudden death. He won reelection in 1948. In 1953, he retired to Independence, Missouri, where he lived until his death in 1972.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT I have today signed H.R. 5113, the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Under this legislation, the United States will continue to participate in the great collective defense effort of the free nations and to assist free peoples around the world who want to develop and safeguard their freedom and maintain the peace. This is constructive legislation—hopeful legislation. The amounts authorized are less than I requested but this act will bring substantial help to those who are eager to help themselves. It will enable our free nation partners to continue to increase their contributions to the common defense effort. Their contributions are as important as our own. We must never forget that we are just as dependent upon the efforts of other nations as they are on ours. This act will mean military equipment for troops who want to be able to defend their homelands if attacked. It will mean raw materials and production equipment for factories that can turn out guns and tanks and planes for the common defense of freedom. It will mean technicians and books, fertilizer and seeds, irrigation pumps and medical supplies, and many other things for people in underdeveloped areas who want to grow in strength and independence. In these and many other ways, this

act will mean life and energy for the great collective effort of the free nations to build a better world. The peoples of the underdeveloped areas of the world want desperately to take fuller advantage of their human and natural resources. We are now supplying material and technical assistance to help them realize these aspirations, and I believe that we should continue to do so. I am thinking particularly of the necessity of supporting the free nations of Asia in their efforts to strengthen the economic foundations of their independence. There is some misapprehension that the free world is embarked on nothing but an armaments race with the Soviet Empire. This is not the case. What the free world is actually doing is to unleash the constructive forces of human freedom. We are building armaments, of course—we would be fools if we did not. But we are doing far more than that. We are joining with and helping the free nations organize into stronger international associations than ever before. We are helping to restore the productive power of war-shattered countries. We are helping to build up the health, the education, and the welfare of free men all around the world. In short, we are joining with other peoples to prove by deeds that the way to freedom is the way of peace and human progress.

Statement by President Truman upon Signing the Mutual Security Act

Document Analysis

In this statement accompanying his signature on the Mutual Security Act of 1951, President Harry S. Truman remains consistent in his position that economic, military, and technical assistance to other nations promotes international peace and freedom. Truman suggests that the monies made available in the act would enable recipient nations to help themselves. Additionally, the act, Truman argues, is not part of a Cold War strategy to undercut the Soviet Union; rather, it represent an investment in the health and freedom of all nations. Truman acknowledges that he requested from Congress a significantly higher appropriation in his original bill. Nonetheless, the nearly $7.5 billion approved by Congress will prove helpful to nations who are “eager to help themselves.” These countries, Truman argues, are committed to the mutual effort to safeguard against invasion and building from within their democratic infrastructures. Truman’s analysis is consistent with his previous efforts to rebuild, strengthen, and safeguard war-torn Europe. In this statement, Truman argues that the act is part of a broader initiative to help American allies build their armed forces and thus be better equipped to repel attacks. The act, he adds, will also help nations purchase raw materials and related equipment in order to update their respective weapons arsenals. In this arena, Truman cites the philosophy—echoed by Congress and world leaders—that the most pressing issue facing “free” nations with underdeveloped military infrastructures is the threat of a Soviet-led attack (or an attack by a Soviet-friendly government). Furthermore, the act’s funds are to be used for agricultural equipment, medical supplies, workforce training, and other peaceful purposes. In short, Truman says, the act will help these nations not only rebuild but also build an even better world than that which existed before the World War II. Truman further states that the aim of the act is not to support the ongoing arms race against the Soviets. Certainly, he acknowledges, given the perceived aggressiveness of the Soviets, there is an imperative for the US and its allies to continue to build up their respective militaries. However, there is also an imperative for nations to build from within the social and economic capital they need to prevent the type of environment that fostered pro-Communist sentiment. The Korean War is ongoing, without a discernible end in sight. Addition-

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ally, postwar Europe and developing nations are still rebuilding. Truman and other Western leaders view any nation not already aligned with NATO and the United States as susceptible to Communist invasion as long as it is economically and militarily vulnerable. Truman argues that the American policy of bolstering European and East Asian states is not an investment in the global chess match against the Soviet Union. Rather, he says, the act and similar policies are designed to let each participating nation’s citizens invest in the development of infrastructures that promote human freedom. Essential Themes

By signing the Mutual Security Act of 1951, President Truman recognized the vulnerability of nations in postWorld War II Europe and in the developing world. Influenced by the Korean conflict and events in Eastern Europe, Truman argued that each of these nations lay in the crosshairs of an expanding “Soviet Empire.” For several years, Truman and Congress had invested millions of dollars in rebuilding Europe and East Asia. The imperative for rebuilding “free” nations was amplified, Truman believed, by both the growth of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the Korean War. Truman did not obtain the full funding he originally sought from Congress. However, in his accompanying document, Truman insisted that the monies appropriated for the act would be well-spent. Nations that were seeking to build (or rebuild) their economies, political infrastructures, and militaries needed American assistance to do so, Truman argued, or else they risked becoming vulnerable to foreign attack. Truman understood the act’s Cold War implications. He acknowledged that bolstering the militaries of Eastern European and East Asian nations would be viewed as part of the ongoing arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Then again, he argued, any nation that desired to live free and sought the ability to protect its citizens should be aided. US assistance to build and rebuild free nations would first go to safeguarding them from foreign attack. The monies would also help them invest internally, thereby strengthening their respective economic, political, and social foundations. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

“Biographical Sketch: Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States.” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, n.d. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, 1992. Print. Ohn, Chang-Il. “The Causes of the Korean War.” International Journal of Korean Studies 14.2 (2010): 19–44. Print. “U.S. Foreign Aid in Review, 1945–1960.” Congressional Digest 39.6–7 (1960): 164. Academic Search Complete. Web. 8 Jan. 2016.

President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace”

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 President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace” Date: April 16, 1953 Author: Dwight D. Eisenhower Genre: speech Summary Overview

Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, died on March 5, 1953. Though he had been an ally of the United States and Great Britain during World War II, Stalin had led the Soviet Union into nearly a decade of hostility with the West since the war ended, spreading Communism through Eastern Europe, supporting Chinese forces fighting the United States in Korea, and successfully developing and testing a nuclear weapon. The world was living with the threat of global nuclear war by the time Stalin died, and many wondered if the new leadership of the Soviet Union would be inclined to engage in disarmament talks. When Eisenhower gave this speech the month after Stalin’s death, it was still unclear who would emerge as the new primary Soviet leader; Stalin’s eventual successor, Nikita Khrushchev, had not yet solidified his position, and Eisenhower appealed to the new leadership to consider a peaceful course, in view of the cost of the military buildup going on in both nations. The speech was given to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast on television and radio. It remains one of the best-known speeches of Eisenhower’s presidency and a powerful argument for world peace. Defining Moment

Joseph Stalin rose to power in the Soviet Union following the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, eventually assuming dictatorial powers. During World War II, Stalin’s Soviet Union became an uneasy ally of the United States and Great Britain, playing a decisive role in Germany’s defeat. After the war, the Soviet Union occupied vast territory in Eastern Europe, including East Germany, making those countries into Communist satellite states. Stalin’s relationship with his former allies deteriorated rapidly as he turned his attention to developing the first Soviet atomic bomb, which was successfully tested on August 29, 1949. This ushered in an era of intense military and political tension—the Cold War—

as the United States and the Soviet Union struggled for military supremacy and international influence, without ever directly engaging in armed conflict. When Stalin died in 1953, the top Soviet leaders vying for control quickly made it clear that Stalin was not the model leader for the future. It was a hopeful sign for the rest of the world that perhaps the new leadership would be open to a different course than the aggressive path taken under the former leader. Meanwhile, in the United States, mere months before Stalin’s death, Eisenhower had won the presidency by promising to end the war in Korea and to fight Communism and corruption at home. With Americans worried about the growing nuclear threat, Eisenhower sought to offer the Soviet Union a chance to demonstrate that it wished to change direction and follow a peaceful course. Author Biography

Dwight David Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890. He was the third son of seven, and when he was two years old, his parents moved to Abilene, Kansas. Eisenhower graduated from Abilene High School in 1909 and was accepted to West Point in 1911. He was an officer in the Army during World War I but was not sent overseas. He continued his military career after the war and was made a brigadier general on October 3, 1941. Eisenhower went on to command the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942. In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made Eisenhower supreme allied commander in Europe, and he was in charge of the Allied forces that invaded occupied France on June 6, 1944, D-Day. After a postwar position as the military commander of occupied Germany, Eisenhower was named chief of staff of the Army, until becoming president of Columbia University in 1948. He was named supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1950, but retained the presidency of Columbia until 1953, when he became

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president of the United States, defeating Democrat Adlai Stevenson. After serving a second term as president, Eisenhower retired to Pennsylvania, where his German American roots lay. He died of congestive heart failure

on March 28, 1969, and is buried on the grounds of the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT In this spring of 1953 the free world weighs one question above all others: the chance for a just peace for all peoples. To weigh this chance is to summon instantly to mind another recent moment of great decision. It came with that yet more hopeful spring of 1945, bright with the promise of victory and of freedom. The hope of all just men in that moment too was a just and lasting peace. The eight years that have passed have seen that hope waver, grow dim, and almost die. And the shadow of fear again has darkly lengthened across the world. Today the hope of free men remains stubborn and brave, but it is sternly disciplined by experience. It shuns not only all crude counsel of despair but also the selfdeceit of easy illusion. It weighs the chance for peace with sure, clear knowledge of what happened to the vain hope of 1945. In that spring of victory the soldiers of the Western Allies met the soldiers of Russia in the center of Europe. They were triumphant comrades in arms. Their peoples shared the joyous prospect of building, in honor of their dead, the only fitting monument—an age of just peace. All these war-weary peoples shared too this concrete, decent purpose: to guard vigilantly against the domination ever again of any part of the world by a single, unbridled aggressive power. This common purpose lasted an instant and perished. The nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads. The United States and our valued friends, the other free nations, chose one road. The leaders of the Soviet Union chose another. The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs. First: No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.

Second: No nation’s security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations. Third: Any nation’s right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable. Fourth: Any nation’s attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible. And fifth: A nation’s hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations. In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war, toward true peace. This way was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations: to prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears. This way was to control and to reduce armaments. This way was to allow all nations to devote their energies and resources to the great and good tasks of healing the war’s wounds, of clothing and feeding and housing the needy, of perfecting a just political life, of enjoying the fruits of their own free toil. The Soviet government held a vastly different vision of the future. In the world of its design, security was to be found, not in mutual trust and mutual aid but in force: huge armies, subversion, rule of neighbor nations. The goal was power superiority at all cost. Security was to be sought by denying it to all others. The result has been tragic for the world and, for the Soviet Union, it has also been ironic. The amassing of Soviet power alerted free nations to a new danger of aggression. It compelled them in selfdefense to spend unprecedented money and energy for armaments. It forced them to develop weapons of war now capable of inflicting instant and terrible punishment upon any aggressor.

President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace”

It instilled in the free nations—and let none doubt this—the unshakable conviction that, as long as there persists a threat to freedom, they must, at any cost, remain armed, strong, and ready for the risk of war. It inspired them—and let none doubt this—to attain a unity of purpose and will beyond the power of propaganda or pressure to break, now or ever. There remained, however, one thing essentially unchanged and unaffected by Soviet conduct: the readiness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any genuine evidence of peaceful purpose enabling all peoples again to resume their common quest of just peace. The free nations, most solemnly and repeatedly, have assured the Soviet Union that their firm association has never had any aggressive purpose whatsoever. Soviet leaders, however, have seemed to persuade themselves, or tried to persuade their people, otherwise. And so it has come to pass that the Soviet Union itself has shared and suffered the very fears it has fostered in the rest of the world. This has been the way of life forged by eight years of fear and force. What can the world, or any nation in it, hope for if no turning is found on this dread road? The worst to be feared and the best to be expected can be simply stated. The worst is atomic war. The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

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It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some 50 miles of concrete highway. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron. These plain and cruel truths define the peril and point the hope that come with this spring of 1953. This is one of those times in the affairs of nations when the gravest choices must be made, if there is to be a turning toward a just and lasting peace. It is a moment that calls upon the governments of the world to speak their intentions with simplicity and with honesty. It calls upon them to answer the question that stirs the hearts of all sane men: is there no other way the world may live? The world knows that an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin. The extraordinary 30-year span of his rule saw the Soviet Empire expand to reach from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, finally to dominate 800 million souls. The Soviet system shaped by Stalin and his predecessors was born of one World War. It survived with stubborn and often amazing courage a second World War. It has lived to threaten a third. Now a new leadership has assumed power in the Soviet Union. Its links to the past, however strong, cannot bind it completely. Its future is, in great part, its own to make. This new leadership confronts a free world aroused, as rarely in its history, by the will to stay free. This free world knows, out of the bitter wisdom of experience, that vigilance and sacrifice are the price of liberty. It knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively demands the unity of purpose and action made possible by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, embracing a European Defense Community.

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It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal partner in this community and that this, for Germany, is the only safe way to full, final unity. It knows that aggression in Korea and in southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action. This is the kind of free world which the new Soviet leadership confronts. It is a world that demands and expects the fullest respect of its rights and interests. It is a world that will always accord the same respect to all others. So the new Soviet leadership now has a precious opportunity to awaken, with the rest of the world, to the point of peril reached and to help turn the tide of history. Will it do this? We do not yet know. Recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders give some evidence that they may recognize this critical moment. We welcome every honest act of peace. We care nothing for mere rhetoric. We are only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds. The opportunities for such deeds are many. The performance of a great number of them waits upon no complex protocol but upon the simple will to do them. Even a few such clear and specific acts, such as the Soviet Union’s signature upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World War II, would be impressive signs of sincere intent. They would carry a power of persuasion not to be matched by any amount of oratory. This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations can find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive. With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace, we are ready, with renewed resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our day. The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea. This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea. It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely

released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud. We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total. Out of this can grow a still wider task—the achieving of just political settlements for the other serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union. None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble— given only the will to respect the rights of all nations. Again we say: the United States is ready to assume its just part. We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria, which will free that country from economic exploitation and from occupation by foreign troops. We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon that foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas. This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections. This free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe. As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include: 1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations. 2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes. 3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons. 4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace”

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The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations. The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith—the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively. The fruit of success in all these tasks would present the world with the greatest task, and the greatest opportunity, of all. It is this: the dedication of the energies, the resources, and the imaginations of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war. This would be a declared total war, not upon any human enemy but upon the brute forces of poverty and need. The peace we seek, rounded upon decent trust and cooperative effort among nations, can be fortified, not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge this world in arms. This idea of a just and peaceful world is not new or strange to us. It inspired the people of the United States to initiate the European Recovery Program in 1947. That program was prepared to treat, with like and equal concern, the needs of Eastern and Western Europe. We are prepared to reaffirm, with the most concrete evidence, our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous. This Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be to help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom. The monuments to this new kind of war would be these: roads and schools, hospitals and homes, food and health. We are ready, in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the needs, rather than the fears, of the world.

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We are ready, by these and all such actions, to make of the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples. I know of nothing I can add to make plainer the sincere purpose of the United States. I know of no course, other than that marked by these and similar actions, that can be called the highway of peace. I know of only one question upon which progress waits. It is this: What is the Soviet Union ready to do? Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken. Again we say: the hunger for peace is too great, the hour in history too late, for any government to mock men’s hopes with mere words and promises and gestures. The test of truth is simple. There can be no persuasion but by deeds. Is the new leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to use its decisive influence in the Communist world, including control of the flow of arms, to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but genuine peace in Asia? Is it prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government? Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent U.N. control and inspection? If not, where then is the concrete evidence of the Soviet Union’s concern for peace? The test is clear. There is, before all peoples, a precious chance to turn the black tide of events. If we failed to strive to seize this chance, the judgment of future ages would be harsh and just. If we strive but fail and the world remains armed against itself, it at least need be divided no longer in its clear knowledge of who has condemned humankind to this fate. The purpose of the United States, in stating these proposals, is simple and clear. These proposals spring, without ulterior purpose or political passion, from our calm conviction that the hunger for peace is in the hearts of all peoples—those of Russia and of China no less than of our own country.

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They conform to our firm faith that God created men to enjoy, not destroy, the fruits of the earth and of their own toil.

Document Analysis

At the start of his speech, Eisenhower recalls the alliance that had once existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. They had fought side by side and ended World War II as “triumphant comrades in arms.” What a tragedy, he says, that such a shadow had fallen over US-Soviet relations in the eight years since. The common dream of all peoples at the close of a terrible war was peace and a chance to rebuild their lives. However, rather than continuing to make common purpose in the pursuit of peace, Eisenhower says, the “nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads”: he says the path of the United States and its allies has been one of openness and cooperation in international affairs and support for the principle of national selfdetermination, while the Soviet Union has followed a path marked by “huge armies, subversion, [and] rule of neighbor nations,” as by imposing Communism in Eastern Europe and supporting Communist North Korea in its invasion of South Korea. This has driven other nations to arm themselves to the hilt for their own security and for both sides to spend “unprecedented money and energy for armaments.” Eisenhower asserts that the worst-case scenario for a world so divided is nuclear war, and the best-case scenario is ongoing tension and the wasting of national resources on all sides on military preparedness rather than social development. In perhaps the most famous line of his speech, he says, “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.” Noting that “an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin,” Eisenhower challenges the transitioning Soviet leadership to choose a new path. Specifically, he calls on the Soviets to partner with the West in ending the Korean War; concluding the postwar occupation of Austria; working toward reuniting Germany; and, most

They aspire to this: the lifting, from the backs and from the hearts of men, of their burden of arms and of fears, so that they may find before them a golden age of freedom and of peace.

of all, engaging in long-term arms reduction talks. He lays out specific proposals on this last point, including his push to create a United Nations agency for the control of nuclear materials. He says that if the world squanders this “precious chance to turn the black tide of events,” in recognition of the universal human desire for peace, then “the judgment of future ages would be harsh and just.” Essential Themes

The primary theme of this piece is Eisenhower’s desire to roll back the massive military buildup that threatened the security of the entire world. The death of Stalin had provided a unique opportunity for a change of course, and Eisenhower invited the Soviet Union to take advantage of it, or bear much of the blame for the tension and animosity in the world, since other nations, the United States included, needed to be able to defend themselves against the growing Soviet threat. Although Khrushchev’s rule was significantly less ruthless than Stalin’s, few of the most fervent hopes Eisenhower expressed in his speech were realized during his presidency, or even his lifetime. On one hand, an armistice was indeed signed in Korea just a few months after this speech; also, the Allied occupation of Austria was ended in 1955, and the International Atomic Energy Agency was created in 1957. However, the Cold War nuclear-arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was to continue nearly unabated well into the 1980s, with the Cold War itself and the division of Germany not ending until about 1990. Nonetheless, Eisenhower is credited by historians with at least stabilizing, if not reducing, the US-Soviet rivalry. His call for a less militarized world would be immortalized at the close of his presidency, when he warned in his 1961 farewell address against the rising “military-industrial complex.” —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace”

Bibliography and Additional Reading

“1952 Presidential Campaign.” Eisenhower Presidential Library. Eisenhower Presidential Lib., n.d. Web. 18 Nov. 2015. Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952. Vol. 1. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983. Print. Thomas, Evans. Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World. New York: Little, Brown, 2012. Print. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1993. Print.

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 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea Date: October 1, 1953 Authors: Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea Genre: treaty Summary Overview

Two months after the Korean War ended, the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) entered into an agreement to safeguard against future invasions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and/or other aggressors. The treaty made it possible for the United States to maintain a military presence in South Korea and for the United States to bolster South Korea’s military capability. The agreement also established a security umbrella for the Pacific region (particularly around the Korean Peninsula and Japan), one that would promote regional cooperation and peaceful resolution of regional disputes. Defining Moment

When Japan’s surrender brought World War II to a close, a new era dawned. This era became known as the Cold War, a forty-five-year period in which the Communist Soviet Union and the United States, including countries under each superpower’s sway, engaged in a global campaign of competitiveness and mistrust. Although no direct military engagement between the Unites States and the Soviet Union took place during this period, the two were actively involved in a number of regional and civil wars. The Asia-Pacific Theater was one such region. Shortly after the Japanese surrender, the Korean Peninsula, which had been under the control of the Japanese Empire since the early 1900s, was divided at the thirty-eighth parallel. In what would become known as North Korea, a Communist government was installed by the Soviets (although China would eventually bolster the government in Pyongyang) in order to provide a buffer between the Soviet Union and the US occupying force in Japan. In South Korea, a pro-Western democracy was established, supported economically, politically, and militarily by the United States.

North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, however, looked to reunite the Koreas under his control. Armed and backed by the Soviet Union and China, North Korean forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel on June 25, 1950, catching South Korean forces by surprise. Immediately, the United Nations Security Council (with the Soviet Union abstaining) called for international assistance on behalf of South Korea. US president Harry S. Truman answered the call, sending General Douglas MacArthur to lead the multinational effort to repel the invading North Korean forces. The UN “police action,” led by the United States and other international forces, succeeded in pushing the North Korean forces behind the thirty-eighth parallel again. However, US-led forces crossed that line, taking Pyongyang and pursuing the North Korean forces deep into their home country. In response, Communist China’s revitalized army intervened on the side of the North, pushing the US coalition forces back to the thirty-eighth parallel. There, the war continued for nearly three years in and around the border between North and South Korea. During the latter two years of this conflict, negotiators on both sides continued to push for peace. On July 27, 1953, an armistice was reached. Some 3 million people—more than half of whom were civilians—died during the conflict, which ended in a stalemate. Among its principles, the armistice reestablished a two-mile-wide demilitarized zone near the thirtyeighth parallel, a tenuous divide between the bitter Korean rivals. The end of the Korean War did not usher in a new period of peace, however. Kim still aspired to reunify the two countries, and fears of another invasion remained in the minds of both South Koreans and Americans. The lack of a decisive victory against the Communist forces backing North Korea also weighed heavily on US leaders, many of whom felt that China

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea

and Russia might have been empowered by the war’s outcome. In a highly strategic region, the eyes of both sides of the Cold War remained fixed on the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding Pacific region. Author Biography

The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in October 1953 by negotiators from the United States and the Republic of Korea. US president Harry S. Truman and his

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diplomatic representatives laid the groundwork for the treaty during the Korean War. However, central to hastening its resolution was the newly elected American president, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower made good on a campaign promise to travel to the region to push for an armistice. South Korea’s first president was Syngman Rhee, who took office in 1948 when the provisional government was established. He held the office until 1960, when a violent uprising forced him out.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Parties to this Treaty, Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area, Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations. ARTICLE II The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable

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measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes. ARTICLE III Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. ARTICLE IV The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement. ARTICLE V This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington. ARTICLE VI This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

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DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the English and Korean languages, this first day of October 1953. UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES [The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty subject to the following understanding:] It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall

Document Analysis

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and South Korea comprised six short articles developed as a framework for regional security and peace. The treaty contains simple but nonetheless significant verbiage that unites the two nations against regional military threats. It does not directly identify these threats. However, the language used suggests that the agreement would have major regional implications. The treaty begins by making a statement to the rest of the world that the two signatory nations were committed to international peace and the authority of the United Nations. However, it is essentially a military document in nature, containing simple themes that speak to threats to regional peace and proposing a strong, unified response to those threats. In Article II, for example, the two nations commit to consulting with one another when a threat arises, developing a quick and reasonable response to that threat. Although advocating for “self help” for each nation, the treaty also emphasizes mutual effort in deterring the continued threat from North Korea. Article IV grants the United States the ability to maintain a military presence throughout South Korea. In addition to airbases, naval forces, and other technology, the United States would be allowed to continue stationing troops within South Korea’s borders. There would be no timetable for US withdrawal from South Korea, either, as Article VI gives the treaty “indefinite” duration (despite giving both nations the ability to terminate the agreement with one year’s notice). Although the six articles of this treaty contain simple language, the themes the agreement presents are significant. In the event of an attack against South Korea, the

anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea. [Acknowledged by the Republic of Korea in a note of February 1, 1954 and included in the President’s proclamation of November 17, 1954.]

United States and South Korea will work collectively to deter the attack. North Korea had been pushed back during the Korean War, but not defeated. By 1953, there had been no resolution to the conflict, which meant that North Korea still posed a major threat to South Korea. Under the terms of this agreement, if North Korea were to attack the South at any time in the future, the Republic of Korea and the United States would be far more prepared to repel Pyongyang’s forces. Then again, this agreement does not speak simply to North Korean aggression. In strategic terms, for the Soviets, the Korean Peninsula was similar to Poland in that it existed as a “buffer” against the United States and the West. The American presence in the region was still great, with bases not only in South Korea but also Japan. Adding to the Cold War theme was the increasing power of Communist China, which had demonstrated its military capability during the Korean War. Although these specific nations are not identified in the treaty, the document positions itself as key to regional security. The preamble to the treaty, for example, does not speak just to the Koreas as a region of focus—it describes security concerns for the entire “Pacific area.” Implicit in such language is the notion that any attack on South Korea—whether from North Korea, China, or Russia—would amount to a threat to the stability and security of the entire region. Essential Themes

The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea served two major purposes. First, in the absence of a formal treaty between the two Koreas, the agreement represented a deterrent from future invasions from North Korea. The document en-

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea

abled a major American ground, sea, and air presence to continue operating within South Korea’s borders. Inthe event of an attack similar to that which took place in 1950, South Korea and the United States would be prepared to quickly counterattack under the framework established in this agreement. The treaty, however, was also designed as a long-term deterrent to any and all attacks. The agreement was indefinite in nature, ensuring that US forces would remain active in South Korea in perpetuity. The language of the agreement implies that the entire region, including Japan, northeastern China, eastern Russia, and the Korean Peninsula, carried major geopolitical value to all Pacific parties. Therefore, the treaty concluded, any attack on South Korea would constitute a threat to the peace and stability of the entire region. As such, the

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treaty acted as a safeguard, preventing would-be aggressors from advancing their military agendas. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon, 1987. Print. Hymel, Kevin M. “The Korean War at 50.” Army Magazine 52.5 (2002): 16. Academic Search Alumni Edition. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. Marshall, Tim. “Korea: A History of the North-South Split.” Sky News. Sky UK, 4 Apr. 2013. Web. 8 Jan. 2016. Ohn, Chang-Il. “The Causes of the Korean War.” International Journal of Korean Studies 14.2 (2010): 19–44. Print.

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 A “New Look” at National Defense Policy Date: October 30, 1953 Author: James S. Lay Jr. Genre: government document Summary Overview

Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidential election of 1952 by a landslide. He had had a distinguished military career, having led the Allied forces in Europe during World War II. One of his first initiatives on taking office was to order a thorough evaluation of threats to national security. This so-called New Look at national defense policy produced National Security Council Report 162, version 2, known as NSC 162/2. Eisenhower was concerned that out-of-control military spending could crush the US economy, and he sought to balance economic and military priorities. NSC 162/2 encouraged a reliance on nuclear weapons and air superiority and convinced Eisenhower that nuclear weapons were the most cost-effective deterrent to the Soviet threat. It was impossible to deploy ground forces all over the globe, but nuclear defenses could be set up in allied countries and provide protection without expensive ground troops. The Korean War was deeply unpopular and had dragged on for three years, demonstrating the limitations of ground warfare. NSC 162/2 called for both continued support for political elements that were troublesome to Communist governments and economic and military support to allies in Europe and Asia, as well as nuclear “retaliatory power sufficient to insure unacceptable damage to the Soviet system” in case of war. Defining Moment

NSC 162/2 was developed at a critical time in the US-Soviet arms race. Days before Eisenhower won the presidency, the United States detonated the first thermonuclear bomb on a remote island in the Pacific. Though this gave the United States brief technical superiority, it was correctly assumed that the Soviet Union would soon follow suit. It did so in August 1953, two months before this report was released. The two superpowers had acquired unimaginable destructive capability.

The United States and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained further after the United States revealed its atomic capabilities, dropping bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The Soviet Union raced to catch up, testing its first nuclear weapon on August 29, 1949. The United States responded by accelerating the development of a thermonuclear weapon whose destructive capacity dwarfed any previous technology. Thermonuclear weapons use a small fission reaction to ignite a powerful fusion response, producing a blast many times more powerful than that of earlier atomic bombs. In October 1953, the National Security Council faced an adversary that shared possession of the most destructive weapon in history and seemed determined to gain or maintain control over numerous other nations. Former president Harry S. Truman’s advisors had identified a rapidly approaching point within the decade when they believed that the Soviet Union would be best positioned to launch a nuclear strike and had urged a rapid and expensive military build-up to enable the United States to counter such a strike. Eisenhower’s advisors, however, urged a long-term approach, balancing the need to build and maintain a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deliver a massive retaliatory strike with the need to avoid undue economic pressure in the United States. Eisenhower was wary of involving the United States in numerous Korea-sized conflicts across the globe that would drain economic resources through conventional warfare. He preferred instead to support internal opposition in Communist countries and to weaken the Soviet Union economically and politically, while supporting American allies in Europe and Asia in order to resolve regional conflicts in a way favorable to the United States.

A “New Look” at National Defense Policy

Document Information

Eisenhower made far greater use of the National Security Council (NSC) than his predecessor, under whom the agency had been created in 1947. A military man with a love for process and order, Eisenhower saw the NSC as the most effective tool for military and foreign-policy planning and spent considerable time and resources on the reports that the NSC produced. Eisenhower adopted a three-tiered system to produce policy papers. An interdepartmental planning group was created, made up of the ablest minds in the military, the State Department, and the intelligence community. This group wrote and researched policy papers, ironing out departmental disagreements before the papers were presented at the formal NSC meetings, which Eisenhower attended consistently. If the NSC leaders did not agree with key aspects of a paper, they

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sent it back to the planning group for revisions. The weekly NSC meetings themselves were long and sometimes contentious. They dealt at length with the president’s proposed budget, as Eisenhower was especially concerned with the economic strength of the United States and understood that military spending could either boost or weaken the economy, depending on how it was managed. Under Eisenhower, the NSC became an important tool to settle conflicts, coordinate activities, and gain consensus between federal departments. Papers such as NSC 162/2 were the result of constructive interdepartmental discussion and debate. NSC 162/2 was officially recorded by James Selden Lay Jr. In 1947, when the National Security Council replaced the National Intelligence Authority, he was named as assistant and then sole executive secretary of the NSC.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Policy conclusions Basic Problems of National Security Policy 31. a. To meet the Soviet threat to U.S. security. b. In doing so, to avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions. Nature of the Soviet Threat 32. a. With increasing atomic power, the Soviets have a mounting capability of inflicting very serious and possibly crippling damage on the United States. The USSR will also continue to have large military forces capable of aggressive action against countries of the free world. Present estimates are, however, that the USSR will not deliberately initiate general war during the next several years, although general war might result from miscalculation. In the absence of general war, a prolonged period of tension may ensue, during which each side increases its armaments, reaches atomic plenty and seeks to improve its relative power position. b. In any case, the Soviets will continue to seek to divide and weaken the free world coalition, to absorb or win the allegiance of the presently uncommitted areas

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of the world, and to isolate the United States, using cold war tactics and the communist apparatus. Their capacity for political warfare against the United States as well as its allies will be enhanced by their increased atomic capability. 33. a. A sound, strong, and growing U.S. economy is necessary to support over the long pull a satisfactory posture of defense in the free world and a U.S. capability rapidly and effectively to change to full mobilization. The United States should not weaken its capacity for high productivity for defense, its free institutions, and the incentives on which its long-term economic growth depends. b. A recession in the level of U.S. economic activity could seriously prejudice the security of the free world. Defense Against Soviet Power and Action 34. In the face of these threats, the United States must develop and maintain, at the lowest feasible cost, requisite military and nonmilitary strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet military aggression against the United States or other areas vital to its security.

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a. The risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based on massive atomic capability, including necessary bases; an integrated and effective continental defense system; ready forces of the United States and its allies suitably deployed and adequate to deter or initially to counter aggression, and to discharge required initial tasks in the event of general war; and an adequate mobilization base; all supported by the determined spirit of the U.S. people. b. This strong security posture must also be supported by an effective U.S. intelligence system, an adequate manpower program, superior scientific research and development, a program of limited defense mobilization, reasonable internal security, and an informed American people. c. Such a strong security posture is essential to counter the Soviet divisive tactics and hold together the coalition. If our allies were uncertain about our ability or will to counter Soviet aggression, they would be strongly tempted to adopt a neutralist position, especially in the face of the atomic threat. 35. In the interest of its own security, the United States must have the support of allies. a. The military striking power necessary to retaliate depends for the foreseeable future on having bases in allied countries. Furthermore, the ground forces required to counter local aggressions must be supplied largely by our allies. b. The loss of major allies by subversion, divisive tactics, or the growth of neutralist attitudes, would seriously affect the security of the United States. 36. United States policies must, therefore, be designed to retain the cooperation of our allies, to seek to win the friendship and cooperation of the presently uncommitted areas of the world, and thereby to strengthen the cohesion of the free world. a. Our allies must be genuinely convinced that our strategy is one of collective security. The alliance must be rooted in a strong feeling of a community of interest and firm confidence in the steadiness and wisdom of U.S. leadership.

b. Cooperative efforts, including equitable contributions by our allies, will continue to be necessary to build the military, economic and political strength of the coalition and the stability of the free world. c. Constructive U.S. policies, not related solely to anti-communism, are needed to persuade uncommitted countries that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world. d. To enhance the capacity of free world nations for self-support and defense, and to reduce progressively their need for U.S. aid, the United States should assist in stimulating international trade, freer access to markets and raw materials, and the healthy growth of underdeveloped areas. In this connection, it should consider a modification of its tariff and trade policies. e. In subsequent fiscal years economic grant aid and loans by the United States to other nations of the free world should be based on the best interests of the United States. 37. a. In Western Europe, a position of strength must be based mainly on British, French, and German cooperation in the defense of the continent. To achieve a stronger Europe, the United States should support, as long as there is hope of early success, the building of an integrated European Community (including West Germany and if possible a united Germany), linked to the United States through NATO. The United States should press for a strong, united stable Germany, oriented to the free world and militarily capable of overcoming internal subversion and disorder and also of taking a major part in the collective defense of the free world against aggression. The United States must continue to assist in creating and maintaining mutually agreed European forces, but should reduce such assistance as rapidly as United States interests permit. b. In the Far East, strength must be built on existing bilateral and multilateral security arrangements until more comprehensive regional arrangements become feasible. The United States should stress assistance in developing Japan as a major element of strength. The United States should maintain the security of the offshore island chain and continue to develop the defensive

A “New Look” at National Defense Policy

capacity of Korea and Southeast Asia in accordance with existing commitments. c. In the Middle East, a strong regional grouping is not now feasible. In order to assure during peace time for the United States and its allies the resources (especially oil) and the strategic positions of the area and their denial to the Soviet bloc, the United States should build on Turkey, Pakistan and, if possible, Iran, and assist in achieving stability in the Middle East by political actions and limited military and economic assistance, and technical assistance, to other countries in the area. d. In other areas of the free world the United States should furnish limited military aid, and limited technical and economic assistance, to other free nations, according to the calculated advantage of such aid to the U.S. world position. 38. a. As presently deployed in support of our commitments, the armed forces of the United States are over-extended, thereby depriving us of mobility and initiative for future military action in defense of the free world. b. Under present conditions, however, any major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe or the Far East would be interpreted as a diminution of U.S. interest in the defense of these areas and would seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the coalition. c. Our diplomacy must concentrate upon clarifying to our allies in parts of the world not gripped by war conditions that the best defense of the free world rests upon a deployment of U.S. forces which permits initiative, flexibility and support; upon our political commitment to strike back hard directly against any aggressor who attacks such allies; and upon such allies’ own indigenous security efforts. 39. a. In specific situations where a warning appears desirable and feasible as an added deterrent, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China, in general terms or with reference to specific areas as the situation requires, its intention to react with military force against any aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces. b. (1) In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as

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other munitions. Where the consent of an ally is required for the use of these weapons from U.S. bases on the territory of such ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such ally for such use. The United States should also seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations. (2) This policy should not be made public without further consideration by the National Security Council. Defense Against the Threat to the U.S. Economy and Institutions 40. a. A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability of the free world. In the interest of both the United States and its allies, it is vital that the support of defense expenditures should not seriously impair the basic soundness of the U.S. economy by undermining incentives or by inflation. b. The United States must, however, meet the necessary costs of the policies essential for its security. The actual level of such costs cannot be estimated until further study, but should be kept to the minimum consistent with the carrying out of these policies. c. Barring basic change in the world situation, the Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures into balance, or into substantial balance with its total annual revenues and should maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy. d. Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government, and to minimize Federal expenditures for programs that are not essential to the national security. e. The United States should seek to maintain a higher and expanding rate of economic activity at relatively stable price levels. f. The economic potential of private enterprise should be maximized by minimizing governmental controls and regulations, and by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources (e.g. nuclear power). 41. To support the necessarily heavy burdens for national security, the morale of the citizens of the United States must be based both on responsibility and freedom

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for the individual. The dangers from Soviet subversion and espionage require strong and effective security measures. Eternal vigilance, however, is needed in their exercise to prevent the intimidation of free criticism. It is essential that necessary measures of protection should not be so used as to destroy the national unity based on freedom, not on fear.

b. Take all feasible diplomatic, political, economic and covert measures to counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control to achieve dominant power in a free world country. c. Undertake selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist control over any areas of the free world.

Reduction of the Soviet Threat

44. a. Measures to impose pressures on the Soviet bloc should take into account the desirability of creating conditions which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more receptive to acceptable negotiated settlements. b. Accordingly, the United States should take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, impair Soviet relations with Communist China, complicate control in the satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

42. a. The United States must seek to improve the power position of itself and the rest of the free world in relation to the Soviet bloc. b. The United States must also keep open the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China acceptable and enforceable agreements, whether limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues, including control of armaments. c. The willingness of the Soviet leadership to negotiate acceptable settlements, without necessarily abandoning hostility to the non-Soviet world, may tend to increase over time, if the United States and its allies develop and increase their own strength, determination and cohesion, maintain retaliatory power sufficient to insure unacceptable damage to the Soviet system should the USSR resort to general war, and prove that the free world can prosper despite Soviet pressures, or if for any reason Soviet stability and influence are reduced. d. The policy of the United States is to prevent Soviet aggression and continuing domination of other nations, and to establish an effective control of armaments under proper safeguards; but is not to dictate the internal political and economic organization of the USSR. 43. As a means of reducing Soviet capabilities for extending control and influence in the free world, the United States should: a. Take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as effective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements.

45. In the face of the developing Soviet threat, the broad aim of U.S. security policies must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards. The United States and its allies must always seek to create and sustain the hope and confidence of the free world in the ability of its basic ideas and institutions not merely to oppose the communist threat, but to provide a way of life superior to Communism. 46. The foregoing conclusions are valid only so long as the United States maintains a retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise Soviet attack. Therefore, there must be continuing examination and periodic report to the National Security Council in regard to the likelihood of such neutralization of U.S. retaliatory capability.

A “New Look” at National Defense Policy

Document Analysis

This selection of NSC 162/2 presents the conclusions of the paper. It begins with the concern that national security must be achieved without damaging the health of the US economy or weakening the country’s “fundamental values and institutions.” It makes clear, however, that the security threat is real, as the Soviet Union has the ability to inflict serious damage on the United States in the event of a war. Though the Soviet Union is deemed unlikely to instigate a war within the next few years, it is expected to try to undermine US alliances and extend its influence in vulnerable areas of the world to try to isolate the United States. The paper’s key conclusions are that the robust defense of the United States requires a growing economy and that economic recession in the United States could seriously threaten “the free world”—the United States and its allies. It is crucial, therefore, that the United States control the cost of maintaining its defense capabilities. This report illustrates Eisenhower’s discomfort with his predecessor’s threefold increase in military spending. Moving forward, a strong military and defensive apparatus must be maintained at the “lowest feasible cost.” The key to this defense is “massive atomic capability,” to be maintained alongside strategically positioned forces, and an “integrated and effective continental defense system,” supported by a strong intelligence system. The United States should thus continue to support new research into technology that will put it at an advantage over the Soviet Union. The report emphasizes the need to ensure the full support of US allies and to cultivate the support of “presently uncommitted areas of the world.” The United States needs to be able to maintain bases in allied territory and rely on allies for ground troops. Rather than providing large amounts of direct financial support to key allies—which had been necessary after the devastation of World War II—the United States should encourage economic self-reliance in the free world by “stimulating international trade” and reconsidering trade policies, while encouraging mutual defense pacts in Asia and Europe and working closely with allies in the Middle East. The defense of US allies needs to be streamlined, and, should hostilities break out, “the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.” Furthermore, regarding this last point, “this policy should not be made public without further consideration by the National Security Council.”

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Significant attention in the document is paid to how defense spending and the economy are linked. The minimum amount needed should be spent on the military, with the government working to eliminate wasteful spending and to eliminate programs not vital to security. The American public is seen as important in this effort, and the report emphasizes that Americans need to be driven by “freedom, not fear,” in order to keep the economy robust. The report ends with a reminder of the need to periodically assess the nation’s readiness to meet an attack. Essential Themes

NSC 162/2—the basis of Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy—concerned itself with the need to marshal the maximum national defense capability to counter the Soviet threat, while minimally hampering the US economy. The solution was seen in developing a formidable nuclear capability, which was less expensive than conventional weapons and seen as more likely to deter Soviet aggression. Unfortunately, the lessons of the Korean conflict did not fully support this claim. The North Korean Communists were backed by the Soviet Union (indirectly) and China (directly) in their invasion of South Korea, and the United States had substantial nuclear capability at the time. Though this may have been enough to deter the Soviet Union from direct war with the United States, it did little to resolve the actual conflict. The threat of nuclear force was also not enough to prevent the Soviet Union from using conventional military force in conflicts that fell short of a direct attack on the United States, such as in the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, when Soviet troops crushed a democratic uprising against the Communist government in that country. When the policy of massive nuclear deterrence was tested, it failed to prevent further Communist expansion or keep the United States from committing ground and naval troops abroad. When the French were driven out of Indochina by nationalist Vietnamese rebels in 1954, the United States became increasingly concerned that this would create another Communist stronghold in Asia. The United States was then militarily involved in Vietnam for twenty years. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bowie, Robert R. & Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. Print. Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon, 1995. Print.

Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2005. Print. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1994. Print.

“Atoms for Peace”

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 “Atoms for Peace” Date: December 8, 1953 Author: Dwight D. Eisenhower Genre: speech Summary Overview

President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave this speech to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. In it, Eisenhower addressed the extraordinary destructiveness of the nuclear weapons (then called “atomic” weapons) being stockpiled across the world and the tension that permeated international relations while the threat of annihilation was ever-present and the world seemed always to be on the edge of war. Eisenhower reinforced the United States’ ability to defend and retaliate against any nuclear attack, but he decried the extraordinary cost to human civilization that this would cause. The answer, he said, was not to turn back time and eradicate all nuclear materials, but to turn those materials to peaceful purposes. He argued that uranium could be safely shared internationally and put to the service of “agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities.” He called on the United Nations to set up an International Atomic Energy Agency to manage the distribution of nuclear materials. This speech was an important step toward turning nuclear energy to peaceful purposes and an attempt to balance out the terribly destructive potential of the same technology. Defining Moment

The world first understood the devastating power of atomic energy when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The United States and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained further after the superiority of US weaponry was revealed. Indeed, some scholars have theorized that the bombs dropped on Japan were as much a reminder to the Soviet Union of US dominance as a strategic way to end the war. Attempts to control this destructive technology began as soon as the bombs were dropped. The United States was aware that the Soviet Union was working

on its own nuclear weapon and believed that it would be eight to fifteen years before the Soviets had a workable device. Still, the urgency was clear. The United Nations, formally established within months of the bombing of Japan, passed its first resolution on January 24, 1946, establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” The UNAEC had six permanent members (Canada, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union tested a nuclear weapon successfully for the first time. It ushered in an era of intense military and political tension, as the United States and the Soviet Union struggled for military supremacy and international influence. Without engaging in direct armed conflict—in this Cold War, the threat of a devastating nuclear exchange was everpresent. The Soviet Union blocked all attempts in the UN to control nuclear materials and continued to aggressively test and display nuclear weapons. The United States continued to stockpile weapons as well. Each side argued that it was interested only in peace but was forced to maintain weapons capable of counteracting the other side in case of attack. The United States continued to research and develop new weaponry, detonating a hydrogen bomb just before the November 1952 election in which Eisenhower won the presidency. By 1953, both countries were heavily armed, and other nations (including Britain, France, and China) were pursuing nuclear weapons as well. The United States had a vested interest in continuing to pursue nuclear technology, and skeptics saw the stated US desire to turn this technology to peaceful purposes as a diversion from continuing the buildup of ever more dangerous weapons. Still, Eisenhower’s speech had a widespread impact, turning the conversation about nuclear technology into an international conversation about its use

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in the service of mankind and ultimately resulting in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. Author Biography

Dwight David Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890. He was the third son of seven, and when he was two years old, his parents moved to Abilene, Kansas. Eisenhower graduated from Abilene High School in 1909 and was accepted to West Point in 1911. He was an officer in the Army during World War I but was not sent overseas. He continued his military career after the war and was made a brigadier general on October 3, 1941. Eisenhower went on to command the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942. In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made Eisen-

hower Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and he was in charge of the Allied forces that invaded occupied France on June 6, 1944, D-Day. After a postwar position as the military commander of occupied Germany, Eisenhower was named chief of staff of the Army, until becoming president of Columbia University in 1948. He was named supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1950, but retained the presidency of Columbia until 1953, when he became president of the United States, defeating Democrat Adlai Stevenson. After serving a second term as president, Eisenhower retired to Pennsylvania, where his German American family was from. He died of congestive heart failure on March 28, 1969, and is buried on the grounds of the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Madame President, Members of the General Assembly: When Secretary General Hammarskjold’s invitation to address this General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and of France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset our world. During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honor. That honor is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations. At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this Assembly. Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes. But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will

provide a great share of the wisdom, the courage, and the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations, and happiness and well-being for all men. Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so clearly etched in your Charter. Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity merely to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes. I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates and on mine for a great many months— thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people. I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all—and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tensions of today’s world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

“Atoms for Peace”

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new—one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare. The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today’s existence. My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character. On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world’s first atomic explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted 42 test explosions. Atomic bombs today are more than 25 times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent. Today, the United States’ stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of World War II. A single air group, whether afloat or land-based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II. In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use. But the dread secret, and the fearful engines of atomic might, are not ours alone. In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, Great Britain and Canada, whose sci-

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entific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries, and the designs of atomic bombs. The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period, the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions. If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others—possibly all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression. The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That program will be accelerated and expanded. But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs for a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage. Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reactions would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defense capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor—for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor’s land would be laid waste—all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hope of the United States.

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To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed—the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us generation from generation—and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward decency, and right, and justice. Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction? Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the “Great Destroyers” but the whole book of history reveals mankind’s never-ending quest for peace, and mankind’s God-given capacity to build. It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants itself to live in freedom, and in the confidence that the people of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life. So my country’s purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well-being. In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience. I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act. I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world. But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps—now. The United States and its allies, Great Britain and France, have over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table. On the record has long stood the request of the United States, Great Britain, and France to nego-

tiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany. On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian Peace Treaty. On the same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea. Most recently, we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a Four Power Meeting. Along with our allies, Great Britain and France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable preconditions previously put forward. As you already know from our joint Bermuda communiqué, the United States, Great Britain, and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union. The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results toward peace—the only true way of lessening international tension. We never have, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs. We will never say that the peoples of Russia are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship. On the contrary, we hope that this coming Conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the West—the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations. Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria, and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmonious family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of Russia. Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asia, we seek peaceful opportunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and to elevate their lives. These are not idle words or shallow visions. Behind them lies a story of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war, but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record, already written, of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy

“Atoms for Peace”

peoples, and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought, and natural disaster. These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or protestations of peaceful intent. But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored. There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not yet been well explored—an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In its resolution of November 18th, 1953, this General Assembly suggested—and I quote—“that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution . . . and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954.” The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be “principally involved,” to seek “an acceptable solution” to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world. We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception. The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace. The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military buildup can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here—now—today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world’s scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would

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rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage. To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people, and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now. I therefore make the following proposals: The Governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the “private conversations” I have referred to earlier. The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate. Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control. The Atomic Energy Agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage, and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure. The more important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind. The United States would be more than willing—it would be proud to take up with others “principally involved” the

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development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited. Of those “principally involved” the Soviet Union must, of course, be one. I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would: First—encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that they had all the material needed for the conduct of all experiments that were appropriate; Second—begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles; Third—allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first, rather than in building up the armaments of war; Fourth—open up a new channel for peaceful discussion, and initiate at least a new approach to the many

Document Analysis

Eisenhower begins his address to the United Nations by assuring that body of the continued support of the United States. Eisenhower then declares his intention to speak in “a language that in a sense is new . . . the language of atomic warfare.” He acknowledges that the United States had been the first to detonate atomic bombs and that the US stockpile of atomic weapons has become more destructive than anything the world had ever seen, with every branch of the US military able to deploy nuclear weaponry. He then notes that this extraordinary technology is not the monopoly of the United States, but is shared by US allies Canada and the United Kingdom—as well as, he adds, the Soviet Union. The structure of the sentence in which he makes this last point highlights the ominous feeling shared by other nations at the Soviet Union’s capabilities: “The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.” Eisenhower chose this short form in a speech characterized by long, descriptive sentences. Eisenhower observes that unless nuclear technology can be controlled, “two atomic colossi are doomed ma-

difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations, if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress toward peace. Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace. The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly; in the capitals and military headquarters of the world; in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governors or governed, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace. To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. I again thank the delegates for the great honor they have done me, in inviting me to appear before them, and in listening to me so courteously. Thank you.

levolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world.” Acknowledging that no nation, including the Soviet Union, wants to see the “human degradation and destruction” that a nuclear war would cause, Eisenhower calls for negotiations among the great powers—he names the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union—to address the proliferation and amassing of atomic weapons. What is new in Eisenhower’s speech, however, is his call for not just a reduction in atomic weapons but also an international effort to move toward peaceful uses for atomic power (the first successful generation of electricity using nuclear power had only taken place two years earlier, in 1951). Eisenhower suggests that nuclear technology can be “transformed into universal, efficient, and economic usage,” becoming a great benefit to mankind rather than a source of potential annihilation. He proposes making some uranium available to scientists around the world for peaceful experimentation, “to the extent permitted by elementary prudence,” in a process overseen by his proposed International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be an organ of

“Atoms for Peace”

the UN. He proposes to include the Soviet Union in this effort. Eisenhower assures the UN that the United States is prepared to participate in any plan that would “diminish the potential destructive power of the world’ atomic stockpiles” and “make positive progress toward peace.” Essential Themes

The primary theme of this speech is the need for the management of the growing stockpile of nuclear weaponry and the proposal that international efforts also be turned toward the peaceful development of nuclear power. This was a new idea, as up to that time, nuclear technology was a closely guarded secret among allies; Eisenhower was proposing that the international community share in research efforts to turn this technology toward productive ends. Once atomic energy was used to generate electricity and for other applications in the service of the betterment of humanity, the amazing progress that had been made in nuclear science could be transformed into a force for good, in Eisenhower’s view. This process would need to be carefully regulated, and Eisenhower called on the Soviet Union to participate fully. Critics of this speech argued that an underlying

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theme was the United States’ commitment to continue nuclear testing and development under the guise of peacetime applications and that it could be used as a cover to continue to develop ever more dangerous weapons. However, a few years after this, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was indeed founded, and the basic contours of international nuclear nonproliferation efforts began to take shape. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: The President. Vol. 2. New York: Simon, 1984. Print. Fischer, David. History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years. Vienna: IAEA, 1997. PDF file. Thomas, Evans. Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World. New York: Little, 2012. Print. Varnum, Jessica. “Sixty Years of Atoms for Peace.” Nuclear Engineering International. NEI, 23 Jan. 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2015. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1993. Print. s

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 CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran Date: March 1954 Author: Donald N. Wilber Genre: government document Summary Overview

In the late summer of 1953, British and American intelligence services worked together to orchestrate a coup to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq (also spelled Mosaddegh or Mosaddiq). The British relied heavily on Iranian oil, which they had controlled since 1909, and Mossadeq led a popular movement to nationalize the oil fields. The British responded to nationalization with a boycott, removing trained personnel from Iranian refineries and refusing to purchase or transport Iranian oil. This led to an economic crisis, and fears in the West that the Soviet Union would exploit this instability to gain influence in Iran through the Tudeh Party, Iran’s Communist party. The shah, or monarch, of Iran was reluctant to support the coup plot, which hinged on a royal decree that would remove Mossadeq and install a pro-Western prime minister, Fazlollah Zahedi. After significant pressure from the CIA, the shah agreed to support the coup, which replaced Mossadeq with Zahedi and reopened Iranian oil to Western investment. The following year, one of the main CIA organizers of the coup, Donald N. Wilber, wrote a classified history of the event that was not made public until the year 2000. Defining Moment

Great Britain’s interest in Iranian oil began in earnest on May 28, 1901, when the shah granted the petroleum rights over vast areas of territory to a British citizen, William Knox D’Arcy. When oil was not immediately discovered, D’Arcy was forced to accept other investors. Significant quantities of oil were discovered in 1908, and in 1909, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) which would later become British Petroleum, was formed. By 1913, a massive refinery in Abadan was pumping oil destined for the British Empire. Under the agreement with D’Arcy, the Iranian government’s share of the oil profits was just 16 percent, and the company declined to open its books for inspection.

Just before World War I, the British navy upgraded their ships from coal to oil, and the British government gained a controlling interest in the APOC. The British economy and military were dependent on a steady flow of inexpensive Iranian oil. During the war, the British stationed troops in Iran to protect their pipelines and proposed in 1919 that Iran become a British protectorate. Though this was not accepted by Iran, the British continued to control the vast majority of Iranian territory, but not without opposition. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Iranian government fought to renegotiate the D’Arcy agreement and regain greater control of the nation’s resources. In 1933, a new sixty-year agreement was reached, which increased payments to the Iranian government and reduced the amount of land under direct APOC control. Britain’s relationship with Iran became even more complicated during World War II. The Soviet Union was a key British ally and was holding the Axis armies at bay on the Eastern Front, and this two-front war was key to Britain’s survival. The Soviet Union depended on Iranian oil to resupply its army, and though Iran was neutral, the shah was suspected of Nazi sympathies. British and Soviet forces therefore invaded Iran in 1941. The ruler, Reza Shah, was deposed and replaced by his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who remained in power until 1979. After the war, the Iranian parliament wanted greater control over the country’s oil reserves. Mossadeq was the leader of the nationalization movement and was elected prime minister of Iran in 1951. On May 2, Mossadeq declared the oil fields to be the property of Iran alone. The response from Britain was to remove all trained personnel from the refineries and organize and international boycott of Iranian oil. Production and sales dropped precipitously, leading to an economic crisis and internal unrest. By 1952, British and American intelligence officers had begun to develop a plan to oust

CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran

Mossadeq. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the newly elected president of the United States, was afraid that the Soviet Union would be able to take advantage of the instability in Iran and decided to support the coup. Author Biography

Donald Newton Wilber was born in Wisconsin on November 14, 1907. He attended New Trier High School and then went to Princeton University, where he graduated with a BA in 1929, as well as an MFA and PhD in architecture in 1949. Wilber’s area of scholarly expertise was the Middle East, and he traveled and wrote ex-

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tensively in Iran, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. Wilber’s book Iran, Past and Present was published in 1948, establishing him as an expert on Iranian history. These scholarly endeavors gave Wilbur cover for his activities with the CIA, which he joined in 1948. He was a primary planner of the overthrow of Mossadeq in favor of a government friendlier to Western interests. Wilber served in the CIA until 1970, while working with various prestigious universities. He died on February 2, 1997, in Princeton, New Jersey, survived by his wife and two daughters.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT SECRET Summary By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries; was reaching a dangerous and advanced stage of illegal, deficit financing; was disregarding the Iranian constitution in prolonging Premier Mohammed Mossadeq’s tenure of office; was motivated mainly by Mossadeq’s desire for personal power; was governed by irresponsible policies based on emotion; had weakened the Shah and the Iranian Army to a dangerous degree; and had cooperated closely with the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran. In View of these factors, it was estimated that Iran was in real danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain; if that happened it would mean a victory for the Soviets in the Cold War and a major setback for the West in the Middle East. No remedial action other than the covert action plan set forth below could be found to improve the existing state of affairs. It was the aim of the TPAJAX project to cause the fall of the Mossadeq government; to reestablish the prestige and power of the Shah; and to replace the Mossadeq government with one which would govern Iran according to constructive policies. Specifically, the aim was to bring power to a government which would reach equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party.

Once it had been determined definitely that it was not in American interests for the Mossadeq government to remain in power and CIA had been so informed by the Secretary of State in March 1953, CIA began drafting a plan whereby the aims state above could be realized through covert action. An estimate entitled “Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq” was completed on 16 April 1953. It was here determined that an overthrow of Mossadeq was possible through covert operations. In April it was determined that CIA should conduct the envisioned operation jointly with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). By the end of April, it was decided that CIA and SIS officers would draw up a plan on Cyprus which would be submitted to CIA and SIS Headquarters, and to the Department of State and the Foreign Office for final approval. On 3 June 1953, US ambassador Loy Wesley Henderson arrived in the United States where he was fully consulted with regard to the objective and aims, as stated above, as well as CIA’s intentions to design covert means of achieving the objective and aims. The plan was completed by 10 June 1953 at which time Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, CIA (who carried with him the views of the Department of State, CIA, and Ambassador Henderson); Mr. Roger Goiran, CIA Chief of Station, Iran; and two CIA planning officers met in Beirut to consider the plan. With minor changes the operational proposal was submitted to the SIS in London on 14 June 1953. On 19 June 1953, the final operational plan, agreed

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upon by Mr. Roosevelt for the CIA and by British Intelligence in London, was submitted in Washington to the Department of State; to Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA; and to Ambassador Henderson for approval. Simultaneously, it was submitted to the British Foreign Office by SIS for approval. The Department of State wanted to be assured of two things before it would grant approval of the plan: 1. That the United States Government could provide adequate grant aid to a successor Iranian Government so that such a government could be sustained until an oil settlement was reached. 2. That the British Government would signify in writing, to the satisfaction of the Department of State, its intentions to reach an early oil settlement with a successor Iranian Government in a spirit of good will and equity. The Department of State satisfied itself on both of these scores. In mid-July 1953, the Department of State and the British Foreign Office granted authorization for the implementation of the TPAJAX project, and the Director of CIA obtained the approval of the President of the United States. The SIS, with the concurrence of the CIA Director and Ambassador Henderson, proposed that Mr. Roosevelt assume field command in Tehran of the final phases of the operation. It was determined by the Department of State that it would be advisable for Ambassador Henderson to postpone his return to Iran, from Washington consultation, until the operation had been concluded. Arrangements were made jointly with SIS whereby operational liaison would be conducted on Cyprus where a CIA officer would be temporarily stationed, and support liaison would be conducted in Washington. Rapid three-way communications were arranged through CIA facilities between Tehran, Cyprus, and Washington. The time set for the operation was mid-August. In Iran, CIA and SIS propaganda assets were to conduct an increasingly intensified propaganda effort through the press, handbills, and the Tehran clergy in a campaign designed to weaken the Mossadeq government in any way possible. In the United States, highranking US officials were to make official statements

which would shatter any hopes held by Premier Mossadeq that American economic aid would be forthcoming, and disabuse the Iranian public of the Mossadeq myth that the United States supported his regime. General Fazlollah Zahedi, a former member of Mossadeq’s cabinet, was chosen as the most suitable successor to the Premier since he stood out as the only person of stature who had consistently been openly in opposition to Mossadeq and who claimed any significant following. Zahedi was to be approached by CIA and be told of our operation and its aim of installing him as the new prime minister. He was to name a military secretariat with which CIA would conclude a detailed staff plan of action. From the outset, the cooperation of the Shah was considered to be an essential part of the plan. His cooperation was necessary to assure the action required of the Tehran militart garrisons, and to legalize the succession of a new prime minister. Since the Shah had shown himself to be a man of indecision, it was determined that pressure on him to cooperate would take the following forms: 1. The Shah’s dynamic and forceful twin sister, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, was to come from Europe to urge the Shah to dismiss Mossadeq. She would say she had been in contact with US and UK officials who had requested her to do so. 2. Arrangements were made for a visit to Iran by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former head of the US Gendarme Mission, who the Shah liked and respected. Schwarzkopf was to explain the proposed project and get from the Shah signed firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mossadeq, appointing Zahedi, and calling on the Army to remain loyal to the crown. 3. The principal indigenous British agent, who bona fides had been established with the Shah, was to reinforce the Shah that this was a joint US-UK action. 4. Failing results from the above, Mr. Roosevelt, representing the President of the United States, would urge the Shah to sign the above-mentioned firmans. When received, the firmans would be released by CIA to Zahedi on the daycalled for in the plan. On D-Day, the Shah was

CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran

to be at some location outside of Tehran so that Zahedi, armed with the royal firmans and with military support, could take over the government without danger of the Sha’s reversing his stand, and to avoid any attempt on the Shah’s life. Through agents in the Tehran military, CIA was to ensure, to the degree possible, Tehran Army cooperation in support of the Shah-appointed new prime minister. The following public statements made in the United States had tremendous impact on Iran and Mossadeq, and contributed greatly to Mossadeq’s downfall: 1. The publication, on 9 June 1953, of President Eisenhower’s 29 June 1953 letter to Premier Mossadeq made it clear that increased aid would not be forthcoming to Iran. 2. The Secretary of State’s press conferences of 28 July 1953 stated that “. . . . The growing activities of the illegal Communist Party in Iran and the toleration fo them by the Iranian Government has caused our government concern. These developments make it more difficult to grant aid to Iran.” 3. The President’s Seattle speech at the Governors’ convention, in which he stated that the United States would not sit by and see Asian countries fall behind the Iron Curtain, had definite effect. In cooperation with the Department of State, CIA had several articles planted in major American newspapers and magazines which, when reproduced in Iran, had the desired psychological effect in Iran and contributed to the war of nerves against Mossadeq. After considerable pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf, and after several meetings with Mr. Roosevelt, the Shah finally signed the required firmans on 15 August 1953. Action was set for 16 August. However, owing to a security leak in the Iranian military, the chief of the Shah’s bodyguard, assigned to seize Mossadeq qith the help of two truckloads of pro-Shah soldiers, was overwhelmed by superior armed forces still loyal to Mossadeq. The balance of the military plan was thus frustrated for that day. Upon hearing that the plan has misfired, the Shah flew to Baghdad. This was an act of prudence and had been at least partially foreseen in

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the plan. Zahedi remained in hiding in CIA custody. With his key officers, he eluded Mossadeq’s security forces which were seeking to apprehend the major opposition elements. Early in the afternoon of 17 August 1953 Ambassador Henderson returned to Tehran. General Zahedi, through a CIA-arranged secret press conferences and through CIA covert printing facilities, announced to Iran that he was legally prime minister and that Mossadeq had staged an illegal coup against him. CIA agents disseminated a large quantity of photographs of the firmans, appointing Zahedi prime minister and dismissing Mosssadeq. This had tremendous impact on the people of Tehran who had already been shocked and angered when they realized that the Shah had been forced to leave Iran because of Mossadeq’s actions. US Ambassador Burton Y. Berry, in Baghdad, contacted the Shah and stated that he had confidence that the Shah would return soon to Iran despite the apparent adverse situation at the time. Contact was also established with the Shah in Rome after he had flown there from Baghdad. Mr. Roosevelt and the station consistently reported that Mossadeq’s apparent victory was misleading; that there were very concrete signs that the Army was still loyal to the Shah; and that a favorable reversal of the situation was possible. The station further urged both the British Foreign Office and the Department of State to make a maximum effort to persuade the Shah to make public statements encouraging the Army and populace to reject Mossadeq and to accept Zahedi as prime minister. On 19 August 1953, a pro-Shah demonstration, originating in the bazaar area, took on overwhelming proportions. The demonstration appeared to start partially spontaneously, revealing the fundamental prestige of the Shah and the public alarm at the undisguised republican move being started by the Communists as well as by certain National Frontists. Station political action assets also contributed to the beginnings of the ProShah demonstrations. The Army very soon joined the pro-Shah movement and by noon of that day it was clear that Tehran, as well as certain provincial areas, were controlled by pro-Shah street groups and Army units. The situation was such that the above-mentioned military plan could then be implemented. At the station’s signal, Zahedi came out of hiding to lead the movement. He first

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broadcast over Radio Tehran and announced that the government was his. The General Staff offices were then seized, Mossadeq’s home was gutted, and pro-Mossadeq politicians and officers arrested. By the end of 19 August, the country was in the hands of the new Premier, Zahedi, and members of the Mossadeq government were either in hiding or were incarcerated. The Shah returned shortly to Iran where he was given a rousing popular reception. The Shah was deeply moved by the fact that his people and Army had revolted in the face of adversity against a vindictive Mossadeq and a Communist Party riding the crest of a temporary victory and clearly planning to declare Iran a republic. The Shah felt for the first time that he had the mandate of his people, and he returned determined to regain firm control of the Army. In order to give Zahedi badly needed immediate financial assistance so that the month-end payrolls could be met before the United States could provide large scale grant aid, CIA covertly made available $5,000,000

Document Analysis

This selection is the introduction and summary of Wilber’s CIA history of the coup. It begins with a brief recap of the reasons that the CIA and British intelligence had decided to remove Mossadeq from power. The first sentence outlines perhaps the principal British concern: “By the end of 1952, it had become clear that the Mossadeq government in Iran was incapable of reaching an oil settlement with interested Western countries.” They believed furthermore that Mossadeq was acting recklessly, contrary to the constitution of Iran, and was in danger of leading the nation “behind the Iron Curtain,” or into Soviet-style Communism—perhaps the principal American concern. If Iran turned to Communism, it would advance Soviet interests in the Middle East at the expense of the West, and so the decision was made to replace the Mossadeq government with one that would “govern Iran according to constructive policies.” By April 1953, a coup was agreed upon as the best course of action, and plans were drawn up for a joint operation between the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Services. By mid-July 1953, the plan was approved by both governments; in the United States, the operation was named TPAJAX, or Operation Ajax.

within two days of Zahedi’s assumption of power. [The C.I.A.’s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author’s own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran. Because the introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not published here. In addition, certain names and identifying descriptions have been removed from the documents available on the Web.]

The lead-up to the coup involved a propaganda war, with US officials making clear in public statements that economic aid would not be offered to Mossadeq’s Iran. At the same time, opposition to Mossadeq was fomented inside the country, particularly through the media. A top army general, Fazlollah Zahedi, was picked to replace Mossadeq as prime minister. However, the plot also hinged on the cooperation of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was extremely reluctant to involve himself in a plot by foreign powers and is described by Wilber as “a man of indecision.” The report lays out the ways that pressure was brought to bear on the shah, from bringing his sister and US Army general H. Norman Schwarzkopf Sr. to negotiate with him, to readying the orders for him to sign and promising to spirit him away while the coup was taking place. On August 15, under considerable pressure, the shah signed the decrees needed to oust Mossadeq. The plot seemed doomed from the beginning. A security leak meant that the element of surprise was lost, and Mossadeq initially escaped capture. The shah fled to Iraq, and the CIA worked to gather support for the newly appointed Zahedi by disseminating copies of the decrees replacing Mossadeq. On August 19, with the help of some CIA agents, a pro-shah demonstration in

CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran

the streets of Tehran gathered momentum. By the end of the day, the capital was in the hands of supporters of Zahedi and the shah, and Mossadeq and his supporters were arrested. The report ends by noting that the CIA secretly transferred five million dollars to Zahedi’s government within two days in order to keep the government running until promised US grant aid was forthcoming. Essential Themes

The Iranian coup of 1953 was the first of several CIA operations that sought to encourage rivals of obstreperous or Communist-leaning leaders during the Cold War; for example, the following year, in 1954, the CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala to overthrow the democratically elected government of Jacobo Árbenz, and in 1961, the CIA backed the ill-fated Bay of Pigs Invasion intended to oust Fidel Castro, the Communist leader of Cuba. When the extent of US intervention in these countries was suspected, or confirmed, it led to long-term resentment and distrust of US policy in these regions. The overthrow of Mossadeq was no exception.

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The shah continued to rule until 1979 in close association with the United States and Britain. When he was overthrown by militants led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, the depth of animosity toward the United States in Iran was made clear. The American Embassy was attacked and the staff taken hostage, accused of spying and manipulating the Iranian people. Tensions with Iran remain high in part because of the historical distrust sewn during the 1953 coup. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Abrahamian, Ervand. The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern US-Iranian Relations. New York: New, 2013. Print. Bowie, Robert R. & Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. Print. Gasiorowski, Mark J. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 2004. Print.

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 Balkan Pact Date: August 9, 1954 Genre: treaty

Summary Overview

The Balkan Pact was the culmination of four successive treaties between the nations of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Officially designed to promote peace and trilateral cooperation between the three Balkan countries, the accord was also a mutual defense pact. The framework of the pact allowed for the establishment of a joint council that would be charged with assessing regional security concerns, settling disputes among the parties, and planning against any foreign attacks. Although the Balkan Pact did not officially dissolve, it fell into disregard during the 1960s due to a breakdown in relations among the three nations.. Defining Moment

The end of World War II ushered in the forty-five-year era known as the Cold War, a period in which military, political, and economic competition between Westernand Soviet-aligned nations reached a fever pitch. The United States formed a mutual defense pact with its Western European allies in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet Union did the same with its Eastern European allies, forging the Warsaw Pact less than a decade after NATO came into being. These pacts were characterized by interstate cooperation as well as defense; a military attack on one of the participants would, under the terms of the agreements, be considered an attack on all pact members. For those states that were not officially aligned with NATO or the Warsaw Pact, a choice needed to be made. This choice could cause international ripples, particularly if those nations were deemed to be of strategic value to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Such was the case in the southeastern region of Europe known as the Balkans. The Soviets and NATO both had vested interests in the Balkans, particularly in light of the region’s geographically strategic value. In Yugoslavia, mutual distrust between President Josip Broz Tito and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin and gave rise to economic

sanctions, isolation, and even the threat of military conflict. Yugoslavia was estranged from the West as well, in large part due to Yugoslavia’s differences with Italy over the postwar fate of Trieste and Yugoslav support of Greek Communists during that country’s civil war. Greece, on the other hand, having reemerged from defeating the Communists, was moving rapidly back to economic stability (thanks to a major infusion of US aid under the Truman Doctrine). During this time, Turkey, which controlled entry to the Black Sea, received more than $230 million in US development aid, money that helped it build infrastructure and invest in social development programs such as education. Turkey, in turn, supported the US effort in Korea and pursued membership in NATO. Each nation was strategically valuable to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, although Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia were all to varying degrees connected to both East and West, the three Balkan states also saw the value of revisiting a centuries-old regional relationship. Greece and Turkey had normalized relations and had signed a number of trade and economic agreements in 1950, and both joined NATO in 1952. Yugoslavia, under the threat of a full Soviet occupation, looked to create a stronger relationship with these two non-Communist nations. A number of highlevel military conferences were held between the three nations in 1952. With the endorsement of NATO, the three nations moved toward the creation of an “Eastern NATO.” Yugoslavia would not be invited to join NATO, but a trilateral defense pact would essentially place it within NATO’s protective shield. On February 28, 1953, the leaders of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia met in Ankara to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration, sometimes called the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the first of a series of agreements that would make this mutual defense pact a reality. On November 7, 1953, they met in

Balkan Pact

Belgrade and signed a follow-up to this treaty, known as the Additional Agreement to the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration. Finally, on August 9, 1954, they convened in the resort region of Bled, Yugoslavia, where they signed an agreement that gave the relationship le-

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gal status: the Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia—or the Balkan Pact for short.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Contracting Parties, Reaffirming their faith in the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to contribute, by coordinating their efforts, to the safeguarding of peace, the strengthening of security and the development of international cooperation; Resolved to ensure in the most effective manner the territorial integrity as well as the political independence of their countries in accordance with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter; Animated by the desire to widen and reinforce the bases of friendship and cooperation established in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between their countries, signed at Ankara on February 28, 1953, which proved to be an extremely effective instrument; Having in view that the said Treaty has always been considered an initial step toward an alliance; Considering that the conclusion of such an alliance is necessary; Convinced, furthermore, that the institution of a system of collective security among them through a treaty of alliance would not only constitute a decisive factor for their own security and independence, but would also benefit all the other countries adhering to the cause of a just and equitable peace, especially those situated in their area; Have decided to conclude the present Treaty and, for this purpose, have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries: Who, having exhibited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions: Article I The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which they

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may be involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Article II The Contracting Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or more of them in any part of their territories shall be considered an aggression against all the Contracting Parties, who, consequently, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall jointly and severally go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by taking immediately and by common accord any measures, including the use of armed force, which they deem necessary for effective defense. The Contracting Parties undertake, without prejudice to Article VII of the present Treaty, not to conclude peace or any other arrangement with the aggressor in the absence of a prior mutual agreement between the Parties. Article III To ensure in a continuous and effective manner the attainment of the objectives of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties undertake to assist each other to maintain and strengthen their defensive capacity. Article IV With a view to ensuring the effective application of the present Treaty, it is agreed as follows: 1. There is hereby established a Permanent Council to be composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and any other members of the Governments of the Contracting Parties whose presence might be required by the needs of the situation and the nature of the subjects to be treated. The Permanent Council shall meet regularly twice a

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year. It may hold additional meetings whenever the Governments of all the Contracting Parties deem this necessary When the Permanent Council is not in session, it shall perform its functions through the Permanent Secretariat of the Treaty of Ankara according to a procedure to be determined. The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs provided for in Article I of the Treaty of Ankara shall be replaced by the Permanent Council. Decisions of the Permanent Council on substantive matters shall be taken by unanimous agreement. 2. The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall continue their common task begun in application of Articles II and III of the Treaty of Ankara, with due regard to the provisions of the present Treaty. Article V As soon as the situation envisaged in Article II of the present Treaty occurs, the Contracting Parties will consult immediately and the Permanent Council shall meet at once in order to determine the measures which should be taken in addition to those already adopted pursuant to the aforesaid Article II, referred to above and which it would be necessary to take jointly in order to meet the situation. Article VI In the event of serious deterioration of the international situation, and more particularly in the areas where such deterioration might have a negative effect, whether direct or indirect, on the security of their area, the Contracting Parties will consult each other with a view to examining the situation and to determining their attitude. The Contracting Parties, recognizing that an armed aggression against a country other than one of them may, by spreading, threaten directly or indirectly the security and the integrity of one or more of them, agree as follows: In the event of an armed aggression against a country toward which one or more Contracting Parties has or have, at the time of signature of the present Treaty, obligations of mutual assistance, the Contracting Parties will consult each other regarding the measures which should be taken in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations and in order to meet the situation thus created in their area.

It is understood that the consultations referred to in this article might include an emergency meeting of the Permanent Council. Article VII The Contracting Parties will immediately inform the United Nations Security Council of any armed aggression against them, and of the measures of self-defense which have been taken; they will discontinue the said measures when the Security Council has effectively applied those mentioned in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Likewise, the Governments of the Contracting Parties will immediately make the public statement provided for in United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 378 (V) A of November 17, 1950 (2)relating to the duties of States in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, and they will act in accordance with the said Resolution. Article VIII The Contracting Parties reaffirm their decision not to participate in any coalition directed against any one of them and not to make any commitment incompatible with the provisions of the present Treaty. Article IX The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations. Article X The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949. Article XI The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Contracting Parties at Ankara on February 28, 1953 shall remain in force in so far as it is not modified by the provisions of the present Treaty. The Contracting Parties agree to apply the provisions of Article XIII of the present Treaty in respect of the duration of the Treaty of Ankara.

Balkan Pact

Article XII The provisions of Article IX of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of February 28 shall apply to the present Treaty under the same conditions. Article XIII The present Treaty is concluded for a period of twenty years. If none of the Contracting Parties denounces this Treaty one year before its expiration, it shall automatically be extended for one more year, and so on until it is denounced by one of the Contracting Parties. Article XIV The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contract-

Document Analysis

The Balkan Pact was designed as a mutual defense pact, one that would promote international cooperation and regional peace while emphasizing the mutual security of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in the face of a perceived Soviet threat. The agreement defers to the United Nations, specifically the UN Security Council, in the event of regional or interstate conflict or disputes, but it emphasizes that the three nations, two of which were members of NATO, will defend one another in the event of a foreign attack. This pact was anticipated to remain in effect for twenty years. To facilitate this longevity, the charter document includes a framework that creates a central council, composed of the foreign ministers of each signing nation. Article 4 of the pact states that this council will “meet regularly twice a year,” plus on other occasions when important issues become manifest. The Balkan Pact is not intended to supersede or otherwise alter each nation’s standing in the United Nations, NATO, or any other international organization. This element of the treaty serves two purposes. First, by deferring to the authority of the United Nations, the three nations avoid venturing beyond the influence of the world’s primary international organization, to which both the United States and the Soviet Union belonged and thus, ostensibly, answered. Second, it minimizes any ripples between the three signatories and the Soviet Union, which was maintaining pressure particularly

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ing Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Greece. The Treaty shall be registered with the United Nations. It has been drawn up in the French language three identical copies, one of which is to be delivered to each of the Contracting Parties. In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties have affixed their signatures hereto. Done at Bled, August 9, 1954.

on its fellow Communist state, Yugoslavia. The treaty’s stated desire not to alter NATO’s organization, such as by adding a new member (namely Yugoslavia), maintains a nonthreatening posture in the face of the Soviet Union. The most important element of the Balkan Pact is its nature as a mutual defense pact. The treaty promises the international community that the signatories will adhere to international law and will seek the peaceful resolution of any international disputes. However, as clearly outlined in article 2 of the agreement, any military attack on one of the three nations will be seen as an attack on all three, and all three will respond accordingly. Experts concur that this provision was primarily to the benefit of Yugoslavia. Greece and Turkey were by this time already members of NATO, giving them the promise of protection from the Soviet Union, the main threat in the region. Yugoslavia, however, was not a member of NATO, and any attempt to wrest that country from Soviet influence would be seen as an aggressive move against Moscow. Therefore, while Yugoslavia could not join NATO without provoking conflict, its inclusion in the Balkan Pact in effect linked Yugoslavia to NATO without explicitly altering its alignment. Article 8 of the Balkan Pact gives further clarity to this last point. It affirms that the signing nations will “not . . . participate in any coalition directed against any one of them” or “make any commitment incompatible with the provisions of the present Treaty,” a position

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that seemingly cements Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia’s tacit neutrality in the Cold War. Essential Themes

The Balkan Pact of 1954 represented the culmination of several years of increased cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in the face of the growing regional push by the Warsaw Pact. Its framework was carefully designed to protect the security of the three signing nations in such a way that it would not be seen as offensive to Moscow. More generally, some experts argue that it was an effort to extend NATO’s reach into the region without overtly challenging the Soviet Union in the Balkans. Historically, the three nations involved in the Balkan Pact had been competitors and adversaries rather than allies. This history of mistrust was seemingly set aside only a few years before the Balkan Pact, when the threat of Soviet intrusion and the promise of Western economic development and military protection came into frame. The pact was intended to serve as a longterm vehicle through which both threat and promise could be addressed. However, tensions remained between Greece and Turkey in particular, exacerbated in ensuing years by the struggle for sovereignty over the Mediterranean island of Cyprus. The Balkan Pact was signed as Yugoslavia in particular was under enormous pressure from the Soviet Union. Its design, therefore, deferred to the UN and

to international law, evincing respect for both NATO (which sought Yugoslavia as a member) and the Soviet Union (which was already a major influence on Tito’s Communist regime). Although the pact would not remain in force for the intended twenty years, it remains significant within the context of the Cold War in Eastern Europe —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Smrkolj, Maja. “Balkan Pact (1953–54).” The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012. 790–94. Print. Stone, David R. “The Balkan Pact and American Policy.” East European Quarterly 28.3 (1994): 393–407. Dr. David R. Stone, Professor of History. Web. 14 Dec. 2015. “Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact), August 9, 1954.” The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Lib., Yale U, 2008. Web. 14 Dec. 2015. “Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, February 28, 1953.” The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Lib., Yale U, 2008. Web. 14 Dec. 2015.

President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam

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 President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam Date: October 25, 1954 Author: Dwight D. Eisenhower Genre: letter Summary Overview

In October 1954, only five months after the Viet Minh (Vietnamese nationalist forces, including many communists) defeated the French armies at the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu, US president Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to assure South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem of the financial and military support of the United States. Vietnam was divided into two artificially created nations—South Vietnam and North Vietnam, the latter of which was under the leadership of the Communist Ho Chi Minh. Many in the south supported Ho’s leadership and actively worked to reunite the nation under a Communist government. Although the separation of the country was meant to be temporary—lasting only until elections could be held— both the South Vietnamese and US governments felt that Ho Chi Minh stood a good chance of winning an election; thus, they actively promoted South Vietnamese independence as the only way of keeping the entire peninsula of Indochina from falling to the Communists. Defining Moment

The seeds of American involvement in Vietnam, and Southeast Asia in general, were sewn long before President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to assure South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem of his support in October 1954. France, which had left Southeast Asia in defeat only five months earlier, had been the dominant colonial power in the region since the late nineteenth century. Much of the animosity on the part of some Vietnamese leaders toward the West had been based on the fact that even as France withdrew direct colonial rule in the 1920s, it left the Catholic emperor Bao Dai as the head of what amounted to a French protectorate. This caused divisions within the predominantly Buddhist Vietnamese population.

In 1941, Vietnam was invaded by the Japanese Empire, which held power (via the pro-Axis Vichy French government) throughout the rest of World War II. For his part, Bao Dai cooperated with the Japanese, and in 1945, he declared Vietnam to be independent of its French colonial rulers, essentially transforming it into a protectorate of Japan. When World War II ended with Japan’s defeat in August 1945, Ho Chi Minh—who had been fighting the Japanese occupation throughout the war, winning worldwide admiration and the loyalty of many Vietnamese citizens—persuaded Bao Dai to abdicate. Ho Chi Minh then declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (also known as North Vietnam) in September 1945. Though the French did away with Ho Chi Minh’s government in late 1946, their efforts to reassert colonial government in Vietnam resulted only in a protracted war with Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh guerrilla army. In 1949, the French reinstalled Bao Dai, this time as chief of state, and continued to fight the Viet Minh with American support. What began as a civil war within Vietnam quickly transformed into a Cold War faceoff between the Communist Viet Minh and the French. After the war dragged on for another five years, the French forces were eventually defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. In July, the Geneva Accords put a formal end to the war, as the nation was divided between Bao Dai’s supporters south of the seventeenth parallel and Ho Chi Minh’s supporters north of it. The accords called for elections to reunite the country by 1956. By the time of the accords, Diem had become prime minister and Bao Dai, though still technically chief of state, was living in France. Neither Diem’s government nor the United States signed the Geneva Accords, as they knew that elections would likely result in Ho Chi Minh and the Communists coming to power.

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Author Biography

President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) led the Allied forces in the defeat of Nazi Germany during World War II, and by the 1950s, he was leading the United States through the early years of the Cold War—the ideological and sometimes military struggle with the Soviet Union and against Communism in general. Although he brought the Korean War to a ceasefire in 1953, Eisenhower began US involvement in Vietnam at the same time, providing the French with financial

and military aid. However, he stopped short of sending American bombers to support the French forces when the Viet Minh held them under siege at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Although not wishing to send American forces into Vietnam, Eisenhower had earlier in the year given his “domino theory” speech, which outlined his view that to let Vietnam “fall” to Communism would only lead to the expansion of Communism throughout Southeast Asia and beyond.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Washington, [undated.] Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning VietNam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within. Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly

Document Analysis

In October 1954, President Eisenhower wrote Prime Minster Diem to reassure him of the support of the United States. Though both the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese governments were internationally recognized as a result of the Geneva Accords, Eisenhower’s sympathies are obvious when he refers to Ho Chi Minh’s supporters as “enemies” and “subversive

to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent VietNam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people. Sincerely, [signature]

collaborators” and Diem’s supporters as “loyal.” As he sees South Vietnam as a bulwark against the further spread of Communism in the region, Eisenhower expresses his commitment to making the United States the guarantor of the “welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam”—Diem’s government, in other words.

President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam

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However much Eisenhower sees Diem as preferable to Ho Chi Minh, his support is not without qualification. Eisenhower stipulates that American aid comes with an understanding that Diem’s government will be “undertaking needed reforms.” This a likely a reference to the Roman Catholic Diem’s persecution of Buddhism while leading a largely Buddhist population. His reservations about Diem aside, Eisenhower considers the creation of South Vietnam to be a success in stemming the tide of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, resulting in a government that he hopes will “be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology.” Eisenhower’s 1954 letter to Diem sets the United States on a course of intervention in Southeast Asia. Though Eisenhower is committed to not entangling the nation in another Asian war, having just extricated the United States from the unpopular quagmire of the Korean War, the commitments he makes to Diem’s government have unforeseen consequences that lead to heightened US involvement in Vietnam for the following twenty years.

his Catholic supporters, further alienating the population he governed. In March 1959, a renewed conflict began when Ho Chi Minh declared a war to unify Vietnam under his leadership; the first two Americans to die in the conflict were killed four months later. By the time US president John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, the insurgency of Communist forces in South Vietnam was becoming increasingly concerning, as was Diem’s apparent inability to effectively govern the country or command its military. By 1963, Kennedy had increased the number of advisers in South Vietnam to sixteen thousand, but Diem’s failures had caused the administration to support a coup against him, which led to Diem’s assassination on November 2, 1963. After Kennedy’s assassination twenty days later, Lyndon B. Johnson became president, and the Vietnam War, with the United States as a full participant, began in earnest. In August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin incident gave Johnson the excuse he needed to fully involve the US military. Over the following decade, 2.7 million American soldiers served in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and fifty-eight thousand Americans would die in the conflict, along with over one million Vietnamese. —Steven L. Danver, PhD

Essential Themes

Bibliography and Additional Reading

With the backing of Eisenhower now guaranteed, South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem moved to consolidate his power. American military aid began to arrive in early 1955, as did American military advisers, hoping to train the newly established South Vietnamese army. By late 1955, it became clear that the American support of South Vietnam was directly tied to Ngo Dinh Diem rather than the official chief of state Bao Dai. In October, an election was held in which South Vietnamese were asked to choose between the two leaders. Given that Ngo Dinh Diem controlled the military, Bao Dai was in France, and campaigning for Bao Dai was forbidden, Diem was elected easily in a ballot that most observers acknowledged was fraudulent. Three days later, Diem then proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam (also known as South Vietnam), with himself as president. When the deadline for unifying elections outlined in the Geneva Accords passed in July 1956, a new phase of the Vietnamese conflict was near. The needed reforms within South Vietnam did not happen either, as Diem seized land from Buddhist peasants, giving it to

Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Holt, 1999. Print. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin, 1983. Print. Morgan, Ted. Valley of Death: The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. New York: Random, 2010. Print. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Vintage, 1988. Print.

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 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty Date: December 2, 1954 Genre: treaty Summary Overview

Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China has always been informed by its proximity. Taiwan lies off the coast of China, separated from it by the Taiwan Strait. Its coast is less than a hundred miles from mainland China, and its associated islands stretch to within two miles of the mainland. Taiwan was first annexed by China in 1683, under the Qing dynasty, and remained under Chinese control for more than two hundred years, until it was ceded to Japan in 1895 following China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. China fought on the side of the Allied powers during World War II, and at the end of the war in 1945, Taiwan was returned to China as a term of Japan’s surrender. Facing defeat by Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War of 1927–49, the nationalist Republic of China (ROC) government, led by the Kuomintang political party, relocated to Taiwan, leaving Mao Zedong’s Communist Party of in control of the mainland, newly dubbed the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both the PRC and the ROC laid claim to Taiwan and the islands in the Taiwan Strait (with the ROC in de facto control), and tensions in the area remained high. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States saw Taiwan and the ROC as an important strategic barrier to further Communist expansion in Asia. The SinoAmerican Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the United States was therefore part of the United States’ policy of containment, which provided both economic aid and military support to countries threatened by Communist aggression. Defining Moment

The two-decade-plus Chinese Civil War culminated in the Communist Revolution of 1949, during which Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek fled mainland China with much of his army, garrisoning troops on smaller islands in the Taiwan Strait and openly planning to recapture the mainland from bases in Taiwan. In the early 1950s, the ROC led several attacks against

mainland China that had little impact. Still, both the ROC in Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland viewed the islands in the Taiwan Strait as strategically important, considering them to be potential launching sites for an invasion of the mainland. The United States was initially ambivalent about supporting Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC, but when the Korean War broke out in 1950, the United States sent battleships into the Taiwan Strait, antagonizing the PRC and leading to open warfare with China in Korea. After the breakdown of relations between the United States and Communist China during the Korean War, Taiwan became increasingly important to the US strategy of Communist containment in Asia, and the ROC government in Taiwan became a close ally. The Korean War ended with an armistice on July 27, 1953, but relations between China and the United States continued to be strained. The following year, the United States initiated the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), an anti-Communist mutual defense pact. (Only two SEATO members— Thailand and the Philippines—were actually located in Southeast Asia; the other member nations were Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Great Britain, and the United States.) Public support of the ROC and open discussions of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty further antagonized the PRC, which saw this as a direct affront to its claims of sovereignty over Taiwan. The US fleet had withdrawn from the Taiwan Strait at the end of the Korean War, and in August 1954, Chiang Kai-shek stationed more than sixty thousand troops on the Kinmen and Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC responded by shelling Kinmen and Matsu, as well as the ROC-administered Tachen Islands, kicking off what would come to be known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, signed shortly after the crisis began, was a clear message to the PRC that the ROC would have US support if attacked. The treaty stopped short of promising the defense of

Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty

the islands closest to the Chinese mainland, but was a significant step in establishing the ROC’s long-term control of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands—referred to in the treaty by their Portuguese name, the Pescadores—

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and establishing a bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia. The treaty was ratified and went into effect on March 3, 1955.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Parties to this Treaty, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area, Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war, Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. ARTICLE II In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

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ARTICLE III The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends. ARTICLE IV The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty. ARTICLE V Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE VI For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms “territorial” and “territories” shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement. ARTICLE VII The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air

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and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement. ARTICLE VIII This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE IX This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have

Document Analysis

Formally known as the Mutual Defense Treaty, this 1954 agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of China begins with a statement of the two parties’ “faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.” This acknowledgement of the ultimate “responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security” is made explicit later in the treaty, in Article 8. In order to “strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,” the ROC and the United States will join other nations in the area opposed to Communist expansion, establishing “collective defense . . . pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security.” This is clearly a message to the PRC in China, the “potential aggressor,” as the treaty later makes clear. The treaty also references the long relationship between China and the United States, deepened by their alliance against their common Japanese enemy during World War II. Because the United States considers the ROC in Taiwan to be the officially recognized government for all of China, the treaty commends their common fight against “imperialist aggression.” In Article 1, the treaty promises to attempt to settle any dispute through the United Nations, in accordance with international law. Article 2 lays out plainly why the Mutual Defense Treaty is necessary: the ROC needs

been exchanged by them at Taipei. ARTICLE X This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

to be able to defend itself against “armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without” against its “territorial integrity and political stability.” Under Article 5, if an armed attack were made in the region against the ROC or against one of the other territories under US protection, the United States and the ROC would work together to “meet the common danger.” Article 7 gives the United States the right to establish strategic military bases in Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. The treaty closes with the provision that it must be ratified in both countries and that it will “remain in force indefinitely,” although either government can cancel it with one year’s notice. Essential Themes

At the end of World War II, Korea had been split in two, with the Soviet Union overseeing the northern part of the country. By 1954, the division had been solidified by the Korean War, and a strong Communist nation had been established in the north. The PRC was willing to openly fight the United States in Korea, and other Asian nations that relied on the protection and influence of the United States, such as the Philippines and Japan, were under constant threat. The ROC in Taiwan provided the United States with an additional strategic ally in Asia and a tantalizing alternative government for mainland China. Though the United States did not offer the ROC support for an offensive invasion, it recognized the ROC as the official government of China and

Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty

promised to provide aid if it were attacked. The United States hoped to stop the spread of Communism in Asia by bolstering those nations whose governments opposed it, even when they were led by autocratic leaders like Chiang Kai-shek. Though the ROC in Taiwan was far from a bastion of freedom and democracy, it served the United States’ strategic interests to have it as an ally. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Lansford, Tom. The Lords of Foggy Bottom: American Secretaries of State and the World They Shaped. Baldwin Place, NY: Encyc. Soc., 2001. Print. Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A Political History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2003. Print. Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard UP, 2009. Print.

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 Baghdad Pact Date: February 25, 1955 Authors: Kingdom of Iraq; Republic of Turkey; United Kingdom; Dominion of Pakistan; Kingdom of Iran Genre: treaty Summary Overview

In the 1950s, United States foreign policy was concerned primarily with halting the spread of Communism throughout the world. Asia, Europe, and the Middle East all bordered the Soviet Union, and had great strategic importance for the United States, Great Britain, and their allies. The Middle East, in particular, with its vast oil reserves and its proximity to the Soviet Union, seemed ripe for a Communist incursion, and the maintenance of pro-Western governments was of great concern to the United States and Great Britain. In 1953, US secretary of state John Foster Dulles traveled to several Middle Eastern capitals, gathering support for a pro-Western defense alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This ultimately led to the formation of the Baghdad Pact, or Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), between Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and the United Kingdom. The United States did not ultimately sign the treaty, as it was reluctant to antagonize Egypt and wary of being perceived as anti-Israel, but remained involved in the organization. Though it was a milestone in the containment policies of the United States, the agreement proved to be short-lived and generally unsuccessful. After Iraq withdrew from the pact in 1959, the alliance changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), but when Iran withdrew in 1979 it dissolved completely. Defining Moment

The United States and the Soviet Union had clashed over control of the oil-rich land of the Middle East since the end of World War II. Initially allies, Russian, British, and American forces occupied Iran to keep its resources out of German hands. After the war, however, relations between the Soviet Union and its former allies were in precipitous decline, and the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its troops from the region. Under

increasing international pressure, they withdrew in March 1946, but their interest in the Middle East was clear. Later that month, Turkey and Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood, the first in a sequence of separate mutual assistance treaties signed over the following decade between Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States eventually signed separate agreements with all of the nations who would join the Baghdad Pact. In 1954 Pakistan and Turkey signed a security agreement, followed by Iraq and Turkey in February 1955. Yet both the United States and the United Kingdom wanted a broader regional mutual defense pact, along the lines of NATO or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Such alliances were key to the Western powers’ strategy of containment of Communism, which relied on pro-Western governments in nations surrounding the Soviet Union in order to block the spread of Soviet influence. Containment was the main policy of the United States during the Cold War, and would significantly shape international relations. The United States and Great Britain were hopeful that Jordan and Syria would also join a potential agreement, which would complete the regional barrier to Communist expansion in what became known as the Northern Tier area of the Middle East. Direct negotiation with Middle Eastern nations was tricky for the United States, however, as it enjoyed a special relationship with Israel, which was suspicious of Western treaties with nations antagonistic toward it. In addition, the pact faced strong opposition from Arabs in the anticolonialist movement, especially Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and his followers. Nasser saw the Baghdad Pact as a threat to his leadership in the Middle East and resented Western influence in the region. He denounced it in the press. Jordan and Syria, facing significant public pressure, did

Baghdad Pact

not join. The United Kingdom joined Iraq and Turkey’s earlier alliance in February 1955 along with Pakistan and Iran, forming the official Baghdad Pact, but the United States did not sign the agreement. Although not formally a member, the United States was intimately involved in the creation of the Baghdad Pact. It achieved a major strategic goal for the United States policy of containment, linking Turkey, the southernmost member of NATO, with the westernmost member of SEATO, Pakistan, to form a bloc along the southwestern border of the Soviet Union. Document Information

The Baghdad Pact, as a multinational treaty, had no single author, but was crafted through the work of the governments involved. It began in February 1955 as a cooperation agreement between Turkey and Iraq, de-

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signed to provide a framework for mutually opposing any aggression from foreign powers. The two allies then invited other nations to join; the United Kingdom did so in April 1955, followed by Pakistan in September and Iran in October. The place of signing—Iraq’s capital, Baghdad—lent the pact its name. Although the United States did not sign the Baghdad Pact, it was instrumental in forming the alliance. Most notably, US secretary of state John Foster Dulles, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, played a key role in shaping the agreement in accord with US goals in the region. British foreign secretary Anthony Eden was another important figure representing the Western powers in the development of the Baghdad Pact.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognised the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies; Whereas article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter; And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter; They have been fully convinced of the necessity of con-

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cluding a pact fulfilling these aims, and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:ARTICLE 1 Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other. ARTICLE 2 In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties. ARTICLE 3 The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other’s internal

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affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter. ARTICLE 4 The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact. ARTICLE 5 This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These a measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

Document Analysis

The Baghdad Pact begins by referencing the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood signed by Iraq and Turkey in 1946. It recognizes that the earlier treaty acknowledged that world peace was not possible without peace in the Middle East, and that “the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress.” It also mentions the signing nations’ submission to the authority of both the Arab League and the United Nations, and their adherence to international law, reinforcing the Baghdad Pact as one of many interrelated treaties and alliances created after World War II. Critically, the pact references the primary goal of “the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle

ARTICLE 6 A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact. The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure. ARTICLE 7 This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties. ARTICLE 8 This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail. DONE in duplicate at Bagdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of February 1955.

East region.” The pact’s eight articles outline the ways in which this goal is intended to be achieved. Signers will “cooperate for their security and defense,” and “refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other’s internal affairs.” It states that special agreements between individual members are allowed as long as they work toward cooperation. Likewise, the pact ensures that it does not interfere with any member’s agreements or alliances with other nations outside the pact. The governments of each participant are left responsible for enacting the treaty at the practical level—significantly, no mention is made of an overarching hierarchy of command or shared armed forces. This meant the pact did not provide an outright structure for mutual defense. The pact is left open to anyone who has an active

Baghdad Pact

interest in the security of the Middle East, particularly members of the Arab League. It further states that once four nations have ratified the pact, a permanent council will be set up to administer its application, though it leaves the procedure of the council open. For a longterm structure, the pact states that it can be renewed every five years after it comes into force. It also confirms the right of any member to withdraw, and that it will remain valid even after a member leaves the treaty. The treaty was ratified by all parties by October 1955. Essential Themes

The United States was pursuing a policy of containment in 1955, encouraging the formation of alliances to thwart the Soviet Union’s ability to expand and spread. The Middle East seemed particularly vulnerable, but was also a sensitive area for US foreign policy. The Baghdad Pact was designed, encouraged, and promoted by the United States, working closely with Great Britain, but in the end the United States was not a signatory. This absence points to the complex political climate in the region, with Arab nationalism, pro-Western dictatorships, Israeli territorial instability, and encroaching Communism all in the mix. After the pact went into effect, the United States continued to support the alliance, even joining as an associate member and serving on its military committee in an attempt to bolster its influence. However, the Baghdad Pact never proved effective in containing Communism or promoting peace in the Middle East. The seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956 by Egyptian

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forces under Nasser led to the decline of British influence in the region, and the Soviet Union successfully aligned itself with several Middle Eastern countries. Iraq withdrew from the pact in 1959 after its government was overthrown, and the other nations abandoned the Baghdad Pact title in favor of the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO. The headquarters of CENTO were moved to Ankara, Turkey, and the organization generally served as a vehicle for economic cooperation rather than a military alliance. Although Pakistan attempted to gain the support of other members during its 1965 war with India, no mutual defense was provided. CENTO officially disbanded in 1979 after the Iran withdrew following its revolution and Pakistan also left. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Ashton, Nigel John. “The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955–1958.” Review of International Studies 19.2 (1993): 123–37. Print. Lansford, Tom. The Lords of Foggy Bottom: American Secretaries of State and the World They Shaped. Baldwin Place: Encyclopedia Soc., 2001. Print. Sanjian, Ara. “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact.” Middle Eastern Studies 33.2 (1997): 226–66. Print. Yesilbursa, B. Kemal. The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950–1959. New York: Cass, 2005. Print.

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 President Sukarno’s Address at the Bandung Conference Date: April 18, 1955 Author: Sukarno Genre: speech Summary Overview

The Cold War was barely a decade old when a significant number of newly free and decolonizing African and Asian nations began to articulate a nonaligned position between the two superpower blocs. One of the key moments in this process was the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955. While some meetings in similar veins had occurred earlier, this conference was globally visible as a symbol of an alternative path forward in international relations for African and Asian nations that did not want to choose sides. Sukarno, Indonesia’s nationalist leader, gave this speech to open the conference and to welcome the representatives from dozens of non-Western free nations and colonies. While emphasizing the positive progress and contributions of Asian and African nations to international relations, Sukarno also warned of the threat of nuclear weapons and criticized any vestiges of colonialism remaining in the non-Western world. Defining Moment

Many historians identify the Bandung Conference as the official beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement, which began in opposition to the Cold War. By 1950 the division of Germany, which would last for the next four decades, was complete, and a hot war had begun between Communist and non-Communist forces in Korea. As new nations became independent, including India and Pakistan in 1947 and Indonesia in 1949, and others, such as Ghana (then the Gold Coast) in West Africa, were clearly on the path toward independence, the time seemed ripe for a meeting to discuss both the similarities between African and Asian nations and the options in international relations that they might pursue. In addition to promoting anticolonialism and nonalignment in the Cold War, the conference also opposed racism and emphasized the growing power and influence of nonwhite nations on the world stage. In fact,

the administration of US president Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted to influence the conference through the speeches of pro-Western delegations, largely due to a fear that Communist China would dominate the conference. In addition to fears of Cold War violence spreading into the non-Western world, the conference members shared the realization that their own differences, seen not least in the violence between Hindus and Muslims during the partition of Pakistan and India in 1947, could undermine their growing international strength. Thus, Sukarno and others stressed themes of unity, for the purposes of pursuing nonaligned foreign policies as well as promoting internal and regional peace and stability. As Sukarno noted at several points in his speech, the Bandung Conference was not the first meeting of African and Asian leaders, although at the time it was the largest and most globally visible to date, and many similar meetings would occur throughout the rest of the 1950s on a regional level. In Africa, two different organizations, the All-African Peoples’ Conference and the Solidarity Council of the Afro-Asian Countries (later the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation), would meet in various locations during the latter part of the decade to discuss similar themes of nonalignment and anticolonialism. Thus, the Bandung Conference represented both a culmination of the growing power of a nonaligned Third World and the beginning of more expansive, consistent attempts to maintain the momentum and progress of such international organizations in the service of developing nations’ unity and goals. Author Biography

Sukarno was a nationalist leader of Indonesia—formerly the Dutch East Indies, a Dutch colony since the early 1600s—and an important figure in the Non-Aligned Movement during the early Cold War. He declared Indonesia an independent nation in August 1945, just

President Sukarno’s Address at the Bandung Conference

after the end of World War II, leading to a four-year struggle during which Dutch forces attempted to retake the former colony. Following the Netherlands’ formal recognition of Indonesian independence in December 1949, Sukarno led Indonesia as president until 1966. When he seemed to become too friendly to Communist parties in his country, the Eisenhower administration attempted to foment armed opposition to his government on some of the smaller islands of Indonesia and

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provided support for some anti-Sukarno generals in the late 1950s. However, Sukarno retained power until the mid-1960s, when an alleged Communist coup attempt in 1965 led to a violent military clampdown and persecution of potential Communists under General Suharto. By 1966 Sukarno had essentially given up power to Suharto, who then led Indonesia until 1998. Sukarno died in 1970.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Sisters and Brothers. It is my great honour and privilege on this historic day to bid you welcome to Indonesia. On behalf of the people and government of Indonesia—your hosts—I beg your understanding and forebearance if some circumstances in our country do not meet your expectation. We have, I assure you, done our best to make your stay amongst us memorable for both our guests and your hosts. We hope that the warmth of our welcome will compensate for whatever material shortcomings there may be. As I survey this hall and the distinguished guests gathered here, my heart is filled with emotion. This is the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind! I am proud that my country is your host. I am happy that you were able to accept the invitations extended by the Five Sponsoring Countries. But also I cannot restrain feelings of sadness when I recall the tribulations through which many of our peoples have so recently passed, tribulations which have exacted a heavy toll in life, in material things, and in the things of the spirit. I recognise that we are gathered here today as a result of sacrifices. Sacrifices made by our forefathers and by the people of our own and younger generations. For me, this hall is filled not only by the leaders of the nations of Asia and Africa; it also contains within its walls the undying, the indomitable, the invincible spirit of those who went before us. Their struggle and sacrifice paved the way for this meeting of the highest representatives of independent and sovereign nations from two of the biggest continents of the globe. It is a new departure in the history of the world that

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leaders of Asian and African peoples can meet together in their own countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of common concern. Only a few decades ago it was frequently necessary to travel to other countries and even other continents before the spokesmen of our peoples could confer. I recall in this connection the Conference of the “League Against Imperialism and Colonialism” which was held in Brussels almost thirty years ago. At that Conference many distinguished Delegates who are present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence. But that was a meeting place thousands of miles away, amidst foreign people, in a foreign country, in a foreign continent. It was not assembled there by choice, but by necessity. Today the contrast is great. Our nations and countries are colonies no more. Now we are free, sovereign and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to go to other continents to confer. Already there have been important meetings of Asian States in Asia itself. If we look for the forerunner of this our great gathering, we must look to Colombo, capital of independent Cri Lanka, and to the Conference of the five Prime Ministers which was held there in 1954. And the Bogor Conference in December 1954 showed that the road ahead was clear for Asian-African solidarity, and the Conference to which I have the honour of welcoming you today is the realisation of that solidarity. Indeed, I am proud that my country is your host. But my thoughts are not wholly of the honour which is Indonesia’s today. No. My mind is for a part darkened

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by other considerations. You have not gathered together in a world of peace and unity and cooperation. Great chasms yawn between nations and groups of nations. Our unhappy world is torn and tortured, and the peoples of all countries walk in fear lest, through no fault of theirs, the dogs of war are unchained once again. And if in spite of all that the peoples may do, this should happen. what then? What of our newly-recovered independence then? What of our children and our parents? The burden of the delegates to this Conference is not a light one, for I know that these questions—which are questions of the life or death of humanity itself—must be on your minds, as they are on mine. And the nations of Asia and Africa cannot, even if they wish to, avoid their part in finding solutions to these problems. For that is part of the duties of independence itself. That is part of the price we gladly pay for our independence. For many generations our peoples have been the voiceless ones in the world. We have been the unregarded, the peoples for whom decisions were made by others whose interests were paramount, the peoples who lived in poverty and humiliation. Then our nations demanded, nay fought for independence, and achieved independence, and with that independence came responsibility. We have heavy responsibilities to ourselves, and to the world, and to the yet unborn generations. But we do not regret them. In 1945, the first year of our national revolution, we of Indonesia were confronted with the question of what we were going to do with our independence when it was finally attained and secured—we never questioned that it would be attained and secured. We knew how to oppose and destroy. Then we were suddenly confronted with the necessity of giving content and meaning to our independence. Not material content and meaning only, but also ethical and moral content, for independence without ethics and without morality would be indeed a poor imitation of what we sought. The responsibilities and burdens, the rights and duties and privileges of independence must be seen as part of the ethical and moral content of independence. Indeed, we welcome the change which places new burdens upon us, and we are all resolved to exert all our

strength and courage in carrying these burdens. Sisters and Brothers, how terrificly dynamic is our time! I recall that, several years ago, I had occasion to make a public analysis of colonialism, and that I then drew attention to what I called the “Life-line of Imperialism”. This line runs from the Straits of Gibraltar, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan. For most of that enormous distance, the territories on both sides of this life-line were colonies, the peoples were unfree, their futures mortgaged to an alien system. Along that lifeline, that main artery of imperialism, there was pumped the life-blood of colonialism. And today in this hall are gathered together the leaders of those same peoples. They are no longer the victims of colonialism. They are no longer the tools of others and the playthings of forces they cannot influence. Today, you are representatives of free peoples, peoples of a different stature and standing in the world. Yes, there has indeed been a “Sturm über Asien”—and over Africa too. The last few years have seen enormous changes. Nations, States, have awoken from a sleep of centuries. The passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquillity has made place for struggle and activity. Irresistible forces have swept the two continents. The mental, spiritual and political face of the whole world has been changed, and the process is still not complete. There are new conditions, new concepts, new problems, new ideals abroad in the world. Hurricanes of national awakening and reawakening have swept over the land, shaking it, changing it, changing it for the better. This twentieth century has been a period of terrific dynamism. Perhaps the last fifty years have seen more developments and more material progress than the previous five hundred years. Man has learned to control many of the scourges which once threatened him. He has learned to consume distance. He has learned to project his voice and his picture across oceans and continents. He has probed deep into the secrets of nature and learned how to make the desert bloom and the plants of the earth increase their bounty. He has learned how to release the immense forces locked in the smallest particles of matter. But has man’s political skill marched hand-in-hand with his technical and scientific skill? Man can chain

President Sukarno’s Address at the Bandung Conference

lightning to his command—can he control the society in which he lives? The answer is No! The political skill of man has been far outstripped by technical skill, and what he has made he cannot be sure of controlling. The result of this is fear. And man gasps for safety and morality. Perhaps now more than at any other moment in the history of the world, society, government and statesmanship need to be based upon the highest code of morality and ethics. And in political terms, what is the highest code of morality? It is the subordination of everything to the well-being of mankind. But today we are faced with a situation where the well-being of mankind is not always the primary consideration. Many who are in places of high power think, rather, of controlling the world. Yes, we are living in a world of fear. The life of man today is corroded and made bitter by fear. Fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies. Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself, because it is fear which drives men to act foolishly, to act thoughtlessly, to act dangerously. In your deliberations, Sisters and Brothers, I beg of you, do not be guided by these fears, because fear is an acid which etches man’s actions into curious patterns. Be guided by hopes and determination, be guided by ideals, and, yes, be guided by dreams! We are of many different nations, we are of many different social backgrounds and cultural patterns. Our ways of life are different. Our national characters, or colours or motifs--call it what you will—are different. Our racial stock is different, and even the colour of our skin is different. But what does that matter? Mankind is united or divided by considerations other than these. Conflict comes not from variety of skins, nor from variety of religion, but from variety of desires. All of us, I am certain, are united by more important things than those which superficially divide us. We are united, for instance, by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common detestation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world. Are not these aims mentioned in the letter of invitation to which you responded? I freely confess it—in these aims I am not disinterested or driven by purely impersonal motives.

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How is it possible to be disinterested about colonialism? For us, colonialism is not something far and distant. We have known it in all its ruthlessness. We have seen the immense human wastage it causes, the poverty it causes, and the heritage it leaves behind when, eventually and reluctantly, it is driven out by the inevitable march of history. My people, and the peoples of many nations of Asia and Africa know these things, for we have experienced them. Indeed, we cannot yet say that all parts of our countries are free already. Some parts still labour under the lash. And some parts of Asia and Africa which are not represented here still suffer from the same condition. Yes, some parts of our nations are not yet free. That is why all of us cannot yet feel that journey’s end has been reached. No people can feel themselves free, so long as part of their motherland is unfree. Like peace, freedom is indivisible. There is no such thing as being half free, as there is no such thing as being half alive. We are often told “Colonialism is dead.” Let us not be deceived or even soothed by that. I say to you, colonialism is not yet dead. How can we say it is dead, so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree. And, I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth. The battle against colonialism has been a long one, and do you know that today is a famous anniversary in that battle? On the eighteenth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and seventy five, just one hundred and eighty years ago, Paul Revere rode at midnight through the New England countryside, warning of the approach of British troops and of the opening of the American War of Independence, the first successful anti-colonial war in history. About this midnight ride the poet Longfellow wrote: A cry of defiance and not of fear, A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door,

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And a word that shall echo for evermore. Yes, it shall echo for evermore, just as the other anticolonial words which gave us comfort and reassurance during the darkest days of our struggle shall echo for evermore. But remember, that battle which began 180 years ago is not yet completely won, and it will not have been completely won until we can survey this our own world, and can say that colonialism is dead. So, I am not disinterested when I speak of the fight against colonialism. Nor am I disinterested when I speak of the battle for peace. How can any of us be disinterested about peace? Not so very long ago we argued that peace was necessary for us because an outbreak of fighting in our part of the world would imperil our precious independence, so recently won at such great cost. Today, the picture is more black. War would not only mean a threat to our independence, it may mean the end of civilisation and even of human life. There is a force loose in the world whose potentiality for evil no man truly knows. Even in practice and rehearsal for war the effects may well be building up into something of unknown horror. Not so long ago it was possible to take some little comfort from the idea that the clash, if it came, could perhaps be settled by what were called “conventional weapons”—bombs, tanks, cannon and men. Today that little grain of comfort is denied us for it has been made clear that the weapons of ultimate horror will certainly be used, and the military planning of nations is on that basis. The unconventional has become the conventional, and who knows what other examples of misguided and diabolical scientific skill have been discovered as a plague on humanity. And do not think that the oceans and the seas will protect us. The food that we eat, the water that we drink, yes, even the very air that we breathe can be contaminated by poisons originating from thousands of miles away. And it could be that, even if we ourselves escaped lightly, the unborn generations of our children would bear on their distorted bodies the marks of our failure to control the forces which have been released on the world. No task is more urgent than that of preserving peace. Without peace our independence means little. The reha-

bilitation and upbuilding of our countries will have little meaning. Our revolutions will not be allowed to run their course. What can we do? The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power. Even their economic strength is dispersed and slight. We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy for us is not a matter of the big stick. Our statesmen, by and large, are not backed up with serried ranks of jet bombers. What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on to the side of peace. In this struggle, some success has already been scored. I think it is generally recognised that the activity of the Prime Ministers of the Sponsoring Countries which invited you here had a not unimportant role to play in ending the fighting in Indo-China. Look, the peoples of Asia raised their voices, and the world listened. It was no small victory and no negligible precedent! The five Prime Ministers did not make threats. They issued no ultimatum, they mobilised no troops. Instead they consulted together, discussed the issues, pooled their ideas, added together their individual political skills and came forward with sound and reasoned suggestions which formed the basis for a settlement of the long struggle in Indo-China. I have often since then asked myself why these five were successful when others, with long records of diplomacy, were unsuccessful, and, in fact, had allowed a bad situation to get worse, so that there was a danger of the conflict spreading. Was it because they were Asians? Maybe that is part of the answer, for the conflagration was on their doorstep, and any extension of it would have presented an immediate threat to their own houses. But I think that the answer really lies in the fact that those five Prime Ministers brought a fresh approach to bear

President Sukarno’s Address at the Bandung Conference

on the problem. They were not seeking advantage for their own countries. They had no axe of power-politics to grind. They had but one interest--how to end the fighting in such a way that the chances of continuing peace and stability were enhanced. That, my Sisters and Brothers, was an historic occasion. Some countries of free Asia spoke, and the world listened. They spoke on a subject of immediate concern to Asia, and in doing so made it quite clear that the affairs of Asia are the concern of the Asian peoples themselves. The days are now long past when the future of Asia can be settled by other and distant peoples. However, we cannot, we dare not, confine our interests to the affairs of our own continents. The States of the world today depend one upon the other and no nation can be an island into itself. Splendid isolation may once have been possible; it is so no longer. The affairs of all the world are our affairs, and our future depends upon the solutions found to all international problems, however far or distant they may seem. As I survey this hall, my thoughts go back to another Conference of Asian peoples. In the beginning of 1949—historically speaking only a moment ago—my country was for the second time since our Proclamation of Independence engaged in a life and death struggle. Our nation was besieged and beleaguered, much of our territory occupied, a great part of our leaders imprisoned or exiled, our existence as a State threatened. Issues were being decided, not in the conference chamber, but on the battlefield. Our envoys then were rifles, and cannon, and bombs, and grenades, and bamboo spears. We were blockaded, physically and intellectually. It was at that sad but glorious moment in our national history that our good neighbour India convened a Conference of Asian and African Nations in New Delhi, to protest against the injustice committed against Indonesia and to give support to our struggle. The intellectual blockade was broken! Our Delegates flew to New Delhi and learned at first hand of the massive support. which was being given to our struggle for national existence. Never before in the history of mankind has such a solidarity of Asian and African peoples been shown for the rescue of a fellow Asian Nation in danger. The diplomats and statesmen, the Press and the common men of our

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Asian and African neighbours were all supporting us. We were given fresh courage to press our struggle onwards to its final successful conclusion. We again realised to the full the truth of Desmoulin’s statement : “Have no doubt of the omnipotence of a free people”. Perhaps in some ways the Conference which has assembled here today has some roots in that manifestation of Asian-African solidarity six years ago. However that may be, the fact remains that every one of you bears a heavy responsibility, and I pray to God that the responsibility will be discharged with courage and wisdom. I pray to God that this Asian-African. Conference succeeds in doing its job. Ah, Sisters and Brothers, let this Conference be a great success! In spite of diversity that exists among its participants,—let this Conference be a great success! Yes, there is diversity among us. Who denies it? Small and great nations are represented here, with people professing almost every religion under the sun,--Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroasthrianism, Shintoism, and others. Almost every political faith we encounter here—Democracy, Monarchism, Theocracy, with innumerable variants. And practically every economic doctrine has its representative in this hall—Marhaenism, Socialism, Capitalism, Communism, in all their manifold variations and combinations. But what harm is in diversity, when there is unity in desire? This Conference is not to oppose each other, it is a conference of brotherhood. It is not an Islam Conference, nor a Christian Conference, nor a Buddhist Conference. It is not a meeting of Malayans, nor one of Arabs, nor one of Indo-Aryan stock. It is not an exclusive club either, not a bloc which seeks to oppose any other bloc. Rather it is a body of enlightened, tolerant opinion which seeks to impress on the world that all men and all countries have their place under the sun—to impress on the world that it is possible to live together, meet together, speak to each other, without losing one’s individual identity; and yet to contribute to the general understanding of matters of common concern, and to develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their well-being and survival on earth. I know that in Asia and Africa there is greater diversity

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of religions, faiths, and beliefs, than in the other continents of the world. But that is only natural! Asia and Africa are the classic birthplaces of faiths and ideas, which have spread all over the world. Therefore, it behoves us to take particular care to ensure that the principle which is usually called the “Live and let live” principle—mark, I do not say the principle of “Laissez faire, laissez passer” of Liberalism which is obsolete—is first of all applied by us most completely within our own Asian and African frontiers. Then only can it be fully extended to our relations with our neighbouring countries, and to others more distant. Religion is of dominating importance particularly in this part of the world. There are perhaps more religions here than in other regions of this globe. But, again, our countries were the birthplaces of religions. Must we be divided by the multiformity of our religious life? It is true, each religion has its own history, its own individuality, its own “raison d’être,” its special pride in its own beliefs, its own mission, its special truths which it desires to propagate. But unless we realise that all great religions are one in their message of tolerance and in their insistence on the observance of the principle of “Live and let live,” unless the followers of each religion are prepared to give the same consideration to the rights of others everywhere, unless every State does its duty to ensure that the same rights are given to the followers of all faiths-unless these things are done, religion is debased, and its true purpose perverted. Unless Asian-African countries realise their responsibilities in this matter and take steps jointly to fulfil them, the very strength of religious beliefs, which should be a source of unity and a bulwark against foreign interference, will cause its disruption, and may result in destroying the hardwon freedom which large parts of Asia and Africa have achieved by acting together. Sisters and Brothers, Indonesia is Asia-Africa in small. It is a country with many religions and many faiths. We have in Indonesia Moslims, we have Christians, we have Civa-Buddhists, we have peoples with other creeds. Moreover, we have many ethnic units, such as Achenese, Bataks, Central-Sumatrans, Sundanese, Central-Javanese, Madurese, Toradjas, Balinese, etc. But thank God, we have our will to unity. We have our Pancha Sila. We practise the “Live and let live” principle, we are tolerant to each other. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—Unity in Diver-

sity – is the motto of the Indonesian State. We are one nation. So, let this Asian-African Conference be a great success! Make the “Live and let live” principle and the “Unity in Diversity motto the unifying force which brings us all together—to seek in friendly, uninhibited discussion, ways and means by which each of us can live his own life, and let others live their own lives, in their own way, in harmony, and in peace. If we succeed in doing so, the effect of it for the freedom independence and the welfare of man will be great on the world at large. The Light of Understanding has again been lit, the Pillar of Cooperation again erected. The likelihood of success of this Conference is proved already by the very presence of you all here today. It is for us to give it strength, to give it the power, of inspiration-to spread its message all over the World. Failure will mean that the Light of Understanding which seemed to have dawned in the East—the Light towards which looked all the great religions born here in the past—has again been obscured by an unfriendly cloud before man could benefit from its warm radiance. But let us be full of hope and full of confidence. We have so much in common. Relatively speaking, all of us gathered here today are neighbours. Almost all of us have ties of common experience, the experience of colonialism. Many of us have a common religion. Many of us have common cultural roots. Many of us, the so-called “under developed” nations, have more or less similar economic problem so that each can profit from the others’ experience and help. And I think I may say that we all hold dear the ideals of national independence and freedom. Yes, we have so much in common. And yet we know so little of each other. If this Conference succeeds in making the peoples of the East whose representatives are gathered here understand each other a little more, appreciate each other a little more, sympathise with each other’s problems a little more—if those things happen, then this Conference, of course, will have been worthwhile, whatever else is may achieve. But I hope that this Conference will give more than understanding only and goodwill only—I hope that it will falsify and give the lie to the saying of one diplomat from far abroad: “We will turn this Asian-African

President Sukarno’s Address at the Bandung Conference

Conference into an afternoon-tea meeting”. I hope that it will give evidence of the fact that we Asian and African leaders understand that Asia and Africa can prosper only when they are united, and that even the safety of the World at large cannot be safeguarded without a united Asia-Africa. I hope that this Conference will give guidance to mankind, will point out to mankind the way which it must take to attain safety and peace. I hope that it will give evidence that Asia and Africa have been reborn, nay, that New Asia and a New Africa have been born! Our task is first to seek an understanding of each other, and out of that understanding will come a greater appreciation of each other, and out of that appreciation will come collective action. Bear in mind the words of one of Asia’s greatest sons: “To speak is easy. To act is hard. To understand is hardest. Once one understands, action is easy.” I have come to the end. Under God, may your deliberations be fruitful, and may your wisdom strike sparks of light from the hard flints of today’s circumstances. Let us not be bitter about the past, but let us keep our eyes firmly on the future. Let us remember that no bless-

Document Analysis

One way Sukarno emphasizes the growing power and importance of African and Asian nations throughout his speech is by using language that portrays movement and energy. He speaks of multiple nations actively throwing off the yoke of colonialism, claiming, “Nations, states, have awoken from a sleep of centuries. The passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquility has made place for struggle and activity.” Likewise, he highlights the new activity of African and Asian nations as they begin to participate as equals on the international stage, claiming that, despite a relative lack of economic and military power compared to Western nations, they “can inject the voice of reason into world affairs.” Overall, his language implies that these nations are making internal progress and are themselves becoming engines of progress in international relations. By employing this type of language, Sukarno implicitly undermines much of the past language of colonial occupiers who long claimed that African and Asian nations had stopped developing and progressing forward in history and that Western

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ing of God is so sweet as life and liberty. Let us remember that the stature of all mankind is diminished so long as nations or parts of nations are still unfree. Let us remember that the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of human degradation, his bonds of poverty—the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for too long stunted the development of humanity’s majority. And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united. As President of the Republic of Indonesia, and on behalf of the eighty million people of Indonesia, I bid you welcome to this country. I declare the Asian-African Conference opened, and I pray that the Blessing of God will be upon it, and that its discussions will be profitable to the peoples of Asia and Africa, and to the peoples of all nations! Bismillah! God speed!

nations were needed to help them along this path. To this claim, Sukarno replies that these nations will now advance on their own, through their own strength, and will even contribute positively to an international arena still dominated by Western and European powers. A central contribution to the conversation of international relations, for Sukarno, is an emphasis on peace and a warning against the potential destruction that could be wrought by atomic weapons. By the mid1950s, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed hydrogen bombs, which were magnitudes of power greater than the nuclear bombs used on Japan in 1945. At multiple points, Sukarno warns of destruction due to the military arsenals of Cold War enemies. Speaking of “a world of fear. . . . fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies,” as well as the potential “end of civilization and even of human life,” he consistently portrays the very real threat that Cold War conflict poses to the nations of Africa and Asia, even if they are not aligned with one side or the other. His strident message is that simply avoid-

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ing or ignoring the Cold War is, unfortunately, not an option for nonaligned nations. They have to insist on a more peaceful, stable, and hopeful future. The nations of Africa and Asia, for Sukarno, have key roles to play on the world stage by countering Western and European notions that an ideological conflict to the death is the only path forward and by insisting that non-Western nations have much to contribute to the progress of humanity in international relations. Essential Themes

As Sukarno’s speech notes multiple times, the nations meeting in Indonesia represented an enormously diverse collection of religions, ethnicities, and political viewpoints. Still, Sukarno emphasized the need for unity, toleration, and mutual understanding. His key slogan, and that of Indonesia at the time, was, “Unity in diversity.” He claimed that unity existed already in reality, due in part due to the common experience of these nations under Western colonialism and in part to “more or less similar economic problems,” and especially due to the ability of the African and Asian nations to help the world “develop a true consciousness of the interdependence of men and nations for their wellbeing and survival on Earth.” Sukarno believed that the nonaligned world would show the capitalist and Communist blocs, then poised to destroy both each other and the planet, the value of unity through their actions, their past, and even simply their existence. Despite such positive language, Sukarno reserved some of his harshest words for, in addition to nuclear bombs, colonialism and anything that smacked of it. He railed against lingering colonialism, which still stood astride most of Africa in 1955, as well as Malaysia and other places in Asia. In addition to formal colonialism, he condemned colonialism “in its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation.” The latter description referred to African colonies such as South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Kenya, and Algeria where populations of white European settlers either wielded full control or

worked closely with the ruling European governments. Sukarno’s warnings of economic control reflected a common concern among non-Western leaders at the time—especially Kwame Nkrumah, then prime minister of the Gold Coast, soon to be prime minister and then president of the independent nation of Ghana— that Western economic neocolonialism would continue to constrict and influence the political, economic, and foreign policy options of newly independent African and Asian states. If strong economic ties to former colonizers remained in place through formal loans by Western governments or heavy amounts of investment by Western companies, new leaders could not exercise full independence. As much as Sukarno strove for unity among diverse African and Asian nations, he also exhorted them to maintain vigilance and root out any vestiges of colonialism still present. —Kevin E. Grimm, PhD

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Hanna, Willard A. “Sukarno: President of Indonesia.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 22 Apr. 2015. Web. 18 Nov. 2015. Lawrence, Mark Atwood. “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment.” The Cold War in the Third World. Ed. Robert J. McMahon. New York: Oxford UP, 2013. 139–55. Print. McMahon, Robert J. “‘The Point of No Return’: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953– 1960.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Ed. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns. Lanham: Rowman, 2006. 75–100. Print. Parker, Jason C. “Small Victory, Missed Chance: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Turning of the Cold War.” The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Ed. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns. Lanham: Rowman, 2006. 153–74. Print.

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 Warsaw Pact Date: May 14, 1955 Genre: treaty Summary Overview

On May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union and seven of its European allies and satellite states signed a mutual defense agreement, known as the Warsaw Pact, which was spurred by their opposition to West Germany’s entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on May 9, 1955. The Soviet Union saw the remilitarization of West Germany as a direct threat, not only itself, but also to neighboring countries under Soviet control, particularly Communist East Germany (the German Democratic Republic). The pact included the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Romania, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, and its members pledged to come to the aid of any other members if attacked by an outside force. In order to maximize the countries’ military capabilities, a unified military command was established with Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union used the Warsaw Pact to consolidate its control over satellite states in Eastern Europe, and this had long-term implications for all of Europe, which had become firmly divided into two opposing blocs. Defining Moment

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies, albeit uneasy ones, during World War II, and the Soviet Union played a decisive role in Germany’s defeat in 1945. The United States and the Soviet Union invaded Germany from different sides and met in Berlin to great fanfare. Postwar relations between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies deteriorated rapidly, however, and war nearly broke out again when Stalin blocked access to West Berlin, which was embedded within Soviet-occupied East Germany. The Berlin Airlift brought supplies to West Berlin for eleven months, and the Soviet Union turned its attention to developing and testing its first atomic bomb. On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon for the first time. This helped usher in the Cold War— an era of intense military and political tension in which the United States and the Soviet Union struggled for

military supremacy and international influence, though without ever actually unleashing nuclear war. The Soviet Union occupied vast territory in Eastern Europe after World War II, setting up Communist governments that were firmly under Soviet control. These nations formed an ideological, political, and economic bloc. Eager to check the spread of Communism throughout Europe, the United States implemented the Marshall Plan in 1948, which provided significant economic aid to non-Communist nations. As tensions with the Soviet Union continued to mount, the United States and eleven other nations formed a mutual defense organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. This agreement formally pledged US military aid to its allies in Europe, and further strained relations with the Soviet Union. By 1955, Germany had been a divided nation for a decade. In 1949, the zone of occupation in western Germany held by the United States, France, and Britain became the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The zone held by the Soviet Union in eastern Germany became the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Six years later, on May 5, 1955, the US ended its military occupation of West Germany, paving the way for West Germany to remilitarize and join NATO, which it did on May 9. The Soviet Union was not the only European nation that was apprehensive about allowing Germany to be a military power again, but the United States believed that a strongly defended West Germany was key to halting the spread of Communism in Europe, and it convinced its European allies in NATO to allow West Germany to rearm under close international scrutiny. The Soviet Union argued that in the wake of the terrible damage done by Germany in both world wars, such a move would force them to increase their military capabilities, particularly since East Germany, now controlled closely by the Soviet Union, was under direct threat from its neighbor. The Warsaw Pact was a mutual defense agreement, promising military aid if any of the signatories were attacked. It was a

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direct response to West Germany’s inclusion in NATO and was signed five days later. Document Information

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, known as the Warsaw Pact, was signed on May 14, 1955, after three days of discussion. Delegates from across Communist Europe, with an observer from China, gathered at the presidential palace in Warsaw, Poland. The Soviet premier, Nikolai Bulganin, and

foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov led the Soviet delegation, along with Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev. The leaders of states within the Soviet Union such as Ukraine and Latvia were also present. The prime minister and defense ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania all signed the agreement. After all of these nations had ratified the pact, it went into force on June 6, 1955.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Contracting Parties, reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political systems, which would make it possible to unite their efforts in safeguarding the peace of Europe; mindful, at the same time, of the situation created in Europe by the ratification of the Paris agreements, which envisage the formation of a new military alignment in the shape of “Western European Union,” with the participation of a remilitarized Western Germany and the integration of the latter in the North-Atlantic bloc, which increased the danger of another war and constitutes a threat to the national security of the peaceable states; being persuaded that in these circumstances the peaceable European states must take the necessary measures to safeguard their security and in the interests of preserving peace in Europe; guided by the objects and principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization; being desirous of further promoting and developing friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of noninterference in their internal affairs, have decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and have for that purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries: who, having presented their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle their international disputes peacefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize international peace and security. Article 2 The Contracting Parties declare their readiness to participate in a spirit of sincere cooperation in all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security, and will fully devote their energies to the attainment of this end. The Contracting Parties will furthermore strive for the adoption, in agreement with other states which may desire to cooperate in this, of effective measures for universal reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. Article 3 The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security. They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security.

Warsaw Pact

Article 4 In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and security. Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be reported to the Security Council in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization. These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain international peace and security. Article 5 The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall function on the basis of jointly established principles. They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and provide defence against possible aggression. Article 6 For the purpose of the consultations among the Parties envisaged in the present Treaty, and also for the purpose of examining questions which may arise in the operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty shall be represented by a member of its Government or by another specifically appointed representative. The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as may prove necessary. Article 7 The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in

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any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the present Treaty. The Contracting Parties declare that their commitments under existing international treaties do not conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty. Article 8 The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view to further developing and fostering economic and cultural intercourse with one another, each adhering to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs. Article 9 The present Treaty is open to the accession of other states, irrespective of their social and political systems, which express their readiness by participation in the present Treaty to assist in uniting the efforts of the peaceable states in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the declaration of accession has been deposited with the Government of the Polish People’s Republic. Article 10 The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Polish People’s Republic. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The Government of the Polish People’s Republic shall notify the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of ratification is deposited. Article 11 The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least one year before the expiration of this period present to the Government of the Polish People’s Republic a statement of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the next ten years. Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the

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Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European Treaty enters into force. .. Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages,

Document Analysis

The Warsaw Pact begins with a statement that leaves no doubt about its origins. The signers of the pact are concerned about a remilitarized West Germany, particularly in light of its membership in NATO. The socalled peaceable states outside of the “North Atlantic bloc” need to protect themselves, since the arming of West Germany “increased the danger of another war and constitutes a threat.” The introduction also makes it clear that this is to be a lawful treaty, conforming to the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, the language of the Warsaw Pact is similar to that of the NATO charter, making it more difficult for NATO members to object to. The agreement also spells out the willingness of the members to participate in “all international actions designed to safeguard international peace and security,” which also includes the reduction or prohibition of nuclear weapons. This article is particularly galling for Western European nations, who were trying without success to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union to control nuclear weapons through the United Nations Security Council. The central articles in this agreement address defense and military coordination. Member nations agree to consult with each other in case of any threat of attack. In order to meet such an attack, the member nations will “come to the assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force.” The member nations agree to have the United Nations Security Council be the ultimate arbiter in case of a conflict, but member states would have the right to act in their mutual defense in the meantime. Article 5 sets up a centralized “Joint Command of the armed forces,” which is to be implemented in accordance with “jointly established principles,” ostensibly making it easier to respond quickly to an outside attack. There is a corresponding Political Consultative Committee to streamline communication between members, who also pledge not to enter into any treaties

all texts being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish People’s Republic to all the Parties to the Treaty. In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and affixed their seals.

that would conflict with the pact. Other states are also invited to join the pact, which will be in force for twenty years, unless a “General European Treaty of Collective Security” is put into place. This is a reference to NATO, which constituted the first exclusionary mutual defense agreement. The Soviet Union argues that it is forced to do the same. Essential Themes

The immediate impact of the Warsaw Pact was to align all major European powers into one of the two rival organizations. This division codified and formalized the deep divide between Communist nations and those allied with the United States, and this division was the backdrop for all of the conflicts of the Cold War. Though the Warsaw Pact employed language similar to the NATO charter, the key article set up a centralized joint command. There was little doubt that this would be a way for the Soviet Union to consolidate and expand its control over the military in other Communist nations in Eastern Europe and to discourage dissent. The Soviet Union used Warsaw Pact forces to suppress revolts in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Warsaw Pact continued until 1991, when the alliance was dissolved following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Clawson, Robert W. The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means. Wilmington: Scholarly, 1982. Print. Harper, John Lamberton. The Cold War. New York: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. Jones, Christopher D. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact. Brooklyn: Praeger, 1981. Print. “The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955.” Office of the Historian. US Dept. of State, n.d. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

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 Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences Date: February 25, 1956 Author: Nikita Khrushchev Genre: speech Summary Overview

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave the so-called Secret Speech on February 25, 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It had been nearly two years since the death of Joseph Stalin, who had led the Soviet Union for three decades, starting in 1924. Since Stalin’s death, Soviet leaders had struggled with the legacy of his brutal regime, while jockeying for position in Moscow. Stalin was known for his widespread purges of political allies and opponents alike, and under his leadership, eight to ten million Soviet citizens died or were sent to forced labor camps. Khrushchev, who had been part of Stalin’s inner circle, shared the blame for all the Stalinist executions and imprisonments, but he blamed these crimes on Stalin’s absolute power and the belief Stalin had cultivated in his own infallibility, his “cult of personality.” Khrushchev condemned Stalin harshly in his speech, arguing that the Soviet Union needed to return to an idealized Leninist version of Communism where the party was more important than any one person. Though the full text of the speech was not released publicly in the Soviet Union until 1989, unofficial versions of it were widely circulated and helped to usher in a period of relative liberalization and reform in the Soviet Union. Defining Moment

Nikita Khrushchev was an early follower of Joseph Stalin, first coming to his attention in the late 1920s when Khrushchev was a regional party leader in Ukraine. Khrushchev then moved to Moscow and rose to prominence in city government, eventually becoming a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and a trusted advisor to Stalin. Stalin rose to power in the Soviet Union following the death of Lenin in 1924. By 1929, he was the undisputed totalitarian leader, and began a regime char-

acterized by enforced collectivization and modernization, mass political imprisonment and executions, and increasing paranoia. Though Stalin and Nazi leader Adolf Hitler had a mutual nonaggression pact at the beginning of World War II, Hitler invaded suddenly in June 1941, and the Soviet Union fought for its life. Stalin allied with US president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill in the last years of the war, and the Soviet Union played a decisive role in Germany’s defeat. On August 29, 1949, the first successful test was made by the Soviet Union of a nuclear weapon. This helped usher in the Cold War, an era of intense military and political tension, as the United States and the Soviet Union struggled for military supremacy and international influence. Stalin became even more ruthless and paranoid in the last years of his life, purging his military and political leadership and finding enemies everywhere. Following his death on March 5, 1953, a power struggle ensued among top party officials. Within a few months Khrushchev engineered the arrest and execution of his main rival, Lavrenty Beria, head of the Soviet secret police. He gained increasing support among the party leadership, ousting Stalin’s chosen successor, Georgy Malenkov. He was elected first secretary of the Central Committee in September 1953 and placed his allies in key leadership positions. Author Biography

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was born on April 17, 1894, in Kalinovka, Russia. He was the son of a miner and laborer, and after a rudimentary rural education, he moved with his family to Ukraine (then part of the Russian Empire) and became a pipe fitter. In 1918, he became a member of the Bolsheviks, who had led the Russian Revolution and became the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev rose through the

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Communist Party in the 1920s. In 1934, he became the Communist Party leader for Moscow and a member of the party’s Central Committee, and participated in Stalin’s Great Purge, which sent millions of people to their deaths or into forced labor camps. Khrushchev was made a full member of the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee in 1939, but returned to Ukraine during World War II and was a military leader during the German invasion of 1941. In 1949, Khrush-

chev returned to Moscow and to a privileged position as one of Stalin’s chief advisors. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev won the ensuing power struggle, and for the next decade pursued comparatively liberal domestic policies while facing down the United States in some of the tensest years of the Cold War. Khrushchev was forced to retire on October 14, 1964, and died of a heart attack on September 11, 1971, in Moscow.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Comrades! In the party central committee’s report at the 20th Congress and in a number of speeches by delegates to the congress, as also formerly during plenary CC/CPSU [central committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union] sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences. After Stalin’s death, the central committee began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour. Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years. The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin’s life and activity. Concerning Stalin’s merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. Stalin’s role of Stalin in the preparation and execution of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, and in the fight for the construction of socialism in our country, is universally known. Everyone knows it well. At present, we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now and for the future—with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.

Because not all as yet realise fully the practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual, the great harm caused by violation of the principle of collective party direction and by the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person, the central committee considers it absolutely necessary to make material pertaining to this matter available to the 20th congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union. Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual. In a letter to the German political worker Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: “From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the [1st] international the numerous addresses from various countries which recognised my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of communists on the condition that everything making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. Lassalle subsequently did quite the opposite.” Sometime later Engels wrote: “Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose. We most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally.” The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing and organisational roles of the party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the central com-

Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences

mittee. Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the working class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement. While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders and organisers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatised every manifestation of the cult of the individual, inexorably combated [any] foreign-to-Marxism views about a “hero” and a “crowd,” and countered all efforts to oppose a “hero” to the masses and to the people. Lenin taught that the party’s strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party follows the people - workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. Lenin said: “Only he who believes in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the living creativeness of the people, will win and retain power.” Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik Communist party as the leader and teacher of the people. He called for the presentation of all the most important questions before the opinion of knowledgeable workers, before the opinion of their party. He said: “We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch.” Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at belittling or weakening the directing role of the party in the structure of the Soviet state. He worked out Bolshevik principles of party direction and norms of party life, stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its collegiality. Already during the pre-Revolutionary years, Lenin called the central committee a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of party principles. “During the period between congresses,” Lenin pointed out, “the central committee guards and interprets the principles of the party.” Underlining the role of the central committee and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: “Our central committee constituted itself as a closely centralised and highly authoritative group.” During Lenin’s life the central committee was a real expression of collective leadership: of the party and of the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always unyielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed his views upon his coworkers by force. He tried to convince. He patiently explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently

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saw to it that the norms of party life were realised, that party statutes were enforced, that party congresses and plenary sessions of the central committee took place at their proper intervals. In addition to VI Lenin’s great accomplishments for the victory of the working class and of the working peasants, for the victory of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientific communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself also in this. [Lenin] detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, VI Lenin made a completely correct characterisation of Stalin. He pointed out that it was necessary to consider transferring Stalin from the position of general secretary because Stalin was excessively rude, did not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, and was capricious and abused his power. In December 1922, in a letter to the party congress, Vladimir Ilyich wrote: “After taking over the position of general secretary, comrade Stalin accumulated immeasurable power in his hands and I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care.” This letter—a political document of tremendous importance, known in the party’s history as Lenin’s “Testament”—was distributed among delegates to this 20th Party Congress. You have read it and will undoubtedly read it again more than once. You might reflect on Lenin’s plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir Ilyich’s anxiety concerning the party, the people, the state, and the future direction of party policy. Vladimir Ilyich said: “Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of general secretary. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc.” This document of Lenin’s was made known to the delegates at the 13th party congress, who discussed

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the question of transferring Stalin from the position of general secretary. The delegates declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed Vladimir Ilyich’s critical remarks and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety. Comrades! The party congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm Stalin’s character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his “Testament”. These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya to [Lev] Kamenev, who was at that time head of the politburo, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin. I will now read these documents:

To comrade Stalin (copies for: Kamenev and Zinoviev): Dear comrade Stalin! You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me. I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologising, or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us. Sincerely: Lenin, March 5, 1923

Lev Borisovich Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the party. During all these 30 years I have never heard one word of rudeness from any comrade. The party’s and Ilyich’s business is no less dear to me than to Stalin. I need maximum self-control right now. What one can and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich I know better than any doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and what does not. In any case I know [it] better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory [Zinoviev] as much closer comrades of V[ladimir] I[lyich]. I beg you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile invectives and threats. I have no doubt what the control commission’s unanimous decision [in this matter], with which Stalin sees fit to threaten me, will be. However I have neither strength nor time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a human being and my nerves are strained to the utmost.” N. Krupskaya Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on December 23, 1922. After two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:

(Commotion in the hall.) Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin’s life, could thus behave toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya - whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of the party since its creation - we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character. As later events have proven, Lenin’s anxiety was justified. In the first period after Lenin’s death, Stalin still paid attention to his advice, but later he began to disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich. When we analyse the practice of Stalin in regard to the direction of the party and of the country, when we pause to consider everything which Stalin perpetrated, we must be convinced that Lenin’s fears were justified. The negative characteristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin’s time, were only incipient, transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party. We have to consider seriously and analyse correctly this matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership and in work, and who prac-

Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences

ticed brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts. Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed these concepts or tried to prove his [own] viewpoint and the correctness of his [own] position was doomed to removal from the leadership collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was especially true during the period following the 17th party congress, when many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism, fell victim to Stalin’s despotism. We must affirm that the party fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully, as a result of which the party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role. The party led a great political-ideological struggle against those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who represented a political line hostile to the party and to the cause of socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the restoration of capitalism and toward capitulation to the world bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us, or orientation toward “cotton-dress industrialisation,” or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry; we would not have the kolkhozes; we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist encirclement. It was for this reason that the party led an inexorable ideological fight, explaining to all [its] members and to the non-party masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportunists. And this great work of explaining the party line bore fruit. Both the Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically isolated. An overwhelming party majority supported the Leninist line, and

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the party was able to awaken and organise the working masses to apply the Leninist line and to build socialism. A fact worth noting is that extreme repressive measures were not used against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites, and others during the course of the furious ideological fight against them. The fight [in the 1920s] was on ideological grounds. But some years later, when socialism in our country was fundamentally constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when Soviet social structure had radically changed, when the social basis for political movements and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted, when the ideological opponents of the party were long since defeated politically—then repression directed against them began. It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression through the government apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism—Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by the party —and subsequently also against many honest communists, against those party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the civil war and the first and most difficult years of industrialisation and collectivisation, who had fought actively against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist party line. Stalin originated the concept “enemy of the people.” This term automatically made it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven. It made possible the use of the cruelest repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputations. The concept “enemy of the people” actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one’s views known on this or that issue, even [issues] of a practical nature. On the whole, the only proof of guilt actually used, against all norms of current legal science, was the “confession” of the accused himself. As subsequent probing has proven, “confessions” were acquired through physical pressures against the accused. This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely innocent individuals—[persons] who in the past had defended the party line—became victims. We must assert that, in regard to those persons who

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in their time had opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula “enemy of the people” was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals. It is a fact that many persons who were later annihilated as enemies of the party and people had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of these persons had made errors during Lenin’s life, but, despite this, Lenin benefited by their work; he corrected them and he did everything possible to retain them in the ranks of the party; he induced them to follow him. In this connection the delegates to the party congress should familiarise themselves with an unpublished note by VI Lenin directed to the central committee’s politburo in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the [party] control commission, Lenin wrote that the commission should be transformed into a real “organ of party and proletarian conscience. “As a special duty of the control commission there is recommended a deep, individualised relationship with, and sometimes even a type of therapy for, the representatives of the so-called opposition - those who have experienced a psychological crisis because of failure in their Soviet or party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way used among comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be formulated by the central committee’s organisational bureau, etc.” Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, in his practice of directing the party demanded the most intimate party contact with people who had shown indecision or temporary non-conformity with the party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the application of extreme methods. Lenin’s wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres. An entirely different relationship with people characterised Stalin. Lenin’s traits—patient work with people,

stubborn and painstaking education of them, the ability to induce people to follow him without using compulsion, but rather through the ideological influence on them of the whole collective—were entirely foreign to Stalin. He discarded the Leninist method of convincing and educating, he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws. Arbitrary behaviour by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation. This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the party ranks and of all strata of working people, but, on the contrary, brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin. Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin’s plans for the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this fight, had the party’s devotion to principles been skillfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side, we certainly would not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen victim to the method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system. Let us recall some historical facts. In the days before the October revolution, two members of the central committee of the Bolshevik party— Kamenev and Zinoviev—declared themselves against Lenin’s plan for an armed uprising. In addition, on October 18 they published in the Menshevik newspaper, Novaya Zhizn, a statement declaring that the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and that they considered it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed to the enemy the decision of the central committee to stage the uprising, and that the uprising had

Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences

been organised to take place within the very near future. This was treason against the party and against the Revolution. In this connection, VI Lenin wrote: “Kamenev and Zinoviev revealed the decision of the central committee of their party on the armed uprising to [Mikhail] Rodzyanko and [Alexander] Kerensky... He put before the central committee the question of Zinoviev’s and Kamenev’s expulsion from the party.” However, after the great socialist October revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions. Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most responsible party tasks and participated actively in the work of the leading party and Soviet organs. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during Lenin’s life. In his “testament” Lenin warned that “Zinoviev’s and Kamenev’s October episode was of course not an accident.” But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly not their shooting. Or, let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present, after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyse this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who, in their time, joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in the workers’ movement before the revolution, during the socialist october revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that, had Lenin lived, such an extreme method would not have been used against any of them. Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the revolution when this was actually necessary? No; no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the revolution and of the working class and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall only VI Lenin’s fight with the socialist revo-

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lutionary organisers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and not against those who blunder, who err, and whom it was possible to lead through ideological influence and even retain in the leadership. Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for survival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war. Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilising the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet Government. Here we see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so alarmed VI Lenin. Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, the central committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the central committee, not asking for the opinion of the committee members nor even of the members of the central committee’s politburo; often he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning very important party and government matters. Considering the question of the cult of an individual, we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the party’s

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role and significance in the direction of the socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for a successful building of socialism in our country. Pointing to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik party, as ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms of party life; he called for the realisation of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the party and the state. Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism. “This means,” said Lenin, “that all party matters are accomplished by all party members - directly or through representatives—who, without any exceptions, are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegia, all holders of party

Document Analysis

Khrushchev’s speech opens with a description of how the most important leaders in the history of Communism, from Karl Marx to Vladimir Lenin, had opposed the elevation of one person, a “cult of the individual,” above the interests of the Communist Party, and that Joseph Stalin had done just that. Khrushchev asserts that Stalin’s personality cult was “the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.” Lenin is clearly the contrasting model for Khrushchev: an example of a leader who did not aggregate all power to himself and worked for the party, not his own interests. Khrushchev uses Lenin as the voice of his first denunciation of Stalin. Lenin had seen in him the “negative characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences.” He quotes from a document known as Lenin’s Testament—suppressed during Stalin’s rein—in which Lenin suggested that Stalin was too rude and hot-tempered to hold the position of party secretary-general and should be replaced with someone who was more tolerant and considerate toward fellow party members. Khrushchev argued that Lenin had seen only a glimpse of those tendencies which would result later into the “grave abuse of power” that characterized Stalin’s leadership after Lenin’s death. His “intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power” were clearly shown in his treatment of the members of the Seventeenth Central

positions are elective, they must account for their activities and are recallable.” It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the central committee members or of the members of the central committee’s politburo. In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convoke congresses, party conferences and plenary sessions of the central committee at which all the most important questions were discussed and where resolutions, carefully worked out by the collective of leaders, were approved….

Committee, elected in 1934, and more than two-thirds of whom were later arrested and shot. Khrushchev asks what better example there could be of Stalin’s disregard for “collective party leadership.” It was after this meeting in 1934 that Stalin abandoned even the pretense of collective leadership, convinced that “now he could decide all things alone.” Since much of Stalin’s reputation in the Soviet Union was based on the role he played in its defense against Nazi Germany, Khrushchev turns his attention to denouncing that as well. Stalin had killed off his most able and experienced military leaders, he argued, and had ignored numerous warning signs that the Germans were planning to invade. If the Soviet Union had mobilized in time, “our wartime losses would have been decidedly smaller.” After the war, Stalin’s “persecution mania” grew even more acute, and Khrushchev details the various plots and purges that were ordered, and accuses Stalin of damaging the reputation and international standing of the Soviet Union as well. As the speech draws to a close, Khrushchev answers the question on everyone’s mind: If Stalin was so outrageously brutal and cruel, why did none of the other Soviet leaders stop him, and why was he able to do so much to advance the progress of the Soviet Union? Khrushchev answers that most of the success attributed to Stalin was actually the result of the work of the party and the people. Conversely, the greatest harm was done by keeping the majority of the party’s leader-

Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences

ship in the dark about how accusations and trials were handled. The way forward, Khrushchev asserts, is to return the Soviet government to the correct Marxist-Leninist collective party system, and look critically at elements of the state that had become too closely intertwined with the cult of Stalin. This has to be done carefully, however, as it could make the Soviet Union appear weak to its enemies. Once the cult of the individual is eliminated, Khrushchev argues, the party can return to its proper leadership role, and the Soviet Union will be on a path to greatness once again. Essential Themes

This speech was given after the public sessions of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The party faithful were given special passes to the speech, and visitors, journalists, and representatives from other Communist nations were excluded. The speech took four hours and had a profound effect on its listeners. Later reports blamed health problems and even suicides on the shock of hearing Stalin, the revered Soviet leader, denounced as a cruel, paranoid tyrant. Later that evening, the speech was shared with delegates from other Communist countries, and within two weeks, a version of the speech had been released to local Communist groups. The general outline of the speech was leaked to an American journalist, and

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appeared in the United States in early March. By the end of the month, the contents of the speech had been heard by millions of Soviet citizens, and by June it had been printed nearly in full by major newspapers across the world. The speech spread quickly, and ushered in a period of liberalization known as Khrushchev’s Thaw. Restrictions on art and literature were eased, and Stalin’s image was no longer venerated. Five years later, Stalin’s body was removed from where it lay in Lenin’s tomb and buried, away from public view. Several other Communist leaders condemned the speech, accusing Khrushchev of changing history and denouncing a great man. Many Western diplomats and scholars, on the other hand, believed the speech was a way for Khrushchev to distance himself from Stalin’s brutal regime, in which he too had been a leader. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

“February 25, 1956: Khrushchev Denounces the Stalinist ‘Personality Cult.’” Nation. Nation, 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 4 Dec. 2015. Harper, John Lamberton. The Cold War. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. Zubok, V. M., and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996. Print.

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 Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam Date: June 1, 1956 Author: John F. Kennedy Genre: speech Summary Overview

Vietnam was going through a period of transition in the mid-1950s. The former colonial rulers, the French, withdrew their forces and, in 1954, divided the territory into North and South Vietnam. In 1956, an election was to be held to unify the country, and the communist leaders in the North were favored to win. The organization the American Friends of Vietnam was opposed to this election and supported the government of South Vietnam. Senator John F. Kennedy was invited to give the keynote speech to a conference that was convened to influence American leaders to support this policy. Given that four and a half years later Senator Kennedy would become president, this speech is an important indicator of his thoughts prior to achieving the highest office in government. Also, his analysis of what might happen if the United States were to become involved in the war in Vietnam in 1954 proved to be an accurate view of the conflict that lay ahead. Defining Moment

The communist movement was successful in 1917 in transforming Russia into the Soviet Union. But communism’s spread soon stalled. This changed after World War II, when communist governments were put in place throughout areas in Europe and Asia that were occupied by the Soviet army. The 1949 victory by communist forces in China gave communism a strong position in Asia. When Vietnamese leaders sought to overthrow the French, communist leaders were more than willing to assist. The division of Vietnam into two countries, North and South, gave the leadership of the North to those who had adopted communist ideology, and leadership of the South was taken by Western/capitalist-leaning individuals. By the time of this conference in June 1956, all French forces had withdrawn and an election was to be held to reunify Vietnam. There was little doubt that the leaders of North Vietnam, those who had been most

active in the anti-French revolution, and who most fully adopted the communist ideology, would win the election. Thus, it was believed, if the United States was to stem the growth of communism in Asia, it must support the leaders of South Vietnam to keep communism bottled up in the North. The gathering convened by the American Friends of Vietnam proposed to influence American leaders of both parties to support South Vietnam along with its leader, Ngo Dinh Diem. John F. Kennedy, a rising star in the Democratic Party, was invited to speak. Although a majority of the American Friends of Vietnam were conservative, it was necessary to get liberals, such as Kennedy, to support the cause. Kennedy’s views, as expressed in this speech, help to explain why, as president, he was willing to increase military aid to South Vietnam. While neither this speech nor this conference can be given total credit for the policy of America supporting South Vietnam, the talk sought a continuation of President Eisenhower’s commitment of opposing communism. The continuity of American policy in 1961, in the transition from a Republican administration to a Democratic one, is clearly foreshadowed in this speech, as was Kennedy’s strong anticommunist rhetoric during the presidential campaign. Kennedy’s statement that Vietnam was the “keystone of the Free World in Southeast Asia” was a clear variant on the “domino theory,” which had been put forth by President Eisenhower two years before. This speech contains the essence of what would become American policy toward Vietnam for most of the succeeding two decades. Author Biography

John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1917–1963) was born into a wealthy Catholic family in Boston. His parents stressed success for him and all his siblings. As a student, he excelled at what he enjoyed and was mediocre at the rest. Although he spent much of his time socializing,

Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam

his senior thesis at Harvard was published in 1940. A naval war hero in World War II, in 1946, he was elected to the House of Representatives. In 1952, he ran for the US Senate, defeating the Republican incumbent in a year when Republicans won the presidency, the Senate, and the House. The following year, he married Jacqueline Bouvier. He ran for and was elected presi-

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dent in 1960 and was the first Catholic to hold that position. His foreign policy was staunchly anticommunist throughout the world. Assassinated on November 21, 1963, Kennedy had a mixed record of accomplishments during his short term as president, but the enthusiasm and activism he inspired endeared him to many across the nation.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT It is a genuine pleasure to be here today at this vital Conference on the future of Vietnam, and America’s stake in that new nation, sponsored by the American Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which I am proud to be a member. Your meeting today at a time when political events concerning Vietnam are approaching a climax, both in that country and in our own Congress, is most timely. Your topic and deliberations, which emphasize the promise of the future more than the failures of the past, are most constructive. I can assure you that the Congress of the United States will give considerable weight to your findings and recommendations; and I extend to all of you who have made the effort to participate in this Conference my congratulations and best wishes. It is an ironic and tragic fact that this Conference is being held at a time when the news about Vietnam has virtually disappeared from the front pages of the American press, and the American people have all but forgotten the tiny nation for which we are in large measure responsible. This decline in public attention is due, I believe, to three factors: (1) First, it is due in part to the amazing success of President Diem in meeting firmly and with determination the major political and economic crises which had heretofore continually plagued Vietnam. (I shall say more about this point later, for it deserves more consideration from all Americans interested in the future of Asia). (2) Secondly, it is due in part to the traditional role of American journalism, including readers as well as writers, to be more interested in crises than in accomplishments, to give more space to the threat of wars than the need for works, and to write larger headlines on the sensational omissions of the past than the creative missions

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of the future. (3) Third and finally, our neglect of Vietnam is the result of one of the most serious weaknesses that has hampered the long-range effectiveness of American foreign policy over the past several years—and that is the over emphasis upon our role as “volunteer fire department” for the world. Whenever and wherever fire breaks out—in Indo-China, in the Middle East, in Guatemala, in Cyprus, in the Formosan Straits—our firemen rush in, wheeling up all their heavy equipment, and resorting to every known method of containing and extinguishing the blaze. The crowd gathers—the usually successful efforts of our able volunteers are heartily applauded—and then the firemen rush off to the next conflagration, leaving the grateful but still stunned inhabitants to clean up the rubble, pick up the pieces and rebuild their homes with whatever resources are available. The role, to be sure, is a necessary one; but it is not the only role to be played, and the others cannot be ignored. A volunteer fire department halts, but rarely prevents, fires. It repels but rarely rebuilds; it meets the problems of the present but not of the future. And while we are devoting our attention to the Communist arson in Korea, there is smoldering in Indo-China; we turn our efforts to Indo-China until the alarm sounds in Algeria— and so it goes. Of course Vietnam is not completely forgotten by our policy-makers today—I could not in honesty make such a charge and the facts would easily refute it—but the unfortunate truth of the matter is that, in my opinion, Vietnam would in all likelihood be receiving more attention from our Congress and Administration, and greater assistance under our aid programs, if it were in imminent danger of Communist invasion or revolution. Like those peoples of Latin America and Africa whom we have very

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nearly overlooked in the past decade, the Vietnamese may find that their devotion to the cause of democracy, and their success in reducing the strength of local Communist groups, have had the ironic effect of reducing American support. Yet the need for that support has in no way been reduced. (I hope it will not be necessary for the Diem Government—or this organization—to subsidize the growth of the South Vietnam Communist Party in order to focus American attention on that nation’s critical needs!) No one contends that we should now rush all our firefighting equipment to Vietnam, ignoring the Middle East or any other part of the world. But neither should we conclude that the cessation of hostilities in IndoChina removed that area from the list of important areas of United States foreign policy. Let us briefly consider exactly what is “America’s Stake in Vietnam”: (1) First, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. In the past, our policy-makers have sometimes issued contradictory statements on this point—but the long history of Chinese invasions of Southeast Asia being stopped by Vietnamese warriors should have removed all doubt on this subject. Moreover, the independence of a Free Vietnam is crucial to the free world in fields other than the military. Her economy is essential to the economy of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia—and indeed the world. The fundamental tenets of this nation’s foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation. (2) Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However we may choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengeable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only

to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment—it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail. (3) Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring—we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence—Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest—then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low. (4) Fourth and finally, America’s stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one— for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on the brink of war in Indo-China—a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known. The threat to such war is not now altogether removed from the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of Premier Diem. And the key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation’s security in any new outbreak of trouble. It is these four points, in my opinion, that represent America’s stake in Vietnamese security. And before we look to the future, let us stop to review what the Diem Government has already accomplished by way of increasing that security. Most striking of all, perhaps, has

Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam

been the rehabilitation of more than three-quarters of a million refugees from the North. For these courageous people dedicated to the free way of life, approximately 45,000 houses have been constructed, 2,500 wells dug, 100 schools established and dozens of medical centers and maternity homes provided. Equally impressive has been the increased solidarity and stability of the Government, the elimination of rebellious sects and the taking of the first vital steps toward true democracy. Where once colonialism and Communism struggled for supremacy, a free and independent republic has been proclaimed, recognized by over 40 countries of the free world. Where once a playboy emperor ruled from a distant shore, a constituent assembly has been elected. Social and economic reforms have likewise been remarkable. The living conditions of the peasants have been vastly improved, the wastelands have been cultivated, and a wider ownership of the land is gradually being encouraged. Farm cooperatives and farmer loans have modernized an outmoded agricultural economy; and a tremendous dam in the center of the country has made possible the irrigation of a vast area previously uncultivated. Legislation for better labor relations, health protection, working conditions and wages has been completed under the leadership of President Diem. Finally, the Vietnamese army—now fighting for its own homeland and not its colonial masters - has increased tremendously in both quality and quantity. General O’Daniel can tell you more about these accomplishments. But the responsibility of the United States for Vietnam does not conclude, obviously, with a review of what has been accomplished thus far with our help. Much more needs to be done; much more, in fact, than we have been doing up to now. Military alliances in Southeast Asia are necessary but not enough. Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate weapons are not enough. Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of Communism and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country where concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and hunger are not enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. As Ambassador Chuong has recently said: “People can-

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not be expected to fight for the Free World unless they have their own freedom to defend, their freedom from foreign domination as well as freedom from misery, oppression, corruption.” I shall not attempt to set forth the details of the type of aid program this nation should offer the Vietnamese—for it is not the details of that program that are as important as the spirit with which it is offered and the objectives it seeks to accomplish. We should not attempt to buy the friendship of the Vietnamese. Nor can we win their hearts by making them dependent upon our handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution—a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer—far more peaceful, far more democratic and far more locally controlled. Such a Revolution will require much from the United States and much from Vietnam. We must supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; technicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation taking those first feeble steps toward the complexities of a republican form of government. We must assist the inspiring growth of Vietnamese democracy and economy, including the complete integration of those refugees who gave up their homes and their belongings to seek freedom. We must provide military assistance to rebuild the new Vietnamese Army, which every day faces the growing peril of Vietminh Armies across the border. And finally, in the councils of the world, we must never permit any diplomatic action adverse to this, one of the youngest members of the family of nations—and I include in that injunction a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide elections called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor Free Vietnam was a party to that agreement—and neither the United States nor Free Vietnam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the Agreement they now seek to enforce. All this and more we can offer Free Vietnam, as it passes through the present period of transition on its way to a new era—an era of pride and independence, and era of democratic and economic growth—an era which, when contrasted with the long years of colonial oppres-

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sion, will truly represent a political, social and economic revolution. This is the revolution we can, we should, we must offer to the people of Vietnam—not as charity, not as a business proposition, not as a political maneuver, nor simply to enlist them as soldiers against Communism or as chattels of American foreign policy—but a revolution of their own making, for their own welfare, and for the security of freedom everywhere. The Communists offer them another kind of revolution, glittering and seductive

in its superficial appeal. The choice between the two can be made only by the Vietnamese people themselves. But in these times of trial and burden, true friendships stand out. As Premier Diem recently wrote a great friend of Vietnam, Senator Mansfield, “It is only in winter that you can tell which trees are evergreen.” And I am confident that if this nation demonstrates that it has not forgotten the people of Vietnam, the people of Vietnam will demonstrate that they have not forgotten us.

GLOSSARY Indo-China (also, Indochina): Southeast Asia North: North Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, ally of communist nations, and the eventual victor in the war South Vietnam: the Republic of Vietnam, ally of the United States Vietminh Armies: originally, communist forces fighting the French; the term was later used for North Vietnamese troops and related forces

Document Analysis

While not a well-known speech, this declaration of values by then Senator Kennedy illustrates the speaker’s understanding of American culture and politics as well as of America’s national security policy. The focal point of the United States’ foreign policy was opposition to communism. Kennedy uses Cold War rhetoric here in praising a leader, in this case Diem, who was opposed to communism. During this period, it is implied, if Diem could be useful in stopping the spread of communism, then many, more negative behaviors could be overlooked. For Kennedy and the Friends of Vietnam, and according to the American foreign policy of that day, the ideology of North Vietnam must not be allowed to spread. Thus, Kennedy concisely lays out a position of unity regarding his and Eisenhower’s policy on Vietnam. In an aside, he predicts the course of the military conflict in the 1960s and early ‘70s. Kennedy understood that, in 1956, Vietnam was not a topic of interest for most Americans or their political leaders. Then as now, journalists and readers preferred stories about sensational events, not about situations that seemed to be unfolding smoothly. Thus, with the withdrawal of the French, and with the Geneva Ac-

cords setting a path for Vietnamese unity, the crisis seemed to be over. Kennedy’s analogy of the United States as a volunteer fire department reflects his ability to communicate important issues using everyday images and serves as an apt description of how US forces were being used. Kennedy understood that stopping communist expansion was needed, but, more importantly, he recognized the inadequacy of a policy that achieved only this end. He proclaims that to win in Vietnam, the United States needed to offer a way of life that was “far superior to anything the Communists can offer.” Unfortunately for the people of Vietnam, and for American foreign policy, that which was being offered by the Diem regime did not add up to this sort of total social revolution. Kennedy’s vision of Vietnam as “the keystone to the arch” of countries surrounding China, from Japan to India, was in line with the mainstream thought of American leaders. While in retrospect this view can be questioned, the staggering advances made by communism in the decade prior to 1956 raised legitimate concerns for the United States. As is always the case in foreign policy, Kennedy had to deal with the situation and leaders at hand. Thus, he speaks words of support

Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam

for Diem, even though many of the accomplishments mentioned in the speech were not benefiting the Buddhist majority in Vietnam, but only the Catholic minority, including Diem himself. Kennedy subtly pushes for change in South Vietnam by stating that the country could be a showplace of freedom and democracy for all Vietnamese and all of Asia. Given the steps that Kennedy would later take as president, which moved the United States into a more active military role in Vietnam, it is interesting that he presents his thoughts on what a war in that country might mean. While believing that at some point the United States might have to intervene militarily in Vietnam, he hopes that this will not happen. He reflects that if the United States had entered the previous conflict, it would have been “more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known.” That essential insight ultimately became the reality when Americans had had enough of Vietnam and American troops were finally withdrawn from the country in the 1970s. Essential Themes

While in many areas of politics Kennedy was seen as innovative or liberal, his position on Vietnam reflected the status quo. By 1956, Vietnam had become “our offspring,” and the United States needed to support South Vietnam as a bulkhead against communism. If things faltered in that country, it would be “inevitable” that the United States would have to protect its interests elsewhere in the region. While Kennedy hoped that South Vietnam would progress in all areas, he indicates that he was not totally opposed to American military activity in the country. The fact that he held this view in 1956 meant that there was no real division on the issue between the major candidates in the 1960 presidential election. This speech suggests the policy that Kennedy would pursue when the situation in South Vietnam worsened under his presidency in the early 1960s. The speech may not represent a blueprint of his later actions in Vietnam, but it does reflect his thoughts on how the United States might combat a possible communist expansion. This is the most important aspect of Kennedy’s speech and one that later stood as the basis of American foreign policy in the region in the decade after his death.

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The speech also contains an example of Kennedy’s understanding about how the success or failure of American foreign policy should be measured not merely in terms of military accomplishments or the ideology of a government. He believed, rather, that American foreign policy would be successful only when it helped the average person in Vietnam, or when it assisted the citizens of any country to live better, more secure lives. Freedom and personal security in economic, social, or political terms was what Kennedy thought should be the measure of whether American policy was a success. Thus, he talks about better living conditions, economic growth, and the implementation of democracy for the people of South Vietnam. Through these measures, Kennedy believed, the people of South Vietnam would not only advance themselves, but would also solidify themselves in opposition to communism. While Kennedy recognized that there was value in being the “volunteer fire department” stamping out a communist insurgency, he declares that it was important to follow up such actions by taking measures that allowed the values of freedom and liberty to become a part of the daily life of a country. Only then, Kennedy believed, would the revolution against oppression be complete. —Donald A. Watt, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Dallek, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 2003. Print. Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print. Morgan, Joseph G. The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955–1975. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Print. Prados, John. “JFK and the Diem Coup.” The National Security Archive. George Washington University, 5 Nov. 2003. Web. 29 May 2015. . Sorenson, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Print.

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 Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors Date: October 22, 1956 Genre: political tract Summary Overview

The death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953 ushered in an era of uncertainty, marked by conflict and internal struggles within the Communist governments of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe. By 1956, Nikita Khrushchev established his leadership in the Soviet Union and denounced Stalin’s brutal, totalitarian regime in the so-called Secret Speech. Shortly after this speech was leaked, protesters in Poland and Hungary believed that the time was right to demand political and economic reforms from their Soviet-backed governments. Hungarian journalists and students called for the removal of hard-line Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi, and he resigned in July. His replacement, Ernő Gerő, allowed the body of László Rajk, a Communist official who had been executed in 1949, to be reinterred in Budapest in early October. His burial quickly became a mass protest against Soviet repression in Hungary, and university students revived the Union of Hungarian University and Academy Students (abbreviated MEFESZ in Hungarian), which had been banned by the government. On October 22, student union members at the Technical University of Budapest drew up a list of sixteen demands, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and planned a protest for the following day. For the next twelve days, their movement gained widespread popular support, eventually overthrowing the national government, but was eventually crushed by Soviet troops. Defining Moment

Hungary was a key ally of Nazi Germany during World War II, lured by the promise of the return of territory lost in World War I. In March 1944, the German army occupied Hungary, replacing its regent with a fascist dictator. After a bloody siege, the Soviet army captured Budapest on February 13, 1945, and began an occupation that would last for decades. After the war, harsh reparation payments were imposed on Hungary by the Soviet Union and the currency collapsed. Hungarian

Communists were sent back from exile in the Soviet Union to play key roles in the government. Many, like Rákosi, had spent years away from their compatriots, and had deep loyalties to the Soviet totalitarian leader, Joseph Stalin. Despite Soviet occupation and strong-arm diplomacy bent on crushing opposition to the chosen candidates of the Hungarian Communist Party, a true multiparty democracy briefly emerged in Hungary after the war. By May of 1949, however, the Soviet-backed Communist Party had taken control of the government through threats and coercion. In August, the National Assembly approved a new constitution based on the Soviet model, renaming the country the People’s Republic of Hungary, with Mátyás Rákosi as its leader. The nation was firmly under the control of the Soviet Union. Rákosi arrested and imprisoned anyone he perceived as a threat, including Foreign Secretary László Rajk. Rajk made a confession under torture and was executed on October 15, 1949. Rákosi closely followed Stalin’s example, purging thousands of members of the Communist faithful, fearing any challenge to his authority. He instigated sweeping social and economic reforms as well, expanding the educational system to promote Communist ideology, weakening the church, and collectivizing farms. He encouraged the development of unprofitable heavy industry to support the Soviet Union, and allowed Hungary’s uranium resources to be stripped. The economy sank, and the standard of living fell precipitously. He gave the secret police wide latitude to arrest, detain, and torture Hungarian citizens. Rákosi was powerful but increasingly unpopular, and pockets of resistance continued in Hungary, despite harsh reprisals. After Stalin’s death in 1953, he was briefly replaced as prime minister by reformer Imre Nagy. Nagy liberalized Hungarian media, began discussions on how the economy could be improved, and even considered withdrawing Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, a mutual defense treaty made up of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern

Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors

Europe. Nagy’s tenure was short-lived, however, and he was replaced by a Rákosi supporter in 1955. In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech,” which was actually widely circulated, denounced Stalin and his followers. By July, Rákosi, who was widely hated, had come to be seen as a liability by the Soviet Union and was replaced as general secretary of the Communist Party—a position he had held since 1945—by Ernő Gerő. In October, the party’s Central Committee declared that Rajk had been falsely accused and wrongly executed, and Imre Nagy was allowed to assume party membership, though not leadership. Also in October,

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university students began reforming student unions, which had been banned. On October 22, a group of students at Budapest Technical University compiled a list of sixteen demands, including the reinstatement of Nagy as prime minister. Document Information

The sixteen demands made by the students of the Budapest Technical University were released on October 22, 1956, with a call for a protest the following day. The October 23 action is considered the start of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT STUDENTS OF BUDAPEST! The following resolution was born on 22 October 1956, at the dawn of a new period in Hungarian history, in the Hall of the Building Industry Technological University as a result of the spontaneous movement of several thousand of the Hungarian youth who love their Fatherland: 1. We demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. 2. We demand the election of new leaders in the Hungarian Workers’ Party on the low, medium and high levels by secret ballot from the ranks upwards. These leaders should convene the Party Congress within the shortest possible time and should elect a new central body of leaders. 3. The Government should be reconstituted under the leadership of Comrade Imre Nagy; all criminal leaders of the Stalinist Rákosi era should be relieved of their posts at once. 4. We demand a public trial in the criminal case of Mihaly Farkas and his accomplices. Matyas Rakosi, who is primarily responsible for all the crimes of the recent past and for the ruin of this country, should be brought home and brought before a People’s Court of Judgment. 5. We demand general elections in this country, with universal suffrage, secret ballot and the participation of several Parties for the purpose of electing a new National Assembly. We demand that the workers should have the right to strike. 6. We demand a re-examination and re-adjustment of

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Hungarian - Soviet and Hungarian - Yugoslav political, economic and intellectual relations on the basis of complete political and economic equality and of non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs. 7. We demand the re-organization of the entire economic life of Hungary, with the assistance of specialists. Our whole economic system based on planned economy should be re-examined with an eye to Hungarian conditions and to the vital interests of the Hungarian people. 8. Our foreign trade agreements and the real figures in respect of reparations that can never be paid should be made public. We demand frank and sincere information concerning the country’s uranium deposits, their exploitation and the Russian concession. We demand that Hungary should have the right to sell the uranium ore freely at world market prices in exchange for hard currency. 9. We demand the complete revision of norms in industry and an urgent and radical adjustment of wages to meet the demands of workers and intellectuals. We demand that minimum living wages for workers should be fixed. 10. We demand that the delivery system should be placed on a new basis and that produce should be used rationally. We demand equal treatment of peasants farming individually. 11. We demand the re-examination of all political and economic trials by independent courts and the release and rehabilitation of innocent persons. We demand the immediate repatriation of prisoners of war and of civilians deported to the Soviet Union, including prisoners

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who have been condemned beyond the frontiers of Hungary. 12. We demand complete freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of the Press and a free Radio, as well as a new daily newspaper of large circulation for the MEFESZ [League of Hungarian University and College Student Associations] organization. We demand that the existing ‘screening material’ should be made public and destroyed. 13. We demand that the Stalin statue, the symbol of Stalinist tyranny and political oppression should be removed as quickly as possible and that a memorial worthy of the freedom fighters and martyrs of 1848-49 should be erected on its site. 14. In place of the existing coat of arms, which is foreign to the Hungarian people, we wish the re-introduction of the old Hungarian Kossuth arms. We demand for the Hungarian Army new uniforms worthy of our national traditions. We demand that 15 March should he a national holiday and a non-working day and that 6 Octo-

Document Analysis

The statement of demands of the Hungarian students begins with a telling statement of the significance they ascribe to their actions. They are at “the dawn of a new period in Hungarian history,” and their demands are “a result of the spontaneous movement of several thousand of the Hungarian youth who love their Fatherland.” First and foremost, the students demand the end of the postwar Soviet military occupation. They also demand that new elections by secret ballot be held at all levels of the Communist Party, and that new open elections be held for the National Assembly as well. They demand that Nagy return to lead the government and that Rákosi, who is “primarily responsible for all the crimes of the recent past and for the ruin of this country,” and who had left for the Soviet Union, be returned to Hungary to stand trial. Concerned with the economic crisis in Hungary, the student demands deal with the economy in some detail. The details of postwar reparations payments, as well as exclusive uranium sales to the Soviets, are to be revisited, and political and economic ties between Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia to be made

ber should be a day of national mourning and a school holiday. 15. The youth of the Technological University of Budapest unanimously express their complete solidarity with the Polish and Warsaw workers and youth in connection with the Polish national independence movement. 16. The students of the Building Industry Technological University will organize local units of MEFESZ as quickly as possible, and have resolved to convene a Youth Parliament in Budapest for the 27th of this month (Saturday) at which the entire youth of this country will be represented by their delegates. The students of the Technological University and of the various other Universities will gather in the Gorkij Fasor before the Writers’ Union Headquarters tomorrow, the 23rd of this month, at 2.30 p.m., whence they will proceed to the Palffy Ter (Bem Ter) to the Bem statue, on which they will lay wreaths in sign of their sympathy with the Polish freedom movement. The workers of the factories are invited to join in this procession.

more equitable and based on nonintervention. The collectivization of agriculture had caused particular hardship for the Hungarian people, so the students demand “equality of treatment for individual farms,” as well as a living wage for industrial workers, and the right of workers to organize and strike. The entire planned economy of Hungary is to be reexamined and adjusted. Freedom of speech and a removal of hated symbols of oppression make up the final section of the student’s demands. They call for the formerly banned student union, MEFESZ, to have its own newspaper, and for guarantees of freedom of the press. The statue of Stalin that dominated the central city park of Budapest is to be taken down “as quickly as possible.” National symbols and emblems are to be returned to those that had meaning to Hungarians. March 15, the day that the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 had begun a century before, and October 6, the day that Rejk was reburied, were to be nationally recognized holidays. The students also expressed solidarity with the Polish people, who were struggling to regain greater control over their national affairs as well. A march of students and workers in Budapest is announced for the following day, and a national Youth Parliament is proposed to convene in

Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors

Budapest on October 27. This document is, in short, a demand for reform in nearly every aspect of Hungarian cultural, social, and political life. Essential Themes

The students’ demands for reform were the spark that set off the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. They were read to a gathering crowd on the following afternoon, and then the crowd made its way to the Parliament buildings, growing as it marched. The demonstrators also pulled down the hated statue of Stalin and gathered at the headquarters of the national radio station to air their demands. During skirmishes with police outside the Radio Budapest building, tear gas was thrown from the building, and police shot into the crowd. Hungarian soldiers sent to support the police switched sides instead, joining the protesters. The following day, as Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, Nagy was returned to power as prime minister, and protests continued, with sporadic street fighting between protestors, police, and Soviet forces. Nagy quickly agreed to many of the demands of the protesters, calling for independence from the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of troops, free elections, freedom of the press, and the end of Hungary’s involvement with the Warsaw Pact. There was a brief lull in the fighting, but the Soviet Union was not willing to release control over Hungary, and on the night of

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November 3, Soviet tanks and troops surrounded Budapest. Despite significant resistance, and even a latenight petition to the United Nations Security Council by the protesters, the following day, Soviet tanks entered the city and crushed the revolution. Thousands of Hungarians were killed and many more fled Soviet reprisals. Nagy was arrested on November 22 in Yugoslavia and executed on June 16, 1958. Though the Soviet stranglehold on Hungary was stronger than ever, the uprising both exposed weaknesses in the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and encouraged Khrushchev to consider economic and social reforms. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Fowkes, Ben. Eastern Europe 1945–1969: From Stalinism to Stagnation. Harlow: Longman, 2000. Print. Jones, Christopher D. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact. Brooklyn: Praeger, 1981. Print. Lendvai, Paul. One Day That Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008. Print. Sebestyen, Victor. Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. New York: Pantheon, 2006. Print.

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 Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” Date: February 27, 1957 Author: Mao Zedong Genre: speech Summary Overview

Mao Zedong, leader of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, gave this speech as part of his Hundred Flowers Campaign. After Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech denouncing the brutal regime of dictator Joseph Stalin, Communist leaders around the world considered whether it was prudent to relax some of the restrictions imposed on their citizens, particularly intellectuals and students. Mao invited a renewed conversation about how conditions in China could be improved and offered to accept criticism. In the context of Mao’s extremely repressive regime, this criticism was slow to materialize. Mao made this speech initially as a way to encourage his people to follow the unity-criticismunity model for resolving internal conflicts. The speech was also intended to reinforce the idea that consensus could be reached without any structural change to the Communist government in China. Mao addressed the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956, in which students led an armed uprising against Hungary’s Sovietbacked government. Mao made it clear that this was not an acceptable way to resolve internal conflicts in China. He claimed it was a tool of the West, attempting to exploit “contradictions among the people” that should have been resolved through conversation and education. Defining Moment

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921, and many of its original members, like Mao, were students and academics who had watched the Russian Revolution of 1917 with interest. The Communist government established in Russia was very appealing to Chinese intellectuals, who saw the same class struggle between peasants and landowners that existed in Russia. The nationalist Kuomintang party, led by Chiang Kai-shek, initially accepted the Chinese Communist

Party, but in April 1927, thousands of Communists were killed in Shanghai as the Kuomintang purged them from their ranks. The two factions briefly cooperated to resist the Japanese invasion during World War II, but the relationship quickly deteriorated after Japan’s defeat. The Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek was heavily supported by the United States both during the war, as an ally against Japan, and after, as a barrier to the spread of Communism. The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria in 1945 to fight the Japanese and only withdrew when the Chinese Communist Party was firmly in control of the territory. Despite negotiations between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek in 1945, within a year, civil war had broken out. After a series of strategic victories, Mao announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang faithful fled to Taiwan after his defeat. Mao quickly began a program of sweeping land reforms, intended to consolidate support for the party among the rural peasantry. The 1950 Agrarian Reform Law reallocated land to peasants and led to organized meetings where landowners were often beaten and killed. In 1953, Mao accelerated the reallocation of land to the state and established rural communes. During the early years of his leadership, he also established the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, calling for the arrest of anyone accused of disloyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. Millions of Chinese citizens were killed during land reform and the purging of suspected opponents, and millions more were sent to forced labor camps, where many died of starvation and disease. Mao set quotas for local officials, insisting that public executions were necessary to root out enemies of the people. He encouraged citizens to inform on any suspicious behavior among their family members and friends. This information was used to purge

Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People”

businesspeople, political opponents, and members of Mao’s own party that he suspected of disloyalty. Many suspected government officials were encouraged to commit suicide and did so to avoid public execution or death in the labor camps. By 1953, China was firmly under Mao’s control. His first five-year plan, launched that year along the Soviet model, focused on dramatically increased industrial production and massive civil engineering projects. In 1956, Mao introduced the Hundred Flowers Campaign, ostensibly to invite feedback and criticism, though many thought that this was an attempt by Mao to either demonstrate the extent of his support among the people or root out dissent. In any case, criticism was initially tolerated, but when it became clear that there were many complaints about Mao’s leadership, the policy was reversed, and dissenters were brutally repressed. Author Biography

Mao Zedong, later known as Chairman Mao, was born in Hunan Province, China, on December 26, 1893. He was from a prosperous farming family and received a rudimentary village education while working in his father’s fields. A voracious reader, he left home when he was seventeen to pursue a secondary education in Hunan’s capital city of Changsha, then a hotbed of an-

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timonarchist rebellion. Mao briefly joined the nationalist revolutionary army, which overthrew the monarchy in 1912, then attended several different schools for various trades. He graduated from teacher training in 1918 and he moved to Beijing, where he worked in the Peking University library and followed the progress of the Russian Revolution. In 1921, he was one of the first leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Though a committed Marxist-Leninist, Mao also joined the Kuomintang, believing that such an alliance would be expedient. He rose through the party ranks, working to organize rural peasants. Kuomintang leader Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925 and was replaced by Chiang Kai-shek, who was not interested in mobilizing the rural peasantry or working with the Communists. Mao became a central figure in the resistance to Chiang Kai-shek, leading guerilla warfare from strongholds in the countryside. In 1937, the Japanese invaded China, and the Nationalist and Communist factions briefly reunited to fight the invaders. However, after the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the fragile coalition did not survive. In October 1949, Mao and the Communists established the People’s Republic of China. Mao remained China’s undisputed leader, with the exception of a brief period from 1962 to 1966, until his death on September 9, 1976. He was buried in a mausoleum in Beijing.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Our general subject is the correct handling of contradictions among the people. For convenience, let us discuss it under twelve sub-headings. Although reference will be made to contradictions between ourselves and the enemy, this discussion will centre on contradictions among the people. I. TWO TYPES OF CONTRADICTIONS DIFFERING IN NATURE Never before has our country been as united as it is today. The victories of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and of the socialist revolution and our achievements in socialist construction have rapidly changed the face of the old China. A still brighter future lies ahead for our motherland. The days of national disunity and chaos which the people detested are gone, never to return. Led

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by the working class and the Communist Party, our 600 million people, united as one, are engaged in the great task of building socialism. The unification of our country, the unity of our people and the unity of our various nationalities -- these are the basic guarantees for the sure triumph of our cause. However, this does not mean that contradictions no longer exist in our society. To imagine that none exist is a naive idea which is at variance with objective reality. We are confronted with two types of social contradictions -- those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people. The two are totally different in nature. To understand these two different types of contradictions correctly, we must first be clear on what is meant by “the people” and what is meant by “the enemy”. The con-

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cept of “the people” varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in a given country. Take our own country for example. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, all those classes, strata and social groups opposing Japanese aggression came within the category of the people, while the Japanese imperialists, their Chinese collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements were all enemies of the people. During the War of Liberation, the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs -- the bureaucrat-capitalists, the landlords and the Kuomintang reactionaries who represented these two classes -- were the enemies of the people, while the other classes, strata and social groups, which opposed them, all came within the category of the people. At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people. The contradictions between ourselves and the enemy are antagonistic contradictions. Within the ranks of the people, the contradictions among the working people are non-antagonistic, while those between the exploited and the exploiting classes have a non-antagonistic as well as an antagonistic aspect. There have always been contradictions among the people, but they are different in content in each period of the revolution and in the period of building socialism. In the conditions prevailing in China today, the contradictions among the people comprise the contradictions within the working class, the contradictions within the peasantry, the contradictions within the intelligentsia, the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry, the contradictions between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the intellectuals on the other, the contradictions between the working class and other sections of the working people on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie on the other, the contradictions within the national bourgeoisie, and so on. Our People’s Government is one that genuinely represents the people’s interests, it is a government that serves the people. Nevertheless, there are still certain contradictions between this government and the people. These include the contradictions between the interests

of the state and the interests of the collective on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the other, between democracy and centralism, between the leadership and the led, and the contradictions arising from the bureaucratic style of work of some of the state personnel in their relations with the masses. All these are also contradictions among the people. Generally speaking, the fundamental identity of the people’s interests underlies the contradictions among the people. In our country, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people. By and large, the class struggle between the two is a class struggle within the ranks of the people, because the Chinese national bourgeoisie has a dual character. In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, it had both a revolutionary and a conciliationist side to its character. In the period of the socialist revolution, exploitation of the working class for profit constitutes one side of the character of the national bourgeoisie, while its support of the Constitution and its willingness to accept socialist transformation constitute the other. The national bourgeoisie differs from the imperialists, the landlords and the bureaucrat-capitalists. The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between exploiter and exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between the two classes, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one and be resolved by peaceful methods. However, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie will change into a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy if we do not handle it properly and do not follow the policy of uniting with, criticizing and educating the national bourgeoisie, or if the national bourgeoisie does not accept this policy of ours. Since they are different in nature, the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and the contradictions among the people must be resolved by different methods. To put it briefly, the former entail drawing a clear distinction between ourselves and the enemy, and the latter entail drawing a clear distinction between right and wrong. It is of course true that the distinction between ourselves and the enemy is also one of right and wrong. For example, the question of who is in the right, we or

Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People”

the domestic and foreign reactionaries, the imperialists, the feudalists and bureaucrat-capitalists, is also one of right and wrong, but it is in a different category from questions of right and wrong among the people. Our state is a people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance. What is this dictatorship for? Its first function is internal, namely, to suppress the reactionary classes and elements and those exploiters who resist the socialist revolution, to suppress those who try to wreck our socialist construction, or in other words, to resolve the contradictions between ourselves and the internal enemy. For instance, to arrest, try and sentence certain counterrevolutionaries, and to deprive landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of their right to vote and their freedom of speech for a certain period of time -- all this comes within the scope of our dictatorship. To maintain public order and safeguard the interests of the people, it is necessary to exercise dictatorship as well over thieves, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, criminal gangs and other scoundrels who seriously disrupt public order. The second function of this dictatorship is to protect our country from subversion and possible aggression by external enemies. In such contingencies, it is the task of this dictatorship to resolve the contradiction between ourselves and the external enemy. The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people so that they can devote themselves to peaceful labour and make China a socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. Who is to exercise this dictatorship? Naturally, the working class and the entire people under its leadership. Dictatorship does not apply within the ranks of the people. The people cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves, nor must one section of the people oppress another. Law-breakers among the people will be punished according to law, but this is different in principle from the exercise of dictatorship to suppress enemies of the people. What applies among the people is democratic centralism. Our Constitution lays it down that citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration, religious belief, and so on. Our Constitution also provides that the organs of state must practice democratic centralism, that they must rely on the masses and that their personnel must serve

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the people. Our socialist democracy is the broadest kind of democracy, such as is not to be found in any bourgeois state. Our dictatorship is the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance. That is to say, democracy operates within the ranks of the people, while the working class, uniting with all others enjoying civil rights, and in the first place with the peasantry, enforces dictatorship over the reactionary classes and elements and all those who resist socialist transformation and oppose socialist construction. By civil rights, we mean, politically, the rights of freedom and democracy. But this freedom is freedom with leadership and this democracy is democracy under centralized guidance, not anarchy. Anarchy does not accord with the interests or wishes of the people. Certain people in our country were delighted by the Hungarian incident. They hoped that something similar would happen in China, that thousands upon thousands of people would take to the streets to demonstrate against the People’s Government. Their hopes ran counter to the interests of the masses and therefore could not possibly win their support. Deceived by domestic and foreign counter-revolutionaries, a section of the people in Hungary made the mistake of resorting to violence against the people’s government, with the result that both the state and the people suffered. The damage done to the country’s economy in a few weeks of rioting will take a long time to repair. In our country there were some others who wavered on the question of the Hungarian incident because they were ignorant of the real state of affairs in the world. They think that there is top little freedom under our people’s democracy and that there is more, freedom under Western parliamentary democracy. They ask for a two-party system as in the West, with one party in office and the other in opposition. But this socalled two-party system is nothing but adevice for maintaining the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; it can never guarantee freedoms to the working people. As a matter of fact, freedom and democracy exist not in the abstract, but only in the concrete. In a society where class struggle exists, if there is freedom for the exploiting classes to exploit the working people, there is no freedom for the working people not to be exploited. If there is democracy for the bourgeoisie, there is no democracy for the

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proletariat and other working people. The legal existence of the Communist Party is tolerated in some capitalist countries, but only to the extent that it does not endanger the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie; it is not tolerated beyond that. Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract regard democracy as an end and not as a means. Democracy as such sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means. Marxism teaches us that democracy is part of the superstructure and belongs to the realm of politics. That is to say, in the last analysis, it serves the economic base. The same is true of freedom. Both democracy and freedom are relative, not absolute, and they come into being and develop in specific historical conditions. Within the ranks of the people, democracy is correlative with centralism and freedom with discipline. They are the two opposites of a single entity, contradictory as well as united, and we should not one-sidedly emphasize one to the exclusion of the other. Within the ranks of the people, we cannot do without freedom, nor can we do without discipline; we cannot do without democracy, nor can we do without centralism. This unity of democracy and centralism, of freedom and discipline, constitutes our democratic centralism. Under this system, the people enjoy broad democracy and freedom, but at the same time they have to keep within the bounds of socialist discipline. All this is well understood by the masses. In advocating freedom with leadership and democracy under centralized guidance, we in no way mean that coercive measures should be taken to settle ideological questions or questions involving the distinction between right and wrong among the people. All attempts to use administrative orders or coercive measures to settle ideological questions or questions of right and wrong are not only ineffective but harmful. We cannot abolish religion by administrative order or force people not to believe in it. We cannot compel people to give up idealism, any more than we can force them to embrace Marxism. The only way to settle questions of an ideological nature or controversial issues among the people is by the democratic method, the method of discussion, criticism, persuasion and education, and not by the method of coercion or repression. To be able to carry on their production and studies effectively and to lead their lives in peace and order, the people want their government and those

in charge of production and of cultural and educational organizations to issue appropriate administrative regulations of an obligatory nature. It is common sense that without them the maintenance of public order would be impossible. Administrative regulations and the method of persuasion and education complement each other in resolving contradictions among the people. In fact, administrative regulations for the maintenance of public order must be accompanied by persuasion and education, for in many cases regulations alone will not work. This democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people was epitomized in 1942 in the formula “unity -- criticism -- unity”. To elaborate, that means starting from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. In our experience this is the correct method of resolving contradictions among the people. In 1942 we used it to resolve contradictions inside the Communist Party, namely, the contradictions between the dogmatists and the great majority of the membership, and between dogmatism and Marxism. The “Left” dogmatists had resorted to the method of “ruthless struggle and merciless blows” in inner-Party struggle. It was the wrong method. In criticizing “Left” dogmatism, we did not use this old method but adopted a new one, that is, one of starting from the desire for unity, distinguishing between right and wrong through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis. This was the method used in the rectification movement of 1942. Within a few years, by the time the Chinese Communist Party held its Seventh National Congress in 1945, unity was achieved throughout the Party as anticipated, and consequently the people’s revolution triumphed. Here, the essential thing is to start from the desire for unity. For without this desire for unity, the struggle, once begun, is certain to throw things into confusion and get out of hand. Wouldn’t this be the same as “ruthless struggle and merciless blows”? And what Party unity would there be left? It was precisely this experience that led us to the formula “unity -- criticism -- unity”. Or, in other words, “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones and cure the sickness to save the patient”. We extended this method beyond our Party. We applied it with great success in the anti-Japanese base areas in dealing with the relations between the leadership and the masses,

Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People”

between the army and the people, between officers and men, between the different units of the army, and between the different groups of cadres. The use of this method can be traced back to still earlier times in our Party’s history. Ever since 1927 when we built our revolutionary armed forces and base areas in the south, this method had been used to deal with the relations between the Party and the masses, between the army and the people, between officers and men, and with other relations among the people. The only difference was that during the anti-Japanese war we employed this method much more consciously. And since the liberation of the whole country, we have employed this same method of “unity -- criticism -- unity” in our relations with the democratic parties and with industrial and commercial circles. Our task now is to continue to extend and make still better use of this method throughout the ranks of the people; we want all our factories, co-operatives, shops, schools, offices and people’s organizations, in a word, all our 600 million people, to use it in resolving contradictions among themselves. In ordinary circumstances, contradictions among the people are not antagonistic. But if they are not handled properly, or if we relax our vigilance and lower our guard, antagonism may arise. In a socialist country, a development of this kind is usually only a localized and temporary phenomenon. The reason is that the system of exploitation of man by man has been abolished and the interests of the people are fundamentally identical. The antagonistic actions which took place on a fairly wide scale during the Hungarian incident were the result of the operations of both domestic and foreign counterrevolutionary elements. This was a particular as well as a temporary phenomenon. It was a case of the reactionaries inside a socialist country, in league with the imperialists, attempting to achieve their conspiratorial aims by taking advantage of contradictions among the people to foment dissension and stir up disorder. The lesson of the Hungarian incident merits attention. Many people seem to think that the use of the democratic method to resolve contradictions among the people is something new. Actually it is not. Marxists have always held that the cause of the proletariat must depend on the masses of the people and that Communists must use the democratic method of persuasion and education

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when working among the labouring people and must on no account resort to commandism or coercion. The Chinese Communist Party faithfully adheres to this MarxistLeninist principle. It has been our consistent view that under the people’s democratic dictatorship two different methods, one dictatorial and the other democratic, should be used to resolve the two types of contradictions which differ in nature -- those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people. This idea has been explained again and again in many Party documents and in speeches by many leading comrades of our Party. In my article “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, written in 1949, I said, “The combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people’s democratic dictatorship.” I also pointed out that in order to settle problems within the ranks of the people “the method we employ is democratic, the method of persuasion, not of compulsion”. Again, in addressing the Second Session of the First National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference in June two, I said: The people’s democratic dictatorship uses two methods. Towards the enemy, it uses the method of dictatorship, that is, for as long a period of time as is necessary it does not permit them to take part in political activity and compels them to obey the law of the People’s Government, to engage in labour and, through such labour, be transformed into new men. Towards the people; on the contrary, it uses the method of democracy and not of compulsion, that is, it must necessarily let them take part in political activity and does not compel them to do this or that but uses the method of democracy to educate and persuade. Such education is self-education for the people, and its basic method is criticism and self-criticism. Thus, on many occasions we have discussed the use of the democratic method for resolving contradictions among the people; furthermore, we have in the main applied it in our work, and many cadres and many other people are familiar with it in practice. Why then do some people now feel that it is a new issue? Because, in the past, the struggle between ourselves and the enemy, both internal and external, was most acute, and contradictions among the people therefore did not attract as much attention as they do today. Quite a few people fail to make a clear distinction

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between these two different types of contradictions— those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people—and are prone to confuse: the two. It must be admitted that it is sometimes quite easy to do so. We have had instances of such confusion in our work in the past; In the course of cleaning out counter-revolutionaries good people were sometimes mistaken for bad, and such things still happen today. We are able to keep mistakes within bounds because it has been our policy to draw a sharp line between ourselves and the enemy and to rectify mistakes whenever discovered. Marxist philosophy holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man’s thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this that impels things to move and change. Contradictions exist everywhere, but their nature differs in accordance with the different nature of different things. In any given thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is absolute. Lenin gave a very clear exposition of this law. It has come to be understood by a growing number of people in our country. But for many people it is one thing to accept this law and quite another to apply it in examining and dealing with problems. Many dare not openly admit that contradictions still exist among the people of our country, while it is precisely these contradictions that are pushing our society forward. Many do not admit that contradictions still exist in socialist society, with the result that they become irresolute and passive when confronted with social contradictions; they do not understand that socialist society grows more united and consolidated through the ceaseless process of correctly handling and resolving contradictions. For this reason, we need to explain things to our people, and to our cadres in the first place, in order to help them understand the contradictions in socialist society and learn to use correct methods for handling them. Contradictions in socialist society are fundamentally different from those in the old societies, such as capitalist society. In capitalist society contradictions find expression in acute antagonisms and conflicts, in sharp class struggle; they cannot be resolved by the capitalist

system itself and can only be resolved by socialist revolution. The case is quite different with contradictions in socialist society; on the contrary, they are not antagonistic and can be ceaselessly resolved by the socialist system itself. In socialist society the basic contradictions are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base. However, they are fundamentally different in character and have different features from the contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base in the old societies. The present social system of our country is far superior to that of the old days. If it were not so, the old system would not have been overthrown and the new system could not have been established. In saying that the socialist relations of production correspond better to the character of the productive forces than did the old relations of production, we mean that they allow the productive forces to develop at a speed unattainable in the old society, so that production can expand steadily and increasingly meet the constantly growing needs of the people. Under the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, the productive forces of the old China grew very slowly. For more than fifty years before liberation, China produced only a few tens of thousands of tons of steel a year, not counting the output of the northeastern provinces. If these provinces are included, the peak annual steel output only amounted to a little over 900,000 tons. In 1949, the national steel output was a little over 100,000 tons. Yet now, a mere seven years after the liberation of our country, steel output already exceeds 4,000,000 tons. In the old China, there was hardly any machine-building industry, to say nothing of the automobile and aircraft industries; now we have all three. When the people overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratcapitalism, many were not clear as to which way China should head -- towards capitalism or towards socialism. Facts have now provided the answer: Only socialism can save China. The socialist system has promoted the rapid development of the productive forces of our country, a fact even our enemies abroad have had to acknowledge. But our socialist system has only just been set up; it is not yet fully established or fully consolidated. In joint

Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People”

state-private industrial and commercial enterprises, capitalists still get a fixed rate of interest on their capital, that is to say, exploitation still exists. So far as ownership is concerned, these enterprises are not yet completely socialist in nature. A number of our agricultural and handicraft producers’ co-operatives are still semi-socialist, while even in the fully socialist co-operatives certain specific problems of ownership remain to be solved. Relations between production and exchange in accordance with socialist principles are being gradually established within and between all branches of our economy, and more and more appropriate forms are being sought. The problem of the proper relation of accumulation to consumption within each of the two sectors of the socialist economy -- the one where the means of production are owned by the whole people and the other where the means of production are. owned by the collective -- and the problem of the proper relation of accumulation to consumption between the two sectors themselves are complicated problems for which it is not easy to work out a perfectly rational solution all at once. To sum up, socialist relations of production have been established and are in correspondence with the growth of the productive forces, but these relations are still far from perfect, and this imperfection stands in contradiction to the growth of the productive forces. Apart from correspondence as well as contradiction between the relations of production and the growth: of the productive forces, there is correspondence as well as contradiction between the superstructure and the economic base. The superstructure, comprising the state system and laws of the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist ideology guided by Marxism-Leninism, plays a positive role in facilitating the victory of socialist transformation and the socialist way of organizing labour; it is in correspondence with the socialist economic base, that is, with socialist relations of production. But the existence of bourgeois ideology, a certain bureaucratic style of work in our state organs and defects in some of the links in our state institutions are in contradiction with the socialist economic base. We must continue to resolve all such contradictions in the light of our specific conditions. Of course, new problems will emerge as these contradictions are resolved. And further efforts will be required to resolve the new contradictions.

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For instance, a constant process of readjustment through state planning is needed to deal with the contradiction between production and the needs of society, which will long remain an objective reality. Every year our country draws up an economic plan in order to establish a proper ratio between accumulation and consumption and achieve an equilibrium between production and needs. Equilibrium is nothing but a temporary, relative, unity of opposites. By the end of each year, this equilibrium, taken as a whole, is upset by the struggle of opposites; the unity undergoes a change, equilibrium becomes disequilibrium, unity becomes disunity, and once again it is necessary to work out an equilibrium and unity for the next year. Herein lies the superiority of our planned economy. As a matter of fact, this equilibrium, this unity, is partially upset every month or every quarter, and partial readjustments are called for. Sometimes, contradictions arise and the equilibrium is upset because our subjective arrangements do not conform to objective reality; this is what we call making a mistake. The ceaseless emergence and ceaseless resolution of contradictions constitute the dialectical law of the development of things. Today, matters stand as follows. The large-scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the main come to an end, but class struggle is by no means entirely over. While welcoming the new system, the masses are not yet quite accustomed to it. Government personnel are not sufficiently experienced and have to undertake further study and investigation of specific policies. In other words, time is needed for our socialist system to become established and consolidated, for the masses to become accustomed to the new system, and for government personnel to learn and acquire experience. It is therefore imperative for us at this juncture to raise the question of distinguishing contradictions among the people from those between ourselves and the enemy, as well as the question of the correct handling of contradictions among the people, in order to unite the people of all nationalities in our country for the new battle, the battle against nature, develop our economy and culture, help the whole nation to traverse this period of transition relatively smoothly, consolidate our new system and build up our new state.

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Document Analysis

Mao Zedong originally delivered this speech at an enlarged session of the Supreme State Conference in February 1957, but he revised the transcript before allowing it to be published in the People’s Daily newspaper in June. In the revised transcript, Mao begins by proclaiming “the victories of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and of the socialist revolution” and the unity of the people of China. The people of China have emerged from a period of conflict and chaos, he claims, and are working together on “the great task of building socialism.” However, he concedes that to say that there are no points of disagreement would be unrealistic. In his speech, Mao addresses two primary types of conflict. Though the main body of the speech concerns internal issues, the first section lays out in detail the progression of entities and ideologies that Mao considers to be the enemy. The first and most obvious enemies are the Japanese and those who supported them in the occupation. Next are the “the bureaucrat-capitalists, the landlords and the Kuomintang reactionaries” who fought the Communists during the Chinese Civil War. Now that these enemies have been thoroughly defeated, the enemy of the people is “social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction.” Mao describes the “contradictions” between the people and their external enemies as “antagonistic contradictions,” in contrast to the contradictions among the people, which are “non-antagonistic,” and those between “the exploited and the exploiting classes,” which he sees as having aspects of both. It is inevitable, he notes, that conflicts should arise among people who are not working against socialism but who may be at odds with others engaged in the system. Mao also acknowledges that there are areas of conflict between the state, the community, and the individual. The group that Mao identifies as the “national bourgeoisie” can be antagonistic to “the working class and other sections of the working people,” but conflicts can be resolved if they agree to work together in a nonexploitative way. Mao describes China as “a people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance” and argues that this dictatorship is necessary in order to maintain order and “protect [the] people so that they can devote themselves to peaceful labor.” Since this dictatorship is “led by the working class,” it is

a true democracy, but it needs strong leadership to keep it from devolving into anarchy. Mao argues that the Hungarian Revolution, which he refers to as the “Hungarian incident,” is a cautionary tale, not something to be emulated. He says it is an example of outsiders—“domestic and foreign counterrevolutionaries”—deceiving the people into believing that two-party systems and open elections would give them more freedom than socialism. Once proper government is in place and the people are protected from enemies both external and internal, he claims, the proper way to resolve differences among the people is the “unity-criticism-unity” method, in which consensus can be found through open conversation and persuasion. Essential Themes

The original version of this speech, given in February 1957, encouraged students and intellectuals to offer criticism of the government openly. Mao had assumed that this new open conversation would result in widespread praise for his leadership and that criticism would be directed at issues that Mao wished to reform and party members who had challenged him. When intellectuals finally began to criticize the government, however, they were unsparing and outspoken. Flyers and posters were widely distributed that criticized party members and policy. By June, when this revised version of the speech was published in the official newspaper, Mao was moving away from the open dialogue he had encouraged; within a month of its publication, he had begun a crackdown on dissenters, many of them identified during this Hundred Flowers Campaign. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Mao Zedong. The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward. Ed. Roderick MacFarquhar et al. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard U, 1989. Print. Schoenhals, Michael. “Original Contradictions: On the Unrevised Text of Mao Zedong’s ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People.’” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 16 (1986): 99–112. JSTOR. Web. 21 Dec. 2015. Solomon, Richard H. Mao’s Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. Berkeley: U of California, 1971. Print.

Launching of the Sputnik Satellite

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 Launching of the Sputnik Satellite Date: October 5, 1957 Author: Pravda Genre: article Summary Overview

The Soviet Union gained a monumental head start in the space race when it launched the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957—an event announced the next day in Pravda, the state-run newspaper of the Soviet Union. The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), an organization that promoted and coordinated international scientific cooperation, had encouraged scientists around the world to work toward the successful launch of a satellite during the International Geophysical Year, which lasted from July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958. The United States had announced that it would launch an Earth-orbiting satellite during this time, but the Soviet Union was the first to do so. Sputnik (meaning “fellow traveler”) was less than two feet in diameter and took about ninetysix minutes to complete one full orbit. It remained in space for ninety-two days before reentering Earth’s atmosphere and burning up. The launch of Sputnik was the event that marked the beginning of the race between the United States and the Soviet Union for technological supremacy in space. Not only was Sputnik a blow to the prestige of the United States, it also signaled that the Soviet Union possessed advanced technology that could be used in wartime, since it was delivered to orbit by a Soviet R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile. One month later, the Soviet Union upped the ante by launching Sputnik 2, which carried a passenger—a dog named Laika—proving it could handle an increased payload. The United States launched its own satellite, Explorer 1, in January 1958; in July of the same year, Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act, creating the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Defining Moment

In 1957, the practical possibility of space exploration had been a topic of public interest for nearly a century. In 1865, Jules Verne had published the novel From the

Earth to the Moon, followed by H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds in serialized format in 1897. In 1903, inspired by Verne’s work, Russian scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky published his research on the viability of space exploration. That article, the title of which translates as “The Exploration of Cosmic Space by Means of Reaction Devices,” was the world’s first serious scientific study of the possibility of using rockets to escape Earth’s gravity. In 1924, Tsiolkovsky became a founding member of the Soviet Union’s Society for Studies of Interplanetary Travel. The first liquid-fueled rocket was launched in 1926 by American engineer Robert H. Goddard. Germany began work on long-range ballistic missiles in the 1930s and used them to launch successful attacks on England and Belgium in 1944. The German V-2 rocket was also the first artificial object to pass the Karman line, the internationally accepted boundary between Earth’s atmosphere and outer space, which lies at sixty-two miles (one hundred kilometers) above sea level. The V-2 was captured by the United States at the end of World War II, and many of the scientists who had worked on it were brought back to the United States and ultimately worked at NASA. The Soviet Union also captured key V-2 manufacturing bases and personnel. These rockets were developed less as a way to explore space than as a means of delivering a nuclear weapon to an enemy, but Sputnik and the space race that followed would not have been possible without this rocket technology. In 1952, the ICSU approved a proposal to designate the eighteen-month period from July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, the International Geophysical Year (IGY). The event was scheduled to coincide with a period of maximum solar activity. Participating countries would be represented by scientists who would spend the time making detailed observations and measurements of geophysical phenomena around the world. The ICSU encouraged participating nations to work

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toward the development of a satellite that could gather scientific information about the earth’s surface. Sixtyseven countries ultimately participated in the IGY, and a committee was set up to oversee all of the activities associated with the IGY and ensure that it remained above political or nationalist concerns. Since the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in the bitter ideological and near-military conflict known as the Cold War at the time, the IGY challenge took on additional meaning to the two nations. The United States formed a committee to oversee five working groups and thirteen panels of scientists and eventually involved over 200 members. The United States announced in July 1955 that it would attempt to launch an artificial satellite into orbit. The Soviet Union’s Academy of Sciences joined the ICSU in 1955 and worked to beat the United States into space during the International Geophysical Year. Author Biography

Pravda was the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, first published as a party newspaper on May 5, 1912, on the birthday of Karl Marx. Before 1912, Pravda was a literary and social

journal that gradually became politicized following the Russian Revolution of 1905, which resulted in a new Russian constitution and significant reforms. As many of Pravda’s contributors became increasingly radicalized, it became a political mouthpiece for the Bolshevik (majority) faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) and was widely read by Russian workers and activists. After the Menshevik (minority) faction was expelled from the RSDLP in January 1912, the Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, printed Pravda for the first time as a purely political newspaper. Between 1912 and 1917, the paper changed hands and locations numerous times as the tsarist regime sought to repress it. Following the October Revolution of 1917 and the ascendancy of the Bolsheviks, who officially became the Russian Communist Party in 1918, the paper was printed openly. It moved to Moscow, and the Communist Party made it required reading for party members until 1991. Pravda became the mouthpiece for official government information and the conduit for policy information and government-sanctioned news. It was sold in 1991 during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then became the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 1997.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT For several years scientific research and experimental design work have been conducted in the Soviet Union on the creation of artificial satellites of the earth. As already reported in the press, the first launching of the satellites in the USSR were planned for realization in accordance with the scientific research program of the International Geophysical Year. As a result of very intensive work by scientific research institutes and design bureaus the first artificial satellite in the world has been created. On October 4, 1957, this first satellite was successfully launched in the USSR. According to preliminary data, the carrier rocket has imparted to the satellite the required orbital velocity of about 8000 meters per second. At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajectories around the earth, and its flight can be observed in the rays of the rising and setting sun with the aid of very simple optical instruments (binoculars, telescopes, etc.).

According to calculations which now are being supplemented by direct observations, the satellite will travel at altitudes up to 900 kilometers above the surface of the earth; the time for a complete revolution of the satellite will be one hour and thirty-five minutes; the angle of inclination of its orbit to the equatorial plane is 65 degrees. On October 5 the satellite will pass over the Moscow area twice—at 1:46 a.m. and at 6:42 a.m. Moscow time. Reports about the subsequent movement of the first artificial satellite launched in the USSR on October 4 will be issued regularly by broadcasting stations. The satellite has a spherical shape 58 centimeters in diameter and weighs 83.6 kilograms. It is equipped with two radio transmitters continuously emitting signals at frequencies of 20.005 and 40.002 megacycles per second (wave lengths of about 15 and 7.5 meters, respectively). The power of the transmitters ensures reli-

Launching of the Sputnik Satellite

able reception of the signals by a broad range of radio amateurs. The signals have the form of telegraph pulses of about 0.3 second’s duration with a [312] pause of the same duration. The signal of one frequency is sent during the pause in the signal of the other frequency. Scientific stations located at various points in the Soviet Union are tracking the satellite and determining the elements of its trajectory. Since the density of the rarified upper layers of the atmosphere is not accurately known, there are no data at present for the precise determination of the satellite’s lifetime and of the point of its entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere. Calculations have shown that owing to the tremendous velocity of the satellite, at the end of its existence it will burn up on reaching the dense layers of the atmosphere at an altitude of several tens of kilometers. As early as the end of the nineteenth century the possibility of realizing cosmic flights by means of rockets was first scientifically substantiated in Russia by the

Document Analysis

This document is the official report of the launching of the satellite Sputnik. Though this is the first confirmation of the event, news of the launch was leaked in the United States, and so the announcement was not a complete surprise. The tone of the announcement is terse and factual, with the exception of the final pronouncement, which takes a propagandist turn. This terseness is in stark contrast to the shock that it elicited in the United States, where suddenly the technological superiority of the nation was called into doubt. The report states that the Soviet Union has been working for several years on a satellite and that it coordinated the launch to be part of the International Geophysical Year. Whether or not this is true, framing the launch in this way, as a purely scientific venture, made it difficult for the United States to criticize it or point to it as an aggressive or hostile maneuver. Perhaps most troubling to the United States was the ability of the Soviet Union to deploy a “carrier rocket” capable of “impart[ing] to the satellite the required orbital velocity of about 8000 meters per second.” The report outlines the technical specifications of the satellite. It was equipped with a radio transmitter that allowed it to be heard with basic equipment by a “broad range of radio amateurs.” The lifespan of Sput-

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works of the outstanding Russian scientist K[onstatin] E. Tsiolkovskii [Tsiolkovskiy]. The successful launching of the first man-made earth satellite makes a most important contribution to the treasure-house of world science and culture. The scientific experiment accomplished at such a great height is of tremendous importance for learning the properties of cosmic space and for studying the earth as a planet of our solar system. During the International Geophysical Year the Soviet Union proposes launching several more artificial earth satellites. These subsequent satellites will be larger and heavier and they will be used to carry out programs of scientific research. Artificial earth satellites will pave the way to interplanetary travel and, apparently our contemporaries will witness how the freed and conscientious labor of the people of the new socialist society makes the most daring dreams of mankind a reality.

nik was also in doubt, as this was uncharted territory. The Soviet Union assumed that it would burn up on reentry, which is exactly what happened. The final statements of the report are geared toward enhancing the prestige of the Soviet Union, culminating with the implication that Sputnik is proof of the nation’s superiority, both culturally and politically. The article points out that “the possibility of realizing cosmic flights by means of rockets was first scientifically substantiated in Russia,” citing Tsiolkovsky by name, and promises more and bigger satellites to come. It ends with the political statement that Sputnik’s launch offers proof that “the freed and conscientious labor of the people of the new socialist society makes the most daring dreams of mankind a reality.” Essential Themes

The launch of Sputnik was an unpleasant surprise to the United States, and it was greeted with a mixture of jealousy and fear. The Soviet Union had proved that it had a significant technological advantage over the United States, and many Americans feared that this satellite and rocket superiority could be used to carry deadly weapons right to their doorstep. By the time the United States launched its first satellite, Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958, the Soviet Union had already suc-

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cessfully launched Sputnik 2, which carried a dog into space. Suddenly, the space race took on critical importance in the United States, as the nation’s confidence in its military and scientific prowess was badly shaken. The one-upmanship continued for the next decade, with the Soviet Union at a clear advantage. Among its other accomplishments, it sent the first man (Yuri Gagarin, 1961) and the first woman (Valentina Tereshkova, 1963) into space and landed the first unmanned vehicle (Luna 2, 1959) on the moon. On July 21, 1969, the United States finally regained the technological advantage when two American astronauts walked on the surface of the moon. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Cadbury, Deborah. Space Race: The Epic Battle between America and the Soviet Union for Dominion of Space. New York: Harper, 2005. Print. Chapman, Sydney. IGY: Year of Discovery; The Story of the International Geophysical Year. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1959. Print. Divine, Robert A. The Sputnik Challenge. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print.

Eisenhower on Science in National Security

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 Eisenhower on Science in National Security Date: November 7, 1957 Author: Dwight D. Eisenhower Genre: speech Summary Overview

In this first of two speeches on science and national security, President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded to a nation still shocked by the Soviet Union’s launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, into space on October 4, 1957. That the Soviet Union had beaten the United States to this milestone had profoundly shaken the nation’s confidence in its technological and scientific superiority, and the event marked the beginning of the race for technological supremacy in space between the United States and the Soviet Union. Not only was Sputnik a blow to the prestige of the United States, but also it signaled that the Soviet Union possessed advanced technology that could be used in wartime, since it was delivered to orbit by a Soviet R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile. One month later, four days before this speech was given, the Soviet Union upped the ante by launching Sputnik II, proving it could handle an increased payload. It also carried the first live animal into space, a dog named Laika. President Eisenhower encouraged the nation to recapture and maintain its technological advantage through public support of science education, streamlined partnerships between science and the government, and financial and leadership support for research and development in the armed forces. Defining Moment

The successful launch of Sputnik came as a shock to the US government, military, and scientific community. It also mesmerized, and terrified, the American public, who could see the satellite orbiting the earth with a simple pair of binoculars, or hear its beeping on their radios. Since the production of the first atomic bomb, then the first hydrogen bomb, the United States had assumed its technical superiority over its chief rival in the world. Scientists and politicians argued that the kind of creative thought necessary to launch a vehicle into outer space would be impossible in a country with a repressive totalitarian system. But Sputnik proved that

the Soviet Union could win technological mastery in space. It also did not go unnoticed that the same rocket that brought Sputnik into space could also deliver a nuclear bomb to the United States. The military implications were astounding, leaving Americans to question whether they had lost the nuclear arms race. These fears were compounded when Sputnik II was successfully launched on November 3, carrying an astonishing half-ton payload and a live dog. Ironically, Sputnik also solved a problem for the United States. After the brutal engagement of the Korean War, Eisenhower had taken steps to reduce personnel in the military and focused on nuclear technology that would provide a deterrent to war; this took the form of a retaliatory capability that would wreak unprecedented destruction. A full knowledge of Soviet capabilities was crucial to this deterrence, and the United States was eager to develop satellites that could be used for reconnaissance. They were concerned, however, that the launch of a satellite could be seen by the Soviet Union as a violation of international airspace. The launch of Sputnik had paved the way for future “spy” satellites by establishing the freedom of space. In addition, Eisenhower saw the “space race” as a way to siphon off resources that would otherwise go toward further developing Soviet weaponry. This was no comfort to the citizens of the United States, nor to scientists and politicians not privy to this top-secret information. The blow to the nation’s prestige became a platform for political accusations and rancor in the scientific community. It also sparked a national debate about whether the conspicuous consumerism of the 1950s had redirected much-needed technological research from national defense. Suddenly robot toasters and push-button cars seemed frivolous and gimmicky in the face of earnest Soviet scientists working around the clock for the benefit of their country. Prior to this speech, Eisenhower convened meetings

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with leading American scientists, who urged him both to bolster governmental support for science and to appoint a prominent scientist to a senior position in the White House. Author Biography

Dwight David Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890. He was the third son of seven children, and when he was two years old, his parents moved to Abilene, Kansas. Eisenhower graduated from Abilene High School in 1909 and was accepted to West Point in 1911. He was an officer in the US Army during World War I but was not sent overseas. He continued his military career after the war and was made a brigadier general on October 3, 1941. Eisenhower went on to command the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942 during World War II. In 1943, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt made Eisenhower supreme Allied commander in Europe, and he was in charge of the Allied forces that invaded occupied France on June 6, 1944, D-Day. After a postwar position as the military commander of occupied Germany, Eisenhower was named chief of staff of the Army, until becoming president of Columbia University in 1948. He was named supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1950 but retained the presidency of Columbia until 1953, when he became president of the United States, defeating Democrat Adlai Stevenson. After serving a second term as president, Eisenhower retired to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He died of congestive heart failure on March 28, 1969, and is buried on the grounds of the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT MY SUBJECT tonight is Science in National Security. Originally this talk was to be part of one I intend to make in Oklahoma City next week. However, I found that I could not possibly deal with this subject in just one address. So tonight I shall concentrate on the most immediate aspects of this question of the relationship of science to the defense of our country. Let me tell you plainly what I am going to do in this talk and those to follow. I am going to lay the facts before you—the rough with the smooth. Some of these security facts are reassuring; others are not—they are sternly demanding. Some require that we resolutely continue lines of action now well begun. Others require new action, and still others new dimensions of effort. After putting these facts and requirements before you, I shall propose a program of action—a program that will demand the energetic support of not just the government but every American, if we are to make it successful. I First: some facts about our present security posture. It is one of great strength—but by no means should this assurance satisfy any of us. Our defenses must be adequate not just today, but tomorrow and in all the years to

come, until under the safety of these defenses, we shall have secured a durable and just peace for all the world. As of now, the United States is strong. Our nation has today, and has had for some years, enough power in its strategic retaliatory forces to bring near annihilation to the war-making capabilities of any other country. This position of present strength did not come about by accident. The Korean War had the effect of greatly expanding our peacetime defense forces. As we began the partial demobilization of these forces we undertook also an accelerated program of modernization. As a first step, scientific surveys were instituted soon after the Korean Armistice. The result was a decision to give a “New Look” to the defense establishment, depending for increased efficiency more upon modern science and less upon mere numbers of men. In succeeding years there has been an across-theboard program to bring all units of our defense into line with the possibilities of modern technology. There has been, also, a high level of expenditure on research and development for defense—now running in the aggregate at something over $5 billion a year. Later, scientific surveys focused attention and emphasis on long range ballistic missiles. Development on this item got into high gear more than two years ago.

Eisenhower on Science in National Security

We have since been spending a billion dollars a year on this item alone. Before discussing some of the things we urgently need to do, I would like to give you a few samples of the things that have been done in recent years by our military forces, scientists and engineers to put current scientific discovery at the service of your defense. In our diversified family of missiles, we have weapons adapted to every kind of distance, launching and use. There are now thirty-eight different types either in operation or under development. All combat vessels of the Navy built since 1955 have guided missiles in place of, or to supplement, guns. The Navy has in both oceans, submarines which can rise to the surface and launch, in a matter of minutes, a missile carrying a nuclear warhead, and submerge immediately—while the missile is guided to a target hundreds of miles away. The Navy possesses an atomic depth bomb. Since Korea, both the Army’s and Navy’s anti-aircraft guns have been largely replaced by surface-to-air missiles. All of our new interceptor aircraft are armed with air-to-air missiles. Many of the traditional functions of the Army’s artillery and support aircraft have been taken over by guided missiles. For example, we have already produced, in various distance ranges, hundreds of Matador, Honest John and Corporal missiles. To give you some idea of what this means in terms of explosive power: Four battalions of Corporal missiles alone are equivalent in fire power to all the artillery used in World War II. Some of these missiles have their own built-in mechanisms for seeking out and destroying a target many miles away. Thus, the other day, a Bomarc missile, by itself, sought out a fast-moving, unmanned airplane 45 miles at sea and actually met it head-on. Except for a dwindling number of B-36s, there is hardly an airplane in the combat units of the Air Force that was in them even as late as the Korean conflict. The B-52 jet bomber, supported by its jet tankers, is standard in our Strategic Air Command. Again, to show you what this means in terms of power: One B-52 can carry as much destructive capacity as was delivered by all the bombers in all the years of World War II combined. But

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the B-52 will, in turn, be succeeded by the B-58, a supersonic bomber. Atomic submarines have been developed. One ran almost sixteen days without surfacing; another cruised under the polar ice cap for over five days. A number of huge naval carriers are in operation, supplied with the most powerful nuclear weapons and bombers of great range to deliver them. Construction has started which will produce a carrier to be driven by atomic power. Since 1956 we have developed nuclear explosives with radioactive fall-out of less than 4 percent of the fallout of previous large weapons. This has obvious importance in developing nuclear defenses for use over our own territory. In numbers, our stock of nuclear weapons is so large and so rapidly growing that we are able safely to disperse it to positions assuring its instant availability against attack, and still keep strong reserves. Our scientists assure me that we are well ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field, both in quantity and in quality. We intend to stay ahead. We have already shown that we can, with the precision to make it a useful military weapon, fire a large ballistic missile well over a thousand miles. Our ballistic test missiles have had successful flights to as much as 3,500 miles. An intercontinental missile is required, and we have some of them in an advanced state of development. But, because of our many forward positions, for us an intermediate range missile is for some purposes as good as an intercontinental one. A different kind of missile, the air-breathing Snark, recently travelled over a guided course for 5,000 miles and was accurately placed on target. We have fired three rockets to heights between 2,000 and 4,000 miles, and have received back much valuable information about outer space. One difficult obstacle on the way to producing a useful long-range weapon is that of bringing a missile back from outer space without its burning up like a meteor, because of friction with the earth’s atmosphere. Our scientists and engineers have solved that problem. This object here in my office is an experimental missile—a nose cone. It has been hundreds of miles to outer space and back. Here it is, completely intact.

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These illustrations—which are of course only a small sample of our scientists’ accomplishments—I give you merely to show that our strength is not static but is constantly moving forward with technological improvement. Long-range ballistic missiles, as they exist today, do not cancel the destructive and deterrent power of our Strategic Air Force. The Soviet launching of earth satellites is an achievement of the first importance, and the scientists who brought it about deserve full credit and recognition. Already, useful new facts on outer space have been produced, and more are on the way, as new satellites with added instruments are launched. Earth satellites, in themselves, have no direct present effect upon the nation’s security. However, there is real military significance to these launchings, which I have previously mentioned publicly. Their current military significance lies in the advanced techniques and the competence in military technology they imply, evidenced, for example, by the powerful propulsion equipment necessarily used. But in the main, the Soviets continue to concentrate on the development of war-making weapons and supporting industries. This, as well as their political attitude in all international affairs, serves to warn us that Soviet expansionist aims have not changed. The world has not forgotten the Soviet military invasions of such countries as Finland and Poland, their support of the war in Korea, or their use of force in their ruthless suppression of Hungarian freedom. Eternal vigilance and increased free world military power, backed by our combined economic and spiritual strength, provide the only answer to this threat until the Soviet leaders themselves cease to consume their resources in warlike and expansionist purposes and turn them to the well-being of their own peoples. We frankly recognize that the Soviets are building up types of power that could, if we were attacked, damage us seriously. This is because no defensive system today can possibly be air-tight in preventing all break-throughs of planes and weapons. To aid in protecting against this, we, in partnership with Canada, have long been constructing a continental defense system reaching from far out in the Pacific around the northern edge of this continent and across

the Atlantic approaches. This is a complex system of early warning radars, communication lines, electronic computers, supersonic aircraft, and ground-to-air missiles, some with atomic warheads. This organization and equipment is under constant improvement; emphasis on this improvement must be increased. In addition to retaliatory and continental defense forces, we and our allies maintain strong ground and naval units in strategic areas of the world. In the strength and readiness of all these varied kinds of power—retaliatory, defensive and local-properly distributed and supported, lies the real deterrent to the outbreak of war. This fact brings home to all of us the tremendous importance to this country of our Allies. Not only do they maintain large military forces as part of our combined security, but they provide vital bases and areas that permit the effective deployment of all our forces for defense. It is my conviction, supported by trusted scientific and military advisers, that, although the Soviets are quite likely ahead in some missile and special areas, and are obviously ahead of us in satellite development, as of today the over-all military strength of the free world is distinctly greater than that of the communist countries. We must see to it that whatever advantages they have, are temporary only. II The next question is: How about the future? I must say to you, in all gravity, that in spite of both the present over-all strength and the forward momentum of our defense, it is entirely possible that in the years ahead we could fall behind. I repeat: we could fall behind— unless we now face up to certain pressing requirements and set out to meet them at once. I address myself to this problem knowing that for every American it surmounts any division among us of whatever kind. It reminds us once again that we are not partisans of any kind, we are Americans! We will close ranks as Americans, and get on with the job to be done. According to my scientific friends, one of our greatest, and most glaring, deficiencies is the failure of us in this country to give high enough priority to scientific education and to the place of science in our national life. Of course, these scientists properly assume that we shall continue to acquire the most modern weapons

Eisenhower on Science in National Security

in adequate numbers as fast as they are produced; but their conviction does expose one great future danger that no amount of money or resources currently devoted to it can meet. Education requires time, incentive and skilled teachers. They believe that a second critical need is that of giving higher priority, both public and private, to basic research. As to these long range requirements, I shall have something to say next week. Tonight I shall discuss two other factors, on which prompt action is possible. The first is the tragic failure to secure the great benefits that would flow from mutual sharing of appropriate scientific information and effort among friendly countries. Most great scientific advances of the world have been the product of free international exchange of ideas. There is hardly a nation that has not made some significant contribution to modern science. There instantly comes to mind the contribution of Britain to jet propulsion, radar, and infra-red rays; Germany to rocketry, x-rays, and sulfa drugs; Italy to wireless telegraphy; France to radio activity; and Japan to magnetics. In the free world, we all have a lot to give and a lot to gain in security through the pooling of scientific effort. Why should we deny to our friends information that we are sure the Soviets already have?—information our friends could use toward our mutual security. Why, for want of the fullest practicable sharing, should we waste American research funds and talent struggling with technological problems already mastered by our friends? Here is a way in which, at no cost, we can dramatically and quickly magnify the scientific resources at the disposal of the free world. The second immediate requirement is that of greater concentration of effort and improved arrangements within the government in the fields of science, technology and missiles—including the continuing requirement for the closest kind of Executive-Legislative cooperation.

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III As to action: I report the following items to you tonight. The first thing I have done is to make sure that the very best thought and advice that the scientific community can supply, heretofore provided to me on an informal basis, is now fully organized and formalized so that no gap can occur. The purpose is to make it possible for me, personally, whenever there appears to be any unnecessary delay in our development system, to act promptly and decisively. To that end, I have created the office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. This man, who will be aided by a staff of scientists and a strong Advisory Group of outstanding experts reporting to him and to me, will have the active responsibility of helping me follow through on the program that I am partially outlining tonight and next week. I am glad to be able to tell you that this position has been accepted by Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a man who enjoys my confidence, and the confidence of his colleagues in the scientific and engineering world, and in the government. Through him, I intend to be assured that the entire program is carried forward in closely-integrated fashion, and that such things as alleged inter-service competition or insufficient use of overtime shall not be allowed to create even the suspicion of harm to our scientific and development program. Moreover, Dr. Killian will see to it that those projects which experts judge have the highest potential shall advance with the utmost possible speed. He will make sure that our best talent and the full necessary resources are applied on certain high-priority topsecret items that, for security reasons, I know you will not expect me to enumerate. In looking to Dr. Killian to discharge these responsibilities, I expect him to draw upon the full abilities of the scientists and engineers of our country. Second: In the Defense Department is an official, directly responsible to the Secretary, in charge of missile development. I have directed that the Secretary make certain that the Guided Missile Director is clothed with all the authority that the Secretary himself possesses in this field, so that no administrative or inter-service block

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can occur. Dr. Killian will, of course, work intimately with this official. Third: The Secretary of Defense and I have agreed that any new missile or related program hereafter originated will, whenever practicable, be put under a single manager and administered without regard to the separate services. Fourth: There will be laid before the Congress proposed legislation to remove legal barriers to the exchange of appropriate technological information with friendly countries. Fifth: If the necessary authority is granted, I shall support, along the lines of the agreement reached with Prime Minister Macmillan, a Scientific Committee organized within NATO to carry out an enlarged Atlantic effort in research. Similar action in SEATO and comparable organizations will be studied. And, to help carry out these measures of mutual effort, the Secretary of State will appoint a Science Adviser to himself and Science Attaches in appropriate places abroad. At any point in any of these actions where additional legal authority proves necessary, that authority will be asked of Congress at the outset of its next session. These matters will be discussed in my forthcoming bipartisan meeting with the leaders of Congress. They will be requested to consider every feasible step to hasten needed legislative action. These, my friends, are the most immediate steps that are under way in scientific areas as they bear upon security. Even in two talks I cannot, by any means, cover the entire subject of defense, but only selected questions of pressing and current importance. Accordingly, I am not at this time even alluding to a number of key items bearing strongly on defense, such as mutual aid, and Civil Defense. Likewise I have not dwelt upon the urgent need for greater dispersal in the Strategic Air Command, or for providing all the means that will enable airplanes to take off in the shortest possible time after receipt of warning. In this whole effort it is important to see that nothing is wasted on non-essentials. Defense today is expensive, and growing more so. We cannot afford waste. It misses the whole point to say that we must now increase our expenditures of all kinds on military hard-

ware and defense as, for example, to heed demands recently made that we restore all personnel cuts made in the armed forces. Certainly, we need to feel a high sense of urgency. But this does not mean that we should mount our charger and try to ride off in all directions at once. We must clearly identify the exact and critical needs that have to be met. We must then apply our resources at that point as fully as the need demands. This means selectivity in national expenditures of all kinds. We cannot, on an unlimited scale, have both what we must have and what we would like to have. We can have both a sound defense, and the sound economy on which it rests—if we set our priorities and stick to them and if each of us is ready to carry his own share of the burden. In conclusion: Although for tonight’s purposes I stress the influence of science on defense, I am not forgetting that there is much more to science than its function in strengthening our defense, and much more to our defense than the part played by science. The peaceful contributions of science—to healing, to enriching life, to freeing the spirit—these are the most important products of the conquest of nature’s secrets. And the spiritual powers of a nation—its underlying religious faith, its self-reliance, its capacity for intelligent sacrifice—these are the most important stones in any defense structure. Above all, let me say for all to hear that, so far as we are concerned, the amassing of military might never has been—and never will be—devoted to any other end than defense and the preservation of a just peace. What the world needs today even more than a giant leap into outer space, is a giant step toward peace. Time and again we have demonstrated our eagerness to take such a step. As a start in this direction, I urge the Soviets now to align themselves with the practical and workable disarmament proposals, approved yesterday by a large majority in the United Nations. Never shall we cease to hope and work for the coming of the day when enduring peace will take these military burdens from the back of mankind, and when the scientist can give his full attention, not to human destruction, but to human happiness and fulfillment. Thank you—and good night.

Eisenhower on Science in National Security

Document Analysis

Eisenhower begins this speech by announcing he will discuss “the relationship of science to the defense of our country.” The security situation is a mixed bag, according to Eisenhower, and will require action in order to strengthen the national position. He emphasizes the role that science has played thus far in weapons development and defensive capabilities and lays out a full list and description of the many nuclear weapons and missile deployment systems the United States possesses across the globe. Though the confidence of Americans had been shaken by the launch of Sputnik, Eisenhower tells his listeners, “Our scientists assure me that we are well ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field, both in quantity and in quality.” This superiority is not certain of continuing, however, and he warns that the United States “could fall behind” the Soviet Union if the United States does not make a concerted effort to prioritize science and research. Sputnik is a wake-up call and proof that the Soviets have “advanced techniques and the competence in military technology” sufficient to propel an object into orbit—and thus also to provide advanced weapons delivery capability. Though Eisenhower congratulates the scientists who worked on Sputnik, he sees no reason to assume that the focus of the Soviet Union has shifted to peacetime endeavors. On the contrary, “Soviet expansionist aims have not changed,” and “eternal vigilance and increased free world military power” must continue. In order to streamline communications between agencies and link the government with the scientific community, Eisenhower announces the creation of the office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and appoints Dr. James R. Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to the post. Killian’s job will be to develop these links between scientists and government and monitor technological or scientific developments in the military. Eisenhower emphasises the need for Killian to ensure that all Department of Defense research is shared between branches of the military and that any barriers to communication or rivalries are broken down. Eisenhower also emphasizes the importance of maintaining close relationships with allies of the United States, particularly in order to share research and scientific developments. He proposes that a NATO Science Committee be created and that a science adviser be attached to embassies and to the secretary of state. In closing, Eisenhower stresses that science should

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be returned to peaceful purposes and the bettering of people’s lives and calls on the Soviet Union to join the United States in disarmament and peace talks. Essential Themes

Killian eventually assisted Eisenhower as the head of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The launch of Sputnik I and II was followed by the launch of the first United States satellite, Explorer I, on January 31, 1958. Also in 1958, assisted by PSAC, Eisenhower created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was fully dedicated to space exploration. The space race heated up as each superpower tried to achieve technological milestones ahead of the other. Eisenhower was also interested in how space could be used to gain military advantage and set up national security agencies within the military to explore those options. The United States also pursued reconnaissance satellites under a new agency called the National Reconnaissance Office, the existence of which remained officially classified until the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The race for supremacy in space continued through the 1960s, with the Soviet Union at a clear advantage. The Soviets put the first man and the first woman in space and landed the first vehicle on the moon, among other accomplishments. On July 21, 1969, the United States finally regained the technological advantage when two astronauts walked on the surface of the moon. In 1972, President Richard M. Nixon eliminated the President’s Science Advisory Committee, though it was replaced a few years later by the White House Office of Science and Technology, now known as the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the head of this office is still known as the president’s science advisor. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: Volume II—The President. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. Print. Thomas, Evans. Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World. New York: Little, Brown, 2012. Print. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1993. Print. Wang, Zuoyue. In Sputnik’s Shadow the President’s Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2008. Print.

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 “Communism in the Americas” Date: January 14, 1958 Author: R. Richard Rubottom Jr. Genre: speech Summary Overview

“Communism in the Americas” was originally an address given by US diplomat R. Richard Rubottom Jr. to a joint meeting of the Miami-Dade County Chamber of Commerce and the United Nations Association of Greater Miami and then reprinted by the US State Department. It sets out the US government’s view of the Communist threat in Latin America in the overall context of the Cold War. The danger of Communism is identified primarily not as emanating from Communist parties themselves, which were very small in most of Latin America, but from front groups, ostensibly independent of the Communists but, in fact, controlled by them. The overall evaluation of Communism in Latin America is of a Soviet-dominated, subversive monolith, but the author also suggests that Latin Americans are highly resistant to Communist efforts due to their patriotism, good sense, and religious piety. He supports close relations between the United States and Latin American governments on political, economic, and cultural levels, extending to a relatively free exchange of populations, but makes little mention of military ties except for suggesting that Latin American states lower their military expenses to make more resources available for economic development. Defining Moment

Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which aimed to deter European involvement in the Americas, the United States had sought to maintain hegemony in Latin America. Economic involvement, military aid, and even direct military action were all used to support US interests in the region, in some cases generating conflict and mistrust among Latin Americans. United States foreign policy in the 1950s was conditioned by the Cold War, the global struggle for influence and control with the Soviet Union that had been raging since shortly after the end of World War II. This was both a struggle be-

tween the United States and the Soviet Union as world powers and an ideological conflict between the free enterprise, capitalist economy of the United States and the state-controlled Communism of the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe. In this struggle, Latin America proved an important battleground. Most governments in the region were proAmerican—and therefore anti-Communist—due to US influence. However, many Latin American societies were marked by extreme economic and social inequality, generating support for Communists who claimed to work against such conditions. Many Latin American regimes were also dictatorial rather than democratic, opening them to criticism both from admirers of liberal democracy in the United States and from Communists. Communists attempted to seize upon resentment of the United States among Latin Americans subjected to US political and economic power for decades. The United States had been fostering cooperation against Communism for over a decade, and many Latin American elites opposed Soviet influence for their own reasons as well. Communist alignment with lower class movements seeking greater economic equality made Communism a threat to the propertied classes of Latin American nations. For this reason, the labor movement was thought particularly vulnerable to Communist infiltration, both by American diplomats and by Latin American rulers. Although the United States never abandoned a rhetorical commitment to democracy in Latin America, in practice it was willing to work with dictators and oligarchs, provided they were anti-Communist, and to oppose democratically elected leaders, such as Guatemala’s Jacobo Árbenz, who was deposed in 1954, if they were thought sympathetic to Communism or opposed to American business interests.

“Communism in the Americas”

Author Biography

Roy Richard Rubottom Jr. was born on February 13, 1912, in Texas. After serving in World War II, he entered the Foreign Service via a program to encourage veterans to become diplomats. He was appointed the assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs in 1957 and became a significant influence on US policy in Latin America, particularly regarding Cuba. Rubottom traveled with Vice President Richard Nixon on a 1958 tour of Latin America. Nixon partially blamed the hostility with which he was greeted—which

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helped reveal the extent of anti-Americanism in Latin America—on Rubottom’s planning. Rubottom was also criticized for not identifying rebel Fidel Castro as a Communist before he took control of Cuba. Rubottom was made ambassador to Argentina in 1960 and served for one year. After retiring from the State Department, he had a career in higher education at Southern Methodist University, his alma mater, and Mexico’s University of the Americas, where he served as president. He died in 2010.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Today I want to talk to you about the role of communism in the Americas. It is a thoroughly sinister role. It is the same role in North America, Central America, and South America, or elsewhere in the world. It is unchanged. It may have taken on a new coloration, protective to the Communists themselves but always destructive to the rest of us. This role involves both aspects of the international Communist movement, the ideology of the party line held out by Communists and, even worse, their subversive intervention in the internal affairs of other states and peoples. This, of course, is utterly contrary to our way of life in the Americas and will never succeed. The basic task of Communist Parties all over the world in trying to carry out both aspects is, in the words of Lenin, to combine the strictest loyalty to the ideas of communism with an ability to make all the necessary practical compromises. In the thirties, with the Communist Parties then only small minorities, one of the compromises which was developed to establish contact with the masses, either through collaboration with the leaders of non-Communist organizations or through appealing to the masses over the heads of their leaders, was the so-called “popular front.” Especially in times when Communists wish to lull others into complacency and relaxation such as the present, the “popular front” tactic is applied through the development and infiltration of organizations, often having objectives or appeals which appear to coincide with the legitimate aspirations of a group—the technique of the soporific—which are then used to achieve Com-

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munist objectives. In this way hundreds of thousands of people are made the innocent tools of the Communist conspiracy. We have had this problem of “fronts” in the United States; it is particularly serious in Latin America. The Soviets now control 13 major international front organizations, each with dozens of subsidiary organizations all over the world. Each is a huge “interlocking directorate” linking the Kremlin to a vast network of national organizations operated by local Communists or dupes. All have a common purpose—to draw as many social groups as possible closer to communism and to make amenable to them the global aims of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These fronts are divided, one from another, on functional lines so that, despite their similar operational patterns, they can “offer all things to all men.” There is a front for “peace,” perhaps the cruelest of all, since all mankind yearns for that; there are others for youth, women, labor, international traders, journalists, intellectuals, and professionals. Each has a theme designed to attract a following from the particular target group. They have several things in common: They are all controlled at the top by Communists, directly or indirectly; they engage in vast propaganda activities; today they emphasize “national liberation” and, particularly in Latin America, “economic independence.” Through these fronts, and with Soviet financial support when required, local, national, and international meetings are organized; travel to the Communist hinterland is arranged and financed; selected candidates are trained and indoctrinated; and

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an infinite variety of propaganda publications in all languages is distributed. Sometimes some of the machinations of the Soviet “front men” in Latin America get unexpected publicity. You have undoubtedly read, as I have recently, about how the number-one Communist labor leader of Latin America, Vicente Lombardo Toledano of Mexico, has been busy denying the authenticity of a letter attributed to him by the Government of Ecuador. In the letter, described as a copy of a circular he is supposed to have sent to all affiliates of the Communist-dominated union he heads—the Confederation of Latin American Workers—Lombardo Toledano calls on his lieutenants to furnish him with the answers to a long list of questions bearing on the military and general security status of their respective countries to be used in connection with a Communist offensive in Latin America in 1958. To those of us conversant with Communist techniques and tactics, it is not surprising to find a foreign Communist leader calling on his various underlings to betray their own countries. Just a week ago the Associated Press carried a dispatch from Rio de Janeiro concerning a report prepared by the Brazilian Foreign Office. According to the A. P., the Brazilian Government has copies of minutes of meetings held in Moscow last November by Latin American Communist leaders when it was decided to use Soviet offers of aid to Brazil as part of a campaign to make Brazil a spearhead of Latin American hostility to the United States. Behind the “front” organizations we find the Communist Party proper. Nominally, the Communist Party is legal in only five Latin American Republics—Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay—but in almost all of them Communists are trying to play their kind of subversive game. Party membership apparently varies from a few dozen Communists in several of the Middle American countries to around 50,000 and 80,000 in Brazil and Argentina, respectively. The grand total has been calculated at little more than 200,000, but numbers do not necessarily describe their influence. The Communists have both immediate and longrange objectives in Latin America, as elsewhere. Ultimately, of course, they would like to seize power and try to set up “popular democratic” regimes in which com-

munism would reign. That being out of the question, they are attempting a gradual approach, minimizing their difference with the non-Communist left, playing down their ties with international communism, and, in general, seeking to gain some degree of respectability and acceptance. In this, they have been notably unsuccessful. The Communists concentrate on trying to infiltrate as best they can into intellectual circles and also into key positions in government, organized labor, student groups, and public-opinion media. They then attempt to sow the seeds of chaos, disunity, and other conditions designed to break down the normal democratic functions. Appraisal of Forces Combating Communism In appraising communism’s chances in the Americas, there are, it seems to me, certain fundamental points to be recognized. I outline them, with the sober reminder that neither we nor our friends to the south can ever be complacent in the face of communism’s eternal threat to man’s freedom and welfare. The first and foremost point to remember is that the Communists by themselves represent no immediate threat to the Latin American countries themselves nor to United States national security, for they are in no position anywhere in the hemisphere to gain power through legitimate means. This is not to say that, even though they are by themselves a minority, the Communists do not represent a constant danger. With their underground cadres ever alert to take advantage of popular discontent arising out of turbulent political conditions or widespread economic crisis, the Communist apparatus requires continued vigilance. To gain power through the ballot, Communist agents masquerade as super-nationalists, hoping to penetrate behind the scenes where they can effectively work for a foreign principal. The example of the Árbenz regime’s betrayal of national interests in favor of alien ideology and its subsequent overthrow at the hands of the very Guatemalan people it sought to defraud is too fresh in memory to be forgotten throughout the hemisphere. It was because of the events in Guatemala following the election of President Árbenz that the Tenth InterAmerican Conference (the pro-Communist Foreign Minister of Guatemala dissenting) approved at Caracas in March 1954 a resolution on the “Intervention of

“Communism in the Americas”

International Communism in the American Republics.” Known as resolution 93, it declares that, if the international Communist movement should come to dominate the political institutions of any American state, that would be a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of us all, endangering the peace of America and calling for immediate consultations regarding appropriate action to be taken. On a permanent basis, it further calls for continuing disclosures and exchanges of information between the various American Republics which would counteract the subversive activities of the international Communist conspiracy. In line with this resolution, there is a new vigilance and awareness on the part of virtually all the signatories to the so-called Caracas resolution of the need to identify those who spread the propaganda or who travel in the interests of international communism. There is an awareness of the need to ascertain the source of their funds and the identity of their agents. Nevertheless, there is much more to be done as the Communist web of intrigue and subversion continues to spin itself out under ever-changing guises. The second encouraging factor I would emphasize is that behind this shield of organized governmental antiCommunist effort stands an equally individual but nonetheless potent defense. I refer to the fact that atheistic communism is an anathema to the deeply religious Latin American people. For, if the continent to the south of us is blessed with a rich storehouse of still-buried raw materials, its inhabitants are endowed with a profound belief in God and the spiritual treasures of free men. I am convinced that those Latin Americans who enjoy personal liberty and social justice, along with others who still aspire to reach the eternal goals of all really democratic societies, will not sell their precious birthrights for a mess of Soviet totalitarian pottage, no matter how alluring its description or how deceptive its package. The third factor to be counted on to work against the Communist cause is the very nature of human intelligence, as keen and perceptive in the Americas as anywhere. The “cult of personality” in the Soviet Union, theoretically banished after the end of Stalinism’s bloody tyranny, again raises its head on the shoulders of a Khrushchev, as the Molotovs and Zhukovs suddenly fall at his feet. American public opinion was deeply shocked

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when the Soviet overlords crushed a valiant unarmed Hungarian people by brute force. It is to the everlasting credit of the peoples of America that their appointed representatives to the United Nations last month, in the name of human rights and the very dignity of man, sought to save the lives of Hungarian freedom fighters arrested because they had sought to liberate their homeland from Communist oppression. Soviet propaganda boasts following the Sputnik launchings conveyed veiled military threats against the free world. These attempts at intimidation were not lost upon the American Republics. Symptomatic of this recognition in Latin America of the Communist danger was the forthright order of the day issued last November 27, anniversary of Brazil’s abortive Communist uprising of 1935, by the Brazilian Minister of War, General Henrique Teixeira Lott. General Lott likened communism to a “venomous serpent seeking to poison all humanity,” said its “materialistic and brutish philosophy” was repugnant to Brazilian sentiments, and reaffirmed “with conviction our decision to remain faithful to the sacred principles which govern the Brazilian nation.” I could also cite here such recent public announcements as that of President Manuel Prado of Peru in favor of closer cooperation between the countries of Latin America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the struggle against, as he very well put it, “Marxist imperialism”; or the address of President José María Lemus of El Salvador in which he warned of the existence of a Communist threat aimed at gaining control of local labor unions and political parties; or the newspaper interview of Brazilian Foreign Minister José Carlos de Macedo Soares in which he said that, despite cultural and sports missions and offers of economic and technical assistance, the Soviet Union’s attempts to divide Brazil from the United States and to win new converts for its ideology in Latin America had achieved no noticeable success. The fourth point to be made in this summary review of basic forces working in the hemisphere against communism is the ever-increasing cultural exchange and cooperation between the various American Republics, based on century-old ties. Our official programs, important as they are, form only a small part of the overall picture. Of the Latin Americans who study abroad, over 74

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percent come to the United States. As many of our Latin American neighbors visit here as tourists, more United States citizens are going to live in Latin America, while Latin Americans, unrestricted by quota visa regulations, are relatively free to take up permanent residence in this country. If Spanish is becoming the second language of the United States, so English is rapidly on its way to similar status in Latin America. As the President’s brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, has so succinctly pointed out: Fortunately, while there are wide variations in the types of institutions and degrees of democracy among the American nations, their peoples are all motivated by deep underlying spiritual forces. They desire independence; they want to live in peace and to work for rising economic, educational, and social levels. Such is our common cultural heritage. Such are our common aspirations. Growing Awareness in U.S. Business Community Let us turn for a moment to the United States companies doing business in Latin America. More and more they have come to realize that public relations is a vital part of the substance of their operations. They recognize that the American business community abroad is just as much a target of the agents of international communism as is the United States Government itself. Communist agents seek to discredit American businessmen, to disparage American products, to stir up criticism of American financial methods, to invite labor difficulties. Even though American industrial concerns abroad are in the vanguard of those who practice modern industrial relations, Communist agents are always trying to promote strikes or violence against them. It is reassuring to note greater awareness in the United States business community of the need for their representatives to possess a breadth of culture and a perceptiveness which will enable them to quickly understand and to adjust themselves to the atmosphere in which they are working abroad. Of equal value is an intelligent curiosity and a human approach expressed through a genuine, sympathetic, and active interest in the welfare of the communities where they are stationed. American private enterprise has much of which to be proud, including its role in the vanguard against communism in America and elsewhere. Indeed, its best reference is the high level of

our own economy and the lasting contributions to other nations the world over which have flowed from our system of the “people’s capitalism.” If the foregoing are perhaps the most obvious factors successfully at work combating communism in Latin America, there is one rather new development which may well portend what could be a real revolutionary contribution on the side of democratic social betterment and civic progress in the hemisphere. You will recall that at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference last August Secretary of the Treasury Anderson raised the question as to whether excessive military expenditures on the part of many Latin American Republics were not in fact draining their national resources and impeding highest living standards for their populations. Now we recognize the need to maintain forces adequate to provide internal security and for the mutual (defense of the hemisphere. The problem for any country, of course, is to determine how much is necessary to spend for these purposes. It might be argued that unnecessary expenditures play into the hands of Communist propagandists. Conversely, therefore, spending on productive private industrial capacity or public works would improve standards of living, thereby helping to develop a fundamental and lasting immunity to Communist subversion. Hemisphere reaction to Secretary Anderson’s query has reflected, in my judgment[,] a widespread readiness to study this question further, and it is my hope that in 1958 some constructive action along these lines may be achieved. The most persuasive reason to question the need for large and expensive military establishments arises out of the realization that in the Americas we have developed a hemispheric approach to security which is sealed in the Rio treaty. We have unanimously agreed that an attack on any one state would be considered as an attack on all. This concept of collective security has served as a pattern for the strengthening of the entire free world. Our purpose is peace, both with the rest of the world and among ourselves. The repeatedly successful application of the Rio treaty in halting almost immediately outbreaks of armed aggression has proved beyond doubt the desire and ability of the countries of the Americas to live peacefully together. In short, resort to war as a means of settling disputes in the Americas has become virtually unthinkable.

“Communism in the Americas”

Soviet Trade Offensive Against this background of a peaceful American Continent, determined to work together as free men to improve our lives and those of our children, we now are confronted by press headlines of a so-called Soviet trade offensive in Latin America. The phrase, of course, is dramatic, but what does it really mean? Undoubtedly, as compared to the situation of previous months, there have been more reports recently of offers being made by Soviet spokesmen and salesmen to exchange Russian manufactured goods for Latin American raw materials. But, of course, as businessmen you know that there is a long way from an offer to a closed deal. We need to keep the facts as we know them in perspective. In 1957, according to latest estimates, Latin American trade with the Soviet bloc actually decreased around 12 percent, which means that Latin American trade with the Soviet bloc represented a little more than 1 percent of all Latin American trade. This 1 percent in turn was concentrated largely in four Latin American countries— Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay. If the dollar value of Cuban sugar exports to the U.S.S.R. had not shown a temporary sharp rise as a result of exceptionally high world prices, Latin American trade totals with the Soviet bloc in 1957 would have shown an overall drop of about one-quarter as compared to 1956. According to unofficial figures, Argentine trade was off more than 50 percent, while Brazil’s slight increase contrasted with Uruguay’s small decrease. There is understandably a desire on the part of our neighbors to examine cannily their trade with the Soviet bloc, particularly with an eye to the utilization of credits which have accumulated as a result of previously unsatisfactory trade relations. Undoubtedly my colleagues in the various Foreign Offices of Latin America are well aware of the many pitfalls involved in trade with the Soviets. Their countries have already experienced bitter dissatisfaction with bloc compliance under commercial agreements and especially the growth of inconvertible balances. To wipe out such a balance, reported to be $20 million, I understand, the Argentine Government has just announced dispatch of a mission to Eastern Europe. Another probable cause of Latin American caution, if experience is any teacher, is the knowledge that the Soviet bloc often seeks to use trade as a means of getting

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“a foot in the door.” What this then invites, as we have seen in this country, as well as in Canada, Argentina, Iran, Australia, and Peru—to name a few with somewhat the same bitter experience—is the use of Sovietbloc personnel, protected by diplomatic immunity, for improper and illegal activities, including subversion and espionage. In citing the dangers of trade with the Soviets, I do not wish to overlook that some of the Latin American Republics are now faced with serious economic problems, characterized in most cases by abnormally large supplies of raw materials unable to find their way into normal export channels. We are also concerned with these problems, for we realize we live in a world of interdependence, with the fates of Latin America and the United States inextricably intertwined. Record of U.S. Assistance When critical needs have arisen, the record shows that we have not failed to assist our American allies. A glance over the last 2 years reflects the varied and numerous channels of our assistance. The Export-Import Bank issued loan authorizations totaling $659 million. Our share of the jointly operated United States technical assistance program reached $68 million. Through the technical assistance programs of the Organization of American States and the United Nations we contributed an additional $11.7 million. $80 million was granted as special aid. Under P. L. 480 legislation for the disposal of agricultural surpluses, the United States made available to Latin America $221 million. In 1957, the only year of its existence, a special fund authorized under the amendment sponsored by your distinguished Senator, Mr. Smathers, provided about $20 million of long-term credit for colonization, public health, and sanitation purposes. Through the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, of which we are members, Latin America drew down $160 million to meet balance-of-payments requirements and borrowed another $120 million. United States assistance to the other American Republics has also taken the form of our participation in financial stabilization programs amounting to over $200 million, consisting of U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank, and IMF pledges of currency. These programs still serve as invisible partners,

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ever ready to lend a friendly helping hand to overcome monetary emergencies. Thanks to such a program, the rate of increase in the cost of living in Chile, for instance, was reduced by more than 50 percent in 1957, for the second consecutive year. This is a record of courage and determination of which the Ibañez administration and the Chilean people can well be proud. The same might be said for the achievements of the other countries fighting back valiantly against the ravages of inflation. The current reports of Soviet trade offers were very well described by Secretary Dulles at his last press conference. He pointed out the Communists always like to fish in troubled waters but concluded he did not think the Soviets would catch many unwary Latin American customers. And, the Secretary declared, if the need of Latin America grows as a result of its present economic difficulties, our desire to meet that need will correspondingly grow. What I feel is most important to grasp is that the Communists, no matter how ultranationalist their pretensions and protestations, are really not interested in helping solve Latin America’s problems but rather in complicating them. For in their Marxist credo the end always justifies the means. Communism’s Cancerous Threat If I have repeatedly emphasized the Communist use of nationalism as a Trojan horse of political penetration, it is because I consider such deception a most despicable betrayal of one of our most precious American heritages. The love of one’s country is one of man’s noblest sentiments. But, like the other great sentiments, it is susceptible to base exploitation, to a perversion that can convert the love of one’s nation to a fierce chauvinism and to

Document Analysis

Rubottom explains the need for vigilance and cooperation between the nations of the Americas facing the Communist threat, while offering reasons why he believes Communism will inevitably fail to take hold in Latin America. Rubottom portrays international Communism as a kind of sinister octopus whose head is in Moscow, working conspiratorially through ostensibly innocuous “popular fronts” and “dupes” as well as a smaller number of openly Communist individuals and organizations. Given the audience of businesspeople

hatred for one’s neighbor. Our American system stands for genuine and legitimate love of nation. It is an everevolving system for national, self-realization. It calls for the kind of cooperation which will make it possible for each nation in our inter-American system to develop its human and natural resources so that its highest national aspirations will be fulfilled. Our American system is true international cooperation, for it is based on respect for national self-determination and on respect for the will to develop the national community, which is so alive in Latin America today. Communism, however, is the grave enemy of the national community. Whenever it penetrates, it seeks to disturb, to agitate, to subvert, to destroy. It is not a movement of conscience which seeks to bring to light the responsible quarrel with conditions as they are in order to improve those conditions. Its aim is to pick the quarrel which will confuse and destroy the national community, the quarrel which will paralyze the will to develop the nation, the quarrel which will pervert the love of nation to hate of one part of the nation for another part, and hate of the nation’s neighbors. I bear great faith in our American system; I have an abiding belief in our common patriotic love of country; and I feel deeply that communism’s cancerous threat to the national life of each of the 21 American Republics clearly exposes communism as the dangerous enemy of our finest traditions of nationhood. I am confident that I echo the sentiments of the leaders and the peoples of the Americas when I leave you with this closing thought-that there is no place in this God-given and God-fearing New World of 360 million souls for anything resembling the materialistic and atheistic concepts of godless communism.

and the economic importance of US investment in Latin America, particular attention is given to Communist infiltration of the labor movement and the “Soviet trade offensive.” Rubottom emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the governments of the Americas in the face of the Communist menace. The example he gives is the 1954 Caracas resolution proclaiming collective defense against Communism and pledging cooperation between American governments. Rubottom quotes a series of pro-American Latin American leaders to

“Communism in the Americas”

emphasize the solidarity of the hemisphere against Communism. Rubottom also plays to his audience by emphasizing the central role of American private enterprise in the struggle against Communism in Latin America. He suggests that the superiority of the American economic system is an important asset in the struggle. By comparison, he claims, the Soviets are unreliable traders and use trade activities as a cover for espionage and subversion. A particular concern is the appeal of Communism to Latin American nationalism. Rubottom distinguishes between a good nationalism based on the love of one’s country and a bad, extreme nationalism vulnerable to Communist manipulation. Rubottom’s premier example of bad nationalism is the recently overthrown president of Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz. Árbenz had opposed the domination of Guatemala by the US-based United Fruit Company and was overthrown in a US-backed military coup in 1954. In discussing the Guatemalan affair, Rubottom adheres to the official government line that Árbenz was overthrown in a spontaneous uprising of the Guatemalan people opposed to Árbenz’s alleged Communism, obscuring the role played by the United States government, US economic interests like United Fruit, and the Guatemalan military. Rubottom further attempts to counter the nationalist appeal of Communism by asserting that Communists are traitors to their own countries by placing the needs of the international Communist movement above patriotic loyalties. He reinforces the claim of United States benevolence towards Latin America by enumerating several of the aid programs the US directed at the region. Communism’s atheistic nature is another factor Rubottom cites against the possibility of Communism being adopted in Latin America. He claims that the power of religious faith, shared by the United States and Latin America, is a powerful bulwark against Communism. Essential Themes

In the time following Rubottom’s speech, American fear of Communist activity in the Americas would greatly increase, and the confidence Rubottom showed in the ability of Latin Americans to resist Communist blandishments would be increasingly questioned. The riots against the visit of American vice president Richard

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Nixon to Latin America later in 1958 made the unpopularity of the United States in Latin America clear. The following year saw Fidel Castro take power in Cuba. Unlike Árbenz, Castro would formally align his country with the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, disproving Rubottom’s belief that Latin Americans would uniformly reject Communism. Also unlike Árbenz, Castro would withstand several American attempts to topple his regime. The Latin American Communist movement in the immediate wake of Castro would continue to appeal to leftist and anti-American nationalist elements. The activities of American business in Latin America that Rubottom lauded would be portrayed by Castro and his supporters as economic imperialism. However, Castro-style Communism would not spread to Latin American countries other than Cuba. The United States would continue to see Latin America through a Cold War lens for the next three decades. The pro-American, anti-Communist regimes Rubottom held as exemplars would face major challenges in the post-Cuban Revolution era. Though Rubottom said nothing of explicit military aid to Latin American nations, seeing the struggle as essentially a political and economic one, after Castro, military aid would become far more central to American policy, a major way in which the United States maintained its power and challenged its enemies in the region. By the 1980s, the United States would be directly or indirectly involved in several Latin American military conflicts. Rubottom’s call for reduced military spending in the context of collective security would largely be forgotten. —William E. Burns, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Belmonte, Laura A. Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War. Philadelphia, PA: U of Pennsylvania P, 2008. Print. Cullather, Nick. Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2006. Print. Iber, Patrick. Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2015. Print. Rabe, Stephen G. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 1988. Print.

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 Fidel Castro’s Speech at Twenty-One Nations Conference Date: May 2, 1959 Author: Fidel Castro Genre: speech Summary Overview

This document is a translated excerpt from what was originally an hour and twenty minute speech in Spanish by Fidel Castro to the Twenty-One Nations Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina. This conference hosted nations from across the Americas. Castro spends the speech outlining the suffering throughout much of the Americas, railing against dictatorships, and calling for an increase in US aid to the region. Castro had recently risen to (and not yet consolidated) power. Though he would go on to become one of United States’ arch antagonists, he was not yet in open conflict with his northern neighbor at the time of the speech. Defining Moment

From the end of World War II until Castro’s 1959 speech, the United States poured tens of billions of dollars into the reconstruction of Western Europe. Giving a commencement speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall called for the economic aid plan to help rebuild Europe. President Truman signed the European Recovery Program, dubbed the Marshall Plan, into law on April 3 of the next year. After injecting almost $13 billion (over $130 billion in 2016 dollars) into Western Europe, the Marshall Plan gave way to the Mutual Security Act, which authorized another $7.5 billion annually up through the time of Castro’s speech. This aid stands as the impetus for Castro’s call for more US aid within the Americas. At the time he gave this speech, Castro had been prime minister of Cuba for less than eleven weeks, and former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista had been in exile for less than eighteen weeks. Shortly after being sworn into office, Castro began a tour of the Americas in order to stir up positive public relations for Cuba’s change of government. He first went to the United States, where he met with Vice President Richard Nixon, whom he immediately disdained; he continued to

Canada, Trinidad, Brazil, and Uruguay; his tour ended in Argentina, where he gave this speech. According to eye witnesses, Castro spoke extemporaneously while standing, as opposed to the other speakers at the conference who sat and tended to use notes. The United States government was, no doubt, keeping a close eye on Castro and Cuba at this time, but this fiery address marks a time before Castro and the United States were in open conflict. Castro had not yet declared himself a Communist revolutionary, saying instead that he was a “humanist” revolutionary. The aid proposal never met with any serious consideration in the United States, and in the following years, relations between the two nations became more troubled. In an environment of mutual anxiety, Cuba embraced a closer relationship with the United States’ geopolitical nemesis, the Soviet Union. In October 1960, the United States initiated a trade embargo that persists to this day (despite some changes under the Obama administration). In January of 1961, the United States ended diplomatic relations with Cuba; these were reinstated only in July 2015. In April 1961, the CIA backed disaffected Cuban nationals in an attempted counterrevolution; Castro thwarted the attempt, which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev and the USSR tried to install nuclear weapons in Cuba, but President John F. Kennedy pressured them to abandon their designs. Although the brinksmanship of the early 1960s was not replicated in the years after, US-Cuban relations remained virtually nonexistent until President Barack Obama announced a normalization on December 17, 2014. Author Biography

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was born on August 13, 1926 in Birán, Cuba. He became an ardent leftist and anti-imperialist activist while studying law at the Uni-

Fidel Castro’s Speech at Twenty-One Nations Conference

versity of Havana. After earning a law degree in 1950, Castro organized and led guerrilla fighters against Cuba’s dictator Fulgencio Batista. He was imprisoned for his efforts in 1953. He was sentenced to fifteen years but released after less than two. He renewed his guerrilla campaign with increased vigor, and Batista was forced into exile in late 1958. Castro became prime minister of Cuba one and a half months later, in February 1959. He gave the Twenty-One Nations speech two months later. Domestically, Castro consolidated his au-

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thority. In the heyday of the Cold War, Castro’s proclivities aligned Cuba with the USSR, and Cuban relations with the United States soon became strained. Two of the most notorious Cold War events, the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, placed Cuba in the epicenter of the Cold War. Through decades of US opposition and, ultimately, the fall of the Soviet Union, Castro remained in power in Cuba. Battling health issues in 2006, he ceded his authority to his brother and officially retired in 2008.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT We are all conscious of the sacrifices made by our peoples; we are all conscious of the hopes that have been prompting those sacrifices, and also of the expectant unrest caused in the conscience of America by the recent victories of democracy against dictatorial rulers. We have all cherished the illusion that tyrants are disappearing from the face of our Continent. Yet, the truth is that such disappearance is only an illusion, and nobody would dare to state here, honestly and frankly, how long will the constitutional governments of Latin America actually last; how long do they suppose this period of democratic awakening, which has cost so much suffering and so many sacrifices, will last; and also how long do they suppose those democratic governments, overrun with poverty and need, which create an unending series of troubles and conflicts will last, before those who are watching for the right moment to take power from those democratic rulers, through violence, of course. How is it possible for Democracy to hold its own under such circumstances? We have adopted the democratic ideal, which is the ideal of all the peoples of this hemisphere, because it is the ideal best fitting the idiosyncrasy and the ambitions of the peoples of this Continent, and yet economic and social conditions prevailing in Latin America make impracticable the actual realization of the democratic ideal in our countries, because regardless of who may be running the country, whether a right wing dictatorship or a left wing dictatorship, the fact is that it is a dictatorship which does not believe in the principles guiding the peoples of Latin America. And if we are sincerely concerned about whether our countries are going to fall in the hands of leftist dictatorship, it is just

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as logical and honest to show the same concern about the possibility that our countries might fall in the hands of right wing dictatorships. Because, after all, what Latin America wants and longs for, what Latin America is striving for, is just plain democracy. The truth is that we are showing just one of the ugly faces of evil to the people, but conceal the other equally ugly face, so that they won’t see it. Many speakers often discuss democracy with their listeners, and then refuse to grant democratic rights and privileges in their own backyards. They speak of democracy to the same peoples they are betraying, to the same peoples whose rights they are denying, but the people only see sacrifices. They have lost faith, the faith that is so necessary at this critical instant when we have to have our continent for democracy, but not for a theoretical democracy, not for a democracy with hunger and misery, not for a democracy under the reign of terror and oppression but for a true democracy, based on real respect for the dignity of men with all human liberties prevailing within a framework of social justice because the peoples of America want neither liberty without bread nor bread without liberty! There is no more corrupt system of government than a dictatorship. (It is true that there are constitutional governments that are as corrupt as they are constitutional; but while the constitutional governments have to watch their step, have to take care of themselves, because they must hold elections and might lose them, or the people might refuse to vote, there are things which act as brakes to slow down and even stop corruption, aided by the freedom of speech: the elections held every two years.) On

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the other hand, in the case of a dictatorship, the men in power steal the people’s money for ten, fifteen, twenty and even more years and make millions and millions of dollars. Nobody dares to accuse them, nobody complains, nobody protests, simply because nobody can do any such thing; nobody holds them back, nobody can replace them.... Consequently, simultaneously with the efforts toward our economic development, our peoples have to make special efforts of a moral character, and when such standards are definitely adopted, when the possibility to mobilize resources becomes more and more difficult to certain rulers because they do not represent the interests of their peoples, do not represent the will of their peoples, such handicaps will operate to improve the political standards of the nations of our Continent simultaneously with, and in the measure that we improve our economic status. On the other hand, we must not run the risk of strengthening dictatorships by cooperating with them. This is one of the risks to which we are all exposed. We do not agree with the theory to the effect that the ideal system of government for economic development is the dictatorship; and that, furthermore, corruption is a vice which tends to discredit us and conspires against economic development.... That’s why the really democratic government like our own should not be satisfied with being considered democratic; we must be absolutely honest too. This is a considerable part of our cooperation, of the sacrifices we have to make. We must definitely be conscious of the fact that our duty is not to represent the interests of minorities. Because at these conventions, at these conferences and these meetings we ought to represent and further the interests of the majorities and, therefore, we ought to impose on ourselves the sacrifices required by our own countries, lest we might ask sacrifices from just one class, from the workers, for instance, and not to the other sectors of the country. Because on an enterprise of this sort all sacrifices must be uniform for all the sectors of the nation, and this is something which the economic classes understand very clearly, as they have understood it in Cuba, where the government keeps on adopting its measures with the full support of the majority of the economic classes of the country, prompted by their desire to further the national interests.

I have gone over the speech of the United States delegation; I have read it carefully. It describes all the efforts made heretofore in the form of cooperation given through international credit agencies. It also mentions their recent contribution to the Interamerican Development Bank, the individual assistance given in certain cases to certain countries.... All of that is true. But the contribution given through that agency is utterly insufficient; I don’t mean to say that the goodwill that prompted and led to those contributions was insufficient or that the desire to help and the sincerity of the offer was short in any way. The trouble is that the resources placed at the disposal of those international agencies have been utterly insufficient. Where it not so, why should Latin America be so pitifully underdeveloped? How could it be if our peoples had access to really sufficient credit agencies? Of the five hundred millions.... Of the billion dollars of basic capital, one half is our half, consisting of our own soft or weak currencies and affected by our inflationary problems; because if that money we are contributing is going to be worth anything it has to be backed by United States dollars, or by gold bullion. And I now ask you, where do you suppose we are going to get those dollars or that bullion? So there you are. The resources so nobly contributed, the resources we owe to international cooperation, are obviously and utterly insufficient. That’s the truth. The references made by the United States delegation to the sacrifices made those contributions.... Well, there is no doubt that their contribution has been substantial and decisive. However, the United States can, thanks to their powerful economy, make sacrifices that are beyond the possibilities of our underdeveloped countries. That colossal economy of North America is perfectly capable of making that, and much greater sacrifices too. They have made them before, and that’s is precisely why they are big and strong. However, they have not made them for the peoples of Latin America; their assistance money has not been channeled to our countries, to the peoples of the family of nations living in this hemisphere. Those sacrifices have been made in behalf of Europe, for its reconstruction after the war, and in behalf of remote countries and peoples of the Middle East; not in behalf of the peoples that are most closely linked by tradition and political and economic relations with the United States.

Fidel Castro’s Speech at Twenty-One Nations Conference

Now, why should not we in Latin America expect the United States to give us the support, the help, the

Document Analysis

Fidel Castro, Cuba’s recently sworn-in prime minister at the time, covers much ground in this sprawling speech. The off-the-cuff style differs from most written documents and scripted speeches. That is not to say that the speech is not cogent or coherent; it is both, despite its ranging style. Castro uses the word “dictatorship” nine times. Additionally, he employs the word “tyrants” and the phrase “dictatorial rulers” once each. With each usage, he rails against this concept as an evil that must be absolutely avoided. For example, he proclaims, “There is no more corrupt system of government than a dictatorship.” This may be a bit surprising to read for modern-day students. Before Castro ceded power to his brother in 2006 due to health reasons, he had held singular power in Cuba for decades. Anti-Castro propaganda in the United States has amplified his reputation as a dictator. However, in May of 1959, no one would have labelled him such or considered his mention of the concept ironic. His comment would have applied instead to the recently deposed Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista and others of his ilk. Batista, who had been out of power for only a matter of months, is also key to understanding Castro’s discussion of the right-left divide within his criticism of dictatorships. He proclaims, “And if we are sincerely concerned about whether our countries are going to fall in the hands of leftist dictatorship, it is just as logical and honest to show the same concern about the possibility that our countries might fall in the hands of right wing dictatorships.” At this point in time, Castro was downplaying his socialist proclivities; however, given his leftist history and his quick ascendance to the world stage during the height of the Cold War, the United States was already concerned about his leftist leanings. Without admitting a preference for socialism, Castro reminds his audience that dictators come from every part of the political spectrum. In the person of Batista, Cuba had recently deposed a dictator from the far right. Not until the final paragraph does Castro reference the United States directly. He calls for an increase in US aid to the Americas, citing the poverty of the region

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cooperation they have been giving right along to all those other countries of the world?

and US aid to other areas. Castro was still on relatively good terms with the United States at this point; US aid was still pouring into Europe. Castro praises democracy at length, something that will have been well received by an American audience. Finally, he makes sure to mention that the lack of aid from America does not spring from a lack of goodwill. Thus, his request seems genuine. On the other hand, one might argue that there is an element of cynicism, or antagonism, to it. Although the United States was expending money elsewhere, this speech in Argentina may have served as a kind of passive-aggressive means to elicit US aid. Castro had recently visited the United States and met with Vice President Richard Nixon, whom he did not like. Perhaps that experience enters into the tone or tenor of the speech when he talks about US aid. Essential Themes

The sprawling style of Castro’s speech might lead some to dismiss it altogether. However, a look at the carefully developed theme of “sacrifice” (or “sacrifices”) may help to sway the reader to appreciate the speech. Castro uses the term “sacrifices” throughout. It begins as a synonym for sufferings. The first sentence states, “We are all conscious of the sacrifices made by our peoples.” Specifically, Castro connects the term with collective suffering. However, in the final paragraph, the term takes on a new meaning. Sacrifices, here, refer to US aid to the Americas and elsewhere. Castro acknowledges that the United States has already contributed some aid to the Americas, but it has not been enough: “That colossal economy of North America is perfectly capable of making that, and much greater sacrifices to.” The other three instances of “sacrifices” in the final paragraph take on much the same meaning. The development of this theme works to paint aid from the United States as representing a chance for the US to do its part for the other nations of the Americas, which have already been making sacrifices for long enough. Ultimately, though, Castro’s plea failed to produce financial results, even as it presented him to a broad audience of Latin American leaders. —Anthony Vivian

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Castro, Fidel. Capitalism in Crisis: Globalization and World Politics Today. Minneapolis, MN: Ocean P, 2000. Print. Quirk, Robert E. Fidel Castro. New York: Norton, 1995. Print. Ramonet, Ignacio & Fidel Castro. Fidel Castro: My Life: A Spoken Autobiography. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print. Szulc, Tad. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: Avon Books, 1986. Print.

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 Nixon and Khrushchev: The Kitchen Debate Date: July 24, 1959 Author: Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev Genre: debate Summary Overview

At the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a cultural exchange to boost communication between the superpowers. One result was the unfolding of this impromptu discussion or debate between Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev, taking place in the kitchen of a model American-style suburban home in Moscow. The two politicians seemed mostly to talk past one another, perhaps addressing their respective audiences at home. Nevertheless, the transcript of the interaction provides invaluable insight into how the proponents framed their respective views on capitalism and Communism. Defining Moment

As World War II ended, so did the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the common enemy now defeated, the world’s two remaining superpowers began an ideological battle—the Cold War— that would last for decades. Much of the world, particularly Europe, separated into two factions, one led by the United States, the other by the Soviet Union. The opposing blocs differed primarily in their economic systems. Nations under the influence of the Soviet Union replicated its Communist system, while those led by the United States were based on a capitalist system. The global conflict played a large role in shaping domestic politics along both home fronts. In the United States for example, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s aggressive pursuit of American Communists (and alleged Communists) became a polarizing force that shaped American society through the first half of the 1950s. In 1959, the two superpowers agreed to hold exhibits in each other’s countries to attempt to bridge a gap in communication and understanding between them. A month after the Soviets opened their exhibit in New York, the Americans opened theirs in Moscow. At the latter opening, Vice President Nixon led Soviet premier Khrushchev through the space and an impromptu

debate or dialogue ensued. Despite the attempts at more open communication, the Cold War continued to intensify. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the two powers to the brink of nuclear war. The Vietnam War, the bloodiest and costliest of the proxy wars from an American perspective, raged throughout the late 1960s and early ‘70s. On the other hand, direct warfare never broke out between the opposing superpowers themselves. Author Biography

Richard Nixon was born in Yorba Linda, California, on January 9, 1913. He ascended the political ladder rapidly, winning a seat in the US House of Representatives in 1946, a seat in the Senate four years later, and chosen by Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Republican vice presidential candidate four years after that. The Eisenhower-Nixon ticket won consecutive terms in the White House; however, Nixon lost his own presidential bid to John F. Kennedy in the 1960 election. Eight years later, he got another shot and was victorious in his quest for the White House. His presidency achieved successes such as opening relations with the People’s Republic of China, but his presidency is perhaps most remembered for the Watergate Scandal, wherein Nixon’s political operatives engaged in a variety of dirty and illegal tactics during his successful 1972 reelection bid. Nixon ended up resigning from the presidency in 1973 rather than face impeachment. He died on April 22, 1994. Nikita Khrushchev was born in Kalinovka, Russia, in 1894. He rose in the ranks of Stalin’s Soviet Union, supporting the dictator’s political purges and overseeing the Ukraine. He fought in World War II and was present at the bloody defense of Stalingrad. After Stalin’s death in 1953, an internal struggle for power ensued, from which Khrushchev emerged victorious. He publicly denounced Stalin, and his reign and worked to

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establish a less repressive government inside the Soviet Union. Khrushchev faced off against John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He stayed in power

until 1964, when he was peacefully deposed. He died on September 11, 1971.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT [Both men enter kitchen in the American exhibit.] Nixon: I want to show you this kitchen. It is like those of our houses in California. [Nixon points to dishwasher.] Khrushchev: We have such things. Nixon: This is our newest model. This is the kind which is built in thousands of units for direct installations in the houses. In America, we like to make life easier for women... Khrushchev: Your capitalistic attitude toward women does not occur under Communism. Nixon: I think that this attitude towards women is universal. What we want to do, is make life more easy for our housewives …. This house can be bought for $14,000, and most American [veterans from World War II] can buy a home in the bracket of $10,000 to $15,000. Let me give you an example that you can appreciate. Our steel workers as you know, are now on strike. But any steel worker could buy this house. They earn $3 an hour. This house costs about $100 a month to buy on a contract running 25 to 30 years. Khrushchev: We have steel workers and peasants who can afford to spend $14,000 for a house. Your American houses are built to last only 20 years so builders could sell new houses at the end. We build firmly. We build for our children and grandchildren. Nixon: American houses last for more than 20 years, but, even so, after twenty years, many Americans want a new house or a new kitchen. Their kitchen is obsolete by that time.... The American system is designed to take advantage of new inventions and new techniques.

Khrushchev: This theory does not hold water. Some things never get out of date—houses, for instance, and furniture, furnishings—perhaps—but not houses. I have read much about America and American houses, and I do not think that this exhibit and what you say is strictly accurate. Nixon: Well, um... Khrushchev: I hope I have not insulted you. Nixon: I have been insulted by experts. Everything we say [on the other hand] is in good humor. Always speak frankly. Khrushchev: The Americans have created their own image of the Soviet man. But he is not as you think. You think the Russian people will be dumbfounded to see these things, but the fact is that newly built Russian houses have all this equipment right now. Nixon: Yes, but... Khrushchev: In Russia, all you have to do to get a house is to be born in the Soviet Union. You are entitled to housing.... In America, if you don’t have a dollar you have a right to choose between sleeping in a house or on the pavement. Yet you say we are the slave to Communism. Nixon: I appreciate that you are very articulate and energetic... Khrushchev: Energetic is not the same thing as wise. Nixon: If you were in the Senate, we would call you a filibusterer! You—[Khrushchev interrupts] —do all the talking and don’t let anyone else talk. This exhibit was not designed to astound but to interest. Diversity, the

Nixon and Khrushchev: The Kitchen Debate

right to choose, the fact that we have 1,000 builders building 1,000 different houses is the most important thing. We don’t have one decision made at the top by one government official. This is the difference.

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Other US speaker: Mr. Vice President, from what you have seen of our exhibition, how do you think it’s going to impress the people of the Soviet Union?

Nixon: Oh yes, [Nixon chuckling] he still is [a lawyer].

Nixon: It’s a very effective exhibit, and it’s one that will cause a great deal of interest. I might say that this morning I, very early in the morning, went down to visit a market, where the farmers from various outskirts of the city bring in their items to sell. I can only say that there was a great deal of interest among these people, who were workers and farmers, etc.... I would imagine that the exhibition from that standpoint would, therefore, be a considerable success. As far as Mr. Khrushchev’s comments just now, they are in the tradition we learned to expect from him of speaking extemporaneously and frankly whenever he has an opportunity. I can only say that if this competition which you have described so effectively, in which you plan to outstrip us, particularly in the production of consumer goods. . . . If this competition is to do the best for both of our peoples and for people everywhere, there must be a free exchange of ideas. There are some instances where you may be ahead of us—for example in the development of the thrust of your rockets for the investigation of outer space. There may be some instances, for example, color television, where we’re ahead of you. But in order for both of us benefit...

Other Russian speaker: Tell us, please, what are your general impressions of the exhibit?

Khrushchev: [interrupting] No, in rockets we’ve passed you by, and in the technology...

Khrushchev: It’s clear to me that the construction workers didn’t manage to finish their work and the exhibit still is not put in order... This is what America is capable of, and how long has she existed? 300 years? 150 years of independence and this is her level. We haven’t quite reached 42 years, and in another 7 years, we’ll be at the level of America, and after that we’ll go farther. As we pass you by, we’ll wave “hi” to you, and then if you want, we’ll stop and say, “please come along behind us.” . . .If you want to live under capitalism, go ahead, that’s your question, an internal matter, it doesn’t concern us. We can feel sorry for you, but really, you wouldn’t understand. We’ve already seen how you understand things.

Nixon: [continuing to talk] You see, you never concede anything.

Khrushchev: On politics, we will never agree with you. For instance, Mikoyan [Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan] likes very peppery soup. I do not. But this does not mean that we do not get along. Nixon: You can learn from us, and we can learn from you. There must be a free exchange. Let the people choose the kind of house, the kind of soup, the kind of ideas that they want. [Translation lost as both men enter the television recording studio.] Khrushchev: [In jest] You look very angry, as if you want to fight me. Are you still angry? Nixon: [in jest] That’s right! Khrushchev: ...and Nixon was once a lawyer? Now he’s nervous.

Khrushchev: We always knew that Americans were smart people. Stupid people could not have risen to the economic level that they’ve reached. But as you know, “we don’t beat flies with our nostrils!” In 42 years we’ve made progress. Nixon: You must not be afraid of ideas. Khrushchev: We’re saying it is you who must not be afraid of ideas. We’re not afraid of anything....

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Nixon: Well, then, let’s have more exchange of them. We all agree on that, right? Khrushchev: Good. [Khrushchev turns to translator and asks:] Now, what did I agree on? Nixon: [interrupts] Now, let’s go look at our pictures. Khrushchev: Yes, I agree. But first I want to clarify what I’m agreeing on. Don’t I have that right? I know that I’m dealing with a very good lawyer. Therefore, I want to be unwavering in my miner’s girth, so our miners will say, “He’s ours and he doesn’t give in!” Nixon: No question about that. Khrushchev: You’re a lawyer of Capitalism, I’m a lawyer for Communism. Let’s kiss. Nixon: All that I can say, from the way you talk and the way you dominate the conversation, you would have made a good lawyer yourself. What I mean is this: Here you can see the type of tape which will transmit this very conversation immediately, and this indicates the possibilities of increasing communication. And this increase in communication, will teach us some things, and you some things, too. Because, after all, you don’t know everything.

Document Analysis

Inside an artificial kitchen within an artificial American-style suburban house, Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev engage in a conversation that quickly evolves into an ideological debate. They agree on the need for greater communication between their two countries, yet they mostly talk past one another as they espouse the advantages of their respective economic systems. Their comments provide an invaluable look into the political beliefs and rhetoric of the time. It becomes clear from the outset that Nixon will use this exhibit and this discussion as a platform to champion American capitalism and consumerism. Showing off a dishwasher to Khrushchev, he remarks, “In America, we like to make life easier for women.” Today, the comment can come across as somewhat misogynistic,

Khrushchev: If I don’t know everything, then you know absolutely nothing about Communism, except for fear! But now the dispute will be on an unequal basis. The apparatus is yours, and you speak English, while I speak Russian. Your words are taped and will be shown and heard. What I say to you about science won’t be translated, and so your people won’t hear it. These aren’t equal conditions. Nixon: There isn’t a day that goes by in the United States when we can’t read everything that you say in the Soviet Union.... And, I can assure you, never make a statement here that you don’t think we read in the United States. Khrushchev: If that’s the way it is, I’m holding you to it. Give me your word.... I want you, the Vice President, to give me your word that my speech will also be taped in English. Will it be? Nixon: Certainly it will be. And by the same token, everything that I say will be recorded and translated and will be carried all over the Soviet Union. That’s a fair bargain. [Both men shake hands and walk off stage, still talking.]

in that it reduces women to housewives. However, in 1959, the comment served to describe the convenience made possible by technological innovation. When Khrushchev comments that American houses are only made to last for twenty years, Nixon refutes the point but then continues, “Even so, after twenty years, many Americans want a new house or a new kitchen. Their kitchen is obsolete by that time....The American system is designed to take advantage of new inventions and new techniques.” While not fully conceding Khrushchev’s assertion that Soviet construction is longer lasting, Nixon argues that change, or advancement, can be a good thing. Finally, Nixon cites the economic diversity inherent in capitalist systems: “Diversity, the right to choose, the fact that we have 1,000 builders building 1,000 different houses is the most important thing. We

Nixon and Khrushchev: The Kitchen Debate

don’t have one decision made at the top by one government official. This is the difference.” Khrushchev spiritedly rebuts Nixon’s claims and fervently defends Communism. When Nixon shows him the dishwasher, he retorts, “We have such things,” and later, he expands upon the sentiment: “You think the Russian people will be dumbfounded to see these things, but the fact is that newly built Russian houses have all this equipment right now.” These statements seem aimed at undermining Nixon’s assertions regarding the superiority of American innovation and technology. Khrushchev moves on to claim Soviet superiority in building durability: “Your American houses are built to last only 20 years so builders could sell new houses at the end. We build firmly. We build for our children and grandchildren.” He credits Soviet housing longevity to the lack of greedy builders. Furthermore, according to Khrushchev, Communism provides greater access to housing: “In Russia, all you have to do to get a house is to be born in the Soviet Union. You are entitled to housing.” He characterizes housing as an inherent right for Soviets in the same way that an American might consider freedom of speech or of religion a right. Although by the end, he seems to step back a bit from his earlier claim about Soviet technological greatness, mentioning the Soviet Union’s relative youth (“In another 7 years, we’ll be at the level of America”), he goes on to say that “after that we’ll go farther. As we pass you by, we’ll wave ‘hi’ to you.” Khrushchev thus believes that Communism will prove no hindrance to innovation and that the Soviets will soon outstrip the Americans. Essential Themes

The theme of communication comes up in two contrasting ways throughout this conversation. On the one hand, an increase in understanding by way of improved communication was the stated purpose of this exhibit—and its attendant conversation. Nixon brings this up time and again, stating, for example, “You can learn from us, and we can learn from you. There must be a

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free exchange.” On the other hand, within the back and forth between the two men there are numerous breakdowns in communication that highlight the need for such cultural exchanges. At one point Khrushchev jokingly asks, “You look very angry, as if you want to fight me. Are you still angry?” Obviously, there is a need for improved communication there. The exchange shows that the dialogue between the two men was, at best, awkward and, at worst, seriously strained. The same dynamic can be seen a little later in the debate. While discussing the concept of ideas, Nixon repeats the need for cultural understanding and exchange: “Well, then, let’s have more exchange of them [ideas]. We all agree on that, right?” Khrushchev readily agrees, “Good.” However, he then turns to his translator to ask, “Now, what did I agree on?” After a little back and forth, they finally do agree that their conversation should be broadcast unedited in both countries. However, these moments of miscommunication are symbolic of the flow of the conversation as a whole. While discussing their economic systems, the two seem to talk past one another to address their own domestic audiences. Yet, isn’t that often what is to be expected of politicians? —Anthony Vivian Bibliography and Additional Reading

Fursenko, Aleksandr & Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006. Print. Khrushchev, Nikita. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. New York: Little, Brown, 1974. Print. Nixon, Richard. Leaders: Profiles and Reminiscences of Men Who Have Shaped the Modern World. Norwalk, CT: Easton P, 1982. Print. Phillips Sarah T. & Shane Hamilton. The Kitchen Debate and Cold War Consumer Politics: A Brief History with Documents. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2014. Print.

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 Antarctic Treaty Date: December 1, 1959 Geographic Region: Antarctica Authors: United States, the Soviet Union, and ten other countries Genre: treaty

Summary Overview

By the 1950s, the only region on Earth in which war had not been fought was Antarctica. This icy, desolate region was viewed by scientists from all over the world as an area filled with potential scientific discoveries. Representatives from twelve nations, gathering in Washington, DC, came to the consensus that Antarctica should remain untarnished by military development or conflict. In a brief, fourteen-point document, each signatory agreed that they should share the continent, consulting with each other on the scientific exploration and other peaceful uses of the region. It is viewed as one of the most successful international agreements in history, continuing unbroken through 2015 and drawing in forty-one additional signatory nations. Defining Moment

At the end of World War II, mutual distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union gave rise to the Cold War. These two nations did not engage in military conflict, but most of the world became a chessboard on which the countries carried out political and ideological maneuvers. The United States formed a mutual defense pact with its Western European allies in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet Union did the same with its Eastern European allies, forging the Warsaw Pact less than a decade after NATO came into being. By the 1950s, the ideological differences between democracy and Communism broadened the Cold War’s list of participants, as nations in every corner of the world aligned themselves with one of the two poles of influence. In exchange for their support, these nations were given financial aid, military supplies, and even political legitimacy. In many cases, the allies of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact hosted those organizations’ military bases and installations, including facili-

ties from which nuclear weapons could be launched. By the late 1950s, most of the world was a participant, in one way or another, in the Cold War. As one of the few nonaligned regions, Antarctica held potential for both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the 5.4 million-square-mile continent did not offer vast oil resources or even major geographical strategic benefit. Instead, Antarctica’s harsh, freezing climate provided the superpowers with a place to test their respective troops and equipment in the event that cold-weather battles took place. For example, after World War II, the United States sent thirteen ships and forty-seven hundred men to Antarctica for Operation High Jump. In 1957, NATO and the Soviet Union’s pursuit of conquering Antarctica gave rise to a peaceful interest in that ice-covered continent. A group of approximately thirty thousand scientists from sixty-seven countries converged around the International Geophysical Year (IGY) project, which was largely born from the lack of exchanges between scientists in the East and West because of the Cold War. From 1957 through 1958, the IGY fostered a number of major scientific discoveries and accomplishments, including the launch of Sputnik and a recording of the coldest temperature in the world (that of less than −125 degrees Fahrenheit) at the South Pole. Although the scientific communities of the United States and the Soviet Union would continue to compete for scientific discovery and accomplishment in Antarctica, there remained a spirit of good will between the two (particularly since it was apparent that Antarctica offered no strategic or economic benefit). Such positive relations fostered a desire among the scientists and leaders of twelve nations that Antarctica should remain a natural preserve worthy of study, not conquest. Signed on December 1, 1959, the treaty went into effect in June 1961.

Antarctic Treaty

Author Biography and Document Information

The Treaty of Antarctica was signed on December 1, 1959, by scientists representing the twelve nations and gave rise to the IGY. Seven of the signing nations—the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Norway, France, and Argentina—previously claimed territory in Antarctica. Several of these claims overlapped.

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Japan, South Africa, and Belgium also signed the treaty, expressing their desire to use the region peacefully. The United States, which hosted the treaty negotiations, and the Soviet Union also joined the signatories. After signing the treaty in Washington, DC, the participants convened in Canberra, Australia, in 1961, to establish the framework for scientific research in Antarctica.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Governments of Argentina, Australia Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord; Acknowledge the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international co-operation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind; Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; Have agreed as follows:

Article II Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article I 1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any types of weapons. 2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.

Article IV 1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: a. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activi-

Article III 1. In order to promote international co-operation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable: a. information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations; b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations; c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available. 2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to the establishment of co-operative working relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.

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ties or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State’s right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. Article V 1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited. 2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties the rules established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica. Article VI The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area. Article VII 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be

given of the termination of their appointment. 2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. 3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article. 4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of a. all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory; b. all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and c. any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty. Article VIII 1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1 (b) of Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions. 2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures In pursuance of subparagraph 1 (e) of Article IX, the Con-

Antarctic Treaty

tracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. Article IX 1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding: a. use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; b. facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; c. facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; d. facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; e. questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; f. preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition. 3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article. 4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those measures.

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5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from the date of entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article. Article X Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty. Article XI 1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement or reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. Article XII 1. a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meeting provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received notice from all such contracting Parties that they have ratified it. b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting Policy when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the

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provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the date of the expiration of such period. 2. a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the Treaty. b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved at such a Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties immediately after the termination of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article. c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1 (a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date of its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty, and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice by the depositary Government. Article XIII 1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be open for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to accede to the

Document Analysis

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is distinctive for its simplicity in verbiage and structure. The twelve original signatories—including the United States and the Soviet Union—outline an international agreement that promotes the peaceful use of Antarctica. The treaty’s premise is that every signatory will share information and data drawn from the cooperative and peaceable ex-

Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the Treaty. 2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by each State in accordance with its constitutional processes. 3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government. 4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the present Treaty shall enter into force for these States and for States which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its instruments of accession. 6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XIV The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. In Witness Whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty. Done at Washington this first day of December, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine.

ploration of Antarctica, not build military installations or conduct military operations there, or lay claim to any territory in the region. The treaty also leaves the door open for other nations to join the collective, as long as those countries adhere to its tenets. The first major theme of the treaty is the prevention of Antarctica’s use for military purposes. The first article makes this point clear by strictly prohibiting the

Antarctic Treaty

presence of military personnel, weaponry, or installations below 60 degrees south latitude (as established in Article 6 of the treaty). The only exception to this rule is if military personnel and technology are present for research or other peaceful activities. However, the treaty explicitly prohibits any military maneuvers or the discharge or deployment of any weaponry. Speaking directly to the prevailing concern of the Cold War—nuclear weapons—Article 5 states that no nuclear weapons testing may be conducted unless a much broader international agreement regarding nuclear testing is ratified and the twelve signatories to the treaty agree to adhere to it. In other words, the treaty empowers signatories to prevent the deployment of nuclear and conventional weapons on Antarctica. The second major component of the treaty is the signatories’ freedom to conduct scientific research within the Antarctic Treaty. Under Articles 2 and 3, all of the treaty’s participants “agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable,” they will conduct their respective scientific investigations in cooperation with the other signatories. They will share with one another any information they find, doing so via the many different observatories and scientific installations on the mainland or offshore. In fact, each signatory will be able to exchange personnel in addition to data and technology. Furthermore, the treaty allows for the deployment of observers to Antarctic science installations to ensure that both the spirit of cooperation is maintained and no violations of the treaty are taking place. Also, inspections can take place on any ships or aircraft coming to and leaving the region. Observers can also conduct aerial inspections of installations or projects, both as part of their ability to share information and to ensure compliance with the treaty. Finally, the treaty establishes a general framework within which the signatories can settle any disputes. There are to be no unilateral or other territorial claims to Antarctica. However, if disputes do arise, the disputing nations have the opportunity to work out their differences. If a mediator is needed, either the other treaty participants can assist or, if such a conflict extends beyond the capabilities of the treaty, the UN International Court of Justice will serve as a vehicle for settlement.

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Essential Themes

The Antarctic Treaty was developed to ensure that the icy continent would not be used for (or serve as the location of) any activity other than scientific research. Antarctica served little geopolitical or economic value to any of the nations involved. However, as the treaty was drafted, there was a latent concern, primarily born of the Cold War environment, that Antarctica would be seen as a potential military training ground, nuclear test site, or other area for military operations. Not only did the treaty explicitly prohibit such uses of the region, but it also provided mechanisms for inspections and monitoring to enforce this rule. As outlined in the treaty, Antarctica belongs to no one nation—no territorial claims by any nation or international organization would be recognized or enforced. Disputes would be settled peacefully and within the framework of the treaty and the International Court of Justice. The Antarctic Treaty was established with the notion that other nations could join (as dozens more did over the next few decades). Each term of the treaty is succinct, ensuring that no party agreeing to participate could misinterpret and/or misuse the document’s framework for the peaceful and cooperative scientific study of Antarctica. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Candidi, M. “Principles of the Antarctic Treaty.” EAS Publication Series 33 (2008): 233–38. Academic Search Complete. Web. 11 Dec. 2015. Joyner, Christopher C. “Japan and the Antarctic Treaty System.” Ecology Law Quarterly 16 (1989): 155–69. Legal Source. Web. 11 Dec. 2015. López-Martínez, Jerónimo & Michael D. Sparrow. “Science in Antarctica and the Role of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).” Journal of the Black Sea/Mediterranean Environment 20.2 (2014): 127–36. Environment Complete. Web. 11 Dec. 2015. Triggs, G. D. The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources. New York: Cambridge UP, 1987. Print.

THE RED SCARE C

Department, were also suspected of being communist sympathizers or agents. For this reason President Harry Truman, a Democrat, signed an executive order demanding that government officials be screened for their loyalty to the United States. Actual Soviet spies did turn up, too, such as the German-born atomic physicist Klaus Fuchs and the former New Deal administrator Alger Hiss; yet the level of fear and suspicion associated with such broad anticommunist measures far exceeded the threat posed to the nation by the individual cases identified. Fanning the flames of this postwar Red Scare was Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. At Wheeling, West Virginia, in February 1950, McCarthy claimed to have in his pocket the names of dozens of communist agents working in the State Department. Later, McCarthy’s claimed figures increased, as did the vagueness of his charges. Anyone questioning the senator’s facts or figures was him- or herself accused of being a communist conspirator. Much of the drama, moreover, unfolded under the bright lights of a Senate committee hearing, which in its later stages was televised. By 1954 McCarthy was denouncing the US Army as a haven for communists—at which point the public seemed to have had enough of the crusader and wanted to hear no more from McCarthy or his kind. Once again, America had apparently learned a lesson about over-reaction and overreach.

ommunists in American society were a concern of many politicians and citizens throughout the Cold War, but especially in the early years. The heyday of American communism had been during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when the capitalist system seemed to be falling short in addressing people’s needs. Even before the crash the nation saw its share of communist activism, particularly in the cities. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, for example, there was a major Red Scare in the United States. Labor strikes came to be seen as dangerous threats to American values, and as something spurred by foreign—or immigrant—agitators. Various forms of “criminal syndicalism” were investigated by US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, whose storm-trooper–style assaults on suspected groups and individuals came to be known as Palmer raids. Within a few short years, however, the excesses of this first Red Scare subsided and things got back to normal. With the end of World War II and the development of a cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, a second Red Scare erupted. In 1947 the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), under Republican leadership, opened an investigation into communists in the United States. One of the early HUAC targets was Hollywood screenwriters, thought to be a collection of liberal-left thinkers and a pernicious influence on American life. People inside the federal government, particularly those in the State

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 Executive Order 9835 Date: March 21, 1947 Author: Harry S. Truman Genre: government document Summary Overview

At the end of World War II, tensions ran high between the United States and its former ally, the Soviet Union. The two powers disagreed on plans for the future of Europe, and the United States’ possession of atomic weapons and refusal to share this technology drove a further wedge between them. As US fears of Communism grew and the Soviet Union pursued its own development of an atomic weapon, some in the US government warned of the threat posed by spies and traitors whose ideological ties to the Soviet Union could lead them to leak sensitive or dangerous information. President Harry Truman’s Executive Order 9835 was designed to root out this alleged subversive element in the federal government. This order required that all federal employees be screened for loyalty as a matter of national security. The effort to expose Communists prompted the widespread influence of the Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations (AGLOSO), which identified groups whose members could allegedly be suspected of anti-American sympathies. These measures led to a precipitous decline in civil liberties as ever more aggressive investigations sought to uncover Communist plots.

a highly charged atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. As the Soviet Union became directly opposed to US foreign policy, rumors circulated that there were extensive Communist spy networks in the United States, including within the government. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), created in 1938 and made permanent in 1945, was in charge of antiCommunist investigations. The Soviet Union’s increasingly hard line views and the discovery of several actual spies in the United States further fueled an obsession in the United States with internal subversion. Some political and cultural leaders, particularly religious and political conservatives, saw this “Red Scare” as a political opportunity, and the Republican Party adopted the threat of Communism and the perceived weakness of the Democrats under Harry Truman as a major issue in the congressional elections of 1946. In 1946, the HUAC investigated several alleged Communist groups, and concluded that the security of the country was threatened by the employment of anyone with questionable loyalty. Boosted by the argument that Democrats were soft on Communism, the Republican Party gained control of both houses of Congress and demanded action to identify and eliminate subversives in any federal position. According to most accounts, the Truman administration did not view Communist subversion as a major problem, but it felt the political pressure to provide some response to the issue. In November 1946, President Truman established the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty (TCEL) to study how to best determine the loyalty of federal employees. The TCEL investigation was based on testimony from various government agencies and officials. Attorney General Tom Clark and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under director J. Edgar Hoover helped push the TCEL’s final report to recommend the creation of a strict federal loyalty program. Truman fol-

Defining Moment

Even before the end of World War II, the US government had begun attempts to screen its employees for loyalty by banning individuals with ties to Fascist, Communist, or other political groups seen as antidemocratic. The Hatch Act of 1939 led to the creation of a committee to investigate the possibility of subversive activities, as well as a secret version of the AGLOSO that identified groups whose members posed a potential threat. After the war, tensions with the Soviet Union quickly began to rise. Dramatically opposed ideologies between the two nations, an imbalance of power (the Soviet Union had not yet developed nuclear weapons), and economic trouble within the United States led to 233

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lowed this recommendation by signing Executive Order 9835 on March 21, 1947, which mandated that all current federal employees as well as all applicants for federal jobs be investigated to determine their loyalty. Author Biography

Harry S. Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri, in 1884. He served in the National Guard during World War I, aiding in the formation of his regiment and eventually becoming a captain. Thanks to his political connections, Truman was appointed or elected to a series of minor public offices before being elected to the United States Senate in 1934. Truman’s strong reputation in the Senate led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to se-

lect him as a running mate in the 1944 presidential election, and Truman won the vice presidency. When Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, Truman became the president of the United States. He oversaw Germany’s surrender and made the decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan. After World War II, Truman helped establish the United Nations and the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and was narrowly reelected in 1948. His later initiatives included the Fair Deal domestic policy program and the containment of Communism, including the Korean War. Truman did not seek reelection in 1952, and retired from politics. He died in 1972.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Whereas each employee of the Government of the United States is endowed with a measure of trusteeship over the democratic processes which are the heart and sinew of the United States; and

States, it is hereby, in the interest of the internal management of the Government, ordered as follows:

Whereas it is of vital importance that persons employed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States; and

1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government.

Whereas, although the loyalty of by far the overwhelming majority of all Government employees is beyond question, the presence within the Government service of any disloyal or subversive person constitutes a threat to our democratic processes; and Whereas maximum protection must be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, and equal protection from unfounded accusations of disloyalty must be afforded the loyal employees of the Government: Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403), as amended, and section 9A of the act approved August 2, 1939 (18 U.S.C. 61i), and as President and Chief Executive of the United

PART I—INVESTIGATION OF APPLICANTS

2. Investigations of persons entering the competitive service shall be conducted by the Civil Service Commission, except in such cases as are covered by a special agreement between the Commission and any given department or agency. 3. Investigations of persons other than those entering the competitive service shall be conducted by the employing department or agency. Departments and agencies without investigative organizations shall utilize the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission. 4. The investigations of persons entering the employ of the executive branch may be conducted after any such person enters upon actual employment therein, but in any such case the appointment of such person shall be

Executive Order 9835

conditioned upon a favorable determination with respect to his loyalty. 5. Investigations of persons entering the competitive service shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible; provided, however, that if any such investigation is not completed within 18 months from the date on which a person enters actual employment, the condition that his employment is subject to investigation shall expire, except in a case in which the Civil Service Commission has made an initial adjudication of disloyalty and the case continues to be active by reason of an appeal, and it shall then be the responsibility of the employing department or agency to conclude such investigation and make a final determination concerning the loyalty of such person. 6. An investigation shall be made of all applicants at all available pertinent sources of information and shall include reference to: 7. Federal Bureau of Investigation files. 8. Civil Service Commission files. 9. Military and naval intelligence files. 10. The files of any other appropriate government investigative or intelligence agency. 11. House Committee on un-American Activities files. 12. Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the applicant, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.

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to loyalty of an applicant is revealed a full investigation shall be conducted. A full field investigation shall also be conducted of those applicants, or of applicants for particular positions, as may be designated by the head of the employing department or agency, such designations to be based on the determination by any such head of the best interests of national security. PART II—INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES 1. The head of each department and agency in the executive branch of the Government shall be personally responsible for an effective program to assure that disloyal civilian officers or employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency. 2. He shall be responsible for prescribing and supervising the loyalty determination procedures of his department or agency, in accordance with the provisions of this order, which shall be considered as providing minimum requirements. 3. The head of a department or agency which does not have an investigative organization shall utilize the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission. 4. The head of each department and agency shall appoint one or more loyalty boards, each composed of not less than three representatives of the department or agency concerned, for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising within such department or agency and making recommendations with respect to the removal of any officer or employee of such department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty, and he shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of the proceedings before such boards.

13. Schools and colleges attended by applicant. 14. Former employers of applicant. 15. References given by applicant. 16. Any other appropriate source. 17. Whenever derogatory information with respect

5. An officer or employee who is charged with being disloyal shall have a right to an administrative hearing before a loyalty board in the employing department or agency. He may appear before such board personally, accompanied by counsel or representative of his own choosing, and present evidence on his own behalf, through witnesses or by affidavit.

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6. The officer or employee shall be served with a written notice of such hearing in sufficient time, and shall be informed therein of the nature of the charges against him in sufficient detail, so that he will be enabled to prepare his defense. The charges shall be stated as specifically and completely as, in the discretion of the employing department or agency, security considerations permit, and the officer or employee shall be informed in the notice (1) of his right to reply to such charges in writing within a specified reasonable period of time, (2) of his right to an administrative hearing on such charges before a loyalty board, and (3) of his right to appear before such board personally, to be accompanied by counsel or representative of his own choosing, and to present evidence on his behalf, through witness or by affidavit. 7. A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board shall be subject to appeal by the officer or employee affected, prior to his removal, to the head of the employing department or agency or to such person or persons as may be designated by such head, under such regulations as may be prescribed by him, and the decision of the department or agency concerned shall be subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, for an advisory recommendation. 8. The rights of hearing, notice thereof, and appeal therefrom shall be accorded to every officer or employee prior to his removal on grounds of disloyalty, irrespective of tenure, or of manner, method, or nature of appointment, but the head of the employing department or agency may suspend any officer or employee at any time pending a determination with respect to loyalty. 9. The loyalty boards of the various departments and agencies shall furnish to the Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, such reports as may be requested concerning the operation of the loyalty program in any such department or agency. PART III—RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 1. There shall be established in the Civil Service

Commission a Loyalty Review Board of not less than three impartial persons, the members of which shall be officers or employees of the Commission. 2. The Board shall have authority to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency and to make advisory recommendations thereon to the head of the employing department or agency. Such cases may be referred to the Board either by the employing department or agency, or by the officer or employee concerned. 3. The Board shall make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this order, deemed necessary to implement statutes and Executive orders relating to employee loyalty. 4. The Loyalty Review Board shall also: (1) Advise all departments and agencies on all problems relating to employee loyalty. (2) Disseminate information pertinent to employee loyalty programs. (3) Coordinate the employee loyalty policies and procedures of the several departments and agencies. (4) Make reports and submit recommendations to the Civil Service Commission for transmission to the President from time to time as may be necessary to the maintenance of the employee loyalty program. 5. There shall also be established and maintained in the Civil Service Commission a central master index covering all persons on whom loyalty investigations have been made by any department or agency since September 1, 1939. Such master index shall contain the name of each person investigated, adequate identifying information concerning each such person, and a reference to each department and agency which has conducted a loyalty investigation concerning the person involved.

Executive Order 9835

6. All executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish to the Civil Service Commission all information appropriate for the establishment and maintenance of the central master index. 7. The reports and other investigative material and information developed by the investigating department or agency shall be retained by such department or agency in each case. 8. The Loyalty Review Board shall currently be furnished by the Department of Justice the name of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which the Attorney General, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. 9. The Loyalty Review Board shall disseminate such information to all departments and agencies. PART IV—SECURITY MEASURES IN INVESTIGATIONS 1. At the request of the head of any department or agency of the executive branch an investigative agency shall make available to such head, personally, all investigative material and information collected by the investigative agency concerning any employee or prospective employee of the requesting department or agency, or shall make such material and information available to any officer or officers designated by such head and approved by the investigative agency. 2. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, however, the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the names of confidential informants, provided it furnishes sufficient information about such informants on the basis of which the requesting department or agency can make an adequate evaluation of the information furnished by them, and provided it advises the requesting department

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or agency in writing that it is essential to the protection of the informants or to the investigation of other cases that the identity of the informants not be revealed. Investigative agencies shall not use this discretion to decline to reveal sources of information where such action is not essential. 3. Each department and agency of the executive branch should develop and maintain, for the collection and analysis of information relating to the loyalty of its employees and prospective employees, a staff specially trained in security techniques, and an effective security control system for protecting such information generally and for protecting confidential sources of such information particularly. PART V—STANDARDS 1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States. 2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following: 3. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs; 4. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof; 5. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States; 6. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States;

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7. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States. 8. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

4. The Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee shall draft rules applicable to the handling and transmission of confidential documents and other documents and information which should not be publicly disclosed, and upon approval by the President such rules shall constitute the minimum standards for the handling and transmission of such documents and information, and shall be applicable to all departments and agencies of the executive branch. 5. The provisions of this order shall not be applicable to persons summarily removed under the provisions of section 3 of the act of December 17, 1942, 56 Stat. 1053, of the act of July 5, 1946, 60 Stat. 453, or of any other statute conferring the power of summary removal.

PART VI—MISCELLANEOUS 1. Each department and agency of the executive branch, to the extent that it has not already done so, shall submit, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, either directly or through the Civil Service Commission, the names (and such other necessary identifying material as the Federal Bureau of Investigation may require) of all of its incumbent employees. 2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall check such names against its records of persons concerning whom there is substantial evidence of being within the purview of paragraph 2 of Part V hereof, and shall notify each department and agency of such information. 3. Upon receipt of the above-mentioned information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, each department and agency shall make, or cause to be made by the Civil Service Commission, such investigation of those employees as the head of the department or agency shall deem advisable.

6. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard, are hereby directed to continue to enforce and maintain the highest standards of loyalty within the armed services, pursuant to the applicable statutes, the Articles of War, and the Articles for the Government of the Navy. 7. This order shall be effective immediately, but compliance with such of its provisions as require the expenditure of funds shall be deferred pending the appropriation of such funds. 8. Executive Order No. 9300 of February 5, 1943, is hereby revoked. Harry S. Truman The White House, March 21, 1947.

GLOSSARY adjudication: the act of a court in making an order, judgment, or decree derogatory: tending to lessen the merit or reputation of a person or thing; disparaging endowed: to furnish, as with some talent, money, faculty or quality; equip

Executive Order 9835

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expeditiously: characterized by promptness; quickly whereas: while on the contrary

Document Analysis

Executive Order 9835 begins by laying out the premise for testing the loyalty of all federal employees. It acknowledges that though most—in fact, “by far the overwhelming majority”—of employees are loyal, the possibility of any “disloyal or subversive” people anywhere in public service constitutes a threat to the entire nation. Since the United States needs protection against any possibility of infiltration, it is necessary to investigate all current and potential employees. Truman also states that these investigations will also protect employees against false accusations. The body of the order lays out the structure for performing these investigations. New applicants for positions will be screened thoroughly by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and multiple aspects of their lives, including schooling, former employers, and any other records deemed relevant, will be examined. Any indication of disloyalty will be followed by a full investigation. Current employees are to be examined according to a system set up by their department heads, who are held responsible for removing any disloyal individuals serving beneath them. Departments are required to set up loyalty boards, which are to investigate employees to the standards set by the order. If employees are found to be disloyal, they have the right to defend themselves in a hearing. The accused will be given adequate time to prepare their defense, but only as “security conditions permit,” and the identities of any informants against them will not be revealed. When a loyalty board recommends the removal of an employee after a hearing, the decision may be appealed by the employee in question. Truman declares that an overarching Loyalty Review Board is to be established in the CSC to hear appeals and coordinate information sharing between the loyalty boards of individual departments. It will also run the internal management and dissemination of the list of subversive foreign or domestic organizations to be provided by the attorney general or the Department of Justice. The basic standard for disloyalty is laid out; in addition to spying and espionage, reasons for dismissal include membership, affiliation, or “sympathetic association” with any of the organizations on the attorney

general’s list. All employees’ names are given to the FBI for checks against its own records. The heads of the armed forces are given the task of ensuring that they will “continue to enforce and maintain the highest standards of loyalty within the armed services.” All information gathered in the federal investigations will be kept in a master index. Essential Themes

Executive Order 9835 demonstrates the willingness of the Truman administration to take drastic measures in the name of national security in the highly charged postwar atmosphere. The establishment of a federal loyalty program sparked the postwar erosion of civil liberties that marked the Red Scare. Shortly after Truman signed the order, the AGLOSO was published and gained widespread public attention, eventually being used as a blacklist by many private groups as well as government organizations. The frenzy of anti-Communist activity culminated in the egregious persecution led by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the HUAC in the 1950s, which gave rise to the term “McCarthyism” for unsubstantiated accusations of subversion made for political gain. Many of those accused suffered significant professional and personal damages due to the negative impact of being associated with Communism, regardless of their actual level of involvement or political beliefs, and McCarthyism had a deep impact on the social and political landscape of the United States. Truman’s Executive Order 9835 did receive criticism, especially from civil liberties advocates concerned about the lack of effective protection against false accusations. The order itself was eventually revoked by President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10450 in 1953, though the debate over the surrounding issues lived on. The later order took away the powers of the Loyalty Review Board, though it did not reinstate any federal employees who had been previously dismissed for disloyalty. The controversial subject of citizens’ rights versus national security would remain for years to come. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2007. Print. Goldstein, Robert Justin. “Prelude to McCarthyism: The Making of a Blacklist.” Prologue Magazine 38.3

(2006). Web. 20 Feb. 2015. Storrs, Landon R. Y. The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013. Print.

Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee

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 Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee Date: March 26, 1947 Author: J. Edgar Hoover Genre: speech; report Summary Overview

Whereas the most famous hearings held by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) were interviews with movie stars, artists, or intellectuals, conducted in order to ferret out Communists within US society—especially in Hollywood—the HUAC’s interview with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director J. Edgar Hoover was of a different sort. Hoover’s testimony acted both to provide the HUAC with ideological cover and to demonstrate that various federal organizations were all on the same page regarding the threat posed by Communism and what to do about it. Hoover’s authority as FBI director, his almost folk-hero status due to his successes fighting gangsters such as John Dillinger during the 1920s and 1930s, and his long track record of fighting Communism and radicalism beginning in 1919 made his HUAC testimony compelling and gave Hoover a platform to speak to the American people. Defining Moment

During the years after the end of World War II, the US government turned its focus from defeating fascism in Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan to defeating Communism in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and especially within the United States itself. Though Communist political ideologies had gained some traction in the United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s, with the country’s emergence as a world superpower after World War II, such ideologies were increasingly unwelcome in the context of the threat posed by the other superpower, the Soviet Union. Many Americans feared that American Communists were preparing an overthrow of the government as had occurred in the Soviet Union, and the US government began taking steps to root out the influence of Communism in the United States.

To that end, the House Un-American Activities Committee, which had been formed in 1938 to investigate Americans who potentially had ties to Fascism and Nazism, emerged from World War II to focus almost exclusively on the threat posed by Communism in US society. With the onset of the Cold War, the American people were exceedingly fearful of Communism and the threat it posed to democracy and capitalism within the United States, and thus many eagerly supported the HUAC’s investigation of the influence of Communism in Hollywood during 1947. In 1947, the HUAC began to hold hearings in Hollywood that sought to uncover subversive Communist messages that were allegedly introduced into motion pictures by left-leaning producers, directors, writers, and actors. Though many Americans supported the aims of the HUAC hearings, many also were wary of the tactics used to gain information, such as potentially abusing the power of the subpoena, demanding that witnesses publicly name those they suspected of being Communists even if there was no evidence, and encouraging the firing of those who were seen as possibly having Communist sympathies. Though the HUAC had been successful in rooting out those it considered to have Communist sympathies within federal arts organizations, such as the Federal Theatre Project, its members felt they needed both the support of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and the investigative power of the FBI in order to truly make a difference in Hollywood. To that end, HUAC chair J. Parnell Thomas invited Hoover to testify on March 26, 1947. Only two weeks before Hoover testified in front of the HUAC, President Harry S. Truman articulated the Truman Doctrine of containing Communism and authoritarianism, squarely placing the US federal government against those whom they suspected of subverting either US allies or the US government itself.

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Further, only four days before Hoover’s testimony, Truman issued Executive Order 9835, which instituted a loyalty program to ensure that federal employees posed no threat to the US government. Hoover was happy to help the HUAC’s efforts. After all, he had been fighting Communism for nearly thirty years when he stepped before the committee. His view of the threat’s gravity, as well as the appropriate actions to combat it, were in line with the committee’s and demonstrated unity within various organizations of the federal government. Author Biography

J. Edgar Hoover was born on January 1, 1895, and joined the US Department of Justice in 1917. Within his first two years of federal employment, he made a name for himself as an anti-Communist by heading

the General Intelligence Division of the Department of Justice, which staged raids against suspected anarchists and Communists at the direction of US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and became part of the Bureau of Investigation in 1921. After becoming director of the Bureau of Investigation in 1924 (which became the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935), Hoover made a name for himself by capturing notorious gangsters, but he remained especially vigilant against those whom he considered to have radical political perspectives, carrying out spying operations, often without reporting them to the attorney general or the president. By the beginning of the Cold War in the 1940s, Hoover was seen as one of the greatest anti-Communists of the day and the FBI as an essential tool against Communist subversion. Hoover remained director of the FBI until his death on May 2, 1972.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT My feelings concerning the Communist Party of the United States are well known. I have not hesitated over the years to express my concern and apprehension. As a consequence its professional smear brigades have conducted a relentless assault against the FBI. You who have been members of this committee also know the fury with which the party, its sympathizers and fellow travelers can launch an assault. I do not mind such attacks. What has been disillusioning is the manner in which they have been able to enlist support often from apparently wellmeaning but thoroughly duped persons.... The communist movement in the United States began to manifest itself in 1919. Since then it has changed its name and its party line whenever expedient and tactical. But always it comes back to fundamentals and bills itself as the party of Marxism-Leninism. As such, it stands for the destruction of our American form of government; it stands for the destruction of American democracy; it stands for the destruction of free enterprise; and it stands for the creation of a “Soviet of the United States” and ultimate world revolution.... The communist, once he is fully trained and indoctrinated, realizes that he can create his order in the United States only by “bloody revolution.” Their chief textbook, “The History of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union,” is used as a basis for planning their revolution. Their tactics require that to be successful they must have: 1. The will and sympathy of the people. 2. Military aid and assistance. 3. Plenty of guns and ammunition. 4. A program for extermination of the police as they are the most important enemy and are termed “trained fascists.” 5. Seizure of all communications, buses, railroads, radio stations, and other forms of communications and transportation.... One thing is certain. The American progress which all good citizens seek, such as old-age security, houses for veterans, child assistance, and a host of others, is being adopted as window dressing by the communists to conceal their true aims and entrap gullible followers.... The mad march of Red fascism is a cause for concern in America. But the deceit, the trickery, and the lies of the American communists are catching up with them. Whenever the spotlight of truth is focused upon them they cry, “Red-baiting.” Now that their aims and objectives are being exposed, they are creating a Committee for the Constitutional Rights of Communists, and are feverishly working to build up what they term a quarter-million-

Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee

dollar defense fund to place ads in papers, to publish pamphlets, to buy radio time. They know that their backs will soon be to the wall.... What is important is the claim of the communists themselves that for every party member there are 10 others ready, willing and able to do the party’s work. Herein lies the greatest menace of communism. For these are the people who infiltrate and corrupt various spheres of American life. So rather than the size of the Communist Party, the way to weigh its true importance is by testing its influence, its ability to infiltrate.... The communists have developed one of the greatest propaganda machines the world has ever known. They have been able to penetrate and infiltrate many respectable public opinion mediums. They capitalize upon illfounded charges associating known honest progressive liberals with left-wing causes. I have always entertained the view that there are few appellations more degrading than “communist” and hence it should be reserved for those justly deserving the degradation. The communist propaganda technique is designed to promote emotional response with the hope that the victim will be attracted by what he is told the communist way of life holds in store for him. The objective, of course, is to develop discontent and hasten the day when the communists can gather sufficient support and following to overthrow the American way of life.... Communists and their followers are prolific letter writers, and some of the more energetic ones follow the practice of directing numerous letters of protest to editors but signing a different name to each. Members of Congress are well aware of communists starting their pressure campaigns by an avalanche of mail which follows the party line.... The American communists launched a furtive attack on Hollywood in 1935 by the issuance of a directive calling for a concentration in Hollywood. The orders called for action on two fronts: One, an effort to infiltrate the labor unions; two, infiltrate the so-called intellectual and creative fields. In movie circles, communists developed an effective defense a few years ago in meeting criticism. They would counter with the question “After all, what is the matter with communism?” It was effective because many per-

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sons did not possess adequate knowledge of the subject to give an intelligent answer.... I feel that this committee could render a great service to the nation through its power of exposure in quickly spotlighting existing front organizations and those which will be created in the future. There are easy tests to establish the real character of such organizations: 1. Does the group espouse the cause of Americanism or the cause of Soviet Russia? 2. Does the organization feature as speakers at its meeting known communists, sympathizers, or fellow travelers? 3. Does the organization shift when the party line shifts? 4. Does the organization sponsor causes, campaigns, literature, petitions, or other activities sponsored by the party or other front organizations? 5. Is the organization used as a sounding board by or is it endorsed by communist-controlled labor unions? 6. Does its literature follow the communist line or is it printed by the communist press? 7. Does the organization receive consistent favorable mention in the communist publications? 8. Does the organization present itself to be nonpartisan yet engage in political activities and consistently advocate causes favored by the communists? 9. Does the organization denounce American and British foreign policy while always lauding Soviet policy? 10. Does the organization utilize communist “double-talk” by referring to Soviet dominated countries as democracies, complaining that the United States is imperialistic and constantly denouncing monopoly-capital? 11. Have outstanding leaders in public life openly renounced affiliation with the organization? 12. Does the organization, if espousing liberal progressive causes, attract well-known honest patriotic liberals or does it denounce well-known liberals? 13. Does the organization have a consistent record of supporting the American viewpoint over the years? 14. Does the organization consider matters now directly related to its avowed purposes and objectives? The Communist Party of the United States is a fifth column if there ever was one. It is far better organized than were the Nazis in occupied countries prior to their

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capitulation. They are seeking to weaken America just as they did in their era of obstruction when they were aligned with the Nazis. Their goal is the overthrow of our government. There is no doubt as to where a real communist’s loyalty rests. Their allegiance is to Russia, not the United States.... What can we do? And what should be our course of action? The best antidote to communism is vigorous, intelligent, old-fashioned Americanism, with eternal vigilance. I do not favor any course of action which would give the communists cause to portray and pity themselves as martyrs. I do favor unrelenting prosecution wherever they are found to be violating our country’s laws. As Americans, our most effective defense is a workable democracy that guarantees and preserves our cherished freedoms. I would have no fears if more Americans possessed the zeal, the fervor, the persistence and the industry to learn about this menace of Red fascism. I do fear for the liberal and progressive who has been hoodwinked and

duped into joining hands with the communists. I confess to a real apprehension so long as communists are able to secure ministers of the gospel to promote their evil work and espouse a cause that is alien to the religion of Christ and Judaism. I do fear so long as school boards and parents tolerate conditions whereby communists and fellow travelers, under the guise of academic freedom, can teach our youth a way of life that eventually will destroy the sanctity of the home, that undermines faith in God, that causes them to scorn respect for constituted authority and sabotage our revered Constitution. I do fear so long as American labor groups are infiltrated, dominated or saturated with the virus of communism. I do fear the palliation and weasel-worded gestures against communism indulged in by some of our labor leaders who should know better, but who have become pawns in the hands of sinister but astute manipulations for the communist cause. I fear for ignorance on the part of all our people who may take the poisonous pills of communist propaganda.

GLOSSARY fifth column: a group of people who act traitorously and subversively out of a secret sympathy with an enemy of their country indoctrinated: to instruct in a doctrine, principle, or ideology, especially to imbue with a specific biased belief or view point; to teach or inculcate palliation: to relieve or lessen without curing; mitigate; alleviate

Document Analysis

When the House Committee on Un-American Activities invited FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to testify on March 26, 1947, it was ostensibly to discuss the possibility of outlawing the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). However, Hoover spoke much more broadly about the threat posed by Communism and the various things that could and should be done to combat its influence. Hoover argued that Communism stood for nothing short of “the destruction of our American form of government” and “the destruction of free enterprise.” He asserted that the “the communist, once he is fully trained and indoctrinated, realizes that he can create his order in the United States only by ‘bloody revolution.’” Hoover’s views on Communism were well

known to both the committee and the public, and he acknowledged that he had never hesitated to speak of his “concern and apprehension” about Communism. His testimony that day was less about outlawing the CPUSA and more about forging an alliance between the HUAC and the FBI to fight Communism together moving forward. To Hoover, the activities of the HUAC worked hand-in-hand with those carried out by the FBI. The FBI could investigate potential Communists, but the HUAC could best publicly disseminate the FBI’s findings through its hearings. To Hoover, there were true Americans who aided the Communists in spreading their message, but many who had done so were “apparently well-meaning but thoroughly duped persons.” By

Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee

informing the American people of the dangers of Communist infiltration, the HUAC was performing a public service by creating a well-informed populace. The function of the FBI within the United States throughout the Cold War, on the other hand, was completely different. The FBI could investigate those suspected of Communist sympathies in order to find any violations of the law or any potential threats in terms of espionage or sabotage. At the time of Hoover’s testimony, HUAC’s target was the producers, directors, writers, and actors in Hollywood, whom committee members felt were imbuing American movies with subtle Communist messages. Hoover backed the HUAC agenda, noting efforts by Communists to infiltrate labor unions that organized workers on film productions as well as those who actually wrote, directed, and acted in the movies. Again, Hoover’s answer is to educate the public on the perils of Communism and the tactics he said Communists used. His greatest fears were that those who might influence public opinion, particularly Hollywood filmmakers, liberal and progressive politicians and activists, left-leaning members of the clergy, and academics who favor academic freedom, would “teach our youth a way of life that eventually will destroy the sanctity of the home, that undermines faith in God, that causes them to scorn respect for constituted authority and sabotage our revered Constitution.” To Hoover, these were the real threats that the FBI should investigate and the HUAC should expose. Essential Themes

Even before Hoover’s testimony before the HUAC, the FBI had been involved in working to help shape public opinion about the evils of Communism, arguing that Communists in the United States were, in fact, working at the behest of the United States’ Cold War foe, the Soviet Union. The FBI began to play an increasing role in the investigation of Communism within the federal government and within American society as a whole. However, the tide of public opinion about the zealous anti-Communist tactics used by both the FBI and the HUAC began to change during the 1950s, when Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin took the HUAC’s tactics to their extreme, even going so far as to televise his hearings, in which he mercilessly harangued those he suspected of hav-

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ing Communist sympathies. When McCarthy’s tactics became too much for the American public to stomach, the HUAC and FBI also suffered a loss in standing in the public mind. However, Hoover’s zeal never wavered, and in the 1960s he oversaw an expansion of the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which involved covert espionage, often illegal investigations without probable cause, of individuals the FBI thought might be subversives. Since the HUAC was no longer an effective means to expose Communist sympathizers to public scrutiny, Hoover believed he and the FBI could use covert means to smear those he considered sympathetic to Communism. Though anti-Communism continued to be a theme in American life throughout the Cold War era, explicit hearings, such as those held by HUAC and McCarthy, ended by the mid-1950s, and operations, such as COINTELPRO, came under public scrutiny when they were exposed in 1971, forcing Hoover to abandon one of the main strategies the FBI used to investigate suspected American Communists. By that time, however, the tenor of the Cold War had changed with the onset of the period of détente and the de-escalation of tensions with Communist nations. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bentley, Eric, ed. Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938–1968. New York: Thunder’s Mouth, 2002. Print. Hoover, J. Edgar. Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It. New York: Holt, 1958. Print. Litvak, Joseph. The Un-Americans: Jews, the Blacklist, and Stoolpigeon Culture. Durham: Duke UP, 2009. Print. May, Lary, ed. Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989. Print. O’Reilly, Kenneth. Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1983. Print. Sbardellati, John. J. Edgar Hoover Goes to the Movies: The FBI and the Origins of Hollywood’s Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2012. Print.

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 Ronald Reagan’s Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee Date: October 23, 1947 Author: Ronald Reagan Genre: speech; report Summary Overview

In October 1947, motion picture actor and future US president Ronald Reagan gave testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) regarding the influence of Communism within the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), of which Reagan was president. Though the HUAC had been in existence since 1938, its activities had increased dramatically after the conclusion of World War II, as the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and Communism within the United States became more widespread. The HUAC had the power to subpoena anyone and exerted pressure on its witnesses to provide the names of people they suspected of being Communists. Refusing to name names could result in the witness being held in contempt of Congress and was likely to lead some members to the conclusion that the person him- or herself was a Communist. Though Reagan was staunchly anti-Communist, with a long track record of opposing the influence of Marxist ideologies, he also expressed reservations about the activities of HUAC. Defining Moment

The fear of Communism in the United States was nothing new in the late 1940s. As early as 1919—only two years after the Soviet Union came into being—US attorney general A. Mitchell Palmer staged a series of raids on suspected Communists that set the tone for what would become known as the First Red Scare. By 1938, when the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was formed to investigate domestic disloyalty and subversion, its focus was primarily on Fascism, as the preeminent threats came from Nazi Germany and Japan. However, in the context of the Great Depression, Communists and Communist organizations also came under scrutiny. Whatever the motives for its founding, the HUAC was often used for

political ends, mainly to discredit liberal supporters of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal domestic policy program. After the end of World War II, the attention of the HUAC quickly turned fully toward the threat posed by Communism. In 1946, William R. Wilkerson, the publisher of the Hollywood Reporter, began to publish a series of articles in which he named actors, directors, and others in the motion picture industry that he claimed were Communists. Usually naming people with either dubious proof or none at all, this first “blacklist” caught the attention of the HUAC, which then began to subpoena those they thought might be in a position to know of any Communist activity in Hollywood. What the HUAC may not have known was that Reagan and others had already been recruited by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to help ferret out Communists in a number of different Hollywood organizations. FBI officials had disclosed their belief that Communists were trying to gain influence in Hollywood in order to use motion pictures to spread their message and that numerous film writers and actors were either Communist Party members or Communist sympathizers. Reagan agreed to work with the FBI. Reagan was briefly involved with two groups, the American Veterans Committee and the Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, which the FBI considered to be Communist-front organizations. Reagan had left both groups because of his views against Communism, but at the same time had stated to the FBI that he distrusted the motives of the HUAC and worried about its apparent attempts to quell free speech. Along with animator Walt Disney, Reagan was one of the prominent names subpoenaed by the HUAC in October 1947. As president of the SAG, Reagan was in a unique position to know a wide array of Hollywood

Ronald Reagan’s Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee

stars and to assess whether they were Communists intent on subverting industry groups, or, even more importantly, subtly inserting pro-Communist propaganda into Hollywood movies. Author Biography

Ronald Reagan was born on February 6, 1911, and came of age during the Great Depression. Like many others of his generation, he initially supported Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Democratic Party rather than the Republicans, whom many blamed for the Depression. He became a Hollywood actor in 1937 and joined the SAG,

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quickly becoming involved in the union’s management. Reagan produced military training films during World War II before becoming president of the SAG in 1947. As his acting career wound down in the early 1950s, he became increasingly involved in politics, and his views shifted from liberal to conservative. Reagan was elected governor of California as a Republican in 1966 and, in 1980, was elected to the US presidency. He led a resurgence of conservative ideology in both domestic and foreign affairs and was reelected in 1984. After his retirement, Reagan battled Alzheimer’s disease and died on June 5, 2004.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Committee met at 10:30 A.M. [October 23, 1947], the Honorable J. Parnell Thomas (Chairman) presiding. THE CHAIRMAN: The record will show that Mr. McDowell, Mr. Vail, Mr. Nixon, and Mr. Thomas are present. A Subcommittee is sitting. Staff members present: Mr. Robert E. Stripling, Chief Investigator; Messrs. Louis J. Russell, H. A. Smith, and Robert B. Gatson, Investigators; and Mr. Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research. MR. STRIPLING: When and where were you born, Mr. Reagan? MR. REAGAN: Tampico, Illinois, February 6, 1911. MR. STRIPLING: What is your present occupation? MR. REAGAN: Motion-picture actor. MR. STRIPLING: How long have you been engaged in that profession? MR. REAGAN: Since June 1937, with a brief interlude of three and a half years—that at the time didn’t seem very brief. MR. STRIPLING: What period was that?

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MR. REAGAN: That was during the late war. MR. STRIPLING: What branch of the service were you in? MR. REAGAN: Well, sir, I had been for several years in the Reserve as an officer in the United States Calvary, but I was assigned to the Air Corp. MR. STRIPLING: Are you the president of the guild at the present time? MR. REAGAN: Yes, sir. . . . MR. STRIPLING: As a member of the board of directors, as president of the Screen Actors Guild, and as an active member, have you at any time observed or noted within the organization a clique of either Communists or Fascists who were attempting to exert influence or pressure on the guild? MR. REAGAN: Well, sir, my testimony must be very similar to that of Mr. [George] Murphy and Mr. [Robert] Montgomery. There has been a small group within the Screen Actors Guild which has consistently opposed the policy of the guild board and officers of the guild, as evidenced by the vote on various issues. That small clique referred to has been suspected of more or less following

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the tactics that we associated with the Communist Party. MR. STRIPLING: Would you refer to them as a disruptive influence within the guild?

MR. STRIPLING: Would you say from your observation that this is typical of the tactics or strategy of the Communists, to solicit and use the names of prominent people to either raise money or gain support.

MR. REAGAN: I would say that at times they have attempted to be a disruptive influence.

MR. REAGAN: I think it is in keeping with their tactics, yes, sir.

MR. STRIPLING: You have no knowledge yourself as to whether or not any of them are members of the Communist Party?

MR. STRIPLING: Do you think there is anything democratic about those tactics? MR. REAGAN: I do not, sir.

MR. REAGAN: No, sir, I have no investigative force, or anything, and I do not know. MR. STRIPLING: Has it ever been reported to you that certain members of the guild were Communists? MR. REAGAN: Yes, sir, I have heard different discussions and some of them tagged as Communists. MR. STRIPLING: Would you say that this clique has attempted to dominate the guild? MR. REAGAN: Well, sir, by attempting to put over their own particular views on various issues. . . . MR. STRIPLING: Mr. Reagan, there has been testimony to the effect here that numerous Communist-front organizations have been set up in Hollywood. Have you ever been solicited to join any of those organizations or any organization which you consider to be a Communistfront organization? MR. REAGAN: Well, sir, I have received literature from an organization called the Committee for a Far-Eastern Democratic Policy. I don’t know whether it is Communist or not. I only know that I didn’t like their views and as a result I didn’t want to have anything to do with them. ...

MR. STRIPLING: Mr. Reagan, what is your feeling about what steps should be taken to rid the motion-picture industry of any Communist influences? MR. REAGAN: Well, sir, ninety-nine percent of us are pretty well aware of what is going on, and I think, within the bounds of our democratic rights and never once stepping over the rights given us by democracy, we have done a pretty good job in our business of keeping those people’s activities curtailed. After all, we must recognize them at present as a political party. On that basis we have exposed their lies when we came across them, we have opposed their propaganda, and I can certainly testify that in the case of the Screen Actors Guild we have been eminently successful in preventing them from, with their usual tactics, trying to run a majority of an organization with a well-organized minority. In opposing those people, the best thing to do is make democracy work. . . . Sir, I detest, I abhor their philosophy, but I detest more than that their tactics, which are those of the fifth column, and are dishonest, but at the same time I never as a citizen want to see our country become urged, by either fear or resentment of this group that we ever compromise with any of our democratic principles through that fear or resentment. I still think that democracy can do it.

Ronald Reagan’s Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee

Document Analysis

In this congressional transcript, Reagan answers question posed by the HUAC chief investigator Robert E. Stripling regarding his background and his knowledge of Communist activity in the motion picture industry. Reagan claims he is aware of some attempts to influence the SAG by individuals he thinks may be Communists or Communist sympathizers, but says they are a small minority. He asserts his own anti-Communist views as well as his belief that promoting democracy is the best way to counteract Communism. Stripling begins the questioning by going over the basic facts—where Reagan was born, his occupation, and his wartime military service. Then Reagan is directly asked if he has seen within the SAG “a clique of either Communists or Fascists who were attempting to exert influence or pressure on the guild.” Reagan’s answer is both nonspecific and noncommittal. He states that, as others had testified, there are some within SAG that he has suspects are Communists, but that he has no direct information about their affiliation. However, he does deem their ideas disruptive and their tactics as those that he would associate with members of the Communist Party. Reagan states that he has heard that some members of the SAG were thought to be Communists, but is hesitant to cite such hearsay evidence. He agrees that the suspicious faction could be considered to be attempting to dominate the SAG and impose its own ideology on the group. Stripling then asks Reagan if he has been recruited by any Communist-front organizations. Reagan describes receiving literature from a group called the Committee for a Far-Eastern Democratic Policy, claiming that he disregarded it, as he did not like the group’s views, but he qualifies that he does not know whether the group is in fact Communist. Stripling then asks if the group’s recruitment tactics are typical of Communist organizations, and Reagan agrees that they are and that such methods are undemocratic. Reagan does not mention his involvement in two other groups considered Communist-front organizations, or his work as an informant for the FBI on those groups. In his conclusion, Reagan is asked what he thinks should be done to purge Hollywood of Communist subversion. He responds by asserting that most people in the motion picture industry are aware of any Communist efforts and that the majority has been largely successful in preventing Communism from having any real impact on the industry. He obliquely critiques the

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HUAC investigation by claiming that anti-Communist efforts must remain “within the bounds of our democratic rights” and that the best method is to let democracy run its course. Reagan reasserts his opposition to Communist beliefs and tactics, but cautions against allowing fear and resentment to dictate the US response to Communism. Essential Themes

The key themes of Reagan’s testimony are the atmosphere of anti-Communist suspicion fostered by the HUAC, its impact on the motion picture industry, and the conflicting views on how to deal with the perceived Communist threat. Central to the issue is the balance between addressing potential matters of national security and preserving the right to free speech. Reagan illustrates the divisive nature of the subject, as he was strongly opposed to Communism and cooperated with the HUAC, but also understood the risk the investigations posed to democratic values. The HUAC investigations into Hollywood have been viewed by historians as a major violation of free speech. Investigations often ruined careers, as studios kept blacklists of actors, writers, and directors that were suspected of having Communist sympathies. The HUAC grilled the people they subpoenaed about their personal political beliefs and then asked for the names of any other people who might have also participated in subversive activities. Those who refused to cooperate could be held in contempt of Congress and imprisoned. Those who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights were branded Communists and often blacklisted. Soon after Reagan testified, ten writers, producers, and directors refused to cooperate with the HUAC investigations and were held in contempt of Congress. The so-called Hollywood Ten were all sentenced to prison and blacklisted by the studios. However, their saga also became a cause célèbre among those who thought, as Reagan had alluded, that the right to freedom of speech and thought was of greater importance than whether or not one was or ever had been associated with Communism. Reagan’s call to allow democracy to naturally resist Communist influence went unheeded. The Second Red Scare grew into the 1950s, culminating with Senator Joseph McCarthy’s extreme accusations of subversion for his own political gain; such unfounded accusations and persecution became known as “McCarthyism.” The Hollywood blacklist lasted into the

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1960s, and many careers were damaged beyond repair. The era of fear and paranoia would have a lasting effect on US politics and culture. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bentley, Eric, ed. Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings before the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, 1938–1968. New York: Thunder’s Mouth, 2002. Print. Litvak, Joseph. The Un-Americans: Jews, the Blacklist, and Stoolpigeon Culture. Durham: Duke UP, 2009. Print. May, Lary, ed. Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989. Print. Vaughan, Stephen. Ronald Reagan in Hollywood: Movies and Politics. New York: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.

Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations

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 Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations Date: October 27, 1947 Author: Eric Allen Johnston Genre: court testimony

Summary Overview

In October 1947, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (popularized as House Un-American Activities Committee, or HUAC) held a series of investigations into a suspected Communist infiltration of the film industry. Among those summoned to testify was Motion Picture Association of America president Eric A. Johnston, a moderate Republican businessman whose position made him responsible for overseeing Hollywood studios’ interests as a whole. While acknowledging the diversity of political viewpoints and the likely presence of at least a few affirmed Communists in Hollywood, Johnston sharply criticized the House committee for its headstrong approach to rooting out subversion. He both strongly contested the implications that Hollywood permitted Communist ideology to inform its films and complained that the scandal stirred by the committee’s efforts infringed on free speech and carried the possibility of economic devastation for the film industry. He argued that it was better and more American to resolve the underlying social problems that led people to support Communist ideals. Defining Moment

Although the political and economic ideology known as Communism developed during the 1800s, it did not become a major force into world politics until the Russian Revolution of 1917 installed the Soviet Communist regime in place of Russia’s imperial government. The radical and bloody nature of the Russian Revolution shocked the world and caused many Americans to fear that a similar radical movement could transform into an actively revolutionary one in the United States. The First Red Scare that followed World War I reflected these concerns, and during this time, the American government rooted out both real and perceived threats from the left. Although this fervor soon faded, Americans remained deeply uneasy about Communism.

With the rise of the Nazi government in Germany, however, US leaders such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to see the Soviet Union as a useful ally against German aggression. Supported in part by US aid, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and the Soviet army weakened Nazi troops along the Eastern Front; after the German surrender, the Soviets helped pressure the Japanese to surrender in the Pacific theater. However, the resolution of World War II brought the US-Soviet partnership to an end. Immense wartime damage left traditional European powers such as Great Britain, Germany, and France unusually weakened. The ascendance of the United States ensured its role as the leading geopolitical power of the Western world; despite its own heavy wartime losses, the Soviet Union quickly proved its main challenger. As the Allies sought to remake a tattered Europe, Stalin pressed for greater Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. US leaders saw the existence of Communism as a threat to democratic values and, therefore, strongly opposed its expansion. The theory of containment, which argued that limiting Soviet expansion would ultimately destroy Communism, underpinned the postwar Truman Doctrine, which pledged US assistance to any people resisting Communism. The Cold War had begun. As it had during the First Red Scare, domestic concern over the threat of Communism skyrocketed during the late 1940s, sparking a Second Red Scare. Two congressional entities came to exemplify the Red Scare of the post–World War II era: the House Un-American Activities Committee, first formed in the late 1930s to investigate subversive activity, and, from 1950 on, the inquiries headed by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Even as President Harry S. Truman issued executive orders requiring government employees to swear loyalty oaths, HUAC held hearings seeking evidence or simple accusations of subversive support for Communist ideals among the nation’s people. Among its high-profile and

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best-known investigations were those into government official Alger Hiss and into entertainers ranging from folk singer Pete Seeger to numerous Hollywood directors, actors, and screenwriters. In 1947, notable figures, including Screen Actors Guild head Ronald Reagan and famed animator Walt Disney, appeared before the committee to discuss the issue of possible Communist influence in Hollywood. Author Biography

In 1945, Eric Allen Johnston succeeded long-standing Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) head Will H. Hays as the studio organization’s president. In this role, Johnston was primarily responsible for enforcing the studios’ self-imposed censorship rules, com-

monly known as the Hays Code. Before becoming head of the MPAA, Johnston had already built a career in the business world. He worked as a traveling vacuum salesman after World War I, and by the early 1930s, he was at the head of a thriving business in household appliance manufacturing and distribution located in the Pacific Northwest. As his interests expanded, Johnston became active in the Chamber of Commerce. In 1942, members elected him as the organization’s president in something of an upset: Johnston held more liberal, prolabor views than his forebears in that role. Although a Republican, he developed a relationship with the Roosevelt administration and represented the US entrepreneurial spirit abroad throughout the 1940s and 1950s.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT I’m not here to try to whitewash Hollywood, and I’m not here to help sling a tar brush at it, either. I want to stick to the facts as I see them. There are several points I’d like to make to this committee. The first one is this: A damaging impression of Hollywood has spread all over the country as a result of last week’s hearings. You have a lot of sensational testimony about Hollywood. From some of it the public will get the idea that Hollywood is running over with Communists and communism. I believe the impression which has gone out is the sort of scare-head stuff which is grossly unfair to a great American industry. It must be a great satisfaction to the Communist leadership in this country to have people believe that Hollywood Communists are astronomical in number and almost irresistible in power. Now, what are the facts? Not everybody in Hollywood is a Communist. I have said before that undoubtedly there are Communists in Hollywood, but in my opinion the percentage is extremely small. I have had a number of close looks at Hollywood in the last 2 years, and I have looked at it through the eyes of an average businessman. I recognize that as the world’s capital of show business, there is bound to be a lot of show business in Hollywood. There is no business, Mr. Chairman, like show business. But underneath there is the solid foundation of patriotic, hardworking, decent

citizens. Making motion pictures is hard work. You just don’t dash off a motion picture between social engagements. . . . I wind up my first point with a request of this committee. The damaging impression about Hollywood should be corrected. I urge your committee to do so in these public hearings. There is another damaging impression which should be corrected. The report of the subcommittee said that some of the most flagrant Communist propaganda films were produced as the result of White House pressure. This charge has been completely refuted by the testimony before you. My second point includes another request of the committee. The report of your subcommittee stated that you had a list of all pictures produced in Hollywood in the last 8 years which contained Communist propaganda. Your committee has not made this list public. Until the list is made public the industry stands condemned by unsupported generalizations, and we are denied the opportunity to refute these charges publicly. Again, I remind the committee that we have offered to put on a special showing of any or all of the pictures which stand accused so that you can see for yourselves what’s in them. The contents of the pictures constitute the only proof. Unless this evidence is presented and we are given

Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations

the chance to refute it in these public hearings, it is the obligation of the committee to absolve the industry from the charges against it. Now, I come to my third point—a vitally important one to every American and to the system under which we live. It is free speech. . . . When I talk about freedom of speech in connection with this hearing, I mean just this: You don’t need to pass a law to choke off free speech or seriously curtail it. Intimidation or coercion will do it just as well. You can’t make good and honest motion pictures in an atmosphere of fear. I intend to use every influence at my command to keep the screen free. I don’t propose that Government shall tell the motion-picture industry, directly or by coercion, what kind of pictures it ought to make. I am as whole-souledly against that as I would be against dictating to the press or the radio, to the book publishers or to the magazines. . . . To sum up this point: We insist on our rights to decide what will or will not go in our pictures. We are deeply conscious of the responsibility this freedom involves, but we have no intention to violate this trust by permitting subversive propaganda in our films. Now, my next point is this: When I was before this committee last March, I said that I wanted to see Communists exposed. I still do. I’m heart and soul for it. An exposed Communist is an unarmed Communist. Expose them, but expose them in the traditional American manner. But I believe that when this committee or any other agency undertakes to expose communism it must be scrupulous to avoid tying a red tag on innocent people by indiscriminate labeling. It seems to me it is getting dangerously easy to call a man a Communist without proof or even reasonable suspicion. When a distinguished leader of the Republican Party in the United States Senate is accused of following the Communist Party line for introducing a housing bill, it is time, gentlemen, to give a little serious thought to the dangers of thoughtless smearing by gossip and hearsay.

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Senator Robert Taft isn’t going to worry about being called a Communist. But not every American is a Senator Taft who can properly ignore such an accusation. Most of us in America are just little people, and loose charges can hurt little people. They take away everything a man has—his livelihood, his reputation, and his personal dignity. When just one man is falsely damned as a Communist in an hour like this when the Red issue is at white heat, no one of us is safe. Gentlemen, I maintain that preservation of the rights of the individual is a proper duty for this Committee on Un-American Activities. This country’s entire tradition is based on the principle that the individual is a higher power than the state; that the state owes its authority to the individual, and must treat him accordingly. Expose communism, but don’t put any American who isn’t a Communist in a concentration camp of suspicion. We are not willing to give up our freedoms to save our freedoms. I now come to my final point: What are we going to do positively and constructively about combating communism? It isn’t enough to be antiCommunist any more than it is to be antismallpox. You can still die from smallpox if you haven’t used a serum against it. A positive program is the best antitoxin of the plague of communism. Communism must have breeding grounds. Men and women who have a reasonable measure of opportunity aren’t taken in by the prattle of Communists. Revolutions plotted by frustrated intellectuals at cocktail parties won’t get anywhere if we wipe out the potential causes of communism. The most effective way is to make democracy work for greater opportunity, for greater participation, for greater security for all our people. The real breeding ground of communism is in the slums. It is everywhere where people haven’t enough to eat or enough to wear through no fault of their own. Communism hunts misery, feeds on misery, and profits by it. Freedoms walk hand-in-hand with abundance. That has been the history of America. It has been the American story. It turned the eyes of the world to America,

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because America gave reality to freedom, plus abundance when it was still an idle daydream in the rest of the world. We have been the greatest exporter of freedom, and the world is hungry for it. Today it needs our wheat and our fuel to stave off hunger and fight off cold, but hungry and cold as they may be, men always hunger for freedom. We want to continue to practice and to export freedom.

Document Analysis

Speaking to HUAC, Johnston asserts four key points in his defense of Hollywood studios and their role in US society. He uses strong, forthright language to present his positions to the committee, showing neither a great willingness nor a complete refusal to assist in its investigations. This stance of avowed anti-Communism combined with strong support for independent expression and social welfare meant that Johnston could not himself be accused to subversive opinions even as he admonishes the committee for what he saw as its rabid excesses. Johnston works systematically through four key points. The first of these rests on the claim that HUAC’s actions have given the American people the impression that Hollywood—one of the nation’s cultural centers— is rife with Communist influence, a suggestion he say is “grossly unfair” to the film industry and to the “patriotic, hardworking, decent citizens,” who kept the movies humming. To that end, Johnston asks that the committee back away from its attack on the studios—a goal well in keeping with his role in protecting studios interests. Johnston also requests that the committee give up some of the secrecy surrounding its suggestions that Hollywood films contain subversive elements by naming the offending films. “Unless this evidence is presented and we are given the chance to refute it in these public hearings, it is the obligation of the committee to absolve the industry from the charges against it,” he argues. Later in his testimony, Johnston further argues that accusations based on the slightest perception of leftism threatened individual liberties and could unfairly ruin lives. Indeed, this type of unsupported attack was common of the anti-Communist craze of the era,

If we fortify our democracy to lick want, we will lick communism—here and abroad. Communists can hang all the iron curtains they like, but they’ll never be able to shut out the story of a land where freemen walk without fear and live with abundance. [Applause.] (The chairman pounding gavel.) . . .

and ultimately proved to be its undoing. Finally, Johnston moves on to two ideological points that applied to society at large. He argues that political intimidation—like that taking place, it is implied, by HUAC—is a threat to free speech, one of the bedrock American ideals. Private individuals have the right to dictate their own content, but also the responsibility to ensure that it is not a danger to liberty. In the same way, he asserts that government has the responsibility to fight Communism through positive measures, such as economic and social support for the poorest and least privileged members of society, as those with the greatest need were the most likely to seek refuge in political radicalism. Essential Themes

Johnston offered a resounding condemnation of the accusations leveled by HUAC and the accompanying anti-Communist fervor of the Second Red Scare. However, despite his assertions that Hollywood was largely free of Communist influence, he did go on to support an internal measure shortly after his testimony in which Hollywood studios refused to give work to Communists; this also came to include those people who would not deny membership in the Community Party, who would not cooperate with HUAC’s inquisition, or who were simply believed to have Communist sympathies or affiliations. The most famous of these blacklisted professionals were the “Hollywood Ten,” a group of ten leftist directors and screenwriters who challenged HUAC’s tactics and were ruled in contempt of Congress for their protest. Hollywood’s blacklist of political radicals endured into the 1960s. Hollywood executives by these actions agreed that protecting the image of the movie industry, which Johnston noted risked being tarnished

Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations

by HUAC’s inquiries, outweighed protecting the free speech or political association rights of its individual employees. Nevertheless, Johnston’s complaints about the baseless nature of many of the accusations leveled at the Hollywood film industry resounded with those offered by critics of the Red Scare across political parties and ideologies. During the 1950s, HUAC’s investigations gave way to those of Senator McCarthy, who accused numerous people of Communist involvement without cause or evidence. Fear of domestic subversion reached a fever pitch. Eventually, however, the histrionic and fruitless nature of McCarthy’s investigations turned the American public against the anti-Communist witch hunts of the era. Tensions between film and political free speech remain in the twenty-first century. In 2014, for example, Sony pulled the politically charged comedy The Interview from its scheduled wide release after hackers believed to represent North Korea, whose leader was trivialized in the film, interfered with studio operations and made threats against movie theaters that planned

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to show the picture. After drawing condemnations from the press, the public, and President Barack Obama, Sony reversed its position and released the film to independent theaters and digital services. Thus, the struggle among corporate interests, political appearances, and artistic expression continues. —Vanessa E. Vaughn, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Ceplair, Larry, & Steven Englund. The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film Community, 1930– 1960. Berkeley: U of California P, 1979. Print. Dick, Bernard K. Radical Innocence: A Critical Study of the Hollywood Ten. Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1983. Print. “Eric Johnston Dies; Aided 3 Presidents.” New York Times 23 Aug. 1963: 1. Print. Gladchuck, John Joseph. Hollywood and Anticommunism: HUAC and the Evolution of the Red Menace, 1935–1950. 2006. Hoboken: Taylor, 2013. Digital file.

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 Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted) Date: August 3, 1948 Author: Whittaker Chambers Genre: testimony, report Summary Overview

Whittaker Chambers’ testimony was a watershed moment for the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The committee at Chambers’ hearing consisted of three Republicans (Mundt, McDowell, Nixon) and three Democrats (Rankin, Peterson, Hebert); Chambers at the time was a staunch anti-communist editor at Time magazine. Criticism of the committee’s mission threatened to dissolve HUAC, until Whittaker Chambers offered himself as a witness with some sensational information. Chambers’ naming of Alger Hiss, a prominent New Deal politician, as a communist provided opponents of New Deal politics the evidence they wanted to win influence for their own agendas. Since the statue of limitations had passed for espionage at the time of the accusation, Alger Hiss was tried for making false statements about his activities. The Alger Hiss perjury trial convinced many of the value in HUAC’s activities, contributed to the rise of Richard Nixon, and fueled the accusations of Joe McCarthy in the 1950s that there was widespread Soviet infiltration in the government. Defining Moment

During the 1930s and 40s, murmurs of “Communists in government” periodically reached the director of the FBI and the president. As the appeal of Soviet communism waned for American-based spies, defectors looked to the US government to save themselves from reprisals. Stalin was rapidly gaining power internationally after the Second World War and using extraordinary means to consolidate his authority domestically. Between 1936 and 1938, Stalin’s Great Purge resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Agents disillusioned by these events were often silenced by mysterious means. The defectors, like Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, went to the FBI and pointed out other communist agents in order to save themselves. As Cold War antagonism heated up the

arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States, fears about Soviet spies deliberately crippling American power were stirred by these reports. Anxieties over domestic subversion in the United States were behind the formation of a notorious legislative committee. The House Un-American Activities Committee was formed in 1938 to uncover people engaged in subversive activities within the United States. The committee had investigated individuals suspected of Nazi associations and argued for the internment of Japanese Americans, but it became most known for its focus on suspected communists. In 1947, HUAC held hearings in an attempt to root out communism in Hollywood. The “Hollywood Ten” who refused to testify were blacklisted, and hundreds of others in the entertainment industry found themselves unable to attain productive work because of suspicions against their loyalty. When Whittaker Chambers came forward to testify in 1948, the focus of the committee then turned to governmental officials. At the time that Chambers accused Alger Hiss, Hiss was president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hiss had also held several New Deal posts, worked for the State Department, and attended the Yalta Conference. Hiss was part of the left-leaning political elite that had shaped American policy for nearly twenty years; his downfall marked the beginning of a new phase in American politics. Accusations against the party in power could be framed in terms of disloyalty, as if the country were in an open state of war. The Alger Hiss perjury trial would become just one of the first acrimonious battles between leftand right-wing politics as the Cold War progressed. Author Biography

Whittaker Chambers, born Jay Vivian Chambers in 1901, began his career as a Communist and ended his life in 1961 as a poster boy for the right-wing move

Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted)

ment. In 1925, Chambers joined the Communist Party of the United States and worked as a writer and editor. From 1932 until 1938, Chambers also carried out espionage for the Communist underground. Chambers claimed later to have encountered many high-ranking members of the New Deal administration who were also involved in ferrying secret state documents to the Soviet Union. Increasingly disillusioned with Soviet politics, Chambers defected and attempted to reveal

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what he knew in 1939 to Adolf Berle. He found work as editor at Time magazine in the intervening period, and it would not be until 1948 and the corroboration of another Soviet defect, Elizabeth Bentley, that his allegations were taken seriously. Chambers’ 1952 book Witness documented his role in the Hiss case and became a sensation supported by conservative figures such as the Heritage Foundation and Ronald Reagan.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT HEARINGS REGARDING COMMUNIST ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TUESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1948 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a. m., in the hearing room of the Committee on Ways and Means, New House Office Building, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, presiding. Committee members present: Representatives Karl E. Mundt, John McDowell, Richard M. Nixon, John E. Hallkin, J. Hanlin Peterson and F. Edward Hebert. Staff members present: Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator; Louis Russell, Wi1liam Wheeler, and Donald T. Appell, investigators; and A. S. Poore, editor, for the committee. Mr. MUNDT. The hearing will come to order. The members present are Messrs. McDowell, Nixon, Rankin, Peterson, Hebert, and Mundt. Mr. STRIPLING. The first witness, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Whittaker Chambers. Mr. Chambers, will you stand and raise your right hand and be sworn, please? Mr. MUNDT. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God. Mr. CHAMBERS. I do. TESTIMONY OF DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chambers, you are here before the committee in response to a subpoena that was served on you yesterday by Mr. Stephen v. Birmingham. Is that correct? Mr. CHAMBERS. I am. Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state your full name?

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Mr. CHAMBERS. My name is David Whittaker Chambers. Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chambers, will you raise your voice a little please? What is your present address? Mr. CHAMBERS. 9 Rockefeller Plaza. Mr. STRIPLING. That is your business address? Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right. Mr. STRIPLING. What is your present occupation? Mr. CHAMBERS. I am senior editor of Time magazine. Mr. STRIPLING. When and where were you born ? Mr. CHAMBERS. I was born April 1, 1901, in Philadelphia. Mr. STRIPLING. How long have you been associated with Time magazine? Mr. CHAMBERS. Nine years. Mr. STRIPLING. Prior to that time what was your occupation? Mr. CHAMBERS. I was a member of the Communist Party and a paid functionary of the party. Mr. STRIPLING. When did you first join the Communist Party? Mr. CHAMBERS. 1924. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chambers, people at the press table still feel they can’t hear you. Will you please speak louder? Mr. CHAMBERS. I will speak as loud as I can. Mr. STRIPLING. Will you repeat when you joined the Communist Party? Mr. CHAMBERS. I joined the Communist Party in 1924.

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Mr. STRIPLING. How long did you remain a member of the Communist Party? Mr. CHAMBERS. Until 1937. Mr. STRIPLING. Where did you join the Communist Party? Mr. CHAMBERS. In New York City. Mr. STRIPLING. When did you disassociate yourself with the Communist Party? Mr. CHAMBERS. I should like to read a statement if I may. Mr. STRIPLING. A statement you have prepared yourself? Mr. CHAMBERS. That I have myself prepared. Mr. STRIPLING. I suggest the witness be permitted to read this. He has shown it to me. Mr. MUNDT. I take it the statement you are about to read will indicate why you did disassociate yourself from the party? Mr. CHAMBERS. I will try to do so. Mr. RANKIN. And we will be permitted to question him after this statement? Mr. MUNDT. Yes, sir. You will be permitted to read it. Mr. CHAMBERS. Almost exactly 9 years ago-that is, 2 days after Hitler and Stalin signed their pact--I went to Washington and reported to the authorities what I knew about the infiltration of the United States Government by Communists. For years international communism, of which the United States Communist Party is an integral part, had been in a state of undeclared war with this Republic. With the Hitler-Stalin pact, that war reached a new stage. I regarded my action in going to the Government as a simple act of war, like the shooting of an armed enemy in combat. At that moment in history, I was one of the few men on this side of the battle who could perform this service. I had joined the Communist Party in 1924. No one recruited me. I had become convinced that the society in which we live, western civilization, had reached a crisis, of which the First World War was the military expression, and that it was doomed to collapse or revert to barbarism. I did not understand the causes of the crisis or know what to do about it. But I felt that, as an intelligent

man, I must do something. In the writings of Karl Marx I thought that I had found the explanation of the historical and economic causes. In the writings of Lenin I thought I had found the answer to the question, What to do? In 1937 I repudiated Marx’ doctrines and Lenin’s tactics. Experience and the record had convinced me that communism is a form of totalitarianism, that its triumph means slavery to men wherever they fall under its sway, and spiritual night to the human mind and soul. I resolved to break with the Communist Party at whatever risk to my life or other tragedy to myself or my family. Yet, so strong is the hold which the insidious evil of communism secures on its disciples, that I could still say to someone at the time: “I know that I am leaving the winning side for the losing side, but it is better to die on the losing side than to live under communism.” For a year I lived in hiding, sleeping by day and watching through the night with gun or revolver within easy reach. That was what underground communism could do to one man in the peaceful United States in the year 1938. I had sound reason for supposing that the Communists might try to kill me. For a number of years I had myself served in the under-ground, chiefly in Washington, D. C. The heart of my report to the United States Government consisted of a description of the apparatus to which I was attached. It was an underground organization of the United States Communist Party developed, to the best of my knowledge, by Harold Ware, one of the sons of the Communist leader known as “Mother Bloor.” I knew it at its top level, a group of seven or so men, from among whom in later years certain members of Miss Bentley’s organization were apparently recruited. The head of the underground group at the time I knew it was Nathan Witt, an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board. Later, Tohn Abt became the leader. Lee Pressman was also a member of this group, as was Alger Hiss, who, as a member of the State Department, later organized the conferences at Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco, and the United States side of the Yalta Conference.

Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted)

The purpose of this group at that time was not primarily espionage. Its original purpose was the Communist infiltration of the American Government. But espionage was certainly one of its eventual objectives. Let no one be surprised at this statement. Disloyalty is a matter of principle with every member of the Communist Party. The Communist Party exists for the specific purpose of overthrowing the Government; at the opportune time, by any and all means; and each of its members, by the fact that he is a member, is dedicated to this purpose. It is 10 years since I broke away from the Communist Party. During that decade I have sought to live an industrious and God-fearing life. At the same time I have fought communism constantly by act and written word. I am proud to appear before this committee. The publicity inseparable from such testimony has darkened, and will no doubt continue to darken, my effort to integrate myself in the community of free men. But that is a small price to pay if my testimony helps to make Americans recognize at last that they are at grips with a secret, sinister, and enormously powerful force whose tireless purpose is their enslavement. At the same time, I should like, thus publicly, to call upon all ex-Communists who have not yet declared themselves, and all men within the Communist Party whose better instincts have not yet been corrupted and crushed by it, to aid in this struggle while there is still time to do so. Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chambers, in your statement you stated that you yourself had served the underground, chiefly in Washington, D. C. What underground apparatus are you speaking of and when was it established? Mr. CHAMBERS. Perhaps we should make a distinction at the beginning. It is Communist theory and practice that even in countries where the Communist Party is legal, an underground party exists side by side with the open party. The apparatus in Washington was an organization or group of that underground. Mr. RANKIN. When you speak of the apparatus in Washington you mean the Communist cell, do you not? Mr. CHAMBERS. I mean in effect a group of Communist cells.

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Mr. RANKIN. A group of Communist cells when you speak of “apparatus”? Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes. Mr. STRIPLING. Was a plan devised by the Communists to infiltrate the Government of the United States for the purpose of using these cells for the benefit of the Soviet Union? Mr. CHAMBERS. I would certainly say that that would be an ultimate objective. Mr. STRIPLING. What about the particular apparatus to which you referred in your statement? Mr. CHAMBERS. Do you mean was it a Soviet agency? Mr. STRIPLING. Was it established for the purpose of causing people in the Government to serve the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union? Mr. CHAMBERS. I think you could only say that in the extreme sense the American party is an agency which serves the purpose of the Soviet Government. Mr. STRIPLING. Who comprised this cell or apparatus to which you referred? Mr. CHAMBERS. The apparatus was organized with a leading group of seven men, each of whom was a leader of the cell. Mr. STRIPLING. Could you name the seven individuals? Mr. CHAMBERS. The head of the group as I have said was at first Nathan Witt. Other members of the group were Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, Donald Hiss, Victor PerIo, Charles Kramer-Mr. MUNDT. What was Charles Kramer’s correct name? Mr. CHAMBERS. I think his original name was Krevitsky, and John Abt-I don’t know if I mentioned him before or not-and Henry Collins, Mr. RANKIN. How about Harold Ware? Mr. CHAMBERS. Harold Ware was, of course, the organizer. Mr. STRIPLING. Harold Ware was the son of Ella Reeve Bloor, the woman Communist? Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes. Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know where in the Government these seven individuals were employed? Mr. CHAMBERS. I did at one time. I think I could remember some of them.

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Henry Collins was in the Department of Agriculture, Alger Hiss at that time I think was in the Munitions Investigation Committee or whatever the official title

Document Analysis

The main body of Whittaker Chambers’ testimony illustrates an aggressive stance often taken by conservative politicians and writers at the time. Chambers’ hawkish tone when discussing communism does not support the idea of Soviet containment, unlike his more progressive opponents. In his prepared statement, Chambers characterizes the communist threat as an insidious, enslaving force and portrays himself as a warrior for freedom. As a result of Chambers’ rhetorical strategy, he establishes himself as a trustworthy witness for his audience at the hearing and prepares them to view the officials he names as incalculably malicious. From the very beginning, Chambers states that the Communists are the greatest enemy to the United States. American Communists cannot be separated from communists globally: they all have been “in a state of undeclared war with this Republic” up to the point that Chambers defected nine years ago. This statement pits one country against a foe that is at once immense, international, and formed of insidious individuals rather than a coherent governmental body. Chambers goes on to characterize communism as “a form of totalitarianism…and spiritual night to the human mind and soul.” These strong words deliberately affect the audience’s fear: communism is not only a proposed form of government, but it also personally destroys the intellectual capacities of men and women. Near the end of his prepared statement, he says that Americans “are at grips with a secret, sinister, and enormously powerful force whose tireless purpose is their enslavement.” Again, this statement characterizes communists as the evil opponent in a war: the issue of the American people’s freedom is at stake in this fight. Chambers also presents himself as a freedom fighter in the war between good and evil. First, he excuses his former communist sympathies as benign ignorance. He believed the world to be in crisis after the First World War and thought that Karl Marx’s writings provided a solution. However, Chambers glides over his activities among the communists and devotes far more time to

was, and Donald Hiss I think is in the Labor Department, connected with immigration. I don’t know offhand what the others were doing…

explaining how he came to defect. He describes his thought process in defecting in terms similar to a soldier: “I know that I am leaving the winning side for the losing side, but it is better to die on the losing side than to live under communism.” He designs his selfpresentation in his defection from communism to gain his audience’s sympathy and admiration: Chambers was so convinced of communism’s evil that he was willing to die for the cause of freedom. He concludes his prepared statement by assuring his audience again that he has made an effort “to integrate.in the community of free men.” His narrative of coming out of slavery to freedom characterizes him as both sympathetic defector and warrior against darkness. Finally, the result of these two rhetorical strategies in Chambers’ statement induces the audience to see the current issue as time-sensitive. The implications of not heeding his words will result in an apocalyptic state of totalitarianism. He concludes by asking other Communist Party members to come forward and “aid in this struggle, while there is still time to do so.” Chambers’ testimony encourages his listeners to believe that allowing the individuals he names to be unpunished will result in a catastrophe. Essential Themes

The first perjury trial of Alger Hiss resulted in a hung jury. He was only indicted for perjury in 1950 after a second trial. Alger Hiss continued to maintain his innocence for the rest of his life; he would become symbolic for treason to conservative intellectuals or a martyr for progressives. Nonetheless, the accusations leveled at Hiss and other governmental officials seemed prescient to Americans at the time. The year after Whittaker Chambers gave his first testimony before the HUAC, the Soviet Union tested their first atomic bomb, which was years ahead of American forecasts. How did the Soviet Union obtain the necessary information to develop the technology so quickly? Then, in 1951 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were found guilty of espionage, which further reinforced to the public the idea that So-

Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted)

viet infiltration was widespread and deliberately crippling American political and technological advances. Alger Hiss’ perjury trial also launched the career of Richard Nixon. His reputation for hunting out spies won him a Senate seat in 1950; Nixon would then get the vice president nomination two years later under Eisenhower. However, after the Watergate scandal in 1974 damaged Nixon’s credibility and use of power, the White House tapes would reveal Nixon’s cavalier attitude towards evidence and character assassination. Hiss used this moment in Nixon’s career to his advantage: he was readmitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1975. The release of the Venona papers in the 1990s indicated that perhaps Hiss, who died in 1996, was not as innocent as he maintained; yet the case has continued to define the way that the political parties relate to each other. Tony Lake’s nomination for Director of the CIA was withdrawn in 1996 because of Republican opposition, but some have speculated that a cause of the failed nomination was Lake’s response in an interview that he was not sure Alger Hiss was guilty. Reverbera-

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tions of this bipartisan acrimony can even be seen in more recent politicized congressional hearings, such as the Benghazi hearing in 2015. In the short term, Alger Hiss’ perjury trial was remarkable for the “Red Scare” politics of the Cold War, but the longer-term effects of this divisive case may have contributed to the way one party in Congress attacks the opposing party in the executive office. —Ashleigh Fata, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Storrs, Landon R. V. The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013. Print. Tanenhaus, Sam. Whittaker Chambers: A Biography. New York: Random House, 1997. Print. Weinstein, Allen. Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case. 1978. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2013. Print. Whitfield, Stephen J. The Culture of the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996. Print.

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 Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Speech to the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia Date: February 9, 1950 Author: Joseph McCarthy Genre: speech Summary Overview

Joseph McCarthy was a Republican senator from Wisconsin who began serving in 1946. He was a popular speaker, and on February 9, 1950, he was invited to speak at the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia, at an event celebrating the birthday of Abraham Lincoln. This speech addressed the issue that would define the remainder of McCarthy’s career: the Communist “infestation” of the federal government. McCarthy played into American’s post-World War II fear that Communism was the next grave threat to the nation and that spies and traitors existed at every level of society and were actively shaping government policy. These fears were not groundless, as the Soviet Union was in possession of nuclear weapons, had set up Communist states in Eastern Europe, and had recruited spies in the US government and military. Sensational espionage cases had been the obsession of the press, and McCarthy’s charges of widespread Communism in the State Department attracted a flood of publicity, launching this little-known senator into the national spotlight. Defining Moment

The United States and the Soviet Union had been uneasy allies during the latter part of World War II, but that fragile relationship began to disintegrate even before the end of the war. The United States demonstrated its atomic capabilities by bombing Japan in 1945, but it did not share this technology with its allies. Tensions rapidly escalated after the war, with the Soviet Union in hot pursuit of its own nuclear weapon and conflicts over the control of territory in Germany and Eastern Europe. The Berlin Blockade of 1948–49, in which the Soviet Union blocked access to West Berlin, nearly led to a new conflict, as the United States and its allies resorted to dropping supplies from the air.

In addition, the United States watched as China’s civil war resulted in another victory for the Communists and the Soviet Union established Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe. Communism seemed to be spreading everywhere, and several high-level espionage cases added to the fear that Soviet spies were at work at the highest levels of the US government and military. In 1947, US president Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9835, which called for an investigation of the loyalty of all federal employees. President Truman hoped that this would prove that the Democrats were not soft on Communism and take some of the steam out of the Republican Party’s accusations of disloyalty among federal employees. This investigation unearthed some three hundred employees suspected of disloyalty but did not result in any espionage convictions. In 1948, State Department official Alger Hiss was accused of espionage and convicted of perjury in a sensational trial that obsessed the American press. In the United States and Canada, some suspected spies were offered immunity in exchange for identifying members of the government and the military who were either Communist sympathizers or had engaged in espionage. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), an investigative committee of the House of Representatives, first set up in 1938 to investigate Nazi sympathizers, used often tenuous or conflicting evidence to bring charges against those suspected of having ties to Communism, including private citizens. Though the activities of HUAC are often associated with Senator McCarthy, he did not serve in the House of Representatives and, therefore, was never part of HUAC. When McCarthy gave this speech in 1950, he was playing to the widespread fear that Communist operatives were working to overthrow the government from within and that the State Department allowed this to continue unchecked. He did not, however, anticipate

Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Speech to the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia

the firestorm that his speech would cause. The subsequent investigation of his charges led to increased anti-Communist hysteria and a meteoric political rise for McCarthy, who saw traitors in every corner. McCarthy continued to investigate suspected Communist sympathizers until his censure in the Senate in 1954. Author Biography

Joseph Raymond McCarthy was born near Appleton, Wisconsin, on November 14, 1908. He was the fifth of seven children born to Timothy McCarthy and Bridget Tierney McCarthy. When he was fourteen years old, McCarthy dropped out of school to assist his parents with their farm, but he returned to finish school when he was twenty. McCarthy attended the University of

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Wisconsin and Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, where he earned a law degree and was admitted to the bar in 1935. McCarthy won a seat as a circuit judge in 1939. McCarthy joined the Marines in 1942, during World War II, serving until February 1945. In 1946, he won a seat in the Senate. In 1953, with Republican president Dwight D. Eisenhower in office, McCarthy was made chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, a position that he used to investigate suspected Communists in the government. When his attention turned to high-level Army leadership, however, his popularity began to plummet, and he was censured by his Senate colleagues in 1954. He died on May 2, 1957, of liver disease.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Five years after a world war has been won, men’s hearts should anticipate a long peace, and men’s minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes with war. But this is not such a period—for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of the “cold war.” This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps—a time of a great armaments race…. Today we are engaged in a final, all-out battle between communistic atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of communism have selected this as the time. And, ladies and gentlemen, the chips are down— they are truly down…. Six years ago, at the time of the first conference to map out the peace—Dumbarton Oaks—there was within the Soviet orbit 180,000,000 people. Lined up on the anti-totalitarian side there were in the world at that time roughly 1,625,000,000 people. Today, only 6 years later, there are 800,000,000 people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia—an increase of over 400 percent. On our side, the figure has shrunk to around 500,000,000. In other words, in less than 6 years the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 5 against us. This indicates the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories and American defeats in the cold war. As one of our outstanding historical figures once said, “When a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be

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because of enemies from without, but rather because of enemies from within.”… The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate or members of minority groups who have been selling this Nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has had to offer—the finest homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government we can give. This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the worst.... In my opinion the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists. I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy…. I know that you are saying to yourself, “Well, why doesn’t the Congress do something about it?” Actually, ladies and gentlemen, one of the important reasons for the graft, the corruption, the dishonesty, the disloyalty, the treason in high Government positions—one of the

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most important reasons why this continues is a lack of moral uprising on the part of the 140,000,000 American people. In the light of history, however, this is not hard to explain. It is the result of an emotional hang-over and a temporary moral lapse which follows every war. It is the apathy to evil which people who have been subjected to the tremendous evils of war feel. As the people of the world see mass murder, the destruction of defenseless and innocent people, and all of the crime and lack of morals which go with war, they become numb and apathetic. It has always been thus after war. However, the morals of our people have not been destroyed. They still exist. This cloak of numbness and apathy has only needed a spark to rekindle them. Happily, this spark has finally been supplied. As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes—

Document Analysis

McCarthy begins this speech by stating that he understands the American people are expecting a time of peace, since World War II has been won. However, they could not be more wrong, he argues, since the spread of Communism is continuing unchecked and taking over the world. McCarthy argues that this is a critical time when “all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps.” The balance of power has shifted, and now democracy is fighting for its life, he says. McCarthy uses statistics to back up his viewpoint, arguing that “in less than 6 years the odds have changed from 9 to 1 in our favor to 8 to 5 against us.” Not only do Communists outnumber the “anti-totalitarian” side, they have infiltrated it, he insists. McCarthy sets up the basis for his later activism by charging that democracy will be brought down by “enemies from within.” The traitors are not poor immigrants or the “less fortunate.” On the contrary, McCarthy argues, the most privileged positions in government are held by Communists. The State Department, he argues, is “infested” with them. McCarthy claims to possess a list of fifty-seven individuals with Communist ties. (In some versions of this speech, which was not recorded, he claimed 205 individuals.) He urges a “moral uprising” on the part of the American people, whom he under-

of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ’s Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefore, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy. When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people. He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of national honesty and decency in government.

stands to be suffering from an “emotional hangover” after witnessing the horrors of war and who have become “numb and apathetic.” McCarthy takes aim at Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who reacted emotionally to the conviction of Alger Hiss, who had worked with him for years; Acheson declared that he would not abandon Hiss and quoted from the Bible in doing so. McCarthy states that this is both blasphemy and proof that the State Department “endorsed communism, high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust.” However, now that the Americans’ indignation has been roused, McCarthy believes they will work to sweep away the “whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers.” Essential Themes

The impact of McCarthy’s speech was immediate and far-reaching. Advance copies of the speech were sent to the press, alleging there were 205 Communists in the State Department. (However, in a letter McCarthy wrote to President Truman and in later transcripts of the speech, he claims knowledge of fifty-seven alleged Communists). Though McCarthy brandished his list both at the Wheeling speech and later to the Senate, he did not make the names on it public. McCarthy’s speech generated a firestorm simply because it played

Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Speech to the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia

on the fear of average Americans that the government had been infiltrated by Soviets and would be brought down from within. As McCarthy became increasingly aggressive and vindictive, key figures in the press, most notably Edward R. Murrow, began to question his sources and methods. When McCarthy began to accuse key Army officers of treasonous allegiances, his popularity plummeted, and he was censured by the Senate, an official reprimand that destroyed his credibility. Though the widespread fear of Soviet infiltration was strong enough to allow McCarthy wide discretion in his accusations, eventually, Americans realized that lives were being ruined by investigations made under suspect circumstances. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Fried, Richard M. Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. Print. Herman, Arthur. Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator. New York: Free P, 2000. Print. Shogan, Robert. No Sense of Decency: The Army-McCarthy Hearings: A Demagogue Falls and Television Takes Charge of American Politics. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009. Print.

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 “Declaration of Conscience” Date: June 1, 1950 Author: Margaret Chase Smith Genre: speech Summary Overview

In June 1950, Margaret Chase Smith, Republican senator from Maine, openly criticized what she saw as an assault on freedom of speech being led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, and she was joined in her protest by six other moderate Republican senators. McCarthy claimed that the federal government was “infested” with Communists. He said he had a list of dozens of proven Communists who were working for the US government. The speech played into postwar America’s fear that Communism was the next grave threat to the nation and that spies and traitors existed at every level of society and were actively shaping government policy. A Senate subcommittee, known as the Tydings Committee, was set up investigate McCarthy’s accusations, which were mostly directed against State Department employees. Most of the ensuing Senate hearings were a platform from which McCarthy accused civil servants of Communist sympathies or spying, with little hard evidence. Members of both parties became increasingly uncomfortable with these sensational accusations. Defining Moment

Margaret Chase Smith gave this speech on the Senate floor at the height of the Second Red Scare, which followed World War II, when tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated and fear of Communist infiltration and influence in American society blossomed. The United States and the Soviet Union had been uneasy allies during the latter part of World War II, but that fragile relationship began to disintegrate even before the end of the war. The United States demonstrated its atomic capabilities by bombing Japan in 1945 but did not share this lethal technology with its allies. Tensions grew rapidly after the war, with both the Soviet Union in hot pursuit of its own nuclear weapon and conflicts over the control of territory in Germany and Eastern Europe. The Berlin Blockade in 1948–9 nearly led to a new conflict as the Soviet Union

blocked access to West Berlin, with the United States and its allies resorting to dropping supplies from the air. In addition, the United States watched as China’s civil war resulted in a victory for Communists in that country, and the Soviet Union established other Communist governments in its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe. Communism seemed to be spreading everywhere, and a number of high-profile espionage cases in the United States added to the fear that Soviet spies were at work at the highest levels of the US government and military. In February 1950, Joseph McCarthy, a Republican senator from Wisconsin, gave a speech to the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia, in which he claimed to have knowledge of fifty-seven Communists working in the State Department, a number he later increased to 205. In response to his accusations, the Tydings Committee was convened to investigate his charges. The committee concluded his charges were baseless, but his fiery testimony before it was only the start of McCarthy’s controversial fouryear anti-Communist campaign. Smith’s “Declaration of Conscience,” though it did not mention McCarthy by name, is regarded as the first organized Senate opposition to McCarthy’s persecutory crusade. Smith had reason to believe that standing up to McCarthy would have consequences, and in fact, in Smith’s next senatorial campaign, McCarthy campaigned (unsuccessfully) for her opponent. Author Biography

Margaret Madeline Chase Smith was born in Skowhegan, Maine, on December 14, 1897. She was the oldest of six children. Smith graduated from Skowhegan High School in 1916 and briefly taught school near her home. She did not attend college. Smith worked for various state and local women’s organizations; she married Clyde Smith, a local politician and businessman,

“Declaration of Conscience”

in 1930. In 1937, after Clyde Smith was elected to the US House of Representatives from Maine’s second district, Smith moved with him to Washington, DC. When her husband fell ill and then died in the spring of 1940, Smith was elected to complete his term and then to a full term a few months later; she served a total of eight years in the House. In 1948, Smith ran for and

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won a Senate seat, becoming the first woman to sit in both houses of Congress. She served in the Senate until being defeated on a bid for reelection in 1972. Until 2011, she was the longest-serving female senator in history. She died of a stroke at age ninety-seven on May 29, 1995, in her hometown of Skowhegan.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Mr. President, I would like to speak briefly and simply about a serious national condition. It is a national feeling of fear and frustration that could result in national suicide and the end of everything that we Americans hold dear. It is a condition that comes from the lack of effective leadership either in the legislative branch or the executive branch of our government. That leadership is so lacking that serious and responsible proposals are being made that national advisory commissions be appointed to provide such critically needed leadership. I speak as briefly as possible because too much harm has already been done with irresponsible words of bitterness and selfish political opportunism. I speak as simply as possible because the issue is too great to be obscured by eloquence. I speak simply and briefly in the hope that my words will be taken to heart. Mr. President, I speak as a Republican. I speak as a woman. I speak as a United States senator. I speak as an American. “A FORUM OF HATE AND CHARACTER ASSASSINATION” The United States Senate has long enjoyed worldwide respect as the greatest deliberative body in the world. But recently that deliberative character has too often been debased to the level of a forum of hate and character assassination sheltered by the shield of congressional immunity. It is ironical that we senators can in debate in the Senate, directly or indirectly, by any form of words, impute to any American who is not a senator any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming an American— and without that non-senator American having any legal redress against us—yet if we say the same thing in the

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Senate about our colleagues we can be stopped on the grounds of being out of order. It is strange that we can verbally attack anyone else without restraint and with full protection, and yet we hold ourselves above the same type of criticism here on the Senate floor. Surely the United States Senate is big enough to take self-criticism and self-appraisal. Surely we should be able to take the same kind of character attacks that we “dish out” to outsiders. I think that it is high time for the United States Senate and its members to do some real soul searching and to weigh our consciences as to the manner in which we are performing our duty to the people of America and the manner in which we are using or abusing our individual powers and privileges. I think that it is high time that we remembered that we have sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution. I think that it is high time that we remembered that the Constitution, as amended, speaks not only of the freedom of speech but also of trial by jury instead of trial by accusation. Whether it be a criminal prosecution in court or a character prosecution in the Senate, there is little practical distinction when the life of a person has been ruined. “THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AMERICANISM” Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism in making character assassinations are all too frequently those who, by our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of Americanism— • The right to criticize. • The right to hold unpopular beliefs. • The right to protest. • The right of independent thought.

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The exercise of these rights should not cost one single American citizen his reputation or his right to a livelihood nor should he be in danger of losing his reputation or livelihood merely because he happens to know someone who holds unpopular beliefs. Who of us does not? Otherwise none of us could call our souls our own. Otherwise thought control would have set in. The American people are sick and tired of being afraid to speak their minds lest they be politically smeared as “Communists” or “Fascists” by their opponents. Freedom of speech is not what it used to be in America. It has been so abused by some that it is not exercised by others. The American people are sick and tired of seeing innocent people smeared and guilty people whitewashed. But there have been enough proved cases, such as the Amerasia case, the Hiss case, the Coplon case, the Gold case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations.

The Democratic administration has completely confused the American people by its daily contradictory grave warnings and optimistic assurances, which show the people that our Democratic administration has no idea of where it is going. The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration. There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges. Surely these are sufficient reasons to make it clear to the American people that it is time for a change and that a Republican victory is necessary to the security of the country. Surely it is clear that this nation will continue to suffer so long as it is governed by the present ineffective Democratic administration. “THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF CALUMNY”

A CHALLENGE TO THE REPUBUCAN PARTY As a Republican, I say to my colleagues on this side of the aisle that the Republican party faces a challenge today that is not unlike the challenge which it faced back in Lincoln’s day. The Republican party so successfully met that challenge that it emerged from the Civil War as the champion of a united nation—in addition to being a party which unrelentingly fought loose spending and loose programs. Today our country is being psychologically divided by the confusion and the suspicions that are bred in the United States Senate to spread like cancerous tentacles of “know nothing, suspect everything” attitudes. Today we have a Democratic administration which has developed a mania for loose spending and loose programs. History is repeating itself-and the Republican party again has the opportunity to emerge as the champion of unity and prudence. The record of the present Democratic administration has provided us with sufficient campaign issues without the necessity of resorting to political smears. America is rapidly losing its position as leader of the world simply because the Democratic administration has pitifully failed to provide effective leadership.

Yet to displace it with a Republican regime embracing a philosophy that lacks political integrity or intellectual honesty would prove equally disastrous to the nation. The nation sorely needs a Republican victory. But I do not want to see the Republican party ride to political victory on the Four Horsemen of Calumny—Fear, Ignorance, Bigotry, and Smear. I doubt if the Republican party could do so, simply because I do not believe the American people will uphold any political party that puts political exploitation above national interest. Surely we Republicans are not that desperate for victory. I do not want to see the Republican party win that way. While it might be a fleeting victory for the Republican party, it would be a more lasting defeat for the American people. Surely it would ultimately be suicide for the Republican party and the two-party system that has protected our American liberties from the dictatorship of a one-party system. As members of the minority party, we do not have the primary authority to formulate the policy of our government. But we do have the responsibility of rendering constructive criticism, of clarifying issues, of allaying fears by acting as responsible citizens.

“Declaration of Conscience”

As a woman, I wonder how the mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters feel about the way in which members of their families have been politically mangled in Senate debate—and I use the word “debate” advisedly. “IRRESPONSIBLE SENSATIONALISM” As a United States senator, I am not proud of the way in which the Senate has been made a publicity platform for irresponsible sensationalism. I am not proud of the reckless abandon in which unproved charges have been hurled from this side of the aisle. I am not proud of the obviously staged, undignified countercharges which have been attempted in retaliation from the other side of the aisle. I do not like the way the Senate has been made a rendezvous for vilification, for selfish political gain at the sacrifice of individual reputations and national unity. I am not proud of the way we smear outsiders from the floor of the Senate and hide behind the cloak of congressional immunity and still place ourselves beyond criticism on the floor of the Senate. As an American, I am shocked at the way Republicans and Democrats alike are playing directly into the Communist design of “confuse, divide, and conquer.” As an American, I do not want a Democratic administration “whitewash” or “coverup” any more than I want a Republican smear or witch hunt. As an American, I condemn a Republican Fascist just as much as I condemn a Democrat Communist. I condemn a Democrat Fascist just as much as I condemn a Republican Communist. They are equally dangerous to you and me and to our country. As an American, I want to see our nation recapture the strength and unity it once had when we fought the enemy instead of ourselves. It is with these thoughts that I have drafted what I call a Declaration of Conscience. I am gratified that the senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], the senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], the senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the senator from New York [Mr. IVES], the senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE], and the senator from New Jersey [Mr. HENDRICKSON] have con-

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curred in that declaration and have authorized me to announce their concurrence. The declaration reads as follows: STATEMENT OF SEVEN REPUBLICAN SENATORS 1. We are Republicans. But we are Americans first. It is as Americans that we express our concern with the growing confusion that threatens the security and stability of our country. Democrats and Republicans alike have contributed to that confusion. 2. The Democratic administration has initially created the confusion by its lack of effective leadership, by its contradictory grave warnings and optimistic assurances, by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home, by its oversensitiveness to rightful criticism, by its petty bitterness against its critics. 3. Certain elements of the Republican party have materially added to this confusion in the hopes of riding the Republican party to victory through the selfish political exploitation of fear, bigotry, ignorance, and intolerance. There are enough mistakes of the Democrats for Republicans to criticize constructively without resorting to political smears. 4. To this extent, Democrats and Republicans alike have unwittingly, but undeniably, played directly into the Communist design of “confuse, divide, and conquer.” 5. It is high time that we stopped thinking politically as Republicans and Democrats about elections and started thinking patriotically as Americans about national security based on individual freedom. It is high time that we all stopped being tools and victims of totalitarian techniques—techniques that, if continued here unchecked, will surely end what we have come to cherish as the American way of life. Margaret Chase Smith, Maine Charles W. Tobey, New Hampshire George D. Aiken, Vermont Wayne L. Morse, Oregon Irving M. Ives, New York Edward J. Thye, Minnesota Robert C. Hendrickson, New Jersey

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Document Analysis

This speech is Smith’s protest against what she sees as the alarmist tenor of political debate in the United States, which she believes threatens the country with “national suicide” as the people lose faith in their leaders. A Republican, Smith is at pains to say that though she blames the Democratic leadership for losing the trust of the American people, she blames the Senate— and, though she does not name him, McCarthy—for turning the institution into “a forum of hate and character assassination.” Because senatorial debate is protected, she argues, the Senate had become a place where regular Americans were subject to unsubstantiated accusations and slander, and with no recourse—a veiled reference to charges of Communism and disloyalty to the United States. At the same time, senators could limit dissension in their ranks using procedural safeguards. This allowed senators to attack private citizens in a public forum without any redress, while stifling dissent in their own ranks. Smith sees this as hypocritical. “Surely we should be able to take the same kind of character attacks that we ‘dish out’ to outsiders.” She challenges the other senators to examine their consciences and consider whether they are abusing their power and failing in their duty to protect the Constitution. Smith lays out the basic principles of free speech that are at the heart of “Americanism”: the right to criticize, to hold unpopular beliefs, to protest, and to exercise independent thought. Since these freedoms are protected by the Constitution, exercising them should not be cause to deny employment or ruin a reputation. Smith says that Americans are afraid to speak their minds in a culture of suspicion, where freedom of speech “has been so abused by some that it is not exercised by others.” She notes that the most prominent cases relating to actual espionage, such as the Alger Hiss case, have had the unfortunate side effect of making even the most groundless accusations sound plausible. Though Smith was obviously protesting attacks led by a fellow Republican, she took pains to lay the blame for the nation’s lack of confidence in the government on the Democratic administration of Harry S. Truman (who also goes unnamed in the speech). The combination of “grave warnings and optimistic assurances” issued by the administration had resulted in the American people not believing in the ability of the government to protect and defend them. Still, there was no political need for the unsubstantiated fearmongering going on in the Senate, Smith argues: “The record of

the present Democratic administration has provided us with sufficient campaign issues without the necessity of resorting to political smears.” She believes, Republicans would undoubtedly do a better job leading the country and would win back the trust of the American people, but need not “ride to political victory on the Four Horsemen of Calumny—Fear, Ignorance, Bigotry, and Smear.” Smith and her six cosigners agreed to a list of points that lay out her basic argument: that both parties bear some responsibility for the current state of paranoia in the country and, therefore, have become unwitting pawns of totalitarianism; Communism is winning, if the nation is divided and the Constitution unprotected. Essential Themes

Smith’s defense of freedom of speech was the first time that anyone in the Senate stood up to Senator McCarthy and challenged his campaign that questioned the loyalty of ordinary Americans based on flimsy evidence and without adhering to any standard of proof. She asserted that it was essential for the United States to adhere to its bedrock values of individual liberty, especially in times of national threat, such as the one posed by Communism, and not resort to what would come to be called anti-Communist “witch hunts.” With the support of six other senators, Smith made the case that political gain made by fearmongering was unworthy of the Republican Party, even as she laid the blame for the prevalent atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust then in the country at the feet of the Democratic administration. The prevailing theme of Smith’s speech remains a powerful one: Freedom of speech and the Constitution must be protected in order to preserve the American way of life. However, 1950 was to prove only the starting year of McCarthy’s anti-Communist crusade. As the Korean War broke out less than a month after Smith’s speech, her message was for a time lost in the atmosphere of rising Cold War tensions. It would not be until 1954 that McCarthy’s zealotry alienated so many people that he was finally censured by his Senate colleagues and lost his place in the media spotlight. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Fried, Richard M. Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. Print.

“Declaration of Conscience”

Herman, Arthur. Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator. New York: Free P, 2000. Print. Sherman, Janann. No Place for a Woman: A Life of Senator Margaret Chase Smith. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1999. Print. Smith, Margaret Chase. US House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. 2 Oct. 2015.

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 Rosenberg Case Excerpts Date: 1951 Authors: Emanuel Bloch (for the Defense) and Irving Saypol (for the Prosecution) Genre: trial transcript Summary Overview

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, both sympathetic to the ideas of the communist party, were arrested in 1950 on the charge of conspiracy to commit espionage. In 1951, they were tried and convicted, largely on the testimony of Ethel’s brother, David Greenglass. Julius Rosenberg was said to be a “hub” of Soviet espionage. Ethel was arrested in order to force her husband Julius to confess. The trial occurred during a time of great tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, with fear of communism and fear of atomic weapons running rampant. Despite appeals for sparing the couple, the Rosenbergs were executed by electric chair at Sing Sing Prison on June 19, 1953. Defining Moment

The Manhattan Project was the codename assigned in 1941 to a secret American weapons project. The purpose of the project was to design and build an atomic bomb. The codename originated from the Manhattan District of the US Army Corps of Engineers, assigned to construction work for the project. The project itself was in response to a letter from Albert Einstein to President Franklin D. Roosevelt stating that German scientists had succeeded in splitting the uranium atom, resulting in fission, and that the Americans should not allow the Nazis to develop this technology for atomic weapons ahead of them. Although the project consisted of sites all across the United States and even into Canada, headquarters were in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Los Alamos, New Mexico, directed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, was the site of the laboratory where weapons were actually developed. David Greenglass worked at this facility as well as the physicist Klaus Fuchs (who was convicted of violating the Official Secrets Act by the British in 1950). On July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb in history was tested at the Alamogordo Air Base in New Mexico. Then, on August 6, for the purpose of ending World War II, the bomb codenamed “Little

Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, by the orders of President Harry S. Truman. Three days later, on August 9, the bomb codenamed “Fat Man” was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. After Japan surrendered at the end of World War II, Korea, which had been under Japanese rule, became occupied by the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel and the United States south of the 38th parallel. The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when soldiers from the north, backed by the Soviets under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, crossed the 38th parallel. In an effort to contain the spread of communism, Americans entered the war in July 1950. Shortly afterward, China entered the war in defense of North Korea. During the war, the boundary separating North and South Korea moved both south and north, ending finally where it began. An armistice was signed July 27, 1953. Mounting tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II resulted in the Cold War, a term coined by George Orwell in his 1945 essay, “You and the Atomic Bomb.” These tensions revolved around the conflict surrounding the spread of communism and resulted in the massive stockpiling of military weapons. In 1949, the Soviets launched a test of their own atomic bomb, several years before projected by the Western World, which likely contributed to the anticommunism hysteria known as McCarthyism, after Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. McCarthy claimed that hundreds of communists operated in the US State Department, the Army, Hollywood, and elsewhere. Defendant Biographies

Julius Rosenberg was born to Jewish Russian immigrants in New York City on May 12, 1918. As a teen, he attended Seward High School and joined the Young Communist League. In 1939, Rosenberg graduated from City College of New York with a degree in electri-

Rosenberg Case Excerpts

cal engineering, and was married to Ethel Greenglass, who was also a member of the Communist Party. During World War II, he worked as an engineer for the US Signal Corps, from which he was discharged in 1945 because of his membership in the Communist Party. During the war, Rosenberg began working as an agent for the Soviet Union, to whom he passed military information. He also recruited other agents, one of whom was David Greenglass, the brother of his wife, Ethel. Known by the codename “Liberal,” Rosenberg was arrested July17, 1950, on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Tried on March 6, 1951, he was convicted on March 29 and sentenced to death on April 5. On June 19, 1953, Rosenberg was executed by electric chair at Sing Sing Prison. Ethel Rosenberg was born Ethel Greenglass to Jewish Russian immigrants in New York City on September 28, 1915. After graduating from Seward High School

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in 1931 she began working as a clerk for the National New York Packing and Shipping Company, where she was active in the union. In 1934, she met Julius Rosenberg at a New Year’s Eve union party. Both active in the Communist Party, the two were married in 1939. A son, Michael, was born in 1943; another son, Robert, was born in 1947. Between these two births, on June 3, 1945, Ethel Rosenberg’s brother, David Greenglass, who worked as a machinist on the Manhattan Project, delivered information on the construction of the atomic bomb to Harry Gold, who worked as a Soviet spy courier. Ethel Rosenberg was arrested on August 11, 1950, then tried, convicted and sentenced to death for conspiracy to commit espionage solely on the basis of statements from Greenglass that she had typed the documents he had delivered to the Soviets. She was executed by electric chair at Sing Sing Prison on June 19, 1953, just minutes after her husband, Julius.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT SUMMATION OF EMANUEL BLOCH FOR THE DEFENSE (EXCERPTS) The fear that an impartial jury could not be secured was particularly important in this type of case. Now, all of you are New Yorkers or you come from the environs of New York. We are a pretty sophisticated people. People can’t put thing over on us very easily. We are fairly wise in the ways of the world and the ways of people and we all know that there is not a person in this world who hasn’t some prejudice, and you would be inhuman if you didn’t have some prejudice. But we ask you now as we asked you before, please don’t decide this case because you may have some bias or some prejudice against some political philosophy. If you want to convict these defendants because you think that they are Communists and you don’t like communism and you don’t like any member of the Communist Party, then, ladies and gentlemen, I can sit down now and there is absolutely no use in my talking. There was no use in going through this whole rigmarole of a three weeks’ trial. That is not the crime. But believe me, ladies and gentlemen, I am not here, other defense counsel are not here as attorneys for the Communist Party and we are not here as attorneys for

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the Soviet Union. I can only speak for myself and my father. We are representing Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, two American citizens, who come to you as American citizens, charged with a specific crime, and ask you to judge them the way you would want to be judged if you were sitting over there before twelve other jurors.... Now, let us take Dave Greenglass. This didn’t come out of my mouth. This came out of his mouth. Is he a self-confessed spy? Is there any doubt in any of your minds that Dave Greenglass is a self-confessed espionage agent? He characterized himself that way. What did this man do? He took an oath when he entered the Army of the United States. He didn’t even remember what the oath was. That is how seriously he took it. But, in substance, he swore to support our country. Is there any doubt in your mind that he violated that oath? Is there any doubt in your mind that he disgraced the uniform of every soldier in the United States by his actions? Do you know what that man did? He was assigned to one of the most important secret projects in this country, and by his own statements, by his own admissions, he told you that he stole information out of there and gave it to strangers, and that it was going to the Soviet Government. Now, that is undisputed. I would like Mr. Saypol or anybody

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who is going to sum upon the part of the Government to refute that. Is there any doubt in your mind about that? You know, before I summed up, I wanted to go to a dictionary and I wanted to find a word that could describe a Dave Greenglass. I couldn’t find it, because I don’t think that there is a word in the English vocabulary or in the dictionary of any civilization which can describe a character like Dave Greenglass. But one thing I think you do know, that any man who will testify against his own blood and flesh, his own sister, is repulsive, is revolting, who violates every code that any civilization has ever lived by. He is the lowest of the lowest animals that I have ever seen, and if you are honest with yourself, you will admit that he is lowest than the lowest animal that you have ever seen. This is not a man; this is an animal. And how he got up there, and how he got up there. Did you look at him? I know you did; you watched him; all your eyes were fastened on him, just as people are fascinated by horror; and he smirked and he smiled and I asked him a question, so that it would be in the cold printed record, “Are you aware of your smile?” And do you know the answer I got? Do you remember it? “Not very.” Listen to that answer, “Not very.” Well, maybe some people enjoy funerals; maybe some people enjoy lynchings, but I wonder whether in anything that you have read or in anything that you have experienced you have ever come across a man, who comes round to bury his own sister and smiles. Tell me, is this the kind of a man you are going to believe? God Almighty, if ever a witness discredited himself on a stand, he did. What kind of a man can be disbelieve if we are going to believe Dave Greenglass? What is the sense of having witness chairs? What is the sense of having juries subject witnesses’ testimony to scrutiny and analysis? Is that the kind of a man that you would believe in your own life or would you punch him in the nose and throw him out and have nothing to do with him because he is a low rebel? Come on, be honest with yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, is that the kind of testimony that you are going to accept? And he was arrogant; he was arrogant. He felt he had the Government of the United States behind him. He had a right to be arrogant; he had a right to be arrogant, because I want to say right now that the Greenglasses

put it all over the FBI and put it all over Mr. Saypol’s staff, and I submit that they are smarter than the whole bunch. They sold them a bill of goods. Every man sitting over here is an honest man. The FBI representatives, Mr. Say pol and his staff, every man of them, they are doing their duty, but you know, even the smartest of us can be tricked, and do you want me to show you how they were tricked?.... Ruth Greenglass admitted here that she was in this conspiracy. Is there any doubt about that? Is there any doubt that in the middle of November she came out to Albuquerque and tried to induce her husband to sell secrets? Is there any doubt that she grabbed Gold’s money and deposited it in the bank? Is there any doubt that she gained by the illegal fruits of her husband’s venture? Is there any doubt that she knew all about it? Ruth Greenglass has never been arrested. She has never been indicted. She has never been sent to jail. Doesn’t that strike you as strange? If this is such a terrible crime, and I tell you , gentlemen, it is a serious crime, a most serious crime, don’t you think that the Greenglasses put it over the Government when Ruth Greenglass wasn’t even indicted? Something peculiar, and I am not attributing anything wrong to the FBI or the prosecutor’s staff, and let us get that straight right now. With all due respect I think the Greenglasses sold you a bill of goods. . . . Ruth Greenglass got out. She walked out and put her sister-in-law in. It was a deal that the Greenglasses planned and made for themselves, and they made it— they may not have made it by express agreement with the Government, and I don’t think the Government would countenance anything like that, but tell me do actions speak louder than words? Is the proof of the pudding in the eating? Is Ruth Greenglass a defendant here? And, ladies and gentlemen, this explains why Dave Greenglass was willing to bury his sister and his brotherin-law to save his wife. Yes, there were other factors of course. He had a grudge against Rosenberg because he felt that Rosenberg had gypped him out of a thousand dollars, but that would not have been enough to explain Greenglass’ act. Not only are the Greenglasses self-confessed spies but they were mercenary spies. They spied for money. . . . They would do anything for money. They would murder

Rosenberg Case Excerpts

people for money. They are trying to murder people for money. Now I will tell you what the plot of the Greenglasses was here. Two-fold. Greenglass figured that if he couldn’t put the finger on somebody, he would lessen his own punishment; and he had to put the finger on somebody who was here in the United States, and he had to put the finger on somebody who was a clay pigeon; and that man sitting there (indicating defendant Julius Rosenberg) is a clay pigeon, because he was fired from the Government service, because it was alleged that he was a member of the Community party; and he was the guy who was very open and expressed his views about the United States and the Soviet Union, which may have been all right when the Soviet Union and the United States were Allies, but today it is anathema; and you heard him testify, and he said it openly here, he didn’t try to conceal it, “Yes, I thought that the Soviet did a lot for the underdog and they did a lot of reconstruction work and he went on to recount one or two other things that he felt should be to their credit. Well, that is the kind of philosophy that was expounded in the New Deal days by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and by these gentlemen of the press, sitting here. But, boy, when you do that today, it is different; and in 1950 we had the same kind of climate that we have now. This man was a clay pigeon.... What kind of man was [Julius Rosenberg]? Is this a Costello? Is this your concept of a racketeer? Is this your concept of a pay-off man, a man who lived in a Knickerbocker Village apartment at $45 a month, and finally his rent was raised after many, many years, was raised to $51 a month, whose wife did scrubbing and cleaning and who had two kids, and they had a terrible struggle and they had to go and borrow money, and he scraped together $1,000 in May 1950 to buy stock in the Pitt Machine Company, and he had to give notes for $4,500 for the balance of the purchase price; tell me, does that square with your idea of a pay-off man? Now, look at that terrible spy (pointing to the defendant Ethel Rosenberg). Look at that terrible spy and compare her to Ruthie Greenglass, who came here all dolled up, arrogant, smart, cute, eager-beaver, like a phonograph record. [Y]ou will find that [Ruth Greenglass] repeated, almost word for word, if not word for word, the whole

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business; and she wants you to believe that she didn’t rehearse this story with Dave and Dave Greenglass didn’t rehearse this story with her. Cute, cute. Maybe some of you are more acute in sizing up women than others, but if Ruth Greenglass is not the embodiment of evil, I would like to know what person is? Is Ruth Greenglass the kind of person that can be trusted? Let me tell you something, she is so acute that she wriggled out of this. That is how smart she is. She wriggled out of it. She squirmed through that needle’s eye. Well, if she can fool the FBI, I do hope that she won’t be able to fool you..... [Ethel] wanted to help [David Greenglass]. That is human. Can we condemn every member of a family who wants to stick to another member of the family? What is so terrible? Wouldn’t you do it, and wouldn’t I do it? And here is a man who had had a fight with Davey to get his stock. And when Davey came around and said he was in trouble, like a schnook--that is a Jewish word; it means this--I am trying to get the exact translation--well, a very easygoing fool. He goes to his doctor to try to get a false certification for Davey.... [Gold] got his 30-year bit and he told the truth. That is why I didn’t cross-examine him.... Bentley is a professional anti-Communist. She makes money on it. I am sure the Government doesn’t pay her any money. She writes books, she lectures. This is her business; her business is testifying. Now, what did she say? Let us hear what this great authority said, this intellectual moll, this Puritan little girl from New England. Did she ever meet Rosenberg? She was a top gal. She gave orders, she says to Earl Browder.... Now, for God’s sake, you are intelligent people. Do you believe, or have you ever heard that a Government cites somebody without making public the citation: And do you believe that this little guy (indicating), with a little business, this terribly wealthy man who hasn’t got a dime to his name, that he was cited by the Russian Government? If you believe that, for God’s sake, convict the Rosenbergs and let’s get an end to this case; but if you don’t believe it, then take a lot of the other things with salt that these Greenglasses said in their anxiety to bury the Rosenbergs.... Now I want to conclude very simply. I told you at the beginning and I tell you now that we don’t come to you in this kind of charge looking for sympathy. Believe me,

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ladies and gentlemen, there is plenty of room here for a lawyer to try to harp on your emotions, especially so far as Ethel Rosenberg is concerned; a mother, she has two children, her husband is under arrest. No, because if these people are guilty of that crime they deserve no sympathy. No, we want you to decide this case with your minds, not with your hearts, with your minds. . . . I say that if you do that, you can come to no other conclusion than that these defendants are innocent and you are going to show to the world that in America a man can get a fair trial THE SUMMATION OF IRVING SAYPOL FOR THE PROSECUTION (EXCERPTS) All of the partners and employees of the firm do not do the same thing at the same time. While one partner talks to a customer, another may be negotiating with another prospect. . . . Each act by each party, by each employer in the court of business is an act performed for the benefit of the firm and for the benefit of his fellows. Imagine a wheel. In the center of the wheel, Rosenberg, reaching out like the tentacles of an octopus. Rosenberg to David Greenglass. Ethel Rosenberg, Ruth Greenglass; Rosenberg to Harry Gold; Rosenberg, Yakovlev. Information obtained, supplied. Rosenberg, Sobell, Elitcher--always the objective in the center coming from all the legs, all the tentacles going to the one center, solely for the one object: The benefit of Soviet Russia. The sources, Government sources, Los Alamos, atomic information. Sobell, Elitcher, information from the Navy, relating particularly to gunfire control; always secret, always classified, always of advantage to a foreign government. The association of Rosenberg and Sobell began at City College, and it continues until today. They have been held together by one common bond: Their mutual devotion to communism and the Soviet Union, and their membership in this conspiracy to commit espionage for that Soviet Union. That is why their classmate, Max Elitcher, was asked to join the Young Communist League when they were at college. That is why Sobell and Rosenberg joined in the concerted action to recruit Elitcher into their Soviet espionage ring. While Sobell was chairman of his Communist Party unit in Washington, delivering to its members weekly directives concerning worship of the Soviet Union, Rosenberg was working his way up in the Communist Party underground.

Rosenberg told Elitcher at Manny Wolf ’s that night in 1948, just as Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg had told Ruth Greenglass that night in November 1944, how he had realized the ambition of his life. He told them how he had gone from one Communist Party contact to another until he had achieved the coveted status of a Communist Party espionage agent. There is no condonation for the activities of the Greenglasses in 1944 and 1945. David Greenglass is a confessed member of the Rosenberg espionage ring. . . By his own plea of guilty, by his own voluntary act, without weaving a web of lies in an attempt to deceive you, he has made himself liable to the death penalty, too. The spurious defense that Greenglass, or the Greenglasses, in order to satisfy a business grudge, a business dispute against the Rosenbergs, has concocted a story about espionage, making himself liable to the capital penalty by his plea of guilty because of the business disagreement, is as much of a concoction as the story of the defendants that Greenglass went to his worst enemy, Julius Rosenberg, for help when he wanted to flee the country. Greenglass’ relations toward his older sister, Ethel, and her husband, Julius, were such that he was willing prey to their Communistic propaganda. He committed this crime because they persuaded him to do it. As far as Gold is concerned, the die has already been cast. The charges against him have already been disposed of. He has been sentenced to thirty years, the maximum term of imprisonment. He can gain nothing from testifying as he did in this courtroom except the initial relief, the moral satisfaction in his soul of having told the truth and tried to make amends. Harry Gold, who furnished the absolute corroboration of the testimony of the Greenglasses, forged the necessary link in the chain that points indisputably to the guilt of the Rosenbergs. Not one question was asked of him by any defendant on cross-examination. The atom bomb secrets stolen by Greenglass at the instigation of the Rosenbergs were delivered by Harry Gold right into the hands of an official representative of the Soviet Union. The veracity of David and Ruth Greenglass and of Harry Gold is established by documentary evidence and cannot be contradicted. You have in evidence before you the registration card from the Hotel Hilton in Albuquerque, which shows that he was

Rosenberg Case Excerpts

registered there on June 3, 1945. You have before you the transcript of the record of the Albuquerque bank, showing that on the morning of June 4, 1945, Ruth Greenglass opened a bank account in Albuquerque and made an initial deposit of $400 in cash--just as she and David testified they did here on the witness stand right before you. This description of the atom bomb, destined for delivery to the Soviet Union, was typed up by the defendant Ethel Rosenberg that afternoon at her apartment at 10 Monroe Street. Just so had she on countless other occasions sat at that typewriter and struck the keys, blow by blow, against her own country in the interests of the Soviets. The truth was beginning to catch up with the Rosenbergs and their crowd. The passport photos of the Greenglass family were taken at Rosenberg’s insistence. Rosenberg asked for five sets, but Greenglass had six sets taken. The five sets are now undoubtedly in the hands of Rosenberg’s Soviet partners, but the sixth set is here, in this courtroom, before you as Government’s Exhibits 9-A and 9-B. We know what Julius Rosenberg told Ruth Greenglass on that occasion and what he and his wife told Ruth and David on every occasion when they were together. The Rosenbergs told them to go and commit espionage in the interests of communism in the Soviet Union, just as Rosenberg and Sobell told that to Elitcher and countless others, and that is what happened. You heard the testimony about what was done to that console table, so that it was used for microfilming. How strange, on the one hand, the testimony from the Greenglasses that that was a present from the Soviet, the testimony from the Rosenbergs that they paid $221 for it in 1944 or 1945, when furniture was scarce, at Macy’s; and then a disinterested woman (Mrs. Evelyn Cox), even in the face of adroit cross-examination, resolute in her determination, told the truth. She saw the table. Mrs. Rosenberg told her it was a wedding present from a friend of Julius, whom they hadn’t seen for many years. And this remarkably strange behavior taking the best piece of furniture in the house and storing it in the closet--why did they have to hide it? Yesterday you heard Mr. Schneider identify both of them as those who had come to him at his place of

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business on a Saturday in the middle of June 1950, with their children. He told us nothing of snapshots, taken for amusement of precocious children. He told us of an order for three dozen passport photos for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and their family, who told him that they were going to France. But it is these very witnesses whom they now attack that they themselves chose as their partners in crime. While Rosenberg attacks the Greenglasses today, seven years ago it was the Rosenbergs who took this same David Greenglass and set him to betraying his country. It was Sobell at Rosenberg’s instigation who recruited Elitcher. The only ones with knowledge about the activities of these defendants are those who participated in the same activities. These witnesses were not your choice, nor were they mine, these witnesses, Elitcher and the Greenglasses. They were selected by the defendants as their associates and partners in crime. We have not only the testimony of Ruth and David Greenglass about Rosenberg’s espionage activities. We have Elitcher’s, a man who never saw Ruth and David Greenglass or Harry Gold. Elitcher has placed the brand of Soviet spy on Rosenberg. You have the documentary evidence of Gold’s registration card, the bank account, the wrapping paper, the testimony of Dr. Bernhardt, Dorothy Abel, Evelyn Cox, of Schneider, who took the passport pictures. That is why the evidence as to the Rosenbergs’ guilt is incontrovertible. Their guilt is established by the proof not beyond a reasonable doubt, but beyond any conceivable doubt. These defendants seek to escape the consequences of their own acts by hiding behind straw men. . . . Greenglass is a confessed spy and Elitcher has admitted that some years ago he did not disclose his Communist Party membership in an application; but these men under the greatest stress have stood up here and disclosed the truth about their past activities. They have not compounded their sins by trying to lie to you here in this courtroom. The question here is not the fate, or present or future, of other people. The question here is the guilt of these three defendants named by the grand jury here on trial before you in this courtroom. That is the single issue and the evidence on that issue is overwhelming. Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard statements of defense counsel here concerning the injection of com-

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munism in this case. I repeat again, these defendants are not on trial for being Communists. I don’t want you to convict them merely because of their Communist activity. Communism, as the testimony has demonstrated, has a very definite place in this case because it is the Communist ideology which teaches worship and devotion to the Soviet Union over our own government. It has provided the motive and inspiration for these people to do the terrible things which have been proven against them. It is this adherence and devotion which makes clear their intent and motivation in carrying out this conspiracy to commit espionage. We ask you to sustain the charge of the grand jury in a verdict of guilty against each of these three defendants, on one basis and one basis alone; the evidence produced in this courtroom as to their guilt of the crime of conspiracy to commit espionage; that proof as to each defendant has been overwhelming. The guilt of each one has been established beyond any peradventure of doubt. I am a firm believer in the American jury system. I have confidence in the perception of the jury of twelve intelligent American citizens. I am confident that you will render the only verdict possible on the evidence presented before you in this courtroom--that of guilty as charged by the grand jury as to each of these three defendants JUDGE KAUFMAN’S STATEMENT UPON SENTENCING THE ROSENBERGS Citizens of this country who betray their fellowcountrymen can be under none of the delusions about the benignity of Soviet power that they might have been prior to World War II. The nature of Russian terrorism is now self-evident. Idealism as a rational dissolves . . . I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate contemplated murder is dwarfed in magnitude by comparison with the crime you have committed. In committing the act of murder, the criminal kills only his victim. The immediate family is brought to grief and when justice is meted out the chapter is closed. But in your case, I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent peo-

ple may pay the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country. No one can say that we do not live in a constant state of tension. We have evidence of your treachery all around us every day--for the civilian defense activities throughout the nation are aimed at preparing us for an atom bomb attack. Nor can it be said in mitigation of the offense that the power which set the conspiracy in motion and profited from it was not openly hostile to the United States at the time of the conspiracy. If this was your excuse the error of your ways in setting yourselves above our properly constituted authorities and the decision of those authorities not to share the information with Russia must now be obvious . . . In the light of this, I can only conclude that the defendants entered into this most serious conspiracy against their country with full realization of its implications . . . The statute of which the defendants at the bar stand convicted is clear. I have previously stated my view that the verdict of guilty was amply justified by the evidence. In the light of the circumstances, I feel that I must pass such sentence upon the principals in this diabolical conspiracy to destroy a God-fearing nation, which will demonstrate with finality that this nation’s security must remain inviolate; that traffic in military secrets, whether promoted by slavish devotion to a foreign ideology or by a desire for monetary gains must cease. The evidence indicated quite clearly that Julius Rosenberg was the prime mover in this conspiracy. However, let no mistake be made about the role which his wife, Ethel Rosenberg, played in this conspiracy. Instead of deterring him from pursuing his ignoble cause, she encouraged and assisted the cause. She was a mature woman--almost three years older than her husband and almost seven years older than her younger brother. She was a full-fledged partner in this crime. Indeed the defendants Julius and Ethel Rosenberg placed their devotion to their cause above their own personal safety and were conscious that they were sacrificing their own children, should their misdeeds be detected--all of which did not deter them from pursuing their course. Love for their cause dominated their lives— it was even greater than their love for their children.”

Rosenberg Case Excerpts

Document Analysis

Emanuel Bloch, in his summation for the defense, focuses on discrediting the witnesses, primarily David Greenglass. However, first Bloch emphasizes that the crime under discussion is not that of holding communist sympathies. He notes that Greenglass had confessed to being a spy, and that he had given information about “one of the most important secret projects in this country” to the Russians. He determines that a man who would testify against his sister is “repulsive,” “an animal.” He announces that Greenglass sacrificed his sister in order to save his wife, Ruth Greenglass, who was never charged. Bloch ends by maintaining the innocence of his clients and appealing to the need for a fair trial. Irving Saypol, in his summation for the prosecution, focuses on presenting Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as predators, people who used their family relationship to persuade David Greenglass to commit espionage in the name of their devotion to communism. Saypol points out that Greenglass, in confessing, “made himself liable to the death penalty,” and he praises Greenglass for telling the truth. In contrast, Saypol charges the defendants with lying and “hiding behind straw men,” or false accusations. Judge Kaufman, in his statement upon sentencing the Rosenbergs, describes their crime as “worse than murder.” Kaufman accuses them of providing the Russians with the atomic bomb years before US officials predicted they would have it, thereby facilitating Soviet participation in the Korean War. He blames the deaths occurring in the Korean War on the Rosenbergs. Finally, he blames the defendants for their “slavish devotion to a foreign ideology,” which they place even above their devotion to their children. Essential Themes

The prosecution of the Rosenbergs occurred during a

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time of great fear in the United States—fear of Communism, fear of the atomic bomb, fear of further wars. The destructive capability of atomic weapons probably intensified these fears, as did the secretive nature of Cold War-era espionage and the difficulty of knowing when and where it occurred. Although the Soviet Union was a US ally during World War II, largely because of the common enemy of Nazi Germany relations between the two world powers disintegrated after the war owing to differences in ideology. The Soviet Union strove to spread communism to its geographic neighbors and beyond. The United States, on the other hand, strove to limit the spread of communism, which was widely portrayed as evil. This set of conflicts played out in the Korean War, which unfolded at the same time as the arrest, trial, and execution of the Rosenbergs. It is worth noting that information that came to light after the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to confirm that Julius Rosenberg indeed operated as a Soviet agent before his arrest, whereas Ethel Rosenberg perhaps knew of her husband’s involvement but was not herself actively involved in espionage. —Nettie Farris Bibliography and Additional Reading

Carmichael, Virginia. Framing History: The Rosenberg Story and the Cold War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993. Print. Dershowitz, Alan M. “The Trial of the Rosenbergs:” America on Trial: Inside the Legal Battles That Transformed Our Nation. New York: Warner Books, 2004. Print. Schneir, Walter. Final Verdict: What Really Happened in the Rosenberg Case. New York: Melville House Publishing, 2010. Print. Sulick, Michael J. “The Executed Spies: The Rosensbergs.” Spying in America. Washington, DC: Georgetown UP, 2012. Print.

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 In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer Date: June 29, 1954 Author: United States Atomic Energy Commission Genre: report Summary Overview

This statement by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officially revoked the security clearance of J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had been instrumental in the development of the atomic bomb for the United States in the Second World War. The decision to deny Oppenheimer access to national nuclear secrets caused many to see the scientist as a martyr to two political trends in the 1950s: McCarthyism and the military-industrial complex. Oppenheimer’s enemies argued that his leftist political sympathies and opposition to increasingly aggressive nuclear armament were destructive to national security, even though no evidence proved that the scientist had been disloyal. Although many saw Oppenheimer’s debarment as a tragedy resulting from the paranoia of “Red Scare” politics, it did not cause a mass exodus of scientists from nuclear laboratories. Instead, the lack of scientists’ desertion signaled the willingness of many to make scientific goals meet with the anticommunist political ideology of the time. Defining Moment

The final decision to take away Oppenheimer’s security clearance on June 28, 1954, one day before his contract expired, shows that the AEC hearing was not simply an issue of scientific integrity. The Oppenheimer hearing resulted from an American political environment increasingly concerned with maintaining an aggressive policy of competition against the Soviet Union. The need to validate this aggressive arms race led to increasingly undemocratic actions, assisted in large part by the anti-communist fervor stoked by Senator McCarthy in the 1950s, to silence any qualms about the acquisition of increasingly lethal weaponry. Questioning the loyalty of a scientist who helped secure American victory in the Second World War proved that no one was safe from reproach. In the 1930s Oppenheimer was friends with members of the American Communist Party, but he seems to have forgone his ear-

lier interests to the extent that General Leslie Groves was not anxious about allowing Oppenheimer to direct the Manhattan Project. However, loyalty during the war was not enough to save Oppenheimer’s career during the height of the Red Scare. When the Soviets first tested an atomic weapon in 1949, years ahead of when the United States expected their rivals to have developed the technology, Oppenheimer’s appeals for a cautious nuclear policy appeared dangerous to rivals. The stimulus for the contrived attack against Oppenheimer’s loyalty was Operation Candor, a policy recommended in 1953 by the Oppenheimer-led State Department disarmament panel. Operation Candor recommended that the government be more transparent to the public about the danger, quantity, and increase of weapons. Opponents to this were Lewis L. Strauss and William Borden, who believed that divulging information would benefit the Soviets. Consequently, the two men disseminated information insinuating Oppenheimer might be a Soviet agent to the FBI and the president: in effect, they attacked Oppenheimer’s security record as a way to shut down Operation Candor. Borden and Strauss were initially successful. As a result of the Oppenheimer hearing, it became necessary for scientists ultimately to strike a balance between Joseph Stalin and Joseph McCarthy. Compelled by the undemocratic extents that the government would go to protect its interests, there was no recourse for scientists but to fall in line with American defense policy which prized national security over all else. Author Biographies

The McMahon Act created the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1946. The mission of the AEC was to foster and control the use of atomic science following the cessation of hostilities in the Second World War. This new commission was supposed to transfer the responsibility of developing the United

In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer

States’ nuclear arsenal from the military into civilian hands and foster the development of technologies promoting public welfare. During the early history of the commission, high-level members such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Lewis L. Strauss clashed over the devel-

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opment of a more lethal form of atomic weaponry, the hydrogen bomb, in 1949. Strauss was one of the first Commissioners and would later be involved in bringing allegations against Oppenheimer’s political loyalty in the security clearance investigation from 1953-54.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT STATEMENT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION [For immediate release June 29, 1954] UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Washington 25, D. C. The Atomic Energy Commission announced today that it had reached a decision in the matter of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The Commission by a vote of 4 to 1 decided that Dr. Oppenheimer should be denied access to restricted data. Commissioners Strauss, Murray, Zuckert, and Campbell voted to deny clearance for access to restricted data, and Commissioner Smyth voted to reinstate clearance for access to restricted data. Messrs. Strauss, Zuckert, and Campbell signed the majority opinion; Mr. Murray concurred with the majority decision in a separate opinion. Dr. Smyth supported his conclusion in a minority opinion. Certain members of the Commission issued additional statements in support of their conclusions. These opinions and statements are attached. UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Washington 25, D. C., June 29, 1954. The issue before the Commission is whether the security of the United States warrants Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer’s continued access to restricted data of the Atomic Energy Commission. The data to which Dr. Oppenheimer has had until recently full access include some of the most vital secrets in the possession of the United States. Having carefully studied the pertinent documents— the transcript of the hearings before the Personnel Security Board (Gray Board), the findings and recommendation of the Board, the briefs of Dr. Oppenheimer’s

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counsel, and the findings and recommendation of the General Manager-we have concluded that Dr. Oppenheimer’s clearance for access to restricted data should not be reinstated. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 lays upon the Commissioners the duty to reach a determination as to “the character, associations, and loyalty” of the individuals engaged in the work of the Commission. Thus, disloyalty would be one basis for disqualification, but it is only one. Substantial defects of character and imprudent and dangerous associations, particularly with known subversives who place the interests of foreign powers above those of the United States, are also reasons for disqualification. On the basis of the record before the Commission, comprising the transcript of the hearing before the Gray Board as well as reports of Military Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we find Dr. Oppenheimer is not entitled to the continued confidence of the Government and of this Commission because of the proof of fundamental defects in his “character.” In respect to the criterion of “associations,” we find that his associations with persons known to him to be Communists have extended far beyond the tolerable limits of prudence and self-restraint which are to be expected of one holding the high positions that the Government has continuously entrusted to him since 1942. These associations have lasted too long to be justified as merely the intermittent and accidental revival of earlier friendships. Neither in the deliberations by the full Commission nor in the review of the Gray Board was importance attached to the opinions of Dr. Oppenheimer as they bore upon the 1949 debate within the Government on the question of whether the United States should proceed with the thermonuclear weapon program. In this debate, Dr. Oppenheimer was, of course, entitled to his

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opinion. The fundamental issues here are apart from and beyond this episode. The history of their development is follows: On December 23, 1953, Dr. Oppenheimer was notified that his security clearance had been suspended, and he was provided with the allegations which had brought his trustworthiness into question. He was also furnished with a copy of the Atomic Energy Commission’s security clearance procedures, and was informed of his right to a hearing under those procedures. By telegram dated January 29, 1954, Dr. Oppenheimer requested a hearing. On March 4, 1954, after requesting and receiving three extensions of time, he submitted his answer to the letter of December 23, 1953. On March 15, 1954, Dr. Oppenheimer was informed that Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Thomas A. Morgan, and Dr. Ward V. Evans would conduct the hearing. The hearing before the Gray Board commenced on April 12, 1954, and continued through May 6, 1954. Dr. Oppenheimer was represented by four lawyers. He was present to confront all witnesses; he had the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses; his counsel made both oral and written argument to the Board. The Board submitted its findings and recommendation to the General Manager of the Commission on May 27,1954. A majority of the Board recommended against reinstatement of clearance, Dr. Evans dissenting. Dr. Oppenheimer had full advantage of the security procedures of the Commission. In our opinion he had a just hearing. On May 28, l954, the General Manager notified Dr. Oppenheimer of the adverse recommendation of the Personnel Security Board and forwarded to him a copy of the Board’s findings and recommendation. The General Manager informed Dr. Oppenheimer of his right to request review of his case by the Personnel Security Review Board. Dr. Oppenheimer was also informed that upon consideration of the record in the case-including the recommendation of the Personnel Security Review Board in the event review by that Board was requestedthe General Manager would submit to the Commission his own recommendation as to whether or not clearance should be reinstated and that the Commission would

thereafter make the final determination. By letter of June 1, 1954, Dr. Oppenheimer waived his right to a review of his case by the Personnel Security Review Board. He requested immediate consideration of his case by the Commission. On June 7, 1954, his counsel submitted a written brief to the Commission. The General Manager reviewed the testimony and the findings and recommendation of the Gray Board and the briefs; his conclusion that Dr. Oppenheimer’s clearance should not be reinstated was submitted to the Commission on June 12, 1954. Prior to these proceedings, the derogatory information in Government files concerning Dr. Oppenheimer had never been weighed by any board on the basis of sworn testimony. The important result of these hearings was to bring out significant information bearing upon Dr. Oppenheimer’s character and associations hitherto unknown to the Commission and presumably unknown also to those who testified as character witnesses on his behalf. These hearings additionally established as fact many matters which previously had been only allegations. In weighing the matter at issue, we have taken into account Dr. Oppenheimer’s past contributions to the atomic energy program. At the same time, we have been mindful of the fact that the positions of high trust and responsibility which Dr. Oppenheimer has occupied carried with them a commensurately high obligation of unequivocal character and conduct on his part. A Government official having access to the most sensitive areas of restricted data and to the innermost details of national war plans and weapons must measure up to exemplary standards of reliability, self-discipline, and trustworthiness. Dr. Oppenheimer has fallen far short of acceptable standards. The record shows that Dr. Oppenheimer has consistently placed himself outside the rules which govern others. He has falsified in matters wherein he was charged with grave responsibilities in the national interest. In his associations he has repeatedly exhibited a willful disregard of the normal and proper obligations of security. As to “character” (1) Dr. Oppenheimer has now admitted under oath that while in charge of the Los Alamos Laboratory and working on the most secret weapon

In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer

development for the Government, he told Colonel Pash a fabrication of lies. Colonel Pash was an officer of Military Intelligence charged with the duty of protecting the atomic-weapons project against spies. Dr. Oppenheimer told Colonel Pash in circumstantial detail of an attempt by a Soviet agent to obtain from him information about the work on the atom bomb. This was the Haakon Chevalier incident. In the hearings recently concluded, Dr. Oppenheimer under oath swears that the story he told Colonel Pash was a “whole fabrication and tissue of lies” (Tr., p. 149). It is not clear today whether the account Dr. Oppenheimer gave to Colonel Pash in 1943 concerning the Chevalier incident or the story he told the Gray Board last month is the true version. If Dr. Oppenheimer lied in 1943, as he now says he did, he committed the crime of knowingly making false and material statements to a Federal officer. If he lied to the Board, be committed perjury in 1954. (2) Dr. Oppenheimer testified to the Gray Board that if he had known Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz was an active Communist or that Lomanitz had disclosed information about the atomic project to an unauthorized person, he would not have written to Colonel Lansdale of the Manhattan District the letter of October 19, 1943, in which Dr. Oppenheimer supported the desire of Lomanitz to return to the atomic project. The record shows, however, that on August 26, 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer told Colonel Pash that he (Oppenheimer) knew that Lomanitz had revealed information about the project. Furthermore, on September 12, 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer told Colonel Lansdale that he (Oppenheimer) had previously learned for a fact that Lomanitz was a Communist Party member (Tr. pp. 118, 119, 128, 129, 143, 875). (3) In 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer indicated to Colonel Lansdale that he did not know Rudy Lambert, a Communist Party functionary. In fact, Dr. Oppenheimer asked Colonel Lansdale what Lambert looked like. Now, however, Dr. Oppenheimer under oath has admitted that be knew and had seen Lambert at least half a dozen times prior to 1943; he supplied a detailed description of Lambert; he said that once or twice he had lunch with Lambert and Isaac Folkoff, another Communist Party

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functionary, to discuss his (Oppenheimer’s) contributions to the Communist Party; and that he knew at the time that Lambert was an official in the Communist Party (Tr. pp. 139, 140, 877). (4) In 1949 Dr. Oppenheimer testified before a closed session of the House Un-American Activities Committee about the Communist Party membership and activities of Dr. Bernard Peters. A summary of Dr. Oppenheimer’s testimony subsequently appeared in a newspaper, the Rochester Times Union. Dr. Oppenheimer then wrote a letter to that newspaper. The effect of that letter was to contradict the testimony he had given a congressional committee (Tr. pp. 210-215). (5) In connection with the meeting of the General Advisory Committee on October 29, 1949, at which the thermonuclear weapon program was considered, Dr. Oppenheimer testified before the Gray Board that the General Advisory Committee was “surprisingly unanimous” in its recommendation that the United States ought not to take the initiative at that time in a thermonuclear program. Now, however, under cross-examination, Dr. Oppenheimer testifies that he did not know how Dr. Seaborg (1 of the 9 members of Dr. Oppenheimer’s committee) then felt about the program because Dr. Seaborg “was in Sweden, and there was no communication with him.” On being confronted with a letter from Dr. Seaborg to him dated October 14, 1949-a letter which had been in Dr. Oppenheimer’s files-Dr. Oppenheimer admitted having received the letter prior to the General Advisory Committee meeting in 1949. In that letter Dr. Seaborg said: “Although I deplore the prospects of our country putting a tremendous effort into this, I must confess that I have been unable to come to the conclusion that we should not.” Yet Dr. Seaborg’s view was not mentioned in Dr. Oppenheimer’s report for the General Advisory Committee to the Commission in October 1949. In fact the existence of this letter remained unknown to the Commission until it was disclosed during the hearings (Tr. pp. 233, 237-241). (6) In 1950, Dr. Oppenheimer told an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that he had not known Joseph Weinberg to be a member of the Communist Party until that fact become public knowledge. Yet on September 12, 1943, Dr. Oppenheimer told Colonel

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Lansdale that Weinberg was a Communist Party member (Tr., p. 875). The catalog does not end with these six examples. The work of Military Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission-all, at one time or another have felt the effect of his falsehoods, evasions, and misrepresentations. Dr. Oppenheimer’s persistent and willful disregard for the obligations of security is evidenced by his obstruction of inquiries by security officials. In the Chevalier incident, Dr. Oppenheimer was questioned in 1943 by Colonel Pash, Colonel Lansdale, and General Groves about the attempt to obtain information from him on the atomic bomb project in the interest of the Soviet Government. He had waited 8 months before mentioning the occurrence to the proper authorities. Thereafter for almost 4 months Dr. Oppenheimer refused to name the individual who had approached him. Under oath he now admits that his refusal to name the individual impeded the Government’s investigation of espionage. The record shows other instances where Dr. Oppenheimer has refused to answer inquiries of Federal officials on security matters or has been deliberately misleading. As to “associations” “Associations” is a factor which, under the law, must be considered by the Commission. Dr. Oppenheimer’s close association with Communists is another part of the pattern of his disregard of the obligations of security. Dr. Oppenheimer, under oath, admitted to the Gray Board that from 1937 to at least 1942 he made regular and substantial contributions in cash to the Communist Party. He has admitted that he was a “fellow traveler” at least until 1942. He admits that he attended small evening meetings at private homes at which most, if not all, of the others present were Communist Party members. He was in contact with officials of the Communist Party, some of whom had been engaged in espionage. His activities were of such a nature that these Communists

looked upon him as one of their number. However, Dr. Oppenheimer’s early Communist associations are not in themselves a controlling reason for our decision. They take on importance in the context of his persistent and continuing association with Communists, including his admitted meetings with Haakon Chevalier in Paris as recently as last December-the same individual who had been intermediary for the Soviet Consulate in 1943. On February 25, 1950, Dr. Oppenheimer wrote a letter to Chevalier attempting “to clear the record with regard to your alleged involvement in the atom business.” Chevalier used this letter in connection with his application to the State Department for a United States passport. Later that year Chevalier came and stayed with Dr. Oppenheimer for several days at the latter’s home. In December 1953, Dr. Oppenheimer visited with Chevalier privately on two occasions in Paris, and lent his name to Chevalier’s dealings with the United States Embassy in Paris on a problem which, according to Dr. Oppenheimer, involved Chevalier’s clearance. Dr. Oppenheimer admitted that today he has only a “strong guess” that Chevalier is not active in Communist Party affairs. These episodes separately and together present a serious picture. It is clear that for one who has had access for so long to the most vital defense secrets of the Government and who would retain such access if his clearance were continued, Dr. Oppenheimer has defaulted not once but many times upon the obligations that should and must be willingly borne by citizens in the national service. Concern for the defense and security of the United States requires that Dr. Oppenheimer’s clearance should not be reinstated. Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer is hereby denied access to restricted data.

In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer

Document Analysis

Commonly, a governmental agency grants a security clearance at the beginning of a contract and after a background investigation into a person’s personal and professional history. This document, written at the end of Oppenheimer’s contract, damages Oppenheimer’s trustworthiness in order to denigrate his loyalty to United States. The report functions as an example of how closely the personal and the political were intertwined during the beginning of the Cold War. As a document published publically, this report focuses primarily on Oppenheimer’s uncertain testimony from years before the hearing in order to damage his ethical standing. The report begins by openly asserting that it is not Oppenheimer’s loyalty, but his character that disqualifies him from the confidence of the United States. Instead, it is “the proof of fundamental defects in his ‘character’” that disqualifies Oppenheimer from an access he had continuously since 1942. Since this criticism of Oppenheimer comes perilously close to an ad hominem attack, the report next stresses that this hearing is in no way punishment because Oppenheimer opposed the thermonuclear weapon program in 1949, but the history of Oppenheimer’s thoughts continues to be the subject of the charges against his position as nuclear advisor. The personal nature of this political hearing can be seen in the ensuing enumeration of charges. The list of examples provided by the report frames Oppenheimer’s conduct as uncertain or variable rather than providing any definitive evidence of malfeasance. The first charge against Oppenheimer’s character refers to the Haakon Chevalier incident in 1943, when Oppenheimer took eight months to report that his friend approached him about a possible Soviet contact. The entire incident in this report is marked by uncertainty. The report states “it is not clear today” whether the account told to the Gray Board is the true version; it continues to hint towards suspicious behavior in this incident by two conditional sentences: “If Dr. Oppenheimer lied in 1943… If he lied to the Board…” These conditions do not prove misconduct, but do characterize Oppenheimer as a liar instead of confused or forgetful. The second, third, and fourth charge against Oppenheimer’s conduct characterizes him in much the same way. The fifth charge refers to another incident of Oppenheimer “misrepresenting” information: he said that the General Advisory Committee of the AEC was “unanimously” against the development of thermonu-

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clear weapons, when one member actually deplored the development, but gave cautious support while away from the United States. Although the report stated that Oppenheimer’s opinions regarding thermonuclear weaponry were not at issue, this minor charge seems to allude to his thoughts being on trial. The report then goes onto generalize Oppenheimer’s behavior again without providing any firm evidence for malfeasance: many government agencies “all, at one time or another have felt the effect of his falsehoods, evasions, and misrepresentations.” The effect of this generalization is to gather support against Oppenheimer and ratify to the audience the decision to terminate Oppenheimer’s privileged position. After discussing Oppenheimer’s character defects, the report turns to defects in the people with whom Oppenheimer associated. Although the report says that Oppenheimer’s early Communist ties “are not in themselves a controlling reason for our decision,” they clearly are. The personal history of Oppenheimer before Russia became an enemy becomes more evidence to attack Oppenheimer politically after the fact. Once again, the report brings up the Chevalier incident as evidence: what could be interpreted as Oppenheimer’s support of an old friend who made a mistake becomes now “his persistent and continuing association with Communists.” This report accomplished the opposite of what it aimed to do. Rather than showing that Oppenheimer was subversive, this report can be read and has been read as an indictment against a renowned physicist for “thought-crimes.” This document asserts that Oppenheimer had a “disregard of the obligations of security,” but it raises the question about what exactly those obligations are for national security and how far can the government proceed against individual integrity to maintain that security. Essential Themes

In the short term, the American government and public realized the mistake in punishing a notable scientist for advocating a sane nuclear armament program. President Eisenhower coined the term “military-industrial complex” in his 1961 Farewell Address, in which he cautioned about pouring too many resources into military institutions and companies that would advocate for polices not in the nation’s best interests. In 1963, President Kennedy recognized the need to rehabilitate the United States government’s relationship with Op-

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penheimer and honored the scientist with the Enrico Fermi Award. Finally, in 1975 the AEC was dissolved and its responsibilities allocated eventually to the new Department of Energy in 1977. However, Oppenheimer’s return to grace and the dissolution of the AEC did not stop the larger issues that contributed to the security clearance hearing in 19535s4. Despite Eisenhower’s warning about the militaryindustrial complex, anti-communist policies contributed to vast allocations of funding for the defense budget and private military contractors. It was expedient for scientists to focus on technologies beneficial for promoting national security rather than for civilian welfare. The vast amount spent on the Vietnam War can be seen as a consequence of the military-industrial complex’s growth. Even loss of support for the Vietnam War has not stopped the power of the military-industrial complex or suspicious tactics by the government to target potential threats. The disclosures made in 2013 by Edward Snowden, a former intelligence contractor for the United States government, revealed that the United States government was still involved in mass surveillance and expensive intelligence gathering procedures. As a re-

sult, the U.S. Department of Justice initiated charges against Snowden for violating the Espionage Act. Snowden’s flight to Russia for asylum and the outcry following the reveal renewed debates that the American public had been considering since Oppenheimer’s hearing: how far should the state go to protect its interests? Do the necessities of national security trump the right of individuals to dissent at any time? —Ashleigh Fata, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bird, Kai and Martin J. Sherwin. American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer. New York: Random House, 2005. Print. Hewlett, Richard G. and Jack M. Holl. Atoms for Peace and War 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission. Los Angeles: U of California Press, 1989. Print. Hunner, Jon. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Cold War, and the Atomic West. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 2009. Print. Walker, Mark, ed. Science and Ideology: A Comparative History. New York: Routledge, 2003. Print.

Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy

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 Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy Date: December 2, 1954 Author: US Senate Genre: government document Summary Overview

Joseph McCarthy became a household name on February 2, 1950, when he gave a speech on the subject that would define the remainder of his career: the “infestation” of the federal government by Communists. McCarthy, a lackluster Republican senator from Wisconsin, claimed to have a list of 205 Communists who were connected to the State Department. McCarthy played into postwar America’s fear that Communism was the next grave threat to the nation and that spies and traitors existed at every level of society and were actively shaping policy in the government. These fears were not groundless, as the Soviet Union was in possession of nuclear weapons, had set up Communist states in Eastern Europe, was actively supporting the Chinese and their North Korean allies in the Korean War, and had recruited spies in the United States government and military. Sensational espionage cases had been an obsession of the press, and McCarthy’s charges of widespread Communism in the State Department attracted a flood of publicity. In 1953, under newly elected president Dwight D. Eisenhower, also a Republican, McCarthy was put in charge of the Committee on Government Operations, which he used to hold increasingly aggressive investigations into alleged Communists, eventually costing more than two thousand government employees their jobs. In late 1953, McCarthy began investigating the armed forces, and the tide began to turn against him. At the end of the following year, McCarthy was censured by his Senate colleagues and lost what was left of his credibility. Defining Moment

McCarthy’s censure by the Senate marked the decline of the Second Red Scare, during which tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union had escalated to a critical point. The two nations had been uneasy allies during the latter part of World War II, but tensions rapidly escalated after the war, with the So-

viet Union in hot pursuit of its own nuclear weapon and conflicts arising over the control of territory in Germany and Eastern Europe. Communism seemed to be spreading everywhere, and several high-level espionage cases added to the fear that Soviet spies were at work at the highest levels of the US government and military. After McCarthy’s 1950 speech in which he claimed to have knowledge of 205 Communists working in the State Department, the Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees, also known as the Tydings Committee, was convened to investigate his charges. McCarthy used the Tydings Committee as a platform to launch attacks against people he believed to have Communist sympathies. Though his accusations were often based on flimsy evidence or hearsay, he gathered significant national attention and threatened political opponents with exposing their loyalty as questionable. In 1953, McCarthy was put in charge of the Committee on Government Operations, through which he aggressively pursued alleged Communist sympathizers in the federal government. With few willing to defend those accused and risk being accused themselves, more than two thousand government employees lost their jobs. McCarthy began investigating the armed forces in autumn 1953 and began holding hearings in April 1954. Though willing to believe that State Department employees could be disloyal, many of McCarthy’s supporters balked at his investigation of the military. In televised broadcasts, the US Army fought back ferociously against his accusations and revealed that McCarthy had tried to use his influence to gain preferential treatment for aides who had been drafted, further damaging his reputation. In a pivotal moment, the Army’s chief counsel, defending one of his colleagues, shouted, “Have you no sense of decency, sir?,” at which observers at the hearing began to applaud.

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In July 1954, Vermont senator Ralph Flanders called for McCarthy to be censured on the grounds that he was damaging the reputation of the Senate. Senators subsequently drew up a list of forty-six charges against him, and a bipartisan committee was formed in August 1954, headed by Utah senator Arthur V. Watkins, to investigate the charges. The group ultimately recommended censure based on McCarthy’s flouting of senatorial rules and his offensive accusations launched against members of the committee. On December 2,

the Senate voted 67–22 to condemn McCarthy on both counts. Author Biography

The censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy took place during the Eighty-Third United States Congress. The Senate met from 1953 to 1955, during the administration of President Eisenhower. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives had Republican majorities.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Resolved, That the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, failed to cooperate with the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration in clearing up matters referred to that subcommittee which concerned his conduct as a Senator and affected the honor of the Senate and, instead, repeatedly abused the subcommittee and its members who were trying to carry out assigned duties, thereby obstructing the constitutional processes of the Senate, and that this conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, is contrary to senatorial traditions and is hereby condemned. Sec 2. The Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, in writing to the chairman of the Select Committee to Study Censure Charges (Mr. Watkins) after the Select Committee had issued its report and before the report was presented to the Senate charging three members of the Select Committee with “deliberate deception” and “fraud” for failure to disqualify themselves; in stating to the press on November 4, 1954, that the special Senate session that was to begin November 8, 1954, was a “lynch-party”; in repeatedly describing this special Sen-

Document Analysis

Though more than forty charges were initially brought against McCarthy by the investigating committee, only two withstood close scrutiny and had bipartisan support. These both related to his conduct as a senator and his treatment of his fellow senators. The first charge involved his treatment of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, which had conducted investigations of McCarthy in 1951 and 1952 and

ate session as a “lynch bee” in a nationwide television and radio show on November 7, 1954; in stating to the public press on November 13, 1954, that the chairman of the Select Committee (Mr. Watkins) was guilty of “the most unusual, most cowardly things I’ve ever heard of” and stating further: “I expected he would be afraid to answer the questions, but didn’t think he’d be stupid enough to make a public statement”; and in characterizing the said committee as the “unwitting handmaiden,” “involuntary agent” and “attorneys-in-fact” of the Communist Party and in charging that the said committee in writing its report “imitated Communist methods—that it distorted, misrepresented, and omitted in its effort to manufacture a plausible rationalization” in support of its recommendations to the Senate, which characterizations and charges were contained in a statement released to the press and inserted in the Congressional Record of November 10, 1954, acted contrary to senatorial ethics and tended to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute, to obstruct the constitutional processes of the Senate, and to impair its dignity; and such conduct is hereby condemned.

found him to be an uncooperative colleague. He had “repeatedly abused the subcommittee and its members who were trying to carry out assigned duties” and refused to cooperate with the “constitutional process of the Senate.” This was not in line with the character and tradition of the Senate, and therefore his colleagues condemned him. It is, perhaps, ironic that the man who made his name by forcing people to sit through long hearings to face personal attacks against them would ultimately be

Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy

censured for refusing to take his turn in front of a committee. The second charge was brought because of his egregious treatment of the investigating committee. It quoted McCarthy exhaustively and provided ample examples of disrespectful and abusive treatment of the committee and of Senator Watkins. He had described the committee as a “lynch-party” and accused them of “fraud” and “deception.” The bullying tactics that had silenced so many of McCarthy’s critics worked against him here, however, as his colleagues were unmoved by his accusations that they were working for the Communist government and using “Communist methods.” In the press, McCarthy had made characteristically vague and inflammatory accusations against Senator Watkins, who led the committee, saying only that the senator was guilty of “the most unusual, most cowardly things [McCarthy had] ever heard of.” In the end, the Senate and the nation had finally had enough. McCarthy was found to have “acted contrary to senatorial ethics and tended to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute,” and so he was censured. Essential Themes

The senatorial censure of Joseph McCarthy spelled the end of a period of hysterical accusations against suspected Communist sympathizers, who at the time seemed to be lurking around every corner. In 1950, the average American was willing to believe that the government had been infiltrated by Soviets and that the

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country would be brought down from within. McCarthy worked in rumor and suspicion, and chance meetings were considered enough evidence to ruin careers and lives. Standards of proof and constitutional protections were abandoned. As McCarthy became increasingly aggressive and vindictive, key figures in the press, most notably Edward R. Murrow, began to question his sources and methods. When McCarthy began to accuse key Army officers of treasonous allegiances, his popularity plummeted, and he was ultimately censured by the Senate, a serious punishment that spelled the end of his career. Though the widespread fear of Soviet infiltration was initially strong enough to allow Joseph McCarthy wide discretion in his accusations and effectively silence his critics, his Senate colleagues were finally able to bring an end to this dark period in American political history. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Fried, Richard M. Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print. Herman, Arthur. Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator. New York: Free, 2000. Print. Shogan, Robert. No Sense of Decency: The Army-McCarthy Hearings; A Demagogue Falls and Television Takes Charge of American Politics. Chicago: Dee, 2009. Print.

DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AM MERICAN HISTORY

(1945-1991)

DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The Cold War (1945-1991) Editor Michael Shally-Jensen, PhD

VOLUME 2

SALEM PRESS A Division of EBSCO Information Services Ipswich, Massachusetts

GREY HOUSE PUBLISHING

Copyright ©2016, by Salem Press, A Division of EBSCO Information Services, Inc., and Grey House Publishing, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. For permissions requests, contact [email protected]. ∞ The paper used in these volumes conforms to the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48 1992 (R2009).

Publisher’s Cataloging-In-Publication Data (Prepared by The Donohue Group, Inc.) Names: Shally-Jensen, Michael, editor. Title: The Cold War (1945-1991) / editor, Michael Shally-Jensen, PhD. Other Titles: Defining documents in American history (Salem Press) Description: [First edition]. | Ipswich, Massachusetts : Salem Press, a division of EBSCO Information Services ; [Amenia, New York] : Grey House Publishing, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: ISBN 978-1-61925-858-7 (set) | ISBN 978-1-68217-391-6 (vol. 1) | ISBN 978-1-68217-392-3 (vol. 2) Subjects: LCSH: Cold War--Sources. | United States--Politics and government--1945-1989--Sources. | United States--Foreign relations--Soviet Union--Sources. | Soviet Union--Foreign relations--United States--Sources. | World politics--1945-1989--Sources. Classification: LCC E813 .C65 2016 | DDC 973.918--dc23

FIRST PRINTING PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Table of Contents Publisher’s Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Editor’s Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

VOLUME 1 Postwar Cold War Potsdam Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Truman Doctrine Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Speech on the Marshall Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 “The Sources of Soviet Content” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Vyshinky’s Speech to the UN General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 NATO Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Memorandum on Lifting the Soviet Blockade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Dean Acheson on the “Loss” of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Atomic Explosion in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 International Control of Atomic Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Report to the American People on Korea and US Policy in the Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Statement by President Truman upon Signing the Mutual Security Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 A “New Look” at National Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 “Atoms for Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 Balkan Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138 President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 Baghdad Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 President Sukarno's Address at the Bandung Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 Warsaw Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 v

Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176 Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .186 Launching of the Sputnik Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195 Eisenhower on Science in National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .199 “Communism in the Americas” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206 Fidel Castro’s Speech at Twenty-One Nations Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 Nixon and Khrushchev: The Kitchen Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224

Red Scare Executive Order 9835 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233 Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241 Ronald Reagan’s Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .246 Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251 Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .256 Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Speech to the Republican Women's Club of Wheeling, West Virginia . . . . . . . .262 “Declaration of Conscience” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .266 Rosenberg Case Excerpts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272 In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .280 Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287

VOLUME 2

Escalation and Détente The U2 Spy-Plane—Excerpts of a Speech by Khrushchev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293 Eisenhower’s Farewell Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .298 Telegram from the US Mission in Berlin regarding the Sealing-off of East Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303 Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .307 JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311 JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316 vi

JFK: “A Strategy of Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .322 JFK: “Ich bin ein Berliner” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .329 Televised Interview with President Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .333 Limited Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339 On Alleged Soviet and Cuban Connections with Lee Harvey Oswald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .347 LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .351 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358 The “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .364 Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .368 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378 Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .384 Nuclear Accidents Measures Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .391 Documents Relating to Normalization of Relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China . . .395 Biological Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406 Jackson-Vanik Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .412 Helsinki Accords (Excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .416 Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .419 US Contingency Plans in Light of Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .426 Charter 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .431 SALT II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .436

End Game Documents Relating to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .443 CIA Cable on the Situation in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .448 Ronald Reagan's “Evil Empire” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .452 Able Archer ‘83: The Soviet “War Scare” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .459 Ronald Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .467 Ronald Reagan's “Tear Down This Wall” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .471 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .478 Mikhail Gorbachev's UN Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .490 US Embassy Cables Concerning the Crackdown on Tiananmen Square . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .498 Egon Krenz Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .503 Gorbachev’s Farewell Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .506

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Appendixes Chronological List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .513 Web Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .516 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .519 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .529

DEFINING DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The Cold War (1945-1991)

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or most of the 1950s, from Korea and McCarthyism to Sputnik and the Cuban Revolution, the person in the White House was Dwight D. Eisenhower. The two-term Republican may not have been the hardest of hardline Cold Warriors, yet as a former five-star general and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe he certainly was no slouch in that department, either. Near the very end of his presidential term, in January 1961, Eisenhower fairly shocked the nation by announcing that, yes, communism was a serious threat to all freedomloving peoples, but a potentially greater threat was the Cold War itself and its affect on US political economy. Eisenhower worried especially about the emergence of a “permanent armaments industry of vast proportions” and how it sucked up the nation’s capital and human talent. He felt that further expansion of the “militaryindustrial complex” could prove “disastrous” for American society in the long run. The incoming president, John F. Kennedy, had won a tight electoral contest against Eisenhower’s vice president, Richard M. Nixon, by warning of a marked “missile gap” between the United States and Russia. Kennedy claimed, falsely, that US nuclear stockpiles were behind those of the Soviets. He did little, therefore, to slow the advance of the American military-industrial complex and in fact added a major new component to it: a huge national aerospace program charged with landing, in the near future, an astronaut on the moon. Around this same time, in the early 1960s, Kennedy also faced a series of geopolitical crises. First, a Cuban group of anti-Castro forces, with backing from the CIA, planned but failed to overthrow the new Cuban leader with the disastrous Bay of Pigs landing (April 1961). Then, in the summer of that same year, leaders of communist East Germany, with Soviet backing, began sealing-off East Berlin from its western counterpart, presenting NATO and the American president with a dilemma over whether to respond militarily or not. (They did not do so, using rhetoric and diplomacy instead—to no avail.) Finally, in the most challenging situation of all, US intelligence sources discovered

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that the Soviet Union was moving nuclear missiles into Cuba (October 1962), causing Kennedy to respond by imposing a naval blockade. For several days, US-USSR tensions were extremely high and the threat of nuclear war seemed nearer than it had ever been. Fortunately for the world, Kennedy and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, arrived at an agreement whereby the Cuban missiles would be removed and the United States would pull back its own forward-deployed missiles in Turkey. Even the assassination of JFK a year later in Dallas gave rise to Cold War conspiracies. His American assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had lived in the Soviet Union for a while and tried to visit Cuba. Because Oswald himself was killed by a gunman while in police custody, the conspiracy theories never stopped coming. Undoubtedly the biggest Cold War debacle for the United States was the Vietnam War. Kennedy had followed on Eisenhower’s lead in supporting South Vietnam in its struggle against communist North Vietnam and communist elements inside South Vietnam. Kennedy provided military advisers and trainers along with arms. His successor, Lyndon Johnson, did more—much more—in an effort to end the conflict quickly so that he could focus on US domestic policy. Johnson was pleased to have wrangled a congressional declaration of war against North Vietnam in 1964 to enable him to send in American troops and launch a massive bombing campaign. Yet, four years later Johnson had achieved little in Vietnam and sacrificed much. He yielded the presidency and, following the elections of 1968, Richard Nixon assumed it. But Nixon, too, got bogged down in Vietnam, even as he tried to reset Cold War politics by opening up communications with China and sitting down with Soviet leaders to set limits on nuclear armaments. All the while, Nixon and his chief aide, Henry Kissinger, remained staunch anti-communists, conducting covert operations against perceived leftist threats (such as Chile’s Salvadore Allende) and supporting brutal military dictatorships (such as the one in Pakistan) if it served their purposes to do so. 291

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 The U2 Spy-Plane Incident—Excerpts of a Speech by Khrushchev Date: May 5, 1960 Author: Nikita Khrushchev Genre: speech Summary Overview

Aware that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had been conducting high-altitude spying missions over Soviet territory, Soviet Premier Khrushchev knew he could use the crash and capture of Captain Gary Powers’ U-2 spy jet on May 1, 1960 to embarrass the United States. Since President Dwight Eisenhower and the CIA did not know that the Soviets had Powers, they promulgated a cover story about a missing NASA weather craft. Then, a few days later, on May 5, 1960 Khrushchev set the political trap he was planning for the Americans by announcing a spy plane had been shot down, but not that the pilot was alive. The Americans, unaware that Khrushchev was keeping information about Captain Powers from them, continued with the NASA cover story, which in turn allowed Khrushchev to expose the United States’ covert actions. As a result, relations between the US and the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated: the hopefulness that characterized EastWest relations before the U-2 incident was no more. Defining Moment

The Cold War was not just a clash of political ideologies, but also a competition of technological prowess. When the Soviets initiated their space program and launched Sputnik into orbit in 1957, the Americans were at a loss. The missile that launched Sputnik into orbit was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): such a missile could deliver a nuclear warhead at great distances in a matter of moments, which meant that the United States no longer had two oceans for defense. The so-called “Sputnik crisis” instigated public fear and anxiety about what seemed to be a technological and defensive gap between the United States and Soviet Union. Startled by the threat of perceived Soviet technological advances, the United States began covert flights (also

called “overflights”) over Soviet territory to track missile development. In 1957, President Eisenhower requested from Pakistan the ability to establish an intelligence base near Peshawar. From this facility, the Americans set out the U-2 spy plane, a jet that could fly at altitudes thought to be inaccessible to Soviet fighter jets and missiles. Additionally, the CIA did not expect any pilot to be able to survive a crash, should a missile be able to hit. However, the Soviets were able to detect that American U-2 jets had invaded Soviet airspace on covert intelligence missions. On May 1, 1960 Captain Francis Gary Powers left on operation GRAND SLAM from Pakistan to photograph Soviet ICBM sites. A Soviet surface-to-air missile brought down Powers’ plane, and the pilot, who survived, was held in Soviet custody. The crash of Powers’ U-2 was fifteen days away from the scheduled Four Powers Summit. This was an infelicitous incident for the progress of the Cold War since the summit was to be the first conference attended by both Soviet and western leaders in five years. Nikita Khrushchev was upset by the U-2 crash: he had been promoting a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist bloc and was distressed to discover unimpeachable evidence of American mistrust. His speech on May 5, 1960 announced to the world that the Soviets had a U-2 spy plane, but did not reveal that the pilot of the craft survived. In doing this, Khrushchev began the trap to embarrass the United States, which would in turn give the Soviet Union the moral high ground on the global stage. Author Biography

Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) rose from humble beginnings to become premier of the Soviet Union from 1958 to1964. His leadership was a departure from Stalin: increased reform marked Khrushchev’s tenure. In a “secret speech” addressed to the 20th Congress

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of the Communist Party in 1956, Khrushchev condemned his predecessor’s purges and aggressive policies towards both capitalist and communist countries; instead, Khrushchev implemented de-Stalinization. The “Khrushchev Thaw” saw the rehabilitation of political prisoners, relaxed censorship laws, and a general advocacy of “peaceful coexistence” with countries of

the non-communist bloc. Although Khrushchev advocated moderation, his time in power saw some of the most serious tensions in foreign relations: revolutions in 1956 in Poland and Hungary, the failed Four Powers Summit in May 1960, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, which was the closest the Soviet Union and United States came to outright nuclear warfare.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT EXCERPTS OF SPEECH BY KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR ON MAY 5, 1960 per Izvestia May 6, 1960 In behalf of the Soviet Government I would like to inform you about aggressive activities which took place during the last few weeks on the part of the United States of America against the Soviet Union. These aggressive activities were demonstrated by the fact that the United States of America has sent their airplanes on missions for the purpose of spying on our country. These airplanes have crossed our State boundaries and invaded the Territory of the Soviet Union. We have earlier protested to the United States of America, the Security Council of the UN because of similar aggressive acts in the past. As a rule, the United States of America has denied any acts of aggression on their part, although the proof which they used to support their denial was not reliable. On the other hand when we have resisted such aggressive activities and the United States of America has suffered casualties in the form of destroyed airplanes, then they (the USA) have complained and delivered protests requiring that we, the Soviet Union, should compensate them for their losses. An aggressive act on the part of the United States of America took place on April 9, 1960. A US airplane had invaded the territory of our country from Afghanistan. Naturally not a single person could sanely suspect that this violation of our boundaries was made by Afghanistan, which is a friendly country as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. We are convinced that that plane belonged to the United States of America and obviously was based somewhere in the territory of Turkey, Iran or

Pakistan, which are bound to the United States by obligations imposed by the aggressive block of SENTO. When this invasion was accomplished some of our comrades had raised the question: Is it necessary to warn the United States of America? Such activities have in no way any relation with the negotiations between us and the President of the USA and other governmental officials of America, which took place during our visit to the United States. We have reached an agreement with the President of the USA on a Summit Meeting, and this meeting is supposed to take place very shortly. An aggressive invasion on the ter ritory of another country is a bad preparation for such a meeting. The purpose of a conference of heads of governments is to weaken international tension, to liquidate the state of a “cold war”, to stop an arms race, to agree on a complete and general disarmament, to regulate the question on a German peace treaty, West Berlin, and all other problems which disturb a normal peaceful co-existence of countries of various social and political structures. We have exchanged views on a governmental level and have decided in this case not to take any extraordinary steps, not to write notes or memorandums, because we know from experience that this will get us nowhere. Aggressive circles considering themselves stronger, act on the principle that the weaker will complain about the stronger, and the stronger will not pay any attention to it and continue their sudden activities. At that time we had strongly warned our military, particularly those persons which are responsible for the condition of the anti-aircraft defense of our country, that they should act decisively and should prevent lawless invasions by foreign planes of our territory. The American military, obviously, like lawlessness, as is shown by the incident of April 9, and they have

The U2 Spy-Plane Incident—Excerpts of a Speech by Khrushchev

decided to repeat their aggressive act. For this purpose the day was chosen which is festive to our people and to the workers of the world. May 1, which is the international holiday of brotherly solidarity of the working class. Early in the morning of that day, at 5:36 a. m. Moscow time, an American plane had crossed our boundary and had continued to fly deep into the Soviet territory. Our Minister of Defense had immediately reported to the government about this aggressive act. The answer of the government was: The aggressor knows what he is asking for when he is invading a foreign territory. If the aggressor remains unpunished, then new provocations will follow. Therefore we must act, we must shoot down the airplane. This assignment was carried out. The plane was shot down. After a preliminary investigation it appeared that the plane belonged to the United States of America, in spite of the fact that it did not carry any markings; these markings were covered with paint. At this moment, a commission of experts is studying all data which fell into our hands. It was established that this plane crossed the state boundaries of the Soviet Union either from Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan in the same manner as did the plane of April 9. And these countries are our “good neighbors”. After studying all materials, which are now in our possession, the Soviet Government will direct a strong protest to the United States of America and will warn them that if similar aggressive acts against our country continue to take place, we will be completely justified to answer such acts with means which we would find necessary to apply, in order to maintain the security of our country. I think that we will direct the most serious warning to all countries which make their territory available to the United States of America for aggressive activities against our country. We consider that such an incident as the one that took place on May 1st will draw the attention of all countries of the world since it is a very dangerous sign. Just imag-

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ine what would have happened if a Soviet plane would, for instance, appear over New York, Chicago, or Detroit and would continue to fly over these cities. What would have been the reaction of the United States of America? Officials of the United States of America have repeatedly made statements that American planes, equipped with hydrogen bombs, take off immediately when a foreign plane approaches and take a course in the direction of targets which were predetermined for each one of the bombers. This would have meant the beginning of a war. We would like to ask these American officials: If you have in mind to take such one-sided measures in case of an assumed aggression against your country, then why do you not think about the fact that we might reply with the same measures if a foreign plane would appear over our country and which would endanger the security of our homeland? Of course we have the same rights on the basis of which you would like to act in a similar case. I think that nobody doubts that we have the means to answer any attack. It is true that we have no sentry duty of bombers, but we have sentry rockets which will accurately and irrevocably reach the given mark and will act more truly and more reliably than sentry planes. I think we should, from this high tribune, warn those countries very seriously which make their territory available to aggressive forces and by the same token make it easy for these forces to act against us. It takes a long time for governments of such countries to understand that they are playing with fire, since our retaliation will be directed against these countries and they will be paying for the stupid activities of their governments which avail their territory to aggressive forces of other governments. The case with the American airplane which invaded our country, is very dangerous. Therefore we will present this question before the Security Council, in order to reach an end to aggressive activities on the part of the United States of America since such activities will lead to war.

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Document Analysis

Khrushchev’s speech announced to the world what the Soviets had suspected: extralegal spy planes from the United States had been encroaching within Soviet boundaries. This speech shows how Khrushchev was different from his predecessor, Stalin. Rather than use the U-2 incident as a cause for war, Khrushchev’s speech aims to win moral support for the Soviet cause by painting the United States as aggressors and the Soviet Union as peaceful. Ultimately, Khrushchev’s juxtaposition of the aggressive and careless United States against the peaceful and high-minded Soviet Union ties into goals elaborated in his “Secret Speech” in 1956. By painting the United States’ actions as paranoid, aggressive, and suspicious, the cause of communism would be recognized as a legitimate and advantageous form of government worldwide. To start, Khrushchev uses the word “aggressive” or “aggression” to characterize the United States’ actions nineteen times in these excerpts. The repetition of this word emphasizes that the practice of overflights is not just a surveillance tactic, but technically an invasion. He also shows that this aggression is symptomatic of United States’ foreign policy. “As a rule,” says Khrushchev, “the United States of America has denied any acts of aggression on their part, although the proof which they used to support their denial was not reliable.” Khrushchev’s speech, then, will provide reliable proof of the U.S.’s malice. In addition to this aggressiveness, Khrushchev stresses the extralegal nature of the overflights. He says, after detecting these flights, “The American military, obviously, like lawlessness, and they have decided to repeat their aggressive act.” The word “obviously” makes it seem as if the evidence is overwhelmingly on Khrushchev’s side. In this speech, the habit of aerial surveillance becomes a symbol of serious national flaws. On the contrary, Khrushchev depicts the Soviet Union as circumspect. Not only has the Soviet Union protested earlier incursions over Soviet airspace, but they are also refraining from using the U-2 incident as motivation for war. In light of these incursions on Soviet airspace, the Soviet Union has appealed to the United Nations and conducted negotiations with the Americans to no avail. The United States even had the temerity to fly over Soviet territory on an international holiday. Although Khrushchev wants to show the Soviet Union as a law-abiding country, he is clear to show that his nation is not weak. Regarding the repeated flights,

Khrushchev illustrates his government’s deliberation: “If the aggressor remains unpunished, then new provocations will follow. Therefore we must act, we must shoot down the airplane.” By this calculation, the United States did not leave any other option to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev also uses a hypothetical situation to show the difference between his country and the United States: planes equipped with hydrogen bombs take off any time a foreign plane approaches a target; why, then, should the Soviet Union not act in a similar way to protect its interests? Finally, Khrushchev shows that the disjunction between American aggression and Soviet peace may not continue. There is a possibility for the Soviet Union to react to American tactics in kind. “It takes a long time for governments of such countries to understand that they are playing with fire,” he says. Khrushchev shows in this speech that his policy of peaceful coexistence may not last if the non-socialist bloc continues to antagonize Soviet borders. Essential Themes

The U-2 incident defeated any hopes that the Soviet Union and the United States would cooperate in the near future. Khrushchev wanted Eisenhower to apologize for the spying missions and promise that they would stop; Eisenhower on the other hand refused to offer the apology Khrushchev wanted and urged the ratification of an “open skies” agreement that legitimized overflights. Instead of compromising at the summit in 1960, the two leaders departed on worse terms. The deteriorated relationship between the two countries resulted in more proxy wars in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. It would also not be until 1992 and after the fall of communism that the Americans, Russians, and other nations would come together and agree to the Treaty on Open Skies. This treaty, which became effective in 2002, has its roots in proposals made by Eisenhower to the Soviets in the 1950s for unarmed surveillance flights. The U-2 incident also had an effect on the development of US military technology. The loss of Powers’ jet and his subsequent confinement taught the CIA two things: they needed faster, more undetectable aircraft for surveillance and to eliminate the danger of losing a human pilot in enemy territory. It was, after all, Khrushchev’s reveal that Gary Powers still lived that doomed the CIA cover story about a lost weather plane. As a result, supersonic planes, spy satellites, and unmanned

The U2 Spy-Plane Incident—Excerpts of a Speech by Khrushchev

drones were developed. Drones in particular have become a popular military tool since their modern development. The Vietnam War was the first extensive use of drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; the popularity of drones has only continued in use by the United States in military conflict in the Middle East. Not only can drones provide surveillance like the U-2 of the 1950s and 60s, but they can be equipped with weapons to create a lethal and low-cost killing machine that can be operated from home territory. The fiasco of the U-2 crash compelled the United States to admit to the world the extent of secret surveillance, but the appeal of gathering intelligence through covert and increasingly lethal aerial means has not lessened at all in the intervening years. —Ashleigh Fata, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Beschloss, Michael R. Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair. New York: Faber & Faber, 1986. Print. Callanan, James. Covert Action in the Cold War: U.S. Policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010. Print. Donovan, James. Strangers on a Bridge: The Case of Colonel Abel and Francis Gary Powers. 1964. New York: Scribner, 2015. Print. Powers, Francis Gary and Curt Gentry. Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time. 1970. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004. Print.

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 Eisenhower’s Farewell Address Date: January 17, 1961 Author: Dwight D. Eisenhower Genre: speech Summary Overview

Dwight D. Eisenhower gave this speech at the end of his second term as president of the United States. He had held the nation’s highest office since 1953. Though he had overseen the development of military technology and capability beyond the imagining of previous generations, Eisenhower grew increasingly concerned about the power of the “military-industrial complex” he had helped to create. The nation’s wealth was being funneled into military contracts. He warned the people of the nation that they were in danger of losing free scientific thought, as universities were increasingly driven by government contracts and public policy was in danger of being controlled by a “scientific-technological elite.” Though the Cold War and the Soviet threat necessitated a powerful standing military and defensive infrastructure, Eisenhower warned that this powerful element could lead the nation away from the peaceful principles that it was supposed to protect. A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower warned that the nation must resist the deficit-spending, “live for today” mentality that the prosperity and youth of the age encouraged and be responsible also to future generations. Defining Moment

World War II essentially ended the belief by US officials that the best policy in international affairs was to remain isolated and neutral, positions that had been popular at the beginnings of both world wars. American public opinion and policy turned to a greatly expanded role in international affairs, and the president’s influence and power over foreign policy steadily grew, particularly under Eisenhower, who was a military hero in his own right. The driver for this was, in large part, the rise of aggressive Communism at the end of the war and the inability of a devastated European economy to recover on its own. Relations with the Soviet Union, an ally during the war, were deteriorating, and another ally, Winston Churchill, had warned that there was an “Iron Curtain” coming down between Eastern and

Western Europe. The ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States defined the next four decades in world history, as both sides endeavored to block the expansion and influence of the other. The Truman Doctrine of 1947, which pledged military support to contain the spread of Communism, led to an increase in the military budget the following year. In 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, and Communist rebels took control of China. The following year, the Korean War broke out, pitting the United States against the Communist North Koreans and their Chinese and Soviet allies. The events of 1949 and 1950 further entrenched the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, ensuring that the struggle for military and technological supremacy would continue. The military budget, and the role of the United States as the defender of the world against Communism, continued to grow until the end of the Korean War in 1953, the year that Eisenhower took office. Despite Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, which emphasized nuclear deterrents over maintaining a large traditional army, the military budget took up between 9 and 14 percent of the gross national product during his administration, averaging three times higher than in 1947. Though Eisenhower was not able to successfully curb military spending, and acknowledged that the Cold War necessitated a strong and swift defensive capability, he was never comfortable with the dedication of so much of the nation’s wealth and talent to weapons development and production. His “Chance for Peace” speech, in which he compared the cost of a bomber to the cost of schools and hospitals, and his farewell speech, in which he warned against the increasing power of the military-industrial complex, bookended a presidency in which military buildup seemed the only deterrent to the threat from the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower’s Farewell Address

Author Biography

Dwight David Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890. He was the third son of seven born, and when he was two years old, his parents moved to Abilene, Kansas. Eisenhower graduated from Abilene High School in 1909, and was accepted to West Point in 1911. He was an officer in the Army during World War I. He continued his military career after the war and became a brigadier general in 1941. Eisenhower commanded the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942. In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made Eisenhower supreme Allied commander in Europe, and he was in charge of the Allied

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forces that invaded occupied France on June 6, 1944, D-Day. After a postwar position as the military commander of occupied Germany, Eisenhower was named chief of staff of the Army, until becoming president of Columbia University in 1948. He was named supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1950, but retained the presidency of Columbia until 1953, when he became president of the United States. After serving a second term as president, Eisenhower retired to Pennsylvania. He died of congestive heart failure on March 28, 1969, and is buried on the grounds of the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Good evening, my fellow Americans. First, I should like to express my gratitude to the radio and television networks for the opportunities they have given me over the years to bring reports and messages to our nation. My special thanks go to them for the opportunity of addressing you this evening. Three days from now, after half century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor. This evening, I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen. Like every other—Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all. Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the nation. My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and finally to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years. In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the nation

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good, rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling—on my part—of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together. We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts, America is today the strongest, the most influential, and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America’s leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches, and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment. Throughout America’s adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace, to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among peoples and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension, or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt, both at home and abroad. Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insiduous [insidious] in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to

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be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment. Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defenses; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel. But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs, balance between the private and the public economy, balance between the cost and hoped for advantages, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable, balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual, balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress. Lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration. The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their Government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of threat and stress. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. Of these, I mention two only. A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Our military organization today bears little relation to that known of any of my predecessors in peacetime, or, indeed, by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make

swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States cooperations—corporations. Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet, we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved. So is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government. Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers. The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by

Eisenhower’s Farewell Address

Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society. Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society’s future, we— you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow. During the long lane of the history yet to be written, America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many fast frustrations—past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of disarmament—of the battlefield. Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent, I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lin-

Document Analysis

Eisenhower begins his farewell address by wishing the new president, John F. Kennedy, well, and reminding him that the American people expect him to work productively with Congress. He also looks back at his own long relationship with Congress, from his appointment to West Point as a young man to “intimate” years during

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gering sadness of war, as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years, I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight. Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road. So, in this, my last good night to you as your President, I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and in peace. I trust in that—in that—in that service you find some things worthy. As for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future. You and I, my fellow citizens, need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals. To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America’s prayerful and continuing aspiration: We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its few spiritual blessings. Those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibility; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; and that the sources—scourges of poverty, disease, and ignorance will be made [to] disappear from the earth; and that in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love. Now, on Friday noon, I am to become a private citizen. I am proud to do so. I look forward to it. Thank you, and good night.

and after the war, to “mutual interdependence” during his presidency. He is grateful for the work they have accomplished together. The people of the United States are justifiably proud of their “pre-eminence” in the world, despite all of the upheaval and wars of the twentieth century, but Eisenhower changes the tone of the speech at this point. The

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United States must not measure success by material gain alone, but by its contributions to “world peace and human betterment.” Eisenhower identifies a primary purpose of the United States as the keeping of peace “between nations,” and the support of freedom among its people. To turn away from this purpose because of the current state of the world would be a grievous error. The goals of freedom and peace are threatened by Communism, the “hostile ideology” that poses a danger of “indefinite duration.” It is tempting to think that in an era of amazing scientific and technological advances, the world’s problems can be solved through “spectacular and costly action,” but this is a trap. Eisenhower reminds Americans that what they are most in need of is not spectacular technological power, but balance. The continuous growth of the military and weapons technology has dangerously tilted the scales away from the private, individual economy toward public spending, and toward immediate action versus sustained long-term growth. There is no question that the military is needed to keep the peace, Eisenhower says, and that the military must be well armed and able to respond immediately. However, the military has evolved out of necessity into something never before seen in American history, he adds. Whereas in the past, weapons were made as needed, and then those industries converted to peacetime use, Eisenhower notes that there is now a standing armament industry with no peacetime purpose outside of defense. Indeed, the defense industry is a larger sector of the economy than “the net income of all United States corporations.” Where there is money, there is power, he reminds his listeners. The influence of the defense industries, the “military-industrial complex,” is “economic, political, even spiritual.” In addition, the role of science and technology in the defense industry has necessitated that research universities work closely with the government. The free-thinking scholars of the past are replaced with government employees working on military contracts. Eisenhower does not offer an alternative to this, just a warning. The citizens of the United States must be on guard, to ensure that “security and liberty may prosper together,” and they must focus on the future, providing fiscal stability for future generations.

Essential Themes

In 2011, fifty years after this speech was given, President Eisenhower’s granddaughter Susan published an article in the Washington Post arguing that the world had failed to heed the warning in her grandfather’s final speech. The nation was spending beyond its means, she argued, and the post-9/11 military budget had grown to a staggering $700 billion, an amount that was equivalent to spending during World War II. Eisenhower’s speech has been quoted and discussed at length since it was given, particularly its caution against allowing the power of the military-industrial complex to grow unchecked and its concern that defense spending would place future economic stability at risk. Eisenhower intended his speech to inform primarily the administration that followed his, but during the Kennedy administration, military spending did not drop appreciably. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations dealt with the same difficult decisions that Eisenhower did, and the US involvement between North and South Vietnam prompted another jump in the budget, pushing spending to nearly 10 percent of GDP in 1968. By 1970, defense spending began to decline as a percentage of the US economy, but it remained the largest single expenditure of the federal government until surpassed by Social Security in 1976. Defense industries remain a powerful lobby, and the debate over how to cut defense spending without compromising the security of the United States continues. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower, Vol. II: The President. New York: Simon, 1984. Print. Eisenhower, Susan. “Fifty Years Later, We’re Still Ignoring Ike’s Warning.” Washington Post. Washington Post, 16 Jan. 2011. Web. Thomas, Evans. Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World. New York: Little, 2012. Print. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1993. Print.

Telegram from the US Mission in Berlin regarding the Sealing-off of East Berlin

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 Telegram from the US Mission in Berlin regarding the Sealing-off of East Berlin Date: August 16, 1961 Author: Edwin Allan Lightner, Jr. Genre: Memorandum, Report Summary Overview

At the end of World War II both the German nation and its capital, Berlin, were divided into four occupation zones by the victorious allies: the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. As the wartime alliance gave way to the Cold War, the city of Berlin was divided into a Soviet-controlled eastern sector and US, British and French-controlled western sector. West Berlin was a democratic enclave 110 miles within communist East Germany and was supplied via land and air corridors by the United States and its allies from West Germany. At a tense meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy in Vienna, Austria, in June 1961, the Soviet Premier presented a six-month ultimatum regarding the situation in Berlin, demanding that by then allied troops must leave the western sector. In a televised address on July 25, Kennedy reasserted that the allies were in West Berlin to stay and announced increased draft calls, the activation of 150,000 reserves, increased military spending, and an accelerated fallout shelter (civil defense) program. Fear of potential nuclear war hung in the air. Faced with a growing exodus of Germans from East to West Berlin, on August 13, 1961 the East Germans began erecting a barrier between the eastern and western halves of the city that would soon become the Berlin Wall, one of the starkest symbols of the Cold War division of Europe. Defining Moment

From the beginning of the Cold War, Berlin was a hotspot. In 1948, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin attempted to force the US, UK, and French troops out of West Berlin by imposing a land blockade of the western sectors. This led to the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift in which the cut-off citizens and allied troops of West Berlin were supplied by planes for over a year before Stalin lifted the blockade. In 1949 West Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and was integrated

into the US-led military alliance NATO. That same year East Germany became the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which in 1955 became part of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. The perceived threat of NATO troops deep inside the communist Eastern Bloc, as well as the higher standard of living and greater freedom in West Berlin, became a thorn in the side of the Soviet Union and East Germany. The unflattering contrast between West and East Berlin became more apparent when an East Berlin workers’ revolt in 1953 was crushed by Soviet troops. Nevertheless, the citizens of Berlin remained generally free to move back and forth across the eastern and western zones of the city. This relative ease of movement led to a steady stream of East Germans, especially skilled professionals, leaving East Berlin for a better life in West Berlin (many later moving to West Germany proper). The exodus reached over 15,000 per month by early 1961. Since 1949 the population of East Germany had declined by two million, and this “brain drain” threatened the East German economy and became a propaganda coup for the capitalist nations of Western Europe. In 1958, what has become known as the “Berlin Crisis” began when Soviet Premier Khrushchev started agitating for the removal of NATO forces from West Berlin and President Dwight Eisenhower reaffirmed the allies’ determination to remain. Although the Warsaw Pact had superiority in conventional forces, NATO relied on US nuclear superiority to deter a Soviet move on West Berlin. At a confrontational meeting between a blustering Khrushchev and an inexperienced Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, the Soviet chief issued an ultimatum for the United States, Britain, and France to remove their forces from West Berlin within six months. At that time he declared he would sign an official peace treaty with

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the GDR turning control over all of Berlin to it. Kennedy’s defiant address of July 25 elevated the Berlin Crisis to a major Cold War showdown. On August 13 Soviet troops took up positions throughout East Berlin as their East German allies began erecting barriers dividing the city. At this point, the head of the US diplomatic mission in Berlin, Allan Lightner, sent an alarming telegram to the US State Department that put the worst possible interpretation on the Soviet moves, seeing them not as a disguised Soviet retreat from earlier positions but rather as a prelude to more aggressive action. On August 18, the East Germans began building the wall.

Author Biography

Edwin Allan Lightner Jr. was born in New York City in 1907. He graduated from Princeton University with a degree in history in 1930 and directly began his long career as a Foreign Service Officer. Lightner served in 18 countries in four continents including as ambassador to Libya, 1963-5. As head of the US mission in Berlin, Lightner played an important role in the 1962 exchange of Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf I. Abel for downed American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers at the “Bridge of Spies.” In 1961 he was an important figure during the showdown that led to the construction of the Berlin Wall. He was married to Dorothy Boyce with whom he had two sons and a daughter. Lightner died on September 15, 1990.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Berlin, August 16, 1961, 8 p.m. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Following is our estimate present situation. As result increased refugee flow and related Communist prestige loss, SED regime with specific approval of Soviets and other Warsaw Pact countries has taken drastic control action to prevent entry their own people to West Berlin. Seal-off SovZone and East Berlin from West Berlin by military and police action has torn completely asunder residual web of one city fabric and of Four-Power status Berlin. Such closure boundary around West Berlin was doubtless contemplated by East as one consequence of separate peace treaty with GDR. Timing of action was apparently altered by internal GDR pressures. Increased refugee flow forced Sov/GDR hand and action of direct brute force has created a fait accompli. Well planned and abundantly accoutered with a massive display of military and police power, action was initially unqualifiedly successful and continues thus far successful so far as population East Germany or Berlin reaction is concerned, not to mention overall Western reaction. It appears to us that there are two alternative interpretations of significance of events past 4 days: 1) Since Sovs/GDR have attained by direct action

such important desiderata from their standpoint, it might be argued that it should be easier hence to negotiate with them an interim solution concerning West Berlin. Clear as it was before, it should now be crystal-clear that there is no possibility whatsoever of effective negotiations now with the Sovs concerning a broad all-German settlement which would of itself take care of the Berlin problem. Having thus already obtained such important results by last Sunday’s actions, Sovs/GDR may be more “reasonable” in negotiations on other aspects of a possible Berlin arrangement. 2) On other hand, it may be argued that if Sovs/GDR are able to “get away” with this fait accompli, other similar actions may be undertaken by them prior to any negotiations and they may be even more demanding in such negotiations. Having taken such a big slice of salami and successfully digested it, with no hindrance, they may be expected to snatch further pieces greedily. Sovs/GDR want to absorb West Berlin, drive out Western Allies, and break down German national resistance. They made a big step toward these objectives last Sunday on EastWest Berlin sector line. Their apparent success will encourage them to take further steps. We believe second alternative is proper interpretation of significance of past few days’ events here.

Telegram from the US Mission in Berlin regarding the Sealing-off of East Berlin

Threatening and arrogant utterances of Sov/GDR leaders since Vienna meeting, as well as their actions, would tend to support second alternative. From local standpoint, we are impressed by how even within a few days one direct action is being followed by another. While the initial action Sunday was directed almost exclusively to control of the movement of SovZone and East Berlin residents, already the East Germans have been introducing regulations and practical measures having the effect of drastically controlling and restricting the movement of West Berliners into East Berlin (ref Berlin’s 200 Dept).2We anticipate renewal of last fall’s effort to control entry of Allied personnel into East Berlin. Two Mission cars had difficulties today. We also note arrogant tone ofSov Commandant’s reply to Western Commandants’ protest of Aug 3 concerning bordercrossers (Berlin’s 212 Dept, 185 Bonn). If our view as to proper interpretation is correct, it means we have now entered phase of actual practical confrontation with Sovs on Berlin, that we have moved out of phase of confrontation, by words and threats and into phase of deeds. If so, it is highly doubtful whether it can possibly suffice to reply to deeds with words of protestation. What actions should West then take to meet this situation? Suspension of issuance of TTDs we have already recommended (Berlin’s 207 Dept, 180 Bonn); economic countermeasures likewise we believe should be instituted at once (Berlin’s 211 Dept, 184 Bonn);5 Western travel into SovZone should be discouraged so far as possible and Western participation in SovZone sports and cultural events should be prohibited, to match restrictions on East German participation in Western events which follows from TTD ban. There may be other countermeasures which should also be applied, but we here

Document Analysis

The telegram begins by accurately assessing the immediate cause for the barriers going up: “Increased refugee flow forced Sov/GDR hand and action of direct brute force…” Lightner’s telegram, it is important to note, came after the East Germans and Soviets set up barbed wire and other barriers dividing the city but before the actual construction of the wall began. This is significant because the construction of a more permanent wall

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have not been privy to detailed discussions of possible countermeasures. However, what is important is purpose of these measures. Is their purpose to slapSov/GDR on the wrist for what they have done? Or is it our purpose by strong counteractions to endeavor to indicate to them by deeds the grave consequences of continuation on their part of their current aggressive policy with respect to Berlin? Briefly, our countermeasures should seek to have a deterrent effect. To have a deterrent effect, countermeasures must not be calculated to fit the violation, but must to a certain extent overshoot the mark. We recognize risk that countermeasures which seek to be deterrent may in turn bring on other Sov/GDR countermeasures. We believe this risk has to be borne. Abrogation of IZT by FedRep last Sept in response to GDR Sept 8 decree was a countermeasure which overshot the mark and hence had a deterrent effect, albeit for only a year. The Sovs/ GDR have now resumed the encroachment program they interrupted last fall; it may be that our countermeasures will lead them to take other measures sooner than expected. However, that did not happen last fall and if we take totally ineffectual measures they will be encouraged to take further steps faster. Seal-off of West Berlin has already changed status quo in Communist favor in a way that strengthens their bargaining position in negotiations. It has already weakened effect we hoped to derive from Western military preparations announced by President on July 25. Assuming as we do that negotiations on Berlin will still take place, it is important that our bargaining position be not further weakened by our failure to take impressive countermeasures that will be clearly and widely recognized as such. Lightner

suggested a possible Soviet acceptance of the current status quo in Berlin, meaning a war might be averted. This, however, was unclear at the time Lightner sent his telegram, and the ambassador viewed the bold move by the Soviets and East Germans as a possible prelude to further action designed to drive the allies out of West Berlin. Lightner outlines “two alternative interpretations” of the recent communist moves. The first was that the So-

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viets had abandoned the idea of claiming all Berlin and would be easier to negotiate with (over time, that interpretation proved closer to the truth.) He framed the second and more ominous alternative colorfully: “Having taken such a big slice of salami and successfully digested it, with no hindrance, they may be expected to snatch further pieces greedily. Sov/GDR want to absorb West Berlin, drive out Western Allies, and break down German national resistance.” Lightner argues for the second interpretation and asserts that instead of responding incrementally and proportionally to Soviet actions, the United States should react stronger than might be expected to send a deterrent message. He writes, “To have a deterrent effect, countermeasures must not be calculated to fit the violation, but must to a certain extent overshoot the mark.” Essential Themes

Kennedy ended up exercising restraint in the coming months. The construction of an actual wall suggested a possible way out of the impasse over Berlin and, although it seemed to lessen the prospect of war over the divided city, it did confine to communist East Germany those citizens who longed to seek freedom in the West. Before the Berlin Wall came down on June 4, 1989, symbolizing the end of the Cold War, over 5,000 East Germans had made dangerous escapes to the West and 136 were killed by East German guards in the attempt. Berlin remained a source of potential war throughout the year following the summer of 1961. In the fall the Soviets resumed nuclear testing, ending a moratorium of several years and the United States soon followed suit. Meanwhile, Lightner played a central role in a dramatic confrontation in Berlin in October 1961. The Four Power Agreement on Berlin had given all occupying powers the right to travel through each others’ zones. On a trip to the East Berlin Opera with his wife, Lightner was stopped by East German police and asked for identification. Not recognizing the right of the East

Germans to do so, Lightner returned with US military police who escorted him through the check point. The new dispute over access rights to the eastern half of the city led General Lucius Clay to position US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie on October 27 and 28, to which the Soviets responded in kind. Each side’s tanks faced off only 100 yards from each other. The standoff was slowly de-escalated as each side gradually backed their tanks away yards at a time over the course of hours. The Berlin Wall became a symbol of the Cold War and the site of historic US presidential speeches. In the summer of 1963, President Kennedy visited Berlin and was welcomed by cheering crowds. There he declared: “There are many people in the world who really don’t understand… what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin.” In 1987, President Ronald Reagan spoke at the Wall and challenged Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev: “General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” —Robert Surbrug, PhD Bibliography and Additional Readings

Dallek, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963. New York: Back Bay Books, 2003. Print. Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. Print. Kempe, Frederick. Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. New York: Penguin Books, 2011. Print.

Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana

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 Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana Date: February 4, 1962 Author: Fidel Castro Genre: speech Summary Overview

When Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro delivered this speech in February 1962, relations between the United States and Cuba had deteriorated precipitously. The leader of Cuba since ousting the nation’s former dictator, Fulgencio Batista, in 1959, Castro had first declared that he was not a Communist and had made overtures to the United States. These were not well received by the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which considered him a dangerous radical. After the botched Bay of Pigs episode in 1961, in which CIA-backed anti-Castro rebels failed to rally support against them, Castro moved rapidly toward Communism, declaring Cuba a socialist state in April 1961, and stating publically that he was a MarxistLeninist in December. Cuba was suspended from the Organization of American States in January 1962, and Castro delivered this speech shortly after, calling on Latin American states to overthrow the United States. In response, the United States imposed a full economic embargo on Cuba, driving Castro further into league with the Soviet Union. Defining Moment

The island nation of Cuba has had a complex relationship with the United States throughout its history. First claimed by Christopher Columbus in 1492, Cuba was a Spanish colony until 1898, though Havana was briefly occupied by the British in 1762 and then exchanged for Florida. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States invested heavily in sugar, tobacco, and mining interests in Cuba, whose position off the Florida coast made the country an ideal trade partner. In 1881, the US secretary of state James G. Blaine noted that Cuba was “part of the American commercial system.” Primarily because of these economic interests, the United States was heavily involved in the Cuban War of Independence from 1895 to 1898. Cuban revolution-

ary leader José Martí gathered significant support for Cuban independence while living in the United States, and warships were sent to Havana in 1898 to end the subsequent civil war. The Spanish army left Cuba for the last time in December 1898, and the United States assumed control of Cuba on January 1, 1899. Though the United States had been eager to assist Cuba in gaining independence, it also wanted to protect its economic interests. A temporary government was put in place, headed by Americans, and foreign investment in the nation reached an all-time high, while policies favorable to the United States were put in place. In 1902, with a friendly candidate in place, Tomás Estrada Palma, the United States handed over control of Cuba, with the stipulation that the United States had a right to intervene militarily in Cuba, a right that it exercised repeatedly to ensure that Cuba remained in reliably pro-American hands. By the 1930s, Cuba had loosened its ties to the United States and initiated a series of reforms that gave greater autonomy to the island. In 1940, Fulgencio Batista won the presidency in a free election, but in 1952, after being out of office for eight years, he staged a coup, setting himself up as a dictator. Castro was involved in one of many revolts against Batista and was captured and sentenced to prison in 1953. He was released in 1955, and after exile in Mexico, he returned to Cuba and began guerrilla attacks on Batista’s forces. Other rebel groups joined Castro, and by 1958, the nation was in full civil war. Batista fled Cuba in January 1959. After consolidating his power among the nation’s rebel groups, Castro took control of Cuba. The United States, which had supported Batista during the revolution, was initially willing to work with Castro’s government and sent a new ambassador to Havana. Relations quickly soured, however, as Castro nationalized land and industry, appropriating assets owned by US com-

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panies. In response, the United States severed diplomatic ties in January 1961, and engineered the ouster of Cuba from the Organization of American States in January 1962. On February 7, 1962, the United States banned all trade with Cuba, after the Second Declaration of Havana, in which Castro called on all Central and South American countries to revolt against the United States. Author Biography

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was born on August 13, 1926, near Biran, Cuba. He was the son of a wealthy Spanish sugar farmer. His father was married but had a second family with one of his servants, Castro’s mother. The pair had seven children and later married when Castro was a teenager. Despite his illegitimate birth, Castro was educated at Jesuit boarding schools, reserved for the island’s elites. Although intellectually bright, Castro was more interested in athletic pursuits

in school. While attending El Colegio de Belén, he pitched for the school baseball team. In 1945, Castro entered the law school of the University of Havana, where he was first exposed to the ideas of Cuban nationalism and socialism. In 1947, he took part in a failed coup to oust Rafael Trujillo, the leader of the Dominican Republic. In 1950, Castro graduated from law school and opened a private law practice, pursuing a seat in the Cuban parliament. However, the 1952 election was canceled when General Batista’s coup returned the onetime leader to power. Castro was involved in a failed insurrection against Batista in 1953 that made him a national hero. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison but was released in 1955. After prolonged guerrilla warfare, the Batista government collapsed in 1959, and Castro was named prime minister. In 1976, he became the president. In 2008, he handed over power to his brother Raúl.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT What is Cuba’s history but that of Latin America? What is the history of Latin America but the history of Asia, Africa, and Oceania? And what is the history of all these peoples but the history of the cruelest exploitation of the world by imperialism? At the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, a handful of economically developed nations had divided the world among themselves subjecting two thirds of humanity to their economic and political domination Humanity was forced to work for the dominating classes of the group of nations which had a developed capitalist economy. The historic circumstances which permitted certain European countries and the United States of North America to attain a high industrial development level put them in a position which enabled them to subject and exploit the rest of the world. What motives lay behind this expansion of the industrial powers? Were they moral, “civilizing” reasons, as they claimed? No. Their motives were economic. The discovery of America sent the European conquerors across the seas to occupy and to exploit the lands and peoples of other continents; the lust for riches was the basic motivation for their conduct. America’s discov-

ery took place in the search for shorter ways to the Orient, whose products Europe valued highly. A new social class, the merchants and the producers of articles manufactured for commerce, arose from the feudal society of lords and serfs in the latter part of the Middle Ages. The lust for gold promoted the efforts of the new class. The lust for profit was the incentive of their behavior throughout its history. As industry and trade developed, the social influence of the new class grew. The new productive forces maturing in the midst of the feudal society increasingly clashed with feudalism and its serfdom, its laws, its institutions, its philosophy, its morals, its art, and its political ideology.. . . Since the end of the Second World War, the Latin American nations are becoming pauperized constantly. The value of their capita income falls. The dreadful percentages of child death rate do not decrease, the number of illiterates grows higher, the peoples lack employment, land, adequate housing, schools, hospitals, communication systems and the means of subsistence. On the other hand, North America investments exceed l0 billion dollars. Latin America, moreover, supplies cheap raw materials and pays high prices for manufactured articles. Like

Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana

the first Spanish conquerors, who exchanged mirrors and trinkets with the Indians for silver and gold, so the United States trades with Latin America. To hold on to this torrent of wealth, to take greater possession of America’s resources and to exploit its long-suffering peoples: this is what is hidden behind the military pacts, the military missions and Washington’s diplomatic lobbying. . . . Wherever roads are closed to the peoples, where repression of workers and peasants is fierce, where the domination of Yankee monopolies is strongest, the first and most important lesson is to understand that it is neither just nor correct to divert the peoples with the vain and fanciful illusion that the dominant classes can be uprooted by legal means which do not and will not exist. The ruling classes are entrenched in all positions of state power. They monopolize the teaching field. They dominate all means of mass communication. They have

Document Analysis

Castro begins his speech by aligning Cuba with not only Latin America but also “Asia, Africa, and Oceania,” parts of the world that he states have been subjected throughout history to imperial exploitation. He offers a brief historical perspective on how a “handful of economically developed nations” have been able to exploit two-thirds of the world’s population for their own ruthless economic ends. The United States and a few European nations have been the offenders, he says, taking economic advantage of the rest of the world under the guise of “civilizing” it. Castro traces this development to Spanish conquest, when the “lust for riches” drove European nations across the world, bringing their feudal hierarchies with them. The feudal peasantry may have transformed over time into the exploited working class, but the motivation at the heart of the US relationship with Latin American is the same lust for profit, Castro explains. Throughout his speech, Castro compares the brutal Spanish subjugation of indigenous people of the Americas with the contemporary relationship between the United States and Latin America. Just as the Spanish exchanged worthless “trinkets” for “silver and gold,” the United States exploits Latin American countries, taking

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infinite financial resources. Theirs is a power which the monopolies and the ruling few will defend by blood and fire with the strength of their police and their armies. The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution. We know that in America and throughout the world the revolution will be victorious. But revolutionaries cannot sit in the doorways of their homes to watch the corpse of imperialism pass by. The role of Job does not behoove a revolutionary. Each year by which America’s liberation may be hastened will mean millions of children rescued from death, millions of minds, freed for learning, infinitudes of sorrow spared the peoples. Even though the Yankee imperialists are preparing a bloodbath for America they will not succeed in drowning the people’s struggle. They will evoke universal hatred against themselves. This will be the last act of their rapacious and caveman system. . . .

their natural resources and raw materials through unbalanced trade deals and defending their right to do so with military pacts that are only to the advantage of the United States. Meanwhile, Castro states, the citizens of these countries suffer from poor health care, high infant mortality, and crushing poverty. Castro argues there is no point trying to combat this colossus through legal means. The “ruling class,” supported by the United States, will never give up power. He states that the power must be taken from them by force and that doing so is not a passive process. When the United States is overthrown, it will mean “millions of children rescued from death.” Castro ends his speech on an ominous note, as he warns that the United States is preparing a “bloodbath,” which will be the last act of the “rapacious and caveman system.” Essential Themes

The inflamed rhetoric of the Second Declaration of Cuba was not lost on the United States, already convinced of the danger posed by its Cuban neighbor. On the other hand, Castro had good reason to be enraged. In 1961, the United States had supported a disastrous coup attempt launched at the Bay of Pigs, aimed at overthrowing Castro and justifying US military inter-

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vention in Cuba. Since relations with the United States were irretrievably damaged, Castro turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for economic support and defense. Castro believed, rightly, that the United States was prepared to use military force to unseat his government. The Soviet Union offered a deterrent to another Cuban invasion that also achieved the Soviets’ goal of placing missiles within easy striking range of the United States. It would place missiles in Cuba, a move that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev felt was justified because of the Jupiter missiles the United States had placed in Turkey, near the Russian border. When a US spy plane identified and photographed the missile base in Cuba just before the missiles themselves arrived, President John F. Kennedy demanded their removal. After several days of international tension, an incident known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles. For its part, the United States vowed not to invade Cuba and also offered a secret promise

to remove its missiles in Turkey. After more than fifty years, the United and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations in 2015. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Erikson, Daniel P. The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution. New York: Bloomsbury, 2008. Print. Matthews, Herbert Lionel. Fidel Castro. New York: Simon, 1969. Print. Renwick, Danielle, and Brianna Lee. “US-Cuba Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations. CFR, 4 Aug. 2015. Web. Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton, 1965. Print Staten, Clifford L. The History of Cuba. Westport: Greenwood, 2003. Print.

JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon”

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 JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon” Date: September 12, 1962 Author: John F. Kennedy Genre: speech Summary Overview

President John F. Kennedy gave this speech in support of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s newly created Apollo program on September 12, 1962, at Rice University in Houston, Texas. As part of the campaign, Kennedy also visited Houston’s Manned Spacecraft Center (later renamed the Johnson Space Center), the Launch Operations Center in Florida (later known as the Kennedy Space Center), and the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, all sites that were crucial to the Apollo program’s success. This speech, made during the height of the Cold War, explained why he believed that NASA should be fully funded and urged Americans to embrace a new era of space exploration and technological innovation that would return the United States to its primary place in the “space race” with the Soviet Union, which had been first to achieve major milestones in space those first years. The moon had become the ultimate prize, and Americans were increasingly concerned that the Soviets would get there first, delivering a serious blow to US prestige. The race to the moon was not only a contest for supremacy in space, but a display of military technology and the victory of a social and political worldview. Defining Moment

The “space race” between the Soviet Union and the United States can be traced to the end of World War II. In 1944, near the end of the war, Germany launched successful attacks on England and Belgium with longrange ballistic missiles. Their V-2 rocket was also the first artificial object to pass the Kármán line, the boundary between Earth’s atmosphere and outer space, 100 kilometers (62 miles) above sea level. The V-2 was captured by the United States at the end of World War II, and many of the scientists who had worked on it were brought back to the United States and ultimately employed at NASA. The Soviet Union also captured key

V-2 manufacturing bases and personnel. These rockets were developed less as a way to explore space than as a means of delivering a nuclear weapon to an enemy, but the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik 1 and the space race that followed would not have been possible without this rocket technology. The Soviet launch of the artificial satellite Sputnik 1 on October 4, 1957, was an unpleasant surprise to the United States, and was greeted with a mixture of jealousy and fear. The Soviet Union had proven that it had a significant technological advantage over the United States, and many Americans feared that this satellite and the superior rocket that had carried it could be used to carry deadly weapons right to their doorstep. By the time the United States launched its first satellite, Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958, the Soviet Union had already successfully launched Sputnik 2, which carried a dog into space. Suddenly, the space race took on critical importance in the United States, as the confidence of the nation in its military and scientific prowess was badly shaken. President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed an order later that year that created NASA, a federal agency devoted to space exploration. However, the Soviet Union launched Luna 2 in 1959, the first space probe to land on the moon, and on April 12, 1961, Soviet Yuri A. Gagarin became the first human to enter space when he orbited Earth in the capsule Vostok 1. While the United States put astronaut Alan Shepard into space on May 5, 1961, it would be another nine months before an American, John Glenn, would orbit the earth. Kennedy made landing an American on the moon a national priority when he proposed the idea to Congress on May 25, 1961. This goal was realized in 1969, less than six years after he was assassinated.

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Author Biography

John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on May 29, 1917. He was the second of nine children in a prominent Irish Catholic family. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was a successful banker who also served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and as ambassador to Great Britain. Kennedy attended the Choate School and graduated from Harvard University in 1940, joining the Navy after college. Though he was seriously injured when his PT boat was sunk by a Japanese destroyer in 1943, Kennedy famously helped to rescue the survivors. After

returning from the war, he served in the US House of Representatives for six years and then earned a seat in the US Senate in 1953. In 1955, he wrote the Pulitzer Prize–winning book Profiles in Courage. He became the first Roman Catholic president of the United States and the youngest in its history in 1960. While in office, Kennedy took action on civil rights and combating poverty, founding the Peace Corps. He also narrowly avoided confrontations with the Soviet Union in Berlin and Cuba. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and was buried at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT President Pitzer, Mr. Vice President, Governor, Congressman Thomas, Senator Wiley, and Congressman Miller, Mr. Webb, Mr. Bell, scientists, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen: I appreciate your president having made me an honorary visiting professor, and I will assure you that my first lecture will be very brief. I am delighted to be here and I’m particularly delighted to be here on this occasion. We meet at a college noted for knowledge, in a city noted for progress, in a State noted for strength, and we stand in need of all three, for we meet in an hour of change and challenge, in a decade of hope and fear, in an age of both knowledge and ignorance. The greater our knowledge increases, the greater our ignorance unfolds. Despite the striking fact that most of the scientists that the world has ever known are alive and working today, despite the fact that this Nation’s own scientific manpower is doubling every 12 years in a rate of growth more than three times that of our population as a whole, despite that, the vast stretches of the unknown and the unanswered and the unfinished still far outstrip our collective comprehension. No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if you will, the 50,000 years of man1s recorded history in a time span of but a half a century. Stated in these terms, we know very little about the first 40 years, except at the end of them advanced man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover them. Then about 10 years ago, under this standard, man

emerged from his caves to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man learned to write and use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less than two years ago. The printing press came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50-year span of human history, the steam engine provided a new source of power. Newton explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and telephones and automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last week did we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, and now if America1s new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight. This is a breathtaking pace, and such a pace cannot help but create new ills as it dispels old, new ignorance, new problems, new dangers. Surely the opening vistas of space promise high costs and hardships, as well as high reward. So it is not surprising that some would have us stay where we are a little longer to rest, to wait. But this city of Houston, this State of Texas, this country of the United States was not built by those who waited and rested and wished to look behind them. This country was conquered by those who moved forward—and so will space. William Bradford, speaking in 1630 of the founding of the Plymouth Bay Colony, said that all great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage. If this capsule history of our progress teaches us any-

JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon”

thing, it is that man, in his quest for knowledge and progress, is determined and cannot be deterred. The exploration of space will go ahead, whether we join in it or not, and it is one of the great adventures of all time, and no nation which expects to be the leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in the race for space. Those who came before us made certain that this country rode the first waves of the industrial revolutions, the first waves of modern invention, and the first wave of nuclear power, and this generation does not intend to founder in the backwash of the coming age of space. We mean to be a part of it—we mean to lead it. For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the moon and to the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding. Yet the vows of this Nation can only be fulfilled if we in this Nation are first, and, therefore, we intend to be first. In short, our leadership in science and in industry, our hopes for peace and security, our obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us to make this effort, to solve these mysteries, to solve them for the good of all men, and to become the world’s leading space-faring nation. We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people. For space science, like nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war. I do not say the we should or will go unprotected against the hostile misuse of space any more than we go unprotected against the hostile use of land or sea, but I do say that space can be explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours. There is no strife, no prejudice, no national conflict in outer space as yet. Its hazards are hostile to us all. Its conquest deserves the best of all mankind, and its opportunity for peaceful cooperation many never come again. But why, some say, the moon? Why choose this as

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our goal? And they may well ask why climb the highest mountain? Why, 35 years ago, fly the Atlantic? Why does Rice play Texas? We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others, too. It is for these reasons that I regard the decision last year to shift our efforts in space from low to high gear as among the most important decisions that will be made during my incumbency in the office of the Presidency. In the last 24 hours we have seen facilities now being created for the greatest and most complex exploration in man’s history. We have felt the ground shake and the air shattered by the testing of a Saturn C-1 booster rocket, many times as powerful as the Atlas which launched John Glenn, generating power equivalent to 10,000 automobiles with their accelerators on the floor. We have seen the site where five F-1 rocket engines, each one as powerful as all eight engines of the Saturn combined, will be clustered together to make the advanced Saturn missile, assembled in a new building to be built at Cape Canaveral as tall as a 48-story structure, as wide as a city block, and as long as two lengths of this field. Within these last 19 months at least 45 satellites have circled the earth. Some 40 of them were “made in the United States of America” and they were far more sophisticated and supplied far more knowledge to the people of the world than those of the Soviet Union. The Mariner spacecraft now on its way to Venus is the most intricate instrument in the history of space science. The accuracy of that shot is comparable to firing a missile from Cape Canaveral and dropping it in this stadium between the the 40-yard lines. Transit satellites are helping our ships at sea to steer a safer course. Tiros satellites have given us unprecedented warnings of hurricanes and storms, and will do the same for forest fires and icebergs. We have had our failures, but so have others, even if they do not admit them. And they may be less public. To be sure, we are behind, and will be behind for some time in manned flight. But we do not intend to stay behind, and in this decade, we shall make up and

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move ahead. The growth of our science and education will be enriched by new knowledge of our universe and environment, by new techniques of learning and mapping and observation, by new tools and computers for industry, medicine, the home as well as the school. Technical institutions, such as Rice, will reap the harvest of these gains. And finally, the space effort itself, while still in its infancy, has already created a great number of new companies, and tens of thousands of new jobs. Space and related industries are generating new demands in investment and skilled personnel, and this city and this State, and this region, will share greatly in this growth. What was once the furthest outpost on the old frontier of the West will be the furthest outpost on the new frontier of science and space. Houston, your City of Houston, with its Manned Spacecraft Center, will become the heart of a large scientific and engineering community. During the next 5 years the National Aeronautics and Space Administration expects to double the number of scientists and engineers in this area, to increase its outlays for salaries and expenses to $60 million a year; to invest some $200 million in plant and laboratory facilities; and to direct or contract for new space efforts over $1 billion from this Center in this City. To be sure, all this costs us all a good deal of money. This year1s space budget is three times what it was in January 1961, and it is greater than the space budget of the previous eight years combined. That budget now stands at $5,400 million a year—a staggering sum, though somewhat less than we pay for cigarettes and cigars every year. Space expenditures will soon rise some more, from 40 cents per person per week to more than 50 cents a week for every man, woman and child in the United Stated, for we have given this program a high national priority—even though I realize that this is in some measure an act of faith and vision, for we do not now know what benefits await us. But if I were to say, my

fellow citizens, that we shall send to the moon, 240,000 miles away from the control station in Houston, a giant rocket more than 300 feet tall, the length of this football field, made of new metal alloys, some of which have not yet been invented, capable of standing heat and stresses several times more than have ever been experienced, fitted together with a precision better than the finest watch, carrying all the equipment needed for propulsion, guidance, control, communications, food and survival, on an untried mission, to an unknown celestial body, and then return it safely to earth, re-entering the atmosphere at speeds of over 25,000 miles per hour, causing heat about half that of the temperature of the sun—almost as hot as it is here today—and do all this, and do it right, and do it first before this decade is out—then we must be bold. I’m the one who is doing all the work, so we just want you to stay cool for a minute. [laughter] However, I think we’re going to do it, and I think that we must pay what needs to be paid. I don’t think we ought to waste any money, but I think we ought to do the job. And this will be done in the decade of the sixties. It may be done while some of you are still here at school at this college and university. It will be done during the term of office of some of the people who sit here on this platform. But it will be done. And it will be done before the end of this decade. I am delighted that this university is playing a part in putting a man on the moon as part of a great national effort of the United States of America. Many years ago the great British explorer George Mallory, who was to die on Mount Everest, was asked why did he want to climb it. He said, “Because it is there.” Well, space is there, and we’re going to climb it, and the moon and the planets are there, and new hopes for knowledge and peace are there. And, therefore, as we set sail we ask God’s blessing on the most hazardous and dangerous and greatest adventure on which man has ever embarked. Thank you.

JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon”

Document Analysis

President Kennedy begins his speech at Rice University by comparing the extraordinary dichotomies of the age. It is a time of “hope and fear,” he declares, of “knowledge and ignorance.” To put the advancements of the human race in context, he condenses the previous fifty thousand years of human progress into fifty years. Looked at in this way, human development has accelerated rapidly, bringing both positive change and “new ignorance, new problems, new dangers.” Kennedy knows that there are those who see the space race as a waste of time and energy or as an unnecessarily risky endeavor, but he also illustrates that waiting around for someone else to explore a new frontier has not been, and still is not, the American way. Space will be explored, he argues, and the people of the United States “have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace.” In order to accomplish this feat, the United States must be first, and Kennedy acknowledges that the nation has fallen behind. The line quoted most often from this speech is Kennedy’s explanation of the importance of traveling to the moon. “We choose to go to the moon,” he says, because it is the new frontier. Like flight, or the exploration of the furthest reaches of the world, travel to space is the next challenge to the world. It is a challenge that must be accepted, and one that will “organize and measure the best of our energies and skills.” The United States already has an impressive list of accomplishments in terms of building spacecraft technology and sophisticated satellites, Kennedy emphasizes, even though it has fallen behind the Soviet Union. It is time to build on these advancements and close the gap. Kennedy identifies space exploration as one of the highest priorities of his administration, arguing that it will build jobs and spur the economy, as well as advance scientific knowledge and research institutions such as Rice. This effort will cost money, of course, but he is eager to point out that a huge risk must be taken to achieve great things. Kennedy closes with a quote from the great explorer Sir Edmund Hillary that explained his desire to climb the formidable Mount Everest. Similarly, the United States must make an extraordinary effort to reach the moon

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before the decade is out, Kennedy determines, most simply because it “is there,” awaiting exploration. Essential Themes

Kennedy’s speech at Rice University was broadcast across the nation and galvanized support for the space program, as its themes of American pride, progress, and leadership appealed to the nation, especially during the heightened tensions of the Cold War. The government made NASA and the Apollo program a national priority. By 1966, NASA’s budget alone was 4.4 percent of the federal budget, and astronauts and space travel obsessed the nation. Eventually, over four hundred thousand people worked for some aspect of the NASA lunar landing program, both in NASA itself and through industrial and university contracts. On December 21, 1968, Apollo 8 was launched with three astronauts on board. While Apollo 8 was the first mission to successfully take a manned rocket to the moon and back, it did not land. The crew of Apollo 8 took photographs of the moon and gathered data in preparation for a manned lunar landing the following year. The level of commitment largely inspired by Kennedy’s words was exemplified when, on July 16, 1969, Neil Armstrong, Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin, and Michael Collins launched successfully aboard Apollo 11, landing on the moon on July 20, fulfilling Kennedy’s ambitious goal of landing on the moon within a decade of his famous Rice University speech. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Hardesty, Von, and Gene Eisman. Epic Rivalry: The Inside Story of the Soviet and American Space Race. Washington: Natl. Geographic, 2007. Print. Harwood, William. “Kennedy’s Apollo Legacy—A Race Worth Running.” CBS News. CBS News, 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 18 Mar. 2016. Logsdon, John M. John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon. New York: Palgrave, 2010. Print. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton, 1965. Print.

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 JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba Date: October 22, 1962 Author: John F. Kennedy Genre: speech Summary Overview

Perhaps at no other point in the nearly fifty years of the Cold War did the United States and the Soviet Union come closer to nuclear war than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In October 1962, an American U-2 spy plane obtained photographic evidence that the Soviet Union was deploying nuclear missiles at bases being constructed in Cuba, which is only ninety miles off of the coast of Florida. Subsequently, President John F. Kennedy had to determine an American response that would end the crisis but not escalate a tense situation into nuclear war. While many of his advisers were advocating for military action to remove the missiles and even to overthrow the Cuban government, Kennedy chose the less aggressive but still risky response of a naval quarantine. Kennedy delivered this grave address via televised broadcast on the evening of October 22, 1962, in order to update the American people about the findings and their implications, explain the decision to put the quarantine into effect, and confirm that the country would not tolerate the threat or use of such weapons against the United States or any other country. Defining Moment

The decades following the conclusion of World War II saw two of the former Allies, the United States and the Soviet Union, emerge as the world’s superpowers, with each trying to outmaneuver the other in terms of political, military, and nuclear supremacy. While the United States had been the first nation to develop a nuclear bomb at the end of World War II, by 1949 the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power as well, and the number and destructive force of nuclear weapons rapidly increased through the 1950s. Very quickly, both superpowers were able to construct enough weapons to completely obliterate the other, and it was theorized that the main constraint to either of the powers launching nuclear missiles and bombers against the other was the idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD)—that

the nation being attacked would be able to launch enough of its own missiles before being destroyed to decimate the other, leaving little or no incentive to launch a nuclear strike. The entire theory of MAD rested on the idea that there would be enough time to launch a counterstrike before the missiles arrived, which would certainly be the case were the missiles launched from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. However, in December 1956, Fidel Castro began a Soviet-supported Communist revolution against the American-supported regime of Fulgencio Batista. After the Batista government fell on January 1, 1959, the Soviet Union quickly recognized the new Cuban government and began providing it with military support, allegedly consisting only of defensive weapons. That same year, the United States signed an agreement with Turkey, which bordered the Soviet Union, to install nuclear missiles aimed at Soviet cities. Despite American attempts to have Castro assassinated and supporting the failed attempt of some 1,400 Cuban émigrés to spark a counterrevolution at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Castro’s regime was well entrenched and enjoyed Soviet economic and military support. Upon initial intelligence indicating that the Soviets were building up arms in Cuba, Kennedy issued a public warning against this activity in September 1962. On October 14, 1962, an American U-2 spy plane flew over western Cuba, conducting aerial reconnaissance. The following day, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) photo reading teams found evidence of the presence of a Soviet medium-range nuclear missile system near San Cristóbal. When Kennedy found out about the missiles on October 16, he convened the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) to formulate a response. Most of the president’s advisers were resigned to the idea that the United States would have to take military action against

JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba

the missiles, as their proximity would negate the idea of MAD and leave the United States vulnerable to a nuclear first strike to which it would not have time to respond. Eight days following the discovery of the missiles, Kennedy took to the prime-time airwaves to inform the nation of the crisis, describe the context of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba, and explain the action he chose to take: a quarantine (instead of a blockade, which is used in times of war) of all military matériel arriving in Cuba, which was directed at stopping the flow of weapons from the Soviet Union. Kennedy sought to build the case for the fact that he chose to undertake a far more moderate response than most of his advisers called for.

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Author Biography

John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on May 29, 1917. After graduating from Harvard University in 1940, he joined the Navy; he famously helped to rescue survivors when his PT boat was sunk by a Japanese destroyer in 1943. Following the end of World War II, he began his political career by serving in the US House of Representatives for six years before winning a US Senate seat in 1953. In 1960, he was elected the thirty-fifth president of the United States, becoming the youngest president in history. While he promoted civil rights legislation and fighting poverty, his presidency would largely be characterized by efforts to stem the expansion of Communism. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and he was buried at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Good evening, my fellow citizens: This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 A.M., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail. The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D. C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

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Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared. This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation. The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has

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been planned for some months. Yet, only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive antiaircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, “the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes,” that there is, and I quote the Soviet Government, “there is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba,” and that, and I quote, their government, “the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.” That statement was false. Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, “pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba,” that, and I quote him, “training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive, and if it were otherwise,” Mr. Gromyko went on, “the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance.” That statement also was false. Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace. For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history unlike that of

the Soviets since the end of World War II demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull’s-eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines. In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat. But this secret, swift, extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere. Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required, and it is under way; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth; but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced. Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately: First: To halt this offensive buildup a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment

JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba

to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948. Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS [Organization of American States], in their communiqué of October 6, rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized. Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis. Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements, and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted. Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

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Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction by returning to his government’s own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis, and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions. This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful without limiting our freedom of action. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides, including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples. But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed, including in particular the brave people of West Berlin, will be met by whatever action is needed. Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolu-

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tion was betrayed and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas, and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil. These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny your freedom. Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free—free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back

Document Analysis

Kennedy begins his televised address with a very blunt statement of the fact that Soviet missiles are now in Cuba, saying that “[w]ithin the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island.” He then goes on to describe the strategic danger, stating that the medium-range missiles would be able to reach any city in the southeastern United States, even Washington, DC. Further, he reveals that additional sites for intermediate-range missiles are under construction, and that those missiles would be able to reach any part of the United States— as well as most of Canada. The presence of the overtly “offensive weapons,” Kennedy explains, was clearly well planned in direct contradiction to what Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko had told him about only sending defensive aid to Cuba, as well as Kennedy’s earlier warnings to the Soviets; therefore, the buildup, which he sternly deems “a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo,” represents a direct threat to the security of the United States and the

to the society of free nations and to the associations of this hemisphere. My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead—months in which both our patience and our will be tested, months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are; but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission. Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right; not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved. Thank you and good night.

world. Kennedy stresses that the balance between Soviet and American forces that has ensured peace to this point is under threat and that action must be taken, drawing a parallel with the situation in Europe in the years before World War II, when Hitler’s aggression was tolerated, leading only to further aggression. To ensure that the American public understands the government’s reaction to the situation, Kennedy details each of the steps he plans to undertake. The American response to the deployment of the missiles in Cuba would not be to invade, he emphasizes, but rather to establish a quarantine line of American naval vessels to intercept any cargoes bound for Cuba. However, any nuclear attack from Cuba directed toward any nation, he asserts, would be considered a Soviet attack that would require a response. In order to gain international support, he calls for emergency meetings of the Organization of American States and the UN Security Council to condemn the Soviet actions. In addition, Kennedy seeks to assure the Cuban people that he considers them to be innocent in this matter, and that the United States seeks to avoid any actions that might cause them

JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba

harm. While he acknowledges that the situation is difficult and that the outcome is unforeseeable, he justifies his decision by once again appealing to American pride and the dedication to defending the nation’s freedom versus the alternative of “surrender or submission.” Essential Themes

Three days after Kennedy’s televised address, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, presented the UN Security Council with the photographic evidence of the Soviet missile installations, while the Soviets still denied their existence. Behind the scenes, however, numerous back-channel negotiations were taking place between American and Soviet representatives to find a mutually advantageous way to end the standoff. Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, communicated with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Even as the negotiations proceeded, the two nations moved closer to war, with Soviet ships attempting to pass through the quarantine, only to have the Americans fire warning shots. Publicly, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev condemned the quarantine as a blockade, which could be construed as an act of war. An American U-2 spy plane was also shot down over Cuba. However, Kennedy remained committed to avoiding a conflict that he believed would have quickly escalated. At the same time that Khrushchev was publicly denouncing the quarantine, lower-level communiques made it clear that the Soviets were willing to withdraw the Cuban missiles in return for the American withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and assurances that the United States would not invade Cuba or support any further attempts

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to topple the Castro regime. The United States was left to interpret these seemingly conflicting messages from Khrushchev, choosing to believe the word of ABC News reporter John Scali, who claimed that he had been approached by a Soviet agent regarding Khrushchev’s willingness to work out a deal. Six days after Kennedy’s speech and the establishment of the quarantine, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for Kennedy’s public promise not to invade Cuba and his private assurance that the American missiles in Turkey would be removed. Nuclear war had been narrowly avoided, and Kennedy’s diplomatic stature rose in the eyes of many. In the end, it was Kennedy’s willingness to defy his advisers and undertake a risky but more diplomatic strategy that headed off what could have been a catastrophic nuclear war. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gibson, David R. Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2012. Print. Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Norton, 1969. Print. Khrushchev, Sergei. “How My Father and President Kennedy Saved the World.” American Heritage Oct. 2002: 66–75. Print. Russell, Bertrand. Unarmed Victory. New York: Simon, 1963. Print. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton, 1965. Print.

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 JFK: “A Strategy of Peace” Date: June 10, 1963 Author: John F. Kennedy Genre: speech Summary Overview

Since the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union had debated limits on both the development and testing of nuclear weapons, but Cold War tensions had continually derailed these talks. In 1962, the two superpowers came dangerously close to nuclear war during a tense standoff over Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis, as the incident became known, was resolved peacefully when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles in exchange for promises that the United States would not invade Cuba and, secretly, that it would remove US missiles from Turkey. With this crisis averted, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union resumed talks to ban nuclear testing in June 1963. The talks were in their early stages when President John F. Kennedy delivered this commencement speech at American University in Washington, DC, promising that the United States would not test a nuclear weapon as long as the other states engaged in talks did not do so either. The talks were successful, and the groundbreaking Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by all three parties on August 5, 1963. Defining Moment

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies, albeit uneasy ones, during World War II, but opposing ideologies and deep-seated mistrust ensured that the alliance would be strained further after the United States revealed its nuclear capabilities, dropping bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The Soviet Union raced to catch up, testing its first nuclear weapon on August 29, 1949. The United States responded by accelerating the development of a thermonuclear weapon, whose destructive capacity dwarfed any previous technology. Thermonuclear weapons use a small fission reaction to ignite a powerful fusion response, producing a blast many times

more powerful than that of earlier nuclear bombs. The United States successfully tested a thermonuclear weapon in 1952, and the Soviet Union followed in August 1953. Thus, by the time of Kennedy’s speech, both of these superpowers possessed weapons capable of unprecedented destruction. Great Britain also became a nuclear state when it tested its first nuclear weapon in 1952. As the Soviet Union and the United States raced both to build larger and more destructive weapons and to perfect the technology necessary to launch them at each other, both sides claimed that they were ready to engage in disarmament talks but were not able to reach an agreement. Talks between the two nations continued, with the greatest conflict over how disarmament was to be monitored or verified. The United States and Great Britain advocated for on-site inspections, which the Soviet Union would not allow. In 1960, an agreement seemed close, but when an American spy plane was shot down in Soviet airspace, negotiations were suspended. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons testing continued, with France testing its first weapon in February 1960. In October 1961, the Soviet Union detonated the most powerful weapon in history, a fifty-megaton bomb nicknamed the “Tsar Bomba.” The next October, the United States gathered evidence that Soviet missiles were being placed in Cuba, mere miles from the US mainland. President Kennedy responded with a naval blockade around Cuba and promised to use military force if necessary. The world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. After tense negotiations with Soviet leader Khrushchev, an agreement was reached to remove the weapons from Cuba in exchange for a promise by the United States not to invade, in addition to a secret promise from Kennedy himself to remove missiles in Turkey, within range of the Soviet Union. Ironically, this crisis proved to the

JFK: “A Strategy of Peace”

leaders of both nations that compromise was possible, and talks between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain were reinvigorated. France and China were also invited to participate, but they declined. Author Biography

John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on May 29, 1917. He was the second of nine children in a prominent Irish Catholic family. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was a successful banker who also served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and as the American ambassador to Great Britain. Kennedy attended the Choate School and graduated from Harvard University in 1940, joining the Navy after college. In 1943, he was seriously injured

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when a Japanese destroyer sunk his PT boat, but he famously helped to rescue the survivors. After returning from war, he served in the US House of Representatives for six years and was elected to the US Senate in 1953. In 1955, he wrote the Pulitzer Prize–winning book Profiles in Courage. In 1960, he became the first Roman Catholic president of the United States and the youngest in its history. While in office, Kennedy took action on civil rights, combated poverty, and founded the Peace Corps. He also narrowly avoided confrontations with the Soviet Union in Berlin and Cuba. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and was buried at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT President Anderson, members of the faculty, board of trustees, distinguished guests, my old colleague, Senator Bob Byrd, who has earned his degree through many years of attending night law school while I am earning mine in the next 30 minutes, ladies and gentlemen: It is with great pride that I participate in this ceremony of the American University, sponsored by the Methodist Church, founded by Bishop John Fletcher Hurst, and first opened by President Woodrow Wilson in 1914. This is a young and growing university, but it has already fulfilled Bishop Hurst’s enlightened hope for the study of history and public affairs in a city devoted to the making of history and to the conduct of the public’s business. By sponsoring this institution of higher learning for all who wish to learn, whatever their color or their creed, the Methodists of this area and the Nation deserve the Nation’s thanks, and I commend all those who are today graduating. Professor Woodrow Wilson once said that every man sent out from a university should be a man of his nation as well as a man of his time, and I am confident that the men and women who carry the honor of graduating from this institution will continue to give from their lives, from their talents, a high measure of public service and public support. “There are few earthly things more beautiful than a university,” wrote John Masefield, in his tribute to Eng-

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lish universities—and his words are equally true today. He did not refer to spires and towers, to campus greens and ivied walls. He admired the splendid beauty of the university, he said, because it was “a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those who perceive truth may strive to make others see.” I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived—yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace. What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time. I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It

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makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn. Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles—which can only destroy and never create—is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace. I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war—and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task. Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament—and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude—as individuals and as a Nation— for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward—by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home. First: Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable—that mankind is doomed—that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade--therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable—and we believe they can do it again. I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the value of hopes and dreams but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace—based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no single, simple key to this peace—no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process—a way of solving problems. With such a peace, there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor—it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors. So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it. Second: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It is discouraging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on Military Strategy and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims—such as the allegation that “American imperialist circles are preparing to unleash different types of wars . . . that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union . . . [and that] the political aims of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries... [and] to achieve world domination . . . by means of aggressive wars.” Truly, as it was written long ago: “The wicked flee when no man pursueth.” Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements—to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning—a warning to the American

JFK: “A Strategy of Peace”

people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats. No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage. Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique, among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation’s territory, including nearly two thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland—a loss equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago. Today, should total war ever break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this Nation’s closest allies—our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counter-weapons. In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours—and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obli-

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gations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest. So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal. Third: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last 18 years been different. We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists’ interest to agree on a genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world. To secure these ends, America’s weapons are nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility. For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people—but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth. Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system—a system capable

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of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished. At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention or which threaten to erupt into war. Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East, and in the Indian subcontinent, have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others—by seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and in Canada. Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by alliances. Those alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge. Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom, but in pursuing the paths of peace. It is our hope—and the purpose of allied policies—to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The Communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that, if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured. This will require a new effort to achieve world law—a new context for world discussions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased understanding will require increased contact and communication. One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other’s actions which might occur at a time of crisis.

We have also been talking in Geneva about other first-step measures of arms control, designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and to reduce the risks of accidental war. Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament-designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this Government since the 1920’s. It has been urgently sought by the past three ado ministrations. And however dim the prospects may be today, we intend to continue this effort—to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities of disarmament are. The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is badly needed, is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards. I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard. First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history—but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind. Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament, but I hope it will help us achieve it.

JFK: “A Strategy of Peace”

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude toward peace and freedom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives—as many of you who are graduating today will have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home. But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete. It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government—local, State, and National—to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land. All this is not unrelated to world peace. “When a man’s ways please the Lord,” the Scriptures tell us, “he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him.” And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of

Document Analysis President Kennedy’s commencement address begins with an explanation of why he has chosen to speak on the topic of world peace at a university. It is in such a setting, Kennedy says, that truth can be pursued and shared, and so it is appropriate to address the graduates on a topic “on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived.” One of President Kennedy’s goals is to define the kind of peace he wants, which is not a “Pax Americana,” dependent on the military might of the United States imposing peace on the rest of the world. It is a genuine peace, based on the ability of citizens of the world to work together and to be able to spend their energy on constructive, rather than destructive, endeavors. He notes that the incredible destructive power of nuclear weapons has given war a “new face.” One nuclear bomb carries the explosive power of all of the weapons unleashed during the whole of World War II, and so war

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human rights—the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation, the right to breathe air as nature provided it—the right of future generations to a healthy existence? While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can—if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers—offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race. The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

is not an option. The only hope for the world is peace. Kennedy acknowledges that the pursuit of peace is not as “dramatic” as warmongering. This issue was personal for him, having sought a compromise with Khrushchev just months before in Cuba. In fact, Kennedy had been criticized by some of his generals for not using the Cuban Missile Crisis as an opportunity to unseat Fidel Castro’s Communist regime in Cuba. In this speech, Kennedy shifts the focus from the evils of the Soviet Union and asks Americans to examine both their own judgments and assumptions about the possibility of peace and their attitude toward the Soviet Union. President Kennedy challenges the idea that peace is impossible, calling this a “dangerous, defeatist belief.” Humankind is responsible for the problem of war, he says, and humankind can solve it. To deny this is to believe that “war is inevitable—that mankind is doomed.” Americans do not have to like the Soviet Union or Communism, he argues, but they

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can learn to live in peace with each other, as neighbors or family members often struggle to get along but find that their differences lessen over time. Kennedy urges the students of American University, and the rest of the country, to persevere in the pursuit of peace, and give the Soviet Union the opportunity to return to the negotiating table. He asks them to question what the leaders of the Soviet Union really think and how much of their inflammatory rhetoric is propaganda. The heaviest burden and greatest losses in any nuclear conflict would be borne by these two countries, he argues, and so the assumption must be made that they have a common interest in pursuing peace. The United States must adopt a position that allows room for constructive change in the Communist world. It must be made clear that the United States’ nuclear weapons are “nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use.” An important first step toward greater cooperation and understanding is the conclusion of a nuclear test ban, on which Kennedy is working with the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The students of American University are encouraged to be an example of peace by serving in the Peace Corps and by advocating for human rights. Peace is a human right, Kennedy argues, and so the only acceptable strategy for the United States is a “strategy of peace.” Essential Themes

The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed on August 5, 1963, in Moscow, by representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. China and France declined the invitation to join the

agreement. The treaty banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Though its parameters were limited, as the name implies, it was a significant step toward greater cooperation in the control of nuclear weapons. In 1968, nations around the world signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this accord, countries that did not possess nuclear weapons agreed not to develop them. The nations that already had nuclear weapons— France, China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—were exempted from this ban but promised to eventually disarm. India, Israel, and Pakistan did not join the treaty, and North Korea withdrew in 2003, testing nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016. Though this treaty was the most significant agreement concerning nuclear weapons, discussions about the control of nuclear materials continue worldwide. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Birnbaum, Norman. “JFK’s Presidential Courage— June 10, 1963.” Nation. Nation, 12 June 2013. Web. Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Norton, 1969. Print. Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton, 1965. Print. Wittner, Lawrence S. Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. Print.

JFK: “Ich bin ein Berliner”

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 JFK: “Ich bin ein Berliner” Date: June 26, 1963 Author: John F. Kennedy Genre: speech Summary Overview

In June 1963, President John F. Kennedy traveled to West Berlin to demonstrate his support for the citizens there. The democratic enclave was hemmed in on all sides by Communist East Germany and had been a source of continued tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, who had divided Germany at the end of World War II. In 1961, East Germany had erected a wall, ostensibly to prevent spies crossing into East Berlin. However, it was actually intended to prevent the mass exodus from East to West Germany, as the Berlin border was the most permeable in Germany. Despite his limited German-language skills, President Kennedy used two German phrases in his speech to the crowd, estimated at over 120,000, including the memorable “Ich bin ein Berliner,” translated as, “I am a Berliner.” This nine-minute speech had a profound impact and became one of his most memorable, making such a positive impression on the assembled West Berliners that the square where he spoke was later renamed John-F.-Kennedy-Platz. Defining Moment

The United States and the Soviet Union were allies, albeit uneasy ones, during World War II, and the Soviet Union played a decisive role in Germany’s defeat in 1945. The two nations invaded Germany from different sides and met in Berlin to great fanfare. Relations between the Soviet Union and its World War II allies deteriorated rapidly, however, and war nearly broke out again when Joseph Stalin blocked access to West Berlin, which was under US control, from Soviet occupied East Germany. Beginning in June 1948 and lasting for eleven months, the Berlin Airlift brought supplies to West Berlin. In 1949, the West German occupation zone held by the United States, France, and Britain became the Federal Republic of Germany. The zone held by the Soviet

Union in East Germany became the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Soviet Union occupied vast territory in Europe after the war, including East Germany, and controlled the Communist government there. Berlin remained divided, with the area of West Berlin that had once been under US control continuing as part of West Germany, even though it was nearly one hundred miles from the rest of the country. The city was a flashpoint for the United States and the Soviet Union, with the Soviets repeatedly threatening to occupy West Berlin and the United States promising to defend it. In 1961, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev approved the construction of a wall between East and West Berlin, ostensibly to prevent westerners from entering as spies or to work against the Communist state but actually to contain the flood of defectors to the west. An estimated 3.5 million Germans had already fled to the west through the relatively permeable border. The first fence was made of barbed wire, but it was quickly replaced by a twelve-foot-tall, four-foot-wide concrete structure, defended by an area called the “Death Strip” with attack dogs, floodlights, armed guards, and trip wires. The Berlin Wall slowed the exodus of East Germans to a trickle, and access was tightly controlled through a series of checkpoints. One of these, called “Checkpoint Charlie,” the only point where non-Germans could cross, was the location of a tense standoff in October 1961, when an American diplomat was denied access to East Berlin. In the ensuing standoff, Soviet and US tanks took up positions along the checkpoint. After a tense sixteen hours, both sides backed down. In June 1963, President Kennedy visited West Germany and was received by large, enthusiastic crowds. Many in West Germany saw both the United States as their most important ally and Kennedy as a heroic fig-

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ure who was willing to defend West German interests against the Soviet Union. Author Biography

John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, on May 29, 1917. He was the second of nine children in a prominent Irish Catholic family. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, was a successful banker who also served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and as the American ambassador to Great Britain. Kennedy attended the Choate School and graduated from Harvard University in 1940, joining the Navy after college. In 1943, he was seriously injured when a Japanese destroyer sunk his PT boat, but he

famously helped to rescue the survivors. After returning from war, he served in the US House of Representatives for six years and was elected to the US Senate in 1953. In 1955, he wrote the Pulitzer Prize–winning book Profiles in Courage. In 1960, he became the first Roman Catholic president of the United States and the youngest in its history. While in office, Kennedy took action on civil rights, combated poverty, and founded the Peace Corps. He also narrowly avoided confrontations with the Soviet Union in Berlin and Cuba. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and was buried at Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT I am proud to come to this city as the guest of your distinguished Mayor, who has symbolized throughout the world the fighting spirit of West Berlin. And I am proud to visit the Federal Republic with your distinguished Chancellor who for so many years has committed Germany to democracy and freedom and progress, and to come here in the company of my fellow American, General Clay, who has been in this city during its great moments of crisis and will come again if ever needed. Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was “civis Romanus sum.” Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is “Ich bin ein Berliner.” I appreciate my interpreter translating my German! There are many people in the world who really don’t understand, or say they don’t, what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits us to make economic progress. Lass’ sie nach Berlin kommen. Let them come to Berlin. Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us. I want to say, on behalf of my countrymen, who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic, who are far dis-

tant from you, that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even from a distance, the story of the last 18 years. I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged for 18 years that still lives with the vitality and the force, and the hope and the determination of the city of West Berlin. While the wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures of the Communist system, for all the world to see, we take no satisfaction in it, for it is, as your Mayor has said, an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together. What is true of this city is true of Germany—real, lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. In 18 years of peace and good faith, this generation of Germans has earned the right to be free, including the right to unite their families and their nation in lasting peace, with good will to all people. You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part of the main. So let me ask you as I close, to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today, to the hopes of tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to the day of peace with justice, beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind. Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is

JFK: “Ich bin ein Berliner”

enslaved, all are not free. When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe. When that day finally comes, as it will, the people of West Berlin can take

Document Analysis

President Kennedy begins this speech by thanking the American general Lucius D. Clay, who was responsible for West Berlin, and the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The language that he uses highlights the role that West Berlin plays in defending against the incursions of Communism. He mentions the “fighting spirit” of West Berlin and the chancellor’s commitment to “democracy and freedom and progress.” During Roman times, Kennedy says, a citizen of Rome would say with pride that he was a Roman, and everyone would know the privileges and protections this bestowed. In the free world, Kennedy says, the “proudest boast” is “Ich bin ein Berliner,” or “I am a Berliner.” Kennedy acknowledges that his grasp of the language is tenuous, and he thanks his interpreter for making sure the Germans understood his effort to speak their language. Kennedy closes the speech with this same statement, again in German, but this time applies it to himself, since “All free men . . . are citizens of Berlin.” Kennedy made a conciliatory speech just two weeks earlier at the American University in Washington, DC, where he encouraged the American people to imagine a path to peace with the Soviet Union. In his Berlin speech, however, he calls out the conflict between the “free world” and Communism, with Berlin as the best example of the repression and failure of the “Communist system.” Kennedy employs another German phrase to highlight the central place of Berlin in this conflict. “Lass’ sie nach Berlin kommen. Let them come to Berlin.” The failure of Communism is highlighted by the fact that the people of East Berlin are fleeing in huge numbers. Kennedy alludes to this exodus when he says, “Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us.”

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sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front lines for almost two decades. All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words “Ich bin ein Berliner.”

President Kennedy mentions three times that Berlin had been in conflict since the end of World War II, which was eighteen long years ago. Despite being besieged on all sides by Communist East Germany, living in their “defended island of freedom,” the citizens of West Berlin have been a shining example for all who wish for freedom, Kennedy says. When Germany is reunited and Europe is at peace, he notes, they can be proud to have held the “front lines for almost two decades.” Essential Themes

East and West Germany remained separated by the Berlin Wall until 1989. Hundreds of people died trying to escape East Germany by breeching the wall. Between the time of Kennedy’s speech and the reunification of Germany, more than five thousand people managed to escape to West Germany in Berlin. On November 9, 1989, as Communism began to lose its grip on Europe, the East German government opened the border. Citizens of both nations flooded into Berlin and surrounded the wall, coming across the long-closed border by the thousands. By the end of that weekend, more than two million people had crossed into West Berlin, and many others began to chip away at the wall with picks and chisels. Bulldozers removed other sections to cheers from the crowd. For many, it was the first time since the end of World War II that Germany had been free. Within a year, Germany was reunited for the first time since 1945. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Kempe, Frederick. Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. New York: Putnam’s, 2011. Print. Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton, 1965. Print. Smyser, W. R. Kennedy and the Berlin Wall. Lanham: Rowman, 2009. Print.

Televised Interview with President Kennedy

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 Televised Interview with President Kennedy Date: September 9, 1963 Author(s): John F. Kennedy, Chet Huntley, and David Brinkley Genre: interview; transcript Summary Overview

There are times when it is hard to pin down presidents as to what their thoughts are regarding certain issues or situations. A news conference, or televised interview, is one way to get the president on record. The TV coanchors Chet Huntley and David Brinkley wanted the president to address the issues of the day on their news program. At the same time, Kennedy wanted to present an image of a president who was in control of major events and in tune with what the American people desired. While the interview covered more than just the events in Vietnam, what was happening in that country formed a significant portion of the dialogue. Although Kennedy stated that the anti-communist operations were proving successful, he acknowledged that there were other South Vietnamese domestic concerns that were also concerns for the United States. In retrospect, what Kennedy had to say about these issues foreshadowed what came to pass within a few months. Defining Moment

Television had helped Kennedy win the presidency, and he used it to communicate his thoughts not only to American, but also to foreign leaders. Thus, in September 1963, he allowed the anchors of evening news broadcasts to interview him. Having conducted one with CBS, this second one was with NBC news co-anchors, Chet Huntley and David Brinkley. At that time, the two hosted the top-rated evening news program, which meant that any interview they conducted was guaranteed to have a large audience. Having been in office for more than two and a half years, Kennedy had been dealing with Vietnam since day one. The increase in military advisors and economic aid had been a consistent part of his foreign policy. For over a year, there had been some in the administration who had questioned American policy, especially as it related to supporting the South Vietnamese govern-

ment headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem. In private conversations earlier in the year, Kennedy himself had expressed such concerns. Only a month earlier, Kennedy had replaced the American ambassador to South Vietnam, Frederick Nolting, a strong supporter of Diem, with Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., a skeptic regarding Diem’s government. In addition, rumors were circulating of the CIA pushing some South Vietnamese generals to undertake a coup, adding uncertainty to the situation. With those events in the background, President Kennedy sat down with Huntley and Brinkley to answer questions regarding current programs and proposals of his administration. His obvious hope was to strengthen support for his administration from the American populace and from members of Congress. As regards the questions related to South Vietnam, Kennedy made it clear that he had concerns about the South Vietnamese government, without overtly withdrawing his support for it. The fact, however, that he mentions some of these concerns makes it clear that they were more serious than he wanted to let on. His refusal to answer a question about the CIA should have been expected, although that was the question that probably needed answering the most. Author Biography

John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1917–1963) was born into a wealthy family in Boston. His parents pushed all their children to succeed. He graduated from Harvard, having written his senior thesis—published in 1940—on the topic of why Britain was unprepared for World War II. He served as a naval officer World War II, winning medals for courage. In 1946, he was elected to the House of Representatives. In 1952, he was elected to the US Senate. The following year, he married Jacqueline Bouvier. He was elected president in 1960, the first Catholic to hold that position. His foreign policy

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was staunchly anti-communist, while domestically, he pushed for equality and an increase in emphasis upon the space program. Kennedy was assassinated on November 21, 1963. Since he was president for a relatively short period, a number of his programs and ideas had not yet been implemented. Nevertheless, his youthful image and enthusiasm inspired many throughout the country. Chester “Chet” Huntley (1911–1974) was a journalist from Montana who worked his way up on radio and television. His big break came when he co-anchored the 1956 national political convention coverage. In

1956, he became co-anchor, with David Brinkley, of the NBC evening news until his retirement in 1970. David Brinkley (1920–2003) was born in North Carolina and began his journalism career while still in high school. In 1943, he moved to Washington and became the NBC White House correspondent. Co-anchoring the evening news with Huntley, Brinkley then continued with NBC after Huntley’s retirement. In 1981, he moved to ABC and initiated a new Sunday morning news format, staying with that network until his retirement in 1997.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT THE PRESIDENT. On the whole, I think this country has done an outstanding job. A good many countries today are free that would not be free. Communism’s gains since 1945 in spite of chaos and poverty have been limited, and I think the balance of power still rests with the West, and I think it can increase our strength if we make the right decisions this year, economically, here at home and in the field of foreign policy. Two matters that we have been talking about are examples of that. One is the tax cut which affects our economic growth, which affects the whole movement of this country internally; the test ban treaty which affects our security abroad and our leadership. That is why I think it is very important that the Senate pass it. You know the old story that who prepares for battle that the trumpet blows an uncertain sound. Well, I think that if the United States Senate rejected that treaty after the Government has committed itself to it, the sound from the United States around the world would be very uncertain. Mr. Huntley: Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy? THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better.

Since June, however, the difficulties with the Buddhists, we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn’t been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time and we must be patient, we must persist. Mr. Huntley: Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now? THE PRESIDENT. I don’t think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost, a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don’t want that. Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called “domino theory,” that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of southeast Asia will go behind it?

Televised Interview with President Kennedy

THE PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it. Mr. Brinkley: In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it? THE PRESIDENT. No. Mr. Huntley: Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here. THE PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn’t so. Mr. McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South VietNam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department. Mr. Brinkley: With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can’t we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence. We have some influence, and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don’t—we can’t expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can’t make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don’t want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would

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like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can’t make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States, SEATO, southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say because they don’t like events in southeast Asia or they don’t like the government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw. Mr. Huntley: Someone called the civil rights issue in 1964, I think, the fear of the political unknown. Would you agree? THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I think that what they are wondering is what effect this will have, whether the North, which has supported civil rights in the past, will continue to support it. I think they will. I think the bill we put in is a reasonable bill, and I think that—my judgment is that we will not divide this country politically into Negroes and whites. That would be a fatal mistake for a society which should be as united as ours is. I think it should be divided, in other words, Republicans and Democrats, but not by race. Mr. Huntley: But in the Congress, do you see the issue coming down to a full scale test of strength, or do you see it ending in a compromise? THE PRESIDENT. We don’t start off with a compromise. I hope it is going to pass as close to the form in which we sent it up as possible. Mr. Brinkley: Do you plan to see President Tito this fall, Mr. President? THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don’t know. It would depend in part, and there are other Presidents who will be coming to the United Nations, and I would expect to see most of them.

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Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, Harry Truman was out for his walk this morning and he said he did not think we should have a tax cut until we get the budget balanced, and the other day Senator Humphrey was saying in the Senate that what the American people think is true is very often more important than what actually is true. In view of all that, what do you think about cutting taxes while the budget is still in deficit? THE PRESIDENT. The reason the Government is in deficit is because you have more than 4 million people unemployed, and because the last 5 years you have had rather a sluggish growth, much slower than any other Western country. I am in favor of a tax cut because I am concerned that if we don’t get the tax cut that we are going to have an increase in unemployment and that we may move into a period of economic downturn. We had a recession in ‘58, a recession in 1960. We have done pretty well since then, but we still have over 4 million unemployed. I think this tax cut can give the stimulus to our economy over the next 2 or 3 years. I think it will provide for greater national wealth. I think it will reduce unemployment. I think it will strengthen our gold position. So I think that the proposal we made is responsible and in the best interests of the country. Otherwise, if we don’t get the tax cut, I would think that our prospects are much less certain. I think the Federal Reserve Board has indicated that. Nineteen hundred and sixty-four is going to be an uncertain time if we don’t get the tax cut. I think that to delay it to 1964 would be very unwise. I think our whole experience in the late fifties shows us how necessary and desirable it is. My guess is that if we can get the tax cut, with the stimulus it will give to the economy, that we will get our budget in balance quicker than we will if we don’t have it.

Mr. Huntley: The affirmative economic response to Britain’s tax cut seemed to be almost immediate. Would it be as immediate in this country, do you think? THE PRESIDENT. I think it would be. Interestingly enough, the British came forward with their tax cut in April, passed it within a month. They have experienced economic benefits from it. Unemployment has been substantially reduced. They have a larger deficit than we do. Yet the only criticism was that it wasn’t enough. Nearly every economist has supported us. I think it is in the best economic interests of the country, unless this country just wants to drag along, have 5 or 6 million people unemployed, have profits reduced, have economic prospects, have our budgets unbalanced by a much larger proportion. The largest unbalanced budget in the history of this country was in 1958 because of the recession—$12 1/2 billion. The fact of the matter is that, of course, Government expenditures do go up in every administration, but the country’s wealth goes up. President Eisenhower spent $185 billion more than President Truman. But the country was much wealthier. It is much wealthier now than it was in the last year of President Eisenhower’s administration. I think our economic situation can be very good. I think what we have proposed is a responsible answer to a problem which has been part of our economic life for 5 or 6 years, and that is slack, failure to grow sufficiently, relatively high unemployment. If you put that together with the fact that we have to find 35,000 new jobs a week, I think the situation in this country calls for a tax reduction this year. Mr. Huntley: Thank you, Mr. President.

GLOSSARY difficulties with the Buddhists: a reference to the massive social protests taking place against the Diem government over the latter’s treatment of Buddhist groups Kashmir: a disputed territory bordering northwest India and northeast Pakistan Saigon: the capital of South Vietnam; today, Ho Chi Minh City

Televised Interview with President Kennedy

Document Analysis

By the time President Kennedy came into office, television had truly become a national media. He used it extensively, including being the first chief executive to have his press conferences broadcast live. Kennedy held sixty-four press conferences in his thirty-four months in office, with additional interviews, as in the case of this one, also taking place. The relationship between Kennedy and the news media was less adversarial than has been the case for presidents in recent years. The status of events in South Vietnam was of interest to the nation. One item emerging from the interview is how the United States can support a government with which it has major disagreements. The other principal concern is the ongoing struggle with communism. The anticommunist tone of Kennedy’s responses is in line with his political orientation throughout his life. Whether or not he was as optimistic as his responses indicate, Kennedy did try to assure the American public that the communist push for expansion was being thwarted. His counsel is for patience, as American interests would ultimately prevail. In the midst of questions on civil rights, the test ban treaty, the upcoming United Nations session and a tax cut, Huntley and Brinkley raise the issue of Vietnam. The videos available from this interview show a friendly atmosphere, but that does not mean that the newsmen do not want to get the scoop on other reporters. Unlike four years later, when Vietnam became a central issue for all of America, it is still an emerging concern in 1963. When asked by Huntley, Kennedy does acknowledge that the United States sometimes gets “locked into a policy” even when change might be needed. As part of the response to that question, Kennedy raises the issue of the Buddhist protests against the Diem regime. (Diem had focused on the needs of the Catholic Vietnamese rather than the Buddhist majority.) While, to a certain extent, Kennedy tries to reduce the importance of the protests by stating that they were in “the Saigon area,” in reality, this is an acknowledgement of the seriousness of the situation. Anti-government protests normally occurred outside the capital, which was always under tight security. The Buddhist protests had started in Hue in May and, by September, were spreading widely throughout the country. Kennedy’s reference to the Saigon demonstrations is an indirect indication that the policy of supporting Diem might be moving toward a conclusion.

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Several of the questions deal with what steps might be taken to pressure the Diem government into changing its policy toward South Vietnamese Buddhists. This had moved to the front pages of the American media in 1963 because, in an act of ultimate protest, a Buddhist monk had set himself on fire in Saigon that June. While not directly addressing the specifics of the Buddhist protests or their cause, Kennedy asserts that the United States “should use our influence in as effective a way as we can” regarding these and other issues. He also acknowledges that the United States should not “expect these countries to do everything the way we want.” Related, yet not acknowledged in this interview, is the question about CIA activity. Kennedy refuses to say anything about it, although the question is raised because of rumors that the CIA was trying to instigate a coup. Declassified documents show that the CIA had indeed discussed a coup with some Vietnamese generals, but had not necessarily instigated the conversations. Essential Themes

Kennedy responds more directly to some questions regarding Vietnam than was the case for other presidents in similar situations. One point that he makes clearly is that there’s a limit to what foreign aid can buy. To expect that any nation receiving assistance from the United States will do whatever the United States desires, is misguided. Thus, there are various things happening in South Vietnam of which the United States does not approve. However, it also is apparent that there are limits to what is acceptable to the United States. Thus are the (not incorrect) rumors about the CIA discussing a South Vietnamese coup raised. While nothing Kennedy ever says points directly to allowing a South Vietnamese-led coup to take place in South Vietnam only two months later, his intimation of having problems with the Diem regime suggests encouragement of those considering such an action. As was seen in November, the patience that Kennedy counseled did have its limits. Throughout his discussion of South Vietnam, and various regions of Asia, Kennedy makes it clear that the ultimate goal is stopping communism. When asked about the domino theory, that if South Vietnam fell other Southeast Asian countries would as well, Kennedy responds that he does “believe it.” Throughout the interview, when asked about possible changes in the American position or actions in South Vietnam, Kennedy always raises the concern about how these

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things will affect the effort to stop the spread of communism. Having the majority of the South Vietnamese population support the government of South Vietnam, or questions as to whether the United States should cut its foreign aid, are questions and concerns that Kennedy accepts as valid. However, overriding all of these interests is the need to stop communism from taking control in new countries. This was one of America’s and Kennedy’s guiding principles. And ultimately, it was this concern that drew the United States further into the conflict in South Vietnam. The Vietnam War was the result of this strong anti-communist mindset dominating the scene in the post-World War II era. —Donald A. Watt, PhD

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Chomsky, Noam. Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and US Political Culture. Cambridge: South End Press, 1993. Print. Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Print. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. 1965. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2002. Print. Sorenson, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Print.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

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 Limited Test Ban Treaty Date: August 5, 1963 Geographic Region: Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States Genre: treaty Summary Overview

On August 5, 1963, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union meeting in Moscow signed the first treaty to limit the testing of nuclear weapons. The approximately eighteen years that passed between the development and use of the first nuclear bombs by the United States at the end of World War II and the signing of the treaty had seen a massive arms race between the Western powers—primarily the United States and United Kingdom—and the Soviet Union. More and more powerful weapons were created and tested with little regard for the radioactive fallout entering the atmosphere or its impact on plant, animal, and human health. Although the negotiations took eight years, the Limited Test Ban Treaty ultimately restricted nuclear weapons testing to underground explosions, and although it did not stop or even slow the arms race, it proved to be an important first step in the superpowers working together toward limiting the growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles. Defining Moment

The world changed in a number of important ways following the conclusion of World War II. The two factors that combined to create the Cold War that followed were the development of nuclear weapons (or atomic weapons, as they were first called) and the Soviet Union’s postwar desire to establish a ring of friendly governments around it, leading to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and a seeming desire to expand further. Though the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were allies during World War II, the relationship rapidly deteriorated after the use of the first two nuclear weapons against Japan at the conclusion of the war in August 1945. The Soviets quickly realized that they would need to have a nuclear weapon as well in order to compete with the Western powers in Europe. As a result, like the United States before them,

they engaged in a program to develop a nuclear bomb, achieving a nuclear chain reaction in December 1946 and detonating their first bomb in August 1949. By the time the Soviets detonated their first nuclear bomb, the Americans and British were developing even more powerful weapons. Such weapons needed to be tested, and the Americans began detonating bombs both on small islands in the Pacific Ocean in the late 1940s and in the deserts of Nevada in the early 1950s. The Soviets began testing their weapons at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. The pace of testing accelerated with the pace of development of new weapons. In 1952, the United States exploded the first thermonuclear device (a hydrogen bomb, more powerful than previous nuclear bombs) at Eniwetok Atoll, while less than a year later the Soviets were testing devices on the way toward the development of a hydrogen bomb. The Americans tested an improved hydrogen bomb at Bikini Atoll in March 1954. While the number of tests had been increasing, so had the evidence that the fallout from these weapons presented seriously adverse health risks to those nearby or downwind. For example, the March 1954 test was concluded without removing nearby island residents, and they experienced significant health problems as a result of a blast that was much larger than expected. By the mid-1950s, it was becoming clear that indirect exposure to atomic radiation was also a health problem. Radiation had been detected in food supplies as a result of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, and the underwater tests were having equally dramatic impacts on the aquatic environment of the South Pacific, as the British were also testing in their territories in the region. In May 1955, the Soviet Union first voiced the idea of an international agreement to cease nuclear testing through the inclusion of a proposal regarding the discontinuance of weapons testing as part of the United Nations (UN) Disarmament Commission. The

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three powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) started negotiations and, as a first step, agreed on an informal moratorium on testing, although that was to last less than three years before the Americans and Soviets resumed testing. It would take another two years after this to finally negotiate a treaty to eliminate the atmospheric and underwater testing of atomic weapons. Document Information

The final negotiations for the Limited Test Ban Treaty took place in July 1963, and the treaty was ultimately signed by US secretary of state Dean Rusk, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, and British foreign minister Alec Douglas-Home. Though leaders on all sides

had expressed a desire to limit testing since the late 1950s, the political will to negotiate an agreement with international verification and inspections did not rise until the early 1960s. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, US president John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev both saw the need for a treaty. The discussions continued, and by 1963 the basic mechanisms of verification were agreed upon; it was only the scale and frequency of inspections that were left to be negotiated. On July 15, 1963, delegates met in Moscow to negotiate the final treaty agreement, which they were able to do over a very brief ten-day conference, with the treaty signing taking place on August 5, 1963.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the “Original Parties,” Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of mans environment by radioactive substances, Have agreed as follows:

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve. 2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article I 1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

Article II 1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties. Article III 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

Document Analysis

A brief document, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water focuses on the definitions of activities banned by the treaty, the mechanism for amendment to the treaty, the ability for additional nations to sign the treaty, and the duration of the treaty. The preamble to the treaty discusses the three original signing nations and their ambitious goal of “the speediest possible achievement of an agreement . . . which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the pro-

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6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article IV This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance. Article V This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixtythree. For the Government of the United States of America DEAN RUSK For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland SIR DOUGLAS HOME For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics A. GROMYKO

duction and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.” Although the Limited Test Ban Treaty would not come close to meeting that long-term goal, it was a vital first step in curbing the unprecedented arms race that had dominated the period since World War II. In the first section of the document, at the most basic level, the parties to the treaty agree not to test nuclear weapons in the air, in outer space, underwater, and on land in any territory under their control or in any location if radioactive debris could conceivably

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contaminate areas outside of their borders. While the treaty does not explicitly ban underground testing, this latter qualification is designed to at least limit any such activities. The overall aim of the treaty is to prevent the spread of radioactive materials, as earlier tests had already resulted in measurable amounts of radiation being found in crops and watersheds. An important point in the text is that it is not confined to nuclear explosions conducted solely for military purposes, but rather, the treaty outlaws “any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion.” This encompassing description ensures that nations cannot claim that nuclear test explosions were done for peaceful purposes, and yet use the research to advance weapons programs. The treaty is designed to be signed by additional nations outside of the original three and can be amended at the recommendation of any signer with a majority vote of all of the signers; however, for any amendment to take effect, all three of the original signers have to approve. Though the treaty is to be unlimited in duration, any of the signers can withdraw from the treaty with three months’ notice. Essential Themes

The ultimate success of the treaty can be called mixed. In terms of its immediate goal—the elimination of above-ground or underwater nuclear testing—it was largely successful. Over one hundred nations ultimately signed the pact, including nearly all nations with sizable enough military and scientific infrastructures as to possibly produce a nuclear weapon. The only two notable nations not to sign the treaty were the People’s Republic of China and France. On the other hand, the treaty, which was seen as a first step toward calming Cold War tensions, did not lead to additional steps over the rest of the decade to bring the United States and the Soviet Union together. A comprehensive test ban treaty would not be signed for over thirty years after the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the idea of détente, when tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union would lessen to a degree, would not come until the 1970s. It would be another five years before the next agreement between the superpowers, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was signed. During the 1970s, Richard Nixon, who had been vice president under Dwight

D. Eisenhower when the first talks leading to the Limited Test Ban Treaty began, became the US president, and he sought to reduce tensions between the nuclear powers. In 1972, Nixon became the first president to travel to Moscow, and he signed two important treaties: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). These treaties represented the first agreements that actually placed limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the superpowers. Immediately after the signing of SALT I, negotiations for a follow-up treaty began. Negotiations were slow and contentious, but in 1979, US president Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed SALT II, which limited the number of both nations’ nuclear weapons to 2,250 delivery vehicles. However, a renewed rise in tensions due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused Carter to advise the US Senate not to ratify the treaty, though both nations pledged to adhere to its provisions. In 1991, the powers both signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which actually reduced the number of nuclear weapons in the final years of the Cold War and after. — Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bonham, G. Matthew, Victor M. Sergeev, and Pavel B. Parshin. “The Limited Test-Ban Agreement: Emergence of New Knowledge Structures in International Negotiation.” International Studies Quarterly 41.2 (1997): 215–40. Print. Craig, Campbell, and Sergey Radchenko. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War. New Haven: Yale UP, 2008. Print. Graham, Thomas, and Damien J. LaVera. Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era. Seattle: U of Washington P, 2002. Print. Mastny, Vojtech. “The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for Détente?” Journal of Cold War Studies 10.1 (2008): 3–25. Print. Wenger, Andreas, and Marcel Gerber. “John F. Kennedy and the Limited Test Ban Treaty: A Case Study of Presidential Leadership.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39.2 (1999): 460–87. Print.

On Alleged Soviet and Cuban Connections with Lee Harvey Oswald

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 On Alleged Soviet and Cuban Connections with Lee Harvey Oswald Date: November 25, 1963 Author: Andrei Gromyko Genre: letter; report Summary Overview

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, and then the murder of his assassin Lee Harvey Oswald two days later, affected not only the United States but also the Soviet Union. This telegram containing a draft report elucidates the Soviet Union’s concern that the assassination of the American president, his assassin’s Soviet ties, and the murder of the assassin could significantly debilitate Soviet-American relations. Because the Cuban Missile Crisis, the closest the two superpowers had come to open war, had been resolved only a year before, the Soviet Union was keen to avoid blame and the possibility of violence. Andrei Gromyko, Nikita Khrushchev’s Foreign Minister and main author of this document, had served the Soviet Union since the days of Stalin: he was well-versed in the delicate balance of relations that kept the two contentious states from nuclear war. Defining Moment

Gromyko’s telegram and draft report shows how intertwined Soviet and American politics were during the Cold War: trouble domestically could result in disaster internationally. Kennedy’s assassination could have meant the rise of more fervent anti-communists in American government. As it was, Kennedy and Khrushchev had a tumultuous relationship before the American president’s assassination in 1963. Kennedy’s foreign policy displayed traits of both hawkishness and conciliation. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, albeit a failure, followed the promise in Kennedy’s inauguration speech to “pay any price, bear any burden” in the name of liberty. Castro’s revolution in Cuba, located ninety miles from American soil, brought the threat of communism too close for comfort. The failure of the CIAbacked counter-revolutionary forces at the Bay of Pigs

contributed to the tense Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Khrushchev’s decision to put a missile base in Cuba then, both to support the new communist government and intimidate the United States, resulted in the closest brush yet with war between the two powers. The United States and the Soviet Union began a gradual rapprochement after the threat of nuclear war almost became reality. In August 1963, the two signed the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which outlawed the testing of all nuclear weapons except for those tested underground. Next, in October 1963 Kennedy brokered the sale of excess wheat to the Soviet Union: this trade deal was a remarkable step forward toward more peaceful relations. Peaceful coexistence, at the very least, seemed more possible than it was a year prior. Kennedy’s assassination, however, tested the renewed spirit of cooperation between the two nations. Some claimed that the assassination was politically motivated, and this claim seemed to be substantiated by Lee Harvey Oswald’s background. Oswald had applied for Soviet citizenship, lived in Minsk until 1962, and had tried to visit Cuba. Gromyko’s draft statement to the Soviet Central Committee illustrates the combined desire for rapprochement with the United States and the fear that American unrest could lead to a worse debacle than the Cuban Missile Crisis. Author Biography

Andrei Gromyko had a long and storied career in Soviet foreign policy. Starting under Stalin, Gromyko served as a Soviet delegate at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences; he also gained a reputation as “Mr. Nyet” as the representative to the United Nations for his zealous use of the Soviet veto. When Khrushchev was in power, the Soviet premier’s colorful personality superseded that of Gromyko. Still, as ambassador and Foreign Minis-

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ter, Gromyko was at the center of negotiating Soviet policy, such as serving as Khrushchev’s representative to meet with President Kennedy at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After Khrushchev was ousted from Soviet politics in 1964, Gromyko’s career flourished again. He participated in the signing of nuclear

arms pacts to prevent the proliferation of lethal weaponry. Finally, Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 found Gromyko relegated to the largely ceremonial office of president and the end of his enormous power in foreign affairs.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Top Secret 43690 2640 Ya. 1963 First Sector To be returned to the General Section of the CC CPSU [i.e., Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] CC CPSU The American press has disseminated various slanderous fabrications regarding some Soviet and Cuban “connections” of Lee Harvey Oswald, who was charged by the U.S. authorities with the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy and who was then himself killed under mysterious circumstances. In addition, some organs of the American press are attempting to support their insinuations by referring to the fact that Oswald lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959 through June 1962. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the KGB of the Council of Ministers of the USSR have prepared a statement for the Soviet press to debunk these allegations by the American media. The thrust of the draft statement is that the murder of Oswald himself reveals now even more clearly the identity of the groups who are behind President Kennedy’s assassination and who are obviously trying to cover up their tracks. The question of whether it is advisable to publish such a statement requires special consideration, the final decision being contingent on how the investigation of the circumstances surrounding Kennedy’s assassination turns out. It the U.S. authorities request the Soviet embassy in Washington for information concerning Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union, they could be provided with a relevant report on this matter. The draft … is appended. Please review it.

A. Gromyko V. Semichastnyy Appendix I ON FABRICATIONS IN CERTAIN AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS In the past few days the world has witnessed a monstrous crime. The U.S. President, John F. Kennedy, has died at the hand of an assassin. The heinous crime has evoked the rightful indignation of all decent people, all those interested in preserving and strengthening peace. The assassin’s bullet cut down President Kennedy at a moment when there were visible prospects in the world for a reduction in international tension, and trust had begun to appear in relations between states. It is well known how fiercely the late president of the U.S. was attacked for his steps aimed at resolving international disputes by reaching agreement between countries, particularly the USSR and the U.S. Finally, it is no accident that certain groups are now attempting to cover up their tracks and conceal the real perpetrators of this foul crime. The more that events connected with the assassination of President Kennedy unfold, the easier it is to discern the identity of those who directed the assassin’s hand. Now that Lee Harvey Oswald, accused of murdering the President, has himself been killed under mysterious circumstances, one can see even more clearly the absurdity and malice of the slanderous fabrications in certain organs of the American press, which are trying to establish Oswald’s “connection” with either the Soviet Union or Cuba, using the fact that he spent some time in the Soviet Union as the basis for their insinuations. As we have learned, U.S. national L.H. Oswald came to the Soviet Union in October 1959 as a tourist, like thousands of other U.S. citizens. While in Moscow

On Alleged Soviet and Cuban Connections with Lee Harvey Oswald

he applied for Soviet citizenship. Since the ground for accepting this request were insufficient, his application was rejected. After making persistent appeals Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union temporarily with the status of foreign national, as is customarily done in regard to other foreigners as well. He lived and worked in Minsk a while and got married there to a Soviet citizen. During his stay in the Soviet Union he kept in touch with the U.S. embassy in Moscow. In 1962, Oswald decided to leave the Soviet Union and departed for the U.S. in June with his wife and child, after receiving permission from the American embassy in Moscow, to which he had applied for this permission. We also know from reports by U.S. authorities that Oswald served in the U.S. Marine Corps in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan, and after being discharged from the army [sic] began traveling in European countries. As we noted above, in October 1959 he appeared in the Soviet Union as a tourist. Those are the facts relating to the arrival, stay, and departure from the Soviet Union of U.S. national L.H. Oswald. All this shows the malicious nature of the anti-

Document Analysis

Andrei Gromyko was known as “Grim Grom” by the American media for his perpetually dour countenance. However, his draft report shows the Soviet’s grim attitude in foreign relations as well. In this document, the Soviet Foreign Minister connects cooling international tensions to the motivation for Kennedy’s assassination by criminal elements who despise peace. Gromyko’s draft report is aimed at members of the American press who have been suggesting a Communist motive behind the assassination; his report seeks then to discredit those people who would have the temerity to question the Soviet Union’s intentions. He creates this connection in motivation first by claiming that “all decent people, all those interested in preserving and strengthening peace” will be distraught by Kennedy’s death. He elides the international fiascos of the Kennedy administration, like the Bay of Pigs Invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis, and instead states that “trust had begun to appear in relations between states,” and that Kennedy was recently criticized for his “steps aimed at resolving international disputes.”

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Soviet insinuations being spread by certain U.S. newspapers in connection with Oswald’s arrest. All those who honor the memory of President J.F. Kennedy and his approach to resolving serious international problems understand what groups are interested in concocting such slanderous anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban fabrications, and reject them with contempt. Hardly anyone gave credence to those fabrications even when the first reports came out regarding the circumstances of President Kennedy’s assassination. But now that a new shot has been fired in Dallas, aimed this time at a person accused of murdering the U.S. president, such fabrications cannot but elicit a bitter smile and understandable indignation not only outside the United States but among all decent Americans, who have the right to expect that justice will be meted out to the real murderers and organizers of this shameful crime. Who does not realize that the physical destruction of Oswald is an additional link in the chain of crimes leading to the real masterminds of President Kennedy’s assassination, who stop at nothing in their efforts to mislead the investigation and put it on a false trail?

Instead of giving a comprehensive picture of Kennedy’s Soviet policy, Gromyko characterizes the late president as being on the side of peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is clearly in this grouping with Kennedy as Gromyko continues. Although it is true that Kennedy’s assassin wanted to become a Soviet citizen, Gromyko obscures details of this period in Lee Harvey Oswald’s life in order to make the Soviet Union look as benevolent as possible. As Gromyko says, Oswald came to the Soviet Union as a tourist, “like thousands of other U.S. citizens.” In other words, the fact that Oswald came to the Soviet Union was not out of the ordinary. Then, his initial attempt to apply for citizenship was rejected, and it was only after “persistent appeals” that the Soviet Union granted him temporary residency “as is customarily done.” Gromyko does not mention that the Soviet Union considered it would be useful propaganda to say that a US Marine wanted to defect. The general character of Oswald’s time in the Soviet Union appears to be administratively sound and unpartisan, rather than motivated by Oswald’s Marxist fervor or the

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Soviet Union’s desire to gain attention for an American defector. In sum, Gromyko’s report shows to his American audience that there is no reason to suspect from Oswald’s time in the Soviet Union that Communists had anything to do with Kennedy’s assassination. On the other hand, anyone who decries the Soviet Union’s motivations is a slanderous fabricator in Gromyko’s words. Further on in the report, he once again connects Kennedy to the push for international peace with the Soviet Union: he says, “All those who honor the memory of President J.F. Kennedy and his approach to resolving serious international problems understand what groups are interest in concocting such slanderous anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban fabrications, and reject them with contempt.” The implicit understanding is that those who seek to discredit the Soviet Union desire international conflict. He concludes by encouraging detractors to look at themselves rather than at the Soviet Union for blame: after the death of Oswald, culpability ostensibly lies among those seeking to use a Communist conspiracy as a cover story. In the end, Gromyko delivers a strong statement that intends to assert the Soviet Union’s commitment to peace as well as decry the American tendency to blame Communists for every calamity. This report is also a calculated statement that aims to deflect blame on the Soviet Union back to the United States for the president’s death; in turn, this makes the Soviet Union seem to have the moral high ground in a chaotic political situation. Essential Themes

Gromyko’s report picks up on one of the most persistent themes in modern American culture, which is the idea that there was a conspiracy behind the Kennedy assassination. It was politically advantageous at the time for the Soviets to deflect blame from themselves and left-leaning individuals located in the United States; framing the assassination of a Democratic president as a potential coup would also redirect American attention to right-wing parties at home. President Johnson formed the Warren Commission on November 29, 1963 in order to investigate Kennedy’s death. Although the perpetrator was dead and unable to confess his motives, the Warren Commission officially reported that Kennedy’s assassination was due to a single gunman, also known as the “lone gunman theory.” The Warren Commission concluded that Oswald, although he professed Marxist ideas occasion-

ally, had pretensions to greatness, a sense of discontentedness with the world, and an overriding hatred for American society that together caused him to commit his crime alone. Still, Lee Harvey Oswald’s curious past combined with his sudden death have contributed to the aura of mystery around the event. Many found the Warren Commission’s results unsatisfactory based on their personal experience in viewing the film and photographic evidence; instead, some believed in a possible “coverup” belying reality. In 1976, the House Select Committee on Assassinations reopened the Kennedy case. This new investigation revised its earlier findings based on another analysis of acoustic evidence from that fateful day. This committee reported that there was a high probability that more than one gunman fired. This substantiated what some believed to be the “grassy knoll” shooter, or the idea that there was another gunman firing from a small grass-covered hill near the motorcade in addition to Lee Harvey Oswald in the Texas School Book Depository. This report was soon discredited as well by further panels, and in 1992 the Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act officially opened up and moved the assassination documents to the National Archive. However, the appeal of a conspiracy behind Kennedy’s assassination has not apparently lessened. A 2013 Gallup poll found that 61 percent of Americans believed that more than one person was behind the president’s death. The enormous popularity of alleging a conspiracy behind the president’s death instead of viewing it as the reaction of one unhinged individual is indicative of a lasting culture of mistrust in the government and the CIA during the secretive Cold War years and after. —Ashleigh Fata, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Dumberell, John. President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism. New York: Manchester UP, 2004. Print. Gromyko, Andrei. Memoirs. Trans. Harold Shukman. New York: Doubleday, 1989. Print. Savodnik, Peter. The Interloper: Lee Harvey Oswald Inside the Soviet Union. New York: Basic Books, 2013. Print. Swift, Art. “Majority in U.S. Still Believe JFK Killed in a Conspiracy.” Gallup, 2013. Web.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

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 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident Date: August 4–7, 1964 Author/s: Lyndon B. Johnson and United States Congress Genre: speech; address Summary Overview

After the defeat of the French colonial forces in 1954, the United States became the guarantor of security for the pro-Western government of South Vietnam, which was threatened not only by the government and army of communist North Vietnam, but by pro-communist guerilla fighters among their own people. In August 1964, two American destroyers, USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy, were conducting intelligence-gathering operations off the coast of North Vietnam, in the Gulf of Tonkin, when they were reportedly attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Though he claimed the American ships were in international waters rather than being close to the North Vietnamese coast, and though he was aware that the evidence for the attacks being unprovoked was dubious, President Lyndon B. Johnson wasted no time in presenting a resolution to Congress seeking to defend American interests in the region by any means the president deemed necessary and proper. Defining Moment

After their defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French colonial army left Southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese nationalist and communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, declared an independent Vietnam. However, the peace conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, divided the country into two halves, with Ho Chi Minh’s nationalists in the north and a corrupt, but pro-Western, government under President Ngo Dinh Diem in the south, with elections to reunify the country scheduled for 1956. Diem, however, refused to hold the elections, establishing a dictatorship in South Vietnam. The ensuing years saw the rapid growth of the Viet Cong: nationalists living in the south, but supportive of a unified Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership. By 1960, the Viet Cong had the official support of the government and armed forces of North Vietnam.

Diem’s popularity among his own people (who were overwhelmingly Buddhist, while Diem was Catholic) faded during the early 1960s, and when a Buddhist monk set himself on fire in Saigon in June 1963, many South Vietnamese turned against him. A coup d’état, supported by the CIA, overthrew Diem on November 1, 1963, and he was assassinated the next day. With the upheaval in South Vietnam and the continued growth of the Viet Cong with material support from North Vietnam, the US government was more committed than ever to preventing the North Vietnamese from unifying the country under communist rule. As this was in the midst of the Cold War, American policy was heavily influenced by the so-called Domino Theory, which stated that if one country were to be allowed to fall to communism it would only lead to more and more communist uprisings throughout the region. During the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy began to increase American aid to South Vietnam, sending large amounts of military hardware and, beginning in 1961, American military advisors. By the end of 1962, the number of military advisors had increased to 12,000, and American helicopter crews began flying missions in the country. By the time of Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, about 16,700 American military advisors were in South Vietnam, though he remained opposed to direct American involvement in combat operations. By the summer of 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson, who advocated a more proactive American role in protecting the independence of South Vietnam, was increasing American military presence both in South Vietnam and in the waters off the coast of both North and South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese military had proven no more able to stabilize the country than had Diem, and Johnson was convinced that only the American military and American intelligence efforts

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would be able to prevent the North Vietnamese from taking over. Author Biography

President Lyndon B. Johnson and the vast majority of the members of the United States Congress shared a common vision of the world order in some of the tensest years of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Every conflict was viewed in the context of the geopolitical struggle between the super-

powers, and Vietnam is perhaps the greatest example of this. Rather than seeing it as a fight between Vietnamese nationalists and French colonizers or pro-Western Vietnamese, the American government as a whole viewed the conflict as a simple matter of communism vs. anti-communism. Any actions taken by the United States in Vietnam were taken to prevent not only Vietnam from becoming a communist nation, and thus, a Soviet puppet state, but also to prevent all of Southeast Asia from falling to a series of communist uprisings.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT President Johnson’s Address to the Public August 4, 1964 My fellow Americans: As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses. The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy. But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations. In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war. I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support. And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight. It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America, but it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace; that firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

*** Gulf of Tonkin Resolution August 7, 1964 Joint Resolution To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United Stated naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and Whereas these attackers are part of deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protest their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their destinies in their own way: Now, therefore be it

Document Analysis

On August 2, 1962, the USS Maddox, an American naval destroyer, was reportedly attacked with torpedoes by a number of small North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. A second encounter, including the Maddox and a second American destroyer, the USS Turner Joy, was reported two days later. On the date of the second attack President Lyndon B. Johnson went on television to inform the American public of the incidents and to recommend immediate reprisals, including a bombing campaign to be carried out by the Air Force. Behind the actions in the Gulf of Tonkin, however, was a determination reached by the Johnson administration by August 1964 that the only way to prevent a North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam was direct American military action. American surveillance, such as that being carried out in North Vietnamese waters by ships like the Maddox and Turner Joy, revealed large amounts of supplies and personnel flowing from

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Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

the north to the south. However, when the incidents on August 2 and August 4 were reported to the American public, no mention was made of this or the fact that the actions did not take place in international waters. As it turned out, the attack on the Turner Joy may have never taken place at all. Johnson’s response to the attacks was to inform the American public and immediately call for Congress to authorize the use of force to defend American military installations in Southeast Asia. This led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which passed House of Representatives unanimously and the Senate with only two opposing votes. Rather than viewing the conflict in Vietnam as an internal civil war, the resolution put the actions in stark, Cold War terms, declaring that “these attackers are part of deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom.” It au-

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thorized President Johnson “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.” Johnson’s television address had the desired effect, at least for the time being, in that it gave the American people and the Congress a tangible reason to support American military involvement in Vietnam. Essential Themes

The joint resolution that Congress passed on August 7, 1964, declared that the North Vietnamese had “deliberately and repeatedly attacked United Stated naval vessels lawfully present in international waters”, which was based on the information that the Johnson administration had provided. The resolution was for the express purpose of promoting and maintaining “international peace and security in southeast Asia,” but had the effect of acting as a de facto declaration of war against North Vietnam. Congress did not see it that way, as they expected that the president, as commander-inchief, would have to ask Congress for any additional expansion of the conflict. Johnson, however, repeatedly used the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as justification for expanding American military involvement in what became the Vietnam War, stating that he the resolution was “like grandma’s night shirt—it covered everything.” Though neither Johnson nor Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were sure of the veracity of the reports of the second attack, Johnson did not hesitate to use the attack to drum up support for expanded American involvement in Vietnam. The Maddox, which carried electronic spy equipment, had not been in international waters as Johnson claimed, but was

collecting intelligence close to the coast of North Vietnam. Though stories of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis being manufactured for political reasons increasingly gained traction as the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular, evidence supporting the allegations gradually accumulated. However, by that time, the war was on. Retaliatory air strikes began immediately, and American forces bombed the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main supply line carrying materials from North Vietnam to Viet Cong guerrilla fighters in South Vietnam. In March 1965, the United States commenced Operation Rolling Thunder, a three-year-long massive strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnamese targets in order to reduce North Vietnam’s ability to support the insurgency in the south. Also in March 1965, the first American combat troops arrived to defend the Da Nang Air Base in South Vietnam, beginning an escalation that would see over a half million American troops in the region at its height. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Holt, 1999. MacLear, Michael. Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War. Toronto: Methuen, 1981. Print. Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1988. Print. Siff, Ezra Y. Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America’s Vietnam War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. Print.

LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest”

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 LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest” Date: April 7, 1965 Author: Lyndon Baines Johnson Genre: speech Summary Overview

For all of his great achievements, Lyndon Baines Johnson, the thirty-sixth president of the United States, is perhaps best remembered, rightly or wrongly, for taking America to war in Vietnam. What ultimately became one of the costliest wars in United States history, in both material and lives, had its roots in a profound fear of communism and a loss of American international standing. Johnson’s rationale for the war, and his strategy for fighting it, were best laid out in a speech he delivered at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965. Considered perhaps the most important foreign policy statement of the Johnson administration, the speech, billed as “Peace Without Conquest,” was an attempt to stem the growing alarm across the United States at the sudden escalation of the war by a man who had run for president the previous year on promises of peace. Ultimately, the speech offers insight into Johnson’s flawed understanding of the Vietnam conflict, and why, in hindsight, his strategy for war was doomed to failure from the start. Defining Moment

After the defeat of the Axis powers at the end of World War II, after Soviet forces occupied the countries they “liberated” from the Nazis, and after China fell to the Communist forces of Mao Zedong, Western leaders began to fear what they called the “Domino Effect.” If one country in a region were to succumb to communism, then, the theory held, eventually all countries in the region would succumb to communism. It was belief in this theory that led to Western intervention in the Korean conflict, and why, beginning with Eisenhower and continuing with Kennedy, the United States began to take an ever greater interest in the small Southeast Asian country of Vietnam. Long under French colonial rule, the Vietnamese had successfully overthrown their European masters in what was called the First Indochina War. As part of the

negotiated peace, Vietnam was divided, much as Korea had been, between the communist north and the loyalist south. However, in 1954, pro-communist forces, known as the Viet Cong, began a guerilla campaign to bring the south under northern rule. As fighting escalated and the despotic regime of South Vietnam took ever harsher measures to deal with the insurrection, the superpowers began to take interest. While China and the Soviet Union began sending aid to the North, the United States became ever more involved in the South. Tensions ran high until 1963, when South Vietnam’s government was overthrown and the conflict with communist forces escalated. Up until the assassination of President Kennedy, the United States had limited its involvement to a financial and advisory role; however, this quickly changed after the election of President Johnson. Despite having run as a peace candidate, Johnson greatly increased US-aid to South Vietnam. Using the Gulf of Tonkin Incident as a pretext, and armed with Congressional approval, Johnson began a coordinated bombing campaign of the North, while bolstering the South’s defenses with American ground troops. The sudden escalation in American involvement was strongly criticized by many across the nation, especially a small, but highly influential minority in the media. American allies as well complained about what they saw as a kind of neo-imperialism perpetrated by the United States. It was amidst this backdrop that Johnson decided to address not only the nation, but the world, as to justify American military intervention in Vietnam. If the Johnson administration were to wage a war abroad, it would need to win the war of public opinion at home. Author Biography

Lyndon Baines Johnson was born in Stonewall, Texas, in August 1908. The oldest of five children, Johnson gravitated toward debate and public speaking at an early age. After receiving a degree in education, John-

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son first went into teaching and then, in 1930, politics. After receiving a law degree and having worked as a congressional aide, Johnson was elected to Congress as a Democrat in 1937 to represent Texas’ tenth congressional district. A devoted member of Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition, Johnson soon made a name for himself as a wheeler and dealer, able to convince even the most obstinate foes of the righteousness of his cause. After a distinguished naval career during World War II, Johnson was elected to the United States Senate and quickly rose through the ranks, first to become majority whip and later the leader of the Senate Democrats. Respected, admired, and feared, Johnson ran for president in the 1960 Democratic primary. Having

lost to his chief rival, the junior Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, Johnson begrudgingly, and much to the chagrin of the Kennedys, accepted the nomination as vice president. Often marginalized by the Kennedy administration, Johnson became president after Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 and was elected in his own right in 1964 by an impressive margin. Despite having done considerable work on social welfare and civil rights, Johnson’s presidency was marred by the growing war in Vietnam. Facing ever more hostile public opinion, Johnson chose not to run for reelection in 1968 and withdrew from public life. Lyndon Baines Johnson died in January 1973.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Mr. Garland, Senator Brewster, Senator Tydings, Members of the congressional delegation, members of the faculty of Johns Hopkins, student body, my fellow Americans: Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world. I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government. Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam’s steaming soil. Why must we take this painful road? Why must this Nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away? We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny.

And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure. This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace. We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place. The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from north to south. This support is the heartbeat of the war. And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities. The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest”

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes. Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam? We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence. And I intend to keep that promise. To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong. We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America’s word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war. We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: “Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.” There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China’s power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up. There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason

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that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom. OUR OBJECTIVE IN VIET-NAM Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is absolutely necessary. In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires. We do this in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties. And we do this to convince the leaders of North VietNam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a very simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement. We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace. We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery, the will to endure as well as the will to resist. I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to any challenge. Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending. Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

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Such peace demands an independent South VietNam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country. These are the essentials of any final settlement. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones. We have stated this position over and over again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready, with this purpose, for unconditional discussions. And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command. But we will use it. This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle. These countries of southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrestle existence from the soil. They are often wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40. Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the work of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works. Now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North VietNam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible. The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area. As far back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office, and his deep knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development. For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress. The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and the existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done. The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority]. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills that are needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort. I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn, rice and cotton. So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding, patriotic, distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank. In areas that are still ripped by conflict, of course development will not be easy. Peace will be necessary for

LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest”

final success. But we cannot and must not wait for peace to begin this job. THE DREAM OF WORLD ORDER This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country now—does not always come without conflict. We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful; or because we have made some mistakes; or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions. But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation. We will do this because our own security is at stake. But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true. For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so. For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so. For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so. The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam—of China and India—of Russia and America—are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed. Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

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I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers. But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can. We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly. A dam built across a great river is impressive. In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and the homes heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA [Rural Electric Authority]. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive. A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive. The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive. These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American Nation believes to be impressive. And, if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so. Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough? Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we could? Have we done enough? We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: “I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live.” This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale never dreamed of before.

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Well, we will choose life. In so doing we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind. To Dr. Eisenhower and Mr. Garland, and this great

institution, Johns Hopkins, I thank you for this opportunity to convey my thoughts to you and to the American people. Good night.

GLOSSARY delegation: a group of representatives infirmities: physical or mental weaknesses turbulence: violent movement; upheaval

Document Analysis

In his speech, Johnson attempts to do several things. Foremost, the president tries to reassure critics that he is focused on peace. He affirms that he is willing to do everything and anything, including one-on-on or multiparty negotiations to come to a fair and equitable agreement. If the aims of keeping South Vietnam free can be achieved through diplomacy, his administration will exhaust every option. He also tries to win over the people of South Vietnam by offering a billion dollars in aid to help develop the Mekong River basin. Very much in keeping with Johnson’s New Deal roots, the massive UN-led project would transform South Vietnam and perhaps the region. He recalls the changes brought about to the United States thanks to massive public works projects. The message Johnson hoped this would send to the Vietnamese and the peoples of Southeast Asia was that the United States was not just bringing war, it was going to help remake and revitalize the region. However, amidst the promises of aid and peace, Johnson also warns that the United States will use whatever military power is at its disposal to forcefully keep communism at bay. The war in Vietnam, Johnson reasons, is not a small squabble over an insignificant third world country, this is a direct conflict with China and the Soviet Union. At stake is not just the freedom of South Vietnam, but the freedom of the world, and perhaps more importantly, the prestige and international standing of the United States. Johnson states clearly that American military forces will stay in Vietnam no matter how long it takes: “We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired.” Central to his military policy in Vietnam, Johnson points to

the bombing of the north. Through airstrikes he hopes to weaken and demoralize the North Vietnamese and their allies to the point where they are forced to seek peace. Although all options are on the table, Johnson reiterates again and again that South Vietnam must remain a free nation. America made a promise, and it is a promise that Johnson intends to keep. Essential Themes

Lyndon Johnson’s attempt to turn domestic public opinion in favor of military action in Vietnam was a resounding success. Promising both peace and strength, Johnson was able to walk a tight line, reassuring both critics and supporters. In a sense he was echoing the sentiments of past presidents, such as Woodrow Wilson, and his mentor Franklin Roosevelt, that America wants only freedom and equality for all and is willing to use force, albeit reluctantly, to achieve it. Peace advocates could rally around Johnson’s willingness to negotiate, while hawks could applaud his renewed pledge to continue attacking the enemy until victory was achieved. Here was the carrot and the stick. America’s allies too, generally approved of the speech, praising Johnson’s focus on aid and diplomacy. Not surprisingly, communist countries reacted with hostility, focusing almost entirely on the warmongering rhetoric. In Vietnam, both north and south reacted with a mixture of confusion and unease. This feeling of anxiety soon seeped into all corners, as in the months following the speech, the Johnson administration escalated the bombing campaign, pausing here and there in an awkward strategy to allow the North Vietnamese to negotiate. In the end, the speech was little more than

LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest”

empty rhetoric. With a blank check from Congress, Johnson ramped up American military involvement in Vietnam. Within months, thousands more troops were sent to Southeast Asia, and American bombers were dropping unimagined quantities of ordnance (explosive weapons) on Hanoi and other North Vietnamese cities. As the war in Vietnam became ever bloodier, Johnson’s domestic agenda, including the War on Poverty and the Great Society, began to lose support. Soon a new and vocal antiwar movement began to gain ever more traction, especially from those of fighting age, and Johnson, who in 1964 had won the presidency with an impressive 486 out of 538 electoral votes, became one of the most unpopular presidents in modern history. The “Peace Without Conquest” speech was the high-water mark for the Johnson administration. It was height of Johnson’s popularity and also the beginning of

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the end of his presidency. It was only four years later, facing opposition from all sides, and an unwinnable war abroad, that Lyndon Baines Johnson decided not to run for a second term. —KP Dawes, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Herring, George. America’s Longest War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996. Print. VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Print. Yuravlivker, Dror. “‘Peace without Conquest’: Lyndon Johnson’s Speech of April 7, 1965.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 36.3 (2006): 457–481. Print.

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 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Date: January 27, 1967 Geographic Regions: London, Moscow, and Washington, DC Authors: Legal Subcommittee of the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs Genre: treaty Summary Overview

In 1967, at the height of the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations drafted, and ninety-two nations signed, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In many ways, it was an anticolonial treaty, in that it both sought to prevent the superpowers (and any other nations that might someday establish a presence in space) from using space for military purposes and articulated a utopian vision of space science as conducted for the benefit of all of humanity. Though the space race was still a Cold War endeavor, internationally, there was a common desire among nations to see countries share the advantages of their discoveries with one another. Defining Moment

Although rocketry had been in existence for centuries, the militarization of rocketry during World War II started what would come to be known as the space race. Near the end of the war, Germany had developed the V-2 rocket, which was the world’s first ballistic missile, traveling on the edge of space. In fact, the designer of the V-2, Wernher von Braun, surrendered to the Americans and later proved instrumental in the American space effort; the Redstone rocket that carried the first American into space derived from the V-2. However daunting the idea of ballistic missiles was, the use of satellites as a platform for launching nuclear weapons was even more frightening. In 1957, the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, setting the space race into motion. Americans pushed for their government to match the Soviets, fearing that the advantage the Soviets enjoyed might translate into military superiority. In reality, space has been used for military purposes, but in terms of espionage and anti-

satellite weaponry, not space-based nuclear warheads aimed at targets on Earth. One thing that the launch of Sputnik 1 did prove was that the Soviets had rockets large and sophisticated enough to transport nuclear weapons to the United States, and this military aspect of the space race proved to be the primary motivation for the American efforts that followed. In 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that if the Soviets were to achieve a significant military presence in space, it would constitute a direct threat to the military preparedness of the United States. Even as both the Soviets and Americans dreamed of using space as the basis for military superiority, scientists in both nations and many others were participating in events such as the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year (IGY), which emphasized the peaceful uses of science to advance humanity. In fact, both the launch of Sputnik 1 and the American efforts that culminated in the January 1958 launch of Explorer 1 were to be part of the IGY’s emphasis on science and peace. Also, as a part of the IGY, twelve nations sent scientists to study in Antarctica cooperatively and in the name of peace. These twelve nations signed the Antarctic Treaty (1959), agreeing not to use Antarctica for military purposes but for the benefit of humanity. In many ways, the United Nations used the principles of the Antarctic Treaty—which called for the continent to become “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”—to shape its similar treaty for the uses of space. Author Biography

In June 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted drafts of a possible treaty on the uses of outer space to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. On December 8, the committee announced that an agreement had been

Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space

reached between the twenty-eight member nations. On December 19, the UN General Assembly approved the treaty unanimously, and it was sent to the member nations to ratify. Many hoped the treaty would be a first step toward nuclear disarmament, because it represent-

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ed an agreement between nations on opposite sides of the Cold War. In essence, the members of the United Nations hoped that scientific cooperation in space would translate to both scientific cooperation and disarmament on Earth.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS TREATY, INSPIRED by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, RECOGNIZING the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, BELIEVING that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, DESIRING to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, BELIEVING that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, RECALLING resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space”, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963, RECALLING resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963, TAKING account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space, CONVINCED that a Treaty on Principles Governing

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the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING: Article I The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation. Article II Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article III States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

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Article IV States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited. Article V In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties. Article VI States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization. Article VII Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party

from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. Article VIII A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party of the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return. Article IX In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party

Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space

to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment. Article X In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned. Article XI In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively. Article XII All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

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Article XIII The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international inter-governmental organizations. Any practical questions arising in connexion with activities carried on by international inter-governmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty. Article XIV 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Gov-

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ernments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it. Article XVI Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments.

Document Analysis

The premise of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is an optimistic view of the future and the potential role that space exploration can play in creating an environment for two antagonistic superpowers to cooperate for the benefit of humanity. At the same time, the treaty creates guidelines to ensure that no single nation dominates space or benefits solely from the scientific breakthroughs that are sure to come. Most important, and noted before the actual articles that make up the bulk of the treaty text, it reiterates the United Nations’ call for the participants not to place any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space. Although only the United States and Soviet Union had viable space programs at the time, the treaty decrees that all of space and the celestial bodies therein “shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.” No national claims are to be made in space or on the moon, and the first three articles in the treaty make this clear. International law, rather than the laws of any individual nation, will govern the exploration and use of space. The later articles of the treaty articulate a vision of space exploration that emphasizes cooperation and mutual good will. The space-faring nations are responsible for their own equipment, whether that be satellites,

Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification. Article XVII This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.

space stations, or installations on the moon, and are liable for any harm caused to the equipment or installations of another nation. Astronauts and other space explorers are to be viewed as ambassadors of mankind, and if any space explorers need help, explorers from other nations are expected to render assistance. The document makes clear that space is to be used for the benefit of all of the signing nations. The provisions of the treaty are to be verified voluntarily; nations are to inform the United Nations of the locations and nature of all installations in space and on celestial bodies such as the moon. Such installations are to be open to representatives from other nations to visit. Essential Themes

The utopian vision cast by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space was only partially met. Even at the time that the treaty was signed in 1967, both the United States and the Soviet Union had launched military satellites. More concerned with weaponized space installations, the United Nations did not penalize the nations for having nonaggressive military equipment in space. This concession was important to the United States especially. Before the advent of reconnaissance satellites, the U-2 spy plane was the chief method the United States employed to perform photographic reconnaissance on the Soviet Union. This strategy had already proved problematic: in 1960, the Soviet Union

Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space

shot down a U-2 in its air space. The pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was tried in a propaganda event, which greatly embarrassed the United States. The development of reconnaissance satellites made such flights unnecessary, as a single satellite could collect more data than all of the U-2 flights put together. Additionally, the treaty did not prohibit military personnel from participating in scientific research in space. However, this provision provided enough loopholes that both the United States and the Soviet Union regularly conducted military research in space. As long as the countries did not deploy complete weapons systems, the treaty’s provisions were considered to have been met. For the most part, the treaty prevented the outright militarization of space. However, in the 1980s, US president Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (the so-called Star Wars missile defense system), which, if it had been implemented, would have been in direct violation of the treaty. Several other treaties regarding the uses of space followed the first, including the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968; the Rescue Agreement); the Convention on International Li-

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ability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972; the Liability Convention); and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976; the Registration Convention). The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space continues to act as the international body overseeing the treaties. —Steven L. Danver, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Christol, C. Q. The Modern International Law of Outer Space. New York: Pergamon, 1984. Print. Dembling, Paul G., and Daniel M. Arons. “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty.” Journal of Air Law and Commerce 33 (1967): 419–56. Print. Markoff, Marko G. “Disarmament and ‘Peaceful Purposes’ Provisions in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.” Journal of Space Law 4 (1976): 3–22. Print. Morgan, Richard A. “Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and ‘Peaceful Purposes.’” Journal of Air Law and Commerce 60 (1994): 237–326. Print. Reijnen, Bess C. M. The United Nations Space Treaties Analyzed. Gif-sur-Yvette: Editions Frontières. 1992.

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 The “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto Date: July 27, 1968 Author: Ludvík Vaculík Country: Czechoslovakia Genre: essay; political tract Summary Overview

In this 1968 manifesto, Czech writer Ludvík Vaculík denounced the repressive rule of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and called for reform. He described the situation in Czechoslovakia in terms of the failure of the Communist leadership, though without challenging Communism itself or the Czechoslovak government’s dependency on the Soviet Union. He saw the rule of the Communist Party as authoritarian and corrupting to Czech society. However, he also saw reform-minded Communists as potential allies. Vaculík called for popular activism. He also recognized the possibility of foreign (meaning Soviet) intervention to suppress the reform movement, saying that the people would fight for a government that represents them. Defining Moment

In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union occupied many Eastern European countries, including Czechoslovakia, and placed Communist governments in power there. (Not all Eastern European Communist governments were Soviet allies; Yugoslavia and later Albania were exceptions.) Like the Soviet Union itself, Eastern European Communist governments operated on the Leninist model of the one-party state, in which every aspect of state power was controlled by the Communist Party. Secret police forces modeled on the Soviet KGB were essential instruments of rule, and Soviet troops continued to maintain bases in many countries. The Eastern European countries controlled by the Soviet Union were bound in an economic agreement, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), founded in 1949, and a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, founded in 1955. Eastern European Communist governments faced a series of challenges over the following decades, particularly after Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “deStalinization” speech in 1956. At first, these challenges

were usually precipitated by divisions within the ruling Communist parties. Czechoslovakia’s “Prague Spring” in 1968 was one of the most dramatic and influential challenges to Communism in the period of Communist domination of Eastern Europe. Like the earlier Hungarian uprising of 1956, it began with dissension within the Communist Party itself. In January 1968, the reformist Communist Alexander Dubček took over leadership of Czechoslovakia from the more authoritarian Antonín Novotný. Dubček began some cautious steps toward liberalization, including the limited legitimization of political activity outside the Communist Party and the end of censorship. Dubček’s reforms encouraged Czechoslovaks to press for more changes, possibly even democratization, but it also caused concern among Communist hard-liners in and out of Czechoslovakia, and particularly in the Soviet regime of Leonid Brezhnev. Author Biography

Ludvík Vaculík was a member of the Czechslovak Communist Party and the Writers Union, the official organization of Czechoslovak writers. In July 1967, he gave a speech at the Writers Union Congress attacking the leadership of the party and the concept of the party’s leading role in society, a fundamental tenet of orthodox, Soviet-style Communism. The next year, with the encouragement of reform-minded members of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, and cosigned by dozens of other writers and intellectuals, Vaculík published this essay, under the full title “The Two Thousand Words That Belong to Workers, Farmers, Officials, Scientists, Artists, and Everybody.” It initially appeared in three Czech newspapers and one literary weekly, in June 1968, a day after the abolition of censorship. Following the end of the Prague Spring and the reestablishment of an authoritarian Communist regime,

The “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto

Vaculík, along with many other dissidents, was expelled from the Communist Party and faced harsh censorship and repression. He became active in the circulation of illegal manuscripts known as samizdat, and was one of

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the signatories of the 1977 democratic manifesto Charter 77. He survived to see the fall of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia in 1989, the dissolution of the country into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and died in 2015.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Two Thousand Words that Belong to Workers, Farmers, Officials, Scientists, Artists, and Everybody The first threat to our national life was from war. Than came other evil days and events that endangered the nation’s spiritual well-being and character. Most of the nation welcomed the socialist program with high hopes. But it fell into the hands of the wrong people. It would not have mattered so much that they lacked adequate experience in affairs of state, factual knowledge, or philosophical education, if only they had had enough common prudence and decency to listen to the opinion of others and agree to being gradually replaced by more able people. After enjoying great popular confidence immediately after the war, the communist party by degrees bartered this confidence away for office, until it had all the offices and nothing else. We feel we must say this, it is familiar to those of us who are communists and who are as disappointed as the rest at the way things turned out. The leaders’ mistaken policies transformed a political party and an alliance based on ideas into an organization for exerting power, one that proved highly attractive to power-hungry individuals eager to wield authority, to cowards who took the safe and easy route, and to people with bad conscience. The influx of members such as these affected the character and behavior of the party, whose internal arrangements made it impossible, short of scandalous incidents, for honest members to gain influence and adapt it continuously to modern conditions. Many communists fought against this decline, but they did not manage to prevent what ensued. Conditions inside the communist party served as both a pattern for and a cause of the identical conditions in the state. The party’s association with the state deprived it of the asset of separation from executive power. No one criticized the activities of the state and of economic organs. Parliament forgot how to hold proper

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debates, the government forgot how to govern properly, and managers forgot how to manage properly. Elections lost their significance, and the law carried no weight. We could not trust our representatives on any committee or, if we could, there was no point in asking them for anything because they were powerless. Worse still, we could scarcely trust one another. Personal and collective honor decayed. Honesty was a useless virtue, assessment by merit unheard of. Most people accordingly lost interest in public affairs, worrying only about themselves and about money, a further blot on the system being the impossibility today of relying even on the value of money. Personal relations were ruined, there was no more joy in work, and the nation, in short, entered a period that endangered its spiritual well-being and its character. . . . *** Since the beginning of this year we have been experiencing a regenerative process of democratization. It started inside the communist party, that much we must admit, even those communists among us who no longer had hopes that anything good could emerge from that quarter know this. It must also be added, of course, that the process could have started nowhere else. For after twenty years the communists were the only ones able to conduct some sort of political activity. It was only the opposition inside the communist party that had the privilege to voice antagonistic views. The effort and initiative now displayed by democratically-minded communists are only then a partial repayment of the debt owned by the entire party to the non-communists whom it had kept down in an inequal position. Accordingly, thanks are due to the communist party, though perhaps it should be granted that the party is making an honest effort at the eleventh hour to save its own honor and the nation’s. The regenerative process has introduced nothing particularly new into our lives. It revives ideas and topics, many of which are older than the errors of our socialism, while others, having emerged from below the surface of visible history,

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should long ago have found expression but were instead repressed. Let us not foster the illusion that it is the power of truth which now makes such ideas victorious. Their victory has been due rather to the weakness of the old leaders, evidently already debilitated by twenty years of unchallenged rule. All the defects hidden in the foundations and ideology of the system have clearly reached their peak. So let us not overestimate the effects of the writers’ and students’ criticisms. The source of social change is the economy. A true word makes its mark only when it is spoken under conditions that have been properly prepared—conditions that, in our context, unfortunately include the impoverishment of our whole society and the complete collapse of the old system of government, which had enabled certain types of politicians to get rich, calmly and quietly, at our expense. Truth, then, is not prevailing. Truth is merely what remains when everything else has been frittered away. So there is no reason for national jubilation, simply for fresh hope. In this moment of hope, albeit hope still threatened, we appeal to you. It took several months before many of us believed it was safe to speak up; many of us still do not think it is safe. But speak up we did exposing ourselves to the extent that we have no choice but to complete our plan to humanize the regime. If we did not, the old forces would exact cruel revenge. We appeal about all to those who so far have waited on the sidelines. The time now approaching will decide events for years to come. . . .

Document Analysis

Vaculík lays out a denunciation of the Czechoslovak regime and a brief narrative of how things arrived at their present state. The troubles begin with World War II, in which Czechoslovakia lost its national independence and even its existence to Nazi Germany. The socialist program of the Soviet-backed Communists may have raised people’s hopes momentarily, but it had become a disaster both materially and spiritually. The merger of party and state institutions, key to the Leninist program, was corrupting to both, in Vaculík’s telling. As the Communist Party became more oriented toward simply holding power, it attracted people into its leadership who were interested in power and not ideas or policy. Governmental institutions had lost any accountability to society, as elections became meaningless forms. The

*** There has been great alarm recently over the possibility that foreign forces will intervene in our development. Whatever superior forces may face us, all we can do is stick to our own positions, behave decently, and initiate nothing ourselves. We can show our government that we will stand by it, with weapons if need be, if it will do what we give it a mandate to do. And we can assure our allies that we will observe our treaties of alliance, friendship, and trade. Irritable reproaches and ill-argued suspicions on our part can only make things harder for our government, and bring no benefit to ourselves. In any case, the only way we can achieve equality is to improve our domestic situation and carry the process of renewal far enough to some day elect statesmen with sufficient courage, honor, and political acumen to create such equality and keep it that way. But this is a problem that faces all governments of small countries everywhere. *** This spring a great opportunity was given to us once again, as it was after the end of the war. Again we have the chance to take into our own hands our common cause, which for working purposes we call socialism, and give it a form more appropriate to our once-good reputation and to be fairly good opinion we used to have ourselves. The spring is over and will never return. By winter we will know all. . . .

government’s corruption reached into private life and society, as citizens lost the ability to trust each other. Even Czech money was becoming worthless. Vaculík says that as the Communist Party expanded its control and the space for public political debate shrank, the only place where debate still continued came to be within the party itself. He credits “democratically-minded communists” in the party with attempting an “eleventh hour” program of reform—presumably visible in Dubček’s rise to power. Although Vaculík’s denunciation of the regime overall is bitter, it is reformist rather than revolutionary. Vaculík does not attack Communism per se or the regime’s dependency on the Soviet Union by name, although the threat from “foreign forces” he refers to are clearly the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. Vaculík claims that

The “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto

many Communists had fought against the corruption of the Communist leadership and were equally victims with non-Communist Czechoslovaks. He does not invoke Western states as models, and he closes with an invocation of “our common cause, which for working purposes we call socialism.” Vaculík calls for civic action involving the people who have not yet involved themselves in reform efforts, who have “waited on the sidelines”; their help is needed to complete “our plan to humanize the regime.” Vaculík does not envision Czechoslovakia leaving the Soviet bloc, as can be seen by his claim that it should not change any of its existing relationships. He does however leave open the possibility that the Czech people would defend a reformist Czech government from foreign (i.e. Soviet) forces “with weapons if need be,” although he does not emphasize this. His words make clear that neither the return of hard-line Communism nor the victory of democratization is inevitable, and that much depends on the coming months. Essential Themes

Both the content of this document and the fact that it was published without any official authorization or prior consultation with the Communist authorities energized Czechoslovaks who believed that reform of the system was possible. However, it also raised the concern of the Soviet leadership over the dangers of the Czechoslovak opposition and the weakening of Communism in that country. Dubček, like Vaculík, hoped that Czechoslovakia’s remaining in the Warsaw Pact would be enough for the Soviets to tolerate the Prague Spring reforms, but this hoped proved vain. The Prague Spring ended the night of August 20 with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and allied Warsaw Pact forces. Despite mostly nonviolent resistance, the Soviets reestablished strongly authoritarian Communist rule through superior force. (The Czechoslovak invasion is sometimes considered the first expression of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet belief in intervening in situations where an existing Communist government of a Soviet ally was threatened.) Although Dubček clung to power until the following April, he was then replaced by the hard-line Communist Gustav Husák, who reversed Dubček’s reforms. The new re-

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gime was even more repressive than the Czechoslovak Communist Party had been before the Prague Spring. The type of opposition that “The Two Thousand Words” showed to Communist leadership, without attacking Communism itself, quickly became obsolete as dissidents took a more forthrightly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet approach. They also began to identify more openly with the capitalist and democratic West and to seek alliances there. Vaculík’s book recounting his experiences as a dissenter, A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator (1987), was published in the West, as were the works of other Czechoslovak dissenters. This was true throughout the Soviet bloc as well as in Czechoslovakia—the next major reformist movement, Poland’s Solidarity movement, emerged outside the Communist Party and was uninterested in Communist reform. The struggle against the Czechoslovak Communist regime ended in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, when the Communists were peaceably overthrown following the liberalization of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and his renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Velvet Revolution was followed by the dissolution of Czechoslovakia along ethnic lines into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1991. —William E. Burns, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bilefsky, Dan. “Ludvik Vaculik, Influential Czech Writer and Dissident, Dies at 88.” New York Times. New York Times, 10 June 2015. Web. 11 Feb. 2016. Bischof, Günter, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds. The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Lanham: Lexington, 2010. Print. Navrátil, Jaromír, ed. The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader. New York: Central European UP, 1998. Print. Vaculík, Ludvik. A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator: The Prague Chronicles of Ludvík Vaculík. Trans. George Theiner. London: Readers Intl., 1987. Print. Williams, Kieran. The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print.

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 Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization” Date: November 03, 1969 Author: Richard M. Nixon Genre: speech Summary Overview

In his speech of November 3, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon introduced a new phrase, “silent majority,” and a new policy, termed “Vietnamization.” He distinguished the silent majority, the people that he believed supported his policies, from the “vocal minority” of antiwar protesters. Vietnamization involved shifting more of the burden of fighting the war from US troops to a larger and better trained and equipped South Vietnamese army, which would eventually permit the United States to withdraw. These terms served to frame the subsequent debate in America about the Vietnam War. Defining Moment

Denouncing those who advocated walking away from the nation’s commitments, Nixon pledged during the campaign that he could achieve “an honorable peace” in Vietnam. (The standard phrase later became “peace with honor.”) In speeches and public statements he generally assumed hardline positions on Vietnam, but he took a different line in private sessions with liberal reporters and newspaper editors. The public came to believe that he had a “secret plan to end the war,” although he did not use that terminology. The phrase was introduced by a reporter who was trying to summarize the candidate’s vague and contradictory claims regarding the possibility of a quick victory. Still, Nixon never explicitly disowned the phrase. Nixon’s actual plans focused more on reducing the United States’ direct role in the war so as to minimize domestic opposition to it. Eventually this would involve continuation of the negotiations with North Vietnam initiated by President Lyndon B. Johnson, coercive military actions to compel the North Vietnamese to make concessions in the peace talks (which was also consistent with the Johnson administration), the improved equipment and training of the South Vietnamese army (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN), and periodic announcements of unilateral US

troop withdrawals accompanied by positive reports on how the war was proceeding. This is not to say that Nixon would have rejected an acceptable settlement, but that he was prepared to continue the war in other ways if a settlement was not reached. Perceptions also mattered. In August, North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh responded to a US negotiating proposal in a manner that he may have considered a serious counteroffer, but which Nixon considered an outright rejection. In internal discussions, the notion of shifting the major burden of ground combat to ARVN was initially referred to as “de-Americanizing” the war. Eventually, the accepted term was Vietnamization. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger was skeptical of Vietnamization and warned that pressure to resolve the war quickly would increase if Vietnamization failed to reduce US casualties. In the summer of 1969, as Nixon was sending secret envoys to meet with the North Vietnamese, he also had plans drawn up for a “savage blow” against North Vietnam. The White House called the operation Duck Hook, while at the US command in Saigon it was known as Pruning Knife. Elements of the plan included heavy conventional bombing (532 sorties a day), the mining of harbors (in Cambodia, too, for good measure), and a ground invasion across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. At least some consideration was given to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The onslaught would occur in intervals of four days, with every fifth day off to give Hanoi a chance to respond, until North Vietnam agreed to negotiate seriously. A presidential speech announcing the offensive was drafted in September. (“It is my duty to tell you tonight of a major decision in our quest for an honorable peace in Vietnam.”) Without revealing details, Nixon conveyed threats of severe military action in early November if Hanoi was not forthcoming in negotiations.

Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization”

Nixon finally decided against Duck Hook/Pruning Knife on November 1. The secretaries of state and defense and members of the National Security Council staff had opposed it all along, saying it would prolong the war rather than end it; that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had not been intimidated by the threats; that it would not change the military situation within South Vietnam; that it would further fuel the antiwar movement at home; that it would elicit adverse reactions from the Soviet Union, China, and Europe; and that Hanoi would never believe that it was intended to encourage negotiations. Nixon and Kissinger later expressed regret for not following through on the plan. The “moratorium” on the war—a peace demonstration that brought hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets of Washington on October 15—helped seal the fate of Duck Hook/Pruning Knife. Nixon concluded that the show of domestic opposition undercut the credibility of the ultimatum. An even larger demonstration was planned for mid-November, and launching this offensive immediately before it could have had unpredictable results. The president also allowed that the death of Ho Chi Minh in September might open new possibilities for negotiation. Thus the circumstances for Nixon’s November 3 speech were set. In it, he set out to dampen antiwar sentiment and mobilize his supporters. By revealing the existence of “subterranean” support for his policies, he would seek to undermine resistance to his policies in the bureaucracy and in the nation as a whole.

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Author Biography

Richard Milhous Nixon was born on Jan. 9, 1913, in Yorba Linda, California, and was raised as a Quaker. He graduated from Whittier College (1934) and Duke University Law School (1937), served as an officer in the US Navy in World War II, and was elected by California to the House of Representatives in 1946. Nixon joined the House Un-American Activities Committee and gained a national reputation for his investigation of Alger Hiss, whom he accused of espionage for the Soviet Union. He won election to the Senate in 1950 and developed a reputation as a staunch anticommunist crusader (“red-baiter”). Representing the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Nixon was selected as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s running mate and served as vice president (1953–61). Selected as his party’s presidential nominee in 1960, he lost narrowly to John F. Kennedy. In 1962, he lost the election for governor of California and temporarily retired from politics. Returning to the political scene, he was elected president in 1968, after campaigning on a promise to end the war in Vietnam and to restore law and order after years of political turmoil, protests, and race riots. Despite his anticommunist reputation, he sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China, in part, but not entirely, to help extricate the United States from Vietnam. Reelected in 1972 in a landslide, he became, in 1974, the first president in US history to resign in disgrace, as a result of the Watergate affair. Nixon died on April 22, 1994.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Good evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

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Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for peace? Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20:

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The war had been going on for 4 years. 1,000 Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war. But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war. The great question is: How can we win America’s peace? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000

military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam. Now, many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others—I among them—have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before; They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves. With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation—and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North. For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world. Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: ... we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean

Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization”

a collapse not only of South VietNam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there. President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war. For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront. In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year. We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections. We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-orleave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference,

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Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave. We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiation I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace— initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might

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be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from this letter to you now: Dear Mr. President: I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one— least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war. I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive. But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants. There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news—where the lives of our young men are involved. Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams. We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression. Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”

Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization”

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia: • First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. • Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with US or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. • Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy. The defense of freedom is everybody’s business—not just America’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace. The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird’s visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces. In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams’ orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over

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20 percent. And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam. After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops. Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office. • Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year. • Most important—United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years. Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater. I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in a Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in. The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to able to report tonight

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progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid. Along with this optimistic estimate, I must—in all candor—leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be. My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. • I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. • Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or

through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary, a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom. I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace—not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world. In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people. We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right. I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.” Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street. For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause,

Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization”

prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society. And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war. I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters. I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world. And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth. I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does succeed, what the critics say now won’t matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won’t matter. I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the

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American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership. Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism. And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris. Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that. Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end war.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man. Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated— the goal of a just and lasting peace. As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it. I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with our hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers. Thank you and goodnight.

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Document Analysis

The day after his speech a number of municipal and state elections were held in which Republican and other conservative candidates did well. Nixon pointed to this as evidence that the silent majority of Americans supported him and his policies. This was, in Nixon’s view, one of the rare speeches that change the course of history. The White House received 50,000 telegrams and 30,000 letters praising the speech. An overnight poll showed support for his Vietnam policy rising to 77 percent after the speech, from 58 percent before. This was the highest rating that Nixon would receive during his first term for his handling of the war. It was not entirely a coincidence. The Nixon White House had an unprecedented apparatus for measuring and influencing public opinion, which involved both in-house and commercial polling operations. In addition to keeping close track of trends in opinion, the administration would propose “loaded” questions in order to boost favorable responses. (A 1970 survey allegedly intended to gauge the public reaction to the Cambodia incursion asked, “Do you support the president’s action to end the war in Vietnam, to avoid getting into a war in Cambodia, to protect U.S. troops?”) In this case, the administration sought to preempt opinion in a variety of ways. For instance, the White House—according to court testimony thirty years later, in 1999, by former Nixon aide Alexander Butterworth—solicited positive letters and telegrams from labor unions, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, Air Force retirees, governors, and state Republican chairmen. (Butterworth described the response as “contrived” but sincere.) White House chief of staff (and former advertising executive) H. R. Haldeman reported in his diary that, on the night of the speech, the president ordered him to “get 100 vicious dirty calls to New York Times and Washington Post about their editorials (even though no idea what they’ll be).” Nixon always assumed the press would be negative. The polling surge, however, was short lived, lasting about two weeks. So was the mail campaign. Three weeks after the speech, the number of antiwar letters to the White House outnumbered supportive letters once again. Essential Themes

In mid-October, when Nixon sat down to write the first draft his November 3 speech, he started with a note to

himself. He scrawled across the top of his note pad: “Don’t Get Rattled—Don’t Waver—Don’t React.” The speech began with Nixon’s assertion that he was interested in peace, but specified that he intended to “win” the peace. After briefly reviewing the origins of the war in a manner that overlooked any US responsibility, he detailed reasons why the United States had to stay in the war. (“For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude. . . . It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.”) And, to be sure, exiting an ongoing war without strongly adverse consequences is not a simple matter. Nixon outlined the conciliatory steps that he was prepared to take and his willingness to discuss the other side’s proposals, attributing the failure to make progress fully to the North Vietnamese. At that point, he shifted the discussion to the policy of Vietnamization, which he described as an aspect of the Nixon Doctrine (or Guam Doctrine), which he had first proclaimed on the island of Guam on July 25, 1969. The Nixon Doctrine was a plan to minimize US intervention in the developing world by building up local allies (“pillars of stability”) to defend themselves and to police their own respective regions with the support of the United States. Thus the United States would arm, train, and equip the military forces of South Vietnam so that they could fight their own battles. This would permit the United States to initiate a gradual withdrawal of its forces, a process that had already begun. Eventually, he said, all US forces would be removed “on an orderly scheduled timetable,” although he did indicate the length of that timetable. The timing would be tied to conditions on the ground: the strength of ARVN, the reduction in US casualties, and the level of infiltration of enemy forces into South Vietnam. With his plan, he offered something both to those who did not want to give up on the Vietnam War and to those who wanted more than anything to leave the war behind. Finally, contrasting his proposal to a hasty and calamitous abandoning of an ally, he distinguished between the “vocal minority” of Americans who protested the war and demanded an immediate exit and the “great silent majority” who supported his approach, whom he identified with reason, and upon whose political support he would rely. At the same time, he saw in this division (but mostly in the war’s opponents) grave threats not only to the war effort, but to the future of the United States itself. (“If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority

Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization”

this Nation has no future as a free society. . . . North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.”) —Scott C. Monje, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Berman, Larry. No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 2001. Print. Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. The Great Silent Majority: Nixon’s 1969 Speech on Vietnamization. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014. Print. Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: Putnam’s, 1994. Print.

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Katz, Andrew Z. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Administration and the Pursuit of Peace with Honor in Vietnam.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27.3 (Summer 1997): 496–513. Print. Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Print. Perlstein, Rick. Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America. New York: Scribner, 2008. Print. Rottinghaus, Brandon. “‘Dear Mr. President’: The Institutionalization and Politicization of Public Opinion Mail in the White House.” Political Science Quarterly 121.3 (2006): 451–76. Print.,

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 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Date: July 1, 1968 Author: United Nations, Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) Genre: Treaty Summary Overview

Historically, any new useful weapons technology has eventually spread from the group which originated it to other groups around the world. The fear that this would also happen with nuclear weapons was the driving force behind the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The thought process was that the more countries that had these weapons, the more likely it was that they would be used. The hope was that a treaty could be adopted that would keep the weapons limited to a few countries, lessening the risk of their use, whether intentional or accidental. Eighteen nations were charged with drawing up a treaty, although most of the substantial work was done by negotiators from the United States and the Soviet Union. The result was a treaty that was signed by virtually all the nations of the world. The treaty has generally been seen as a success. Defining Moment

The pressures to come up with the ultimate weapon to victoriously end World War II gave rise to the Manhattan Project and the development of atomic and nuclear weapons by the United States. Over the next twenty years the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China followed suit in developing bombs. Although calls for the elimination or international control of nuclear weapons had begun in 1946, no substantial progress had been made by the early 1960s. The projection was that, within a decade, another twenty nations would have nuclear weapons. In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution asking for a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. It took seven years for this request to be fulfilled, most of the progress being made in the final two years. Beginning on December 4, 1961, when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the resolution entitled “Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” many hoped that progress would

be made. Events in the wider world, however, such as the construction of the Berlin Wall, the emerging war in Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, hindered quick action. The early 1960s was not a period conducive to international cooperation. Yet, for those observing this series of crises between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the need for cooperation and arms control became more imperative. As leaders among the rival powers, the United States and the Soviet Union were central to the development of any nuclear arms control treaty. ENCD was organized in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1962, by adding eight “non-aligned” nations to the five NATO (Western) and five Warsaw Pact (Eastern) members that were initially given the task of developing arms control proposals. Both the United States and the Soviet Union introduced arms control proposals within a month of ENCD’s creation. Although progress was made in developing cooperative ventures between the United States and the Soviet Union, it took six years before the final version of the treaty was tentatively agreed to by these two nations as well as the other members of the ENCD. By March 1970, the treaty had been adopted by the required number of countries and went into effect. It has since been ratified by more than 190 countries. Three nations in existence in 1968 (India, Israel, Pakistan) never signed the treaty; neither has one (South Sudan) created since; and one (North Korea) has withdrawn from the treaty. Despite these exceptions, the NNP has been ratified, or accepted, by more nations than any other nuclear weapons treaty. Author Biography

The United Nations was formed in 1945 by fifty-one of the nations that were victorious in World War II. Since that time, membership has been offered to virtually every nation, the UN having gained its 193rd member in 2011. With many quasi-independent agencies related to the UN, it is involved in many aspects of internation-

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

al affairs. The General Assembly, in which all nations have a vote, passes many resolutions, although all substantive actions go through the Security Council (five permanent members with veto power and ten rotating members). ENCD, which existed from 1962 to 1969, had eighteen members, but only seventeen actively participated. They were: Western Bloc: Canada, France (non-participating), Italy, United Kingdom, the United

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States; Eastern Bloc: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union; Non-aligned: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. In addition to the NNP, the ENCD helped facilitate the bi-lateral Hotline Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1979, the work of the ENCD has been carried on by the Conference on Disarmament.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (entered into force March 5, 1970) The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty,” Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclearweapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all

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Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of

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the world’s human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which

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shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

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3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the sub-

Document Analysis

Although General Assembly resolution, which is the basis for beginning the negotiations leading to the NPT, focuses on the “dissemination” of nuclear weapons to new locations, the NPT moves beyond that simple goal. With the introduction in 1965 of the word “proliferation” to the discussions, the treaty became more than one that sought to limit the number of countries having nuclear weapons. It also sought to limit the “proliferation” of weapons within nuclear powers’ arsenals. In order to gain virtually worldwide adoption, the potential for peaceful research and use was granted to all nations. The NPT incorporates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA; which was created by the international community when President Eisenhower proposed “Atoms for Peace” a decade earlier) as a key player for the implementation of the treaty.

ject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

As with many treaties, the introductory paragraphs are basically public relations statements, and the closing articles (VII-XI) are steps for implementation. The goals given in the preamble indicate the potential value of the treaty. However, neither in the articles dealing with implementation nor in any outlining permissible activities, are there statements regarding the penalties for failing to comply with the treaty. This enables the treaty to be more widely accepted while, for better or worse, it forces those in compliance with it to evaluate how to respond whenever a nation violates the treaty’s provisions. Fortunately, very few intentional violations of the treaty have come to light. Articles I, II, and III are the heart of the treaty, as it has been implemented. Except for the five nations that already have nuclear weapons (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

States), the world community will not develop or possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers agree not to give nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states agree not to take nuclear weapons, and the IAEA is given the power to track nuclear materials and to inspect anything related to them. Thus, the “dissemination” of weapons and weapon technology is forbidden. Articles IV and V give all nations the right to peacefully use nuclear power (including explosions), as well as to have educational and research facilities that deal with atomic and nuclear issues. Thus, universities everywhere can offer courses on nuclear physics, and with the appropriate safeguards and secondary agreements, all nations can construct facilities to generate electricity using nuclear power. However, a combination of the costs and inability to secure nuclear facilities means that only relatively developed nations can have any type of nuclear facility, whether for research or power generation. Article VI is very important in terms of the adoption of the treaty, while at the same time it is the provision that has been most widely ignored since the treaty was signed. The previous articles could have been covered by the terms “dissemination” or “proliferation.” However, with the inclusion of this article, proliferation becomes the key term. The five nuclear powers promise that they will end the “arms race” and work toward the internationalization of nuclear weapons. While treaties from SALT I (referring to strategic arms limitation talks) on claimed to fulfill this article, it is only partially true. From 1968 until the beginning of the 21st century, bi-lateral treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union limited only the growth of nuclear weapons. However, the two START (strategic arms reduction talks) treaties include provisions to reduce the number of weapons, thus finally moving the two major nuclear powers in the direction of fulfilling the intent of Article VI. Essential Themes

The NPT is an important tool in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and weapon technology. Four of the five nations that are not party to the treaty have developed, or are trying to develop, nuclear weapons. Only one of the signatories (South Africa) admits to a major push to acquire nuclear weapons, but it has since renounced the effort. Two others (Iraq and Iran) probably did, with similar results. Thus, the difference in the portion of the two groups seeking nuclear weapons

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(80 percent versus 2 percent), demonstrates its value. The US State Department estimates that without the treaty about thirty nations would have nuclear weapons. Clearly, the treaty has drastically slowed the spread of such weapons. At the same time, the treaty did not lead to the end of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Economic issues and a change in political goals by the Soviet Union/Russia are the factors that slowed, and continue to slow, the arms race. While the end of the Cold War did not completely end the arms race, it did away with most of the reasons why the arms race persisted. Although most nations accept slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, many leading non-aligned nations continue to complain about the failure of Article VI to be fully implemented. Although the NPT allows continued development of peaceful nuclear applications, the treaty has slowed these developments. The need to have IAEA track materials and approve the safeguards for these materials and facilities has caused this slowing of the research into and implementation of these programs. However, most countries have been willing to accept this tradeoff to insure a more secure world. With the change of security concerns from the East-West rivalry to terrorist activities, most are pleased that nuclear materials are under strict controls. The NPT was made permanent in 1995. —Donald A. Watt, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bunn, George and John B. Rhinelander. “Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now.” Arms Control Association. Washington: Arms Control Association, 2008. Web. Burns, Richard Dean and Philip E. Coyle III. The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Print. National Nuclear Security Administration. “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” National Nuclear Security Administration. Washington: Department of Energy, 2016. Web. Sagan, Scott Douglas and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012. Print. U.S. Department of State. “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action. Washington: US Department of State, 2016. Web.

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 Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile Date: November 5, 1970 Author: Henry Kissinger Genre: Memorandum Summary Overview

The election of socialist Salvador Allende as Chile’s president in September 1970 presented the Nixon administration with a conundrum. Unlike Fidel Castro’s Cuban Revolution, which came to power on the back of an armed insurrection, Allende’s rise to power was through Chile’s constitutional process. Allende’s economic agenda represented a threat to US corporate interests in Chile and he was expected to align with Cuba and the Soviet Union in his foreign policy. Fearing the impact of a popularly elected Marxist, but mindful that openly undermining a democratic government would tarnish the United States’ reputation, Nixon and Kissinger implemented a CIA covert program to, in Nixon’s words, “make the [Chilean] economy scream.” The CIA spent over $6 million dollars to destabilize Chile’s economy, ultimately leading to a military coup by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973, ushering in over a decade-and-a-half of dictatorship. Defining Moment

United States’ interference in the affairs of Latin America dated back to the nineteenth century and accelerated after the 1898 Spanish-American War. During the age of “Gunboat Diplomacy,” US marines were frequently sent to occupy nations in the Caribbean and Central America. The motive was usually twofold: to protect US business interests and to enforce the Monroe Doctrine by keep “extra-hemispheric” powers like England and Germany from occupying these nations when they could not meet debt obligations. After the dawn of the Cold War, these US policies were reinforced with a commitment to preventing the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the hemisphere. Toward this end, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered the CIA to orchestrate a coup in Guatemala in 1954 to overthrow the democratically elected, leftleaning president Jacabo Arbenz. Fidel Castro’s Cuban revolution of 1959 shook the

United States government and efforts to remove Castro at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 only cemented his alliance with the Soviet Union, leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis the following year. US intervention in Latin America continued in 1965 when President Lyndon Johnson ordered US troops to invade the Dominican Republic to prevent a leftist movement from coming to power. Part of President John F. Kennedy’s program to prevent revolution was the Alliance for Progress, a multimillion-dollar program aimed at modernizing Latin American nations’ economies and developing their middle class. No nation received more Alliance for Progress aid than Chile, a nation with a democratic tradition stretching back to 1833. Chile, however, experienced economic issues including inflation and labor unrest throughout the 1960s. Its economy was heavily dependent on US corporations such as Anaconda Copper and Kennecot Copper (copper was Chile’s leading export) and International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and PepsiCo. Salvador Allende, a trained physician, had run for president and lost in 1958 and was defeated again in 1964 by Christian Democrat Edward Frei with the help of a large infusion of covert CIA aid. On his third campaign, however, Allende won a narrow victory garnering 36.3 percent of the popular vote to the second place rightwing challenger’s 35 percent and the centrist Christian Democrat’s 27.8 percent. The Nixon administration’s first action was to try to keep Allende from being confirmed as president by convincing the sitting president and Chilean Congress to break with tradition and not confirm the electoral winner. Simultaneously, the CIA pursued a separate track where it sought to incite a small group of rightwing military officers to instigate a coup by kidnapping the pro-Constitution Army head, General Rene Schneider, then blaming his abduction on leftists. On Octo-

Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile

ber 22 the conspirators assassinated General Schneider, which the US government disavowed and which strengthened Chileans’ resolve to confirm Allende in the presidency. It was at this point that Nixon and Kissinger sought a long-term covert action plan to subvert the Allende government. Author Biography

Henry Alfred Kissinger was born to Jewish parents in Fuerth, Germany on May 27, 1943. Kissinger and his family fled Hitler’s Germany in 1938 and settled in the United States where in 1943 he became a naturalized citizen. He served in the US Army Counterintelligence Corps from 1943 to 1946 in the European theater and received a Bronze Star. Kissinger received degrees from Harvard University, including a PhD in 1954. He

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served on the faculty of Harvard from 1954 to 1969 and authored influential works on foreign policy, especially nuclear weapons strategy. Kissinger was a foreign policy advisor to Republican New York governor Nelson Rockefeller during his three unsuccessful bids for the Republican presidential nomination. President Richard Nixon appointed Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs where he served from 1969 to 1975. He was concurrently confirmed as Secretary of State in 1973 where he served the Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations until 1977. Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize with North Vietnam’s Le Duc Tho for their work on the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Washington, November 5, 1970. SUBJECT NSC Meeting, November 6—Chile This meeting will consider the question of what strategy we should adopt to deal with an Allende government in Chile. A. Dimensions of the Problem The election of Allende as President of Chile poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere. Your decision as to what to do about it may be the most historic and difficult foreign affairs decision you will have to make this year, for what happens in Chile over the next six to twelve months will have ramifications that will go far beyond just US-Chilean relations. They will have an effect on what happens in the rest of Latin America and the developing world; on what our future position will be in the hemisphere; and on the larger world picture, including our relations with the USSR. They will even affect our own conception of what our role in the world is. Allende is a tough, dedicated Marxist. He comes to power with a profound anti-US bias. The Communist and Socialist parties form the core of the political coalition that is his power base. Everyone agrees that Allende will purposefully seek:

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—to establish a socialist, Marxist state in Chile; —to eliminate US influence from Chile and the hemisphere; —to establish close relations and linkages with the USSR, Cuba and other Socialist countries. The consolidation of Allende in power in Chile, therefore, would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world: —US investments (totaling some one billion dollars) may be lost, at least in part; Chile may default on debts (about $1.5 billion) owed the US Government and private US banks. —Chile would probably become a leader of opposition to us in the inter-American system, a source of disruption in the hemisphere, and a focal point of support for subversion in the rest of Latin America. —It would become part of the Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region. —The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on—and even precedent value for—other parts of the world, espe-

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cially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it. While events in Chile pose these potentially very adverse consequences for us, they are taking a form which makes them extremely difficult for us to deal with or offset, and which in fact poses some very painful dilemmas for us: a. Allende was elected legally, the first Marxist government ever to come to power by free elections. He has legitimacy in the eyes of Chileans and most of the world; there is nothing we can do to deny him that legitimacy or claim he does not have it. b. We are strongly on record in support of self-determination and respect for free election; you are firmly on record for non-intervention in the internal affairs of this hemisphere and of accepting nations “as they are.” It would therefore be very costly for us to act in ways that appear to violate those principles, and Latin Americans and others in the world will view our policy as a test of the credibility of our rhetoric. On the other hand, our failure to react to this situation risks being perceived in Latin America and in Europe as indifference or impotence in the face of clearly adverse developments in a region long considered our sphere of influence. c. Allende’s government is likely to move along lines that will make it very difficult to marshal international or hemisphere censure of him—he is most likely to appear as an “independent” socialist country rather than a Soviet satellite or “Communist government.” Yet a Titoist government in Latin America would be far more dangerous to us than it is in Europe, precisely because it can move against our policies and interests more easily and ambiguously and because its “model” effect can be insidious. Allende starts with some significant weaknesses in his position: —There are tensions in his supporting coalition. —There is strong if diffuse resistance in Chilean society to moving to a Marxist or totalitarian state. —There is suspicion of Allende in the military. —There are serious economic problems and constraints. To meet this situation, Allende’s immediate “game plan” is clearly to avoid pressure and coalescing of opposition

prematurely, and to keep his opponents within Chile fragmented so that he can neutralize them one by one as he is able. To this end, he will seek to: —be internationally respectable; —move cautiously and pragmatically; —avoid immediate confrontations with us; and —move slowly in formalizing relations with Cuba and other Socialist countries. There is disagreement among the agencies as to precisely how successful Allende will be in overcoming his problems and weaknesses, or how inevitable it really is that he will follow the course described or that the threats noted will materialize. But the weight of the assessments is that Allende and the forces that have come to power with him do have the skill, the means and the capacity to maintain and consolidate themselves in power, provided they can play things their way. Logic would certainly argue that he will have the motivation to pursue purposefully aims he has after all held for some 25 years. Since he has an admittedly profound anti-US and anti-capitalist bias, his policies are bound to constitute serious problems for us if he has any degree of ability to implement them. B. The Basic Issue What all of this boils down to is a fundamental dilemma and issue: a. Do we wait and try to protect our interests in the context of dealing with Allende because: —we believe we cannot do anything about him anyway; —he may not develop into the threat we fear or may mellow in time; —we do not want to risk turning nationalism against us and damaging our image, credibility and position in the world; AND thereby risk letting Allende consolidate himself and his ties with Cuba and the USSR, so that a year or two from now when he has established his base he can move more strongly against us, and then we really will be unable to do anything about it or reverse the process. Allende would in effect use us to gain legitimacy and then turn on us on some economic issue and thereby caste us in the role of “Yankee imperialist” on an issue of his choice. OR

Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile

b. Do we decide to do something to prevent him from consolidating himself nowwhen we know he is weaker than he will ever be and when he obviously fears our pressure and hostility, because: —we can be reasonably sure he is dedicated to opposing us; —he will be able to consolidate himself and then be able to counter us in increasingly intense ways; and —to the extent he consolidates himself and links to the USSR and Cuba the trend of events and dynamics will be irreversible. AND thereby risk: —giving him the nationalistic issue as a weapon to entrench himself; —damaging our credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world as interventionist; —turning nationalism and latent fear of US domination in the rest of Latin America into violent and intense opposition to us; and —perhaps failing to prevent his consolidation anyway. C. Our Choices There are deep and fundamental differences among the agencies on this basic issue. They manifest themselves in essentially three possible approaches: 1. The Modus Vivendi Strategy: This school of thought, which is essentially State’s position, argues that we really do not have the capability of preventing Allende from consolidating himself or forcing his failure; that the main course of events in Chile will be determined primarily by the Allende government and its reactions to the internal situation; and that the best thing we can do in these circumstances is maintain our relationship and our presence in Chile so that over the long haul we may be able to foster and influencing domestic trends favorable to our interests. In this view actions to exert pressure on Allende or to isolate Chile will not only be ineffective, but will only accelerate adverse developments in Chile and limit our capacity to have any influence on the long-range trend. In this view the risks that Allende will consolidate himself and the long-range consequences therefrom are less dangerous to us than the immediate probable reaction to attempts to oppose Allende. Its perception of

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Allende’s long-term development is essentially optimistic and benign. Implicit is the argument that it is not certain he can overcome his internal weaknesses, that he may pragmatically limit his opposition to us, and that if he turns into another Tito that would not be bad since we deal with other governments of this kind anyway. 2. The Hostile Approach: DOD, CIA and some State people, on the other hand, argue that it is patent thatAllende is our enemy, that he will move counter to us just as soon and as strongly as he feels he can; and that when his hostility is manifest to us it will be because he has consolidated his power and then it really will be too late to do very much—the process is irreversible. In this view, therefore, we should try to prevent him from consolidating now when he is at his weakest. Implicit in this school of thought is the assumption that we can affect events, and that the risks of stirring up criticism to our position elsewhere are less dangerous to us than the long-term consolidation of a Marxist government in Chile. Within this approach there are in turn two schools of thought: a. Overt Hostility. This view argues that we should not delay putting pressure on Allende and therefore should not wait to react to his moves with counter-punches. It considers the dangers of making our hostility public or of initiating the fight less important than making unambiguously clear what our position is and where we stand. It assumes that Allende does not really need our hostility to help consolidate himself, because if he did he would confront us now. Instead he appears to fear our hostility. This approach therefore would call for (1) initiating punitive measures, such as terminating aid or economic embargo; (2) making every effort to rally international support of this position; and (3) declaring and publicizing our concern and hostility. b. Non-overt Pressure, Cold, Correct Approach. This approach concurs in the view that pressure should be placed on Allende now and that we should oppose him. But it argues that how we package that pressure and opposition is crucial and may make the difference between effectiveness and ineffectiveness. It argues

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that an image of the US initiating punitive measures will permit Allende to marshal domestic support and international sympathy on the one hand, and make it difficult for us to obtain international cooperation on the other. It further argues that it is the effect of pressure not the posture of hostility that hurts Allende; the latter gives him tactical opportunities to blunt the impact of our opposition. Implicit in this approach is the judgment that how unambiguous our public position is and making a public record are all less important in the long run than maximizing our pressure and minimizing risks to our position in the rest of the world. This approach therefore calls for essentially the same range of pressures as the previous one, but would use them quietly and covertly; on the surface our posture would be correct, but cold. Any public manifestation or statement of hostility would be geared to his actions to avoid giving him the advantage of arguing he is the aggrieved party.

The main question with the hostile approach is whether we can effectively prevent Allende from consolidating his power. There is at least some prospect that we can. But the argument can be made that even if we did not succeed—provided we did not damage ourselves too severely in the process—we could hardly be worse off than letting him entrench himself; that there is in fact some virtue in posturing ourselves in a position of opposition as a means of at least containing him and improving our chance of inducing others to help us contain him later if we have to. In my judgment the dangers of doing nothing are greater than the risks we run in trying to do something, especially since we have flexibility in tailoring our efforts to minimize those risks. I recommend, therefore that you make a decision that we will oppose Allende as strongly as we can and do all we can to keep him from consolidating power, taking care to package those efforts in a style that gives us the appearance of reacting to his moves.

D. Assessments As noted, the basic issue is whether we are to wait and try to adjust or act now to oppose. The great weakness in the modus vivendi approach is that: —it gives Allende the strategic initiative; —it plays into his game plan and almost insures that he will consolidate himself; —if he does consolidate himself, he will have even more freedom to act against us after a period of our acceptance of him than if we had opposed him all along; —there are no apparent reasons or available intelligence to justify a benign or optimistic view of an Allende regime over the long term. In fact, as noted, an “independent” rational socialist state linked to Cuba and the USSR can be even more dangerous for our long-term interests than a very radical regime. There is nothing in this strategy that promises to deter or prevent adverse anti-U.S. actions when and if Chile wants to pursue them—and there are far more compelling reasons to believe that he will when he feels he is established than that he will not.

E. The NSC Meeting Contrary to your usual practice of not making a decision at NSC meetings, it is essential that you make it crystal clear where you stand on this issue at today’s meeting. If all concerned do not understand that you want Allende opposed as strongly as we can, the result will be a steady drift toward the modus vivendi approach. This is primarily a question of priorities and nuance. The emphasis resulting from today’s meeting must be on opposing Allende and preventing his consolidating power and not on minimizing risks. I recommend that after your opening remarks you call on Dick Helms to give you a briefing on the situation and what we might expect. I would then outline the main issues and options along the above lines, after which you could call on Secretaries Rogers and Laird for their views and observations. Your Talking Points, which are appended, are written along these lines. Also included in your book are: —A State/DOD options paper. —An analytical summary of that options paper.

Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile

Document Analysis

In the memo of November 5 Kissinger makes a dramatic case for the dangers Allende’s election posed, outlines competing proposals of seeking a “modus vivendi” (acceptance) and a “hostile approach” toward Chile, then urges the president to argue for a hard line at the upcoming meeting of the National Security Council. The degree to which Kissinger elevates the threat from Chile is remarkable given that the previous year he had dismissed Chile as “a dagger aimed at the heart of Antarctica.” However, Kissinger had heard from anxious US corporate heads with Chilean investments and had come to see the example of an elected Marxist as particularly dangerous. In the memo, Kissinger writes, “… an ‘independent’ rational socialist state linked to Cuba and the USSR can be even more dangerous for our long-term interests than a very radical regime.” Kissinger opens the memo to Nixon with a startling framing of the stakes: “Your decision as to what to do about it may be the most historic and difficult foreign affairs decision you will have to make this year…” Coming just months after Nixon had escalated the war in Vietnam by sending US troops into Cambodia, this is an extraordinary statement. Kissinger then argues that under Allende Chile would float into the Cuban-Soviet orbit and challenge US interests throughout Latin America and influence events as far away as Italy, where Communists were running in that nation’s election. He also notes that the Allende government threatened a billion dollars in US corporate investments and over a billion in potential loan defaults. The United States was faced with a dilemma; to act openly risked global condemnation and exposing the United States as hypocritical for not adhering to its stated democratic principles; but to wait to act allowed Allende to consolidate power. Kissinger concludes that the president should argue for action forcefully, otherwise the case for acceptance of Allende, advocated most strongly by the State Department, would gain sway. In a follow-up memo of November 9 (not printed here), Kissinger announced that Nixon had decided on a mix of approaches: to officially accept the new government while secretly seeking to subvert Chile’s economy. Kissinger wrote, “… the United States will seek to maximize pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere inter-

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ests.” The document then outlines actions that would be taken, such as a cutoff of aid from US programs and loans from international financial organizations, but it does not mention the leading covert role that would be played by the CIA, which the administration wished to keep secret from other government agencies. Essential Themes

The policies outlined in this and the November 9 memo were accompanied by a covert program by the CIA over the next three years to sow political discord and economic unrest in Chile. The CIA spent over $6 million to promote anti-Allende propaganda, fund opposition groups and newspapers, encourage a truckers’ strike, and spread unrest generally. This covert campaign exacerbated Allende’s other problems. Some radical farmer and labor groups sought to push his government in a more revolutionary direction through illegal land and factory seizures, and the nationalization of foreign corporations and other Allende policies deeply divided Chileans. Although Allende’s coalition picked up seats in the 1972 elections, the CIA’s destabilization campaign, combined with fallout from Allende’s policies, led to rising prices, food shortages, strikes, and power outages. Receiving positive signals from the Nixon administration, the Chilean military, led by General Augusto Pinochet, carried out a coup on September 11, 1973. Allende, surrounded by twenty-three body guards in the presidential Moneda Palace, gave a final, defiant address by radio to the Chilean people before committing suicide (some believe he was murdered). The coup witnessed mass arrests, extensive torture, and several thousand killed of whom about 1,500 were executed. Pinochet maintained one of the most brutal regimes in Latin American through the 1970s and 1980s before a popular plebiscite in 1988 and election in 1989 ended his reign and returned democratic rule to Chile in 1990. —Robert Surbrug, PhD

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Dalleck, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarpersCollins Publishers, 2007. Print. Hersch, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit Books, 1983. Print. Kinzer, Stephen. Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006. Print. Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. New York and London: The New Press, 2003. Print.

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 Nuclear Accidents Measures Agreement Date: September 30, 1971 Geographic Regions: United States, Soviet Union (present-day Russia) Authors: William P. Rogers and Andrey Gromyko (signatories) Genre: treaty Summary Overview

In the fall of 1971, the United States and Soviet Union acknowledged that, although each nation already had strict safety protocols in place for their respective nuclear arsenals, there remained a major risk of technical or human error that could cause a global nuclear disaster. The Accidents Measures Agreement, as it came to be known, stipulated that either country would notify the other in the event of an accident or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The United States and Soviet Union agreed to take all possible measures to safeguard their nuclear stockpiles. If either of the two signatories were to launch a nuclear weapon outside of its territory, the other was to be notified well in advance of the launch. The agreement was designed to promote communication between the two nuclear powers. Defining Moment

In 1945, the end of World War II was hastened by the detonation of two nuclear bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States was immediately the world’s only nuclear superpower, possessing a weapon that in an instant could level an entire city. This status, however, was short-lived—the Soviet Union, recognizing the threat of a nuclear-armed United States, tested its own nuclear bomb for the first time in 1949. The Cold War, which began shortly after the end of World War II, suddenly became not just a competition over political ideologies between the United States and the Soviet Union: it involved a nuclear arms race. Ironically, the nuclear bomb held little political value to either the United States or the Soviet Union. Neither side would entertain the idea of using these weapons to secure highly sought-after influence and territory in Eastern Europe, for example. With the possible exception of their use in retaliation for a nuclear strike, these weapons simply had no application in the politi-

cal and security chess match between the Cold War adversaries. Nevertheless, the nuclear arms race grew apace after the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapon. The United States tested its first hydrogen bomb—five hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki—in 1952. The Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb only a year later. The race to create the most destructive nuclear weapon continued through the 1960s, as did the pursuit of technology—such as intercontinental ballistic missiles—that could deliver those weapons to a target on the other side of the world. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the world how dangerously close it was to nuclear war. The extraordinary tension between the United States and Soviet Union was evident during this standoff—one accidental firing between the two naval forces could have resulted in war. Also in play at this time, and for most of the Cold War, was the theory of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). Put simply, MAD stated that a nuclear war would cause the destruction of both sides, because of a devastating first strike by one party being followed by a retaliatory second strike by the other party. Thus, neither side in theory had an incentive to initiate a nuclear exchange, as long as parity continued between the two arsenals. The Cuban Missile Crisis and MAD helped pave the way for the two sides to discuss the state of the arms race. To be sure, neither side was willing to begin dismantling its stockpiles. However, there was common ground on one major point: it would take little more than a breakdown in safeguards, technical malfunction, or human error to start a war that could destroy the world. Cuba was only the most public brush with nuclear confrontation—historians note that by this time there had been many incidents of sensor and radar malfunctions on both sides that led to the scram-

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bling of bombers and readying of missiles. In 1969, as the United States and the Soviet Union began formally discussing limiting their production of nuclear weapons in the landmark Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), the topic of both avoiding such accidents and avoiding miscommunication between the two nations became an important component of the negotiations. Author Biography

William Pierce Rogers was born on June 23, 1913, in Norfolk, New York. A graduate of Colgate University and the Cornell University School of Law, Rogers was a lieutenant commander in the US Navy during World War II. After the war, Rogers held several high-level legal positions in the federal government, including that of attorney general under President Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1957 to 1961. Rogers later held positions with the US delegation to the United Nations General

Assembly. In 1969, he became President Richard M. Nixon’s secretary of state, a post he held until 1973. He died on January 2, 2001. Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko was born on July 18, 1909, in Stariye Gromyki in the Russian Empire (now in Belarus). Gromyko joined the Communist Party in 1931, after his schooling, and was called to Moscow in 1934. In 1939, Gromyko started his career at the Foreign Ministry. In 1943, Premier Joseph Stalin appointed him ambassador to the United States; in this role, he helped form the United Nations in 1944. He would serve as foreign minister not only to Stalin but Stalin’s successors: Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev. During his twenty-eight years as foreign minister, Gromyko was a central figure in some of the most pivotal events of the Cold War. He died in 1989.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Signed at Washington September 30, 1971 Entered into force September 30, 1971 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties: Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risk of outbreak of such a war, including measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, and is in no way contrary to the interests of any other country, Bearing in mind that continued efforts are also needed in the future to seek ways of reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Each Party undertakes to maintain and to improve, as it deems necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control. Article 2 The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the event of such an incident, the Party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon without its causing damage. Article 3 The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of signs of interference with these systems or with related communications facilities, if such occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.

Nuclear Accidents Measures Agreement

Article 4 Each Party undertakes to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party. Article 5 Each Party, in other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents, undertakes to act in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party. In any such situation, each Party may inform the other Party or request information when in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Article 6 For transmission of urgent information, notifications and requests for information in situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the Direct Communications Link between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For transmission of other information, notification and requests for information, the Parties, at their own

Document Analysis

The Accidents Measures Agreement acknowledges the simple fact that the very existence of nuclear weapons represents a danger to the world. Regardless of stateof-the-art technical safeguards, command and control systems, and other sophisticated measures in place to ensure the security of these weapons, the dire implications of the weapons’ use cannot be downplayed with the promise of security. Human error, technical malfunction, and other unforeseen circumstances could bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. This agreement is to serve as the mechanism that will, ideally, keep the United States and the Soviet Union from unintentionally reaching that point. The first major component of the agreement is the assurance from both nations that the best possible steps would be taken to safeguard against technical or human error. This policy does not simply refer to the security measures that would prevent unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons. It also refers to technological up-

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discretion, may use any communications facilities, including diplomatic channels, depending on the degree of urgency. Article 7 The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at further implementation of the purposes of this Agreement. Article 8 This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. Article 9 This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. DONE at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: WILLIAM P. ROGERS FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: A. GROMYKO

grades to early warning systems, sensors, radars, and other technologies that detect potential threats. By ensuring that these systems are operating properly and in an optimal manner, the agreement shows, each party could avoid unnecessary military actions to address unidentified objects entering its airspace. Central to the agreement is communication between the two nations. Article 2, for example, states that each party will immediately notify the other “in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war.” Such communication could prevent either nation from presuming that such an event was a purposeful act of belligerence against the other. Articles 3 and 4 also speak to communicating on matters that could be otherwise misinterpreted as acts of war, such as an unidentified object or launching a missile outside of a nation’s territorial boundaries. The communication to which the agreement refers is

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not simply the usual diplomatic channels. In fact, the agreement calls for direct communication between US and Soviet leadership, as well as communications between diplomats and other personnel. The agreement strives to establish a line of communication at every level so that, depending on the level of urgency, there exists a protocol to correct any miscommunication. Furthermore, the agreement lays the groundwork for communication to take place for planned situations. If a party has a planned missile launch, for example, or a situation arises that might be seen by the other as potentially provocative (such as those that might involve the peaceful deployment of troops), that party would be urged to contact the other through the proper channels. The other party, likewise, may make inquiries about such situations. The point, the agreement reads, is not only that each nation would have communications networks in place to address emergency situations but also to prevent emergencies from arising in the first place. The agreement was signed with the expectation that it would have an “unlimited duration.” Over the coming decades, the United States and the Soviet Union would often confer on the matters addressed in the agreement. The document—and the framework it initially established in 1971—would be a living agreement, one that would be amended and modified as the relationship between the two countries continued. Essential Themes

By 1971, the ideological differences between the United States and Soviet Union were stark, and each continued stockpiling nuclear weapons. Although neither nation truly saw the value of these weapons as negotiating tools, the weapons’ value as a deterrent—because their use would cause global destruction—could not be overstated. The Accidents Measures Agreement provides an acknowledgement of this fact and works to

prevent at least the accidental outbreak of nuclear war. The central theme of the agreement is that both sides should take the most prudent possible steps to avoid any misunderstandings that could lead to war. Both sides are encouraged to make sure that their security systems are up to date and unlikely to make mistakes that might lead to a provocative action. However, the most basic component of the agreement is its insistence on interstate communication. Each side should be able to contact the other if an unidentified object enters its airspace, an unexpected missile launch occurs, or any other incident might be misinterpreted as an aggressive act. Just as nuclear weapons and related technologies evolve, so too does this agreement. The agreement, still in force in the twenty-first century, took a bold step in 1971 of at least addressing the situations that might unintentionally cause nuclear war as the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers operated under a Cold War regime. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Borawski, John. “U.S.-Soviet Move toward Risk Reduction.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43.6 (1987): 16–18. Print. Duta, Andreea Emilia. “Security Environment and Nuclear Balance during the Cold War.” Research and Science Today 2.6 (2013): 51. Print. Swift, John. “The Soviet-American Arms Race.” History Today. History Today, Mar. 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2016. United States. Department of State. “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II.” Office of the Historian. US Dept. of State, 31 Oct. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.

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 Documents Relating to Normalization of Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China Dates: February 27, 1972; December 15, 1978 Authors: Richard Nixon; Jimmy Carter Genre: government document; speech Summary Overview

On February 21, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon arrived in Beijing, China, with his wife and a contingent of American diplomats, including National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. It was an unexpected and historic visit between the two nations that had been on the brink of open war with each other since 1949, when Mao Zedong led a successful Communist revolution that overthrew the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The United States maintained relations with Chiang, who fled to Taiwan with what was left of his army and garrisoned himself there with the intention of recapturing mainland China. This government, known as the Republic of China (ROC) was recognized by the United States as the true government of China, while the Communist People’s Republic of China (PRC), remained a bitter enemy. Mao Zedong and the PRC, along with the Soviet Union, fought the United States in Korea, and Nixon arrived in Beijing in the midst of the Vietnam War, in which the PRC supported North Vietnam against the United States. Despite this animosity, by 1972, both China and the United States had good reason to move toward normalizing relations. The United States looked to end the unpopular war in Vietnam, and China wanted to distance itself from the Soviet Union. However, Nixon’s plan for China was derailed by domestic problems and scandal, and nearly eight years passed before the United States, at that point led by President Jimmy Carter, and China, led by Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, established diplomatic relations. Defining Moment

At the end of the Chinese Civil War of 1949, Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek fled from mainland China to Taiwan with much of his army. The United States was initially ambivalent about both supporting

Chiang and recognizing the Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC), but when the Korean War broke out in 1950, the United States sent battleships into the Taiwan Strait, antagonizing the Communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and leading to open warfare with China in Korea. After the Korean War, Taiwan became increasingly important to the United States’ strategy of the containment of Communism in Asia, and the ROC government in Taiwan became a close ally. The Korean War ended with an armistice on July 27, 1953, but relations between China and the United States continued to be strained. The following year, the United States initiated the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a group of Asian countries organized for mutual defense with US support. There were periodic points of contact between the PRC and the United States, despite their unwillingness to formally establish diplomatic relations. Ambassadors of the PRC and the United States met in Poland in 1955, and though the ROC was the official government of China in the United Nations, there were UNled attempts to broker peace deals between the United States and the PRC over contested territory in Asia. In 1971, the United Nations recognized the PRC as the government of China and Taiwan’s ROC lost its seat in the UN. Despite a generation of animosity between them, the United States and the PRC moved toward rapprochement. President Nixon was eager to find a way out of the Vietnam War. Mao Zedong was eager to have a bargaining chip to use against the Soviet Union, with whom China was increasingly at odds. In 1971, the US ping-pong team was invited to China, the first group of Americans on Chinese soil in decades. That same year, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing. In 1972, President Nixon visited Beijing, and Kissinger, Secretary of State Wil-

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liam P. Rogers, Mao Zedong (chairman of the Chinese Communist Party), and Zhou Enlai (the Chinese premier), crafted what has become commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué, a document that laid out the positions of both nations while acknowledging their continuing conflict on the question of Taiwan. After the communiqué, the PRC and the United States opened up communication offices, a first step in official recognition. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, the Vietnam War had ended, but opposition remained to official recognition of the PRC. Negotiations began in the spring of 1978, with the issue of the status of Taiwan still not completely resolved. The United States acknowledged that Taiwan was part of China,

but also reserved the right to have a special relationship with Taiwan. Document Information

On February 27, 1972, the governments of the People’s Republic of China and the United States simultaneously released the Shanghai Communiqué joint statement, in Shanghai and Washington, DC, respectively. President Carter’s speech outlining the normalization of the relationship between the United States and China was broadcast live on both radio and television from the Oval Office at the White House at 9 p.m. on December 15, 1978.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China February 28, 1972 President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People’s Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials. President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs. During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit. President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes. The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the

Documents Relating to Normalization of Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eightpoint program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea”. It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination. The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eightpoint proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam

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and the United States on January 27, 1972, represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of december 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry. There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations. With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that: progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries; both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict; neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony;

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neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest. The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”. The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges. Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit

are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries. The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest. The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world. President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China. *** Address to the Nation on Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China December 15, 1978 As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People’s Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months. In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

Documents Relating to Normalization of Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization. The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the

Document Analysis

The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué is a letter of understanding rather than a formal diplomatic document or treaty. It is a roadmap to how two world powers long at odds can work toward a stronger relationship, even as disagreements and points of conflict remain. The format of the communiqué is telling. The document begins with a recap of the visit of President Nixon, the First Lady, Nixon’s top advisor Henry Kissinger, and other diplomats to Beijing, noting the “serious and frank exchange of views” that occurred between Nixon and the PRC’s chairman Mao. Since this exchange of views did not resolve the issue of the status of Taiwan or Vietnam, referred to obliquely here as part of a larger statement on “Indochina,” this format is the best way for a joint statement to be issued that expresses conflicting views and agreement. The greatest point of agreement is that neither party wants more Soviet interference in Asia. In a barely concealed reference, both agreed that neither of them will “seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” In addition, the United States agrees to reduce its military presence in Taiwan and promises to continue this drawdown as “tension in the area diminishes.” Both sides agree that the establishment of formal diplomatic relations is key to continuing the work toward an ongoing peaceful relationship. “They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries . . . contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia.” President Carter, in his 1978 address, establishes a formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC, giving it recognition as the true government of China, though Carter is quick to point out that the United States will continue to have “commercial, cultural, and other un-

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Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves. The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interest, and to the peace of the entire world.

official relations with the people of Taiwan.” This is a groundbreaking moment, thirty years in the making, and Carter recaps the previous points of the Shanghai Communiqué to root his announcement in the previous agreement. The governments of China and the United States will continue to oppose any nation that seeks “hegemony” in Asia and would work toward overall reduction in military conflict. The United States and China will officially open embassies in each other’s capital cities on January 1, 1979. The United States is not recognizing China for political or military expediency, Carter argues, but as a matter of “simple reality.” More than that, Carter harks back to the days when China and the United States were friends, even allies during World War II. In order to allow a return to a closer relationship, the mechanisms of diplomacy must be allowed to work, Carter notes; therefore, diplomatic ties must be reestablished. Carter specifically addresses the Taiwanese people, assuring them that the United States will continue to have an “interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue” as well as a close relationship, even if in an informal way. At the end of long years of negotiations, Carter says, recognition of China is key to “the advancement of peace.” Essential Themes

As part of the agreement to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China, the United States radically changed its relationship with Taiwan. However, within the US government, support for the defense of Taiwan continued. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which became law in April 1979, promised military aid in the defense of Taiwan. This was one of the first conflicts to test the newly warmed relations between the United States and China. President Carter assured China that he would interpret the TRA in a manner consistent

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with the agreements reached during the normalization of relations. In early 1979, Chinese vice premier Deng Xiaoping paid an official visit to the United States, the first time a Chinese leader had done so since 1949. Deng’s visit was a turning point for US-Chinese relations, as he charmed the nation, famously donning a ten-gallon hat in Texas, captivating journalists and politicians alike, and signing agreements that pledged cooperation on a variety of issues. During the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, which began in December 1979, China and the United States coordinated their responses to Soviet actions and led the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games. In the spring of 1989, hundreds of pro-democracy student protestors were massacred in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. The United States

responded by freezing diplomatic relations with China. Though the relationship with China was strained by human-rights issues and disagreements over internal policy, official dialogue resumed in 1993, and full trade relations were established in 2000. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Garver, John W. China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China. New York: Oxford UP, 2016. Print. Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A Political History. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2003. Print. Shambaugh, David L. Tangled Titans: The United States and China. Lanham: Rowman, 2013. Print.

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 Biological Weapons Convention Date: April 10, 1972 Geographic Region: London, England; Moscow, Soviet Union; and Washington, DC Genre: treaty Summary Overview

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), represented the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban certain types of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The UN convention prohibited each signatory from developing, producing, and stockpiling chemical and biological weapons. It also called upon each nation to destroy whatever WMDs it already possessed and to prevent distribution of such weapons in other countries. With the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom acting as depositaries (charged with the administrative management of the convention), the BWC was established as a living document, enabling new signatories, amendments, party withdrawals, and periodic reviews over the course of its unlimited duration of activity. The BWC entered into force on March 26, 1975. As of 2015, there have been seven review conferences of the convention, with the eighth set for December 2016. Defining Moment

By the early twentieth century, the torturous effects of poisonous clouds created by chemical and biological weapons had changed the complexion of war, giving rise to debate over the morality of nonconventional weaponry. Chemical weapons started to be deployed on a large scale during World War I, which was nicknamed by many “the chemist’s war,” in light of the many technological and scientific innovations that came into use. During the war, the first major chemical weapons attack took place, when the German army released chlorine, mustard, and other toxic chemicals onto unsuspecting French forces. These weapons generated approximately 1.3 million casualties, including some ninety thousand deaths. The French, British, and US militaries attempted to develop their own WMDs, but these programs

lagged far behind the Germans. When World War I ended in 1918, there were multiple attempts to abolish such weapons. Multiple conferences were held in pursuit of this goal, but it was not until 1925 that such an initiative bore fruit in international law. The Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of offensive chemical weapons. However, the Protocol did not prohibit the production and/or stockpiling of these WMDs, nor did it ban the use of these weapons when attacked with chemical weapons by noncompliant states. During World War II, many of the participating nations (including the United States) used chemical weapons. During the Cold War, countries continued to develop and stockpile WMDs, including napalm and Agent Orange (both of which the United States used in Vietnam). Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Egypt reportedly used a variety of chemical weapons—such as nerve and mustard gases—against insurgents in Yemen during the Six-Day War in 1967. By the end of the 1960s, the United States began focusing less on chemical weapons development, despite decades of experiments with such weapons systems. The danger of exposure to civilian populations, experts warned, far outbalanced the perceived need for stockpiling those WMDs. In 1969, the United Nations published the report “Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use,” which raised the issue of the grave long-term effects of deployed chemical weapons. A report issued by the World Health Organization published the following year discussed the threat to civilians of such weapons. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon called for the ban and dismantlement of American chemical weapons stockpiles. In 1972, the United States, acting as one of three depositaries in the United Nations, joined what would be known as the Biological Warfare Convention.

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HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recognising the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war, Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Desiring also to contribute to the realisation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents, Recognising that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Article II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any neces-

Biological Weapons Convention

sary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. Article V The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article VI (1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. Article VII Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention. Article VIII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the

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Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. Article IX Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognised objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Article X (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organisations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Article XI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

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Article XII Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realised. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Article XIII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests. Article XIV (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by

Document Analysis

The goals of the Biological Weapons Convention are that all biological, chemical, and similar weapons should be dismantled and that no such WMDs should be developed in the future. Citing as abhorrent the weapons identified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the BWC requires that every signatory and depositary country not only stop production of these weapons but also destroy existing stockpiles. Participating states also

signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XV This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

agree to prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical, or similar weapons to nonparticipating states. Furthermore, the participants agree to remain in communication with one another, as well as with the United Nations, to ensure that these WMDs will never be used and eventually be eradicated. The BWC begins by stating that each participant recognizes the need for total global chemical, biological, and bacteriological WMD disarmament. The intro-

Biological Weapons Convention

ductory statement notes that the United Nations “has repeatedly condemned” the use of these weapons in light of the Geneva Protocol and hints at the torturous effects of these weapons, noting that future use of WMDs “would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Citing “the sake of all mankind,” this section recognizes an imperative to halt both the “production and stockpiling” of these weapons. The fifteen articles of the convention state clearly the commitment to total disarmament. Each party agrees not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, or otherwise receive biological, chemical, and similar WMDs. Additionally, existing stockpiles are to be destroyed or “divert[ed] to peaceful purposes.” The BWC implicitly raises the point that not every state in the world (indeed, not every member of the United Nations) will agree to the terms of the BWC. In fact, the document implies, many states might be pursuing such weapons. Therefore, to further prevent the use of these WMDs, the BWC calls upon each signatory not to share with other states information about such weapons and to actively discourage the development or proliferation programs of other countries. Article 5 of the BWC encourages participating nations to work with one another should issues arise that undermine their ability to carry out the provisions of the BWC. Through such communication, the parties involved cooperate with one another in the pursuit of the lofty goals of the BWC. Although the BWC encourages bi- and multilateral communication and cooperation, the convention recognizes the United Nations as the central authority for carrying out this agreement. Nations with concerns about biological, chemical, and/or bacteriological weapons issues are, under the terms of article 6, encouraged to file official complaints with the UN Security Council, which would in turn launch an investigation. Each party to the BWC is required to support the Security Council’s investigation into such matters, upon request. The BWC is intended to have a fluid lifespan, capable of being amended as pertinent issues arise over the course of the convention’s unlimited duration. Over time, new countries will be accepted, each of which would submit to one of the three depositaries managing the BWC’s administration—the United States, the

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Soviet Union, and Great Britain. The signatory nations also have the right to withdraw from the convention if they deem it necessary to do so, but they must include “a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Essential Themes

Born of both the actual and potential horrors of biological, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention called for the curtailment of weapons development, the dismantling of weapons stockpiles, and, the nondeployment of additional such weapons. Working with one another through proper communications channels, sponsored by the United Nations, the participating states took a positive step toward peacefully reducing the prevalence of these weapons within their borders. The BWC also noted that proliferation of these WMDs was as dangerous to the world order as their development, manufacturing, and stockpiling. The Convention called upon every signatory to take the proper steps to prevent the proliferation of these deadly weapons. With the safety of all humanity in mind, the BWC stated, every avenue by which these weapons might appear should be closed. At the time of the conventions, twenty-two countries signed the agreement. Since then, more than 170 states have either acceded to or ratified the treaty. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

“The Biological Weapons Convention.” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2015. Web. 11 Mar. 2016. Gerstein, Daniel M. National Security and Arms Control in the Age of Biotechnology: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Lanham: Rowman, 2013. Print. Goldblat, Jozef. “The Biological Weapons Convention: An Overview.” International Review of the Red Cross. Intl. Committee of the Red Cross, 30 June 1997. Web. 11 Mar. 2016. Rissanen, Jenni. “The Biological Weapons Convention.” NTI. Nuclear Threat Initiative, 1 Mar. 2003. Web. 11 Mar. 2016.

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 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Date: May 26, 1972 Geographic Regions: United States, Soviet Union (present-day Russia) Authors: Richard M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev (signatories) Genre: treaty

Summary Overview

One of many components of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) of the late 1960s and early 1970s between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (or ABM Treaty) addressed a potential arms race involving defensive weapons. The ABM Treaty limited the number of anti-ballistic missile defense system sites to two per nation—one at the capital city, the other at an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch site. The treaty also set limits on the number of missiles that could be at a single antimissile defense site. Furthermore, the treaty hindered the development of new anti-ballistic missile technologies, helping ensure nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Defining Moment

In 1945, World War II came to an end shortly after the detonation of two devastating nuclear bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States was immediately the world’s first nuclear power, possessing a weapon that could instantly level an entire city. America’s special status, however, was shortlived—the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb in 1949. With this development, the nascent Cold War that began shortly after the end of the war became not just a competition over political ideologies: it involved a nuclear arms race as well. The race continued to intensify as new technologies were introduced, strengthening the power of nuclear weapons and the manner in which they were delivered. The United States tested its first hydrogen bomb—five hundred times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki—in 1952. The Soviet Union caught up with the US program only a year later. The race to create the most destructive nuclear weapon continued

through the 1960s, as did the pursuit of technology— such as intercontinental ballistic missiles—that could deliver those weapons to a target on the other side of the world. By the late 1960s, so-called multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) also emerged—ICBMs capable of carrying not just one nuclear warhead but ten or more. The evolving intensity of and delivery systems for nuclear weapons created another race: the pursuit of systems capable of defending against a nuclear attack. Such “missile defense” systems are designed to detect and destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they reach their target. For example, anti-ballistic missiles are missiles intended to shoot down ballistic missiles. In theory, with a sufficiently effective arsenal of antiballistic missiles, a nation could launch a missile attack against another nation and, when the other retaliated, the former could repel that counterattack. The Soviets were the first of the two major powers to develop an integrated anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system, creating one in the 1960s to protect Moscow, and putting it into operation in 1971. The United States forged ahead with developing its own systems, while many privately acknowledged that the endeavor was cost-prohibitive and largely ineffective. In 1967, the United States proposed that it and the Soviet Union adopt strict limitations on ABM defensive systems. The Soviets countered by calling for limitations on both ABM and offensive weaponry. A year later, both sides agreed to discuss both issues in a more substantive manner. They fulfilled this agreement in 1969, embarking on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT, later known as SALT I). The United States proposed that each nation have only one ABM site—around Washington and Moscow—but conversations broke down when the United States later called for more ABM sites and Russia insisted there be more

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

negotiations on offensive weapons. In May of 1971, a tentative agreement—one that focused on a limited ABM treaty—had been reached. When the SALT I talks concluded a year later, the parties had reached an interim agreement on offensive weapons and a more substantive accord on ABM defensive systems. Author Biography

Richard Milhous Nixon was born on January 9, 1913, in Yorba Linda, California. He graduated from Whittier College in 1934 and received a scholarship to attend Duke University School of Law, where he finished in 1937. After World War II, in which he served in the Pacific with the US Navy, Nixon successfully ran for Congress in 1946. Nixon was elected to the Senate in 1950, but two years later was tapped as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Republican running mate in the 1952 presidential

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election. After two terms as vice president, Nixon ran unsuccessfully for the White House in 1960. In 1968, he was elected president, remaining in office until his resignation in 1974 following the Watergate scandal. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was born in Dneprodzerhinsk, Ukraine (then part of the Russian Empire), on December 19, 1906. He worked at a factory until joining the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1929. During World War II, he served as both a colonel and a party official. In 1950, Brezhnev was elected to the Supreme Soviet (the upper legislative chamber of the Soviet Union), gaining political strength with the help of Premier Nikita Khrushchev. From 1960 through 1964, he served as president of the Presidium in the Supreme Soviet, establishing him as Khrushchev’s deputy. He succeeded Khrushchev in 1964, leading the Soviet Union until his death in 1982.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972 Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972 Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972 Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972 Entered into force October 3, 1972 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit antiballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain

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agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an indi-

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vidual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty. Article II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. 2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are: (a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed. Article III Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to correspond-

ing ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars. Article IV The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges. Article V 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Article VI To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Article VII Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Article VIII ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Article IX To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty. Article X Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty. Article XI The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Article XII 1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

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Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will: (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms. 2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article XIV 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

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Article XV 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: L. I. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Document Analysis

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a carefully crafted agreement that speaks directly to the matter of defensive weapons systems in the United States and the Soviet Union. The ABM Treaty places strict limits on where missile defense system sites can be placed. It also addresses the volume of weapons that can be placed on these sites. Furthermore, the treaty places restrictions on the development of ABM technologies, ensuring that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would enjoy a technological advantage over the other in the event of a nuclear war. As the treaty states, the penetration capability of each side would remain relatively unchallenged, guaranteeing heavy and widespread destruction if the two nations came to blows (and thus preserving the doctrine of nuclear deterrence). The first main provision of the treaty is to limit the number of ABM sites that either nation could install to two: one around the nation’s capital and one around an ICBM launch site. The rest of each nation would be exposed. This provision ensures, in theory, that both sides would be able to protect at least one missile facility, thereby ensuring that if a missile attack was initiated, the other could retaliate. The second major element of the treaty focuses on the composition of the sites themselves. The concern existed that one or both of the parties could place a sizable arsenal of ABM weaponry that could potentially

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RICHARD NIXON President of the United States of America

defend a broader geographic area or otherwise create a defensive advantage over the attacking nation. The treaty, therefore, limits to one hundred the number of interceptor missiles an ABM site could contain. At the same time, the treaty dictates that no other American or Soviet surface-to-air missile can be modified to intercept or otherwise disrupt the trajectories of incoming ICBMs. This provision ensures that only the two ABM installations in each nation would be able to prevent the penetration of attacking missiles. The third major provision of the ABM Treaty is the restriction on either side updating or improving its respective ABM system in such a way that parity between the two countries is compromised. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could develop sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM technologies. Additionally, the two parties could not give missiles, launchers, detection systems, or other technologies extra capability of detecting (with the exception of early warning radars located within the nations’ respective northern borders) or engaging an incoming missile. In addition to these major points, the ABM Treaty speaks to the dangers of proliferation and the need for continued negotiations on reducing offensive and defensive weaponry. Each side agrees not to share any of its ABM technologies with other states (despite the fact that, by this time, several nations had their own nuclear weapons arsenals). Finally, in light of the need to avoid

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

nuclear war altogether, the two sides agree to continue working on the broader issues associated with SALT and to maintain communications with regard to the enforcement of the terms of this agreement. Essential Themes

By 1969, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had diversified. The two nations continued to build their nuclear weapons arsenals, which were designed to inflict maximum widespread destruction. Then again, each side was concerned with defending itself from this destruction. Without parity (equal strength), the stronger nation could conceivably survive a nuclear exchange. While each side haggled with the other about offensive weapons, the ABM Treaty created a framework in which defensive weapons and technologies would not give either side a strategic advantage. The ABM Treaty (which was terminated with the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2002) placed strict limitations on the number of ABM installations that could be used to repel an attack. It also limited the number of missiles that could be used at a given installation and prohibited the modification of any

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existing defensive or offensive weapon in such a way that it could widen the interceptive capability of one side. Furthermore, it limited testing and prohibited the development of new technologies capable of creating a defensive advantage. The ABM Treaty sought to limit the ability of each side in the Cold War confrontation to defend itself from a nuclear attack while the two sides continued to negotiate reductions in offensive weapons. —Michael P. Auerbach, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Blacker, Coit D., and Gloria Duffy. International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Print. United States. Dept. of State. “Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II.” Office of the Historian. US Dept. of State, 31 Oct. 2013. Web. 29 Mar. 2016. Swift, John. “The Soviet-American Arms Race.” History Today. History Today, Mar. 2009. Web. 29 Mar. 2016.

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 Jackson-Vanik Amendment Date: 1974 Authors: Henry M. Jackson; Charles Vanik Genre: law Summary Overview

The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 was a law regarding trade with “nonmarket” economies, meaning Communist countries. It required nonmarket economies to allow free emigration before they could be granted most-favored-nation (MFN) status, the highest level of access to trade the United States allowed. The principal target of the act was the Soviet Union, particularly in relation to its Jewish population. Defining Moment

The Jackson-Vanik amendment came during the period of détente, the partial easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union originally promoted by President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and continued by Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford. Some American leaders opposed détente based on both the idea that the Soviets were still strategic competitors who needed to be confronted, not cooperated with, and the idea that in the rush to détente the human rights of people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were being forgotten. A lobbying campaign for the freer emigration of Soviet Jews was growing. There was a revival of Jewish culture and Jewish identity in the Soviet Union in the 1960s, which led to a greater awareness of the ties between Jews in the Soviet Union and those in the United States and Israel. Soviet Jews were beginning to forge ties with Jewish organizations outside the Soviet Union. Many Jews wished to emigrate, some out of general discontent with the poverty and repression of Soviet life and some for specifically Jewish reasons, such as the ability to practice Judaism and express Jewish identity more openly. Despite Soviet claims that all forms of prejudice had been banished from their society, Jewish people were subject to considerable official and unofficial anti-Semitism. There was also a growing Zionist movement among Soviet Jews who sought to immigrate to Israel.

Barriers to emigration were many. The process of applying for an exit visa could take many years. Scientists could be denied visas on the grounds that they held information vital to the Soviet state and, therefore, could not be trusted abroad. (One Soviet Jew refused emigration on this basis was Anatoly Shcharansky, who became a celebrated dissident in the West and was arrested by the Soviets on false charges of being an American spy. He was eventually released in 1986 and immigrated to Israel, where he is known as Natan Sharansky.) The Jewish population of the Soviet Union was relatively highly educated, and the Soviets required educated Jews to pay back the cost of their education before allowing them to emigrate; this so-called “diploma tax” could amount to the equivalent of tens of thousands of dollars. Jews whom the Soviets did not allow to leave were known as “refuseniks.” In June 1970, a group of refuseniks attempted to hijack a plane and fly to Sweden, their ultimate destination being Israel. The plot was foiled by the KGB, but the trial and condemnation of the group led to much sympathy from the West and pressure on the Soviets to release them. The cause of allowing Soviet Jews to emigrate became enormously popular in the United States, crossing divides in the Jewish community and linking Jewish activists with other human-rights activists and groups. Although the Jackson-Vanik amendment also applied to nonJews, as well as to countries other than the Soviet Union, in practice the debate over the amendment was couched almost entirely in terms of the Soviet Jewish population. Author Biography and Document Information

The two sponsors of the trade-act amendment, both Democrats, were Congressman Charles Vanik (1913– 2007) of Ohio and Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (1912–83) of Washington, although the amendment

Jackson-Vanik Amendment

also had numerous co-sponsors in both houses of Congress. In particular, Jackson had a reputation as one of the strongest cold warriors in the Democratic Party. Although not Jewish himself, like many leading Democrats, he had strong connections with the Jewish community. A group of liberal Democratic senators, including Jackson, Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, and Jacob Javits of New York, took the initial leadership on linking trade relations with the Soviets and freer emigration. The amendment was first introduced in 1972, as part of a proposed bill called the East-West Trade Relations Act. However, that measure was not passed, so the amendment was

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reintroduced as section 402 of the Trade Act. (Thus, it is not technically an amendment.) The Soviets lobbied the American business community against the idea, pointing out that they had already abandoned the diploma tax. Secretary of State Kissinger, the dominant force in foreign policy at the time, was known for his lack of interest in human rights issues, which he saw as pointless obstacles to a realistic relationship with the Soviets. Though Kissinger opposed the amendment, Congress passed it overwhelmingly. On January 3, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed into law the 1974 Trade Act, which included the JacksonVanik amendment.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT 19 U.S. Code § 2432 - Freedom of emigration in East-West trade (a) Actions of nonmarket economy countries making them ineligible for normal trade relations, programs of credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees, or commercial agreements to assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after  January 3, 1975, products from any nonmarket economy country shall not be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations), such country shall not participate in any program of the Government of the United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees, directly or indirectly, and the President of the United States shall not conclude any commercial agreement with any such country, during the period beginning with the date on which the President determines that such country— (1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate; (2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or (3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice;

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and ending on the date on which the President determines that such country is no longer in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3). (b) Presidential determination and report to Congress that nation is not violating freedom of emigration After January 3, 1975, (A) products of a nonmarket economy country may be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations), (B) such country may participate in any program of the Government of the United States which extends credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees, and (C) the President may conclude a commercial agreement with such country, only after the President has submitted to the Congress a report indicating that such country is not in violation of paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) of this section. Such report with respect to such country shall include information as to the nature and implementation of emigration laws and policies and restrictions or discrimination applied to or against persons wishing to emigrate. The report required by this subsection shall be submitted initially as provided herein and, with current information, on or before each June 30 and December 31 thereafter so long as such treatment is received, such credits or guarantees are extended, or such agreement is in effect. (c) Waiver authority of President (1) During the 18-month period beginning on January 3, 1975, the President is authorized to waive by Exec-

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utive order the application of subsections (a) and (b) of this section with respect to any country, if he reports to the Congress that— (A) he has determined that such waiver will substantially promote the objectives of this section; and (B) he has received assurances that the emigration practices of that country will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of this section. (2) During any period subsequent to the 18-month period referred to in paragraph (1), the President is authorized to waive by Executive order the application of subsections (a) and (b) of this section with respect to any country, if the waiver authority granted by this subsection continues to apply to such country pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and if he reports to the Congress that— (A) he has determined that such waiver will substantially promote the objectives of this section; and (B) he has received assurances that the emigration practices of that country will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of this section. (3) A waiver with respect to any country shall terminate on the day after the waiver authority granted by this subsection ceases to be effective with respect to such country pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. The President may, at any time, terminate by Executive order any waiver granted under this subsection. (d) Extension of waiver authority (1) If the President determines that the further extension of the waiver authority granted under subsection (c) of this section will substantially promote the objectives of this section, he may recommend further extensions of such authority for successive 12-month periods. Any such recommendations shall— (A) be made not later than 30 days before the expiration of such authority; (B) be made in a document transmitted to the House of Representatives and the Senate setting forth his reasons for recommending the extension of such authority; and (C) include, for each country with respect to which a waiver granted under subsection (c) of this section is in effect, a determination that continuation of the waiver applicable to that country will substantially promote the

objectives of this section, and a statement setting forth his reasons for such determination. If the President recommends the further extension of such authority, such authority shall continue in effect until the end of the 12-month period following the end of the previous 12-month extension with respect to any country (except for any country with respect to which such authority has not been extended under this subsection), unless a joint resolution described in  section 2193(a) of this title is enacted into law pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (2). (2) (A) The requirements of this paragraph are met if the joint resolution is enacted under the procedures set forth in section 2193 of this title, and— (i) the Congress adopts and transmits the joint resolution to the President before the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date the waiver authority would expire but for an extension under paragraph (1), and (ii) if the President vetoes the joint resolution, each House of Congress votes to override such veto on or before the later of the last day of the 60-day period referred to in clause (i) or the last day of the 15-day period (excluding any day described in section 2194(b) of this title) beginning on the date the Congress receives the veto message from the President. (B) If a joint resolution is enacted into law under the provisions of this paragraph, the waiver authority applicable to any country with respect to which the joint resolution disapproves of the extension of such authority shall cease to be effective as of the day after the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of the joint resolution. (C) A joint resolution to which this subsection and section 2193 of this title apply may be introduced at any time on or after the date the President transmits to the Congress the document described in paragraph (1)(B). (e) Countries not covered This section shall not apply to any country the products of which are eligible for the rates set forth in rate column numbered 1 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States on January 3, 1975.

Jackson-Vanik Amendment

Document Analysis

The term “nonmarket economy” is not defined in the act, nor does it have a standard definition, although in practice it applies only to Communist countries. (Yugoslavia, not a member of the Soviet-led alliance, was exempted, as was Poland, which had already received MFN status and was therefore exempt from the Jackson-Vanik amendment.) The intention of the act is “to assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights.” The amendment places power in the hands of the president to either determine that a specific nonmarket economy country is in compliance with the requirements or, in specific cases, to waive the requirements. The president can deny normal trade relations with a country under three conditions: if the country denies emigration, “imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration,” or fines or taxes those who express a desire to leave the country. Congress plays no necessary role in these determinations but can intervene to overrule determinations of compliance or waivers. However, such attempts are difficult and have not been successful. (Congress tried to remove China’s waiver after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, but it failed, as did subsequent attempts to remove China’s waiver.) After the fall of the Soviet Union, most of the former Communist world was removed from the list of “nonmarket” economies subject to the amendment, determined to be in compliance, or given a waiver. Two countries against whom the United States had an embargo, Cuba and North Korea, were not. Essential Themes

The Soviets regarded the Jackson-Vanik amendment as an illegitimate interference in their domestic affairs and refused the improvement in trade relations offered by the act if it came at the price of acquiescence to the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The amendment was not initially successful in allowing freer emigration for Sovi-

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et Jews. What had more impact on Soviet behavior was the Stevenson amendment passed a few months later, which limited the trade credits provided to the Soviet Union to $300 million unless the limit was raised by the president and Congress together, contingent on Soviet behavior on issues such as emigration. Although Soviet Jewish emigration increased in the 1970s, the gates were really opened only with the relaxation of emigration restrictions by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, and then even more by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Whatever the amendment’s effects, Jews in both the United States and Israel greeted it happily. Partly on the strength of the amendment, Jackson ran, unsuccessfully, as a strong cold warrior for the Democratic nomination for president in 1976. After the fall of the Soviet Union, some debated repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, but the act remained in effect for two decades, applying to Russia and states created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Despite moves made for its repeal in the early 2000s, only in 2012 did the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act repeal the amendment. —William E. Burns, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Feingold, Henry L. “Silent No More”: Saving the Jews of Russia, the American Jewish Effort, 1967–1989. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 2007. Print. Ginsberg, Julie. “Reassessing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.” Council on Foreign Relations. CFR, 2 July 2009. Web. 15 Mar. 2016. Peretz, Pauline. Let My People Go: The Transnational Politics of Soviet Jewish Emigration during the Cold War. New Brunswick: Transaction, 2015. Print. Pregelj, Vladimir N. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey. Congressional Research Service, 1 Aug. 2005. PDF file.

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 Helsinki Accords (Excerpt) Date: August 1, 1975 Author: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Geographic Region: Europe Genre: government document; treaty

Summary Overview

The Helsinki Accords (also known as the Helsinki Final Act) were a set of diplomatic agreements signed by all the European countries (except Albania and Andorra), the United States, and Canada, acting together as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The accords ratified the post–World War II boundaries of European countries, required states to notify each other of major military movements, and pledged economic and cultural cooperation. They also included promises to encourage individual mobility and broaden access to information, and they forbade the acquisition of territory by force. Defining Moment

The Helsinki Accords can be considered a climax of the policy of détente, or easing of tensions, between the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev and the United States under presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford during the 1970s. The Soviets were interested in an agreement that ratified the boundaries of post–World War II Europe. Unlike other European wars, such as the Napoleonic Wars or World War I, World War II had not been followed by a European congress in which the new territorial and political order was ratified by the European powers. The Soviets had been pushing for such a conference since the mid-1950s. In the United States, one of the principal concerns was that the Helsinki agreement not be interpreted as recognizing the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia during World War II.

The American policy had consistently been to not recognize the incorporation of these states into the Soviet Union, a policy supported by organized groups of Americans of Eastern European descent. However, America’s European allies were interested in a process to bring Europe closer together and increase access to the East. The Ostpolitik (eastern policy) initiated by West German chancellor Willy Brandt in the late 1960s moved West Germany closer to an acceptance of the postwar German borders and the existence of East Germany. Author Biography and Document Information

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe met for the first time in Helsinki, Finland, on July 3, 1973. The talks then moved from Helsinki to the Swiss city of Geneva, long established as a place for international diplomacy. The Geneva round lasted for two years, following which the parties moved back to Helsinki to sign the final agreement on August 1, 1975. The United States and Canada, as well as all European countries save Andorra and isolationist Albania, were represented at the conference. (In addition to continental European countries, the group included island countries commonly viewed as European states, including Great Britain, Cyprus, Ireland, Iceland, and Malta.) The group included countries from Western Europe, countries from the Soviet-dominated Communist bloc, and neutral countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Yugoslavia. It also included the Holy See and one predominantly Muslim country, Turkey.

Helsinki Accords (Excerpt)

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HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development. Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

Document Analysis

The Helsinki Accords set forth a series of principles on how states should interact with each other and how they should treat their own populations. The topics addressed in the accords fall into four categories: political issues, including the recognition of boundaries, the settlement of disputes, and military-to-military relations; issues of economics, science, and the environment, with an emphasis on fostering cooperation; humanitarian and cultural issues; and finally a system for verification and follow-up meetings. The accords are rhetorically framed within the larger framework of the United Nations and its principles. The accords begin with a Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, among which is a recognition that the Charter of the United Nations has priority over other international agreements, including the Helsinki Accords themselves, and there are frequent references to other UN documents. The accords essentially freeze European borders in the shape they had taken in the aftermath of the World War II, by forbidding the acquisition of territory by force. The accords set forth a system whereby states will keep each other informed of military maneuvers, particularly large ones that could be mistaken for preparations for an invasion. The accords also call for disarmament, but lay no particular requirements on participating states, rendering it more a pious hope than an obligation.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere. The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States....

The second part encourages states to promote international economic cooperation through the lowering of trade barriers while minimizing market disruptions. States should encourage business-to-business relations and the exchange of statistical information, preferably with the establishment of uniform standards for that information. The accords spell out several areas for scientific and technological cooperation, but they avoid specific commitments of the member states. The discussion of the environment focuses on pollution and the preservation of nature, though without mention of the issues of climate change that would later come to dominate environmental diplomacy. The third part, regarding cooperation in the sphere of culture, includes provisions for facilitating people’s ability to move between countries, “considering the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust among peoples.” Carefully limiting foreign travel, particularly for dissidents and other enemies of the state, was one of the principal methods by which Communist regimes maintained control over their populations, so this was one of the most controversial areas of the accords. Another controversial area was the accords’ encouragement of the circulation of information in printed and filmed form from other countries, as well as the free movement of journalists, which would threaten Communist governments’ ability to control their citizens’ access to information.

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Essential Themes

Brezhnev had hoped that the Helsinki Accords’ recognition of the post–World War II borders would be enthusiastically welcomed by the Soviet people and help booster the legitimacy of his government. However, the accords caused more problems than they solved for the Soviet government. Although many considered the provisions of the Helsinki Accords governing free movement and access to information to be an empty promise without a mechanism for enforcement, they did help inspire a number of dissident movements in Communist-ruled Eastern Europe, such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. These groups were sometimes known as “Helsinki committees.” The ongoing process of reports on compliance with Helsinki helped keep the issue of human rights in Communist Europe in the public eye. The Helsinki process also enhanced military-to-military relationships across Europe, lessening the fear of accidental war based on military exercises being misperceived as preparations for attack. The Helsinki Accords continued to be controversial in the United States, particularly among hard-line conservatives suspicious of détente. It was also denounced by rising Conservative star Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Although the Baltic territories are not mentioned by name, the Soviet bloc claimed that the Helsinki Accords recognized the former republics as part of the Soviet Union, while the Americans insisted that they did not. After endorsing the Helsinki Accords, the US House of Representatives reaffirmed US nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation, a policy that the United States followed until the fall of the Soviet Union, when the Baltic states regained their independence. So concerned was President Ford that the Helsinki agreement not be used to legitimate Soviet control in Eastern Europe that he stated in a presidential debate with his Democratic challenger, Jimmy Carter, that Poland was not under the control of the Soviet Union. This denial of the reality of the Soviet-Polish relationship may have contributed to his narrow loss to Carter in the 1976 election. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe continued to meet after Helsinki. The first follow-up conference took place in the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade from October 4, 1977, to March 8, 1978. The Belgrade conference focused on human and mi-

nority rights and was much more contentious between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc than was the Helsinki meeting. Subsequent meetings took place at Madrid from 1980 to 1983, at Stockholm from 1984 to 1986, and at Vienna from 1986 to 1989. In 1990, in recognition of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the CSCE met again in Paris and signed a new charter, recognizing the changes on the continent and renaming the group the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Reflecting the changes after the fall of Communism, the OSCE now includes a greater number of states, including Albania and Andorra, as well as the many independent countries that came into existence following the breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The Helsinki agreement survived the fall of European Communism and the Soviet Union, but the peaceful Europe envisioned by Helsinki ended with the fall of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars among the Yugoslav successor states. The Helsinki principle forbidding the acquisition of territory by force has also recently been challenged by Russia’s conquest and annexation of the Crimea. The encouragement of international trade and other economic provisions have mostly been carried out in the framework of the European Union, which includes a smaller number of exclusively European states, rather than the OSCE. Free movement across borders is also principally an EU matter. Finally, issues of the circulation of information across borders have been revolutionized by the rise of the Internet. —William E. Burns, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bloed, Arie, ed. From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1990. Print. Kandiah, Michael D., and Gillian Staerck, eds. The Helsinki Negotiations: The Accords and Their Impact. London: Institute of Contemporary British History, 2006. PDF file. Mastny, Vojtech. Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and Documentation. Durham: Duke UP, 1986. Print. Snyder, Sarah B. Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network. New York: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print.

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 Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech Date: January 19, 1976 Author: Margaret Thatcher Geographic Region: United Kingdom Genre: speech Summary Overview

This speech, given at Kensington Town Hall in the Chelsea area of London, England, was a political address aimed critically at the policies of the Labour Party government of the United Kingdom in 1976. Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party, the other major British party, argued that the Labour government’s policy of cuts in the defense budget and détente with the Soviet Union showed weakness in the face of Soviet expansionism. She claimed that the Soviet leadership was striving to become the world’s dominant military power at the expense of both the United Kingdom and the United States. The Conservatives, she asserted, would take the threat seriously and more effectively defend the United Kingdom—and the world—from the forces of international Communism. The Soviets were also directly affected by the powerful and adamant nature of her words and position, bestowing the lasting nickname of “Iron Lady” upon her. Defining Moment

The late 1970s were part of the period of détente, the partial rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union and the cooling of tensions characteristic of the Cold War; the policy widely supported among the United States’ European allies, including the United Kingdom. The Labour Party then in power was generally associated with a nonconfrontational attitude toward the Soviets, although the United Kingdom remained a loyal member of the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO had been created in 1949 by Western powers to provide security against the increasing threat of Communism, mainly from the Soviet Union, in the areas of Europe weakened by World War II. While the early 1970s saw some indications of a decline in Cold War tensions, especially in the form of legislation promoting the end of the

arms race between the two powers, such as the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, by 1976, there were some signs that things were trending back to a more Cold War–style approach. In 1975, the Communists of North Vietnam had taken over South Vietnam, violating a cease-fire to do so. Cambodia and Laos had also fallen under Communist control. The breakup of the Portuguese empire in Africa led to a protracted, murky struggle over the control of the African nation of Angola, in which Communists supported factions arrayed against those supported by the West, as well as Communist involvement in the change of government in Portugal itself. Thatcher had become the leader of the Conservative Party in 1975—the first woman to lead the party—and she generally identified with the party’s hard-right faction, in contrast with the more moderate leadership of the previous Conservative prime minister, Edward Heath. As of 1974, the United Kingdom had once again been governed by the Labour Party, first under the leadership of prime minister Harold Wilson until 1976, and then under prime minister James Callaghan. Author Biography and Document Information

Margaret Thatcher was born on October 13, 1925, in Grantham, Lincolnshire, England. After graduating from the University of Oxford and practicing for a time as a barrister, she first entered into politics with an unsuccessful run for Parliament in 1950. Earning a seat in the House of Commons in 1959, she rapidly ascended the ranks of the Conservative Party. In 1979, she became the first woman to be named prime minister of the United Kingdom, and she would go on to become one of the longest-serving British prime ministers of modern times. She was generally identified with a hard-right, anti-union approach to the economy; skepticism about the welfare state; a traditional approach to

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morality; and a rather hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War years. She was suspicious of the European Union as well but friendly to the United States, particularly under President Ronald Reagan,

with whom she had much in common ideologically. As prime minister throughout the 1980s, she had an immense impact on British culture.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The first duty of any Government is to safeguard its people against external aggression. To guarantee the survival of our way of life. The question we must now ask ourselves is whether the present Government is fulfilling that duty. It is dismantling our defences at a moment when the strategic threat to Britain and her allies from an expansionist power is graver than at any moment since the end of the last war. Military men are always warning us that the strategic balance is tilting against NATO and the west. But the Socialists never listen. They don’t seem to realise that the submarines and missiles that the Russians are building could be destined to be used against us. Perhaps some people in the Labour Party think we are on the same side as the Russians! But just let’s look at what the Russians are doing. She’s ruled by a dictatorship of patient, far-sighted determined men who are rapidly making their country the foremost naval and military power in the world. They are not doing this solely for the sake of selfdefence. A huge, largely land-locked country like Russia does not need to build the most powerful navy in the world just to guard its own frontiers. No. The Russians are bent on world dominance, and they are rapidly acquiring the means to become the most powerful imperial nation the world has seen. The men in the Soviet politburo don’t have to worry about the ebb and flow of public opinion. They put guns before butter, while we put just about everything before guns. They know that they are a super power in only one sense—the military sense. They are a failure in human and economic terms. But let us make no mistake. The Russians calculate that their military strength will more than make up for

their economic and social weakness. They are determined to use it in order to get what they want from us. Last year on the eve of the Helsinki Conference, I warned that the Soviet Union is spending 20 per cent more each year than the United States on military research and development. 25 per cent more on weapons and equipment. 60 per cent more on strategic nuclear forces. In the past ten years Russia has spent 50 per cent more than the United States on naval shipbuilding. Some military experts believe that Russia has already achieved strategic superiority over America. But it is the balance of conventional forces which poses the most immediate dangers for NATO. I am going to visit our troops in Germany on Thursday. I am going at a moment when the Warsaw Pact forces—that is, the forces of Russia and her allies—in Central Europe outnumber NATOs by 150,000 men nearly 10,000 tanks and 2,600 aircraft. We cannot afford to let that gap get bigger. Still more serious gaps have opened up elsewhere— especially in the troubled area of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean. The rise of Russia as a world-wide naval power, threatens our oil rigs and our traditional life-lines, the sea routes. Over the past ten years, the Russians have quadrupled their force of nuclear submarines. They are now building one nuclear submarine a month. They are searching for new naval base facilities all over the world, while we are giving up our few remaining bases. They have moved into the Indian Ocean. They pose a rising threat to our northern waters and, farther east to Japan’s vital sea routes. The Soviet navy is not designed for self-defence. We do not have to imagine an all-out nuclear war or even a conventional war in order to see how it could be used for

Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech

political purposes. I would be the first to welcome any evidence that the Russians are ready to enter into a genuine détente. But I am afraid that the evidence points the other way. I warned before Helsinki of the dangers of falling for an illusory détente. Some people were sceptical at the time, but we now see that my warning was fully justified. Has détente induced the Russians to cut back on their defence programme? Has it dissuaded them from brazen intervention in Angola? Has it led to any improvement in the conditions of Soviet citizens, or the subject populations of Eastern Europe? We know the answers. At Helsinki we endorsed the status quo in Eastern Europe. In return we had hoped for the freer movement of people and ideas across the Iron Curtain. So far we have got nothing of substance. We are devoted, as we always have been, to the maintenance of peace. We will welcome any initiative from the Soviet Union that would contribute to that goal. But we must also heed the warnings of those, like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who remind us that we have been fighting a kind of ‘Third World War’ over the entire period since 1945—and that we have been steadily losing ground. As we look back over the battles of the past year, over the list of countries that have been lost to freedom or are imperilled by Soviet expansion can we deny that Solzhenitsyn is right? We have seen Vietnam and all of Indochina swallowed up by Communist aggression. We have seen the Communists make an open grab for power in Portugal, our oldest ally—a sign that many of the battles in the Third World War are being fought inside Western countries. And now the Soviet Union and its satellites are pouring money, arms and front-line troops into Angola in the hope of dragging it into the Communist bloc. We must remember that there are no Queensbury rules in the contest that is now going on. And the Russians are playing to win.

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They have one great advantage over us—the battles are being fought on our territory, not theirs. Within a week of the Helsinki conference, Mr Zarodov , a leading Soviet ideologue, was writing in Pravda about the need for the Communist Parties of Western Europe to forget about tactical compromises with Social Democrats, and take the offensive in order to bring about proletarian revolution. Later Mr Brezhnev made a statement in which he gave this article his personal endorsement. If this is the line that the Soviet leadership adopts at its Party Congress next month, then we must heed their warning. It undoubtedly applies to us too. We in Britain cannot opt out of the world. If we cannot understand why the Russians are rapidly becoming the greatest naval and military power the world has ever seen—if we cannot draw the lesson of what they tried to do in Portugal and are now trying to do in Angola—then we are destined, in their words,to end up on ‘the scrap heap of history’. We look to our alliance with American and NATO as the main guarantee of our own security and, in the world beyond Europe, the United States is still the prime champion of freedom. But we are all aware of how the bitter experience of Vietnam has changed the public mood in America. We are also aware of the circumstances that inhibit action by an American president in an election year. So it is more vital than ever that each and every one of us within NATO should contribute his proper share to the defence of freedom. Britain, with her world-wide experience of diplomacy and defence, has a special role to play. We in the Conservative Party are determined that Britain should fulfil that role. We’re not harking back to some nostalgic illusion about Britain’s role in the past. We’re saying—Britain has a part to play now, a part to play for the future. The advance of Communist power threatens our whole way of life. That advance is not irreversible, providing that we take the necessary measures now. But the longer that we go on running down our means of survival, the harder it will be to catch up.

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In other words: the longer Labour remains in Government, the more vulnerable this country will be. (Applause.) What has this Government been doing with our defences? Under the last defence review, the Government said it would cut defence spending by £4,700 million over the next nine years. Then they said they would cut a further £110 million. It now seems that we will see further cuts. If there are further cuts, perhaps the Defence Secretary should change his title, for the sake of accuracy, to the Secretary for Insecurity. On defence, we are now spending less per head of the population than any of our major allies. Britain spends only £90 per head on defence. West Germany spends £130, France spends £115. The United States spends £215. Even neutral Sweden spends £60 more per head than we do. Of course, we are poorer than most of our NATO allies. This is part of the disastrous economic legacy of Socialism. But let us be clear about one thing. This is not a moment when anyone with the interests of this country at heart should be talking about cutting our defences. It is a time when we urgently need to strengthen our defences. Of course this places a burden on us. But it is one that we must be willing to bear if we want our freedom to survive. Throughout our history, we have carried the torch for freedom. Now, as I travel the world, I find people asking again and again, “What has happened to Britain?” They want to know why we are hiding our heads in the sand, why with all our experience, we are not giving a lead. Many people may not be aware, even now, of the full extent of the threat. We expect our Governments to take a more farsighted view. To give them their due, the Government spelled out the extent of the peril in their Defence White Paper last year, But, having done so, they drew the absurd conclusion that our defence efforts should be reduced.

The Socialists, in fact, seem to regard defence as almost infinitely cuttable. They are much more cautious when it comes to cutting other types of public expenditure. They seem to think that we can afford to go deeper into debt so that the Government can prop up a lossmaking company. And waste our money on the profligate extension of nationalisation and measures such as the Community Land Act. Apparently, we can even afford to lend money to the Russians, at a lower rate of interest that we have to pay on our own borrowings. But we cannot afford, in Labour’s view, to maintain our defences at the necessary level—not even at a time when on top of our NATO commitments, we are fighting a major internal war against terrorism in Northern Ireland, and need more troops in order to win it. There are crises farther from home that could affect us deeply. Angola is the most immediate. In Angola, the Soviet-backed guerrilla movement, the MPLA, is making rapid headway in its current offensive, despite the fact that it controls only a third of the population, and is supported by even less. The MPLA is gaining ground because the Soviet Union and its satellites are pouring money, guns and front-line troops into the battle. Six thousand Cuban regular soldiers are still there. But it is obvious that an acceptable solution for Angola is only possible if all outside powers withdraw their military support. You might well ask: why on earth should we think twice about what is happening in a far-away place like Angola? There are four important reasons. The first is that Angola occupies a vital strategic position. If the pro-Soviet faction wins, one of the immediate consequences will almost certainly be the setting up of Soviet air and naval bases on the South Atlantic. The second reason is that the presence of Communist forces in this area will make it much more difficult to settle the Rhodesian problem and achieve an understanding between South Africa and black Africa. The third reason is even more far-reaching. If the Russians have their way in Angola, they may

Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech

well conclude that they can repeat the performance elsewhere. Similarly, uncommitted nations would be left to conclude that NATO is a spent force and that their best policy is to pursue an accommodation with Russia. Fourthly, what the Russians are doing in Angola is against détente. They seem to believe that their intervention is consistent with détente. Indeed, Izvestiya recently argued that Soviet support for the Communist MPLA is “an investment in détente”—which gives us a good idea of what they really mean by the word. We should make it plain to the Russians that we do not believe that what they are doing in Angola is consistent with détente. It is usually said that NATO policy ends in North Africa at the Tropic of Cancer. But the situation in Angola brings home the fact that NATOs supply lines need to be protected much further south. In the Conservative Party we believe that our foreign policy should continue to be based on a close understanding with our traditional ally, America. This is part of our Anglo-Saxon tradition as well as part of our NATO commitment, and it adds to our contribution to the European Community. Our Anglo-Saxon heritage embraces the countries of the Old Commonwealth that have too often been neglected by politicians in this country, but are always close to the hearts of British people. We believe that we should build on our traditional bonds with Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as on our new ties with Europe. I am delighted to see that the Australians and the New Zealanders have concluded—as I believe that most people in this country are coming to conclude—that Socialism has failed. In their two electoral avalanches at the end of last year, they brought back Governments committed to freedom of choice, governments that will roll back the frontiers of state intervention in the economy and will restore incentives for people to work and save. Our congratulations go to Mr Fraser and Mr Muldoon. I know that our countries will be able to learn from

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each other. What has happened in Australasia is part of a wider reawakening to the need to provide a more positive defence of the values and traditions on which Western civilisation, and prosperity, are based. We stand with that select body of nations that believe in democracy and social and economic freedom. Part of Britain’s world role should be to provide, through its spokesmen, a reasoned and vigorous defence of the Western concept of rights and liberties: The kind that America’s Ambassador to the UN, Mr Moynihan , has recently provided in his powerfully argued speeches. But our role reaches beyond this. We have abundant experience and expertise in this country in the art of diplomacy in its broadest sense. It should be used, within Europe, in the efforts to achieve effective foreign policy initiatives. Within the EEC, the interests of individual nations are not identical and our separate identities must be seen as a strength rather than a weakness. Any steps towards closer European union must be carefully considered. We are committed to direct elections within the Community, but the timing needs to be carefully calculated. But new problems are looming up. Among them is the possibility that the Communists will come to power through a coalition in Italy. This is a good reason why we should aim for closer links between those political groups in the European Parliament that reject Socialism. We have a difficult year ahead in 1976. I hope it will not result in a further decline of Western power and influence of the kind that we saw in 1975. It is clear that internal violence—and above all political terrorism—will continue to pose a major challenge to all Western societies, and that it may be exploited as an instrument by the Communists. We should seek close co-ordination between the police and security services of the Community, and of NATO, in the battle against terrorism. The way that our own police have coped with recent terrorist incidents provides a splendid model for other forces. The message of the Conservative Party is that Britain

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has an important role to play on the world stage. It is based on the remarkable qualities of the British people. Labour has neglected that role. Our capacity to play a constructive role in world affairs is of course related to our economic and military strength. Socialism has weakened us on both counts. This puts at risk not just our chance to play a useful role in the councils of the world, but the Survival of our way of life. Caught up in the problems and hardships that Socialism has brought to Britain, we are sometimes in danger of failing to see the vast transformations taking place in the world that dwarf our own problems, great though they are. But we have to wake up to those developments, and find the political will to respond to them. Soviet military power will not disappear just because we refuse to look at it. And we must assume that it is there to be used—as threat or as force—unless we maintain the necessary deterrents. We are under no illusions about the limits of British influence. We are often told how this country that once ruled a quarter of the world is today just a group of offshore

Document Analysis

The central focus of the speech is the military rise of the Soviet Union and the inability of the ruling Labour government to understand or efficiently react to this buildup. Thatcher opens the speech by linking the threat of Soviet expansionism to the “last war,” by which she means World War II. This linkage both emphasizes the gravity of the Soviet threat and puts her in a position paralleling that of Winston Churchill before World War II, warning of a threat that others would minimize or seek to appease. Thatcher depicts the leadership of the Soviet Union, however, not as a new Adolf Hitler but as a cold, calculating group bent on increasing Soviet power by any means that seem desirable. She finds British—and by extension, US—policy to be dangerously naïve, denouncing the détente policy by name. She criticizes the recently concluded Helsinki Accords as giving Western recognition of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe

islands. Well, we in the Conservative Party believe that Britain is still great. The decline of our relative power in the world was partly inevitable—with the rise of the super powers with their vast reserves of manpower and resources. But it was partly avoidable too—the result of our economic decline accelerated by Socialism. We must reverse that decline when we are returned to Government. In the meantime, the Conservative Party has the vital task of shaking the British public out of a long sleep. Sedatives have been prescribed by people, in and out of Government, telling us that there is no external threat to Britain, that all is sweetness and light in Moscow, and that a squadron of fighter planes or a company of marine commandos is less important than some new subsidy. The Conservative Party must now sound the warning. There are moments in our history when we have to make a fundamental choice. This is one such moment—a moment when our choice will determine the life or death of our kind of society,—and the future of our children. Let’s ensure that our children will have cause to rejoice that we did not forsake their freedom.

in exchange for human rights guarantees the Soviets have easily broken. She paints a frightening picture of a Soviet military buildup that will match and eventually exceed the military forces of the West, including those of the United States. This military force cannot be meant just for self-defense, she argues, as a “largely land-locked country like Russia does not need to build the most powerful navy in the world just to guard its own frontiers.” She even suggests that the United States, in its post-Vietnam mood, may no longer be reliable to depend upon for security and full leadership of the Western alliance. In this situation, Thatcher suggests that Great Britain has a particular role to play above and beyond simply being a member of the Western alliance. She places the ideological role of Great Britain in an “Anglo-Saxon” context that includes the United States and the countries of the former British Empire that had been colonized by people from Great Britain, including Canada,

Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech

Australia, and New Zealand. Thatcher appeals to British patriotism and the idea of a unique British destiny at a time when Great Britain had lost nearly all of its vast empire and was politically and militarily dwarfed by the superpowers. She tells the British people that they still have a vital contribution to make to the world. Although Thatcher denounces and even demonizes the Soviet leadership, the real target of the speech is the Labour government of Prime Minister Wilson. She charges the government with having mishandled the nation’s defense with irresponsible budget cuts and a generally naïve attitude regarding the Soviet threat. The situation is particularly dire in that a great portion of the defense budget has to be devoted to the struggle in Northern Ireland, a struggle Thatcher fully supports even while she sees it as a drain on resources that could go to the more important struggle with the Soviets. Additionally, she highlights the ongoing battle against the threat of Soviet Communism in Angola as a representative example of the kinds of crises Great Britain should have the power to defend against. She even suggests that some members of Labour think of the Soviet Union as an ally rather than an adversary. To the extent that the budget cuts have been forced by Great Britain’s inability to pay for an adequate defense, that too, according to Thatcher, is the fault of the socialism of the Labour movement that has crippled the British economy. The answer to all of these problems is a Conservative government that will revitalize the British economy and restore the country’s military. Essential Themes

The term “Iron Lady,” which later became a popular appellation (not always complimentary) for Thatcher as prime minister, was first coined by the Soviets themselves in response to this speech. The Conservatives under Thatcher won the next general election in 1979, the first of three they would win under Thatcher’s leadership as she became the longestserving prime minister since the nineteenth century. However, the foreign-policy issues raised in this speech

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were not central to her victory, which focused on the economy and what she charged was the excessive power of labor unions under the Labour government. At the same time, as prime minister, she did oversee increases in the defense budget. Thatcher’s militant Cold War stance resonated beyond the United Kingdom itself. Her image as an implacable opponent of the Soviets made her popular among Eastern European dissidents. Her profound opposition to the Soviet Union was nearly as influential in the United States as it was in her own country. The administration of Reagan, which came into power in 1981, was extremely sympathetic to Thatcher’s way of thinking on both foreign and domestic matters, and the two leaders forged a close alliance, far closer than Thatcher’s relationship with the previous US president, Jimmy Carter. Thatcher became, and remains, a hero to American conservatives in a way uncommon for foreign leaders. However, Thatcher’s portrayal of a Soviet Union ceaselessly on the advance against a weakening West did not fit actual Soviet perceptions of its position or the reality of Cold War politics in the late 1970s. The Soviets were not actually close to becoming a stronger military power than the United States or a serious menace to the United Kingdom. —William E. Burns, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Cooper, James. Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: A Very Political Special Relationship. New York: Palgrave, 2012. Print. Cosgrave, Patrick. Margaret Thatcher: A Tory and Her Party. London: Hutchinson, 1978. Print. Croft, Stuart. British Security Policy: The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War. London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991. Print. Moore, Charles. Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography—from Grantham to the Falklands. New York: Knopf, 2013. Print.

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 US Contingency Plans in Light of Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola Date: c. April 1976 Author: Washington Special Actions Group at the behest of Henry A. Kissinger Genre: Memorandum

Summary Overview

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that Cuban intervention in Angola, if not met with US retaliation, would lead to further interventions by Cuba as well as acts of aggression by other states. He ordered the preparation of a list of contingencies, ranging from diplomatic statements to military action, to deter and counter further Cuban action. The Ford administration ended, however, before a decision could be taken on implementing it. Defining Moment

Relations between the United States and Cuba became fraught soon after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, owing to Cuba’s decision to ally with the Soviet Union and to US fears that Cuba would foment revolution in other parts of Latin America. Behind the scenes, Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union was ambiguous and played an interactive role in its policy regarding revolution. Especially after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis— during which, in Fidel Castro’s view, the Soviet Union failed to stand up for Cuba—the Cuban regime sought to spread revolution in Latin America and to a lesser extent in Africa. This was apparently done to distract the United States, to create new allies, and somehow to reduce Cuba’s dependence on (or improve its bargaining leverage with) the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, those efforts had collapsed, and Cuba then strove to maximize its financial independence by producing a ten-million-ton sugar harvest. That, too, fell short, ruining much of the rest of the economy in the process. As a consequence, rather than maximize its independence, Cuba capitulated, reorganizing its government and economy along Soviet lines and joining the Moscow-based Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON) in the early 1970s.

At this point, the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 intervened. The new Portuguese regime granted independence to its extensive colonial empire, of which Angola was a part. One result was that, in Angola, a civil war erupted among three rival movements: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Cuba had contacts with the MPLA in the mid-1960s, but the relationship had faded by this time. The Soviet Union offered some material assistance but would not send trainers or advisers to Angola, at least not before formal independence scheduled for November 1975. (Portugal was, after all, a NATO country.) In the summer of 1975, after Congo (Brazzaville) refused to act as a conduit of aid, the Soviets turned to Cuba to facilitate assistance. Cuba agreed to establish four military training centers on Angolan soil before independence. In October 1975, the South African army intervened directly in the Angolan war on the side of the FNLA and UNITA. Cuban trainers at Benguela organized the MPLA’s southern defense, which South African troops promptly crushed. Faced with a sudden crisis, Castro responded by doubling down. Evidently without consulting Moscow, he sent Cuban combat troops to Angola by air and sea, putting a halt to the South African advance. After Angola formally became independent under an MPLA government (and the United States had not intervened), Moscow provided Aeroflot airliners to assist the further movement of Cuban troops and began flying military equipment directly from the Soviet Union to Angola. Cuban and MPLA forces had substantially prevailed by early March 1976 (although some level of fighting continued in Angola for nearly three decades). Afterward, Soviet economic aid to Cuba increased substantially, suggesting that the in-

US Contingency Plans in Light of Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola

tervention had indeed boosted Cuba’s bargaining leverage, and Soviet-Cuban relations reached a high point. In the first half of 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the Gerald Ford administration were trying to improve relations with Cuba, as Kissinger and the Richard Nixon administration had already done with the Soviet Union and China. The Cubans showed interest but were unwilling to negotiate formally unless the United States ended its embargo of Cuba first. The United States expressed a willingness to remove sanctions in stages if Cuba reciprocated with parallel concessions, also in stages. The two sides discussed this in a formal meeting in July, but the Cubans ended by insisting that Washington lift the embargo as a precondition. Meanwhile, in Angola, the Central Intelligence Agency had begun a clandestine program to support the FNLA and UNITA. The fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese army in April 1975 made Kissinger especially concerned that the United States would appear weak and ineffectual if it remained completely on the sidelines and that such weakness would encourage aggressiveness by its adversaries. (John Stockwell, the CIA officer assigned to head the Angola Task Force, protested that the operation could not be both small enough to remain secret and large enough to succeed.) Congress took exactly the opposite lesson from the fall of Saigon. Unwilling to relive the Vietnam episode, Congress had acted to prevent the United States from re-engaging in that country’s renewed war. After the CIA’s Angolan operation was revealed in the press in December 1975, Congress acted to shut it down as well. This period (along with congressional opposition to the Contra War in Nicaragua in the 1980s) marked a high point in direct congressional involvement in foreign policy. It does not appear that the United States at any time considered trying to win the MPLA away from its alliance with the Soviet bloc, although the movement was initially open to relations with Washington. Kissinger remained concerned about overcoming the “Vietnam syndrome” in US foreign policy—that is, a reluctance to act rooted in an aversion to overseas military involvement that could result in another quagmire. (In addition, some have suggested that Kissinger was personally offended that Castro decided to intervene in Africa at a time when he was trying to improve relations with Cuba.) He encouraged South African and Israeli support for the anti-MPLA coalition. He also proposed direct US action against Cuba. In a meeting with Presi-

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dent Ford on February 25, 1976, Kissinger indicated that Latin American leaders were “scared to death about Cuba.” He went on to conclude, “I think we are going to have to smash Castro. We probably can’t do it before the elections.” Ford responded, “I agree.” In another Oval Office meeting, on March 15, Kissinger cited Saudi Arabian and Iranian concerns about Cuban expansion and commented, “I think sooner or later we have to crack the Cubans. . . . I think we have to humiliate them. If they move into Namibia or Rhodesia, I would be in favor of clobbering them.” He proposed that a contingency plan be drawn up by the National Security Council (NSC) or the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), a special subcommittee of the NSC that normally dealt with crisis situations. The issue then moved to the WSAG (March 24). There Kissinger evoked something akin to the theory of falling dominoes that had fueled the Vietnam War, arguing that Cuba’s Angolan intervention was only the beginning. (“If the Cubans destroy Rhodesia then Namibia is next and then there is South Africa.”) He stressed that it was a “strategic problem,” not a question of African policy, because of the assumed impact of Cuban actions on the perceptions and ambitions of other countries. (“If there is a perception overseas that we are so weakened by our internal debate so that it looks like we can’t do anything about a country of 8 million people, then in three or four years we are going to have a real crisis.”) He said the Saudis expected to see Cubans in South Yemen and that the Latin Americans feared that Cuban intervention in Africa would trigger a larger race war. The task of drafting the contingencies was assigned to a small group to assure secrecy. Author Biography

Henry A. Kissinger (1923– ) is a German-born American historian and diplomat. A Harvard professor, Kissinger became known to the foreign policy establishment with the publication of his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957) for the Council on Foreign Relations. After advising the presidential campaign of Nelson Rockefeller, he served in the Nixon and Ford administrations as national security adviser (1969–75) and secretary of state (1973–77), the only person to have held both positions simultaneously. Kissinger’s legacy is complex. He is identified with the policy of détente toward that Soviet Union and the diplomatic opening to China, and he was corecipient (1973, with Le Duc Tho) of the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating

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the end of the Vietnam War (although the war started again after the US withdrawal). He is also associated with secret bombing campaigns in countries neighbor-

ing Vietnam and covert operations in various Third World countries.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) CUBAN CONTINGENCIES SUMMARY This study considers possible US reactions to further Cuban-Soviet, Angola-type intervention. It discusses: 1. Those political-economic, non-military actions which might be taken now or over the next few months to dissuade Castro from further intervention by isolating and exerting pressure on him; 2. Intermediate actions to be taken prior to an actual further intervention which foreshadow possible further application of military force and which are intended to give more credence to our warnings; and, 3. A set of possible military options predicated on the assumption that deterrent actions have been unsuccessful and that the Cubans have already taken or are in the process of taking an interventionist action. Our basic objective is to prevent the creation of a pattern of international conduct in which Cuba and the USSR arrogate to themselves the right to intervene with combat forces in local or regional conflicts. We are already engaging in such an effort through public warnings, signals to the USSR, changes in our African policy and some measures designed to isolate Castro. If this is not successful, we will have to decide between two broad courses: actions intended to make the Soviets and Cubans pay a political price over the longer term, or actions intended to terminate the Cuban actions including measures involving application of differing levels of force. It is difficult to determine in advance a precise threshold which would determine our response to a Cuban provocation. It would obviously be lower in a US territory like Puerto Rico or in this hemisphere than elsewhere. Furthermore, intervention may be a gradual matter beginning with advisers and progressing to training, shipment of arms, and actual combat forces. The situation

which the US confronts may, therefore, be ambiguous and involve a flow of Bloc supplies with Cuban personnel support. There are four categories in which the courses of action available to us can be placed. 1. The first relates to political and economic measures affecting Cuba. Some are immediate and unilateral actions like confining their diplomats to a radius of 25 miles from New York City, [clause redacted] and reinstituting special broadcasts to Cuba. Economically, we can try to persuade Western European nations to terminate aid programs, encourage Argentina, Spain, Japan and others to limit credits and attempt to restrict the trade of friendly countries with Cuba. Supplementary measures involve Cuba and other countries and should be keyed to some further Cuban move. They include sending a message to Castro and raising the issue in the UN, the OAS, NATO, and the EC 9. 2. The second category of action relates to the Soviet Union. It is easier to bring pressure on Cuba, as the closer and weaker partner in a tightly interwoven relationship, than on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, any action taken against Cuba will inevitably affect US-Soviet relations. Furthermore, Cuba could not undertake further interventions without Soviet willingness to run high risks of crises with the US. Therefore, if we believe that we can achieve our objective more effectively by broadening our pressure, we can begin such measures as postponing low substantive exchanges and delaying the opening of Consulates in Kiev and New York. Then we could cease licensing computers. More severe long-term actions would include delaying additional grain purchases, renouncing some of the bilateral agreements, and breaking off SALT and MBFR negotiations. 3. The third category relates to preventive actions involving disposition of military forces in the Caribbean, [roughly one and a half lines redacted] Such actions include [clause redacted] reinforcing Guantanamo, jamming of Cuban communications and navigation aids,

US Contingency Plans in Light of Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola

[roughly one and a half lines redacted] increasing force presence in the Caribbean and reorganizing our force posture there to establish a command in Puerto Rico and reopen bases there and in Key West. Such force adjustments would not degrade our other commitments. It is intended to demonstrate the seriousness of our purpose. 4. Finally, there are a series of military actions on a graduated scale of seriousness which involve the possibility of hostilities and would be considered acts of war. In all cases, a preliminary decision would have to be taken whether to evacuate some 4,000 dependents and nonessential employees from Guantanamo and reinforce the 500-man defense force there in view of the great vulnerability of the base to attack from Cuban forces. All four options contain the possibility of engagement of Soviet naval or air personnel and none would have an immediate and direct impact upon Cuban support for its military intervention force overseas. Military requirements would involve a large part of the force allocated to CINCLANT (2 carrier task forces) and the US would be hard pressed to confront the Soviets or other opposing forces militarily elsewhere in the world while engaging in such operations. The lowest level of application of force would be a series of blockade-type actions ranging from a quarantine of war materiel entering or leaving Cuba to a quarantine of all POL entering Cuba and finally to a total blockade of all material except food and medical supplies. Since

95% of Cuba’s trade moves on foreign ships, two-thirds of which are Soviet, we would quickly be brought into confrontation with them. [just over one line redacted] It is estimated that Cuba has a two-month POL reserve and that it could extend this to as much as six months by applying measures of severe austerity. A concurrent air quarantine/blockade would have to be considered. There are seven civilian airlines serving Cuba, three of which are free world, flying about six flights a day. Neither the Soviets nor the Cubans have the capability of maintaining an effective oil airlift and only about 5% of Cuba’s total imports could be supplied by airlift. Another possibility would be the mining of Cuba’s ports through naval and air implacement. This would probably result in from 50 to 60 ships being imprisoned in Cuban ports. Air superiority would be required prior to minelaying. This would involve probable engagement of Cuban and possibly Soviet air defenses. Interdiction of some airfields would also be required. The last measure contemplated would be a punitive airstrike to destroy selected high-value Cuban military targets. All targets are located within defended areas. Some US losses could be expected as well as engagement of Soviet personnel. All military actions would have to be accompanied by a series of complementary political measures involving Congress, our allies in Europe and Latin America, the UN, and the Soviet Union.

GLOSSARY Bloc: the Soviet bloc, i.e., the Soviet Union and its allies CINCLANT: Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command EC 9: the (then) nine countries of the European Communities (precursor to the European Union) Free World: relating to non-Communist countries MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (conventional arms-control negotiations) NODIS: No Distribution OAS: Organization of American States, representing the countries of the Western Hemisphere POL: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (nuclear arms-control negotiations) SECRET: Disclosure would cause serious damage to national security XGDS: Exempt from General Declassification Schedule

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Naturally, the vague and somewhat emotional terminology used by Kissinger in meetings with the president (“smash,” “clobber”) does not appear in the Cuban contingency plan. Equally notable is the very different tone. While it does not take a position on what policy to pursue, the document is careful to highlight the negatives: the strain on resources, the limited benefits, the likelihood of coming into conflict with the Soviet Union. This is a necessary part of careful planning, yet one also gets the impression that those who drafted the contingencies were far less enthusiastic than Kissinger about the prospect of starting a fight.

southern Africa and the Middle East, the Cuban forces soon left Ethiopia, became bogged down in Angola, and never intervened elsewhere in Africa. Eventually the Ethiopian regime collapsed, and MPLA-led Angola turned to the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Cubans did, however, renew their interest in Latin American revolution for a time, aiding the revolutionary regime that came to power in Nicaragua in 1979 and the revolutionary guerrilla movement in El Salvador in the 1980s. The Soviet interpretation of success in Angola may have encouraged its later actions in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. —Scott C. Monje, PhD

Essential Themes

Bibliography and Additional Reading

It is worth noting, as Kissinger did during the WASG meeting on March 24, 1976, that the contingency plan is a document outlining what is technically possible and what the likely consequences of various actions would be. Although Kissinger seemed inclined to take action, the contingency plan, in and of itself, is not a decision to do anything. Any decision to act on the proposals or to set them aside would be made by the president, presumably after consulting the National Security Council, members of Congress, and allies. Kissinger noted to President Ford in February 1976 that “We probably can’t do it before the elections.” As it turned out, Ford lost the 1976 election to Jimmy Carter. In 1977 the Soviet Union ferried Cuban troops into Ethiopia to help that country resist an invasion by Somalia. We can only wonder how the Ford administration would have reacted. The Soviet Union, which had been backing both countries, lost its position in Somalia. Carter did not respond militarily, although he took advantage of the situation to acquire access to naval facilities in Somalia and Kenya. Although Kissinger had feared the spread of Cuban intervention throughout

Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2002. Print. Gleijeses, Piero. Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2013. Print. “Kissinger Considered Attack on Cuba following Angola Incursion.” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 487. Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, George Washington University, 2014. Web. LeoGrande, William M., and Peter Kornbluh. Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana, updated ed. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2015. Print. Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. Print. Westad, Odd Arne. “Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974–1976: A New Pattern of Intervention.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–1997), 21–32. Web..

Document Analysis

Charter 77

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 Charter 77 Date: January 6, 1977 Country: Czechoslovakia Genre: charter; political tract Summary Overview

Charter 77 was a statement by a group of Czechoslovak intellectuals (“Chartists”) about the poor state of human rights in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. The document listed the many areas in which the government actively denied people their human rights and pointed out that these were all violations of international agreements the government had made. The Charter 77 statement announced the formation of a loose association also called Charter 77 to work for the improvement of Czechoslovak society.

international attention by charging their governments with having violated international agreements. One of the events that triggered the formation of Charter 77 was the arrest of members of a dissident rock band, the Plastic People of the Universe, after they had participated in an impromptu rock festival in Bojanovice, a small community outside Prague. (Since they did not hold a musician’s license granted by the government, the Plastic People of the Universe could not appear in regular venues.) Author Biography and Document Information

Defining Moment

After the suppression of the 1968 Prague Spring reform movement, Czechoslovakia went from being one of the more tolerant of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe to being one of the more repressive. The conservative regime of Gustáv Husák, put into power by the Soviets after crushing the Prague Spring, particularly targeted liberal intellectuals, who were regarded as troublemakers and agents of the West. The 1975 Helsinki Accords, which Czechoslovakia—like all the other European countries except Albania—agreed to, contained an extensive series of commitments to basic human rights and freedoms such as those of travel and information. In early 1976, the government also ratified two United Nations covenants on human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It printed these covenants in government newspapers which sold out quickly, giving readers a convenient way to measure the government’s performance against its commitments. Although most people were not optimistic that Communist countries would actually adhere to these commitments, the Helsinki Accords and the UN covenants served as a focus for dissidents in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere to condemn the hypocrisy, dishonesty, and repressiveness of their governments, as well as attract

The charter is the product of a loosely affiliated group of Czechoslovak dissident intellectuals. No single figure is credited with writing the document or founding the group, but the document designates three of its leading signatories as spokesmen for the movement: playwright Václav Havel, academic philosopher Jan Patočka, and the lawyer and former Communist official Jiří Hájek. Patočka died shortly after, on March 13, 1977, of exhaustion and illness, and his death was treated as a martyrdom to the movement. On the document’s first appearance, it had 242 signatories, although many more were added in the subsequent weeks and months. Signatories were predominantly male, about 80 percent of the total. Signatories were also heavily concentrated in the region of Prague, the capital city, and disproportionately Czech, with only a handful of signatories from Czechoslovakia’s other major ethnic group, the Slovaks. (The Slovaks who did sign were mostly people who resided in predominantly Czech Prague.) The Chartists included a range of political positions, from those with roots in the Communist Party and the Communist reform movement of the late 1960s to Protestant and Catholic activists. Some of those with a party background had broken from Communism entirely, while others still held out hope for a reformed Communism different from that of Husák. Not all those who sympathized with the document

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were signatories. The organizers discouraged some people from signing, such as university students who could lose their scholarships.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT In the Czechoslovak Register of Laws No. 120 of October 13, 1976, texts were published of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were signed on behalf of our republic in 1968, reiterated at Helsinki in 1975 and came into force in our country on March 23, 1976. From that date our citizens have enjoyed the rights, and our state the duties, ensuing from them. The human rights and freedoms underwritten by these covenants constitute features of civilized life for which many progressive movements have striven throughout history and whose codification could greatly assist humane developments in our society. We accordingly welcome the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic’s accession to those agreements. Their publication, however, serves as a powerful reminder of the extent to which basic human rights in our country exist, regrettably, on paper alone. The right to freedom of expression, for example, guaranteed by Article 19 of the first-mentioned covenant, is in our case purely illusory. Tens of thousands of our citizens are prevented from working in their own fields for the sole reason that they hold views differing from official ones, and are discriminated against and harassed in all kinds of ways by the authorities and public organizations. Deprived as they are of any means to defend themselves, they become victims of a virtual apartheid. Hundreds of thousands of other citizens are denied that “freedom from fear” mentioned in the preamble to the first covenant, being condemned to the constant risk of unemployment or other penalties if they voice their own opinions. In violation of Article 13 of the second-mentioned covenant, guaranteeing everyone the right to education, countless young people are prevented from studying because of their own views or even their parents’. Innumerable citizens live in fear of their own or their children’s right to education being withdrawn if they should

ever speak up in accordance with their convictions. Any exercise of the right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print” or “in the form of art” specified in Article 19, Clause 2 of the first covenant is followed by extra-judicial and even judicial sanctions, often in the form of criminal charges, as in the recent trial of young musicians [referring to the trial of the band Plastic People of the Universe]. Freedom of public expression is inhibited by the centralized control of all the communication media and of publishing and cultural institutions. No philosophical, political or scientific view or artistic activity that departs ever so slightly from the narrow bounds of official ideology or aesthetics is allowed to be published; no open criticism can be made of abnormal social phenomena; no public defense is possible against false and insulting charges made in official propaganda. The legal protection against “attacks on honor and reputation” clearly guaranteed by Article 17 of the first covenant is in practice non-existent: false accusations cannot be rebutted, and any attempt to secure compensation or correction through the courts is futile; no open debate is allowed in the domain of thought and art. Many scholars, writers, artists and others are penalized for having legally published or expressed, years ago, opinions which are condemned by those who hold political power today. Freedom of religious confession, emphatically guaranteed by Article 18 of the first covenant, is continually curtailed by arbitrary official action; by interference with the activity of churchmen, who are constantly threatened by the refusal of the state to permit them the exercise of their functions, or by the withdrawal of such permission; by financial or other transactions against those who express their religious faith in word or action; by constraints on religious training and so forth. One instrument for the curtailment or in many cases

Charter 77

complete elimination of many civic rights is the system by which all national institutions and organizations are in effect subject to political directives from the machinery of the ruling party and to decisions made by powerful individuals. The constitution of the republic, its laws and legal norms do not regulate the form or content, the issuing or application of such decisions; they are often only given out verbally, unknown to the public at large and beyond its powers to check; their originators are responsible to no one but themselves and their own hierarchy; yet they have a decisive impact on the decision-making and executive organs of government, justice, trade unions, interest groups and all other organizations, of the other political parties, enterprises, factories, institutions, offices and so on, for whom these instructions have precedence even before the law. Where organizations or individuals, in the interpretation of their rights and duties, come into conflict with such directives, they cannot have recourse to any nonparty authority, since none such exists. This constitutes, of course, a serious limitation of the right ensuing from Articles 21 and 22 of the first-mentioned covenant, which provides for freedom of association and forbids any restriction on its exercise, from Article 25 on the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, and from Article 26 stipulating equal protection by the law without discrimination. This state of affairs likewise prevents workers and others from exercising the unrestricted right to establish trade unions and other organizations to protect their economic and social interests, and from freely enjoying the right to strike provided for in Clause 1 of Article 8 in the second-mentioned covenant. Further civic rights, including the explicit prohibition of “arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence” (Article 17 of the first covenant), are seriously vitiated by the various forms of interference in the private life of citizens exercised by the Ministry of the Interior, for example by bugging telephones and houses, opening mail, following personal movements, searching homes, setting up networks of neighborhood informers (often recruited by illicit threats or promises) and in other ways. This Ministry frequently interferes in employers’

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decisions, instigates acts of discrimination by authorities and organizations, brings weight to bear on the organs of justice and even orchestrates propaganda campaigns in the media. This activity is governed by no law and, being clandestine, affords the citizen no chance to defend himself. In cases of prosecution on political grounds the investigative and judicial organs violate the rights of those charged and those defending them, as guaranteed by Article 14 of the first covenant and indeed by Czechoslovak law. The prison treatment of those sentenced in such cases is an affront to their human dignity and a menace to their health, being aimed at breaking their morale. Clause 2, Article 12 of the first covenant, guaranteeing every citizen the right to leave the country, is consistently violated, or under the pretense of “defense of national security” is subjected to various unjustifiable conditions (Clause 3). The granting of entry visas to foreigners is also treated arbitrarily, and many are unable to visit Czechoslovakia merely because of professional or personal contacts with those of our citizens who are subject to discrimination. Some of our people—either in private, at their places of work or by the only feasible public channel, the foreign media—have drawn attention to the systematic violation of human rights and democratic freedoms and demanded amends in specific cases. But their pleas have remained largely ignored or been made grounds for police investigation. Responsibility for the maintenance of rights in our country naturally devolves in the first place on the political and state authorities. Yet not only on them: everyone bears his share of responsibility for the conditions that prevail and accordingly also for the observance of legally enshrined agreements, binding upon all individuals as well as upon governments. It is this sense of co-responsibility, our belief in the importance of its conscious public acceptance and the general need to give it new and more effective expression that led us to the idea of creating Charter 77, whose inception we today publicly announce. Charter 77 is a loose, informal and open association of people of various shades of opinion, faiths and professions united by the will to strive individually and collec-

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tively for the respecting of civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world—rights accorded to all men by the two mentioned international covenants, by the Final Act of the Helsinki conference and by numerous other international documents opposing war, violence and social or spiritual oppression, and which are comprehensively laid down in the U.N. Universal Charter of Human Rights. Charter 77 springs from a background of friendship and solidarity among people who share our concern for those ideals that have inspired, and continue to inspire, their lives and their work. Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal membership. It embraces everyone who agrees with its ideas and participates in its work. It does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity. Like many similar citizen initiatives in various countries, West and East, it seeks to promote the general public interest. Charter 77 does not aim, then, to set out its own platform of political or social reform or change, but within its own field of impact to conduct a constructive dialogue with the political and state authorities, particularly by drawing attention to individual cases where human and civic frights are violated, to document such grievances and suggest

Document Analysis

Charter 77 opens with an appeal to the international agreements protecting human rights to which Czechoslovakia was a signatory, including the two UN covenants and the recently signed Helsinki Accords. The document does not call for regime change or democratization, but for the regime to observe the human-rights agreements that it has already made. The fundamental rhetorical device is the contrast of the lofty agreements that the Czechoslovak government has signed regarding human rights and the dismal reality of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovaks lack freedom of expression, as citizens who express themselves fearlessly can be barred from work in their chosen professions as well as subjected to other kinds of penalties. Those who disagree with the regime may lose their or even their children’s right to education. The government’s secret police can ceaselessly interfere with the private lives of Czechoslovak citizens through opening mail, wiretaps and bugging, and even house searches. Networks of informers both

remedies, to make proposals of a more general character calculated to reinforce such rights and machinery for protecting them, to act as an intermediary in situations of conflict which may lead to violations of rights, and so forth. By its symbolic name Charter 77 denotes that it has come into being at the start of a year proclaimed as Political Prisoners’ Year—a year in which a conference in Belgrade is due to review the implementation of the obligations assumed at Helsinki. As signatories, we hereby authorize Professor Dr. Jan Patocka, Dr. Vaclav Havel and Professor Dr. Jiri Hajek to act as the spokesmen for the Charter. These spokesmen are endowed with full authority to represent it visa-vis state and other bodies, and the public at home and abroad, and their signatures attest to the authenticity of documents issued by the Charter. They will have us and others who join us as their colleagues taking part in any needful negotiations, shouldering particular tasks and sharing every responsibility. We believe that Charter 77 will help to enable all citizens of Czechoslovakia to work and live as free human beings. Prague, 1 January 1977

violate privacy and make it difficult for Czechoslovaks to trust each other. Citizens arrested on political charges have no due process or right of appeal. They are subject to harsh conditions in prison, intended to break their spirit. Those who wish to leave the country are not allowed to, in violation of the regime’s public commitment to freedom of movement. There is also no room in Czechoslovak public life for art or personal expression that deviates from “the narrow bounds of official ideology or aesthetics,” because it cannot be published or promoted. This makes it impossible to identify or work to solve social problems. Czechoslovaks also lack freedom of religion. Even complaining about the injustice of Czechoslovak society can bring harsh punishment. The issues identified by the charter are principally those that affect intellectuals. The document does not call for changes in the economy, except for the formation of independent trade unions. By not taking an economic stance, the charter could remain acceptable

Charter 77

to everyone from reform Communists and socialists to those interested in moving toward a more open market. However, ignoring economic issues also limited the document’s appeal at a time when Czechoslovaks were aware that, despite the growth of the economy, their material lives were not as good as those in the non-Communist West. Czechoslovaks primarily interested in “bread-and-butter” issues would find little in the charter to address their concerns. Underlying the numerous restrictions on individual freedom in Czechoslovakia is the Communist Party’s monopoly on power, meaning there is no institution to check or counterbalance the party. The constitution of the Czechoslovak state, like the international human rights agreements to which the regime is a party, is essentially meaningless in the face of the party’s dominance. The charter concludes by announcing the formation of an informal group, also called Charter 77, to open a civic discussion about the conditions of Czechoslovak society. The document is careful to establish that the group is not a hierarchy or a political party competing for power, but a loose group “united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world.” The members are described as coming from various backgrounds, political and religious. Finally, the document expresses a wish to open “a constructive dialogue with the political and state authorities” about ways to move toward a greater respect for human and civil rights in Czechoslovakia. Essential Themes

The government responded fiercely to Charter 77, denouncing it and its signatories and mobilizing regime intellectuals in an “anti-Charter” group. Several signers were imprisoned or otherwise punished, although none were executed. Ironically, since the charter could not be legally published or circulated in Czechoslovakia, many Czechoslovaks knew of it primarily from the regime’s campaign against it. The document was published in Western newspapers and circulated in underground copies in Czechoslovakia. It generated a large secondary samizdat literature (banned literature that

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was reproduced and passed from person to person), including commentaries on the charter and defenses of its signers against the attacks of the government. Charter 77 attracted a great deal of attention in the West, the group received the first Andrei Sakharov Freedom Award (named after the famous Soviet dissident) from the Norwegian Helsinki Committee in 1984. An International Committee for the Support of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia was formed in Paris and attracted leading Western intellectuals and writers, including the American novelist Saul Bellow and the West German writer Heinrich Böll. Many of the Charter 77 activists became leaders in Czechoslovakia’s peaceful transition from Communism in 1989—the “Velvet Revolution”—and in the independent Czech and Slovak states. Václav Havel became president of the Czech Republic. With the end of the Communist regime, however, the charter became a document primarily of historical interest. An attempt to form a political party based on the charter’s principles, the Civic Forum, failed completely, and the Charter 77 group itself was dissolved after the overthrow of Communism. Groups outside Czechoslovakia placed themselves in the tradition of Charter 77, including a British constitutional reform group, Charter 88; a Hungarian opposition group, Charter 92; a Belarusian human rights group, Charter 97; and a Chinese human rights group, Charter 08. —William E. Burns, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Bolton, Jonathan. Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, the Plastic People of the Universe, and Czech Culture under Communism. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2012. Print. Havel, Václav. Letter to Olga: June 1979–September 1982. Trans. Paul Wilson. New York: Holt, 1989. Print. McRae, Robert. Resistance and Revolution: Vaclav Havel’s Czechoslovakia. Ottawa: Carleton UP, 1997. Print. Skilling, H. Gordon. Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia. London: Allen, 1981. Print.

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 SALT II Date: June 18, 1979 Genre: treaty Summary Overview

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT, were negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit the production of the missiles needed to deliver nuclear weapons. The first SALT agreement, signed by US president Richard M. Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, was the result of three years of negotiations between the two superpowers. SALT I, as it was later known, included an agreement that set limits on antiballistic or defensive missiles, and limits on offensive weapons as well, and was understood to be an interim agreement with more detailed negotiations to follow. Negotiations resumed later in 1972 and were known as SALT II. These talks spanned seven years and focused on the regulation of longrange bombers, strategic missiles that could be used to launch multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and the overall number of missiles developed and maintained by both sides. Talks stalled repeatedly, in part over parity issues, as the two superpowers had pursued different technologies. Also at issue was an acceptable inspection protocol and limits on technology that had not yet been tested. Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter signed SALT II in Vienna on June 18, 1979, but the US Senate never ratified it. Defining Moment

The world first understood the terrible destructive power of nuclear energy when the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Attempts to control this destructive technology began as soon as the bombs were dropped. The United Nations, formally established within months of the bombing of Japan, passed its first resolution on January 24, 1946, establishing the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” The UNAEC had six permanent members (the United States, Britain,

France, the Soviet Union, China, and Canada) and six rotating members. On August 29, 1949, the first successful test was made by the Soviet Union of a nuclear weapon. On September 23, US president Harry S. Truman announced to the world that the Soviet Union had the bomb, marking the largest development to date in the new Cold War between the two superpowers. The Soviet Union blocked all attempts in the UN to control nuclear materials, and continued to aggressively test and display nuclear weapons. The United States continued to stockpile weapons as well, with US officials arguing that they were interested only in peace but were forced to maintain weapons capable of counteracting the Soviet Union in case of attack. They continued to research and develop new weaponry, detonating a hydrogen bomb on November 1, 1952. The Soviet Union followed suit in 1953. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first satellite into orbit, raising fears that the rocket that delivered Sputnik into space could deliver a nuclear warhead to the United States. Nuclear testing, part of the military posturing done by both nations, was finally limited by the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations. The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union all agreed to end testing of nuclear weapons anywhere but underground. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, was an agreement by the nuclear states not to transfer nuclear weapons technology to states that did not already have it, and by non-nuclear states not to seek to become nuclear-armed. Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union had each developed intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the other without the use of a piloted aircraft, and both countries had stockpiled nuclear warheads by the thousands. It was the development of a missile defense system that spurred the first SALT negotiations. President Lyndon B. Johnson announced in 1967 that the Soviet Union was building a missile defense system around Moscow.

SALT II

This was a crucial development, since it would theoretically enable the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear first strike and then shoot down missiles from a reciprocal strike. SALT I, signed in May 1972 by Johnson’s successor, Richard M. Nixon, and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, limited missile defense systems (the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty), and an interim agreement was reached limiting some offensive weapons. The primary goal of continuing negotiations, known as SALT II, was to come to a comprehensive, permanent agreement to limit offensive weapons and their delivery systems. These talks spanned seven years.

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Document Information

SALT II was signed in Vienna, Austria, on June 18, 1979. United States president Jimmy Carter and the general secretary of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, signed the document, which had been negotiated since 1972. In 1974, at a summit in Vladivostok, President Gerald Ford and Brezhnev had agreed on the basic framework of the 1979 SALT II agreement, but five additional years of negotiations were needed for a final agreement.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious  that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Proceeding  from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972, Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, Convinced  that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, Mindful  of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Guided by the principle of equality and equal security, Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security, Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament,

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Declaring  their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty…. Article III 1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400. 2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number. 3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates. 4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum num-

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ber of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. 5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. 6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI. Article IV 1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. 2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers. 3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. 4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions…. 5. Each Party undertakes: (a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements; (b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers; (c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers…. 6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule…. 7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms

of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty…. 8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose…. 9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flighttested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM…. 10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date…. For the United States of America • ICBMs of the Minuteman III type—Seven reentry vehicles; • SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type—Fourteen reentry vehicles; • SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type—Seven reentry vehicles. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics • ICBMs of the RS-16 type—Four reentry vehicles; • ICBMs of the RS-18 type—Six reentry vehicles; • ICBMs of the RS-20 type—Ten reentry vehicles; • SLBMs of the RSM-50 type—Seven reentry vehicles. 11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flighttested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten…. 12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen…. Article V 1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with

SALT II

MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320,455. 2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200. 3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820. 4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. . . . Article VII The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training. . . . Article VIII Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles. . . . Article IX 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy: (a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles; . . . (b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for

Document Analysis

This treaty begins with an explanation of the reasons that both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to limit their nuclear weapons stockpiles, fore-

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emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers; . . . (c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles; . . . (d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; (e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or (f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. Article X Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. Article XI Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. . . . Article XV For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law . . .

most among them the “devastating consequences for all mankind” if a nuclear war were to occur. Both parties also wished to continue talks based on the foundation of SALT I, and fulfill the arms reduction obligations of

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the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They also agree that the ultimate goal is “general and complete disarmament,” the sticking point being, of course, that it must be mutual and verifiable. With these agreements in place, specific points can be addressed. The first article of this treaty is a promise to “limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively,” to limit the development of new weapons, and to abide by the terms of the treaty. Each article of the treaty is followed by a list of “agreed statements” and “common understandings” so there is no doubt as to which weapon systems are being addressed. For example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are defined as having a range greater than 5,500 kilometers (3,400 miles), which is the shortest distance between the eastern United States and the western Soviet Union. The other weapons and delivery systems that are at issue in this treaty, primarily heavy bombers of the type that would carry nuclear weapons or launch cruise missiles, submarine-launched nuclear weapons, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs—missiles that carry multiple warheads), are also carefully defined. With terms carefully defined, the treaty establishes specific limits for specific systems, limiting the overall number of launchers of MIRVs on either side to 1,320. Other devices for the delivery of strategic nuclear materials such as ICBM launchers and bombers were limited to 2,400, with a further reduction to 2,250 in 1981. Some systems are banned entirely, such as certain types of submarine launchers and ICBM launchers. The nuclear warheads attached to these launchers are also limited. The treaty also places limits on emerging technology, banning testing on new types of ICBMs and new technology that is possible but not yet developed, including long-range missiles carried on ships or launched from the bottom of the ocean. SALT II also addresses verification of these reductions, and sets the terms of the treaty through 1985. Essential Themes

Once the SALT II agreement was signed, it was transmitted by the president to the Senate for ratification. Despite years of painstaking negotiations, ratification of the treaty was far from certain, as a coalition

of Democrat and Republican senators opposed SALT II, arguing that the means of verifying the agreed-upon reductions were flimsy, and that the Soviet Union had not shown good faith—continuing to aggressively intervene in international affairs, and repressing internal dissent. President Carter himself withdrew his request for ratification of the treaty in January 1980, after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Although the United States did not formally ratify SALT II, both Carter and Brezhnev made it clear that they intended to abide by the terms of the treaty; Ronald Reagan, who followed Carter into the White House, was a loud opponent of SALT II during the 1980 presidential campaign, but in May 1982, he too agreed to abide by the terms of the agreement. Later, Reagan found the Soviet Union in violation of the terms of the SALT II Treaty, but in 1985, he agreed to continue to abide by the terms of the agreement, as long as the Soviet Union continued to show that it was committed to continuing arms-reduction agreements. In 1986, President Reagan outlined his reasons to believe that the Soviet Union was not in compliance with either the letter or the spirit of the SALT II agreements, which had expired in 1985, declaring that the United States must now make strategic decisions based on its defense, and not on the treaty. He also assured the world that he did not intend to increase the nuclear arsenal of the United States, and would “continue to exercise the utmost restraint.” The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), supplanted the SALT II Treaty, and accomplished many of its aims. It was signed on July 31, 1991, and entered into force on December 5, 1994. —Bethany Groff Dorau, MA Bibliography and Additional Reading

Glynn, Patrick. Closing Pandora’s Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War. New York: Basic, 1992. Print. Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009. Print. Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1993. Print.

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ne could never have imagined, at first, that the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 would bring about a new era in Soviet-US relations. Reagan was not merely a Republican anticommunist, he was a rather strident anticommunist, someone who had built his career on anticommunism and conservative American values and who often spoke in apocalyptic terms about the threat that Soviet communism posed for the United States and the world. He considered the USSR an “evil empire” that should not just be contained but weakened, reduced, vanquished. Thus, despite new scientific warnings that even a limited nuclear exchange between the two superpowers could produce a “nuclear winter,” whereby poison dust and a virtual blackout of the sun would wipe out all (or most) life on earth, Reagan moved to greatly increase military spending, including spending on nuclear missiles. A growing movement urging the administration to “freeze” the US nuclear weapons program or to adopt a “no first use” policy had no effect on Reagan. His counterargument was that such actions would only tip the scales in the Soviets’ favor and make the world more, not less, unsafe. Indeed, Reagan doubled down on strategic weaponry and announced his goal of building a high-tech satellite system that would seal-off the United States from any potential nuclear launches aimed against it. His Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), as it was called, was hailed by national security hardliners as brilliant but lampooned as wrongheaded by opponents, who dubbed it “Star Wars.” Ultimately, the economics of the program together with its considerable technological challenges—not to mention the politicking involved—proved too strong a barrier to overcome. SDI was given up on, but only after Reagan left office. In the meantime, the American president seemed to have met his match, as it were, in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader who came to power in early 1985. Gorbachev recognized that Stalinism was

long dead, and that Brezhnev-style Soviet communism was, or should be, dead as well. He proclaimed a new era of openness (glasnost) and systemic restructuring (perestroika). Only in this way might the Soviet Union be modernized and its economy revitalized. A key to moving the USSR behemoth down this path was scaling back on nuclear weaponry with all of the bombers, missiles, and launch stations that came with it. Gorbachev therefore proposed, with the surprising assent of Reagan, more than just détente and arms limitation; he suggested a marked reduction in strategic arms, especially in intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Reagan’s neoconservative supporters disliked the idea, fearing it was a trick that would leave the United States exposed. Reagan, however, came to trust Gorbachev (and vice versa) and the two worked together to make arms reduction a reality. A historic treaty was signed in 1987. By then, of course, there was already writing on the wall about the declining state of the Soviet empire. Poland had for several years seen jousting back and forth between communist government officials and leaders of various small but effective democratic movements, including one centered on the Solidarity trade union. Elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc, too, cracks in the façade began to appear. In East Berlin, in the autumn of 1989, protesters were shocked to discover mixed signals being sent by the government regarding the movement of East German citizens across the borders. Within short order, they took advantage and the Berlin Wall, the very symbol of the Cold War, was torn down by East and West Germans alike. That was the start, really, of the collapse of the rest of the Soviet system. Before too long (1991) Russia itself was no longer a Soviet state but headed a loose group of former USSR members belonging to the (nominally democratic) Russian Federation. The Cold War became a piece of history at that point.

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 Documents Relating to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Date(s): September 23, 1980; November 5, 1982; March 21, 1986 Author(s): Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), President Ronald Reagan Genre: Report Summary Overview

During the Cold War, two sizeable military conflicts each directly involved one of the two superpowers: Vietnam (the United States) and Afghanistan (the Soviet Union). Earlier in the 1970s, communism had expanded in Vietnam after the United States decided to withdraw its forces. In Afghanistan in the late 1970s, the government was transformed from a non-aligned one into a Communist-headed one, even while much of the rest of the country stood at odds with that result. Factional fighting and political assassinations ensued, and in December 1979 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to install a Soviet-backed regime and extend its authority to the rest of the nation. Many Americans, both inside and outside the government, advocated not only a forceful diplomatic response but also military assistance to the Afghani mujahedeen fighters resisting the Soviet occupation. The CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sought to learn more about what was happening, and which Afghan groups’ interests might align with those of the United States. Thus did the CIA/DIA produce reports such as the ones reprinted here, while also arranging the shipment of military supplies to anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, President Reagan made public statements intended to keep pressure on the Soviets to withdraw their troops. If the Soviets prevailed, it was thought, it could give them a significant victory in the ongoing Cold War. Defining Moment

Throughout the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union tried to expand their spheres of influence and block each other’s geopolitical maneuvers. Entering the 1970s, Afghanistan had been a non-aligned country and was relatively inactive on the international stage. This changed in 1973, however, when a coup overthrew the Afghan monarchy. King Mohammad Zahir Shah had recently appointed a prime minister who

was anti-Communist and who advocated instituting some liberal Western ideas. Mohammad Daoud Khan, a former prime minister, led the 1973 coup and was more open to communist ideas. Strongly supported by the Soviet Union, Daoud Khan tried to balance Soviet interests against American desires. In 1978, the Soviets seemed to tire of dealing with him, resulting in a Communist takeover under Nur Mohammad Taraki. Taraki signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, which the Soviets used as justification for their invasion in December 1979. However, in September 1979, Taraki was overthrown and killed by Hafizullah Amin. On December 27th, Amin himself was overthrown by Soviet-backed forces and replaced by a strong friend of the Soviet Union, Babrak Karmal. The Afghan Communist Party now firmly controlled the government, and during the last week of 1979 about 40,000 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to insure that Karmal stayed in power and carried out policies in line with Soviet desires. Prior to 1978, the central government in Afghanistan had allowed tribal and regional leaders a substantial amount of freedom in the handling of local affairs. Karmal and his Soviet allies, on the other hand, wanted total control of the nation. Although not everyone in every region opposed that idea, there was widespread opposition to the attempt to radically strengthen the central government. The effort to enforce the central government’s policy of total control placed a heavy burden on Soviet troops charged with enforcing the policy. In addition, Moscow’s policy virtually insured that the United States would provide supplies and assistance to those opposing the Communists. The CIA coordinated most of the American assistance going to the antiSoviet leaders. After Reagan was elected president, he supported many anti-Communist efforts, through both covert and overt means.

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Author Biography

The Central Intelligence Agency, a civilian agency, was created in 1948 to both openly and covertly gather information on foreign governments and foreign operatives. It grew out of the Office of Strategic Services, a World War II agency. The Directorate of Analysis was established in 1952 and reorganized in 1981, with several sub-offices including Political Analysis. The Defense Intelligence Agency was established in the early 1961. It is a joint operation of all branches

of the military. Its mission is to provide needed information for the Department of Defense and the armed forces, not the government as a whole. Ronald Wilson Reagan (1911-2004) was born in Illinois, although most of his adult life was spent in California, where he served as governor (1966-73). He was president of the United States from 1981 to 1989, being noted for his political vision and conservative views.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT [Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Political Analysis] 23 September 1980 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia SUMMARY The Tribes There are hundreds of tribes belonging to more than a dozen ethnic groups in Afghanistan and neighboring areas of Iran and Pakistan. Most are loosely organized with little or no central authority, but in some the power of the tribal chief is nearly absolute. Some have only a few thousand members; others, several hundred thousand. Some tribesmen are nomadic, most are settled farmers, and a few have abandoned the tribal way of life almost entirely. These variations occur even with tribes. Pushtun [or Pashtun] Mohmands (living on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border near the Khyber Pass) include both nomads and farmer, and some members of the tribe have broken with traditional ways altogether to become urban laborers or even physicians or lawyers. Tribes in Afghanistan Tribal loyalties have more importance among the Pushtun of eastern and southern Afghanistan than among most of the other ethnic groups. Among the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan, for example, tribal ties are weak, and they probably are not much stronger for many of the

Turkmen of northwest Afghanistan. Even for the Pushtuns, tribal membership usually means little more than a feeling of identity with others in the tribe. Organized action by an entire tribe is rare. An attack on one part of a tribe may bring some response from other tribesmen not directly affected, but each extended family or village usually determines its own course without reference to the rest of the tribe or to the ostensible tribal leaders. Those who cling most closely to the tradition tribal ways are the least likely to be influenced by Communism. To the extent that the tribesmen have an ideology it is a belief that a combination of Islam and even older tribal traditions is the proper guide for action. Among most tribes, the traditional views include such things as the obligation to seek revenge, masculine superiority, an emphasis on personal bravery and honor, and suspicion of outsiders. Tradition also tends to sanctify everything from rules governing property ownership to ways of treating illness. Any change in the traditional way of life is considered wrong, and modern ideas–whether Communist or Western–are seen as a threat. The Afghan insurgency has been strongest among the most traditionally minded such as the Pushtuns of Paktia Province and the Nuristanis and Tajiks farther north along the Pakistani border. They resist the Afghan Marxists and the Soviets more to preserve their old ways than to fight Communism. Some of the reforms that have incensed the tribes–education of women, for example– are neither Communist nor anti-Islamic, but they conflict with the tribesman’s perceptions of what is right…. In the tribal villages, it is in the interests of the most influential men–local landowners, religious leaders, or

Documents Relating to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

both–to reject reforms, especially Communist ones, that threaten both their property and their political power. Nevertheless, Communist programs might have some appeal to the settled tribes…. A major problem for the Soviets is to convince the tribes that it is to their advantage to support the government. The Soviets can bolster their arguments with offers of weapons and money. They can also threaten retaliation against tribesmen who will not cooperate, or threaten to support their traditional enemies…. Even were the tribesmen motivated by more than an opportunity to steal, they would probably regard any arrangement with the Soviets as a temporary expedient and would turn against them as soon as it seemed advantageous to do so… In the past, tribesmen fighting for outsiders have changed alliance in response to offers of better pay, or even when they decided their pay [was] inadequate. A recent book review published in Tashkent made much of Britain’s problems in the 19th century in trying to keep Afghan tribes loyal. *** [Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Research, 5 November 1982] Assessment of Insurgent Equipment All six major resistance groups appear to have adequate supplies of modern assault weapons and ammunition but still lack the heavier weaponry needed to turn the military situation in their favor. Smaller groups in isolated provinces, however, are still affected by shortages of small arms and ammunition. While Soviets can and do temporarily disrupt the two-way flow of men and supplies through the major mountain passes, we do not believe the Soviets can permanently seal off Afghanistan from the rest of the world. The rugged terrain, limited manpower thus far available to Soviet/Afghan commanders, hostility of the local populace and the resourcefulness of the resistance argue against a successful effort to permanently close the passes. Insurgent Equipment Deficiencies Major military equipment deficiencies among resistance forces include more and better surface-to-air missiles

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and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, antitank missiles, antitank mines, man-pack mortars and tactical radio equipment…. Resolve of the Resistance Forces The resistance forces could continue the insurgency for the foreseeable future at its present level against current Soviet forces. We believe the Soviets would have to double their strength to break the current stalemate… *** Proclamation 5450 - Afghanistan Day, 1986 March 21, 1986 By the President of the United States of America A Proclamation The people of Afghanistan celebrate March 21 as the beginning of their new year. In ordinary times, it is an occasion of joy, renewal, and hope for a better future. March 21, 1986, however, does not mark the passage of an ordinary year, nor does it bring cause to celebrate. For the heroic Afghan people it marks the beginning of yet another year in their struggle for national liberation against the ruthless Soviet military force that seeks to conquer them. Over six years ago, on December 27, 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, a small, friendly, nonaligned, and deeply religious neighbor. For six long years, the Soviets have sought to obliterate Afghan culture and remold that ancient nation into a replica of their own system, causing millions of Afghan refugees to flee the country. To achieve their goals, the Soviets installed the quisling regime of Babrak Karmal, in which Soviet advisors now man the key positions. They have transported thousands of young Afghans to the Soviet Union for reeducation in summer camps, universities, and specialized institutions, and they have set up a secret police apparatus matched in brutality only by their own KGB. These tactics hardly begin to describe the continuing horror of the Soviet attempt to subjugate Afghanistan, a violation of international law repeatedly condemned by the United Nations. Despite calculated destruction of crops, irrigation systems, and livestock, indiscriminate air and artillery bombardments of civilian areas, brutal

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reprisals against noncombatants, and other unspeakable atrocities, the Afghan people remain determined to defend their liberty. The resistance has in fact become more effective than ever. The Soviet failure to quell the Afghan people is not surprising. The Afghans have a long history of resisting invasion and of defending their homes, their faith, and their culture. Since December 1979, resistance fighters have acquitted themselves well in many engagements against larger and better armed Soviet forces. The Afghan freedom fighters have shown they can render all of their country unsafe for the invader. After six years of hard, bloody fighting, the Soviets are far from achieving their military goals. Recently the Afghan resistance has taken major steps toward achieving unity and making its presence felt on the international scene, strengthening its ability to publicize the Afghan cause. We welcome these developments. With the support of the community of civilized nations, the Afghan resistance has also increased its efforts to aid civilians remaining inside Afghanistan. This will improve the Afghan people’s ability to carry on the fight and counter the deliberate Soviet attempt to drive the civilian population away from resistance-controlled areas. Throughout the period of their brutal occupation, the Soviets have tried—but failed—to divide the international supporters of the cause of Afghan freedom. They cannot be divided. The overwhelming votes in the

Document Analysis

Although the United States was officially an outside observer, these documents demonstrate that the Americans were involved in the Afghan wars of the 1980s. The first two documents were for internal use by government agencies, while the proclamation by Reagan was for the general public. American intelligence agencies sought out weaknesses in the Soviet position and ways to help the resistance. The American president conducted a public relations campaign that likewise helped the resistance. Although few Americans paid much attention to Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, throughout the 1980s events in and related to Afghanistan moved to the forefront of public awareness. The CIA analysis of the socio-political situation in Afghanistan was necessary because, previously, the

United Nations General Assembly, year after year, are but one expression of the ongoing commitment of the world community to this cause. For our part we reaffirm our commitment to support this just struggle until the Soviets withdraw; until the people of Afghanistan regain their liberties, their independence, and the right to self-determination; and until the refugees can return in safety to their native land. Only such a settlement can command the support of the Afghan people; a settlement that does not command their support will not end this war. Today, we pay tribute to the brave men, women, and children of Afghanistan and remind them that their sacrifice is not and will not be forgotten. The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 272, has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation designating March 21, 1986, as “Afghanistan Day.” Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim March 21, 1986, as Afghanistan Day. In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and tenth. RONALD REAGAN

United States had had only moderate involvement with the country. Although formal diplomatic relations had been established in 1921, there was little interaction prior to the onset of the Cold War, and even then it was limited to a few economic projects. While some were intended to strengthen the central government, as can be seen from the CIA analysis, this had not happened in this case. Tribal loyalties took precedence over national ones, although even tribes were “loosely organized.” The CIA accurately understood this to be a positive factor in resisting the Communist incursion, as most local tribal and religious leaders were ready to help the highest bidder, provided it did not interfere in local affairs. In 1980, then, this fit American needs perfectly. The DIA report represents the more controversial aspect of American involvement in Afghanistan: pro-

Documents Relating to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

viding weapons to the resistance. The DIA’s analysis of what weapons and weapon systems were available to the tribes fighting the Soviets, was at the heart of this matter. The 1982 list of resistance groups’ “deficiencies” in military equipment was basically a requisition by the DIA for the weapons listed. The DIA accurately understood that local forces resisting the non-native troops could sustain a conflict at a much lower cost than could those from the outside. Thus, it was left to the Soviets as to how much of their resources they were willing to expend to obtain a military victory. President Reagan campaigned on a strong anti-Communist platform. In Afghanistan, this included covert operations supporting the resistance. In addition, he also harshly criticized Communism in public forums. Thus the proclamation of Afghanistan Day in 1986 was not a simple statement applauding Afghan society. What he issued was a short history of the Soviet incursion into that country and the resulting war—at that time more than six years old. Reagan closed with the dramatic statement of tribute, “to the brave men, women, and children of Afghanistan and remind them that their sacrifice is not and will not be forgotten.” The Afghan sacrifices as opposed to the brutality of the Soviets was the president’s constant message. This message was designed to strengthen support for the Afghan resistance both within the United States and internationally. In the end, the Soviet Union did not want to increase its effort to the level reflected in the DIA report, and, facing strong international opposition, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Essential Themes

Examining the three documents, in the Historical Document section, it can be seen that each one has a central theme. The CIA report’s theme is the tribal nature of the country, and the advantages that that gives to those resisting the central government. For the DIA, it is the types of heavy weapons needed to augment those already available in the nation (mostly, sidearms). Finally, for Reagan, it is the dichotomy between the heroic Afghan people and the invading forces of the Soviet Union, which three years earlier he had called the “Evil Empire.” In spite of the fact that each document differs in its specifics, the group is united in so far as seeking ways to support the anti-Communist movement. The fact that Afghanistan has never been a strongly

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unified nation is seen in these documents as key to being able to develop anti-Soviet forces. Tradition normally triumphs over change in Afghanistan, and the implication in the CIA document is that the US could assist this through giving the right type of support. The slightly later DIA document focuses on military items that might be supplied to the tribal divisions for them to prevail in the conflict. Sticking to military matters, the DIA’s analysis projected a positive outcome for the resistance, unless the Soviets decide to greatly increase their support of the Afghan government. President Reagan, in his proclamation, very definitely interprets the situation from an American, antiCommunist, point of view. (As is often the case, one person’s “freedom fighter” is another person’s “terrorist.”) Ultimately, the hopeful optimism of the DIA report and Reagan’s observations proved correct. The Soviets could not bear up under the long-term strain of a foreign war. However, when the United States became involved in Afghanistan as a result of the September 11 al-Qaida attacks on American targets, things in Afghanistan were both the same yet different. One can recognize in the 1980 CIA analysis a picture of tribal and regional differences that still held true in 2001 (and after), the main difference being the growth of the Taliban and al-Qaida. —Donald A. Watt, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Braithwaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: HarperCollins, 2009. Print. Office of the Historian. “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978-1980.” U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs. Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2016. Web. Savranskaya, Svetlana. “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs.” The September 11th Sourcebooks: Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War. Washington: The National Security Archive, 2016. Web. Wilson Center. “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.” Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2016. Web.

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 CIA Cable on the Situation in Poland Date: December 24, 1981 Author: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Genre: Report Summary Overview

Poland was the key country in setting the stage for the end of the Cold War. At the time that this cable was written, forces for change had been under way in the nation for more than two years. Outside of Poland, yet touching the heart of the nation, was the selection of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as pope (John Paul II) in October 1978. Traditionally a strong Catholic nation, Poland under the sway of a Polish pope strengthened its ties to the one institution—the church—that could confront the Communist government. Internally, the Solidarity Trade Union, the first union in a Communist country not controlled by the Communist Party, was formally established in September 1980, and in addition to its economic agenda, Solidarity maintained close ties with the Catholic Church. Inspired by both the pope and Solidarity, the Polish people expressed their dissatisfaction with the Communist government, resulting in martial law being declared on December 13, 1981. The CIA and other US governmental bodies monitored the situation closely. Defining Moment

As World War II drew to a close, the armies of the Soviet Union pushed west, crossing Poland, as they moved toward and into Germany. The Allies’ joint forces of the western European nations and the United States pushed into Germany from the west. An agreement had been reached to the effect that whichever Allied country was in control of an area would be allowed to establish national governments in the area. This tacitly gave the Soviet Union permission to create Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe, including Poland. Thus, beginning in 1945, Polish governments were controlled by the Communist Party. In 1980, therefore, when the Solidarity trade union began to agitate against the Communist government in Poland, it was taking actions that many considered unthinkable. It was widely assumed that if the Polish leaders did

not quickly step in to control the situation, the Soviet Union would send in troops, as it had done previously in other Eastern European countries. Over a period of fifteen months, however, Polish leaders permitted Solidarity to carry on. Finally, on December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared a state of martial law and suspended all activities by Solidarity. In consequence, thousands of individuals were arrested and all major mining and manufacturing facilities found themselves with Polish army troops assigned to them in order to quash any labor activism. The CIA report reprinted here was issued less than two weeks after the imposition of martial law. While not supporting the Communist government, church leaders did not want large numbers of people killed, or the lives of average citizens made unbearable. Similarly, the government knew that the Catholic Church, under Pope John Paul II, was the only organization that could challenge the status quo sufficiently as to cause the Soviets to impose control from the outside. In order to preclude that prospect, the Polish government did not initially act against the church in issuing its martial law proclamation; and the church, in turn, was careful not to take any action that might make the situation worse and invite intervention. As illustrated in the accompanying CIA cable, then, there were three sides to this situation, each with its own reasons for not desiring to disrupt the delicate balance. Author Biography

Unnamed individuals from the Directorate of Operations division of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote this report for use by officials in the United States. The unnamed source mentioned in the document is most likely Ryszard Kuklinski, a colonel in the Polish Army with access to many secret Polish documents and someone who spied for the United States. (He may also have spied for the Soviet Union.)

CIA Cable on the Situation in Poland

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 as an heir to the Office of Strategic Services, which operated during World War II. In between, these duties were handled by the Central Intelligence Group. The Directorate of Operations is the section of the CIA that

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undertakes covert operations to secure the information requested by the president or those acting on behalf of the president. This office was previously called the Clandestine Service.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Intelligence Information Cable THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE CITE TDFIRDB-315/23025 DlST 24 DECEMBER COUNTRY POLAND/ USSR SUBJECT: SOVIET PRESSURE ON POLISH GOVERNMENT TO ACT AGAINST THE POLISH CHURCH D O I: LATE DECEMBER 1981 SOURCE: A FORMER POLISH GENERAL STAFF OFFICER WHO MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS BASED ON HIS PAST EXPERIENCE AND CONTACTS. 1. WHILE THERE ARE NO POLISH PLANS PER SE TO ACT AGAINST THE CHURCH VERY STRONG PRESSURE WAS EXERTED BY THE SOVIETS TO COMPEL THE POLES TO SEVERELY CURTAIL THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. SOME SOVIET MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE MAIN CAUSE: FOR THE CUIRRENT POLISH SITUATION IS THE CHURCH’S INFLUENCE IN POLAND AND THE ELECTION OF A POLISH POPE. THE SOVIETS CONDEMNED THE POLISH DECISION TO ALLOW THE POPE TO VISIT POLAND IN JUNE 1979, AND DEMANDED THAT CHURCH INFLUENCE BE RADICALLY LIMITED. ACTIONS SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN BY THE POLISH SECURITY SERVICE AGAINST THE CHURCH INCLUDED RECORDING ALL [SIC] SERMONS BY PRIESTS, REPORTING INFORMATION ON CHURCH ACTIVITIES AND THE POLITICAL LEANINGS OF BISHOPS AND PRIESTS. MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS DAILY SITUATION REPORTS GIVEN TO TOP POLISH LEADERS, INCLUDE A

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SECTION ON THE CHURCH. 2. IF IT HAS NOT BEEN DONE YET, THE CURTAILMENT OF CHURCH ACTIVITIES DEMANDED BY THE SOVIETS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WITHIN THE MILITARY COUNCIL, THE LIMITATION OF THE CHURCH IS THE SECOND GOAL TO BE PURSUED AS SOON AS THE RESISTANCE OF THE WORKERS IS BROKEN. CURTAILMENT OF CHURCH ACTIVITIES WOULD INCLUDE LIMITING THE FREEDOM OF PREISTS AND BISHOPS AND OTHER CLERGY, CANCELLING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS, CANCELLING THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW CHURCHES AND CONFINING ALL CHURCH ACTIVITIES TO EXISTING CHURCHES ONLY. PRIESTS, BISHOPS, NUNS, ALL OTHER CLERICS WHO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE REGIME WILL BE ISOLATED AND ARRESTED. AT PRESENT, EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO ISOLATE ONLY THOSE WHO ARE PARTICULARLY VOCAL IN CONDEMNING THE GOVERNMENT AND SUPPORTING SOLIDARITY. LATER -- MORE HARSH MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN. HIGH LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE POLES IN THIS REGARD INCLUDES SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR MEASURES AGAINST THE CLERGY. THESE HAVE INCLUDED GETTING PRIESTS DRUNK, PATERNITY SUITS AGAINST PRIESTS, AND A SMEAR CAMPAIGN TO COMPROMISE THE CLERGY. A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE POLISH CHURCH OCCURRED LAST SUMMER, WHEN WARSAW PACT COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF V. I. KULIKOV VISITED POLAND. HE ASKED TO SEE A FILM OF THE POPE’S VISIT, THROUGHOUT WHICH HE RAILED ABOUT HOW UNTHINK-

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ABLE IT WAS THAT A CHURCH LEADER COULD GET SUCH A RECEPTION IN A COMMUNIST COUNTRY. 3.[SOURCE COMMENT: IN ONE CONVERSATION AMONG KULIKOV, POLISH LEADER WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI, AND SEVERAL OTHER GENERALS, THE HATRED FOR THE POPE AND THE DEMAND THAT THE POLES ACCEPT SOCIALISM AND REJECT GOD WAS CLEARLY EVIDENT. IT IS NOT EXCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD TRY TO ASSASSINATE THE POPE. AT A JULY 1981 MEETING WITHIN THE GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL WLADYSLAW HERMASZEWSKI, WHO IS CLOSE TO THE SOVIETS, REPEATED THE SOVIET LINE THAT ALL THE PROBLEMS BEGAN WITH THE ELECTION OF THE POPE. HE SAID THAT AT THAT TIME THERE WERE MANY POLES WHO WOULD DO “THE SAME THING AS THE TURK,” THAT IS TRY TO ASSASSINATE THE POPE. SOURCE BELIEVES

Document Analysis

During most of the one thousand years that Poland had been a predominately Christian nation, the Catholic Church had supported the state and the state had supported the Church. However, with the imposition of a Communist government after World War II, a government that was officially atheistic, this all changed. When, 30 years later, native son Karol Wojtyla was elected pope, the situation changed again. Pope John Paul II desired to make a visit to his homeland in 1979, and, much to the dismay of the Soviet leaders, the Polish government permitted it. The millions of people who attended the thirty-two services the pope held during his nine-day visit, became more unified in both their faith and their Polish nationalism. The potential strength of the Church became clear to the Communist leaders, and how such influence could be kept in check became their top priority. Nonviolent ways in which to blunt the Church’s message and discredit its leaders were considered, on the grounds that use of direct force was too dangerous (in terms of world perceptions). The symbol of John Paul II was too strong to combat, however.

THAT THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY HAD A HAND IN THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF THE POPE AS THEY ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM SUCH AN ACTION. THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED AND STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT SO LONG AS THERE IS A POLISH POPE, COMMUNISM WILL NOT TAKE ROOT IN POLAND.] 4. THROUGHOUT THE PAST YEAR, THERE HAVE BEEN VERY STRONG PRESSURES ON JARUZELSKI TO LIMIT THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH IN POLISH SOCIETY. THE POLES HAVE ARGUED THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT TO DO SO AND AT PRESENT CONDITIONS ARE NOT RIPE FOR IT. THEY TRIED TO SHOW THE ‘POSITIVE ASPECTS OF CHURCH INFLUENCE’, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHURCH AND CARDINAL STEFAN WYSZYNSKI, NOW DECEASED, AS BEING A FORCE FOR MODERATION AND FOR CALM. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, DISREGARD THIS LINE OF REASONING.

Thus, when Solidarity, with the assent of the Church, organized unrest against the government in 1980, the Communist government had to decide whether or not to directly confront the Church. Most believed that Solidarity would not have arisen without the symbol of John Paul II and the support of the Church. The various plans described in the cable were discussed by Communist authorities but never fully implemented. Although some individual church leaders were harassed or arrested, the government decided that the highest priority was the “resistance of the workers” rather than the activities of the church. The differences between Polish Communist leaders and Soviet leaders are clearly illustrated in the text. A visiting Soviet official, reviewing the Pope’s 1979 visit, states that it was unimaginable that the Pope could be invited and given a positive “reception in a Communist country.” In response to Soviet pressure, the Polish leader’s response is that “the time is not right” to come down on the Church. As can be seen from some of the points in this document, the church had a much closer relationship with the Communist government of Poland than it had

CIA Cable on the Situation in Poland

with many other Communist states. Allowing religion classes in schools and the construction of (some) new churches were things that would never be permitted in most other countries of the Eastern Bloc. While not explicitly mentioned in the text, yet understood by the writer and his intended readers, prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, Poland was the only country in Eastern Europe to be predominately Roman Catholic. This gave it strong ties with Western Europe. Any strong acts against the Church would have international repercussions. Thus, the Polish leaders never pushed the Church too hard. Essential Themes

There are two basic thoughts expressed in the text: 1) that the Church needs to be controlled by the (Communist) state, and 2) that if the Polish government does not accomplish this, then the Soviet Union may take it upon itself to do so. The United States opposed the Communist government in Poland and needed this information in order to better understand the imposition of martial law. In the slightly more than two years since Pope John Paul II’s visit, it had become clear to the Polish leaders that allowing that visit had been a monumental mistake. Speaking a decade later, General Jaruzelski stated that John Paul II’s visit had been the “detonator” that led to the eventual fall of the Communist government. Within this document, arguments are given as to why the Catholic Church needed to be brought under control, but it also illustrates the fact that the government did not have the resolve to do this. While several types of surveillance are mentioned, as well as some small steps to take against individual clergy, no mention is made of any plans for large-scale confrontations with the Church. What seems to have been the reason behind that decision is the threat of Soviet intervention in Polish affairs. Prior incidents such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, were likely in the Polish leaders’ minds. They knew that if the Soviets invaded, other leaders would be in place when the Soviets left. Thus, the Polish leaders had to take steps, or at least consid-

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er steps, that would satisfy the Soviet leaders without incurring the ire of the Church or the world at large. Many people then and now believe that the declaration of martial law was prompted more by fears of the Soviet Union than by fears of either Solidarity or the Church. Some of the former Polish leaders have claimed that a Soviet invasion was imminent, although that has yet to be conclusively documented. Whatever prompted Jaruzelski to declare martial law, the government was successful in virtually destroying the influence of the Solidarity movement for the next several years. At the same time, a lack of resolve to forcefully confront the Catholic Church, even while making an enemy of it, eventually cost the government the stability it desired. Leaders’s fears about the Church came true. With the continued influence of the pope, the Church solidified its strong position within Polish society, supporting causes that eventually allowed for the revival of Solidarity. Meanwhile, the Communist regime was sidelined. Regime leaders seemed to have understood the situation yet did nothing to change it dramatically, ultimately watching the Communist state collapse in Poland in 1989. —Donald A. Watt, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Barnes, Jane and Helen Whitney. “John Paul II & the Fall of Communism.” Frontline. Boston: WGBH Educational Foundation, 2014. Documentary. Kemp-Welch, A. Poland under Communism: A Cold War History. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. Print. Kramer, Mark. “The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: An Analysis of the Newly Released CIA Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski.” Cold War International History Project: Working Paper #59. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009. Web. MacEachin, Dougland J. US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis: 1980-1981. Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2000. Web. Weigel, George. The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II – The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2010. Print.

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 Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Speech Date: March 8, 1983 Author: Ronald Reagan Genre: speech, address Summary Overview

President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 “Evil Empire” speech was a pivotal moment in the step towards changing the scope of the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union, particularly as it pertained to nuclear warfare. The speech, delivered to the National Association of Evangelicals, emphasized moral convictions and established the notion that while the United States held the ethical upper hand, the Soviet Union was not of the same principled caliber. Reagan spoke on topics such as abortion, school prayer, and discrimination, but the real focus of the speech addressed the state of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The speech emphasized the “peace through strength” doctrine so important to Reagan; created a good-versus-evil dynamic between the United States and the Soviet Union, leading to increased public support for Reagan’s efforts; and ultimately played a significant role in the nuclear agreement between the two countries that was finally reached in 1987.

hope was resurrected. Reagan’s dedication and perseverance toward alleviating Cold War tensions ultimately proved successful. Upon defeating Jimmy Carter and assuming the presidency in 1981, Reagan made a promise to the nation to confront the Soviets. Making good on his promise, he devoted himself to “peace through strength,” and made his intentions towards the Soviet Union clear when in 1983 he delivered the famous “Evil Empire” speech to the National Association of Evangelicals. In this speech, Reagan established a good-versus-evil dynamic between the United States and the Soviet Union. He encouraged American citizens to “pray for the salvation of those who live in totalitarian darkness” and assured the people of the United States that they would not fall to a nation devoted to a “legacy of evil.” The speech was thought to cause a chain reaction of events ultimately leading to the successful nuclear arms negotiations between the two nations, the decline of the Soviet Empire, and the end of the Cold War.

Defining Moment

The Cold War was a period in post-World War II history when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in political and military conflict. The term Cold War was used because there was no actual large-scale fighting taking place, although tensions and competition between the nations were at an all-time high. When Ronald Reagan assumed the position of president of the United States in 1981, people believed the efforts to contain the Cold War were already falling apart, and fear of nuclear attack was a concern of many. It was believed that the economic and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union were never to be reconciled, and hope for improved relations between the two nations was not strong. However, as a result of the efforts of Reagan and his eventual Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, the disintegrating relationship between the two nations was improved and

Author Biography

Following a successful film career and two-terms of service as the Governor of California, Ronald Reagan served as the 40th President of the United States from 1981-1989. Reagan’s “peace through strength” philosophy led to the successful improvement of Soviet relations and an important nuclear agreement, which was thought by many to be an unattainable goal prior to Reagan’s time in office. Additionally, during Reagan’s tenure as president, his efforts to cut taxes and increase defense spending contributed to the longest period of time the United States has gone without a recession or depression, although the national debt increased significantly. Dubbed the “Great Communicator,” Reagan died at the age of 93 following a well-publicized battle with Alzheimer’s.

Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Speech

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HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Thank you…[Applause]…Thank you very much… Thank you very much…[Applause subsides]…Thank you very much…and, Reverend Clergy all, and Senator Hawkins, distinguished members of the Florida congressional delegation, and all of you: I can’t tell you how you have warmed my heart with your welcome. I’m delighted to be here today. Those of you in the National Association of Evangelicals are known for your spiritual and humanitarian work. And I would be especially remiss if I didn’t discharge right now one personal debt of gratitude. Thank you for your prayers. Nancy and I have felt their presence many times in many ways. And believe me, for us they’ve made all the difference. The other day in the East Room of the White House at a meeting there, someone asked me whether I was aware of all the people out there who were praying for the President. And I, had to say, “Yes, I am. I’ve felt it. I believe in intercessionary prayer.” But I couldn’t help but say to that questioner after he’d asked the question that–or at least say to them that if sometimes when he was praying he got a busy signal, it was just me in there ahead of him. [Laughter] I think I understand how Abraham Lincoln felt when he said, “I have been driven many times to my knees by the overwhelming conviction that I had nowhere else to go.” From the joy and the good feeling of this conference, I go to a political reception. Now, [Laughter] I don’t know why, but that bit of scheduling reminds me of a story–[Laughter]–which I’ll share with you: An evangelical minister and a politician arrived at Heaven’s gate one day together. And St. Peter, after doing all the necessary formalities, took them in hand to show them where their quarters would be. And he took them to a small, single room with a bed, a chair, and a table and said this was for the clergyman. And the politician was a little worried about what might be in store for him. And he couldn’t believe it then when St. Peter stopped in front of a beautiful mansion with lovely grounds… many servants, and told him that these would be his quarters. And he couldn’t help but ask, he said, “But wait, how– there’s something wrong–how do I get this mansion while that good and holy man only gets a single room?” And

St. Peter said, “You have to understand how things are up here. We’ve got thousands and thousands of clergy. You’re the first politician who ever made it.” [Laughter and Applause] But I don’t want to contribute to a stereotype. [Laughter] So I tell you there are a great many God-fearing, dedicated, noble men and women in public life, present company included. And yes, we need your help to keep us ever mindful of the ideas and the principles that brought us into the public arena in the first place. The basis of those ideals and principles is… a commitment to freedom and personal liberty that, itself is grounded in the much deeper realization that freedom prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly (mispronounces and corrects himself) sought and humbly accepted. The American experiment in democracy rests on this insight. Its discovery was the great triumph of our Founding Fathers, voiced by William Penn when he said: “If we will not be governed by God, we must be governed by tyrants.” Explaining the inalienable rights of men, Jefferson said, “The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time.” And it was George Washington who said that “of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports.” And finally, that shrewdest of all observers of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, put it eloquently, after he had gone on a search for the secret of America’s greatness and genius–and he said: “Not until I went into the churches of America and heard her pulpits aflame with righteousness did I understand the greatness and the genius of America. America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great.” [Applause] Well, I’m… [Applause] ..Well, I’m pleased to be here today with you who are keeping America great by keeping her good. Only through your work and prayers and those of millions of others can we hope to survive this perilous century and keep alive this experiment in liberty, this last, best hope of man. I want you to know that this administration is motivated by a political philosophy that sees the greatness of America in you, her people, and in your families, churches,

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neighborhoods, communities–the institutions that foster and nourish values like concern for others and respect for the rule of law under God. Now, I don’t have to tell you that this puts us in opposition to, or at least out of step with, a–a prevailing attitude of many who have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values upon which our very civilization is based. No matter how well intentioned, their value system is radically different from that of most Americans. And while they proclaim that they’re freeing us from superstitions of the past, they’ve taken upon themselves the job of superintending us by government rule and regulation. Sometimes their voices are louder than ours, but they are not yet a majority. [Applause] An example of that vocal superiority is evident in a controversy now going on in Washington. And since I’m involved, I’ve been waiting to hear from the parents of young America. How far are they willing to go in giving to government their prerogatives as parents? Let me state the case as briefly and simply as I can. An organization of citizens, sincerely motivated, deeply concerned about the increase in illegitimate births and abortions involving girls well below the age of consent, some time ago established a nationwide network of clinics to offer help to these girls and, hopefully, alleviate this situation. Now, again, let me say, I do not fault their intent. However, in their well-intentioned effort, these clinics decided to provide advice and birth control drugs and devices to underage girls without the knowledge of their parents. For some years now, the federal government has helped with funds to subsidize these clinics. In providing for this, the Congress decreed that every effort would be made to maximize parental participation. Nevertheless, the drugs and devices are prescribed without getting parental consent or giving notification after they’ve done so. Girls termed “sexually active”–and that has replaced the word “promiscuous”–are given this help in order to prevent illegitimate worth/birth (quickly corrects himself) eh or abortion. Well, we have ordered clinics receiving federal funds to notify the parents such help has been given. [Applause] One of the nation’s leading newspapers has created the term “squeal rule” in editorializing against

us for doing this, and we’re being criticized for violating the privacy of young people. A judge has recently granted an injunction against an enforcement of our rule. I’ve watched TV panel shows discuss this issue, seen columnists pontificating on our error, but no one seems to mention morality as playing a part in the subject of sex. [Applause] Is all of Judeo-Christian tradition wrong? Are we to believe that something so sacred can be looked upon as a purely physical thing with no potential for emotional and psychological harm? And isn’t it the parents’ right to give counsel and advice to keep their children from making mistakes that may affect their entire lives? [Slight crescendo of voice and emphasis–Long Applause] Many of us in government would like to know what parents think about this intrusion in their family by government. We’re going to fight in the courts. The right of parents and the rights of family take precedence over those of Washington-based bureaucrats and social engineers. [Applause] But the fight against parental notification is really only one example of many attempts to water down traditional values and even abrogate the original terms of American democracy. Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged. [Applause] When our founding fathers passed the First Amendment, they sought to protect churches from government interference. They never intended to construct a wall of hostility between government and the concept of religious belief itself. [Murmurs of agreement, Applause] The evidence of this permeates our history and our government. The Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. “In God We Trust” is engraved on our coinage. The Supreme Court opens its proceedings with a religious invocation. And the members of Congress open their sessions with a prayer. I just happen to believe the schoolchildren of the United States are entitled to the same privileges as [Continues over applause] Supreme Court Justices and Congressmen. Last year, I sent the Congress a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools. Already this session, there’s growing bipartisan support for the amendment, and I am calling on the Congress to act speedily to

Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Speech

pass it and to let our children pray. [Applause] Perhaps some of you, read recently about the Lubbock school case, where a judge actually ruled that it was unconstitutional for a school district to give equal treatment to religious and nonreligious student groups, even when the group meetings were being held during the students’ own time. The First Amendment never intended to require government to discriminate against religious speech. [Applause] Senators Denton and Hatfield have proposed legislation in the Congress on the whole question of prohibiting discrimination against religious forms of student speech. Such legislation could go far to restore freedom of religious speech for public school students. And I hope the Congress considers these bills quickly. And with your help, I think it’s possible we could also get the constitutional amendment through the Congress this year. [Applause] More than a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of fifty states, statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on demand now takes the lives of up to one and a half million unborn children a year. Human life legislation ending this tragedy will someday pass the Congress, and you and I must never rest until it does. [Applause] Unless and until it can be proven that the unborn child is not a living entity, then its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness must be protected. [Applause] You…You may remember that when abortion on demand began, many, and indeed, I’m sure many of you, warned that the practice would lead to a decline in respect for human life, that the philosophical premises used to justify abortion on demand would ultimately be used to justify other attacks on the sacredness of human life–infanticide or mercy killing. Tragically enough, those warnings proved all too true. Only last year a court permitted the death by starvation of a handicapped infant. I have directed the Health and Human Services Department to make clear to every health care facility in the United States that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects all handicapped persons against discrimination based on handicaps, including infants. [Applause] And we have taken the further step of requiring that each and every recipient of federal funds who provides health care… services to infants must post and keep posted in

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a conspicuous place a notice stating that “discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is prohibited by federal law.” It also lists a twenty-four-hour; toll-free number so that nurses and others may report violations in time to save the infant’s life. [Applause] In addition, recent legislation introduced by–in the Congress–by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois not only increases restrictions on publicly financed abortions, it also addresses this whole problem of infanticide. I urge the Congress to begin hearings and to adopt legislation that will protect the right of life to all children, including the disabled or handicapped. Now, I’m sure that you must get discouraged at times, but there you’ve done better than you know, perhaps. There’s a great spiritual awakening in America, a [Applause]…a renewal of the traditional values that have been the bedrock of America’s goodness and greatness. One recent survey by a Washington-based research council concluded that Americans were far more religious than the people of other nations; 95 percent of those surveyed expressed a belief in God and a huge majority believed the Ten Commandments had real meaning in their lives, and another study has found that an overwhelming majority of Americans disapprove of adultery, teenage sex, pornography, abortion, and hard drugs, and this same study showed a deep reverence for the importance of family ties and religious belief. I [Applause]…I think the items that we’ve discussed here today must be a key part of the nation’s political agenda. For the first time the Congress is openly and seriously debating and dealing with the prayer and abortion issues–and that’s enormous progress right there. I repeat: America is in the midst of a spiritual awakening and a moral renewal. And with your biblical keynote, I say today, “Yes, let justice roll on like a river, righteousness like a never-failing stream.” Now, [Applause]…obviously, much of this new political and social consensus I’ve talked about is based on a positive view of American history, one that takes pride in our country’s accomplishments and record. But we must never forget that no government schemes are going to perfect man. We know that living in this world means dealing with what philosophers would call the phenomenology of evil or, as theologians would put it, the doc-

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trine of sin. There is sin and evil in the world, and we’re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. Our nation, too, has a legacy of evil with which it must deal. The glory of this land has been its capacity for transcending the moral evils of our past. For example, the long struggle of minority citizens…for equal rights, once a source of disunity and civil war is now a point of pride for all Americans. We must never go back. There is no room for racism, anti-Semitism, or other forms of ethnic and racial hatred in this country. [Long Applause] I know that you’ve been horrified, as have I, by the resurgence of some hate groups preaching bigotry and prejudice. Use the mighty voice of your pulpits and the powerful standing of your churches to denounce and isolate these hate groups in our midst. The commandment given us is clear and simple: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” [Applause] But whatever sad episodes exist in our past, any objective observer must hold a positive view of American history, a history that has been the story of hopes fulfilled and dreams made into reality. Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves, but for millions of others around the world. And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as president, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas–that’s their name for religion–or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat. Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today. This doesn’t mean we should isolate ourselves and

refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now pr-proposes 50 percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles. [Applause] At the same time, however, they must be made to understand: we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. [Long Applause] And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace, but we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some. The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength. [Applause] I would a-[Applause continuing]…I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets’ global desires. [Laughter, Applause] A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze. A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions. [Applause] I, a number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people’s minds. And

Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Speech

he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, “I love my little girls more than anything–” And I said to myself, “Oh, no, don’t. You can’t — don’t say that.” But I had underestimated him. He went on: “I would rather see my little girls die now; still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God.” [Applause] There were…There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important. Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness–pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the State, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world. It was C.S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable “Screwtape Letters,” wrote: “The greatest evil is not done now…in those sordid ‘dens of crime’ that Dickens loved to paint. It is…not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result, but it is conceived and ordered; moved, seconded, carried and minuted in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice.” Well, because these “quiet men” do not “raise their voices,” because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they’re always making “their final territorial demand,” some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simpleminded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom. So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I’ve always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the Church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride–

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the temptation of blithely..uh..declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil. I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration’s efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate–real and verifiable reductions in the world’s nuclear arsenals and one day, with God’s help, their total elimination. [Applause] While America’s military strength is important, let me add here that I’ve always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith. Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western world exists to the degree in which the West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism’s attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marxism-Leninism is actually the second-oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, “Ye shall be as gods.” The Western world can answer this challenge, he wrote, “but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism’s faith in Man.” I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last–last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: “He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no… might He increased strength. But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary.” [Applause]

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Yes, change your world. One of our founding fathers, Thomas Paine, said, “We have it within our power to begin the world over again.” We can do it, doing together

Document Analysis

The “Evil Empire” speech established Reagan’s firm belief that the United States stood on strong moral ground, as he repeatedly emphasizes the strength of American values and beliefs in the body of the speech. In so doing, Reagan calls into question the morality of the Soviet Union, which had the effect of diminishing the belief in the Soviet government’s legitimacy. Reagan stresses the ideological superiority of the United States and acknowledges what he believed to be the Soviet’s lack of a moral compass in an effort to pressure the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union had been actively expanding its governmental authority and oppressing its population, and Reagan strategically highlights his belief in the superiority of American values in an attempt to persuade the Soviets to scale down or abandon such efforts. By creating a good-versus-evil dynamic, Reagan successfully placed pressure on Soviet leaders and earned the confidence and support of the American people for what undoubtedly would be a lengthy, and expensive, battle to escape the Cold War. Support for military efforts was, of course, an integral part in the eventual end of the Cold War and collapse of significant Soviet power. While Reagan wholeheartedly believed America was ideologically purer than the Soviet Union, creating a right-versus-wrong dynamic between the two nations was helpful when asking the American public to support expensive military efforts. Reagan made a commitment to expand the American military, and the decision to do so played no small part in ending the power struggle with the Soviets. The Soviet Union could not financially compete with the funding Reagan was pumping into the American military, and as a result the Soviet Union could never be successful in claiming victory. Reagan’s strategic choice to increase funding for military endeavors and strict adherence to a personal moral code contributed significantly to the American defeat of the Soviet Union. The “Evil Empire” speech was designed to make the intentions of a determined president clear, and by defining America as good and the Soviet Union as evil, Reagan

what no one church could do by itself. God bless you, and thank you very much. [Long Applause]

was successful in his attempts to achieve victory and end the relentless Cold War. Essential Themes

It is not possible to know what would have happened to the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had there not been a President Reagan—or a Mikhail Gorbachev—in office. However, it is widely believed the initiatives Reagan introduced and remained committed to throughout his presidency contributed to the reduction in Soviet power, to signed nuclear arms agreements, to the eventual collapse of the Berlin Wall, and to the resulting freedom of citizens of former Eastern Bloc countries. Reagan was dedicated to the idea that America’s adherence to morals and ethics could defeat the powerful Soviet empire. Additionally, Reagan was committed to pledging significant financial resources to fund increased military efforts. By combining the power of morals and military strength, Reagan resolved to put an end to the Cold War and achieve peacetime through a show of strength. —Amber R. Dickinson, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Busch, Andrew E. 1997. “Ronald Reagan and the Defeat of the Soviet Empire.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 451-466. Print. Deudney, Daniel and John Ikenberry. 1992. “Who Won the Cold War.” Foreign Policy. No. 87, pp. 123-128. Print. D’Souza, Dinesh. 1997. Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader. New York: Simon & Schuster. Print. Felzenberg, Alvin S. 1997. “There You Go Again.” Policy Review. No. 82, pp. 51. Print.

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 Able Archer ’83: The Soviet “War Scare” Date: Event: November 2–11, 1983; report: February 15, 1990 (declassified with redactions, October 14, 2015) Author: President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Genre: Report Summary Overview

President Ronald Reagan, based in part on Western perceptions of Soviet perceptions of the military balance, sought to adjust the balance by strengthening US military capabilities. The American assessment of Soviet perceptions, however, had not been accurate, and Soviet leaders interpreted the US actions as aggressive in intent. In November 1983, at a time of heightened tensions, the Soviet leadership mistook a NATO military exercise as the possible preparation for a preemptive attack and put their own forces on alert. Defining Moment

During the tenuous détente in US-Soviet relations during the 1970s, American conservatives from both parties (the parties being less ideologically polarized at that time) portrayed the USSR as abusing the period of reduced confrontation to gain unilateral advantage both in terms of strategic weapons and by fomenting revolution in developing countries (often referred to as the Third World at the time). They argued that the intelligence community was underestimating Soviet military spending and weapons modernization and criticized the analysts for relying too heavily on “so-called hard data” and assumptions of rationality at the expense of intangible factors. In 1976 the CIA arranged a competition in which its own analysts (“Team A”) and a group of conservative intellectuals led by Harvard history professor Richard Pipes (“Team B”) would analyze the same set of data. Team B forcefully argued that the Soviets were seeking strategic superiority and developing a capacity to fight, survive, and win a nuclear war. (Team A allowed that this could be their goal, but that it was not achievable. The State Department did not believe that they even saw it as a goal.) Events eventually revealed that Team B was correct in believing that Soviet military spending was higher than estimated at the time, but the Soviet military-

industrial complex was highly inefficient (and a serious strain on the economy). Team B’s assessments of Soviet strategy as well as advances in missile accuracy and other aspects of modernization were wildly exaggerated, but that could not be proved at the time. The Committee on the Present Danger was formed to sound the alarm about the Soviet threat. The committee advocated increased defense spending, lobbied against ratification of the SALT II arms-control treaty, and warned of an impending “window of vulnerability,” a period when the United States would be exposed to a disarming nuclear first strike. Under pressure from the Committee on the Present Danger, the Republican presidential campaign, the Soviet deployment of a new generation of intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in eastern Europe, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter administration arranged with NATO to deploy a new generation of IRBMs in western Europe, withdrew SALT II from the Senate before it had been considered for ratification, and issued a number of defense-related executive decisions. In particular, Carter issued Presidential Directive 58 (PD-58) on assuring continuity of government during a nuclear war and PD-59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.” Although officially top secret, elements of PD-59 were soon leaked to the press. PD-59 constituted an effort to bolster the effectiveness of deterrence by creating a capacity to fight a nuclear war successfully if deterrence should fail (e.g., multiple preplanned nuclear strike options; capacity for rapid target selection and target-damage assessment; strengthened command, control, communications, intelligence [C3I]; option to “launch on warning”). The stated logic was that a credible war-fighting capability was required to make deterrence work and thus prevent the need to fight a war. Naturally, the war-fighting ca-

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pability was what drew the most attention. Controversy arose over whether it would make the decision to employ nuclear weapons easier. State Department adviser Marshall Shulman predicted that it could increase the Soviet leadership’s sense of vulnerability. Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in January 1981 vowing to compensate for what he saw as Carter’s inadequate response to the Soviet threat. He boosted military spending further, nearly doubling it in the course of his first term; pressed ahead with the deployment of IRBMs in Europe; initiated the development of a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (the MX); and prompted high-technology research on defenses against ballistic missiles (the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, dubbed “Star Wars” by journalists). Regarding arms control, he refused to resurrect SALT II (although he abided by its provisions) and insisted that new talks aim at actual reductions of missile forces (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START), although during his first term the proposals were designed to fail—offers that would appear reasonable to the general public but would be unacceptable to the Soviet government, thus assuring that no progress would be made and that the Soviets would carry the blame. Beyond these concrete measures, Reagan went on the offensive rhetorically. He pronounced the USSR illegitimate, inherently unstable, and historically doomed. It was “an evil empire,” “the focus of evil in the modern world,” and therefore, to seek détente with it rather than to challenge it would be an immoral act. Soviet leaders understood the situation differently. While they did lend support to Third World allies and revolutionaries, they tended to view it as preventing reactionaries from stopping the natural course of history. Rather than initiating such actions, they generally reacted to local events and requests for assistance that they themselves viewed as a burden. While they did have a massive strategic military buildup, they viewed it as an effort to catch up to the United States’ qualitative lead in missile technology. While they saw their new IRBMs in Europe as a natural technological upgrade of existing systems, they saw the U.S. IRBMs as a new capability, able to take out the Kremlin in 10 minutes or less. Moreover, PD-59 had specifically highlighted leadership as a target. In fact, a new computerized system designed to measure the “correlation of forces” was telling them that they were the ones vulnerable to attack. At the time they were developing a system, codenamed Perimeter, that would assure the launching of a

retaliatory strike even after the national leadership had been wiped out. They dismissed US talk of aggressive Soviet objectives as cover for the United States’ own plans, undertaken for other reasons. The US buildup of the later Carter and Reagan years, although undertaken as a response to perceived Soviet actions, caught them unawares and made them nervous. Having virtually exhausted their economy building missiles, the prospect of a new arms race in antimissile defenses, requiring entirely new technologies, was more than daunting. At least some Soviet leaders, including General Secretary Yury Andropov (1982–84), interpreted Reagan’s rhetoric as preparing the public mood for war. Already in 1981 the Politburo initiated Operation RYAN (or VRYAN), instructing intelligence agents around the world to look for signs of preparation for a surprise nuclear attack. In April 1983 a half dozen US Navy aircraft, engaged in maneuvers, violated Soviet airspace over the Kurile Islands; it had been unintended, but it put the Soviet air defenses, which failed to intercept them, on edge. In September 1983, when a South Korean airliner accidently wandered over Sakhalin Island, the Soviets mistook it a for a spy plane (one had actually been in the vicinity to monitor Soviet missile tests) and shot it down. Even after they realized that it had been a civilian plane, Soviet leaders believed that US intelligence agencies had sent it deliberately to test Soviet air-defense radars. Reagan, without waiting for the details, denounced the incident as “an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations.” Andropov condemned it as a “sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special services.” Later that month he said that the Reagan administration was on “a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace.” The CIA assessed that U.S.-Soviet relations were as bleak as at any time since the death of Stalin in 1953. It was in this atmosphere, in Nov. 2–11, 1983, that NATO engaged in a military exercise called Able Archer ’83. The exercise, a regular annual event, was to test procedures for the release of nuclear weapons during a European conflict. The Soviets, however, believed that an exercise could be used as cover for war preparations (their own contingency plans allowed for that), and key aspects of this exercise were different from previous cases. On the night of November 8–9, Soviet intelligence mistakenly reported that US military bases

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had been put on alert. Agents abroad were assigned to ascertain the reason for the alert and to redouble their efforts to uncover war preparations. Realization of the Soviet war scare unsettled the US government and changed the course of policy. Yet the question of whether it had actually happened or was some sort of diversion remained disputed. CIA assessments in May and August 1984 confidently asserted that it had all been for show. As the accompanying report shows, it was 1990 before the intelligence community came to a consensus that, “In 1983, we may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger.” Author Biography

Founded in 1956 as the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, this panel was

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renamed the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1961, (The board was abolished in 1977 and reconstituted in 1981. The word “foreign” was dropped in 2008.) An independent element within the Executive Office of the President, it is a nonpartisan board of not more than 16 members, appointed by the president, who are knowledgeable of intelligence matters but not currently employees of the federal government. Its purpose is to advise the president on the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community in meeting the nation’s intelligence needs. The board is said to have complete access to the full range of intelligence-related information as well as direct access to the president. It reports to the president as necessary, but not less than twice a year. A subcommittee, the Intelligence Oversight Board (1976), advises on the legality of intelligence operations.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON

The Soviet “War Scare” President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board February 15, 1990 Executive Summary From the late 1970’s to the mid-1980’s, the military forces and intelligence services of the Soviet Union were redirected in ways that suggested that the Soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the possibility of a sudden strike launched by the United States and its NATO allies. These changes were accompanied by leadership statements -- some public, but many made in secret meetings -- arguing that the US was seeking strategic superiority in order to be able to launch a nuclear first strike. These actions and statements are often referred to as the period of the “war scare.” The changes in Soviet military and intelligence arrangements included: improvements of Warsaw Pact

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combat readiness (by recalling reservists, lengthening service times, increasing draft ages, and abolishing many draft deferments), an unprecedented emphasis on civil defense exercises, an end of military support for gathering the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), the forward deployment of unusual numbers of SPETSNAZ forces, increased readiness of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and forward deployed nuclear capable aircraft, massive military exercises that for the first time emphasized surviving and responding to a sudden enemy strike, a new agreement among Warsaw Pact countries that gave Soviet leaders authority in the event of an attack to unilaterally commit Pact forces, creation within the GRU of a new directorate to run networks of illegal agents abroad, an urgent KGB (and some satellite services’) requirement that gave the highest priority [to] the gathering of politico-military indicators of US/NATO preparations for a sudden nuclear attack, establishment of a special warning condition to alert Soviet forces that a surprise enemy strike using weapons of mass destruction was in progress, and the creation of a special KGB unit to manage a computer program (the VRYAN model) that would objectively measure the correlation of forces and warn when Soviet relative strength had declined to the point that a preemptive Soviet attack might be justified.

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During the November 1983 NATO “Able Archer” nuclear release exercises, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. These included: placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland on heightened alert, [APPROXIMATELY SIX LINES OF TEXT DELETED] The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and NATO policymakers. If they were simply part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter it from employing improved weapons, and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. If they reflected an internal Soviet power struggle -- for example, a contest between conservatives and pragmatists, or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats -- then they could not be ignored, but they would not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality -- by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own -- then the “war scare” was a cause for real concern. During the past year, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we (the U.S. intelligence community) knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of documents, conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data. Additionally, we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events. We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike -- perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise -- were growing. We also believe that the US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach significant weight to the possibility that the war scare was real. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to

the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling war preparations. In two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE’s) in May and August of 1984, the intelligence community said: “We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.” Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be “propaganda.” The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not now, support such categoric conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelligence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President. A strongly stated interpretation was defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with it and by failing to subject that interpretation to a comparative risk assessment. In time, analysts’ views changed. In an annex to a February 1988 NIE, analysts declared: “During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s there were increasing Soviet concerns about the drift of superpower relations, which some in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. These concerns were shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United States was taking steps to achieve military superiority.” The Soviets’ VRYAN program was evaluated as part of an effort to collect data and subject it to computer analysis in a way that would warn the USSR when the US had achieved decisive military superiority. Reporting from a variety of [APPROXIMATELY FOUR WORDS DELETED] sources, including Oleg Gordievsky, (a senior KGB officer who once served as second in command in the London Residency and who has since defected to Great Britain), taken as a whole, strongly indicates that there was in fact a genuine belief among key members of the Soviet leadership that the United States had embarked on a program of achieving decisive military superiority that might prompt a sudden nuclear missile attack on the USSR. Although some details of that belief became known

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only recently, there was at the time evidence -- from secret directives and speeches by Soviet authorities -- that a major change in Soviet political and strategic thinking had probably occurred. For example, we knew by 1984 at the latest that a Soviet general had interpreted President Carter’s PD-59 as preparing US strategic forces for a preemptive strike, that the Head of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, General Kryuchkov had told key subordinates that the KGB must work to prevent the US from launching a surprise attack, that KGB and Czechoslovak intelligence Residencies had been tasked to gather information on US preparations for war, and that missile submarines had been placed on shortened readiness times. Many of these facts were summarized in a memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W) to DCI William Casey in June 1984, a memo that Casey then forwarded to the President, [APPROXIMATELY THREE LINES OF TEXT DELETED] Neither the NIO/W nor the [APPROXIMATELY ONE WORD DELETED] altered the official position of the intelligence community as expressed in the 1984 SNIE and as reasserted, in almost identical language, in the August 1984 SNIE. Analysts will always have legitimate disagreements over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain intelligence reports. Moreover, part of the confidence that PFIAB has in its own assessment of the war scare derives from information not known at the time. Our purpose in presenting this report is not so much to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE’s as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed. In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially where there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estimates must be cast in terms of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode. By “alternative scenarios,” we mean a full statement of each major, possible interpretation of a set of intelligence indicators. In this case, these scenarios might have included: 1. Soviet leaders had not changed their strategic thinking but were attempting by means of propaganda and intelligence deceptions to slow the US military

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build-up, prevent the deployment of new weapons, and isolate the US from its allies. 2. Soviet leaders may or may not have changed their strategic thinking, but a power struggle among Kremlin factions and the need to deflect blame for poor economic conditions made it useful to exaggerate the military intentions and capabilities of the US. 3. Soviet leaders had changed their strategic thinking and, in fact, believed that the US was attempting to gain decisive strategic superiority in order, possibly, to launch a nuclear first strike. By “comparative risk assessment,” we mean assigning two kinds of weights to each scenario: one that estimates the probability that the scenario is correct and another that assesses the risk to the United States if it wrongly rejects a scenario that is, in fact, correct. In 1984, one might reasonably have given the highest probability of being correct to the first or second scenario (even though, as we argue in this report, we believe that would have been an error). But having done this, it would surely have been clear even then that if the third scenario was in fact correct and we acted as if it were wrong, the risks to the United States would have been very great -- greater than if we had rejected a correct first or second scenario. As it happened, the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized this risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual level of alert. But these officers acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the years leading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance as to the possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking. By urging that some major estimates be based on a comparative assessment of fully developed alternative scenarios, we are not arguing for “competitive analysis” or greater use of dissenting opinions. An intelligence estimate is not the product of a governmental debating society in which institutional rivals try to outdo one another in their display of advocacy skills. We are arguing instead for adopting the view that since it is very hard to understand the present, much less the future, it is a mistake to act as if we can. On the most important issues, it is difficult if not impossible to say with confidence that we know what is happening or will happen. We can,

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however, say that there are a small number of possibilities, each of which has a (rough) probability and each of which presents to the policymaker likely risks and opportunities. When analysts attempt to arrive at a single strong conclusion, they not only run the risk of being wrong, they run two additional and perhaps more worrisome risks. They are likely to underestimate the possibility of change (the safest prediction is always that tomorrow will be like today) and they are likely to rely on mirrorimaging (our adversaries think the way we do). In this era of unprecedented, breakneck change, the first error grows in importance. And since we cannot know what individuals will next hold power in the USSR or when, it is an especially grave error to assume that since we know the US is not going to start World War III, the next leaders of the Kremlin will also believe that -- and act on that belief. In short, our criticism of the 1984 SNIE’s, though in part substantive, is in larger part procedural. We do not think there is any simple organizational change that will correct that procedure. If strategic intelligence estimates are to give policymakers a better sense of risks and opportunities, it will only happen if policymakers insist that that is what they want and refuse to accept anything less. This review of the war scare period also suggests another lesson. It is quite clear to the Board that during the critical years when the Kremlin was reassessing US intentions, the US intelligence community did not react quickly to or think deeply about the early signs of that change. The war scare indicators began appear-

ing in the early 1980’s; the first estimate to address this was not written until 1984. At the time it was written, the US knew very little about Kremlin decisionmaking. [APPROXIMATELY THREE LINES OF TEXT DELETED] the SNIE authors wrote confidently about “Soviet leadership intentions.” We recommend that the National Security Council oversee a reassessment of the intelligence community’s understanding of Soviet military and political decisionmaking, both in general terms and in light of the judgments made in the 1984 estimates. Our own leadership needs far better intelligence reporting on and assessments of the mindset of the Soviet leadership -- its ideological/political instincts and perceptions. As part of this reassessment, it should exploit the current opening in the Iron Curtain to interview past and present East Bloc and Soviet officials about the sources and consequences of the war scare in order to obtain a better understanding of the perceptions and inner conflicts of Soviet decisionmakers. Finally, we suggest that the US review the way in which it manages military exercises, its own intelligence collection efforts, [ONE LINE OF TEXT DELETED] to insure that these are carried out in a way that is responsive to indications and warning for war. In 1983 we may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger. Though the current thaw in US-Soviet relations suggests that neither side is likely in the near term to reach for that trigger, events are moving so fast that it would be unwise to assume that Soviet leaders will not in the future act, from misunderstanding or malevolence, in ways that put the peace in jeopardy.

GLOSSARY first chief directorate: KGB branch responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities GAMMA: contains intercepts of Soviet communications GRU: Soviet military intelligence (Glavnoe razvedyvatel’noe upravlenie) KGB: Soviet state security committee (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti) NOCONTRACT: not releasable to contractors/consultants NOFORN: not releasable to foreign nationals ORCON: dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator

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PD-59: presidential directive 59, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy” (July 25, 1980) SNIE: Special National Intelligence Estimate SPETSNAZ: Soviet special operations forces (Voiska spetsial’nogo naznacheniia) TOP SECRET: release would cause exceptionally grave damage to national security UMBRA: highly sensitive communications intelligence WNINTEL: Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

Document Analysis

After the exercises ended, Soviet anxieties began to ease. From the Soviet perspective, the Able Archer episode was the closest the world had come to war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States and its allies, on the other hand, were largely unaware that anything was happening until after the fact. The first clues came from Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB agent based in London and secretly in the employ of British intelligence, who informed them of Operation RYAN. Gordievsky’s initial reports had reached Washington in October 1983, but US officials did not know how to react to them. The tendency was to treat them as part of a larger Soviet disinformation scheme to undermine Western defensive preparations. The deployment of US IRBMs was carried out in December as scheduled, and in response, the Soviets suspended all arms-control negotiations for the next two years. While intelligence officials were divided over the meaning of what had happened, Reagan, personally, was struck by the realization that the Soviets might really think of the United States as a threat. By his way of thinking, the Soviets were the threat, and the United States had to highlight the Soviets’ vulnerabilities as a way to deter them. For the first time he entertained the possibility that someone might see America as something other than “a force for good in the world.” He now began to have second thoughts about his approach. He renewed his theme of the elimination of nuclear weapons, something that he had mentioned before but which virtually no one in his administration had taken seriously. In December he sent a letter to Andropov disavowing any intention of challenging the security of the Soviet Union or its people. In a major speech in January 1984, he made no reference to the “evil empire,” instead stressing, “We do not threaten the Soviet Union.” The Soviets, however, dismissed the speech as

an election-year ploy, and for the time being the KGB continued to look for signs of war preparations. Essential Themes

The PFIAB report is both an analysis of what happened in US-Soviet relations and an analysis of the US intelligence community’s assessment of those relations. The critique is thus both substantive and procedural. It is in part an exercise in determining how to do an intelligence assessment, considering the lack of available information and the varying levels of certainty in the value of the evidence. The 1984 assessments, for instance, were described as drawing conclusions that were too certain, given the sparse evidence, and too dismissive of inconsistent evidence. Real-time informa tion is always partial, and its reliability is always variable. The report calls on analysts to make policy makers aware of the uncertainties of their reports by providing “comparative scenarios” of what could happen in the future. (Yet, although written less than two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the report gives no indication that such a collapse is a possibility.) An inherent problem, however, is that policy makers have little patience for uncertainties. They will always prefer straightforward answers to their questions and will tend to listen to the advisers that provide them. The report also notes that organizational change will not help. This is probably true, but it goes against the trend of such reports, which frequently call for bureaucratic restructuring in response to shortcomings. —Scott C. Monje, PhD

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky, eds. Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1993. Print. DiCicco, Jonathan M. “Fear, Loathing, and Cracks in Reagan’s Mirror Images: Able Archer 83 and an American First Step toward Rapprochement in the Cold War.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7:3 (July 2011), 253–274. Print. Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Random House, 2009. Print. Jones, Nate, Tom Blanton, and Lauren Harper, eds. The 1983 War Scare Declassified and For Real. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 533. Washington, DC: National Security Archive, George Washington U, 2015. Web.

Manchanda, Arnav. “When Truth Is Stranger Than Fiction: The Able Archer Incident.” Cold War History 9:1 (February 2009), 111–133. Print. Mastny, Vojtech. “How Able Was ‘Able Archer’? Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective.” Journal of Cold War Studies 11:1 (Winter 2009), 108–123. Print. Scott, Len. “Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited.” Intelligence and National Security 26:6 (December 2011), 759–777. Print.

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 Ronald Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative Date: December 28, 1984 Author: Ronald Reagan Genre: Report Summary Overview

Although twenty-one months earlier, President Ronald Reagan had announced his intention to begin research into the creation of a system that would defend against strategic (nuclear) weapons, exact plans for this system were not in place at the time. During 1984, military leaders and those overseeing possible avenues of scientific research for the system were able to bring focus to which options were possible with current technology and which might be effective. Thus, as the year came to a close, Reagan issued a report on the status of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), to which the document included here is the introduction. This report emphasized the strength of Reagan’s resolve to develop such a system. The Soviet Union, which was the nation toward which these defensive efforts were directed, had to evaluate what steps to take in response to the SDI. The fact that, at that time, the Soviet leadership was in a state of transition made Reagan’s initiative more effective in creating uncertainty in that nation and the world. Defining Moment

In the 1980 campaign Reagan used the slogan “Let’s Make America Great Again.” Domestically, the 1970s had generally been a time of poor economic performance, and, in addition, many questioned the foreign policy of President Jimmy Carter. Reagan promised to revive the economy and to strengthen American military forces, with the United States’ foreign policy becoming more assertive diplomatically and militarily. Once elected, Reagan followed through on his promise to strengthen America’s military forces, causing the Soviets to respond in a similar fashion. Ever since the 1950s, the assumption was that if attacked, both the Soviet Union and the United States had the resources to respond with enough force to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the attacker. It was called the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Neither side

had any substantial defense against the other’s nuclear arsenal. Several times toward the end of President Carter’s presidency computer malfunctions had created indications that Soviet missiles had launched. In popular literary fiction, television, and movies, the effects of nuclear war, including wars caused by rogue commanders or hackers, was being graphically depicted. These fictional events caused Reagan to question his advisors on these issues, and not all the responses were comforting. In addition to these real, and imagined, events, Reagan’s desire to engage the Soviet Union from a position of strength rather than weakness, as implied in the mutually assured destruction doctrine, created his openness to the SDI. Many believed that the technology for SDI was unattainable, giving it the nickname Star Wars. However, Reagan believed that, given the right resources, the anti-missile technology required for a true defensive system could become a reality. Throughout the remaining years of his presidency, Reagan insured that the required appropriations were included in the budget. In addition to those who questioned the possibility of developing the technology, others opposed it on the grounds that it would destabilize the deterrent system that had worked for the past three decades. Although, ultimately, Reagan’s hoped-for strategic defense system never materialized, the research did allow the development of battlefield anti-missile systems. During the first half of Reagan’s presidency, the Soviet Union had a series of old, ill leaders, unable to negotiate with the American president. Thus, while Reagan was considering the creation of the SDI, there was no forceful external pressure or useful information on Soviet thinking that might cause him to stop. The burdens that SDI placed upon the Soviet Union militaryindustrial complex, in addition to Reagan’s decision to increase offensive weapon capabilities, were factors in the collapse of the Communist Bloc within a decade.

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Author Biography Ronald Wilson Reagan was born in 1911 in Tampico, Illinois, and grew up in Dixon, Illinois. He graduated from Eureka College and became a radio sports announcer in Iowa. In 1937, he moved to California and became a “B” movie actor, advancing to feature movies from 1940 to 1957. He then worked in television and for General Electric, becoming a well-known speaker. Previously a Democrat, he moved into politics in 1964

supporting Republican Barry Goldwater for president. In 1966, he was elected governor of California, serving two terms. Elected president in 1980, he pushed for economic revitalization and a massive military buildup. Eventually, he was able to work with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on a variety of issues. Previously married and divorced, Reagan married Nancy Davis in 1952. He died in 2004.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Since the advent of nuclear weapons, every President has sought to minimize the risk of nuclear destruction by maintaining effective forces to deter aggression and by pursuing complementary arms control agreements. This approach has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war while protecting Western security for nearly four decades. Originally, we relied on balanced defensive and offensive forces to deter. But over the last twenty years, the United States has nearly abandoned efforts to develop and deploy defenses against nuclear weapons, relying instead almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation. We accepted the notion that if both we and the Soviet Union were able to retaliate with devastating power even after absorbing a first strike, that stable deterrence would endure. That rather novel concept seemed at the time to be sensible for two reasons. First, the Soviets stated that they believed that both sides should have roughly equal forces and neither side should seek to alter the balance to gain unilateral advantage. Second, there did not seem to be any alternative. The state of the art in defensive systems did not permit an effective defensive system. Today both of these basic assumptions are being called into question. The pace of the Soviet offensive and defensive buildup has upset the balance in the areas of greatest importance during crises. Furthermore, new technologies are now at hand that may make possible a truly effective nonnuclear defense.\ For these reasons and because of the awesome destructive potential of nuclear weapons, we must seek another means of deterring war. It is both militarily and morally necessary. Certainly, there should be a better way

to strengthen peace and stability, a way to move away from a future that relies so heavily on the prospect of rapid and massive nuclear retaliation and toward greater reliance on defensive systems that threaten no one. On March 23, 1983, I announced my decision to take an important first step toward this goal by directing the establishment of a comprehensive and intensive research program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, aimed at eventually eliminating the threat posed by nuclear armed ballistic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a program of vigorous research focused on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of finding ways to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies. The SDI research program will provide to a future President and a future Congress the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. At the same time, the United States is committed to the negotiation of equal and verifiable agreements that bring real reductions in the power of the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To this end, my Administration has proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of arms control proposals. We are working tirelessly for the success of these efforts, but we can and must go further in trying to strengthen the peace. Our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative complements our arms reduction efforts and helps to pave the way for creating a more stable and secure world. The research that we are undertaking is consistent with all of our treaty obligations, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Ronald Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative

In the near term, the SDI research program also responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) effort, which includes actual deployments. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to expand its ballistic missile defense capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. And, in the long-term, we have confidence that SDI will be a crucial means by which both the United States and the Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep reductions, and eventually, even the elimination of ballistic missiles and the nuclear weapons they carry. Our vital interests and those of our allies are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. They, too, rely upon our nuclear forces to deter attack against them. Therefore, as we pursue the promise offered by the Strategic Defense Initiative, we will continue to work closely with our friends and allies. We will ensure that, in the event of a future decision to develop and deploy defensive systems - a decision in which consultation with our allies will play an important part-allied, as well as U.S. security against aggression would be enhanced. Through the SDI research program, I have called upon the great scientific talents of our country to turn to

Document Analysis

Reflecting the Constitutional mandate for the government of the United States to “provide for the common defense,” in 1983 Reagan proposed a transformation of the strategic defense policy from one based on the mutual fear of destruction by two opposed nuclear states to one involving the physical destruction of a warhead launched against the United States. Reagan believed the Soviet Union was trying to build enough weapons as to make the doctrine of mutually assured destruction essentially meaningless. While continually referring to possible negotiations to limit strategic weapon systems, Reagan makes it clear in his statement that he believes that both strong offensive and defensive capabilities are needed to ensure the security of the United States. Thus, in this statement, he pushes for continued support of SDI research. Deterrence created the uneasy stability that was at the heart of the nuclear rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reagan clearly understood this even while he was not sold on the idea completely. While both countries had proved rational in the past,

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the cause of strengthening world peace by rendering ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete. In short, I propose to channel our technological prowess toward building a more secure and stable world. And I want to emphasize that in carrying out this research program, the United States seeks neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war. As you review the following pages, I would ask you to remember that the quality of our future is at stake and to reflect on what we are trying to achieve the strengthening of our ability to preserve the peace while shifting away from our current dependence upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. I would also ask you to consider the SDI research program in light of both the Soviet Union’s extensive, ongoing efforts in this area and our own government’s constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. I hope that you will conclude by lending your own strong and continuing support to this research effort—an effort that could prove to be critical to our nation’s future. Ronald Reagan December 28, 1984.

he was not certain that that would always be the case. Convinced that the Soviets were strengthening their offensive capabilities, he suggests that he does not trust their statements of peace. Whether or not Reagan knew that the anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow was fairly porous, he asserted that the SDI was necessary in case the Soviets decided to expand their defensive system. Deterrence assumes both sides can inflict significant damage on each other, whether attacking or counter-attacking. Reagan, however, argues that the situation could remain stable if the United States were to have an effective defensive shield. Among other things, other countries could then assume that the United States would not initiate a nuclear war. Reagan had great confidence in American technology. Tremendous changes had occurred since the beginning of the Cold War. This was true of offensive weapons and, to an extent, defensive weapons. Even if the technology was developed to intercept incoming missiles, there would necessarily be limits on the area protected. The Soviets knew that, and throughout 1984 attempted to split the Western alliance by making it clear

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that something protecting the United States would not protect its European NATO allies. In his statement, Reagan indicates that America’s allies should feel more secure if the United States and American weapon systems are more secure. He is, however, careful not to indicate that the defensive shield would be expanded to include Europe. Within the text, Reagan asserts that a defensive system would “threaten no one.” The fact that many Soviet military leaders perceived such a system as a serious threat did not seem to be part of Reagan’s mindset. Reagan was the first US president since World War II not to have a summit meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union during his first term in office. Thus, he did not receive the kind of direct feedback that other presidents had had. Reagan understood that the SDI was a long-term effort, referring it here to “a future President and a future Congress.” Reagan saw the 1980s as the right time to transform the Cold War through the development of weapon systems that he believed would insure the safety of the United States for decades to come. Essential Themes

In March, 1983, Reagan publically instructed the Department of Defense, and related organizations, to begin research to create a defensive system capable of destroying any nuclear weapon being used against the United States. In April 1984 the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was created to oversee the research efforts being undertaken to implement the SDI. While the report to which this document was the introduction was not widely circulated, the decision to place the material within the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents indicates that Reagan wanted greater public awareness of his thoughts regarding SDI. The basic point that Reagan makes in this document is that the United States should, and will, increase its security by developing weapons and systems to destroy nuclear weapons fired at the United States. The implication is that the Soviet leadership could not be trusted, meaning that the doctrine of deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. Reagan was willing to stretch the anti-ballistic missile treaty to its limits, and to push US military research beyond all expectations. Reagan was convinced that these weapon systems

could be developed within a reasonable amount of time, and that while they might cause concern among the Soviet leadership there would be no major negative outcomes for the United States, he thought. Although given the doctrine of mutual deterrence, Reagan’s critics were right to note that either side’s ability to block the other’s attack could be destabilizing, Reagan was correct in perceiving at the time that there would be no immediate repercussions for the United States. Gorbachev, taking power in 1985, did not want a military confrontation with the United States—or with any other country. When he tried to expand Soviet military capability, the country reached its economic limits. Thus the SDI was a factor in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. While the SDI never developed any weapon systems effective against intercontinental ballistic missiles, it was continued, under various names, for more than thirty years afterward. Today, its ambitious goals have been scaled back to systems based on the defense against a single missile and other conventional attacks. The original SDI remains a symbol of the 1980s and represents one aspect of Reagan’s pledge to insure that the United States would be the undisputed world leader. —Donald A. Watt, PhD . Bibliography and Additional Reading

Dabrowski, John R. Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years. Washington: Missile Defense Agency History Office, 2013. Web. Frances FitzGerald. Way Out there in the Blue. Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Shuster, 2000. Print. Podvig, Pavel. “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program.” Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Working Paper. Geneva: Russian Nuclear Forces Project, March 2013. Web. Reagan, Ronald. “National Security Decision Directives: 1981-1989, NSDD:32,35,85,91,116,119,16 1,172,178,192,195,258,261.” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum. Simi Valley, CA: National Archives and Records Administration, 2016. Web. Weisberg, Jacob, Jr., with Arthur M. Schlesinger (ed.) and Sean Wilentz (ed.). Ronald Reagan. (The American Presidents Series.) New York: Times Books, 2016. Print.

Ronald Reagan’s “Tear Down This Wall” Speech

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 Ronald Reagan’s “Tear Down This Wall” Speech Date: June 12, 1987 Author: Ronald Reagan Genre: Speech Summary Overview

The speech in which Ronald Reagan implored General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall was an iconic moment in the closing phase of the Cold War. Some people, however, have exaggerated its significance, even holding it responsible for the successful conclusion of the Cold War. If it had achieved a greater impact on events, then its influence might not have been at all positive. Defining Moment

By the spring of 1987, the Iran-Contra affair had largely immobilized the Reagan administration. The president’s political opponents were on the offensive, his approval ratings had hit a four-year low (42 percent approved of his handling of the job and 46 percent disapproved; with regard to foreign policy, 29 percent approved and 58 percent disapproved), and Congressional hearings began in May. At the same time, Reagan’s conservative allies were outraged over his recent overtures to the Soviet Union. In Europe, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher was upset by the proposal he had made to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavík, Iceland, in October 1986 to eliminate nuclear weapons, which, she insisted, were needed to balance the Soviet advantage in conventional military forces. On the other hand, negotiations on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) were showing promise after Gorbachev’s suggestion that they be separated from talks on strategic weapons and SDI, but this also left many of his conservative supporters uneasy. At this point, Reagan was invited to speak on the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin. By and large, apart from some rhetoric in the early years, the Reagan administration had not challenged the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. (Some discreet support for the suppressed Solidarity labor union in Poland was an exception.) Now, the earlier rhetoric was about to return.

The words used in the Reagan speech of June 12, 1987, came not from his foreign policy team but mostly from Peter Robinson, a 30-year-old member of the White House speechwriting staff, writing his first major speech. Put off by the insistence of US diplomats that he should not say anything inflammatory, Robinson was inspired by complaints about the Berlin Wall that he heard from West Berliners at a dinner party. Thus he made a call to tear down the wall the central passage of the speech. The White House speechwriting staff liked his draft speech, but it drew immediate opposition from the State Department and the National Security Council, where it was variously described as naïve, raising false hopes, clumsy, and needlessly provocative. Deputy National Security Adviser Colin Powell and Secretary of State George Shultz intervened personally, Shultz calling it “an affront to Mr. Gorbachev.” Foreign policy officials allowed that the president could make a reference to the removal of the wall, but only if it was vague and not put in the form of a challenge, such as “One day, this ugly wall will disappear.” In the end, however, Reagan sided with Robinson and the catchy line. For Gorbachev’s part, his top priority was reforming the economic and political structure of the Soviet Union and reducing the various financial drains on its economy—especially military expenditures, which consumed, by some estimates, 25 percent of GDP. To justify that, lest he be accused by rivals of undermining national security, he had to improve relations with the West first. This had consequences for Eastern Europe. Gorbachev cut the economic subsidies that had, since the Khrushchev years, allowed the Eastern European allies to live somewhat better than the Soviets; he advised them to reform their own systems; and he warned them not to expect the Soviet military to intervene in case of domestic turmoil because that would undermine relations with the West for years to come. None

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of these messages were particularly welcome in the Warsaw Pact capitals. Disruption seemed inevitable, although the leaders did not initially believe the pledge not to intervene if trouble arose. At home, Gorbachev’s reform agenda was beginning to move ahead. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee in January 1987, he had attacked conservatism and inertia and proposed holding a party conference, the first since 1941, to review progress and to discuss ways to democratize the party and society as a whole. The proposal was to be confirmed at another Central Committee meeting in June, the month of Reagan’s speech. Resistance to reform, however, was beginning to emerge. High-ranking leaders such as Yegor Ligachev, who had once considered themselves reformers, were beginning to have second thoughts as the extent of the reforms needed became more evident.

Author Biography Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) was the 40th president of the United States (1981–89). A conservative Republican, he sought to reduce the expanded role of government rooted in the presidencies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson and to reassert the United States’ role in world affairs. His initial policies toward the Soviet Union emphasized hostile rhetoric and military expenditures on both missiles and defenses against missiles. Later, especially after the inauguration of Mikhail Gorbachev, he shifted to a more cooperative approach but continued to insist on investments in antimissile defenses. Those defenses, as conceived at the time, were technically impractical and never came to fruition during his time in office.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Thank you very much. Chancellor Kohl, Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gentlemen: Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to the people of this city and the world at the city hall. Well, since then two other presidents have come, each in his turn, to Berlin. And today I, myself, make my second visit to your city. We come to Berlin, we American Presidents, because it’s our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. But I must confess, we’re drawn here by other things as well: by the feeling of history in this city, more than 500 years older than our own nation; by the beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten; most of all, by your courage and determination. Perhaps the composer Paul Lincke understood something about American Presidents. You see, like so many Presidents before me, I come here today because wherever I go, whatever I do: “Ich hab’ noch einen Koffer in Berlin.” [I still have a suitcase in Berlin.] Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, I extend my warmest greetings and the good will of the American people. To those listening in East Berlin, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as

surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in the West, in this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.] Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same—still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar. President von Weizsäcker has said: “The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed.” Today I say: As long as this gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question

Ronald Reagan’s “Tear Down This Wall” Speech

of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph. In this season of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State—as you’ve been told—George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this month, he said: “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the Western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: “The Marshall plan is helping here to strengthen the free world.” A strong, free world in the West, that dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to become an economic giant. Italy, France, Belgium— virtually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth; the European Community was founded. In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty—that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled. Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany—busy office blocks, fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of park land. Where a city’s culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there’s abundance— food, clothing, automobiles-the wonderful goods of the Ku’damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berlin-

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ers have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on Earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But, my friends, there were a few things the Soviets didn’t count on: Berliner Herz, Berliner Humor, ja, und Berliner Schnauze. [Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a Berliner schnauze.] [Laughter] In the 1950’s, Khrushchev predicted: “We will bury you.” But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind— too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor. And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace. There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall! I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent—and I pledge to you my country’s efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both

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sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS20 nuclear missiles, capable of-striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counter-deployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward with its counter-deployment, there were difficult days— days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city—and the Soviets later walked away from the table. But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then—I invite those who protest today—to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the talks in Geneva, we have also proposed deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. And the Western allies have likewise made far-reaching proposals to reduce the danger of conventional war and to place a total ban on chemical weapons. While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative—research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled, Berlin was under siege. And today, despite all the pressures upon this city, Berlin stands secure in its liberty. And freedom itself is transforming the globe.

In the Philippines, in South and Central America, democracy has been given a rebirth. Throughout the Pacific, free markets are working miracle after miracle of economic growth. In the industrialized nations, a technological revolution is taking place--a revolution marked by rapid, dramatic advances in computers and telecommunications. In Europe, only one nation and those it controls refuse to join the community of freedom. Yet in this age of redoubled economic growth, of information and innovation, the Soviet Union faces a choice: It must make fundamental changes, or it will become obsolete. Today thus represents a moment of hope. We in the West stand ready to cooperate with the East to promote true openness, to break down barriers that separate people, to create a safer, freer world. And surely there is no better place than Berlin, the meeting place of East and West, to make a start. Free people of Berlin: Today, as in the past, the United States stands for the strict observance and full implementation of all parts of the Four Power Agreement of 1971. Let us use this occasion, the 750th anniversary of this city, to usher in a new era, to seek a still fuller, richer life for the Berlin of the future. Together, let us maintain and develop the ties between the Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin, which is permitted by the 1971 agreement. And I invite Mr. Gorbachev: Let us work to bring the Eastern and Western parts of the city closer together, so that all the inhabitants of all Berlin can enjoy the benefits that come with life in one of the great cities of the world. To open Berlin still further to all Europe, East and West, let us expand the vital air access to this city, finding ways of making commercial air service to Berlin more convenient, more comfortable, and more economical. We look to the day when West Berlin can become one of the chief aviation hubs in all central Europe. With our French and British partners, the United States is prepared to help bring international meetings to Berlin. It would be only fitting for Berlin to serve as the site of United Nations meetings, or world conferences on human rights and arms control or other issues that call for international cooperation. There is no better way to establish hope for the future than to enlighten young minds, and we would be honored to sponsor summer

Ronald Reagan’s “Tear Down This Wall” Speech

youth exchanges, cultural events, and other programs for young Berliners from the East. Our French and British friends, I’m certain, will do the same. And it’s my hope that an authority can be found in East Berlin to sponsor visits from young people of the Western sectors. One final proposal, one close to my heart: Sport represents a source of enjoyment and ennoblement, and you many have noted that the Republic of Korea--South Korea-has offered to permit certain events of the 1988 Olympics to take place in the North. International sports competitions of all kinds could take place in both parts of this city. And what better way to demonstrate to the world the openness of this city than to offer in some future year to hold the Olympic games here in Berlin, East and West? In these four decades, as I have said, you Berliners have built a great city. You’ve done so in spite of threats-the Soviet attempts to impose the East-mark, the blockade. Today the city thrives in spite of the challenges implicit in the very presence of this wall. What keeps you here? Certainly there’s a great deal to be said for your fortitude, for your defiant courage. But I believe there’s something deeper, something that involves Berlin’s whole look and feel and way of life—not mere sentiment. No one could live long in Berlin without being completely disabused of illusions. Something instead, that has seen the difficulties of life in Berlin but chose to accept them, that continues to build this good and proud city in contrast to a surrounding totalitarian presence that refuses to release human energies or aspirations. Something that speaks with a powerful voice of affirmation, that says yes to this city, yes to the future, yes to freedom. In a word, I would submit that what keeps you in Berlin is love—love both profound and abiding.

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Perhaps this gets to the root of the matter, to the most fundamental distinction of all between East and West. The totalitarian world produces backwardness because it does such violence to the spirit, thwarting the human impulse to create, to enjoy, to worship. The totalitarian world finds even symbols of love and of worship an affront. Years ago, before the East Germans began rebuilding their churches, they erected a secular structure: the television tower at Alexander Platz. Virtually ever since, the authorities have been working to correct what they view as the tower’s one major flaw, treating the glass sphere at the top with paints and chemicals of every kind. Yet even today when the Sun strikes that sphere— that sphere that towers over all Berlin—the light makes the sign of the cross. There in Berlin, like the city itself, symbols of love, symbols of worship, cannot be suppressed. As I looked out a moment ago from the Reichstag, that embodiment of German unity, I noticed words crudely spray-painted upon the wall, perhaps by a young Berliner, “This wall will fall. Beliefs become reality.” Yes, across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom. And I would like, before I close, to say one word. I have read, and I have been questioned since I’ve been here about certain demonstrations against my coming. And I would like to say just one thing, and to those who demonstrate so. I wonder if they have ever asked themselves that if they should have the kind of government they apparently seek, no one would ever be able to do what they’re doing again. Thank you and God bless you all.

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Document Analysis

Essential Themes

According to Gorbachev’s memoirs, in June 1987, the same month as Reagan’s Berlin Wall speech, he met with the West German president, Richard von Weizsäcker, who cautiously raised the question of German reunification. Gorbachev responded that he would not rule out the possibility in the future but that at the present time it was premature or even harmful to raise the issue. Harmful, presumably, because it would play into the hands of Gorbachev’s opponents at home. The memoir makes no specific mention of Reagan’s Berlin speech, although he does complain of the administration’s continued challenges. A year later, Reagan met with Gorbachev at a summit and returned to the theme, asking if he intended to tear down the wall. Gorbachev said, “No.” From a policy perspective, the only follow-up to the speech was a modest effort to regularize Four Power controls over the divided city. This was based on a 1971 agreement that reaffirmed the postwar occupation rights of American, British, French, and Soviet troops. The United States sent a proposal to that effect six months after the speech, to which the Soviets responded ten months after that. The George H. W. Bush administration picked up the issue in the summer of 1989, by which time the German question was about to resolve itself. In concrete policy terms, the Reagan administration’s aim did not extend beyond the firm establishment of a détente between the two blocs. The only evident impact the speech had was in U.S. domestic politics, where it helped placate Reagan’s conservative critics, which may well have been his intention all along. The actual demolition of the wall occurred two and a half years later, on Nov. 9, 1989, and was accomplished by locals at a time when the East German leadership was beset with confusion and indecision in the face of growing protests and apparent abandonment on the part of Moscow. Both Reagan and Gorbachev did, in fact, contribute to that event, but their contributions were indirect. Gorbachev’s greatest contributions were (a) promoting and legitimating processes of change the Communist system and (b) refusing to intervene militarily to enforce orthodoxy in East Europe. Reagan contributed to the outcome by improving relations with Moscow enough to permit Gorbachev to pursue that line.

Reagan’s speech consists essentially of four parts. First, he offers contrasts between life in the West and life under communism, ending with his call to tear down the wall. Then, he argues that his peace-through-strength approach to relations with the Soviet Union was responsible for the improvement in relations. Next, he makes a number of modest proposals to regularize relations between the two parts of Berlin. He finishes with a tribute to the virtues and fortitude of West Berliners and asserts again that the wall cannot last. In the view of Robinson, Reagan’s speechwriter, the Berlin speech revealed truths that others were too timid to utter and thereby changed history. He relates that many of those who had opposed the speech’s blunt language later told him that he had been right all along (although that, of course, was after the speech was over and the Soviets had safely ignored it). How the speech is supposed to have changed history is not at all clear. Robinson says that the speech gave East Germans a new sense of the possible, yet when the wall did come down, people on both sides were plainly shocked that it had happened. Reagan later described his speech as a public call for “an East-West act of reconciliation.” Yet there was no Soviet response. When the wall came down, it was the result of Eastern collapse, not EastWest collaboration. Even Reagan had not foreseen this. From a different perspective, Reagan—after working hard to develop a relationship with Gorbachev in order to assure peace—publicly questioned Gorbachev’s sincerity and challenged him to do something that would undermine his position within his own political structure. Many in the Reagan administration, and perhaps Reagan himself, continued to believe that the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and the promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative had shown the Soviet leadership that the United States would not permit it to gain military superiority and thus compelled it to negotiate. Gorbachev, however, was already convinced that the Soviet Union was spending unsustainable amounts on its military. Thus he was actively trying to persuade his colleagues that relations with the United States had substantially improved, that the improvement had reduced the threat to the Soviet Union, and that this permitted them to cut back on military spending. The Berlin challenge, in this regard, was counterproductive. Fortunately, the Soviet leaders were absorbed with other issues and ignored the speech entirely. If the speech had had an impact on East-West

Ronald Reagan’s “Tear Down This Wall” Speech

relations, it would likely have been a negative one. —Scott C. Monje, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Dionne, E. J., Jr. “Polls Show Reagan Approval Rating at Four-Year Low.” New York Times, March 3, 1987. Web. Mann, James. The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War. New York: Viking, 2009. Print. Ratnesar, Romesh. Tear Down This Wall: A City, a President, and the Speech That Ended the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. Print. Reagan, Ronald. “I’m Convinced That Gorbachev

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Wants a Free-Market Democracy.” New York Times, June 12, 1990. Web. Robinson, Peter. How Ronald Reagan Changed My Life. New York: Regan Books, 2003. Print. Robinson, Peter. “’Tear Down This Wall’: How Top Advisers Opposed Reagan’s Challenge to Gorbachev— But Lost.” Prologue 39:2 (Summer 2007). Web. Sarotte, Mary Elise. The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall. New York: Basic Books, 2014. Print. Zelikow, Philip, and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1995. Print.

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 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Date: December 8, 1987 Author: Ronald Reagan; Mikhail Gorbachev Genre: Treaty Summary Overview

The term Cold War was developed to describe the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union that had escalated since the end of World War II and persisted into the early 1990s. By the time Ronald Reagan was sworn into office as President of the United States in 1981, there was a widespread belief that the American government was losing the attempt to stay ahead of the Soviets in the Cold War. Concern over Communist ideological intentions spread to fear of nuclear annihilation, with growing apprehension about the American government’s efforts to subvert Soviet power. As such, one of President Reagan’s primary objectives was to confront the Soviet Union and significantly reduce the amount of nuclear arms it possessed. After years of negotiations, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev finally reached a nuclear arms agreement, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF treaty), in 1987. The treaty eliminated land-based missiles, effectively reducing the number of nuclear arms possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Defining Moment

Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union had been building since the end of World War II. The two nations were entangled in a fierce competition to be the victor in the political, economic, and ideological arenas as well as in the area of nuclear weapons. By the early 1980s, fear over Soviet nuclear arms stockpiles was at an all-time high and concern regarding America’s ability to defeat the Soviets was reaching a fever-pitch. People were fearful of an imminent nuclear attack, and were even more fearful that the government could do nothing to prevent nuclear annihilation. The Kremlin made it clear that, as unpalatable as it might be, it would not shy away from nuclear attack if it felt that it was warranted. Talks went on for years, often stalling owing to Moscow’s refusal to engage in further

discussions. Once Soviet leadership changed, and the dynamic and open-minded Gorbachev became involved in the conversation about nuclear arms, there was a real opportunity to come to a mutual agreement. Thus, by mutual agreement the United States and the Soviet Union began effective discussions regarding what should be done to address the issue of nuclear weapons. In December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which was the first treaty of its kind to reduce rather than simply limit nuclear arms. Both leaders agreed that instead of placing a limit on the number of nuclear arms each country could possess, as had been tried before, they must eliminate certain types of nuclear arms entirely. By signing the INF treaty, the leaders of the two superpowers facilitated additional negotiations that would ultimately lead to the end of the Cold War.

Author Biography Ronald Reagan, the 40th president of the United States, served two terms between 1981-1989. A former movie actor and Screen Actors Guild president, he later worked in television and for General Electric. In 1966, he was elected governor of California, serving two terms. Elected president in 1980, he pushed for economic revitalization and a military buildup. Reagan believed that the United States could achieve great success if it acted through strength and operated within a moral compass. Under his leadership, relations with the Soviet Union improved and a nuclear arms agreement was achieved. Reagan died in 2004. Mikhail Gorbachev served as the first president of the Soviet Union from 1990-1991. Born to peasants, Gorbachev rose up through the ranks of the Communist Party and became admired in his country for his goal to achieve positive change within the Soviet Union. Prior to his retirement in 1991, Gorbachev served as

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the General Secretary of the Communist Party, where he was known for developing a more democratic election system.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles Signed at Washington December 8, 1987 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate May 27, 1988 Instruments of ratification exchanged June 1, 1988 Entered into force June 1, 1988 Proclaimed by U.S. President December 27, 1988 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty. Article II For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)” means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle. 2. The term “cruise missile” means an unmanned, selfpropelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of

aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)” means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle. 3. The term “GLBM launcher” means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM. 4. The term “GLCM launcher” means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM. 5. The term “intermediate-range missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. 6. The term “shorter-range missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. 7. The term “deployment area” means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located. 8. The term “missile operating base” means: (a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and (b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. 9. The term “missile support facility,” as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or

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an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding. 10. The term “transit” means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility. 11. The term “deployed missile” means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. 12. The term “non-deployed missile” means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base. 13. The term “deployed launcher” means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. 14. The term “non-deployed launcher” means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base. 15. The term “basing country” means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediaterange or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be “located.” Article III 1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are: (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the

R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively. 2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are: (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively. Article IV 1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party. 2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and nondeployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that: (a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty: (i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediaterange missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads; (ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads; (iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed

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launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; (iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and (v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediaterange missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and (b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated. Article V 1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party. 2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and nondeployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimina-

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tion. 3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers. Article VI 1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall: (a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or (b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. Article VII For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flighttested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. 2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. 3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply. 4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be

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covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. 5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding. 6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of the type in the Memorandum of Understanding. 7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs. 8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM. 9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding. 10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply: (a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile; (b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediaterange or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile. 11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers. 12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorterrange missiles provided that: (a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty; (b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves; (c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and (d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty. Article VIII 1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediaterange missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere. 2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located

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in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas. 3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere. 4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days. 5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area. 6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorterrange missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. 7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. 8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities. 9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

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Article IX 1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. 2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. 3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. 4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes. 5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party: (a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility; (b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change; (c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the sched-

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uled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including: (i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated; (ii) the elimination site; (iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and (iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility; (d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including: (i) the type of missiles to be eliminated; (ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series; (iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and (iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility; (e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including: (i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and (ii) the date and location of such elimination; and (f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launch-

ers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including: (i) the number of missiles or launchers; (ii) the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival; (iii) the mode of transport; and (iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit. 6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty. Article X 1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection. 3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions. 4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to

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this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ. 5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles. 6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are: (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4. 7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty. 8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled: (a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed; (b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and (c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

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Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated. 9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted. Article XI 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries. 3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided

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pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted. 5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct: (a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and (b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities. 6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring: (a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propel-

lant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or (b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. 7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed. 8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of

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training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination. Article XII 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Neither Party shall: (a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or (b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers. 3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures: (a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and (b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such

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an observation. Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time. Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty. 2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to: (a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination; (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty; (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and (d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty. Article XIV The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions. Article XV 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordi-

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nary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XVI Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Article XVII 1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Ronald Reagan President of the United States of America FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Document Analysis

Essential Themes

Reagan and Gorbachev alike were interested in advancing the arms negotiations in an attempt to move away from the extreme tensions created by both countries’ possession of nuclear weapons. Reagan had made great strides in earning support for his “peace through strength” doctrine, and while the general public was distrustful of the Soviets, they were extremely supportive of an arms deal. Great pressure was put on the Soviet Union through Reagan’s efforts, and it became evident to Soviet leaders they would not be able to continue to compete economically or militarily with the United States. Even though his predecessors had balked at a so-called zero-option proposed by Reagan, under which entire categories of arms would be eliminated, Gorbachev chose to accept Reagan’s proposal and an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was reached. The INF treaty eliminated all land-based missiles firing at intermediate and shorter-range for an unlimited duration. This treaty was the most detailed and strict of its kind, and went on to serve as a template for future nuclear weapon treaties. Reagan’s persistence and Gorbachev’s willingness to accept the stringent terms of the treaty were a turning point in the Cold War, and was considered a great achievement for the United States.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were certainly not the first leaders to attempt to address serious issues brought forth by the Cold War. However, they were the first leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, to successfully negotiate a nuclear arms treaty both countries could agree to. Were it not for the relationship that Reagan and Gorbachev established, beginning at a summit in Geneva in 1985, an agreement may never have been reached at all. Both leaders were interested in settling the concern over nuclear arms, and both were willing to go to lengths previously unreached in nuclear weapons discussions and treaties. While American leaders, like President Carter, had previously engaged the Soviet Union in talks regarding weapons negotiations, there had been little progress in reaching an agreement with which both nations could be satisfied. When Reagan assumed office in 1981, he proposed the zero-option offer calling for the complete elimination of certain types of nuclear weapons. Reagan made his disdain for nuclear weaponry known, and because of his aggressive approach the Soviets suspended talks until 1983. In 1984, under protest from the general public, the United States felt compelled to deploy missiles in West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom in response to the Soviet’s expansion of nuclear arms. This move once again promoted Soviet

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Union leaders to abandon negotiations. A change in Soviet leadership occurred in 1985, which would prove to greatly impact the outcome of the nuclear weapons negotiations. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the role of General Secretary of the Communist Party, which put him in a position to work closely with President Reagan. The two leaders began to develop feelings of trust and understanding toward each other, and this relationship became pivotal in the outcome of nuclear arms discussions. —Amber R. Dickinson, PhD . Bibliography and Additional Reading

“Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).” U.S. Department of State. Web.

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Brown, Archie. 1997. The Gorbachev Factor. New York: Oxford UP. Print. D’Souza, Dinesh. 1997. Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader. New York: Simon & Schuster. Print. Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1991. “Did “Peace Through Strength End the Cold War? Lessons from INF.” International Security. Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 162-188. Print. Sigleman, Lee. 1990. “Disarming the Opposition: The President, the Public, and the INF Treaty.” Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 37-47. Print.

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 Mikhail Gorbachev’s UN Speech Date: December 7, 1988 Author: Mikhail Gorbachev Genre: Speech Summary Overview

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech before the UN General Assembly marked a high point in his attempt to change the nature of international relations. He foresaw a system based on cooperation, mutual respect, international law, and international institutions and hoped that this would also advance the cause of domestic reform within the Soviet Union. Defining Moment

Mikhail Gorbachev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and US president Ronald Reagan had signed an agreement in December 1987 that completely eliminated both countries’ intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and, just as significant, provided for the first time for intrusive, onsite verification. It was the high point of their armscontrol agenda. That was followed by a summit meeting in Moscow in May 1988, during which Reagan commented that he no longer considered the Soviet Union to be an evil empire. For Gorbachev this should have opened up new prospects for cooperation, yet progress seemed to stall. Reagan, who tended to view relations in personal terms, had changed this attitude toward the Soviet Union sharply since the 1983 Able Archer war scare and his development of a personal relationship with the reformist Gorbachev. Nevertheless, many of the administration’s foreign policy professionals were more firmly rooted in a realist approach. In their view, the fundamentals of East-West relations had not changed, and they suspected that Gorbachev’s “peace offensive” was intended to sway West European opinion and drive a wedge between the United States and its NATO allies. Soviet leaders had made similar attempts in the past. In addition, other officials were guided less by realism than by ideological opposition to the Soviet Union; some of them actually resigned over the INF treaty. The Americans were also demanding that the Soviets

do more to bolster human rights in their country. In September 1988, George Bush, then vice president and Republican presidential candidate, advised Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze to transact as much business as he could before the end of Reagan’s term. Bush said that he believed he would win the election but likely would not have the same standing with Congress that Reagan had. The Soviet leaders also understood that Bush was viewed with suspicion by the American right and therefore might have less freedom to maneuver with regard to the Soviet Union. In October, as if to highlight the skepticism, CIA deputy director Robert Gates gave a speech in which he openly doubted Gorbachev’s capacity to carry out his economic reforms or, perhaps, even to retain power. (This led to a rebuke from Secretary of State George Shultz, who viewed it as an inappropriate intervention in the policy process by an intelligence agency.) The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been working on Gorbachev’s United Nations speech for some time. Gorbachev personally began thinking about it that summer, met with his closest aides at the end of October, and concentrated on it from late November. He and his aides completely rewrote the ministry’s draft, a process that did not end until they were already on the plane to New York. Gorbachev thought of it as the “anti-Fulton speech.” Just as Churchill’s famous 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri, which had introduced the expression “Iron Curtain,” had come to symbolize the beginning of the Cold War, Gorbachev hoped that this speech would symbolize the Cold War’s end, thus preventing any reversal in the course of EastWest relations after the presidential transition and even opening a new era in world politics. He wanted to present a new, comprehensive concept of a proper world order and how to achieve it. In this way, he hoped to reduce his country’s massive military expenditures so that he could devote the resources to other purposes. He

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also hoped that a positive international response would bolster his political position at home, where skepticism toward reform was growing. Gorbachev reports in his memoirs that the Politburo agreed to his initial concepts and suggestions for the speech and had no objections of principle. How much he told them, however, is not clear. Christian F. Ostermann of the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project says that the Politburo had not cleared the speech in advance and did not publicly approve it until after it had been given.

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Author Biography Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev (1931– ) was the last leader (1985–91) of the Soviet Union. Coming after a period that he dubbed the “age of stagnation,” he set out to reinvigorate the Soviet system. He instituted reforms in many areas of government, economy, and foreign policy, and when obstacles arose, he often doubled down on reform when other leaders might have backtracked. Nonetheless, he succeeded more in disrupting the old system than in creating a new, better functioning one. Although his people were much freer as a consequence of his rule, his reforms ultimately resulted in economic chaos and the collapse of the Soviet state.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Two great revolutions, the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917, have exerted a powerful influence on the actual nature of the historical process and radically changed the course of world events. Both of them, each in its own way, have given a gigantic impetus to man’s progress. They are also the ones that have formed in many respects the way of thinking which is still prevailing in the public consciousness. That is a very great spiritual wealth, but there emerges before us today a different world, for which it is necessary to seek different roads toward the future, to seek— relying, of course, on accumulated experience—but also seeing the radical differences between that which was yesterday and that which is taking place today. The newness of the tasks, and at the same time their difficulty, are not limited to this. Today we have entered an era when progress will be based on the interests of all mankind. Consciousness of this requires that world policy, too, should be determined by the priority of the values of all mankind. The history of the past centuries and millennia has been a history of almost ubiquitous wars, and sometimes desperate battles, leading to mutual destruction. They occurred in the clash of social and political interests and national hostility, be it from ideological or religious incompatibility. All that was the case, and even now many still claim that this past -- which has not been overcome -- is an immutable pattern. However, parallel with

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the process of wars, hostility, and alienation of peoples and countries, another process, just as objectively conditioned, was in motion and gaining force: The process of the emergence of a mutually connected and integral world. Further world progress is now possible only through the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement toward a new world order. We have arrived at a frontier at which controlled spontaneity leads to a dead end. The world community must learn to shape and direct the process in such a way as to preserve civilization, to make it safe for all and more pleasant for normal life. It is a question of cooperation that could be more accurately called “co-creation” and “co-development.” The formula of development “at another’s expense” is becoming outdated. In light of present realities, genuine progress by infringing upon the rights and liberties of man and peoples, or at the expense of nature, is impossible. The very tackling of global problems requires a new “volume” and “quality” of cooperation by states and sociopolitical currents regardless of ideological and other differences. Of course, radical and revolutionary changes are taking place and will continue to take place within individual countries and social structures. This has been and will continue to be the case, but our times are making corrections here, too. Internal transformational processes cannot achieve their national objectives merely by taking

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“course parallel” with others without using the achievements of the surrounding world and the possibilities of equitable cooperation. In these conditions, interference in those internal processes with the aim of altering them according to someone else’s prescription would be all the more destructive for the emergence of a peaceful order. In the past, differences often served as a factor in pulling away from one another. Now they are being given the opportunity to be a factor in mutual enrichment and attraction. Behind differences in social structure, in the way of life, and in the preference for certain values, stand interests. There is no getting away from that, but neither is there any getting away from the need to find a balance of interests within an international framework, which has become a condition for survival and progress. As you ponder all this, you come to the conclusion that if we wish to take account of the lessons of the past and the realities of the present, if we must reckon with the objective logic of world development, it is necessary to seek -- and the seek jointly -- an approach toward improving the international situation and building a new world. If that is so, then it is also worth agreeing on the fundamental and truly universal prerequisites and principles for such activities. It is evident, for example, that force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be instruments of foreign policy. [...] The compelling necessity of the principle of freedom of choice is also clear to us. The failure to recognize this, to recognize it, is fraught with very dire consequences, consequences for world peace. Denying that right to the peoples, no matter what the pretext, no matter what the words are used to conceal it, means infringing upon even the unstable balance that is, has been possible to achieve. Freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there should be no exceptions. We have not come to the conclusion of the immutability of this principle simply through good motives. We have been led to it through impartial analysis of the objective processes of our time. The increasing varieties of social development in different countries are becoming in ever more perceptible feature of these processes. This relates to both the capitalist and socialist systems. The variety of sociopolitical structures which has grown over the last decades from national liberation movements also demonstrates this.

This objective fact presupposes respect for other people’s views and stands, tolerance, a preparedness to see phenomena that are different as not necessarily bad or hostile, and an ability to learn to live side by side while remaining different and not agreeing with one another on every issue. The de-ideologization of interstate relations has become a demand of the new stage. We are not giving up our convictions, philosophy, or traditions. Neither are we calling on anyone else to give up theirs. Yet we are not going to shut ourselves up within the range of our values. That would lead to spiritual impoverishment, for it would mean renouncing so powerful a source of development as sharing all the original things created independently by each nation. In the course of such sharing, each should prove the advantages of his own system, his own way of life and values, but not through words or propaganda alone, but through real deeds as well. That is, indeed, an honest struggle of ideology, but it must not be carried over into mutual relations between states. Otherwise we simply will not be able to solve a single world problem; arrange broad, mutually advantageous and equitable cooperation between peoples; manage rationally the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution; transform world economic relations; protect the environment; overcome underdevelopment; or put an end to hunger, disease, illiteracy, and other mass ills. Finally, in that case, we will not manage to eliminate the nuclear threat and militarism. Such are our reflections on the natural order of things in the world on the threshold of the 21st century. We are, of course, far from claiming to have infallible truth, but having subjected the previous realities—realities that have arisen again—to strict analysis, we have come to the conclusion that it is by precisely such approaches that we must search jointly for a way to achieve the supremacy of the common human idea over the countless multiplicity of centrifugal forces, to preserve the vitality of a civilization that is possibly the only one in the universe. [...] Our country is undergoing a truly revolutionary upsurge. The process of restructuring is gaining pace; We started by elaborating the theoretical concepts of restructuring; we had to assess the nature and scope of the problems, to interpret the lessons of the past, and to express this in the form of political conclusions and

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programs. This was done. The theoretical work, the reinterpretation of what had happened, the final elaboration, enrichment, and correction of political stances have not ended. They continue. However, it was fundamentally important to start from an overall concept, which is already now being confirmed by the experience of past years, which has turned out to be generally correct and to which there is no alternative. In order to involve society in implementing the plans for restructuring it had to be made more truly democratic. Under the badge of democratization, restructuring has now encompassed politics, the economy, spiritual life, and ideology. We have unfolded a radical economic reform, we have accumulated experience, and from the new year we are transferring the entire national economy to new forms and work methods. Moreover, this means a profound reorganization of production relations and the realization of the immense potential of socialist property. In moving toward such bold revolutionary transformations, we understood that there would be errors, that there would be resistance, that the novelty would bring new problems. We foresaw the possibility of breakdowns in individual sections. However, the profound democratic reform of the entire system of power and government is the guarantee that the overall process of restructuring will move steadily forward and gather strength. We completed the first stage of the process of political reform with the recent decisions by the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on amendments to the Constitution and the adoption of the Law on Elections. Without stopping, we embarked upon the second stage of this. At which the most important task will be working on the interaction between the central government and the republics, settling relations between nationalities on the principles of Leninist internationalism bequeathed to us by the great revolution and, at the same time, reorganizing the power of the Soviets locally. We are faced with immense work. At the same time we must resolve major problems. We are more than fully confident. We have both the theory, the policy and the vanguard force of restructuring a party which is also restructuring itself in accordance with the new tasks and the radical changes throughout society. And the most important thing: all peoples and all generations of citizens in our great country are in favor of restructuring.

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We have gone substantially and deeply into the business of constructing a socialist state based on the rule of law. A whole series of new laws has been prepared or is at a completion stage. Many of them come into force as early as 1989, and we trust that they will correspond to the highest standards from the point of view of ensuring the rights of the individual. Soviet democracy is to acquire a firm, normative base. This means such acts as the Law on Freedom of Conscience, on glasnost, on public associations and organizations, and on much else. There are now no people in places of imprisonment in the country who have been sentenced for their political or religious convictions. It is proposed to include in the drafts of the new laws additional guarantees ruling out any form or persecution on these bases. Of course, this does not apply to those who have committed real criminal or state offenses: espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and so on, whatever political or philosophical views they may hold. The draft amendments to the criminal code are ready and waiting their turn. In particular, those articles relating to the use of the supreme measure of punishment are being reviewed. The problem of exit and entry is also being resolved in a humane spirit, including the case of leaving the country in order to be reunited with relatives. As you know, one of the reasons for refusal of visas is citizens’ possession of secrets. Strictly substantiated terms for the length of time for possessing secrets are being introduced in advance. On starting work at a relevant institution or enterprise, everyone will be made aware of this regulation. Disputes that arise can be appealed under the law. Thus the problem of the so-called “refuseniks” is being removed. We intend to expand the Soviet Union’s participation in the monitoring mechanism on human rights in the United Nations and within the framework of the pan-European process. We consider that the jurisdiction of the International Court in The Hague with respect to interpreting and applying agreements in the field of human rights should be obligatory for all states. Within the Helsinki process, we are also examining an end to jamming of all the foreign radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union. On the whole, our credo is as follows: Political problems should be solved only by political means, and human problems only in a humane way. [...]

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Now about the most important topic, without which no problem of the coming century can be resolved: disarmament. [...] Today I can inform you of the following: The Soviet Union has made a decision on reducing its armed forces. In the next two years, their numerical strength will be reduced by 500,000 persons, and the volume of conventional arms will also be cut considerably. These reductions will be made on a unilateral basis, unconnected with negotiations on the mandate for the Vienna meeting. By agreement with our allies in the Warsaw Pact, we have made the decision to withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to disband them by 1991. Assault landing formations and units, and a number of others, including assault rivercrossing forces, with their armaments and combat equipment, will also be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces situated in those countries. The Soviet forces situated in those countries will be cut by 50,000 persons, and their arms by 5,000 tanks. All remaining Soviet divisions on the territory of our allies will be reorganized. They will be given a different structure from today’s which will become unambiguously defensive, after the removal of a large number of their tanks. [...] By this act, just as by all our actions aimed at the demilitarization of international relations, we would also like to draw the attention of the world community to another topical problem, the problem of changing over from an economy of armament to an economy of disarmament. Is the conversion of military production realistic? I have already had occasion to speak about this. We believe that it is, indeed, realistic. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready to do the following. Within the framework of the economic reform we are ready to draw up and submit our internal plan for conversion, to prepare in the course of 1989, as an experiment, the plans for the conversion of two or three defense enterprises, to publish our experience of job relocation of specialists from the military industry, and also of using its equipment, buildings, and works in civilian industry, It is desirable that all states, primarily the major military powers, submit their national plans on this issue to the United Nations. It would be useful to form a group of scientists, entrusting it with a comprehensive analysis of problems of conversion as a whole and as applied to individual

countries and regions, to be reported to the U.N. secretary-general, and later to examine this matter at a General Assembly session. Finally, being on U.S. soil, but also for other, understandable reasons, I cannot but turn to the subject of our relations with this great country. ... Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America span 5 1/2 decades. The world has changed, and so have the nature, role, and place of these relations in world politics. For too long they were built under the banner of confrontation, and sometimes of hostility, either open or concealed. But in the last few years, throughout the world people were able to heave a sigh of relief, thanks to the changes for the better in the substance and atmosphere of the relations between Moscow and Washington. No one intends to underestimate the serious nature of the disagreements, and the difficulties of the problems which have not been settled. However, we have already graduated from the primary school of instruction in mutual understanding and in searching for solutions in our and in the common interests. The U.S.S.R. and the United States created the biggest nuclear missile arsenals, but after objectively recognizing their responsibility, they were able to be the first to conclude an agreement on the reduction and physical destruction of a proportion of these weapons, which threatened both themselves and everyone else. Both sides possess the biggest and the most refined military secrets. But it is they who have laid the basis for and are developing a system of mutual verification with regard to both the destruction and the limiting and banning of armaments production. It is they who are amassing experience for future bilateral and multilateral agreements. We value this. We acknowledge and value the contribution of President Ronald Reagan and the members of his administration, above all Mr. George Shultz. All this is capital that has been invested in a joint undertaking of historic importance. It must not be wasted or left out of circulation. The future U.S. administration headed by newly elected President George Bush will find in us a partner, ready— without long pauses and backward movements—to continue the dialogue in a spirit of realism, openness, and goodwill, and with a striving for concrete

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results, over an agenda encompassing the key issues of Soviet-U.S. relations and international politics. We are talking first and foremost about consistent progress toward concluding a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, while retaining the ABM Treaty; about elaborating a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons—here, it seems to us, we have the preconditions for making 1989 the decisive year; and about talks on reducing conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe. We are also talking about economic, ecological and humanitarian problems in the widest possible sense. [...] We are not inclined to oversimplify the situation in the world. Yes, the tendency toward disarmament has received a strong impetus, and this process is gaining its own momentum, but it has not become irreversible. Yes, the striving to give up confrontation in favor of dialogue and cooperation has made itself strongly felt, but it has by no means secured its position forever in the practice of international relations. Yes, the movement toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is capable of fundamentally transforming the political and spiritual face of the planet, but only the very first steps have been taken. Moreover, in certain influential circles, they have been greeted with mistrust, and they are meeting resistance. The inheritance of inertia of the past are continuing to operate. Profound contradictions and the roots of many conflicts have not disappeared. The fundamental fact remains that the formation of the peaceful period

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will take place in conditions of the existence and rivalry of various socioeconomic and political systems. However, the meaning of our international efforts, and one of the key tenets of the new thinking, is precisely to impart to this rivalry the quality of sensible competition in conditions of respect for freedom of choice and a balance of interests. In this case it will even become useful and productive from the viewpoint of general world development; otherwise; if the main component remains the arms race, as it has been till now, rivalry will be fatal. Indeed, an ever greater number of people throughout the world, from the man in the street to leaders, are beginning to understand this. Esteemed Mr. Chairman, esteemed delegates: I finish my first speech at the United Nations with the same feeling with which I began it: a feeling of responsibility to my own people and to the world community. We have met at the end of a year that has been so significant for the United Nations, and on the threshold of a year from which all of us expect so much. One would like to believe that our joint efforts to put an end to the era of wars, confrontation and regional conflicts, aggression against nature, the terror of hunger and poverty, as well as political terrorism, will be comparable with our hopes. This is our common goal, and it is only by acting together that we may attain it. Thank you.

GLOSSARY glasnost: Gorbachev’s policy of greater openness and freedom in communications refuseniks (otkazniki): Soviet citizens denied the right to leave the country restructuring (perestroika): Gorbachev’s policy of transforming the Soviet economy along market-oriented lines

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Document Analysis

Gorbachev’s speech, and especially the troop cuts, weakened the resistance in the US foreign policy establishment to the notion that the Soviet reforms were real and that Gorbachev sincerely wanted to change the nature of East-West relations. This was a position that Reagan had already come to, but officials who focused on longer-term national interests remained skeptical that such fundamental changes could be brought about so easily. While impressed by the concrete proposals, they noted that some of Gorbachev’s new foreign policy ideas resembled themes that had frequently been repeated in Soviet propaganda. (Could people trust that he really meant them this time?) Reliance on the United Nations could be a self-serving way for the Soviet Union to reduce its expenditures on foreign policy while, as a permanent member of the Security Council, maintaining its say in the outcomes of international issues. And even if Gorbachev was sincere, would his successors continue his line or revert to older practices? Overcoming such skepticism, while certainly not impossible, would take time. After the speech, Gorbachev met on Governors Island with Reagan and Vice President—and Presidentelect—George Bush. Gorbachev emphasized to Bush that he was serious and sought to commit him to following Reagan’s recent course on East-West relations. Bush, however, was more of a realist than Reagan, and he was also concerned about being viewed as his own man. He responded evasively to Gorbachev and noted that he expected, in general, to review policies at the beginning of his term. Otherwise, the meeting was not substantive. Gorbachev, while en route to Governors Island, had learned of an earthquake that had devastated parts of northern Armenia, killing 25,000 people. He cut his US trip short, canceled a scheduled visit to Cuba, and rushed back to the Soviet Union. At a Politburo meeting three weeks later, on December 27–28, 1988, Gorbachev met with only mild resistance. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov wanted the press to explain to readers that the Soviet Union was not giving up on socialism, only a distorted version of it, and noted that integration into the world economy could have pitfalls. Defense Minister Yazov agreed to share his ministry’s plans for withdrawing troops from East Europe with the Defense Council, but not necessarily with the Supreme Soviet, even though it now had the responsibility of reviewing and approving the

defense budget. Secretary Yegor Ligachev, however, insisted that the class character of international relations could not be ignored and that they could not weaken defense preparedness. (Ligachev had been demoted to agriculture secretary in October and was removed from the party leadership entirely in 1990.) Shevardnadze believed that Gorbachev’s enthusiastic reception among the American people would force the new administration to continue cordial relations. Gorbachev, himself, warned that American conservatives were arguing that the Soviet initiatives had been forced on them by American strength. If this view were allowed to prevail, he warned, it could lead to an increase in the arms race and US interventionism. He added that the constant Western predictions of the imminent collapse of perestroika meant that they are afraid of it. After further negotiations between human rights envoys Richard Schifter and Anatoly Adamishin, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the other countries of Europe (and Canada) signed the concluding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Vienna session) on January 17, 1989, just days before Reagan left office. This opened the way for negotiations during the Bush administration on limiting conventional military forces in Europe. Perhaps the most immediate impact of the policies articulated in the speech came in East Europe, where, in the second half of 1989, the Communist regimes collapsed one after another before a wave of mostly peaceful demonstrations while Gorbachev refused to send troops to suppress the demonstrators and keep the regimes in place. Essential Themes

While still praising the Russian Revolution as a positive event in world history, Gorbachev introduced the notion of universal values, values that can bring the world together. This may not seem new to the Western audience, but it is a distinct change from the more conventional Soviet notion of class-based values that divide capitalist and communist societies from one another. Countries were to be free to choose their own paths of development. He then discussed the origins and ongoing development of the Soviet Union’s domestic reforms: economic “restructuring” (or, in Russian, perestroika) and political “democratization,” which reinforce each other, as well as greater openness (glasnost) and bolstering the rule of law.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s UN Speech

Turning specifically to foreign policy, Gorbachev stressed the importance of working through the United Nations and solving problems by political rather than military means. It was at this point that he made his most striking announcements: a unilateral reduction in the size of the Soviet military by 500,000 men; the withdrawal and disbanding of six armored divisions from East Europe; and the reorganization of remaining units along unambiguously defensive lines. In this connection he proposed a global transition to an economy less tied to military production, a process that was to be coordinated through the United Nations. He then elaborated on the recent changes in US-Soviet relations and the need to build further on them—citing, in particular, a number of arms control goals—and warning of the risk of backsliding. Gorbachev and his foreign policy adviser, Anatoly Chernyaev, were disappointed by the Soviet press’s reaction to the speech. They believed the reactions focused too much on the specific proposals and overlooked the underlying logic, that Gorbachev’s “new thinking” had broken the bounds of the official ideology, Marxism-Leninism. He was more pleased with the reaction of the Western press, which was startled to hear such ideas coming from the “chief Communist.” Chernyaev saw the speech as a conscious retreat from orthodox class theory and methodology, though not yet Gorbachev’s final break with the old thinking. The positive response that the speech received from the inter-

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national community gave Gorbachev the confidence to move forward in the face of what would become growing resistance at home. (At about the same time, Soviet intellectuals were reexamining the country’s past and reopening old issues long considered resolved or officially forgotten. For some it was a vital reassessment; for others, treasonous.) —Scott C. Monje, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Brown, Archie. The Gorbachev Factor. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print. Chernyaev, Anatoly. My Six Years with Gorbachev. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2000. Print. Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Print. “On the Eve: A Glimpse Inside the Politburo at the End of 1988.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 12/14 (Fall/Winter 2001): 24–9. Print. Prados, John. How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011. Print. Service, Robert. The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991. New York: PublicAffairs, 2015. Print. Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2014. Print.

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 US Embassy Cables Concerning the Crackdown in Tiananmen Square Date: June 3-4, 1989 Author: James Lilley Genre: Report

Summary Overview In early June 1989 James Lilley, the US Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), sent a number of messages to prominent but unnamed State Department officials in Washington, DC about ongoing protests taking place in the city. The messages sent on June 3 described a volatile situation in which thousands of the PRC’s military troops had entered the city to confront demonstrators at Tiananmen Square, but they provided little hint of the violence that would dominate global headlines the following day. On June 4, however, Lilley reported that Embassy officials had received numerous accounts of the use of tear gas and live ammunition by the Chinese military against the demonstrators. Barricades had been erected by the demonstrators to slow the advance of the soldiers, but armed personnel carriers (APC) had broken through and reached the square. The American Embassy received conflicting reports of the number of people killed or injured, but, Lilley observed, “we expect the final count of dead and injured to be very high.” Defining Moment The events that took place in Tiananmen Square on June 3-4 were rooted in the deep divisions in the PRC between reform-minded political leaders and their supporters, on the one hand, and the more powerful conservative members of the government who opposed even moderate changes to the Chinese political system, on the other. The reformist wing was led by Party Secretary Hu Yaobang, while the conservative wing was led by Deng Xiaoping, whose sole official position was chairman of the Central Military Commission but who nevertheless functioned as “Paramount Leader” of the nation. In 1987 Hu was dismissed from his position after he expressed support for a more open and transparent political system and refused to punish student

protestors sufficiently. The decision to dismiss Hu angered many intellectuals and students, but it would be two years before they could transform their anger and frustration into a cohesive protest movement. Growing anger and dissatisfaction with the Chinese government’s unwillingness even to discuss political reform led Chinese students and intellectuals to organize a massive demonstration in Beijing. The protest was initially planned for May 4, 1989, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. However, when Hu died on April 15, it was decided to start the demonstrations early. Three days later, a large group of university students staged a sit-in at Tiananmen Square. The protestors demanded the full rehabilitation of Hu’s reputation, an increase in funding for education, an end to government corruption, and fewer restrictions on speech and the press. The tenor of these demands indicated that the vast majority of protestors did not want to overthrow the government but merely to achieve modest reforms. By the time of Hu’s funeral on April 22, more than two hundred thousand people were participating in the demonstrations, and the number would grow to include as many as one million. Initially, Chinese officials stalled for time, hoping perhaps that the protests would fizzle out. However, when Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Union, visited China in May, his presence and his reputation as a supporter of political reform emboldened the protestors, one of whom waved a banner that read “in the Soviet Union they have Gorbachev. In China we have whom?” The wording of the banner demonstrates that protestors were keenly aware of Gorbachev’s efforts to reform Soviet society. In fact, the protests in Beijing happened at a time when similar movements were building in Eastern European countries (particularly in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany). But whereas in Europe, at this late stage in the

US Embassy Cables Concerning the Crackdown in Tiananmen Square

Cold War, governments were unwilling to respond to protests with force, Chinese authorities felt no such hesitancy. Author Biography

James Lilley was born on January 15, 1928 in Qingdao in Shandong Province, China, to American expatriate parents. In 1940 his family moved back to the United as the outbreak of World War II made it too dangerous for them to continue living there. After serving in the

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United States Army in 1945-46, Lilley earned a bachelor’s degree from Yale and then a master’s from George Washington University. In 1951 he joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) where he specialized in East Asian affairs. In 1975 he was appointed national intelligence officer to China. In 1986 Lilley was chosen as US Ambassador to South Korea. In 1989 he was appointed Ambassador to the PRC, a position that he would hold until 1991.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0043 … SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 28: TEN TO FIFTEEN THOUSAND ARMED TROOPS STOPPED AT CITY PERIMETER BY HUMAN AND BUS BARRRICADES [3 June 1989] REF: BEIJING 15383 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. TEN TO FIFTEEN THOUSAND HELMETED, ARMED TROOPS MOVED TOWARD BEIJING DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON/EARLY EVENING HOURS OF JUNE 3. AS OF 1930, LARGE CONVOYS HAVE BEEN STOPPED AS BEFORE BY BUS AND HUMAN BARRICADES. THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF TROOP TRUCKS IS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE CITY IN FRONT OF THE NEW WORLD TRADE CENTER, ABOUT 5-6 KILOMETERS FROM TIANANMEN SQUARE. EMBOFFS SAW AT LEAST TWENTY TRUCKS THERE, BUT MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED HAD BEEN SEEN HEADING TOWARD THE CITY ON THAT ROUTE, SO WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE ONE HUNDRED PLUS TROOP TRUCKS AT THAT LOCATION. THE TROOPS ARE HELMETED AND ARE CARRYING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.

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MOST OF THEM SEEM TO BE STAYING IN THEIR TRUCKS FOR THE TIME BEING. MORE THAN 35 TRUCKS FILLED WITH HELMETED, ARMED TROOPS ARE STOPPED AT THE SECOND RING ROAD OVERPASS, DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC HOUSING COMPOUND. THERE ARE REPORTEDLY 82 TRUCKS BLOCKED BY FOUR LARGE DUMP TRUCKS ALONG THE ROAD TO CAPITAL AIRPORT. WE ALSO HAVE REPORTS OF TWENTY SIX TRUCKS STOPPED AND SURROUNDED BY CITY RESIDENTS BETWEEN THE LIDO HOTEL AND THE GREAT WALL HOTEL IN THE NORTHEASTERN SUBURBS. THERE ARE ABOUT TWO THOUSAND TROOPS JUST WEST OF THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE IN A STANDOFF WITH CITY RESIDENTS WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE EARLY AFTERNOON. THE POPULATION APPEARS HOSTILE TO PLA MOVEMENTS INTO THE CITY. 3. ELITE AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE MOVING FROM THE SOUTH AND TANK UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO MOVE. DAO OFFICERS ARE OUT CHECKING THE WESTERN SUBURBS. DAO IS REPORTING FURTHER DETAILS TO WASHINGTON. ALL EMBASSY INFORMATION SO FAR SUGGESTS THAT THE UNITS OTHER THAN THE AIRBORNE TROOPS ARE FROM THE 39TH ARMY.

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4. THE TROOPS HAVE OBVIOUSLY NOT YET BEEN GIVEN ORDERS PERMITTING THEM TO USE FORCE. THEIR LARGE NUMBERS, THE FACT THAT THEY ARE HELMETED, AND THE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS THEY ARE CARRYING SUGGEST THAT THE FORCE OPTION IS REAL.

LILLEY

*** FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO AMCONSUL CHENGDU POUCH… SUBJECT: SITREP NO. 31: TIANANMEN AT 0145 ON - JUNE 4: GUNFIRE ON THE SQUARE, TWO APC’S - BURNING ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE SQUARE

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: AS OF 0145, ABC NEWS REPORTERS ON THE SQUARE REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF TROOPS AND RIOT POLICE ON THE SOUTHERN END OF TIANANMEN. TEAR GAS AND GUNFIRE WERE REPORTED ON THE SQUARE. EMBOFF SAW TRACERS BEING FIRED OVER THE SQUARE. ABC JOURNALISTS SAID THAT TWO ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS WERE ON FIRE AT THE NORTHEAST AND NORTHWEST CORNERS OF THE SQUARE. A BARRICADE NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF FUXINGMEN AND THE SECOND RING ROAD WAS BREACHED AS TROOPS ADVANCED ON THE SQUARE FROM THE WEST. AS OF 0250, THE SITUATION IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY WAS VERY CONFUSED. TROOPS APPEAR TO BE ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR THE SQUARE FROM WEST TO EAST. WE HAVE NO ACCURATE COUNT OF DEAD AND WOUNDED, BUT CASUALTIES NO DOUBT WILL BE HIGH (##) DEMONSTRATOR WHO LAID DOWN IN FRONT OF AN ADVANCING APC AND WAS RUN OVER. UNCONFIRMED ACCOUNTS CITE SEVENTY DEAD AND MANY WOUNDED.

GIVEN THE AGGRESIVE PLA MOVES REPORTED BY ABC NEWS REPORTERS, WE EXPECT FINAL COUNTS OF DEAD AND INJURED TO BE VERY HIGH. END SUMMARY. 3. STUDENTS SET DEBRIS THROWN ATOP AT LEAST ONE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND LIT THE DEBRIS, ACCORDING TO EMBOFF NEAR THE SCENE. ABC REPORTED THAT ONE OTHER ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER IS AFLAME. AT LEAST ONE BUS WAS ALSO BURNING, ACCORDING TO ABC NEWS REPORTERS ON THE SQUARE AT 0120. THE EYEWITNESSES REPORTED THAT TROOPS AND RIOT POLICE WERE ON THE SOUTHERN END OF THE SQUARE AND TROOPS WERE MOVING TO THE SQUARE FROM THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE CITY. THEY REPORTEDLY BROKE THROUGH A BARRICADE NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF FUXINGMEN AND THE SECOND RING ROAD. DEMONSTRATORS’ BARRICADES HAVE SLOWED BUT NOT STOPPED THE TROOPS’ ADVANCE. THERE HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN INDISCRIMINATE GUNFIRE BY THE TROOPS ON THE SQUARE. WE CAN HEAR GUNFIRE FROM THE EMBASSY AND JIANGUOMENWAI DIPLOMATIC COMPOUND. EYEWITNESSES REPORT TEAR GAS ON THE SQUARE, FLARES BEING FIRED ABOVE IT, AND TRACERS BEING FIRED OVER IT. 4. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, SEVENTY HAVE BEEN KILLED AND LARGE NUMBERS WOUNDED. ANOTHER REPORT CITED NINE DEAD AND OVER ONE-HUNDRED WOUNDED AT THE FUXING HOSPITAL. THE CHILDRENS’ HOSPITAL INDICATED THAT IT HAD 11 DEAD. WE HAVE A FIRM REPORT THAT AT LEAST ONE HAS DIED, HAVING BEEN RUN OVER BY AN APC. EYEWITNESSES SAID THAT AN APC MOVING TOWARD THE SQUARE FROM THE EAST CRASHED THROUGH A BARRICADE AND PLOWED RIGHT THROUGH A CROWD ON CHANGAN STREET. FINAL NUMBERS OF DEAD AND WOUNDED COULD BE VERY HIGH, BASED ON EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF THE ARMY’S

US Embassy Cables Concerning the Crackdown in Tiananmen Square

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ACTION THUS FAR.

ERN SIDE OF BEIJING.

5. THE SITUATION IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY IS VERY CONFUSED. POLOFFS AT THE BEIJING HOTEL REPORTED THAT TROOPS ARE PUSHING A LARGE CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS EAST ON CHANGANJIE. ALTHOUGH THESE TROOPS APPEAR NOT TO BE FIRING ON THE CROWD, POLOFFS REPORT FIRING BEHIND THE TROOPS COMING FROM THE SQUARE.

7. SOME UNITS HAVE NOT ADOPTED SUCH AGGRESIVE MOVES. AT 0124, AN EMBASSY SPOUSE SAW TROOPS AT THE JIANGUOMENWAI OVERPASS NEXT TO THE DIPLOMATIC HOUSING COMPOUND TALKING CALMLY WITH THE CITY RESIDENTS BLOCKING THEIR PATH. CONVERSELY, PANIC REPORTEDLY SET IN AMONG PEOPLE ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE CITY WHERE THE VIOLENCE HAS BEEN WORST THUS FAR.

6. A LARGE CONVOY OF MILITARY VEHICLES IS COMING TOWARD THE CITY FROM THE WEST-

Document Analysis

Lilley’s message of June 3 notes that ten to fifteen thousand Chinese troops had arrived in Beijing, with the largest concentration centered around the New World Trade Center, roughly 5 kilometers from Tiananmen Square. The troops, accompanied by 100 army trucks, are said to be helmeted and carrying automatic weapons. Some of the military trucks had reportedly been blocked from traveling around the city by civilian vehicles. Lilley reports that civilians remain generally hostile to the military presence. Noting that the Chinese military forces are helmeted, heavily armed, in combatready vehicles and including elite airborne units, the ambassador concludes that “the force option is real.” By 1:45 AM the next day the first Chinese troops had reached Tiananmen Square where they were reported to have used tear gas and live ammunition on protestors to clear the area. Equally troubling, an APC reportedly had run over a protestor who attempted to block its advance. Other protestors lit cars and at least one bus on fire to block the military’s advance into the square. These efforts, however, only worked in the short term because the APCs had pushed through the barricades. Lilley notes that there were numerous reports of Chinese troops firing indiscriminately at protestors. Not surprisingly, given the chaotic nature of these events, numerous, conflicting reports circulated regarding the number of people killed. Lilley notes tersely that “final numbers of dead and wounded could be very high, based on eyewitness accounts of the Army’s action.” In contrast to the behavior of soldiers around Tianan-

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men Square, troops stationed next to the diplomatic compound were observed talking calmly to protestors who blocked their way. The contrasting behavior may have occurred because the soldiers in Tiananmen Square were largely out of the view of foreign media, while those around the compound were not. Essential Themes

The June 3 messages sent by Lilley depict a tense and hostile situation, but not a violent one. When PRC forces entered Beijing on June 3, there were no reports of violence. However, this changed on the morning of June 4, when government forces, under orders from Deng, attacked demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and the surrounding area. While reports differ, it is estimated that the Chinese military killed between a few dozen and several hundred demonstrators that day. The military’s actions in early June not only resulted in the deaths of many demonstrations, it also effectively destroyed any hope of political reform. Deng and his supporters had preserved the status quo for the foreseeable future. Large-scale protests demanding reform from the government would not be tolerated in China. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the protests the Chinese government targeted intellectuals and students who participated in or supported the protests. Untold numbers were arrested, and some were even executed for their role in the demonstrations. The crackdown on demonstrators at Tiananmen Square sent a clear message that those who demanded democratic political reform would be crushed. The demonstrations in Tiananmen Square occurred

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at the same time as protests with similar demands were occurring in Eastern Europe. The communist governments of Eastern Europe were unwilling or unable to use violence to end the protests. As a result, much of Eastern Europe had moved away from totalitarian, communist rule by 1991. A similar situation emerged in Russia and the other states of the USSR. Such would not be the case in China, however, where the government remained willing to use force. The military crackdown on June 4 destroyed the reform movement. The PRC has seen little progress in the direction of democratic political reform since. —Gerald F. Goodwin, PhD

Bibliography and Additional Reading

Baum, Richard. Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996. Print. Cunningham, Philip J. Tiananmen Moon: Inside the Chinese Student Uprising of 1989. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Print. Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin P, 2005. Print. Levine, Steven and Alexander Pantsov. Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life. New York: Oxford UP, 2015. Print.

Egon Krenz Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

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 Egon Krenz Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev Date: November 10, 1989 Author: Egon Krenz Genre: Letter Summary Overview

On November 10, 1989 in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Egon Krenz, General Secretary of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), customarily referred to as East Germany (communist ally of the Soviet Union), explained why East German officials had opened the Bornholmer Strasse border crossing the previous night. Krenz explained that the border had been opened after thousands of East Germans showed up at the crossing, demanding entry into West Berlin. According to Krenz, had the guards not opened the gates, the consequences—violence and numerous fatalities— would have been far worse. Sixty thousand East Germans had crossed into West Berlin, but the majority returned the following day. East German authorities once again closed the border, allowing only those with proper authorization to cross, and Krenz asked Gorbachev to contact western governments to ensure that they wouldn’t encourage further disruptions at the border. The letter revealed the weaknesses of the communist East German government and presaged its collapse. Defining Moment

The city of Berlin had been a point of contention since the end of World War II. After its surrender Germany was divided into four zones of occupation with the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union each occupying a zone. Berlin was located inside the Soviet zone, but because of its symbolic importance as the capital of Germany it was also divided into four zones. In May 1948 President Harry Truman convinced Great Britain and France to merge their zones with the American zone, including those in Berlin. A new German state known as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), better known as West Germany, was formed. Angered over what he interpreted as an aggres-

sive act, Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Soviet Union, ordered a blockade around the western sectors of Berlin to force the United States and its allies to abandon the city. Truman did not back down and ordered a massive airlift to feed the Germans in West Berlin. Stalin abandoned the blockade. However, tensions over Berlin did not end. On August 13, 1961 the East German government, at the direction of the USSR and to prevent its citizens from fleeing to West Berlin and then West Germany, constructed a wall separating East and West Berlin. For nearly three decades the Berlin Wall would serve not only as a barrier between East and West Berlin but also as a powerful symbol of the Cold War between the communist and noncommunist nations. Like other countries aligned with the USSR, East Germany experienced monumental changes in 1989. By year’s end, the Berlin Wall would be torn down and East Germany would exist as a country in name only. These changes began in May, 1989 when Hungary opened its border with Austria. In August alone, tens of thousands of East Germans traveled to Hungary and then crossed the border into Austria and then into West Germany where they received automatic citizenship. When the East German government banned travel to Hungary, East Germans began clandestinely escaping through Czechoslovakia. By late October 200,000 East Germans had fled the country. That same month massive protests broke out in Leipzig and East Berlin demanding that the government of General Secretary Erich Honecker institute reforms similar to those previously introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR. Some groups leading these protests, most notably New Forum, called for moderate reforms which didn’t directly challenge the fundamentals of a communist society, while others, the Social Democratic Party and Democracy Now, boldly pushed for revolutionary political and economic changes.

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These protests eventually led Honecker to resign on October 18. However, organized protests demanding significant reform continued under his successor, the more moderate Egon Krenz. On November 9 Krenz’s government announced that it would support free elections and the easing of travel restrictions. However, during the press conference announcing these decisions, Gunter Schabowski, a Politburo official, mistakenly stated that East Germans were permitted to cross into West Germany immediately and without restriction. The news spread quickly and tens of thousands of East Germans gathered at the Berlin Wall and other border crossings. Border guards at the Bornholmer Strasse crossing point opened the gates and thousands of East Germans flooded into West Berlin.

Author Biography

Born on March 19, 1937 in modern day Kolobrzeg, Poland, Egon Krenz served in the East Germany military before joining the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in 1955. After serving in the East German parliament for most of the 1970s, Krenz became a member of the Politburo, the governing body of East Germany, in 1983. Protests in the fall of 1989 led to the resignation of General Secretary of the GDR Erich Honecker, and Krenz succeeded him. Facing a crisis over the Berlin Wall, Krenz stumbled and the wall was torn down. He was out of office by December 1989. In 1997, he was sentenced to six and a half years in prison for the murder of four East Germans who had been killed trying to cross the border into West Berlin.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT [November 10, 1989] [LETTER, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE GDR SED (Socialist Union Party) EGON KRENZ TO GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC CPSU MIKHAIL GORBACHEV] General Secretary CC CPSU [Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union] comrade Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev Moscow Dear comrade Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev! In connection with the developments of the situation in GDR, tonight it became necessary to make a decision to permit the exit of citizens of the German Democratic Republic to West Berlin as well. A large gathering of people at the KPP [Kontrollpassierpunkt - checkpoint] to West Berlin demanded a quick decision from us. Denying passage to West Berlin could have led to serious consequences whose scale would become unforeseeable. The articles of the Quadripartite agreement on West Berlin does not bear on this decision, since permissions

for exit into West Berlin to visit relatives have been given out up until now as well. Last night, about 60 thousand citizens of the GDR crossed the KPP into West Berlin. Of these, about 45 thousand returned back to the GDR. From 6 o’clock in the morning today, only persons having the appropriate visa from the GDR can go into West Berlin. The same also applies for permanent exit from the GDR. I request, dear comrade Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev that you instruct the USSR ambassador in the GDR to get in touch without delay with the representatives of the Western powers with the aim of ensuring normal order in the city and of averting provocations on the state border from West Berlin. With communist greetings Egon Krenz General Secretary of the SED

Egon Krenz Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

Document Analysis

On November 10, 1989 General Secretary Egon Krenz wrote a detailed letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the USSR, informing him about the developing situation in East Germany and explaining the decision to allow East German citizens to cross into West Berlin the day before. Krenz explained that in response to ongoing protests in East Germany, authorities had decided to “permit the exit of citizens of the German Democratic Republic to West Berlin.” The magnitude of these protests had required a quick decision. He argued strongly that denying passage to those who had congregated along the Bornholmer border crossing would have had serious consequences. While Krenz did not say so explicitly, he clearly feared a violent reaction were East Germans not allowed temporary passage to West Berlin. Krenz reported that sixty thousand East Germans had crossed the border into West Berlin, but forty-five thousand returned the following day. These numbers suggested that the majority of the people who crossed into West Berlin had no intention of leaving East Germany permanently. However, at the same time a significant number, fifteen thousand, had not yet returned. Many East Germans clearly wanted to leave their country. Fearing that more people would flee if he did not intervene, Krenz informed Gorbachev that as of six a.m., only people with appropriate government visas would be allowed to cross into West Berlin. This signaled a return to the original policy. Krenz’s letter concludes with a request that Gorbachev instruct the Soviet Foreign Minister to contact representatives of the Western powers to ensure that they do not encourage further disorder around the crossings. However, at that point there was really nothing Krenz, Gorbachev, or anyone else could do to prevent East Germans from continuing to cross into West Berlin. Essential Themes

In his letter Krenz seeks to explain and defend the decision to temporarily open the border with West Berlin on the previous night. He also wants to assure Gorbachev that future disruptions at the border could be prevented and that the widespread desire of East Germans to cross into West Germany was likely temporary. However, in reality the border then was no more secure than the night before. If anything the situation was worsening as Germans had begun dismantling the wall. There

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was little Krenz, Gorbachev, or anyone else could have done to control or alter the situation. Over the next few days thousands of East Germans not only crossed into West Berlin but, along with West Germans, stood and danced on the Berlin Wall. Others began to demolish it using hammers and chisels. Unwilling to use force to stop these actions, East German officials could do little but watch. Krenz’s letter reveals the imminent collapse of his government and a communist East Germany aligned with the USSR. The question remained at the time: what would happen to East Germany? Most western leaders, with the exception of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, initially opposed the reunification of East and West Germany, fearing that a united Germany would threaten the post–World War II political order in Europe. However, as the weeks passed it became clear that reunification was all but inevitable. By January, 1990 even Hans Modrow, Krenz’s replacement, admitted to Gorbachev that the majority of East Germans wanted a unified state. Gorbachev eventually came to agree that this was the best course of action, and on October 3, 1990 the two German states, which had been divided since the end of World War II, became one. The events of November 9-10, 1989 had a dramatic impact not only on the future of Germany but also on communism in Europe. For many Europeans living under Communist rule, the quick destruction of the Berlin Wall signaled that anything was possible. By December 1989 communist governments had been overthrown in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. During the next year most countries making up the Soviet Bloc in Europe replaced their governments. —Gerald F. Goodwin, PhD Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin P, 2005. Print. Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. Print. Leffler, Melvyn P. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New York: Hill & Wang, 2007. Print. Turner, Henry Ashby, Germany from Partition to Reunification. New Haven: Yale UP, 1992. Print.

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 Gorbachev’s Farewell Address Date: December 25, 1991 Author: Mikhail Gorbachev Genre: Speech Summary Overview

On December 25, 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), announced his resignation and, more importantly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He noted that when he assumed leadership of the USSR, the Soviet empire was threatened by previous governments’ unwillingness to adapt the communist economic system to a changing world and the decades’ long arms race with the United States. Through Gorbachev’s efforts the nation had achieved significant reforms guaranteeing a more prosperous future. However, Gorbachev recognized that his attempts to achieve democratic reform had provoked opponents to try to overthrow his government, in August 1991. He therefore warned Russian citizens that anti-democratic forces would continue to try to reverse the changes his government had accomplished unless the people remained steadfast in their defense of democratic goals. Defining Moment

Gorbachev’s final address to the Russian people represented the culmination of years of upheaval in the Soviet Empire. Since 1985 Gorbachev had pushed through a reformist agenda centered on democratic political change and the end of rigid control of the economy as demanded by Marxist ideology. Unintentionally, the Soviet leader had encouraged demands for wholesale immediate reform and the desires of various ethnic and nationalist groups inside the Soviet bloc for freedom. The first signs of cracks in the Soviet empire appeared in Poland in April 1989, when the Solidarity Movement’s protests against martial law and economic stagnation led General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Gorbachev’s close ally in the state, to legalize pro-Solidarity political parties and announce free elections. When the Soviet Union did not intervene, anti-communists won a resounding victory during the June elections, and Lech Walesa, a pro-Solidarity candidate, was elected to the

presidency. In October of the same year, in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), better known as East Germany, massive protests erupted against the communist government. In less than a month, a new government in East Germany eased travel restrictions, a decision that would lead to the destruction of the Berlin Wall within a few months and the reunification of the two Germanys in 1990. Protests in neighboring Czechoslovakia led to the resignation of the Communist government and the election of dissident poet Vaclav Havel in late 1989. By the summer of 1990, Ukraine, Latvia, and Hungary, among others, had thrown off the yoke of communism. Equally significant, on March 15, 1990, Russian citizens voted to create the position of President of the Soviet Union. Previously the head of the Russian state had always been the General Secretary of the Communist Party. When Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia on June 12, 1991, Gorbachev remained the leader of a crumbling empire but was no longer the highest ranking official in his country. This visible disintegration of the Soviet Union dramatically impacted Gorbachev’s political status. On August 18, 1991, Soviet hardliners staged a coup, placing Gorbachev under house arrest and trying to seize control of the government. The hardliners sought to preserve the Communist party and what was left of the Soviet Union, but their efforts only hastened its collapse. Yeltsin quickly rallied anti-coup demonstrators, and the coup fell apart after a few days. These events weakened Gorbachev’s prestige and power and raised Yeltsin’s profile. In early December 1991, under Yeltsin’s leadership, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and other countries replaced the Soviet mantle with a loose confederation of states known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev accepted reality and announced his resignation as well as the official dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev’s Farewell Address

Author Biography

Mikhail Gorbachev was born in 1931 in the village of Privolnoe in the Stavropal region of Southern Russia. Like many of his generation, his early life was marked by World War II and the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1942, the Germany army occupied Gorbachev’s small village, causing considerable hardship for the women and children who remained there. After the war, Gorbachev earned a law degree at Moscow State University. He returned to Stavropal where for the next two decades he steadily advanced through the ranks of the Communist Party. In 1978 he was appointed Secretary of Agriculture, joining the Po-

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litburo a short time later. On March 12, 1985, he was unanimously elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the top leadership post. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union experimented with political liberalization (glasnost) and economic restructuring (perestroika). His foreign policies were characterized by cuts in Soviet military forces and negotiated arms-control agreements with the United States. Gorbachev held the position of General Secretary until the office was abolished on March 15, 1990, and he was appointed president. He resigned from the presidency on December 25, 1991.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT Addressing you for the last time as president of the USSR, I find it necessary to state my position with regard to the path we have embarked on since 1985--especially since controversial, superficial, and biased judgments abound. Fate has decided that, when I became head of state, it was already obvious there was something wrong in this country. We had plenty of everything; land, oil, gas, and other natural resources, and God has also endowed us with intellect and talent--yet we lived much worse than people in other industrialized countries, and the gap was constantly widening. The reason was apparent even then--our society was stifled in the grip of a bureaucratic command system. Doomed to serve ideology, and bear the heavy burden of the arms race, it was strained to the utmost. All attempts at implementing half hearted reforms--and there have been many--failed one after another. The country was losing hope. We could not go on living like this. We had to change everything radically. For this reason I never regretted that I did not use my position as general secretary merely to reign for a few years. This would have been irresponsible and immoral. I understood that initiating reforms on such a large scale in a society like ours was a most difficult and risky undertaking. But even now, I am convinced that the democratic reforms started in the spring of 1985 were histori-

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cally justified. The process of renovating the country and bringing about fundamental change in the international community proved to be much more complex than originally anticipated. However, let us acknowledge what has been achieved so far. Society has acquired freedom; it has been freed politically and spiritually. And this is the most important achievement, which we have not fully come to grips with, in part because we still have not learned how to use our freedom. However, a historic task has been accomplished. The totalitarian system, which prevented this country from becoming wealthy and prosperous a long time ago, has been dismantled. A breakthrough has been made on the road to democratic reforms. Free elections, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, representative legislatures, and a multiparty system have all become realities. We have set out to introduce a pluralistic economy, and the equality of all forms of ownership is being established. In the course of the land reform, peasantry is reviving, individual farmers have appeared, and millions of hectares of land have been allocated to the urban and rural population. Laws were passed on the economic freedom of producers, and free enterprise, shareholding, and privatization are under way. Shifting the course of our economy towards a free

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market, we must not forget that this is being done for the benefit of the individual. In these times of hardship, everything must be done to ensure the social protection of the individual--particularly old people and children. We live in a new world. An end has been put to the Cold War, the arms race, and the insane militarization of our country, which crippled our economy, distorted our thinking, and undermined our morals. The threat of a world war is no more. Once again, I should like to stress I have done everything in my power during the transitional period to ensure safe control over nuclear weapons. We opened ourselves up to the rest of the world, renounced interference in the affairs of others, and the use of troops beyond our borders, and we have gained trust, solidarity, and respect. We have become a major stronghold for the reorganization of modern civilization on the basis of peaceful, democratic principles. The peoples and nations of this country have acquired genuine freedom to choose their own way towards selfdetermination. The quest for a democratic reform of our multinational state had led us to the point where we were about to sign a new union treaty. All these changes demanded utmost exertion and were carried through under conditions of an unrelenting struggle against the growing resistance from the old, obsolete, and reactionary forces--the former party and state structures and the economic management apparatus--as well as our patterns, our ideological prejudices, our egalitarian and parasitic psychology. The changes ran up against our intolerance, a low level of political culture, and a fear of change. That is why we have wasted so much time. The old system tumbled down even before the new one could begin functioning. And our society slid into even deeper crisis. I am aware of the dissatisfaction with today’s grave situation, the harsh criticism of authority at all levels,

and of my personal role. But I would like to stress once again: In so vast a country, given its heritage, fundamental changes cannot be carried out without difficulties and pain. The August coup brought the overall crisis to a breaking point. The most disastrous aspect of this crisis is the collapse of statehood. And today I watch apprehensively the loss of the citizenship of a great country by our citizens—he consequences of this could be grave for all of us. I consider it vitally important to sustain the democratic achievements of the last few years. We have earned them through the suffering of our entire history and our tragic experience. We must not abandon them under any circumstances, under any pretext. Otherwise, all our hopes for a better future will be buried. I am speaking of this frankly and honestly. It is my moral duty. Today I want to express my gratitude to all those citizens who have given their support to the policy of renovating this country and who participated in the democratic reform. I am thankful to statesmen, political and public leaders, and millions of ordinary people in other countries—to all those who understood our objectives and gave us their support, meeting us halfway and offering genuine cooperation. I leave my post with concern--but also with hope, with faith in you, your wisdom and spiritual strength. We are the heirs of a great civilization, and its revival and transformation to a modern and dignified life depend on all and everyone. I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to those who stood by my side, defending the right and good cause over all these years. We certainly could have avoided certain errors and done better in many ways. But I am convinced that, sooner or later, our common efforts will bear fruit and our peoples will live in a prosperous and democratic society.

Gorbachev’s Farewell Address

Document Analysis

On December 25, 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev delivered his final address as president of the USSR announcing both his resignation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He acknowledged that his leadership of the USSR, which began in 1985, had given rise not only to significant controversy but also to major challenges. This was not surprising because when he became leader, “it was already obvious there was something wrong in this country.” The nation was blessed with an abundance of land, natural resources like oil and gas, and many intelligent people, but the Russian people had a far lower standard of living than citizens of other industrialized nations, a gap that was continuing to grow. Gorbachev argued that previous governments’ refusal to develop policies outside the framework of communist ideology and the arms race with the United States had placed heavy strains on the Soviet economy. On taking office Gorbachev stated his view about the need to “change everything radically.” He recognized that change, especially radical change, would be difficult and risky, but it was necessary to improve the lives of the nation’s citizens. As a result of democratic reforms, which began in 1985, “the totalitarian system, which prevented this country from being wealthy and prosperous a long time ago,” had been thoroughly dismantled to the great benefit of the Russian people. As well, efforts to achieve democratic reforms had transformed the dream of free elections, a representative legislature, freedom of the press, and tolerance of religious beliefs into reality. Reforms related to property ownership and economic production were proceeding in a similar direction. These reforms were initiated to improve the lives of all Russians, but especially the most vulnerable, children and the elderly. These reforms were possible because of the changing nature of the world—the end of the Cold War, the lessening of the arms race, and, with it, the threat of a global conflict. Gorbachev reminded the Russian people that despite the necessity of reform, “old, obsolete, and reactionary forces” opposed and complicated his efforts at every turn. Such obstructionist forces were behind the attempt to overthrow his government in August. Despite this resistance by some, Gorbachev argued that the democratic accomplishments of the last few years must not be eroded, “otherwise, all our hopes for a better future will be buried.” Gorbachev thanked all Russians who supported his

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government’s attempts to achieve democratic reform as well as political leaders and private citizens of other countries who supported Russia during this transitional period. He concluded by expressing hope and optimism that Russia would continue to move toward democracy and freedom. Essential Themes

Gorbachev’s final address to the Russian people marked the end of both his political career and the existence of the Soviet Union. When he was appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party and the official leader of the USSR in March 1985, he took office intending to reform Soviet society to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union and the international communist movement. In many respects, Gorbachev successfully implemented his reformist agenda. He liberalized the Soviet economy and passed significant democratic reforms. Despite these efforts, he was unable to prevent the collapse of the USSR. Beginning in Poland in 1989, large scale protests against Communist rule broke out throughout the Soviet Bloc. Although Gorbachev wanted to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union, he did not want bloodshed. Unwilling and perhaps unable to put down the protests with force, Gorbachev accepted their success. As the Soviet Union crumbled, Gorbachev’s grip on power in Russia was significantly weakened with the election of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency in June 1991. Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin had no desire to preserve the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s grip on power was further weakened when Soviet hardliners seized him and attempted to gain control of the government in August 1991. By the time Gorbachev delivered his final address, his power and authority had all but evaporated. He was essentially the leader of a country that no longer existed. The day after his speech, the hammer and sickle flag of the Soviet Union was taken off the Kremlin for the last time and replaced with the Russian flag. Both the Soviet Union and Gorbachev’s attempt to strengthen it through reform had ultimately met with failure. —Gerald F. Goodwin, PhD .

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Bibliography and Additional Reading

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin P, 2005. Print. Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. New York: Doubleday, 1996. Print. Kantowicz, Edward R. Coming Apart, Coming Together: The World in the 20th Century. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2000. Print. Leffler, Melvyn P. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New York: Hill & Wang, 2007. Print.

APPENDIXES

Chronological List 1945: Potsdam Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1946: Stalin’s Election Speech, 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1946: Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1947: Truman Doctrine Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1947: Executive Order 9835 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233 1947: Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Un-American Activities Committee . . . . . . . . . . .241 1947: Speech on the Marshall Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 1947: “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1947: Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 1947: Vyshinsky’s Speech to the UN General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 1947: Ronald Reagan’s Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee. . . . . . . . . . . . .246 1947: Testimony Regarding Communist Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251 1948: Testimony of Whittaker Chambers (Excerpted). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .256 1949: NATO Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 1949: Memorandum on Lifting the Soviet Blockade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 1949: Dean Acheson on the “Loss” of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 1949: Atomic Explosion in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 1949: International Control of Atomic Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 1950: Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Speech to the Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia . . . . .262 1950: NSC 68: “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 1950: “Declaration of Conscience” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .266 1951: Report to the American People on Korea and US Policy in the Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 1951: Statement by President Truman upon Signing the Mutual Security Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 1953: President Eisenhower—“The Chance for Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 1953: Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114 1953: A “New Look” at National Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118 1953: “Atoms for Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 1954: CIA Summary of the Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132 1954: In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .280 1954: Balkan Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138 1954: President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 1954: Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .146 1954: Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287 1955: Baghdad Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150 1955: President Sukarno’s Address at the Bandung Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 513

1955: Warsaw Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 1956: Khrushchev on the “Cult of Personality” and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 1956: Senator John F. Kennedy on America’s Stake in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .176 1956: Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 1957: Mao on the “Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .186 1957: Launching of the Sputnik Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .195 1957: Eisenhower on Science in National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .199 1958: “Communism in the Americas” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206 1959: Fidel Castro’s Speech at Twenty-One Nations Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .214 1959: Nixon and Khrushchev: The Kitchen Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219 1959: Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .224 1951: Rosenberg Case Excerpts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272 1960: The U2 Spy-Plane Incident—Excerpts of a Speech by Khrushchev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293 1961: Eisenhower’s Farewell Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .298 1961: Telegram from the US Mission in Berlin regarding the Sealing-off of East Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . .303 1962: Fidel Castro: Second Declaration of Havana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .307 1962: JFK: “We Choose to Go to the Moon” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311 1962: JFK: Report on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316 1963: JFK: “A Strategy of Peace” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .322 1963: JFK: “Ich bin ein Berliner” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .329 1963: Limited Test Ban Treaty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339 1963: Televised Interview with President Kennedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .333 1963: On Alleged Soviet and Cuban Connections with Lee Harvey Oswald . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343 1964: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .347 1965: LBJ: “Peace Without Conquest” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .351 1967: Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358 1968: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .378 1968: The “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .364 1969: Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .368 1970: Kissinger Memo regarding Policy toward Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .384 1971: Nuclear Accidents Measures Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .391 1972: Documents Relating to Normalization of Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .395 1972: Biological Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .401 1972: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .406 1974: Jackson-Vanik Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .412 1975: Helsinki Accords (Excerpt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .416 514

1976: Margaret Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .419 1976: US Contingency Plans in Light of Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .426 1977: Charter 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .431 1979: SALT II

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .436

1980: Documents Relating to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .443 1981: CIA Cable on the Situation in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .448 1983: Ronald Reagan’s “Evil Empire” Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .452 1983: Able Archer ’83: The Soviet “War Scare” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .459 1984: Ronald Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative 1987: Ronald Reagan’s “Tear Down This Wall” Speech 1987: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1988: Mikhail Gorbachev’s UN Speech

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .467 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .471

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .478

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .490

1989: US Embassy Cables Concerning the Crackdown in Tiananmen Square

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .498

1989: Egon Krenz Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .503 1991: Gorbachev’s Farewell Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .506

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Web Resources digitalhistory.uh.edu Offers an online history textbook, Hypertext History, which chronicles the story of America, along with interactive timelines. This online source also contains handouts, lesson plans, e-lectures, movies, games, biographies, glossaries, maps, music, and much more.

history.com/topics/american-history Tells the story of America through topics of interest, such as the Declaration of Independence, major wars, and notable Americans. Features videos from The History Channel and other resources. history.com/topics/cold-war/red-scare “Red Scare,” from the History Channel, provides an article, photos, speeches, and videos on the topic of the perceived communist threat in the United States and various anticommunist measures.

docsteach.org Centered on teaching through the use of primary source documents. This online resource provides activities for many different historical eras dating to the American Revolution as well as thousands of primary source documents.

historymatters.gmu.edu An online resource from George Mason University that provides links, teaching materials, primary documents, and guides for evaluating historical records.

edsitement.neh.gov An online resource for teachers, students, and parents seeking to further their understanding of the humanities. This site offers lesson plan searches, student resources, and interactive activities.

http://amhistory.si.edu/militaryhistory/ “The Price Of Freedom: Americans At War” is a Smithsonian multimedia interactive on each war in United States’ history—including the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Videos (with transcript), images, and text are included.

gilderlehrman.org Offers many options in relation to the history of America. The History by Era section provides detailed explanations of specific time periods while the primary sources present firsthand accounts from a historical perspective.

https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/ The Eisenhower Presidential Museum and Boyhood Home, Abilene, Kansas, offers a changing set of exhibits and other resources relating to the 34th US president.

gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/postwar-politicsand-origins-cold-war/essays/postwar-politics-andcold-war “Postwar Politics and the Cold War,” from the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, provides an essay and links to related resources.

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/ The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum offers exhibits, documents, and other resources for research on the 38th president of the United States.

havefunwithhistory.com An online, interactive resource for students, teachers, and anybody who has an interest in American histor

https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/1945present The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History features essays and primary sources covering the period from 1945 to the present.

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http://www.jfklibrary.org/ The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum provides films and transcripts of JFK speeches, along with other resources.

memory.loc.gov/ammem/index.html Covers the various eras and ages of American history in detail, including resources such as readings, interactive activities, multimedia, and more.

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/ The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library & Museum offers exhibits, documents, and other resources for research on the 39th president of the United States.

pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/ From the PBS series American Experience, “The Race for the Superbomb” offers a teacher’s guide, a timeline, and more.

http://www.lbjlibrary.org/ The LBJ Presidential Library offers exhibits, documents, and other resources for research on the 36th president of the United States.

si.edu/encyclopedia_si/nmah/timeline.htm Details the course of American history chronologically. Important dates and significant events link to other pages within the Smithsonian site that offer more details.

https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/ The Nixon Presidential Library and Museum offers a virtual library, archives, and other resources for learning about Richard M. Nixon. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/lastdays/ Another PBS/American Experience program called “Last Days of Vietnam,” about the 1975 effort to safely remove U.S. citizens and Vietnamese supporters from Saigon as it fell to the communists. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/ From the award-winning PBS series American Experience, an online companion to Vietnam: A Television History. https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute offers information and resources on the 40th president of the United States. http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/ From Texas Tech University, the Vietnam Project offers a variety of documents, oral histories, and other resources relating to the Vietnam War.

smithsonianeducation.org An online resource for educators, families, and students offering lesson plans, interactive activities, and more. teachingamericanhistory.org Allows visitors to learn more about American history through original source documents detailing the broad spectrum of American history. The site contains document libraries, audio lectures, lesson plans, and more. teachinghistory.org A project funded by the US Department of Education that aims to assist teachers of all levels to augment their efforts in teaching American history. It strives to amplify student achievement through improving the knowledge of teachers. trumanlibrary.org/ The Harry S. Truman library provides a host of educational resources related to the 33rd president of the United States. ushistory.org/us Contains an outline that details the entire record of American history. This resource offers historical insight and stories that demonstrate what truly an American truly is from a historical perspective.

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wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-internationalhistory-project The Wilson Center’s “Cold War International History Project” offers a variety of archival and multimedia sources.

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Index A

American Communists 219, 241, 245, 260 American Economic Mission 35 American Expeditionary Force 41 American Friends of Vietnam 176, 177, 181 Americanism 207, 243, 244, 267, 270 American Legion 376 American missiles in Turkey 321 American Revolution 516 American Society of Newspaper Editors 107 American University 322, 323, 328, 331 American Veterans Committee 246 amorphous 47, 53, 55 anarchy 178, 189, 194 Andropov 392, 460, 465 Anglo-Persian Oil Company 132 Antarctic Treaty vi, 224, 228, 229, 358, 514, 520, 523, 527 anti-American 213 anti-Americanism 207 Anti-Ballistic 342, 406, 407, 410, 437, 468, 514 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 406, 407, 410, 437 anti-ballistic missile defense system 406 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 342 anti-Charter 435 anti-Communism 120 anti-Communist 102, 146, 206, 209, 213, 263, 266, 270 anti-missile technology 467 anti-Nazi 10 anti-Semitism 412 antiwar 357, 368, 369, 376 antiwar letters 376 antiwar movement 357, 369 antiwar sentiments 369 APOC 132 Apollo 8 315 Apollo 11 315 Apollo program 311, 315 Arab League States 151 Arbenz 384 Árbenz, Jacobo 137, 206, 208, 213 Arlington National Cemetery 312, 317, 323, 330 armaments 104, 108, 110, 112, 119, 122, 129, 130, 263 armistice 395 arms race 96, 105, 112, 118, 199, 319, 325, 326, 327, 339, 341 Armstrong, Neil 315 Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) 368, 376

ABC 334 Abilene High School 299 Abilene, Kansas 299 Able Archer vii, ix, 459, 460, 462, 463, 465, 466, 490, 515, 521, 524, 526 ABM Treaty 406, 410, 411 Abortion on demand 455 Abrams, Creighton, General 373 Abt 258, 259 Accidents Measures Agreement vii, 391, 393, 394, 514 Acheson 68, 72, 73, 80, 82 Acheson, Dean 68, 72, 73, 78, 80, 82, 92, 264, 519 Acheson-Lilienthal 82 A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator 367, 527 Adamishin 496 Address at the Bandung Conference 154, 513 Adenauer, Konrad 331 adjudication 235, 238 Adolf Berle 257 adroit 51, 55 Aeroflot airliners 426 Afghan Communist Party 443 Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation 154 Agent Orange 401 Agrarian Reform Law 186 Agreement on Control Machinery 5 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts 363 Agreements on Aid to Greece and Turkey 64 Aiken, George D. 269 Alamogordo Air Base 272 Aldrin, Edwin “Buzz” 315 All-African Peoples’ Conference 154 Allied Commission at Vienna 5 Allied Commission on Reparations 6, 8 Allied Control Commissions 11 Allied Control Council 9 Allied forces 107, 118, 126, 144, 200 Allied Governments 10 Allied landing in North Africa 299 Allied powers 97, 146 Allied Powers 72 Allied troops 8, 12 Allies 3, 5, 10, 14, 15, 43, 55, 72, 73, 74, 82, 83, 251 al-Qaida 447 Amerasia 268 529

530

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Index

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 368 Articles for the Government of the Navy 238 Articles of War 238 artificial satellite 311 Asian-African solidarity 155, 159 Asia-Pacific Theater 114 atomic bomb 3, 79, 80, 82, 91, 96, 98, 107, 127, 130, 199, 298, 342 atomic bombs 79, 82, 234 Atomic Development Authority 82 atomic energy 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 110, 112, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131 Atomic Energy Commission 82, 83, 85, 88, 436 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 280 Atomic Energy Commission (Atomic Energy Agency) 112, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131 atomic power 119, 127, 130, 201 atomic submarines 201 atomic technology 82 atomic test 80, 81, 91 atomic warfare 127, 130 atomic warheads 202 atomic weapon 81, 83, 89, 233 atomic weaponry 80, 82 atomic weapons 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 110, 127, 130, 233, 339, 340 "Atoms for Peace" 125 Attlee, Clement 3, 15, 16 Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations 233, 239 Australasia 423 Austrian Peace Treaty 128 Austrian Provisional Government 9 Axis 3, 10, 11, 15, 132, 143 Axis powers 351 Axis Powers 10, 11, 18, 19 Ayatollah Khomeini 137

B Baghdad Pact v, 150, 151, 152, 153, 513, 519, 526, 528 Balkan countries 138 Balkan Pact v, 138, 139, 141, 142, 513, 519, 527 Bandung Conference 154, 162, 513, 525 Bao Dai 143, 145 Baruch, Bernard 82, 83 Baruch Plan 82, 83 Batista, Fulgencio 214, 215, 217, 307, 316 Battle of Bataan 97

Bay of Pigs 137, 214, 215, 291, 307, 309, 316, 343, 345, 384 Bay of Pigs Invasion 137, 214, 215 Beijing, China 395 Bellow 435 Beria gang 173 Berlin Airlift 72, 163, 303, 329 Berlin blockade 73, 74, 99 Berlin Conference 4 Berlin Constitution 74 Berliner 329, 330, 331, 472, 473, 475, 514 Berlin Wall ix, xii, xiii, 74, 303, 304, 306, 329, 331, 332, 378, 441, 458, 471, 476, 477, 503, 504, 505, 506, 526, 527 Bevin, Ernest 43 Big Three 3 Bikini Atoll 339 bilateral trade 398 Biological Warfare Convention 401 Biological Weapons Convention vii, 401, 404, 405, 514, 519, 522, 526 Biran, Cuba 308 BLACK 12 Black, Eugene 354 blacklist 239, 246, 249, 254 Blaine, James G. 307 bloc 65, 66 Bloch, Emanuel 272, 279 Blockade 72, 74 Bloor, Ella Reeve 259 Bloss, Wilhelm 168 Board of Appeals and Review 68 Bohlen, Charles 40 Bohlen, Chip 92 Bojanovice 431 Böll, Heinrich 435 Bolshevik 196 Bolshevik Party 47 Bolsheviks 167, 172, 196 Borden, William 280 Bornholmer Strasse border crossing 503 Bosporus 34, 38, 45 Bradley 73, 74 Bradley, Omar 74 Brandenburg Gate xiii, 472 Brandt, Willy 416 Brewster, Senator 352 Brezhnev Doctrine 367 Brezhnev, Leonid 342

Index

Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich 406, 407, 436, 437, 440 Brinkley, David 333, 334 British Petroleum 132 Brookline, Massachusetts 312, 317, 323, 330 Budapest Technical University 183 Buddenbrooks 53 Buddhists 181, 336, 337 Buenos Aires Economic Conference 210 Building Industry Technological University 183, 184 Bukharinites 171 Bush, George 490, 494, 496 Butano, Samuel S. 92 Butterworth, Alexander 376

C Cairo Declaration 14 Callaghan, James 419 Cambodia 396 Camelot 338 capitalism 210, 219, 221, 222 capitalist 206, 219, 222 capitalistic 220 cartels 6 Carter, James Earl “Jimmy” Jr. 395, 396, 436, 437 Carter, Jimmy 342 Casey, William, DCI 463 Castro, Fidel 137, 207, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 307, 310, 316, 327 Castro regime 321 Castro Ruz, Fidel Alejandro 214, 307, 308, 310, 316, 327 caveat emptor 49, 55 CBS 333 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 92, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 213, 214, 307, 316 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 150 Chairman Mao See Zedong 187, 194, 396, 524 Chambers, David Whittaker; Jay Vivian; Witness (book) 257 “Chance for Peace” speech 298 Chancellor of the Exchequer 26 Charter of the United Nations 11, 37, 69, 70, 71, 94, 147, 148, 225, 227, 228 Charter of the United Nations Organization 11 Chartists 431 Checkpoint Charlie 329 Cheka 20, 23 Chernyaev, Anatoly 497

•

531

Chevalier incident See Haakon Chevalier incident 283, 284, 285 Chiang Kai-shek 146, 149, 395 Childrens' Hospital 500 Chile, Marxist state in 385 Chinese Civil War 75, 146, 194, 395 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 186 Chi Peng-fei 396 Choate School 312, 323, 330 Chou En-lai, Premier 396 Chuong, Ambassador 179 Churchill, Winston 3, 15, 16, 40, 74, 298 Civic Forum 435 civil liberties 233, 239 civil rights 335, 337, 352 Civil Service Act of 1883 234 Civil Service Commission 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 Civil War 146, 268, 395 clandestine 85, 86, 88, 89 Clark, Tom 233 Clay 73, 74 Clay, Lucius 74 Clay, Lucius D. 331 Clayton, Will 40 Cockran, Bourke 28 COINTELPRO 245 Colin Powell 471 collective party direction 168 Collins, Henry 259, 260 Collins, Michael 315 Columbia University 299 Columbus, Christopher 307 Combined Shipping Adjustment Board 9 COMMISSION 11, 13, 236 Committee for a Far-Eastern Democratic Policy 248, 249 Committee for the Constitutional Rights of Communists 242 Committee on Government Operations 263, 287 Commonwealth of Independent States 506 Communism in the Americas 206 Communist cells 259 Communist China 96, 97, 114, 116, 121, 122, 146 Communist East Germany 329, 331 Communist party 132 Communist Party 47, 50, 51, 53, 64, 65, 242, 243, 244, 246, 248, 249, 253 Communist Party of China 396 Communist Party of the Russian Federation 196

532

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Index

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 196, 207, 407 Communist Party of the United States 242, 243, 244 Communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) 395, 396, 399 Communist revolution 316 Communist Revolution 146 Community Land Act 422 comparative risk assessment 462, 463 computer malfunctions 467 concentration camp 253 Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe 46 Confederation of Latin American Workers 208 Conference of Asian and African Nations 159 Conference of Foreign Ministers 73 Conference on Disarmament 379 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 496 Conservative Party 419, 421, 423, 424 conspicuous consumerism 199 Constitution 74, 234, 237, 238, 244, 245 consumerism 199, 222 containment 91, 98, 146 containment of Communism 395 Control Commissions 11 Control Council 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 Control Council at Berlin 5 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 363 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 363 convoke 4 Coplon 268 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON) 426 Council of Ministers 143 Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 11 counter-blockade 73 counterblockade 72, 73, 74 Counter Intelligence Program 245 Court of Justice 227, 229 covert flights 293 CPUSA 244 Crimea 5, 10, 11, 68, 418 Crimea Conference 5, 10, 11 Cuba 137, 207, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217 Cuban Missile Crisis ix, 215, 219, 220, 294, 310, 316, 321, 322, 327, 328, 340, 343, 344, 345, 378, 384, 391, 426, 465, 522, 523

Cuban Revolution 213 Cuban-Soviet Intervention in Angola 426, 515 Cuban-Soviet orbit 389 Cuban War of Independence 307 Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 364 Czechoslovak Register of Laws No. 120 432

D Dallas, Texas 312, 317, 323, 330 Da Nang Air Base 350 D’Arcy, William Knox 132 Dardanelles 34, 38, 45 Davies, John Paton 76 Davis, John P. 92 D-Day 107, 126, 134, 200, 299 Death Strip 329 Declaration of Conscience 266 Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States 417 Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, The 47 defense industry 302 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 443 defense spending 302 de-ideologization of interstate relations 492 delegation 352, 356 demilitarized zone 114 Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 368 Democracy Now 503 Democratic National Convention 98 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 114, 397 Democratic Republic of Vietnam 143 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 180 Deng Xiaoping 395, 400 Denison, Texas 299 denounce 243 derogatory 235, 238 destruction of the Berlin Wall 505, 506 détente 342, 412 de Tocqueville, Alexis 453 Dien Bien Phu 143, 144, 145 Dillinger, John 241 diploma tax 412, 413 diplomatic relations 395, 398, 399, 400 Direct Communications Link 393 Directorate of Operations 448, 449 disarmament 107, 111, 204, 205, 301, 319, 322, 324, 326, 328, 339, 340 discrimination 413

Index

Disney, Walt 246, 252 dissidents, Eastern European (TK) 425 dissolution of the Soviet Union 196, 415, 506, 509 Division of British Commonwealth Affairs 69 Division of West European Affairs 68 Dobrynin, Anatoly 321 Dominican Republic 308 Domino Effect 351 domino theory 34 “Domino Theory” 78 Douglas-Home, Alec 340 draft 35, 67, 88, 238 drones, unmanned 296 Dubček, Alexander 364 Duck Hook 368, 369 Dulles, Allen W. 134, 212 Dulles, John Foster 56, 150, 151 Dumbarton Oaks 263 Dzhugashvili, Joseph Vissarionovich 17

E Earl Browder 275 early warning systems 393 East and West Germany 74 East Berlin 74 East German 74 East Germany 45, 72, 73, 74 Eastland, James O. 45 East-West Trade Relations Act 413 economic embargo on Cuba 307 Eden, Anthony 151 efficacious 42 egress 87, 89 Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) 378 Eighty-Third United States Congress 288 Einstein, Albert 272 Eisenhower administration 336 Eisenhower, Dwight D., President 176, 336, 369, 370, 371 Eisenhower-Nixon ticket 219 Eisenhower Presidential Library 108, 113, 126, 200, 299 Eisenhower’s Farewell Address 298, 303 El Colegio de Belén 308 Elitcher, Max 276 Elizabeth Bentley 256, 257 emigration laws and policies 413 endowed 234, 238 enemy of the people 171, 172, 194 English common law 28

•

533

Eniwetok Atoll 339 environmental diplomacy 417 envisaged 86, 89 espionage 93, 94, 95, 122, 211, 213, 262, 266, 270, 287 European Advisory Commission 5, 15 European Community 120, 423, 473 European Defense Community 109 European Inland Transport Conference 12 European Recovery Program 40, 43, 64, 111, 214 European theater 3 European union 423 Evans, Ward V. 113, 131, 205, 282, 302, 527 Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) 316 Executive Order 233, 234, 238, 239, 242 Executive Order 9835 233, 234, 239, 242, 262 Executive Order 10450 239 Executive Order No. 9300 238 exit visa 412 expeditiously 235, 239 Exploration of Cosmic Space by Means of Reaction Devices, The 195 Explorer 1 195, 197, 311, 358 Export-Import Bank 211 expropriated 46, 55 expropriation 47, 55

F Fair Deal 234 Farkas, Mihaly 183 Fascist 10, 233, 269 Fasor, Gorkij 184 Fat Man 79, 82 FBI 233, 239, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246, 249 Federal Bureau of Investigation 233, 235, 238, 241, 242, 246 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 303, 503 Federal Reserve Bank 211 Federal Theatre Project 241 “fellow traveler” 195, 284 Fifth Amendment 249 fifth column 243, 244, 248 Final Act of the Helsinki conference 434 First Indochina War 351 First Lightning 79, 81, 91 First Lord of the Admiralty 26 first nuclear weapon 322 First Red Scare 246, 251

534

•

Index

First Sino-Japanese War 146 First Taiwan Strait Crisis 146 fission bomb 91, 92 Flanders, Ralph 288 Folkoff, Isaac 283 Ford, Gerald administration 427 Ford, Gerald R. 412, 413, 437 Foreign Affairs 11, 45, 46, 56, 64, 65 foreign policy 413 Forrestal, James V. 45, 46 Four Power Agreement 306, 474 Four Power Meeting 128 Four Powers Summit 293, 294 free enterprise 206, 242, 244 free trade 6 free trade unions 6 Free Vietnam 178, 179 free world country 122 free world nations 120 Frei, Edward 384 Friends of Vietnam 176, 177, 180, 181 From the Earth to the Moon 195 Fuchs, Klaus 79, 231, 272 Fulton, Missouri 25, 490 fusion response 322 Fuxing Hospital 500

G Gagarin, Yuri 198 Gagarin, Yuri A. 311 Garland, Mr. 352, 356 Gates, Robert 490 Gatson, Robert B. 247 General Assembly resolution 191 (III) 83 General Intelligence Division 242 Geneva 179, 180 Geneva Accords 143, 144, 145 Geneva Protocol 401, 402, 404, 405 geopolitical maneuvers 443 George 34, 40, 44, 45, 46, 55, 56, 64, 67, 72, 247, 516 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 303, 329, 503, 506 German Federal Republic 74 German reunification 72, 476 Gerő, Ernő 182, 183 Gestapo 5 Gettysburg Address 43 Ghana (Gold Coast) 154, 162

Gibbon, Edward 47 glasnost xiii, 441, 493, 495, 496, 507 GLBM launcher 479 GLCM launcher 479 Glenn, John 311, 313 glib 50, 55 Goddard, Robert H. 195 gold 216 Gold Coast See Ghana 154, 162 Gold, Harry 273, 276, 277 Gorbachev, Mikhail vii, xiii, 306, 344, 367, 392, 415, 441, 452, 458, 468, 471, 472, 478, 488, 489, 490, 498, 503, 505, 506, 507, 509, 515 Gorbachev’s Farewell Address vii, 506, 515 Gordievsky, Oleg 462, 465, 466, 519 Government’s Exhibits 9-A and 9-B 277 “grassy knoll” shooter 346 Gray Board See Personnel Security Board 281, 282, 283, 284, 285 Gray, Mr. Gordon 282 Great Britain Ideological role 424 Great Depression 241, 246, 247 Great Purge 65 Great Purge, Stalin’s 168, 256 great silent majority 375, 376 Great Society 357 Greenglass, David 272, 273, 275, 276, 277, 279 Greenglass, Ethel 273 Greenglass, Ruth 274, 275, 276, 277, 279 Gromyko, Andrei 320, 340 Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich 392 gross 86, 89 Groves, General Leslie 280 Guam Doctrine 376 Guatemala, coup in 137, 384 Gulf of Tonkin 347, 351 Gulf of Tonkin Incident, The 347 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 349, 350 Gunboat Diplomacy 384

H Haakon Chevalier incident 283, 285 Hafizullah 443 Hájek, Jiří 431 Haldeman, H. R. 376 Hammarskjold, Secretart General 126 Hangchow 396 Hanoi 353, 357, 368, 369, 371, 372, 374

Index

Harvard University 312, 317, 323, 330 Hatch 233 Hatch Act of 1939 233 Havel, Václav 431, 435 hawks 356 Hays Code 252 Hays, Will H. 252 H-bomb 91 Heath, Edward 419 hegemony 396, 397, 399 Helms, Dick 388 Helsinki Accords vii, 416, 417, 418, 424, 431, 434, 514 Helsinki Conference 420 Hendrickson, Robert C. 269 Heritage Foundation 257 Hickerson, John Dewey 68, 69 Hiroshima 79, 82, 91, 118, 125, 322, 406, 436 Hiroshima, Japan 272 Hiss, Alger 231, 252, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 268, 270, 369 Hiss, Donald 259, 260 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, The 242 Hitler, Adolf 3, 5, 45, 51, 101, 167, 320, 424 Hitler-Stalin pact 258 Ho Chi Minh 78, 143, 144, 145, 336, 347, 350, 368, 369, 371, 372 Ho Chi Minh City 336 Ho Chi Minh Trail 350 Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions 246 Hollywood Reporter 246 “Hollywood Ten” 256 Hollywood Ten 249, 254, 255 holocaust 299 Holy See 416 Honecker, Erich, General Secretary 503, 504 Hooker, Robert 92 Hoover, J. Edgar 233, 241, 242, 244, 245 Hostile Approach, The 387 House of Commons 419 House Select Committee on Assassinations 346 House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) xii, 231, 233, 241, 246, 256, 262 H.R. 5113 104 Hua Guofeng 395 Hue 337, 370 Human life legislation 455 human rights 327, 328, 412, 413, 415

•

535

Humphrey, Hubert 336 Hundred Flowers Campaign 186, 187, 194 Hungarian Kossuth arms 184 Hungarian Revolution (of 1848) 184 Hungarian Revolution (of 1956) 183, 185 Hungarian Workers’ Party 183 Huntley, Chester "Chet" 333, 334 Husák, Gustáv 431 hydrogen bomb 91, 124, 125, 199, 339, 406, 436

I I am a Berliner 329, 331 Ibañez 212 Ich bin ein Berliner 329 imperialism 99, 209, 213, 351 impinge 87, 89 Inchon 97 inculcate 244 India, Israel 328 Indochina 99, 110, 123, 143, 180, 351 indoctrinated 242, 244 Indonesia (Dutch East Indies) 154 Indo-Pakistan question 397 infirmities 352, 356 ingress 87, 89 Intelligence Oversight Board 461 Inter-American Conference 208 Interamerican Development Bank 216 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 68 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 391, 406, 436, 438, 440, 460, 470 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 471 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty vii, 478, 515 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 112, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 379, 380, 381, 382, 521 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 211 International Committee for the Support of Charter 77 435 International Communism 209 international Communist movement 207, 209, 213 International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) 195, 196 International Court of Justice 227, 229 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 431, 432 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 431, 432

536

•

Index

International Geophysical Year (IGY) 195, 196, 197, 198, 224, 225, 358, 520 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 211 International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) 384 Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics 208 intransigence 43, 48, 55 intransigent 55 Iran-Contra affair 471 Irish Catholic 312, 323, 330 Iron Curtain v, ix, 25, 33, 74, 133, 135, 136, 298, 421, 464, 490, 513, 522, 525 “Iron Curtain” Speech v, 25, 513 Iron Lady See Thatcher vii, 419, 425, 515 “Iron Lady” Speech vii, 419, 515 Islam 159, 444 Isolationism 95 Ives, Irving M. 269 Izvestiya 423

J Jackson, Henry M. “Scoop” 412 Jackson-Vanik Amendment 412, 415, 416, 419, 426, 431 Jacqueline Bouvier 177, 333 Japanese militarism 397 Japan’s invasion of China 75 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, General 448, 506 Javits, Jacob 413 Jessup, Philip Caryl 72, 73, 74 John-F.-Kennedy-Platz 329 John Paul II 448, 450, 451, 519, 528 Johnson administration 347, 351, 356, 357, 368 Johnson, Lyndon B. 436 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President 347, 351, 352, 357, 368, 370, 371 Johnson Space Center 311 Johnston, Eric A. 251, 252, 254, 255 Joint Command of the armed forces 165, 166 Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples 397 joint resolution 414 Judaism 412 Jupiter missiles 310

K Kai-shek, Chiang, Generalissimo 75, 77, 146, 149, 186, 187, 395, 527

Kamenev, [Lev] 170, 172, 173 Karmal, Babrak 443, 445 Karman line 195 Kármán line 311 Kashmir 335, 336 Kaufman, Judge [Samuel], statement of 278 Kennan, George 1, 24, 40, 56, 524 Kennan, George F. 34, 40, 45, 46, 55, 56 Kennecot Copper 384 Kennedy administration 352 Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act 346 Kennedy, Joseph P. 312, 323, 330 Kennedy, Robert F., Senator 321 Kennedy Space Center 311 Kensington Town Hall 419 Kerensky [Alexander] 173 KGB 412 KGB unit See VRYAN 461 Khan, Mohammad Daoud 443 Killian, James R., Dr. 203, 204, 205 Kim Il-sung 114 Kingdom of Iraq 150 Kinmen and Matsu Islands 146 Kissinger Henry Alfred, Secretary of State vii, 291, 368, 384, 395, 396, 399, 412, 426, 427 Kitchen Debate 219 Knickerbocker Village apartment 275 Kohl, Helmut, Chancellor 505 Konev, Ivan 164 Konstantinovna Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna 170 Korean Armistice 200 Korean conflict 101, 105, 123, 201 Kramer, Charles 259 Kremlin 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 207 Krenz, Egon 503, 504, 505, 515 Krevitsky See Kramer, Charles 259 Kryuchkov, General 463 Kuklinski, Ryszard 448, 451, 523 Kuomintang 146 Kuomintang party 186

L labor 41, 43, 46, 52, 55, 243, 244, 245, 252 labor movement 206, 212 labor unions 209, 243, 245 Labour Party 3, 419, 420

Index

Labour reforms 25 Laika 195, 199 Laird, Secretary 373 Lake, Tony 261 Lambert, Rudy 283 Landon, Truman 92 Lansdale, Colonel 283, 284 Laos 178, 181, 338, 396 Latin American Communist movement 213 Launch Operations Center 311 Lavrenty Beria 167 Lay, James S., Jr. 118, 119 LBJ 351 Lee Pressman 258, 259 Lenin 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 107, 196, 207 Leninist 307 Lenin, Vladimir 107, 196 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, V. I.; “Testament” 168, 170, 173 Leonid Brezhnev xii, 342, 364, 392, 416, 436, 437 letter of understanding 399 Lewis, C.S. 457 Liability Convention (1972) 363 liberal 206 liberal socialism 47 LIDO HOTEL 499 Ligachev, Yegor 472, 496 Lightner, Jr. Edwin Allan 304 Lilienthal, David E. 82 Lilley, James 498, 499 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 322, 328 Lincoln, Abraham 43, 262, 264, 268 “Little Boy” 272 Little Boy 79, 82 Lloyd George, David 30 Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr., Ambassador 333, 371, 372 Lomanitz, Giovanni Rossi 283 long-range ballistic missiles 311 “long telegram” 34 Long Telegram 45, 46, 55 Los Alamos, New Mexico 272 Lott, Henrique Teixeira 209 Lovett, Robert 92 loyalty 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 242, 244, 251 Loyalty Review Board 236, 237, 239 Lubbock school case 455 Luce, Henry 75 Luna 2 198, 311 lunar landing 315

•

537

M MacArthur, Douglas 97, 101, 102, 114 Macmillan 204 MAD See mutual assured destruction 242 Malenkov, Georgy 167 Malik, Jacob 72, 73, 74 Mandel, Benjamin 247 Manhattan Project 79, 82, 272, 273, 280, 378 Manned Spacecraft Center 311, 314 Mann, Thomas 53 Mansfield, Michael J., Senator 180 Mao 351 Mao See Zedong vi, 75, 78, 146, 186, 187, 194, 351, 395, 396, 399, 502, 514, 519, 524, 526, 527 Mao Tsetung 396 Mao Zedong 351, 395, 396 Marshall, George C., US General 103, 473 Marshall Plan 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 80, 98, 103, 214, 234 Marshall Plan (1948) 473 Marshall Space Flight Center 311 Martí, José 307 Martin, Joseph William, Jr. 98 Marx 47 Marxian ideology 46 Marxian socialism 55 Marxism 55, 242 Marxism-Leninism 242 Marxist 34, 45, 46, 47, 55, 209, 212, 246 Marxist-Leninist 47, 307 Marxist or Leninist communism 47 Marx, Karl 196 Marx, Karl; on capitalism 23, 174, 196, 258, 260 Massachusetts 312, 317, 323, 330 McCarthy 239, 245, 249, 251, 255 McCarthy, Bridget Tierney 263 McCarthyism 78, 239, 240, 249, 272, 280, 291, 522 McCarthy, Timothy 263 McDowell 247 McMahon Act 280 McNamara, Robert S. 350 MEFESZ See Union of Hungarian University and Academy Students 182, 184 Mekong River 354, 356 Menshevik 196 Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) 150 Mikoyan 221 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich 221

538

•

Index

military actions on a graduated scale of seriousness 429 military-industrial complex 112, 280, 285, 286, 291, 298, 300, 302, 459, 467 military spending 298, 302 Minh 336, 368, 369, 371, 372 Minsk 343, 345 MIRVs 406, 436, 439, 440 missile defense system 406, 410, 436 Modrow, Hans 505 Molotovs 209 Molotov, Vyacheslav 164 Moneda Palace 389 Monroe Doctrine 206 Montgomery, Robert 247 Moral Violence of Nations 158 Morgan, Thomas A. 282 Morse 269 Morse, Wayne L. 269 Moscow Declaration 9 Moscow Summer Olympic Games 400 Mossadeq, Mohammad 132 most-favored-nation (MFN) status 412 Motion Picture Association of America 251, 252 Moynihan 423 MPAA 252 mujahedeen fighters 443 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) 406, 436, 440 Murphy, George 247 Murray, Commissioner 281 Murrow, Edward R. 265, 289 mutual assured destruction (MAD) 316 Mutual Defense Treaty 114, 115, 116, 146, 148 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China 398 Mutual Security Act of 1954 103, 104, 105, 214 MX (intercontinental ballistic missiles) 460

N Nagasaki 79, 82, 91, 118, 125, 322, 406, 436 Nagasaki, Japan 82, 272 Nagy, Imre 182, 183 Napoleon 51 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 150 National Aeronautics and Space Act 195 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 195, 205, 311 National Association of Evangelicals 452, 453

National Council of Poland 10 National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 426 National Intelligence Authority 119 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE’s) 462 National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W) 463 nationalism 212, 213 nationalist 123, 143, 144, 145, 146, 196, 213 National Reconnaissance Office 205 National Security Council 56, 80, 335, 369 National Security Council (NSC) 91, 95, 96, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 427 National Security Council Report 68 56 National Security Policy 119 National Socialist Party 3, 5 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 426 NATO 68, 71, 74, 89, 90 naval blockade 322 Nazi 3, 5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 34, 41, 45, 46, 48, 72, 79, 132, 144, 241, 246, 251, 262 Nazi Germany 3, 34, 45, 46, 72, 79, 241, 246 Nazi Party 3, 6, 15 Nazis 14, 32, 43, 243, 244, 272, 351 Nazi-style nationalism 3 NBC 333, 334 NCS 68 91 New Deal 240, 246, 352, 356 New Economic Policy 47 “New Look” policy 298 New York Times Co. v. United States, The 443, 448, 452, 459 Ngo Dinh Diem, President 176, 333 NIE’s See National Intelligence Estimates 462 Nikolai Bulganin 164 Nitze, Paul 92 Nixon Doctrine 372, 376 Nixon, Richard M. 205, 257, 291, 368, 392, 395, 401, 406, 412, 416, 436, 437, 517 Nkrumah, Kwame 162 Nobel Peace Prize 41, 67 Nolting, Frederick 333 Non-Aligned Movement 154 nondiscriminatory treatment 413 nonmarket economy country 413, 415 normalization of relations between China and the United States 397, 398 North and South Korea 114

Index

North and South Vietnam 176, 368 North-Atlantic bloc 164 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 103, 105, 107, 109, 120, 126, 200, 204, 205, 209, 224, 299 North Korea 97, 99, 112, 114, 116 North Korean Communists 99, 123 North Vietnam 347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355 Norwegian Helsinki Committee 435 Novotný, Antonín 364 NSC 20/4 92, 93 NSC 68 56, 91, 92, 95 NSC 162/2 118, 119, 123 Nuclear Accidents Measures Agreement vii, 391, 514 nuclear arms 91, 96, 199 nuclear arms race 79, 83, 96, 112, 199, 406, 407 nuclear arsenal 81 nuclear attack 92, 95, 125 nuclear bomb 199, 316, 327, 339 nuclear chain reaction 339 nuclear conflict 328 nuclear devices 328 nuclear energy 91, 125, 226, 436 nuclear explosives 201 nuclear materials 328 nuclear nonproliferation 131 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 342 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 378 nuclear power 121, 130, 131 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 483, 487 nuclear state 322 nuclear technology 82, 91, 125, 130, 131, 199 nuclear test ban 322, 328, 342 nuclear test-ban treaty xii nuclear testing 131, 229 nuclear war 107, 112, 130, 219, 316, 318, 320, 321, 322, 325 nuclear weapon 79, 82, 91, 107, 118, 125, 195, 262, 266, 287, 311, 322, 323, 339, 340, 342 nuclear weaponry 130, 131 nuclear weapons 82, 233, 406, 407, 410, 411, 436, 439, 440 nuclear weapons testing 322, 339 Nuristanis 444

O Oak Ridge, Tennessee 272 Obama administration 214 Obama, Barack 214, 255

•

539

occupation zones 97, 303 Occupied Germany 30 October revolution 172, 173 October Revolution 196 O’Daniel, General 179 Oder-Neisse line 15 Office for Outer Space Affairs, Legal Subcommittee of 358 Office of European Affairs 69 Office of Science and Technology Policy 205 Official Secrets Act 272 Olympics (1988) 475 on-site inspection 322 Operation Ajax (TPAJAX) 133, 134, 136 Operation Candor 280 operation GRAND SLAM 293 Operation High Jump 224 Operation Rolling Thunder 350 Operation RYAN 460, 465 Oppenheimer, J. Robert vi, 272, 280, 281, 284, 286, 513, 520, 523 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 418 Organization of American States 211, 307, 308, 319, 320 Organization of American States (OAS) 319 Orwell, George; “You and the Atomic Bomb” 272 Ostermann, Christian F. 491 Ostpolitik 416 Oswald, Lee Harvey; murder of vii, 291, 343, 344, 345, 346, 514, 526

P Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza 132, 136 Paine, Thomas 458 Pakistan 328 Palffy Ter (Bem Ter) 184 palliation 244 palliative 42 Palma, Tomás Estrada 307 Palmer, A. Mitchell 242 Paris agreements 164 Pash, Colonel 283, 284 Patočka, Jan 431 patriotism 206 Pax Americana 323, 327 Peace Corps 312, 323, 327, 328, 330 “peace through strength” doctrine 452, 488

540

•

Index

Peace Treaty 10 Peace Treaty for Italy 10 peace with honor 368 "Peace Without Conquest" 351, 357 Pearl Harbor 75 Penghu Islands 147, 148 People’s Liberation Army 75 People’s Republic of Hungary 182 perestroika xiii, 441, 495, 496, 507 Permanent Defense Agreement 28 Permanent Joint Board on Defense 69 Permanent Secretariat of the Treaty of Ankara 140 Pershing IB 485 Personnel Security Board (Gray Board) 281 Pescadores 147, 148 Peters, Bernard, Dr. 283 PFIAB See President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 463, 465 physiognomy 46, 55 pillars of stability 376 Pinochet, Augusto, General 384, 389 Pipes, Richard 459 Pitt Machine Company 275 P. L. 480 211 Plastic People of the Universe 431, 432, 435, 520 Plenipotentiaries 115, 148, 228 “Point Four” initiative 103 Poland 395, 415 Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 91, 92 Polish Provisional Government 10, 12, 16 Polish Provisional Government of National Unity 10, 16 Politburo 50 Political Bureau (Politburo) 168 Political Consultative Committee 165, 166 Political Prisoners’ Year 434 popular front 207 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 426 Portuguese empire Break-up of in Africa 419 Portuguese Revolution 426 post-9/11 military budget 302 postulate 49 potash 7, 14, 23 Potsdam 3, 15, 16, 17, 25, 40, 72 Potsdam Agreement 3, 15, 16, 17, 25, 72 Potsdam Conference 3, 15, 16 Powers, Francis Gary, Captain 293, 297, 304, 363, 521 Prado, Manuel 209

Prague Spring (1968) 364, 367, 431, 520, 525, 528 Prague Spring reforms 367 Pravda 32, 195, 196, 421 Presidential Directive 58 (PD-58) 459 President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities 461 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 459, 461, 462 President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) 205 pro-American 206, 212, 213 Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender 14 pro-Communist 105, 208 Profiles in Courage 312, 323, 330 proletarian 46, 55 proletariat 46, 47, 49, 55 propaganda 179, 371 Protocol on Elimination 481, 482, 484, 485, 486, 487 Protocol on Inspection 484, 485, 487 Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam 397 proxy wars 219 Pruning Knife 368, 369 PT boat 312, 317, 323, 330 Pulitzer Prize 312, 323, 330 Pushtun 444 Pyongyang 114, 116

Q Qing dynasty 146 Qing Dynasty 75 Quixote, Don 55 quixotic 54, 55

R Rajk, László 182 Rákosi, Mátyás 182 rapprochement 395 ratification 70, 71 ratified 70 Reagan, Ronald 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252 Realpolitik 32 Reconstruction 44, 211 Red Army 21, 22 red-baiter 369 Red-baiting 242 Red China 100 Red fascism 242, 244

Index

Red Square 54 Red Tide 178 refugees 178, 179, 370 refuseniks 412, 493, 495 Registration Convention (1976) 363 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 455 Reichstag 473, 475 Reims 3 Republican Women’s Club of Wheeling, West Virginia 262, 266 Republic of Korea 98, 101, 114, 115, 116 Republic of Vietnam 180, 368 Rescue Agreement (1968) 363 Resolution 83 97 resolution 93 209 Resolution of Hungarian Student Protestors vi, 182, 514 reunification 72, 74 reunification, German 72, 476 reunification of Germany 331 Review Board 236, 237, 239 Reykjavík, Iceland 471 Reza Shah 132 Rhee, Syngman 115 Ribicoff, Abraham 413 Rice University 311, 315 Ridgway, Matthew 101 right of self-determination 397 Rio treaty 210 Rio Treaty 68 Robinson, Peter 471 ROC 146, 147, 148, 149 Rochester Times Union 283 Rodzyanko, [Mikhail] 173 Rogers, Secretory of State 371 Rogers, William P. 395, 396 Rogers, William Pierce 392 Roman Catholic 312, 323, 330 Roosevelt, Eleanor 32 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 3, 35, 41, 66, 73, 80, 234, 246, 247, 251, 299 Rosenberg Case vi, 272, 279, 514, 526 Rosenberg, Ethel ix, 260, 272, 273, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279 Rosenberg, Julius 272, 273, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279 Royall 73, 74 Royall, Kenneth 74 Rubottom, R. Richard, Jr. 206, 207 Rural Electric Authority (REA) 355

•

541

Rusk, Dean 340 Russell, Louis J. 247 Russian Communist Party 196 Russian Revolution 35, 251 Russian Revolution of 1905 196 Russian Revolution (of 1917) 491 Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) 196 Ryzhkov, Nikolai, Prime Minister 496

S Saigon 334, 335, 336, 337, 368, 371 Sakhalin Island 460 SALT I 342 SALT II vii, ix, 342, 436, 437, 440, 459, 460, 515 samizdat literature 435 San Cristóbal 316 Saypol, Irving 272, 279 Scali, John 321 Schabowski, Gunter 504 Schifter, Richard 496 Schneider, Rene, General 384 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, Sr. 134, 136 scientific-technological elite 298, 301 Screen Actors Guild 246, 247, 248, 252 Screen Actors’ Guild 246, 247, 249 SDI See Strategic Defense Initiative 441, 460, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 525 Seaborg Dr. 283 SEATO 146, 204, 335 Second Declaration of Havana 307 Second International 47 Second Red Scare 240, 249, 251, 254, 266, 287 second World War 109 secret police 48 “Secret Speech” 296 section 402 of the Trade Act 413 Securities and Exchange Commission 312, 323, 330 Security Council 11, 35, 56, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 80, 83, 87 Security Council of the United Nations 73 Seeger, Pete 252 Select Committee to Study Censure Charges 288 Semichastnyy, V. 344 Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan 339 Senate Committee on Government Operations 263 Senate Committee on Rules and Administration 288 Senate Joint Resolution 272 446 SENTO 294 Seoul 97, 98

542

•

Index

Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act 415 Service, John Stewart 76 seventeenth parallel 143 Seventh National Congress 190 Shah, Mohammad Zahir 443 Shanghai Communiqué 396, 399 Sharansky, Natan 412 Shcharansky, Anatoly 412 Shepard, Alan 311 Shevardnadze, Eduard 490 Shulman, Marshall 460 Shultz, George, Secretary of State 471, 490, 494 Silent Majority 377 Sing Sing Prison 272, 273 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 146, 150, 154 Sino-Soviet split xii, 78 Sino-U.S. relations 396 Six-Day War 401 small fission reaction 322 Smathers 211 Smith, Clyde 266, 267 Smith, H. A. 247 Smith, Margaret Madeline Chase 266, 269, 271, 272, 280 Smyth, Commissioner 281 Snowden, Edward 286 Sobell, [Morton] 276, 277 socialism 217 Socialism 46, 49, 50 socialist 197, 217 Socialist 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 46, 48, 49, 54, 79, 83, 88 socialist society 197 Social Security 302 Society for Studies of Interplanetary Travel 195 Socrates 47 Solidarity Council of the Afro-Asian Countries (AfroAsian People’s Solidarity Organisation) 154 Solidarity Trade Union 448 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander 421 Sources of Soviet Conduct, The 45, 46, 55 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 349, 350 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 146 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 146, 150, 395 South Korea 96, 97, 99, 101, 103, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 123 South Korean 97, 99, 114 South Vietnam 334, 335, 347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355

South Vietnam Communist Party 178 South Vietnamese forces 373 Soviet and Western blockade 74 Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba 316 Soviet atomic test 81 Soviet-backed guerrilla movement, (MPLA) 422 Soviet bloc 121, 122, 211 Soviet bloc, in Eastern Europe 121, 122, 185, 211, 367, 418, 427, 429, 506 Soviet blockade 73 Soviet-Communist 122 Soviet disinformation scheme 465 Soviet Empire 104, 105, 109 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 342 Soviet Jews 412, 415 Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 490 Soviet politburo 420 Soviet Russia 263 Soviets 91, 103, 105, 112, 114, 116, 119, 125, 133, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 211, 212, 213, 219, 223, 265, 289 Soviet spies 262, 266, 287 Soviet system 92, 94, 109, 118, 122 Soviet trade offensive 210, 211 Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan 400 space exploration 311, 315 space race 195, 198, 199, 205, 311, 315 Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology 203, 205 Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE’s) 462 SPETSNAZ forces 461 spheres of interest 398 Sputnik 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 209, 224, 311 Sputnik 1 195, 311, 358 Sputnik 2 195, 198, 311 Sputnik I and II 205 Sputnik II 199 spy plane 310, 316, 321, 322 Stalingrad 219 Stalinism 45, 209 Stalinist Rákosi era 183 Stalin, Joseph 3, 15, 16, 39, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 72, 74, 107, 109, 112, 219, 251, 329 Star Wars See Strategic Defense Initiative 363, 441, 460, 467, 470, 522, 525 Statement of Principles 83, 84, 86, 87 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 380 Stevenson, Adlai 321 Stevenson, Adlai Ewing II 108, 126, 200

Index

Stevenson amendment 415 Stockwell, John 427 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 342 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 406, 411, 436 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) 342, 392, 406 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 383 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 342 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 441, 467, 468 Strategy of Peace, A 322 Strauss, Lewis L., Commissioner 280, 281 Stripling, Robert E. 247, 248, 249 Sturm über Asien 156 Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration 288 Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees 287 Suez Canal 153, 156 suffrage 10 Sukarno 154, 155, 161, 162, 513, 522 super-nationalists 208 superpower 103, 114, 205, 396, 436 Supreme Soviet 407

T Taft, Robert 253 Taiwan 146, 147, 148, 149 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 399 Taiwan Strait 146, 395, 398 Tajiks 444 Taliban 447 Taraki, Nur Mohammad 443 Tariff Schedules of the United States 414 Technical University of Budapest 182 temple of peace 27 Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty 233 Tennessee Valley 82 Tennessee Valley Authority 82 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 354 Tereshkova, Valentina 198 Thailand 178, 335, 353, 373 Thatcher, Margaret vii, 418, 419, 425, 471, 515, 521, 524 thereof 11, 69, 236, 237 thermonuclear bomb 92, 118 thermonuclear device 339 thermonuclear weapon 91, 118, 322 The Sinews of Peace 25, 31 “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” 45, 46 Third World War 421

•

543

thirty-eighth parallel 97, 98, 103, 114 Thomas, J. Parnell 241, 247 Three Governments 4, 8, 9, 11, 12 Three Heads of Government 4 Three Powers 8, 9, 10 Thye, Edward J. 269 Tiananmen Square vii, xiii, 400, 415, 498, 501, 515 Tito, Josip Broz 138 Tito, President 335 Tobey, Charles W. 269 Toledano, Vicente Lombardo 208 Toledano, Vincente Lombardo 208 Trade Act of 1974 412 trade embargo 214 Treaty of Antarctica 225 Treaty of Brussels 68 Treaty of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance with Soviet Russia 29 Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration 138, 139, 142, 519 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood 150, 151, 152 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance See Warsaw Pact 164 Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation 151 Treaty of Potsdam 40 Treaty on Open Skies 296 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space vii, 358, 514 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) 406, 437 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 328 Treaty Ports 75 tripartite 8, 9, 14, 23 Tripartite Shipping Commission 9 Trotskyites 21, 171, 173 Trujillo, Rafael 308 Truman administration 96, 97, 98 Truman Doctrine v, 34, 38, 39, 64, 65, 66, 67, 103, 138, 241, 251, 298, 513, 520, 523 Truman, Harry S. 3, 34, 35, 38, 40, 64, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80, 83, 91, 97, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 114, 115, 118, 233, 234, 238, 241, 251, 262, 270, 436, 518 Tsar Bomba 322 Tsarist 46, 47 Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin 195, 197 Tudeh Party 132

544

•

Index

Tufts, Robert 92 turbulence 355, 356 Turkey 310, 316, 321, 322 TVA 354 Twenty-One Nations Conference 214 Twenty-One Nations speech 215 “Two Thousand Words” Manifesto vii, 364, 514 Tydings Committee 266, 287 Tydings, Senator 352

U U-2 spy plane 316, 321 ultranationalist 212 UNAEC 82, 83, 89 U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea 397 unfettered 10, 16 UN General Assembly 64, 359, 490, 513 unilateral 368 UN International Court of Justice 229 union 247 Union of Hungarian University and Academy Students (MEFESZ) 182 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) 92, 93, 94, 119, 121, 122, 196, 211, 214, 215, 225 unions 6, 243, 245 United Fruit Company 213 United Nation 65 United Nations 4, 7, 10, 11, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 234 United Nations Association of Greater Miami 206 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 82, 83, 85 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) 125 United Nations Command 97 United Nations Command in South Korea 97 United Nations General Assembly 64, 65, 66, 83, 89, 125 unity-criticism-unity model 186 Universal Charter of Human Rights 434 University of Havana 308 UNO See United Nations Organizations 27 UN Security Council 83, 141, 320, 321, 405 unwinnable war, an 357 US Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) See Lilley 498 US Army Corps of Engineers, Manhattan District of

272 US-Chilean relations 385 US Contingency Plans 426, 515 US House of Representatives 312, 317, 323, 330 US missiles 322 US ping-pong team 395 US Senate 312, 317, 323, 330, 342 USS Maddox 347, 349 US-Soviet arms race 118 U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet 493 USS Turner Joy 347, 349 US Zone 74

V V-2 rocket 311 Vaculík, Ludvík; A Cup of Coffee with My Interrogator 367, 527 Vail 247 Vandenberg, Arthur H. 43 Vanik, Charles 412 Velvet Revolution 367, 435 Venona papers 261 Verne, Jules 195 Versailles Treaty 30 Veterans of Foreign Wars 376 Viet Cong (VC) 350, 351, 369 Viet Minh 78, 143, 144 Vietminh Armies 179, 180 Vietnam 123, 143, 144, 145, 219 Vietnamese rebels 123 Vietnamization 368, 373, 374, 376, 377 Vietnamizing 373 “Vietnam syndrome” 427 Vietnam War 145, 219, 338, 357, 368, 376, 377 Vincent, John Carter 76 vocal minority 368, 374, 376 von Weizsäcker, President [Richard] 472, 476 Voorhees 73, 74 Voorhees, Tracy 74 Vostok 1 311 VRYAN See Operation RYAN 460, 461, 462 Vyshinsky, Andrey 64, 65, 66

W waive by Executive order 413, 414 Walesa, Lech 506 Wallace, Henry 32 Wallace, Henry A. 39

Index

war crimes 6 war criminals 9, 14, 15 Ware, Harold 258, 259 warmongering 327 War of the Worlds, The 195 War on Poverty 357 Warren Commission 346 “War Scare” vii, 459, 461, 515 Washington 43, 46, 56, 68, 69, 71 Washington Post 302 Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) 426, 427 Watergate 369 Watergate scandal 407 Watergate Scandal 219 Watkins, Arthur V. 288, 289 Watkins, Mr. 288 weapons of mass destruction 439 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 164, 313, 359, 360, 362, 401, 402, 439, 461 We Choose to Go to the Moon 311 Weinberg, Joseph 283 Wells, H. G. 195 Wernher von Braun 358 West Berlin 72, 73, 74 Western European Union 164 Western Union Defence Organization 68 West German 72 West Germany 66, 73, 74 West Germany entrance into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1, 56, 68, 74, 83, 103, 107, 109, 126, 138, 150, 163, 200, 209, 224, 299, 419 Westminster College 25, 26 West Point 299, 301 White House Office of Science and Technology 205 Whittier College 407 Wilber, Donald Newton 132, 133 Wilkerson, William R. 246 Wilson, Harold 419 Wilson, Woodrow 323 Wilson, Woodrow, President 356, 375 Wirtschaftswunder 473 Witt, Nathan 258, 259 Wojtyla, Karol, Cardinal 448, 450 worker-peasant alliance 189, 194 World Bank 354 World War I 41, 43, 80, 98, 104, 107, 126, 132, 200, 234, 251, 252, 299, 375 World War I, cause of 23 world war III 99

•

545

World War III, declaration of 24 Writers Union 364 Wyszynski, Stefan, Cardinal 450

X Xiaoping, Deng 395, 400, 498, 502, 519, 524

Y Yalta 3, 15, 16, 25, 30, 34, 37, 55, 256, 258, 343, 525 Yalta Agreement 34 Yalta and Potsdam Conferences 16 Yalta Conference 3, 15, 16, 34, 55 Yaobang, Hu Party Secretary of PRC 498 Yat-sen, Sun 187 Yazov, Defense Minister 496 Yeltsin, Boris 506, 509 Yorba Linda, California 407 You and the Atomic Bomb 272 Young Communist League 272, 276 Youth Parliament in Budapest 184 Yugoslavia 415

Z Zahedi, Fazlollah 132, 134, 136 Zarodov 421 Zedong, Mao 75, 146, 186, 187, 194, 351, 395, 396, 524, 526 Zhizn, Novaya 172 Zhou Enlai 396 Zhukov, Georgy 164 Zhukovs 209 Zinoviev 170, 172, 173 Zionist movement 412 ZONE OF TANGIER 12 Zubok, V. 17, 24, 175, 528 Zuckert, Commissioner 281