Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America

Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America Anne Marie Hoffmann Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America

Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America Series Editors Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard International Studies Instituto Mora Mexico City, Mexico César Villanueva Department of International Studies Universidad Iberoamericana Mexico City, Mexico

This series seeks to go beyond a traditional focus on the virtues of intra-­ regional and inter-regional trade agreements, liberal economic policies, and a narrow security agenda in Latin America. Instead, titles deal with a broad range of topics related to international cooperation, global and regional governance, sustainable development and environmental cooperation, internal displacement, and social inclusion in the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda – as well as their repercussions for public policy across the region. Moreover, the series principally focuses on new international cooperation dynamics such as South-South and triangular cooperation, knowledge sharing as a current practice, and the role of the private sector in financing international cooperation and development in Latin America. The series also includes topics that fall outside the traditional scope of studying cooperation and development, in this case, (in)security and forced internal displacement, cultural cooperation, and Buen Vivir among indigenous peoples and farmers in Latin America. Finally, this series welcomes titles which explore the tensions and dialogue around how to manage the imbalance between state, markets, and society with a view to re-articulating cooperation and governance dynamics in the 21st century. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15135

Anne Marie Hoffmann

Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America

Anne Marie Hoffmann Hamburg University of Applied Sciences Hamburg, Germany

Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America ISBN 978-3-319-98067-6    ISBN 978-3-319-98068-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953184 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit © PatricioHidalgoP/iStock/Getty Images Plus Cover design: Akihiro Nakayama This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Neusa and Bernd.

Series Editors’ Preface

UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas), inaugurated in May 2008, is certainly a strange bird from a regional scope but also from an organizational perspective. In spite of celebrating its tenth anniversary this year, in 2018, the presence, impact, and relevance of UNASUR in the region is more in question now than ever. It is not that the organization lacks purpose or substance; neither it is that the South American nations do not see the necessity of joining common forces to cope with external regional challenges, nor the problem is due to its ideological origins, more oriented towards progressive politics and not so much neoliberal principles. The strangeness of UNASUR rests in its incapacity to align itself with the timing of the rest of the world; at the time of crisis for regional integration, progressive politics could not find any place for reinvention, and the economic power of the region, in comparative terms with that of other regions, was rapidly declining after the heydays of the extractive boom. The ideological founding fathers of UNASUR, Hugo Chávez, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Néstor Kichner, are all gone, and the successors, there and elsewhere, see very little incentive to follow one of the highest historical dreams of many nations of South America, the so-called Bolivarian integration, a nineteenth-century vision that aimed at reaching a unity of nations with similar origins and cultures. As it stands now, UNASUR has a pro-tempore leadership from Bolivia, led by its foreign minister, Fernando Huanacuni, that has been severely questioned by most members, mainly liberal presidents such as Mauricio Macri from Argentina, Juan Manuel Santos from Colombia, and Michel vii

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Temer from Brazil. The political times have changed; Donald Trump is the President of the United States, the United Kingdom decided to leave the Eurozone, and China has the greatest economic influence in the region, not to mention that the Organization of American States is no longer the main opponent of UNASUR. Another strange feature of UNASUR is that it has not compelled much effort to analyze its rise and fall from a scholarly perspective. Strange as it sounds, UNASUR has not been under scrutiny in a systematic and thorough fashion neither from within Latin America (intra-comparison) nor any other continent (e.g. in a cross-comparative perspective with the European Union). Therefore, Anne Hoffman’s in-depth examination, titled Regional Governance in South America: Public Policy-Making in Regional Organizations, of the rationale and working procedures of UNASUR is a welcome contribution to fill in a gap in the literature on public policy-making in regional organizations, and it also stands out in this series that aim to present novel research on governance, development, and social inclusion in Latin America. So, what has happened during these ten years of existence, from the solemn declamatory visions that UNASUR would confer a “South American identity and citizenship” to concrete policy initiatives strengthening regional cooperation “beyond the economic and political dimensions,” as Hoffman mentions in her Introduction? Symbolically, since December 2014, UNASUR boasts a headquarter integrated with the Middle of the World Complex in Quito, Ecuador. But unlike the policy-­making procedures of the over-researched European Union where the institutions in Brussels play a major role, the UNASUR is very much a “dispersed” regional organization and still rather unknown both to academia and policy-makers.1 1  It should be said that there is a body of literature, especially in Spanish, about the UNASUR, see, for example, César Augusto Bermúdez Torres, “MERCOSUR Y UNASUR: Una mirada a la integración regional a comienzos del siglo XXI”, Análisis Político, vol. 24, no. 72, Bogotá Aug. 2011, pp.  115–131; Andrea C.  Bianculli and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman (eds.), Regional Organizations and Social Policy in Europe and Latin America: A Space for Social Citizenship?, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Daniel Kersffeld, “El papel de la UNASUR ante los conflictos internacionales: dos estudios de caso”, Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, vol. 58 no. 218, México may./ago. 2013, pp. 193–208; Elena Lazarou, “Brazil and regional integration in South America: lessons from the EU’s crisis”, Contexto Internacional, vol. 35, no. 2, Rio de Janeiro July/Dec. 2013, pp. 353–385; Pia Riggirozzi and Jean Grugel, “Regional governance and legitimacy in South America: the meaning of UNASUR”, International Affairs, vol. 91, no. 4, 1 July 2015, pp. 781–797;

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Some observers have labeled the UNASUR a “leftist” project, whereas others contend that it is rather unnecessary to look for ideological labels since most regional organizations are inherently pragmatic and during their life time will certainly feature participants of distinct political colors. Hence, Hoffman properly situates the UNASUR between the “highs and lows” of economic, political, and social conjunctures in the region, comprising the “Pink Tide,” the momentum for leftist governments, and the return of staunch defenders of neoliberal economic principles. However, limited substance can be found on the real effects UNASUR has had on the political and economic stability in the region, besides incendiary speeches of some of its most conspicuous defenders. On April 20, 2018, six UNASUR countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay) announced they would temporarily suspend their membership because of dissatisfaction with the organization’s stand on the escalating violence in Venezuela while being “adrift” under the pro-tempore presidency of Bolivia. In fact, UNASUR has not had any fixed General Secretary since Ernesto Samper left in January 2017. Interestingly, as Hoffman points out, the lack of permanent leadership has not been a major problem for the organization; the steering function of UNASUR lies in the different councils rather than the secretariat, it seems. Unlike Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN), whose rationale is driven by economic concerns, UNASUR does not put (free) trade or market mechanisms in focus. Instead, it is conspicuously intergovernmental and centers on political cooperation in “low” politics. While it seems implausible that UNASUR will start climbing the “integration ladder” modeling the European Union, there have been talks about thinking of a common Southern Bank (Banco del Sur), common currency, and a common market, but then domestic or regional crises have halted such prospective exercises. By using well-selected quotes from interviews with José Antonio Sanahuja, “Regionalismo post-liberal y multilateralismo en Sudamérica: El caso de UNASUR”, in Andrés Serbin, Laneydi Martínez, Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior (eds.), El regionalismo “post–liberal” en América Latina y el Caribe: Nuevos actores, nuevos temas, nuevos desafíos. Anuario de la Integración Regional de América Latina y el Gran Caribe, Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES): Argentina, 2012, pp. 19–72; United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “UNASUR: Fostering South American integration through development and cooperation”, November 2014, available at: https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/37384-unasurfostering-south-american-integration-through-development-and-cooperation.

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policy-makers and experts, Hoffman illustrates how UNASUR is distinct from, for example, the Mercosur. As one of the delegates she interviewed put it: “While UNASUR focusses on the execution of projects and the development of joint positions, the Mercosur’s objective is to create legal norms, which are applied in the countries.” So, even if there are domestic crises or dissatisfaction with questionable proceedings for ousting or preventing democratically elected leaders from government in neighboring countries,2 the UNASUR keeps working on since it is primarily driven by common interests on a lower scale and more technical, practical exchanges than grand agreements or all-encompassing declarations. Given there is no need to ratify regulations, monitor proper implementation of binding principles, or the like, the councils have a readiness for swift and flexible (re)action, aided by network structures of experts. Accordingly, Hoffman demonstrates how UNASUR is an example of regional governance where intergovernmental organizational structures allow for institutional flexibility and a greater presence of transgovernmental networks involving technical experts and high-level officials from the ministries or authorities engaged in any of the 12 councils making up the organization. Clearly, the intergovernmental logic (as opposite to any supranational-inspired driving force) coupled with a remarkably flexible institutional design together facilitate “dissimilar processes” of public policy-making across different policy sectors. The reader will appreciate that Hoffman establishes an original analytical model for an integrated understanding of the UNASUR that takes into account particular features at the macro- and micro-levels. Centering on five councils, handling issues of health, social development, infrastructure and planning, culture, science, technology, and innovation, each receives a proper contextualization regarding its creation and key characteristics, as well as the degree of “fit” between this UNASUR policy area and the national administrations. Hoffman then introduces the influence of certain UNASUR “frames” on the given policy area, based, for example, on human rights, democracy, sovereignty, sustainability, social development, and so forth. Entering the realm of micro-processes, Hoffman scrutinizes each council according to the degree of collusion of national interests, the space for autonomy of action of policy-makers, and the prevalence of group 2   Carlos Closa and Stefano Palestini, “Tutelage and Regime Survival in Regional Organizations’ Democracy Protection: The Case of MERCOSUR and UNASUR”, World Politics, Published online: 1 June 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887118000035.

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cohesion within the transgovernmental network featuring ministerial representatives. These three factors have an impact on the possibility of developing “sectoral rationality” within each council, and they also serve as foundation for comparing the functionality and effectiveness of the five councils examined. In particular, we find it intriguing to follow Hoffman’s research as she reveals how cooperation around specific policy areas originates from perceived needs within each council; instead of policy-makers or technical experts waiting for instructions “from above,” they go ahead and formulate their own agendas and objectives to be met. This particular characteristic points to how factors related to group dynamics and micro-processes of socialization play a determining role for collective action to occur. Consequently, Hoffman departs from an interactionist assumption when scrutinizing the particular “social nature” of each council. Herein lies an original contribution both in terms of theorizing conceptually and how to empirically observe and make sense of unique organizational and institutional features embedded in regional organizations. We hope that Hoffman will continue her important work on the UNASUR, especially as she leaves open a few themes for further research. As for the theoretical-conceptual discussion, Hoffman explains how the choice of institutional design of regional organizations can either obstruct or facilitate integration within policy areas. In the case of UNASUR, it is clear that “sectoral integration does neither require presidential involvement nor supranationality,” as she puts it succinctly in her Conclusions. How this statement stands in relation to other regional organizations is a pertinent question worth comparative examination. Another exciting path relates to what Hoffman found out through several of the interviews she conducted with policy-makers: that national administrations, facing limited economic and human resources, seem burdened with the UNASUR councils, alongside numerous other bilateral, regional, or multilateral cooperation schemes. Also, there has been a tendency from the side of certain countries to politicize the councils, so the question becomes whether national administrations can resist such pressures or they will succumb and become “co-opted,” which is problematic since “technical rationality is the dominant logic” in the councils, as she asserts. Without any doubt, from its conception, UNASUR proposed a challenge to the neoliberal credo and politics in the region, so much misused and misapplied, from where a new possible route meant a possibility to escape orthodoxy. The initial enthusiasm for UNASUR was in part

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­ ndermined by the poor institutional architecture of the organization, the u lack of vision to incorporate some key political values to its core (e.g. social democracy, regulated markets, and freedom of expression), and the long-­ term sustainable vision to make this great effort a living mechanism for fostering development and peace. Finally, one could wonder about how much of actual integration in particular areas of public policies UNASUR really has contributed to. The specific country evidences need be brought out in the light and scrutinized under the inquiry whether transgovernmental policy-making has made a difference or not, for example, along the dimensions of sustainable development and social cohesion in a particular policy sector. Against the background of ongoing national implementations of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, is the UNASUR seeking to integrate a common vision around the 17 Sustainable Development Goals in their shared venues for policy coordination within the councils? Notwithstanding, there is no doubt that this valuable study by Anne Hoffman will inspire future research about the UNASUR. Mexico City, Mexico June 15, 2018

Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard César Villanueva

Acknowledgments

This book is based on my doctoral thesis, which I have written at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. I would like to thank all my colleagues and friends, in particular, at the ILAS.  The Friedrich Ebert Foundation provided my scholarship and made field trips possible. I am grateful for this opportunity. I would like to thank Detlef Nolte and Pia Riggirozzi for their helpful advice and supervision. Great thanks go to Daniel from the Universidad de la República in Uruguay and Michel from the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Ecuador. I am also indebted to Veronica Rocha in Chile and Pedro Schinca in Uruguay. Both facilitated many contacts and were available to help me with my studies. I also owe thanks to all my interview partners, who shared their experiences and impressions with me. Finally, I would like to thank Lisa, Janina, Tara, Katja, Ronny, and Frede.

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Contents

1 Introduction: Regional Governance in South America   1 References 11 2 Public Policies in Regional Integration Theory  15 2.1 Policy-Making in the Study of Regions 17 2.2 Evidence from Regional Integration Theory 21 2.3 Analytical Dimensions of Regional Public Policy-Making 24 References 27 3 Policy Studies and Regional Public Policy-Making  31 3.1 Levels of Policy-Making 32 3.2 Dimensions of Policy-Making 34 3.2.1 Actors 35 3.2.2 Interests 39 3.2.3 Structures 40 3.2.4 Ideas 42 3.3 Conceptual Model of Regional Public Policy-Making 43 References 46

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4 The Case of UNASUR  49 4.1 The Regional Organization of UNASUR 50 4.2 Methodological Approach 53 4.2.1 The Practice of Triangulation 55 4.2.2 Macro-Level: Institutional Analysis of Organizations 56 4.2.3 Micro-Level: Collective Action in Regional Spaces 61 References 63 5 Regional Organizations in South America  67 5.1 Regionalism in South America: Waves and Institutional Creation 67 5.1.1 Waves of Regionalism in Latin America 68 5.1.2 Drivers of Regionalism? Brazil and Venezuela 71 5.1.3 South American Regional Organizations and the Creation of UNASUR 74 5.2 The Institutional Dimension of UNASUR 78 5.2.1 Organizational Frames of UNASUR 79 5.2.2 Formal Organizational Structure of Policy-Making in UNASUR 89 5.3 Analysis of the Macro-Level 99 References103 6 Regional Public Policy-Making in Sectoral Councils 109 6.1 South American Council of Health (CSS)110 6.1.1 The Context of Policy-Making in Health110 6.1.2 Group Processes in the Health Council116 6.1.3 Summary: Regional Health119 6.2 South American Council of Social Development (CSDS)120 6.2.1 The Context of Policy-Making in Social Development120 6.2.2 Group Processes in the Social Development Council124 6.2.3 Summary: Regional Social Development128 6.3 South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning (COSIPLAN)129 6.3.1 The Context of Policy-Making in Infrastructure129 6.3.2 Group Processes in the Infrastructure Council135 6.3.3 Summary: Regional Infrastructure139

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6.4 South American Council of Culture (CSC)139 6.4.1 The Context of Policy-Making in Culture139 6.4.2 Group Processes in the Culture Council144 6.4.3 Summary: Regional Culture147 6.5 South American Council of Science, Technology, and Innovation (COSUCTI)149 6.5.1 The Context of Policy-Making in Science149 6.5.2 Group Processes in the Science Council152 6.5.3 Summary: Regional Science and Technology156 References158 7 Policy-Making in UNASUR Councils: Comparative Analysis 163 7.1 Formal Structure: Institutional Conditions for Regional Public Policy-Making163 7.2 Frame Dimension: Political Objectives of Regional Public Policy-Making166 7.3 The Role of Brazil and Venezuela in Regional PolicyMaking167 7.4 Comparison of Policy-Making in Sectoral Councils170 7.4.1 Health171 7.4.2 Social Development172 7.4.3 Infrastructure173 7.4.4 Culture174 7.4.5 Science175 7.4.6 Comparative Analysis of Sectoral Councils176 References182 8 Conclusion: Regional Governance in South America 185 8.1 Review187 8.2 Case Study188 8.3 Assessment of Regional Public Policy-Making190 8.4 Outlook and Further Research192 References195 Index 197

Abbreviations

ACTO ALADI ALALC ALBA BID BNDES CAF CAN CCT CEED CELAC CEPAL CEU CMC CNS COSIPLAN COSUCTI CSC CSD CSDS CSE CSS EASE ECLAC EU FAO FIC

Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social Corporación Andina de Fomento Comunidad Andina de Naciones Comité de Coordinación Técnica Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de Defensa Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe Consejo Electoral de UNASUR Consejo del Mercado Común Comunidad de Naciones Suramericanas Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento Consejo Suramericano de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Consejo Suramericano de Cultura Consejo Suramericano de Defensa Consejo Suramericano de Desarrollo Social Consejo Suramericano de Educación Consejo Suramericano de Salud Evaluación Ambiental y Social con Enfoque Estratégico Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean European Union Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Fondo de Iniciativas Comunes xix

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ABBREVIATIONS

FONPLATA FTAA GMC GTE IBD IIRSA IPEA ISAGS ISM LAFTA MERCOSUR MICSUR NAFTA OAS OEI ORAS CONHU OTCA PA PAHO PPT RECyT SAFTA SEGIB SICSUR SSAN UNASUR UNESCO WHO

Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata Free Trade Area of the Americas Grupo Mercado Común Grupo Técnico Ejecutivo Inter-American Development Bank Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada x Instituto Suramericano de Gobierno en Salud Instituto Social del Mercosur Latin American Free Trade Association Mercado Común del Cono Sur Mercado de Industrias Culturales del Sur North American Free Trade Agreement Organization of American States Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos Organismo Andino de Salud—Convenio Hipólito Unanue Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica Pacific Alliance Pan American Health Organization Presidency Pro-Tempore Reunión Especializada de Ciencia y Tecnología del Mercosur South American Free Trade Area Secretaría General Iberoamericana Sistema de Información Cultural del MERCOSUR Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional Unión de Naciones Suramericanas United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Health Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Policy-making at the national, regional, and global levels. Source: Author’s figure Fig. 3.2 Model of regional public policy-making. Source: Author’s figure Fig. 4.1 Model of regional public policy-making and levels. Source: Author’s figure Fig. 4.2 Model of regional public policy-making and levels II. Source: Author’s figure

32 45 56 61

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Schools and assumption for the concept of regional public policies25 Table 2.2 Constitutive elements of the regional level 26 Table 2.3 Constitutive elements of the regional level and dimensions of analysis 27 Table 2.4 Dimensions of analysis—simplified model 27 Table 3.1 Factors determining regional public policy-making 43 Table 3.2 Systematization of factors of regional public policy-making 44 Table 4.1 Creation of UNASUR councils 52 Table 5.1 Financial contribution by member states in US$ with quotas (2014–2017)94 Table 5.2 Creation and approval of councils by the CJEG 98 Table 6.1 Ministerial development health 111 Table 6.2 Systematization of action plans of the regional organizations 112 Table 6.3 Ministerial development of social development 122 Table 6.4 National coordination infrastructure and planning 130 Table 6.5 Ministerial development culture 142 Table 6.6 Ministerial development of science and technology 150 Table 7.1 Comparative analysis of sectoral councils 177

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Regional Governance in South America

On May 23, 2008, the presidents of all 12 independent South American nations signed the Constitutive Treaty of a newly created organization. The UNASUR, Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, the Union of South American Nations, was meant to strengthen the “political dialogue among Member States to guarantee a space for agreement in order to reinforce South American integration” (UNASUR 2008, 3). At this third presidential summit in the Brazilian capital Brasilia, the by then acting presidents of the South American nations agreed on building a “South American identity and citizenship” (UNASUR 2008, 1) and strengthening common regional policies beyond the economic and political dimensions. Only ten years later, on April 20, 2018, their successors are confronted with the suspension of membership of six member states. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru, representing half of all UNASUR members, decided to withdraw temporarily from UNASUR. The reasons for this suspension, according to the respective member states, are rooted in the inability to find a General Secretary. Since the mandate of the former Secretary Ernesto Samper ended in January 2017, the UNASUR member states were not able to designate a new candidate. The reasons for this inability are manifold. National problems, economic crises and fiscal austerity, unhealthy ideological alliances, and a missing long-­term orientation of governments all contribute to this situation, in which UNASUR appears to be unable to act. © The Author(s) 2019 A. M. Hoffmann, Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3_1

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It is not the objective of this book to explain why presidents cannot agree on a Secretary and keep vetoing possible candidates. Instead, the objective is to look behind the scenes of presidential politics and to understand the patterns and pitfalls of the regional organization UNASUR. In fact, the organization worked most of the time without actual leadership. From its very beginning, finding a General Secretary was a difficult task to undertake. Although UNASUR made major progress with Ernesto Samper, it was not inoperative before or after his mandate. In many different organs, policies have been developed and pursued. This book will focus on these regional public policies and seeks to understand how these processes of policy-making work in different UNASUR organs. The suspension of membership of half of UNASUR’s member states is a good opportunity to ask which effects presidential disputes have on regional policy-making, what the objectives of UNASUR organs are, and, finally, if UNASUR really is unable to act. According to the withdrawing governments, the Union came to deadlock. Yet, this interpretation runs short the variety of processes taking place in the ambit of UNASUR. In the past, UNASUR has often been misinterpreted. But, what is UNASUR really about? Three interpretations until today dominate the discussions around the organization. First, UNASUR was analyzed as the convergence of the southern common market Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) and the also economically oriented Andean Community CAN (Comunidad Andina). Yet, UNASUR does not involve a market or trade agreement. The Union is political in nature. There is no economic primacy, and, hence, an economically oriented analysis of UNASUR does not make sense. In it’s second common interpretation, UNASUR raised attention as “conflict solver” in its first years of existence. Presidents and Ministers of Foreign Affairs got involved in diverse regional and national conflicts and offered solution in the name of UNASUR. However, this form of involvement is no organizational feature of the organization but rather a product of successful summitry. It is only a snapshot of UNASUR’s institutionality. Third, in particular, academia tended to judge UNASUR as ideologically motivated leftist project. Although the creational track offers good reasons for this interpretation, it would be an abridged judgment. The project has been planned for more than three decades, long before the so-called turn to the left gained ground in South America. Liberal, conservative, and leftist presidents contributed to the development of UNASUR. Moreover, regional tensions and frictions also characterized the creation of the Union. What differentiates today from 2008 is

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the simple willingness of governments to cooperate at the regional level and to develop a long-term perspective. UNASUR represents a political compromise. It is a political space that acknowledges the relevance of common public policies for regional development. It is progressive in the sense that it seeks to establish a regional public sphere via the emplacement of several regional public policies. The most impressive and astonishing about UNASUR is the ability to provide the space for a variety of policy fields to act and interact at the regional level. This major characteristic of the organization is at the same time the most unseen one. Ex-General Secretary Ernesto Samper in our interview told me without any doubt or ambiguity that UNASUR is all about regional public policies. According to him, its objective is to “identify public policies” (Samper 2014). The misinterpretation of UNASUR is to a large extent a conceptual problem. There is no concept of regional public policy-making, and, as a consequence thereof, no understanding of it. This book sets new grounds for the analysis of this level of interaction and therewith opens space for new analytical approaches to regions. Its comprehensive analysis contributes to the series “Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America,” with an in-depth understanding of the processes of regional public policy-making. In line with the approach of the series, which reaches beyond the traditional analysis of regions along economic trade or presidential agreements, this title emphasizes the relevance of regional cooperation in a variety of public policy fields. It directs attention to the diverse and multifaceted processes that actually take place in regions, which still keep being unseen or even disregarded by academic research. The book argues that regional governance, understood as an institutional form, needs to provide the space for policy-makers to interact independently and in a process of collective action to develop a common regional perspective. This regional perspective is based on shared experiences and challenges. Being the most unequal region in the world, South American policy-makers particularly in social policy fields are aware of the necessity to cooperate. The development of regional public policies, to them, is a precondition to long-term sustainable development. Pragmatically, the founding fathers of the Union stressed the necessity of “social and human development with equity and inclusion to eradicate poverty and overcome inequalities in the region” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art.3.b).

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With regard to the political agenda, scholars used to interpret the creation of the South American Union as indicative of the prolonged process of regional transformation in South America. Especially the proponents of a post-hegemonic regionalism (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012) argue that social development is increasingly important in regional cooperation (Riggirozzi and Grugel 2015). New organizations are constructed concerning the experiences of older organizations. As a result, various agreements, differing in range and scope as well as in their time of existence, today constitute the regional landscape of South America. Several new agreements have been signed in the last two decades and complement the existing organizations of Mercosur, CAN, and ALADI (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración). ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) was created in 2004, CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos) in 2010, and Alianza del Pacifico in 2011. In comparison to other regional organizations, the institutional flexibility of UNASUR appears to be supportive of different policy-making processes. UNASUR managed to provide the space for cooperation in these different policy fields. By analyzing and comparing five of them, this book seeks to understand the mechanisms of regional public policy-making and to reveal the conditions to effective policy formulation. These are the South American councils of health, social development, infrastructure, culture, and science. In total, UNASUR comprises 12 sectoral councils, ranging from security over education to culture. The case study of UNASUR investigates how flexible structures allow policy fields to develop their own working procedures. This strict intergovernmental working mode in combination with the flexible institutional structure of UNASUR allows analyzing factors influencing collective action in different groups. It permits an understanding of how processes in policy fields developed differently from each other. The case of UNASUR proves that the flexible intergovernmental structure supports dissimilar processes within the same formal structure. By doing so, UNASUR is not only empirically an interesting case, but also conceptually. Its institutional flexibility allows analyzing patterns of regional public policy-making in comparative perspective and challenges the traditional interpretation of regional integration and regional institutions. The quest for explanations as to why supranationality is failing is still dominant in the literature on regional integration. The different layers of traditional explanations can be grouped into the leading schools of

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thought of (neo)functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Both, initially being empirical theories of the European integration process, were influential in the study of regions worldwide. However, scholarly thought in this tradition rather explains why supranationality fails, instead of considering the variety of empirically observable processes that are actually taking place. Neofunctionalists, who were the first to describe European integration, firmly believed that economic cooperation between nation-­ states has integrative power. Ernst Haas (1964) argued for the functional necessity of economic integration. Supranational institutions, to him, are the drivers of integration and at the same time the final objective of cooperation. Intergovernmentalists, on the other side, rejected the existence of supranationality. Andrew Moravcsik (1998) argued that the European integration is built on the foundation of intergovernmental institutions. To him, only as long as states are willing to accept rules, institutions can assert authority over sovereign nations. Nevertheless, his analysis worked around the existence or non-existence of supranationality. Until today, this perspective is dominant. Scholars such as Malamud (2013) built their argument around weak or missing supranational institutions and claimed that regional processes always depend on presidential policy-making. At the same time, the economy is still treated as the pulling force of regionalism (Gardini 2009). Both presumptions, the one of supranationality and of an economic integrative power, do not hold true in the case of UNASUR, and modern South American regionalism in general. On the contrary, as we will see due the course of this book, both factors have the potential to obstruct regional policy-making instead of favoring it. Traditional integration theories are no longer able to explain the emerging processes not only in South America but also in different world regions. As a result, regionalists started to detach from these “old” theories of regional integration. In particular, “New Regionalism” scholars contributed to the study of regions with constructivist perspectives, mainly arguing that regions are constructed spaces. The concepts of regioness (Hettne 2003, 2005) and region-building approaches (Neuman 2003; Van Langenhove 2011) paved the way for the theorization of regions beyond the scope of regional organizations. Although New Regionalism incentivized the stride towards a more comprehensive study of regions, the result of the theoretical amplification has been the fragmentation of the field, rather than a better understanding of regional processes. Even if a variety of actors is taken into consideration, the state as a unitary regional actor

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stays unrevealed. To sum up with Acharya and Johnston: “the study of New Regionalism does not mean that the formal regionalism among states has become unimportant” (2007, 10). We do not know how different actors are engaged in different regional processes. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that state actors are not relevant any longer. Quite the contrary, intergovernmental organizations are constituted by the interaction of state representatives. Both, Old and New Regionalism, still tend to treat the state as unitary actor. This perspective disregards the notion that pluralism of interests constitutes democratic states and that these interests may also transcend national borders. Policy-makers in one field might very well be pursuing different interests than those pursued by policy-makers in other policy fields. The question of whether or not states are ceding sovereignty is pointless when it comes to understanding how sectoral integration evolves in regions. To grasp the empirical phenomenon of regional public policy-making adequately, this book chooses to embed the analysis into the broader framework of comparative regionalism. According to Söderbaum, the aim of comparative regionalism is to “engage in a more fruitful dialogue, and through that process overcome the fragmentation in the field of regionalism” (2015, 22). Acharya proposes that the approach is not bound to the normativity of supranational institutions (2012, 12–13). That means that, in terms of comparative regionalism, current regional configurations are analyzed in a rather pragmatic way. Evaluations of “successful” or “efficient” strongly depend on the context and the self-targeted purposes of regional institutions, instead of being assessed according to normatively inspired institutional configurations (Best 2012; Riggirozzi 2012). In line with this approach, the objective of the present study is to broaden the conceptual understanding of policy-making processes within the framework of intergovernmental regional organizations. Employing the perspective of Goertz and Powers, who conceptualize regional organizations as an “institutional form” (2014, 2), the study focuses on the institutional underpinnings of regional public policy-making. Institutions are not simply material structures, but “certainly social constructions” (Powers and Goertz 2011, 2389). The concept of regional governance allows for focusing on the intergovernmental institutions of regional organizations without normative implications. Instead, it considers institutional conditions according to their effect. Regional governance, hence, describes how institutionally

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flexible structures facilitate the independent evolution of policy fields in regions. Governance as such focuses on the coordination of action and of structures, on the interdependencies in a regional setting. In general terms, it describes institutionalized systems of rules, which provide rationales for behavior. There is no authoritative imposition to rule compliance. Governance, as a result, implies an actor-based perception of policy-making, which is useful for the study of regional public policy-­ making. Scholars such as Hveem (2003) conceptualized regional governance for the regional level as corresponding to systems of the national states. In line with this argument, Nolte (2014) points out that regional governance in most cases is characterized by intergovernmental organizational structures. Riggirozzi (2012) adds a constructivist perspective to the debate, by pointing out that regional governance has to respond to how regions are constructed and reconstructed. From an institutionalist point of view, flexibility is a fundamental precondition for governance. Formal structures are necessary to legitimize interaction, but should not restrict the development of independent processes of policy-making. Regional governance, therefore, corresponds to the coordination and management of parallel regional processes instead of the establishment of hierarchical order or fixed rules. Accordingly, the adoption of the concept of regional governance allows to focus on policy processes in regional institutional settings, alternatively, on arenas of collective action and shared responsibility of independent actors (Hveem 2003, 81). It is a valuable analytical approach to understand what is going on in certain public policy fields, which is, basically, regional public policy-­ making. Different from public policy-making at a national level, it includes the development of a regional perspective and the achievement of common policy objectives. This is important to note, as we can empirically observe that different policy fields develop independently from each other although being part of the same organization. The sectoral councils of UNASUR are an illustrative example of this finding. While the Health or Culture Council display major progress in institutionalization and policy formulation, others, such as the Social Development Council, are not even able to agree on common definitions. Independent from its performance at the presidential level, UNASUR is therefore an example of modern regionalism that aims at developing transnational public policies. Regional organizations worldwide are increasingly investing in cooperation in rather social policy fields such as health, education, culture, or social development. So far academic research

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ignored forms of public policy-making processes at the regional level. Today, we are not able to explain why regional public policy-makers harmonize educational agendas or why they produce common cultural goods. In particular, we cannot explain why some policy fields develop a regional perspective and others do not. To understand what is occurring in regions, it is not enough to speculate about the interests of states and the failure of institutions. The foundational question to this book, thus, arises from a fundamental empirical puzzle in a situation of transformation in many regions. How is it possible that different policy fields develop in such different ways, even though they are embedded into the same regional structure? If not supranational institutions or economic integration, then what determines policy-making processes in different policy fields? In short, what does regional policy-making look like in practice and what are the conditions to it? As I am going to show throughout the analysis in this book, every public policy field, be it health, education, infrastructure, or energy, develops its rationality of action with its own objectives. In effect, group-inherent factors are decisive for the development of policy-making processes and hence for successful collective action in regions. As mentioned before, policy-making in public sectors at the regional level is carried out primarily by governmental representatives. These representatives establish groups of policy-makers at the regional level. However, according to Olson, the prominent pioneer of collective action theory, a group of actors sharing a common interest does not automatically lead to collective action (1965). While Olson mainly elaborated on individual and primarily economic incentives as a reason for collective action, newer approaches focus on sociological explanations (Gilbert 2006; Searle 2005). Group processes, which might lead to the enactment of common objectives, and thereby contribute to collective action, are the concern of the theoretical perspective of social interactionism (Blumer 1986). Fundamentally, interactionist theory seeks to explain social processes through the construction of meaning in human interaction. Individual behavior accordingly has to be interpreted in its context (Blumer 1986; Goffman 1970). In the case of this study, the context is narrowed down to groups of policy-makers in regional intergovernmental organizations. Consequently, I am going to apply an actor-based approach based on the interactionist assumption. While intergovernmental regional institutions create the spaces in which regional policy-makers interact, factors inherent to such groups will decide whether collective action is possible or not.

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The behavior of actors beyond presidential politics is still unknown in the study of regions. To analyze processes of policy-making at the inter-­ ministerial level, hence, I will employ notions of the study of global policy-­ making. At the international level, scholars have already discussed policy-making in distinct forms. The dominant approach is the network approach (Cross 2011; Maxwell and Stone 2004; Stone 2013). Especially in global politics, scholars focused on the study of epistemic communities or advocacy coalitions (Stone 2013), which are constituted by a variety of actors from civil society, private economy, or NGOs (Cross 2013), instead of ministerial representatives. Keohane and Nye, however, were the first to focus explicitly on groups of governmental representatives as networks. Describing them as transgovernmental networks (Keohane and Nye 1974), they indicated the importance of such groups in policy-making. The relevance of transgovernmental networks has been stressed again recently. Slaughter (2009) and Raustalia (2002) in particular contributed to the rediscovering of transgovernmental networks. As Raustalia argues, “international cooperation is not inter-national at all; rather it is occurring between discrete, specialized agencies of governments” (2002, 2). Generally, the concept of transgovernmental networks corresponds to Mayntz’s hypothesis that networked policy-making preeminently advances in subsystems (1993). Policy fields in modern societies can be interpreted as such. In practice this means that, for example, health, education, energy, or infrastructure constitute subsystems of a broader system. The regional organization of these policy fields corresponds to the administrative systems of the respective integrating nation-states. National administrations in modern democratic states are becoming increasingly similar to each other. For regional policy-­ making, this means that “regulators in State A usually have a functional counterpart in State B, often in an identically named ministry or agency” (Raustalia 2002, 13). To Raustalia, “the expansion of domestic regulation” (2002, 16) is a factor explaining the increase of transgovernmental networks. We can assume that the similarity of structures is higher within regions, as national administrations, as well as political culture, are more likely to resemble in regions. In intergovernmental regional institutions, national representatives are exclusively ministerial officials. Their background as civil servants in national public administrations determines their behavior in networks. Unlike international organizations, intergovernmental regional organizations are strongly dominated by the representatives of member states. And

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these, in turn, depend on their national bureaucracy. As Slaughter and Hale argue, the “social nature” (2010a, 57) of transgovernmental networks is decisive for their performance. As already stressed, we do not have much information on how policy-makers interact at a transnational level. Slaughter and Hale point out that “more research is needed to understand the mechanism through which socialization might occur within transgovernmental networks, the relation between socialization and the operation of networks, and the condition under which socialization does not occur” (Slaughter and Hale 2010b, 351). By studying transgovernmental networks at the regional level, this study addresses these questions. In conclusion, the concept of regional public policy-making connects the macro-level, which is determined by the structures and the normativity of the respective region, with the micro-level of policy-making. It helps to analyze how external factors influence processes of policy-making in each network and investigates which factors define collective action internally. As external conditions equally apply to all policy fields, the key to understand differences in their development lies in the distinctiveness of the arenas of collective action. In order to conceptualize the mechanisms which determine regional public policy-making, this book develops and applies an analytical model of regional public policy-making. Chapter 2, after introducing basic concepts and defining terminology, reviews the literature on regional integration studies with a focus on relevant assumptions for policy-making in different policy fields. The review concludes with the derivation of analytical dimensions which are relevant for the model. In Chap. 3 concepts from policy studies will be added to each of the analytical dimension. The concepts are derived both from national policy studies and global policy studies. Chapter 4 introduces the case of UNASUR as well as the methodological approach of the study. The model is based on internal and external factors of interaction between policy-makers. Accordingly, the analysis proceeds first at the macro- and subsequently at the micro-level. Methodological triangulation combines approaches from institutional organization theory and frame analysis at the macro-level with collective action approaches at the micro-level. The macro-level will be analyzed in Chap. 5. This chapter examines the creational process, the political objectives, and the formal structure of UNASUR. In Chap. 6, five different councils of the organization will be analyzed in detail. First, the influence of the formal structure and administrative aspects will be examined for each council. Finally, internal group processes are investigated according to the analytical model of regional

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public policy-making. Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the analysis at the macro- and micro-level, summarizes the analysis of each of the five councils, and compares them with each other. The chapter concludes with general trends observed in the policy processes and formulates assumptions of regional public policy-making in the case of UNASUR. Finally, Chap. 8 reviews the study and summarizes the findings of the analysis. General implications for further studies of regional public policies are formulated.

References Acharya, Amitav. 2012. Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come? The International Spectator 47 (1): 3–15. Acharya, Amitav, and Alastair Iain Johnston. 2007. Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Best, Edward. 2012. Assessing Regional Governance: An Indicative Framework for Developing Indicators. In The Regional Integration Manual: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods, ed. Philippe de Lombaerde, Renato Galvão Flores, Lelio Iapadre, and Michael Schulz, 1–24. London: Routledge. Blumer, Herbert. 1986. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cross, Mai’a K.  Davis. 2011. Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-­ Based Networks Are Transforming the European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ———. 2013. Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later. Review of International Studies 39 (01): 137–160. Gardini, Gian Luca, ed. 2009. Latin America in the 21st Century—Nations, Regionalism, Globalization. London: Zed Books. Gilbert, M. 2006. Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1): 3–17. Goertz, Gary, and Kathy Powers. 2014. Regional Governance: The Evolution of a New Institutional Form. Discussion Paper Social Science Research Center Berlin SP IV (2014-106). Goffman, Erving. 1970. Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State—Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hettne, Björn. 2003. The New Regionalism Revisited. In Theories of New Regionalism, ed. Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M.  Shaw, 22–42. International Political Economy Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK. ———. 2005. Regionalism and World Order. In Global Politics of Regionalism— Theory and Practice, ed. Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne, and Luk Van Langenhove, 269–286. London: Pluto Press.

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Hveem, Helge. 2003. The Regional Project in Global Governance. In Theories of New Regionalism, ed. Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M.  Shaw, 81–98. International Political Economy Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1974. Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations. World Politics 27 (1): 39–62. https://doi. org/10.2307/2009925. Malamud, Andrés. 2013. Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration: Conceptual Issues and the Latin American Experiences. EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 20. Maxwell, Simon, and Diane Stone, eds. 2004. Global Knowledge Networks and International Development. 1st ed. London: Routledge. Mayntz, Renate. 1993. Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks. Knowledge and Policy 6 (1): 3–16. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe—Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Neuman, Iver B. 2003. A Region-Building Approach. In Theories of New Regionalism, ed. Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M.  Shaw, 160–178. International Political Economy Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Nolte, Detlef. 2014. Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented Regional Governance Complex? Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 89. http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2494843. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Powers, Kathy, and Gary Goertz. 2011. The Economic-Institutional Construction of Regions: Conceptualisation and Operationalisation. Review of International Studies 37 (5): 2387–2415. Raustalia, Kal. 2002. The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law Association 43 (1): 1–92. Riggirozzi, Pía. 2012. Reconstructing Regionalism: What Does Development Have to Do with It? In The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism, ed. Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie, 17–39. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Riggirozzi, Pía, and Jean Grugel. 2015. Regional Governance and Legitimacy in South America: The Meaning of UNASUR. International Affairs 91 (4): 781–797. Riggirozzi, Pía, and Diana Tussie, eds. 2012. The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Searle, John R. 2005. What Is an Institution? Journal of Institutional Economics 1 (1): 1–22. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2009. A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Thomas N.  Hale. 2010a. Transgovernmental Networks and Emerging Powers. In Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance, ed. Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew Fenton Cooper, 48–62. Waterloo, ON: Brookings Institution Press. ———. 2010b. Transgovernmental Networks. In The SAGE Handbook of Governance, ed. Mark Bevir, 342–352. SAGE Publications Ltd. Söderbaum, Frederik. 2015. Early, Old, New and Comparative Regionalism: The Scholarly Development of the Field. KFG Working Paper, no. 64. Stone, Diane. 2013. Knowledge Actors and Transnational Governance: The Private-­ Public Policy Nexus in the Global Agora. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Van Langenhove, Luk. 2011. Building Regions—The Regionalization of the World Order. Burlington: Ashgate.

Official Documents UNASUR (Union of South American Nations). 2008. Constitutive Treaty. Brasilia, Brazil.

Interviews Samper, Ernesto. 2014.   Former General Secretary of UNASUR   General Secretariat UNASUR   Quito, Ecuador   Interview: 22.11.2014

CHAPTER 2

Public Policies in Regional Integration Theory

The study of regions is not new to modern academic research. It is, in fact, as old as regional integration itself. Latin America, in particular, has a long tradition of regional cooperation. Before the European integration process commenced in the 1950s and started influencing scholarly debates, Latin America put on display different forms of transgovernmental regional cooperation and integration. During the so-called Pan-American conferences in the early twentieth century, the idea of cooperation between nation-states arose and built the foundations for the inter-American system. The Organization of American States (OAS), established in 1948, is the successor of the Pan-American summitry and later the Pan-American Union, dating back to 1889. Despite this early tradition in intraregional cooperation in the Americas, the comparatively dense integration process in Europe was decisive for the development of the scholarly field of regional integration studies. The study of the European integration was groundbreaking for the development of regional integration theories. Referring to the political developments in Europe, scholars from then on explained regional integration with the establishment of supranationality. Simultaneously to the continuous progress in the European legislation, the relevance of those academic debates arose. Theory development for a long time considered only the European integration process. Today, we can identify an increasing number of different agreements and organizations outside of Europe. There is a “virtually endless list of regional organizations” (Fioramonti 2012, 3; Hettne and Söderbaum © The Author(s) 2019 A. M. Hoffmann, Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3_2

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2008, 64). Those either operate with a specific function or are of a more generalist nature. Nevertheless, scholars keep analyzing regions with the premises of European integration theory. As Van Langenhove (2011, 110) has observed, regional integration schemes beyond Europe have not been able to produce supranational spaces. From a European perspective on regional integration, it could be argued that the implementation of Latin American integration is inconsequential. While Latin American states have recognized the necessity of cooperation to solve common problems and pursue shared interests, they are not willing to cede sovereignty. As a result, scholars denied that Latin American initiatives achieved regional integration. This comparison of Latin American regional integration with the European process is not valid and pointless. Latin America shows different patterns of integration. For the most part, new regional organizations tend to establish flexible institutions. Institutional flexibility, in contrast to supranational administrations, allows for the development of diverse regional processes at different levels—according to the concrete demands and the characteristics of each region. In other words, institutional flexibility facilitates independent regional processes. The organization of UNASUR is an emblematic example of institutional flexibility. Supranationality is not an objective of the South American Union. Instead, the facilitation of several regional public policies is. UNASUR, in its short time of existence, displayed good records in providing regional public policies to the South American region. This performance challenges the traditional assumption, that supranational institutions are a necessary condition for regional integration. The emergence of regional public policies is directly connected to institutional design. Yet, we do not know how. There is no conceptual knowledge of empirical phenomena beyond European integration. Being confronted with a “fast emerging empirical phenomenon without much theory to work from” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2008, 78) is typical for modern regionalism, as Hettne and Söderbaum explain. Subsequently, I am going to review, discuss, and combine concepts and theories of the traditional regional integration studies as well as newer approaches to regionalism. By merging and combining different approaches, I am applying what it is called eclectic research. Eclectic research has become relatively common in regionalism, as it captures the multidimensionality of regionalism. One reason is the theoretical variety in regionalism as well as the spreading of regional schemes during the last decades. Nolte describes this as a

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c­onsequence of the “nature of our research topic” (2011, 49). Sil and Katzenstein (2010) principally developed the concept of analytical eclecticism in response to their work on international relations theory. One major critique was that IR theory lost its practical relevance. Academic research, in their perception, is running the risk of missing “real-world dilemmas” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 9). Eclecticism, therefore, tries to bridge the gap between practice and theory. Sil and Katzenstein define as eclectic any approach “that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements […] of theories or narratives that had been developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems” (2010, 10). The benefit of eclecticism is not the development of paradigms but the broadening of the scope of research. Accordingly, regional governance, as an approach focusing on empirical phenomena in regions, offers an adequate conceptual framework to study regional public policy-making. It allows for the combination of theoretical approaches from integration theory and policy studies within the premises of eclectic research. In the following two chapters, I am going to review both, regional integration literature and policy studies, given their potential to inform the study of regional public policy-making.

2.1   Policy-Making in the Study of Regions When we speak about “regional” policy-making, we first need to define what “region” means. The region as such has been more and more perceived as “not given in nature” but rather as “a social construct that people somehow invent” (Ruggie 2002, 134). Referring to the geographical dimension, Goltermann et al. define regions as “groupings of territorial units” (2012, 3). The definition of regions has different dimensions. Regions can be defined in geographic, economic, social, cultural, or political terms. They have “material and ideational dimensions” (Katzenstein 2005, 10). Godehardt and Nabers describe regions by “geographical and political criteria” (2011, 2) and emphasize that geography is still important for the definition of regions. To them, geography is still the “essence of regions” (Godehardt and Nabers 2011, 2; Godehardt 2012, 61). In particular, New Regionalism approaches tend to contextualize regions as “constructed and re-constructed in the process of global transformation” (Farrell 2005, 8). The construction of regions in geographical and political terms plays an important role in South and Latin American r­ egionalism.

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The inclusion or exclusion of nations and areas indicates political preferences and objectives of cooperation. Examples are CELAC, explicitly excluding the United States and Canada and including Cuba, or the Pacific Alliance, which comprises Pacific nations with an external orientation to trade and foreign markets. UNASUR, clearly demarcating a “Southern” community, implies the detachment from Latin America as broader community. The inclusion of Suriname and Guyana into the South American Union fortifies the geographical dimension of the South American identity promoted by UNASUR. Regionalism, as a conceptual term, describes this multidimensional process of the establishment of “regional coherence and identity” (Farrell 2005, 8). Fawcett notices that the perceptions of regions “naturally flow” (2005, 24) to understandings of regionalism, which means the cooperation by states and non-state actors within a given region. All of them contribute to what can be understood as political projects of regions, so-called regional projects, (Hveem 2003; Van Langenhove 2011). Regional organizations are the institutional manifestation of regional projects. Modern South and Latin American regional organizations nowadays are no longer determined by goals of free trade and economic liberalism but are instead spaces for deliberation and the identification of common interests and spheres of interaction. According to Riggirozzi, new forms of regionalism are a manifestation of the “rediscovery of the region as a common space for pulling together resources” (Riggirozzi 2012, 24). They reject the primacy of the economic domain in international or regional cooperation and perceive integration as a multidimensional phenomenon (Thakur and Van Langenhove 2008, 30). Cooperation does not only happen in the traditional foreign relations context but in a variety of public policy fields. Regional policy-making is public policy-making. While regional cooperation is typically conceived as a loosely structured system (Hurrell 1995, 336), regional integration is connected to supranationality, as in the debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Basic functional ideas are at the core of the term integration. Haas wondered about whether integration “refers to a process, a condition, or both” (Haas 1964, 26). He concludes that integration is a normative term, referring to a process, which entails the vision of a future stage of a certain international organization. The functionalist definition can be subsumed to the transfer of “loyalty, expectations and decision-making power to a new, regional center” (Dosenrode 2012, 16). This traditional definition of regional integration includes “the process of supranationalization

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of authority in a given policy field, which requires some degree of shared sovereignty” (Fioramonti 2012, 4). Today, however, different scholars challenge this understanding of “integration” in view of empirically observable developments. Liberal concepts, for example, define regional integration as result of bargaining processes between states that follow their interests (Goltermann et al. 2012, 5). De Lombaerde et al. define regional integration as a “complex and multi-dimensional process of change” (De Lombaerde et  al. 2011, 323). South American regional organizations likewise did not display supranational policy-making so far but continuously pass through processes of change. Interaction at the regional level has always been dynamic, and UNASUR is an expression of this dynamism. Nevertheless, scholars tend to deny that there is regional integration in South America. In conclusion, we can find a variety of definitions and conceptual confusion in the field of regional integration studies instead of clear-cut definitions. The idea of “constructed regions” and “identity creation” point to an increasing interest in how actors perceive their region as a space of interaction. An actor-based approach, as I am applying it to the case of UNASUR, therefore, is valuable and necessary. The normative perspective on regions did not lead anywhere. Yet, an understanding of how involved actors perceive regions might contribute to the reformulation of integration theory and concomitantly the definition of integration. In this context of theoretical redefinition, regional governance is increasingly used to capture the complex and multidimensional processes in regions. The concept disconnects the region from a broader framework and looks at characteristics of intraregional policy-making. There is no coherent definition of governance as such, but in political science, it is first and foremost an institutional term (Fürst 2006, 41). Governance describes the coordination of action. For the regional level, Hveem defines governance in general terms as a formation of rules which provide rationales for action and interaction (Hveem 2003, 81). As Nolte stresses, it is essential to understand “how regions are politically organized and governed” (Nolte 2014, 1). To him, regional governance is “essentially, but not exclusively, based on intergovernmental regional organizations” (Nolte 2014, 7). Institutionally, regional governance has to conform the national systems of the respective member states (Hveem 2003, 83). Regional governance may differ from region to region (Herz 2013, 241). The concept does not foresee necessary structures or a normative perspective, but pragmatically captures the existing structure. Riggirozzi points out that regions today are

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“faced with substantially divergent visions of what regional governance should mean” (Riggirozzi 2012, 17). She argues that regional governance has to respond to the reconstruction of the region, which in the Latin American case began in the last decades. The reason for this reconstruction is that there is no hegemonic model of the political economy any longer. New forms of cooperation have arisen consequently. In light of these novel cooperative mechanisms, Riggirozzi proposes that regional governance should be thought of as a “new political space, where consensuses are deliberated and delivered” (Riggirozzi 2012, 18). Similarly, Jayasuriya understands regional governance as the management of “interdependencies within a […] region through the creation of institutional forums, policy instruments and networks” (Jayasuriya 2009, 321). The totality of regional organizations and institutions can be interpreted as what Nolte defines as “regional governance complexes” (Nolte 2014). Referring to the concept of regime complexes at the international level (Alter and Meunier 2009), Nolte describes the interaction of different regional organizations and institutions as a structure that establishes rules and norms in different policy fields. The function of these structures is the pursuance of shared interests and the solution of collective problems. The element of collective behavior is vital in regional governance. It contraposes simple power-based explanations of regional processes by emphasizing the cooperative behavior of regional actors. Regional governance, therefore, cannot describe interests of single actors in a region but describes the essence of regions by focusing on the collectivity of regional actors. The common objectives of regional actors are crucial to the understanding of a region. In their analysis of post-hegemonic regionalism in Latin America, Riggirozzi and Tussie ask whether “regional leaders act in recognition of collective concerns, or as simply self-interest maximizers using the regional space as a platform for achieving national and global interest” (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012, 4). This concern reacts to the focus on presidential politics that still characterizes Latin American regional studies. In this context, the term “interpresidentialism” (Tussie 2009, 175) has been used to describe strong presidential policy-making. Especially in the context of Mercosur, Malamud (2005, 2008) observed that successful regional policies could be achieved when presidents communicated directly and defined this procedure as “presidential diplomacy.” Particularly for Brazil and Argentina, scholars suggested that presidents made terms directly and avoided the establishment of institutionalized forms of regulation (Hummel and Lohaus 2012, 69). Structurally,

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Malamud explains this phenomenon through the presidential systems of South American states. Presidents, contradictory to parliamentarian heads of government, are not accountable to their parliaments and therefore relatively free in their action (Malamud 2008, 153). To him, ministers or secretaries simply act as “assistants to the presidents” (Malamud 2008, 127) and hence are bound to presidential decisions. Interpresidentialism consequently proposes that presidential governance is a systemic consequence of presidential systems. However, presidential governance only explains policy-making by presidents, be it in the form of summitry or regional organizations. It does not explain inter-ministerial cooperation. Taking a closer look at transnational cooperation in public policies, we can easily identify complex relations between participating actors. The deduction of presidential politics does not explain such processes. On the contrary, it raises the question of whether the autonomy of the executive facilitates cooperation between public policy-makers.

2.2   Evidence from Regional Integration Theory Institutional flexibility in the eyes of traditional regional integration scholars is weak institutionalization. As mentioned before, this judgment is a neofunctional heritage. Neofunctionalism attempted to explain regional integration by the establishment of supranational institutions. Haas, a proponent of neofunctionalist theory, himself declared that the approach was “better in predicting failure” (Haas 1970, 629) than in explaining regional integration. Likewise, South American regional organizations are often interpreted as “weak” and, in consequence, as examples of failed integration. Yet, all regional systems are dissimilar to the one studied by neofunctionalists, which is the European Union. Schmitter (1970, 850), another functionalist thinker, rightly recognized that European integration is different from all other regions not only in terms of organizational structures but also regarding their common problems. Neofunctionalism is firmly connected to European Integration and primarily analyzes the “ongoing role of institutions” (Hurrell 1995, 349), not the emergence of integration schemes. At first sight, it could be assumed that neofunctional theory cannot contribute to the study of policy-­making in intergovernmental regional organizations. However, it would be wrong to disregard neofunctionalist thinking altogether. Especially ideas on technocracy, professionalism of transnational actors,

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and institutionalization offer some remarkable concepts for the study of collective behavior of regional networks. Early functionalists distinguished between political and technical decisions. This differentiation provides essential information about decision-­ making processes (Nye 1968, 867). Central to functionalism is the question of how these different rationalities lead to further integration and to the development of organizational structures (Wolf 1999, 39). Due to the assumption that technocrats are “interested in tasks rather than in power” (Haas 1964, 11), Haas believed that they would “achieve agreement where statesmen will fail” (Haas 1964, 11). Consequently, technical rationality is a solution to problems that have been caused by power-­ politics. Functionalists believed that national officials could act as technical officials, who, first and foremost, consider their tasks as international representatives. Paul Taylor mentioned in the preface to the work of Mitrany, a leading functionalist scholar, that a “man can be weaned away from his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international co-­operation” (Mitrany 1975). This statement indicates that the identification of actors influences the negotiation process. Although these assumptions have been made in the view of supranational structures, they could equally be relevant for policy-making in intergovernmental organizations. As regional public policy-makers are primarily civil servants, their interaction in separated regional spaces might have the same effect. Instead of identifying with the supranational objectives of an organization, the identification with original objectives of policy fields is probable. The functionalist, supranational understanding of organizational objectives connects to “some systemic need” (Haas 1964, 5) which determines the actors’ behavior. Organizations are, in this sense, created according to a joint problem, and the organizational objective is to solve it. The creational context of an organization determines the behavior of actors. While functionalism advanced with the upsurge of international organizations, the “scientific theory of regionalism” (Mitrany 1975)—neofunctionalism—developed later. Supranational officials are assumed to influence distributional outcomes via the provision of information (Moravcsik 1998, 52). Information and administration costs play an indispensable role in the neofunctionalist theory. Supranational officials are supposed to have a comparative advantage in the access to information. The primacy of information is a common characteristic of civil services, for example, ministries, in democratic states and therefore relevant to consider in the analysis of regional ministerial cooperation. Being concerned with regional policy

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fields, ministerial cooperation will be key to analyze processes of policy-­ making. The idea of measuring the relevance of ministerial cooperation in the integration process is not new. Nye (1968, 869) already in 1968 has proposed the acquisition of data on ministerial involvement to define the actual scope of regional integration. However, also in intergovernmental organizations, official state representatives communicate transnationally and thereby contribute to the establishment of networks and communities (Keohane and Nye 2011, 20). Direct contact between bureaucracies, in particular, might enhance the dissolution of unified national interest and result in multifaceted foreign policy-making (Keohane and Nye 2011, 29). Functionalism and neofunctionalism suggest the study of the rationality of actors and ask if they share a professional identification or act in line with national interests. Additionally, functionalist theory suggests the analysis of the status of administrative organs. Do they have an advantageous position since they administrate information? Finally, does a possible information advantage increase the autonomy of action of policy-makers in intergovernmental organizations? Regional integration scholars who reject the focus on supranationality developed the rival explanation of integration processes with the conception of intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik (1998), a famous proponent of the intergovernmental theory, emphasizes the interests of states and criticizes the strong technocratic perspective of neofunctionalism. He points to the failures of neofunctionalism but at the same time declares that his work is not a complete rejection of it. According to him, integration depends “on the choice of the state” (Moravcsik 1998, 13). In Moravcsik’s view, supranational officials do not have the power that neofunctionalists have accredited them. Intergovernmentalism does not discount the existence of supranational entities, but compared to neofunctionalism, it does not view them as a driving force of regionalism. The pooling or delegation of sovereignty is considered a feature of regional organizations. It applies whenever voting procedures diverge from unanimity voting (Moravcsik 1998, 67). Empirically, however, we find the majority of regional agreements having consensus-based decision-making procedures. UNASUR, as well as the majority of new Latin American regional organizations, applies consensusbased decision-making. In consequence, unanimity voting means that states have the possibility to veto decisions and thereby keep their sovereignty. From the very beginning, the voting rules in UNASUR have been object to several discussions. Advocates of unanimity voting argue that it assures the participation and identification of all member states. Others criticize that the possibility of vetoing causes deadlock. One example is the

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repeated inability to agree on a General Secretary, as explained previously. However, although the voting rule applies to all UNASUR organs, we need to differentiate the effects of unanimity voting. Disagreement in the presidential council has completely different reasons compared to the situation in sectoral councils. As I am going to show in Chap. 6, unanimity voting does not pose problems to sectoral councils as long as policy-makers are in the condition to develop a common regional agenda. The reason to veto a decision here might simply be the technical inability to implement a certain policy. Still, policy-makers have the opportunity to abstain from voting, which in many cases means that the remaining states can proceed. At the presidential level, however, vetoing does have political reasons and indeed may cause deadlock. The different effects, consensus-based decisionmaking does have in different organs, support my basic argument that regional integration is a multifaceted process that needs institutional flexibility to meet the requirements of all layers. Against the suppositions of intergovernmentalists, which developed a unitary perspective of states, I propose the broadening of this perspective by considering regional public policy-making. Coming from the perspective of European integration, Moravcsik interprets the state as a “unitary and rational actor” (Moravcsik 1998, 22). According to him, interest groups, elites, bureaucrats, and political actors all follow a unified interest, which finds its expression in the nation-state. This perspective led to the tendency of unifying the interests of actors in succeeding theoretical approaches. Although Moravcsik recognized that “national preferences are often heterogeneous” (Moravcsik 1998, 51), he still tried to unify the bargaining positions of states in regional organizations. Following this line of argumentation, the fact that different organs, for example, in different sectors of regional organizations might pursue different interests, might be overlooked. The sectoral councils of UNASUR illustratively demonstrate how diverse interests can be. In a detailed analysis in Chap. 6, I am going to show that there is no unified national position in regional organizations.

2.3   Analytical Dimensions of Regional Public Policy-Making In this chapter we have seen that regional integration theory found different explanations for regional processes. These theories have not been able to capture the phenomenon of regional public policies and developed misleading normative perspectives in some cases. Nevertheless, they contribute with

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Table 2.1  Schools and assumption for the concept of regional public policies (Neo)functionalism Intergovernmentalism (New) Regionalism

•  Rationality of technical actors •  National interests •  Policy fields/construction of regions

Source: Author’s table

interesting elements to the study of sectoral integration and modern regional governance. Table  2.1 summarizes the appropriate assumptions for the study of regional public policy-making of each scholarly school. Early functionalists, in particular, focused on the role of actors in integration processes. They claimed that successful cooperation depends on the ability of actors to abstract from national interests. Neofunctionalism adopted this idea and projected different types of actors: on the one hand, those bound to political rationality, and on the other hand administrative actors, who follow a somewhat technical rationality. This differentiation contributes to the understanding of sectoral policy-making. As the ministerial representatives design public policies at a regional level, these administrative actors play a crucial role in the analysis of regional governance mechanisms. The argument made by Nye (1968), that interaction between ministerial representatives determines the policy outcome in regional cooperation, is essential for the analysis of regional public policy-making. According to functionalist thinking, technical rationality considers the solution of problems. Nonetheless, neofunctionalism reminds us that there are relevant national interests. Intergovernmentalists argued that these interests obstruct supranationality and therefore rejected integration. The perception of the state as unitary actor explains the missing research of regional policymaking in different policy fields. By not looking at differentiated national processes, the theory could not even detect possibly distinct processes. At the same time, all state representatives in regional organizations have the same national background. National interests, therefore, continue being a relevant factor for all areas of regional policy-making. Like the functionalists, New Regionalism scholars also consider actors to be relevant for regional processes and emphasize the complex processes of interaction in which these actors engage. New Regionalists remarkably broadened the perspective of regional integration studies by introducing social actors and normative concepts to the study of regions. They understand regions as constructed spaces of contestation. Modern approaches

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of regionalism indicate two crucial dimensions for public policy-making: first, they point to the diversity of possible cooperation fields. Second, they emphasize the relevance of constructivist elements in regional integration studies. The assumption that actors construct regions suggests the study of regional political projects as one factor possibly influencing regional public policy-making. To summarize the arguments of regional integration studies, different elements can be conceptualized to determine regional public policy-­ making as theoretically guiding elements for the analytical framework. Those will later be applied to the study of regional public policies. Table 2.2 presents these elements. As there is no concept or theory of public policy-making at the regional level as well as no empirical knowledge thereof, we cannot know how these factors exert influence or how they affect each other. Following the eclectic approach to this study, concepts and assumptions from policy studies will be reviewed to better understand policy-making processes at a regional level. For a long time, policy studies have been applied solely at the national level. Only recently global public policies entered the academic debate. To bridge regional integration theory and policy studies, the categories derived from regional studies serve as a guideline. I ­synthesize them to the analytical dimensions of actors, interests, structure, and ideas. For a comparative study, I am moreover distinguishing internal and external factors. The internal factors describe the micro-level of policy-­ making and differ in between policy fields. The external factors, in other words the institutional conditions to policy-making, describe the macro-­ level and apply equally to all policy-making processes. These dimensions are included in Table 2.3 and summarize the analytical model: For illustrative purposes, Table 2.3 is simplified and directly connected to the analytical dimensions to the respective level and dimension of analysis in Table 2.4. Table 2.2  Constitutive elements of the regional level (Neo)functionalism Intergovernmentalism (New) Regionalism Source: Author’s table

• Rationality of technical actors •  National interests •  Policy fields •  Construction of regions

•  Interaction of policy-makers • Collusion of national interest •  Organizational structure •  Regional projects

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Table 2.3  Constitutive elements of the regional level and dimensions of analysis Level of analysis

Micro-level

Macro-level

Dimension

Actors

Interests

Structures

Ideas

Theoretical background Explanatory focus Relevance in policy-­ making

(Neo) functionalism Rationality of actors Interaction of policy-makers

Intergovernmentalism

(New) Regionalism

National interests

Policy fields

Collusion of national interests

Organizational structures

Construction of regions Regional projects

Source: Author’s table

Table 2.4  Dimensions of analysis—simplified model Level of analysis

Micro-level

Macro-level

Dimension

Actors

Interests

Structures

Relevance in policy-making

Interaction of policy-makers

Collusion of Organizational national interests structures

Ideas Regional projects

Source: Author’s table

References Alter, Karen J., and Sophie Meunier. 2009. The Politics of International Regime Complexity. Perspectives on Politics 7 (01): 13–24. De Lombaerde, Philippe, Renato G. Flôres, P. Lelio Iapadre, and Michael Schulz, eds. 2011. The Regional Integration Manual—Quantitative and Qualitative Methods. London: Routledge. Dosenrode, Soren. 2012. Crisis and Regional Integration: A Federalist and Neo-­ Functionalist Perspective. In Regions and Crises—New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalism, ed. L.  Fioramonti, 13–30. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Farrell, Mary. 2005. The Global Politics of Regionalism: An Introduction. In Global Politics of Regionalism—Theory and Practice, ed. Björn Hettne, Luk Van Langenhove, and Mary Farrell, 1–20. London: Pluto Press. Fawcett, Louise. 2005. Regionalism from a Historical Perspective. In Global Politics of Regionalism—Theory and Practice, ed. Björn Hettne, Luk Van Langenhove, and Mary Farrell, 21–37. London: Pluto Press.

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Fioramonti, Lorenzo. 2012. Introduction. Regionalism in Times of Crises. In Regions and Crises—New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalism, ed. L. Fioramonti, 1–12. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Fürst, Dietrich. 2006. Regional Governance—Ein Überblick. In Regional Governance—Steuerung, Koordination Und Kommunikation in Regionalen Netzwerken Als Neue Formen Des Regierens, ed. Ralf Kleinfeld, Harald Plamper, and Andreas Huber, 37–59. Göttingen: V&R unipress. Godehardt, Nadine. 2012. Regionen Und Regionale Ordnungen in Den Internationalen Beziehungen. In Macht, Führung Und Regionale Organisation— Theorien Und Forschungsperspektiven, ed. Daniel Flemes, Dirk Nabers, and Detlef Nolte, 53–74. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Godehardt, Nadine, and Dirk Nabers. 2011. Regional Powers and Regional Orders. New York: Routledge. Goltermann, Lukas, Mathis Lohaus, Kai Striebinger, and Alexander Spielau. 2012. Roads to Regionalism: Concepts, Issues, Cases. In Roads to Regionalism, Genesis, Design, and Effects of Regional Organizations, ed. Tanja A.  Börzel, Lukas Goltermann, and Kai Striebinger, 3–24. Farnham: Routledge. Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State—Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ———. 1970. The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing. International Organization 24 (4): 607–646. Herz, Monica. 2013. Regional Governance. In International Organization and Global Governance, ed. Thomas G.  Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, 236–250. London and New York: Taylor & Francis. Hettne, Björn, and Frederik Söderbaum. 2008. The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, New Frontiers. In Regionalisation and Global Governance—The Taming of Globalisation? ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Christopher W. Hughes, and Philippe De Lombaerde, 61–79. New York: Routledge. Hummel, Felix, and Mathis Lohaus. 2012. MERCOSUR: Integration through Presidents and Paymasters. In Roads to Regionalism, Genesis, Design, and Effects of Regional Organizations, ed. Kai Striebinger, Lukas Goltermann, and Tanja Börzel, 59–80. Farnham: Routledge. Hurrell, Andrew. 1995. Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics. Review of International Studies 21 (4): 331–358. Hveem, Helge. 2003. The Regional Project in Global Governance. In Theories of New Regionalism, ed. Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M.  Shaw, 81–98. International Political Economy Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Jayasuriya, Kanishka. 2009. Regulatory Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: Drivers, Instruments and Actors. Australian Journal of International Affairs 63 (3): 335–347. Katzenstein, Peter J. 2005. A World of Regions—Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. Ann Arbor, MI: Cornell University Press.

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Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S.  Nye. 2011. Power and Interdependence. 4th ed. Stoughton: Longman. Malamud, Andrés. 2005. Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur. An Empirical Examination. Latin American Research Review 40 (1): 138–164. ———. 2008. The Internal Agenda of Mercosur: Interdependence, Leadership and Institutionalization. In Los Nuevos Enfoques de La Integración: Más Allá Del Nuevo Regionalismo, ed. Grace Jaramillo, 115–135. Quito: FLACSO. Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Martin Robertson. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe—Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Nolte, Detlef. 2011. Regional Powers and Regional Governance. In Regional Powers and Regional Orders, ed. Nadine Godehardt and Dirk Nabers, 49–67. New York: Routledge. ———. 2014. Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented Regional Governance Complex? Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 89. Nye, Joseph S. 1968. Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement. International Organization 22 (4): 855–880. Riggirozzi, Pía. 2012. Reconstructing Regionalism: What Does Development Have to Do with It? In The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism, ed. Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie, 17–39. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Riggirozzi, Pía, and Diana Tussie. 2012. The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism in Latin America. In The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism, ed. Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie, 1–16. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Ruggie, John Gerard. 2002. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation. London: Routledge. Schmitter, Philippe C. 1970. A Revised Theory of Regional Integration. International Organization 24 (4): 836–868. Sil, Rudra, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2010. Beyond Paradigms, Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Thakur, Ramesh, and Luk Van Langenhove. 2008. Enhancing Global Governance through Regional Integration. In Regionalisation and Global Governance—The Taming of Globalisation? ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Christopher W. Hughes, and Philippe De Lombaerde, 17–42. New York: Routledge. Tussie, Diana. 2009. Latin America. Contrasting Motivations for Regional Projects. Review of International Studies 35 (1): 169–188. Van Langenhove, Luk. 2011. Building Regions—The Regionalization of the World Order. Burlington: Ashgate. Wolf, Dieter. 1999. Integrationstheorien Im Vergleich—Funktionalistische Und Intergouvernementalistische Erklärung Für Die Europäische Wirtschafts- Und Währungsunion Im Vertrag von Maastricht. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

CHAPTER 3

Policy Studies and Regional Public Policy-Making

At the global level, theory is mainly trying to catch up with new developments and seeking to explain global public policies (Kaul 2013, 2). While there is an ongoing discussion about whether or not there are structural changes in global policies and policy-making in the international arena, we do not know anything about the regional level (Pattberg 2013). Therefore, it is useful to distinguish levels of analysis. By conceptualizing the regional level as a “mesolevel,” it encompasses characteristics of the national and the global level. It is important to note that the “region” is not equal to the “regional level.” The region describes socially constructed spaces of action, as we have seen in Chap. 2, while I distinguish levels for conceptual purposes. Governments are always involved in national policy-making, and policies usually are programs, projects, or laws. Global policies work on a less concrete level. They can take the form of an agreement, a standard definition, or a simple policy paper. National governments, moreover, do not necessarily determine global policies. A variety of actors is possibly the author of global policies. However, governments keep being critical to the implementation of global policies at their national systems. This dimension is equally relevant for the regional level. Figure  3.1 illustrates the levels of analysis. We can assume that structural conditions of the global level to some extent apply at the regional one. On both levels the determining factor is the missing authority. Any regional organization outside of Europe works © The Author(s) 2019 A. M. Hoffmann, Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3_3

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Global Policies

Global Governance

IO’s; Regimes

Regional Policies

Regional Governance

Regional Organization

National Policies

Governance

National Government

Fig. 3.1  Policy-making at the national, regional, and global levels. Source: Author’s figure

with purely intergovernmental mechanisms. That means that policy implementation at the regional level will likewise depend on the willingness and ability of national states. National governments delegate representatives to regional organizations and international organizations. These representatives play a crucial role, as they build the nexus of national interests and regional policy-making. The conditions, which enable their interaction, are key to understand regional public policy-making. In the following chapter, I am going to review the literature dealing with policy-making and, in particular, public policies. As already mentioned, there are no studies conceptualizing regional public policies, as to why I am combining approaches from national and global policies studies with the insights from regional integration studies (Chap. 2).

3.1   Levels of Policy-Making Public policies found their entrance to academic discussions with the policy studies of Harold Lasswell in the 1950s. Lasswell did not want to study a phenomenon “for its own sake” (deLeon and Vogenbeck 2006, 4; Lasswell 1956) and initiated the study of public policies, which was primarily problem-oriented and interdisciplinary. A theory development was not the objective of policy studies. In line with Lasswell’s approach, the problem-­ oriented concept of policy analysis became the dominant approach in the following years. Influenced by system analysis and public administration management, the objective of policy analysis was to strengthen the policy process and provide advice. The evermore rationalist and empiricist policy analyses culminated in what is today called “New Public Management” (NPM) (deLeon and Vogenbeck 2006, 5).

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NPM can be summarized as efficiency-oriented (for further information, see Bouckaert et al. (2010, 10)), and until today studies have mainly been conducted in OECD countries (Bouckaert et al. 2010, 4). Although Latin American scholars also started to work in line with this tradition (Pallares 1988; de Oliveira 2006; Souza 2006), it is the tradition of policy studies in Latin America that brings with it a higher awareness to context-­ sensitivity and multidimensionality of policy-making. Particularly during the 1980s, scholars looked at “state policies” as an indicator for the relation between a state and its society. Especially Oszlak and O’Donnell made an important contribution by emphasizing that the fractions and fragmentations of Latin American societies need to be differentiated to understand public policy-making. They understand individual public policies as part of a “social process as the structure of a topic or a question”1 (Oszlak and O’Donnell 1976, 108) and conceptualize public policies as solutions to specific “questions” or “problems” that a state poses. Accordingly, some social groups or fractions can place their demands on the agenda of states, while others can’t (Oszlak and O’Donnell 1976, 110). The finding that policies do not depend on objective criteria, but on social processes of bargaining, is an essential contribution of Latin American policy studies. To Villanueva, the policies of governments reflect civil conflict or consensus, as they “crystalize or defeat the representativeness, constitutionality, publicity, rationality of the governments”2 (Aguilar Villanueva 1992, 2, 20). Likewise, Cuervo, in his outstanding contribution to the “Ensayos Sobre Politicas Públicas” by Cuervo et al. (Cuervo 2007), emphasizes that the function of public policies is to identify and resolve common problems. In the preface to the second edition of the “Ensayos” (Cuervo 2015), Velasco reminds us that the Latin American region has a tradition of strong executive states and fragmented societies (Velasco 2015). Traditional South American public policy studies, accordingly, focus on the relationship between governments and the public sphere. In contrast to the classic and formalized European Policy Studies, the Latin American literature includes an important political perspective to the study of public administrations. Policy-making does imply not only administrative structures but also involves social processes of determination of  “proceso social tejido alrededor de un tema o cuestión.”  “cristalizan o malogran la representatividad, constitucionalidad, publicidad, racionalidad de los gobiernos.” 1 2

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the public sphere. It suggests considering the way of how national administrations respond to ongoing social processes. The respective “public,” hence, is an essential dimension for public policy-making at all levels. Scholars have tended to explain public policies by looking back at philosophical conceptualizations of “the public.” Wolin, for example, refers to Cicero’s conception of the res publica which means “public issue” and connects the public with the community (Wolin 1960, 2). Ruggie refers to Max Weber and his understanding of public authority, representing “the fusion of power with legitimate social purposes” (Ruggie 2004, 10). The public domain can thus be interpreted as the area of deliberation and contestation. Wagner emphasizes the connection between the nation-state and public policies (Wagner 2006). The notion of state duties or state tasks is firmly connected to the emergence of the nation-state. These ideas of “the public” make public policies to the task of governments. The emerging academic debate on global public policies challenged this connection of public policies with governments or nation-states. At the global level of policy-making, definitions become even more diffuse. It would be too easy to simply transfer the idea of “the common” to the international level, as we would miss the aspect of missing government or authority. This equally applies to the regional level. As already mentioned, intergovernmental regional organizations do not have authoritative organs. At the global, as well as at the regional level, policy-making is “not a matter of regulating states the way states regulate their citizens” (Slaughter 2009, 16). Although global interconnection, global problems, and common political interests are rising, there are no established concepts of a global public sphere. Kaul explains global public policies by the “recognition of common interests and a bridging of the foreign/domestic divide” (Kaul 2013, 13). The question of the “common” and the “global public” leads us to the question of membership in the distinct public domain. The delimitation of a “public sphere” at first sight seems easier at the regional level as compared to the global level. However, as explained in Chap. 2, the “region” as such is an object of contestation. A regional public sphere, accordingly, depends on the construction of regions.

3.2   Dimensions of Policy-Making As we have seen, public policy-making mainly depends on the respective “public.” The discrepancies between national and global public policies show how crucial it is to clearly define the features of public policy-making

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at each level. For this purpose, the dimensions of actors, institutions, structure, and ideas will be discussed in view of valuable considerations from policy studies. 3.2.1  Actors The actor level differs remarkably at the national and the global level of public policy-making. Traditional policy studies at the national level usually focus on governmental actors. At the global level, it is somewhat difficult to define the relevant actors. Depending on the issue area and the level of institutionalization, actors vary. The concept of policy communities proved to be useful to conceptualize different actor groups and can also be applied at the regional level. Policy communities describe the non-­ formalized interaction between policy-makers. The term “community” indicates a common perception of problems (Miller and Demir 2006, 140). As we have seen in regional integration studies as well as in policy studies, the perception of shared objectives and collective behavior is essential for policy-making. In policy studies, communities are conceptualized in the form of networks such as epistemic communities, professional networks, or governmental networks. All of them describe horizontal governance and thereby respond to an increasing fragmentation of plural societies (Miller and Demir 2006, 137). To Torfing, governance by networks is the “horizontal articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors who interact through negotiations that take place within a relatively institutionalized framework and facilitate self-regulated policymaking in the shadow of hierarchy” (Torfing 2012). The term “governance networks” summarizes the variety of possible configurations of networks. Their objectives can be problem definition, rule-setting, or the maximization of joint efforts. Policy studies traditionally define networks as policy networks. These correspond to a certain policy field or area and thus to sectoral segregation of policy-making in modern administrations. Policy networks are characterized by a specific belief system (Weible and Sabatier 2006) that links to this segregation. Likewise, Messner describes these specific belief systems, or policy field immanent logic, as “tacit knowledge” (Messner 1995, 205). Basically, this means that policy networks develop an understanding of their own policy field that is connected to implicit rules of action and interaction. Mayntz connects these networks with the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons and the idea of functional subsystems (Mayntz 1993). In practice,

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this means that, for example, health, education, energy, or infrastructure constitutes an own subsystem with an own belief system. Such an organizational division characterizes modern states into subfields and applies equally to the global or regional level. At the same time, the differentiation into subsystems emphasizes the importance of ministerial bureaucracies. Their function is to control and coordinate resources in policy fields, such as information or budget. Public policy studies, therefore, more and more take into account the relevance of their opinion on what would be “appropriate” or “adequate” policies (Howlett et al. 2009, 50). Also in South American regionalism, and particularly in the case of the UNASUR, ministerial bureaucracies are at the core of regional public policy-­making. The sectoral councils in all South American regional organizations comprise representatives of the corresponding national departments. In practice, this means that, for example, representatives of national health ministries interact in the South American Health Council. Ministries of foreign affairs only seldom engage in sectoral policy-making, which is due to the technical agenda rationality persisting in these councils. In a similar manner, functionalists stressed the relevance of supranational technical personnel, as we have seen in Chap. 2. Especially the functionalist concept of rationality influenced debates on networked policy-making at a national as well as global level. In the context of EU research, neofunctionalists draw a purely technocratic image of administrative actors. Technocrats are described as efficiency-oriented and rational (Radaelli 1999b, 3–6). The initial concept of technocracy emerged from national bureaucracies and means “rationalization of the policy process along predictable lines” (Radaelli 1999a, 46). However, technical rationality does not necessarily mean that policy-making follows an objective and efficient way of planning. It can simply mean that there is a distinct rationality of policy-making and that this rationality differs from field to field. In the study of regional policy communities, rationality basically means “sectoral rationality.” This rationality can be assessed with the concept of “epistemes.” Epistemes are corpora of expert knowledge and epistemic communities are policy communities, which usually act in global policy-making. They are networks of experts, influencing the policy process with expert knowledge. The term “epistemic” involves an ideational and norm-setting component. Nevertheless, the concept has been reduced to the scientific notion of expertise. The traditional definition of epistemic communities, however, is based on the conception of constructed realities. Holzner introduced the term epistemic communities as groups of actors,

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which interact on the basis of a high similarity of “frames of references, of epistemologies” (Holzner 1972, 68). The expert community of scientists is only one possibility between “religious communities, work communities, some ideological movements and the like” (Holzner 1972, 68). Epistemic communities share intentions, expectations, symbols, behavioral rules, and points of reference (Cross 2013). Although the concept of epistemic communities has been criticized for exaggerating the influence of experts, it is useful to explain how transnational cooperation is institutionalized in public policy sectors and how networks contribute to the emergence of public policies. The study of epistemic communities introduced compelling new rationales to global policy studies. The initial framing of problems and the perception that ideas inform policies are essential characteristics of the concept (Haas 1992, 21). Epistemic communities, yet, need to be distinguished from technocracy. The explanatory category is not the understanding of technical knowledge but the formation of consensual knowledge. Epistemic knowledge or, rather, consensual knowledge is the substance of sectoral rationality. Subsequently, sectoral rationality is inherent to the respective policy field. The definition of epistemic knowledge, accordingly, has to be understood in the respective context of policy-making (Cross 2013). In regional intergovernmental organizations, civil servants represent their national states in regional policy networks and determine this context. A concept that is comparatively underestimated but adequate to capture policy communities at the regional level is that of transnational executive networks. According to Stone, these networks describe inter-ministerial cooperation and emphasize that transnational problems require transnational governance (Stone 2013, 43). Transnational executive networks emerge when at least one governmental sub-unit or agency builds a coalition with another government’s sub-unit to influence their national policy process. They may also include specialized agencies with a professional interest in distinct topics. These networks need a certain degree of autonomy so that agencies, as well as governmental sub-units, can freely interact with their counterparts in different countries. Keohane and Nye already studied executive networks in 1974 (Keohane and Nye 1974). They conceptualized the transnational executive networks of governmental representatives as “transgovernmental networks” (Keohane and Nye 1974). Policy coordination, accordingly, is the formal and informal coordination between ministerial bureaucracies. This interaction implies a shared belief system and rationality. As Adler and Haas point out, “policy coordination is, ultimately, based on consent and mutual expectations” (Adler and Haas 1990, 371).

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At the regional level, policy coordination is likely to support the independent action of networks. In general, transnational activities make governmental policies “sensitive to one another” (Keohane and Nye 1974, 41). Policy-makers will have to consider the political structures of others when designing their own policies. The consequence is “regulatory coordination” (Drezner 2008, 8), which finally leads to “policy harmonization” (Stone 2013, 26). Via regulatory coordination, the compliance with rules and regulations becomes more natural. Technical training and assistance in capacity building as well as the provision of information lead to the adaption of administrative structures in several nations (Slaughter 2009, 175). In the case of South American regionalism, it is interesting to observe how many new ministries have been created almost in parallel. One illustrative example that I am going to discuss in detail in Chap. 6 is the ministry of social development. Several South American states created a corresponding ministry in the last two decades and therewith facilitated regional cooperation, not only in UNASUR but also in Mercosur, CAN, or ALADI.  The argument of Raustalia that “regulators in State A usually have a functional counterpart in State B, often in an identically named ministry or agency” (Raustalia 2002, 13), seems to work in both directions: similar institutions favor regional public policy-making, but regional public policy-making also favors institutional creation at the national level. To Raustalia, this “expansion of domestic regulation” (Raustalia 2002, 16) is a significant factor explaining the increase of transgovernmental networks. The identification of actors with their counterparts contributes to the interaction in the sense that it produces cohesion within the network. Keohane and Nye underline that face-to-face meetings are essential for establishing relations between executive representatives: “When the same officials meet recurrently, they sometimes develop a sense of collegiality” (Keohane and Nye 1974, 45). Instead of identifying themselves according to nationality, officials might identify themselves in a more professional way. In this case, they would not act principally as national representatives but rather as professionals or experts. These networks then are characterized by “ties of common interest, professional orientation, and personal friendship” (Keohane and Nye 1974, 46). Furthermore, Cross mentions that “frequent meetings solidify a body of shared professional norms” and that “common culture comprises the sense of purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage within the community” (Cross 2013, 150). The identification of policy-makers with each other and the identification as professionals are decisive for the formation of a “social nature” of cohesiveness in transgovernmental networks.

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3.2.2  Interests As we have seen in Chap. 2, traditional intergovernmental thinking interprets states as unitary actors. If this is the case, all policy-makers would be following the same national interest. Yet, this assumption only works on the condition that actors pursue national interests at a regional level. It disregards that actors might not have a pre-formulated national interest that they try to advance in regional cooperation. Likewise, interests are not necessarily measurable in terms of policy outputs. For a long time, an output-orientation dominated policy studies. Howlett et  al. defined different typologies of policy-making which can either be problem-­oriented or solution focused (Howlett et al. 2013). Recently, newer studies that have been influenced by constructivist perspectives started focusing on the initial phase of agenda setting. The term agenda describes a “collection of problems, understandings of causes, symbols, solutions and other elements of public problems” (Birkland 2006, 63). We can assume that actors pursue national interests in this initial phase by placing their issues on the agenda. The agenda will determine the following phases of policy-making and therefore illustrates interests. In the phase of agenda setting, we can observe that some groups or actors are more powerful than others and can more easily influence the outcome of the policy debate. Still, we have to consider that it is not necessarily the “most persuasive argument” (Birkland 2006, 65) which will determine the outcome. Rhetorical as well as material factors influence the multifaceted process of agenda setting. Agenda setting and the ability to dominate agendas have important implications in South American regionalism. The strong asymmetries in the regions are also reflected in their means of representation in regional organs. Factors such as language, technical training of representatives, and the size of delegations give bigger and richer nations an advantage in bargaining processes. Smaller nations, instead of pushing agendas, often have troubles with providing the resources for participation in regional bodies. One option for smaller states is to focus on particular policy fields. Those policy fields having the highest relevance are those in which states will invest in the long run. A continuous participation and interaction gives policy-makers the chance to contribute to the creation of a regional perspective. An interesting question is whether some actors develop forms of leadership. As we are dealing with intergovernmental networks, forms

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of “distributive” leadership (Schlappa and Imani 2013, 3) can be helpful in capturing leadership in policy-making networks. Distributive leadership does not imply that all members have equal influence. Power can still be concentrated (Graeme et al. 2011, 245). It is a process which develops over time and leads to the institutionalization of relations between leaders and followers. The leadership relation is connected to the generation of shared understanding by all individual actors (Schlappa and Imani 2013, 10). Distributive leadership requires actors who are capable of leading, as well as those who accept leadership. As intergovernmental policy-making is often based on unanimity, leadership is a crucial factor in policy-making. It cannot be pursued too offensively, as it would cause opposition. Leadership is a recurrent issue of concern in South American regionalism. On the one hand, nations express their willingness to accept leadership; on the other hand, they are fearful of too offensive leaders, as, for example, Brazil, Mexico, and recently Venezuela. The concept of distributive leadership allows us to understand different modes of leadership, which relate to the actual process of policy-making and are based on consensus. 3.2.3  Structures Reconsidering the assumptions Keohane and Nye made on transgovernmental networks (Keohane and Nye 2011), national governments cannot be evaluated as unitary actors in international relations. They are involved with a variety of actors at different levels and interdependent on other governments. IR theory and regional integration theory did not sufficiently consider the participation of different governmental actors in transnational politics. This is especially true for intergovernmental theory. Stone criticizes the still nation-state-bound research. She claims that the perception of policy-making by states is inadequate at the international level (Stone 2013, 20–24). In her concept of disaggregated states, Slaughter similarly emphasizes that states are not unitary actors, but engage in transnational cooperation in different ways. She points out that “the analytical lens of the unitary state obscures the very existence of these different government institutions” (Slaughter 2009, 13). In this context, she indicates that the role of executive representatives in foreign affairs is becoming increasingly complex. Not only officials from Ministries of Foreign Affairs but a variety of governmental actors work together “with their foreign counterparts for different reasons” (Slaughter 2009, 38).

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As we have seen in the previous sections, it is essential to understand the context in which policy-makers interact. Policy studies at the global level tend to locate policy-making in organizations. The evolution of a policy orientation in social sciences relies on the emergence of social organizations, be it the administration of the state or the business cooperation. Peters connects policies with institutions and asks whether policies result from institutions or produce institutions (Peters 2013, 11). Schmidt found that explanations are missing. In the context of her discursive elaboration on institutionalism, she emphasized the role of institutions as context to policy-making (Schmidt 2012). The institutional context, according to Schmidt, is where the “substantive content of ideas” is formulated and “the interactive processes of discourse and policy argumentation” takes place (Schmidt 2012, 85). Institutions can be both, simple meanings or frames of communication, or they can be the formal context of argumentation and discursive interaction (Schmidt 2012, 86). Institutions are social constructs and therefore depend on social interaction. Institutions can have the effect of bringing “potential coalitions” of members together who share interests and give them the opportunity to form de facto coalitions via personal contact. These coalitions are the basis of regional public policy-making. By establishing constant relations between policy-makers, organizations substantially contribute to the emergence of public policies, even without having permanent structures or supranational agencies (Keohane and Nye 1974, 52). The way in which international organizations are institutionalized determines the creation of transgovernmental policy coordination. Slaughter puts forth that “many international organizations are primarily convening structures for horizontal networks of national officials” (Slaughter 2009, 22). International organizations, therefore, can play a significant role in the establishment of transgovernmental networks. Many international organizations “are nothing more than a framework for government network” (Slaughter 2009, 152). The administrative structures of these organizations, such as offices or secretariats, have the intention of facilitating the work of transgovernmental networks. Studies on international organizations show that the design of institutions determines the actions taken. Therefore, on the regional level, the policy-makers’ ability to create and design institutions is imperative.

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3.2.4  Ideas Constructivist ideas made a central contribution to the study of global governance. Different scholars emphasized the importance of “worldviews” or “belief systems” for policy-making (Howlett et al. 2009, 97). Even the originators of policy studies argued that there is no “objective realm of facts independent of the observer” (Howlett et al. 2009, 27). A simple technical observation would suggest that problems have an “objective existence” (Howlett et al. 2009, 93) which only has to be recognized by policy-makers. Problem recognition, however, includes the projection of a desirable status. Majone, one of the first to emphasize the critical ability of policy-makers to invent social categories, describes how the perception of problems, the conceptualization of problems, and, subsequently, the building of public opinion is essential to the understanding of policy-­ making (Majone 1992). Public policy-making according to Majone is, therefore, defining problems and finding the means to solve them. The perception of problems can be very concrete or uncertain. Similarly, the options for a solution may be numerous (Majone 1992, 38). The type of problem will define the approach to policy-making. The recognition of a regional dimension of problems would be the first pre-condition for policy-­makers to engage in regional public policy-making. Today, interpretive methods are widely used, particularly in connection with global governance and international politics. Interpretive policy studies primarily examine the meaning of the public policy. Analysts assume that the success or failure of policies depends on policy-makers as well as on the response of the respective target groups. This conviction is expressed in the terminology of the policy argument (Fischer and Forester 1993). It emphasizes the importance of communication and framing of policies. Policy arguments are concerned either with the concrete policy or with abstract levels of the “societal system within which the programmatic action takes place” (Fischer 2006, 232). These two levels of policy deliberation, concrete and abstract, occur continuously and simultaneously. Although they tackle different questions and use different resources, they cannot be separated from each other. The process of argumentation in policy-making is a moderate approach. It is not about passionate ­discussions but emphasizes the procedural aspect of reaching conclusions. Argumentation, as any form of communication, is based on mutual understanding of the actors. The context of communication is consequently a central constituent of communicative processes.

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Whenever policy-makers develop new interpretations, these interpretations are a result of the contact and exchange of ideas of actors with their counterparts (Stone 2013, 49). According to Fischer and Gottweis, not only the verbal and nonverbal communication is relevant. They point out that these resources, and the way they are used, reflect meanings and beliefs (Fischer and Gottweis 2012, 13). Consequently, “pre-agreed-upon understandings” (Fischer and Gottweis 2012, 10), which are effectively meanings, influence the actual communicative practice. Communication henceforth has to be understood as an iterative process. To study regional public policies, accordingly, those processes of meaning-making are fundamental. It is vital to understand how national officials tend to recognize regional dimensions of problems since they continuously engage in face-­to-­face communication in transnational cooperation. Especially perspectives from constructivist theory of action indicate that social interaction determines structures. This has significant implications for the demarcation of regional spaces. In the end, the perception of the actors defines what “the region” and what the “regional public” is. Only if policy-makers believe that the region has some substantial dimension, they can propose regional public policies.

3.3   Conceptual Model of Regional Public Policy-Making The four categories of actors, interests, institutions, and ideas are analytical dimensions which constitute the regional level of public policy-making. They have been discussed with the objective of bridging the regional integration literature with assumptions of policy studies. Table  3.1 summarizes the relevant factors. Table 3.1  Factors determining regional public policy-making Actors Interests Structures Ideas

–  –  –  –  –  –  –  – 

Source: Author’s table

Sectoral rationality in policy communities Professionalism of policy-makers in transgovernmental networks Independent policy-making or pursuance of national interests Distributive leadership Objectives of institutional creation/formal structures Institutional development Problems of regional dimension Regional project

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At the national level, policy-making processes are reasonably organized. Institutionally, governments are responsible for delivering public policies. With this authoritarian element, policies do not depend on bargaining and argumentation to the extent they do on the global level. Usually, policy-­ makers are administrative or at least executive actors. At the regional level, the understanding of the constructed meaning of policies is a helpful concept. It is vital to understand what regional policies are. Accordingly, the actors’ comprehension is decisive for regional policy-making. Their ability to compromise, to bargain, and to argue is essential for regional public policy-making. It is imperative to reconsider that we are dealing with intergovernmental structures. That means that actors must seek the approval of others whenever they wish to introduce issues to the agenda. The more coherent their interests are, the more natural agenda setting and consequently, policy determination is. Policy-makers in intergovernmental regional organizations usually are ministerial representatives. To put it differently, transgovernmental networks act in the context of regional organizations. This is one part of the institutional context. Moreover, each representative depends on its national government. The degree of independence a policy-maker has from its government, determines the ability of his action at the regional level. In the application of the assumptions made in Chap. 2, Table 3.2 illustrates the extension of the dimensions. Table 3.2  Systematization of factors of regional public policy-making Micro-level Actors

Structures

Ideas

–  Group cohesion –  Autonomy of action –  Collusion of national interests

– Formal organizational structure

– Sectoral rationality in policy communities

– Objectives of institutional creation/formal structures – Institutional development

– Political agenda of regional organization – Problems of regional dimension

– Professionalism of regional policymakers in transgovernmental networks Source: Author’s table

Interests

Macro-level

– Independent policy-making or pursuance of national interests – Distributive leadership

– Regional project

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The model uses an actor-centered approach and understands that transgovernmental networks are central to the execution of regional public policies. As already explained in Chap. 2, the macro-level and the micro-­ level of regional public policy-making need to be distinguished. The formal structure of a regional organization, as well as the political objectives of the organization, constitutes the macro-level. To the groups of policy-­ making, these conditions are external. The internal conditions of group processes describe the micro-level of regional public policy-making. The internal conditions are derived from the dimensions of actors and interests. The factors of the “collusion of national interests” and “autonomy of action” correspond to the dimension of interests, while the factor of “group cohesion” summarizes the actor dimension. Group cohesion is a familiar concept in the study of networks and policy communities. According to Yanow, interaction in groups enforces internal cohesion and creates a feeling of identification (Yanow 2000, 10). Cross also stresses the importance of internal dynamics of communities and networks. According to Cross, internal cohesion of groups can be measured by different factors. She proposes the analysis of “(1) selection and training; (2) meeting frequency and quality; (3) shared professional norms; and (4) common culture” (Cross 2013, 150) of group members. In particular, the “common culture comprises the sense of purpose, identity, symbolism, and heritage within the community. It is more than simply esprit de corps, but a sense of identifying with one another” (Cross 2013, 150). It thereby corresponds to the sectoral rationality of the respective policy field. The internal factors influence each other equally. The analytical model separates them for conceptual purposes. Figure 3.2 illustrates the model for the comparative analysis of regional public policy-making. Institutional context Formal Structure Political Program

National Public Administration

Policy-Network Group Cohesion Collusion of National Interests Autonomy of Action

Regional Public PolicyMaking

Fig. 3.2  Model of regional public policy-making. Source: Author’s figure

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The model is concerned primarily with the micro- and macro-level of the empirical phenomenon of regional public policy-making. It examines national administrations as a given variable, which influence the composition of groups of policy-making.

References Adler, Emanuel, and Peter M. Haas. 1990. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. In When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations, ed. Ernst B. Haas, vol. 22, 367–390. Studies in International Political Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Aguilar Villanueva, Luis F. 1992. La Hechura de Las Políticas. Vol. 2. Mexico: Miguel Ángel Porrúa. Birkland, Thomas A. 2006. Agenda Setting in Public Policy. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 63–78. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Bouckaert, Geert, Guy Peters, and Koen Verhoest. 2010. The Coordination of Public Sector Organizations. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Cross, Mai’a K. Davis. 2013. Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later. Review of International Studies 39 (1): 137–160. Cuervo, Jorge I., ed. 2007. Ensayos Sobre Politicas Publicas. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. ———., ed. 2015. Ensayos sobre políticas públicas II. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. deLeon, Peter, and Danielle M.  Vogenbeck. 2006. The Policy Sciences at the Crossroad. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 3–14. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Drezner, Daniel W. 2008. All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Rev. ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fischer, Frank. 2006. Deliberative Policy Analysis as Practical Reason: Integrating Empirical and Normative Arguments. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J.  Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 223–236. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Fischer, Frank, and John Forester. 1993. The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Fischer, Frank, and Herbert Gottweis. 2012. Introduction: The Argumentative Turn Revisited. In The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice, ed. Frank Fischer and Herbert Gottweis, 1–30. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Graeme, Currie, Suzana Grubnic, and Ron Hodges. 2011. Leadership in Public Services Networks: Antecedents, Process and Outcome. Public Administration 89 (2): 242–264. Haas, Peter M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46 (1): 1–35. Holzner, Burkart. 1972. Reality Construction in Society. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publication. Howlett, Michael, Allan McConnell, and Anthony D.  Perl. 2013. Reconciling Streams and Stages: Avoiding Mixed Metaphors in the Characterization of Policy Processes. In APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper. http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300442. Howlett, Michael, Anthony Perl, and M. Ramesh. 2009. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles & Policy Subsystems. Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press. Kaul, Inge. 2013. Global Public Policy: A Policy in the Making. Accessed July 9, 2015. http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/panel73_s1_kaul.pdf. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1974. Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations. World Politics 27 (1): 39–62. ———. 2011. Power and Interdependence. 4th ed. Stoughton: Longman. Lasswell, Harold D. 1956. The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom. The American Political Science Review 50 (4): 961–979. Majone, Giandomenico. 1992. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mayntz, Renate. 1993. Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks. Knowledge and Policy 6 (1): 3–16. Messner, Dirk. 1995. Die Netzwerkgesellschaft: wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit als Probleme gesellschaftlicher Steuerung. Köln: Weltforum-Verlag. Miller, Hugh T., and Tansu Demir. 2006. Policy Communities. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 137–148. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. de Oliveira, José Antônio Puppim. 2006. Desafios Do Planejamento Em Políticas Públicas: Diferentes Visões e Práticas. RAP Rio de Janeiro 40 (1): 273–288. Oszlak, Oscar, and Guillermo A. O’Donnell. 1976. Estado y Políticas Estatales En América Latina: Hacia Una Estrategia de Investigación. Buenos Aires: Cedes. Pallares, Francesc. 1988. Las Políticas Públicas: El Sistema Político En Acción. Revista de Estudios Políticos 62: 141–162. Pattberg, Philipp. 2013. The Emerging Transnational Policy Sphere: Lessons Learned from the Sustainability Arena. Accessed August 14, 2015. http:// www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/panel_73_s2__pattberg.pdf. Peters, Guy. 2013. Individuals, Institutions and Public Policy: Making the Linkages. Accessed June 2, 2015. http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/ panel_84_s1_peters.pdf.

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Radaelli, Claudio M. 1999a. The Public Policy of the European Union: Whither Politics of Expertise? Journal of European Public Policy 6: 757–774. ———. 1999b. Technocracy in the European Union. London: Longman. Raustalia, Kal. 2002. The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law Association 43 (1): 1–92. Ruggie, John Gerard. 2004. Reconstituting the Global Public Domain—Issues, Actors, and Practices. European Journal of International Relations 10 (4): 499–531. Schlappa, Hans, and Yasmin Imani. 2013. Leadership in the Co-Production of Public Services: An Initial Conceptual Framework. Accessed October 17, 2015. http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/IMG/pdf/panel_43_h_schlappa_y_imani.pdf. Schmidt, Vivian A. 2012. Discursive Institutionalism: Scope, Dynamics, and Philosophical Underpinnings. In The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice, ed. Frank Fischer and Herbert Gottweis, 85–113. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2009. A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Souza, Celina. 2006. Políticas Públicas: Uma Revisão Da Literatura. Sociologias 8: 20–45. Stone, Diane. 2013. Knowledge Actors and Transnational Governance: The Private-­ Public Policy Nexus in the Global Agora. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Torfing, Jacob. 2012. Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Velasco, Javier Torres. 2015. Prefacio. In Ensayos sobre políticas públicas II, ed. Jorge Iván Cuervo Restrepo, 9–15. Bogotá: U. Externado de Colombia. Wagner, Peter. 2006. Public Policy, Social Science, and the State: An Historical Perspective. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 29–40. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Weible, Christopher M., and Paul A.  Sabatier. 2006. A Guide to Advocacy Coalition Framework. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 123–136. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Wolin, Sheldon S. 1960. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Boston: Princeton University Press. Yanow, Dvora. 2000. Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Qualitative Research Methods. Beverly Hills, CA [u.a.], 1986–47. Thousand Oaks, CA [u.a.]: Sage.

CHAPTER 4

The Case of UNASUR

The Union of South American Nations, created in 2008 by all sovereign South American nations, has the objective of providing regional public policies. It is an example of intense cooperation on a ministerial level without presidential interference. Subsequently, the sectoral level of UNASUR developed in a dynamic process. Regardless, the focus in academic as well as public debates has not been regional public policies but security issues, regional conflicts, or questions of global order. What differentiated UNASUR from other regional organizations initially was its political involvement in regional conflicts. In the first years of its existence, UNASUR played a leading role in promoting solutions in various state and inter-state crises that support democracy, human rights, and peace. These basic principles of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty intended to stabilize the South American region and create an autonomous and sovereign area. Comprehensibly, those politically charged situations diverted the attention away from the organizational and structural development of the organization. It gave the impression that UNASUR united South American presidents, giving evidence to arguments put forward by interpresidentialists (compare Chap. 2). UNASUR’s records in conflict resolution play into the hands of agents, hypothesizing that state leaders had never before spoken in one voice in such delicate political situations. A limited perspective on presidential politics would suggest that UNASUR failed after a short period of some years, as presidents stopped © The Author(s) 2019 A. M. Hoffmann, Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3_4

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interacting in the ambit of the South American organization. This vision does not recognize that every regional agreement responds to a definite necessity of cooperation. If UNASUR would be a presidential forum at first instance, why would there be the necessity for sectoral councils, and what function would they fulfill? The institutionalization of cooperative mechanisms in sectors indicates that the structure of UNASUR responds to regional public policy-making across different policy fields. If we look closer at all the initiatives carried out in the name of the South American Union, we can identify a high diversity of policy-making beyond presidential politics. There has been remarkable progress in technical units of UNASUR, including but not limited to the positive records of the South American Health Council, the integrative attempts of the South American Defense Council, and the harmonization of policies by the South American Education Council. The political cooperation in these sectoral policies, which are in essence public policies, is a structural characteristic of UNASUR that remains even if presidents do not engage actively. In summary, UNASUR represents an ideal case to illustrate the study of regional public policy-making in intergovernmental regional organizations. As a formal organization, the South American Union ideal typically embodies intergovernmental modes of decisionmaking. Regarding policy-making, the separated sectoral councils allow for the study of interactions in a closed setting. A comparative perspective of policy-making in councils, therefore, is possible.

4.1   The Regional Organization of UNASUR After presidents signed the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, the union demonstrated a rapid establishment of sectors. The Health Council (Consejo Suramericano de Salud) and Defense Council (Consejo Suramericano de Defensa) were the first two councils to be created in 2008. Over the following four years, ten other councils were established as part of the organizational structure of UNASUR, ranging from infrastructure to culture and justice. At present, there are 12 councils in total, which are complemented by thematic working groups and initiatives on specific issues. We know little about the process of institutionalization of the councils. A preliminary examination of UNASUR’s constitutive documents does not explain this configuration. The Constitutive Treaty states merely in Article 5 (Institutional Development) that “sectoral Ministerial Meetings,

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and meetings of the Councils at Ministerial level, Working Groups and other institutional levels may be convened as required on a permanent or temporary basis, in order to fulfill the mandates and recommendations of the competent bodies” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art. 5). Consequently, there are no predefined criteria for the inclusion of specific sectors. Therefore, the initiative to establish a council is not set and may result from different processes. However, the final decision to include these sectors is dependent upon the opinions of the presidential council. The general objective of UNASUR formulated in Article 2 of the Constitutive Treaty is to “build, in a participatory and consensual manner, an integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art. 2). According to this declaration, regional integration is structurally transferred to the sectoral councils. As compared with other South American regional organizations, UNASUR’s sectoral work in thematic councils acts as the pivotal element of the South American Union. Public policy-­ making, in this case, is not a side effect of integration but a means to an end per se. According to General Secretary Ernesto Samper, the councils’ objective is to “identify public policies,”1 and in ministerial meetings, representatives are “together, exchanging information about public policies”2 (Samper 2014). With this interpretation, Samper suggests that councils have a creative and constructive function in the regional public policy-­ making process. The identification of public policies relates to the determination of problems. The different sectors constituting UNASUR follow the same formal principles of policy-making and cooperation. As they are components of a collective organization, they are structurally similar to each other. This shared structure allows for focusing on the internal characteristics, which distinguish each sector. Each sector is at a different stage of development and a different level of progress. While some of the councils can deliver projects, other councils are not even able to identify necessary concepts and working mechanisms. Currently, UNASUR comprises 12 councils,3 which are listed in Table 4.1.

 “identificar políticas públicas.”  “reunidos, cruzando información sobre políticas públicas.” 3  Although official working languages in UNASUR are Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English, acronyms normally refer to Spanish names of entities. Accordingly, official UNASUR organs will be entitled in Spanish acronyms in this study. 1 2

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Table 4.1  Creation of UNASUR councils Council

Created

In

CSS Consejo de Salud Suramericano CDS Consejo de Defensa Suramericano COSIPLAN Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento CSDS Consejo Suramericano de Desarrollo Social CSPM Consejo Suramericano sobre el Problema Mundial de las Drogas CES Consejo Energético Suramericano CSEF Consejo Suramericano de Economía y Finanzas CE Consejo Electoral de UNASUR CSE Consejo Suramericano de Educación CSC Consejo Suramericano de Cultura CSCT Consejo Suramericano de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación CES (Del) Consejo Suramericano en materia de Seguridad Ciudadana, Justicia

11/2008

Río de Janeiro, Brazil

12/2008 01/2009

Salvador de Bahía, Brazil Quito, Ecuador

08/2009

Quito, Ecuador

08/2009

Quito, Ecuador

05/2010

Los Cardales, Argentina Georgetown, Guyana

11/2010 10/2011 11/2012

Buenos Aires, Argentina Lima, Peru

11/2012

Lima, Peru

11/2012

Lima, Peru

11/2012

Lima, Peru

Source: Author’s table based on information available at www.sgunasur.org

The analysis of regional public policies combines the analysis of organizational structures, institutions, and regional processes with a nuanced examination of actor roles, objectives, and interests. The selection of cases takes these dimensions into account by choosing councils which cover all possible institutional characteristics of sectoral councils. As the councils attain different characteristics, diverse cases have been selected. Diverse cases have the objective of achieving a “maximum variance along relevant dimension” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302). The cases are “selected on the basis of expectations about their information content” (Flyvbjerg

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2006, 230) and to maximize the utility of information from small samples and single cases (see also (Levy 2008)). The cases are: • CSS—Consejo de Salud Suramericano (Health Council) • COSIPLAN—Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento (Infrastructure Council) • CSDS—Consejo Suramericano de Desarrollo Social (Social Development Council) • CSC—Consejo Suramericano de Cultura (Culture Council) • CSCT—Consejo Suramericano de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (Science Council) The Health Council was among the first to be created, while the Culture and Science Councils were among the last ones. Regarding policy outputs, the Health, Infrastructure, and Culture Councils produced some results. Also, the Health Council created an administrative institution to support its work. The Infrastructure Council is well known in academia as well as in public. It is based on the infrastructure program IIRSA, which existed already before UNASUR.  The Social Development Council, although having a high meeting frequency, was not able to produce notable results. Corresponding to the concept of transgovernmental networks, the councils will be treated as “interpretive communities.” This concept has been developed in interpretive policy analysis to conceptualize the communicative practice of groups of policy-makers in a structural setting (Yanow 2000; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006), as explained in Chap. 3. The analyzed data consequently focuses on conditions of policy-making in the respective councils. According to the previously presented model, these are internal as well as external conditions.

4.2   Methodological Approach Regional public policy-making is a multidimensional phenomenon. It involves individual actors and their behavior in groups, national interests, national public administrations, the formal structures of regional organizations, and finally the political objectives of different actors in regional cooperation. Although I am working with an institutional constructivist approach, I am going to complement the study with different methods and instruments in order to capture the complexity of the phenomenon of regional public policy-making. Accordingly, I am triangulating the

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methodological approach of this study. The analysis of a phenomenon by triangulation is to some extent artificial. In reality, the analytical dimensions surrounding institutional and network-inherent factors merge. For ­conceptual purposes, it is therefore useful to distinguish between them and to analyze them separately. All applied methods follow the interpretive paradigm and rely on the epistemological foundations of interactionism. Interactionist approaches have a focus on the “human capacity for making and communicating meaning” (Yanow 1996, 5). The objective of interactionist research is to reconstruct social practice, its formation, and its conditions. As seen in the examination of policy studies, the communicative interaction of policy-­ makers has important implications for their common work. Given that, the analysis deals with the occurrence and realization of collective behavior in policy communities, whereby individuals, which are “fitting their lines of action to one another,” are engaged in collective action (Blumer 1986, 16). Fundamentally, interactionist approaches assume that “humans learn their basic symbols, their conceptions of self, and the definitions they attach to social objects through interaction with others” (Denzin 1989, 5). Within this understanding, each person is continuously interpreting the meanings, which are attributed to objects created through interactions between human beings (Blumer 1986, 2). The central epistemological claim, interactionist theory makes, is that “the human individual confronts a world that he must interpret in order to act instead of an environment to which he responds” (Blumer 1986, 15). This underlying assumption is critical to understand processes of collective action. Whenever actors might be called into action, they first will interpret their situation regarding conditions and other actors. Interactionist approaches of collective action, therefore, are suitable to analyze the influencing factors proposed by the model of regional public policy-making and the relation of context and internal group processes. The factors which influence the “human conduct” vary from system to system, and group to group. As Denzin puts it, “participants in any behavioral setting both create and interpret the rules that influence normal conduct within that situation” (Denzin 1989, 11). Accordingly, the structural as well as the ideational context of groups influences interactions within the group. Triangulation consequently is an adequate practice to analyze these different layers of the phenomenon of regional public policy-­making. The interactionist approach suggests qualitative research. The methods usually applied are narrative interviews (Labov and Waletzky 1997),

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observation, and content analysis of documents, personal statements, observation protocols, and interview transcripts. Collectively, these methods built the foundation for the analysis of the case of UNASUR. A total of 52 interviews were conducted with interviewees of three different groups. These are policy-makers in sectoral councils, representatives from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and political officials from all South American member nations. 4.2.1  The Practice of Triangulation As already put, eclectic research best meets the objectives of the study of regional public policy-making. Also, the practice of triangulation provides the possibility of including different perspectives and meets the requirements of eclectic research. In this context, Hettne and Söderbaum emphasize that “an empirical case can (or rather should) be approached from different theoretical angles” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2007, 61). The conceptual model of regional public policy-making relies on the analysis of the macro- and the micro-level. According to Moran-Ellis, “for those empirical questions about phenomena, which operate at both macro and micro levels, one method alone cannot offer a sufficient basis for sociological explanation” (Moran-Ellis 2006, 48). Subsequently, interpretive policy analysis at the micro-level and institutional theory of organizations at the macro-level are combined. Triangulation is a relatively usual practice that allows for the application of different methods and techniques, whenever required in a specific research design (Schnell et al. 2008, 262). Presently, the practice of triangulation is mostly used in the context of ethnographic studies and as a mixed methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative methods (Flick 2008, 9). It also presents benefits for the conceptualization and dissemination of new fields of research, which the analysis of regional public policy-­making undoubtedly does. Flicks puts it quite simply: “triangulation is appropriate whenever a single method not suffices to” (Flick 2008, 12). In the field of policy studies, there has been an increasing adoption of multiple methods. At present, a high percentage of scholars are using triangulation in the comparative study of public policies (Munck and Snyder 2007, 17). In academic debates, there is an entirely messy and confusing usage of the terms mixed methods, integrated methods, or multi-­ methodological research. The term triangulation is often used interchangeably with these. Yet, triangulation has to be distinguished. While

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Institutional context Formal Structure Political Program Macro-Level Policy-Network National Public Administration

Group Cohesion Collusion of National Interests Autonomy of Action

Regional Public PolicyMaking Micro-Level

Fig. 4.1  Model of regional public policy-making and levels. Source: Author’s figure

mixed methods usually mean the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, triangulation can describe the combination of only qualitative methods. Methods in the present study are all qualitative. The difference to the simple combination or integration of methods is that “triangulation incorporates an epistemological claim about the outcomes of the research” (Moran-Ellis 2006, 46). The researcher is concerned with the new observations that can be produced when combining data collection by multiple methods. The analysis of regional public policy-making implies such a perspective. According to the model, the macro- and micro-­ levels are disaggregated. I am going to analyze the institutional dimension (macro) and the group internal processes (micro) successively, as displayed in Fig. 4.1. For the analysis of the institutional context, I am applying concepts of institutional analysis of organizations as well as frame analysis. Group processes on the other side, I am going to analyze in line with interactionist approaches of collective action. 4.2.2  Macro-Level: Institutional Analysis of Organizations Institutional theory, broadly speaking, is concerned with the establishment of social structure. These structures, “including schemas, rules, norms, and routines,” are “guidelines for social behavior” (Scott 2005, 460). To explore how the institutional dimensions of a regional organization shape

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interactions within transgovernmental networks, I apply the institutional analysis in organization theory. Institutionalist assumptions will be adapted to frame institutions as determining variable of policy-making. I nstitutionalism and Organization Theory In political sciences, institutionalist research is characterized by a focus on political institutions (Goodin 1998, 2). Douglass North defines institutions generally as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991, 97). Although having an economic and game-theoretic focus, North proposes an evolutionary perspective on institutions in general. In his opinion, institutions are the basis for complex systems of interaction (North 1991, 99–101). In contrast, institutional approaches with a behavioralist tradition explained collective political behavior as “aggregate consequence of political choice” (Powell and DiMaggio 2012, 2). March and Olsen, who had a leading role in the development of new institutional approaches, found that the assumption of collective action is what differentiates institutional theory from other behavioralist theories (March and Olsen 1995, 35). That means that individuals might not always follow individual interests but act “for the sake of the good of the community” (March and Olsen 1995, 35). March and Olsen, who made their statement especially for democratic policy-making, found that the policy outcome depends on the structure of political institutions and not only on economic and social determinants. They claim that political preferences are “neither stable nor exogenous” but are “molded through political experiences” (March and Olsen 1984, 738). This implication gives institutions a central role in policy-­making as it assumes that interests arise from inside. The behavior of actors is determined by rules, which can be understood as ordering principles. They provide rationales for action in specific situations. Institutions for March and Olsen consequently do not depend on the awareness of individual actors. Accordingly, institutionalism has an endogenous perspective of institutions. They are not only “equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual actors or arenas for contending social forces” (March and Olsen 2006, 4). This perspective of March and Olsen fundamentally influenced new institutionalism in organization theory. The crucial difference to rational choice institutionalism is that although both assume institutions to be products of human design, only rational choice believes that they are “the products of conscious design” (Powell and DiMaggio 2012, 8).

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March and Olsen define institutions as “collections of interrelated practices and routines, sometimes formalized into formal rules and laws and sometimes less formally specified” (March and Olsen 1995, 34). This definition is valid in the application to the concept of regional public policy-­ making. Likewise, their definition of governance in the context of public administrations can be applied to regional governance. First, governance “involves developing identities of citizens and groups in the political environment,” second, governance provides “capabilities for appropriate political action,” which is, third, evaluated by a system of accounts. Fourth, governance is created as an adaptive system and therefore able to change (March and Olsen 1995, 45). In conclusion, regional policy-making is a practice of state representatives in a transnational structural setting. The bureaucrat, the diplomat, and the politician all have distinct role perceptions in this setting. While old institutionalists assumed especially bureaucrats to act strategically and possibly instrumentalize institutions, new institutionalists suppose that interests and actors themselves are constituted through their interaction in the respective institution (Powell and DiMaggio 2012, 14). Regional organizations, in correspondence to the constituting national systems, therefore can support the development of sectoral rationalities. According to Meyer and Rowan, formal structures of organizations are “a blueprint for activities” (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 342). They include positions, working objectives, and obligations. This formal structure, which is best represented by modern bureaucracies, is designed impersonally. Informal rules of procedure complement or substitute formal structures (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 343). New institutional thinking developed the concept of “open systems” to capture these structures (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 341). Open systems contradict the “central value system” of organizations, which was proposed by Parson as the instructive element for action (Hassard 1995, 22) and used by functionalists to explain institutionalization in supranational organizations (Chap. 2). Connected to the idea of open systems is the concept of organizational fields. Organizational fields, and concomitantly organizational separation, in this concept, are the institutional expression of sectoralization of the public sphere. Scott described these fields as a “socially constructed arena within which diverse, interdependent organizations carry out specialized functions” (Scott 2005, 469). The concept has been inspired by modern public policy studies and corresponds to the idea of sectoral subsystems. The concept of organizational fields is important to connect the macro-level of institutional research in organizations

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with the micro-level. As Powell and Colyvas are convinced, “macro-­ categories guide micro-interactions” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 284). Institutional research accordingly can “benefit from complementary attention to the micro-order and the macro-level” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 295). Garfinkel and Goffman, in line with interactionist assumptions, both argued that macro-structures are the outcome of social order that is “created on the ground floor, through situated local practices” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 281). Garfinkel argued that social roles which determine behavior are constituted in daily life interactions. To create intersubjectivity, or to put it simply, to understand each other, people apply what Garfinkel termed “background understandings” (Garfinkel 1964, 44) in communication. Mannheim used the term “atheoretical knowledge” to describe “not directly explicable knowledge of actors” which seems to be “underlying every social (inter)action” (Bohnsack et  al. 2010, 21). Atheoretical knowledge is a common concept in social sciences that can be called practical sense, according to Bourdieu or implicit and tacit knowledge, following Polanyi (Bohnsack et al. 2013, 4). While Garfinkel provided the “insight that rationality is constructed through common-place interactions,” Goffman introduced the concept of frames “as providing a structure to social context” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 282). Frames, in practice, can be identified as metaphors. These connect the present to past occurrences and thereby “offer meaning to daily activity” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 293). Frames of the organizational context are not necessarily visible but may be taken for granted and therefore unconsciously utilized for establishing meaning of the practice, which is taking place in the respective organization. In conclusion, interactionists added a constructivist element to the institutional theory of organizations. They claim that not only the formal structure determines the interaction of collectivities but also cognitive systems of the individual actors. These cognitive systems, which can be expressed in frames, may derive from the macro-structure. In the case of regional organizations, the political objectives might represent such frames.  he Influence of Ideas: Frame Analysis T Schemes of interpretation of reality, or frames, are a result of interpersonal communication and rely on an interactionist approach (Goffman 1981). Whenever actors come together, they engage in what Giddens describes as an interactive interpretation of the situation they find themselves in

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(Giddens 1986, 87). Interpretive policy analysis emphasizes the relevance of frames, and how they construct and reconstruct policies (Fischer 2006, 226). Fischer and Forester define the process of policy-making as “constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification” (Fischer and Forester 1993, 2), which is the conceptual framing of problems. Frames can develop a meta-communicative function. They imply information and exclusion criteria and by doing so construct an intersubjective reality by experience and everyday communication. Notably, frames are not mere descriptions of reality, but rather constructions that “give meaning to reality, and shape the understanding of reality” (Verloo 2005, 20). Such frames of reference, as Holzner calls them, lead to the perception and “formulation of plans of action” (Holzner 1972, 14). According to this assumption, frames are a relevant factor influencing the agenda of policy-making in groups. To be able to understand the normativity of UNASUR in policy-­ making, I am going to analyze the macro-frames, which derive directly from the regional organization. Frames and institutions are treated as external determinants to policy-making in networks, to explore why different transgovernmental networks develop different group mechanisms. Frames and institutions pertain equally to all networks and have to be transformed inherently by the different actor groups. As Entman points out, frames are “not likely to have a universal effect on all” (Entman 1993, 54). The purpose of the identification of macro-frames is to compare how they are evoked in the sectoral councils. Therefore, I distinguish between framing and evoked frames. Framing describes the purposeful construction of frames, while an evoked frame, on the contrary, is a reaction that is accompanied or triggered by frames. Framing has often been analyzed according to social movement theory. For policy studies, those approaches emphasized the activating effects of the framing process (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897). Strategic framing is a term increasingly used in this context (Gamson 1992). It describes the process of framing to create legitimacy or to incentivize action (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 888). “Human rights” and “democracy” as metaphors for moral behavior are examples of this concept. Frames work as “basic building blocks for the construction of broadly resonant norms, and they thereby serve to legitimate normative orders” (Payne 2001, 39). UNASUR as regional organization refers broadly to such norms and internalizes universal concepts.

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4.2.3  Micro-Level: Collective Action in Regional Spaces DiMaggio and Powell practically pioneered the study of microfoundations in the institutional analysis of organizations. For that purpose, they applied insights from interactionism and ethnomethodology to institutional analysis (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 279). The microfoundations of institutional theory are concerned with the “understanding of how individuals locate themselves in social relations and interpret their context” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 277). For policy-making, this means that whenever policy-­ makers take decisions, their choices are determined by their institutional context. This interaction is added to the illustration of the conceptual model in Fig. 4.2. Powell and Owen-Smith conceive of human sense making as adoption to institutional logics. To them, institutional logics “are inextricably tied to concrete structures” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, 600). They provide rationales for the actors’ behavior, as they constitute “the constellation of beliefs and associated practices (the schemes and scripts) that a field’s participants hold in common” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, 600). These logics are strongly connected to the organizational fields. The commonality of beliefs is constitutive to some logic, which in turn characterizes an organizational field. March and Olsen speak of the “development of a community of rule, based on a common identity, and sense of belonging” as a “key issue of [a] political organization” (March and Olsen 2009, 11). This sense of belonging corresponds to the sectoral rationality Institutional context Formal Structure Political Program Macro-Level Policy-Network National Public Administration

Group Cohesion Collusion of National Interests Autonomy of Action

Regional Public PolicyMaking Micro-Level

Fig. 4.2  Model of regional public policy-making and levels II. Source: Author’s figure

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proposed in Chap. 3 and the factor of group cohesion proposed in the model of regional public policy-making (Chap. 3). March and Olsen describe institutional logics as the logic of appropriateness. This logic determines behavior according to a complex system of rules, roles, identities, and internalized beliefs about what is right and wrong. They claim that it is not about rational choices but about how actors behave appropriately in certain situations. Institutions and identities constitute the ambit of action which policy-makers have. These are social constructs. Institutions provide actors “with consistent behavioral rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March and Olsen 1995, 30). This means that actors attempt to match their “behavior to a situation” (March and Olsen 1995, 30). As March and Olsen state, “to act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good” (March and Olsen 2009, 4). Yet, behaving appropriately gets difficult when actors are confronted with different rule systems and contexts. The interpretation of what is appropriate in these cases might be conflicting. Actors face “contending imperatives of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1995, 31). Conflicting rules have a significant impact on policy-making, especially in transnational cooperation, where actors are bound to more than one set of rules. The multiplicity of organizational fields that overlap in regional organizations might create conflict. Whenever “multiple competing logics are in play in the same setting” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, 600), conflict may arise, or new forms of action may develop. Institutional change, therefore, is not initiated by conscious actors but rather based on irregularities, which actors might observe in their daily practice. To Powell and Colyvas, “institutional transformation is often rather subtle” (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 277). March and Olsen explain that competing rules are not considered consciously, but rather unwittingly, as “rules that are more familiar are more likely to be evoked, thus recently used or recently revised rules come to attention” (March and Olsen 2009, 9). Therefore, collective sectoral rationality certainly supports the establishment of the same rules. International organizations always work at the intersection of different contexts. They, hence, cannot only be understood by their characteristics but also according to their various dependencies deriving from different contexts. Consequently, these different environments pose challenges to the institutional framework in different ways, sometimes stronger sometimes

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less resilient (Siedschlag 2013, 166). To illustrate conflicting institutions in the international political realm, the institution of diplomacy is often used as a reference. By studying diplomacy as a political institution, Bátora figured that regional integration processes remarkably change this institution. At the same time, transnational cooperation is strongly determined by diplomacy (Bátora 2005, 45). Although states might vary significantly regarding behavior, organization, and interests, they all share the institution of diplomacy, which acts as the gatekeeper in international communication. As professional carriers of the institution, diplomats act as state representatives anchored in their national political systems and behave according to a set of rules and procedures that are characteristic of transnational cooperation. Bátora, therefore, states that diplomacy has a “Janusfaced” characteristic (Bátora 2005, 46). While being socialized in the national logic of their states, diplomats “over time and through mutual interactions […] gradually developed a shared professional identity” (Bátora 2005, 47). In the case of sectoralized transnational policy-making, however, diplomats are not necessarily gatekeepers anymore. In regional organizations a variety of national actors, who do not necessarily belong to the diplomatic corps, interact with their counterparts from other nations directly. Policy-makers themselves get into this ambiguous situation. For the investigation of patterns of regional public policy-making, it is crucial to understand the institutional logics of different actors. Similarly, transgovernmental sectoral networks are in a comparable situation of representing their nation and a distinct policy field. The interaction in groups enforces internal cohesion, which might create a feeling of identification. Members of a group share “cognitive mechanisms,” and “use the same or similar language” (Yanow 1996, 8). To be classified as an interpretive community, groups need a “shared point of view relative to a policy issue” (Yanow 2000, 37). This shared vision materializes as regional perspective in the case of regional public policy-making.

References Bátora, Jozef. 2005. Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy? Journal of European Public Policy 12 (1): 44–66. Blumer, Herbert. 1986. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bohnsack, Ralf, Iris Nentwig-Gesemann, and Arnd-Michael Nohl. 2013. Einleitung: Die dokumentarische Methode und ihre Forschungspraxis. In

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Die dokumentarische Methode und ihre Forschungspraxis, ed. Ralf Bohnsack, Iris Nentwig-Gesemann, and Arnd-Michael Nohl, 9–32. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Bohnsack, Ralf, Nicolle Pfaff, and Wivian Weller. 2010. Qualitative Analysis and Documentary Method in International Educational Research. Opladen and Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich. Denzin, Norman K. 1989. The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. London: Transaction Publishers. Entman, Robert M. 1993. Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. McQuail’s Reader in Mass Communication Theory 43: 390–397. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization 52: 887–917. Fischer, Frank. 2006. Deliberative Policy Analysis as Practical Reason: Integrating Empirical and Normative Arguments. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J.  Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, 223–236. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Fischer, Frank, and John Forester. 1993. The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Flick, Uwe. 2008. Triangulation: eine Einführung. 2. Qualitative Sozialforschung 12. Wiesbaden: VS, Verl. für Sozialwiss. Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry 12 (2): 219–245. Gamson, William. 1992. Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garfinkel, Harold. 1964. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Wiley. Giddens, Anthony. 1986. The Constitution of Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goffman, Erving. 1981. Forms of Talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Goodin, Robert E. 1998. The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hassard, John. 1995. Sociology and Organization Theory: Positivism, Paradigms and Postmodernity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hettne, Björn, and Frederik Söderbaum. 2007. The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, New Frontiers. In Regionalisation and Global Governance—The Taming of Globalisation? ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Christopher W. Hughes, and Philippe De Lombaerde, 61–79. New York: Routledge. Holzner, Burkart. 1972. Reality Construction in Society. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publication. Labov, William, and Joshua Waletzky. 1997. Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience. Journal of Narrative & Life History 7 (1–4): 3–38.

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Official Documents UNASUR (Union of South American Nations). 2008. Constitutive Treaty. Brasilia, Brazil.

Interviews Samper, Ernesto. 2014.   Former General Secretary of UNASUR   General Secretariat UNASUR   Quito, Ecuador   Interview: 22.11.2014

CHAPTER 5

Regional Organizations in South America

5.1   Regionalism in South America: Waves and Institutional Creation Latin American regionalism “has been characterized by a sequence of different regional cooperation projects” (Nolte 2014, 11) since the 1990s. The idea to create UNASUR can be traced back to 1993, when Brazil proposed the creation of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) (Nolte 2014, 12). Since the Brazilian government encountered opposition against such an economically oriented project, it changed its course. Beginning with the first “Cumbre Sudamericana” in 2000  in the Brazilian capital Brasilia, the Cardoso government started a novel and flexible movement of South American Summitry. In this context three important things happened: (1) the inclusion of Guyana and Suriname into South American regional cooperation was initiated, (2) the IIRSA was created, and (3) the convergence of Mercosur and CAN was promoted (Sanahuja 2012, 35). The new South American project was in no way perceived as contradictory to the existing ones, as they all followed the same logic of open regionalism. UNASUR, finally, was created as a flexible and political regional mechanism, responding to the negative experiences the South American nations made with supranational structures. Whether the low institutionalization is a weakness or strength of UNASUR is controversially debated. The

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organization is often interpreted as “minimal consensus” and therefore as a retrograde step in regional integration. Others, however, emphasize that the loose structure avoids conflict. As Sanahuja points out: “for all countries, the most relevant factor is probably the flexibility and the few demands of UNASUR about commerce and economic development”1 (Sanahuja 2012, 37). Whether the case of UNASUR is an example of successful integration depends on one’s definition of integration. In any case, its noneconomic regional integration model helped other policy fields to gain visibility in the politicization of regionalism. Regional integration without an economic focus is possible. The South American trend consequently motivates the study of regional public policy-making beyond commerce and trade policies. The focus is not on market and trade integration anymore, but instead on social cohesion and sustainable development. 5.1.1  Waves of Regionalism in Latin America Regional cooperation has a long tradition in South America. Already in 1960, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA; Spanish ALALC—Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio) has been established. Shortly afterward, in 1969, the Andean Pact entered into force. The objectives of regional agreements in this early period were the creation of common markets and the industrialization of the respective member states. In particular, CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina) promoted these objectives as conditions for economic development during the 1960s and 1970s.2 In the 1980s, this model was reformulated towards the neoliberal paradigm of regional integration (Pizarro 2008, 27) which has dominated the South American region in the following decades. The creation of Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) in 1991 and the signing of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994 demarcated the beginning of a new era of neoliberal regional integration in the Americas. As Tussie explains, Mercosur was created to contest “the US-led mode” of trade cooperation. In short time, Mercosur gained international recognition and interest (Tussie 2009, 170). Following the 1  “para todos los países, el factor más relevante probablemente sea la flexibilidad y pocas demandas de UNASUR en relación al comercio y el desarrollo.” 2  This model of development is firmly connected with Raúl Prebisch, an influential academic of CEPAL.

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­bjective of economic liberalization, Mercosur initially was designed o according to the model of “open regionalism.” Open regionalism was a “platform from which member states could participate in wider international trends” (Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira 2007, 61). It involved politics of neoliberal economic reforms and was interpreted as the deactivation of the economic development model proposed by Prebisch and CEPAL (Pizarro 2008, 29). However, as a reaction to severe economic and financial crises that followed the adoption of neoliberal politics, Mercosur was then transformed into an anti-neoliberal organization. In the late 1990s, Mercosur “came to be seen as a symbol of resistance to neo-liberalism,” and started promoting social goals alongside its pre-existing economic goals (Tussie 2009, 176). As Gardini explains, “Mercosur started a new phase” (Gardini 2009, 87) from 2003 onward. To achieve sustainable economic and social development goals, Mercosur introduced a social agenda. At the same time, South American states entered a prolonged process of political change through the election of new progressive governments. This finally led to the rejection of the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), and thereby manifested the South American opposition to the North American economic interests in the region. The idea of FTAA, which came up in the 1990s, was to create a free trade zone covering all American nations. As Tussie laconically points out: “the year 2005 concluded with the collapse of the FTAA as envisioned by the US and with it, the fall of Washington’s principal strategy for the region” (Tussie 2009, 179). The final rejection of the FTAA was a turning point in Inter-­ American regionalism. The failure of FTAA came along with the open contestation of US-American hegemony in the region. At the same time, also the OAS (Organization of American States), created in 1948, suffered from the loss of influence and meaning. What followed can be considered as a regional, interregional, or even continental diversification of processes in Latin American integration (Bizzozero 2011, 40). The rise of novel models of regionalism led to the decline of OAS and opened a variety of spaces for intergovernmental dialogue (Vigevani et al. 2013, 19). Following the so-called Turn to the Left, which describes the almost simultaneous election of left presidents in the beginning of the 2000s in many South American countries, institutional creation had been diverse and vast. These presidents were Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil), Tabaré Vázquez and later José Mujica (Uruguay), Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Evo Morales (Bolivia), and

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Néstor Kirchner (Argentina) (Pizarro 2008, 30). Venezuela and Cuba initiated the creation of new institutions by founding ALBA in 2004. Other decidedly leftist governments, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, joined the alliance later. Another regional cooperation agreement with a distinct ideological constituent, CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), can also be interpreted as a response to the US-American aspiration to create an American Free Trade Area (Bizzozero 2011; Priess 2010). CELAC was created by the Rio Group and Caribbean states in 2010 and covers the whole American continent, excluding the United States and Canada. The creation of the CELAC called into question the legitimacy of the US-dominated OAS (Feinberg 2010; Serbin et al. 2012a). The most recent regional agreement is the Alianza del Pacífico (Pacific Alliance), created as a free trade area between Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Due to its liberal orientation, it was considered a counterpart to the leftist agreements. From its beginnings on it was therefore suspected to threaten the endeavors for a unified South American region in the realm of the UNASUR.  The Pacific Arc, as the Alliance was called before its formal constitution, was promoted at the beginning of the twenty-first century by the then Peruvian president Alan Garcia. Pacific Alliance members include countries on the Pacific coast which “share a similar, market-­ led economic orientation” (Nolte 2014, 14). Scholars and practitioners often use the Pacific Alliance to argue in favor of an economic rationale for regional integration. The arguments are based on the finding “that really existing integration attempts have regularly adopted economic goals” (Malamud 2013, 2). Although this might have appeared to occur superficially, there is no evidence that market integration generally facilitates political unification. On the contrary, Latin American economic problems often led to stagnation in integration processes, like in the cases of the Argentine-Brazilian trade disputes, or the cellulose case between Argentina and Uruguay. The enduring dispute between Argentina and Uruguay arose in 2002 when Uruguay decided to install cellulose plants on the banks of the Uruguay River. Argentina claims that this industry causes damages to the environment at the other side of the river, which is Argentine national territory. The case is being debated internationally since 2005 (Sannazarro 2011). Previously the devaluation of the Brazilian currency in 1999 and 2001 which directly affected the Argentine economy had significant impact at Mercosur (Carranza 2003).

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Pizarro, the former Chilean Minister of Planning, argues from a standard economic point of view that the Latin American integration process is “disappointing” (Pizarro 2008, 24), due to the failure of far-reaching free trade agreements and the low level of intraregional trades. In fact, only 15% of Latin American exports were intraregional in 2008 (Pizarro 2008, 24). Pizarro, however, evaluates regional integration only regarding economic performance, specifically in terms of intraregional trade. Economists criticize the performance of new regionalist models but fail to grasp the actual substance of organizations. As newer regional organizations such as UNASUR show, their contribution is more far-reaching than mere commercial treaties. The new wave of South American regionalism relies on the democratic election of progressivist governments and leftist presidents, the increasing regulation of markets by states, and excessive social programs (Serbin et al. 2012b, 10–11). Due to the belief that neoliberal economic integration projects failed to induce growth and democracy, alternative models of regionalism are now being debated. A higher emphasis is put on social development, social politics, and cooperation in a variety of policy fields. These are forms of political, rather than economic, integration (Riggirozzi 2012, 138). As Riggirozzi and Grugel point out, the “contemporary region-building in South America is firmly political and intergovernmental in character” (Riggirozzi and Grugel 2015, 781). UNASUR is an example of this New Regionalism in South America. The South American Union often served as an illustration for progressive regionalism based on the principles of sustainable development and democracy in its first years of existence. 5.1.2   Drivers of Regionalism? Brazil and Venezuela The influence of Brazil and Venezuela has often been discussed as decisive for progress in South American regionalism. Hence, it is an interesting question whether these dominant political positions at the macro-level reflect in policy-making processes at the micro-level. Literature suggests that the relationship between Venezuela and Brazil has always had an extraordinary influence on South American regionalism (Romero 2010, 12). Particularly the relationship between the two presidents Lula da Silva and Hugo Chávez has been recognized as key to the advancement of regional integration (Romero 2010, 19). In the end, UNASUR epitomizes the dialectical situation of simultaneously

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occurring competition and cooperation between Brazil and Venezuela when striving for regional influence (Hoffmann 2015, 27). According to Carmo, Venezuela recognizes the importance of Brazil for regional integration (do Carmo 2012, 310). Nevertheless, Venezuela and Brazil engaged in a competition about the definition of what the South American region is (Burges 2008, 78). The Venezuelan foreign policy can be categorized as anti-hegemonic and anti-liberal. Chávez repeatedly confronted and criticized the United States for their hegemonic control of the Inter-American relations (Hoffmann 2015, 27). His imagination was a cooperative regionalism to establish an “authentic Pan-Americanism” (Linares 2010, 52). The re-­interpretation of Pan-Americanism was one central objective of the Bolivarian revolution. In contrast to Brazil, Venezuela postulated the replacement of the Inter-American system by a Latin American system, excluding the United States and Canada (Romero 2010, 6). Venezuela interprets the OAS as a hegemonic instrument of the United States and US-dominated institution. This rejection of the OAS is one point of conflict between Brazil and Venezuela. The other one is based on the self-­perception of Chávez, which caused the intense Venezuelan activism in regional cooperation. Chávez positioned Venezuela in the epicenter between Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. This vision challenges the Brazilian interpretation of South America as the region naturally influenced or even dominated by Brazil (Hoffmann 2015, 28). Chávez’s open foreign policy came along with the transformation of the Venezuelan state under the label of the Bolivarian revolution. He proposed an image of a Latin American regionalism, which is characterized by a stronger role of the state in the economy (Werz 2009, 173). The radicalization of Chavez’s foreign policy took place after the coup in 2002. This time after the coup coincides with Lula taking over the Brazilian presidential office (do Carmo 2012, 310). The Brazilian and Venezuelan positions converged at this point, when they both based their foreign policy projections on the South American region. Although Cardoso already intensified regional cooperation, it was Lula who explicitly formulated a South American regional agenda. Celso Amorim, the minister of foreign affairs from 2003 to the end of 2010 under President Lula, explicitly and openly declared South America as a priority of the Lula administration. This priority found its political expression in Brazil’s mediation in regional conflicts, the constant dialogue

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with neighboring governments, and engagement in regional integration (Hirst et al. 2010, 8). It is valued as an asset of the foreign policy of the Lula administration that Brazil evolved to “the point of convergence between the liberal and pro-US positions and the radical and antiAmericanistic positions”3 (do Carmo 2012, 314). This quality has been crucial for the creation of UNASUR. The Brazilian progressive regional agenda also reached out to different sectors. The growing “degree of cooperation between different ministries,” (Saraiva 2010, 165) which usually is not considered in research, has been acknowledged by the Brazilian government. Ministerial cooperation remarkably intensified during the Lula administration. Also, Hirst et  al. identify an increasing presence of Brazilian ministerial cooperation abroad. Especially in South-South cooperation, Brazilian international departments engage in different areas, such as culture, education, labor, or energy (Hirst et al. 2010, 5). The strong position of Brazil in international “soft politics” is particularly remarkable in the health area. The Brazilian activism in global health contributed to the creation of the terminology of “health diplomacy” (Hirst et al. 2010, 4). This emphasis on South-South cooperation in different sectors indicates an important role of Brazilian policy-makers in UNASUR councils. However, there are some problems related to the Brazilian aspirations for regional leadership. The mere size and economic power of Brazil cause concerns among its South American neighbors. An explicit and coercive expression of leadership could easily be interpreted as Brazilian imperialism (Burges 2008, 82). The Brazilian approach, including different levels of action and a variety of actors, differs remarkably from the Venezuelan regional politics. Malamud argued that Venezuelan alliance-building under Chávez, especially with Ecuador or Bolivia, is a threat to Brazilian leadership (Malamud 2011, 12). In my analysis of the policy fields, I am going to evaluate to what extent these foreign policy principles reflect different ways and effects of engaging in regional policy-making. The creation of UNASUR has often been interpreted as a point of convergence of the different national interests of Brazil and Venezuela. Whether this convergence is a necessary factor in regional public policy-­ making in UNASUR is examined in detail for each sector in this book. 3  “Ponto de convergência entre as posições mais liberais e pró-EUA e as posições mais radicais e antiamericana.”

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5.1.3   South American Regional Organizations and the Creation of UNASUR UNASUR was founded in 2008 as an international organization with legal personality succeeding the CNS (Comunidad de Naciones Suramericanas). Initially, UNASUR had the organizational aim to avoid further financial and bureaucratic costs, by using the given structures of Mercosur, CAN, and to some extent ALADI (compare Declaración de Cusco 2006). However, over time, UNASUR was perceived more and more as having independent processes of integration, and the focus on sectoral policy-making was foregrounded. A simple convergence of existing South American regional institutions seemed not appropriate. Existing structures would have undermined the development of a working mode that supports the political goals that had crystallized during the negotiation process of UNASUR.  At first, the CNS was founded to initiate a convergence of Mercosur, CAN, and to some extent ALADI. Also in the declaration of Cochabamba in 2006, the intention of UNASUR to combine the existing structures of CAN and Mercosur was still declared explicitly: We propose a new model of integration with its own pluralist identity in contempt of diversity and differences, recognizing different political and ideological conceptions, which correspond to the democratic plurality of our countries. […] This innovative integration includes all the accomplishments and advances of the processes of Mercosur and CAN, as well as the experience of Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, aiming to achieve more than their convergence. The ultimate objective of this integration process is, and will continue to be, to strengthen a more equitable and harmonious integrated South America.4 (Declaración de Cochabamba 2006)

The organization was meant to be built upon already existing structures of other regional integration schemes (Solca 2011). The South American integration proposed with the creation of UNASUR evidently 4  “Nos planteamos un nuevo modelo de integración con identidad propia, pluralista, en medio de la diversidad y las diferencias, reconociendo las distintas concepciones políticas e ideológicas, que corresponden a la pluralidad democrática de nuestros países. Se trata de una integración innovadora que incluya todos los logros y lo avanzado por los procesos del MERCOSUR y la CAN, así como la experiencia de Chile, Guyana y Suriname, yendo más allá de la convergencia de los mismos. El objetivo último de este proceso de integración es y será favorecer un desarrollo más equitativo, armónico e integral de América del Sur.”

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exceeds the economic integration and differs from the so far existing agreements. It is interesting to observe how the relevance of CAN declined with the negotiations for UNASUR.  Initially, Mercosur and CAN were expected to be merged into a South American regional economic organization. However, the economic focus of regional integration vanished little by little and so did CAN. Venezuela’s entrance in Mercosur and its leaving of CAN is often discussed as another turning point in South American regionalism. Disagreements about the member states’ relation with the United States caused the Venezuelan withdrawal. Peru and Colombia wanted to intensify economic cooperation with the United States and signed trade agreements. Venezuela interpreted this behavior as intolerable. As a result of Peru and Colombia signing bilateral contracts with the United States, Venezuela declared that it would leave the Andean Community in 2006, as ideological discrepancies were apparently too vast. The entrance of Venezuela into Mercosur was a harsh setback for CAN. Further, Ecuador and Bolivia expressed interest in joining Mercosur. As a result, Nolte presumes that “the Andean Community will be further debilitated and possibly enter into a process of dissolution” (Nolte 2014, 14). The Andean Community was initially founded as the Andean Pact in 1969 and included Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. In 1997, the Andean Pact was renamed the Andean Community. Its institutional structures are similar to the European Union. The Presidential Council is the primary decision-­making body, hierarchically followed by the council of foreign relations ministers. The Andean Commission works as the normative body. The CAN headquarter is the administrative organ, while the Andean Parliament has a counseling function. An essential component of the Andean Community is the Andean Court of Justice, which acts as the community’s dispute settlement organism. In practice, however, any transfers of sovereignty from member states to the regional organization are not observable, as members refrain from committing themselves. The inability to speak with one voice is pervasive as many regional organizations face the same problem. Nevertheless, CAN, in an unambiguous way, shows how formal structures can impede cooperation between member states. The Andean countries suffer from strongly diverging economic perspectives. The missing economic and financial cohesion has often been interpreted as the reason for failure (Gardini 2009, 73). Different economic perspectives led to deadlock in trade cooperation. Accordingly, the Andean Community was not able to establish common external tariffs

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even after 40 years of existence (Pizarro 2008, 25). Although this finding is limited to economic cooperation, ideological discrepancies may be one reason for the failure of CAN. However, an institutional explanation is more convincing. The formal structure of the Andean Community does not allow for adequate policy-making in areas outside of trade and economy. Cooperation is possible and even successful beyond the formal structure of CAN, as it is the case in the relatively independent health and education organs. In the educational sector, the University of the Andes acts as a successful example of this cooperation. Likewise, the associated ORAS CONHU (Organismo Andino de Salud—Convenio Hipólito Unanue) is a successful example of cooperation in the health sector. Notwithstanding, cooperation in non-economic policy fields is only gradually existent in the Andean Community. Member states rather engage in other regional institutions to cooperate efficiently in a variety of policy fields. The tight institutionalization of CAN’s core organs left no space for policy-making in different sectors in the formal context of CAN. This supports the argument that institutional flexibility is a necessary condition for the development of policy processes. Mercosur, founded collectively by Argentina and Brazil and complemented by Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991, provides an example for parallel thought. As already explained, Mercosur was created in response to the open regionalism paradigm. In the beginning it experienced a remarkable liberalization of economic relations. Soon after that, various economic crises reverted the liberalizing attempts. In particular, the Brazilian financial crisis of 1999 caused severe economic problems in the neighboring country, Argentina. As a result, the primary partners of Mercosur drifted apart. While intraregional trade reached its peak in 1998 with 25.3%, it fell to 11.4% in 2002 (Obaya 2007, 7). Mistrust and decreased willingness to integrate within Mercosur resulted in the pursuit of new initiatives, including the creation of Mercosur’s parliament in 2007. This can be understood as an element of a reformulation of the objectives of the organization. The institutionalization of the regional parliament is another element, which is reminiscent of the formal structure of the European Union. Like in the European Council, heads of states and specific ministers gather in the decision-making body of Mercosur, the CMC (Common Market Council). The CMG (Common Market Group) is composed of financial and economic ministerial representatives and national banks. All organs take decisions by consensus. Also, Mercosur has an administrative secretariat

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that serves a technical function. Mercosur’s institutional design tried to avoid the negative experiences the Andean Community had with supranational structures by adopting intergovernmental decision-making (Tussie 2009, 175). Nevertheless, mainly economically oriented groups or presidents take decisions. Moreover, Mercosur involves the harmonization of national norms and is not solely based on unanimous voting. Mercosur institutions keep sticking to the normative of supranationality. Should Mercosur and CAN be merged into one South American organization, the new institutions are likely to resemble Mercosur and CAN structures. As both are designed similar to the European Union, and both have an economic focus, the convergence would result in a South American market and South American supranational institutions. However, UNASUR differs remarkably from such an organization. UNASUR avoided the problems CAN and Mercosur faced in the past by being a political union with an executive sector focusing on a variety of different policy fields. These former problems have been, first, that divergent economic models led to the deadlock of cooperation. The regional organizations are structured regarding economic primacy, and representatives of the economic sector, which favor an economic rationality in all policy fields, constitute decision-making bodies. The results are discrepancies that affect the whole organization. Second, states always refrained from ceding sovereignty. Nevertheless, the institutional structure of Mercosur and especially CAN require the harmonization of national norms. The unwillingness to do so additionally obstructs progress. UNASUR was finally created with the Constitutive Treaty in May 2008. Instead of its initial objectives, the organization strongly diverges from the institutions of Mercosur and CAN. With the constitutive declaration, the organization gained a new status. Beyond the legal personality, the necessary ratification of (at least nine) member states required the commitment of the South American nations to a minimal level of institutional manifestation. Hence, the interpretation of UNASUR as a dialogue forum is untenable, particularly since Uruguay’s ratification as the ninth state in December 2010. One significant differentiation is that, while the convergence of Mercosur and CAN has been focused on in the previous declarations, UNASUR gained independence with its creation as an international organization (Borda 2012). UNASUR fulfilled the main characteristic of an international organization under the terms of the formal definition within international public law. International organizations are defined as a cooperation between subjects of international law, based on a

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treaty according to international law (Ruffert and Walter 2009, 3). Another criterion, equally fulfilled by UNASUR, is that a component “of distinct will” (Klabbers 2009, 7) had been established. With the deployment of the Secretary General, this component came into force. It is important to note that a distinct will does not imply authority. This defining criterion does not intend supranationality. The General Secretariat has no authoritative imposition at the remaining organs or at member states. To summarize, the South American Union advanced from an economic convergence project to a political cooperation agreement. The political program of UNASUR is a result of two major developments: first, the political landscape in South America changed, which led to a different, non-liberal regionalism. Second, ideological discrepancies and divergent economic systems resulted in negative experiences with economic cooperation. The political change in South America is not, as often assumed, connected to the election of left-wing presidents, but started earlier. Around the turn of the millennium, presidents had already started to reformulate national policies and to focus on sustainable development. During this time, organizations such as Mercosur, changed their profile. While the economic performance of the regional organization was declining, the institutional structure started to expand. The Andean Community, in contrast, entered a process of dissolution and lost its influence. However, both Mercosur and CAN equally do not provide institutional flexibility for sectoral policy-making, as all policy processes depend on their decision-­ making bodies. These bodies are primarily of an economic character, except for the presidential level. UNASUR, instead, provides such flexibility as it does not depend on decision-making bodies.

5.2   The Institutional Dimension of UNASUR According to the underlying assumption of constructivist institutionalism, there are discursive foundations in each institution (Goertz and Powers 2014). For newly created regional organizations, it is imperative to examine how the changed political landscape translates into the construction of the region and how this construction reflects in regional institutions. This macro-level has significant implications for policy-making in UNASUR councils. Theory suggests that actors in organizations primarily perceive their real structural surrounding, instead of some “superordinate systemic imperative” (Hall 1986, 263). As seen in Chap. 3, actors will develop a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2009) in their concrete

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structural context. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how the institutions of UNASUR are designed and how it determines policy-making in councils. Both the normative dimension of UNASUR and the formal structure of the organization are constituents of the macro-level. 5.2.1  Organizational Frames of UNASUR This chapter explores the narrative foundations of UNASUR. To be able to compare how the normativity of UNASUR might influence the construction and reconstruction of policies, I first identify this normativity. As explained in Chap. 4, frame analysis is an instrument of interpretive policy analysis used to reconstruct objectives that underlie political processes. Following this, I am going to conceptualize the political program of UNASUR in view of frames. The political dimension determines the objectives of UNASUR. Article 2 of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty states that its objective is to eliminate “socio-economic inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of bolstering the sovereignty and independence of the States” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art. 2). These objectives could be attained by integrating the “political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and infrastructure dimensions” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art. 2). Though, in the founding documents, distinct councils are not defined. Regardless of the specific composition of sectoral councils, the political program of UNASUR is thought to have implications for all councils. Political officials and representatives from various Ministries of Foreign Affairs explained that UNASUR has transversal values, which should be pursued by all councils. Such a view is supported by Ernesto Samper, who describes “three fundamental principles which constitute the origin of the ‘union of nations.’ These principles are peace, human rights, and democracy”5 (Secretary General 2015, 23). Human rights mainstreaming, following the concept of gender mainstreaming, urged Central American states to consider human rights issues in the context of all fields of policy-making. It is meant to strengthen knowledge and expertise on human rights. In political science, this ­concept is regarded more as a policy-making approach than a theoretical consideration 5  “tres principios fundamentales que le dieron origen como ‘unión de países’. Estos ejes articuladores son la paz, los derechos humanos y la democracia.”

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of human rights (González Plessmann 2009, 165). In this context, human rights function as a norm, acting as a general normative obligation of states, rather than a concrete right of individuals. Such a general norm has to be transparent in state policies towards society, which are primarily public policies (González Plessmann 2009, 168). In the case of UNASUR, political officials also transferred the concept of mainstreaming to the norms of democracy and peace. The extent to which the fundamental political objectives of peace, democracy, and human rights can be conceptualized as frames is examined next. Subsequently, I am going to delineate additional frames, which are relevant for the policy-making level. These are sovereignty and social development. Peace UNASUR’s role in conflict mediation is well known. At the same time, the objective of “peace-building” is the most abstract value of the South American Union. This dimension does not surpass the work of sectoral councils. One representative of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that this dimension refers to a political agreement and thereby directly to the level of heads of state. The normative level demands short-term political solutions rather than structural adaptation (Interview 23, 2015). Short-­ term solutions are rather located at the presidential or foreign affairs level. A variety of issues is connected to the endeavor of “peace-building.” The dominating issues are narco-trafficking, natural resources, and border conflicts. For example, representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs remember that border conflicts plagued the region not long ago. The fact that “Ecuador had a huge problem with its border to Peru, but solved it in a negotiation”6 (Carrión 2014) in the context of UNASUR, is essential to understand the relevance, which political officials attribute to the South American Union in conflict resolution. Examples for recurrent conflicts are those between Chile and Bolivia, or Venezuela and Colombia: After the war between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru at the end of the nineteenth century, Bolivia lost its access to the Pacific. Although Chile is guaranteeing free access for Bolivia through the respective corridor, Bolivia is still claiming the territory back and brought the case to the International Court of Justice in 2013. The Venezuelan-Colombian relations are l­ikewise tense, resulting in several border conflicts. Examples are the diplomatic crisis in 6  “Ecuador tenia un problema grave de limites con el Perú, y lo resolvió a través de una negociación.”

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2010, in which the ex-Colombian president Uribe accused Venezuela of actively providing space for Colombian guerilla troops. In another case in 2015, Venezuelan president Maduro expulsed habitants of Colombian nationality living near the border and again caused diplomatic tensions. Despite all these tensions, policy-makers remember that the South American Union was created in a peaceful period without “acute” conflict. This “peaceful” moment of creation is highly symbolic and therefore valued as necessary for the organization. The image of UNASUR as a dialogue forum primarily originated through its role in conflict resolution and was substantiated through the creation of the Defense Council. For political officials, UNASUR acts as a “space of open dialogue and trust-­ building” (Interview 14, 2015). For most of them, the objective of the Defense Council is to facilitate cooperation between military and defensive forces in the region. A representative to UNASUR argues that “while being together, confidence building will be easier”7 (Interview 43, 2015). The provision of the institutional arena to gather and interact makes a mediator of UNASUR at various levels. Right from the beginning, UNASUR worked as a mediator in regional conflicts, resulting in the Defense Council receiving much academic and public interest. By mediating regional crises, the UNASUR took over a role “which obviously was pursued by the council of the OAS in the past”8 (Interview 43, 2015). In many cases, UNASUR was able to solve conflicts more efficiently than the OAS (Weiffen et al. 2013). Democracy In the past, UNASUR was seen as the promoter of democracy (Riggirozzi and Grugel 2015). Its ambition to stabilize the democratically elected governments of its member states is discussed in comparison with the instruments of democracy promotion of the OAS (Heine and Weiffen 2014, 142; Legler 2012; Legler et al. 2012). The interventions UNASUR conducted in different member states that were suffering from failure in democratic procedures made UNASUR famous. In September 2008, right after the creation of UNASUR, the regional organization surpassed the OAS for the first time: In the Bolivian crisis, known as the separatist crisis of Pando, the Chilean Pro-Tempore president, Michelle Bachelet, acted as a mediator between the conflicting parties in the name of the 7 8

 “estando juntos los sudamericanos, se facilita el ‘confidence-building.’”  “que evidentemente en el pasado había cumplido el consejo de la OEA.”

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South American Union. South American presidents supported the Bolivian president Morales in order of keeping him in mandate after a “civic coup d’etat by Governors in some Bolivian states” (Dangl 2008). Another example of UNASUR’s dedication to promoting democracy is the suspension of Paraguay from UNASUR after the “parliamentary coup” in 2012. President Lugo of Paraguay was removed from power by his parliament after internal conflict and after having only 24 hours for preparing his defense (Marsteintredet et al. 2013). UNASUR conceived this removal as irregular and excluded Paraguay until presidential elections reinstalled democratic order (Hellinger 2014, 520). The temporary exclusion was justified concerning the Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on the Commitment to Democracy. This document states that “in the event of a breach or threat of breach against the democratic order” (UNASUR 2010, Democratic Protocol, 1), the treaty allows for the “suspension of the right to participate in the various bodies and branches of UNASUR, as well as the suspension of the rights and benefits enjoyed under the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR” (UNASUR 2010, Democratic Protocol, 3). It is important to mention that all measures shall be taken under respect of “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the affected State” (UNASUR 2010, Democratic Protocol). The democratic protocol neither legitimizes nor calls for intervention in the member states. As Riggirozzi and Grugel remind us, “UNASUR is willing to act to stop elected governments being overthrown, but it is not pushing for mechanisms to ensure citizen voice or representation—indeed, such measures would be regarded as undue interference in member-state affairs” (Riggirozzi and Grugel 2015, 795). This emphasis allows states to find their democratic models and not to force them into previously established democratic procedures. Using the example of Ecuador, Samper explains: “if a citizen feels represented—it is a decision which has to be respected”9 (Samper 2014). Also, Gustavo Pacheco from the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that “Chavism was decided at the polls”10 (Pacheco 2015). Therefore, as the Paraguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs Loizaga Lezcano emphasizes, UNASUR has to act in “respect of the ­individuality of each state”11 (Loizaga Lezcano 2015). This toleration of various models of democracy is necessary to build a  “si un ciudadano se siente representado—es una decisión que se tiene que respetar.”  “el ‘chavismo’ fue decidido en las urnas.” 11  “respectando la individualidad de cada estado.” 9

10

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common ground of action. Although all South American nations established representative democracies, their understanding of procedures differ. Most Brazilian delegates to UNASUR explained that democracy is understood as a broader concept and reaches beyond the realization of periodic elections. At least for Brazil, civil rights, the opposition, and the liberty of press are relevant features (Interview 7, 2014). Some states, however, may focus on the election process, while others want to guarantee participators rights. To UNASUR, democracy acts as a legitimizing characteristic because states need to maintain formal democratic order to be part of the organization. However, what democratic order exactly is, is not specified. Definitions may vary from the pure constitutional state to participative democracy. In any case, there is a consensus on the necessity of democratic order in general. Democracy promotion proved to be the most substantial value of UNASUR as supported by normative and founding documents as well as by statements of officials of the General Secretariat and those who participated in the creation of UNASUR. To this group of actors, the dictatorial past of all South American states served as motivation for this normativity, in the sense of preventing its comeback. Ernesto Samper, in his agenda for the General Secretariat, emphasizes that “UNASUR was born to preserve, deepen and strengthen the process of democratization in its political and social systems, which started at the beginning of the 80s in this part of the world”12 (Secretary General 2015). This strong normative component is part of an ongoing process of region-building and necessarily connected to UNASUR. Already in the first presidential summit, when there was no indication of a “Left Turn,” presidents emphasized their willingness to strengthen democracy. Henrique Cardoso, the inviting Brazilian president in 2000, expressed his wish to “maintain consultation and to adopt the actions required for the defense of democracy and the protection of human rights in any possible rupture, or threat of rupture, of the democratic order in each South American country”13 (Declaración de los Presidentes 2000, 3). The former Bolivian president, Hugo Bánzer Suaréz, pointed to the transformation of South American nations and new opportunities in cooperation, 12  “UNASUR nació para preservar, profundizar y fortalecer el proceso de democratización de sus sistemas políticos y sociales que comenzó a comienzos de los años 80 en esta parte del mundo.” 13  “Na hipótese de ruptura, ou ameaça de ruptura, da ordem democrática em qualquer pais da América do Sul, manteremos consultas e adoptaremos as medidas necessárias para a defesa da democracia e a protecção dos direitos humanos.”

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stating that “it is not possible to compare the democracies led by minorities at the beginning of the 20th century, with these social and participative democracies which arose during this tumultuous beginning of the 21st century”14 (Declaración de los Presidentes 2000, 1). As stated, the dictatorial past of South American nations was mentioned explicitly by almost all political officials and cited as a reason to focus on democracy preservation by UNASUR.  Notably, the creation of the Electoral Council is connected to the normative objective of democracy. The “Consejo Electoral de UNASUR” (CEU) was established in November 2012 and is responsible for organizing electoral missions in South America. These missions observe elections on the invitation of the respective country. The function of the mission is disputed between South American political officials. Majorly, it is considered as providing a sense of autonomy. An increasing number of South American states reject OAS electoral missions. The UNASUR electoral missions were evaluated as reliable from the beginning, but the missions kept on trying to further improve technical procedures. The standards are developed between countries, keeping their national characteristics in mind. Francisco Carrión, the former Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wonders “why should we wait for inspectors and supervisors to come from Europe or the US for the election processes”15 (Carrión 2014), if South American states, with the help of the Electoral Council, have been able to reach maturity with respect to their electoral processes. In light of this maturity, the CEU is seen as “a demonstration, that we value ourselves”16 (Carrión 2014). While some political officials perceived the electoral missions as a “replica of the election observation of the OAS”17 (Interview 43, 2015), others underlined the differences between the systems. A former Secretary General of OAS, aware of the possibility of substitution, states that “it is better if there are observing three instead of two”18 (Interview 43, 2015), indicating that the missions do not substitute each other but may be complementary. Samper explains that the missions of UNASUR are “constituted 14  “No es posible comparar la democracia minoritaria de principios del siglo veinte con esta democracia de participación social que se abre paso en el tumultuoso comienzo del siglo veintiuno.” 15  “porque esperar que vengan inspectores o vigilantes, a los procesos electorales de Europa, o de los Estados Unidos.” 16  “una demostración que nos valemos por nosotros mismo.” 17  “replica a las observaciones electorales que hace la OEA.” 18  “es mejor que la observen tres que dos.”

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by representatives of the electoral authorities of each country”19 (Samper 2014). Such a perspective on the Electoral Council as a technical commission of the countries is dominant. There is no political, but only technical, evaluation of elections foreseen. Human Rights The normativity of democracy developed comparably to the normativity of human rights. Both frames are strongly interconnected and usually mentioned together. However, the human rights frame is less evident in narratives of political officials or policy-makers. Only officials from the General Secretariat or Ministries of Foreign Affairs explicitly mentioned human rights. This may be due to the lack of representation in a specific council, as it is the case in the Electoral Council for Democracy or the Defense Council for Peace. Instead, there is only a working group in the General Secretariat dealing with human rights, which recently started working on concrete questions. For the question of how its institutional context influences regional public policy, the political agenda of “Human rights Mainstreaming” (Transversalización), elaborated by the human rights working group, is particularly important. Abramovich formulates a similar perspective in the context of the Economic Commission for Latin American (CEPAL), which has previously contributed importantly to the regional development of Latin America. He states that “the international right of human rights does not create policies, but it establishes standards which provide a framework for the policies which each state defines”20 (Abramovich 2006, 43). This advertence of human rights as cultural and social rights responds to a changed perception of political reality in the South American nations. UNASUR’s normative documents emphasize the cohesiveness of human rights and public policies. By placing human rights in line with public policies, they become something the state has to enforce actively. This understanding provides a fundamentally different interpretation of the role of states in the provision of human rights. To Ernesto Samper, the function of UNASUR regarding human rights is to promote a broader version of economic and social rights, not in the Inter-­ American sense of political rights of countries. Samper speaks of human

 “misiones integradas por representantes de las autoridades electorales de cada país.”  “el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos no formula políticas, sino que establece estándares que sirven de marco a las políticas que cada Estado define.” 19 20

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rights as an “ethical frame of reference”21 (Samper 2014) and thereby connects the amplified version that UNASUR is offering to the concept of mainstreaming. Notably, all representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs explicitly mentioned the concept of Human Rights Mainstreaming. Liberal democracy, as a conceptual approach to human rights, has put civil society in a passive role. Subsequently, liberal human rights conceptions interpret the state as a possible abuser (compare Kurki 2010). UNASUR, as a regional organization, offers a different interpretation. Via the fortification of public policies, the state is accredited with a central role in the provision of social conditions for human rights. Several political officials emphasize this strong position of the state. It is a central characteristic of the political program of UNASUR and connects to the embodiment of sovereignty. S overeignty and Social Development The Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR explicitly mentions the objective of “bolstering the sovereignty and independence of the states” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art. 9). In debates on the meaning and function of UNASUR, striving for sovereignty has mainly been interpreted as a rejection of the Inter-American system and especially of the United States’ influence in the region. The three examples of peace, democracy, and human rights point in this direction. The simultaneous creation of UNASUR and the “Left Turn” in South America enforced this perception. In particular, the offensive Bolivarian anti-US-American discourse, shared by some South American nations, resulted in an ideologization of the regional organization. However, as previously noted, the normativity of UNASUR has been developed before 2008 and can be traced back to the beginning of the century or even earlier. Scholars as well as the public often perceived UNASUR as leftist project—however, its trajectory shows that this is not the case. Instead, the organization was created to involve many politically diverse opinions and directions, as long as all stick to the objective of progressive and sustainable development. Pacheco, a representative of the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recognizes the diversity of UNASUR, emphasizing that “there are all the political ideologies represented in UNASUR, there are governments of

 “referente ético.”

21

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the Right, Center, Center-left, of Left-wing”22 (Pacheco 2015). This variety of political positions is often described as characteristic of UNASUR by policy-makers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs for Paraguay accentuates how important it is that “in the ambit of UNASUR we respect plurality”23 (Loizaga Lezcano 2015). Interestingly, representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs discuss sovereignty regarding the entire region, rather than nations’ individual sovereignties. Most of them connect this collective sovereignty to South American identity and solidarity. The tolerance of different political systems is central. Only in selected circumstances has sovereignty been mentioned for the national context. Chilean representatives emphasized economic freedom and noted the existence of different economic models (Interview 43, 2015). Brazilian representatives furthermore indicated the differences in national administrative systems, which require consensus-based decision-making (Interview 07, 2014). From this perspective, South American unity is predominantly explained by cultural and geographical determinants. The strong geographical component represents common strategic interests, where “the history [and] the cultural tradition is the same”24 (Carrión 2014). Similar languages— which are Spanish and Portuguese—and shared history are often mentioned as cultural unifiers. All political officials emphasize the importance of understanding each other. To them, this commonality is a guarantee for fluent communication. In this context, the participation of Guyana and Suriname, speaking English and Dutch, respectively, is impressive. Both countries have distinct languages and cultural traditions. Surinamese and Guyanese policy-makers perceive difficulties between them and the remaining member states, which are connected to the different languages and the different cultural backgrounds. Political officials of all member states are unable to answer how these countries fit into the proclaimed common South American tradition. Instead, actors deviate and draw attention to the difficulties while highlighting that it is an exciting effort to integrate these two countries. The initiative to gather the countries and offer a common ground of activism is therefore perceived as a significant achievement of UNASUR. The fact that all 12 sovereign South American 22  “en UNASUR, sobre todo están presentados todos el arco político ideológico, hay gobiernos de derecha, de centro, de centro izquierda, de izquierda.” 23  “en el marco de UNASUR respectemos la pluralidad.” 24  “la raíz histórica, cultural es la misma.”

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countries are participating in one regional process for the first time makes UNASUR a result of political agreement. It is valued as an important political effort that the South American nations, despite their ideological and political differences, gather in the ambit of UNASUR. Consequently, whether these differences influence policy-making in sectors is a relevant question. According to Samper, the sectoral councils are an essential contribution to the political objectives of UNASUR. He explains that “the 12 sectoral councils are beginning to make concrete recommendations about how to increase social inclusion in general”25 (Samper 2014). To him, social inequality is the main problem in the South American region. Representatives from Ministries of Foreign Affairs commonly perceived the inequality within and between South American states as a threat to the stability of the region. Accordingly, most representatives expressed that UNASUR is or should be a development instrument. The political emphasis on social development emerged simultaneously with the emphasis on democracy. As early as 2000, the presidents emphasized the importance of cooperation in development at the Brasilia Summit. Henrique Cardoso claimed that the “eradication of poverty”26 and the “reduction of inequality”27 are urgent tasks (Declaración de los Presidentes 2000, 3). The Peruvian ex-president Alberto Fujimori stressed that “we are 450 million South-Americans, but 200 million of us are living in poverty, in precarious living conditions”28 (Declaración de los Presidentes 2000, 8). The Surinamese ex-president, Runaldo Ronald Venetiaan, appealed not to “forget the needs of those people in our countries who have not even entered the era of electricity yet” (Declaración de los Presidentes 2000, 9). According to Pacheco from the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this emphasis on development policies is a reaction to the “social crisis, which happened in the region in the 90s, after the neoliberal era”29 (Pacheco 2015). Accordingly, the UNASUR is not indicative of an ideologically incentivized change in politics, but rather a mechanism, which makes a slow and already longer enduring process of regional transformation 25  “los 12 consejos sectoriales, comiencen hacer recomendaciones concretas sobre como aumentar la inclusión social en general.” 26  “Erradicação da pobreza.” 27  “Redução das desigualdades.” 28  “somos 450 millones de Sudamericanos, pero 200 millones de los nuestros viven en la pobreza, en condiciones de vida precariat.” 29  “crisis social, que quedó en la región en los anos 90, después de la era neoliberal.”

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visible. Therefore, sectoral policy-making is not expected to be oriented towards leftist or anti-hegemonic politics, as it is often suggested in the academic literature. On the contrary, cooperation in different policy fields is a constitutive part of regional processes in South America and started developing before UNASUR was created. It can be questioned whether the agenda of UNASUR even influences sectors or if they merely respond to the same structural process, which led to the creation of UNASUR.  The political objectives of UNASUR are inserted into a flexible institutional structure. The concept of mainstreaming is eminent for political officials. The following chapters will explore whether UNASUR foresees any institutional instruments for the enforcement of its political objectives. 5.2.2  Formal Organizational Structure of Policy-Making in UNASUR As already mentioned the organization as such is relatively flexible. This loose structure has allowed sectors to develop quite independently. Unlike all other institutions of UNASUR, which are based on consensual decision-­making, the General Secretariat is the only organ not composed of representatives of each member state. However, it is primarily an administrative organ. The sectoral councils are accountable to the remaining organs, which follow a hierarchical order. The Constitutive Treaty establishes the constitutive, political organs of UNASUR in its present form. The organs are: • the Council of Heads of State and Government (led by the Pre-­Tempore Presidency) • the Council of Ministers Foreign Affairs • the Council of Delegates • the General Secretariat (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty). In this chapter, I am going to present these organs and provide information on budget, formal working procedures, and the sectoral councils.  he Council of Heads of State and Government (Presidential Council) T The Presidential Council of UNASUR is the formal decision-making body of the organization and takes all institutionally relevant decision. Article 6

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of the Constitutive Treaty defines these decisions as “policy guidelines, action plans, programs and projects for the South American integrations process” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, Art. 6). Another important function of the Presidential Council is the creation of councils at the ministerial level.  ro-Tempore Presidency (PTP) P Each of the member states holds the presidency of UNASUR successively for a one-year period. This implies the chair of all ordinary and extraordinary UNASUR organs (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 56), except the General Secretariat, which is not constituted by representatives of member states. Beside general administrative functions in the coordination of the agenda of UNASUR organs, the PTP conveys presidential decisions to the remaining organs. The country that holds the PTP is responsible for the international representation of UNASUR and for relations with third parties. However, the fact that decisions require consensus among member states restricts leadership that could be based on this position. Accordingly, the PTP is only allowed to make declarations in the name of UNASUR and sign agreements under the condition of prior consultation with the remaining member states. The General Regulations of UNASUR provide the possibility of designating other member states than the PTP to chair ministerial councils. Moreover, the chair can be shared (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 40). The condition for both designation and partition of chairs is the consensus of all member states. This regulation takes into account the financial and organizational burden of presiding UNASUR.  The smaller member states of Guyana and Suriname, which held the presidency from November 2010 until October 2011 and August 2013 until December 2014, respectively, shared the mandate and only chaired some of the 12 ministerial councils. In the case of partition, the member states are asked to propose chairmanship for free councils. This decision will typically be derived from the national representatives in the respective ministries, according to their capacity, experience, and interest. The notable effort of Uruguay, which took over the PTP succeeding Suriname in December 2014, to chair all UNASUR organs on its own, has been evaluated as a firm commitment, as Uruguay belongs to the smaller countries in UNASUR.

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 he Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs T The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs assists the Presidential Council by preparing meetings and by implementing the decisions taken by the presidents and heads of governments. Moreover, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs approves the annual action plan and an annual budget of the organization. It can also create working groups “based on the priorities set by the Council of Heads of State and Government” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, 15). Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are to be held biannually. Just as it is the case for the Presidential Council, extraordinary meetings can be requested.  he Council of Delegates T With the Declaration of Cochabamba, the Council of Delegates was initially created as the Commission of High Officials in 2006. This organ copes with the increasing complexity of and overlap between South American regional initiatives. The intention was to coordinate existing initiatives and prevent the duplication of efforts. This Commission of High Officials was entrusted with a variety of coordinative tasks. The harmonization with representatives of Mercosur, CAN, and ALADI belonged to the primary objectives of the commission. Later, in the context of the creation of UNASUR, the commission was transformed into a political body and called the Council of Delegates of UNASUR. The management of regional initiatives still belongs to the Council’s tasks. However, to date, the main focus is to support the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. According to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, the Council has to be “composed of one accredited representative of each member state” (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, 17). Although not formally specified, the delegates are usually officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, which makes sense as the council prepares the meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and later implements their decisions. This organ can be described as the connecting link between the decision-making and the operational level of UNASUR, as it serves a coordinative and communicative role in the relation of decision-making bodies of UNASUR with the sectoral councils. The General Regulations of UNASUR appoint this by stating that “the Council of Delegates shall act as the general coordinating body for the integration process” (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 57).

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 he General Secretariat T The General Secretariat is the administrative and only permanent organ of UNASUR. It is located in Mitad del Mundo, near Quito, Ecuador, and was established as a permanent organ by the decision of the presidents in 2007. Before that, the administrative functions of the Secretariat were carried out by one of the member states. In line with the declaration of Cuzco from 2004, Peru took over the first Pro-Tempore Secretariat (Declaración de Cusco 2004). In the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR, the General Secretariat was primarily established to assist the Presidential Council, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the PTP. The General Secretary leads the Secretariat and is appointed for two years. In May 2010, before the Constitutive Treaty entered into force, the Argentine ex-president Néstor Kirchner became the first General Secretary. After his death in October of the same year, the position as Secretary of UNASUR stayed vacant for more than half a year. Following a prolonged period of negotiations, the member states agreed on the division of the term and announced the Colombian ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria Emma Mejía for the first year and the Venezuelan ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Alí Rodríguez Araque for the second one (Carrión 2014). Although his mandate expired midst of 2013, Alí Rodríguez remained in the position of General Secretary, because states were not able to agree on a successor. The difficulties of finding an adequate candidate for the position of General Secretary of UNASUR is not only a current problem but already caused many debates in the past. From its very beginning, the aims and scope of the position were disputed between member states, as the refusal of Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, the former Ecuadorian president, shows. Right after the creation of the position of the Secretary in 2007, he was elected as first General Secretary of UNASUR. However, Borja refused to assume the mandate. According to Francisco Carrión, Borja had a far-reaching perspective of the duties and powers of the Secretary (Carrión 2014). The mere administrative function of the Secretary was disappointing for Borja and, accordingly, he resigned. Only the General Regulations of UNASUR, which entered in vigor in June 2012, specified the function of the Secretariat and the position of the Secretary. Although still enforcing the “political will of the Council of Heads of State and Government,” the Secretariat now is required to “preserve and deepen the political dimension of UNASUR” (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 45). The Secretariat is further responsible for

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developing a biannual working plan and shall “strengthen coordination and institutional support relations with the Council of Delegates” (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 46). Still, the Secretariat’s function is primarily supportive and its scope of political influence limited. However, the Secretariat and Secretary have accredited a more active function in the integration process of UNASUR, than previously foreseen. The organization of the General Secretariat mainly depends on the General Secretary. He is allowed to propose modifications and to restructure the institutions, depending on the agreement of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The former General Secretary from 2014 to 2017, Colombian ex-­president Ernesto Samper, was the first to invite public tenders for positions in the Secretariat throughout South America. By doing this, he complied with the requirements of the General Regulations to select the officials through a “transparent and objective” (UNASUR 2012, 54) process. Until this point, the directors as well as technical and administrative staff were designated by member states and belonged to the diplomatic corps of the respective states. The states were providing officials to help to ensure the consolidation of the General Secretariat. Diplomatic staff assigned to the General Secretariat had been in charge of coordinating the work of the Secretariat with sectoral councils. The idea of public tenders is connected to the endeavor of commissioning international staff with this task. Given that the organization of the General Secretariat depends on the budget of UNASUR, the restriction to the employment of permanent staff is a financial one. Budget The three main expenses of UNASUR are listed in the General Regulations and include (1) the General Secretariat, (2) other permanent institutional bodies, and (3) common temporary initiatives (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 58). The budget has to be approved annually by resolution of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It is composed of the contributions of UNASUR member states. The amounts are calculated percentage-­wise according to the states’ economies. Table 5.1 shows the contributions of the member states for 2015, 2016, and 2017. Additionally, member states are required to cover all expenses for sending their staff to meetings, projects, or seminars. A highly disputed problem in this context is whether third-party funding should be extended. External financing of initiatives or projects is part of the Union’s external relations and is regulated in the “Policy Guideline of UNASUR for the

100

16.00 0.80 37.40 7.00 8.00 4.00 0.10 1.33 8.34 0.10 1.00 12.4

%

Source: CMRE (2015a, 2016)

Total

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Columbia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela

Member state

1,572,769.07 78,638.81 3,676,953.65 688,085.72 786,384.53 393,191.67 9,829.40 131,173.00 819,834.00 9,829.40 98,297.62 1,218,896.21 346,491.93 9,830,375.00

2014

100

16.55 1.00 38.95 7.20 9.92 4.00 0.10 1.2 7.54 0.10 1.00 12.40

% 1,798,029.57 108,642.27 4,231,616.42 782,224.34 1,077,731.32 434,569.08 10,864.23 134,716.41 819,162.72 10,864.23 108,642.27 1,347,164.15 1,008,290.00 11,872,517.00

2015

100

16.52 1.14 38.98 7.26 11.1 3.72 0.11 1.11 7.26 0.12 1.08 11.60

%

10,864,227.00

1,794,770.30 123,852.19 4,234,875.68 788,742.88 1,205,929.20 404,149.24 11,950.65 120,592.92 788,742.88 13,037.07 117,333.65 1,260,250.33

2016

Table 5.1  Financial contribution by member states in US$ with quotas (2014–2017)

100

16.52 1.14 38.98 7.26 11.10 3.72 0.11 1.11 7.26 0.12 1.08 Nov-60

%

10,864,227.00

1,794,770.30 123,852.10 4,234,875.60 788,742.80 1,205,929.20 404,149.20 11,950.60 120,592.90 788,742.80 13,037.00 117,333.60 1,260,250.30

2017

94  A. M. HOFFMANN

  REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA 

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relation with third parties” (CJEG 2012) which has been approved in November 2012 by the Presidential Council. The presidents herein support the relationship with other countries, regional organisms, or organizations. However, according to the regulations, all cooperation in whichever form needs the prior approval by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CJEG 2012, 5). When funds can be acquired, it is the General Secretariat who “legally represents the UNASUR in the case of external funding, coordinates and canalizes the approved funding”30 (CJEG 2012, 6). The relations with third parties, moreover, are being debated in the Council of Delegates. To acquire project specific, external funding for sectoral councils, therefore, becomes laborious. In sectoral councils, states may finance projects themselves, if they wish to do so. However, most of the states are not able to do that, for different reasons that I am going to discuss in the next chapter. Financing, accordingly, is a significant restriction in regional public policy-making in the context of UNASUR. For the poorest countries, the mere participation in regional cooperation is costly. As the South American countries are highly dissimilar, the general budget of UNASUR provides financial support to the financially weakest members. For example, in 2016, Bolivia, Guyana, Suriname, and Paraguay each could receive refunding up to US$ 50,000 from the general budget (CMRE 2015a, Resolución 018/2015, 6). Major items in the UNASUR budget are expenses for the maintenance of permanent institutions. The institutions currently sustained by UNASUR are the Center for Strategic Defense Studies (CEED) as well as the Institute on Health Governance (ISAGS), which are technical bodies of the Defense Council and the Health Council, respectively. Both are budgeted with approximately US$ 1 million per year per institution (CMRE 2015a, 5). Another budget item, which is mainly relevant for the work of sectoral councils, is the FIC (Fondo de Iniciativas Comunes), which is the fund for joint initiatives. In the resolution of June 2012, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recognized the necessity to “optimize the use of available resources for the development of common incentives”31 (CMRE 2012b) and approved an amount of US$ 750,000 for the respective fund. This fund, administered by the General Secretariat, finances the common temporary initiatives. According to the mentioned resolution, 30  “ejercerá la representación legal de UNASUR gato gordo en materia de financiamiento de fuentes externas, coordinará y canalizará los recursos aprobados.” 31  “optimizar el uso de recursos disponibles para el desarrollo de iniciativas comunes.”

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these initiatives are projects which are proposed by the sectoral councils and have to have “a high social impact in the territory of the Union, which benefits the population of the Member States directly”32 (CMRE 2012b). Other institutions of UNASUR, such as ISAGS or CEED, or permanent working groups, may carry out projects of the fund as well. The initiatives shall have a positive impact on civil society and contribute to its participation in and benefit of the integration process. The budget for 2016 allocates US$ 650,000 to projects in the ambit of FIC.  According to the General Regulations of UNASUR, this amount hast to be approved by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Examples for projects that are financed by FIC are a “Platform for the exchange of experiences and the technical assistance for the prevention of cervical cancer in South America” by ISAGS or a “Study which provides the input for the development of a strategy to facilitate the Railway Integration of South America” by COSIPLAN (CMRE 2015c). For a long time, the selection process of projects has been problematic to reconstruct and turned out to be tedious and complicated. Already in its resolution from June 2012, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs assigned the Council of Delegates to develop a methodology for the allocation of resources (CMRE 2012a). The resulting regulations have been approved in November of the same year. They define criteria for eligibility and required documentation, such as the denomination of the executing entity, but are lenient in the selection process. The allocation of funds has been difficult since the establishment of FIC. To improve the management and accessibility of the fund, the regulations of execution were revised in December 2015. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs approved the establishment of a technical committee. This multilateral organ, together with the General Secretariat, is since then responsible for the common initiatives and their coordination (CMRE 2015b). The committee, like all multilateral organs of UNASUR, operates according to the General Regulations of UNASUR.  ormal Working Procedures F The pro-tempore chair of each organ is responsible for the convocation of meetings, the elaboration of the respective agenda, the documentation of meetings, and the information of members. The Regulations foresee the 32  “un alto impacto social en el territorio de la Unión, que beneficien de modo directo a poblaciones de los Estados Miembros.”

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support of the General Secretariat for any meeting of UNASUR. This support, however, depends on the budget and human resources provided to the General Secretariat. Precisely, the Secretariat is supposed to prepare draft meeting reports and the documentation of decisions and agreements in the working languages. The official languages of UNASUR are Spanish, Portuguese, English, and Dutch (UNASUR 2008, Constitutive Treaty, 23). The General Regulations, however, specified that the working languages are Spanish and English (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 66). These are valid for the operational level of UNASUR. Sectoral Councils In general, the Presidential Council has to approve the creation of the sectoral councils, while the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs may create working groups. Sectoral councils work according to the formal working procedures mentioned above and are prescribed to elaborate a statute, which “shall define its objectives” (UNASUR 2012, General Regulations, 43). Commonly, proposals for the creation of councils, institutions, or universal programs follow the hierarchy of UNASUR. Accordingly, they first have to be approved by the Council of Delegates, followed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and finally by the Presidential Council. The same applies to the inclusion of existing initiatives into UNASUR.  An example of such an initiative would be the IIRSA. As mentioned before (Chap. 4), UNASUR has so far established 12 councils. Table 5.2 summarizes the five councils compared in this study. As we have seen in Chap. 4, the treaty of UNASUR, as well as the General Regulations, do not specify the institutionalization of councils. Even the particular policy fields in which councils shall be established are not indicated. According to the regulations, states may propose the creation of councils. In due course, member states presented initiatives to create the councils existing by now. In particular, the first councils created were based on “ongoing processes in the regional context. Therefore they were incorporated and constituted as councils”33 (Carrión 2014). Member states proposed the creation of councils according to their national interest. Yet, councils are only established if they meet the interest of other states, as they have to be approved unanimously. 33  “procesos que estaban en marcha en el contexto regional, y entonces se incorporaban y se constituyeron como consejos.”

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Table 5.2  Creation and approval of councils by the CJEG CSS Consejo Suramericano de Salud COSIPLAN Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento CSDS Consejo Suramericano de Desarrollo Social CSC Consejo Suramericano de Cultura CSCT Consejo Suramericano de Ciencia, Tecnología y Innovación

11/2008

Río de Janeiro, Brazil

01/2009

Quito, Ecuador

08/2009

Quito, Ecuador

11/2012

Lima, Peru Approved (CMRE 2013) Lima, Peru Approved (CMRE 2013)

11/2012

Source: Author’s table based on www.sgunasur.org

Over the last years, the councils have all been named “Consejo Suramericano de ‘…’” to sound alike. Although the councils have evolved independently from each other, they developed common characteristics. These are accountable to the structure of national bureaucracies. Councils will have one responsible person in each national ministry, the so-called national coordinators. In many cases, this person is the director of the department of international relations of the respective ministry. There are some exceptions, depending on the council and country, where this might vary. Indeed, many countries created new institutions to serve the regional representation. One example is Bolivia, which does not have a ministry for social development and accordingly does not have a responsible ministry and has to designate someone else. As Coitino, Uruguayan national coordinator in the Health Council, emphasizes, at this inter-ministerial level, “people are all from international departments, they are all advisers of the first level”34 (Coitino 2015). Many councils hold ministerial and technical meetings. While the technical representatives engage in the operational work, the ministers shall take decisions and approve the working plan and agenda. Almost all councils work in subgroups, which are called working groups or technical groups. A member state coordinates these working groups, sometimes together with another one. Countries may propose to assume the chair of a subgroup. This is not dependent on the PTP but the approval of the  “son todos gente de departamentos internacionales, son asesores de primera línea.”

34

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remaining member states. The low institutionalization was intended to maintain the possibility of adaptation. The founding fathers of UNASUR never intended equal development of councils. On the contrary, the idea was to give different policy fields space to develop possible interlinkages and patterns of cooperation in their own time. Purposefully, institutional flexibility has been provided regarding formal structure. As Ferreira Simoes explains: “Not all structural areas shall develop in parallel: some might have faster progress, others have a slower pace”35 (Ferreira Simoes 2011, 57).

5.3   Analysis of the Macro-Level The objective of this chapter was to demarcate the institutional framework for policy-makers’ interactions. The analysis of the macro-level of regional public policy-making in the South American Union included, first, the context of creation; second, its normativity; and third, the formal organizational structure of UNASUR. As initially described, the organization of UNASUR responds to an emancipatory moment in South American regionalism. It is a characteristic of modern regionalism, which developed in reaction to the neo-liberal reforms and the policies of the Washington consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. The idea of UNASUR dates back to this time and was initially proposed by Brazil as SAFTA.  SAFTA can already be understood as a counterhegemonic project against the dominance of the United States in the region. Its objectives at that point, however, were solely economic. With the South American presidential summit of 2000 in Brasilia, the process which led to the creation of UNASUR started. Initially planned as a convergence of Mercosur and CAN, the South American Union today is a political agreement. The economic primacy successively diminished until it finally disappeared. Presently, the economy is only one aspect out of many addressed by UNASUR. This change of focus can be attributed to past negative experiences with economic integration and to the political structure of many South American countries. In the cases of Mercosur and CAN, different economic systems and ideological discrepancies led to a deadlock in regional integration. In the case of Mercosur, the economic problems in one state proliferated to the other Mercosur members, resulting in subregional economic crises. 35  “Nem todas as áreas estruturantes deverão avançar de forma paralela: algumas poderão registrar avanços mas rápidos, outras terão desempenho mais lento.”

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Consequently, many states refrain from incorporating themselves into supranational structures or new economic agreements. The political shift in the South American states additionally changed the objectives of regional cooperation. Instead of economic and trade agreements, left-­ wing governments preferred to focus on policies that support social development and democratic institutions. The Brazilian and Venezuelan examples showed how two critical regional actors engaged in the institutional construction of the region. The point of convergence of both nations is a significant contribution to the creation of UNASUR. While Brazil views South America as a platform for global ambitions, Venezuela interprets the region regarding the Bolivarian project, which emphasizes a unified South American identity. Both approaches, which are more or less radical, ideologized the South American Union. The dominant regional discourse of both states is reflected in many scholarly debates on UNASUR, which interpret the organization as a product of the Brazilian-Venezuelan political agreement. Although their activism might have contributed to the advancement of the institutionalization process of UNASUR, neither of them can be seen as the “creator” of the organization. The reconstruction of regional developments and the analysis of dominant frames in the political context of UNASUR revealed that social development and democracy promotion refer to an enduring regional process and are not a singularity of UNASUR. This kind of a social agenda has been debated in most of the Latin American regional organizations during the first decades of the twenty-first century. As seen, even Mercosur, which has been created according to the principles of open regionalism, introduced social policies. Therefore, the normativity of UNASUR links to an ongoing process of regional transformation regarding principles and objectives in cooperation. The sustainable development of the South American nations is now given priority in regional cooperation. The endeavor to reduce inequalities within and between South American states is a primary objective of regional cooperation. Councils are therefore required to contribute to this objective within their policy-making process. The General Secretary explicitly mentioned concrete recommendations (Samper 2014), which councils should follow to reduce inequality. Likewise, the UNASUR treaty and regulations suggest that councils should contribute to the political objectives of the organization. At the same time, political officials recurrently refer to the concept of “mainstreaming.” In particular, Human Rights Mainstreaming was declared a concept of public policy-making. According to statements from

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members of UNASUR’s decision-making bodies, human rights shall be a principle of all regional public policies and always be kept in mind during policy-making processes. The “transversal” objectives of peace, democracy, and human rights are explicitly declared principals of UNASUR by its documents and political officials’ statements. These three issue areas are the traditional fields of influence of the OAS.  Although substitution is formally not foreseen, there is a consensus among political actors in UNASUR that the Union represents an alternative model for the promotion of these principles. Most importantly, the state is seen as a provider of rights and not, in the traditional Inter-American understanding, as a violator of those rights. In line with this somewhat subtle contestation of the OAS institutions, UNASUR emphasizes the respect for diversity and sovereignty. The sovereignty frame is reflected in the formal organizational structure of UNASUR. All decisions have to be taken unanimously. This voting rule guarantees that South American states do not have to accept policies which they oppose, as it would be the case in majority voting. Moreover, in contrast to Mercosur and CAN, the South American Union does not foresee an adoption of norms to national legislation but is primarily an executive body which works by joint declarations and projects. The missing formal commitment of states has often been valued as a weakness, in particular by scholars defending the primacy of supranational regional integration. Political actors of UNASUR, in contrast, emphasize the positive side of consensus-based decision-making. Member states can act freely in the realm of UNASUR, while they cannot be forced to accept any decision. The basic rule is that everything is possible as long as all member states agree. If decisions are taken, they are a declaration of the willingness of all member states. As argued initially, intergovernmental structures provide the institutional flexibility for policy-making processes to develop independently and in parallel. The macro-analysis revealed such a flexible structure. Sectoral policy-making is hardly defined, and rules for the procedure are only rudimentarily prescribing administrative issues. UNASUR has been created as a purely intergovernmental organization. The only body of “distinct will,” which is the General Secretariat, has an exclusively administrative and representative function. The refusal of Alejandro Borja to assume the mandate of the first General Secretary due to the limited power of the position shows the difficulties South American policy-makers have with agreeing on supranational structures. Only five years after the first secretary took over

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the mandate in 2010, the Secretariat was able to open tenders for positions as international civil servants. Until 2015, the member states assigned diplomats to conduct the administrative work of the General Secretariat. The change in the administration and the employment of international civil servants is less an effort of supranationalization; instead it directs the institutional development towards a higher professionalization and de-politicization. The developments of the General Secretariat, as well as of FIC, indicate an increasing tendency to strengthen the autonomous work of sectoral councils and therefore are indicative of sectoralization. The long-term process of institutionalizing the FIC, which still results in imprecise regulations of procedures, points to the difficulty of agreeing on universal rules in the realm of inter-state cooperation. It confirms the observed tendency of a general restraint against any form of supranational rule. Policy-makers express their discontent with the current process of selection and assignment of FIC funds. Their demand for formalized procedures and a transparent selection process, however, does not indicate the wish for a supranational ruling. In contrary, it is connected to the wish to have access to funds, independent from political interests and temporary political trends. The FIC, as a funding mechanism, is highly valued. All policy-makers expressed their wish to extend it. Currently, there are only a few projects funded by the FIC. Still the amount designated is often too small for many initiatives. Policy-makers wish to have more flexibility in financing, which is expressed in the problems with third-party funding. While councils want to be able to promote sponsoring and financial cooperation to fund their policies—institutional restrictions by UNASUR limit these efforts. In total, however, there are few formal restrictions to the councils’ work. Both the Constitutive Treaty and the General Regulations of UNASUR provide a very flexible formal structure for all intergovernmental components. The processes of integration of each council into UNASUR’s structure occurred independently. Some initiatives existed before UNASUR, while others did not. UNASUR did not predict a specific constitution of ­councils but was built around the logic of organizational fields or, in the words of Mayntz, around administrative “subfields” (Mayntz 1993). Therefore, the organization has responded to a regional process that was already ongoing. As previously mentioned, this process has found its expression among the political objectives of UNASUR, in particular, peace, human rights, and democracy. As previously mentioned, the assumptions of Owen-Smith and Powell point out that organizational fields are determined by “multiple

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competing logics” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, 600). These logics influence the institutional changes of UNASUR with a concrete direction: The tendency towards financial independence and autonomy of decisionmaking indicates that conflicting norms and rule systems are avoided by retreating to their organizational fields. In that way, “contending imperatives” (March and Olsen 1995, 31) for individual policy-makers’ behavior are circumvented. These conditions contribute to answering the central question of how policy-making processes develop differently in intergovernmental structures, given that they all underlie the same institutional conditions. Group coherent processes can be assumed to be decisive for differences in policy fields. In the following chapter, these individual processes and their differences will be analyzed concerning factors influencing collective action on the micro-level. For the analysis of collective action in UNASUR councils, it is therefore vital to connect macro- and micro- processes. While this chapter was concerned with the examination of the macro-level, the following chapter focuses on the micro-processes of regional public policy-making. The micro-processes of collective action in transgovernmental networks, as explained in Chap. 4, can best be captured by the concept of the “logic of appropriateness” of March and Olsen (1995). It describes institutional logics which determine behavior as a complex system of rules, roles, identities, and internalized beliefs about what is right and wrong. The logic of appropriateness, therefore, corresponds to the interactionist assumption of common “background understandings” that determine behavior.

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Linares, Rosalba. 2010. La Estrategia Multipolar de La Political Exterior Venezolana. Aldea Mundial 15 (15): 51–62. Malamud, Andrés. 2011. A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Politics and Society 53 (3): 1–24. ———. 2013. Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration: Conceptual Issues and the Latin American Experiences. EUI Working Paper RSCAS, no. 20. March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1995. Democratic Governance. New York: Free Press. ———. 2009. The Logic of Appropriateness. ARENA Working Papers 04: 2–28. Marsteintredet, Leiv, Mariana Llanos, and Detlef Nolte. 2013. Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment. Journal of Democracy 24 (4): 110–123. Mayntz, Renate. 1993. Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks. Knowledge and Policy 6 (1): 3–16. Nolte, Detlef. 2014. Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented Regional Governance Complex? Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 89. http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2494843. Obaya, Martin. 2007. The Global Proliferation of Regional Integration. ZEI Regional Integration Observer 1 (1): 7. Owen-Smith, Jason, and Walter W. Powell. 2008. Networks and Institutions. In The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, ed. Royston Greenwood et al., 594–621. London: Sage. Pizarro, Roberto. 2008. El Difícil Camino de La Integración Regional. Nueva Sociedad 214: 24–34. Priess, Frank. 2010. Integración En América Latina. Diálogo Político 2: 176–187. Riggirozzi, Pía. 2012. Re-Territorializando Consenso: Hacia Und RegionalismopostHegemónico En América Latina. In El Regionalismo “Post-­Liberal” En América Latina y El Caribe: Nuevos Actores, Nuevos Temas, Nuevos Desafíos, ed. Andrés Serbin, Laneydi Martínez, and Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior, 132–154. Anuario de La Integración Regional de América Latina y El Gran Caribe. Buenos Aires: CRIES. Riggirozzi, Pía, and Jean Grugel. 2015. Regional Governance and Legitimacy in South America: The Meaning of UNASUR. International Affairs 91 (4): 781–797. Romero, Carlos A. 2010. La Política Exterior de La Venezuela Bolivariana. Plataforma Democrática, Working Paper, no. 4. Ruffert, Matthias, and Christian Walter. 2009. Institutionalisiertes Völkerrecht. München: Beck. Sanahuja, José Antonio. 2012. Regionalismo Post-Liberal y Multilateralismo En Sudamérica: El Caso de UNASUR.  In El Regionalismo “Post-Liberal” En América Latina y El Caribe: Nuevos Actores, Nuevos Temas, Nuevos Desafíos, ed.

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CMRE, UNASUR (Consejo der Ministros y Ministras de Relaciones Exteriores de UNASUR). 2012a. Iniciativas Comunes de UANSUR 2012. Vol. Resolución 22/2012. ———. 2012b. Reglamento Para La Ejecución Del Fondo de Iniciativas Comunes de UNASUR. Vol. Resolución 38/2012. ———. 2013. Aprueba Estatutos Y Planes de Accion de Los Consejos Suramericanos de Educacion, Cultura, Ciencia Teconologia E Innovacion Y El Plan de Accion Del Consejo Suramericano En Materia de Seguridad Ciudadana, Justicia Y Coordinacion de Acciones Contra La Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional. Vol. Resolución 02/2013. ———. 2015a. Presupuesto Anual de UNASUR Para El Ano 2016. Vol. Resolución 018/2015. ———. 2015b. Reglamento Para La Ejecución Del Fondo de Iniciativas Comunes de UNASUR. Vol. Resolución 20/2015. ———. 2015c. Por La Que Se Aprueban Proyectos Para El Fondo de Iniciativas Comunes de UNASUR. Vol. Resolución 24/2015. ———. 2016. Presupuesto ordinario anual de UNASUR para el ano 2017. Presidentes de las Naciones de Sudámerica. 2000. Declaración de los Presidentes (Primera Reunion de Presidentes de America del Sur). ———. 2004. Declaración de Cusco (sobre la Comunidad de Naciones). ———. 2006. Declaración de Cochabamba. UNASUR (Union of South American Nations). 2008. Constitutive Treaty. Brasilia, Brazil. ———. 2010. Democratic Protocol (Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy). ———. 2012. General Regulations of UNASR.

Interviews Carrión, Francisco Mena. 2014   Former Minister of Foreign Affairs   Coordinador URAI, FLACSO Ecuador   Interview: 23.11.2014 Coitiño, Andrés. 2015.   International Relations Assessor   Ministerio de Salud Pública, Uruguay   Interview: 11.03.2015 Loizaga Lezcano, Eladio Ramón. 2015.   Minister of Foreign Affairs   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paraguay

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  Interview: 16.02.2015 Pacheco, Gustavo. 2015.   Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Montevideo, Uruguay   Interview: 14.03.2015 Samper, Ernesto. 2014.   Former General Secretary of UNASUR   General Secretariat UNASUR   Quito, Ecuador   Interview: 22.11.2014

CHAPTER 6

Regional Public Policy-Making in Sectoral Councils

According to the analytical model for the analysis of regional public policy-­ making, the policy fields of health (6.1), social development (6.2), infrastructure and planning (6.3), culture (6.4), and science, technology, and innovation (6.5) are examined in the following steps: • Macro-Level—Conditions to Collective Action: First, the “Creation and Structure” of the policy field is examined with regard to the institutional development of the field, including the respective national administrations as well as the influence of the formal organization of UNASUR. In a second step, I am going to assess the influence of the “Frame Dimension” on policy-making processes. In particular, the frames of human rights, democracy, and peace, as well as the more implicit frames of sovereignty and social development, are prevalent in the UNASUR context. • Micro-Level—Collective Action in Policy Networks: After defining external conditions, I examine the internal conditions to collective action in each policy, including the autonomy of action of policy-­ makers, their collusion of interests, and third, group cohesion. All three factors are decisive for collective action. According to the before made assumptions, collective action is connected to the development of “sectoral rationality.” At the same time, I am going to investigate the reasons for conflict and the inability to establish such a rationality. © The Author(s) 2019 A. M. Hoffmann, Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3_6

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6.1   South American Council of Health (CSS) 6.1.1   The Context of Policy-Making in Health Transnational health cooperation has a long tradition in South America. The respective regional organization, the PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) was founded in 1902, long before the creation of the WHO (World Health Organization) in 1948. The strong emphasis on health cooperation reveals the relevance of health policies for the South American nations and is a portrayal of the political will of governments. Health constitutes the first regional public policy in South America. It was the first sectoral subunit of the International Union of American Republics from 1890, the Pan-American Union, which is the predecessor of the OAS (OAS 2015). Hence, from the very beginning, health governance was connected to the development of independent national states in America. Almost all South American nations have a long tradition in public health administration, as is visible in Table 6.1. The existence of independent ministries of health in the South American nations, which started to collaborate early in regional health issues, facilitated the institutionalization of this council in UNASUR. The Health Council, together with the Defense Council, was the first to be established in UNASUR. Already in 2006, the Presidential Council of the CNS instructed the ministers of health to elaborate a “regional health agenda, with the cooperation of the Andean Health Organism, the subgroup of health 11 of Mercosur [and] the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO)”1 (Presidencia Pro-Tempore Bolivia 2006). Ministerial representatives to the council remember that shortly afterward, in 2007, there was held a meeting of health policy-makers. During this meeting, a unified South American agenda arose, which fundamentally is the agenda of the UNASUR Health Council. As seen in the following table, the current political agendas of regional organizations are consistent with the UNASUR agenda. In specific, the ACTO and ORAS CONHU work in harmony with the UNASUR Health Council (OTCA 2016). The development of the UNASUR political agenda, therefore, is based on an ­existing regional consensus on priority issues. Table 6.2 illustrates the systematization of agendas. 1  “Agenda Regional en materia de salud, con la cooperación del Organismo Andino de Salud, el Subgrupo 11 de Salud del Mercosur, la Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica.”

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Table 6.1  Ministerial development health Ministry or equivalent

Originated from

Brazil

Ministerio de Salud 1949 Ministerio de Salud y Deportes 2003 Ministerio da Saúde

Chile

1953 Ministerio de Salud

Secretaría de Salud Publica 1946 Ministerio de Higiene y Salubridad 1938 Ministério dos Negócios da Educação e Saúde Publica 1930 Ministerio de Higiene, Asistencia y Previsión Social 1924 Ministerio de Higiene

Argentina Bolivia

Colombia

Ecuador Guyana Paraguay

Peru

Suriname Uruguay Venezuela

1959 Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social 2012 Ministerio de Salud Publica 1967 Ministry of Health n/a Ministerio de Salud Publica y Bienestar Social 1998 Ministerio de Salud 1968 Minister van Volksgezondheid 1949 Ministerio de Salud Pública 1933 Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Salud 1999

1946 – – Ministerio de Salud Publica 1936 Ministerio de Salud Pública, Trabajo y Previsión Social 1935 – – Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social 1936

Source: Author’s table based on the respective ministries of health webpages

The harmonization of agendas and the early merging of different regional blocs into UNASUR helped to create an arena of common interest. According to representatives in the Health Council, it helped to establish an organized working routine. The programmatic area of health in Mercosur, previously, did not provide the conditions for such a routine. Although the three commissions of Mercosur Salud also are replicated in UNASUR, the unification of agendas inside Mercosur is perceived as problematic. According to the Argentine representative, “there was a

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Table 6.2  Systematization of action plans of the regional organizations MERCOSUR GT11

CAN ORAS CONHU

Commission of Health Surveillance Commission for Health Products Commission for Services in Health Care

Andean and South American Health Integration Andean Network of Epidemiological Surveillance Universal Access to Medicine Integrated Management of Human Resources in Health Social Determinants of Health

ATCO

UNASUR Health

Environmental health

Epidemiological Surveillance

Politics of Human Resources in the Amazon Health Determinants in the Amazon

Universal Health System

Network of Health Surveillance and Reaction Universal Access to Medicine Development and Management of Human Resources in Health Promotion of Health and Action for the Determinants of Health Elaboration of Universal Health Systems

Impulse, Support, and Consolidation of Research Financing of the Health Agenda Source: Author’s table based on OTCA (2016), MERCOSUR (2016), ORAS CONHU (2016)

consensus about not duplicating the work and the effort”2 (Constanzi 2015). In Mercosur, policy-makers see less flexibility for adopting their actions in the subregional mechanism. The working mode in “Mercosur is more institutionalized, it has a concrete format which has to be followed […], and the agenda is followed point after point”3 (Interview 28, 2015). UNASUR, in contrary, allows for adaptation, whenever necessary in the eyes of health policy-makers.

 “hubo consenso en cuanto a no duplicar los trabajos y los esfuerzos.”  “en Mercosur ya es mas institucionalizado, ya tiene un formato que se cumple […], y la agenda se respecta de punto a punto.” 2 3

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Another often mentioned factor is the objective of action of the Health Council that differs in the remaining regional organizations. While UNASUR focuses on the execution of projects and the development of joint positions, Mercosur’s objective is to create legal norms, which are applied in the countries, as a delegate explains. Conversely, in UNASUR “no document compromises any country”4 (Constanzi 2015). This is an advantage according to representatives in the Health Council. Consequently, the Mercosur member states all perceived difficulties to continue their working routine during the suspension of Paraguay. The Uruguayan representative Coitino underlines that in Mercosur “we had huge problems in the daily work after the suspension of Paraguay”5 (Coitino 2015). UNASUR, in contrast, provides flexibility. As there is no necessity of all countries to internalize norms or ratify regulations, the Health Council of UNASUR can react quickly and flexible, always on a voluntary basis. This form of policy-making proved to be adequate especially for health issues. Illustratively an international assessor from one Ministry of Health in a Mercosur member state explains her preference for UNASUR: if there had to be a convergence between UNASUR and Mercosur, I would prefer to put all efforts into UNASUR and finish with Mercosur. Because it is an archaic structure, where we are, for example negotiating rules for medication. Before these rules are internalized in the countries, the medicine already stopped being produced. We have stuff here which we have been trying to implement for 20 years.6 (Interview 31, 2015)

The UNASUR Health Council, in comparison, works relatively efficiently. This effectiveness results from the institutionalization of ­policy-­making and the prioritization of relevant issues. The Health Council developed a set of institutions, which facilitate and relieve the council’s work. First, the council established six structuring networks, which are composed of national institutions of each member state, and which are  “no hay ningún documento que comprometa algún de los países.”  “nos perjudicó mucho en la salida de Paraguay, en el trabajo cotidiano.” 6  “se tivesse que ter uma convergência imediata entre UNASUR e Mercosur, eu preferia jogar tudo na UNASUR e acabar com Mercosur. Porque o Mercosur é uma estrutura muito arcaica, quando a gente negocia por exemplo regras pra medicamentos, até isso ser internalizados nos países, o medicamento já parou a ser produzido. Tem coisas aí que é 20 anos que a gente está tentando implementar.” 4 5

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responsible for public health services. The objective of these networks is to induce scholarly exchange and to improve public health care in the member states. The networks have strongly been incentivized by Brazilian academic background and are connected to the technical schools of FioCruz (Fundacao Oswaldo Cruz). Second, the South American Institute of Health, ISAGS, which is a technical department associated with the Health Council, was created. The creation of ISAGS had a substantial impact on the work of the Health Council, improving policy-making conditions and helping to make the work of the Health Council more visible. The initiative to create ISAGS came from the working group on human resources, which proposed the establishment of a technical institute for the formation and capacitation of health workers (CSS, Resolución 05/2009). At the beginning of 2009, the Health Council initiated the creation of the institute. Initially, it was meant to be a South American School of Health Governance (CSS, Resolución 05/2009). With confirmed support “of the Brazilian Government to develop the proposed school with the name of ‘South American Institute of Health’ (ISAGS)”7 (CSS, Resolución 05/2009), the council decided to approve the creation of ISAGS, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The former president of FioCruz, Paulo Buss (2001–2008), participated in this meeting as Brazilian representative (CSS, Resolución 05/2009) which is an example for the enduring relationship between the Brazilian cooperation in health conducted by the ministry and their academic counterpart, the FioCruz. Named after the prominent Brazilian epidemiologist Oswaldo Cruz, the creation of FioCruz dates back to the beginning of the last century and is one of the most relevant public institutes in biomedical research worldwide. Its role in education, capacitation, and formation in public health is central to the Brazilian system. The remaining countries well received the Brazilian invitation to host ISAGS.  First, “because it is challenging for Brazil to spend money [in other countries]. Therefore, the solution is, that [the institute] has to be in Brazil”8 (Pineiro 2015). Also, the location would be in proximity to its principal partner, FioCruz. In 2010, the presidential council finally 7  “oferta del Gobierno de Brasil de desampliar la iniciativa de la Escuela propuesta, ahora designada como Instituto Suramericano de Gobierno en Salud (ISAGS).” 8  “porque le cuesta mucho a sacar dinero a Brasil. Entonces la solución es de que sea en Brasil.”

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approved the proposal for the institute to be installed in Rio de Janeiro. One year later, in April 2011, the ministers of health approved the Statute of ISAGS (CSS, Resolución 02/2011), and the institute started working. ISAGS is often interpreted as a product of Brazilian leadership. Indeed, it was the former Brazilian minister of health, José Gomes Temporao, who offered to host the institute in Brazil. Subsequently, Temporao became the first director of ISAGS.  ISAGS and its connection to FioCruz are believed to contribute to the success of UNASUR’s Health Council. Accordingly, representatives underline that UNASUR to them is of a technical nature. This “technical nature” is connected to the location and creation of ISAGS as well as to its work with key partners. Having a technical intergovernmental institution facilitates the execution of projects in the name of the council. As countries are hesitant to transfer budget to other countries, ISAGS has the practical advantage of serving as a receiver and multilateral project carrier. Regardless of the dominance of Brazilian staff and management in ISAGS, other countries did not become suspicious of Brazilian hegemony or overwhelming leadership. As Henri Jouval, the first technical coordinator of ISAGS points out, the staff of ISAGS works “sensitively because the people usually associate us with Brazil. However, we do not represent Brazil. We represent the constellation of the countries”9 (Jouval 2014). Representatives to the Health Council share this perspective. In summary, all policy-makers reported positively on the work of ISAGS. Frame Dimension The Health Council has a clear and distinctive perspective of his function in the political program of UNASUR. Already in the presidential declaration that created the council, it is stated that “Health is a fundamental right of the human and the society and it is a vital component of and for the human development”10 (Establicimiento Consejo de Salud 2008). This right to health is cited in line with the objective of human rights ­promotion of UNASUR. Policy-makers explicitly discuss them as Human Right and refer to Mainstreaming. Another perspective connecting the objectives of the council to the political program of UNASUR is that “health is a social 9  “Um cuidado muito grande, porque as pessoas costumam associar como se nos fossemos Brasil. E nos não representamos o Brasil. Nos representamos a constelação dos países.” 10  “Salud es un derecho fundamental del ser humano y de la sociedad y es un componente vital del y para el desarrollo humano.”

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good, health has to be equal for all, it has to enhance equality”11 (Jouval 2014). Social development accordingly is a component of the work of the Health Council and is perceived as such by policy-makers. Health policy-makers express the objective of developing a long-term perspective on the improvement of health systems. They perceive the institutionality of the council, specifically the ISAGS and the structuring networks as development instrument in the health sector. Interestingly, political conflicts are not interpreted as an impacting factor for the council’s work. One representative, referring to the Chilean-Bolivian border conflict, explains that “normally the countries are very solidary. When we have an emergency at the border, with Chile or with Bolivia, the countries help each other”12 (Interview 28, 2015). Likewise, the Chilean representative emphasizes that health is not part of political conflicts and has a diplomatic, peacebuilding function (Matilde 2015). Concordantly, policy-­makers report not being involved in political issues of UNASUR. Instead of getting involved with regional conflicts, the health policy-makers developed an active agency in international organs. According to the objective of social development, they argued for higher sovereignty regarding international agency. That means that policy-­makers reported defending unified positions in international negotiations. To improve the coverage of health care, they intend to import medicines or coordinate the regional productions jointly. The regulation of the medicine market in South America is a regularly recurring issue not only for policy-makers but also for representatives in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Especially in contrast to international trade regulations and politics of the WHO, the Health Council endeavors to make medication policies socially compatible. 6.1.2  Group Processes in the Health Council  ollusion of National Interests C In particular, the regulation of the access to medication is a common interest of states. Moreover, epidemiological control has since the beginning of the last century been a topic of joint interest and cooperation in the region. Especially Brazil developed a strong position in regional health 11  “Saúde é um bem social, que a saúde tem que ser igual para todos, que tem que buscar equidade.” 12  “normalmente los países son muy solidarios, cuando tenemos una emergencia en frontera, con Chile o con Bolivia, son países que somos solidarios.”

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policy-making. In UNASUR, this interest in health cooperation is expressed not only by the involvement of FioCruz and the initial financing of ISAGS but also by the participation in the council’s meeting. As policy-­ makers stated, Brazil is typically present with a large delegation, from which all conduct a technical way of policy-making. Accordingly, the Brazilian delegation does have special negotiation power. As the Argentine representatives points out, “if Brazil agrees, normally it is easier to convince the rest”13 (Constanzi 2015). Nevertheless, it is important to underline that leadership in the case of Brazilian health policies is based on technical experience and is also perceived as such. As we have seen in the case of ISAGS and FioCruz, member states feel rather supported by these structures than threatened. Moreover, there is a variety of countries pursuing a solid position in the Health Council. According to Jouval, most South American countries have strong positions and work with a robust national administration in health policies. The Uruguayan representative, in particular, pointed to the importance that the UNASUR Health Council has for Uruguay, such as for other smaller countries (Coitino 2015). An issue which is of interest for all member states is the access to medicine. Argentina is coordinating the respective working group, as it belongs to the biggest producers of generics worldwide. Likewise, the Brazilian market invested remarkably in the establishment of local pharmaceutical production. Other countries also started the production. Uruguay, for example, has an “emerging national industry which needs the international commerce and the regional articulation to develop a market”14 (Coitino 2015). Public industries or public-private partnerships are common in the South American pharmaceutical industry and respond to the responsibility which states have in guarantying the access to medicine. Collusion of national interests in regional health policy-making is definitively given. First, as it improves national public health care by supporting exchange and training and second, as all states have an interest in cooperation in the production and access to medicine. Not only the broadening of markets, but also better conditions in foreign trade are the essential objectives. As it is already known from PAHO, joint commercialization and the purchase of medicine has economic benefits. In particular, expensive products for the treatment of diseases such as cancer or HIV can be purchased under better conditions.  “cuando Brasil esta de acuerdo, normalmente es mas fácil de convencer el resto.”  “industria nacional incipiente que necesita mucho del comercio internacional y de la articulación regional para poder desarrollar un mercado.” 13 14

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Autonomy of Action It could be assumed that precisely for shared trading negotiations, national policies might present a restriction. Particularly Chile emphasizes that their trade agreements might obstruct the regulation of the regional market. According to the Chilean representative, “Chile has free trade agreements. Therefore we cannot go there and sign whatever we want”15 (Matilde 2015). Such obstacles or other national postulates, however, are individual cases and do not reflect a general trend in the council. Health policy-makers, in general, reported being autonomous in their action. While the coordination inside the ministries of health differs in the countries, most of all work independent from their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The health area does not have a “stable mechanism between health and foreign affairs”16 (Coitino 2015). Likewise, the Chilean representative points out that “the topics of each group are defined by the technicians and according to the concrete necessities of the countries, not by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs”17 (Matilde 2015). Policies evolve in the respective national ministries of health. Policy-­ makers reported that they work autonomously and technically in the council. About their ministers of health, policy-makers feel that “generally a minister enters without knowing about what we are talking. Accordingly, the suggestions are made by the technical consultants”18 (Coitino 2015). A concern expressed by some policy-makers is that ministers may not have the sufficient insight into regional health issues. On the other side, this means that, instead of identifying with the national positions of their ministers, they identify with their regional counterparts on a technical level. Group Cohesion The UNASUR Health Council relies on a long tradition in cooperation. Different attempts to intensify regional health policy-making have been made in different regional spaces. As seen before, regional health cooperation is not a product of UNASUR. UNASUR only provides the space for cooperation, by integrating the existing initiatives. The process of an 15  “Chile hay un tratado de libre comercio, que es muy fuerte; entonces no podemos ir allá y decir que vamos a firmar con Brasil cualquier cosa.” 16  “mecanismo estable entre salud y relaciones exteriores.” 17  “los ejes temáticos de los bloques son definidos por los técnicos y por las necesidades de los países, no en cancillería.” 18  “generalmente entra un ministro sin saber de que estamos hablando. Entonces eso implica que las sugerencias vienen de los consultores.”

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intensified cooperation in health emerged in parallel to UNASUR’s development since the beginning of the century. Policy-makers, therefore, had already developed a common understanding. They have “a working tradition of years. They have a common basis for important work”19 (Coitino 2015). As a result, the tradition of health cooperation is well known, even outside its field. Policy-makers refer to “the WHO, [and] the PAHO, which are the spaces where physicians and health policy-makers have gathered for 100 years”20 (Interview 43, 2015). This enduring historical tradition acts as one of the many different reasons why the Health Council belonged to the first two councils to be established in UNASUR. Policy-makers in UNASUR perceive that the agenda of the Health Council is based on this tradition. Its integration into UNASUR is an improvement for health cooperation, as it gives policy-makers a more active role through continuously engaging with each other. The policy-­ making network in UNASUR’s Health Council established a technical profile. Statements indicate the irritation with political and economic involvement in the Health Council, by stating that “there is no vision of public health”21 (Interview 50, 2015). Concluding, the tradition in regional policy-making and the intensification of cooperation through the integration into UNASUR contributed to group cohesion, which is primarily expressed in the self-identification of policy-makers as representatives of regional health and not of national interests. 6.1.3  Summary: Regional Health The Health Council is valued as one of the most efficient councils. As previously mentioned, the reasons for cooperative activism are a common tradition, a traditional habit of cooperative policy-making, and collective political interests in the health area. UNASUR reinforced these already existing factors by providing a space for institutionally flexible and technical work to occur in the realm of health policy-making. The international agency that the Health Council developed is a significant characteristic and supports their objectives. With the creation of ISAGS and the institutionalization of the Health Council, global activism  “un trabajo de anos. Y tiene una base de trabajo importantes.”  “la OPS, la PAHO es, es lugar donde los médicos, y los formuladores de políticas de salud se han reunidos hace 100 anos.” 21  “no hay tanto visión de salud publica.” 19 20

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is getting stronger. To negotiate joint positions on a supra-regional level definitively needs a common understanding. It also has the effect of increasing the sensation of “actorness.” The Health Council developed actorness, which is also reflected in group cohesion. Representatives in the Health Council identify themselves with the policy field of health and speak of themselves as an actor in the region. Very illustrative in this regard is the council’s concern to transmit their regional perspective of health policies to decision-making bodies. The Uruguayan representative states that the council “should propose a strategic political vision to the Ministries of Health, to regional health and the regional position in global health debates”22 (Coitino 2015).

6.2   South American Council of Social Development (CSDS) 6.2.1  The Context of Policy-Making in Social Development The South American Council of Social Development, created in August 2009 by the decision of the Presidential Council, is not based on a stable structure of international cooperation but was politically created in a specific moment. The Uruguayan representative explains the creation of the Social Development Council in connection with a general trend, where “immediately all governments knew exactly what they had to do. It was a moment in which even ALADI wanted to have a social council”23 (Vazquez 2015). Accordingly, the Argentine representative urged “a commonality about the institutional and political objective”24 (Toselli 2015). However, he is not referring to a common perspective in regional policy objectives but to the similarity in the national administration of social services. All of these processes took place at a national level and do not include a transnational perspective, although there are some similarities between the national programs. Programs such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil or Jefes de Hogar in Argentina are examples of this changed perspective in national social politics. The Brazilian social welfare program Bolsa Familia was 22  “debe aportar una visión estratégico política a los ministerios de salud, a la salud de la región y al posicionamiento de la región en las discusiones de salud global.” 23  “rápidamente todos los gobiernos tenían muy claro, que había que hacer. Fue un momento en que hasta ALADI quería tener un consejo social.” 24  “una mirada común, sobre tanto el institucional, como de lo programático.”

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launched in 2003 by the then acting president Lula da Silva. It is a conditional cash transfer program and requires, for example, school attendance and health care for children. Jefes de Hogar is an Argentine workfare program that initiated in 2002 under the government of Nestór Kirchner. For working in community projects, unemployed Argentine Heads of Household receive a monthly “stipend.” As a result of this political turn, the decision-making bodies of UNASUR instructed the Social Development Council to develop an agenda of priority actions in social development. This agenda was meant to “work in parallel, complementary, or in cooperation with other councils”25 (Lezcano Escaurica 2015). The presidential declaration of July 2011 states that “with the objective of consolidating the advances and accrediting a higher priority to social development in the South American integration project, we instructed the Council of Social Development to structure and coordinate the elements of the mentioned Action Plan and the agenda of priority social actions”26 (CJEG, Compromiso contra la Desigualdad 2011, 4). In November 2012, the agenda was finally accepted by the Presidential Council. By instructing the Social Development Council to develop this agenda, the Presidential Council changed the position of the council concerning the remaining sectoral councils. The task of elaborating an agenda, which is prevalent in all policy-making processes of the organization, upraises the council. This is an important and unique feature of the Social Development Council and is indicative of its failure to work as policy network or develop common objectives. The area of social policy-making is highly politicized and depends largely on political programs, rather than technical rationality. This problem is reflected in the institutionalization of both the council and the corresponding ministries. The creation of the council and particularly the action agenda respond to a political movement in South America. Likewise, the ministries of social development have only been established recently, as illustrated in Table 6.3. It is observable that there is a high divergence between the national bureaucracies, which have different levels of institutionalization. The only countries that have an own Ministry of Social Development are Argentina,  “trabaja en forma paralela, complementaria, o en cooperación con otros consejos.”  “con el objetivo de consolidar esos avances y otorgar mayor prioridad al desarrollo social en el proyecto de integración suramericana, instruimos al Consejo de Desarrollo Social a estructurar y coordinar los elementos del referido Plan de Acción y de la agenda de acciones sociales prioritarias.” 25 26

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Table 6.3  Ministerial development of social development

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

Guyana

Paraguay Peru

Suriname

Uruguay Venezuela

Ministry or equivalent

Originated from

Ministerio de Desarrollo Social

Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Medio ambiente 1999 Ministerio de Planificación y Coordinacón 1970 Ministerio de Seguridad Alimentaria

2002 Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo 2006 Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Combate al Hambre 2004 Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2011 Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social 2012 Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social 2007 Ministry of Labor, Human Services and Social Security n/a Secretaría Ejecutiva de Acción Social 1995 Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2002 Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Volkshuisvesting 1946 Ministerio de Desarrollo Social 2005 Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Salud y Protección Social 2009

2003 Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación 1990 Departamento Nacional de Planeación 1968 Ministerio de Bienestar Social 1980 –

Dependent on presidency Ministerio de Promoción de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Humano 1996 –

– Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social 1936

Source: Author’s table based on DDSE (2008)

Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. Other states have “coordinating ministries,” which integrate different social areas. The Ecuadorian Ministry for the Coordination of Social Development is one example of this coordinative format. Others do not have any particular institutionality for social development. In Venezuela, even the participation in Mercosur and UNASUR

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is located in different organizations. The Ministry of the Communities is present in Mercosur, and in UNASUR it the vice-presidency for social affairs is. These institutional differences, as well as different groups participating in regional agreements, point to another problem. Ministries do not have a tradition in international relations, as it is the case in health. For Uruguay, the representative explains that “the Ministry of Social Development never had priorities in the international area”27 (Vazquez 2015). A former director of ISM (Instituto Social del Mercosur), a regional research entity for social policies created in 2007 and located in Asuncion, Paraguay, clarifies that “the social agenda is relatively new. Moreover, the Ministries of Social Development are ministries, which are involved with internal politics and attend to a challenging demand. Accordingly, ministries focus on their problems and attend the own [national] problems”28 (Miguel 2015). Policy-makers perceive and understand this problem. At first, Chile coordinated the working group of social policies in UNASUR, beginning in 2007. As the Chilean representative reports, the group worked approximately two years before the council was formally created and named South American Council of Social Development. According to the interpretation of the policy-makers, the working groups were established hastily during the PPT of Guyana in 2009/2010. With the objective to relieve the presidency of Guyana, “each country had to assume one of the groups”29 (Pineiro 2015). Since then, the council engaged in attempts to redefine working groups and put them in line with the action plan. Frame Dimension Although perceiving social development as a central objective of UNASUR, and understanding their council as an inherent part of the organization, policy-makers explain their function in contribution to the political agenda of UNASUR in very abstract terms. Human rights are interpreted as social rights and democracy as the basis for the exercise of citizenship. Inequality is seen as a central problem by all policy-makers, and all agree that its diminution is a central task of UNASUR policy-making. Likewise, policy-­  “el ministerio de desarrollo social, nunca había prioridades en la área internacional.”  “la agenda social es relativamente nueva. Segundo, los ministerios de desarrollo social son ministerios enfocado hacia política interna y atienden una demanda bastante exigente. Entonces eso hace, que en este caso, los ministerios se concentran en sus propios problemas. En atender sus propios problemas.” 29  “cada país hubo que asumir uno de los grupos.” 27 28

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makers in the Social Development Council agree that all policy fields have a social element. The Paraguayan representative expresses that “obviously everything intersects with the social. The states have the well-being of their population as a final mission”30 (Lezcano Escaurica 2015). This shared vision about which objectives regional cooperation should have is also a problem for the Social Development Council. There is a very broad understanding of what is necessary to generate “social well-being” and about how it can be measured. It especially involves ideologies. Defining social policies is a fundamental problem of the council. Although policy-makers consistently identify with the political agenda of UNASUR, it raises difficulties instead of facilitating the processes of regional policy-­ making in the council. 6.2.2  Group Processes in the Social Development Council  ollusion of National Interests C In the case of the Social Development Council, all representatives reported that social development is of particular interest to their country. However, most of all had difficulties in specifying on what precisely these national interests are based. Instead, member states would express their interest in distinct topics. The Paraguayan representative, for example, mentions that “for us, all groups are important, but of course, the social economy is still predominant. For internal reasons, of Paraguay”31 (Lezcano Escaurica 2015). Likewise, Argentina expressed a strong vision of social economy as a national project and explains its interest in cooperation in the issue accordingly (Toselli 2015). This joint interest of Paraguay and Argentina in the social economy resulted in the co-coordination of the respective working group. However, given the national priority, it is difficult to develop a regional vision of the issue. Policy-makers keep referring back to their national political systems and have problems in formulating common regional policy objectives. National interests, therefore, are expressed in universal interest in transporting the own ideological belief rather than in an explicit leadership to pursue regional policies. 30  “obviamente todo repercusse el social. Los Estados tienen como misión final el bienestar de la población.” 31  “para nosotros todos los grupos son importantes, pero si, economía social sigue siendo, digamos, preponderante. por una cuestión más de lineamento particular interno. como Paraguay.”

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As the Uruguayan representative explains, there has been no sign of leadership in the council by now. On the contrary, in the hope of reinforcing the technical performance of the council, they are “always waiting that some leadership appears. Leadership has neither been constant in Mercosur, nor in UNASUR, neither positively nor negatively”32 (Pineiro 2015). Autonomy of Action At the ministerial level, as mentioned previously, there is no tradition in regional cooperation. Accordingly, international relations departments in ministries of institutions of social development have no definite position. This is also reflected in the financing of regional cooperation. Although the ministries of social development are those with the most extensive budgets, the budget spend in international relations is low (Toselli 2015). The reasons are primarily the coverage of national social services, which require financing from the ministries. Deriving money from national social programs is complicated and hard to justify against civil society. Another impeding factor is the relatively strong involvement of UNASUR decision-­ making bodies into the Social Development Council, which is best illustrated by the statement of the Uruguayan representative, by pointing out that “they fight for technical autonomy”33 (Pineiro 2015). Likewise, the Chilean representative expresses that he does not “reject the presence of diplomats, but sometimes this impedes the administrative instruments and processes and the discussions”34 (Rojas 2015). In the Social Development Council, it is typical to have diplomatic accompaniment in the meetings. Some countries, such as is the case in Brazil, even have regular representatives who are themselves members of the diplomatic corps. The relations of the technical experts with their Ministries of Foreign Affairs differ. The Uruguayan representative feels that in comparison “in our case, we are a lot more technocratic than Peru or Ecuador”35 (Schinca 2015). The problem policy-makers, who are used to independent policy-making, face in the close relation of some delegations with their Ministries of Foreign Affairs is that it sometimes causes deadlock, because issues cannot be solved in meetings and in between 32  “esperando que aparezcan liderazgos. Liderazgos en ni uno, en Mercosur y UNASUR han sido constantes. ninguno. Ni positivo ni negativo.” 33  “peleamos por la autonomía técnica.” 34  “rechazo la presencia diplomática, pero, a veces eso implica los instrumentos, las trames administrativas a las discusiones.” 35  “nosotros, por lo menos somos mucho mas tecnócratas, en lo que es Perú, o Ecuador.”

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policy-makers, but require consultancy with Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Different national delegations reported on changing political instructions. These might not necessarily derive from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs but still make part of the respective “national projects.” The Paraguayan representative reports that “it is a huge challenge when everything is changing in a government. Now [after the elections] we will for sure get new instructions”36 (Lezcano Escaurica 2015). Illustratively, this statement reveals different factors, which influence the policy process. First, it shows that there is the persistence of policy-makers also when governments change. Second, there is no continuity in the council’s work due to political changes, which in turn, third, impedes technical autonomy in the policy process. Group Cohesion The fundamental problem of the Social Development Council is that policy-­makers are “speaking completely different about social policy”37 (Toselli 2015). The terminology and concepts are connected to national social development programs. While some countries established programs of conditional cash transfer, others rely on the concept of “desarrollo productivo,” which means development through productivity. One example of differences in national policies, which influence and impede the ­expansion of universal policy objectives in the region, is that Peru has private corporations carrying out social services. While this works in Peru, it would not be imaginable in Uruguay or other states. The diversity in national systems impedes the formulation of common objectives. Instead of developing transnational policy objectives, the policy-makers continue to refer back to national systems and national social standards. They would instead enforce the replication of social programs than of creating common projects. While Guyana and Suriname profit from the ambition of their neighbors to proliferate their national programs in terms of best practice learning, the remaining states are suspicious of the initiatives of the others. One representative points out that “whenever a state proposes an instrument, it will obviously be questioned”38 (Interview 11, 2015). 36  “y como va cambiando todo en un gobierno. Por eso es un desafío muy grande. Nosotros ahora seguramente vamos con otro direccionamiento.” 37  “hablando completamente distinto en términos de política social.” 38  “un instrumento, como el que te acaba presentar un estado, claramente va a ser cuestionado.”

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The initiative of developing a conceptual framework is indicative for the quest for a common denominator in the council. The diversity of national systems and concepts causes the challenge of communicating about how to communicate and about the focus the councils’ work should have. In comparison to other councils, the Social Development Council reveals tendencies to build blocs. In particular, the Mercosur members had a strong position within the council. Moreover, shared positions of ALBA members and the Pacific states can be differentiated. Although Guyana and Suriname did not build a new negotiation bloc, their position can be interpreted as the fourth component. In this context, Guyanese and Surinamese representatives describe UNASUR member states as their “South American neighbors” and have a weaker sense of belonging. This is reflected in the reporting on participation in other regional groups, such as CELAC, CARICOM, and OAS, where they rather align to their Caribbean counterparts. The Mercosur member states developed their own dynamic in UNASUR’s Social Development Council and perceive both regional processes as strongly interwoven. At the beginning of the century, the Mercosur started developing a social agenda. As the Argentine representative explains, policy-makers in Mercosur developed personal affinity “as the representatives are the same in Mercosur and UNASUR they have known each other for a long time”39 (Toselli 2015). Group cohesion thus only developed in the inner circle of Mercosur members. Different to other councils, there is a clear distinction made between Mercosur and Mercosur ampliado. The extended Mercosur, Mercosur ampliado, comprises the full members and the associate members, which are Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. While the policy-makers remain stable in Mercosur, the representatives in Mercosur ampliado rotate more often. Additionally, those who are not full members do not have full participation rights. Neither UNASUR nor Mercosur has been able to develop successful cooperation in social development. A fundamental problem policy-makers identified in Mercosur is connected to the fact that the “Mercosur is primarily a commercial construction”40 (Miguel 2015). As explained in Chap. 5, the political agenda of Mercosur developed in the context of a structure, which was initially created for commerce. 39  “al ser los mismos representantes en Mercosur y UNASUR se conocen hace mucho tiempo.” 40  “Mercosur es una instancia de construcción comercial, principalmente.”

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Even the former director of the ISM points out that he “would like to work in the direction of UNASUR, instead of Mercosur”41 (Miguel 2015) as it at least institutionally allows for better adaption. Mercosur has influenced the social council of UNASUR, as revealed by Mercosur policy-makers, who tried to “transfer a bit of the effort of what we have been working on the social level of Mercosur”42 (Lezcano Escaurica 2015). Policy-makers express quite naturally their ambition to merge the agendas of UNASUR and Mercosur. The initiative to reinforce the policy-making process in the Social Development Council by connecting to existing efforts is not based on consensus. It is just an additional hindrance to the development of group cohesion. By considering the suspicion policy-makers have against each other’s possible objectives, the political instruction according to national projects and the diplomatic interference, the Social Development Council has hardly been able to develop coherent group processes. 6.2.3  Summary: Regional Social Development To conclude, the underlying problem of the Social Development Council is that policy-making in the social area is not about producing some project or policy together but about changing national realities. Social development objectives are always connected to the nation’s current situation. Therefore, it is not easy to develop a “transnational” level of policy-­making for social development. Interestingly, the Social Development Council is supposed to have an instructive function to the remaining councils of the social area. Nevertheless, there continues to be disagreement over the definitions of what social areas are. Policy-makers tend to see social aspects in all councils. This, in turn, brings them into a situation, where policy-making does not follow its usual rationality but always concerns the development of the whole organization. The involvement of the decision-making groups and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs additionally impedes the independent and autonomous identification of problems and the development of their solutions at a technical level. 41  “gustaría trabajar en la dirección mas de UNASUR loves cat, de que de Mercosur. Creo que es una visión mas completa.” 42  “trasladar un poco lo que es el esfuerzo y ver un poco lo que estamos trabajando al nivel social como Mercosur.”

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Different from other councils, policy-makers perceive UNASUR “as a coordinator, more than an executor”43 (Rojas 2015). The policy-makers in the council furthermore feel a stronger dependency on the “political will.” The problem of changing political landscapes is explicitly mentioned. As the region is confronted with a constant political change, this dependency poses a problem to the continuity in the councils’ work. It additionally poses problems for the development of group cohesion.

6.3   South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning (COSIPLAN) 6.3.1  The Context of Policy-Making in Infrastructure The incipiencies of the South American Council for Infrastructure and Planification can be dated back to 2000 when the IIRSA was established by the Brasilia Declaration. The presidents in this declaration observe that “integration between neighbors is supported by being a result of geographical proximity, cultural identity and the consolidation of common values. The South American borders shall stop to be an element of ­isolation and separation and transform into a connecting link of the union, thereby forming a privileged space of cooperation for the circulation of goods and citizens”44 (Presidentes de las Naciones de Sudamérica 2000, 7). In this declaration, infrastructure is highlighted as one of the most critical issues of regional cooperation by the presidents. Shortly afterward, in December 2000, the Ministers of Transport, Energy, and Communication held a meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay, to discuss projects and establish a working plan. The meeting counted on the participation of several ministerial officials, experts, and the contributions and inputs of the American Development Banks, IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), CAF (Corporacion Andina de Fomento), and FONPLATA (Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata) (Acta Montevideo 2000a). According to the variety of national ministers  “como un coordinador, más que un ejecutor.”  “la integración transfronteriza se fortalece por ser una resultante, entre otros factores, de la proximidad geográfica, de la identidad cultural y de la consolidación de valores comunes. Las fronteras Suramericanas deben dejar de constituir un elemento de aislamiento y separación para tornarse un eslabón de unión para la circulación de bienes y personas, conformándose así un espacio privilegiado de cooperación.” 43 44

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involved, central coordinating organs have been organized in each member state. Today, the following national coordinations are in charge, as we can see in Table 6.4. During the ministerial meeting, the action plan for the following ten years (2000–2010) was presented. The action plan defined 13 “Integration Hubs,” which cover different geographic areas in South America, and created the GTEs (Grupos Técnicos Ejecutivos), the technical level of regional cooperation in infrastructure (Plan de Acción, 2000b). The integration projects are supposed to be carried out within the ambit of these hubs. The technical work is organized by the CCT (Comité de Coordinación Técnica). The inclusion of the development banks in the technical coordinating committee (CCT) of IIRSA is a critical point in the differentiation between IIRSA and the Infrastructure Council of UNASUR. In retrospective, policy-makers would say that IIRSA “is born Table 6.4  National coordination infrastructure and planning National coordination located at Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela

Subsecretaría de Planificación Territorial de la Inversión Pública Ministerio del Interior, Obras Públicas y Vivienda Directoria de Planificación Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Servicios y Vivienda Secretaría de Planificación e Inversiones Estratégicas Ministerio de Planeamiento, Presupuesto y Gestión Coordinación Internacional del Ministerio de Obras Públicas MOP Ministerio de Obras Públicas Subdirección de Transporte Departamento Nacional de Planeación Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo Works Services Group Ministry of Public Works Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones Dirección de Planeamiento Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones Dry Civil Technical Works Ministry of Public Works Dirección Nacional de Planificación y Logística Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores

Source: COSIPLAN, Institutional Information

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in the middle of a crisis, the financial crisis of 2000”45 (Garcia Gonzalez 2015). Accordingly, the creation of IIRSA is perceived as initially dominated by banks. The leadership of the process was forwarded to the multilateral banks IDB, CAF, and FONPLATA, which had a substantial impact on the development of the first years. The change to COSIPLAN was only initiated later, after South American states entered a period of economic growth (beginning around the year 2006) and countries could start to invest themselves in infrastructure projects. According to the Chilean representative in COSIPLAN, “the governments started to have money, to invest in infrastructure. This is the time when the countries started to lead the process”46 (Garcia Gonzalez 2015). Nevertheless, policy-­makers reflect positively on IIRSA, as the initiative paved the way for COSIPLAN. In particular, the technical and professional cooperation is valued and maintained in COSIPLAN. With the creation of UNASUR, also the inclusion of IIRSA to the organization was discussed. A working group led by Colombia was in charge of proposing an “Infrastructure Council.” This group was created by the Council of Delegates in 2007 (Acta IX Reunión 2007). The ­objective of having an Infrastructure Council, therefore, was an integral part of the institutionalization process of UNASUR itself. In August 2008, the involved policy-makers already reported to the Council of Delegates that “in various occasions, it was possible to identify that the delegates are the same in both regional bodies, in which moreover the thematic agendas coincidence”47 (Acta XIII Reunión 2008). In March 2009, the Brazilian delegation finally proposed the “creation of the South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning at the ministerial level, in which IIRSA would be the executive technical forum for the planning and development of integration in infrastructure in South America, on the basis of the guidelines which derive from the respective council”48 (Acta XV Reunión 2009a). In June 2010, the ministers of the now called  “Nasce em meio de una crise, a crise de financiamento de 2000.”  “Los gobiernos comenzan tener dinero, para fazer investimentos na área de infraestructura, então era a hora de los países comenzar, a liderar o processo.” 47  “en varias ocasiones ha sido posible identificar que los delegados son los mismos funcionarios de ambas instancias regionales en donde se repiten además las agendas temáticas.” 48  “Creación del Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento, a nivel ministerial, en cual IIRSA sea el foro técnico ejecutivo de la planificación y desarrollo de la infraestructura de integración de América del Sur con base a las directrices que emanen de dicho Consejo.” 45 46

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COSIPLAN held their first official meeting. In their second meeting one year later, the ministers agreed on a strategic agenda for the period of 2012–2022 and established the three thematic working groups of “Rail Integration,” “Telecommunication,” and “Financing Mechanisms and Guarantees” (Declaración COSIPLAN 2011). Other working groups have been added successively. The groups are coordinated by the Coordinating Committee, which is the executive organ of COSIPLAN. The IIRSA maintained as “technical forum” in the COSIPLAN. There is a resilient perception of the difference between IIRSA and COSIPLAN, primarily of their different background by policy-makers. In general, the identification is higher with COSIPLAN. While IIRSA has a mainly economic perspective, COSIPLAN is seen more in line with the idea of regional integration. Many projects that were introduced by the Infrastructure Council would not have been feasible in the IIRSA. In line with that understanding, a Brazilian representative explains his decision whether or not to engage in projects in COSIPLAN, by stating that “if it were only about the economic criterion I would not promote it [the project]”49 (Quintela Santos 2014). IIRSA, however, still has a stable position in the regional infrastructure cooperation. Policy-makers realize the difficulties, which arise from having a double structure. Especially smaller delegations cannot differentiate clearly between the COSIPLAN and IIRSA processes of policy-making. For one representative of a small country, “it is hard to differentiate between what is IIRSA and what is COSIPLAN”50 (Interview 33, 2015). Small delegations mainly perceive this parallelism as a problem. All delegations recognize it as part of institutionalization processes. A currently intensively disputed issue is the financing of projects. States alone are not able to carry the high costs of infrastructure investments. Especially with the decline of economic growth, the capacity to do so decreased. The Infrastructure Council tries to improve investment and donor relations. The inclusion of other banks is discussed as one possibility. Those can be “the Bank of China, the European bank of investments, also regional banks, conventional banks of the region”51 (Garcia Gonzalez 2015). The financing by BNDES, the Brazilian Development Bank, was  “Se for pelo critério económico eu não faço.”  “cuesta diferenciar de que es IIRSA y COSIPLAN.” 51  “sea Banco del China, Banco Europeo de Investimentos, ta. Os bancos regionais, da región, bancos convencionais.” 49 50

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mentioned by several delegations. The BNDES is the leading financier of development projects in Brazil and is associated with the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade. The Brazilian delegation itself, however, indicates that the Brazilian legislation does not readily permit the BNDES to make the foreign investment. Frame Dimension Policy-makers in the Infrastructure Council, in general, do not notice a strong influence of ideology in group processes. Previously, tensions arose in the sphere of IIRSA, when the IDB was still a voting member. Some members explicitly rejected the participation of banks, while others were convinced of the benefit of their participation. At present, the council fully recognizes the social dimension of infrastructure. Nations that used to touch upon these issues regularly are “Venezuela, and for many issues, Argentina, Brazil and Chile”52 (Interview 14, 2015). These states are not only the major contributors to regional cooperation but also are the most unequal nations in South America. Policy-makers working on infrastructure issues feel that they have a central task in the alleviation of poverty and inequality. A Brazilian representative explained that “60–70% of the Brazilian connections are located in São Paulo. In between, there are no connections. This is exemplary for the Latin-American asymmetry. Moreover, where it is needed most, there is only little investment”53 (Quintela Santos 2014). In response to these problems, policy-makers defend the social value of regional cooperation. The Chilean national coordinator interprets this function for social development as a physical integration in the sense of connectivity. Infrastructure according to him has to provide “better access to the small and medium producers, so that they can export their products”54 (Garcia Gonzalez 2015). As already mentioned, the vision of an internal orientation, instead of a conventional export orientation, is the programmatic difference between IIRSA and COSIPLAN.  Notably smaller and/or landlocked states such as Bolivia started questioning the advantage their nation has from participation in IIRSA.  By criticizing the transport of  “Venezuela. Por muchos de los temas Argentina, Brasil y Chile.”  “60, 70% das conexões do Brasil estão localizadas em São Paulo. Subindo você não tem conexão. Isso então demonstra a própria assimetria latinoamericana, tá certo. E onde você mais precisa, menos tem recurso.” 54  “Melhor acesso dos pequenos y médios produtores com sus produtos para conseguir exporter.” 52 53

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goods through the country, there is no development effect. Consequently, both COSIPLAN’s and UNASUR’s projects are meant to have an impact on development. In response, the Infrastructure Council developed a methodology for impact evaluation, which should be applied to IIRSA as well as COSIPLAN projects. The EASE (Evaluaciones Ambientales y Sociales con Enfoque Estratégico) measures the impact of the projects on the locality, the community, benefits, and workplaces. Corresponding to different national impact valuation instruments, the EASE was developed by a multilateral group of technicians. Its objective is “to identify any complementary action that might enhance—from a social, environmental and cultural point of view—the positive effects of projects and minimize their negative impact” (“I.I.R.S.A.” n.d.). In line with the objective of social development, the Infrastructure Council invites the participation of NGOs as a link to civil society. It is the only council in UNASUR explicitly including NGOs in policy-making processes and thereby establishing a link to civil society. Policy-makers interpret their contribution to the political program according to the social impact. Equally, human rights and democracy are understood in terms of access. The idea of cooperation in infrastructure is not to “construct only to construct a street. A street signifies better access to education, better access to health”55 (Garcia Gonzalez 2015). In support, others mentioned that access to information or communication is a requirement for peace, human rights, and democracy. They moreover emphasize the importance of regional cooperation in infrastructure as a guarantee for the success of UNASUR. Francisco Carrión, for example, explains that by building “an infrastructure which physically unites the countries, with highways, and oil pipelines, gas pipelines, they [the countries] become physically integrated, and it is complicated for a project of this nature to fail. If that infrastructure, physically, leads to the consolidation of South America, the bloc will not break apart. IIRSA and COSIPLAN, in my opinion, are the key to success”56 (Carrión 2014).

55  “construir por construir un camino. Um caminho significa melhor acesso a educação, melhor acesso a saúde.” 56  “una infraestructura, que une físicamente a los países. Que hace carreteras, que oleoductos, y gasoductos (.) físicamente, se integran, y es muy difícil que un proyecto de esta naturaleza de puede ir abajo. Si esa infraestructura, física, termina por consolidarse en Sudamérica, hará que el bloque no pude romperse. IIRSA y COSIPLAN, eso es la clave a mi juizio del éxito.”

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6.3.2  Group Processes in the Infrastructure Council  ollusion of National Interests C Policy-makers of all member states mentioned that there is a national interest of the respective governments involved in regional cooperation in infrastructure. In comparison to the situation in COSIPLAN, policy-­ makers perceived less political influence in IIRSA. What occurred due to the establishment of COSIPLAN is the relativization of the purely technical work of IIRSA. The interest of states in the council changed. In the case of Paraguay, the Minister of Foreign Affairs explains that “this land-­ locked country needs to have good connection and access. Without obstacles”57 (Loizaga Lezcano 2015). Similarly, Bolivia depends on different ways of access. For the case of Brazil, infrastructure cooperation is necessary to reduce asymmetries, particularly in the northern areas of the countries. Brazil is mentioned by many delegations as having a strong position in the council, mainly because it involves most of the geographic zones. However, Brazil is not pursuing a clear leadership, mainly due to domestic factors. Besides simply not being able to fund projects, the national political situation strongly influences the Brazilian abilities in foreign policy-making. In conclusion, all states expressed that there is political interest in cooperation in infrastructure. However, there is no regional perspective. Representatives remain mainly in their national logic, pointing to the benefits their country or their neighbors have in regional infrastructure cooperation. Collusion of national interests accordingly only exists in the interest of participation. Autonomy of Action In comparison to other councils, the Infrastructure Council counts on the active participation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in all official meetings. All policy-makers reported that someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanies them. The participation of Ministries of Foreign Affairs is explained by the necessity of having a specialist in foreign policy assisting. All projects involve border issues, which is different in other councils. The Brazilian diplomat in the Infrastructure Council himself explains the necessity of diplomatic support with the example of the Uruguayan-Argentine conflict (compare Chap. 5). He explains that  “Para ese un pais mediterraneo, necessita tener conectividad y acesso fácil. Sin travas.”

57

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the technical staff does not necessarily know, what is being treated by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. “This information does not reach them. The coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Transportation and Planning is important”58 (Parkinson 2014). This example reflects not only the necessity for diplomatic support but also the dominant technical vision of policy-makers, who do not involve in political issues. In particular, technical experts express a priority on technical decision-making. They even perceive political decisions as not adequate for transnational cooperation, as the following statement illustrates: “there are political decisions, right, they are legitimate, but normally the technical representative has to assume responsibility”59 (Interview 19, 2015). Policy-makers feel “tensions” with active diplomats due to the different rationalities of action. While the diplomatic staff “works much more with agreements, we have to concern that the things turn into reality”60 (Quintela Santos 2014). Policy-makers would also emphasize that in practice, “the decision is as a final point taken by the technical coordinator”61 (Abrahão de Castro 2014). Regional policy-making in infrastructure, accordingly, is based on the technical decision, if projects are viable or not. Likewise, policy-makers do not put too much emphasis on political leadership from decision-making bodies. Political priorities in infrastructure, for example, of the PPT or the General Secretary, “are somehow helpful. However, the projects reach far beyond the period of a government or a general secretary. From design to the realization of projects, it will need 10–15 years”62 (Garcia Gonzalez 2015). Policy-makers point to the long-term perspective of the Infrastructure Council by emphasizing that planning needs to surpass legislative periods of governments. This technical vision and long-term planning of projects are seen as a necessary condition to policy-making in infrastructure. The key to success for technical representatives is the working groups, which are least 58  “essa informação não chega a eles. Essa coordenação entre chancelaria, transporte e panejamento é importante.” 59  “Há decisões politicas, tudo bem, elas são legitimas, mais muitas vezes o mandatário que assume depois.” 60  “Trabalha muito mas com acordos, a gente tem uma preocupação muito grande em que as coisas se transformam em realidade.” 61  “mais no limite, a decisão é do coordenador técnico.” 62  “siempre van a ayudar. Pero los projectos estan além dos tempos de um governo o de una secretaria-geral. Da concretización para que proyectos pasan a ser realidades, el camino son casi 10–12 anos. Un túnel, son 15 anos.”

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involved in political considerations. This technical profile of the Infrastructure Council secures the autonomy of action for technical experts as they have a substantial information advantage. The involvement of Ministries of Foreign Affairs is mostly seen as support and not as political obstruction. Group Cohesion In line with their autonomy of action, policy-makers identify with their counterparts through the dominant technical rationality. There is no mentioning of ideological or political conflict by any part. On the contrary, policy-makers have a very technical perception of the positions of other delegations. The variety of projects’ technical forums, which make up a part of the Infrastructure Council, provide a multiplicity of methods to pursue distinct objectives, also outside the council. The projects of the council, including those within the sphere of the council’s mandate, have the objective of connecting countries to each other. Negotiations on how to connect countries are of a technical nature. Nevertheless, the delegations recognize the complexity of multilateral negotiations and the slow progress. A minimum of political vision is necessary to understand the importance of the processes, as a Brazilian ­representative mentioned: “if you have no understanding of the importance of integration, you might leave such a meeting and be incredulous about every kind of integration”63 (Abrahão de Castro 2014). The continuity of participation of several delegations is seen as a facilitating factor. It is valued as a guarantee for the continuity. Moreover, it has the effect of creating negotiation advantages for those being in charge of the council for a more extended period. One delegate emphasizes that “there might emerge a topic and one can say, ‘in 2009 we already spoke about this’, and can refer to the whole history and precedents. Sure, there might come a new person and take care of everything, but often not everything is written on paper”64 (Interview 07, 2014). As newer representatives reported, some policy-makers developed dominance, by creating

63  “Se você não tem noção mínima, da importância da integração, você pode sair dessas reuniões descrentes de qualquer tipo de integração.” 64  “de repente surge un tema y uno puede decir: por allá en el 2009 ya hablamos de eso y que busca toda la historia y los antecedentes, claro, bueno, puede venir una persona nueva y entregarse a todo, pero muchas veces en el papel no esta todo que se trabajó.”

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institutional and process-related knowledge. Based on this “domination of rules and ritual,” they can evolve a form of leadership. The national coordinations for the council differ remarkably in between the member states. For the Brazilian case, different policymakers mentioned a higher turnover of staff, keeping representatives for around one presidential period. The Brazilian national coordination of COSIPLAN is located at the Ministry of Planification. The coordination is not the executive body but instead is concerned with the inclusion of all responsible technical staff. Quintela Santos remembers that at the last meeting of the council, “the Brazilian delegation was huge. We took the ministry of transport, of communication, the BNDES, the federal revenue department with us. Without including Itamaraty, we were eight persons”65 (Quintela Santos 2014). According to the Brazilian delegation, the objective of the coordination is to maintain technical continuity. This continuity is preserved through the distribution of technical tasks. Therefore, changes are not immediately reflected in the council. Contrary to Brazil, many countries do not have the resources to send big delegations to the meetings. Smaller countries remark that it is challenging to coordinate cooperation in infrastructure because there is a diversity of involved actors and interests, which cause the need of many technical experts to be able to work on all projects. Therefore, primarily members of the council of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile delegate tasks. The fact that other states do not have sufficient human resources leads to technical asymmetry between countries. To summarize, it is difficult to identify group cohesion in the Infrastructure Council. Although delegates might know each other for a long time and identify with each other as technical experts in the area of infrastructure, there is currently no common objective to drive group cohesion. The profile of the council includes a variety of projects and different spaces of regional cooperation. As financing and technical expertise are the requirements for successful participation in the council, the asymmetries between national delegations become manifest. Also, the multiplicity and the mere amount of actors involved in the council complicates the development of group cohesion, as positions and interests differ widely. 65  “A delegação brasileira foi imensa. Nos levamos ministério de transporte, de comunicações, o BNDES, levamos receita federal, além da secretaria do Itamaraty, fomos com 8 pessoas.”

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6.3.3  Summary: Regional Infrastructure Similar to other councils, the policy-makers in COSIPLAN all formulated their preference for UNASUR as a regional space over other organizations. Mercosur, for example, did have some impact in infrastructure cooperation, but only in general terms. Member states of Mercosur found that this subregional initiative worked as a “first effort to create a common market”66 (Quintela Santos 2014). However, there is no real effect in policy-­making of the Infrastructure Council. UNASUR, on the contrary, has the objective of solving the problem of bloc-building in South America, in view of the problem that “the countries, in their subregional mechanisms, being it the Pacific Alliance, ALBA or Mercosur, turned against each other”67 (Parkinson 2014). The primacy of technical rationality in policy-making is characteristic of the council. The own function and position is entirely clear to policy-­ makers, who are convinced of technical solutions to problems in infrastructure. An important factor, which undoubtedly contributed to the technical rationality of the council, is the origin in IIRSA, where the ­development banks played a significant role in guiding the work. The technical assistance and rational working mode pertain in COSIPLAN.  Concluding, the COSIPLAN is an exemplary case for successful technical cooperation at a regional level, even without a remarkable degree of group cohesion. Its limitation to technical discussions preserves the group of policy-makers from political interference, although being the object of strong political interests. Policy-makers support the shared aim of maintaining continuity. The only evident problem in the council is financing, which might contribute to bilateral conflicts and finally be the decisive criterion on whether projects are realized or not.

6.4   South American Council of Culture (CSC) 6.4.1   The Context of Policy-Making in Culture The Peruvian minister of culture of the time, Peirano Falconi, qualified the first meeting of UNASUR’s Culture Council on February 27 and 28, 2013, in Lima, Peru, as the first meeting of experts in the region. According  “primeira tentativa de fazer um mercado comum.”  “Os países através dos seus mecanismos sub-regionais, seja Mercosur, Aliança do Pacífico, a ALBA, tiveram muito, voltados uns contra os outros.” 66 67

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to him, these experts for the first time treat “issues and specific agreements about the defense and prevention of the cultural heritage, the interculturality and the cultural industries”68 (Crespial 2013). In that occasion, representatives revised the work done by the former specialized working group on culture and developed a working plan for the coming period. Not long before, on November 30, 2012, the presidential council decided to substitute the South American Council of Education, Culture, and Science, Technology, and Innovation (COSECCTI) by three independent councils (CJEG Decisión 12/2012). The COSECCTI was previously organized in three different specialized working groups in the respective issue area. Accordingly, the Culture Council (CSC) was created besides the Education Council (CSE) and the Science Council (COSUCTI). COSECCTI was one of the first councils to be created by the presidential council, during the meeting in Quito in 2009. Already shortly afterward the division was solicited by the working groups. In June 2013, the Culture Council finally presented its statute. From the very beginning, the group of policy-makers in the field of culture engaged in joint efforts materialized primarily in declarations and ­statements. Retrospectively, the division of COSECCTI and the creation of the CSC are essential steps to explain the institutionalization of the councils’ work. The division of COSECCTI was requested by the technical groups of culture, education, and science themselves, what means that the creation of the distinct councils happened on their initiative. For culture, the Argentine representative explains that “we continued insisting, and finally, because we insisted, the South American Council of Culture could be created”69 (Guariglio 2015). Policy-makers that were already part of COSECCTI pointed out that they expressed their concern with the impracticability of this large council. Already in the creation process of the council, objections have been documented in different protocols. In the protocol of the XVI meeting of the delegates of UNASUR in 2009, it says that “some delegations claimed, that the council is too big and that the different areas cannot be treated by only one council”70 (Acta Reunión XVI 2009b). 68  “temas y acuerdos específicos sobre la defensa y prevención del patrimonio cultural, interculturalidad e industrias culturales.” 69  “seguimos insistiendo, finalmente, porque insistimos, insistimos, se pudo resolver crear el consejo Sudamericano de cultura.” 70  “Algunas delegaciones hicieron presente que este consejo era demasiado amplio y que las diferentes áreas no pueden eventualmente ser tratadas por un solo Consejo.”

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Working in three different policy fields, the council indeed was unable to develop a coherent agenda. The UNASUR member states faced primarily administrative difficulties to respond to the council and all its working groups. Only a few South American states have one minister covering all three issue areas (e.g. Uruguay). The majority had to appoint three ministries. Internal coordination, therefore, was necessary. All policy-­ makers of the different fields agreed after separation that they now can “handle the policies much better than before”71 (Guariglio 2015). In the case of culture, by having a look at the institutional development of national administrations (Table 6.5), we can see that most of the South American states created independent bureaucratic structures for culture only in the last two decades. Culture only recently developed as an independently institutionalized policy field in the South American nations. Before the creation of ministries or secretaries with ministerial status, culture was mostly connected to the ministries of education. The functional differentiation in the bureaucracies of member states came along with the increasing cooperation in regional organizations. It is interesting to observe how the regional ­activities in culture are connected to an institutional change in national political systems. Frame Dimension The Culture Council’s statute describes the objectives of the council as “recognizing and promoting the central value of culture as indispensable basis for the development and the overcoming of poverty and inequality”72 (CSC 2011, 3) and of “promoting the reduction of the regional and ­sub-­regional asymmetries in the field of promotion of the universal access to the culture”73 (CSC 2011, 5). The reductions of poverty and inequality, just as social development, are general objectives of UNASUR. By referring explicitly to these goals in the statute, the policies of the Culture Council are aligned with other public policy fields, which are considered indispensable to attain the ends UNASUR has in view. In the statute, the connection between the devel “dar cuenta muchísimo mejor de las políticas.”  “Reconocer y promover el valor central en la cultura como base indispensable para el desarrollo y superación de la pobreza y desigualdad.” 73  “Promover la reducción de las asimetrías regionales y subregionales en materia de promoción y acceso universal a la cultura.” 71 72

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Table 6.5  Ministerial development culture

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile

Colombia Ecuador Guyana Paraguay Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela

Ministry or equivalent

Originated from

Secretaría de Cultura de la Nación 2002 Ministerio de Cultura 2009 Ministerio de Cultura 1985 Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes 2003 Ministerio de Cultura 1997 Ministerio de Cultura 2007 Department of Culture, Youth and Sports Secretaría Nacional de Cultura 2007 Ministerio de Cultura 2010 Directoraat Cultuur n/a Dirección Nacional de Cultura 2007 Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura 2005

Ministerio de Cultura y Educación 1970 Ministerio de Cultura 1965 – Dependent on Presidency/Ministry of Education – – Part of Ministry of Education Ministerio de Educación y Cultura Instituto Nacional de Cultura 1971 Part of Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture Part of Ministry of Education and Culture Consejo Nacional de la Cultura 1975

Source: Author’s table based on SICSUR (2012)

opment of South American societies and their cultural identity is expressed. Accordingly, policy-makers connect the function of the Culture Council explicitly to the creation of UNASUR and the construction of a regional identity. The council is the basis for the construction of a South American identity based on a collective culture, which is often proclaimed by political leaders. The perception of an identity-building function of the Culture Council is resilient in the statements of policy-makers. The identity of the region is seen as a reinforcing element of the integration process. The council promotes the diversity of traditions as parts of a regional South American identity. There is an open recognition of cultural differences and interculturalism. Policy-makers focus on structural equality (e.g. the

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existence of different indigenous groups) and shared interests in the cultural promotion. In line with the political agenda of UNASUR, they express their objective of turning away from external influences and orienting towards their region. One example is the candidature of Qhapaq, an Inca road system in the Andeans, for being recognized as World Heritage by the UNESCO. Although not being a UNASUR initiative, the participating countries explored their shared interest in the context of regional cooperation. The Culture Council contributes to the construction of a community. This communitarian aspect is central to the council’s agenda. Policy-­ makers explicitly mention the importance of the transfer of cultural policies to civil society for the promotion of regional identity. As objectives of policy-making, they indicate projects, which demonstrate what the region and what the common heritage is. The right to cultural expression, accordingly, is explicitly cited as a human right. Self-determination is mentioned as a fundamental precondition of human rights as well as democracy. UNASUR, in this context, is not only seen as space for transgovernmental policy-making but as a mechanism for the preservation and valuation of the South American cultural heritage (patrimonio cultural). This mechanism is in particular expressed by the possibility for traditional and indigenous groups to maintain their cultural tradition and demonstrate their heritage. The protection of cultural goods and the regional cultural industry contributes to this preservation of cultural traditions. The Culture Council of UNASUR works in a protective and promoting way. For policy-makers, it is crucial to “escape from the logic of massification, the mass culture in, the commercial logic of culture”74 (Interview 06, 2014) to be able to protect their cultural heritage and cultural industries. The protection of cultural goods and the promotion of the regional cultural industry accordingly are interpreted as part of the UNASUR agenda. Policy-makers express their understanding of culture as fundamental part of social development by emphasizing that “culture generates employment, just as culture generates development”75 (Guariglio 2015).

74  “Fugir um pouco da logica de massificação, de cultura em massa, uma logica mercantil de cultura.” 75  “la cultura genera empleo, como la cultura genera desarollo.”

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6.4.2  Group Processes in the Culture Council  ollusion of National Interests C Although explicitly mentioning cultural differences between the member states of UNASUR, policy-makers do not perceive any occurrence of negotiation blocs or alliances. On the contrary, all states are seen as equal. A division into Mercosur and CAN members does not exist in policy-­ making in the Culture Council. One explanation is the work of “Mercosur cultural” itself. In the case of culture, Mercosur ampliado does not work distinctly from Mercosur. That means that policy-makers do not differentiate between members and associates. While other councils mentioned the right to vote as the fundamental difference between associates and members (compare social development), voting is not an issue in the case of culture. The only problem that was indicated is that the presidency of “Mercosur cultural” rotates between member states and associates will not have the chance to preside. The benefit of UNASUR is seen in the fact that all countries participate on equal terms. Also, the Culture Council is the only one that did not mention the consensus rule of UNASUR explicitly—neither positively nor negatively. Taken together, these observations indicate that policy-makers take it for granted that they will reach consensus. For UNASUR, policy-makers remark that countries pursue a common objective. To them, this is more apparent in UNASUR than in other regional organizations. As already mentioned, differences are recognized. However, policy-makers in the Culture Council understand them as complementary. Accordingly, the concepts of diaspora, migration, and indigenous traditions were commonly advocated by Peru, Ecuador, or Bolivia. At the same time Uruguay and Argentina, for example, would instead focus on the cultural tradition of the La Plata subregion. These different cultural traditions, however, form different lines of work and do not impact policy-making. All interviewees speak of common objectives. Argentina, and to some extent Colombia, can be described as influential actors in the council. Especially Argentina expressed its interest in cultural industries. Different to other South American states, where culture is no relevant economic factor, cultural industries here make a remarkable contribution of 3.08% of the total GDP (in 2009) (SICSUR 2012). In line with this position of culture in the Argentine national political agenda, the country realized the first Micsur in Mar del Plata in 2014. Micsur (Mercado de Industrias Culturales de Sur) is a cultural market in which all

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South American nations participate. Different artistic products are exhibited in Micsur, such as paintings, fashion, or design (MICSUR 2016). Colombia hosted the second Micsur in Bogotá in 2016. Moreover, the first project of the Culture Council, the Expreso Sur, was coordinated by Colombia. The Expreso Sur is a documentary in which each of the 12 member states of UNASUR presents 2 national celebrations. It is broadcasted in the public television canals of the member states. Both countries expressed their interest in cultural politics openly. However, the intense activism of Argentina or Colombia is by no part perceived as problematic. The collusion of interests is given, as there are no contradictory positions in the Culture Council. Autonomy of Action Representatives in the Culture Council reported to act independently from decision-making bodies such as the Councils of Delegates or Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In their national context, policy-makers equally act on their own, without the interference of Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The cultural departments in Ministries of Foreign Affairs do not get involved thematically. Usually, they only require information whenever necessary. Although some differences in the coordination can be observed in South American states, the thematic involvement of Ministries of Foreign Affairs was never reported. The institutional independence that cultural departments gained as ministries indeed supported this independent action at the regional level. Concerning the national ministries of culture, representatives to the Culture Council indicated different forms of how they are incorporated into the ministries. While some mentioned interest and support by the minister of culture him/herself, others felt that the ministerial level is indifferent. This is no national characteristic but depends on the respective person in each country. However, the autonomy of action of delegates to the Culture Council does not differ remarkably and pertains comparatively high in all member states. Group Cohesion The internal consilience about the role and value of culture as such distinguishes the Culture Council from other councils in UNASUR. The issue area of culture is not easy to grasp if we compare it, for example, with education, infrastructure, or health. The function of these policy fields is easily comprehensive for outsiders, while culture remains abstract in its function as public policy. It creates a higher insider-outsider divide in

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understanding the function of culture as public policy. The identification of policy-makers with their counterparts, therefore, is more probable. Indeed, the various processes of regionalization in South America, which are taking place in parallel, all contributed to a collective identity of policy-­ makers in the ambit of culture. According to the respective policy-makers in the area of culture, the process of regional cooperation has had positive effects. Guariglio transports an envisioned commonality of policy-­makers in culture by indicating that “it gave us higher visibility of our field, to all of us which work in their respective Ministry of Culture”76 (Guariglio 2015). Regional cooperation in culture is hence creating visibility of cultural politics. Regional processes seem to provide the adequate space to coordinate. The identification as policy-makers in the field of culture, accordingly, relates to the benefit of participating in UNASUR. The respective network of policy-makers in this process could strengthen group cohesion. According to a representative in the council, “the contacts of the network in the cultural sector deepened”77 (Interview 38, 2015). Another beneficial factor is that delegates are the same in all regional initiatives, such as Mercosur, CELAC, and SEGIB (Secretaría General Iberoamericana). Moreover, although directors might change, the technical staff continues. As Vignolo, the Uruguayan representative, emphasizes, “you always have the team working in the background, which will be certainly the same”78 (Vignolo 2015). Equally, a Paraguayan representative points out that the “technical officials are those who continue”79 (Masi 2015). Others speak of “an established network of contacts” (Interview 38, 2015) in this context. According to policy-makers, the experiences they are making in one regional project helps them to improve group processes in other regional organizations. Consequently, different regional processes contribute to the institutional learning in the network, independent from the organization. This institutionalization of policy-making, in turn, strengthens group cohesion. In conclusion, the Culture Council profits from a cohesive group of policy-makers, who are pursuing common regional objectives. It is a 76  “en el terreno nuestro, nos dio incluso más visibilidad también. A todos que trabajamos en nuestros respectivos ministerios de cultura.” 77  “Se aprofundaram muito mas, os contactos, a rede, no sector cultural.” 78  “lo que tenéis es el equipo de atrás, que seguramente si es que esta.” 79  “Funcionário técnico é que segue.”

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particularity of the policy field of culture that conceptual misunderstandings do not occur between experts. In the case of South American political systems, the regional spaces moreover provided the opportunity to increase policy-making efforts and political influence. 6.4.3  Summary: Regional Culture The network of policy-makers in the cultural field developed successively in different regional spaces, such as UNASUR, Mercosur, SEGIB, or CELAC. Cooperation in culture has a long tradition. Long before most of the South American states created an own institutionality in the form of ministries, they cooperated in different regional spaces. Already in 1985 the intergovernmental Organización de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educación, la Ciencia y la Cultura (OEI) was founded. In 1996, shortly after the creation of Mercosur, the “Mercosur cultural” has been established. Although having the primary economic objective of facilitating “the circulation of goods and cultural services”80 (SICSUR 2012, 67), it indicates a general interest in cooperation in culture. In 2010 the ministers of culture moreover created the Fondo Mercosur Cultural, which has the objective of financing “programs and projects which encourage the creation, circulation, promotion, protection, and diffusion of the goods, services and the diversity of the cultural expressions between the countries of Mercosur”81 (SICSUR 2012, 68). The policy-makers, which are responsible for the cooperation in all regional initiatives, established a transgovernmental network that appears to work according to their policy objectives, but independent from regional organizations. Instead, their coherent position allows policy-­ makers to find the adequate space for their objectives, instead of changing their objectives. Another indicator is that policy-makers point out that UNASUR made significant progress when Mercosur was passing through a difficult time, due to the suspension of Paraguay and the first Presidency Pro-Tempore of Venezuela. In UNASUR, the suspension of Paraguay did not affect the work in the way it did in Mercosur. Accordingly, the focus of regional policy-makers changed towards UNASUR. The reintegration  “la circulación de bienes y servicios culturales.”  “programas y proyectos que fomenten la creación, circulación, promoción, protección y difusión de los bienes, servicios y de la diversidad de las expresiones culturales entre los países del Mercosur.” 80 81

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of Paraguay here was perceived as smooth. The Paraguayan representative explains that “Paraguay came back as it had never been gone”82 (Masi 2015). In the case of Mercosur, the process was comparatively dense for Paraguay, as they had to work on the revision of normative documents. Although advocating a convergence, or at least tighter cooperation of Mercosur and UNASUR, most policy-makers emphasized their asset for UNASUR. The fact that Mercosur “was created as an economic space”83 (Interview 06, 2014) is perceived as a negative impact on independent policy-making. Other areas than trade were added later to the Mercosur, and although “Mercosur cultural” already is part of the structure for 20 years, policy-makers still perceive that Mercosur policies, in general, are “constituted according to this economic point of view”84 (Vignolo 2015). Other policy-makers explain that they would opt for UNASUR, if they had to decide between the organizations, such as it has been the case for health and infrastructure. One reason definitively is the institutional ­flexibility. While “the administration of Mercosur is more complex, the administration of UNASUR is simple”85 (Vignolo 2015). To summarize, the Culture Council represents a compelling case for the study of group cohesion. Although initially not relying on independent national bureaucracies, it is the long tradition in cooperation, which supports joint activities in the ambit of UNASUR. Policy-makers develop group cohesion mainly through the constant interaction in different regional initiatives. Another critical factor is that precisely this missing independent institutionality of the policy field of culture in national political systems created something like a common bond. It facilitated the self-­ identification of network members as policy-makers in culture instead of their identification as national representatives in regional organs. Finally, the establishment of ministries of culture is an essential step in the institutionalization of regional policy-making and resulted in the success of UNASUR. In the Culture Council, the usage of terminology is indicative of this finding. More than in other councils, representatives speak of “we” as the Culture Council and not “we” as a national position. Concluding, the Culture Council is an example of the relevance of group cohesion for policy-making in transgovernmental networks.  “Paraguay entró como nunca le echaron.”  “surgió mas como un espacio económico.” 84  “constituido desde un punto de vista pensando en la economía.” 85  “la administración del Mercosur es mas compleja, de la UNASUR es mas sencilla.” 82 83

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6.5   South American Council of Science, Technology, and Innovation (COSUCTI) 6.5.1  The Context of Policy-Making in Science The Science Council has the same origin as the Culture Council, as it made part of the COSECCTI in the beginning. After its division in November 2012, the former working group continued working as the South American Council of Science, Technology, and Innovation. Different to the Culture Council, policy-makers here did not advert explicitly an urgent necessity of dividing the council and did not report a remarkable improvement of policy-making conditions after the division. The issues mentioned in interviews with policy-makers from the science area revealed a different dynamic as compared to the Culture Council. In the lecture of formal documents and protocols, however, it is mentioned that delegates in the working group on science, technology, and innovation wanted to create an independent council. The initiative for the d ­ ivision, in this case, came from Brazil, as the protocol of a working group meeting records. It demands to “analyze the suggestion made by the Brazilian delegation to increase the status of the specialized group of science, technology, and innovation as an autonomous council of UNASUR. In view of that, Brazil commits itself to send a justification of the mentioned suggestion for the analysis and reaction of the working group”86 (COSECCTI 2011). The Science Council moreover is diverse compared to the Culture Council regarding institutional foundations. The national administrations in the science and technology area differ broadly in range and scope. Only four countries out of 12 established ministries of science and technology, while the majority has national councils or secretariats, which depend on the presidency. Table 6.6 summarizes the national organs represented in the Science Council. Accordingly, there is no clear demarcation of the policy field of science and technology in most of the member states. Moreover, the dependency on different national executive organs leads to different forms and probably 86  “Analizar la sugerencia hecha por la delegación del Brasil de elevar el status del Grupo Especializado de Ciencia, Tecnología e innovación al de Consejo Autónomo de UNASUR. En este sentido Brasil se compromete a enviar la justificación de dicha sugerencia para ci análisis y reacción del Grupo de Trabajo.”

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Table 6.6  Ministerial development of science and technology

Argentina

Bolivia Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

Guyana Paraguay

Peru

Suriname

Uruguay

Venezuela

Ministry or equivalent

Originated from

Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva 2007 Viceministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología n/a Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação 1985 Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica 1967 Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 1968 Subsecretaría General de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación

Ministerio de Educación, Ciencia y Teconologia 2003 Part of Ministry of Education

n/a Ministry of Education n/a Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 1997 Consejo Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Tecnológica 2005 Directoraat Onderwijs n/a Dirección de Innovación, Ciencia y Tecnología 2005 Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación Universitaria, Ciencia y Tecnología 2012

–

Dependent on Presidency

Dependent on Presidency

Part of Secretaría de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación 2007 – Dependent on Presidency

Dependent on Presidency

Part of Ministry of Education, Science and Culture 2010 Part of Ministry of Education and Culture 1970 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología

1999

Source: Author’s table based on the webpages of the respective ministries

different foci of policy-making. This background impedes the development of sectoral rationality and obstructs coherent policy-making at the regional level.

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Frame Dimension In its statute, the council describes its function as “contributing to the strengthening of democracy, social inclusion, the promotion of equality, the respect of the plurality and diversities”87 (CMRE, Resolución 02/2013) and thereby refers to the political principles of UNASUR. Policy-­makers refer rather reluctantly to the mainstreaming of democracy and human rights, as in the case of the Argentine representative: “we have incorporated transversal knowledge. We look for projects, which will be presented to UNASUR, these highest of all values, are represented. Let’s say; they cannot be shown in a concrete form”88 (Paoloni 2015). Differently, policy-makers in science make the connection to social ­development to an objective of regional integration. The Brazilian representative points out that the work of the council “certainly has an impact, in the area of human rights, because its focus is social inclusion”89 (Santanna 2014). Policy-makers in the Science Council will all understand social development as the central theme of UNASUR.  In general, they reported that they develop projects that shall have an impact on the society. Apparently the function of the council as development instrument, as a mechanism for the transfer of experience, has been expressed. In the case of the Science Council, it turned out that there are different national positions, which strongly influence policy-making in the council. Especially the Brazilian position intensely reflected the focus on the “creation of conditions which help South American countries [including Brazil] to develop independently”90 (Santanna 2014). First, the concern of losing the intellectual capacity to Europe drives initiatives, which have the objective of offering working opportunities for scientists. Second, the Brazilian position has a particular connection to sovereignty, by emphasizing that science has a development function. As Santanna indicates, the region does not want to “serve as a grain bin”91 (Santanna 2014). The program of the council which is called “Programa Soberanía y Seguridad 87  “contribuir al fortalecimiento de la democracia, la inclusión social, la promoción de la equidad, el respeto de la pluralidad y las diversidades.” 88  “la incorporación del saber transversales, temos. En la busca de los proyectos que se presentan en UNASUR, eses valores, supremos, están representados. Digamos, no se pueden mostrar de forma concreta.” 89  “Com certeza ela tem impacto sim, na área de direitos humanos, porque o foco dela é inclusão social”. 90  “Dar condições, para que os países se desenvolvam de forma independente.” 91  “Servir de como um celeiro.”

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Alimentaria y Nutricional (SSAN-UNASUR)” (COSUCTI 2014a) points into this direction. However, the initiative of SSAN is rather a product of Brazilian activism than a joint initiative of UNASUR. 6.5.2  Group Processes in the Science Council  ollusion of National Interests C Brazil by far has the most influential position in the Science Council. Already in the creation of this council, it played a significant role. Interesting, however, is that Brazil does not show a specific interest in UNASUR itself but instead in regional cooperation in science in general. As the Argentine representative remembers, “there were meetings about regional cooperation in science”92 (Paoloni 2015) in Brazil, already before the council was created. According to her, the vision that has been ­transmitted in this meeting was decisive for the agenda of UNASUR’s Science Council. The Brazilian interest in regional cooperation in science “came along since many years”93 (Santanna 2014). The representative here speaks of “spaces” and “mechanisms” and does not mention specifically UNASUR. As another delegate to the Science Council remarks, “it serves, politically, for Brazil to work as a bloc. They support the level of Mercosur, as well as the level of UNASUR”94 (Interview 37, 2015). The Brazilian representative herself explains that Brazil has “one of the biggest productions of food worldwide”95 (Santanna 2014). Especially the critique on ecological problems, such as the alleged deforestation of the Amazon, brings Brazilian policy-makers in science to try to construct a positive image. Food security, biodiversity, and sustainable agriculture are outstanding issues for Brazilian development politics in this sense. Currently, Brazil is coordinating the two working programs of the councils, which are the already mentioned SSAN, dealing with food security and capacitation in agriculture as well as a program on bio-combustion, also focusing on capacitation in the area. Although Brazil functions as a pushing force of policy-making, it has been perceived as too ambitious by different sides. Ironically, a representative  “había reuniones sobre cooperación regional en ciencia.”  “Já vem de muitos anos.” 94  “a, Brasil sirve, políticamente, trabajar como bloque. Ellos apoyan mucho, tanto a nivel de Mercosur, como de UNASUR.” 95  “uma das maiores produções de alimentos no mundo.” 92 93

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in the Science Council reflects on the Brazilian delegation by saying that “if you go to meetings, they show you many numbers, about what they are financing, only at the national level, the number of researchers, in their network, in institutions. To me, they can handle numbers”96 (Interview 37, 2015). The Brazilian understanding of regional development policies is partly interpreted as patronizingly by other delegates. There is no difference in this position recognizable for UNASUR or Mercosur. On the contrary, policy-makers from Mercosur countries keep mixing experiences of the two regional agreements. For Brazilian policy-­makers, the same policy objectives account for both organizations, although clearly recognizing the different objectives of Mercosur and UNASUR: “in the case of Mercosur, the Mercosur is a market; the idea is that we develop conditions to buy, to sell and to produce, and participate in the economic process”97 (Santanna 2014). In UNASUR, the Brazilian activism created some tension. One example is that Brazil coordinates the abovementioned programs alone, while other representatives want to have it rotating, as it is foreseen in the statutes and regulations of UNASUR. Another country that has a strong presence, without pursuing a questioned leadership, is Ecuador. Ecuador already presided over the council two times, which indicates a particular interest in the issue. Ecuador proposed the “creation of a research network for the technical development, transfer of technology and epidemiological surveillance of diseases”98 (Morelli 2015) and a Foro de Biodiversidad in 2015. Moreover, Ecuador hosted the “First forum on information management in the ambit of regional integration, challenges and advances” and the “First forum of biodiversity of UNASUR” (COSUCTI 2014a, b) in 2014. Also, Peru and Colombia are active participants, while Chile, Suriname, and Guyana have low levels of participation. In the case of Chile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not CONICYT (compare Table 6.6) are participating in the meetings. According to the representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chilean responsible entity is having problems organizing the work and assigning a representative. Given the participation of different member states, we can observe that neither Mercosur nor CAN states 96  “si tu vas a reuniones, ellos te tiran cifras de lo que financian, solo en nivel nacional, la cuantidad de investigadores, en una red, instituciones. A mí, realmente, manejan cifra.” 97  “No caso do Mercosur, o Mercosur é um mercado, entendeu, a ideia que a gente tenha condições de comprar, de vender e produzir, e participar do processo económico.” 98  “creación de una red de investigación para el desarrollo tecnológico, transferencia de tecnología y vigilancia epidemiológico de enfermedades.”

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reveal a higher level of activity than the others. Both regional organs have previous experience with regional cooperation in science. Especially for the Andean Community, the cooperation in education and research is one of the very few prosperous areas. This is reflected in the agendas and initiatives of the respective countries. However, while CAN states focus on academic exchange, Mercosur member states emphasize the role of capacitation for sustainable development and, accordingly, follow a different vision. Autonomy of Action The reflections on the ambit of action are quite ambiguous in the Science Council. On the one hand, policy-makers are wishing for more flexibility, especially regarding financing. On the other hand, they point to institutional insecurity and do not know how to act. In the case of financing, the Brazilian policy-makers indicated restrictions in the use of budget, by mentioning that “we are not managing to invest money in other countries”99 (Santanna 2014). This obstruction to Brazilian spending, however, is a commonality in all sectoral councils. The Argentine representative, on the contrary, reported the benefit of having an own budget and points out that “the activities are financed with the funds of the ministries of science; we inform the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, but the money is for what we are going to execute ourselves”100 (Paoloni 2015). In comparison with Mercosur, member states report that there is a stronger relation to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in regular policy-­ making procedures. Particularly the involvement of the CMC and GMC of Mercosur requires a constant “dialogue of the organisms of science with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs”101 (Paoloni 2015). Although decision-­making is not as independent as in UNASUR, the Mercosur has a financial advantage, which is very important for regional projects. Especially the cooperation with the European Union was mentioned by all Mercosur members. Financing through the EU enables to realize projects. The cooperation with third parties, which also is seen as problematic, is a central issue for UNASUR policy-making. The cooperation with the FAO and with the EU is intended but not easy to realize as we have seen in Chap. 5.  “A gente não consegue por dinheiro no outro país.”  “con las actividades que son financiadas con fondos de los ministerios de ciencia, se informa las cancillerías, pero el dinero es proprio por lo que se ejecuta de forma directa.” 101  “dialogo de los organismos de ciencia con las cancillerías.” 99

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Group Cohesion The working routine in the Science Council was characterized as, in general terms, amicable. However, “major or minor affinities of the persons”102 (Paoloni 2015) are recognized. The fact that there is a coincidence of policy-makers in UNASUR, CELAC, Mercosur, or CAN strengthens personal contacts and relations. Especially in between member states of Mercosur, policy-makers and technical staff exhibit a relatively long residence time in their respective positions. Associate members show more rotation just as it is the case for Venezuela. The Mercosur members, in particular, confounded Mercosur and UNASUR in their reports. In Mercosur, the “Reunión Especializada de Ciencia y Tecnología” (RECyT) is responsible for cooperation in science. This organ was created already in 1992 and accordingly has a long time of institutional experience. In the realm of Mercosur, science cooperation is valued as comparatively prosperous. Policy-makers reported a better institutionalization and a different working mode. This strong position of science cooperation has visible effects on group processes in the UNASUR council. Although the Brazilian delegate reported on the opening of projects for other countries, the difference between Mercosur members and associates is perceived. The difference is made in particular for projects which are based on external funding. All Mercosur member states in this context explicitly mentioned the projects with EU funding. These are not open to associate states. Those, being the most successful and extensive programs, definitively have an impact on policy-making in science. Additionally, as already mentioned, the CAN states have a different experience in scientific cooperation. The case of the Science Council finally shows how different institutional experiences, together with a missing regional identification of the group, negatively impact group cohesion. The impact of strong leading positions of member states, such as Brazil, determines both UNASUR and Mercosur. The origins for many regional projects in Mercosur are bilateral initiatives between Brazil and Argentina. These determine the agenda of regional science cooperation. Programs, which may have started as bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Argentina sometimes are transferred to Mercosur and may also be considered for UNASUR.  The bilateral cooperation mainly occurs in the areas of biodiversity and biotechnology. The bilateral foundation of regional projects is essential, as they have a  “afinidades, mayores o menores de las personas.”

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higher probability of being successful. All policy-makers feel that there are too many projects. One representative explains that “the projects are presented and do not advance further after being initiated”103 (Interview 37, 2015). Especially for smaller countries, this variety of initiatives means high efforts. It is costly for them to manage participation in all projects. The result might be that “we call for videoconferences in the name of UNASUR, and only four participate. Therefore, it is difficult to have something regional, when four participate out of 12”104 (Paoloni 2015). The Uruguayan representative emphasizes that it is impossible to attend all meetings, “therefore we prioritize meetings in Mercosur”105 (Morelli 2015). For smaller countries, the variety of projects means that they have to focus on some. These probably overlap in Mercosur, UNASUR, and CELAC. For the Uruguayan case “the participation in Mercosur is practically the same as in UNASUR”106 (Morelli 2015). As there are only limited human resources, the thematic overlap is probable. Another result of limited human resources in many countries is that countries first discuss distinct issues bilaterally and later forward their position to the remaining states. Although having the advantage of practicability, bilateral negotiations have a negative impact on group cohesion. Especially when they involve a questioned “leader” of this group. 6.5.3  Summary: Regional Science and Technology Group cohesion in the Science Council suffers from different factors. First, there are different institutional experiences, which policy-makers made in Mercosur and CAN as well as in their national administrations. These lead to something policy-makers perceive as a “different use of language.” The focus of cooperation in science moreover is different. While Mercosur members have an economic development perspective on cooperation in science, CAN members work more in line with environmental protection or academic exchange. These differences feed into the lack of a common understanding of the objectives of UNASUR and the missing collective identification with the political program of the organization.  “los proyectos se presentan y no se avanzan mas desde allá de la presentación.”  “len las videoconferencias, llamamos en nombre de UNASUR, y participaron 4 países. Entonces, es difícil tener algo regional si de 12 participan 4.” 105  “entonces priorizamos viajes en Mercosur.” 106  “lo que participamos en Mercosur es prácticamente lo mismo que estamos haciendo en UNASUR.” 103 104

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The problems in defining the scope of work also lead to difficulties in differentiating between technical and political issues. Some policy-makers reported that technical staff often did not want to give an opinion on some issues, as it appeared “too political.” In the end, the Science Council cannot find a precise definition of what kind of organization they are. As the Argentine representative emphasizes, “it is like a hybrid between the presentation of projects and strategic political thinking”107 (Paoloni 2015). Different aspects transport this perception. Policy-making commonly interprets the institutional objective of the council as the exchange of information and experiences about programs and activities that currently are being carried out. The idea of developing science as a policy field in the region is only formulated in general terms. In many cases, the objectives of the council, or of regional integration, merge with national objectives in the area, as we have seen in the case of Brazil. The objective of social development, concordantly, is not explicitly connected to UNASUR but in general to the understanding of the development of Brazil. The political interest in the issue area is disproportionate to policy-­ making in the council. One example, which illustrates that there is interest in scientific cooperation at the UNASUR level, is the “Foro sobre Ciencia, Tecnología, Innovación e industrialización de UNASUR” which took place in Rio de Janeiro in December 2013. The forum counted on the presence of high-level decision-makers from UNASUR, several researchers from primarily Brazilian universities, but only on few ministerial representatives from Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Brazil. Although the delegates in the protocol from the ministerial meeting of 2014 “congratulate themselves for the realization and organization of the ‘Forum on Science, Technology, Innovation and Industrialization of UNASUR’ in the city of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil”108 (COSUCTI 2014a, b), the COSUCTI as such is not entitled in the publication which followed the event. As organizers the UNASUR General Secretariat, the ISAGS, and Brazilian universities are mentioned. The missing visibility of the council is indicative of the missing actorness. To summarize, the council suffers from conceptual imprecision and the inability to specify which projects to follow. The activism depends 107  “es como un hibrido entre la presentación de proyectos, y el pensamiento estratégico politico.” 108  “Se congratulan por la realización y organización del “Foro sobre Ciencia, Tecnología, Innovación e industrialización de UNASUR”, en la ciudad de Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.”

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strongly on the leading states, which in turn have entirely clear ideas on their objective in regional science cooperation. The case of the Science Council shows that its institutional context facilitates policy-making but does not support group processes. Moreover, different countries are represented by their Ministries of Foreign Affairs or representatives from universities. Even ministerial policy-makers are not necessarily from the field of science and technology. Accordingly, group cohesion is challenging to develop.

References COSUCTI (Consejo Suramericano de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación). 2014a. REDE SSAN, 2014. http://redessan-unasul.com.br/. Crespial (Centro Regional para la Salvaguardia del Patrimonio Cultural Inmaterial de América Latina). 2013. Se Inauguró Primera Reunión Del Consejo Suramericano de Cultura de UNASUR. Accessed February 28, 2013. http:// www.crespial.org/es/Noticias/Detalle/2424/se-inauguro-primera-reuniondel-consejo-suramericano-de-cultura-de-unasur-peru. DDSE, OEA (Organization of American States). 2008. Institucionalizacion de La Politica Social en America Latina y la Gobernabilidad Democratica. Washington, DC: Consejo Interamericano para el Desarrollo Integral. I.I.R.S.A. (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America). n.d. Ejes de Integración. Accessed October 25, 2013. http://www. iirsa.org/Page/Detail?menuItemId=68. MERCOSUR. 2016. SGT 11 Perfila Estrategias Para Renovar Metodologías de Trabajo, 2016. Accessed February 23, 2016. http://www.mercosur.int/ innovaportal/v/7143/2/innova.front/sgt-11-perfila-estrategias-para-renovar-metodologias-de-trabajo. MICSUR (Mercado de Industrias Culturales del Sur). 2016. Acerca o MICSUR. MICSur (blog), 2016. http://micsur.org/2016/acerca/. OAS (Organization of American States). 2015. Pan American Union. Index. Pan American Union. Accessed August 7, 2015. https://www.oas.org/columbus/ PanAmericanUnion.asp. ORAS CONHU. 2016. Areas de Accion, 2016. Accessed February 23, 2016. http://www.orasconhu.org/. OTCA (Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica). 2016. Coordinación de Salud. Accessed February 23, 2016. http://otca.info/portal/coordenacaointerna.php?p=otca&coord=1. SICSUR (Sistema de Información Cultural del MERCOSUR). 2012. Los Estados de La Cultura. Estudio Sobre La Institucionalidad Cultural Pública de Los Países Del SICSUR. Institucionalidad Cultural. http://www.cultura.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Los-Estados-de-la-Cultura-SICSUR-2012.pdf.

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Official Documents CJEG, UNASUR (Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y Gobierno de UNASUR). 2011. Compromiso de La UNASUR Contra La Desigualdad, vol. Reunion Extraordinaria. ———. 2012. Por La Cual El Consejo de Jefas Y Jefes de Estado Y de Gobierno de La Union de Naciones Suramericanas Creo Los Consejos Suramricanos de Educacion de Cultura Y de Ciencia Tecnologia E Innovacion En Reemplazo Del COSECCTI, vol. Decision 12/2012. CMRE, UNASUR (Consejo de Ministras y Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Unasur). 2013. Aprueba Estatutos Y Planes de Accion de Los Consejos Suramericanos de Educacion, Cultura, Ciencia Teconologia E Innovacion Y El Plan de Accion Del Consejo Suramericano En Materia de Seguridad Ciudadana, Justicia Y Coordinacion de Acciones Contra La Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional, vol.Resolución 02/2013. COSECCTI (Consejo Sudamericano de Educación, Cultura, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación). 2011. Acta de La Primera Reunion de Altos Delegados Del Grupo de Trabajo En Ciencia Tecnologia E Innovacion. COSIPLAN (Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento). 2011. Declaracion de Las Ministras Y Ministros Del Consejo Suramericano de Infraestructura Y Planeamento. COSUCTI (Consejo Suramericano de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación). 2014b. Declaracion de Ministras Ministros Y Altos Delegados Del Consejo de Ciencia Tecnologia E Innovacion de UNASUR. CSC (Consejo Sudamericano de Cultura). 2011. Statute Proposal of the South American Council of Culture. CSS (Consejo Suramericano de Salud). 2009. Resolucion 05/2009, vol.Resolucion 05/2009. ———. 2011. Resolucion 02/2011, vol.Resolucion 02/2011. Ministers of Transport, Communication and Energy. 2000a. Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America—Acta Montevideo. ———. 2000b. Plan de Acción. Presidencia Pro-Tempore Bolivia. 2006. Hacia la construcción de una politica y agenda regional en materia de salud. Resolución de Cochabamba. Presidentes de las Naciones de Sudamérica. 2000. Comunicado de Brasilia. ———. 2008. Decision Para El Establecimiento Del Consejo de Salud Suramericano de La UNASUR. UNASUR, Consejo de Delegadas y Delegados. 2007. Acta de IX Reunion Consejo de Delegadas Y Delegados de La Union de Naciones Suramericanas. ———. 2008. Acta de XIII Reunion Consejo de Delegadas Y Delegados de La Union de Naciones Suramericanas. ———. 2009a. Acta de XV Consejo de Delegadas Y Delegados de La Union de Naciones Suramericanas. ———. 2009b. Acta de XVI Consejo de Delegadas Y Delegados de La Union de Naciones Suramericanas.

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Interviews Abrahão de Castro, Jorge. 2014.   Director of Planning   Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratégicos   Ministerio do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, Brazil   Interview: 15.12.2014 Carrión, Francisco Mena. 2014.   Former Minister of Foreign Affairs   Coordinador URAI, FLACSO Ecuador   Interview: 23.11.2014 Coitiño, Andrés. 2015   International Relations Assessor.   Ministerio de Salud Pública,   Uruguay Interview: 11.03.2015 Constanzi, Jorgelina. 2015   International Relations Analyst   Ministerio de Salud de la Nación, Argentina   Interview: 16.03.2015 García González, Rigoberto. 2015.   International Coordinator   Ministerio de Obras Públicas MOP   Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Chile   Interview: 04.03.2015 Guariglio, Monica. 2015.   National Director   Política Cultural e Cooperação Internacional   Ministerio de Cultura, Argentina   Interview: 16.03.2015 Jouval, Henri Jr. 2014.   Former Technical Coordinator   ISAGS, Brazil   Interview: 17.11.2014 Lezcano Escauriza, Victor. 2015.   Technical Coordinator   Secretaria de Acción Social, Paraguay   Interview: 17.02.2015 Loizaga Lezcano, Eladio Ramón. 2015   Minister of Foreign Affairs   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paraguay   Interview: 16.02.2015 Masi, Gabriela Rolandi. 2015.   Head of National Cooperation   Secretaria Nacional de Cultura, Paraguay   Interview: 17.02.2015

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Matilde, Maddalena. 2015.   Head of Office   Cooperación y Asuntos Internacionales   Ministerio de Salud, Chile   Interview: 06.03.2015 Miguel, Angel Contreras Natera. 2015.   Former Director Instituto Social Mercosur   Asunción, Paraguay   Interview: 17.02.2015 Morelli, Graciela. 2015.   National Coordinator   Cooperación Internacional—DICYT   Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura, Uruguay   Interview: 10.03.2015 Paoloni, María Florencia. 2015.   Technical Coordinator   Direccion Nacional de Relaciones Internacionales   Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva, Argentina   Interview: 06.02.2015 Parkinson, João Carlos. 2014.   National Coordinator   Coordenação-Geral de Assuntos Econômicos da América do Sul, Central e Caribe   Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Itamaraty, Brazil   Interview: 09.12.2014 Pineiro, Viviana. 2015.  Director   Unidad de Asuntos Internacionales y Cooperación   Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Uruguay   Interview: 09.02.2015 Quintela Santos, Adroaldo. 2014.   Project Manager for Transport   Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratégicos   Ministerio do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, Brazil   Interview: 12.12.2014 Rojas, Ulises Pavez. 2015.   Head of Office   Asuntos Internacionales   Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Chile   Interview: 06.03.2015 Santanna, Bárbara Ribeiro de. 2014.   National Coordinator   Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, Brazil   Interview: 02.12.2014

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Schinca, Pedro. 2015.   Technical Assessor   Unidad de Asuntos Internacionales y Cooperación   Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Uruguay   Interview: 09.02.2015 Toselli, Gabriel. 2015.   International Relations Coordinator   Asuntos Internacionales   Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Argentina   Interview: 16.03.2015 Vazquez, Manuel. 2015.   Technical Assessor   Unidad de Asuntos Internacionales y Cooperación   Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Uruguay   Interview: 09.02.2015 Vignolo, Andrea. 2015.   National Director   Cooperação Internacional e Projetos   Ministério de Educação e Cultura, Uruguay   Interview 23.02.2015

CHAPTER 7

Policy-Making in UNASUR Councils: Comparative Analysis

7.1   Formal Structure: Institutional Conditions for Regional Public Policy-Making The councils of health, social development, infrastructure, culture, and science are bound to the same formal conditions. UNASUR, as a regional organization that embraces all policy fields, provides them with a broad scope of action. At the macro-level, the institutions of UNASUR portray a system which is centered around the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Although the Presidential Council is the highest decision-making body, and by far the most prominent, it does not have particular relevance for public policy-making. This finding is supported by the fact that there is neither a formal nor an informal institutional relation between national ministerial representatives and their respective presidential offices. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs takes the majority of the decisions, and the Council of Delegates does the coordinative work. The latter group is composed of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. UNASUR delegates respond to the sectoral councils and have to approve their agendas and working programs. Representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs have negotiated the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. Accordingly, these representatives accredited themselves a central role, according to their function as political negotiators in all external relations. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of all member states assign one representative to the Council of Delegates. The departmental background © The Author(s) 2019 A. M. Hoffmann, Regional Governance and Policy-Making in South America, Governance, Development, and Social Inclusion in Latin America, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98068-3_7

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of this delegate inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is subject to the structure of the national ministry. Depending on the size of the ministry, international departments in national ministries are responsible for international organizations, regional organizations, and South American relations, among others. In many cases, the departments take care of UNASUR, Mercosur, and also periodically CELAC. These departments cooperate with thematic departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is a division of labor in most Ministries of Foreign Affairs, which resembles the ministries of a state. For example, a representative from the “General Coordination of South American Economic Cooperation” of Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accompanies the sessions of the Infrastructure Council, and another representative from the “Cultural Department” of Itamaraty attends the Culture Council. Depending on the discussed issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might send representatives to sectoral meetings “which have the political position and a global perspective, to assist the technical experts in the sectoral meetings”1 (Interview 26, 2015). This accompaniment, however, is understood as assistance regarding foreign relations. As we have seen, in all councils, policy-makers understand that the technical level has to take the final decision. In line with this perception, the representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs did not consider themselves to be programmatic leaders. On the contrary, they understand sectoral cooperation as a separate process. The technical priority on sectoral policy-making, as well as the internal division of labor in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, leads to further sectoralization. The question that arises is whether the councils interact with each other, as they all belong to the same formal structure and follow the same organizational principles. The central coordinations of UNASUR in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are responsible for the development of a “national perspective” on regional integration. In practice, however, there is no such central coordination of all policy fields. In contrary, the allocation of sectoral councils at different departments in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in many countries intensifies the sectoralization of regional cooperation and the tendency of isolation of policy fields. Only few member states have national meetings of all ministerial representatives. In most cases, however, national representatives would not know 1  “que llevan la posición política y la visión política, global, para ir asesorando a los técnicos especializados en las reuniones sectoriales.”

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each other (e.g. the Brazilian national representative for culture does not know the Brazilian representative in education). The Argentine representative for health does not know the Argentine representative for science. Accordingly, there is no agreed upon “common vision” which a member state could transport in all sectors. The policy-making priorities, consequently, depend on the vision of the ministerial technical representatives. This structure refers to the idea of creating clearly defined policies. One Uruguayan representative in the Social Development Council remarks that “in reality, only the Ministers of Foreign Affairs are the ones who know about what is happening in all the councils”2 (Schinca 2015). Likewise, the Brazilian representative to COSIPLAN points out that “the people from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, they are looking at all [sectors]”3 (Abrahão de Castro 2014). Policy-makers perceive the structure of UNASUR as vertical. Until today only a few attempts have been made to produce policies conjointly. Some endeavors developed in the “social” policy fields of UNASUR. The reason for cooperation was the thematic overlap in councils. Examples are projects around telemedicine which were proposed by the Science as well as Health Council, or projects around food safety, proposed both by the Science and Social Development Councils. Again, such cooperation is more concerned with technical-­administrative issues than with joint policy-making. One implication of the organizational structure of the councils is the strong sectoralization and the primacy of technical cooperation in subfields. Policy-makers tend to classify all political issues as non-sectoral, meaning they are not responsible. In contrast, actors remain focused on their sectoral context and have no formal interface with other sectors. This structure corresponds to the national administrative systems and mirrors the policy fields of the national administrations. The councils respond individually to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and by means of this formal communication support the position of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in their function of political coordination. As a consequence of the departmental separation described before, representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs nonetheless reject that they have insight into all sectoral councils. Concluding, there is no central coordination of all sectoral ­councils in national administrations, and at the same time, there is increasing isolation of policy fields. 2  “en realidad quien tiene conocimiento de todo lo que pasa en los consejos, solo los ministros de relaciones exteriors.” 3  “O povo dos ministérios de relaciones exteriores, eles tão olhando esse conjunto.”

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7.2   Frame Dimension: Political Objectives of Regional Public Policy-Making Policy-makers of all councils point to political bodies and conflict resolution when they are asked about the function of UNASUR. On this abstract level, they rather tend to refer to political bodies beyond the scope of their technical policy field. The effectiveness of UNASUR as an organization is referred to in “cases of high politics”4 (Paoloni 2015). The practice of forwarding questions of political objectives to other bodies indicates dissociation of policy-makers and their policy field from the regional organization. The political objectives of UNASUR in this analysis have been conceptualized regarding macro-frames of the organizational context. These have been analyzed for how they are evoked in individual councils and how they influence policy-making. The political objectives of UNASUR, which are democracy, human rights, and peace, are mentioned explicitly by political officials and representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, while sovereignty and social development are addressed somewhat implicitly. At the policy-making level, however, the social development frame proved to be the strongest one. It was quickly evoked when referring to democracy or human rights. While political officials instrumentalized social development as a means to a non-specific goal, policy-makers agreed that social development is the purpose in itself. The concept of Human Rights Mainstreaming, however, was never mentioned by sector-based policy-makers. Likewise, these policy-makers never reported on any interference of decision-making bodies. Frames are therefore not evoked about the political objectives of UNASUR but instead about the general trends in South America. The emancipatory agenda of UNASUR herself can be interpreted as a response to these new forms of regionalism in South America. As described in Chap. 5, the structural change in the region relates to democracy and social development. These are no distinct objectives of the organization. The long-lasting phase of democratic regimes in the region, as well as the conviction that social development is a fundamental requirement for economic progress, led to the creation of regional organizations with a post-neoliberal agenda, of which UNASUR acts as an illustrative example. At the same time, the described developments are reflected in different sectors of policy-making, as seen in Chap. 6. Accordingly, the normativity of social development and democracy persists 4

 “casos de alta política.”

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in sectors without necessarily being connected to UNASUR as an organization. At the regional level, they are not evoked as frames of the organizational context but as frames of the regional context. A component which characterizes UNASUR as an organization is the independence from the OAS.  The areas of peace, human rights, and democracy are all traditional negotiation fields of the Inter-American system. For that reason, it is often said that the objective of UNASUR is to replace the OAS. However, as the analysis of frames indicates, pursuing the same normative interests does not necessarily mean ideological opposition against the United States but indicates the priority of a South American regional process. It is only a change of focus in support of regional policy-making. This “self-valuation” is connected to the implicit, but equally strong, frame of sovereignty. This frame, referring to the political structure of UNASUR, has not been evoked explicitly at the level of sectoral policy-making either. Instead, South American identity was mentioned. The objective of strengthening the regional identity becomes categorical at the policy-making level in some councils. As seen in the case of the Culture or Health Council, collective regional identity is supportive of group cohesion and collective action. This process of identification and self-valuation is related to the ongoing and enduring process of regional transformation and transfers to a collective South American experience. UNASUR as an organization frames sovereignty politically. The following sections will first focus on the problems that are shared by all councils. In particular, the Brazilian and Venezuelan participation and their impact in policy-making are discussed. After that, I am going to examine and summarize the particularity of each council and its meaning for regional public policy-making.

7.3   The Role of Brazil and Venezuela in Regional Policy-Making Before concluding on the comparative analysis of the councils, the Brazilian and Venezuelan positions in regional public policy-making are briefly reflected. In Chap. 5 both Brazil and Venezuela have been analyzed as drivers of regionalism. In literature about South American regionalism, Brazil and Venezuela are often regarded as principal players and decisive actors for the creation of regional institutions. In particular, the case of UNASUR has been connected to Brazilian-Venezuelan relations and joint policy-making.

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Regardless of the possible political influence both states might have pursued at the macro-level, the analysis of micro-processes shows that both nations have an ambiguous position in the different councils. The reflection of policy-makers on the participation of both, Venezuela and Brazil, was basically the same in all councils. First, the Venezuelan case affirms the assumption that political influence and incoherence of administrative structures negatively impact collective action in transgovernmental networks. Different policy-makers emphasized that the “expectation with the entrance of Venezuela in Mercosur was of amplifying the social”5 (Interview 4, 2014). However, a technical perspective of social development was not contributed in any council. Instead, Venezuela, in the eyes of many policymakers, developed a strong and ideologically founded veto position. In practice, there might be consensus on the content of the decision. Nevertheless, the strong position that Venezuela occupies in discourses on the social impact of policies complicates policy-making. Venezuelan representatives politicize the discourse, while other policy-­makers have a technical and policy field-inherent rationality. A representative of the Science Council explains that “we are saying the same, but with different terminology. Venezuela has a really strong position, in how they want things to be written”6 (Interview 36, 2015). Another representative describes the veto position Venezuela developed by referring to a recently initiated project. In his view it often happens that Venezuela “says no, without having a look at it” (Interview 31, 2015). In another council the Venezuelan participation is perceived as inflexible. The Venezuelan delegate, who is the representative in almost all councils, “knows well all the formal procedures of UNASUR, therefore, in some cases that [we] [the delegates] wanted to change something, he reminded [us] that we are not allowed to” (Interview 31, 2015). The reasons for this position are rooted in the internal restructuring of the Venezuelan representation in the last years. Instead of sending ministerial representatives, diplomats started engaging in sectoral work. In fact, the delegates to ministerial meetings are mostly members of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. This applies to almost all sectoral councils. The interaction between policy-makers in distinct policy fields, therefore, is not given in the case of Venezuela. Concluding, the Venezuelan delegation to UNASUR is the only one which considers the organization as a whole and  “especativa con la entrada de Venezuela al Mercosur fue de amplificar lo social.”  “decimos lo mismo con distintos términos, pero Venezuela es muy fuerte, en como quiere que sea escrito.” 5 6

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connects all parallel processes to each other. However, this position impedes the individual processes within the councils and concordantly the participation of Venezuela in regional public policy-making. The Brazilian case differs from the Venezuelan one. It is neither the ideological position nor the different administrative structure of Brazil, characterizing its participation in UNASUR.  As an Argentine delegate states: “they are not different from Argentina, Chile or Uruguay in terms of discourse, in terms of ideology”7 (Paoloni 2015). Instead, the question of leadership is a recurrent issue for the Brazilian participation. The Brazilian delegate to COSIPLAN explains the difficult position of Brazil in negotiations, by pointing out that “our attitude is an attitude of strong cooperation, of avoiding appearing a big country. We are almost 40% of the territory, and we are 56% of the economy, and almost half of the population, therefore we have an enormous weight”8 (Quintela Santos 2014). Likewise, another Brazilian representative explains that there is a “strong fear of appearing an imperialist country and that you are substituting the big brother by the middle brother, substituting the United States by Brazil”9 (Interview 9, 2014). This economic preponderance of Brazil is perceived by the other member states but is evaluated differently. Famously, the Uruguayan ex-­ president José Pepe Mujica stated that “Brazil has to pay the dinner of the integration”10 while he was traveling to Porto Alegre (El Diário 2014). Likewise, Francisco Carrión, the Ecuadorian ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasizes that Brazilian leadership would fortify UNASUR. To him “Brazil is the natural leader of South America. It is more; it is the natural leader of Latin America”11 (Carrión 2014). As we have seen in the analysis of councils, Brazilian leadership at the policy-making level is not coherent at all. While it is accepted and supported in the case of the Health Council, the suspicion against it is exposed in the Science Council. In other councils, policy-makers partly 7  “a nível de discurso, de ideología no son tan distinto de Argentina o de Chile o de Uruguay.” 8  “a nossa postura é uma postura muito forte de cooperacao, de evitar parecer um pais grande, nos somos o que, somos quase 40 % do territorio, e somos 56% da economia, e praticamente a metade da população, entao é um peso enorme.” 9  “receio muito grande de parecer como um pais imperialista, que voce esteja substituindo o big irmão pelo médio irmão, Estados Unidos substituindo pelo Brasil.” 10  “Brasil tiene que pagar la cena de la integración.” 11  “Brasil es el líder natural de Sudamérica. Es mas, es el líder natural de Latinoamérica.”

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mentioned their wish for a stronger Brazilian leadership. Although Brazilian policy-­makers interpret Brazil as paymaster and development deliverer, they see problems in the national legislation because of financial restrictions. For the sectoral councils of UNASUR, this means that the Brazilian participation strongly depends on national politics, whenever it implies financing. A representative remarks that the change of national governments in Brazil is easily perceivable at the regional policy-making level. After the change from Lula da Silva to Dilma Rousseff in 2011, “it is prevalent, that they [the Brazilian delegation] are having major budgetary restrictions. There were different things they were pushing intensively and then—from one moment to the other, they could not do it any longer”12 (Interview 33, 2015). In conclusion, the Brazilian case indicates the relevance of national administrations in the policy process. Although Brazilian policy-makers might want to engage financially in different projects, they cannot do so due to legislative restrictions. This is not the case in other nations, where the financing of executive policy-making is more flexible.

7.4   Comparison of Policy-Making in Sectoral Councils First of all, ideological polarization in regional processes is only perceived at the decision-making level. Policy-makers in councils stated that they are not involved in political conflicts at the presidential level, as long as these do not affect the national governments the policy-makers belong to. The only conflict directly affecting the work of the councils was the suspension of Paraguay from UNASUR—but only in the sense that one policy-­making counterpart of each council was missing. Before presenting the particularities of each council and its meaning for regional public policy-making, some general tendencies are introduced. Universal problems across councils included, first and foremost, language barriers in the cooperation with Suriname and Guyana. The possibility to communicate informally and autonomously is highly valued by policy-makers. National representatives speaking Dutch and English respectively, are not able to communicate fluently with their counterparts. Even policy-makers from Guyana and Suriname perceive this issue as 12  “se siente, que tienen muchos recortes presupuestarios. Entonces tenia algunas cosas que venían impulsando mucho, y de golpe—no podían mas.”

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problematic. The emphasis on language and communication that policy-­ makers transported indicates the apparent importance of non-formalized, fluent communication. Another recurrently mentioned problem by councils is the lack of finances. Policy-makers at the sectoral level criticize the fact that national governments often do not provide or delay financial contributions to UNASUR. Financial autonomy is a crucial requirement for the independent development of regional policy fields. Policy-makers expressed their wish of cooperating autonomously with third parties to gather funding. Moreover, they emphasized the necessity of broadening the scope of FIC and simplifying its administrative burden. Finally, policy-makers in all councils acknowledged that the divide between big and small countries can be problematic. All small countries reported that they feel underrepresented regarding human resources provisions and technical expertise, as compared to Brazil and Argentina. Also, smaller countries face difficulties in financing travel expenses of their civil servants. UNASUR is considering this problem and paying contributions to the smaller and financially weaker member states, as mentioned in Chap. 5. Councils, however, deal differently with this problem of asymmetry. While some cope with the problem, others do not. The ability to deal with such problems depends on, and at the same time influences, group processes in councils, as we have seen in Chaps. 5 and 6. 7.4.1  Health The Health Council has the longest tradition of transnational cooperation of all compared councils. This tradition is revealed in its ministerial development and joint policy-making, as reflected by the context of PAHO, and has led to the early creation of the council. The Health Council was explicitly created on the basis of the converging agendas from Mercosur, ORAS CONHU, and ATCO.  The similarity of agendas is valued as beneficial by policy-makers. The technical work of the Health Council includes the structuring networks and the ISAGS. Both are a demonstration of Brazilian leadership in regional health politics. Yet, leadership in the Health Council is perceived positively. Indeed, the fact that the Brazilian position is firmly connected to the foundation FioCruz plays a vital role in its positive valuation. Policy-­ makers expressed a personal preference for technical considerations in health policy-making. This also applies to the leadership position. The FioCruz is primarily perceived as an institution of public health and not as

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a political institution. Technical leadership in this sense is welcomed in the council. As discussed in Chap. 3, information agencies play an essential role for transgovernmental networks (Slaughter 2009, 185). These agencies provide technical assistance to member states. The ISAGS represents such an agency and facilitates the technical work of the Health Council. Aside from that, there are no conflicting national positions in the Health Council. To improve access to health care and to prevent diseases are common interests of all member states. For all policy-makers, health is a social good and a human right. They consistently define their policy field as an area of solidarity and view their function in UNASUR as a contribution to the objective of social development. In light of that, the primarily debated topics are the access and production of medicine (generics), as well as epidemiological control. The tradition of regional cooperation in health and the tradition of having international departments in health ministries certainly facilitates the pairing of policy-makers with their counterparts. Policy-makers indicated that they have some common sense and joint positions they defend against their national administrations. The Health Council exhibits strong group cohesion through its collective identification with the regional organization and with each other. Policy-makers developed a regional perspective of health policies. Different from other councils they even differentiate between national positions in regional cooperation and regional positions. 7.4.2  Social Development The Social Development Council is a highly politicized council. Its creation responds to the context of political change in the region. This change has ideological implications for regional cooperation. Although there is a similarity in development objectives and even in structural change, the ideas about how to achieve social development differ remarkably between member states. At the beginning of the century, regional organizations started to include social policies, all of which proved to be challenging to implement. At the same time, member states restructured their national administrations, allowing for the creation of some independent ministries of social development. These transformations are connected to the execution of large social assistance programs, most of which are conditional cash transfer programs. As a result, the institutional change was initiated to coordinate

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these programs. Regional cooperation did not play any role in this scenario. The creation of the Social Development Council of UNASUR has to be understood in line with this general trend in South America. Its agenda was ambitious, but at the same time imprecise from the very beginning. The language use and concepts differ among member states, although the same objectives might be pursued. Additionally, policy-­makers receive new instructions whenever governments change. Accordingly, they are not autonomous in their action. Policy-makers are not able to encourage group cohesion, as they have to defend national positions, which they did not necessarily develop themselves. The politicization of the council by the decision-making bodies of UNASUR is further enforced as it is supposed to develop an agenda of priority social actions for the “social councils” of UNASUR. As a reaction to this task, the council developed identification with the abstract objectives of UNASUR and started being concerned with the overall development of the organization. Development of sectoral rationality, therefore, is not possible. In contrast to structural isolation, the council is required to work according to the inclusive rationality of the political level. Divergent notions of social development impede the formation of a joint vision of regional politics. 7.4.3  Infrastructure The Infrastructure Council, COSIPLAN, is fundamentally built upon IIRSA. The IIRSA was created in 2000 and reflects the ambitions of South American presidents to intensify regional cooperation. The IIRSA was initially financed and directed by American development banks before the UNASUR member states started to take over responsibility. COSIPLAN finally absorbed IIRSA in 2010. The creation of the Infrastructure Council had been planned since UNASUR has been established. However, COSIPLAN was only created in 2010. Problems defining the Infrastructure Council included the multiple program areas covered by the council, the non-conformity of national ministries, as well as the parallelism to IIRSA. The intention was not to duplicate the processes, which had been present in IIRSA.  Finally, the absorption of IIRSA by COSIPLAN resulted in new objectives, but a similarity of technical work. COSIPLAN is concerned with social inclusion, the reduction of asymmetries, and regional connectivity. COSIPLAN benefits from the inherited technical background. Thus, policy-makers in the

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council have a highly technical profile and even maintained the working routine of IIRSA.  Interestingly, the Infrastructure Council is the one with the most substantial participation of Ministries of Foreign Affairs but at the same time the council with the strongest technical profile. Representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are considered a necessary assistance, as there are many border issues involved in technical considerations. In no other council has the importance of technical knowledge and the continuity in negotiations been highlighted as explicitly as it was the case in the Infrastructure Council. Although the collusion of national interests, a relative autonomy of action, and a robust technical profile are given in COSIPLAN, it is hard to speak of group cohesion. The Infrastructure Council shows strong asymmetries between the national delegations with regard to their human, as well as financial, resources. Beyond that, policy-makers continued to defend national interests in regional cooperation and did not develop a distinct regional perspective. Indeed such a perspective is challenging to develop due to the variety of projects and programs in different areas. Accordingly, “sectoral” rationality which would provide a joint regional perspective cannot be identified. 7.4.4  Culture The Culture Council is an illustrative example of sectoral rationality and group cohesion. Although the cultural sector only recently developed an independent ministerial administration in most of the South American states, policy-makers of the area have a strong identification with their counterparts. The Culture Council has a tradition in cooperation which developed over the last three decades. This cooperation was carried out initially by departments and secretariats, mainly in ministries of education. The field of culture often has a weak position in national administrations. This position led to some sense of belonging among policy-makers. Just as it was the case for health policy-makers, representatives of the Culture Council spoke of “we” and “us” instead of referring to national positions. As a consequence, policy-makers in the cultural sector had already developed sectoral rationality, which was further supported by the institutional context of UNASUR.  As presented in Chap. 4, March and Olsen speak of the “development of a community of rule, based on a common identity and sense of belonging” as a “key issue of political

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organization” (March and Olsen 2009, 11). Such a community can be found between policy-makers in the cultural field. The institutional context of UNASUR provided a space for policy-makers in the subfield of culture to gather and develop common political objectives. Accordingly, policy-makers regarded UNASUR to be empowering. Policy-making has been facilitated in this context, particularly after the separation of COSECCTI and the establishment as an independent council. In contrast to the Science Council, policy-makers in the field of culture repeatedly emphasized the importance of this separation. It allowed for the autonomous work of the Culture Council. According to the policy-­ makers, the Culture Council fulfills an important function. While this function is not necessarily related to the UNASUR as such, it is related to the process of regional integration as a whole. Culture has the function of identity-formation and therefore contributes to the recognition of the region. Policy-makers in the Culture Council were able to develop a regional perspective of cultural policies. It is the only council which talks about differences between its member states as a positive contribution instead of an impeding factor. The collective regional objective is to maintain shared traditions, protect cultural diversity, and strengthen the regional cultural industries. 7.4.5  Science The Science Council has the same origin as the Culture Council, though it reveals an entirely different dynamic. In comparison to most of the other councils, the Science Council is not based on independent ministerial administrations, as only four member states have ministries or ministry-­ like structures (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela). In the ­majority of UNASUR member states, the science and technology sector is coordinated by national councils and is sometimes connected to education, or to departments of technological innovation. Except Venezuela, those member states having a ministerial background are the most active ones in the Science Council. The different institutionality of the policy-makers’ background obstructs the development of group cohesion. Therefore, a sectoralized policy-making process and a coherent regional perspective are laborious to develop. Likewise, policy-­ makers perceive strong asymmetries between the participating members, especially regarding human resources. These problems are also reflected in leadership positions. Ecuador and Brazil are pursuing the most active and

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most visible leadership in the council. While Ecuador’s activism is valued positively, the Brazilian activity caused some suspicion. The Brazilian position reflects the council as a development instrument, while policy-makers in other member states hesitate to talk about the function of the council in UNASUR at all. Even though Brazilian activism gets projects off the ground, group cohesion suffers. Additionally, the sharp divergence between Mercosur members and non-members is problematic. The similarity of agendas among these groups further impedes the development of group cohesion. Emphasizing cooperation projects in Mercosur leads to the assumption that the autonomy of action and concomitantly the development of sectoral rationality are restricted more because of dependencies on project cooperation with foreign investors rather than by their national administrations. 7.4.6  Comparative Analysis of Sectoral Councils In conclusion, the five analyzed sectoral councils revealed different patterns of cooperation. Regional public policy-making proved to be a complex and multidimensional process. Table 7.1 summarizes the factors and their effects in each council. The factors at the macro- as well as micro-level showed different effects and interacted differently across and within councils. Each council developed unique characteristics and problems. Nevertheless, general tendencies can be identified through a comparative perspective. First of all, internal group processes seem to be interconnected with national administrations. The proposition of Mayntz and others (compare Chap. 3), which suggests that subfields need a certain extent of autonomy to work effectively, has indeed been shown to affect policy-making at the regional level. Interestingly, the councils which are based on a defined policy field (health and culture) developed group cohesion, while the councils with higher institutional diversity and differences in policy fields (infrastructure, science, and social development) were not able to do so. These are also the councils complaining about asymmetries in ideology, objectives, and financial and human resources between the member states. While also perceived as an obstacle, the asymmetries were not perceived as a problem in the Health and Culture Councils. On the contrary, in these councils, smaller countries emphasized the benefits of participating in each respective council. Summarizing, group cohesion is more likely to develop in clearly delimited policy fields.

Insecurity and controversies

Science

Source: Author’s table

Flexibility

Culture

Flexibility and institutional support Social Political development mandate(prioritarian social actions) Infrastructure Technical profile (based on IIRSA)

Health

Structure

Partly(development instrument)

Identification(South American identity)

Identification in COSIPLAN

Identification(health as rights + agency) Normative mandate

Political program

Macro-level

Table 7.1  Comparative analysis of sectoral councils

Slight and accepted leadership(Argentina, Colombia) Dominant position of Brazil

Accepted leadership of Brazil Different interests, ideologically determined Interest of all members

Collusion of national interest

Medium(technical counterparts but national identification) High(regional project)

High(regional project) Low(ideological differences)

Group cohesion

Medium(dependency on Low cooperation partners)

High

Low(political involvement of national administrations) Medium(involvement of FM, but technical predominance)

High

Autonomy of action

Micro-level

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What Bátora described for diplomats similarly applies for the members of the Health and Culture Councils (compare Chap. 3). According to him, diplomats “over time and through mutual interactions […] gradually developed a shared professional identity” (Bátora 2005, 47), even if being socialized in the national logic of their states. The reasons for this development are different but lead to a similar result. While health policy-makers rely on a long tradition of cooperation, culture policy-makers developed a sense of belonging. Both led to collective sectoral rationality. According to March and Olsen (March and Olsen 1995) (compare Chap. 3), the same understanding of problems is crucial for collective action. In both cases policy-makers have such a common understanding, enabling the development of a regional perspective, while other councils did not develop such a perspective. The Health and Culture Councils, therefore, are emblematic examples of regional public policy-making. In conclusion, a shared professional identity favors sectoral rationality and regional perspectives. The policy-makers in the Health and Culture Councils developed what March and Olsen described as “institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good” (March and Olsen 1995, 30). Institutions play an important role in this “logic of appropriateness,” as they provide actors “with consistent behavioral rules, conceptions of reality, [and] standards of assessment” (March and Olsen 1995, 30). Behaving appropriately gets difficult when actors are confronted with different rule systems and contexts. This is the case in science cooperation and social development in particular. The interpretation of what is appropriate here is conflicting, as actors face “contending imperatives of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1995, 31). The changing instruction by governments and different foci in policy-making both act as the principal impediment to the development of a logic of appropriateness. Imperatives of action derive from the national background of policy-makers. The similarity of national administrations is decisive for collective action at the regional level. In the case of the Infrastructure Council, a very strong technical rationality can be found which eluded the necessity of group cohesion by benefitting from an extremely technical method of cooperation. Although defending primarily national positions and not developing a regional vision, policy-makers in the Infrastructure Council can cooperate efficiently, as they are all bound to the same technical rationality and strictly follow their set of objectives. Similar tendencies can also be found in the Health Council, where ISAGS in particular reports on increasing requirements,

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even from other councils than health. This demand indicates the need and wishes for technically specialized assistance and the primacy of technical rationality over political rationality in regional public policy-­ making. Policy-makers of all areas emphasized that Ministries of Foreign Affairs should not get involved technically in negotiations of councils, but merely coordinate politically. Shared technical rationality of policy-makers in specialized areas facilitates cooperation by professional arguments. Associated with this finding is the rejection of political involvement in public policy-making. For policy-makers sectoral integration is rather output-­oriented, while political officials, especially from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, argue in political dimensions. Many sectoral representatives in all councils articulated their dissatisfaction with the politicization of some regional issues. Policy-makers often express suspicion against the ability of their governments to integrate, as “in the Latin American case you have national governments, which are jealous of power, of everything”13 (Interview 41, 2015). The most illustrative example is the Social Development Council. This council suffered from an ordinated mandate and in addition to that from the inability to develop a joint perspective on regional problems. Diverging definitions of social development moreover obstruct such a perspective. Social policies depend on the respective “national projects” and accordingly on the political agenda of governments. Divergences in these agendas hinder the elaboration of a common regional agenda. Concluding, politicization impedes regional public policy-making. The political influence in councils can, for example, be evaluated based upon whether member states develop leadership and how this is reflected in policy-making. Leadership can be helpful to bring forward individual policies. However, it does not support the development of collective action as such. In the case of the Science Council, it is possible to see how leadership can develop negative effects on group processes. Still, leadership is present in other councils. Examples are the case of the Brazilian activism in the Health Council, and a slight leadership position for Argentina and Colombia in the Culture Council. These leadership positions can be described as distributive leadership (Schlappa and Imani 2013, 3). As stated in Chap. 3, distributive leadership does not imply that all members have the same power or influence (Graeme et al. 2011, 245). 13  “no caso da América latina es que voce tem gobiernos nacionales, muito celosos, del poder, de todo.”

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The leadership relation is connected to the generation of a shared understanding by all individual actors (Schlappa and Imani 2013, 10). That means that effective distributive leadership depends on a shared logic of appropriateness and accordingly on robust group processes. While the Health and Culture Councils did develop such a vision, the Science Council did not. Leadership is helpful when it is based on a high level of group cohesion and the collusion of interests. Finally, the comparison of UNASUR and Mercosur reveals interesting information on the different developments in councils and some common issues. All councils, except COSIPLAN, have a counterpart in Mercosur. Only a few councils, such as health, additionally have an equivalent in other regional organizations. Nevertheless, councils with a strong group cohesion (culture and health) did not refer explicitly to policy-making in the context of Mercosur. In contrast, in the case of science and social development, policy-makers referred to a higher similarity between Mercosur members as well as a defined agenda. Nevertheless, they complained about the inability of joint policy-making also in Mercosur. As discussed in Chap. 5, Mercosur is often described as the most successful regional organization in South America. Astonishingly almost all policy-makers of all councils articulated their preference for UNASUR. The reason is the higher flexibility of policy-making in UNASUR.  Again, Paraguay’s suspension provides an illustrative example. The return to the regional organizations was comparatively smooth in UNASUR, while it was difficult in Mercosur. Moreover, representatives of Mercosur member states pointed out that they have a stronger involvement of their Ministries in Foreign Affairs in Mercosur issues than in UNASUR. All policy-makers mentioned that Mercosur was created for economic cooperation. This objective is still an impediment to the independent development of non-economic policy fields. The problem can best be explained referring to Chap. 3. If we follow the argumentation of Powell and Colyvas, institutional change is not initiated by the consciousness of actors, but rather based on irregularities actors might observe in their daily practice (Powell and Colyvas 2008, 277). In Mercosur, policy-makers struggle with competing rules in the same setting, which correspond to possible sectoral rationality, and the economic primacy of institutional structures. UNASUR, on the contrary, provides the space for different institutional developments and allows actors to adapt their institutional context whenever they are confronted with some “irregularity.” The Health and Culture Councils emphasized the strongest preference for UNASUR over Mercosur.

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Sectoralization, a common consequence of UNASUR’s institutional design, can be seen as a consequence of this development. As mentioned before, all councils communicated their wish for more autonomy and independence from decision-making bodies. The separation of COSECCTI into three independent councils of education, culture, and science is another example of the tendency for sectoralization. It was the initiative of the respective policy-makers which led to the creation of these three independent councils. Concluding, institutional flexibility supports the independent development of sectoral policy-making. Initially, it was argued that intergovernmental structures provide the institutional flexibility, which is necessary for the development of different policy processes. The previously presented arguments support this hypothesis. In the case of UNASUR, it became evident how critical institutional structures are for the improvement of policy-making processes. In particular, the involvement of decision-making bodies and the politicization of sectoral policy-making obstructed the development of sectoral rationality. Moreover, UNASUR does not primarily deal with economic cooperation, such as preceding regional organizations did. On the contrary, the political objectives of the organization correspond to the structural change in the region, which does not only affect economic policy-making but a variety of policy fields. The objectives of social development, connected to human rights, peace, and democracy, are not primary objectives of UNASUR but developed in a diffuse and prolonged process. The objectives of the sectoral councils respond to this process, just as UNASUR does. However, they do not respond to UNASUR as such. The South American Union, in the end, provides the institutional space for the independent development of sectors. This is only possible in purely intergovernmental structures. As seen in the cases of health and culture, councils developed best when they relied on a sectoral tradition and had the flexibility to develop a regional perspective of policy-making. In contrast, the Social Development Council proved that political interference and the politicization of concepts obstructs such an advance. Against the assumptions of regional integration theory, intergovernmentalism does not necessarily mean that processes depend on nation-­ states. Intergovernmental structures provide the institutional flexibility for a variety of actors to engage in regional cooperation and in policy-making according to their abilities and their actual demands. In the end, the ministries of each member state are responsible for the implementation of policies. The willingness of presidents to integrate does not necessarily

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guarantee progress, but the technical autonomy of sectoral policy-makers does. To conclude, intergovernmentalism and sovereignty are not a denial of integration but might help to build structures which assure long-term regional perspectives of cooperation. The work of technical actors is central in this process. Presidential systems do not automatically allow for the implementation of decisions in national systems. Illustratively, one representative from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that “not everything the president wants to do, is possible”14 (Interview 34, 2015).

References Bátora, Jozef. 2005. Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy? Journal of European Public Policy 12 (1): 44–66. El Diário. 2014. Mujica Insiste En Que Brasil ‘Tiene Que Pagar La Cena’ de La Integración, 2014. https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Mujica-insiste-Brasilpagar-integracion_0_301670913.html. Graeme, Currie, Suzana Grubnic, and Ron Hodges. 2011. Leadership in Public Services Networks: Antecedents, Process and Outcome. Public Administration 89 (2): 242–264. March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1995. Democratic Governance. New York: Free Press. ———. 2009. The Logic of Appropriateness. ARENA Working Papers 04, 2–28. Powell, Walter W., and Jeannette A.  Colyvas. 2008. Microfoundations of Institutional Theory. In The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, ed. Royston Greenwood et al., 276–298. London: Sage. Schlappa, Hans, and Yasmin Imani. 2013. Leadership in the Co-Production of Public Services: An Initial Conceptual Framework. http://www.icpublicpolicy. org/IMG/pdf/panel_43_h_schlappa_y_imani.pdf. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 2009. A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Interviews Abrahão de Castro, Jorge. 2014.   Director of Planning   Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratégicos   Ministerio do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, Brazil   Interview: 15.12.2014  “Nem tudo que o presidente quer, da pra fazer.”

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Carrión, Francisco Mena. 2014.   Former Minister of Foreign Affairs   Coordinador URAI, FLACSO Ecuador   Interview: 23.11.2014 Paoloni, María Florencia. 2015.   Technical Coordinator   Direccion Nacional de Relaciones Internacionales   Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Productiva, Argentina   Interview: 06.02.2015 Quintela Santos, Adroaldo. 2014.   Project Manager for Transport   Secretaria de Planejamento e Investimentos Estratégicos   Ministerio do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, Brazil   Interview: 12.12.2014 Schinca, Pedro. 2015.   Technical Assessor   Unidad de Asuntos Internacionales y Cooperación   Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, Uruguay   Interview: 09.02.2015

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion: Regional Governance in South America

The present study is inspired by the fact that supranationality is no longer the objective of most regional organizations. In reality, states have refused to cede sovereignty in all regions except for Europe. Nevertheless, regional integration scholars keep discussing the phenomenon of regional integration processes given the existence or non-existence of supranational structures. Inspired by the European Union, functionalist and neofunctionalists established the study of regional integration as a scholarly field (Haas 1964; Mitrany 1975). Leading theories and concepts of the field, accordingly, are bound to the empirical phenomenon of the European integration process. Also, intergovernmentalists relied on the example of the European Union and rejected functional concepts instead of taking into account the broad variety of intergovernmental regional organizations worldwide. Scholars around Moravcsik (1998) argued that integration depends on the willingness of states to cooperate. Supranationality, to them, does not exist. Although making legitimate claims, intergovernmentalists have not offered explanations for regional cooperation beyond the level of the nation-state. Additionally, both functionalist and intergovernmentalist explanations have not developed a comparative perspective on regions. On the contrary, they developed criteria in the context of the European integration process and assigned them to other regions.

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The Latin American case, in this sense, is emblematic. Even constructors of regional organizations attempted to design supranational s­ tructures, in reference to the European Union, as we have seen in the case of CAN and, to a certain extent, Mercosur. In view of the failure of these organizations, the intergovernmental critique has been translated to the concept of “interpresidentialism” (Malamud 2005, 2008), which defends a strong position of presidents in regional integration and indicates that progress is only possible when presidents agree on a collective position. Yet, also interpresidentialism disregards processes of regional governance, which do not necessarily depend on the engagement of presidents or even strong national positions. The empirical analysis of regional processes at the policy-making level has shown that regional governance is a multidimensional process, depending on a variety of factors. Sectoral integration does require neither presidential involvement nor supranationality. While intergovernmentalists based their arguments on the perspective of a unitary state, the empirical analysis revealed that a variety of actors constitutes governments. In fact, intergovernmental regional organizations provide the institutional flexibility for a variety of actor groups to develop independently from each other. As the study has shown for South America, the region is constituted by parallel transnational processes, which materialize in policy fields and which can only unfold in the ambit of flexible, intergovernmental regional organizations. In academic debates, policy fields or, in other words, sectoral integration has not been captured yet. Only recently, scholars developed the concept of comparative regionalism with the intention of focusing on the region as an object of study and by this means on the empirical phenomena we find in regions. Comparative regionalism can be understood as a reaction to the over-theorization of regions and the missing conceptual understanding of regional processes. In particular, New Regionalism approaches made a case for regions as constructed spaces. However, they have caused conceptual confusion instead of contributing useful concepts for the analysis of regions. Constructivist theories of regionalism to some extent outplayed the regional space by connecting it to the global level. As such, the emphasis was drawn away from the region, and a pattern of global politics was projected upon it instead. In that view, Acharya and Johnston express their concern with the institutional design of regional organizations. They point out that “like the overall literature on globalization, the literature on new regionalism might have underestimated the resilience of the state, or have been too

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quick to predict its demise” (Acharya and Johnston 2007, 10). Although they are considering the macro-level and institutional structures, the claim is equally valid for the micro-level of regional cooperation. Hence, “design issues are important and should not be neglected” (Acharya and Johnston 2007, 10) in the analysis of regional public policy-making. The focus on macro-structures of regional institutions needs to be broadened and take the integration in different policy fields into account. The analysis of sectoral integration illustrates the variety of regional processes co-occurring. The institutional design of regional organizations obstructs or facilitates the development of regional processes in policy fields.

8.1   Review Regional public policy fields, for example, health, education, energy, or infrastructure, are constituted by transgovernmental cooperation between national ministerial representatives of the respective departments. Accordingly, these fields correspond to the national administration of member states in regional organizations. Regional public policy-making, hence, is defined as the interaction of policy-makers at the regional level who are pursuing a common objective. This form of cooperation is constitutive for regions. Hence, the objective of this analysis was to understand how regional public policy-making works in practice and, in particular, how it responds to institutional structures. It followed the assumption that intergovernmental institutions support the development of different policy fields at a regional level. In a situation of transformation in many regions, we can empirically observe that policy fields develop differently, although they are equal regarding formal structure. The central question of how different policy areas could develop in such different ways, even though being embedded into the same regional structure, has significant implications for the academic understanding of regions. The analytical model that has been developed throughout this study to facilitate the study of regional public policy-making focuses on the role of ministerial representatives. To sufficiently capture this group of actors, they are conceptualized as transgovernmental networks. The relevance of transgovernmental networks for transnational policy-making was first emphasized by Keohane and Nye (1974), and recently by Raustalia (2002) or Slaughter and Hale (2010b). Slaughter and Hale argued that the “social nature” (2010a, 57) of transgovernmental networks will determine their interaction and the particular outcome. Thus, group-inherent factors are

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decisive for the development of policy-making processes and hence for successful collective action in regions. Accordingly, the study is based on the interactionist assumption of processes of collective action in groups of policy-makers. Collective action depends on different group internal processes. At the same time, the institutional context of collectivities influences these group processes. For the national level of public policy-making, scholars such as Mayntz found that policy-making in networks advances best in subsystems (Mayntz 1993). Policy fields are such subsystems. At the same time, Messner points out that “tacit knowledge” (Messner 1995, 205), which he understands as policy field immanent logic, best develops in independent institutional structures. As regional public policy-making is based on transgovernmental networks, the institutional separation of policy fields here also applies as a favoring element. Intergovernmental organizations best provide this independence for different policy fields. According to the study of policy networks in flexible institutional structures, this study responds to the conceptual context of regional governance. This concept has been increasingly discussed in recent times and focuses on the coordination of action and of structures, on the interdependencies in a regional setting. From an institutionalist point of view, flexibility is a necessary precondition for governance. Governance describes institutionalized systems of rules, where no authoritative imposition to rule compliance is given. In particular, Nolte (2014) connected regional governance to intergovernmental organizations. In line with the idea that intergovernmental organizations contain different sectors of policy-making, Hveem (2003) indicates that the institutions of regional governance are connected to the national systems of member states. Policy-making in different policy fields in the context of one intergovernmental regional organization can, therefore, be described in terms of regional governance. The model of regional public policy-making, hence, is a model of regional governance. To illustrate this model in practice, it has been applied to the case of UNASUR.

8.2   Case Study In the South American region, we can observe a failure of supranationality and dense institutionalization in many regional organizations. The South American Union, created in 2008, attempted to avoid such failures and therefore established a flexible institutional structure.

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The case study of UNASUR, therefore, allows for investigating whether flexible structures permit policy fields to develop their working ­procedures. The analytical model separates the macro-level and the micro-level of regional public policy-making for conceptual purposes. While the macro-level is constituted by the formal structure and the political objectives (frames) of the regional organization, the micro-level is constituted by the different group processes of transgovernmental networks in the respective policy fields. The comparative analysis of the sectors revealed that any interference from the macro-level into sectoral policy-making, be it institutional or political, obstructs the development of sectoral rationality. The impeding character of politicization is an important finding. The involvement of political officials, the ideological instructions of governments, and the changing political landscape act as major impediments to independent sectoral work. Additionally, conceptual imprecision and diverging definitions of problems and solutions in policy fields obstructed the development of sectoral rationality. According to collective action theory, a common rationality of actors is central to the development of joint objectives and helps to align their actions with each other. The definition of problems is based on the benefit each member will have. In other words, the agenda of a policy-maker depends on his problem-perception. If problem-perception is similar, policy-­makers readily agree on an agenda. Different from political rationality, the sectoral rationality is based on shared experiences and the same identification and comprehension of problems and solutions. Strong political leadership typically impedes collective action. Although it accelerates processes and makes policies happen, it is only rarely based on collective action. As a consequence, policies which are a result of political instrumentalization hardly contribute to long-term development. Instead, they might impede the development of regional perspectives of public policies. The case of UNASUR shows that the independence of policy fields leads to independent policy processes. Policy-making, in this case, is based on a common perception of problems. As policy fields differ remarkably regarding problems, dimensions, and possible solutions, they will develop differently. To aspire equality of sectors, therefore, would mean to restrict their technical autonomy. The case of UNASUR proves that a flexible intergovernmental structure supports dissimilar processes within the same formal organization. Consequently, the South American Union supports the argument that institutional flexibility in intergovernmental organizations provides the space for collective action in a variety of possible processes.

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The study of UNASUR revealed that both levels, the macro- and the micro-levels, reflect ongoing processes. The values of UNASUR are not intrinsic but respond to a long enduring process of transformation of South American politics. In particular democracy, human rights, peace, and social development are all manifested in UNASUR and indicate an open-ended process. Instead of defining a final objective, the emphasis is on independent processes which are developed by regional actors. Connected to this finding is that UNASUR as an organization did not focus on any primacy of economics or security. In terms of formal structure, it does not prioritize any sector. Therefore, the independent development of sectoral, regional policies illustrates in which fields states can cooperate where transgovernmental politics are possible. Policy priorities are not induced but arise according to the logic of policy fields and according to their possibilities. In view of that, UNASUR does not seek to achieve a previously set goal but wants to identify fields of cooperation. The assessment of policy processes within UNASUR emphasizes the relevance of the micro-level of regional public policy-making and indicates that regional organizations respond to regional processes.

8.3   Assessment of Regional Public Policy-Making Acharya and Johnston emphasize that “design issues are important” (2007, 10). The comparative analysis of policy-making in UNASUR supports this argument. A central finding of the analysis of institutional structures and transgovernmental networks is that there is a strong tendency to sectoralization. In particular, those networks which already developed independent processes have formulated their asset for more autonomy in policy-making. The study proved that intergovernmental structures enable parallel regional processes of collective action of policy-makers in different issue areas. This argument is not bound to UNASUR. Most regions are constituted by the parallelism of transgovernmental processes in different issue areas. Whether these processes lead to collective action responses or not depends on how institutions facilitate independent sectoral policy-­ making. The conditions to independent regional public policy-making have been elaborated for the case of UNASUR but can be transferred to other regions. In all modern, democratic societies, we can find similarities between national political systems. Whether policy-makers have a similar background or not is a crucial point for the development of sectoral rationality

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and collective action. If there are delimited policy fields in the respective member states, and these policy fields resemble at the regional level, collective action becomes more probable. These conditions support group cohesion. According to assumptions from network analysis (Chap. 3) and the institutional analysis of organizations (Chap. 4), group cohesion is decisive for collective action. Cohesion in transgovernmental networks depends on a shared professional rationality, the mutual identification of group members with their counterparts, and a shared understanding of problems. Group cohesion is decisive for the development of a regional policy-making perspective. In the end, the internal processes in transgovernmental networks will decide whether interaction leads to regional public policy-making or the simple cooperation between policy-makers. Internal group processes also depend on macro-structures, as mentioned before. The underlying conditions for the development of group cohesion, sectoral rationality, and accordingly collective action at the regional level are the programmatic as well as the institutional flexibility of policy fields. Strict formal structures and politicization are impediments to regional public policy-making. Institutional flexibility instead supports the independent development of sectoral policy-making. The presented findings are particularly relevant in contrast to prevailing arguments about regional integration. Not only neofunctionalist and classic intergovernmentalist scholars but also a majority of today’s students of regional integration apply economic indicators to measure integration. Based on the results of the analysis, an opposite position can be defended: It is a condition to successful intergovernmental regional integration that no economic primacy prevails. As shown in the case of Mercosur and especially CAN, the economic orientation brought organs of economic rationality into decision-making positions. A hierarchical structure favoring economic policy fields, however, impedes the development of other, non-­ economic policy fields. The common understanding that economic integration is the fundamental driver of regional processes, therefore, can be rejected. Every public sector, be it health, education, infrastructure, or energy, has to develop its rationality of action with its objectives, to work efficiently. Regional processes accordingly depend neither on the existence of economic cohesion nor on the willingness to cede sovereignty in favor of supranational institutions. On the contrary, they depend on a variety of possible factors related to institutional flexibility.

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The advantage of intergovernmental organizations which provide formal equality to sectors is quite simple: In organizations with an economic primacy, integration will fail in all sectors, when economic integration is failing. This phenomenon can be observed in many market-oriented regional agreements. However, it is not the case in intergovernmental structures without such a primacy. The autonomy of sectors does not only provide the necessary independence for policy-making but also protects them from failure, possibly resulting from other policy fields. If sectors are granted independence, policy-makers will engage in regional public policy-making, according to concrete demands. The solutions, respectively, will be answers to commonly perceived problems. The probability of effective regional public policy-making, therefore, is higher in loosely structured, intergovernmental organizations.

8.4   Outlook and Further Research The case study of UNASUR exhibited the multiplicity of factors influencing regional public policy-making. At the same time, the study points to essential transformations, which are reflected in regional processes. The model of the European Union is no longer preeminent in institutional design. On the contrary, regional organizations increasingly deviate from the classic conceptualization of regional institutions. The study of UNASUR indicates that the institutional design of regional organizations responds to existing regional processes. As argued initially, these processes are constitutive for the region. Instead of focusing only on macro-structures of regional organizations, we should consider these intraregional micro-processes which build the foundation of regional organizations. Regional public policies, in particular, have not yet been studied. Although some policy fields have gained academic attention, they have not been related to the overall regional processes. This study presents a first attempt to conceptualize regional public policy-making. Throughout this book, I did not only illustrate the relevance of regional public policy-­ making but also disclose the necessity for further research. In the case of UNASUR, problems for policy-makers were connected to the high burden of work, of traveling, workload, and overly ambitious agendas. This aspect indicated that national administrations are not adequately prepared for regional public policy-making. This finding could lead us to the assumption that regional public agendas are a new phenomenon. We do not know the trajectories of regional cooperation in different policy fields

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and different regions. The case of the South American Health Council, for example, showed that today’s policy-making is based on a long tradition of cooperation. Whether the increase of regional public policy-making in South America is a novelty, or if academia simply did not perceive it, is an open question. In view of such developments, the current situation in which half of UNASUR member states suspended leadership due to the inability to find a new General Secretary, does not seem too critical. On contrary, the reluctance of the leaving countries supports the arguments of this book. It illustratively shows how distinct the presidential level acts from the concrete policy-making level. In this study, I have shown that intergovernmental networks do not need a General Secretary or the interference of their presidents to be able to work. Many policy fields reveal an astonishing capacity to interact at a regional level, even in insecure and instable environments. Even more, they continue contributing to institutional creation. Concrete examples are the Health and Culture Councils: The Culture Council created a technical committee that works on measures against the illegal trafficking of cultural goods in 2017, already after Ernesto Samper left office (Ministerio de Cultura y Patrimonio 2017). This committee is a joint endeavor of UNASUR and Mercosur and shows how cooperation in the field of culture envisages a long-term programmatic action. The Health Council, similarly, continues working through its technical institute, ISAGS. As the executive director of ISAGS, Carina Vance, declared, the institute as well as the Health Council will continue working even in the situation of suspended membership of some member states. Instead of progressing with the agenda, the institute will use the time to conduct studies and prepare policy recommendations. According to Vance, these activities have been on the agenda anyways and do not need direct participation of the states (Antunes and Vanca 2018). Both, the joint activities with other regional organizations, such as Mercosur, and the transfer of tasks to technical institutes, are reactions of intergovernmental networks that continue pursuing a common interest in regional public policy-making. Both are indicative for the ability of intergovernmental networks to change their organizational context, for example, adapt to new institutional conditions in order to identify the best context for regional public policy-making. It proves that the organization, as such, is first of all the context for interaction and not any normative imposition to policy-making.

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Accordingly, a missing General Secretary or disagreement between presidents might not favor the progress in regional public policy-making. However, it will also hardly obstruct it. But, what does the temporary suspension of half of UNASUR member states mean? This is unclear, as institutions keep on working, even without progress. A final withdrawal, and consequently the dissolution of UNASUR could be problematic. To be more precise, the withdrawal from any organization providing regional public policies would pose a problem. What will destroy regional public policy-making is taking away the spaces of action of the networks. They only might need minimal resources, but these indeed are necessary. Ministerial representatives need to travel, they need to meet, they need to be able to pursue a regional agenda and accordingly need a minimum of technical autonomy. In the moment, in which a government decides that there is no necessity for regional cooperation in public policy fields, and therewith takes all resources away from regional policy-making, the work of networks gets extremely difficult. The consequence of such a decision would be the denial of a common regional progressive development—an idea that has been developed over decades and materialized in UNASUR. In the past two years many crises in the South American member states also affected the work in UNASUR. The most relevant example is the case of Venezuela. Already in the past, it has proven how problematic the politicization of sectoral councils is. With the imposition of Maduro, also the participation in UNASUR changed. As a replacement for technical personnel, increasingly diplomatic staff participated in meetings and tried to pursue a political agenda. This behavior is detrimental for the work of councils, as technical rationality is the dominant logic (Hoffmann 2015). Instead, Venezuela tried to instrumentalize the councils’ work. Likewise, the Brazilian change in foreign policy affects the work of councils, as Brazil is continuously taking resources out of its international departments. Brazil has the ability to push regional processes, as, for example, in health. Now, however, the government favors cooperation that follows liberal economic principles and reduces regional public policies to a minimum. The future of UNASUR will probably depend on the willingness of states to cooperate at a regional level (Comini and Sanahuja 2018). Yet, it is important to keep in mind that UNASUR is not an ideological project but an institutional space that managed to deliver a variety of public policies to the South American region. This study for the first time draws attention to these micro-processes of regional public policy-making and

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highlights the relevance of transgovernmental networks for regional processes. The case study of UNASUR can be seen as a starting point for an actor-based study of regions, with the objective of understanding the empirical phenomena we observe in regions. The observations made in the case of UNASUR, similarly, hold true for other spaces of regional public policy-making. Finally, with or without UNASUR, intergovernmental networks in different policy fields demonstrate astonishing patterns of interaction and cooperation at the regional level. These work in various settings, as long as they allow policy-makers to gather and develop a common perspective on regional public policies.

References Acharya, Amitav, and Alastair Iain Johnston. 2007. Comparing Regional Institutions: An Introduction. In Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, ed. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, 10–11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Antunes, Andre, and Carina Vanca. 2018. Não fortalecer a integração regional implica retrocessos que têm impactos diretos sobre a vida e a saúde das pessoas. ISAGS (blog). Accessed May 7, 2018. http://isags-unasur.org/entrevistacarina-epsjv/. Comini, Nicolas, and José Antonio Sanahuja. 2018. The New Right Governments’ Empty Chair Strategy at UNASUR. OpenDemocracy. Accessed May 7, 2018. https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/jos-antonio-sanahujanicol-s-comini/new-right-governments-empty-chair-strategy-at-. Haas, Ernst B. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State—Functionalism and International Organization. Standford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hoffmann, Anne Marie. 2015. Venezuela, the Crisis and South American Regionalism. In La Crisis in Venezuela, ed. CARI Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Special ed., 26–33. Boletín Del ISIAE 60. Buenos Aires: Especial sobre Venzuela. Hveem, Helge. 2003. The Regional Project in Global Governance. In Theories of New Regionalism, ed. Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M.  Shaw, 81–98. International Political Economy Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1974. Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations. World Politics 27 (1): 39–62. Malamud, Andrés. 2005. Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur. An Empirical Examination. Latin American Research Review 40 (1): 138–164. ———. 2008. The Internal Agenda of Mercosur: Interdependence, Leadership and Institutionalization. In Los Nuevos Enfoques de La Integración: Más Allá Del Nuevo Regionalismo, ed. Grace Jaramillo, 115–135. Quito: FLACSO.

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Mayntz, Renate. 1993. Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks. Knowledge and Policy 6 (1): 3–16. Messner, Dirk. 1995. Die Netzwerkgesellschaft: wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit als Probleme gesellschaftlicher Steuerung. Weltforum-Verlag. Ministerio de Cultura y Patrimonio. 2017. Consejo Sudamericano de Cultura Aprueba ‘Comité de Lucha Contra Tráfico Ilícito de Bienes Culturales’— Ministerio de Cultura y Patrimonio. Accessed March 31, 2017. https://www. culturaypatrimonio.gob.ec/consejo-sudamericano-de-cultura-aprueba-comitede-lucha-contra-trafico-ilicito-de-bienes-culturales/. Mitrany, David. 1975. The Functional Theory of Politics. London: Martin Robertson. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe—Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Nolte, Detlef. 2014. Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented Regional Governance Complex? Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 89. Raustalia, Kal. 2002. The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law Association 43 (1): 1–92. Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Thomas N.  Hale. 2010a. Transgovernmental Networks and Emerging Powers. In Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance, ed. Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew Fenton Cooper, 48–62. Waterloo, ON: Brookings Institution Press. ———. 2010b. Transgovernmental Networks. In The SAGE Handbook of Governance, 342–352. Sage.

Index1

A Agenda setting, 39, 44 Autonomy of action, 174, 176 B Budget, 89, 91, 93–97 C Central coordination, 164, 165 Collective action, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 54, 56, 57, 61–63, 109, 167, 168, 178, 179, 188–191 Collusion of interests, 45 Common market, 68 Comparative regionalism, 6, 15 Competing logic, 62 Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN, Andean Community), 2, 4, 67, 74–78, 91, 99, 101

Comunidad de Naciones Suramericanas (CNS), 74 Convergence, 67, 73, 74, 77, 78, 99, 100 Council of Delegates, 89, 91, 93, 95–97 Culture Council, 139–149 D Democracy, 71, 79–86, 88, 100–102, 166, 167, 181 Distributive leadership, 40 E Eclecticism, 17 Epistemic community, 35–37 Europe, 15, 16 European Union (EU), 21, 185, 186, 192

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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F Flexibility, 112, 113, 148, 154 Frame, 41, 56, 57, 59–60 Free trade agreement, 71 Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), 69 Functionalism, 185 G General Secretariat, 78, 83, 85, 89, 90, 92–93, 95–97, 101, 102 General Secretary, 51 Global governance, 42 Global public policy, 31, 34 Group cohesion, 45, 62, 109, 118–120, 126–129, 137–139, 145–148, 155–156, 158, 167, 172–176, 178, 180, 191 Group process, 54, 56 H Health Council, 110, 111, 113–120 Human rights, 79, 80, 83, 85–86, 101, 102, 109, 115, 123, 134, 143, 151 I Independence, 145, 167, 181, 188, 189, 192 Infrastructure Council, 130–139 Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), 134 Institutional analysis, 56–61 Institutional design, 186, 187, 192 Institutional development, 109, 141 Institutional flexibility, 4, 16, 21, 24, 181, 186, 189, 191 Instituto Suramericano de Gobierno en Salud (ISAGS), 114–117, 114n7, 119, 157 Interactionism, 54, 61

Interference, 128, 139, 145 Intergovernmentalism, 5, 18, 23, 185, 186, 191 Intergovernmental organization, 6, 8, 22, 23, 188, 189, 192 International organization, 32, 41 Interpresidentialism, 20, 21, 186 Interpretive policy analysis, 53, 55, 60 L Latin America, 15, 16, 18, 20 Latin American integration, 69, 71 Leadership, 169–171, 175, 176, 179, 180 Logic of appropriateness, 62, 178, 180 M Mainstreaming, 79, 80, 86, 89, 100 Mercado Común del Cono Sur (Mercosur), 2, 4, 67–70, 74–78, 91, 99–101 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 135, 136, 153, 163, 164, 182 N National administration, 165, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178 National interest, 32, 39, 45, 116–117, 119, 124–125, 135, 144–145, 152–154 Neofunctionalism, 5, 18, 21–23, 25, 185, 191 Network, 35–41, 44, 45 New regionalism, 17, 25, 186 O Organizational field, 58, 61, 62 Organization of American States (OAS), 15 Organization theory, 57–59

 INDEX 

P Pacific Alliance, 70 Peace, 79–81, 86, 101, 102 Policy argument, 42 Policy community, 35, 36, 45 Policy coordination, 37, 38, 41 Policy field, 3, 4, 6–10, 35, 36, 39, 45 Policy-making, 2, 4–10 Policy studies, 10, 31–46 Political conflict, 170 Political objectives, 166–167, 175, 181 Politicization, 121, 173, 179, 181 Post-hegemonic regionalism, 20 Presidential politics, 49, 50 Public policy, 32–34, 36, 37, 41–45 R Rationality, 22, 23, 25 Regional agenda, 72, 73 Regional cooperation, 15, 18, 25 Regional governance, 1–11, 17, 19, 20, 25, 185–195 Regional integration, 4, 5, 10, 15–27, 185, 186, 191 Regional organization, 2, 4–7, 9, 15, 16, 18–21, 23–25, 49–53, 56, 58–60, 62, 63 Regional projects, 18 Regional public policy-making, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10–11, 187–195 S Science Council, 140, 149, 151–158 Sectoral council, 4, 7, 50–52, 55, 60, 79, 80, 88, 89, 91, 93, 95–99, 102

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Sectoralization, 190 Sectoral policy-making, 189–191 Sectoral rationality, 109, 150, 173, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181 Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (SSAN), 152 Social development, 69, 71, 86–89, 98, 100, 109, 116, 120–129, 133, 134, 141, 143, 144, 151, 157, 166, 168, 172–173, 176, 178–181 Social Development Council, 120, 121, 124–128 South America, 49, 51, 55 South American Health Council, 50 South American regionalism, 5 South American summitry, 67 Sovereignty, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 86–89, 101, 166, 167, 182 Supranationality, 4, 5, 15, 16, 18, 23, 25, 185, 186, 188 T Technical profile, 174 Technocracy, 21 Tradition, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 181 Transgovernmental networks, 9, 10, 53, 57, 60, 187–191, 195 Transnational executive network, 37 Triangulation, 54–56 U Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), 1–5, 7, 10, 11, 49–63