Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran

Majid Labbaf Khaneiki

Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran

Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran

Majid Labbaf Khaneiki

Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran

Majid Labbaf Khaneiki Hydraulic Structures, UNESCO Category II International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structures, UNESCO Category II Yazd, Iran

ISBN 978-3-030-01493-3    ISBN 978-3-030-01494-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018959411 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword to Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran

It is a rare book in the world of historic water technology that can share such a rich tapestry of the places and people who used and lived by this water, chiefly because many of the old systems are no longer in use and lived experiences must be guessed at, or avoided altogether. But qanats in the central plateau of Iran have been used for centuries and continue to function so people who still maintain and use them are a vessel for understanding the evolution of water technology and the social engineering of this supply, if one takes the time to meet them and learn from these lived experiences. Majid Labbaf Khaneiki has done just that for many years and shares this world of experience in the following pages. This book is about qanats and their development in one of the most qanat-dense regions of the earth but, more significantly, offers revealing insight into the inner machinations of qanat water management through examples that highlight the fine-tuned balancing act between group and self-interest in territorial water cooperation. A qanat—with its long tunnel and associated string of wells—traverses different topographies and geologies along its course, diverse geographies that encompass many settlements, tribal boundaries, farming, and grazing lands. Yet, in order to function, various factions with interests in the integrity of a qanat must coordinate. A qanat, therefore, is a good vehicle for cooperation and for impeding territorial compulsions. This book convincingly underscores this point, with rich details on the construction, technology, terminology, people, and places that make the story worth reading. For example, we learn how the waters of the Hasan Abad qanat came to be subdivided and created the system of shared water that has shaped relations and cooperation that characterize the region to this day. Likewise, contemporary cropping patterns and irrigation cycles evolved through the integration of qanat water supply, and the division of waters and their oversight remain within the purview of qanat water managers and water chiefs. Details of labor and legal actions underscore the fine-tuned cooperation between (otherwise) competing regions compelled to cooperate through their mutual need for water, which has led to other avenues of cooperation once these relationships develop.

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Foreword to Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran

The author has considerable expertise in academic qanat studies in Iran and the wider eastern hemisphere and real-world, pragmatic experience in the field working with qanat practitioners and with individuals and organizations involved in revitalizing qanats. This book is a sharing of his experiences and a revealing of truisms into the nature of these shared water resources. It is an insightful story of the evolution of water development, the social structures that enable the development and use of this essential resource, and the urgency of understanding and accommodating these structures in contemporary water management. We should learn from these experiences to find a way forward with our own water conundrums. It is clearly the author’s hope that we do so. Stillwater, Oklahoma

Dale Lightfoot

Acknowledgments

I appreciate the support of the Faculty of Geography, University of Tehran, which paved the way for this study by providing me with required information and documents. I express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Mohammad Reza Rezvani, supervisor of my PhD program, and also to Dr. Seyyed Ali Badri for their invaluable advices which helped me go from strength to strength. I also thank Dr. Seyyed Hasan Motiee Langeroodi and Dr. Abdolreza Roknoddin Eftekhari whose precious suggestions placed this study on the right track. Special thanks go to Tamadon Karizi Consulting Engineers Company and its brilliant director, Dr. Ali Asghar Semsar Yazdi, whose generous support and wonderful aid made it possible for me to conduct my field studies to which the Chaps. 4 and 5 are indebted. I am very grateful to Dr. Matthias Schmidt from the Institute of Geography, University of Augsburg in Germany, who paved the way for me to stay in Augsburg and use their library while working on this research at their institute for 3 weeks. His marvelous comments and suggestions were of great help to me, and the valid questions of his intelligent colleagues helped me much to improve this book. I barely find the right word to thank Dr. Dale Lightfoot from Oklahoma State University. His immense favor to read through this book from cover to cover is beyond any appreciation. I am always beholden to him for his scholarly comments and advices from the very beginning of this study. Also, I am so grateful to Ms. Judith Terpos from Springer, who kindly followed up on the different stages of the production of this book, and her valuable efforts facilitated its publication. I in fact owe this book to many farmers, qanat practitioners, water shareholders, and local experts who kindly accepted to talk to me and patiently answer my questions. I wish to express my indebtedness to them, without whose invaluable information, this study could not take shape at all. Eventually I heartily thank my dear wife, Zohreh Emamzadeh (Pari), whose very existence always gives me more courage and strength to pull through many problems that befell me over the past years. It was because of her that I could focus on my research and pen my ideas in this book. vii

Contents

1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 1.1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   1 1.2 Territory����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   3 1.3 Territorial Water Cooperation ������������������������������������������������������������   5 1.4 Proto–Industrialization and Drought Pump����������������������������������������  17 1.5 Water as a Geographical Possibility���������������������������������������������������  19 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  21 2 Water Supply Systems in Central Iran����������������������������������������������������  25 2.1 Qanat System as a Collective Response to Climate Change��������������  25 2.2 Genesis of Qanat ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  26 2.3 Impact of Climate Change on Qanat Evolution����������������������������������  28 2.4 Climate Change in Central Plateau of Iran ����������������������������������������  29 2.5 Qanat as a Technique to Adapt to Climate Change����������������������������  31 2.6 Qanat in Comparison with Other Hydraulic Structures����������������������  35 2.7 History of Water Management in Iran������������������������������������������������  40 2.8 Traditional Water Division Systems����������������������������������������������������  44 2.9 Irrigation Cycle or “Madar”����������������������������������������������������������������  45 2.10 Water Division Units��������������������������������������������������������������������������  49 2.11 Traditional Water Division in River Systems��������������������������������������  57 2.12 Traditional Water Management and Sustainability����������������������������  59 References����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  61 3 Social Aspects of Water in Central Iran��������������������������������������������������  65 3.1 Qanat as a Cooperative Water Supply System������������������������������������  65 3.2 Cooperation in Construction–Maintenance of Qanat ������������������������  66 3.3 Cooperation in the Qanat’s Operation������������������������������������������������  67 3.4 Cooperation in the Transfer of Qanat Knowledge������������������������������  68 3.5 Cooperation in Water Division������������������������������������������������������������  69 3.6 Water Cooperation in the Cultural Landscape of the Village of Meymand����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  71

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Contents

3.7 Irrigated Agriculture in Relation to the Other Economic Units in Meymand��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   75 3.8 Qanat and Its Position in the Cultural Landscape of Meymand ������   78 3.9 Domestic Water Supply in Meymand ����������������������������������������������   82 3.10 Water Division System in Meymand������������������������������������������������   83 3.11 Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Livelihood in Meymand��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   88 3.12 Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   92 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   93 4 Cain and Abel in the Heaven of Water Cooperation����������������������������   95 4.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   95 4.2 Geographical Outline and Local Conditions of Abarkooh Basin����������������������������������������������������������������������������   97 4.3 Human Habitation in Abarkooh Basin and Uneven Distribution of Vital Resources ����������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 4.4 Climate Change and Its Impact on the Shared Water Resources in Abarkooh Basin����������������������������������������������������������������������������  102 4.5 Utilization of the Shared Water Resources Before and After the Land Reform ��������������������������������������������������������������  107 4.6 Shared Groundwater Resource in the Local Socio-­Economic Context����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  114 4.7 Conclusion����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  127 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  130 5 Cooperation in Lieu of Water ����������������������������������������������������������������  133 5.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  133 5.2 History of Hasan Abad Qanat ����������������������������������������������������������  136 5.3 Water Division and Management System of Hasan Abad Qanat������  141 5.4 Land and Water Ownership��������������������������������������������������������������  152 5.5 Role of Qanat Management Organization in Transboundary Cooperation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  157 5.6 Operation and Economic Aspect of Hasan Abad Qanat ������������������  166 5.7 Qanat of Hasan Abad in the Context of Modernity; Positive and Negative Impacts������������������������������������������������������������������������  170 5.8 Cultural Landscape of the Qanat of Hasan Abad������������������������������  172 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  176 6 Conclusion������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  179 6.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  179 6.2 Sustainable Management of Shared Aquifers in the Model of Livelihood Differentiation������������������������������������������������������������  182 6.3 Sustainability and Resilience in the Model of Common Benefit������  185 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  187 Bibliography����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  187 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  195

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract  This chapter mostly deals with the two concepts of “territory” and “territorial cooperation of water”. The chapter suggests some hypotheses on the role of shared water resources in strengthening cooperation between two or more beneficiary territories. The man-made water currents like qanat which are dependent on periodic maintenance can step up interaction and cooperation between different territories and can blunt the territorial identity, in case they flow across two or several territories and benefit all of them. In other words, where a man-made stream which needs maintenance to keep running crosses two or several territorial borders, the territorial borders may become more uncertain which encourages more cooperation across the borders, and accordingly more cooperation can make the borders vaguer and this cycle continues. According to this chapter, water is one of the vital resources that a community within its territory needs to live on. But in many cases, neither surface streams nor groundwater are confined within the territory borders as are the other resources such as soil, manpower, tools, infrastructures, etc. Therefore the neighboring territories have to establish a cooperative relationship to ensure their sustainable access to their shared water, which can be called territorial water cooperation.

1.1  Introduction Iran enjoys various climatic and geographical conditions which have led to different strategies that the inhabitants have taken to adapt themselves to their environments. In the central plateau of Iran, the climatic and geographical conditions gave rise to the technology of qanat which then underlay the production systems in this region. Qanat consists of some shaft wells interconnected by a subterranean tunnel which drains out the groundwater seepage and conveys it onto the earth surface using the height difference between the two ends of the tunnel. What propels water along a qanat tunnel is the force of gravity. In other words, a qanat is an underground drainage system which collects groundwater at a mountain base and brings it to the less elevated areas (Behnia 1988: 9). A typical qanat enjoys two main sections: water production section which cuts through water saturated soil and gets the groundwater © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Labbaf Khaneiki, Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0_1

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infiltration, and water transport section which serves to transfer this water down to the earth surface. In the past, central plateau of Iran had no water supply source but qanat to provide the agricultural and domestic sectors with water. Nowadays the urban sprawl and modern development have raised the level of water demand to the extent that the ancient qanats are not able to meet. Therefore many desert cities like Yazd have resorted to other alternatives such as tube wells and inter-basin water transfer in order to supply the required water. Overexploitation of groundwater has caused a dramatic decline in the groundwater resources and brought many qanats to the brink of annihilation. Qanat is considered a sustainable groundwater extraction technique that can guarantee a rational coexistence with nature. There is a rich literature about the environmental, technical, cultural and historical values of qanat (Labbaf Khaneiki and Semsar Yazdi 2015), but one cannot find many references on the role of qanat in territorial identities in its beneficiary societies. Territorial identity or behavior can impede the development of fruitful cooperative activities, but qanat could have built up a good capacity for cooperation and social convergence which can be used in configuring sustainable rural development and rural entrepreneurship. The structure of qanat which entails a vast spatial extent may pass across several territories whose inhabitants have to pull together in order to maximize their profit from its water. This study calls into question the common statement that water is always the matter of war and water scarcity in arid zones always triggers conflicts or nourishes oriental despotism. In fact qanat  – as the most vital water supply source in the central plateau of Iran – has not been able to fully meet the water demand of the growing population due to its structural peculiarities, so the qanat-based agricultural sector could not have absorbed all the existing labor force. Thus the population overflow turned to the industrial activities which were not that contingent on water. Growth of industrial activities then led to an increase in “Mobility” which could influence the territorial behavior in the end. The man-made water currents like qanat which are dependent on periodic maintenance can strengthen interaction and cooperation between different territories and can blunt the territorial identity, in case they flow across two or several territories and benefit all of them. In other words, where a man-made stream which needs maintenance to keep running crosses two or several territorial borders, the territorial borders may become more uncertain which encourages more cooperation across the borders, and accordingly more cooperation can make the borders vaguer and this cycle continues. The geographical and climatic conditions of the central plateau of Iran have ruled out the possibility of concentration of all the vital resources (water, soil, workforce, etc.) within a certain territory. The dispersal of pivotal resources over the different territories can make them more dependent on each other and weaken the territorial identity. For example, where a territory enjoys a fertile soil but has to bring water from its neighbor, it cannot develop the sense of self-sufficiency which usually hinges on territorial identity (Fig. 1.1). This chapter underlines qanat and its structural and social characteristics as the main groundwork for territorial cooperation. Territorial cooperation is anchored in

1.2 Territory

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Fig. 1.1  Role of qanat in strengthening territorial cooperation

feeble territorial identity which is associated with uncertainty of territorial borders. I believe that it is feasible to employ the territorial cooperation as a social capital in sustainable rural development. This chapter revolves around the concepts “territory” and “territorial cooperation of water” as a theoretical starting point for the next chapters which would zoom in on my case studies with the same approach.

1.2  Territory Territory is a geographical boundary within which a human community is entitled to the existing vital resources, and their common interests, profits and threats can develop a sense of attachment to the same territory among the community members. Territory is known as one of the most important factors in the mammals’ behaviors. According to biologists, territorial behavior is referred to as a behavior that the members of a particular species exhibit in order to ensure exclusive utilization of a specified area of land which includes the limited vital resources such as food, shelter and mate (Raven Peter and Johnson George 2001: 556). Evolutionary approach raises an important question about territorial behavior: why do the species accept the cost of defending their own territories? In evolutionary biology such questions are usually answered from economic or functional point of view. Although territorial defense may come at a heavy cost for many of the species, the potential benefit gained from the defense would still be so high that they retain enough motives to take such a risk. This benefit can appear in the forms of more secured food, more access to mates, better shelter against the dangers or predators, etc. (Ibid). Some scholars equate the principles of the territorial behaviors in human with that of some other mammals, and they apply the same methods to analyze what humans do in terms of territory. For example Laura Smith makes an analogy between the gangs’ territorial behaviors in Los Angles and the territorial behaviors of such mammals as wolves, and then she comes to the conclusion that the both follow the same pattern. She contends that the gangs specify their territories based on the existing spatial resources by drawing their own graffiti and special figures on the walls, like the wolves that spray their urine to mark their boundaries (Smith et al. 2012: 1). The

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b­ iologists’ findings later tuned up in the works of many scholars in humanities as well. Some believe that spatial territory means a limited space to which some individuals or groups are entitled as their exclusive area and they pull together to defend it whenever needed. In the context of culture, territory is absorbed into our psychological identity and along with the sense of ownership it turns into some symbols (Ansari et  al. 2010: 35). In different mythologies, one can find many examples about how territorial behavior has been exalted as a divine moral deed. For example every Iranian boasts about their legendary champion Arash the archer who was appointed following a truce in order to determine the border between Iran and its foe “Tooran“. Both sides had agreed to recognize wherever Arash’s arrow would land as their final border. The archer’s patriotic morale was so strong that he sent out his soul to propel the arrow which flew as far as the river of Jeyhoon and ripped the trunk of a walnut tree. Arash’s death has always been venerated as a hero who made such a sacrifice to preserve their sacred territory. Although territorial behavior is in fact anchored in our biological evolution, now many layers of our culture has engulfed it to such extent that its imprints are clearly visible in our religions, mythologies, literature, etc. Therefore we cannot reduce the territorial behavior in human only to biology which does not lead us to the truth due to the power of culture which may distort our nature to a large extent. Culture in human communities is so strong that it can divert some seemingly instinctive impulses or weaken or sublimate them. Thus in humanities, such concepts as territory and boundary are considered interdisciplinary, which engage many disciplines. International law deals with such subjects as border conflicts and frontier treaties. Constitutional law clarifies the legal nature of territory and border, while administrative law takes up provincial borders and their subdivisions and federal territories. International relations pertain to the issues of territorial conflicts or interactions as well as the role of territory in the national power and sovereignty. History of international relations revolves around the past of territorial tensions and competitions, while political geography examines the geopolitical, geostrategic and hydropolitical importance of the territories and borders, and political sciences see the border as the embodied concept of territory, which contributes to the formation of government (Khalili 2011: 8). According to these definitions, the concept of territory always influence the process of decision making, and every planning takes place in the context of territory. Based on this approach, territory means a space in which all the members of a community claim the ownership of a particular area and recognize kind of collective governance. Therefore these members should have the opportunity to participate in making decisions on public affairs, at least the decisions that can affect their livelihoods (Ambrosio-Albalá and Bastiaensen 2010: 11).

1.3  Territorial Water Cooperation

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1.3  Territorial Water Cooperation We can say that water is one of the vital resources that a community within its territory needs to live on. However, in many cases, neither surface streams nor groundwater are confined within the territory borders as are the other resources such as soil, manpower, tools, infrastructures, etc. Therefore the neighboring territories have to establish a cooperative relationship to ensure their sustainable access to their shared water, which can be called territorial water cooperation. However, what is cooperation at all? In general, cooperation is a complicated concept which has always piqued the interest of many scholars. Among the scholars there are two prevailing approaches toward cooperation as exogenous and endogenous. The exogenous approach goes hand in hand with the pessimism of Thomas Hobbes who believed that the advent of state tamed the limitless selfishness of the ancient people. According to him, cooperation is indebted to the governments which use different means to harness egotism and encourage altruism. Therefore cooperation is a quality directly foisted on the human society by the outside factors (Axelrod 1984: 4). However, the endogenous approach falls into two main groups first of which is discussed mostly in political sciences and economy, according to which the social foundations can intrinsically habituate their members to cooperation without imposing direct force. In other words, the cooperation needed for achieving organizational goals would protrude from its own context and then spread throughout the other social arenas, and then cooperation would turn into a social habit. That is why some scholars believe that many of our social behaviors are the holdovers from the large game hunting which used to demand a high level of cooperation from the prehistoric humans (Tadie and Fischer 2013). A social habit for cooperation sometimes conflicts with the personal profits of individuals, but cooperation is altogether in favor of the collective profit (Putnam 2000). The second group focuses on the concept of motivation rather than habit. According to this approach, the social foundations can systematically and logically generate the motivation required to continue the cooperation, and again this cooperation ensures the existence of those social foundations. In fact, an intricate relationship is formed between the members of a social foundation, from which the individuals feel that they can obtain maximum profit, through cooperation rather than ego centricism, selfishness and cheating (Coleman 1988). This notion revolves mostly around the relationship between the individuals and their society, and tries to justify the concept of cooperation by scrutinizing how the individuals are connected to their society as a whole in order to gain the maximum profit. However, cooperation can be explained through a tit-for-tat relationship that the individuals establish between themselves according to a spontaneous cost-profit calculation. This relationship which can lead to a cycle of cooperation has well been formulated in the game theory (Axelrod 1984). If we look at the water territorial cooperation from the standpoint of game theory, we may find ourselves trapped in a dilemma which is akin to the famous prisoner

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dilemma. In this dilemma, in case both the upstream and downstream farmers decide to extract less water from the shared aquifer for example regarding Abarkooh basin described in the next chapters, they in fact take a cooperative strategy which leads to preservation of their aquifer and accordingly a sustainable utilization of the groundwater, to the benefit of both sides. However, none of the beneficiary communities can take it for granted that the other side would really abstain from over-­ exploiting the shared aquifer if they do so. In case the upstream community would defect by extracting the shared aquifer as much as they can, but the downstream community adheres to their commitment and abstain, the downstream would gain the least benefit. Thus, the upstream would be loser, in case they abstain but the downstream defects and appropriate the shared aquifer. Therefore, both communities tend to defect mutually on condition that they would not know about the other sides’ intention and final decision. In a nutshell the exploitation of the shared aquifer in a basin like Abarkooh can possibly take place by the four strategies as follows: 1. Cooperative strategy where both upstream and downstream communities abstain from over-extracting 2. Defector versus sucker strategy where upstream still abstains but downstream defects and gets the most benefit 3. Sucker versus defector where downstream abstains but upstream defects 4. Defect strategy where both parties defect and gain a benefit less than when they defect unilaterally but more than when they are betrayed. According to game theory, the upstream and downstream communities are expected to over-exploit the shared aquifer by drilling as many wells as they can, if they are not sure about what the other side is up to. In the next chapters where I detail the situation of Abarkooh basin, you can see that the same strategy proves prevalent over the past four decades. Nonetheless prisoner dilemma goes down a different path if the partners know about each other’s decision. In this case, the tit-for-tat strategy would tend to prevail over the behavior of both sides. Defectors can win in short term but their number tends to dwindle in the society in long term, because of their random fatal encounters with other defectors. The number of suckers who always trust and lose would also fall because of their encounters with the defectors. Therefore those who retaliate rather than defect or trust can better survive the game and form the majority over time. Can we say that a tit-for-tat pattern prevailed over the basin of Abarkooh at best? In this study, later we will see that before 1980 another strategy beyond the prisoner dilemma was in place, which could not be explained easily by either defect strategy (when the players are not aware of each other’s decision) or tit-for-tat strategy (when both are aware of so). In our case studies in this book, the cooperative interactions between the basin upstream and downstream do not always live up to the logic of the prisoner dilemma, at least in the past when their water resources were fairly and sustainably shared. According to the prisoner dilemma, an over-­ exploitation in the upstream would be responded by a similar action in the downstream and their relationship would spill into a vicious cycle of retaliation until their

1.3  Territorial Water Cooperation

7

shared resources would collapse. This status is called “the tragedy of the commons” by Hardin, resulting from unlimited demands for a limited common resource. Under such condition, everyone in a particular community tries to gain more share of a common resource in the knowledge that over-exploitation would put pressure on the resource and bring about a long term cost, but he would be incentivized by the fact that the cost is for everyone and the benefit is only for him. The common resources tend to enter the tragedy of the commons unless some systematic factors would restrict the over-exploitation and discourage the greedy individuals (Hardin 1968). Here we should take a further step toward a more convincing theory to better understand the concept of water cooperation. Ostrom the American political economist who won the Nobel Memorial Prize in 2009 began her argument with the same game theory but she moved on to come up with a more convicting answer to the question how the common pool resources like groundwater are shared and used by different beneficiaries. She writes that “I would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than remorseless tragedies” (Ostrom 1990: 7). We should not confuse common pool resources with open source properties which are believed to have been pervasive in the primitive societies within their communal territory where everyone – from the same society - was equally entitled to the available vital resources almost with no regulation or limitation. Sometimes the concept of common pool resources is mistakenly equated with a lawless open source which can be utilized by every member of a particular society (Fennell 2011: 12). Utilization of common pool resources is not necessarily tantamount to equal access for everyone, but utilization is regulated in the context of many socio-­ economic interactions in the local society. If we return to the subject of this book, we may imagine that groundwater resources are used as open source properties the like of which everyone is free to extract as much as they wish. However, groundwater as a common pool resource is controlled by a nexus of social and economic processes which regulate the individuals’ access according to their social roles, positions, etc. Given that the groundwater resource belongs to the whole society rather than to a few individuals, it is in sync with the environmental conditions on the one hand and with the social circumstances on the other hand. Thus, treating the groundwater as a common pool resource could have ensured its sustainability to the long-term benefit of the beneficiary society in the course of history. As an example, let’s return to our own case study in the Abarkooh basin. In this basin, an aquifer used to be shared between a pastoral community in the upstream and an agrarian community which populated the basin downstream. The aquifer as a common pool resource was replenished by the relatively low precipitation which mostly occurred in the upstream elevated lands. Both upstream and downstream communities utilized the same aquifer in the knowledge that how the other party was playing the game. The prisoner dilemma tells us that we should expect a tit-for-­ tat strategy gradually foisted on the behaviors of both communities. In other words, we should have seen lots of water wells mushrooming in both territories, which have been dug respectively by upstream and downstream communities in reprisal. If the prisoner dilemma was their behavioral pattern, even a drop of water would not

8

1 Introduction

be left in the shared aquifer over hundreds of years of groundwater extraction in the region. To answer the question how come those communities could sustain their groundwater extraction without falling into the vicious cycle of retaliatory exploitation of the shared aquifer, we should pay attention to their indigenous management systems. Both communities came to divide the geography between themselves according to their specialized economic requirements, a spontaneous managerial process which I called “livelihood differentiation” in the next chapters. This livelihood differentiation served as a system which sustainably regulated a cooperative relationship between the basin upstream and downstream. Based on Ostrom’s notion, livelihood differentiation can be viewed as a common property system which ensured the sustainability of the shared aquifer as a common pool resource. However, a disproportional socio-economic transition over the past four decades plagued the traditional common property system and accordingly the cooperative interaction was replaced by a retaliatory relationship as portrayed in the prisoner dilemma, which eventually led to a dramatic drawdown in the shared aquifer, drying up of almost all the qanats, a decline in groundwater quality, and a social and economic crisis. Moreover, cooperation seems one of the most important outcomes of social capital, so in turn a high social capital can result in more cooperation which facilitates the process of development. Antoci and others define social capital as a collection of re-generating and active properties, which is inherent in the social structure of a particular group, facilitating the cooperation between the group members in order to achieve their common goal. These properties are not on a par with physical factors of production or manpower, but they are more intangible (Antoci et al. 2005: 151). Beard believes that social capital is kind of social relation which embraces trust, interaction and cooperation (Beard 2005: 23). Hayami contends that social capital is a system of unofficial social relations which develops more cooperation between economic practitioners and eventually can increase the physical capital of those who play an active role in this system (Hayami 2009: 98). What Reis says about the epistemology of territory mostly revolves around the interaction – and sometimes conflict – between the two key concepts which in fact underlie the social and economic structures: “mobility” and “territorialisation”. Mobility is one of the peculiarities of the production factors, and describes the factors that are not limited to a certain territory, and their optimum location is not dictated by spatial parameters. For example, the carpet workshops are more lucrative in the regions where more skillful workers are available. Therefore the skill of carpet making carries the trait of mobility and is not much tethered to land. However, territorialisation pertains to some production factors whose optimum function relies on space, and spatial proximity is necessary for them to ensure their functional connections with other factors. For example, pasture is a production factor which is firmly fixed in territory and the pastoralist economy is formed by a functional relationship between pasture and the other factors like livestock (Reis 2012). The notion of territory is associated with either interaction or conflict between the two abovementioned concepts: “mobility” and “territorialisation”. The more production factors in a society are anchored in territory, the stronger territorial identity, and then

1.3  Territorial Water Cooperation

9

territory would appear as the backbone of all the social, economic and political structures. On the contrary, the more mobility the production factors enjoy, the weaker the territorial identity, and accordingly the less territory-based power would be built up. Reis’s theory is a good starting point for investigating the issue of territory in my case study. Building upon this theory, one can assume a spectrum for territory, whose one extreme is nomadic economy based on animal husbandry and the other extreme is industrial economy. In nomadic economy most of the production factors are anchored in territory and their spatial proximity plays a vital role in their optimum function. Livestock, pasture, manpower, water resources, pastoral paths, etc. are all interwoven through systematic ecological and spatial relationships. For example, type and variety of livestock is selected according to the environmental conditions of the region and also is influenced by other production factors (Papoli Yazd, Labbaf Khaneiki, 2000). Pasture is also limited by the environmental conditions, as a part of the intricate human ecology in the region, and has a territorial nature (Papoli Yazd, Labbaf Khaneiki, 2000). However, in the industrial economy, the most important factor is human skill which is deployed in making tools, using tools, manufacturing process, production planning and marketing. The other economies are placed somewhere on the spectrum between these two extremes. The most important question is what spot on the spectrum the economy of Iranian central plateau has been placed by qanat and how. It seems very likely that the structural peculiarities of qanat have not allowed it to supply enough water to the growing population, and the available water supply has always lagged behind the population growth, and accordingly the irrigated agricultural sector could not absorb all the available manpower. As a result, the manpower surplus turned to the local industrial activities whose water demand was much lower than that of agriculture. Therefore development of such industries could lead to a rise in “mobility” which could influence the concept of territory. The issue of environmental limitations and their impact on the development of industrial activities are neither new nor out of the academic debates. A deeper understanding of rural industries can shed light on the complicated relationship between “territory” and “production systems”. The theory of “proto-­industrialization” first appeared in Franklin Mendels’s PhD dissertation and was then introduced to the literature of development in 1972 (Mendels 1972). According to this theory, prior to modern industrialization in west, in Europe between 16 and 19 centuries kind of spontaneous organic industrialization came into existence as a result of interactions between geographical conditions and socio-economic predispositions in those regions (Catheren 2008: 1). Those pre-modern industries came to expand their influence area and worked their way into the markets even out of their local territories. Proto-industrialization was rooted in rural regions of Europe, and is regarded as the first stage of the modern industrial revolution in the west (Mendels 1972: 241). Proto-industrialization is premised on the fact that the climatic and geographical conditions in many European regions did not favor involvement in agricultural activities all year round, so the manpower temporarily detached from agriculture could pave the way for rural industries to flourish. Capital was gradually

10

1 Introduction

built up in rural industries, which could lead to more manpower being drained from agricultural sector, and such a cycle brought about more development for rural industries. Development of rural industries in turn challenged many of norms and mechanisms in the European societies, and the traditional systems started to loosen their hold, the systems that used to be very conservative and systematically keep the population growth in balance with the available economic resources. As a result, proto-industrialization pieced together all the essential elements needed for the launch of the modern industrialization such as workforce, capital, liberalism, technical expertise, commercial and manufacturing enterprises, inter-regional markets, etc., and thus the economic destiny of west headed down a new path. Nevertheless the theory of proto-industrialization was modified by some scholars like Levine who regarded proto-industrialization as part of a bigger process referred to as “proletarianization”. Levine believes that proto-industrialization was followed by an abrupt population growth which disturbed traditional patterns of land ownership and social structures in rural communities. That process left behind a considerable population who no longer possessed enough farmlands for their livelihood and had to work for others in return for wage. Therefore manpower was transformed into a proletarian nature in the wake of proto-industrialization, which eventually gave rise to modern industrial revolution (Levine 1977). Later some scholars like Kreidte tried to conflate the theories of Mendels and Levine in order to reach a description on historical move of Europe from feudalism to capitalism (Kriedte et al. 1981: 8). In all these interpretations, manpower or in general human capital remains as a key factor for industrialization process (Suarez-Villa 1985: 319). Except for modern industrial revolution in relation to proto-industrialization, there has been the same pattern of proto-industrialization in the central plateau of Iran. Proto-industrialization is a complicated geographical, social and economic process which is in fact rooted in an interaction between such different elements. These elements may come together and pave the way for proto-industrialization even far away from the European lands. For example, proto-industrialization also came about in Japan and later made it possible for modern industrialization to thrive there (Howell 1992). Even in the central plateau of Iran, proto-industrialization gave rise to a capacity for modern industrialization through an interaction between geographical, social and economic factors, though this capacity was overshadowed by cultural hegemony of the surrounding Iran and was stifled from its beginning. In fact in central plateau of Iran, qanat as the only water supply for agricultural production went with a technical limitation. Qanat could drain out just the overflow of groundwater based on gravity, the same water that came down in the shape of rain or snow at the top of some sparse elevations in the region. Therefore the area of farmlands was not able to keep pace with any increase in population, due to such a limitation in water supply (qanat). In Europe the long winter put limitation on constant agriculture and drove people to invent a way to supplement their income using the surplus manpower from agricultural sector. In central plateau of Iran, the same process took place but because of water limitation rather than the long freezing

1.3  Territorial Water Cooperation

11

winters. Thus In central plateau of Iran small home industries could take advantage of this condition and thrive to a considerable extent. These industries played a crucial role in the economic structure of the region, the industries which rose to national and sometimes international fame such as Persian carpet, textile, silk, pottery, tile, glass, metal products, etc. The following figure shows this geographical-economic mechanism in more detail. In this figure, qanat is impaired by some natural, technical and managerial limitations which are all associated with the structural peculiarities of qanat. The first limitation is water itself which cannot be increased in proportion to increasing water demand. The qanat tunnel is not typically higher than 160 and wider than 80 cm, into which groundwater seeps slowly, builds up and then flows down. Therefore it is not possible to obtain a huge water flow through a typical qanat. Although its water flow can be increased to some extent by digging further into the aquifer or building side braches (Semsar Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2017), other factors may keep such measures at bay. For example, geological condition is not usually homogenous in a particular region, so the extension of a tunnel or side branches may come across impassable barriers such as saline formations or hard rocks which rule out more advance. Also the extent of aquifer and its hydraulic gradient are among the natural limitations which hinder more advances into aquifer. Moreover, the legal bound of neighboring qanats should be observed while extending the qanat gallery through water bearing zone. In many cases there are other qanats adjacent to a qanat, all taking water from the same aquifer. Therefore a qanat advancing toward another qanat can cause a decrease in its water flow, and so is forbidden by tradition and law. Even extending of a qanat should be carried out in tandem with its neighboring qanats, which is calculated by a qanat expert based on the depth of each qanat. The following figure shows the cost of qanat extension as another limitation. Qanat extension can increase the groundwater infiltration area along the tunnel and accordingly results in more water flowing out of qanat. Most of the qanats enjoy petty land ownership, owned by low income farmers who do not afford the high expense of constant extension. Therefore qanat extension is a measure taken to retain the qanat flow or retrieve the same flow if qanat flow would dwindle. In other words, qanat extension serves to retain the present situation, and is not aimed at obtaining more water than the normal hydraulic regime of qanat. It should be also noted that qanat is usually used for surface (flood) irrigation with traditional earthen ditches in which a considerable portion of water percolate or evaporate. Therefore, the more the cultivated area expands and the more earthen open ditches would be built, the more water would escape through percolation and evaporation and the less irrigation efficiency. Moreover, ownership structure of qanat impedes any more development in its agricultural system. Qanats mostly enjoy a joint ownership, and heredity makes water shares become smaller and smaller over time. On the other hand, ownership of water independent from land is considered another limitation for the development of qanat based agricultural systems. These factors altogether prevent qanat-­ based agricultural systems from expanding in order to feed the growing population,

12

1 Introduction

the population that increases exponentially, though the available water resource remains constant at best. Such limitations which are inherent in qanat-based agricultural systems do not allow the whole manpower to engage in agricultural sector, and pave the way for other economic sectors to play their role to supplement the income deficiency of such a subsistence agriculture. One of most important economic sectors in central plateau of Iran has been small local industries which have always served as the cornerstone of the financial and commercial processes in the course of history. Qanat-based agricultural systems used to end up in agricultural products which were all usually consumed in this same region. But a considerable portion of industrial products were intended for exporting to as far other regions as China and India. One can liken those oases in the Iranian desert to some islands scattered across an ocean. Each island has a fragile agricultural system based on irrigational technique of qanat, which cannot provide the booming population with enough food. Therefore the islanders have to hone their skills in industrial and trading activities in order to barter their products for more food with other regions. Those islands have no next neighbors, but they have to travel a relatively long distance across the ocean to reach the first residential land. This example implies some similarities between the conditions that prevailed in the Iranian oases and in some islands like England. Therefore, in central plateau of Iran proto-industrialization led to the expansion of economic and commercial activities across the geography. This current of goods and capitals resulted from proto-industrialization in turn gave rise to some social consequences out of which “territorial cooperation” is of great importance (Fig. 1.2). As mentioned, the subsistence agriculture based on qanat irrigation could not satisfy all the needs of the growing population, and could not involve all the available workforce either. Therefore the workforce surplus resorted to local industries whose products were usually exported to the other regions from where many agricultural products were imported. In fact, they imported water in the shape of agricultural products, taking into account the fact that they no longer needed to worry about water by importing the crop itself which was already watered somewhere else. A particular amount of water is required to produce a particular amount of crop, which is called virtual water. The following figure shows how proto-­ industrialization resulted in importing virtual water which in turn paved the way for territorial cooperation of qanat. Remembering Reis’s theory, one can conclude that in central plateau of Iran pivotal role of small industries have caused such industries to enjoy more mobility and less territorialisation. As mentioned before, in industry there are fewer factors which are inseparable from land or from each other. In industry, the most important factor is human skill which enjoys a high mobility in this sense. Therefore, industry is less susceptible to territory than agriculture, and agriculture is less sensitive to territory than nomadic animal husbandry. More mobility in this sense can make “territory” wane and become more uncertain, and accordingly an uncertain territory makes it easier to coexist and cooperate across its border (Fig. 1.3).

Fig. 1.2  Conceptual model of qanat limitations and their role in the development of local industries

Fig. 1.3  Role of qanat in reinforcing territorial cooperation

14

1 Introduction

Other issues that help us better understand the concept of territory in central plateau of Iran are physical structure and managerial system of qanat which give rise to cooperation and social convergence. In many of qanats like qanat of Hasan Abad (one of my case studies), two or more villages are entitled to a particular qanat which is shared among them to everyone’s benefit. Qanat is a system with a vast spatial extent that may reach the length of tens of kilometers. Therefore taking care of such a system demands a close cooperation from all the shareholders. In most cases, there are some artificial recharge dams locally named Goorab upstream from a qanat. Those earthen dams served to trap the seasonal runoffs behind them and make the water seep into the earth and replenish the aquifer. The dams used to play a vital role in sustaining the qanat discharge. The dams were not located in the territory of the direct beneficiaries of qanat, but they had to be built in the territory of another village up slope from the qanat. But those villagers raised no objection to the construction of such dams in their territory even though they could not gain from the qanat water at all because of height difference. They tolerated the presence of those dams, because they could take indirect advantage of the dams whose sediments were arable and quite suitable for dry farming. The sediments behind the dams provided enough moisture for the crops after water fully subsided and percolated through the ground into the aquifer. The damp sediments were regarded as an opportunity for the upstream villagers to cultivate with no need for irrigation. In case of qanat of Hasan Abad, there are three regions lying along the qanat, each of which has a share of water respectively. This qanat originates from southwest of Mehriz about one kilometer northwest of Gharbalbiz spring, and travels some 40 km to the village of Hasan Abad on western side of Yazd outskirt, respectively watering Sadati district in the town of Mehriz, village of Dehno and eventually Hasan Abad on its way. Sadati district is the first place where the gradient of tunnel allows water to appear on the earth surface. One fifth of water is allotted to Sadati district, and the rest is transferred to the next place through another underground tunnel. The next place is Dehno which takes two fifth of qanat water and releases the rest for Hasan Abad through another underground tunnel. A 40 km long tunnel from its mother well to its final exit point requires a constant maintenance, because any obstruction in the tunnel can come at a heavy cost for the three regions similarly. If somewhere in the tunnel collapses and the ruin was not removed immediately, the water build-up can cause more collapses and hamper the function of qanat. The qanat runs across three territories and makes them all converge and cooperate. Moreover the qanat needs to be extended every year. In other words, the qanat gallery should advance a few meters a year into aquifer in order to keep the same flow. The gallery extension is carried out upstream of qanat and in the vicinity of its mother well located in Mehriz territory, though the two other territories also team up. Also, if the qanat downstream needs to be repaired or cleaned out, the upstream

1.3  Territorial Water Cooperation

15

territories do not hesitate to cooperate. The dynamic of qanat transcends the concept of territory and accordingly the territorial identity wanes, and cooperation and convergence across the border become more feasible. Such man-made water conduits or canals as qanat whose operation is dependent on periodic humans’ care, can weaken territorial cooperation and then strengthen cooperation between different territories, while passing across two or several territories and benefiting all of them. In this case the territorial borders would become more uncertain, which paves the way for more cooperation and interaction, and more cooperation can make the borders more uncertain and this cycle continues. This situation can hardly be extrapolated to natural streams of water like rivers and springs and sometimes the reverse is true, though some scholars completely rule out considerable number of conflicts over water  – even natural streams  - in the course of history. Dinar contends that “water war” is limited to popular press and policy oriented media. According to him “the last time water has played the main role in instigating a war was 4500 years ago” between Lagash and Umma over rights to use Tigris River in modern day Iraq (Dinar 2007: 22). Military clashes between countries purely over water have rarely ever occurred and are unlikely to occur in the future (Mauelshagen 2009). Universally water-related conflicts tend to be internal and take place between local groups and not between states (Gamaliel and Mwagiru 2017: 62). Historical records confirm over 3500 water agreements compared to the small number of military confrontations over freshwater, of which the earliest dates back to some 1200 years ago (Dinar 2007: 29). Priscoli argues that water agreements have actually prevented major conflicts such as on the subcontinent between Pakistan and India (Priscoli 1998: 626). Also Allan tries to disprove the popular intuition that scarcity of water will necessarily lead to water wars by giving an example about the Middle East where has shown no signs of a genuine water war since some minor military events in the northern Jordan Valley in the early 1960s. “On the contrary, there is much evidence of cooperation over scarce water resources in the region, especially in the Jordan River Basin, where freshwater is scarcest” (Allan 2002: 256). According to United Nations Environment Programme, even the world’s most vociferous enemies have negotiated water agreements or are in the process of doing so, and the institutions they have created often prove to be resilient, even when their relations are strained (Wolf Aaron 2005: 10). Wolf believes that despite the potential for dispute in international basins, the record of acute conflict over water resources is historically overwhelmed by the record of cooperation (Wolf Aaron 2007: 20). Nevertheless some other scholars come up with opposite facts proving that water has always played a pivotal role in many historical wars. For example Gleick believes that history of water conflicts dates back to 5000 years ago (Gleick 1993: 80) and “water and water supply systems have been the roots and instruments of war” (Ibid: 83). His search in historical records yields different results as he says that 700 years BC Ashurbanipal of Assyria seized control of water wells to deprive rival Arabia of their water supply, and war over water in the Middle East continued into twentieth century when the 1967 War broke out between Israel and its

16

1 Introduction

n­ eighboring Arab states in the wake of the attempt of Arab League to divert Jordan River away from Israel, at least as one of the war reasons (Ibid: 85). Also some scholars highlight 38 acute disputes between 1948 and 2008, of those, 31 were between Israel and one or more of its neighbors. Yet most of the cases are believed to be political tensions or instability rather than true acts of war, or involved using water as a tool, target, or victim of armed conflict (Petersen-Perlman et al. 2017: 107). Though there is evidence that tends to support the view that vying for more control over the sources of the Jordan River contributed to the 1967 war between Israel and Syria, Egypt and Jordan (Zeitoun 2008: 3). Klare forecasts even increasing conflict over the river systems where growing demands press against limited supplies, especially in Tigris-Euphrates, Indus, the Nile, and Jordan (Klare 2002). This controversy may have something to do with different types of shared water resources. The water resources that tie everyone’s benefits up with each another seem less likely to foment conflicts. Such water resources are contingent on interaction and cooperation from all parties in order to keep running. Different components of such water resources – such as water catchment, water source, hydraulic structures, management system, etc. – are located and relatively scattered on both sides of the border, while benefiting the both sides. Therefore the both sides have to contribute to the water supply system whose operation hinges on their mutual collaboration. This study also considers the difference between natural and artificial water resources. Wolf differentiates between two types of water resources which give rise to two different approaches toward them. According to him, spirituality underlies such a water dualism. For example he says: “different Islamic legal tenets apply to different water sources, basically divided by whether the water is ‘provided by God’ (i.e. from a natural surface or groundwater source which is available year-round) or whether it is ‘provided by man’ (i.e. the human labor which creates a cistern or the attendant canal system). ‘God-given’ waters may not be bought or sold, and their use is available to all equally. To many, the idea of buying and selling water is both repugnant” (Wolf 2012: 82). We may say that the difference between two types of water resources or streams has been reflected in our spiritual beliefs. Natural water streams are more of a bonanza whose operation and maintenance do not require much human skill and cooperation between communities. Therefore their utilization brings about competition rather than cooperation. In this study some examples of this situation have been given. On the contrary, the man-made canals and conduits tend to foster cooperation and mutual interaction between the beneficiaries and this situation can be the cause and result of “territorial uncertainty” at the same time. Danube River along with its man-made canals is a well-­ known international example, which has been used for navigation and transportation since long time ago, connecting many regions in Europe. The main Danube and its 60 tributaries are all shippable, some of which like Tisa-Danube Canal, Danube-­ Black Sea Canal (with the length of 64 km) and Rhine–Main–Danube Canal (with the length of 171  km) have been built by human for the purpose of navigation. Transportation of considerable amount of commodities through these shippable canals could have entwined the economic destinies of many European countries, the

1.4  Proto–Industrialization and Drought Pump

17

way qanat system does on a much smaller scale. In 1948 seven European countries proceeded to establish Danube Commission which was in charge of reinforcing cooperation between the member states in order to ensure free shipping in Danube, albeit the initial idea of this commission dates back to 1856. Later some other countries joined the commission and now it includes Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Serbia (Margić 2014). Inevitable cooperation in Danube region helped to lessen territorial identity, and the moderate territorial identity accordingly paved the way for closer cooperation. As a result, in December 2013 Danube Transnational Cooperation Programme was signed between 14 European countries out of which 9 countries are among the European Union members. Danube Transnational Cooperation Programme has been envisaged for the years 2014 to 2020 and it has expanded cooperation beyond the issue of shipping in Danube into social, political and environmental realms (European Union 2013). Such artificial water canals can lead to the genesis of a “cooperation-territorial uncertainty-cooperation” cycle. If this hypothesis proves true that waning territorial identity leads to closer cooperation and interaction between two or more territories, the other elements should still be factored in. Another factor that contributes to the territorial uncertainty is the dispersal of vital resources over the central plateau of Iran. In other words such vital resources as fresh water, arable soil, favorable climate, etc. are scattered over a wide geographical area and cannot be placed within a specified territory. For example, fertile soil suitable for cultivation is found somewhere far away from fresh water resources and water may be found in the area where arable soil is not available. In fact the close and self-sufficient territories are very rare in this region. Therefore, spatial dispersal of vital resources like fresh water and arable soil over the central plateau of Iran reduces the possibility of determining certain territories which are expected to contain all essential resources needed for the survival of the territory holders. This situation can in turn lead to a feeble territorial identity and then stronger sense of cooperation across the borders.

1.4  Proto–Industrialization and Drought Pump The story of the human’s evolution inspired me to find some subtle connections between the intermittent droughts, waves of migration and cultural interaction with other territories. It is said that millions of years ago, the Sahara region in Africa went through some recurring dry periods with wet intervals when the precipitation rose, some fresh water bodies came about and a green savanna covered the landscape. During the wet period, the favorable conditions of the region drew many species in drove including humans. However, these appealing conditions did not last long and the species were driven away toward the four geographical directions by a severe dry period which turned the savanna into a harsh impassible desert. The desert served as a barrier which kept the members of a particular species separated for a while long enough to evolve in different ways in order to adapt themselves to the

18

1 Introduction

new geographies to which they had migrated. In fact, the diversity of life is simply indebted to a cycle of wet Sahara, migration into Sahara, dry Sahara and then migration out of Sahara. Of course several waves of primitive humans’ migration out of Africa are associated with this cycle which is also called “Sahara Pump” (Parravicini and Pievani 2016). It was very probable that over the past centuries, recurring droughts in the central plateau of Iran played a similar role but in a cultural rather than biological manner. In other words, the dry periods pushed the population surplus out of the qanat-­ dominated regions when the environmental pressure even went beyond the threshold that the offset economic sectors no longer sufficed to recruit the excess workforce. The local communities responded to the climate change with three different strategies, given the magnitude of water scarcity. During a wet period they expanded the area of their cultivated lands with a wider variety of crops and they made less lands lie fallow. When a year turned dry, they shrank the area of farmlands and let more lands lie fallow and resorted to a cropping pattern with lower water demand. Also they put more focus on handicrafts and local industries which could make up for the income that they lost to such a downturn in agriculture. This stage can be called proto-industrialization which could supplement their fickle agricultural economy. During the two former stages, the population could be still fed and sustained by a mixed economy moving between agriculture, local industries and trading. However, there was a third stage when the aridness crossed the tolerance line of the society, and then even the offset economy did not help. In this case, part of the population began to overflow and migrate to the more favorable regions as far as Khorasan, Fars, Khoozestan, etc. There have been several important waves of migration from for example Yazd to the other regions in the wake of some intermittent droughts. That is why it is very easy to find the communities of Yazd’s people in almost every city around the central plateau of Iran, and it is quite possible to track down the impact of Yazd’s art and culture on the host societies. Meybod is a small town near Yazd, whose potteries are well known all over the country. The Iranians coveted those beautiful potteries with their amazing white paintings on a blue glazed background. There is a village in the province of Khorasan Razavi, whose handicraft is mostly a type of pottery which bears a striking resemblance to that of Meybod. The name of the village is Mend, probably a shortened pronunciation of Meybod. In the village, some elderly allege that their ancestors came from Meybod in Yazd a long time ago. Other than those similar potteries and people’s anecdotes, I could not find a reliable evidence to prove that those villagers are really the holdover of a wave of migration provoked by a severe drought. Nonetheless, we can still point out many communities in other regions, who were driven out of their qanat-dependant regions and brought with them the fruits of proto-industrialization to the host societies.

1.5  Water as a Geographical Possibility

19

1.5  Water as a Geographical Possibility No one denies that human communities can never be spared from the influence of their natural environment, but this fact may lead to the notion that similar geographies can give rise to similar human civilizations. If we want to pinpoint two different places on the world map with the most environmental disparity, we may pick Yazd and Venice in Iran and Italy, whose dissimilarity seemingly rules out the possibility of finding any cultural and social resemblance between them. Yazd is surrounded by dryness and Venice is besieged by water, creating two different geographical conditions which deflect our attention from any possible similarities. I too used to take it for granted that these two places – Yazd and Venice – might have gone down two different paths in the course of history. When I was invited by UNESCO Venice Office to attend a meeting on “Global Network of Water Museums” in May 2017, I happened to get lost in the maze of those narrow alleys, which made me find a subtle resemblance between Venice and Yazd. Venice cisterns and their relation to the urban layout were redolent of Yazd water reservoirs whose positions have played an important role in the urban layout. Even up to 1884, fresh water was supplied to Venice population only through some 231 cisterns or wells which are spread out all over the city. These cisterns used to be filled up by rainwater which was filtered through layers of clay and fine sand and then accumulated in the cistern well. Sometimes the cisterns were supplemented by spring water which was carried in barrels by boats from the mainland to this island. Some scholars believed that Venice mostly accommodated the fugitives who fled the waves of violence and prosecution after the collapse of Western Roman Empire in 476 AD. The island was secured by a surrounding saltwater lagoon, though it could not provide its inhabitants with their required fresh water. Therefore they managed to build some cisterns to store fresh water, as vital elements in urban fabric. People of Venice could not fasten their hope on agricultural activities and instead they turned to trading and small industries to earn their living. They in fact managed to trade their products for the ones whose production needed more water, and this way they satisfied part of their water demand by importing virtual water as explained earlier. The siege of saltwater forced them to establish relatively long distance trading with other communities who used to supply the goods that the island itself lacked. In Venice, freshwater scarcity paved the way for some especial economic, social and cultural structures to come into existence, the same process that took place in Yazd as a result of a systematic relationship between human and water. To our surprise, Yazd is surrounded by a vast desert bringing about the situation of an island in a lagoon, which has always been a safe haven for different groups of fugitives. Fresh water scarcity left no option for Yazd inhabitants but building some cisterns to store fresh water, and then these cisterns turned out to be one of the most crucial elements that dictated the urban layout. Like Venice, Yazd environment did not favor agricultural activities, and the population developed their skills in trading and small industries in order to supplement their feeble agricultural economy. Again

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like Venice, Yazd was besieged by something as impassable as sea, a desert which necessitated long distance trading. The similar cultural landscapes in Yazd and Venice have emanated from similar collective responses of those communities to water resources. When it comes to geography of justice, even more striking resemblance between the two cities comes to light. In Venice the public cisterns were built in the city squares or Campo where everyone could have free access to the water. Many of the cisterns were built with the support of the rich families who could carve their coat of arms on the well lid in return for their charitable donation. Those rich families mostly used to have private cisterns at their houses, where they could use their clean roof gutters to harvest the rain water as well and bring it to the cistern, whereas the commoners had to drink water from the public cisterns whose water came from the square pavement. Though the water seeped through layers of sand before reaching the infiltration well, the commoners were more subject to infected water than the nobles especially at the time of epidemics. It was almost impossible for the commoners to build private cisterns at home, because it entailed a relatively large area plus a good budget of which they were bereft. To build a typical cistern, it was required to dig a round pit some 5 m deep and about 10 m in diameter, which is considered huge on a small and densely populated island. The pit had to be insulated against the sea water intrusion and also against the fresh water percolation, and then different types of sands had to be transferred to the island to fill up the pit in layers. In the middle of the pit, a well was built – not dug – with limestone blocks cemented by a permeable mortar through which the pit water could seep into the well. Also some openings were devised as far away from the middle well as possible, such that all the square surface would be sloped toward them for the purpose of collecting rainwater. No doubt the ordinary citizens did not afford to build such cisterns with such costly requirements. As a result, social stratification became associated with different levels of access to clean water. The highest social class had the advantage to access the safest water, like what we see in Yazd. In Yazd, drinking water was supplied to the inhabitants by some cisterns or water reservoirs which are dotted all over the city. Though the maze-like alleys seem not to follow any vivid pattern, the urban layout still gravitates to the water resources including the cisterns and the qanat tunnels which run beneath the city. Like Venice, the cisterns of Yazd were mostly built by the money donated by the rich families whose names were engraved on an endowment inscription attached to the cistern wall at its entrance. The rich families had their houses built in the qanat upstream where the tunnel just entered the city and its water was at its best. Some of the affluent households even enjoyed a private cistern, though its construction was much costly far beyond the commoners’ pocket. A typical cistern consisted of a water tank which was built underground, some wind catchers which served as a ventilation system, a brick dome which covered the water tank, one or two stairways through which people could climb down to collect water, and a faucet at the bottom of the stairway to tap water. Also, the commoners had no chance to build their homes on the top of the qanat tunnel in its very upstream where they could potentially dig a stairway down to the

References

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underground tunnel to get direct access to the clean water, in the way that the rich people usually did. The distance of people from clean water correlated somehow with their different positions in the social hierarchy. This example shows that similar geographical conditions cannot always be expected to provoke similar responses in human communities, but in many cases the reverse proves true. Water cultural landscape is more of a systematic interaction between humans and their natural environment than a simple geographical influence exerted on humans. The similarity between the economic and social structures in Yazd and Venice suggests that geographical possibilities have an inevitable impact on our human lives. In other words, it is not the geographical condition that directly shapes our civilizations, but it is rather the geographical possibilities that usually take over the reins. What this situation sounds is not on a par with geographical determinism and also is not akin to the possibilism, but probably stands in between such that one may call it deterministic possibilism.

References Allan, J. A. (2002). “Hydro-peace in the Middle East: Why no water wars? A case study of the Jordan river basin”, SAIS review vol. XXII no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2002). Ambrosio-Albalá, M., & Bastiaensen, J. (2010). The new territorial paradigm of rural development: Theoretical foundations from systems and institutional theories, Belgium: University of Antwerp. Ansari, M., Jamshidi, S., & Almasifar, N. (2010). To investigate feeling of territory and in territory traveling in urban parks case study: Saee park.” (in Persian. Armanshahr Architecture & Urban Development, 3(4), 33–48. Antoci, A., Sacco, P. L., & Vanin, P. (2005). On the possible conflict between economic growth and social development. In B.  Gui & R.  Sugden (Eds.), Economics and social interaction: Accounting for interpersonal relations (pp.  150–173). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books Publishers. Beard, V.  A. (2005). Individual determinants of participation in community development in Indonesia. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 23, 21–39. Behnia, A. (1988). Building of maintaining Qanat. Tehran: Markaz-e Nashr-e Daneshgahi. Catheren, O. S. (2008). Protoindustrialization, University of Cambridge. Coleman, J.  S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94, S95–S120. Dinar, S. (2007). Water wars? Conflict, cooperation, and negotiation over transboundary water. In V. I. Grover (Ed.), WATER a source of conflict or cooperation? Enfield: Science Publishers. European Union. (2013). Danube transnational cooperation programme: A stream of cooperation. Fennell, L. A. (2011). Ostrom’s law: Property rights in the commons. International Journal of the Commons, 5(1), 9–27. Gamaliel, A., & Mwagiru, M. (2017). Constraints in implementing international water treaties: A CASE study of Nile basin treaty of 1929. Strategic Journal of Business and Change Management, 4(1 (3)), 60–100 Feb 3, 2017. Gleick, P.  H. (1993). Water and conflict: Fresh water resources and international security. International Security, 18(1), 79–112 (Summer 1993). Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, New Series, 162(3859), 1243–1248.

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Hayami, Y. (2009). Social capital, human capital and the community mechanism: Toward a conceptual framework for economists. Journal of Development Studies, 45, 96–123. Howell, D. L. (1992). Proto-industrial origins of Japanese capitalism. The Journal of Asian Studies, 51(2), 269–286 May, 1992. Khalili, M. (2011). The concept of territory in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Geographical frontiers and doctrinal borderlessness (in Persian). Rahbord Journal, 20(58), 7–46. Klare, M. (2002). Resource wars: The new landscape of global conflict. New York: Holt Paperbacks. Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2006). Water distribution systems in Iran (in Persian). Tehran: Ganjine-ye Meli Ab. Labbaf Khaneiki, M., & Semsar Yazdi, A. (2015). Qanat tourism. Yazd: International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structures (ICQHS). Levine, D. (1977). Family formation in an age of nascent capitalism. London: Academic Press. Margić P. (2014). “Towards an Optimal Integration of Inland Waterways in the Transport Chain”, European Parliament, Committee on transport and tourism. Mauelshagen, F. (2009). “Water Politics: Conflict about Limited Resources”, Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Catholic academic exchange program, Bonn, April 24, 2009, accessed online (http://kaadbonn.de/fileadmin/kaad/pdf/Franz_Mauelshagen.pdf). Mendels, F. (1972). Proto-industrialization: The first phase of the industrialization process. Journal of Economic History, 32, 241–261. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Papoli Yazd, & Labbaf Khaneiki. (2000). Pasture: Operation systems (in Persian). Geographical Research, 15(1–2), 7–40. Papoli Yazd, & Labbaf Khaneiki. (2000). Combination of herds in the traditional livestock of Iran (Persian). Geographical Research, 15(1–2), 209–234. Parravicini, A., & Pievani, T. (2016). Multi-level human evolution: Ecological patterns in hominin phylogeny. Journal of Anthropological Sciences, 94, 167–182. Peter, K., Hans, M., & Jurgen, S. (1981). Industrialization before industrialization: Rural industry in the genesis of capitalism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Petersen-Perlman, J.  D., Veilleux, J.  C., & Wolf, A.  T. (2017). International water conflict and cooperation: Challenges and opportunities. Water International, 42(2), 105–120. Priscoli, J. D. (1998). Water and civilization: Using history to reframe water policy debates and to build a new ecological realism. Water Policy, 1, 623–636. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Raven Peter H., & Johnson George, B. (2001). Biology, Sixth edition, McGraw-Hill Companies. Reis, J. (2012). An epistemology of territory: A perspective on contexts for social relations. In P. A. Ashley & D. Crowther (Eds.), Territories of social responsibility: Opening the research and policy agenda (pp. 93–106). Farnham: Gower. Semsar Yazdi, A. A., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2017). Qanat knowledge: Construction and maintenance. Netherlands: Springer. Semsar Yazdi, A.  A., Labbaf Khaneiki, M., & Dehghan Manshadi, B. (2005). A survey on the Qanats of bam from technical and engineering point of view, UNESCO Tehran Cluster office, ICQHS, Tehran. Smith, L. M., Bertozzi, A. L., Brantingham, P. J., Tita, G. E., & Valasik, M. (2012). Adaptation of an animal territory model to street gang spatial patterns in Los Angeles. Journal of Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems, Southwest Missouri State University, 09/2012; 32(9). Suarez-Villa, L. (1985). Industrialization in the development world: Process cycles and the new global division of labour. The Canadian Journal of Regional Science, VIII(3), 307–33l Autumn 1985.

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Tadie, D., & Fischer, A. (2013). Hunting, social structure and human–nature relationships in lower Omo, Ethiopia: People and wildlife at a crossroads. Human Ecology An Interdisciplinary Journal, 41(3), 447–457 Springer US, June 2013. Wolf Aaron, T. (2012). Spiritual understandings of conflict and transformation and their contribution to water dialogue. Water Policy, 14(2012), 73–88. Wolf Aaron, T. (2005). “Hydropolitical Vulnerability and Resilience in International River Basins”, Project of United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. Wolf Aaron, T. (2007). Shared waters: Conflict and cooperation. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 32, 1–29. Zeitoun, M. (2008). Power and power in the Middle East. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Chapter 2

Water Supply Systems in Central Iran

Abstract  This chapter gives an overview of water resources in central Iran. Iran enjoys various climatic and geographical conditions which have led to different strategies that the inhabitants have taken to adapt themselves to their environments. In the central plateau of Iran, the climatic and geographical conditions gave rise to the technology of qanat which then underlay the production systems in this region. In the past, central plateau of Iran had no water supply source but qanat to provide the agricultural and domestic sectors with water. Nowadays the urban sprawl and modern development have raised the level of water demand to the extent that the ancient qanats are no longer able to meet. Therefore many desert cities like Yazd have resorted to other alternatives such as tube wells and inter-basin water transfer in order to supply the required water. Nevertheless the qanat legacy which is reflected in the socio-economic structures still lives on.

2.1  Q  anat System as a Collective Response to Climate Change Qanat is a gently sloping subterranean canal, which taps a water-bearing zone at a higher elevation than cultivated lands. In 2014 there have existed some 37,000 active qanats running all over Iran, discharging about 7 billion cubic meters groundwater a year (Semsar Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2017: 1). A qanat consists of a series of vertical shafts in sloping ground, interconnected at the bottom by a tunnel with a gradient flatter than that of the ground. The first shaft (mother well) is sunk, usually into an alluvial fan, to a level below the groundwater table. Shafts are sunk at intervals of 20 to 200 m in a line between the groundwater recharge zone and the irrigated land. From the air, a qanat system looks like a line of anthills leading from the foothills across the desert to the greenery of an irrigated settlement. Qanat engages a variety of knowledge and its studying entails an interdisciplinary approach. In a traditional realm, qanats are embraced by a socio-economic system which guarantees their sustainability. The facets of this socio-economic system operate closely together and make it possible for the qanats to remain into future. In © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Labbaf Khaneiki, Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0_2

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Iran some qanats date back to over 2000  years in antiquity, and they are still in active use. They still exist because they are sustainable. Qanat sustainability is anchored in its approach towards the nature. Qanat is sustainable due to its perfect harmony and balance with groundwater reserves. Due to their distinctive features, qanats discharge the aquifer water in a continuous manner so that users can perfectly adapt themselves to water fluctuations induced by droughts and wet years. Therefor we know why qanat could have survived the past centuries, but we still wonder how and when qanat came into existence. The antiquity of qanat has always been the subject of controversy among the qanat scholars. Some believe that qanat was invented by particular people in a particular place and then the other people adopted this technique later in history. In this chapter, I try to shed light on whether qanat sprang up in a particular epoch and place or evolved in the course of history in response to environmental changes.

2.2  Genesis of Qanat It is Henry Goblot who explores the genesis of this technology for the first time. He argues in his book that during the early first millennium before Christ, for the first time some small tribal groups gradually began immigrating to the Iranian plateau where there was less precipitation than in the territories they came from. They came from somewhere with many surface streams, so their agricultural techniques required more water than was available in the Iranian plateau. So they had no option but to fasten their hopes on the rivers and springs that originated in the mountains. They faced two barriers; the first was the seasonal rivers which had no water during the dry and hot seasons. The second was the springs that drained shallow groundwater and fell dry during the hot season. But they noticed some permanent runoff flowing through the tunnels excavated by the Urartu miners who were in search of copper. The miners used to dig diagonal tunnel from earth surface down to the copper rich layer which sometimes lay beneath an aquifer. The miners were troubled by groundwater seepage into their tunnel which could be submerged if the water was not drained out. That was why the ancient miners managed to dig some almost horizontal tunnels which served to drain out the water accumulated in their copper mines. Later the Iranian farmers came into contact with the miners and learned how to dig such tunnels into groundwater reserves. In this manner, the ancient Iranians made use of the water that the miners wished to get rid of, and founded a basic system named qanat to supply the required water to their farmlands. According to Goblot, this innovation took place in Urartu and later was introduced to the neighboring areas like the Zagros Mountains. Urartu territory embraced a mountainous plateau between Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and the Caucasus lands. Urartu kingdom came to power in the ninth century BC and was toppled by Medians in the early sixth century BC (Chahin 2001: 182). Goblot believes that the influence of the Medians and Achaemenians made the technology of qanat spread from Urartu (in

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Fig. 2.1  Location of Urartu in relation to ancient Assyria (Radner 2007: 244)

the western north of Iran and near the present border between Iran and Turkey) to all over the Iranian plateau (Goblot Henry 1992) (Fig. 2.1). Although Goblot‘s theory may be valid in Urartu or its neighboring regions, we believe that we should be more realistic toward the invention of qanat. It is more likely that the first qanats were built in the central plateau of Iran at the mountain bases or along the valleys, though we do not rule out the possibility of construction of qanats outside of this region for example in Oman or Urartu independently. But it is hard to accept the theory that the qanat was first invented by the copper miners in Urartu and then introduced to the Iranian plateau and used by the farmers who lived more than 1500 km away from its origin. Not only in the past, but also at present, the immediate reaction of any farmer is to dig into a spring when its water dwindles. In the mountainous region surrounding the Iranian desert there were many natural springs which supplied water to the small communities who lived there. In the wake of climate change, the precipitation reduced and accordingly many of the springs dried up or just trickled. In this situation the immediate reaction of the people might be to dig the same springs to track down the water, and after a while they ended up building a long tunnel with some shaft wells through which they could better haul the debris onto the surface. In fact, we consider that the natural springs led the people to construct the first qanats, and it is very likely that ancient people would be inspired by a trickling spring to burrow back to get closer to the source of water underground. Probably

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that was how the system of qanat came into existence, probably in several regions simultaneously. Hasanalian who has conducted much research on Siyalk has come to the conclusion that the spring of Fin which once provided this ancient settlement with water was later manipulated and turned into a qanat (Hasanalian Davood 2006). Siyalk is a large ancient archeological site close to the modern city of Kashan in central Iran, whose oldest strata date as far back as 7500 years (McCown 1957: 1). Even a few years ago I witnessed this process in an off the beaten path village in southern Khorasan. In this village there was a natural spring with a discharge of about 3 liters per second. After a drought broke out in 1990s, the water of this spring dramatically decreased and as a result the villagers made up their mind to deepen the spring to reach the water again. They dug the spring horizontally up to 30 m and every year they extended this tunnel to keep the discharge steady. After 20 years, that spring was turned into a small qanat with two shaft wells. This scenario can be seen beside the theory that the miners of Urartu invented the qanat as a byproduct, and could be repeated wherever enjoyed favorable conditions for qanats. Who knows how or even whether the farmers in the central Iran came in touch with those miners in Urartu and how they learned this technique and how they brought it back to the central Iran? Goblot’s theory is not premised on the archaeological evidences deduced from scientific excavations and surveys. We lack adequate evidences to give credence to Goblot’s theory about the existence of qanat-like drainage system in the Urartu copper mines as well as how this technique made its way into central Iran.

2.3  Impact of Climate Change on Qanat Evolution Contrary to what is generally assumed, human inhabitation in the desert areas of Iran has never taken place just in the wake of the invention of qanat. It is evident that human settlements formed and flourished in this area since the Paleolithic era long before any qanat existed around. In fact the global warming and climate change drove humans to invent and apply the technique of qanat in order to improve their adaptation to a drier climate and make it possible to come to terms with the harsh condition of living in desert. According to Goblot’s theory, qanat has been invented by the Urartu miners northwest of the Persian territory (Goblot 1992: 108). These miners were troubled by the infiltration of groundwater into their tunnels while digging through the Zagros Mountains in search of copper. They came to invent some drainage tunnels as a solution to the problem of water infiltration, leading to invention of qanat by accident. Such qanats as the by product of the ancient copper mines are said to date back to the early first millennium before Christ (Goblot 1992: 107). According to this theory, the widespread use of qanat as an irrigation technique came to be catching on a few centuries later. Nevertheless the areas where are now known to be dependent on qanat system were already populated by sporadic human communities even hundreds of years before any qanat came into being. Many

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archaeological sites going back to before the second millennium BC all bear witness to the prosperity of these ancient settlements in central Iran, such as Siyalk Kashan, Teppe Hesar in Damghan, Teppe Yahya in Kerman, Teppe Hesar in Gonabad, etc. At that time humans had not reached such a technical level to exploit groundwater, on the other hand the topographical condition of many of those ancient settlements were not suitable for qanat construction. For example, Alfons Gabriel encountered the vestiges of an ancient settlement right in the middle of Lout desert in central Iran, where no human dares to stay even for a few days nowadays. He writes about the existence of this settlement as a riddle, since he was baffled by the question how they managed to supply water in a place whose topographical condition did not allow any qanat (Gabriel 1992: 311). Therefore we should find an answer to the question how the inhabitants of the Iranian desert could live and cultivate before the advent of qanat technology. Maybe the areas that are nothing but desert today were once in a better state and enjoyed a better climate thousands of years ago.

2.4  Climate Change in Central Plateau of Iran 12,800  years ago, the earth happened to return to a semi ice age condition. This freezing change is known as Younger Dryas which persisted for 1200 years (Sobooti 2011: 112). At the time the central plateau of Iran enjoyed some permanent surface streams originating from the surrounding elevations and running down toward some sporadic lakes and water bodies, paving the way for the prehistoric human settlements. Over the prehistoric period, the central Iran especially the regions today on the edge of Iranian deserts were overrun with lakes, springs and rivers according to geological and archeological evidences. The banks of these rivers and lakes accommodated many sedentary farming communities and triggered the creation of some major civilizations there. Thousands of years elapsed and the small patches of desert grew and intruded into the prosperous areas, and accordingly the water bodies and rivers came to dwindle and then dried up, exposing the settlements dependent on those waters to a great change. But the settlements which nestled on the banks of the big rivers far away from the intrusion of the central desert continued their growth into metropolises and principle civilizations. The famous civilizations of Mesopotamia like Babylonian and Akkadian once used to rely on the river of Euphrates give credence to this claim. Also the river of Karkhe that has survived the desertification could quench the lands of Shoosh city for a long time, and made it possible for this ancient city to evolve into the hub of Ilam civilization and then Achaemenid headquarter (Sykes Percy 1984: 48–49). But the destiny of the settlement located on the margin of the Iranian desert went down another path. At the ancient time, the people of Siyalk irrigated their ­farmlands with the plentiful water of the natural spring of Fin (Naamani 1979: 434) and those

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who lived in the Teppe Hesar in Gonabad, Teppe Siyah and Teppe Bayas Abad much probably relied on the river of Kal Shoor. The settlement of Teppe Hesar is an archaeological site once populated between the third and first millenniums BC, and today situated on the southern bank of Kal Shoor. Kal Shoor is a gully crusted with salt, which once quenched the thirst of Teppe Hesar and now sometimes brings a seasonal flood from the surrounding more elevated lands. The both banks of this gully are so saturated with salt that even most salt resistant desert plants cannot put up with it. What really became of these civilizations? This story has happened to many of the ancient settlements on the edge of the central desert whose suitable water sources vanished in the wake of climate change. The drying up of prehistoric rivers and lakes led to the annihilation of some human settlements like what Alfons Gabriel came across in the Lout Desert, but some others took a different strategy to survive. They invented and developed the qanat technique to better adapt to such a harsh condition, wherever the environmental circumstances allowed. Even nowadays, in the central plateau of Iran many of the population centers are situated on the coasts of the gone prehistoric lakes according to geological evidences. One of those lakes once covered all the area around the swamp of Gav Khooni in Isfahan. This lake has left three levels of sedimentation whose highest level is situated at the height of 1550 m above sea level. In other words, the water level was some 80 m higher than what we see in the swamp of Gav Khooni in its heyday. One can imagine the city of Isfahan located right on its coast, and the other today towns like Ezheh, Harand and Varzaneh submerged. The lowland of Abarkooh was not exception though its meteorological conditions were different from that of the northern and western areas. At least two levels of sedimentation are perceptible along the road from Abarkooh to Taft, and the town of Abarkooh has been built just on the highest level of sedimentation (Ramesht 2001: 104). According to Gabriel there once existed a relatively big lake in the central lowland of Iran (Gabriel 1992: 311). On the western side of this lowland close to the assumed lake such cities as Nayin, Aghda, Ardakan, Meybod and Yazd nestle. The city of Nayin is located at the highest level, Aghda at the second level and Ardakan at the third level and actually at the bottom of the assumed lake. There were also other lowlands - once ancient lakes - parallel to the aforementioned lake, whose coasts favored the formation of the primitive human settlements. In fact most of the lakes in the central plateau of Iran were not deep enough to give rise to any particular geological stratification, but the type of sedimentation across those lowlands implies former existence of shallow and relatively stagnant lakes whose coasts were the cradle of ancient settlements (Ramesht 2001: 105). But the climate change gradually made those water bodies dry up, leading to a completely different environmental landscape.

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2.5  Qanat as a Technique to Adapt to Climate Change The archeological findings prove that the climate change at ancient times broke out at a relatively high pace. As an instance the vestiges left from Scythians who dwelt north of Iranian plateau between the second and first millennium BC suggest that their territory were then covered with lush forests (Maleki 1998: 176). Also in Birjand east of Iran, the stone carving of Lakh Mazar exhibits the images of some animals like lion that have long become extinct in the area. This carving dates back to the first millennium BC, when the region enjoyed a better climate suitable for that fauna (Labbaf Khaneiki and Bashash 1994: 29). But this area was devoured by the advancing desertification, and the inhabitants resorted to exploiting groundwater to make it through the new harsh condition. The climate change could not wipe the human presence off the central Iran, but it altered the basis of life and production and gave rise to the “qanat civilization” which was built upon the groundwater extracted by qanat system. In fact the inhabitants of this region responded to the gradual climate change by building qanats that enabled them to better adjust themselves to such a harsh environment. An interesting study recently done on the Lake Van in today Turkey can shed light on the climatic condition of ancient times and its impact on the human civilizations. The sediments that have settled at the bed of this lake over the past 14 years can provide a clue to estimate the climatic conditions at the ancient times. The ratio of Oxygen isotope measured in the two layers of Aragonite and Calcite revealed the climatic conditions before and after the Roman Empire. Therefore the highest relative humidity in the Middle East has been dated between 8400 and 4100 years ago. Afterward a dry period began some 4100 years ago and culminated in a drought about 2100 years ago. Since then no abrupt change occurred in the amount of humidity but a few fluctuations (McCormick Michael et al. 2012: 169–220). Such a decrease in the amount of precipitation left its imprint in the history of ancient civilizations in the Middle East. For example the Akkadian empire collapsed around 2170  BC, which can be associated with their changing climate and its impact on their socio-economic structures (Diamond 2005: 183). Arash Sharifi and his colleagues have conducted a similar research on Neor Lake northwest of Iran, which has come up with almost the same result as that of the Lake Van study. They have dated different layers of sediment at the bottom of Neor Lake by gauging the ratio of oxygen 18 to oxygen 16. The oxygen with the mass number of 18 is heavier than the oxygen 16 which is much more abundant in nature. A molecule of water which consists of oxygen 18 is accordingly heavier than a molecule with oxygen 16 which is also easier to evaporate. The sea creatures with calcium carbonate shell like crab, shrimp, scallop, etc. absorb those molecules of water containing oxygen 18 which remains in their shell. Those animals die and get buried under sediment and wait for the paleoclimatologists to date them by measuring the radioactive decay of the heavier isotope of oxygen. During dry periods when evaporation rate is higher, the water with oxygen 16 more easily evaporates and enters into the atmosphere, and as a result more atoms of oxygen 18 remain in the lake and

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Fig. 2.2  Ups and downs in the climatic conditions of Iranian plateau from 5000 years ago to present according to Sharifi’s measurement (Sharifi et al. 2013)

then gets concentrated in the sediment layer (Rohling 2013: 916). Sharifi’s measurement implies that around 4000 and then 2000–2500 years ago, the Iranian plateau went through drier years (Sharifi et al. 2013) (Fig. 2.2). As the dry period neared its peak, the first qanats showed up and developed in the area. Surface water resources started to shrink and the population turned to groundwater which could be tapped by means of qanat system. Some different archaeological studies ever conducted on the history of qanat in different regions in the Middle East all give credence to the fact that the advent of qanat and the outbreak of a dry period were almost coeval. As an instance the famous inscription of the Assyrian king Sargon was decrypted and turned out to be the description of his eighth battle in 714 BC. Somewhere in the inscription, a civilization in the region of Uroomiye is

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mentioned and the lines 202 until 204 describe a special irrigation system completely akin to qanat (Laessoe, J., 1951: 21–32). In Oman the potteries discovered in the qanat dependent settlements have been dated by thermoluminescence method, and they turned out to date from 300 BC (Yule P., 1999: 121–146). In Iran in Bam, at the bottom of a reservoir of a qanat, Shahriyar Adl unearthed an unbroken container dating from 500 BC, which seems associated with the antiquity of the qanat (Adle S. 2007). Also, around the wells of Qasabe qanat in eastern Iran some pottery fragments have been found, whose design and color imply the antiquity of 2200 years ago (Labbaf Khaneiki R. 1997: 271–298). Some 5 centuries before Christ at the time of Achaemenid occupation, 20 qanats were built in the Ain Manavir oasis in Egypt and the archaeologists have come into consensus on their antiquity (Wuttmann M, et al. 2000: 162–169). Again in Oman in the Al-Meysar oasis an ancient qanat was discovered whose tunnel ceiling was only 50 cm below the present earth surface. This qanat is believed to date back to 600 BC (Wiesgerber G. 2003: 61–67). Eventually Boucharlat the French archaeologist comes to the conclusion that qanat should be invented in Iron Age some 800 years before Christ, after reviewing all the studies ever conducted on the archaeology of qanat (Boucharlat, R. 2003: 161–172). Now we get back to the Lake Van in Turkey. What the archaeologists say about the antiquity of the first qanats tallies with the date of the latter dry period deduced from the sediments in the Lake Van. In other words, some 2800 ago when the Middle East was going through a dry period, some communities succeeded in inventing this technique to boost their adaptation. Adaptation to environmental conditions is a very common strategy for human communities. The communities once living on the banks of permanent rivers in the central plateau of Iran could come to terms with the intensifying drought and then embraced a change in their civilization and culture. In a nutshell, the shrinking surface water bodies drove the communities to turn to the technique of qanat which caused a substantial change in their production system. The change in the production system gave rise to some major modifications in the economic structures in order to better adapt to the new condition, and such modifications accordingly brought about a transformation in social and cultural structures ranging from political foundations to social styles, art, literature, education, etc. Qanat seems to have been invented spontaneously in order to enhance the level of human’s adaptation to the changing environmental conditions. Invention of qanat can take place in different geographical places where enjoyed similar conditions simultaneously and independently. Of course we cannot deny some reliable historical records which mention the model of geographical diffusion of qanat, but this model could not prevail over the model of multi-cluster genesis according to which qanat came into existence at the same time in different places under similar climatic circumstances. The human response to climate change and aggravating water scarcity took the shape of qanat invention which helped ancient communities shift from surface water to groundwater resources (Fig. 2.3). Human has been under very influence of climate since the dawn of his evolution, and the considerable climatic changes that broke out respectively 2.8, 1.7, and one million years ago meaningfully correlate with the hominid’s evolution that led to a

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Fig. 2.3  Relations between climate and technique, which led to the invention of qanat

variety of species from our genus (Demenocal 1995: 53–59). Even the invention of technology and the advent of civilization could not neutralize the impact of climate but it was only deviated from individual to social. Maybe climate no longer accesses us through our shield of technology in order to perpetuate the natural selection and physiological evolution in its original way, but we keep changing in order to better adapt to the changing environmental conditions and ensure our being selected for our technologies rather than our somatic advantages. The human civilizations have been under the influence of climate whether directly or indirectly. Modern archeology takes it for granted that the rise and fall of such famous civilizations as Anasazi, Maya, Hittites and Egyptian had much to do with the climate changes (Cowie Jonathan 2007). The environmental conditions under which humans live are always subject to change. The Paleolithic humans succeeded in using and then making tools to keep pace with their changing environments. Thus technological evolution prevailed over the biological one to a large extent. Technology could speed up the humans’ adaptation to the changing environment, whereas somatic adaptation takes much longer time, entailing millions of genetic mutations in an accidental pattern. During the ice age when the Mammoths became extinct, the invention of fire and clothe spared humans from waiting for the miracle of genetic mutations and natural selection which could probably save them by growing thick hair or developing an insulating layer of fat under skin. Qanat is one of the technologies that properly enhanced the level of human’s adaptation to the environmental change, so that survival became possible in the face of the harsh condition of the Iranian desert. Therefore qanat can be regarded as a collective response of human communities to the climate change. Qanat accordingly underlay a particular production system and economic structure in which a variety of social, political and cultural elements are anchored (Papoli Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2000: 1–23). In this part of world, the impact of geography has been exerted on different aspects of human ­communities

2.6  Qanat in Comparison with Other Hydraulic Structures

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through the technique of qanat, whose indications and vestiges can be traced even today.

2.6  Qanat in Comparison with Other Hydraulic Structures Altogether water is the most abundant element on the earth and is also the most serious problem that humans have ever faced in the course of their history, a problem that used to overwhelm humans because of whether its influx or its scarcity. We set foot in the world with plenty of water which makes up 80 percent of our body as infant. A healthy person can drink about 48 cups of water per day. Somewhere between 70 and 75 percent of the earth’s surface is covered with water. Therefore we are surrounded all the way by water in our environment and are also awash with water in our own bodies. That is why water is an element whose footprint is invisible in our culture the most. Almost every culture used to have and worship a water deity whose duty was to protect water supplies for humans or to protect the humans against the devastation of water or both. Our human cultures and history have been inundated with water goddesses or gods with different names which imply the importance of water in human mind and culture, for example Chalchiuhtlicue in Aztec Mexico, Acionna in Celtic Culture, Mazu in China, Tefnut in Egypt, Vedenemo in Finland, Anapos in Greece, Apam Napat in India, Pariacaca in Incan culture, Suijin in Japan, Abzu in Mesopotamia, Volturnus in Rome and eventually Anahita in Persia. For the both purposes – protection of water for humans and protection of humans against water – the ancient people came to invent a variety of technologies each of which enjoys a long history of utilization and a deep impact on human culture. One can classify all the water related technologies and structures into 4 groups as follows: 1 . Technologies for obtaining water 2. Technologies for transferring water 3. Technologies for storing water 4. Technologies for warding off water Now we want to leaf through hundreds of pages written about the above mentioned technologies to better know why qanat still stands out as a technology that has been paving the way for many people to live in as harsh environment as the Iranian desert. In the group 1, qanat does not stand alone, but there are also other technologies which supply or supplied water to the human settlements. For example no one can deny the significance of historical dams which made it possible for people to make the most of the small streams. A dam should not be equated with a simple structure for storing water, but actually a dam enables people to rely on a fluctuating stream, otherwise they may be either drowned in plenty of water or die out of thirst. The technology of dam can help supply water in a more constant and reliable way rather than living through an “either famine or feast” policy. We can

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Fig. 2.4  Vestiges of Jawa Dam in Jordan Fig. 2.5  The wells of Laft in Hormozgan province, Iran, for harvesting rain water, dating back to Achaemenid era

track down the oldest qanats in the Middle East and North Africa where the first farming sedentary communities came into existence. Jawa Dam is regarded as the first gravity dam that dates back to 3000 years before Christ. This ancient dam is located 100 km northeast of the capital Amman in Jordan, and is 9 m high and 1 m wide, supported by a 50 m wide earth rampart (Garbrecht 1986: 51–64). The Egyptian Sadd-el-Kafara Dam at Wadi Al-Garawi is another example which dates back to around 2600 (Bazza 2006) (Fig. 2.4). Most of dams were built across the big rivers which could irrigate a vast area of farmlands. These structures entailed a great deal of energy and money which did not be afforded by individuals or small communities. Therefore the governments and actually the ancient monarchies were usually behind the construction of those dams, unlike the qanats that were mostly built and owned by petty owners. That is why sort

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of decentralization of power and economy is inherent in the technology of qanat, which distinguishes it from such hydraulic structure as dam. Another technology that fits the group one is the water harvesting wells which can be found in the southern parts of Iran. These wells are dug in rocks and lime stones in order to receive the seasonal runoffs whenever it rains. The wells filled with rain water can provide the people with potable water for the dry months when the sky becomes stingy about rain. The wells of Laft in Hormozgan province, Iran were dug in the Achaemenid period for this purpose (Fig. 2.5). The rain harvesting wells have been serving to supply potable water, but this task is only one of the several tasks that a typical qanat can fulfill. Qanat is not only used for supplying potable water, but it is also used for sanitation, irrigation of farmlands, generating of energy, etc. The multitasking nature of qanat helped those people to better adapt themselves to their arid environment. Qanat still holds its importance when it comes to the technologies for transferring water. One of the famous technologies of this kind is the ancient aqueduct which was built for spanning two sides of a barrier like a gully or a valley where the water current had to cross on its way. The best examples of this technology is always attributed to Romans, but aqueducts were also used as early as the seventh century before Christ when the Assyrians built an 80  km long limestone aqueduct, which included a 10 m high conduit to cross a 300 m wide valley. This aqueduct once served to carry water to the city Nineveh (Jacobsen and Lloyd 1935). Aqueduct and qanat are similar in bringing water to the vicinity of humans where all the soil and climatic conditions as well as security - except for water -favor establishing the settlements rather than bringing the settlements to the vicinity of water. Their resemblance is perceptible in their profiles in which the aqueduct turns out to be like a negative picture of a qanat where the solid parts become hollow and vice versa (Fig. 2.6). Nevertheless they have a crucial difference which has something to do with their technical characteristics. Unlike an aqueduct a qanat is a dynamic system which cuts through the soil and advances into the saturated area underground and even develop some side branches over time in order to get more water or at least keep its discharge steady. An aqueduct is built at once as an integrated structure in order to convey water from a place to another, but a qanat is built over a long period in order to keep pace with the aquifer receding. In the first place a qanat may be dug with the length of a few hundred meters, but it is extended to keep in balance with the groundwater and it may end up in tens of kilometers in length after centuries. Madi in Isfahan, Iran is another example for the water transferring technologies. Madi is an artificial tributary derived from the river of Zayandeh Rood. The network of such tributaries distributed water among the farmlands in the region as accurately as possible. The engineering and technical aspects of Madi are not as intricate as that of qanat, but its management system and water division is akin to that of qanat (Fig. 2.7). Water reservoirs are among the Technologies for storing water. Ab Anbar is a Persian name for traditional water reservoir which is generally filled up with the

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Fig. 2.6  Reverse resemblance of qanat and aqueducts in their profiles

Fig. 2.7  Madi system in Isfahan

water of qanat. Ab Anbar is an underground structure, constructed to store freshwater for drinking. The reservoir was fed from a nearby shallow qanat. All of the water reservoirs had a storage tank whose dimensions depended on the amount of qanat discharge and the demand for water. Most of the storage tanks were made of “sarooj”

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Fig. 2.8  A water reservoir (Ab Anbar) in Yazd with four wind towers

a combination of lime, clay, and chipped straw. Different parts of a water reservoir consist in a storage tank, the roof of the storage tank, wind tower, stairway and ornamental portal. Ab Anbar or water reservoir in Iran is mostly contingent on qanat systems and qanat plays a crucial role in their function. In fact Ab Anbar is a part of qanat to help carry out one of the functions of qanat, which is procuring potable water (Fig. 2.8). People do not always go about inventing technologies to extract or store water, but sometimes they have to come up with ideas on how to get rid of the extra water. One of the famous technologies in this respect is the windmills of Holland. Those windmills historically served many purposes. The most important probably was pumping water out of the lowlands and back into the rivers beyond the dykes so that the land could be farmed. The Dutch have become very innovative when it comes to keeping out the water. They have built dykes, fortifications and then windmills to create new land. The Dutch windmills carried water out of their lands and the qanats carried it into their lands both in order to facilitate farming and life. It is worth noting that unlike a windmill, a qanat with a length of kilometers cannot be operated and maintained by an individual or a few individuals. Cooperative utilization is inherent in the technology of qanat, and is also manifest in its intricate water management and maintenance systems.

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2.7  History of Water Management in Iran In the course of history wherever agriculture has been impossible without irrigation whether in river based economies or in qanat based economies, water management has always been inevitable. What differentiates the river based economy from the qanat based economy in terms of water management is that in the latter, water management is more of an endogenous socio-economic system which cannot foster an extensive power structure unlike the river based economy that paves the way for the governing bodies to amass a considerable deal of political authority (Labbaf Khaneiki 2007). Although Karl Wittfogel’s theory on oriental despotism and the role of large scale bureaucratic irrigation systems has been shattered by many controversies over the past decades, there are still some pieces of truth in it. All over a vast area stretching from North Africa to as far east as Persia, India, Central Asia and China, agriculture economy was highly dependent on artificial irrigation whose intricacy entailed an organized source of manpower. Irrigation gave rise to the complicated water management systems which were run by centralized powers. In fact water as the most important production factor could bestow a considerable authority on the person in charge of water management, and the same person could in turn draw on the same authority to keep a tighter hold on the water management. This cycle could accumulate a great deal of power whose result could not be other than tyranny. Therefore the nature of water management in such arid and semi arid lands could bring about oriental despotism through two ways; first through the organization of a large population which could provide the intricate irrigation system with the required labor, and second through the accumulation of power which was rooted in the crucial role that water played in the production systems under such geographical conditions. However, across the European lands, water did not appear as a scarce vital source and nothing like water rationing system or such a stern water division came into existence in order to regulate the relationship between the thirsty population and the limited water resources. The Europeans could sow their seeds wherever they wished and leave their crops to the natural rainfall to be watered. Therefore they were not confined to the limited water resources, but they could scattered all over a vast area which enjoyed almost the same geographical condition, and the dispersal of power is somehow anchored in the relatively even distribution of geographical possibilities (Naghib Zadeh 2000: 64). I do not want to dust the old theories of geographical determinism by rehashing such ideas, though we may come across some cases that gratify the advocates of such theories. Wittfogel has omitted many exceptions which sometimes outnumber the so called rules. Over the area mentioned by him, the river based economy was not the sole economy, but qanat based economy also stands out as a very important exception. Contrary to Wittfogel’s theory, in the qanat based economy no large scale bureaucratic water management systems came into existence, paving the way for the emergence of trans-regional monarchies. Therefore Wittfogel’s theory seems to hold true mostly in terms of river based economies where the huge volume of water and the

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vast lucrative cultivated lands are tantamount to the extended water management systems with a powerful economic and political nature. As an instance, the Sasanian Empire set up an irrigation organization which managed all the affairs related to water division and ownership in the country. The same organization was retained by the Arab conquerors in the seventh century and was renamed as Divan al-Ma’ which used to record the tax received from the water owners. That organization kept a record of any increase or decrease in the agricultural tax according to the water available each year and also of any water related transaction. The people responsible for water affairs were picked from among adept officials who were called Qayyas or Hassab in the water administration system at the time of Abbasid caliphate, and were called Moqassem al-Ma’ at the time of Ghaznavids in the city of Merv, and Qavvam or Hafazeh in the city of Nishapur (Papoli Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 1998: 49). Given that the ruling powers in the river based economies were highly reliant on the agricultural activities whose huge revenue surplus could bolster their political development, they tried their best to keep the agricultural activities in order and regulate such important production factors as water (Bartold 1971). Water and its management were considered so crucial that the tax was levied based on the amount of water available (Khosravi 1970: 49). The measures taken by Malek Moez al-Din Hossein in fourteenth century well exemplify the significant role of ruling powers in the water management systems. He was from Kurt dynasty who ruled over a vast area of Khorasan for about 148 years, and their kings were based in the city of Herat in today Afghanistan as their capital. Herat fell within the realm of river based economies, as its agricultural production system was reliant on Heray Rud River which originated from the mountains of central Afghanistan and flowed some one thousand kilometer down to Turkmenistan. After a dispute broke out between some groups of People in Herat, Malek Moez al-Din dispatched one of his commanders to meet Nizam al-Din Abdol Rahman Khafi who was well versed in mapping and geometry in order to ask him to draw up a set of laws regarding water division. That same law served as a legal basis on which the river water was divided among the cultivated lands in Herat for a long time (Amiri 2001). Such interventions in water management systems turned out to benefit the governments in the end. If there was no regulation in the water consumption, most of the farmers’ energy was put into the conflicts and competitions over more share of water, and as a result the agricultural activities became bogged down to the detriment of the governments. Another historical example of the governmental intervention in the water management is a water dividing dam in the town of Damqan, reported by Abu Dulaf the Arab traveler who visited the region in 952 AD and described the dam as follows: “there is a strange dam dating back to Sasanian period in order to distribute water. Water is gushing out of a mountainous cave, and then is being divided among one hundred twenty villages for the purpose of irrigation. One hundred twenty canals derive from the dam to transfer the water shares to the beneficiaries, and no increase is possible in the amount of water in those canals, and is not possible to merge them

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either. The dam enjoys a wonderful structure and I have never seen better than or even similar to that in the other towns” (Abu Dulaf 1975: 81). Nonetheless water management and division system does not usually remain unchangeable in a particular place. Population growth, a change in the region cropping pattern, new immigrations into the region and an increase in the number of water users can all bring about considerable changes in the water management system. For example, the settling of some Arab tribes in the town of Qom and their turning to agricultural activities gave rise to a longstanding conflict between them and the local farmers, which eventually led to a change in the region water management system. This conflict has been reported in the book “History of Qom” written in 988  AD, which bears witness to the importance of water management and its transformation due to the introduction of new factors into the region. “Some of the dignitaries in Qom say that before Arabs’ coming no crop was cultivated other than barley, cumin and carthamus, and the farmers did not go about cultivating such vegetables as onion, garlic, cucumber and melon. One month after the occasion of Nowrouz in the mid spring, water shortage culminated in the ceasing of Qom River by the residents of the villages Teymareh and Anar in the river upstream. The Arabs who had settled in Qom and amassed a wealth through agriculture, found their economy in jeopardy, so they came over to the upstream people to settle the problem by proposing two options. They asked the people of Teymareh and Anar to release a fair portion of the river water in order to quench the thirst of the downstream lands, or at least to curb the seasonal runoffs which wreaked havoc on their lands. The Arabs told them why you sent us the furious seasonal runoffs in the winter while you deprived us of the river water during summer when we were badly in need of water. The Arabs shared the cost in winter but never gained from the benefit in summer. Nevertheless, the people of Teymareh and Anar refused to opt for one of those proposals and spurned the Arabs’ request. They rushed into their fortification and barricaded themselves against the angry Arabs who became frustrated at such a negotiation. The Arabs besieged their fortification and destroyed all the dams built across the river and released the whole water toward Qom where they could cultivate a vast variety of crops and vegetables. Thus, the farms of Teymareh and Anar turned into dry barren lands, and the conflict between them and the Arabs never abated. Their men were taken captive, their dams and ditches were reduced to rubble, and many dreadful problems were inflicted on them by the Arabs, until they were fed up with the situation and managed to compromise with the Arabs. They surrendered to the Arabs by admitting that they can no longer resist and wish to obey whatever they want from them, but it should not be forgotten that the downstream lands are not pebbly like theirs and it is not necessary to consume such a huge amount of water there. They suggested carrying out an experiment on the soils of the downstream and upstream lands to prove that the downstream lands could be saturated by less water than consumed by the Arabs. Thus, they took a ball of mud from Qom and the same from Teymareh and Anar, and waited to see which ball lost its water and dried up first. The mud ball from Qom dried up in ten days, while that of Teymareh and Anar took only five days to dry up. Therefore they all came to an understanding that Teymareh and Anar would receive a water share twice as much

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as that of Qom whose soil could keep water for a longer time. Every month from the first to fifth day, water went to Qom, and then from the sixth to 15th day it was the turn of Teymareh and Anar to take the water. From the 16th to 20th day of the month, water was directed again to Qom, and from the twenty first to 30th day, Teymareh and Anar could enjoy the water. Some other people say that Qom was entitled to the first five days and then the last five days every month for irrigation, and Teymareh and Anar could use the water during twenty days in between. According to their agreement, a horseman from Qom traveled along the river up to Teymareh and Anar in order release the water toward Qom. The horseman set off for Teymareh and Anar at dawn and rode his horse as fast as possible to reach Teymareh before dusk, but his horse ran out of breath and died of exhaustion just by the dam which was later called Esfal dam after the horse’s name. Every month a group of men from Qom were dispatched to Teymareh to open the dam and keep guard over the thirty ditches which conveyed water to Teymareh and Anar in order to make sure that the whole water was in their hand during the five days. They grew a variety of vegetables, grains and cotton with this water in Qom” (Qomi 1982: 47). Merv, once one of the principal cities of historical Khorasan, enjoyed an intricate water management system. The farmlands of Merv used to be irrigated by Murghab River which originated from central-western Afghanistan. The water share of each farmland was precisely calculated and recorded by a bureaucratic immense organization under the auspices of the central ruling power, which was in fact specific to the river based economies. Murghab River was accumulated behind a huge dam built of wood in order to even out the fluctuating supply of water over the growing season. Al-Muqaddasi (946–991  AD) describes the Murghab dam and its water division system as follows: “Murghab River flows down along a narrow gully which gradually widens into a vast valley where the river is dammed by an amazing huge wooden wall which accumulates the water so that the water overflows into a canal leading to Merv. The most powerful commander along with ten thousand of his soldiers presides over the dam to ensure its proper function. The water division practiced here cannot be rivaled by any other dam in the region. The founder of this water division system has been quoted as saying that he administered justice as best he could, and he tried his best to measure the water as fairly as possible by a long vertical tablet on which some horizontal marks were carved. When the water level reached the 16th mark, it implied that a prosperous growing season was around the corner and then people celebrated that promising omen, while it did not bode well if the water level remained at the sixth mark which denoted a coming drought. A water division structure was built in a village named Zarq from which a tributary name Zariq originated. Each quarter was entitled to a definite share of water which was delineated by some wooden boards into which many holes were made in certain diameters. When the water increased, everyone could receive more shares, and when the water dwindled, everyone had to content themselves with less water equally, and no one had advantage over the others (Meftah 1992). When it came to the big rivers, the water management system should have been endorsed by the king or his vizier. For example the water division plan of Karaj River could not come into effect without Amir Kabir’s signature, the chief minister

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to Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (1807–1852) (Enayatollah et al. 1971: 214). However, in the qanat based economy, water management system did not take on such a political dimension. Nevertheless in the qanat based economy, water management system was as intricate as in the river based economy, as a local, endogenous and spontaneous socio-economic system. As far as we know, Tahirid dynasty (821–873 AD) was the only ruling power that placed a great value on the qanats as agricultural production factors, though their political economy was mostly anchored in the river based irrigation networks like the other national great kingdoms. At the time of Tahir the founder of Tahirid dynasty a terrible earthquake struck Khorasan, resulting in the destruction of many qanats. After the qanats were repaired and the obstructions were removed and their water started flowing again, some disputes broke out over the water ownership and division. The farmers who failed to settle their problem on their own requested the king Tahir to intervene and mediate in the quarrel. Tahir managed to bring together the clergymen from all over Khorasan to pool their knowledge and compile a book on qanat water division laws (Salimi Moayed 2000: 158). However, the measures taken by Tahir regarding qanats took on a legendary dimension in the course of time. For example, some villagers describe Tahir as a historical personality who possessed an extraordinary capability of building qanats. They believe that Tahir could locate groundwater just at a glance and miraculously find the best place for digging the qanat first well (Ibid: 153). In the central plateau of Iran, one may come across the remote small villages with drizzling qanats whose intricate water management and division system takes any visitor by surprise. Sometimes the villagers attribute their wonderful water management to such famous luminaries as Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201–1274) or Shaykh Baha’ al-Din (1547–1621) (Saedloo 1997: 42). In the qanat based economy, water management system is engulfed by a haze of mythology and fictions and it has not been recorded as precisely as that of the river based economy, probably because of its economic peculiarities which could not draw much attention from the central ruling powers.

2.8  Traditional Water Division Systems In Iran water for irrigation is distributed among the farmers who take turns directing water to their farms. For a particular shareholder, the interval between two irrigations means an irrigation cycle which may take 6–21 days. Traditional water division systems exemplify the soul of coexistence and cooperation which have pulled people together in this region in the course of history. That is why we put a great emphasis on preserving traditional water management systems which can instill the soul of cooperation in all the aspects of social life and pave the way for a more effective water management system in compliance with our new conditions. The first question that may come to one’s mind is how a considerable population can peacefully share and live off their limited sources in the Iranian central plateau.

2.9  Irrigation Cycle or “Madar”

45

It is very typical to see a small current of water flowing out of a qanat in an Iranian desert village. There are hectares of farmlands all dependent on this water, and many farmers are entitled to the same current meandering among the farms and orchards. No dispute or even petty argument breaks out among the shareholders, and it is indebted to an intricate water management system which has evolved over hundreds of years. In case of some qanats, a flow of 100 liters per second may be divided among more than 1000 shareholders who have learned how to live and work side by side through the water management systems, and water ownership may fragment to such a degree that the owner of the smallest portion has rights to only thirty seconds of water once every twelve days, like Vakilabad qanat in Mahan, a town southeast of Kerman (English 1998: 201). In the arid and semi arid regions of Iran, water management is a multifaceted system which encompasses a wide range of issues from water finance to dower when a groom presents some water shares to his bride in order to meet the financial requirements of their marriage. In the following parts, I have picked only irrigation cycle and water division units to show some innovative actions that local farmers take in order to regulate water division, irrigation related subjects and preservation of water resources.

2.9  Irrigation Cycle or “Madar” Madar literally means “cycle” which is the most basic concept in the Iranian traditional water division systems. Water for irrigation is owned by shares. In fact the farmers take turns bringing water to their lands. The interval between two irrigations forms an irrigation cycle or rotation pattern of irrigation water which may take 6–21 days. For example, if a farmer has an irrigation right of 2 h within a 6 day irrigation cycle, it means that he has the right to water his land just for 2 h once every 6 days. The duration of the irrigation cycle ranges from 6 to 21 days all over the country, but the average is between 6 and 16 days in most parts of Iran, which is associated with such factors as cropping pattern. In terms of wheat and barley which are the most common crops in Iran, the best interval between two irrigations is 12 days which is the length of the most common irrigation cycle. The duration of irrigation cycle varies from area to area with the prevailing cropping pattern, the number of shareholders, climatic condition, etc. For example, the more the number of shareholders, the longer the duration of irrigation cycle. Also, in case of the plants with short and horizontal roots which are more vulnerable to the shortage of water, the irrigation cycle tends to be shorter, because a long interval between the irrigations can do a great damage to the crop. The climatic and soil conditions may affect the duration of the irrigation cycle too, and the fact that porous and light soils have a low capacity to hold water leads to a short irrigation cycle and vice versa. In terms of traditional water management, the most essential concept is the irrigation cycle which determines when each farmer is to irrigate as well as how many times each shareholder has the right to use the water during a year. It is worth noting that an irrigation cycle in a particular region is not always constant, but it

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may vary for several reasons. For example in the region of Taft (province of Yazd) there is a wide variety of irrigation cycles with different lengths. Even in a small village, each qanat may have a different irrigation cycle. This variety is attributable to economic, social and climatic factors which are sometimes interwoven. One of the most important causes of the change in the duration of an irrigation cycle is that every qanat needs to be repaired and cleaned once in a while. As mentioned, a qanat is a very long subterranean canal, sometimes up to 60 km long, so this system is subject to many natural phenomena such as flashflood, collapse, etc. That is why every year the shareholders have to collect a sum of money which goes to the maintenance and rehabilitation of their qanat. In some cases, if the damage inflicted on a qanat is so severe that the shareholders can no longer afford the cost of its repair, they would have to ask a rich person to invest in their qanat, appropriating a day of the irrigation cycle in return. In this case they increase the irrigation cycle, for example from 12 to 13 days, out of which one day belongs to someone who has financed the procedure. In this regard there is a story which shows how such a change in the irrigation cycle may occur. In 1710 an earthquake struck the town of Gonabad and reduced many homes to rubble and destroyed an important qanat named the Qanat of Qasabeh. The obstructions in the qanat were so extensive that the shareholders failed to cope with it, so they requested a rich man named Mirza Ali Naqi Riabi to take part in its repair. He accepted on condition that two days would be added to the irrigation cycle and given to him in return. At that time the governor of the region was an Arab named Mir Hasan Khan whose claim for more taxes on the income of the qanat touched off a riot, until Mirza Ali intervened and settled the problem by granting his own shares of the qanat to the governor. The governor was impressed by this sacrifice and decided to donate these irrigation shares to charitable purposes. But after a while, one of Mirza Ali’s sons claimed that he had inherited these irrigation shares and now was entitled to them, so a dispute broke out between him and the elderly governor. Mirza Ali’s son and the authorities of the great shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad agreed that half of the shares would be included in the properties of the shrine as endowment, and in return the authorities would back him up until he won that case. From this experience, the shareholders of the qanat have learned that to be content with their own resources is better than to rely upon a stranger. Sometimes for a religious or charitable purpose, the irrigation cycle may be extended. In many regions, in the name of Imam Hossein who means too much to Iranian Muslims, the farmers add a day to their irrigation cycle and then rent it out in order to come up with the money they need to hold religious events. This custom is called “miyoon” or “farkhiz”, and can only be performed with every body’s consent. Another reason for changing an irrigation cycle is the fluctuation in the flow of a qanat. If the discharge of a qanat dwindles due to drought, the water shares would no longer suffice to irrigate the existing lands. For example, if a farmer has a water share of 4 h within a 6 day irrigation cycle, and the discharge of the qanat dropped from 100 to 50 liters per second, he would not be able to water all his land. To solve this problem he changes his crop to something more resistant to the dry condition,

2.9  Irrigation Cycle or “Madar”

47

and then he receives a water share of 8 h once every 12 days not 6 days. By this means, the existing water can cover all his land, even though the qanat flow is low. In most parts of Iran, each day of an irrigation cycle has a special name, and usually the days are named after the people who own most water shares. For example, if the first day of the period is named Ali, it means that Ali owns more shares than the other shareholders on the first day. This situation can be found in the qanat of Qasem Abad in Yazd which offers a good example of the irrigation cycle and its role in bolstering cooperation among the farmers. In 2016 some 31 hectares of farms and orchards were irrigated by the qanat of Qasem Abad on the outskirts of Yazd in central Iran, whereas it is said that the qanat used to irrigate more than 230 hectares of cultivated lands in the past. At present water is being divided among the farms and orchards based on an accurate management system left from the past. Like many other qanats, here water is rationed based on time too, and the time unit is called Jorreh after the name of a traditional water clock which was used to calculate the time of irrigation. The time unit is still called Jorreh, though the water clock itself was made redundant by the modern wristwatch. A Jorreh equals 11 min., so a person who holds one Jorreh has the right to irrigate his/her land with the qanat water for 11 min. In sum, the qanat water is divided into 1560 Jorreh of which 340 Jorreh belong to Zoroastrian farmers, which are all distributed over a 12 day irrigation cycle. In other words, the shareholders of Qasem Abad qanat can take their water shares in turn once every 12  days. Each day is divided into 8 subdivisions and each subdivision contains 16 Jorreh, so each day might be made up of 128 Jorreh. However, in practice each day is made up of 130 Jorreh of which 128 Jorreh belong to the shareholders and 2 additional Jorreh go to the water chief as his wage, the person who is in charge of water division. Thus the 12 day irrigation cycle is constituted of 1560 Jorreh. Each day of the irrigation cycle is called after the name of someone who owns the most water share, as the 12 days are called respectively as follows: Foroodi, Askari, Khoramshahi, Qolami, Maryam Abadi, Ali Akbari, Haji Ali, Mohammadi, Sorkh Abi, Ramezani, Shahr Bamesi, and Qolam Rezayi. At present (2018), the qanat of Qasem Abad enjoys a council which is responsible for all the qanat affairs including water division according to the irrigation cycle. However, in the past the qanat council was only in charge of qanat maintenance and its financial issues, whereas the water division was handled by twelve water chiefs each of who oversaw one day of the irrigation cycle. The water chiefs looked after the water division as well as any transaction between the shareholders. All the water chiefs were supervised by a senior water chief called Mirab who intervened when a water chief failed to settle a dispute. Water division among the cultivated lands correlated with the cropping pattern, which got the water chief’s job more difficult and complicated. In fact the 12 day irrigation cycle was regarded as the standard cycle which was suitable for wheat as their routine cultivation. In other words, the 12  day  cycle well suited the water demand of wheat cultivation, whereas the other crops with higher water demand should have been irrigated in closer intervals and on a shorter irrigation cycle. For example, in terms of orchards, the irrigation cycle varied from 6 to 12 days with the

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type of fruit trees. Such crops as turnip and beet required a 6 day irrigation cycle, and the crops like cucumber, okra, and tomato needed a cycle as short as 3 days. Therefore, the water chief had to deal with a group of shareholders with different cropping patterns and thus different water demand. Some of them wanted to irrigate once every 12 days, whereas some preferred a 6 day cycle and some a 3 day cycle. Moreover a particular shareholder could get a part of his water share on a 12 day cycle, and other part on a 6 or 3 day cycle. For example, when someone owned 8 Jorreh, he could receive either the entire 8 Jorreh at once on a 12 day cycle or 4 Jorreh but on a 6 day cycle. The first solution to cope with such a stunning complication was to cluster the crops together with similar water demand. In other words, the water chief advised the neighbor farmers to grow the crops with similar water demand in a particular cultivation area, so that water could be transferred more easily with minimum waste and on the same irrigation cycle. Cooperation was the cornerstone of this kind of agricultural system. Clustering the crops with the same water demand made it possible for the farmers to team up at different stages of their cultivation from sowing to irrigating to reaping, which benefited everyone alike. All the neighbors who decided to grow wheat for example cooperated to plow and sow everyone’s lands and then jointly reaped the crops. As mentioned, the water chiefs kept track of the cropping areas connected with each of the 3, 6 and 12 irrigation cycles. The irrigation cycle could be hampered if the cropping area expanded out of proportion. In a nutshell, the farmers would not be able to gain from different irrigation cycles without cooperation and harmony between them. For example, on the first day of the irrigation cycle, which called Foroodi day, the farmers are supposed to irrigate once every 12  days, but those who wish to get their water once every 6 days have to cooperate with the shareholders of the seventh day or Haji Ali day. In fact the farmers of Foroodi day received half of their water share and wait for 6 other days to get the rest on Haji Ali day. This practice necessitates cooperation from the farmers of Haji Ali day by accepting to get half of their water share on Foroodi day in exchange. To do so, the farmers of the two days should coordinate their cropping patterns to ensure a similar water demand. On the other hand, day or night irrigation is another issue which should be taken into consideration while exchanging their places on the irrigation cycle. Someone on the first day (Foroodi day) who has the right to irrigate in the daytime prefers to swap his place with someone who irrigates in the daytime too, though the day and night irrigations alternate over the next cycles. Thus a person irrigating at night would be allowed to irrigate in the daytime during the next cycle. Foroodi and Haji Ali days are 6 days apart, and cooperation between their shareholders works only when they want to irrigate their crops on a 6 day cycle. As for the crops which should be irrigated on a 3 day cycle, the farmers of Foroodi day need to cooperate with those of Qolami day which is 3 days apart. Therefor they receive part of their water shares three days later on Qolami day in order to water the crops in need of more frequent irrigation. In return, the farmers of Qolami day receive the same water share three days later on the next day (Ramezani day), and then the farmers of Ramezani day shifted the same share to the next day

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Fig. 2.9  Combination of different Irrigation cycles in the qanat of Qasem Abad in the context of water cooperation (Foroodi day is assumed as a base point)

by handing over part of their shares to the farmers of the previous day and getting the same share on Foroodi day instead. This way they complete the loop of cooperation. The same order applies to the other days of the irrigation cycle as seen in the following figure (Fig. 2.9).

2.10  Water Division Units To measure the irrigation shares the farmers are entitled to, they have invented some units which differ from area to area with the local conditions and the volume of the water available. In sum, there are three types of water division units traditionally used by the Iranian farmers as follows: 1 . Units based on the area of farm land 2. Units based on the volume of flow 3. Units based on time

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The first type measures the irrigation share by the area of the field that is to be watered. So if someone has a share of 1000 m, it means that he is entitled to a volume of water able to fully irrigate a 1000 square meter land. This unit is used in regions where there is no scarcity of water. The second type is more similar to the units used today than the others. This type measures the volume of water flow per a particular time. In central Iran a unit called “qafiz” is used to measure water current. A qafiz is an amount of water which can irrigate an area of 950 square meters per 24 h. This amount of water is some 0.9 liters per second compared to our new measurement system. I skip over these types of units and focus on the third type which is more common in the arid and semi arid regions of Iran. The third type just measures the time during which a shareholder has the right to irrigate, regardless of either the land area or the volume of flow. In arid areas, units based on time are more common. To calculate the time of irrigation there exist different methods and tools among which we mention the most important ones as follows. 1- Stargazing: Harriet Nash has conducted a research project on water allocation at night based on time calculation by the use of stars. According to Nash’s study in Oman, which applies mainly to the larger qanat systems, “the water shares are based on the time that water flows to the fields. A twenty-four-hour day is divided into two parts called bāda … related to major divisions of water such as blocks for renting for falaj maintenance. It is also divided into forty-eight athar. A day-time athar is the time it takes for a shadow to lengthen by a man’s foot, nominally half an hour. The athar may be subdivided but one twenty fourth of an athar, a little more than 1 minute, is considered the smallest practicable division for irrigation. Another measurement of time is the sahm which is 45 min. and is used instead of the athar in some villages. The sun is still used by many falaj communities, even where they have stopped using the stars. At night, stars appear to circle the earth and their movement can be used to tell the time for allocation of falaj water” (Nash 2007: 161). A similar method of stargazing has been practiced in central Iran where it appears that stars were widely used to know the time at night, while for water division they were used only on certain qanats, and generally not all year round but mainly in winter, when there was sufficient water and short water shares were not needed (Nash et al. 2012). 2- Water clock: The time unit is widespread across the central plateau of Iran. To calculate the time of irrigation they have invented a special type of water clock or clepsydra. This water clock has different names in different parts of Iran. In Khorasan it is called “Fenjan” or “Pengan”. The book “Mafatih al-Oloom” authored by Mohammad Kharazmi in the tenth century is the oldest historical record in which there is a mention of this kind of water clock (Khwarazmi 1948). According to Lambton, water clock (Pengan) was common in sixteenth century Isfahan in order to divide water among the farmlands (Lambton 1939). This clepsydra consists of two bowls made of copper, one of which is so small that it can freely float on the surface of water in the larger one. The floating bowl has a tiny hole at its bottom through which water can enter the bowl and gradually fill it up. After being filled which may take a certain time, the small bowl sinks into the water and bumps on the bottom of the large bowl. As soon as the bump is heard, a unit of time is over, so the

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Fig. 2.10  A water clock for timing irrigation in central Iran (by Kiana Labbaf Khaniki)

time between the two bumps equals a certain unit of time. One can also find marks cut into the inner side of the small bowl, which divide this unit of time into shorter fragments. The time it may take the small bowl to be filled and sink varies from area to area in the central plateau of Iran, ranging from 3 to 24 min. (Fig. 2.10). Sometimes, in a certain area, the unit of time may vary with the season and the irrigation cycle. As an instance, in Bajestan, Khorasan Razavi province, the unit of time varies from 2.3 to 17.2 min. from March to February. In this area, there are three qanats named Mohammad Abad, Golbid and Nowkariz. Given the location of farms and the distance between the qanats and the farms, each farmer may use either one of the three qanats or two/three of them together. The joint flow of the qanats of Golbid and Nowkariz is considered the standard flow to which all the ownership documents refer. For example, if someone claims that he/she possesses ten shares of water, in fact he/she has the right to irrigate his/her land for 46 min., because each unit of time equals 4.6 min. if the flows of Golbid and Nowkariz are taken together. On the other hand, the irrigation cycle may be 21, 14 or 10 days over a year. On a 21  day irrigation cycle, each shareholder is allowed to irrigate only once every 21 days. Moreover, the length of the irrigation cycle varies from season to season in order to adjust the available water to the water demand of their crops. Therefore, there are 15 units of time all of which correlate with both the irrigation cycle and the number of qanats in use, as shown in the following matrix. The gray part of this matrix denotes 15 possibilities for the unit of time, from 2.3 to 17.2 min. Thus the

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Table 2.1  Correlation between irrigation cycle and source of water in Bajestan (Ibid: 105) Irrigation cycle (Day) Unit of time (min.)

10 2.3 3.2 8.2 8.2 5.5

14 3.2 4.6 11.5 11.5 7.8

21 4.8 6.9 17.2 17.2 11.7

Qanat(s) in use Mohammad Abad+Golbid+ Nowkariz Golbid+ Nowkariz Mohammad Abad Golbid Nowkariz

unit of time would equal 4.6 min. with a 14 day irrigation cycle, using the qanats Golbid and Nowkariz both together (Semsar Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2013: 104) (Table 2.1). As mentioned in Iran the water division units fall into three groups: units based on the area of farm land, units based on the volume of flow and units based on time. However, sometimes in a particular region a unit changes into another unit due to different environmental, social and economic reasons. I came across this situation during my field studies in August 2005 in the village Khanrood 31 km southwest of Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi province, Iran. In Khanrood, the cultivated lands lied side by side along a valley which enjoyed several natural springs as their main source of water. The farmers managed to harvest the springs’ water by building some simple small dams called Bash in the local dialect. Those dams were built of such available materials as stone, mud and wood to accumulate the water flowing out of the natural spring. Behind the dam, the water could rise to the level that it allowed the water to flow into a ditch on one side of the valley a few meters above the valley floor, toward the cultivated lands. Therefore the traditional dams not only served to store the water, they also helped bring the water up to the level of their farms and orchards. As mentioned the dams were built of some handy materials like stone, soil and wood, and no one could go around using such materials as cement which could insulate the dam and stop water infiltration out of it. Given that each spring was highly dependent on the water seepage out of the upstream springs, any construction in order to waterproof the dam was not allowed by the other farmers according to a local tradition. In other words, a big portion of the water of each spring came from the upstream dams whose permeable structure let the water percolate and then turned up in the next spring downslope. Needless to say any attempt to waterproof a dam could break the chain of cooperation, and could provoke an immediate reaction from the other beneficiaries. In Khanrood, all the cultivated lands were irrigated by seven canals coming from seven dams called Jooye Nasar, Jooye Sardeh, Jooye Joveyn, Jooye Pish Deh, Jooye Asiab, Jooye Hesar and Jooye Gombeh which were situated respectively from the valley upstream to downstream. Each canal transferred water from its relevant dam to a particular cultivation area. Apart from the aforesaid seven canals, there are four secondary canals called Sar Marq, Pish Hesar, Soltani and Rahimian. What made the main seven canals different from the four secondary canals was not the amount of water conveyed by them as some of the secondary canals enjoyed a larger flow

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than the main ones, but the system of their ownership set them apart. The right to utilization of the main canals was permanent, whereas the secondary canals could be used conditionally and over some certain periods. A secondary canal was sometimes used together with a main canal, and was not possible to be utilized permanently and independently. For example, the secondary canal of Sar Marq belonged to the farmers of the village Moqan, which irrigated an area of 24,000 square meters. Nevertheless those farmers had the right to use the canal of Sar Marq only from sunrise to sunset and then its water should have been diverted into the main canal of Sardeh. Also, the other three secondary canals - Pish Hesar, Soltani and Rahimian – were used along with the main canal Gombeh whose ownership system determined the water shares of those secondary canals as well. In the village Khanrood, land-based water division units were traditionally used to measure the amount of water by factoring in the area of land to be irrigated. This unit was called Man which denoted a certain amount of water enough to irrigate an area of 120 square meters. This area of land was also called one Man. In the first place, Man was a unit of weight being equal to 3 kilos. 3 kilos of wheat seed or one Man of seed was required to sow an area of 120 square meters which was also called one Man of land, and the water needed to irrigate that same land is called one Man of water as well. Therefore the unit of Man was applied for weight, area and volume at the same time. In the past volume-based unit was also used for gauging the water flow in the canals, which was equal to some 30 liters per second of water. In 2005, the villagers began replacing the land-based unit with the time-based unit in the wake of a looming drought at the time. In general, water shortage inclines the farmers to shift from land-based to time-based unit which is more accurate and effective for water rationing. However, the value of one hour of irrigation varied from canal to canal, because the canals were different in terms of their water volume. For example, it was possible to irrigate an area of 360 square meters with the water of Sardeh or Joveyn canals, whereas the canal of Pish Deh could bring a flow able to irrigate an area of 600 square meters. The decreasing discharge of the Khanrood’s canals was mostly linked to the three factors of drought, a change in cropping pattern and eventually the new concrete dams. The following model indicates how the three abovementioned factors could lead to a dramatic decline in the canal water and its consequences (Fig. 2.11). The climate change and a decrease in the annual precipitation contributed to a dramatic decline in the water of the canals at the time. Nevertheless we should not downplay the other two factors which gradually led to such a water shortage over years. One of those factors is the cropping pattern which has changed since the early 1960s. Prior to that date only such crops as wheat, potato and turnip were grown in almost all the farms in Khanrood, which needed at most three times of irrigation all year round. However, after 1960 orchards especially cherry trees quickly took the place of the traditional farm crops which had a much lower water demand compared to the orchards. The cherry trees needed to be irrigated as many as 15 times a year, which raised the water demand to a critical level. In the early 1960s in many of the land lord owned villages, the replacement of farm crops by orchards was attributable to the land reform law which exempted

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Fig. 2.11  Natural and human factors leading to a shift from land-based to time-based unit of water division in the village of Khanrood

mechanized farms as well as orchards from re-distribution of lands. Therefore, many of the land lords rushed to replace their farms with orchards in order to evade the land reform law. Nevertheless, this story did not apply to the village of Khanrood where only petty owners were in the possession of the village lands even before the land reform law, and no land lord ever existed. One can find a subtle link between the changing cropping pattern and the village’s proximity to the city of Mashhad. The big cities provide a lucrative market for the fresh fruits, and the modern urbanism raised the demand for such products which were once regarded as luxury in the traditional life style. The village’s proximity to the urban market and the advent of modern transportation made it much easier for the farmers to deliver such perishable products as fresh fruits. The new market and economic possibility tempted many farmers to shift from traditional cultivation to orchards. The other factor is the concrete dams which led to a considerable decrease in the water flow of the upstream canals. In the early 1980s after the Islamic revolution, some concrete dams with the height of 2 m were built across the valley in order to control the soil erosion by the seasonal runoffs, and to prevent the sediments from being washed into the Toroq Dam. Toroq Dam is located 14 km southeast of Mashhad near a historical dam with the same name. This dam is 81 m high and 14 meters wide and 322 m long. The downside of the concrete dams was that the natural runoffs were trapped behind the dams instead of flowing along the valley, and as a result less water could seep into the upper layer of the ground and turn up at the traditional springs. The water accumulated behind the concrete dams either evaporated into the air or seeped into the deep layers of soil out of the access of the natural springs and then moved toward the valley downstream eventually into the Toroq Dam reservoir. Thus, the springs in the valley upstream discharged less water than did those in the valley downstream, as Jooye Nasar, the uppermost spring, was about to dry up. In fact in the past there was a secondary canal named Sheykh Ramezan which belonged to the village of Moqan. In 1991 the discharge of Jooye Nasar reduced to almost zero and

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the water of Sheykh Ramezan dwindled too to the extent that their water could not be used without being stored in an irrigation pool for a couple of hours. Therefore the farmers of Khanrood and Moqan cooperated to build a joint irrigation pool somewhere between Jooye Nasar and Sheykh Ramezan springs in order to accumulate the waters of both springs and then divide the water among the farmers from the both villages. Given that 58 percent of the cost of the irrigation pool was paid by the farmers of Moqan and 42 percent by the farmers of Khanrood, they could get their shares by the same proportions. 58 percent of the water accumulated in the pool went to the farmers of Moqan and 42 percent belonged to the farmers of Khanrood. The spring water was diverted to the pool for three entire days and then the water was released toward the farms and orchards. It took about 7 h – from 7 am to 2 pm – that the pool became empty of water, and out of 12 times of its emptying, 7 times were for the farmers of Moqan and 5 times for the farmers of Khanrood according to their water share. Each pool could irrigate an area of 6000 square meters. Nonetheless the farmers of Khanrood were not content with their water share, since they believed that their cultivation area was larger than that of Moqan’s farmers who got more water, in the face of a local tradition according to which everyone’s water share should be proportional to the area of their lands. The changing conditions put the traditional land-based unit in contradiction to the time-based unit which just came about in the wake of water scarcity. The farms were irrigated in order of their distances from the pool, so that the nearest farms to the pool were irrigated first. This way the farms were irrigated respectively until the pool ran out of water, and in the next round the irrigation resumed at the same place. Nonetheless, they skipped over the uncultivated lands which usually belonged to those who had not contributed to the cost of pool construction. As for the water division of Jooye Nasar, someone called Salar was hired by the shareholders to take care of the water shares. Salar began his job in mid-May into late September, though this period could change a little with the amount of annual precipitation. He received a monthly salary of 167 USD, and the same amount was paid to his assistant. Each shareholder was required to contribute to this salary by paying 23 cents for each 120 square meters of their lands. Jooye Pish Deh too enjoyed a Salar who used to divide its water among the farmers like Jooye Nasar. In 2005, Mohammad Reza Nariman was the Salar and Mohammad Javaheri was his assistant. It should be noted that Jooye Pish Deh was regarded as the most important canal which irrigated most of the farms in Khanrood. The water transferred by that canal was able to irrigate an area of 120 square meters per 12 min. or 600 square meters per 1 h. At the time of water shortage the farmers resorted to the time-based unit for rationing water among the farms, though when water proved ample, the farmers did not care about the timing and they irrigated the lands from upstream to downstream one after another until they all became saturated. However, at the time of water shortage, they translated their irrigation system into a time-based one, when each 600 square meters of land was entitled only to one hour of water which was considered the minimum time needed to irrigate an area of 600 square meters with the water volume of Jooye Pish Deh. The water flow was diverted to the next

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land immediately after the irrigation time was over, regardless of whether or not the land was well watered. Jooye Sardeh too exemplifies the vivid impact that water shortage may have on water division system in the region. Jooye Sardeh is located between Jooye Nasar and Pish Deh, from which another canal named Joveyn derived. Therefore the both canals - Jooye Sardeh and Joveyn – were connected to one dam. That was why there were 7 main canals despite the fact that the traditional dams in the region numbered only 6 (except for the small dams related to the secondary canals). Jooye Sardeh and Joveyn both together could irrigate an area of 168,000 square meters. According to a local tradition, haft of the water behind the traditional dam was allotted to the canal of Sardeh and the other half to the canal of Joveyn. When water was abundant, the both canals conveyed water at the same time to their relevant farmlands where the farmers could get their shares in turn. However, at the time of water shortage, the shareholders used to put in place an irrigation cycle or a rotation period which facilitated the rationing of water; a practice called Bijeh in the local dialect. A few days before the rationing began, they announced that Bijeh was around the corner and whoever wanted to irrigate their farms should have hurried up. Afterward the water had to be used on an irrigation cycle, such that the dam water was allotted to Sardeh canal for duration of 6 days, and then water flowed into Joveyn canal for the same duration. Jooye Sardeh remained blocked by a metal valve as long as the water flowed down the canal of Joveyn. Also, the canal of Asiab which ran downslope from Sardeh was rationed and divided among the farmers on a 12 day irrigation cycle at the time of water shortage. Such irrigation cycles can be named temporary, because they closely correlate with the annual precipitation. Such cycles disappear when the rainfall provides abundance of water and may return exactly with the same peculiarities when water is at a premium. Downslope from the canal of Asiab, there was another canal called Hesar which used to irrigate a separate cultivation area whose owners as well held some shares of the lands irrigated by Asiab canal. Therefore, at the time of water scarcity, those farmers preferred to forgo the irrigation of their farms with Asiab canal, and instead they diverted the water of Asiab to the canal of Hesar and added it to the water of Hesar in order to have more water being able to well irrigate their farms over there at least. In such a condition the water of Asiab and Hesar would not be separately enough to quench the thirst of the farmlands in the both areas, so the farmers usually decided to save one cultivation area at the cost of the other. A Persian proverb says: one prosperous village is better than one hundred ruined towns. Jooye Gombeh was too subject to the same rationing system at the time of water shortage. That canal was located in the lowermost spot at the valley of Khanrood, downslope from all the other canals. Its water was divided among the farmers of two villages – Khanrood and Ardameh – on a 14 day irrigation cycle. Water division was practiced from late Jun on, but prior to that date much restriction or regulation was not imposed on water utilization. Water division was decided in the village of Ardameh, and the order of water shares was determined, and then the farmers of Khanrood were informed of the result by sending a letter. On a 14 day irrigation

2.11  Traditional Water Division in River Systems

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cycle, 12  days belonged to the farmers of Ardameh and 2  days were allotted to Khanrood. The water of three secondary canals – Pish Hesar, Soltani and Rahimian – was also divided on the same irrigation cycle, as 12  days of that water went to Ardameh and 2 days belonged to the farmers of Khanrood. I can conclude that in Khanrood, water division unit is in fact based on land, which is more common in the areas irrigated by rivers. However, a gradual decline in the water resources have driven the villagers to change their water division system by adopting a time-based unit in order to better adapt their agriculture to the changing environment. The time units used in Khanrood are hour and minute, which imply that this kind of water division unit has just recently been introduced to the region. The villagers have no idea about any local term synonym for such modern time units as hour and minute, because time unit is not very rooted in their farming system and has not left its trace in their agricultural jargon. In the villages where time-based unit is a traditional groundwork for water division, the agricultural jargon is still awash with different words regarding time unit like Fenjan, Jorreh, Tasoo, Jam, etc. though they have been made redundant by the modern time unit.

2.11  Traditional Water Division in River Systems One of the most elaborate water division systems has been devised for Zayandeh River which originates from Zard-Kuh Mountain in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province, and flows 400 km eastward into Gavkhouni swamp. Water division of Zayandeh River in Isfahan seems inseparable from mentioning Sheikh Baha’i as someone who invented an effective system to better distribute this water among different beneficiary regions. Sheikh Baha’i was a scholar who lived between 1547 and 1621  AD mostly in Safavid Isfahan, but turned into a famous personality with a legendary intelligence, to whom many of the architectural and engineering masterpieces of Isfahan have been attributed, though none of them can be substantiated with reliable historical evidences. The only historical document that spells out the details of water division of this river is called Sheikh Baha’i’s Scroll in the belief that he managed to draw up such an elaborate division deed upon the recommendation of the Safavid king. However, many scholars have cast doubt on the authenticity of this story, mostly due to an administrative jargon which was only common in the period of Qajar dynasty but also abounds in Sheikh Baha’i’s Scroll. It is more probable that the scroll has been written at the time of Qajar but was attributed to Sheikh Baha’i to gain legitimacy because of his high position in the public opinion and his image always revered by the then people (Mahmoodian and Qayoomi 2012: 144). Although Sheikh Baha’i’s Scroll is not of great antiquity, water division system of Zayandeh River dates back to ancient times probably when the first agricultural settlements began dotting along the river bank and then competing over the available water. Ahmad ibn Rustah the tenth century geographer has mentioned Ardashir (180–242 AD) the founder of Sasanian Empire as the first person who regulated the

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water division of Zayandeh River. “The water is still divided according to Ardashir’s decision, and each village has been decided to take a certain amount of water during a certain time to ensure that justice is served in case of water” (Ibn Rustah, 1986: 183). Sheikh Baha’i’s Scroll has been written in 27 pages of which one page pertains to the king’s verdict and the method of calculation, two pages take up the executive regulations, and 24 pages contain a detailed record of the water shares of some villages (Mahmoodian and Qayoomi 2012: 144). According to the scroll, the water of Zayandeh River is divided into 33 shares and then distributed among the agricultural areas Elenjan and Lenjan, Marbin and Jey, Baraan and Kerarj, and eventually Roodashteyn (Hajian and Hajian 2013: 5). During the cold months, the water could be used by everyone with no restriction, but from the beginning of June for 165 days the water was allocated only to the shareholders according to the scroll. Nevertheless, part of this water was supplied to the city of Isfahan through a network of canals generally called Madi in  local dialect. Three canals named Fadan, Farshadi and Niasarm ran across the Safavid Isfahan, and also some canals brought water to the royal gardens such as Jooy-e Shah canal. The city had a share from only two canals Fadan and Farshadi, and the third one Niasarm used to pass across the city to convey water to the surrounding farms, with no one allowed to take water in the city itself. Many smaller ditches derived from the main canals Fadan and Farshadi and spread all over the city, forming a nexus of urban water supply system (Mahmoodian and Qayoomi 2012: 145). The water division of Zayandeh River was so important that it was supervised by the king himself. For example in the year 1611when a drought struck the region, Shah Abbas I (1571–1629) put a ban on rice cultivation in Lenjan area to economize on the available water. Actually the king put the domestic uses first when it came to water allocation. Ironically today we have the same problem in Zayandeh River basin, and the rice cultivation in the river upstream relentlessly continues at the cost of the downstream shareholders despite the governmental pressure. Although the King was very concerned about the water management of Zayandeh River, this responsibility was entrusted to an official named Mirab to be in charge of water related issues under the king’s direct supervision. The position of Mirab was ranked among the 21 dignitaries who had the permission to attend the royal assembly in the king’s presence, and Mirab was the 12th person. Tavernier the seventeenth century French traveler reports that “in Safavid Isfahan Mirab is responsible for all waters. This official position is among the highest governmental posts in terms of its benefit. One can compare this post to the directorate of waters and forests in France” (Tavernier 1990: 578). The king’s concern for water management is quite understandable, because in a hydraulic civilization like what we see in the Safavid Isfahan, the kingdom’s stability, authority and sovereignty are closely associated with an effective water management system. Majority of the then population were involved in the agricultural activities which proved impossible without irrigation. During the dry months when the crops were in need of water most, the amount of water was disproportional to the water demand of the extensive cultivated lands whose revenue not only sustained the local economy but also propped up the ruling power

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e­ conomically in the form of tax. That was why water served as a cornerstone in their tax system. Every year the royal officials estimated the amount of water expected to be available until the end of the cropping season, as an indication to predict the amount of harvest on which the annual tax could be levied. Thus, any disorder in the water management could wreak havoc on the agricultural production systems and according could bring down the economic structures and then the government itself. An impaired water division and management system could bring about a terrible chaos in the society where many farmers became ensnared in a ring of violence rather than focusing on their agricultural production. As a result the widespread social dissatisfaction and a downturn in the government’s revenue could pave the way for its fall. For example the water management system of Zayandeh River, which was well run by the Safavid kings, later was afflicted by corruption and despotism at the time of Sultan Suleiman I, and gradually drove the Safavid dynasty into annihilation at the time of Sultan Husayn of course along with the other historical causes. Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716) the German explorer who visited Isfahan at the time of Sultan Suleiman I, reported that “Given that the crops are fully reliant on the water being rationed among the farms, it is very common for the water officials to take bribes, and the desperate farmers vie with each other to bribe the officials” (Kaempfer 1981: 104). As a result, the economy spilled into a dark epoch, eventually leading to the collapse of Safavid dynasty. Chardin (1643–1713) the French traveler describes Iran at the time of Sultan Suleiman I in his book as follows: “This year (1676) Sultan Suleiman is still reigning, and a downturn in economy has occurred just over a short period, only 12 years since the previous king, so terrible that it seems that the country’s wealth has declined by half” (Chardin 1966: 39).

2.12  Traditional Water Management and Sustainability The local communities could adapt themselves to different natural conditions such as drought by many innovations in terms of water distribution management. Moreover they could come up with some sustainable solutions which ensured everyone’s profit. Also their water management was so precise and comprehensive that it prevented any dispute and gained the public acceptance. Needless to say if the society comes to an understanding about a management system, everyone would have enough motivation to take part in its implementation and accordingly the sense of cooperation and convergence would be well established in the society. Therefore the key elements of a water division system consist in adaptation with climatic conditions, accuracy and sustainability, consent of beneficiaries, social justice, transparency and eventually cooperation. We should take the above mentioned elements into account while designing new management systems and refrain from setting up hasty systems which neglect the public contribution and disturb the sustainability of our society and environment. Nowadays the term “water war” or “water conflict” is being bandied around in our political and even scientific literature, whereas traditional communities in the

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Iranian arid land used to live side by side in the face of water shortage that they always had to deal with. Traditional communities have evolved a sustainable relationship with their environment over hundreds or even thousands of years. In the Iranian plateau this relationship is manifest in traditional water management which can be a source of inspiration for those who want to devise a modern water management system in harmony with environment and society. When we talk about hydraulic technologies, some structures and tools may flash through our minds, whereas behind water there is also a profound traditional knowledge which deserves at least the same attention. Traditional water division systems exemplify the soul of coexistence and cooperation which has pulled people together in this region in the course of history. Cooperation among a particular society is considered kind of intangible social capital which proves a predisposition for development. In other words when a society has a strong tendency toward cooperation, economic activities which are contingent on social convergence would better take place and thrive. In traditional water management system, a slight disagreement between some water shareholders can throw all the irrigation system into disorder, leading to the annihilation of the local economy. Therefore, consensus is what

Fig. 2.12  Socio-economic impact of traditional water management system on different aspects of social life in central Iran

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everybody profits from, and the water management system has evolved into a state that now guarantees the collective interests. We believe that the traditional water management system has nourished social convergence on which “cooperation” has been established. Though soul of cooperation is rooted in water management, it has spread to the other social domains such as family life, education, production, etc. Even today it is easier to bring people together to launch a cooperative economic activity in the regions with a history and tradition of water management than the regions where lack such a social foundation. Water has always been the cornerstone of civilizations in the arid and semi arid regions of Iran, and all the social foundations revolving around water have become a kind of model for the other aspects of social life. That is why we put a great emphasis on preserving traditional water management systems which can instill the soul of cooperation in all aspects of social life. The following model shows the socio-economic effects that traditional water management system directly or indirectly has on different aspects of social life (Fig. 2.12). Explaining all the items is a digression, but only it is worth noting that regulation, order and law are inherent in traditional water management system, and wherever such a system is at issue, people observe the rules to a larger extent. It becomes a kind of social style not to flout the rules and laws, where people are accustomed to law and order through traditional water management. For example, the city of Ardakan, Yazd province, which enjoys one of the most elaborate and accurate water management systems in the country, is doing well in the realm of modernity too. Inhabitants of Ardakan pay their water bills on time and have the least water debtors according to the database of water and waste water company. Traditional water management systems can create a special moral paradigm which benefits the same traditional water management systems to work on properly. We believe that irrigation efficiency is not the only outcome of such systems, but also social convergence, lawfulness, cooperation, etc. are their spontaneous results which can make up our social capital.

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Chahin, M. (2001). The kingdom of Armenia: a history (2nd ed.). Richmond: Curzon. Chardin, J. (1966). The travels of Sir John Chardin, (M. Abbasi, Trans.). Vol. 4, Tehran: Amirkabir. Cowie, J.  (2007). Climate change: Biological and human aspects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Demenocal, P. B. (1995). Plio-Pleistocene African climate. Science, 270(5233), 53–59. Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed. New York: Penguin Group. Enayatollah, R., Kouros Gholam, R., Emam Shooshtari, M. A., & Entezami Ali, A. (1971). Water and irrigation technique in ancient Iran. (In Persian. Tehran: Water and Power Ministry. English Paul, W. (1998). “Qanats and lifeworlds in Iranian plateau villages”, Transformations of Middle Eastern natural environments: legacies and lessons conference, Bulletin 103, Yale University, pp. 187–205. Gabriel, A. (1992). Passing through Persian desert, (F. Najd Samiyi, Trans.). Mashhad: Astan Qods Publication. Garbrecht, G. (1986). “Wasserspeicher (Talsperren) in der Antike”, Antike Welt, 2nd special edition: Antiker Wasserbau. Goblot, H. (1992). Qanats; A technique for obtaining water, (Sarv Ghad Moghaddam A., Papoli Yazd M. H., Trans.). Mashhad: Astan Qods Publication. Hajian, N., Hajian P. (2013). Feasibility of Upgrading Sheikh Baha’i’s Scroll Taking the Present Situation into Account (in Persian), the first national conference on the challenges of water resources and agriculture, Isfahan. Hasanalian, D. (2006). Iran Newspaper., No. 3526. Ibn Rustah, A. (1986). Book of precious records (H. Qarechanloo, Trans.). Tehran: Amirkabir. Jacobsen, T., & Lloyd, S. (1935). Sennacherib’s aqueduct at Jerwan, Oriental Institute Publication (Vol. 24). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kaempfer, E. (1981). Kaempfer’s travels account (K Jahandari, Trans.). Tehran: Kharazmi. Khosravi, K. (1970, February). “Irrigation and rural Society in Iran” (in Persian), Social sciences essays, No. 3. Khwarazmi, Abu Abdullah Muhammad Ibn-i Yusef. (1948). Mafatih al-Ulum, (H Khidejam, Trans.). Tehran. Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (1997). Identification of Qanats in Gonabad, Archaeological reports (1), Tehran: Archaeology Research Institute. Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2007). Water division Systems in Iran, National Iranian Water Museum (NIWM). Tehran. Labbaf Khaneiki, R., Bashash R. (1994). Scientific articles on Lakh Mazar in Birjand, Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. Laessoe, J. (1951). The irrigation system at Ulhu, 8th Century B.C. Journal of Cuneiform Studies, 5(1), 21. Lambton, A. K. S. (1939). The regulation of the waters of the Zayande Rud. Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies, IX. Mahmoodian, S., Qayoomi B. M., (2012). Norm of canals; water management system in Safavid Isfahan, Architecture and Municipal Engineering Journal, University of Art, No. 10. Maleki, H. (1998). Forests and Desertification in Iran. Ayandeh Publication. McCormick, M., et al. (2012). Climate change during and after the Roman empire: Reconstructing the past from scientific and historical evidence. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xliii, 2. McCown Donald, E. (1957). The comparative stratigraphy of early Iran, oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Meftah, E. (1992) Historic geography of Murghab – Merv and Merv Rood (in Persian), Historic Researches Journal, No. 6 & 7, Fall 1992, pp. 71–132. Naamani, F. (1979). Evolution of Feudalism in Iran (Vol. 1). Tehran: Kharazmi Publication. Naghib Zadeh, A. (2000). An introduction to sociology (in Persian). Tehran: Samt Publication. Nash, H. (2007). Stargazing in traditional water management: A case study in northern Oman. Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 37, 157–170.

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Nash, H., Labbaf Khaneiki, M., Semsar Yazdi Ali A. (2012). Traditional timing of water shares. Proceedings of the international conference on traditional knowledge for water resources management, Yazd, Iran 21–23. Papoli Yazdi, M. H., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2000). Role of Qanat in formation of civilizations; Theory of sustainability of Qanat culture and civilization. In Proceedings of International Conference on Qanat (Vol. 1). Yazd. Papoli Yazdi, M. H., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (1998). Water division unit in traditional irrigation systems (in Persian). Geographic Researches Journal, 49–50 Summer and Fall 1998. Qomi Hasan ibn Mohammad (1982). History of Qom (Persian translation). Translated by Hasan ibn Ali Abdolmalek Qomi, Edited by Jalal al-Din Tehrani, Tehran: Toos. Radner, K. (2007). Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Musasir, Kumme, Ukku and Subria  – The Buffer States between Assyria and Urartu, BIAINILI-URARTU, Proceedings of the Symposium held in Munich, 12–14 October 2007, pp. 243–264. Ramesht, M. H. (2001, Spring). Quaternary Lakes: Ground of formation and development of civilization in Iran. Geographical Research Journal, 60. Rohling, E. J. (2013). Oxygen isotope composition of seawater. In S. A. Elias (Ed.), The encyclopedia of quaternary science (Vol. 2, pp. 915–922). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Saedloo, H. (1997). “Water in the civilization of Iran and Islam” (in Persian), Rahnamay-e Ketab (Book guide) (Vol. 17). Salimi Moayed, S. (2000). The legend on Qanat genesis in Shahdad region. (in Persian. In Proceedings of International Qanat Conference (Vol. 1). Yazd: Yazd Regional Water Authority. Semsar, Y., & Labbaf Khaneiki. (2017). Qanat knowledge; construction and maintenance. Dordrechet: Springer. Semsar Yazdi, A. A., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2013). Veins of Desert. Yazd: International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structure (UNESCO-ICQHS). Sharifi, A., Pourmand, A., Canuel, E.A., Peterson, L.C., Djamali, M., Lahijani, H. and Naderi, M. (2013). A high-resolution record of climate variability from Neor Lake in NW Iran: Investigating the role of abrupt climate change on human civilization in West Asia. INQUA Quick LakeH workshop on rapidly changing large lakes and human response, Tehran, Iran. Sobooti, Y. (2011). The warm earth the result of 21st century. Tehran: Geography and Cartography Institute of Gitashenasi. Sykes, P. (1984). History of Persia, Vol 1, (S. Fakhr Dayi Gilani, Trans.). M. T., Tehran: Donyaye Ketab. Tavernier, J. B. (1990). Tavernier’s travels account (Persian translation), translated by Aboo Torab Noori. Tehran: Sanayi. Wiesgerber, G. (2003). The impact of the dynamics of Qanats and Aflaj on Oases in Oman: Comparisons with Iran and Bahrain. Proceedings of Internationales Frontinus-symposium Wasserversorgung aus Qanaten- Qanate als Vorbilder im Tunnelelbau, Walferdange, Luxemburg. Wuttmann, M., Gonon, T., & Thiers, C. (2000). The Qanats of Ayn-Manawir (Kharga Oasis, Egypt). In Proceedings of the first international symposium on Qanat, Yazd, Iran (Vol. IV). Tehran: Iranian National Commission for UNESCO. Yule, P. (1999). The Samad period in the Sultanate of Oman. Iraq, 61.

Chapter 3

Social Aspects of Water in Central Iran

Abstract  This chapter starts with the issue of cooperation which is manifest in the different social aspects of qanat system as the main water supply in central Iran. Qanat is a subterranean tunnel with a gentle slope, which drains out groundwater taking advantage of a height difference along its tunnel and by the force of gravity. Cooperation is an inherent element of a qanat’s social organization from its construction to operation. This chapter also examines some social aspects of water in central Iran such as water division systems. In Iran water for irrigation is owned by shares. In fact the farmers take turns bringing water to their land. For a particular shareholder, the interval between two irrigations means an irrigation cycle or rotation pattern of irrigation water which may take 6–21  days. To measure the irrigation shares the farmers are entitled to, they have invented some units which vary from area to area with the local conditions and the volume of the water available. Traditional water division systems exemplify the soul of coexistence and cooperation which have pulled people together in this region in the course of history. The village of Meymand has been chosen as a case study in order to delve further into the social aspects of water in Iran in the context of social, economic and environmental transitions.

3.1  Qanat as a Cooperative Water Supply System Human is a social species whose development is deeply indebted to the sense of cooperation. When humans could invent language at prehistoric times, cooperation was put on a new track which led to the accumulation of knowledge and the genesis of great civilizations. Every social activity served as a core around which experiences and knowledge of the participants could build up. For example if the cavemen did not have to run after games in their primitive groups, they might not be able to mobilize their experiences in order to organize more complicated communities. Qanat system could play such a role in the communities of the arid and semi-arid lands where scarcity or even lack of surface water drove people to search for other water sources underground through qanat technique. Technologies related to qanat are of great value, but we believe that the subtle role of qanat in creating and © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Labbaf Khaneiki, Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0_3

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strengthening the sense of cooperation in local communities is not less valuable. In Iran, qanat water is owned by shares. In fact the farmers take turns bringing water to their land. Traditional water management systems can instill the soul of cooperation in all aspects of social life and pave the way for a more effective water management system in compliance with our new conditions. Qanat is a geographically extended system being sometimes tens of kilometers long. In fact a qanat gallery cuts through a variety of geological formations, runs beneath many human settlements and cultivated lands and is subject to numerous potential threats. Therefore a qanat cannot be built, maintained and operated just by an individual but it demands a vast cooperation from the community. This cooperation takes place from the very first moment of its construction to the last drop of water coming out from its gallery. To better get a handle on this issue, I have classified the fields of cooperation in qanat as construction-maintenance, operation, transfer, and water division.

3.2  Cooperation in Construction–Maintenance of Qanat As mentioned, qanat is a long tunnel whose construction consumes a lot of time, energy and money. It is very difficult for an individual to afford the money required to build or even repair a typical qanat. Therefore the first step to build or repair a qanat is to bring together all the beneficiaries and pool their money in order to cover the qanat expenses (Semsar Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2011). Qanat cost is not limited to the money spent on its construction, but it continues into its operation, because a typical qanat needs repair and cleaning once in a while in order to keep running. Therefore an elaborate financial system has evolved in terms of qanat over time. In some areas one may see some traditions and customs which are subtly associated with financial affairs of qanat. For example in some regions of central Iran the locals used to hold a wedding ceremony for their qanat when it came to dry up. They asked a widow in the village to become wife of qanat and dwell in a house built just close to the qanat exit. The villagers treated with this wedding and the qanat’s wife the same as they did with a real bride, and all the wedding customs were observed exactly like a real one. One of those customs was the wife’s allowance which should be paid by any husband regularly in their culture. Since this weird husband was not able to fulfill its commitment, the village people raised an amount of money once in a while to pay to the bribe on her husband’s behalf. Of course the money collected this way was much more than what the qanat’s wife really needed, so the rest went to qanat maintenance and cleaning. Thus those people were right in their belief that marrying off their qanat can increase its water. Though this custom has long been abolished, but there is still its vestige in many Iranian villages. The allowance paid to a wife is called “Nafaghe” in Persian language but this term also now refers to the money that villagers collect to clean and repair their qanat. The name of that ancient custom is living on, though there is no longer a trace of it in reality (Labbaf Khaneiki and Semsar Yazdi 2015).

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Apart from financial affairs, cooperation is also manifest in the qanat know-how which encompasses a wide range of indigenous knowledge from geometry to botany. In fact if there was not interaction and cooperation between different fields of science, no qanat could come into existence. At the beginning of construction of a qanat, the workers should know about the plant species in the desert and their relationship with groundwater in order to designate the best spot to dig the first well. To do so they should also be knowledgeable on geological stratification to better estimate the depth of the bed rock and the sediment thickness. As they further the qanat construction, more and more fields of science would be engaged in their work. For example in Yazd, Iran when the qanat masters dig overhead from the tunnel ceiling up toward the earth surface they apply some interesting mathematical equations to minimize their error. During my field studies I realized that a qanat master knew of the above mentioned mathematical equations but he talked about them in a different language. When I tried to translate them into the standard mathematical equations, I was amazed at the fact that an illiterate traditional qanat master was using Pythagorean theorem in practice. Cooperation between fields of science even goes farther where medical knowledge is applied to cure the injured or sick workers or prevent the potential threats, where astronomy is used to calculate time for qanat water division. Cooperation is more apparent in the working team while a qanat is being built or refurbished. A working team consists of at least four workers which are closely connected like the cogs of a machine. The team head is the qanat master who is more experienced than the other workers and digs the tunnel end into the soil. A worker sits behind the master and collects the excavated soil and puts it in the buckets which are carried by another worker along the tunnel and hooked to a rope hanging from the nearest well. Finally a worker operates a windlass on the ground to coil up the rope and pull up the debris bucket and dump it around the well opening. These workers perfectly team up to make the most of their energy and time. Sometimes there are additional teams working simultaneously to speed up the qanat construction, and all of them are in a perfect harmony and coordination (Semsar Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2017).

3.3  Cooperation in the Qanat’s Operation Cooperation is not limited to qanat construction, but it becomes more visible when qanat is being used for different purposes. Qanat also gives rise to cooperation in constructing and using some hydraulic structures associated with qanat. For example a water reservoir is filled up with the water coming from a qanat nearby. In the traditional towns and villages water reservoir plays a crucial role in supplying drinking water, which is deeply indebted to cooperation, because all the qanat shareholders should be unanimous to hand over their water to the reservoirs whenever needed. A watermill also operates with the qanat water. A watermill has an intricate relationship with the qanat, its shareholders and the local community from financial and

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social points of view. In a nutshell the right of building and running a watermill can be granted to an individual or a group of people but in fact the watermill belongs to the qanat whose water rotates the watermill turbine. Someone who is in charge of the watermill pays something in cash or in kind occasionally to the qanat owners, and then this payment is spent on the qanat rehabilitation and maintenance. All these things take place in a very systematic way in which all the factors are closely interwoven. Cooperation does not only occur in a particular qanat, but also it may take place between different qanats. In many valleys in Iran qanats usually run down the mountain foots parallel to each other. These qanats originate from mountain foots overlooking a vast plain with thick layers of sediments. Precipitations on the mountains recharge the aquifer and seep into the qanats. In this case the owners of all qanats cooperate to better maintain their qanats. If a qanat would be obstructed by a collapse, the qanat owners have the permission to dig a side tunnel just before the obstruction toward an adjacent parallel qanat. This water can be conveyed to their farmlands through their neighboring qanat, otherwise their lands would dry out and their crop would wither away. To do so, they measure the water volume before joining the neighboring qanat and then they receive the same volume downstream at the exit point. Diverting water to a neighboring qanat gives them enough time to fix the problem and remove the obstruction more comfortably. This cooperation benefits all the qanats in the valley whenever they are in trouble. Qanat is a system with a vast spatial extent that may reach the length of tens of kilometers. Therefore taking care of such a system demands a close cooperation from all the shareholders. In most cases, there are some artificial recharge dams upstream from a qanat. Those earthen dams serve to trap the seasonal runoffs behind them and make the water seep into the earth and replenish the aquifer. The dams play a vital role in sustaining the qanat discharge. The dams are not located in the territory of the direct beneficiaries of qanat, but they have to be built in the territory of another village up slope from the qanat. But those villagers raise no objection to the construction of such dams in their territory even though they cannot gain from the qanat water at all, because of height difference. They tolerate the presence of those dams, because they can take indirect advantage of the dams whose sediments were quite suitable for dry farming. The sediments behind the dams provide enough moisture for the crops after water fully subsides and percolates through the ground to the aquifer. The damp sediments are regarded as an opportunity for the upstream villagers to cultivate with no need for irrigation (Labbaf Khaneiki 2017).

3.4  Cooperation in the Transfer of Qanat Knowledge Qanat knowledge is in fact a historical process which has taken place through an interaction between nations and at same time between generations. From a historical perspective, qanat has been a vehicle for accumulation of humans’ knowledge on their environment. This knowledge has been made up of various pieces coming

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from different nations and generations to portray a gorgeous picture of human coexistence with nature, embodying the concept of cooperation through both history and geography. In the qanat workers’ jargon, it is very easy to find the foreign words adopted from other languages and nations, which are holdovers from a longstanding relationship between different nations in this respect.

3.5  Cooperation in Water Division Water division system of qanat is a perfect example of water cooperation. The first question that may come to one’s mind is how a considerable population can peacefully share and live off their limited sources in the Iranian central plateau. It is very typical to see a small current of water flowing out of a qanat in an Iranian desert village. There are hectares of farmlands all dependent on this water, and many farmers are entitled to the same current meandering among the farms and orchards. No dispute or even argument breaks out among the shareholders, and it is indebted to an intricate water management system which has evolved over hundreds of years. In case of some qanats, a flow of 100 liters per second may be divided among more than 1000 shareholders who have learned how to live and work side by side through their water management systems. In the arid and semi-arid regions of Iran, water management is a multifaceted system which encompasses a wide range of issues from water finance to dower when a groom presents some water shares to his bride in order to meet the financial requirements of their marriage. Water cooperation takes place on the basis of rotation pattern of irrigation water or an “irrigation cycle” which is called “madar” in Iran. Madar literally means “cycle” which is the most basic concept in the Iranian traditional water division systems. Water for irrigation is owned by shares. In fact the farmers take turns bringing water to their land. For a particular shareholder, the interval between two irrigations means an irrigation cycle or rotation pattern of irrigation water which may take 6–21 days. For example, if a farmer has an irrigation right of 2 h within a 6 day irrigation cycle, it means that he has the right to water his land just for 2 h once every 6 days. The duration of the irrigation cycle ranges from 6 to 21 days in all over Iran, but the average is between 6 and 16 days in most of the country, which is mostly related to the cropping pattern. In terms of wheat and barley which are the most common crops in Iran, the best interval between two irrigations is 12 days, and that is the length of the most common irrigation cycle. All the shareholders are fully in harmony with the qanat water division system and everybody takes their shares according to a rotation of irrigation which allows them to irrigate their lands only at specified times. Sometimes all the shareholders decide to change the irrigation cycle to better adapt to the likely climatic changes. If there would not be such cooperation, no one could survive in the harsh environment of the Iranian desert. Fluctuation in the flow of a qanat can drive the shareholders to modify their irrigation cycle unanimously. If the discharge of a qanat decreases due to a drought, the water shares would no longer suffice to irrigate the existing lands.

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For example, if a farmer has a water share of 4 h within a 6 day irrigation cycle, and the discharge of the qanat dropped from 100 to 50 liters per second, he would no longer be able to water his entire land. To solve this problem he changes his crops to something more resistant to the dry condition, and then he receives a water share of 8 h once every 12 days not 6 days. Therefore, the existing water can cover all his land, even though the qanat flow is low. This example applies to all the shareholders which are under the same circumstances. This coordination and cooperation could have ensured their survival in the face of water shortage in central plateau of Iran. The social structures of such region could have evolved this way to gain such a level of cooperation to better adapt to their environment. The duration of irrigation cycle varies from area to area with the prevailing cropping pattern, the number of shareholders, climatic condition, etc. For example, the more the number of shareholders, the longer the duration of irrigation cycle. Also, in case of the plants with short and horizontal roots which are more vulnerable to the shortage of water, the irrigation cycle tends to be shorter, because a long interval between the irrigations can do a great damage to the crops. The climatic and soil conditions may affect the duration of the irrigation cycle too, and the fact that porous and light soils have a low capacity to hold water leads to a short irrigation cycle and vice versa. The most essential concept in terms of traditional water management is the irrigation cycle, which specifies when each farmer is to irrigate as well as how many times each shareholder has the right to use the water during a year. Note that an irrigation cycle in a particular region is not always constant, but it may vary for several reasons. For example in the region of Taft (province of Yazd) there is a wide variety in length of the irrigation cycle. Even in a small village, each qanat may have a different irrigation cycle. This variety is attributable to economic, social and climatic factors which are sometimes interwoven. Sometimes for a religious or charitable purpose, the irrigation cycle may be extended. In many regions, in the name of Imam Hossein who means a lot to the Iranian Muslims, the farmers add a day to their irrigation cycle and then rent it out in order to come up with the money they need to hold religious events. This custom is called “miyoon” or “farkhiz”, and can only be practiced with every body’s consent and cooperation (Labbaf Khaneiki 2006). Sometimes some shares of a qanat are devoted to public or religious purposes. This practice is called “Vaqf” whose revenue may be allocated to building a mosque, a school, or helping orphans or paupers. Here cooperation protrudes from qanat itself and reaches out to the other parts of the society. Social convergence reaches its peak where hundreds of qanat shareholders recognize a part of qanat water as public property and do not violate such social agreements. Those people could adapt themselves to different natural conditions such as drought by many innovations in terms of water distribution management. Moreover they could come up with some sustainable solutions which ensured everyone’s benefit. Also their water management was so clear and comprehensive that it prevented any abuse and gained the public acceptance. Needless to say if the society comes to an understanding about a management system, everyone would have enough motivation to take part in its implementation and accordingly the sense of cooperation

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Fig. 3.1  Fields of cooperation in qanat

and convergence would be well established in the society. Therefore the key elements of a water division system consist in adaptation with climatic conditions, comprehensiveness and sustainability, consent of beneficiaries, social justice, transparency and eventually cooperation. We should take the above mentioned elements into account while designing new management systems and refrain from setting up hasty systems which neglect the public contribution and can disturb the sustainability of the society and environment. (Fig. 3.1).

3.6  W  ater Cooperation in the Cultural Landscape of the Village of Meymand The village of Meymand is located in the province of Kerman, which has been put on the UNESCO World Heritage List for its spectacular hand-dug architecture. This topic tries to show the genuine role of water and irrigation in the configuration of the cultural landscape in Meymand. In the course of time, the fluctuation of the available water resources has led to the different strategies taken by the villagers to better adapt to the changing environmental conditions. All those strategies were devised and practiced in the context of cooperation and social convergence. In Meymand, cooperation is a tradition which can be regarded as the most important peculiarity of their water management system, a tradition that has given rise to a high social capital as the groundwork for the sustainability of their socio-­economic structures over the past centuries. In their water division system, those who own less shares of the common water resource can make the most of their water shares with the help of the other farmers, otherwise it was almost impossible for the petty water shareholders to survive. In Meymand, no farm or orchard would be left dry or

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h­ alf-­irrigated through a big deal of cooperation and swapping the water shares over the irrigation cycle. The sense of cooperation strengthens the social consensus that paves the way for sustainable development in the region. Also, I later examine the climate change and its impact on the village’s water resources in order to show how the other types of livelihood played their role as the adaptation strategies by keeping a balance between their population and the available water. The village of Meymand belongs to the township of Shahr Babak in the province of Kerman, Iran. The village is located 36  km northeast of Shahr Babak, and is bounded in the south by Khatoon Abad Plain and in the northwest by the mountain of Khorrin. The village lies in latitude 30° 14´ N, longitude 55° 23′ E, 2240 m above sea level. As mentioned, Meymand was placed on UNESCO World Heritage List on 4 July 2015 for its special rural architecture. In the village all the houses have been dug into the mountain rocks, creating a typical hand-dug architecture. However, here I rather focus on the issues of water and irrigation as the pivotal factors that have much contributed to the village’s cultural landscape, and I try to give insight into the role of cooperation in the water management and supply systems in Meymand. Among the production factors, water is of great importance, since in the region agriculture is impossible without artificial irrigation, and on the other hand water resources for irrigation are in short supply. The amount of available water never increases altogether, whereas an increase in population and accordingly in their water demand is inevitable. Therefore the only thing that could keep a balance between the agricultural economy and the environment was the water management and supply system. Meymand is among the arid and semi arid regions of Iran, where the socio-economic structures have evolved in the same paradigm. Therefore, water and the water-based production systems are regarded as the most important elements of the cultural landscape in the region. The short distance migration between four regions or four production spots in different seasons, takes place in a systematic relationship with the water resources which are extracted and transferred by some indigenous techniques. Water knowledge and technology have played a vital role in the people’s adaptation to the environmental conditions in the village of Meymand, and have made the region livable and habitable for them. Therefore, the water technologies and the irrigation-based agriculture comprise a significant part of the Meymand’s cultural landscape, whose preservation ensures the sustainability of the region. One of the most important techniques to supply water in Meymand is the qanat system which has been examined in this chapter. Qanat is made up of some shaft wells that provide access to a subterranean tunnel almost horizontal with a very gentle slope. This tunnel cuts through the saturated layers of soil where groundwater seeps into the tunnel and flows down to the qanat’s exit point on the earth surface. In fact qanat takes advantage of a height difference between a basin’s upstream and downstream, where it can drain out the groundwater in the upstream and convey to the downstream for agricultural and domestic purposes.

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The livelihood of Meymand’s people consists in a combination of animal husbandry, agriculture, handicraft and local natural resources. Animal husbandry and agriculture act as the two main pillars of the local economy in Meymand, and none of them seem more dominant than the other. Nevertheless, the importance of agriculture or animal husbandry changes with time according to the changing climatic conditions. Sometimes agriculture gains the upper hand and sometimes animal husbandry prevails in the regions. Altogether the agricultural activities fall into two categories; orchards and farms of which farms can be classified into irrigated and dry farming. In the wet years when the rain suffices to water the crops, the dry farming becomes prevalent, whereas the same lands are used as pastures for grazing the livestock during the dry years. In Fact the transformation of dry farming lands into pastures takes place mostly as a strategy for adaptation to a decrease in the precipitation, by giving a more important role to animal husbandry to play in the local economy. The dry farming lands were mostly allotted only to the cultivation of wheat and barley, whereas the irrigated lands accommodated as many crops as alfalfa, pea, lentil, squash, cucumber, watermelon, tomato, onion and turnip in addition to wheat and barley. The terraced orchards were built just around the village and on the sloped banks of the seasonal rivers and downslope from the qanat’s exit, where a variety of plantations took place such as walnut, almond, Russian olive, sour cherry, apricot, plum and pear. One of the peculiarities of the agricultural system in Meymand is the geographical distribution of the agricultural units according to the type of their activities, which plays a significant role in the configuration of Meymand’s cultural landscape. The same geographical distribution of the agricultural units can explain the “how” and the “why” of seasonal migrations in Meymand. The qanats used to play a vital role in the agricultural system of Meymand, and many of its satellite orchards were reliant on the water being supplied by the qanats. Inside the village itself, the qanats stood out as the main sources of water for both agriculture and domestic uses. There is a valley running just west of the village, where the seasonal runoffs flow from the northern elevations southward. Along this valley and in the vicinity of the village, there are three qanats named Kaloo Moradi, Kaloo Meymand and Hadde Kanooyiyeh which have been built successively to make the most of the area’s groundwater. The qanats’ proximity to the village implies that water as both limitation and possibility led the cultural landscape to take its present shape in the course of time. One of the traits of the qanats of Meymand is their spatial order and their hydraulic inter-connection, which are reflected in the successive qanats running in a queue along a valley. This trait causes the qanats to drain out as much groundwater as possible. Each qanat not only gets water from the aquifer, but it also drains the water that percolates from the upstream irrigated lands down into the soil. In other words, those qanat are not only dependent on the groundwater reserve, but they also re-use the irrigation water which seeps into the soil and escapes from the crops’ root area. The qanat of Kaloo Moradi gathers the water from the upstream orchards which are irrigated by the natural springs. The qanat of Kaloo Meymand drains out the leftover water from the lands which are irrigated by the qanat of Kaloo Moradi, and

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e­ ventually the qanat of Hadde Kanooyiyeh is fed mostly by the water percolation of the lands irrigated by the qanat of Kaloo Meymand. Such inter-connection between the qanats makes up one of the peculiarities of Meymand’s cultural landscape, which is a sustainable and organic relationship with nature to ensure a high degree of thriftiness and adaptation to the available natural resources. In Meymand, to measure the water shares and divide their water among the shareholders, land-based units are used in their traditional irrigation system. Land-­ based units make it possible to divide the water in proportion to the area of lands supposed to be irrigated. In other words, each farmer is entitled to a certain amount of water proportional to the area of his land. This method of water division is specific to the regions where enjoy plenty of water, for example in the basins of Karaj and Zayandeh rivers where large sources of water are available, water is divided on the basis of land area. Land-based division of water may vary from region to region with the soil condition, cropping pattern and local customs and traditions. Therefore, using such land-based division contradicts the current condition of water resources in Meymand, which shows no sign of abundance, unless we accept that the water division system in the village has emanated from a different condition in the past. Probably both climate change and increasing demand for water have taken the village’s condition to the state of water scarcity. In many regions where water is in short supply, the irrigation systems can usually adapt to the water scarcity through the water division units, which is one of the strategies to regain a balance between the water supply and demand. Such a strategy leads to the creation of some intricate water division and management systems which are anchored in the time-based division units. However, in Meymand a relatively easy access to a variety of water sources such as seasonal runoffs, natural springs and qanats has ruled out the necessity of shifting to the time-based units in order to ration the water more accurately. In fact, the nature of the water resources in Meymand has given rise to a water division system based on land area, and that same system has made the ownerships of water and land inseparable. In general, in the regions where the time-based units are common, water ownership proves independent from land ownership, which allows people to buy, sell or event rent the water shares regardless of any particular land. Calculating the time of irrigation regardless of the area of land or the volume of water gives rise to a sort of water market where water appears as a commodity that carries an independent economic value. However, in such regions as Meymand where the land-based units are used to divide water, ownership of water without land is not imaginable, because the water shares are measured according to the area of lands to be irrigated, and it is pointless to divest such a water ownership of land. The livelihood of Meymand’s people is a combination of different activities, which has taken various shapes over time with the changing environmental conditions, where sometimes animal husbandry prevailed and sometimes agriculture had the upper hand. Nevertheless, water supply systems have always retained their importance, the systems that are deeply rooted in cooperation and social convergence.

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3.7  I rrigated Agriculture in Relation to the Other Economic Units in Meymand One of the questions often raised by the researchers is whether agriculture is the basic production system in Meymand or animal husbandry. In other words, we want to know whether the people of Meymand are originally farmers who supplement their economy by animal husbandry or the opposite, they are in fact stockbreeders who are involved in agriculture as their secondary activity. I will later return to this question in more detail, but here it suffices to say that the people of Meymand enjoy a combined economy which takes advantage of livestock, farming, handicrafts and natural resources to different degrees. Animal husbandry and agriculture are two main pillars of the local economy in Meymand, though neither can be regarded as the ever predominant livelihood. In the course of time, one livelihood prevails over the other as the conditions change. The agricultural activities altogether fall into two categories; orchards and farms of which the latter took place in two forms; irrigated and dry farming. The dry farms were left to the rainfall which satisfied the crops’ water demand, but the same farms were abandoned as pastures to be grazed by the livestock during the dry years when the rainfalls proved insufficient (Ashrafi 2000: 19). The dry farms were turned into pastures in response to a decline in the annual precipitation, which led to the animal husbandry outweighing the agriculture. The dry farms were usually allocated to the cultivation of barley and wheat (Ibid), whereas the irrigated farms were cultivated with alfalfa, peas, lentils, squash, cucumber, watermelon, tomato, onion and turnip in addition to barley and wheat. The orchards were built just in the vicinity of the village, on the sloped banks of the seasonal rivers with the terraces of almonds, walnuts, Russian olives, sour cherries, apricots, plums and pears (Mehran 2006: 11). In Meymand, one of the peculiarities of the agricultural production system is the geographical distribution of agricultural units across the village’s effect area, based on different types of activity. This peculiarity plays a pivotal role in the configuration of cultural landscape in Meymand. In fact, the same geographical distribution of agricultural units can explain how and why the seasonal migrations unfold within the area. Many of the researchers define the issue of migration in Meymand by the same pattern as that of the other regions, whereas there is an egregious difference between them, which is attributable to the way that the economic units have been distributed across the area. For example, Riyahian Gahrati writes that:"the people of Meymand migrate three times a year in order to utilize the pastures and resources. They reside around their folds in the less elevated lands which enjoy a warmer weather, from early March to mid-June. The next round of migration takes place between late June and late October when the villagers move to the northern base of the Khorrin mountain where water is more available. They migrate to the village and take shelter in their hand-dug homes during the cold months, as the winter draws near” (Riyahian Gahrati 2003). However, such a migration should be viewed in a systematic nexus of economic units and geographical elements.

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In a nutshell, the people of Meymand have been involved in four main economic units as follows: farmlands, orchards, folds and eventually hand-dug homes. These economic units were not clumped together but spread out across the village’s effect area, due to the different functions each of them carried. The geographical distribution of the economic units was associated with the conditions that each unit entailed, and of course all the conditions could not be found in one particular place. The farmlands entailed a softer soil, less sloped and relatively large area, whereas the terraces on both banks of the river with pebbly and porous soil was ideal for orchards. The folds were built in the less elevated plains which provided suitable vast pastures to feed a large flock of goats and sheep without the risk of trespassing on the cultivated lands. Also, the low altitude of the pastures made it possible for them to have access to enough forage during the cold months. Eventually the hand-­ dug homes served as their small workshops as well, where they could make a variety of handcrafts such as blacksmithing, carpentry, felting, basketry, spinning, weaving, carpet weaving, crochet, shoe making, leather tanning and pottery (Ashrafi and Eghtesadi 2004: 11–12). One can say that each economic unit demands a particular environment situated in a particular place. Therefore, a geographical disparity between the economic units is inevitable, and the inhabitants of Meymand have to move from one economic unit to the other round the year in order to make the most of their diverse geographical possibilities. Moreover, their migration took place hand in hand with a kind of gender segregation. In other words, the men and women do not migrate together and simultaneously all the time, because the division of labor between the two genders was such that they had to travel two different paths in order to complement each other in the economic units. Therefore, migration in Meymand carries two special traits. The first is that their migration correlates with the geographical distribution of the aforesaid four economic units, and in fact the migration takes place only along the distance between the four units which are farmlands, orchards, folds and homes. The second is that both genders do not always travel along, and actually division of labor between the genders is reflected in the different paths that they go over their seasonal migration. A gender-based division of labor leads to a higher economic efficiency, and carries a function that helps the local community to better adapt to their geography. As shown in the following figure, the women are busy only with the livestock in the folds from early April to early July, whereas in the same period, the men commute between the folds and the farmlands being involved in both activities. The men usually work on the farms from sunrise to sunset, and then return to the folds in the evening to give their women a hand. Therefore from early April to early July, the burden of animal husbandry mostly falls on the women, and the men are more focused on the farming activities, though they sometimes help the women. In Meymand, the timing of the flock’s mating is such that the ewes all lamb in the beginning of spring when more fresh grass is available. When the ewes start l­ ambing, the women become busier milking the ewes, making yoghurt and churning the milk

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into butter, which are all considered only women’s tasks. That is why, during the lambing season, all the women should be present in the folds. There are some satellite cultivation areas around the village of Meymand, where many of the farms as well as the orchards are located. Most of the farms where the men work in the spring are situated in the same area as are the orchards. From the mid July, both men and women move to the orchards and cooperate in gardening and picking the fruits. All the population of Meymand is scattered in the satellite orchards each of which belongs to a couple of households. At this time, in addition to orchards, the villagers are involved in the cultivation of such vegetables as turnip, cucumber, watermelon, melon and a type of cantaloupe named Karkoo. At this stage of their migration, no gender-based division of labor takes place. From the mid July to early October, both men and women work together in the orchards, and only a few shepherds are hired to take care of their flock at the folds. The most important areas of the orchards are named as Lash Karguyiyeh, Sare Jen, Rez Malek, Zard Rez, Sare Galleh, La Khis, La Khurin, Poshte Karm, Tila, Kal Manduyiye, Dar Baneh, Dar Khuni, Nuken, Gozgestan, Bone La, Had Konuyiye, Lelun and Morin. In the orchards, all the households have to dwell in the temporary housings like the huts and small cottages. Each group of the households migrates to a particular orchard area according to a certain pattern. In October after harvesting the fruits and vegetables, all the women and men return to their hand-dug houses in Meymand and stay there until early December, and during this period they become fully involved in handicrafts. From early December to late February, the women still stay at their hand-dug houses, while the men move to the folds in the plain to attend to their livestock. However, apart from the aforementioned economic activities, the exploitation of other natural resources is of great importance in the region. Gathering the edible wild fruits like almond and Persian turpentine, making charcoal from the Persian turpentine trees and hunting, play important roles in the local economy, though such activities are not considered the main sources of their livelihood. Gathering the wild grains and fruits has created a special culture in Meymand, which is an important part of their intangible heritage. They know and use almost all the edible plants without damaging their natural life cycle. It is worth noting that the pauper people who have less access to adequate livestock and farm sometimes resort to producing charcoal for sale at the market in the town of Shahr Babak. Such people manage to cut off the branches stealthily to turn them into charcoals, though the wild trees are considered common properties and everyone is entitled to their leaves for feeding the livestock, their fruits for people, and their shadows for the flock’s comfort. Therefore, the local society has a mechanism which prevents those who want to appropriate such common properties for their personal profits, and the natural resources are managed sustainably to meet the collective interest.

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3.8  Q  anat and Its Position in the Cultural Landscape of Meymand Qanats have always played a pivotal role in the agricultural system of Meymand, and many of the satellite orchards were fully reliant on the water of qanats. Inside the village too, qanats stand out as predominant water resources for domestic and agricultural sectors. Just on the west of the village, there is a valley where the seasonal runoffs flow down from the northern elevations southward. Along the same valley and close to the village, there are three qanats named Kaloo Moradi, Kaloo Meymand and Hadde Kanooyiyeh, which run successively one after another from upstream to downstream. Proximity of these qanats to the village of Meymand gives a prominent role to the qanats in configuring the region’s cultural landscape. In UNESCO’s definition, indigenous technologies and production systems as the manifestations of physical culture can change the earth’s features and transform the geography of humans’ livelihood, leading to the formation of a new concept known as cultural landscape. In fact, cultural landscape results from a longstanding interaction between humans and their natural environment, an interaction that can give rise to a set of tangible and intangible cultural values (Mitchell et al. 2009: 3). Therefore, qanat and water resources in the region of Meymand prove to be among the most important components of the region’s cultural landscape, whose preservation leads to the sustainability of the Meymand’s cultural landscape. Those three qanats deserve to be given priority, since they have created an intricate human ecology in a nexus of water cooperation and water supply for drinking, sanitation and agriculture. Up slope from those three qanats, there is a natural spring called Cheshme Lakhis as well as some orchards including the orchard of Mehdi Ebrahimi. All the orchards up slope from the qanats are fully dependent on the water of the natural springs, which is stored in some small pools to be divided among the shareholder according to a special order. The small pools are called Kaloo that literally means the hole of water in the local dialect (Eghtesadi 2005: 169). Up slope from those three qanats, the orchards are irrigated by the spring water a considerable portion of which percolates into the earth and travels toward the downstream qanats in the shape of groundwater and eventually turns up in the qanat galleries. The first qanat is called Kaloo Moradi which catches the groundwater current mostly coming from the irrigated orchards in the upstream. The qanat of Kaloo Moradi was once shared by five persons, but now by inheritance the number of owners has increased to 30 out of whom Ebrahim Bagheri has the most water shares. This qanat is relatively short and shallow and its water dwindles or even dry up at the end of summer, that is why this qanat is called Soheyl Tars which literally means afraid of Canopus. All the qanats with fluctuating discharge, whose water goes down to its minimum at the end of the dry season are called Soheyl Tars in Meymand, but are called Havabin in Yazd which means looking up at the sky (Papoli Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2004: 73). Connection between Canopus and drying up of a qanat is rooted in an ancient belief according to which this star is ominous and the outbreak of bad events are attributable to its rising in the sky (Nash et al. 2012:43).

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The qanat of Kaloo Moradi is running beneath a cemetery, and for this reason the people of Meymand are reluctant to drink its water. In 2016, the water of this qanat dramatically declined and fell below one liter per second. In case of this qanat, the persistent drought over the past years contributed to the drastic drawdown of groundwater, resulting in such a decrease in the qanat discharge. The water of Kaloo Moradi is accumulated in a pool, and then is released to irrigate the downstream orchards by turns. A part of this water seeps into the ground and again turns up in the qanat of Kaloo Meymand as groundwater. The qanat of Kaloo Meymand is located downslope from the qanat of Kaloo Moradi and its water discharge is reliant on both a shallow aquifer and the drainage of the upstream orchards. The qanat of Kaloo Meymand is some 500  m long with a 20  m deep mother well. In the past this qanat was the most important water source for the village, and still supplies a part of tap water of Meymand even today. Earlier a part of this water was allocated to the domestic sector and the rest was accumulated in a pool for irrigation, but nowadays a water tank has taken the place of the old pool to get the whole water and then pump it into the pipes for drinking. After the pool became filled up, the water was allowed to flow down toward a small farm where such crops as wheat, barley and turnip were grown. Nowadays that farm has been turned into a public park for the visitors. There has been an interesting relationship between the qanat of Kaloo Meymand, the farm, the village’s public bath and the village itself, which underlines the role of water in the social life of Meymand. In Meymand, one of the spectacular places is an old public bath which has been dug into a big rock, just like the hand-dug houses. The bath enjoys a locker room, cold and hot water pools, stove, and washing room. The relationship between this bath and the qanat of Kaloo Meymand had nothing to do with the water used by the bath, since the needed water was supplied by the seasonal runoffs which used to flow down the valley during fall and winter. The public bath was used by the villagers only during fall and winter when the cold weather did not allow them to take a bath at the open air pools, and on the other hand they preferred to seize this opportunity and use the free seasonal runoffs for this purpose. The runoff was directed to the tank of bath to be heated and used by the villagers. The relationship between the bath and the qanat was rather economic than technical. The land which used to be irrigated by the qanat of Kaloo Meymand was once donated in charity to the public bath, the same land that has been turned into a public park now. In other words, someone dedicated this piece of land along with its water share from the qanat of Kaloo Meymand for the benefit of Meymand’s people, through spending its profits on the maintenance and operation of the public bath. Each year someone in the village volunteered to take care of the public bath by opening and closing its door at certain times, cleaning everywhere in the bath, procuring firewood for the bath stove, and directing the seasonal surface water into the tank. In return he could take advantage of the land donated to the bath, by having its water share and irrigating the same land. In the end he could harvest the crops for himself in return for the services he did to the public bath over the fall and winter. The men and women both were present in the village during fall and winter, and they had spare time to spend

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on such a job if needed. Therefore, the qanat of Kaloo Meymand used to be a key component of the socio-economic structures of this village and foster more cooperation among the villagers. As shown in the following figure, the qanat of Kaloo Meymand used to carry a twofold benefit for the people of Meymand. On one hand, the qanat directly supplied drinking water to the people, and on the other hand its indirect revenue was used for the maintenance of the public bath to the villagers’ benefit again. This qanat was among the exceptional qanats whose water was used communally by all the people without rationing its water according to a special division system, and its water totally belonged to the public. At present, the water of this qanat is directed into a concrete reservoir in order to be used for supplying drinking water to the village (Fig. 3.2). It is worth noting that all the drinking water needed for the village was not supplied only by the qanat of Kaloo Meymand, but a part of the water was provided by a natural spring called Lay Neyrizoo upslope from the village. The village of Meymand nestles on the base of a hill in the shape a horseshoe just across from the seasonal river. The middle of the horseshoe is called Bon-e Meymand that means the end of Meymand, while the right shank is called Rekhne Shahsavar and the left Taq-e Ebrahim Mahmoodiha. The houses situated in Bon-e Meymand preferred to collect water from Lay Neyrizoo spring, while the other quarters went to the qanat of Kaloo Meymand for drinking water. Downslope from the qanat of Kaloo Meymand, another qanat named Hadde Kanooyiyeh is running, whose mother well has been sunk beside a new parking lot

Fig. 3.2  Socio-economic relations between the village and the qanat of Kaloo Meymand

3.8  Qanat and Its Position in the Cultural Landscape of Meymand

81

in the village. This qanat is some 300 m, with a 15 m deep mother well. The qanat’s gallery was once cleaned in 2010, resulting in an increase of 15 liters per second in its discharge. However, a part of this increase in the qanat discharge can be attributable to the new pipeline that transfers water to the village. A considerable amount of water is being conveyed from Shahr-e Babak to the village of Meymand through a pipeline for drinking and domestic purposes, and the same water later seeps into the aquifer in the shape of wastewater through the village’s septic wells and makes the water table go up. Nevertheless, over the past years the discharge of this qanat has been on the decline again, due to the drawdown of groundwater. The annual precipitation has decreased to the point that the water input through the pipeline can no longer offset the deficiency. One of the measures that can mitigate this bleak situation and help replenish the village’s aquifer is to build some artificial recharge dams in order to harvest the sporadic rainfalls. One of the peculiarities of the qanats in Meymand is their spatial position which put them in a successive order one after another down the slope. Such position makes a hydraulic link between the qanats and enables the villagers to make the most of their groundwater reserves. Each qanat not only drains out the groundwater seepage, but it also intercepts and gathers the percolation of the water coming from the irrigated lands in the upstream. Thus, the water that escapes the crops is recycled by the downstream qanats. The qanat of Kaloo Moradi gathers the percolation of the upstream orchards irrigated by the natural springs, and then the qanat of Kaloo Meymand re-uses the water that escapes the lands irrigated by qanat of Kaloo Moradi, and eventually the qanat of Hadde Kanooyiyeh collects the water left from the qanat of Kaloo Meymand. These hydraulic relations represent a high degree of water cooperation which makes up the cultural landscape of the village of Meymand. (Fig. 3.3). It should be noted that in this valley the serial galleries and their hydraulic links are not limited only to the aforementioned three qanats, but downslope from the

Fig. 3.3  Water cooperation in the shape of hydraulic links between three successive qanats in Meymand

82 Table 3.1  Shareholders of the qanat of Lelan, who divide the water by a local time unit called Habbeh, each Habbeh equals 90 min.

3  Social Aspects of Water in Central Iran Name of shareholder Abdol Ali Moradi, Abdollah Moradi, Majid Meymandi Ramezan Shah Hosseini Sa’dollah Shah Hosseini Seyfollah Shah Hosseini Soghra Shah Hosseini Donated to the mosque Total

Shares 39

32 12 8 3 2 96

qanat of Hadde Kanooyiyeh there is another qanat named Lelan with the same hydraulic relationship. The qanat of Lelan that irrigates the orchards of an area named the same can be considered among the successive qanats, though I did not mention this qanat because it lies relatively far away from the residential area of Meymand and its role in their rural life is not very remarkable. Nevertheless, the water division system of Lelan qanat is interesting. Like the other qanats in the region, the qanat of Lelan is owned by some shareholders who divide its water by time. Their unit of time is called Habbeh that equals 90 min., and all the shares of this qanat amount to 96 shares which are divided among the shareholders according to the following table (Table 3.1). As shown in the above table too, endowment or charitable donation has been of great importance in terms of the qanats in Meymand. The qanat of Kaloo Meymand has fully been donated to the public bath in order to cover the cost of its operation. As for the qanat of Lelan, two shares of its water have been donated to the village mosque in order to pay for the oil needed to illuminate the mosque, by the revenue of the water shares.

3.9  Domestic Water Supply in Meymand As mentioned earlier, in the past the drinking water used to be supplied to the village by the qanat of Kaloo Meymand as well as the spring of Lay Neyrizoo. The spectacular peculiarities of Meymand attracted the attention of the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization, and they gained a foothold in the village by establishing a heritage site in order to nominate the village as UNESCO world heritage. Therefore the government had to pay more attention to the situation of the supply of safe drinking water in the village. As the first step, they built a concrete covered tank to store the water of Kaloo Meymand qanat, which was traditionally accumulated in an open air pool with no protection. This water is now pumped from the aforesaid concrete tank to another tank up the hill from where the water can be distributed through the village’s pipe network by gravity after chlorination. However, over the

3.10  Water Division System in Meymand

83

Fig. 3.4  Simplified map of the domestic water supply system in Meymand

last years, the water of Kaloo Meymand qanat decreased to the point that it could no longer catch up with the rising water demand in the village. Therefore a pipe line was built to transfer water from Shahr-e Babak to the village in order to supplement the qanat water. This water pours into some water tanks upslope from the village. Part of this water directly enters the tap water network and supplies water to a part of the village, while the rest is directed to the water tank of Kaloo Meymand qanat for the consumption of the other parts of Meymand. This water system has been simplified in the following illustration (Fig. 3.4).

3.10  Water Division System in Meymand In Meymand, irrigation water is calculated and divided by land-based units. As mentioned in Chap. 2, in some parts of Iran, water is divided among the shareholders based on the area of farm lands, and each farmer can get his water share in proportion to the area to be irrigated. However, in some other regions, water is rationed based on the volume almost like the units that we use nowadays to measure the volume of water. Eventually a third method to divide water is in vogue in many parts of the central plateau of Iran, according to which water is divided among the shareholders regardless of its volume and the land area both, but only based on the time of irrigation (Labbaf Khaneiki 2006: 77). Although the land-based unit is predominant in Meymand, the volume-based unit is also used for measuring the whole discharge of a qanat or a river, but it is not

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common to measure the water shares by the volume-based unit. In Meymand the volume-based unit is called Asiyab Gard which literally means turning the watermill, equivalent to 50 liters per second. In Meymand, the water shares are divided among the farmers by a land-based unit which pertains to the area of land to be irrigated. The land-based unit is used for measuring water, but it is in fact a weight unit which is also used for weighing the grains like wheat. Therefore, a land-based unit refers to a particular amount of seeds with which a particular area of land can be sown. This unit is called Habbeh which has recently been translated into a time-based unit, and nowadays a Habbeh is considered equivalent to 1.5 h of irrigation. Every 4 Habbeh is called one Charak and every 4 Charak is called one Dang, so a Dang is made up of 16 Habbeh which equals 24 h. All the water shares are divided on a 6 day irrigation cycle which contains 96 Habbeh altogether. Using a land-based unit for water division implies that the region’s irrigation system has been founded on an abundance of water resources in the first place, though nowadays the village is stranded for enough water in the wake of both the climate change and increasing water demand. In many places in the central Iran, shifting from a type of unit to another usually serves as an adaptation strategy against the water scarcity. The land-based unit is specific to the regions where the available water resource is in proportion to the cultivated area, but when the water dwindles or shows an unpredictable fluctuation, the farmers shift to the time-based unit which better distributes among the shareholders both the cost and benefit of such an irrigation system. For example, if a water source is divided among the farmers by area of land, this type of unit works properly as long as the water remains sufficient to quench all the lands. However, if the water level drops below normal and the farmers still expect to irrigate the same area with the same water, some of them would be deprived of their shares partially or even totally, whereas some others would not be affected by the decrease at all. Therefore, in such cases, the farmers shift from land-based unit to time-based one in order to even out the loss that the water scarcity would inflict on the farmers. Thus, water is divided by time, no matter how much water is allocated to a particular land within a certain period of time. They reach a consensus on translating the land-based to time-based unit, taking into account the soil condition, the available water and their irrigational method in the region. For example they determine that one hour of irrigation is tantamount to the minimum amount of water needed to irrigate 200 square meters of land. If the water continues decreasing, all the water shares proportionally decrease. This kind of cooperation ensures social justice in the village. In Meymand, in the past the availability of a variety of water resources like seasonal runoffs, natural springs and qanats ruled out the necessity of time-based unit for water division. The soil and water conditions in the village entailed a land-based unit according to which the water was distributed among the lands in proportion to their areas. The land-based unit made the ownerships of water and land inseparable. In other words, one could not sell or buy a water share independently of its relevant area of land. The time-based unit made it possible for the farmers to consider the water shares separated from the lands and then subject to transaction. Therefore, in

3.10  Water Division System in Meymand

85

the village, the changing environment and accordingly a decline in the water resources, drove the farmers to change their water division unit from land-based to time-based, and then this change brought about the independent ownership of water, giving rise to a water market where water acquired a transactional value. Nowadays the people of Meymand divide their water shares by time, though the name of their division unit is reminiscent of a unit which was once used for measuring the area of lands. The elderly still remember the time when the water of their qanats were so much that it did not need to be accumulated in a pool before irrigating the lands. They call such water Khod Pa that means “on its own foot”, because it could flow down the ditch and directly reach the fields. However, nowadays the qanat water is so little that it cannot survive the percolation and evaporation in the dirt ditches on its way to the farmlands. Therefore, the farmers have to wait for the water to build up in a pool for a while and then they release the water to be divided according to their division system. Even just a few years ago the qanat of Mehrookan was Khod Pa too, whereas this qanat discharged less and less water to the point that its water could not be used without an irrigation pool and eventually the qanat dried up in 2017. Even the active qanats like Kaloo Moradi and Hadde Kanooyiyeh have to subsist on the pools. The length of an irrigation cycle correlates with the amount of water discharged by the qanat. In Meymand, three types of irrigation cycles are practiced as 9 days, 10 days and 12 days cycles. The qanats with higher discharge usually enjoy a 12 day irrigation cycle, whereas the qanats with less water are managed by a 10 or even 9  day  cycle. For example, the water of Kaloo Moradi qanat is rationed on a 9 day cycle, and the qanat of Tila on a 10 day cycle, whereas Cheshme Darre Bid which discharges more water is owned based on a 12 day irrigation cycle. It seems that the qanats with more discharge could have attracted more shareholders, and then more lands should have been irrigated by them, and as a result their irrigation cycles would have been extended to cover everyone. As mentioned earlier, today in Meymand it is no longer possible to use the qanats of Meymand without accumulating their water in the pools for a while prior to irrigation. This type of irrigation which is based on the pools has been well articulated in the book “History of Water and Irrigation in the Province of Kerman” (Garoosi 2003: 63). In this method of irrigation, a time is given to the water accumulation and then another time is spent on its releasing and irrigating. For water division, the time given to water accumulation in the pool does not count. Each farmer directs his water to the pool and waits for the water to accumulate in the pool for a time proportional to his own water share, and then he releases the water toward his land. The irrigation pool is blocked by a stick which is stuffed into a hole inside a round stone. The hole is called Keridun which is installed on the pool floor just across from the water input, through which the water can be released when the stick is pulled out (Shahshahani 1995). The farmers have to take turns in irrigating their lands on each irrigation cycle. Every year in early April, all the qanat shareholders come together to determine the order in which they can get their water shares by drawing lots which is locally called

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Gomar. Someone named Bonak Dar is in charge of drawing lots as well as the other irrigation related affairs. Bonak Dar also intervenes when a dispute breaks out over water between the farmers. When the farmers finish drawing lots and know who should first irrigate, everyone went out teaming up to clean out the ditches. After drawing lots, someone whose turn is on Saturday, his next turn would be 9  days later on Monday on a 9  day irrigation cycle. As mentioned earlier, in Meymand, water division unit is called Habbeh which is in fact a unit already used for measuring the area of lands, but it has transformed into a time measuring unit in response to the environmental changes. Each Habbeh equals 90 min. which is calculated by the movement of a shadow like that of a mountain. The village of Meymand is bounded in the west and northwest by a mountain range which is called Khorrin in the region. The peak of this mountain range is 3300 m above sea level, which is called Tir-e Khorrin. The mountain peak and its shadow are used as a sundial to calculate the time of irrigation. It is considered 6 Habbeh, from dawn to noon when the mountain’s shadow is at its smallest size. 2 other Habbeh would elapse from noon to when the shadow moves to the second line of an adjacent mountain. When the shadow moves to the third line of the adjacent mountain, it tells that 4 other Habbeh have passed. The adjacent mountain is called Gorde Khorrin that stands on the right side of Tir-e Khorrin and looks shorter. On the face of Gorde Khorrin, three parallel lines are visible, which are in fact the extension of three geological strata but used by the locals as three marks for telling the irrigation time Table 3.2. From up to bottom, the shadow of Tir-e Khorrin never reaches the first line visible on the face of Gorde Khorrin, but when the shadow reaches the second line it implies that 8 Habbeh have passed since sunrise, and when the shadow reaches the third line it heralds the passage of 12 Habbeh. After 12 Habbeh elapse, the water accumulated in the pool is immediately released and the pool was blocked again afterwards. If someone owns one Dang of water, he is entitled to 16 Habbeh of which 12 Habbeh are given to him in the daytime and 4 Habbeh at nighttime. 16 Habbeh equals 24 h of irrigation, almost half of which is spent accumulating the water in the pool. In the areas where Tir-e Khorrin and its shadow are out of sight, the farmers use a stick jabbed vertically into the ground, as a sundial to tell the irrigation time. The following table and figure show how the mountain and its shadow are used to calculate the time of irrigation (Fig. 3.5). One of the peculiarities of water division system in Meymand is a soul of cooperation that has ensured its sustainability over the course of time. The farmers who Table 3.2  Irrigation time calculated by the shadow of Khorrin mountain, moving around in the daytime Position of the shadow Base of Tir-e Khorrin Second line of Gorde Khorrin Third line of Gorde Khorrin

Number of Habbeh since sunrise 6 8 12

Equivalent time 12 noon 2–3 pm 6 pm

3.10  Water Division System in Meymand

87

Fig. 3.5  The mountain of Tir-e Khorrin and its shadow whose moving from one line to another on the face of the mountain of Gorde Khorrin is used as a sundial

owned less water-share get their water in the afternoon around 6  pm when the shadow reaches the third line, rather than go after their water share at noon or even when the shadow lies on the second line. For example, those who own only 4 or 6 Habbeh never act individually, but prefer to take one of the two following strategies: A) If a farmer has only 6 Habbeh, he prefers to get his water share every other irrigation cycle. Therefore, he gets 12 Habbeh every 18 days rather than receives 6 Habbeh every 9 days, given that an irrigation cycle takes 9 days. To do so, he has to swap his share for the other farmer’s on different irrigation cycles. He lets another farmer use his 6 Habbeh on the current irrigation cycle, and in return on the next cycle, he gets back his own 6 Habbeh plus 6 additional Habbeh that belong to the other farmer. This kind of cooperation is very effective in terms of orchards, because an 18 day interval between the irrigations does not damage the fruit trees, but it is not very suitable for the farms which should be irrigated more often. B) When it comes to the irrigation of their farms, those who have petty water-­ shares agree to pull together by adding up their water shares and getting 12 Habbeh at once. Afterwards, the water is distributed among them according to their original water shares. Sometimes one has to change his turn on the irrigation cycle, so that he can partner with other petty shareholders especially with those whose lands are near his and can be irrigated together.

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3.11  I mpact of Climate Change on Agricultural Livelihood in Meymand The agricultural landscape in the orchards and farms in the vicinity of Meymand, rows of dead trees, dry ditches and abandoned farmlands all bear witness to a dramatic decline in the rainfall in the wake of a climate change. Type of water division system in the village, the prevalence of land-based unit for water division, and inseparable ownerships of land and water all give credence to the idea that in the past the available water was not at a premium like today. The elderly say that until late 1960s a fury of water used to come out of a natural spring at the base of Khorrin mountain and irrigate a vast cultivated area in the region of Pirvan. The cultivated area belonged to the family of Lakhorrini. At present, the spring is fully dry, and nothing has been left from those green farmlands on the landscape but a blissful memory. Also, the qanat of Mehrookan that used to irrigate a vast farmland has completely dried up. The water of this qanat was once so much that it did not need any irrigation pool to be accumulated, but today it is only wind that is gusting through the qanat’s tunnel. Although over the last years, the Iranian ministry of agriculture allocated a budget of 45,000 USD to the qanat of Mehrookan in order to rehabilitate and save the qanat, the qanat could not survive the consequences of such a decline in the precipitation, and the groundwater depletion finished the qanat off. Many saplings of almond were planted in a large area and a drip irrigation system was carried out in the hope that the qanat would pull through again and its water would be reestablished. However, the qanat dried up and the saplings were parched and hundreds of meters of plastic pipes were deserted. A metal water tank has ironically been placed close to the qanat’s exit, in order to water the flocks of sheep and goats grazing in the region. The water tank is re-filled with water by a truck every once in a while. The water tank as a symbol of livestock breeding has prevailed over the qanat and the almond saplings as the indications of agricultural livelihood. In fact animal husbandry and agriculture have turned out to be two complementary strategies for adaptation to the environmental and climatic changes. In Mehrookan such a landscape again raises the same question; whether the people of Meymand are originally farmers who breed livestock or are originally livestock breeders who cultivate as well. To answer this question, we should pay attention to the climatic conditions. As mentioned earlier, the people of Meymand enjoy a combined livelihood whose components consist in animal husbandry and agriculture each of which may overshadow the other with the changing environmental conditions. If we trace Meymand back into history, we would probably come across a small community who made a living by livestock breeding, food gathering and hunting. Their hand-­ dug houses are reminiscent of some temporary shelters built by a community whose security was their first priority. In Iran, the horseshoe-shaped layout regarding the spatial position of housings is a common pattern that could ensure the maximum security for a particular settlement, because each residential unit can keep a better

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89

watch on the other units built in a horseshoe-shaped layout (Papoli Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2001). In Meymand, the oldest houses are situated in Bon-e Meymand in a horseshoe-­ shaped layout. A horseshoe-shaped layout plus the vestige of an old watchtower all give credence to the fact that the people who chose this region for their dwelling sought security against the political and military turmoil at the time. Although the climatic condition and adequate water resources were ideal for agricultural activities, those people had a tendency toward animal husbandry that enabled them to better move and maneuver in case of an invasion. However, later when the region enjoyed more stability and security, the same people took advantage of the favorable soil and water conditions and turned to the agricultural activities. Over the past three centuries, agricultural activities have been predominant and the other activities have played a supplemental role in their economy. In Meymand and its vicinity, the vestiges of a vast cultivated area including the orchards and farms imply the important role that agriculture used to play in the past, when we estimate the likely income of such a large land, taking into account their population at the time. However, over the last decade, the frequent droughts led to a drastic decline in both the surface runoffs and groundwater reserves. Many of the qanats and natural springs drizzled or even completely dried up. In the wake of a decrease in the annual precipitation and then water scarcity, a considerable area of farmlands were gradually abandoned and turned into pastures, and accordingly the predominant livelihood came to shift from agriculture to animal husbandry. Therefore, one can say that at the ancient time animal husbandry had the upper hand in response to the insecurity, and again at the contemporary time animal husbandry became predominant but this time due to climate change. From 1960s to 1990s, animal husbandry began catching on until it became the predominant livelihood in the region. However, the story changed in 1993 when a contract was signed between the Iranian Ministry of Industries and Mines and NFC1 from China in order to set up a copper smelting factory in Khatoon Abad 30 km east of Shahr-e Babak just near Meymand. Eventually this factory was inaugurated in 2003 with a production capacity of 80,000 tons of copper a year. The copper factory’s proximity to the rural territory of Meymand including its farms and pastures has had a great impact on the people’s livelihood. The persistent drought on the one hand, and the activity of the copper factory with a water consumption of 6036 cubic meters a day on the other hand are tightening the noose around the region’s agricultural economy. Above all, the factory spewed chemical poisonous smoke and dust which settled on the ground within a huge radius and polluted the grass in the pastures, hampering animal husbandry as their second source of livelihood. The poisonous residue settled on the plants’ leaves killed a large number of the grazing livestock and inflicted a terrible damage on the local economy. Although the authorities of the copper factory later claimed that they have compensated for the villagers’ loss and devised some proper filters to prevent any similar accident in the future, at the Iranian parliament the representative of  China Nonferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd.

1

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3  Social Aspects of Water in Central Iran

Shahr-e Babak still complained about the factory’s shortcoming in compensating for the wasted livestock and stopping more contamination (Iranian Parliament News Agency 2014). As a result, agricultural activities have diminished to the point that only a small amount of fruits are produced for local consumption. Though animal husbandry is still in a better situation, it is going down the same path as that of agriculture, and at present animal husbandry has lost its former economic value. For the same environmental reasons, the other supplemental activities like gathering and hunting have come to a halt. In the meantime, a new livelihood has emerged, which could tether at least a part of the shrinking population to the village and stop the absolute evacuation of Meymand. The new livelihood has resulted from a complicated socio-economic transition whose description is far beyond the subject of this book. Suffice to say that tourism and the presence of a heritage site in the village have turned out to be a new livelihood which has configured a new economic fabric. This new livelihood is overshadowing both agriculture and animal husbandry as the two traditional pillars of their local economy. At present, a considerable number of Meymand’s households are becoming economically reliant on tourism sector and the heritage site which is affiliated to the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. The influx of tourists has paved the way for the locals to sell their handicrafts and some local products. Also many of the locals have been hired by the heritage site in return for a regular salary. The heritage site has undertaken some expenses which were traditionally covered by the villagers themselves, like maintaining the houses and alleys. These changes have given rise to a new livelihood in the village of Meymand, as shown in the following figure (Fig. 3.6).

Fig. 3.6  Changing principal livelihoods in Meymand’s economy in relation to environmental and climatic changes

3.11  Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Livelihood in Meymand

91

In the vicinity of Meymand, Mahrookan is one of the best examples that clearly show the climate change and groundwater depletion and their impact on the agricultural landscape. Mahrookan is one of the Meymand’s satellite cultivation areas, which lies along a valley stretching from northeast to southwest. In Mahrookan, the people of Meymand used to harvest a considerable amount of fruits and vegetables every year. As shown in the following table, before 1999 the farmlands of Mahrookan were all irrigated by the qanat of Mahrookan as well as by the water of some natural springs that flowed down a traditional ditch running on the eastern side of the valley toward the farmlands. However, the water of Mahrookan qanat came to dwindle to the point that the farmers eventually had to build a pool in order to accumulate the small flow. Nevertheless the qanat could not survive the continuous groundwater drawdown and it dried up in the end and its pool fell into decay, but the remains of the pool with the dimensions of 10 by 22 by 2 m are still visible 23 m downslope from the qanat exit. On the one hand the persistent drought and on the other hand over-exploitation of groundwater in the valley downstream aggravated the situation and drove the farmers to convey water from Deh Akhoond to Mahrookan to salvage their last trees. Deh Akhoond is located in the same valley but upslope from Mahrookan. Deh Akhoond enjoyed more water, though its soil was not as fertile as that of Mahrookan. In 1999, four farmers named Mohammad Ebrahimi, Abbas Ebrahimi, Ramezan Bagheri and Ali Zeynaddini managed to transfer the water through a pipeline from the qanat of Deh Akhoond to their pool which was built for the water of Mahrookan qanat in the first place. Also, they built some embankments upslope from Deh Akhoond in order to harvest the seasonal runoffs to be transferred to a concrete pool with dimensions of 18.88 by 37.55 by 2 m. The embankments and the pool were built at a heavy cost in the hope that the water obtained from the qanat of Deh Akhoond and the seasonal rainfalls can save their cultivation in Mahrookan from its imminent demise. In Deh Akhoond the concrete pool was used to accumulate the qanat water as well as the water obtained from the seasonal runoffs. The pool was also used for breeding fish, and its water was transferred through a pipeline to Mahrookan to be used in a drip irrigation system. In Deh Akhoond, Accumulation of the seasonal runoffs in the big concrete pool made the traditional ditch redundant, and the water of the natural springs no longer flowed down the valley. On the other hand, the big pool contributed to the annihilation of the qanat of Mahrookan in 2004, because the seasonal runoffs were transferred to the concrete pool where the water could not percolate into the soil and replenish the aquifer. If the water stayed behind the embankments rather than accumulated in the concrete pool, it could seep into the aquifer. Thus the aquifer lost its recharge source and then was afflicted by a drastic drawdown. As a result, the qanat of Mahrookan irreversibly dried up, and then the qanat of Deh Akhoond suffered the same fate, and in 2013 the big concrete pool was left waterless. The small amount of rainfall was no longer enough to fill up the pool. Therefore, the farmers turned to a well which was dug 15 m away from the exit of Mahrookan qanat as a last resort in order to save their orchards of almond, fig and pomegranate that were withering away. The well was 14.80 m deep, whose water was sucked up by an electric pump into a metal tank from which water was sent into some plastic

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Table 3.3  Water resources in Mahrookan and their changes over time Water supply resources

No. Date 1 Before 1999 2 Around 1999 3 Around 2001 4 Around 2004 5 2013 6 2014

Mahrookan qanat In use

Traditional ditch and springs In use

Water transfer from Deh Akhoond + Accumulation of runoffs in the concrete pool and their transfer No need to be used

The well 15 m away from the exit of Mahrookan qanat No need to be used

In use

In use

In use

No need to be used

In use

Dried up

In use

No need to be used

Dried up

Dried up

In use

In use

Dried up Dried up

Dried up Dried up

Dried up Dried up

In use Dried up

pipes for drip irrigation. This well sucked the last drops of the aquifer and eventually dried up in 2014. Now in Mahrookan there is nothing but a bleak landscape with rows of dead trees and black pipes in between. Both rivals the qanat and well surrendered to death, and the only remnant is a small metal tank which is filled with water once in a while by a truck in order to water the thirsty flocks wandering in the valley Table 3.3.

3.12  Conclusion The water division system in Meymand can be summarized as follows: A- in Meymand, we expect the farmers to use a time-based unit for water division, whereas they use a land-based unit in the face of water scarcity in the village. It seems that their water division system is a holdover from the old times when an abundance of water did not necessitate using a time-based unit. B- in Meymand, water clock to calculate the time of irrigation is not in vogue, but they rather use a type of sundial. However, in Shahr-e Babak water clock has always been common. Water clock is traditionally used only in the regions where a time-based unit is inherent in their water division system, and the lack of water clock in Meymand implies that the time-based unit is not rooted in their traditional water division system. C- in Meymand, the ownerships of water and land are inseparable, whereas in the Iranian central plateau in many villages where the time-based units have traditionally been used for water division, a water ownership is developed independently of land. In fact, the land-based unit for water division usually goes hand in hand with the inseparable ownerships of water and land.

References

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D- the most important peculiarity of the water division system is the soul of cooperation which has given rise to a precious social capital and has proven to be a crucial reason for the sustainability of socio-economic structures in Meymand in the course of time. In this water division system, those who have less share of the qanat or spring can make the most of their water through a close cooperation with the other shareholders. Otherwise a farmer who owns only 4 Habbeh for example, may lose all his water to percolation and evaporation in the pool and along the ditch even before his water would reach his land. Therefore, they cooperate to accumulate their water together in order to have a larger quantity of water that makes it easier to irrigate all the partners’ lands. No land is left dry and barren by cooperating and swapping the water shares on the irrigation cycle, no matter how little is its water share. This sense of cooperation is anchored in a social convergence which stands out as a pivotal component of the region’s sustainable development. Taking into account the ongoing climatic condition of Meymand, water scarcity is the most important limitation for agricultural activities. Many of the old springs have dried up in the wake of a dramatic drop in the water table, but a few of qanats are still active and can be rehabilitated. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in Meymand a number of qanats fell into decay as a consequence of a decrease in annual precipitation, a persistent drought, lack of proper maintenance and eventually over-extraction of groundwater. Agriculture constitutes a key part of the cultural landscape in Meymand, and its preservation is of great importance. Given that in the region water and agriculture are interwoven, the measures that may help to protect the agricultural traditions should target the region’s water resources like enhancing irrigation efficiency, rehabilitation of the existing qanats and eventually integrated water resources management.

References Ashrafi, M. (2000). Comprehensive project on historical village of Meymand (in Persian), Unpublished Report, Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. Ashrafi, M., Eghtesadi, K. (2004). A review on the organization of the historical village of Meymand, Unpublished Report, Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. Eghtesadi, K. (2005). Encyclopedia of the village of Meymand (in Persian), Unpublished Report, Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. Garoosi, A. (2003). History of water and irrigation in province of Kerman (in Persian). Tehran: National Commission for Irrigation and Drainage. Iranian Parliament News Agency. (2014). Compensation for the livestock breeders’ loss still unpaid by Khatoon Abad copper smelting factory, Visited on 2014/07/31, at: Khabarfarsi.Com/ ext/10032840. Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2006). Water division systems in Iran (in Persian). Tehran: Iran National Water Museum. Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2017). Territorial Cooperation in Exploitation of Water Resources in Central Plateau of Iran and its Role in Sustainable Rural Development, unpublished.

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Labbaf Khaneiki, M., & Semsar Yazdi, A.  A. (2015). Qanat Tourism, International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structures (UNESCO-ICQHS). Iran Water Resources Management Company. Mehran, M. (2006). Regulations for the repair and design of the historical fabric in the village of Meymand (in Persian), M.S. thesis, Faculty of Architecture, University of Tehran. Mitchell, N., Rossler, M., & Tricaud Pierre, M. (2009). World heritage cultural landscape. Paris: UNESCO. Nash, H., Labbaf Khaneiki, M., Semsar Yazdi A. A. (2012). Traditional conference of qanat water shares, international conference on traditional knowledge for water resources management, Yazd, Iran. Papoli Yazdi, M.  H., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2001). Housing of Kurds in Northern Khorasan: Formation and evolution of housing in the context of mental and cultural structure (in Persian). Geographical Research Journal, 62. Papoli Yazdi, M. H., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2004). Qanats of Taft (in Persian). Mashhad: Papoli Publication. Riyahian Gahrati, R. (2003). Comprehensive project on historical village of Meymand (in Persian), Identification of the degree 2 buffer zone of Meymand, Unpublished Report, Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. Semsar Yazdi, A. A., Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2011). Veins of desert, International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structures (ICQHS), Iran Semsar Yazdi, A. A., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2017). Qanat knowledge: Construction and maintenance. Dordrecht: Springer. Shahshahani, S. (1995). Ethnology of Meymand, Unpublished Report, Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization.

Chapter 4

Cain and Abel in the Heaven of Water Cooperation

Abstract  In the biblical book of genesis, sons of Adam and Eve are said to have been respectively farmer and shepherd whose relationship had something to do with their jobs. A row brewed between the brothers when God rejected Cain’s offering which was the fruit of soil, but Abel’s sacrifice – a sheep – was accepted. This story is an interesting metaphor to describe the situation of the Abarkooh basin whose upstream is occupied by nomads with an economy mostly based on animal husbandry, but its downstream is populated by sons of Cain, whose economy is dependent on agriculture. Before the advent of modernity, both communities were equally favored by God and they used to live in perfect harmony with each other. The different geographical conditions across the basin drove each to occupy a particular niche most suited to their livelihood. The upstream enjoys porous and highly permeable soil which does not favor irrigated farming, plus good pastures and abundance of water. This condition attracts the people who live off livestock and animal husbandry. On the other hand, the downstream lacks that amount of water and good pastures, but it has a fertile soil ideal for irrigation. This condition is to the farmers’ liking, of course, if the upstream people let the water flow down. Water demands in upstream and downstream economies used to be in sync, because of their structural differences matching their geographical differences. This chapter shows how geographical diversity can lead to an environmental justice in terms of shared water resources, if our economies would be configured in compliance with geographical possibilities.

4.1  Introduction Before going into the issue of transboundary relations between the three regions in the provinces Yazd and Fars in terms of shared groundwater resources, we should know about the Iranian national mechanism of shared groundwater resources management. Iran enjoys six principal water basins: 1- Caspian Sea basin with 7 sub-­catchments 2- Persian Gulf and Oman Sea basin with 9 sub-catchments 3- Urmiya lake basin

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4- Central plateau basin with 9 sub-catchments 5- Eastern frontier basin with 3 sub-­ catchments 6- Ghareh Ghoom basin. Topography and earth surface features set these basins apart, and groundwater reserves follow the same boundaries between them to a large extent. However, the political borders between different provinces do not show any association with the actual borders between the above mentioned water basins. Khabbaznia defines the administrative division in Iran as follows: “administrative division is premised on the variety of geographical units, natural and human disparities, and social, ethnic, linguistic and racial diversity in the historical and geographical contexts. Such factors have been recognized by the central government to delineate the boundaries between the provinces” (Khabbaznia 2016: 27). Such definitions imply that administrative division is premised on the ethnic and cultural boundaries left from the past rather than on natural geography including water basins. This situation is prevalent when it comes to the international boundaries between the world countries, which is one of reasons of the international tensions over water resources. Many of the country provinces designate the territories of some special ethnicities and are delineated based on cultural, linguistic and racial similarities such as the provinces Azerbaijan, Loristan, Bakhtiari, Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchistan. Some other provinces are reminiscent of ancient territories mentioned in the historical books, poetries or mythologies such as Khorasan, Mazandaran and Semnan. Therefore water basin was never taken into account while administrative division was under way. Given that many of the aquifers are shared between two or several provinces, disputes over utilization of groundwater resources between the upstream and downstream areas are not unprecedented, and even sometimes relatively severe rows break out between them. Such tensions are usually settled by holding joint meetings, experts’ mediation and local intervention, but there is not an integrated strategy regarding shared groundwater management at the national level. Lack of attention to water basin as a criterion for administrative division has brought about many problems and tensions in terms of utilization of shared aquifers which have wasted a great deal of time and energy from the government. Nevertheless this situation shows a resemblance to the international boundaries between many countries which have been separated according to their ethnic, cultural, historical and political differences regardless of their water basins, and now they have to set out some agreements to facilitate their exploitation of the shared water resources. All the approaches toward the international agreements regarding shared water resources fall into four different approaches which are absolute territorial governance, absolute river basin governance, limited territorial governance and eventually joint water governance (Sholi et al. 2015). Similarities between national shared aquifers and international ones and between the conditions prevailing at both levels may enable us to compare the problems and solutions of the two levels in order to come up with a more sustainable approach toward our international shared aquifers.

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4.2  G  eographical Outline and Local Conditions of Abarkooh Basin Before going into detail about transboundary relations between different communities in Abarkooh basin in terms of their shared groundwater reserves, we should know more about conditions that prevail in this area from a geographical point of view. The aforesaid transboundary relations have come about in a particular historical, geographical, social, economic and political context whose changes may lead to a transition in the transboundary relations. As shown in the following map, Abarkooh is located in the province of Yazd some 150 km southwest of Yazd city, and borders the province of Fars. In the province of Fars, the towns of Abadeh and Eqlid surround the town of Abarkooh respectively from west and southwest. Abadeh and Eqlid are the closest urban centers of Fars province to the town of Abarkooh. Abarkooh has a desert arid and warm climate which is similar to many regions in the central plateau of Iran. From a hydrological point of view, the Abarkooh basin belongs to the bigger basin of the central plateau and is confined to the other sub-basins Gav Khooni, Siyah Kooh desert, Dar Anjir desert, Jazmoorian, Kal river, Tashk lake and Bakhtegan lake. Abarkooh basin covers an area of 57,196 square kilometers of which 47 percent is mountainous, 48 percent is semi mountainous and plain and 5 percent is desert and salty low lands. The towns Sirjan, Khatoon Abad, Shahr Babak, Herat, Marvast, Abarkooh, Eqlid and Abadeh are all situated in the same basin (National Annual Water Statistics 2014: 16). In this study area, the most elevated spot is 2433 m above sea level located in the region of Abadeh and Eqlid, whereas the lowest spot is 1750 m above sea level situated in the region of Abarkooh (Kiani et al. 2016: 22). In the Abarkooh region the annual precipitation amounts to 146 mm on average, which is less than the national average (Ibid: 28). Given the topographical, geological and hydrological situation of the study area, the aquifer of Abarkooh is recharged in its upslope in the regions of Abadeh and Eqlid in the province of Fars, and in fact the three regions enjoy a shared aquifer. Therefore any exploitation of groundwater or any developmental activity in the study area can affect the three regions Abadeh, Eqlid and Abarkooh, albeit over-­ exploitation of groundwater in the upslope (Abadeh and Eqlid) has more negative impact on groundwater resources in the down slope (Abarkooh). Porous and highly permeable sediments in the upslope have made this aquifer tremendously susceptible to overexploitation that takes place in the upslope and intercepts the groundwater flow toward the down slope where Abarkooh suffers water shortage. In this chapter, I have tried to juxtapose the information resulting from my own field studies with the existing historical facts in order to interpret the social behavior of the groundwater-based communities in a historical and geographical context. In this research, all the existing social, geographical, climatologic and historical information have been analyzed in a conceptual model and from an interdisciplinary standpoint in order to achieve a more realistic and holistic perception of the present situation in the study area (Fig. 4.1).

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Fig. 4.1  Geographical situation of Abarkooh basin in the province of Yazd

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4.3  H  uman Habitation in Abarkooh Basin and Uneven Distribution of Vital Resources Geological and climatologic evidences suggest that Abarkooh basin used to enjoy a more favorable climate during the early Holocene, latest phase of the Quaternary (Kiani et al. 2016: 23) and its soil and water resources were attractive enough to draw some human population. However, later on climate change gave rise to water scarcity and accordingly uneven distribution of vital resources across the Abarkooh basin. In other words, arable soil was more abundant in the Abarkooh region but ample water resources could be found in the upslope in Abadeh and Eqlid regions whose soil was not of high quality for agriculture. This uneven distribution of vital resources (particularly soil and water) led to sort of economic differentiation across the human settlements in the study area. In fact a spatial planning took place naturally and organically. The farming communities dependent on arable soil settled in the down slope in Abarkooh but nomadic communities based on pastures preferred the upslope in Faraqeh, Gashar, Surmaq, Abadeh and Eqlid. The uneven distribution of vital resources in the upstream and downstream of this basin came to polarize the human population according to their livelihood preferences. In fact, a special relationship between the upstream and downstream communities defined and regulated the exploitation of shared water resources in the basin. In the nomadic communities, pasture as one of the most important production factors was utilized independently of the downstream irrigation systems, whereas the agrarian communities managed to bridge between the upstream good water resource and downstream good soil resource by transferring water from the upstream. The low water demand in the upstream production system made it possible for the nomadic communities to release their excess water down toward the downstream agrarian communities. In other words, the profits of such a diverse geography were fairly divided among the different economic systems. Diversity of economic systems in the basin upstream and downstream prevented any conflict between their interests, and as a result sustainability of Abarkooh water resources was ensured. According to some historical records as well as my field studies, at least since 300 years ago, the soil and water resources were divided among the upstream and downstream communities rationally based on their different production systems and livelihood. This condition led to a paradox that uneven distribution of resources underlay an even distribution of wealth and then social justice. Over this historical period  – between some 300  years and 40  years ago  – the basin upstream drew different groups of nomadic people with a livestock based economy. Some of those tribes such as Gorji and Parandi tribes were displaced and forced to migrate to this region by the then rulers and kings due to some political and military reasons. However, some other tribes voluntarily chose this region to move in, and some of them accidentally settled in the region on their way while migrating to other destinations. Gorji and Parandi tribes were forced to migrate to the region at the time of Karim Khan Zand ruling from 1751 to 1779 (Kheyr Andish

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2016: 125). The tribes of Qashqayi, Arab, Marandi and Baseri voluntarily chose the basin upstream as their summer resort (Ibid: 141) and the Bakhtiyari tribes settled there in Faraqeh probably on their way to Khorasan when they were exiled by Nader Shah Afshar in 1732. Nader Shah appointed someone named Ahmad Khan Bakhtiyari to the provincial government of the Bakhtiyari region where a troublesome rebel was arrested and ordered to be flogged for his alleged crimes. The rebel’s accomplices, relatives and friends later raided Ahmad Khan and murdered him in revenge. This accident outraged the king Nader Shah who deployed the royal army from Isfahan to Bakhtiyari to subdue the rebels. The rebels were defeated and those directly involved in the murder were executed and the others who were all from Haft Lang branch of Bakhtiyari tribe were exiled to Khorasan in eastern Iran along with their families (Bakhtiyari 1984: 464). Given that the road from Bakhtiyari to Khorasan passed by Abarkooh basin, it seems very probable that the Bakhtiyari tribe currently living in Faraqeh are descended from the same Bakhtiyari exiles, some of whom made a detour and stayed in the basin upstream which resembled their homeland. In Faraqeh whoever I interviewed like Zabihollah Barzegar (91 years old) and Ahmad Karamnejad asserted that they belong to the Haft Lang branch of the Bakhtiyari tribe. At present (2017) the biggest families of Bakhtiyari tribe living in Faraqeh are: Khosravi, Karamnejad, Askarnejad, Ganji, Khakpoor, Derakhshan, Khoshnood, Soltani and Zolqafari (Fig. 4.2). Jane Dieulafoy the French archaeologist who came to Iran in 1881 at the time of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, has reported the presence of Bakhtiyari tribes in the Abarkooh basin. She writes that “the mountains around Eqlid are occupied by Bakhtiyari tribes and no outsider can set foot in there. They put up their tents in the valleys during winter, but move up the mountains and settle there during summer” (Kheyr Andish 2016: 132). Dieulafoy’s report shows that the Bakhtiyari people in

Fig. 4.2  A group of Bakhtiyari young men in Faraqeh in their traditional clothing

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the Abarkooh basin led a nomadic life based on animal husbandry at least until the Qajar period. Many of the local experts contend that nomadic livestock based livelihood was predominant in the basin upstream until the Iranian 1979 revolution. Although around those years agricultural activities began flourishing in the upstream, it was still dwarfed by the massive agriculture in the downstream. Therefore, division of geography according to various economic systems also led to a mutual current of goods and capital between the two territories in the basin upstream and downstream, and this current in turn sustained the production systems both in the upstream and downstream. Environmental capacities ruled out the possibility of producing everything in either upstream or downstream alone, and they could not remain self-sufficient, but quite the opposite they had to fasten their economies to each other’s and play a complementary role. The interdependence of the upstream and downstream economies, and the division of natural resources in relation to the conditions of each production system could eventually lead to the environmental and social justice and minimize the possibility of social tensions over their shared water resources. The upstream products mostly consisted in dairy products, shoes, carpet, wool, fur, fleece, etc. which all came from an animal husbandry economy, and their surplus was exported to the downstream communities. In return, the downstream could satisfy the demand of upstream for the agricultural products which were produced by the same water originating from the upstream territory. This situation has been summarized in the following figure (Fig. 4.3).

Fig. 4.3  Evolution of economic and social structures to maximize adaptation to uneven distribution of vital resources in the study area

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4.4  C  limate Change and Its Impact on the Shared Water Resources in Abarkooh Basin As mentioned, since 300 years ago up to the 1979 revolution, uneven distribution of vital resources in Abarkooh basin paved the way for the nomadic tribes to settle in the basin upstream, whereas the sedentary agrarian communities tended to dwell in the downstream whose fertile soil favored agricultural activities. Different economies entailed different requirements which could be found in different territories, leading to some organic relationship and systematic interaction between the basin upstream and downstream. Such relationship and interaction could sustain a fair distribution of vital resources across this geography, proportional to the special demand of each economy, and accordingly any tension or violent competition between the neighboring territories could be prevented. Nevertheless, one may ask if this peaceful model has always worked in the region and if such a systematic relationship between the neighboring territories has ever fallen out of order. The answer can be found in the historical, archaeological and climatological facts which suggest that environmental changes have always turned out to be the most important factor which could throw such a perfect relationship off balance. In this basin, the model which worked since 300 years ago until the 1979 revolution was premised on the nomadic upstream and agrarian downstream. The upstream society was dependent on the pastures whose low water demand allowed them to release most of the water toward the downstream farming society, and then they used to barter their livestock products and handicrafts for the agricultural goods of the downstream. This simple model could guarantee the sustainable utilization of water resources in the basin, and create a systematic interaction and interdependence between the upstream and downstream territories over a period of at least 250 years. Nevertheless we want to take a closer look at what was going on in this basin before and after the aforementioned model, and how any changes in the basin could affect the relationship between the upstream and downstream regarding their exploitation of water resources. As mentioned, in Abarkooh basin, nomadic and agricultural production systems are two significant factors, each of which has occupied a certain territory. In a historical context, climate change is one of the issues which define and delineate the relationship between the neighboring nomadic and agrarian societies, and in fact climate change can lead to either interaction or tension between the two societies. Many of the historical currents followed the same simple model to a large extent; a model premised on a change in the relationship between the adjacent nomadic and agrarian societies in the wake of climatic and environmental change. Many of the migrations or even invasions of nomadic societies toward the agrarian territories took place as a consequence of climate change. As an instance, the migration of Scythian tribes is believed to be associated with a climate change which broke out in the first millennium before Christ (Boroffka 2010). Given that Chinese sedentary societies have always viewed the northern nomadic societies as impending threats, any mass migration or invasion posed by the northern nomads has been spelled out in the Chinese historical records. If we collate these historical records and paleo-­

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climatological data, we can come to the conclusion that most of the invasions or migrations from Mongolia and Central Asia to the Chinese agrarian territories were triggered by persisting climatic and environmental changes across those nomadic territories (Qing and Zhang 2014: 1). Even the Mongolian invasion which swept away the agrarian society of Iran in 1219 is attributable to the climatic changes and the following droughts at the time (Gautam 2009: 39). Climate change does not have the same impact on different economies, as a nomadic economy based on animal husbandry is more susceptible to climate change because pasture is its most important factor, which closely correlates with the amount of annual precipitation. Any decrease in annual precipitation can immediately affect the area vegetation and in turn lead to a decrease in the livestock products. However, agricultural production system enjoys sort of economic buffer which enables it to survive the environmental changes for a longer time. Producing storable goods, utilizing groundwater resources, investing the surplus of agricultural products in other economic sectors, etc. are among the reasons why agrarian societies can endure the abrupt changes in climatic conditions longer and dodge its negative consequences at least for a longer while compared to the nomadic economy. In the course of history, withering pastures and poor vegetation in the wake of climate change have always brought about a crisis of vital resources for the nomadic societies whose economy has mostly relied on grazing animals. One of the strategies to overcome such intermittent crises was to move toward the agricultural territories whose special economic structures made it possible for them to resist the climate change induced challenges. Such movement toward the agricultural territories sometimes took place in the form of military clashes and violent confrontations which usually ended up in the agrarian societies destroyed and plundered by the nomadic invaders. Nevertheless in this model, the movement of nomadic societies toward the agrarian territories caused by climate change was not necessarily aggressive and destructive. Moreover we should note that climate change cannot be considered the only reason of important historical clashes between the nomadic and agrarian societies, and it is not correct to reduce such complicated historical events to only one factor. But we should view climate change as an important factor which could catalyze such intricate interactions between other social, economic and political factors leading to historical confrontations between nomadic and agrarian societies. It is worth noting that the persisting droughts caused by a climate change in the fourteenth century not only paved the way for the Mongolian great movement toward China, Central Asia and Iran, but the same climate change also affected some small basins in the central plateau of Iran where smaller societies were driven to take similar adaptive strategies. Migration or even invasion can be regarded as a sort of adaptive strategy against climate change in a historical context, though all the nomadic societies did not necessarily turn to it. Sometimes they managed to change their economic structures and production systems to some extent as an adaptive strategy against the new environment created by climate change. In the Abarkooh basin both strategies are discernible. In the basin upstream, climatic and geological conditions did not favor farming activities, whereas its abundant natural springs along with relatively good pastures turned out to be appealing for animal husbandry.

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Therefore settling of nomadic societies in the basin upstream put them in contact with their farmer neighbors living in the basin downstream, and commenced a longstanding relationship between them with lots of ups and downs. Climate change and accordingly any fall in the amount of precipitation could immediately affect the pastures in the basin upstream and drive its nomadic society to take an adaptive strategy. Though I do not rule out some violent confrontations between the upstream and downstream societies as a solution for the upstream nomadic society to make it through the droughts, aggression has not been a common pattern, at least in this basin. The most common strategy for these societies was to adapt their production systems (wholly or partially) to the new conditions brought about by climate change. We can call the period between 300 years ago and the 1979 revolution “livelihood differentiation” before and after which there have been some periods of socio-­ economic disturbances. Livelihood differentiation means division of geographical space among the nomadic and agrarian societies according to their different production demands and economic requirements. Livelihood differentiation is associated with different possibilities found in different spots of a particular geography, which allows different livelihoods to occupy their own niches which provide whatever they need for their production systems without interfering with each other’s interests. Such a division could lead to an organic relationship and economic interaction between the two livelihoods in the basin upstream and downstream and ensure sustainable exploitation of shared water resources. Now we want to take a closer look at the conditions that prevailed over the basin before and after the livelihood differentiation and their impacts on exploitation of shared water resources. People in the know believe that apricot plantation was very rare in the basin upstream, for example in the Surmaq area, some 4 decades ago because of the then climatic conditions which did not favor this kind of agriculture. According to them, the weather was so cold that most apricot blossoms were usually frozen in late March and never bore fruit in the basin upstream. However, over the past 4 decades, the weather condition gradually changed in favor of those who wanted to develop apricot plantations in the basin upstream because the risk of hypothermia decreased. Therefore more and more people showed interest in developing apricot orchards in the basin upstream whose climatic condition once ruled out such an activity. The booming apricot plantation in the upstream can be regarded as an indication of climate change which contributed to the water crisis in the region today. It seems that in the past the weather condition of the basin upstream was colder and then less favorable for apricot plantation. The historical evidences imply that about three centuries ago, the climate in the region was colder and more humid than what we see today, though it began getting warmer and drier since about 1700. It does not mean that the more we go back in history the colder and the more humid climate we find. Quite the opposite, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a warmer and drier climate prevailed over the region, even compared to the present situation. Arash Sharifi and his colleagues contend that the Iranian plateau has gone through many climatic changes since 13,000 years ago according to their study on the sediments of Neor lake in Ardebil province in Iran as well as the other paleo-climatological data. Their study shows that some dry, humid, warm and cold climates intermittently prevailed

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over the Iranian plateau, resulting from a variety of factors from changes in sun energy to changes in wind patterns. Amid these climatic fluctuations, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries stand out as a warm and dry period when the Iranian plateau experienced a harsher condition (Sharifi et al. 2013). Interestingly, many historical records bear witness to the above mentioned paleo-climatological study. In 1275, a Persian geographer named Qazvini authored a book in Arabic entitled “Asar al-Belad Akhbar al-Ebad” which literally means “Relics of Lands and News of People”. In this book he describes the town of Abarkooh as follows: “one of the wonders of Abarkooh is that it never rains inside the town but only in its surroundings, and people attribute it to Abraham’s miracle” (Qazvini 1994: 192). Also another geographer named Yaqoot Homavi in the same thirteenth century has mentioned Abarkooh in his book: “the town of Abarkooh is one third of Estakhr in size, its buildings are dense and most of the alleys are roofed. This town is bare and treeless and there is no garden there except far away from the town” (Homavi 2004: 82). Therefore we can come to the conclusion that some 800 years ago, Abarkooh basin enjoyed a warmer and drier climate, which acknowledges Sharifi’s study as well. Therefore over this period, groundwater is expected to have been the main water resource for Abarkooh basin. More historical records give credence to our assumption. For example, Ibn Balkhi in twelfth century has mentioned the qanat system as the only water source for Abarkooh (Ibn Balkhi 1995: 291). Some 800 to 900 years ago, the relatively warm and dry climate made the region agricultural systems more dependent on groundwater extracted through qanats, and cotton plantations became prevalent. Cotton plantation could bring more “value added” which helped the residents better adapt to such a climatic condition. Qanat-based agriculture usually necessitate developing more offset economic activities in order to compensate for any fall in their income due to the fluctuating nature of this type of water source. The qanat drains out only the aquifer overflow and its discharge usually correlates with the amount of annual precipitation. Thus over the dry years the qanat water dwindles, driving the farmers to take two adaptation strategies which are diminishing the cultivation area and changing the cropping pattern to something with lower water demand. Though these two strategies can adjust their agricultural activates to their available water, their economic efficiency inevitably decreases and accordingly the farmers’ income plummets. To keep such consequences at bay, the farmers diversify their economy by developing other activities than qanat-based agriculture in order to compensate for any decrease in their agricultural revenue. Now we better understand how cotton plantation in Abarkooh could have paved the way for the growth of other offset activities about 800 years ago. In fact, when qanats brought a good deal of water, a cotton plantation could provide enough raw materials for a variety of workshops which could be busy manufacturing cotton products from thread to textile to clothes, even over the drier periods when qanat water was on the wane. In Abarkooh, cotton plantations could give rise to many offset economic activities. According to Ibn Balkhi, the farmers turned their cotton into textile and then produced cotton clothes and exported them to the other regions (Ibid). Thus their cotton crop was processed three times, first it was turned into thread, then textile and eventually clothes, and each time the farmers could obtain more value

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added. Therefore, the manpower surplus became involved in such local industries, the manpower laid off by the agricultural sector due to the decline in farming activities in the wake of water scarcity. This economic strategy could reduce the impact of climate change on their qanat-based agriculture, and keep their overall income almost steady. Some 200  years after Ibn Balkhi in fourteenth century, another geographer named Hafiz Abroo reported that Abarkooh enjoyed a river in addition to its qanats as saying that “the town enjoys a moderate weather and its water is supplied by both river and qanat, and its condition is favorable for fruits and grains” (Hafiz Abroo 1996: 111). One may wonder if Abroo’s report is wrong or something has changed to such extent in Abarkooh over this 200 years. What Abroo reports does not much resemble the town that Homavi describes as dry and treeless. It seems that in twelfth century Abarkooh the aridity was in full swing, but the climate later tended to become wetter. At the same time the area upstream from Abarkooh enjoyed a more moderate climate. Today the elderly remember that until 40  years ago, the basin upstream used to be so cold that the apricot trees were always subject to hypothermia and were not expected to bear much fruit. Nevertheless Ibn Balkhi in the twelfth century reported about Surmaq located in the basin upstream as saying that “Surmaq is a small town whose apricot is unique in the world for its high quality and dried apricot is exported from here to everywhere” (Ibn Balkhi 1995: 291). According to Ibn Balkhi, in Surmaq at the time the climatic condition not only favored apricot plantation, but also their main job was producing dried apricot to be exported to the other regions. Therefore we can conclude that in twelfth century the weather in the basin upstream was not as cold as what its present residents report it to have been about 40 years ago. The historical records do not point out the presence of nomadic societies in the basin upstream in twelfth century. It seems that climatic conditions were favorable enough for the sedentary agrarian societies to flourish even in the upstream, and an agricultural economy used to prevail over the whole region at the time. However, we do not have access to adequate information about the relationship that existed between the upstream and downstream societies and how they managed their shared water resources some 800 years ago. Later on, the basin upstream gradually became an appealing destination for some nomadic societies whose economy was anchored in pastures and livestock, and a new relationship was established between the upstream and downstream societies mainly for two reasons. The first reason was climate change which reduced the capacity of the basin upstream for agricultural activities but made the downstream more favorable for cultivation. Thus the upstream appeared as an ideal place for animal husbandry and the nomadic societies filled up the vacuum. The second reason has something to do with the Mongolian invasion in early thirteenth century, which should not be omitted from our interpretation. Xavier de Planhol believes that some of the nomadic societies have turned to this lifestyle as a strategic reaction to the impending military and political threats (de Planhol 2004). The unstable situation of Iran in the wake of the Mongolian invasion pushed some of the sedentary societies into nomadism in order to ensure more security for themselves. Also, the migration of nomadic tribes from central Asia to the Iranian plateau

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incited this livelihood in such regions as the north of Fars province. Though the settling of nomadic societies in the Abarkooh basin upstream led to a few social tensions, in the end a balance and consensus were achieved over utilization of the available vital resources across the basin, referred to as “livelihood differentiation” in this book. Over the period of “livelihood differentiation”, the shared water resources were exploited by the both upstream and downstream but according to their different water demands which were inherent in their economic structures. Economic requirements are not similar in both agricultural and nomadic economies, so both territories do not view water resources similarly. Over that period, a sustainable and systematic relationship between the basin upstream and downstream regulated their utilization of the shared water resources.

4.5  U  tilization of the Shared Water Resources Before and After the Land Reform In Iran, land reform law enforced in 1962 brought about drastic changes in the land ownership system and left a deep impact on the Iranian rural society. In Abarkooh basin before the land reform, the qanat system stood out as the main water source, as Zeyn al-Abedin Shirvani reported that the qanats used to supply water to Abarkooh some 120 years ago (Shirvani 1897: 61). All the qanats used to originate from the basin upstream like Faraqeh or Gashar regions and appear in Abarkooh and irrigate the downstream lands. In Abarkooh basin, it was a historical tradition for the land lords or rulers to build qanats as important components of their production systems. As an instance, at the beginning of Fath Ali Shah’s reign from Qajar dynasty, someone named Mohammad Hasan Khan was appointed as ruler of Kerman and he ruled over Abarkooh as well. He constructed a qanat in the village of Mehr Abad in Abarkooh, whose water irrigated some farmlands (Modares Zadeh Abarkoohi 1998: 253). As mentioned, at that time Abarkooh was well known as an agricultural hub in the area and its farmers rose to fame for their skills in producing a vast variety of crops (Haji Zadeh Meymandi 2013: 123). The water supplied to the whole Abarkooh basin came from a shared aquifer stretching from Abarkooh lowlands to the Eqlid plain and to the base of Basiran mountains. This aquifer was drained by numerous springs and qanats to provide a considerable portion of water required for the domestic, pastoral and agricultural sectors. There existed numerous qanats built subsequently from the basin upstream to downstream in order to irrigate the farmlands. For example, in Surmaq region, Sori spring was among the important water supply sources which used to play a significant role in the region up to the early 1980s. A little down slope in Chel Zari region two qanats named Chel Zari and Haj Karimi extracted groundwater, of which Chel Zari qanat drained out some 50 liters of water per second and even today it gives 40 liters per second. The discharge of Haj Karimi qanat was about 5 liters per second and it has retained the same discharge to date. These qanats used to supply

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water to Chel Zari whose historical castle is reminiscent of a lucrative past when plenty of water and rich pastures well supported this population. However, in Chel Zari there are only three families and in Karim Abad only one family who are left behind from a surge of immigrants who are now living mostly in the town of Abadeh or the city of Shiraz. Down slope from Chel Zari the region of Gashar were watered by 4 qanats along with 4 natural springs which all quenched the water demand in the region until 1971. The qanats of Gashar were shallow qanats whose mother wells were not deeper than 4 m. Nevertheless in addition to groundwater, Gashar could take advantage of seasonal runoffs to irrigate the farmlands. During the wet years when precipitation was higher than the average, the seasonal river of Gashar used to flow even into June and play an important role in their irrigation based agriculture. That was why the farmers managed to build 21 side canals in order to divert the river water and distribute it all over the farmlands. Nowadays all the aforementioned qanats and springs have dried up in Gashar and there has remained only a very dim vestige of those side canals, because over the past years the rainfall was not enough for the seasonal river to flow down again. The remnants of a relatively huge dam across the Gashar seasonal river heralds a considerable amount of water which used to flow down this valley in the past. The historical dam of Gashar is located at the coordinates 31 degrees, 1  m and 34  s north, and 52 degrees, 58 m and 7 s west. The dam wall is about 20 m thick on average and over 200 m long, built of stone and Sarooj mortar. Sarooj consists of clay, lime and plant fibers which resulted in a tougher and more integrated mortar. One can imagine what a huge volume of water was accumulated behind this dam, which could be transferred to the downstream farmlands through the side canals during the drier seasons. There are some dim vestiges of the dam still discernible in the landscape, an important dam which once evened out this water supply for agriculture probably throughout the year. Unfortunately part of the dam wall has been dismantled by the villagers so they could have re-used its stones in their own buildings. It is not easy to date the Gashar dam at least for me with little knowledge in archaeology, but a building just next to the dam wall can give a clue. This building nestles on a small hill just next to the dam wall, whose construction materials suggest an antiquity of about 300 years. This structure has been built of adobe and clay mortar, whose location and size imply that it once served as the accommodation of the dam personnel and guards, given that such a dam required a group of people to keep track of water level and the dam physical integrity especially during the rainy season. Moreover a dam of this kind entails an intricate water management and distribution system whose people in charge needed such a building to dwell close to the dam (Figs. 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). In the region, people in the know believe that Gashar dam was in active use long time ago and its water was used by the then residents of Gashar castle. Gashar castle located some 1000 m east of Ghashar dam, has a Qajar architectural style dating back to 100–200 years ago. The walls and watch towers of this castle are still standing, and the different types and colors of construction materials suggest that the castle has repeatedly been repaired and reconstructed over time. Gashar castle has now ended up in the middle of a modern farm that belongs to Mr. Roshan one of the

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Fig. 4.4  Historical dam of Gashar which indicates a climate change in the region

Fig. 4.5  Remains of a historical building close to the wall of Gashar dam

greatest landowners in the region. The interior sections of the castle have been destroyed and some new chambers have replaced the old rooms in order to keep the livestock. The relatively small size of this castle can barely convince us that it could accommodate a population more than 200 people. Therefore that small population was not proportional to the huge amount of water behind the Gashar dam which could irrigate a vast land far beyond their ability to cultivate, even if the castle was contemporary with the dam at all. I think that the construction of such a dam was

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Fig. 4.6  Map of Abarkooh basin with its upstream and downstream population centers

not only aimed at irrigating a small farmland belonging to Gashar castle, but the dam was probably meant to supply water to a much larger area which could be found in the basin downstream. Down slope from Gashar there are other villages each of which possessed their own qanats or springs in the past, such as the villages Ali Abad, Gazok, Noosh Abad, Rostam Abad, Sheykh Abad, Kheyr Abad, Safi Abad, Sadegh Abad, Cheshmeh Chahak, Faraqeh, Bidestan, Rahim Abad, Lahmian and Khosro Abad. Out of those old qanats, there are only five qanats still running and the rest all dried up and were replaced by tube wells. Only in Faraqeh region there were 366 qanats of which 10 flowed down toward Abarkooh and irrigated the downstream farmlands. Those 10 qanats consisted in the qanat of Bahr Kooh and the qanat of Shams Abad plus a cluster of four qanats named Nahr Ghadim and another cluster of four qanats named Nahr Jadid. The two qanats of Bahr Kooh and Shams Abad joined each other and then operated a watermill on their way to the farmlands in Abarkooh where water appeared on the surface. These qanats along with the watermill all belonged to a landlord named Agha Zadeh. Albeit there were other qanats which originated from the basin upstream and transferred the shared groundwater to the downstream. As another example, the qanat of Barzan which enjoyed three side branches named Hasan Abad, Siyah and Posht Asiyab was among the important qanats in the region. Before the land reform this qanat was owned by a landlord, but later the qanat water shares were redistributed among the peasants to become petty land owners. In 2017, the representative of the qanat shareholders was someone named Fallah Zadeh (father of former provincial governor of Yazd) who could persuade the government to grant him official permission for drilling two tube wells respectively with the discharge of 15 and 20 liters per second; after their qanat dried up. Nevertheless the most important qanats which flowed down toward the basin downstream were the

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qanat clusters of Nahr Ghadim and Nahr Jadid all used to irrigate the farmlands in Maryam Abad. Nahr Ghadim consisted of four qanats named Mehrgan, Jalil Abad, Siyah and Sangi which all originated from Faraqeh, whereas Nahr Jadid included the qanats Safi Abad, Ahmad Abad, Saleh Abad and Jahan Abad which came from Safi Abad and Deh Arab in the basin upstream. The locals believe that the four qanats of Nahr Ghadim were in fact natural springs whose water were all collected in a canal to be transferred to the basin downstream about 200 to 300 years ago. The chief of Faraqeh claimed for half of the harvest in exchange of this water that he allowed to flow down toward the basin downstream. The four springs came to dry up when the groundwater started depleting. Some of the landlords from Abarkooh proceeded to dig into the aforesaid springs in order to get access again to groundwater. Thus the springs were turned into qanats and their water flowed down again toward Abarkooh. Before the land reform, the four qanats of Nahr Ghadim were all owned by only five landlords named Khalil Hooshmand, Mohammad Javad Firoozi, Mahmood Maleknia, Mirza Abdol Mali and Mohammad Baqer Maleki, but land reform law forced the landlords to re-distribute the water shares among the farmers. More development of cultivated lands in Abarkooh drove up the water demand to the extent that new water sources were sought. Therefore four other qanats collectively named Nahr Jadid were built in the basin upstream and their water was conveyed to the village of Maryam Abad on Abarkooh outskirt. The mother wells of these four qanats are all 8 m deep. Before the land reform, Nahr Jadid was totally owned by a landlord named Omidvar Salar who was parliament member as well. Some of the farmers contend that he was originally from Abadeh, but some others like Mr. Roshan insist that he was born in Abarkooh. In 1961 just before the land reform came into effect, Omidvar Salar signed an agreement with the farmers, according to which the farmers could take ownership of the orchards to be divided among them based on their Nasaq. Nasaq means land tenure or the tenant cultivator’s right to work for a landlord. In the Iranian feudal system, some of the villagers had permanent positions in agricultural production systems, and their right to work as permanent farmer was called Nasaq. The agreement allowed the farmers to get a hold of the orchards on condition that they never lay claim to the farmlands. In return, Salar undertook to provide their orchards with the required water through the same Nahr Jadid. Salar as a parliament member had access to the information about the land reform law which was around the corner at the time, and wanted to save at least his farmlands by signing such an agreement. Thus after the land reform the ownership system of Nahr Jadid completely changed. About 9 years later in 1970, Salar sold his farmlands to someone named Firoozi along with Nahr Jadid as the only water source for irrigation, and assured Firoozi that the farmers were not going to trouble him over the water of Nahr Jadid, because he promised to drill a well for the farmers to satisfy them. However, he went back on his promise and no well was dug for the farmers’ orchards, and as a result a longstanding dispute broke out between Firoozi and the farmers over the water of Nahr Jadid. Eventually after the Iranian 1979 revolution, the farmers took advantage

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of the political and managerial turmoil at the time and seized the whole water in the name of revolution against feudal oppressors. Later on, in 1988 Fars Regional Water Authority helped the farmers to build a concrete open canal in order to transfer the water of Nahr Jadid and Nahr Ghadim both. The canal was meant to gather the whole water from the both sources and bring them down to the cultivated lands in Maryam Abad on Abarkooh outskirt. The concrete canal could enhance the efficiency of water transfer and reduced water escape which took place in the traditional earthen ditches through percolation into the soil. However, in 2006 the both Narh Jadid and Nahr Ghadim dried up and left the farmers in a harsh condition. According to the Iranian Fair Water Distribution Law, the shareholders of Nahr Ghadim proceeded to apply for an official permission to drill two tube wells instead of their qanats which totally ran out of water. Their application met with the approval of Regional Water Authority and drilled two wells with the discharge of 10 and 18 liters per second, though those wells could not in fact substitute for the qanats (Nahr Ghadim) which used to drain out over 110 liters per second. At present, the well with the discharge of 10 liters per second is called Chah Sangi and the other well with 18 liters per second is called Chah Mehrgan, actually called after the dry qanats. The shareholders of Nahr Jadid wanted to go down the same path and apply for an official permission to drill wells, but Firoozi’s heirs brought their application to a standstill by filing a complaint against the farmers. Firoozi’s heirs (Hossein, Ali, Abbas and Zohreh) laid claim to Nahr Jadid, and they alleged that the farmer’s application for such permission is baseless, because their ownership of this water source is in question. This longstanding dispute led to the annihilation of 70 orchards which used to be irrigated by Nahr Jadid before its drying up in return for half of their harvest which was given to its owner Firoozi as water rent. The farmers contented themselves with the former rental system. In other words they asked Firoozi’s heirs to get an official permission for drilling wells and then rent this water out to the farmers in return for half the crop like old days, even if they do not recognize the farmers’ ownership of this water. Also the farmers suggested purchasing this land and its related water share at the cost of some 422,000 USD, but their suggestion was turned down by Firoozi’s heirs. In 2017, the farmers eventually won the case in court, but they faced an appeal submitted to court by Firoozi’s heirs. As mentioned, the water needed for agricultural activities in Abarkooh was supplied through a shared aquifer coming from the basin upstream. Water transfer from the upstream spring or qanats demanded a considerable deal of time and money which were not afforded by the normal farmers. Therefore the affluent landlords and rulers were encouraged to invest in the region water supply systems including water transfer from springs and rivers and qanat construction and get the half harvest annually in return for their money. Thus until the land reform, the landlords had an economic hegemony over the region’s production systems, which was later transferred to the petty land owners after the enforcement of land reform law. Nevertheless, re-distribution of lands among the downstream farmers, division of labor and ­coordination between the workers began waning. Before the land reform, the lands were cultivated and irrigated by the farmers some of whom were specialized in

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irrigation, and a systematic cooperation in the farming team led to higher efficiency of irrigation. However, re-distribution and its intrinsic individualism made the traditional cooperative system collapse, and accordingly irrigation efficiency decreased and water demand increased. In the basin upstream, the land reform brought about the same result and raised the water demand. In fact, one of the subtle objectives of the land reform program was to sedentarize the nomadic tribes, the same policy which was kicked off by Reza Shah Pahlavi but in a more radical manner and then followed by his successor this way (Nader Poor 2000). The nomadic tribes were always considered a potential threat to the national security and sovereignty due to their lifestyle and social hierarchy which made it difficult for the central government to take control of their military capacities. In the framework of land reform, the tribal chiefs in the nomadic societies were regarded as landlords whose lands – which were in fact the communal pastures and migration paths  – were subject to re-distribution. Doing so, the charismatic authority of the chiefs which was rooted in their territorial identity tapered off, and on the other hand their seasonal movements were impeded. In nomadic societies, ownership is recognized as a collective right to the vital resources available within a certain territory. The members’ connection with their tribal livelihood and identity is actually anchored in that same notion of ownership. Re-distribution of lands among the tribe members changed the connotation of ownership, and the members became detached from their historical and social common roots, which paved the way for sedentarization. Also, re-distribution of lands weakened the tribal territorial identity and tribal hierarchy through which the chiefs could exert their authority. Thus the new private ownership could hamper the nomadic lifestyle even for those who were still steadfast in leading a nomadic life, because it became legally impossible to pass across the former communal pastures which were divided among individuals as their private properties. Moving across the communal pastures was now considered trespassing on private lands according to the new law. In fact the government used people against people to change their livelihood and economic structures. Therefore, many of the nomadic people turned into petty land owners whose new agricultural activities raised water demand. For example, the region of Cheshme Ra’na near Eqlid was populated by Kord Shooli tribes who were involved in animal husbandry before the land reform law. Amid the enforcement of land reform law, their chief feared that the government would confiscate their tribal lands and would give them out to outsiders, so the chief himself volunteered to sell out 50 percent of the lands to the same tribesmen who could at least save the lands from falling into the wrong hands. Surprisingly, at the beginning the tribesmen were reluctant to buy the tribal lands to which everyone in the tribe was traditionally entitled. Nowadays the people who had accepted to buy the tribal lands are called “Arbabi Dar” which literally means someone holing the chief’s land. These tribesmen were once involved in grazing livestock whose water demand could be met only by a tiny spring, but after the land reform they turned to agricultural activities which multiplied water demand. Increasing demand for water in the basin upstream affected the systematic relationship which has existed between the basin upstream and downstream for decades.

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The booming agricultural activities in the basin upstream encouraged the newcomers to this business to expand their farmlands as far as possible. Though the basin upstream had little limitation for water resources, development of agriculture entailed favorable soil too which could be found in the downstream. Thus after the land reform, some new land owners emerged, who tended to expand their lands toward the basin downstream. For example, Naser Samimi Abadeyi bought Chah Bolaq farm in the vicinity of Abarkooh in 1971. This farm once belonged to Haj Khan Bozorg, Omidvar Salar’s brother from Abarkooh. In 1951 a flash flood struck the farm and destroyed its qanat, so that its former owner had to get a loan from bank, worth 429,000 USD. However, he did not afford to pay back the bank loan, and he had to sell the farm to someone named Khakpoor Faraqeyi who in turn sold it to Naser Samimi Abadeyi. At that time, the qanat fell into decay, and the farm was irrigated by a spring whose water dwindled and then dried up either. They managed to dig into the spring in order to reach the water again and pump it up by a diesel engine. Eventually in 2009, Naser’s heir sold 50 percent of the farm to some farmers of Abarkooh like Emrahim Omid Panah, and now they are jointly working on the farm. In 2017, the diesel engine pumped up 10 liters of water per second in return for 200 liters of gasoline consumed by the engine each day. In a nutshell we can say that in the whole basin, the land reform law resulted in higher demand for water. In the basin downstream the land reform raised water demand by undermining the traditional agricultural system which led to a decrease in irrigation efficiency. In the basin upstream, land reform made major changes to nomadic livelihood and gave rise to agricultural activities which raised water demand. More demand for water in the basin upstream and downstream threw their consensual exploitation of the water resources off balance, a balance which was gained through hundreds of years of livelihood differentiation and the organic relationship between the agrarian and nomadic societies. The climatic, economic and social transitions have been summarized in the following table. These transitions influenced the relationship between the basin upstream and downstream in terms of exploitation of their shared aquifer (Table 4.1).

4.6  S  hared Groundwater Resource in the Local Socio-­ Economic Context At least since 3 decades ago, management of shared groundwater resources reflected the conditions of the production systems in the basin upstream and downstream. Geographical distribution of vital resources across the basin was such that each region tended to harbor a particular production system. In the basin upstream and downstream, two types of production systems emerged and flourished, whose different peculiarities required different amounts of water. As mentioned before, water and soil are the most important vital resources whose uneven geographical distribution can give rise to livelihood differentiation. Quality and quantity of these two

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Table 4.1  Climatic, economic and social transitions in the basin upstream and downstream over six historical periods Stage 1: 1700–1800 Upstream: Faraqeh, Gashar, Surmaq, Eqlid, Abadeh General climatic Cold condition Main water Springs, surface water resources Situation of Good pastures Situation of soil Highly permeable, little nutrients, porous, low fertility Livelihood and Mostly nomadic social fabric Main products Unknown

Downstream: Abarkooh plain General climatic Moderate condition Main water Spring, upstream surface resources water Situation of Relatively poor pastures Situation of soil Good structure, much nutrients, high fertility Livelihood and Sedentary, farmer social fabric Main products Agricultural products Stage 2: 1800–1962 General climatic Moderate condition Main water Qanats, upstream runoffs resources Poor Situation of pastures Situation of soil Good structure, much nutrients, high fertility Livelihood and Sedentary, farmer social fabric Main products Agricultural products Stage 3: 1962–1979 General climatic Moderate condition Main water Qanats, wells resources Situation of Poor pastures Situation of soil Good structure, much nutrients, high fertility Livelihood and Petty farmer landowners social fabric Main products Agricultural products

Livelihood and social fabric Main products

Stage 4: 1979–1987 General climatic Moderate and warm condition Main water Qanats, wells resources

General climatic condition Main water resources

General climatic condition Main water resources Situation of pastures Situation of soil Livelihood and social fabric Main products General climatic condition Main water resources Situation of pastures Situation of soil

Cold Springs, surface water Good Highly permeable, little nutrients, porous, low fertility Increase in nomadic population Dairy products, handicrafts Cold Springs, qanats Good Highly permeable, little nutrients, porous, low fertility Nomadic with tendency toward agriculture Dairy products, handicrafts, a little agricultural products Cold and moderate Springs, qanats, wells (continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Situation of pastures Situation of soil Livelihood and social fabric Main products

Poor Good structure, much nutrients, high fertility Petty farmer landowners Agricultural products

Stage 5: 1987–1992 General climatic Moderate and warm condition Main water Wells resources Situation of Poor pastures Situation of soil Good structure, much nutrients, high fertility Livelihood and Petty farmer landowners social fabric Main products Agricultural products Stage 6: 1992–2017 General climatic Warm condition Main water Wells resources Situation of Poor pastures Situation of soil Good structure, much nutrients, high fertility Livelihood and Petty farmer landowners social fabric Main products Agricultural products

Situation of pastures Situation of soil Livelihood and social fabric Main products

General climatic condition Main water resources Situation of pastures Situation of soil Livelihood and social fabric Main products General climatic condition Main water resources Situation of pastures Situation of soil Livelihood and social fabric Main products

Average Modified by bringing arable soil from the downstream Sedentary, farmer Dairy products, agricultural products Cold and moderate Qanats, wells Average Modified by bringing arable soil from the downstream Sedentary, farmer Agricultural products Moderate Wells Relatively poor Modified by bringing arable soil from the downstream Major farmer landowners Agricultural products

resources are not homogenous all over the basin, and this unevenness paved the way for the formation of the two different production systems, agriculture and animal husbandry which occupied different niches with different possibilities. Thus those involved in animal husbandry preferred the basin upstream whose adequate precipitation gave rise to the good pastures, whereas the farmers settled in the basin downstream whose fertile soil well favored agriculture. The downstream society could overcome the problem of water scarcity by bringing water from the upstream whose water surplus flowed down and quenched the water demand in the basin downstream too. Water demands in the basin upstream and downstream were in perfect harmony, and not only did the two economic systems not conflict, but they were even complementary to some extent. In fact, the distribution of human societies correlated with the region ecological possibilities, completely in line with the local

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conditions. Here, I point out some examples of ecological reconciliation between indigenous human societies and their natural resources, which can inspire us with traditional ideas for our modern planning. In the basin downstream, grapes were of great economic importance and prevailed over the region’s agriculture until the Iranian 1979 revolution. The vineyards used to be irrigated once every 30  days, whereas the apricot orchards should be watered once every 8 days. Obviously the water demand of grapes is much lower than that of apricots which made huge inroads into the grape production. In the basin downstream, the soil condition was favorable for the grape plantation, and grapes were possible to turn into more storable products like raisins and syrup which could be exported more easily to the other regions when no modern transportation was at their disposal. In addition to grapes, wheat used to play a significant role in the region’s agricultural economy. The farmers used to sow the wheat seeds in late October and then water them once, and they might irrigate the wheat farm one more time in late February if the winter rainfall was not enough. Before the land reform, most of the grape crop was turned into either raisins or syrup, and in fact syrup production had historical roots in the region. Each farmland enjoyed a specific workshop for syrup production, whose ownership was communal and was operational 24 h a day at the time of grape harvest. All the farmers belonging to the farmland were obliged to harvest the grapes and also procure fuel for the workshop where the grape juice had to be boiled down. They not only had to work on the field to pick the grapes together, they also used to collect as much firewood as possible. Even after the land re-distribution, this kind of cooperation continued. It was a painstaking job to find enough firewood in such a dry land with little vegetation, so it demanded a close cooperation from the farmers to scatter in the desert looking for the firewood and thorns in order to boil and thicken the grape juice into storable syrup, while they had to harvest the grapes as quickly as possible. If they did not hasten to boil the grapes, their harvest could rot and the result of one year working was destroyed. Therefore it was not possible for an individual to deal with too many works within a short period, so as a result a cooperative social system was devised and developed, which can be regarded as an important part of the region’s social capital. All the farmers teamed up to harvest an individual’s crop and gather the required firewood both, and they in turn did so for the next farmer’s crop until the last one had his crop harvested and boiled down. This way, all the gapes could be harvested and turned into syrup timely, and the syrup was exported to the other regions especially to the basin upstream; Abadeh and Eqlid. Also, the other regions as far as Yazd, Isfahan and Shiraz were among their customers (Fig. 4.7). Nevertheless a part of the harvested grapes was dried into raisins whose export was second to grape syrup. A special breed of grape named Mesqali was common in the basin downstream, which was suitable for producing grape syrup, though another breed named Shahani caught on in the region, which was bought from the farmers fresh and unprocessed. In fact, the development of modern transportation and road networks made it possible for the farmers to send their fresh products to much farther regions. As a result, the Mesqali grape and its process into syrup were made redundant by Shahani grape which could be exported fresh at a relatively

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Fig. 4.7  vestiges of a syrup workshop which was once operational in a green vineyard on the outskirt of Abarkooh

higher price. The fresh grapes were delivered to the wine factories located in such cities as Abadeh, Isfahan and Shiraz, and the profit gained encouraged the farmers to more develop their Shahani vineyards whose water demand was even lower. Therefore once again but in a modern manner, in the basin upstream and downstream two different production systems with dissimilar demands for water came into existence. In fact after a temporary disturbance brought about by the land reform, the production systems in the basin upstream and downstream could regain their balance by turning to growing Shahani grape in the downstream and producing wine in the upstream. After the Islamic revolution in 1979, a legal ban was put on production, transaction and consumption of alcoholic drinks including wine, and the farmers accordingly lost that lucrative market for their grapes, so they shifted to other cropping patterns. According to my interviews with the locals, shortly after the Islamic revolution, apricot was introduced to the region and planted on a large scale, as a substitute for grapes. In Faraqeh, someone named Javad Hesami introduced the saplings of apricot from Isfahan to the region for the first time in 1981. Such an abrupt change in the region’s cropping pattern and shifting from grape to apricot plantation led to a considerable increase in water demand in Abarkooh and Faraqeh. There are many examples of such a drastic impact that ideology can have on environment, of which the case of Lake Urmia is the most noticeable. One of the important reasons why the lake shrank to some 10 percent of its original size was the damming of rivers and over-pumping of groundwater in order to quench the insatiable thirst of the surrounding orchards and farms. In fact the same story as that of Abarkooh basin happened in the lake basin but on a larger scale. A widespread change in the cropping pattern could raise the water demand which eventually exceeded the lake water input.

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Until the Islamic revolution, in the basin upstream the development of agriculture has been limited by two main factors; cold weather and soil inefficiency. Though the upstream has always enjoyed adequate water resources, farmlands, especially orchards, have been subject to hypothermia when frosty air could have struck the apricot blossoms and buds. On the other hand, in the basin upstream the porous and permeable soil which was not very suitable for agriculture could lower the crop efficiency. Modarres Zadeh Abarghooyi writes about the quality of soil in Faraqeh in the basin upstream that: “over there most of the lands are rocky. Arable soil is barely more than 50 cm deep, and if one finds a layer of soil thicker than that, the soil has certainly been brought to there. The practice of bringing soil and putting a new layer of soil on the ground surface is locally called Nowgir. Altogether in the basin upstream, the soil is not of high quality and does not favor agriculture in the face of too much water in the region” (Modarres Zadeh Abarghooy, 1998: 43). However, these two limitations were overcome eventually, paving the way for the agricultural activities to boom in the basin upstream over the past decades. The cold weather came to moderate as a result of climate warming over the past decades, so that nowadays the risk of hypothermia for apricot orchards is negligible in the basin upstream like in Surmaq and Gashar. The other limitation was once unsuitable soil which later became modified with the help of motorized vehicles and machineries. Over the past decades, a considerable amount of soil was transferred from the basin downstream to the upstream in order to improve the agricultural soil in the upstream. As an instance, only in 2016 Mr. Roshan transported a huge amount of fertile soil in 3800 trucks each of which could carry 8 cubic meters of soil. Therefore, only in one year, some 30,400 cubic meters of fertile soil was transported to the upstream in order to improve only 20 hectares of Mr. Roshan’s farmland. It becomes more stunning to know that every year almost the same amount of soil has to be transported to the same area of land in order to keep its fertility, and the other farmlands and orchards in the upstream all have to do so. The advent of motorized vehicles made it possible to transport such a huge mass of soil from the basin downstream, and as a result in the basin a new mouth opened to suck up the limited water resources. Thus, the traditional systematic interaction between the upstream and downstream gradually turned into a competitive confrontation. Such a competition between the basin upstream and downstream over more share of the groundwater resources led to more and more tube wells which mushroomed on the both sides of their border in order to get as much groundwater as they could. In 1971 there was no tube well at all in Gashar and upslope from there. In 1974 the first official permission was given to Gashar region to drill their first tube well, after their 4 qanats dried up. In the wake of the 1979 Islamic revolution, the governmental restriction on groundwater exploitation was loosened, and proletarian values and revolutionary zeal encouraged the farmers to drill their tube wells at will without official permission. Groundwater was regarded as public property which was usurped by the Shah regime, and now the people could get a hold of the natural resources including water. As a result, many tube wells sprang up everywhere especially in the basin upstream, pumping up groundwater with no limitation. Today only in a small area between Gashar and Surmaq there are 30 tube wells which are

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sucking up the groundwater 24 h a day. At present most of the tube wells in Surmaq are operational either without official permission or with a domestic permission which allows much less withdrawal than the actual one. A change made to the administrative division in 1987 is considered among the factors that exacerbated the growing rivalry between the basin upstream and downstream over their shared aquifer. Separation of Abarkooh from Fars province and then its annexation to Yazd province according to the new administrative division in 1987 started a new chapter on the relationship between the basin upstream and downstream. From 1987 to 1992, Abarkooh water management remained ambiguous, though Abarkooh was part of Yazd province and its water issues were expected to be managed by Yazd Regional Water Authority. During these 5 years, Yazd Regional Water Authority refused to take responsibility for the water management of Abarkooh and accept the documents of its water resources. Because Yazd Regional Water Authority believed that Abarkooh is hydrologically inseparable from Abadeh and Eqlid whose basin should be managed as a whole. Therefore Yazd Regional Water Authority tried its best to convince Fars Regional Water Authority that Abarkooh basin borders were not consistent with the provincial borders and the whole basin should have been viewed as an integrated hydrological unit, even though it is shared by two different provinces. This disagreement between these two entities blurred the water management system in the region and emboldened more people to take advantage of such a chaotic situation and extract more groundwater. Eventually in 1992 Abarkooh was completely separated from Fars province and annexed to Yazd province in terms of its water resources management. Thus the provincial border and the border of water resources management domain overlapped, and the basin upstream and downstream became separated by these borders which now went hand in hand. The increasing development of agriculture in the basin upstream led to a dramatic increase in water demand, and also a managerial confusion over the past decades due to a change in the administrative division paved the way for a competitive exploitation of groundwater and vying for more share of the region’s aquifer. As a result, in the basin upstream an abrupt increase in groundwater extraction left its impact on the water resources in the basin downstream. In 1990s many qanats in the downstream dried up one after another and the tube wells took their place, though the tube wells themselves could not survive the groundwater drawdown and later showed a considerable decrease in their discharge. For example, in Maryam Abad on the outskirt of Abarkooh, in 1990 the water of the qanat of Hambar came to dwindle and eventually it dried up in 1996. This qanat with the length of 2 km and a mother well 15 m deep, used to play a significant role in supplying water to the farmlands of Maryam Abad. The qanat was shared by 104 shareholders who applied for an official permission to drill a tube well after the qanat ran out of water. Their application met with the approval of Yazd Regional Water Authority and they were authorized to drill a 120 m deep well with the maximum discharge of 8 liters per second. The qanat of Hambar was not used for irrigation all the year round, but its water was released into a nearby gully during winters when their lands no longer needed to be watered. The canal which diverted water from the qanat to the gully was locally called Hal Gâh. The permanent current of qanats could create an ecology

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closely associated to the qanat water, which almost vanished in the wake of the drying up of qanats. However, a few qanats which have survived the groundwater depletion still attract region’s wildlife, like the qanat of Osto. Now the tube well of Hambar is extracting groundwater in place of the qanat of Hambar, with the same irrigation cycle. An irrigation cycle means a period of time during which the shareholders take turns getting their water shares based on the time of irrigation. In case of the well of Hambar, each farmer has the right to get their water shares once every 13 days which is called Madar or irrigation cycle. Recently the shareholders have decided to double the irrigation cycle to be 26 days instead of 13 days, so that some farmers would not have to get their water shares over night and irrigate in the dark. This way, all the farmers can irrigate in daylight and well pumps can be turned off over night. This new practice is in the favor of groundwater too, because it gives more time to the aquifer to get replenished. Now the number of shareholders owning the well of Hambar has increased to 300 which is conspicuous compared to 104 shareholders of the qanat of Hambar. In the basin downstream, most of the tube wells have been named after the historical qanats which once brought water to their cultivated lands. For example, in Abarkooh the well of Cheshmeh Chahak took the place of a qanat with the same name, which was in use by late 1990s. After the drying up of this qanat, one of its shaft wells was deepened into the underlying aquifer, and then a pump was installed to suck up some 20 liters of water per second. Albeit in the basin upstream, the new tube wells were drilled at a faster pace. As mentioned, many of the tube wells lack any official permission, and many of them extract much more water than allowed by their official permission. As an instance, the tube well of Ebrahim Daneshvar was drilled at the excuse for breeding wild antelopes and saving them from extinction. Thus an official permission was issued for the applicant to help him preserve that endangered species, but he later used the same tube well for commercial purposes. Now the tube well of Ebrahim Daneshvar is pumping up at least 50 liters of groundwater per second in order to irrigate a big apricot orchard with an area of 100 hectares. In fact, this tube well was allowed to be drilled on condition that the pumped water would be used only for breeding wild antelopes within a 500 hectare preserved area of which 100 hectares have so far been turned into commercial plantation area. In the region of Surmaq, the same situation applies to the tube well of Izadi and many other wells. If we pay attention to the names by which the tube wells are called, we grasp another fact that helps prove our hypothesis in this chapter. In the basin upstream, most of the wells are called by the names of individuals like the wells of Roshan, Ebrahim Daneshvar, Izadi, etc. However, in the basin downstream the wells are called by the names of places like the wells of Mehrgan, Barzan, Cheshmeh Chahak, etc., because in the downstream the wells were drilled in place of the old qanats which used to provide particular places with water and were jointly utilized by a group of shareholders. When the qanats dried up, their ownership systems as well as their names were transferred to the wells drilled in their place. Even before the land reform when the qanats were mostly owned by the landlords, the farmers were viewed as the actual users. This tradition is rooted in the agricultural livelihood which enjoys a long history in the basin downstream. However, calling the tube

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wells by the individuals’ names has something to do with a solo ownership or at most a few people sharing a well. In the upstream, the nomadic livelihood could not create an agrarian social context in which such an intricate water management system could come about, whereas water ownership and management system is anchored in centuries of agriculture in the basin downstream. Therefore, the modern technologies along with other climatic, social and political factors led to the advent of some new farmers who embarked on massive agricultural activities in the basin upstream. The new farmers were out of the region’s ecological and social context and were conjured out of the modern situation in the basin. These farmers came to create a new social class which can be called technocrat landlords. The technocrat landlords could overcome the limitation of soil in the basin upstream by deploying state of the art technologies and bringing a stunning volume of fertile soil in order to improve the unsuitable soil there. They took advantage of the climate change that reduced the risk of frosty air, and they also profited from the ambiguous land ownership system and chaotic situations after the land reform law and again after the 1979 revolution which let them easily seize a large area of land in the basin upstream. The technocrat landlords took this opportunity to set up a new economy in which modern technologies played a crucial role. The modern technologies made it possible for them to turn the barren lands into arable soil and then pump up a huge amount of water from the shared aquifer. This newfangled economy could not adjust itself to the region’s human ecology, and could not play a positive role in the long standing relationship between the basin upstream and downstream. The technocrat landlords lavishly used a variety of modern tools and technologies on their farms and orchards, and they did not hesitate to apply any type of chemical fertilizer and pesticide. The relationship between the technocrat landlords and their workers is quite different from what once existed between the traditional landlords and the farmers before the land reform. In this new economy, the Fordist nature of these vast farmlands bears a striking resemblance to that of modern factories which are designed to spew out as much product as possible. On these farms, labor division takes place according to different stages of an industrialized production system, and the workers are alienated from the land and water and even from the whole process of agriculture. The workers’ wage is paid just in return for the time and size of their work, and they always stand at a distance from the whole process of production, and are not concerned about the other works which in fact complete theirs. In the traditional paradigm, the farmers felt connected to land and water and they played a crucial role in mobilizing the other production factors and could take at least half the harvest in the end, whereas in the modern agricultural units in the basin upstream the workers feel alienated from the work process. This transition has been summarized in the following model (Fig. 4.8 and 4.9). Transformation of local circumstances gave rise to severe tensions and conflicts which were almost unprecedented between the upstream and downstream societies in the traditional paradigm. In 2017, the basin downstream struggled even for drinking water, and they fastened their hope on the fair management of water resources in the upstream. At present, a pipeline coming from Basiran in the basin upstream supplies water to the domestic sector in the basin downstream in Abarkooh. Four

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Fig. 4.8  Transition from a systematic interaction to a competitive confrontation in terms of exploitation of the shared aquifer in the context of climatic, social and political changes

Fig. 4.9  Qanat of Cheshmeh Chahak which dried up as a result of over-exploitation of the shared aquifer

tube wells with the total discharge of 120 liters per second are pumping water into a 60 km long pipeline which transfers water from the basin upstream to downstream only for drinking and household purposes. Faraqeh was once regarded as upstream from Abarkooh and its springs and qanats used to supply water to Abarkooh farmlands, but today Faraqeh itself is looking to its own upstream in Fars province for their help. The water needed for drinking and sanitation in Faraqeh is coming from Fars province, though its intermittent cutting off during summers has outraged the

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Fig. 4.10  Qanat of Jafar Abad came back to life in the wake of a temporary ban on groundwater pumping

people of Faraqeh. In 2017, the farmers of Abarkooh believed that Yazd Regional Water Authority cracking down on illegal extraction of groundwater cannot solve the problem of water scarcity in the basin downstream without cooperation of Fars Regional Water Authority in the upstream. Some farmers contended that the measures taken by Yazd Regional Water Authority could mitigate the water crisis but are not adequate. For example, Yazd Regional Water Authority had the tube wells switched off in Abarkooh for one month during January 2017 in order to give a rest to their aquifer, and the result was satisfactory. Putting a ban on extraction of groundwater only for 30 days resulted in an increase in the water table to the extent that some old qanats which had long been abandoned began flowing. For example, water appeared once again in the tunnel of Jafar Abad qanat which had dried up a long time ago. This qanat was still running with a discharge of 30 liters per second when I visited the village in April 2017 (Fig. 4.10). The result of this program could engender a positive social atmosphere and a promising influence on the public opinion. At present many of the farmers have taken the initiative in prolonging their irrigation cycle and switching off their water pumps every night in order to reduce the pressure on the groundwater reserves. In Abarkooh basin, many of the farmers interviewed by me called for Yazd Regional Water Authority to step up their managerial measures. For example, they suggested shutting down all the pumped wells 12 h a day all the year round or 15 days a month during winters. Such a social consensus on placing more restrictions on over-­ exploitation of groundwater is a precious asset of which the water governance can take advantage. It seems that the province of Fars did not take such supervisory policies as seriously as did the province of Yazd in the basin downstream, because the expected results were assumed to benefit the basin downstream in Yazd province rather than the upstream in Fars province. Nevertheless something like the aforementioned supervisory measure was taken once during a winter in the region of Abadeh. In fact the director of Abadeh Power Company decided to turn off the

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electricity line going to the pumped wells 4 h a day during winter. That measure yielded fruitful results soon in the downstream in Faraqeh, since the water level at their wells started coming up. The director of Abadeh Power Company was from Faraqeh, and it caused some people to believe that the director proceeded to curb over-exploitation of groundwater due to his own personal interests as someone responsible for electricity not water at all; otherwise the managerial structure of Fars Regional Water Authority was unfit to do so systematically. The farmers of Abarkooh believe that kinship and family relations are given more priority than laws and regulations, when it comes to water management organization in the basin upstream in Abadeh and Eqlid, Fars province. Social influence of technocrat landlords prevents Fars Regional Water Authority from prosecuting them for illegal exploitation of groundwater which has widened the gap between the basin upstream and downstream. Ahmad Karam Nejad’s letter to Fars Regional Water Authority reflects the depth of the farmers’ predicament in Faraqeh due to over-exploitation of groundwater in the basin upstream in Fars province. Literal translation of his letter into English is as follows: “In the name of God Addressed to Fars Regional Water Authority To whom it may concern I would appreciate your efforts and favors, and no one doubts about your merit for the position bestowed on you. Law and Koran are entrusted to you, and your management is decisive and your insight ensures the accomplishment of the important duty assigned to you. Hereby I would like to take this opportunity to draw your kind attention to the fact that Faraqeh now belongs to the district of Abarkooh, province of Yazd but it borders the province of Fars located only a few kilometers from Surmaq in your province. Though we are all Iranian and live under the honorable flag of Islam, water resources in Faraqeh are under very influence of the weather conditions in the north of Fars province. Now that the problem of drought and water scarcity is pervasive all over the country, it seems necessary to come up with a solution to stop more drawdown in our groundwater resources and save the agricultural sector from annihilation. The nature turned its back on our qanats and they all dried up in Faraqeh, so we resorted to drilling some 80 tube wells which created employment for 5000 people in agriculture such as production of apricot, pomegranate, grape, plum and vegetables, which has been our ancestral profession. Dear sir; our aquifer in Faraqeh is being replenished in the mountains of Abadeh and Eqlid, and east of Eqlid in Surmaq, Chel Zari and Chalian over-exploitation of groundwater and its squandering are wreaking havoc on our tube wells and as a result on our agriculture. The wells of Chel Zari are pumping up over 50 liters per second each, and if they do not observe the right of their neighbors, all the downstream regions would be reduced to rubble and all these people would be displaced in the end. Therefore, we urgently request you to dispatch your experts to those regions in order to investigate such lavish over-pumping of groundwater which is taking place in the basin upstream in the regions of Surmaq, Chel Zari and Chalian, and then give a comprehensive report to you. We hope that their report would prompt your organization to take necessary measures to put an end to such an extravagance. It should be noted that Yazd Regional Water Authority has encouraged the farmers to enhance the efficiency of their irrigation by shifting to the new methods. Such programs can help to stop squandering our shared groundwater by those wells which are working illegally at all. I hope that our region no longer lingers in the water crisis, and I am sure that your understanding never dashes our hope. I wish you a world of honor, and I always remain grateful for your invaluable support. Best regards, Haj Ahmad Karam Nejad, representative of the farmers of Faraqeh Cc: Minister of Energy, Governor of Abarkooh district, Yazd Regional Water Authority”

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The following conceptual model shows a nexus of different factors which affected the recent changes in the upstream – downstream relationship regarding utilization of their shared groundwater resource (Figs. 4.11 and 4.12).

Fig. 4.11  territorial tension over shared aquifer in Abarkooh basin, caused by systematic impacts of natural and human factors

Fig. 4.12  Squandering water in the basin upstream (Chel Zari) by transferring water through earthen ditches with high percolation

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4.7  Conclusion This chapter examined the relationship between the basin upstream and downstream in terms of their shared aquifer from historical and geographical points of view. The basin upstream pertains to the town of Abarkooh in Yazd province and its related residential centers, and the basin downstream includes the towns of Abadeh and Eqlid in Fars province along with their satellite villages. From about 300 to 50 years ago, the basin upstream and downstream used to live in harmony and in a systematic balance which can be called a period of livelihood differentiation. Livelihood differentiation is referred to as the settling of various livelihoods in different geographies, which best match the economic capacities and ecological requirements of each. Abarkooh basin exemplifies livelihood differentiation which can be regarded as a kind of adaptation strategy to the climatic and environmental conditions. Nomadic livelihood based on animal husbandry settled in the basin upstream, whereas agricultural livelihood occupied the basin downstream and flourished there. Thus the vital resources (water and soil) were fairly divided among them, and their different niches and needs ruled out the possibility of conflict between them over the region limited resources. Nomadic livelihood was deeply dependent on pastures and handicrafts, whereas agricultural livelihood relied on water and soil. Therefore, the water could be released toward the downstream where arable soil was abundant and a lucrative agriculture was possible. In return, their agricultural surplus could satisfy the need of people in the basin upstream for such products. Also, the basin downstream could profit from the dairy products and handicrafts produced in the upstream. Agriculture in the fertile soil found in the basin downstream was quite rational, and animal husbandry and producing handicrafts in the upstream made economic sense. However, over the past five decades, a nexus of complicated human and natural factors unbalanced the systematic interactions between the basin upstream and downstream and pushed them into a longstanding competition over the limited water resources, which brought about nothing but over-exploitation of groundwater and escalating water crisis. In the Abarkooh basin, the groundwater depletion has resulted in an extensive land subsidence which is marked by 33 sinkholes across the plain. What we can learn from those complicated causal processes is that planning for a particular region without identifying different social and environmental possibilities across the region can result in a managerial catastrophe. In this case, there is no point in developing agriculture in the basin upstream where its unfavorable conditions necessitate spending a great deal of time and money on soil improvement and climate control. It was better to make the most of the favorable conditions in the basin downstream to develop agriculture there, but it was recommendable for the upstream to foster other economic activities which could establish a systematic relationship with the downstream economy like before and did not use up the limited water resources and appropriate even the share of the downstream lands. The traditional paradigm in the basin holds this lesson for us that the economies in the upstream and downstream should be complementary, like different pieces of

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a jigsaw puzzle which can fit together to show the beautiful picture of sustainability. For example, in the upstream instead of cancerous growth of apricot orchards which are insatiably sucking up the shared aquifer, food processing industries could have been established and developed, because these industries would have been d­ ependent on the downstream agricultural products as the last ring of a complementary production chain. Moreover such industries would not have consumed a considerable amount of water, and most of the shared water could have been released for the downstream cultivated lands which could have provided those industries with their needed raw materials. These all can happen in the paradigm of sustainable development where systematic ecological interactions, environmental ethics and social justice go hand in hand. By investigating water cooperation in Abarkooh basin, we can conclude that development as an absolute phenomenon and out of the ecological and social contexts bears no value. In every natural system from a tiny cell to a huge ecosystem, development can ensure the system sustainability on condition that the four following vital processes would remain in balance: 1 . Material and energy input into the system 2. Material and energy output from the system 3. Organic relationship between the system components 4. Organic relationship between the system as a whole and its outside environment If a system keeps growing beyond its physical intrinsic limitations to the extent that the above mentioned processes cannot function properly, the demise of the system would be inevitable, because the size of system grows out of proportion to its possible inputs and outputs, and the extraordinary size leads to a disconnection between the system components and also impedes the organic relationship between the system and its surroundings. Human societies are socio-economic systems whose disproportional development can hamper the aforesaid vital processes, leading to their collapse. Human history is awash with many stories about the famous civilizations whose disproportional development dragged them into annihilation (Diamond 2005). Such great civilizations as the Anasazi that once ruled over a vast area in central and northern America lost their organic relationship with their natural environments due to their runaway development which eventually burst into their collapse. Overgrowth of agricultural activities and uncontrolled logging of forests resulted in the irreversible ecological changes which eroded their required vital resources. Many of the great ancient civilizations like the Nile, Inca and Maya fell victim to the disproportional development. Of course Abarkooh basin is not exempted from the same destiny if their sustainable development would not get back on track. The rapid development of agriculture in the basin upstream and downstream both without taking into account their ecological capacities would aggravate the water crisis and bring their economic systems to the brink of annihilation. The following conceptual model can shed light on the traditional paradigm and the lesson it still holds for us to configure sustainable development in the region (Fig. 4.13).

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Fig. 4.13  Model of sustainable management of the shared aquifer premised on the indigenous mechanism

In closing, I do not want to claim that the Abarkooh model can be extrapolated to every region where the upstream is occupied by nomads and the downstream is populated by agrarian sedentary societies, but it is not deniable that a similar model may be found in other regions even on a much larger scale to some extent. As an instance, when we follow the famous rivers Euphrates and Tigris up to their origin, we reach the Taurus Mountains in eastern Anatolia in Turkey where nomadism has long stood out as the prevailing life style. However, in the downstream the

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Mesopotamian civilizations have long been anchored in an agrarian economy based on irrigation. In the rivers upstream the mass influx of Turkish pastoralists from the end of the eleventh century onwards could drastically change the demographic composition of the region in favor of nomadism (De Planhol 1959: 525). However, later the Turkish nomads moved westward and tended to become more sedentary, creating a vacuum in eastern Anatolia, which was gradually filled by Kurdish pastoralists. The Ottoman Empire encouraged the Kurdish pastoralists to replace the Turkish nomads whose absence left their eastern frontiers defenseless against the Persian invasions (Ibid: 528). The nomadic population reached its peak from the late sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century, so that the pastoralists overwhelmingly outnumbered the sedentary people by more than four to one (Dede 2011: 41). However, the story changed when Ottoman administration embarked on the Tanzimat reforms in nineteenth century, according to which a sedentarization program was imposed on the nomadic societies in eastern Anatolia (Ibid: 26). From then on, sedentarization and accordingly agriculture were on the rise in the upstream, leading to an increasing demand for irrigation water. Turkey managed to build 22 dams on these rivers to keep pace with the growing demand for water in the upstream regions where agriculture had become the hub of the economy. The downstream regions in Syria and Iraq were almost deprived of their historical shares of these two rivers, and their agrarian societies eventually succumbed to a set of complicated socio-economic problems mostly brought about by water scarcity. Probably the rise of extremism and longstanding political turmoil in the downstream countries (Syria and Iraq) have something to do with the sedentarization and massive agricultural development in the upstream over the past century at the cost of disintegration of traditional socio-economic structures in the downstream.

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Haji Zadeh Meymandi, M. (2013). Folklores of Abarkooh (in Persian). Yazd: Tik Publication. Homavi Baqdadi Yaqoot. (2004). Mo’jam al-Boldan (Persian translation), 1, Tehran: Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization. Ibn Balkhi. (1995). Fars Nameh (in Persian) (1st ed.). Shiraz: Persian Study Foundation. Khabbaznia, M. (2016, December). “History of administrative division in Iran and its application in National Census” (in Persian), Statistical Centre of Iran. Amar Journal, 21. Kheyr Andish, S. M. (2016). At the base of mountains: Historical and cultural geography of Eqlid (in Persian). Shiraz: Navid Shiraz Publication. Kiani, T., Ramesht, M. H., & Amjad, S. F. (2016, Summer). “An study on climate change induced environmental risks in Abarkooh Basin” (in Persian). Geography and Development Journal, 43, 19–34. Modares, Z., & Abarkoohi, S. A. (1998). Identification of Abarkooh and its history (in Persian). Isfahan: Isfahan University. Nader Poor, B. (2000). “A sociological glance at Qashqayi tribe, their past, present and future” (in Persian). National Studies Journal, 2–3. National Annual Water Statistics (in Persian). (2014). Ministry of Energy, Deputy of Water and Wastewater, National Water and Wastewater Planning Bureau. Pei, Q., & Zhang, D.  D. (2014). Long-term relationship between climate change and nomadic migration in historical China. Ecology and Society, 19(2), 68. Qazvini Zakaria bin Mohammad bin Mahmood. (1994). Relics of lands and news of people (in Persian) (1st ed.). Tehran: Amirkabir. Sharifi, A.  Pourmand, A.  Canuel, E.A.  Peterson, L.C.  Djamali, M.  Lahijani, H. and Naderi, M. (2013). A high-resolution record of climate variability from Neor Lake in NW Iran: Investigating the role of abrupt climate change on human civilization in West Asia. INQUA Quick LakeH workshop on rapidly changing large lakes and human response, Tehran, Iran. Shirvani, Z. a.-A. (1897). Bostan al-Siyaha (in Persian). Tehran: Sanayi Library Publication. Sholi, A., Vatan, F. J., & Avarideh, F. (2015). “Legal theories and regulations on water division in the framework of international transboundary water Laws and Treaties” (in Persian). Journal of Border Sciences and Technologies Faculty 6th year, No. 2, Summer 2015.

Chapter 5

Cooperation in Lieu of Water

Abstract  In the central plateau of Iran, the climatic and geographical conditions gave rise to the technology of qanat which underlay the production systems in this region. Qanat consists of some shaft wells interconnected by a subterranean tunnel which drains out the groundwater seepage and conveys it onto the earth surface using the height difference between the two ends of the tunnel. This chapter takes up the qanat of Hassan Abad and its special peculiarities which made it eligible to be nominated as UNESCO World Heritage in 2015. Hasan Abad Moshir originates from Ebrahim Abad valley near the town of Mehriz and travels 40 km to Yazd. The water of this qanat is shared out between the town of Mehriz, the village of Dehno and Yazd (district of Hasan Abad). One of the most important properties of this qanat is its territorial cooperation which is resulted from a lax territorial behavior caused by the qanat’s dynamics. Dormant territorial behavior can pave the way for a high sense of cooperation and social capital, which are all associated with the peculiarities of qanat. In the region the social foundation which has been formed and evolved around the water resources management could have increased the sense of cooperation.

5.1  Introduction Iran enjoys various climatic and geographical conditions which have led to different strategies that the inhabitants have taken to adapt themselves to their environments. The geographical conditions of central plateau of Iran favored the technology of qanat as the cornerstone of the production systems in this region. Qanat is a tunnel dug through a water saturated area underground in order to drain out the water seeping into the tunnel and transfer it to the cultivated lands using the height difference between the two ends of the tunnel. What propels water along a qanat tunnel is the force of gravity. In other words, a qanat is an underground drainage system which collects groundwater at a mountain base and brings it to the less elevated areas. A typical qanat enjoys two main sections: water production section which cuts through water saturated soil and gets the groundwater infiltration, and water transport section which serves to transfer this water down to the earth surface. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Labbaf Khaneiki, Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0_5

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In the past, central plateau of Iran had no water supply source but qanat to provide the agricultural and domestic sectors with water. Nowadays the urban sprawl and modern development have raised the level of water demand to the extent that the ancient qanats are not able to meet. Therefore many desert cities like Yazd have resorted to other alternatives such as tube wells and inter-basin water transfer in order to supply the required water. Over-exploitation of groundwater has caused a dramatic decline in the groundwater resources and brought many qanats to the brink of annihilation. Qanat is considered a sustainable groundwater extraction technique that can guarantee a rational coexistence with nature. This chapter examines the situation of Hasan Abad qanat in Yazd province, Iran, with an area of 74,645 square kilometers. City of Yazd with its unique adobe architecture is the province capital. Yazd province is located in the central plateau of Iran, whose elevation varies from 660 m above sea level in Rig Zarrin desert to 4055 m in Shirkooh Mountain. In this province, annual precipitation is reported to be 103 mm on average, which is 40 percent of the country average. An estimated the province annually receives some 7.8 billion cubic meters of water as rainfall, which makes up 2 percent of the country amount. Distribution of annual precipitation over a year is very uneven, as its 48 percent occurs during winter, 40 percent in spring, 10 percent in fall and only 2 percent in summer. Moreover, drastic fluctuation in annual precipitation is frequent, and sometimes the population has to go through several years of drought. These characteristics have had a discernible impact on social dynamic in the study area. Low precipitation, high temperature and evaporation have led to the lack of permanent surface streams in the province, except for two small rivers of Azam and Bavanat which originate in the elevations of neighboring Fars province and flow across the border into Yazd province. The total discharge of Azam river is estimated to be 19.25 million cubic meters a year and this estimate is 15.79 for the river of Bavanat, which both play a crucial role in replenishing the groundwater reserves in the plains of Herat and Marvast in Yazd province. Due to its climatic and geographic conditions, Yazd province is highly dependent on groundwater resources, and almost all the water demanded by domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors is supplied through groundwater. Apart from a few karst aquifers, most of the province aquifers have formed in the layers of sediment which are feeding 6670 water sources including tube wells, springs and qanats, with a total discharge of 1378.8 million cubic meters a year. Out of this total discharge, 94.44 percent goes to agriculture, 3.58 to domestic sector and 1.98 to industry. In ancient times, groundwater was obtained through natural springs which were later outnumbered by qanats in the wake of historical climate changes. Qanat was a sustainable technique to extract groundwater, since it could keep in balance the groundwater input and output. The advent of tube wells over the past decades made significant inroads into the traditional qanats, and some of them fell into decay due to over-pumping and groundwater depletion. Nowadays groundwater drawdown is estimated to be between 1 and 1.6 m a year in Yazd province. Nevertheless qanat still plays an important role in local economy and water supply systems in many parts of Yazd province.

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This chapter investigates the situation of groundwater resources shared by different territories along the qanat of Hasan Abad. Based on our past researches, the qanat of Hasan Abad in Yazd was chosen as our case study for this chapter. Qanat of Hasan Abad originates from Ebrahim Abad valley near the town of Mehriz and travels 40 km to the city of Yazd. This qanat enjoys 1330 shaft wells, and according to a measurement made in 2016 its discharge amounts to 130 liters per second. The shallowest well is 1.03 and the deepest well is 17.8 m deep. This qanat enjoys the most discharge and is also of highest quality compared to the other qanats in the region. Along the qanat from its mother well down, three areas respectively benefit from its current, and in fact the qanat passes across three territories (Labbaf Khaneiki and Semsar Yazdi 2015) (Figs. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3). There is a rich literature about the environmental, technical, cultural and historical values of qanat, but one cannot find many references on the role of qanat in territorial identities in its beneficiary societies. Territorial identity or behavior can impede the development of fruitful cooperative activities, but qanat could have built up a good capacity for cooperation and social convergence which can be used in configuring sustainable development. The structure of qanat which spans a large area of land may pass across several territories whose inhabitants have to pull together in order to maximize their profit from its water. The people in the know say that about 700  years ago, two righteous persons named Hassan and Hossein Shah managed to dig a qanat with 17 side branches at the base of “Shirkooh mountain”, but none of the branches ended up with a good discharge. So they vowed to donate one fifth of the water to people in need, just for the sake of god and as charity, provided the qanat brought a large quantity of water. Their wish eventually came true, and one of these branches called “Kooh Sorkhi” hit a fault with a big source of water resulting in a considerable discharge with no fluctuation over time. The water of this qanat is collected at three spots; the town of Mehriz, the village of Dehno and Yazd (district of Hasan Abad). Irrigation cycle varies in these places from 6  days in Mehriz to 8  days in Dehno and 15  days in Yazd, Hasan Abad. Irrigation cycle means a period of time over which the farmers take turn getting their water shares. This water is divided into 6240 shares in Dehno and 15,700 shares in Hasan Abad. The mother well has been sunk in Madvar (Mehriz). The qanat is fed by an alluvial aquifer which has been formed in the limestone formations of Taft. This qanat is divided into five portions at the Sadati division spot. One fifth is allocated to the Sadati neighborhood and the rest flows towards Yazd. After the water reaches the village of Dehno, it is divided again into two equal portions, one (two fifth of the whole) belongs to the shareholders in Dehno and the rest is conveyed to Hassan Abbad Moshir. In Dehno, The shareholders were fewer at first due to the inhabitants of the village but gradually the number of qanat owners grew to 700–800 individuals at present in the wake of the death of elderly and the division of their lands by heredity. One of the most important properties of Hassan Abad qanat is its territorial cooperation which has something to do with lax territorial behaviors in the region. Dormant territorial behavior can pave the way for a high

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Fig. 5.1  Position of Hasan Abad qanat in the maps of Yazd and Iran (Source: UNESCO-ICQHS)

sense of cooperation and social capital, which are all associated with the peculiarities of qanat (Fig. 5.4).

5.2  History of Hasan Abad Qanat As mentioned qanat of Hasan Abad comes from the town of Mehriz, somewhere near Gharbalbiz spring and then travels some 40 km to the city of Yazd. This qanat supplies water to Mehriz and the village of Dehno as well on its way before it ends

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Fig. 5.2  Direction of Hasan Abad qanat on google earth map (Source: Sara Kamalvand)

up in Hasan Abad on the outskirt of Yazd. Therefore from archaeological and historical points of view, Gharbalbiz region is of great importance as the starting point of this qanat. The archaeological site of Gharbalbiz is located 40 km south of Yazd and west of Mehriz, nestling on the hill of Mesqal close to Shirkooh mountain range. This region is called after the Gharbalbiz spring whose water comes out if some karstic cavities beneath the western hills, and then pours into a small lake. Gharbalbiz spring is one of the two natural springs in the province of Yazd, which paved the way for the human settlements to appear on this landscape thousands of years ago. Natural conditions and geographical capacities of this region have drawn human populations since ancient times, leading to the formation of a cultural unit in this part of Iran. In 2000 an archaeological excavation was carried out in a historical site south of Gharbalbiz and continued for 75  days. The excavation was mostly focused on the architectural vestiges, but some other spots like a cemetery were excavated as well in search of more evidences related to human habitation at ancient times. This excavation led to the discovery of the oldest architecture in the province of Yazd. The ancient building enjoys a trapezoidal plan covering an area of 2200 square meters, built of adobe on a stone foundation for more stability. In the face of many damages done to this structure either by natural erosion or by human factors, the archaeologists succeeded in identifying its last functions. The southern part of this structure which was probably its most important part consisted of two porches flanked by two parallel corridors, and a small room in the back surrounded by a thick wall whose outer surface was covered by stones. This structure dates back to Parthian dynasty, built for ritual purposes. Also 35 ancient graves were found in the vicinity of the aforesaid structure, scattered across an area of 200 square meters. The graves were lined with stones and the bodies were placed in there in fetal position while their faces were oriented toward east. The presence of potteries, stone containers and jewels in the graves suggests that the inhabitants believed in an afterlife (Esfandyari 2000). Ebrahim Kazem Najand contends that even prehistoric petroglyph has been found in Gharbalbiz region, which takes the history of human

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Fig. 5.3  Bounds of Hasan Abad qanat based on its water catchment (Source: UNESCO-ICQHS)

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Fig. 5.4  Sadati division structure which separates one fifth of the qanat water for Sadati quarter in Mehriz (Source: ICQHS archive)

habitation back to about 15 thousand years ago (Kazem Najand 2016). Therefore, humans used to live in this region long before the advent of qanat system. In fact the construction of Hasan Abad qanat was a consequence of climate change which shifted the inhabitants from surface water and natural springs to groundwater drained out by qanat system. Qanat came into existence as a collective response to the climate change in order to re-adapt themselves to their new environmental conditions. The region of Gharbalbiz went through the same climate change, and its inhabitants resorted to digging qanat after the surface water resources began shrinking. We do not know when exactly water was transferred from the region of Gharbalbiz to the villages Dehno and Hasan Abad through a qanat system. However, some historical records attribute the foundation of the village Dehno to someone named Nosrat al-Din Shah Yahya who lived between 1343 and 1393 AD (Abavaran Dasht Kavir 2014: 6), so we may deduce that the village dates back to 14th century, though the qanat can be younger than that. The village was not necessarily reliant on this qanat at the time, and it could be probable that the village once enjoyed some other water resources, but later this qanat became their main water supply in the wake of climate change. However, in case of Hasan Abad village it seems that the qanat is older than Hasan Abad itself, even though the qanat has been named after this village which is believed to be founded by someone named Moshir al-­Mamalek. The qanat of Hasan Abad once ran down to two other villages named Dowlat Abad

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and Kahno and irrigated the farmlands there even before Moshir managed to build Hasan Abad. Nevertheless we should take this story with a pinch of salt, because it is not understandable why the village is called Hasan Abad (prospered by Hasan) if it was founded by Moshir. We expect the village to be named after Moshir not Hasan. Perhaps we should look for someone else named Hasan to better understand the history of this village. In the history of Yazd someone named Mohammad Hasan Khan has been mentioned, who was appointed as governor of Yazd and Kerman by Neser al-Din Shah Qajar in 1849. He was very concerned about agriculture and industries and embarked on many developmental projects in his territory (Saadat Noori 1966: 38). He has been described in the history book Jame’ Jafari as follows: “Mohammad Hasan Khan has become the founder of many constructions and numerous qanats in Yazd and Abarkooh during his prosperous reign. As an instance, his Excellency had the qanat of Mehr Abad built in Abarkooh, and is now owned by Saadat’s heirs. Also in the region of Yazd he put a lot of efforts into building two qanats named Hasan Abad and Hossein Abad which were ranked among the great qanats of the region (Nayini 1974: 531). Some evidences suggest that in the past Hasan Abad was more of a farmland than a village and residential center. The maps prepared by the Iranian Geographical Organization in 1955 using the aerial photos of the region, show Hasan Abad just as an area of cultivated lands. However, on the same maps, Maryam Abad is depicted as a residential spot. It should be noted that the both persons Mohammad Hasan Khan and Moshir lived at the time of Qajar dynesty, whereas the author of the book Jame’ Jafari who touched upon Hasan Abad and its qanat was contemporary with Safavid dynasty. The book Jame’ Jafari was authored by Mohammad Mofid Mostufi between 1671 and 1679 about the history and geography of Yazd (Maserrat 1997: 607), where the qanat of Hasan Abad has been described as follows: “this qanat originates from the lands of Mong Abad near Mehriz and runs down to the farmlands of Dehook Sofla” (Mofid 2006: 871). Therefore the construction of this qanat seemingly dates back to even centuries before Moshir. It was also likely that there were several qanats in region with the same name, and in the historical records every Hasan Abad does not necessarily refer to our Hasan Abad qanat. In the past the region of Yazd teemed with different qanats some of which were later abandoned and sank into oblivion. This region was fully reliant on qanats for supplying water, as Hafiz Abroo a 14th century geographer says that “Yazd gets water only from qanats” (Hafiz Abroo 1996: 110). Therefore it does not seem unlikely that the large numbers of qanats in the region, some of which might have similar names, makes it difficult for us to distinguish between the qanat of Hasan Abad and other qanats with the same name.

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5.3  W  ater Division and Management System of Hasan Abad Qanat The village of Hasan Abad has the same share of the qanat as does the village of Dehno. In other words, one fifth of the qanat water belongs to Sadati quarter in the town of Mehriz, and then the rest of water is divided among the villages of Dehno and Hasan Abad equally. It is quite likely that in the past more villages other than Dehno and Hasan Abad were entitled to the water of this qanat. According to the elderly locals in Hasan Abad, until 1931 the village of Dehno which was called Fath Abad at the time enjoyed no share of the qanat of Hasan Abad, but Dehno used to be irrigated by another qanat named Hasan Ali that gradually dried up. At that time, only the farmlands of Hasan Abad, Maryam Abad, Yaqoobi, Mal Amir, Gonbad Sabz and Sadr Abad received the water of this qanat. Local farmers used a traditional unit named Joob for measuring the volume of water, according to which Hasan Abad had a share of 3 Joob and each Joob was equal to 60 Qafiz. The traditional unit of Qafiz was commonly used to measure smaller flows of water, because a Qafiz equals 0.9 liters per second. For example when they measure the discharge of a qanat to be 10 Qafiz, it means that the water flow is about 9 liters per second. Qafiz is actually a unit of mass which is defined as 36 kilos, but it is also used for measuring water flow, because when they say that a flow is 10 Qafiz, it in fact means that the flow can irrigate an area of land which can be sowed with 10 Qafiz of wheat that amounts to 360 kilos (Labbaf Khaneiki 2006). Therefore a Joob equals 60 Qafiz or 54 liters per second. Though Hasan Abad was entitled to 3 Joob, its own farmlands received only 1 Joob and the rest was distributed to the farmlands of Maryam Abad, Yaqoobi, Mal Amir, Gonbaz Sabz and Sadr Abad. According to the locals, Moshir made some modifications to the water division system of this qanat. He was appointed to Yazd treasury by Nase al-Din Shah from Qajar dynasty and then played an important role in construction of many qanats and farmlands in Yazd (Kazemeyni 2003: 1415). At him time, many farmlands around the city of Yazd was exposed to drastic changes and accordingly lost their agricultural value to a large extent, so Moshir decided to divert their water share to the village of Fath Abad which was later called Dehno. Thus, it was agreed that the water coming down from Sadati quarter would be divided in half out of which a half for Dehno and a half for Hasan Abad and Maryam Abad farmlands. This qanat was probably owned and managed by the landlords in the past, and the peasants had the right to irrigate with this water and cultivate the lands and then get a share of the harvest in the end. The locals in the know say that the qanat once totally belonged to Moshir, but something happened between him and the wealthy merchants of Yazd, which put the peasants in possession of the qanat as a result. According to them, Moshir was always nice and easygoing with the peasants and treated them very well, though he was obliged to levy a tax on the farmers, part of which was supposed to be paid to the central government. Nevertheless he did not want to put pressure on the farmers. That was why his payment to the central government became overdue and outraged them. One day Moshir was in the village of Molla Bashi to oversee his farmlands, when a farmer

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came barefoot all the way from Yazd to Molla Bashi running and panting to let Moshir know that the government agents have arrived to arrest him. Moshir was arrested on a charge of tax evasion, before he could make a move to hole up somewhere. The affluent people like Ehramian, Rasoolian, Khan Bahador and Herati came together to figure out how to rescue Moshir. Eventually they decided to settle Moshir’s debt by sharing his responsibility, and later Moshir divided the ownership of Hasan Abad qanat among them in return for their favor. Thus the ownership system of this qanat took on a new situation. What the locals say about the Moshir’s predicament bears a striking resemblance with a famous story recorded by the historians. Ziqam al-Dowleh the then ruler of Yazd ordered Moshir’s detention, and his agents took Moshir to the Khan garden on a charge of tax evasion and fined him 12,000 Tomans equivalent to 39,000 pound sterling at the time (Ibid). The Khan garden also belonged to Moshir, but after that incident the government agents wreaked so much havoc on the garden that Moshir desperately decided to cede it to the farmers forever (Afshar 1995: 431). Therefore, the qanat was shared out between the persons Ehramian, Rasoolian, Khan Bahador, Herati, Rohni and Nazemian as well as such affluent Zoroastrians as Arbab Khoda Rahm Din Yar and Ms. Hormozd Yaran who were entitled to one day of the qanat irrigation cycle, and Arbab Parviz Varjavand whose share was later sold out to the farmers of Hossein Abad. The water of this qanat is divided among the shareholders based on time calculation. It is worth noting that in Iran water division units fall into three categories: area units, volume units and eventually time units. Area unit pertains to water division based on the area of land to be irrigated, according to which each farmer’s water share is proportional to the amount of their land. This type of water division unit is mostly found in the regions abounding with water. Area unit correlates with other factors like soil condition, cropping pattern and local conventions. For example a particular area of land may get a certain amount of water, but the same area of land in another region may receive more water. Such an increase can be associated with the soil condition which varies from region to region, creating different water demands. Volume units pertain to the amount of water belonging to a farmland regardless of its area. Such units calculate how much water goes to a farmland over a certain time. For example, “Sang” is a common traditional unit, which is referred to as a volume of water that flows through a frame with an area of 0.020 square meters in every second. Volume units are used to divide a stream between two or several regions at the same time. For example in case of Hasan Abad qanat, its water is diverted into three different channels each of which goes to a different area in order to simultaneously distribute its water among Sadati quarter and the villages Dehno and Hasan Abad. However, time units are more suitable when a group of farmers want to take turn using the same flow of water. Time units just refer to the duration of irrigation regardless of the water volume and land area. Time units vary from region to region with the amount of water and the other local conditions. This unit is more common where water is in shorter supply and accordingly of higher economic value. In most qanats, water is divided by time unit which varies from qanat to qanat with the qanat

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discharge and soil conditions. Therefore one can find a huge variety of time units with different durations across the country (Labbaf Khaneiki 2006). In terms of Hasan Abad qanat, the time unit is locally called Jorreh which equals 11 min. This time unit is reminiscent of the old days when the farmers used a clepsydra to calculate the irrigation time. Their clepsydra consisted of a small copper bowl with a tiny hole at the bottom, floating on the water surface in a bigger bowl. Water started entering the smaller bowl through its hole until it was filled up and sank into the water. In case of Hasan Abad qanat, it took the small bowl some 11 min to sink into the water, which was called a Jorreh. Though the traditional clepsydra has long been replaced by modern watches, the same time unit with the same name is still commonplace but calculated by modern devices. The water share of Hasan Abad village is divided into 1950 Jorreh which are given out to the farmers over a 7.5 day irrigation cycle, though the irrigation cycle is officially 15 days according to their ownership documents. In other words, each famer should get their water share –no matter how many Jorreh they have – once every 15 days as stipulated in their ownership documents, whereas in practice they can irrigate on a half irrigation cycle or once every 7.5 days. The different between the nominal and actual irrigation cycles is not unprecedented in the other regions of Iran, and has something to do with some climatic and economic changes and even social transition. In all the transactions, the irrigation cycle is mentioned to be once every 15 days, whereas the water shares are delivered in reality once every 7.5 days. I believe that this difference is associated with climate change and a shift in their cropping pattern. A considerable fall in the amount of precipitation and accordingly a decrease in the qanat discharge on one hand, and a dramatic increase in water demand in the wake of adopting a new cropping pattern on the other hand, made the 15  day irrigation cycle inefficient. The 15 day cycle was made redundant, though it lived on nominally in the ownership documents. Urban sprawl and development of modern roads and transportation tempted the farmers into turning to fruit tree plantation in Hasan Abad and Maryam Abad. The modern urban society was a lucrative market for fresh fruits, and the motorized vehicles made it possible for them to get their products to the market timely. Development of orchards raised the demand for water to a large extent, because such crops as wheat and barley can easily resist longer irrigation cycles, but fruit trees are susceptible to the stress caused by a 15 day irrigation cycle. Therefore, the official irrigation cycle was split in half and the farmers adopted a 7.5 irrigation cycle instead of 15. Over the new irrigation cycle, each farmer had to get only half of their water shares. For example if someone has a share of 20 Jorreh, he or she is allowed to get only 10 Jorreh over a 7.5 day irrigation cycle. Thus every 15 days the shareholders can get exactly what they are really entitled to, though the irrigation cycle is split in half. Even this small change in the irrigation cycle of Hasan Abad qanat shows a systematic ecological relationship between those people and their environment, where they could re-adapt themselves to their changing surroundings by adjusting their water management system (Fig. 5.5). As shown in the above model, one of the most outstanding peculiarities of Hasan Abad qanat is a systematic balance between the qanat water management and the social and environmental variations, a balance that can be regained even after some

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Fig. 5.5  Systematic relationships between the qanat irrigation cycle and the changing environmental and social factors

changes in those variations due to the resilient technical and economic structures of this qanat. This ability is the key to success for the resilient systems over the course of their evolution. There are four main social and environmental factors including qanat discharge, cropping pattern, consumption pattern and town-village relationship which are all interconnected in a systematic nexus. Needless to say social and environmental factors are always subject to different changes over time, and a resilient system can keep pace with its changing environment by changing its components and/or the relationship between them to better regain the balance with its surroundings. Otherwise the system is doomed to death. As for the qanat of Hasan Abad, some managerial changes were systematically made in order to re-adapt the system to the changing environment. This story holds a very precious lesson for our modern systems which stay firm and inflexible rather than malleable and adaptable to the changing conditions. Our modern systems are designed to put irrational pressure on their environment in order to bring it into line with their requirements rather than adjust themselves to the changing conditions. That is why many of our modern systems remain far away from sustainability, and eventually the accumulation of environmental backlashes would befall them. In Hasan Abad, a very efficient and precise water management system has come about and evolved into present day. Every 12 h of irrigation is called a Taq, so every day is made up of two Taq. Therefore, an entire irrigation cycle consists of 15 Taq

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or the same 7.5 days during which 1950 Jorreh (water shares) are distributed among the shareholders. In Iran some qanats are managed by a particular person named Mirab who is also responsible for the whole water division, but in case of Hasan Abad there are eight persons each of who is in charge of water division on a day, though the last one oversees just half a day. These persons have been elected by the other shareholders from among themselves. The trustworthy persons who own a big water share are more likely to be chosen as the day water chief. The water chief on the first day is called Sar Band which means someone who gets water first, and the other days are called by numbers like Dovom Band which means someone who gets water on second day. After the seventh day there remains another 12 h called Kel Band which is traditionally managed by Zoroastrians. Until the late 1980s the irrigation cycle was managed by a council of water chiefs including 6 persons as follows: Ali Haj Safar for the first and second days both, Hossein Haji Mohammad for the third day, Akbar Haji Mohammad for the fourth day, Abbas Salimian for the fifth and seventh days, Hasan Salim for the sixth day and eventually Mahyar Mali for the last Taq or the last 12 h. Out of those water chiefs, Abbas Salimian was still alive when I interviewed him in May 2017. The people selected as water chiefs can get 2 Jorreh of water as their salary for dividing each 24 h of the irrigation cycle. 2 Jorreh equals 22 min of irrigation which is valid only over the same cycle, and it is up to the chiefs to either use these 2 Jorreh for their own farmlands or sell them to someone else. The 2 Jorreh were distributed equally among all the water shares by deducting only about 5 seconds from each Jorreh (11 min). At present other people have replaced the past water chiefs, though the water management system works almost the same as before. The present water chiefs are Kazem Hasan Abadi for the first day, Ali Shakeri for the second day, Mohammad Haji Akbar for the third day, Alireza Rezayi for the fourth day, Reza Hasan Abadi for the fifth day, Haj Abbas Sa’daniyeh for the sixth day, Najaf Salimian for the seventh day and eventually Shah Jahan Mali for the last 12 h. Each water chief carefully oversees the water division among the shareholders to ensure that everyone receives their water shares and no one is left out in the cold. I could glean the names of all qanat shareholders through several interviews as listed in the following tables. It should be noted that Hasan Abad was not much affected by the land reform program enforced in the early 1960s. After Moshir turned over the qanat of Hasan Abad to the Yazd nobles, they gradually sold their water shares out to the farmers except for a few nobles who decided to keep their shares for a longer while (Table 5.1–5.8). In the village of Dehno, the qanat was not formerly owned by so many shareholders, though their number increased to some 800 over time through heredity and division of each water share among the heirs of the deceased shareholders. Though this village was not subject to the land reform program in the early 1960s due to the system of petty land ownership which prevailed over the region, some 67,000 square meters of land was re-distributed among the farmers according to the records of the then land reform bureau. In Dehno, irrigation cycle comes around once every 8 day, and each day is divided into two parts. Each part is called a Taq which lasts 12 h,

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Table 5.1  List of water shareholders on the first day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Haj Kazem Hasan Abadi No. Name 1 Khodadad & Daryoosh Najmi 2 Khoda rahm Sabzeh 3 Abbas Tajdidi 4 Mohammad Esmaeel Mehrabi 5 Mohammad Ali Qolam 6 Abbas Ali Nik Akhtar 7 Hassan Shakeri 8 Hossein haji Sha’ban 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Water share (Jorreh) 16

No. Name 16 Hossein Jafari

16 2.5 16

17 18 19

Fereydoon Najmi’s heirs Safar Rahman Mohammad Tajdidi

6

20

Mahmood Rahmani

6

21 22 23

8 3 3.5

24 25

Ali Dehnoyi Hasan Tajdidi Qolamreza haji Mohammad haji Reza Hasan Jafar Mohammad Naghash

8 16

26 27 28

Nik Akhtar Morteza Rahman Mohsen Ali

10 6 7

13 16 0.25

Akbar Hossein Javad 7 3.5 Abdol Hossein haji Reza Ali Hossein Reza 12 Jamshid Manoochehr 16 Yadollah Hossein Jafar 8 Abbas Ali haji Safar 8 Mohammad haji Reza 3.5

Sum

Water share (Jorreh) 7 16 6 19.75

260

Table 5.2  List of water shareholders on the second day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Ali Shakeri No. Name 1 Hossein Mohammad aba Hossein 2 Jalal Shayegh 3 Seyyed Kazem 4 Jalil Sha’r Bafian 5 Khodadad Najmi 6 Abdol Hossein Shayegh 7 Mohammad Ali Salimian 8 Mashallah Hamami 9 Hossein Momen 10 Akbar Ghani zadeh 11 Abbas Saberi 12 Khosro Shesh Baradaran

Water share (Jorreh) 10 4 16 20 8 5.5 8 8 8 8 16 16

No. Name 13 Ahmad Mohammad Hossein Hashem 14 Rostam Vafadar 15 Hasan Ramezan 16 Mohammad haji Nadali 17 Haji Mohammad Hossein 18 Reza Ahmad Momen 19 Haji Akbar 20 21 22 23

Safar Rahman Mohammad Rahman Shahr Lor Zargar Ali Shakeri Sum

Water share (Jorreh) 16 16 16 8 16 8 2.5 16 16 6 12 260

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Table 5.3  List of water shareholders on the third day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Haji Akbar No. Name 1 Mohammad khaki 2 Ghasem Motevasselian

Water share (Jorreh) 20 11

3 4

2.5 22

No. Name 13 Hasan Jafar’s son 14 Hossein Ramezan Abbas Sharifi 15 Ali Sharifi 16 Sohrab Mali

16

17

8

18

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Mohammad Ali Gholam Mohammad Hossein Zargar Seyyed Ali Asghar Shakeri Haji Gholam Abbas

Mehraban Khodabakhsh 2.5 Yahya Hossein haji 12 Mohammad Hossein Akbar Lor 4 Ebrahim Hasan Abadi 21 haji Sadegh Hossein Hasan Abadi haji 21 Sadegh 6 Hossein Mahmood Shayegh

19 20 21 22 23

Water share (Jorreh) 8 4 4 8

Akbar Hossein haji Safar Rahmatollah Hasan Abadi Ali Tafti Akbar Hossein Gholam

16

Abdol Hossein Shayegh Haji Akbar Gholam Reza Unknown

14 8

Sum

16 7 7

22 260

Table 5.4  List of water shareholders on the fourth day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Alireza Rezayi No. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Water share (Jorreh) 5.5 8 8 5.5 8 8

No. 14 15 16 17 18 19

Name Alireza Rezayi Seyyed Parsayian Safar Rahman Yahya Rahman Rostam Khanjari Sheykh Tehrani

8

20

Hossein haji Safar

8

21

Mohammad Hossein Ghasem Reza Abbas Najaf Hossein Ghasem Rahman Mashallah khaki Beman Ali Sarbaz Sum

8

Name Akbar Jafari Alireza Choopani Haji Asghar Rahman Amrollah Rahman Sadegh Rahman Gholam Reza Shayegh Sheykh Abbas & Alireza Sa’daniyeh Fariborz Atashband

9 10

Abbas Rahimnejad Ali Rahimnejad

8 8

22 23

11 12 13

Reza Ahmad Orfi Habib Bagherzadeh Mohammad haji Hossein Ali

8 8 8

24 25

7

Water share (Jorreh) 8 32 7 16 16 8 16 8 16 26 4 4 260

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Table 5.5  List of water shareholders on the fifth day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Reza Hasan Abadi No. Name 1 Akbar Jafari 2 Abbas & Alireza Sa’daniyeh 3 Hossein Ali Najaf 4 Bahram Esfandiar 5 Khoda Rahm Esfandiar 6 Khalil Hasan Abadi 7 Abbas Najaf 8 Ali Asiaban 9 Hasan Gholam Reza 10 Fariborz Najmi 11 Ahmad Zarandian 12 Malek Ardeshir 13 14 15

Water share (Jorreh) 7 20

Water share No. Name (Jorreh) 16 Yadollah Ramezan 8 17 Mohammad haji Reza 4

5 8 8 7 14 24 8 8 4 8

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Mohammad Tajdidi 9.8 Manoochehr Khodayar 18 Mohammad haji Nadali 5

28

Koochak Ali Beman Hasan Abadi Hasan Najaf Sadegh Ramezan Reza Mohammad Jalal Parsayian Reza Nadali Abbas Kashki Hossein Goorabian Gholam Hossein Shayegh Unknown Sum

10 10 13 5 8 4 5 13.8 8 8 9.4 260

Table 5.6  List of water shareholders on the sixth day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Haji Abbas Sa’daniyeh No. Name 1 Gholam Reza haji Sha’ban 2 Hossein Abbas 3 Kazem Salimian 4 Hooshang sandal 5 Fereydoon Bahram 6 Haji Sajedi 7 Keykhosro Soroosh 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Water share (Jorreh) 4 8 8 8 8 21.4 16

Fereydoon Ardeshir 21.4 Bahram Mehr Foolad Bonshahi 7 Mehrab Atashband 14.4 Hossein Hasan Ghasem 8 Manoochehr Khodayar 8 Mehr Beman Mohammad Bondar Abadi

8 16

No. Name 15 Ramezan Mohammad Zahra 16 Khodadad Pabandeh 17 Mahmood Rahmani 18 Ali Dehnoyi 19 Borzoo Namdar 20 Akbar Ghorbani 21 Gholam Hossein Sa’bani 22 Mohammad Ghaolam 23 24 25 26

Ahmad Sha’ban Ahmad Dehghan Zargar Zadeh Seyyed Mehdi Ehramian Sum

Water share (Jorreh) 4 8 16 14 8 8 4 4 4 4 21.8 8

260

5.3 Water Division and Management System of Hasan Abad Qanat

149

Table 5.7  List of water shareholders on the seventh day of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Najaf Abbas Najaf (Salimian) No. Name 1 Haji Heydar 2 Rahim Nejad

Water share (Jorreh) 24 8

3

Akbar Kooshki

10

4 5 6

Mohammad Salimian 8 Abbas Mondegar 8 Hossein Gholam 8 Mohammad Hossein Hasan Reza 10

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Gholam Reza Hasan Ali Reza Entezari Mohammad Javad Entezari Ali Hossein Lor Habib Mondegar Mohammad Ali Hossein Akbar Mohammad Najaf

No. Name 15 Hossein Hasan Reza 16 Mohammad Ali Akbar Ghasem 17 Hossein Mohammad Hossein Ghasem 18 Shahr Lor Zargarzadeh 19 Hasan Ramezan 20 Akbar Rahimnejad 21

8

22

Hossein Mohammad Zarandian Akbar Mohammadi

8 3

23 24

Mohammad Esmaeel Ali Momen

6 10 3

25 26 27

Ali Sadegh Mohammad Najaf Ali Beman’s son

3.5

Sum

Water share (Jorreh) 3.5 6.5 16 32.5 8 14 12

8 8

8

3 12 11 260

Table 5.8  List of water shareholders on the last 12 h of the irrigation cycle Water chief: Shah Jahan Mali No. 1 2 3

Name Mahyar Bahram Khodadad Shahr Lor Mohammad Golestani

4 5 6

Reza Nik Akhtar Mohammad Golkar Mohammad Akbar Shayegh

Water share (Jorreh) 32 16 10 8 8 8

No. 7 8 9 10 11 12

Name Mashallah Entezari Mohammad Motlagh Mohammad poor Hamami Ali Zare’ Hossein Zarandian Zargar Zadeh Sum

Water share (Jorreh) 8 8 8 8 5 3 130

and every 12 h is managed by a separate water chief, so every day has two water chiefs except for the third day which is entirely handled by a chief named Reza Rafiyi. The names of the other chiefs appear on the following table. The water chiefs were expected to look after the qanat water division as carefully as possible, and they used to work a 12 h shift until the Taq was over. In the past, it was a com-

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Table 5.9  Water chiefs of Dehno and their distribution across an 8 day irrigation cycle No. 1

Day (24 h) First

2

Second

3

Third

4

Fourth

5

Fifth

6

Sixth

7

Seventh

8

Eighth

Taq (12 h) First Second First Second First Second First Second First Second First Second First Second First Second

Name of water chief Mohammad Dehghan Hasan Dehghan Amir Dehghan Hossein Dehghan Reza Rafiyi Reza Rafiyi Karim Dehghan Mohammad Ali Dehghan Fazlollah Dehghan Abdolhossein Dehghan Abbas Ali Zare’ Hossein Ali Dehghan Hasan Dehghan Mahmood Dehghan Taqi Rafiyi Ahmad Rafiyi

petitive position to become a water chief, but nowadays this job has fallen out of favor because of a dramatic decline in the agricultural income in the village. The water chiefs were once revered by the society because of the important issue they were responsible for, but nowadays even their social position is on the wane. Like Hasan Abad, in the village of Dehno, the water chiefs do not receive their wage in cash, but they can take an 11 min share (one Jorreh) for themselves out of a 12 h period (Taq). Their duty is not only limited to water division, but they also have to collect financial contributions from the shareholders for the purpose of qanat maintenance and repair. The extensive structure of qanat entails a regular maintenance imposing an annual expense which should be shared by all the shareholders. Their contributions are proportional to the amount of their shares. A water chief has to calculate how much each shareholder is supposed to pay while being mindful of their water shares, and then pool the money and spend it on the qanat maintenance or rehabilitation (Table 5.9). According to the oral history of Dehno, the qanat of Hasan Abad was built by someone named Molla Abdol Hossein some 700 years ago. He allocated one fifth of the qanat water to Sadati quarter in the town of Mehriz, whose residents were believed to be descendants of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam. The people of Dehno called Fath Abad at the time were entitled to four fifth of this water which irrigated their farmlands. About 175 years ago, the then ruler of Yazd urged the villagers of Dehno to pay their overdue tax, but they refused again, and in retaliation the ruler diverted the water flow from the village. The water diversion wreaked havoc on their cultivation, and they managed to find a solution before their farmlands fully disappeared from the landscape. They referred to Moshir who was one of the most influential men in the region to confide their problem to him and ask for

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151

help. Moshir suggested settling their debt and bringing the water back to the village in return for having haft the water. The villagers accepted the deal and Moshir built a new tunnel from Dehno to Hasan Abad in order to get haft the water and convey it to Hasan Abad farmlands. The locals believe that the water was formerly transferred to somewhere near Dowlat Abad Garden through the tunnel of another qanat named Kasnaviyeh, before the new tunnel between Dehno and Hasan Abad was accomplished. From that time on, half of the qanat belonged to the village of Dehno and the rest went to Hasan Abad farmlands. This story contradicts what the elderly farmers of Hasan Abad say about the history of Hasan Abad qanat and its water management. Quite the opposite, the people of Hasan Abad contend that the village of Dehno had no share of this qanat at all since 1931, but this village was irrigated by another qanat named Hasan Ali which gradually fell into decay. According to them, after one fifth of this water was diverted to Sadati quarter, the rest flowed down to the region of Hasan Abad, one third of which went to Hasan Abad farmlands and two third irrigated the lands of Maryam Abad, Yaqoobi, Mal Amir, Gonbad Sabz and Sadr Abad. At the time of Moshir, many of the lands on the outskirt of Yazd lost their agricultural quality and the land use began to change. Therefore it did not make economic sense to bring such water to that area, and Moshir decided to turn the water over to such arable areas as Dehno. Thus the qanat water was divided in half, of which a half went to Dehno and a half belonged to Hasan Abad and Maryam Abad. The difference between the two versions of the same story reflects a subtle competition that is brewing behind the ongoing cooperation and convergence. Each village tries to prove that they are more authentic when it comes to the history of Hasan Abad qanat. This competition has something to do with the environmental changes and social transition which have taken place in the region over the past decades. Nevertheless this qanat still stands out as a perfect example of territorial water cooperation in central Iran, which is associated to their closely intertwined interests which prevent them from slipping into any conflict or actual competition over their shared water. In Sadati quarter in the town of Mehriz, the ownership of qanat water is less complicated, because since the beginning of this qanat, one fifth of its water was bestowed on the descendants of Prophet Muhammad, who were represented by someone named Mir Ezzo al-Din Hossein. He was responsible for this water, and his responsibility has been handed down to his next generations up to present time. The people of Mehriz signed a petition in 1869 to testify that one fifth of this water belongs to the residents of Sadati quarter and it is at their discretion to do whatever they wish with this water. That is why one fifth of this water is called Sadati water in the region. This water is used for irrigating their farmlands and its surplus is rented out to whomever in need of more water. Given that Sadati water was owned by the petty land owners, it was spared from the land reform program in the early 1960s. All the people even those who were not descended from Prophet Muhammad were allowed to use this water for drinking and sanitation, unless they proceeded to utilize this water for irrigation. In case of irrigation, people were obliged to get permission from the owners and pay its price. In Sadati quarter, there is no water chief to oversee the water division. Small numbers of water shareholders

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and their close personal connection have ruled out the need for appointing a water chief. They call their irrigation method “Dam Korti” which literally means i­ rrigating one’s land whenever water reaches his or her land. In other words, relatively small area of cultivation and abundance of water made it possible for the Sadati farmers to divert the water to their own lands and irrigate their crops at will, without any risk of conflict or tension over water. This is another example of the impact of ideology on landscape. Their water share has always been more than their irrigational need, so the other people could take advantage of the permanent water flow along the ditches for household purposes. Nowadays the network of tap water is a boon to those people and they no longer need the leftover of Sadati water, though the expanding cultivation has already swallowed the whole water.

5.4  Land and Water Ownership One of the most important issues is the water ownership laws and regulations which lay a groundwork for territorial water cooperation. Water ownership laws and regulations can optimize the utilization of qanat and ensure its sustainability over time. Water is divided only among those who officially have a share of qanat, and here share means one’s right to use the qanat water for a particular time. Therefore, the qanat water is in fact rationed based on an irrigation cycle called Madar which determines everyone’s turn to irrigate. Water ownership is understandable only in relation to land ownership, because in this respect we can discern two types of relations throughout the country; land dependent water ownership (LDWO) and land separated water ownership (LSWO). LDWO is applicable to the rivers and natural springs, where water share is inseparable from the land irrigated with the same water, and water ownership independent from land is considered invalid. As for LDWO, water is transacted coupled with the relevant area of land, and the water management system is not as complicated as that of the regions with LSWO (Janebollahi 1990: 57). LDWO is widespread in the central plateau of Iran mostly in terms of the qanats with petty owners. The qanat water is divided into different time-based shares each of which belongs to a shareholder regardless of the area of his or her land. Sometimes a person possesses a considerable share of qanat water without having land at all. LDWO has made it possible for the outsiders to come to the village and purchase some shares of the qanat without having a farmland supposed to be irrigated by the qanat. In case of Hasan Abad qanat, some of the shareholders do not live in the region at all, and their own profession has nothing to do with irrigation and agriculture. In the past, the qanat used to play the same role as does stock market today. Many people even those not involved in agriculture were willing to invest in this market in the hope of a price rise following a good precipitation which raises the economic value of qanat water. A water share or a Jorreh means 11 min irrigation, regardless of the water volume. However, in a qanat, water flow is not constant but correlates with the amount of rainfall each year. In other words, the more precipitation, the more discharge the qanat enjoys and the more

5.4 Land and Water Ownership

153

water each shareholder gains within the time of their water share, though their time for irrigation is the same as before. Thus, with the same water share, they can cultivate a larger area of land, resulting in higher revenue. Some of the shareholders live in the city and they rent out their water shares to the farmers in the village. In the qanats with petty owners like the qanat of Hasan Abad, water division system counts even on minutes and seconds, and the water chiefs economize on every drop of water. That is why water management has evolved into a very intricate system which is run by the water chiefs. A. K. S. Lambton reports that water ownership never goes hand in hand with land ownership in the whole region of Yazd except for the villages Najaf Abad, Mehdi Abad, Sadr Abad and Jalal Abad (Lambton 1983: 397). It is worth noting that the ownerships of water and land were inseparable in Hasan Abad too until 1981, thus at the time it was almost impossible to buy or sell a water share independently from its related farmland or orchard. But a rapid social transition affected the ownership system in the village and brought about a new water ownership which could take place separately from land ownership. In the past, every Jorreh (11 min irrigation) entailed having a land with the area of 550 square meters. In other words, every Jorreh was considered for the irrigation of an area of 550 square meters, and any transaction of water spontaneously included a certain area of land one third of which was orchard and the rest was agriculture. However after the 1979 revolution, “Ab-e Rokh” was a new term which made its way into the irrigation vocabulary in the region. Ab-e Rokh literally means “water of face” metaphorically referred to as reputation that was absolutely unsalable in Iranian culture. The water bought and sold separately from land was called Ab-e Rokh which had a negative connotation. One interpretation is that the villagers likened this kind of water to one’s reputation whose sale would bring disgrace on the seller, because it was taken as a giveaway that the seller intends to abandon his or her farmland and quit agriculture as his or her source of income, wealth and accordingly social reputation. Nevertheless, some other believe that the story of Ab-e Rokh has something to do with the prosecution of Baha’i people after being proclaimed as an illegal religion by the Islamic Republic in the wake of the 1979 revolution. In fact they were displaced and their properties including their farmlands were confiscated by the government and then were sold by auction. Amid this tension, their agriculture and orchards were left deserted and eventually fell into decay. Some of the farmers from the village Dehno bought those lands which contained a certain share of water as well. Though Dehno shared the qanat water with Hasan Abad downstream from their lands, it was impossible for the Dehno farmers to possess a land in Hasan Abad but utilize its related water share in Dehno. As mentioned, in Dehno there is a structure that bisects the qanat water, so that half the current goes to Dehno and half continues its way down to Hasan Abad. After that, in each village water is divided among the shareholders based on time not on volume. Therefore a water share in Hasan Abad is a time unit that cannot be translated into the total water share of Dehno which is measured by volume. On the other hand, the water of Dehno is distributed among its shareholders according to a certain irrigation cycle during which a fixed number of people take turns irrigating back to back, and no one can come and find a place there as a new shareholder from the downstream village.

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Fig. 5.6  Causal relationships between social factors leading to the separation of water from land in Hasan Abad

As a result, what the new owners of the Baha’i lands could do with their booty was to sell the water shares separately from the lands, and take advantage of the proximity of Hasan Abad to the growing city of Yazd and change the use of those lands. Thus, such lands were tuned into a residential area and many houses sprang up in the once green farmlands. The only possible customers for the separated water shares were the farmers of Hasan Abad, most of who were in fact reluctant to buy something that has been usurped by force according to them, for the fear of the original owners’ curse that might befall them. Therefore another interpretation is that the villagers likened this kind of water to one’s face which would lost if he or she dares to buy the confiscated properties which once belonged to their own neighbors, friends, or fellow farmers in Hasan Abad. Moreover, the urban sprawl that encroached on the vicinity of Hasan Abad aggravated the situation and encouraged more farmers to give up agriculture and turned their farms into houses, leading to more water shares detached from lands. Thus the new phenomenon of land dependent water ownership (LDWO) came into existence, which has remained to date. The summary of the aforesaid processes which led to the separation of water from land is shown in the following model (Fig. 5.6). As mentioned nowadays in Hasan Abad, water ownership is not only taken separately from land ownership, and the water shares are also out of proportion to the area of lands in many cases if we take a closer look. In other words, it is very likely that someone has more water than land or the other way around. This situation is also associated with the time-based water division and the traditional water management system. Anyway, LDWO brings about some consequences the most important of which is the failure of land integration policies and agricultural mechanization and also the rise of semi-capitalism in the rural regions. In the system of LDWO, water and land are considered two separate production factors which are not necessarily in balance. In fact, the values of water and land are not always on a par, and they fluctuate in different directions according to the changing conditions. That is why water and land do not enjoy the same value in the local market. As an instance,

5.4 Land and Water Ownership

155

during a drought the price of water exceeds the price of land and during a wet year does the opposite. Now if we want to convince some individuals to integrate their lands and cultivate together and then share the harvest based on the amount of land and water they have put into the production, the result would be very tricky. Because sometimes the people who own more water can claim for more share than the people with more land, and sometime the opposite may happen due to the changing circumstances. On the other hand, those who do not have enough water for their entire land, have to buy or even rent some shares of water. Thus some other people can profit from the agricultural system without being involved in it at all by renting out their water shares and gain from the actual farmers’ income in the end. Nowadays in Iran, independent ownership of water and qanat is recognized by the legal system. Nevertheless there are still two categories of qanat regarding their relationship with land ownership; the first category pertains to the qanats which are inseparable from the land ownership and cannot be transacted independently from their related land. The second category touches on the qanats whose ownership is not dependent on land and can be bought and sold regardless of their related land. The first category qanats are treated like the other properties and their ownership is documented at the same department, whereas the second category qanats are dealt with as unique properties for which a specialized department named Qanat Notary Public is responsible. According to the Executive Law of Properties Registration, article 126, such qanats should be registered at the Qanat Notary Public, delineating the location of its mother well, its exit point and any easements. The article 23 stipulates that registration of an estate cannot deprive the owners of a qanat running across the same estate of their legal right. The owners of a qanat who have an easement within someone’s estate can apply for a legal document to ensure their right according to the article 112 of the same law (Ab Avaran Dasht-e Kavir 2013). The ownership of Hasan Abad qanat is in line with the same laws and regulations. In the ownership documents of this qanat, the following specifications have been recorded: “qanat of Hasan Abad originates from Mehriz township, and then its three side branches join together and form a tunnel which runs across the barren land of Abbas Abad. Afterwards a water stream that comes from the mountains joins the qanat gallery as usual and the qanat continues its way across the orchards of the quarter number 34 in Mehriz into the dividing structure called Taqar Sadati, where one fifth of the water is taken and diverted to Sadati quarter. Therefore one fifth of the qanat water is not relevant to this ownership document. Four fifth of the water flows down to the another dividing structure which equally distributes the water between the two villages Dehno and Hasan Abad, after passing across other orchards in Davazdah Imam quarter and then intersecting another qanat named Mohammad Abad whose mother well is sunk east of Baqdad Abad mountain. The qanat water is split in half of which a half goes to Dehno and the other flows down toward Hasan Abad, and the both shares are registered with two different reference numbers”. Many of the traditional laws regarding qanat water have emanated from religious beliefs that help us better understand the indigenous water management systems. Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence abounds with divine laws about water ownership, which once carried a considerable socio-economic function. As an instance, Imam

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Sadigh and Imam Mousa bin-Jafar allowed transaction of qanat water shares either in cash or in kind (Faruqui, Biswas, 2001: 105). Such laws can easily be found in Fiqh, which have played a crucial role in the formation of our recent legislation in terms of water. Persian Constitutional Revolution which took place between 1905 and 1911 was a sharp turn in the history of legislation in Iran, and had a great impact on the laws related to water ownership. According to the Iranian constitutional law, ownership is considered sacred, and its article 45 stipulates that all the natural water bodies including seas, rivers and groundwater all belong to public and should be managed and overseen by the government (Ghorbani 1990: 15). The Iranian laws have clearly touched upon the qanat water division and ownership which stands out as an important issue in the socio-economic life of Iranians. For example, in 1930 a law entitled Qanat Law was ratified in order to encourage people to build and develop qanat systems (Ibid: 196). According to this law article 1, it is permissible to occupy the land on the ground surface between the two shaft wells of a qanat on condition that no harm would be done to the structure of the qanat running underneath (Abavaran Dasht Kavir 2014). Later in 1942 another law was passed, which gave free rein to the government to take a tighter control of irrigation and water division including the qanats used by petty owners. This law paved the way for establishing an irrigation foundation under supervision of the ministry of agriculture (Lambton 1983: 405). Before the nationalization of water resources, water was legally recognized as an alienable possession which could be granted to individuals within the framework of the then existing laws and regulations. The civil law used the term “permissible waters”, which was subject to ownership within the limitations that the same law set out. According to this law article 160, construction of a qanat in an unclaimed land necessarily brings to the constructor the right of ownership of the obtained water. Also, if someone digs a well or builds a qanat in his own land, the obtained water unconditionally belongs to him (Ghorbani 1990: 196). However, the law of water resources nationalization passed in 1968 overturned the previous law by regarding water as a public asset whose preservation and exploitation were put on the agenda of the ministry of water and power (Safayi 1969: 216–217). According the civil law the articles 23 and 25, any utilization of groundwater resources whether through tube well or qanat should be authorized and permitted by the ministry of water and power in every region of the country (Ibid: 218). Even some articles of the Iranian civil law explicitly mention qanats and their water ownership. For example, according to the article 138, the bound of qanat should be observed as far as 500 m from both sides of the qanat course in the soft and porous soils and 250 m in the hard soils. However, in case the aforesaid numbers turn out to be insufficient to protect the qanat against the possible damages within its vicinity, it is legally possible to expand the qanat bound to the required extent. Also the article 139 pertains to the qanat bound, stipulating that qanat bound belongs to the qanat owner(s), and within this vicinity any conduct that violates the essential purpose and the soul of delineating a bound for qanat is forbidden, especially no one is allowed to dig a well or build a qanat in the bound of other wells or qanats, but harmless activities with no impact on the qanat function are permissible. The article 595 of the civil law pertains to the qanat cleaning and the owners’ obligation to

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157

cooperate in maintaining their qanat. According to this article, if a qanat needs to be cleaned out or repaired but one of the qanat owners refuses to take part in the rehabilitation project, the other owners can sue him/her for not contributing to the qanat repairing cost. As a result, the court is allowed to force the violator to pay his/her share, due to the nature of such asset that cannot be taken separately. Eventually Water Fair Distribution Law was passed at the Iranian parliament in 7 March 1983, whose Chap. 2 totally pertains to groundwater issues (Water Fair Distribution Law 1983). It is very normal for the qanats to pass across several territories or properties. Given that qanats are extended groundwater systems, their proper functions entail regular maintenance. Therefore if the owner of a land across which the qanat runs denies access to the qanat wells, the qanat owner can no longer climbed down the wells to clean out or repair that part of the tunnel, and it means a great damage to the integrity of their qanat. According to law, the qanat owners are entitled to easement within other estates. In other words, the qanat owners have the legal right to enter someone else’s estate to use the qanat access wells, where their qanat gallery passes, though this right is just limited to the qanat-related works. The civil law article 93 defines easement as a limited right that someone can have on someone else’s land, and then adds that in terms of qanat, the holder of easement is allowed to enter any land across where the qanat runs just for the purpose of repairing and cleaning. The article 104 goes farther by saying that easement is not only limited to repairing and cleaning but it is also applicable to utilization. If someone is entitled to a qanat and his/her ownership is recognized, he/she should have access to the qanat water logically, even though he/she have to pass across someone else’s land in order to reach the water. In this case, entering someone else’s land is not considered trespassing, but it falls within the definition of easement. The article 105 stipulates that easement is not always free of charge, but the easement holder should undertake any expenses related to his/her utilization on someone else’s land. According to the civil law article 100, in case a qanat gallery collapses and even damages the structures on the surface, while running across a land, the land owner cannot force the qanat owners to fix the qanat when the qanat owners themselves are not willing to do so. However according to law, the qanats running across the residential areas like towns and villages are also allowed to be cleaned and repaired even through their wells sunk inside the houses or pathways, but the silt and debris lifted out from inside the qanat should be removed and hauled away immediately.

5.5  R  ole of Qanat Management Organization in Transboundary Cooperation What makes the qanat of Hasan Abad stands out is its crucial role in establishing a sustainable cooperation between three beneficiary territories along its course; Mehriz, Dehno and Hasan Abad. This territorial cooperation which is mostly

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anchored in the management of Hasan Abad qanat could have amassed a valuable social capacity for sustainable development in the region. Territorial cooperation is fed by a waning territorial identity, which has been studied along the course of Hasan Abad qanat. Territorial identity and behavior can impede the development of cooperative activities, which necessarily involves different territories. However, this qanat carries a good potential for cooperation even between the beneficiary territories, which can be regarded as an important groundwork for sustainable development in the region. My field studies show that the structural peculiarities of Hasan Abad qanat have contributed to the accumulation of social capital which can in turn pave the way for more cooperation between the different territories. In fact a special social organization has emanated from the technical conditions of qanat and then evolved into its present status. This social organization gave rise to a stronger sense of cooperation which later protruded from the water issue and penetrated the other realms of social life. Needless to say that one of the most important results of social capital is cooperation which in turn facilitates the tenor of the sustainable development. Qanat of Hasan Abad needs a regular maintenance to keep running, which is provided by the three beneficiary territories whose benefits are tied up with the integrity of this qanat. This situation encourages more cooperation across the territorial borders, which eventually leads to a waning territorial identity. In other words, the aforementioned circumstances blur the territorial boundaries to some extent, which in turn facilitate more cooperation and interaction between the territories, and this cycle continues. In the region of Yazd, the qanat of Hasan Abad is ranked as a qanat with the most water discharge, and its water is of high quality. This qanat is like a thread running through three places, knitting their interests together. These places are all located along the qanat course, utilizing the same water source. This qanat is an extended water supply system whose maintenance requires a great deal of human resource like labor, time and money. Qanat has evolved over the past centuries like a living organism to better adapt to the environmental conditions. The escalating aridity made the qanat grow longer and longer in order to keep pace with the receding groundwater. In the region, it is not difficult to find such qanats which are tens of kilometers long, and no doubt they were not built over night, but they were extended meter by meter over the past centuries in order to remain in harmony with the available groundwater reserves. However, evolution is a blind process and has nothing to do with perfection, though it bestows on the organisms more abilities to better come to terms with the environmental changes. This notion is applicable to the qanat of Hasan Abad as well. Because the remarkable length and several side branches of the qanat made it possible to drain out groundwater from a wider range and a more reliable source, but its extent has a downside which is more vulnerability to a variety of environmental hazards. This situation is reminiscent of the giant reptiles during Jurassic period, whose stunning size helped them have better access to the bigger sources of food but a meteorite collision changed the environment to the detriment of such giant creatures. The giant size of this qanat is also subject to many threats that overwhelm its owners always bending over backwards to protect the qanat. The

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qanat cuts through many types of geological formation with different physical and chemical characteristic each of which has a different impact on the qanat structure. The owners have to deal with these problems, for example by cleaning out the tunnel once in a while lest the tunnel is clogged. Also, qanat runs beneath the cultivated lands and residential areas which pose many physical and chemical threats to the integrity of qanat. Thus, the qanat maintenance cannot be afforded just by an individual and it demands a great deal of cooperation from the beneficiaries. As mentioned, the qanat of Hasan Abad supplies water to three territories lying on the qanat course one after another from upstream to downstream. The qanat originates from a mountain base one kilometer northwest of Gharbalbiz spring and then flows down to the village of Dehno after irrigating the farmlands of Sadati quarter in the town of Mehriz. After Dehno, the qanat stretches down to the village of Hasan Abad west of Yazd city and today on its outskirt. Thus qanat water appears on the earth surface first in Sadati quarter where one fifth of the water is deducted from the current and the rest pours down into another subterranean tunnel and continues its way toward the next place the village of Dehno. In the village of Dehno, the water is divided in half, of which a half goes to the Dehno farmlands, and the rest keeps flowing down to the village of Hasan Abad through another subterranean tunnel. In fact these tunnels are interconnected and integrated and any dysfunction in any point of the tunnels can affect the whole system. A 40 kilometer tunnel system from the qanat mother well down to its last exit point in Hasan Abad requires an annual maintenance, given that any collapse and obstruction can put the benefits of the three territories in jeopardy no matter where it happens. An obstruction in the tunnel system can lead to the accumulation of water and eventually more collapse, which drastically hampers the proper function of the whole system. That is why the qanat caused the three territories to pull together, the territories which are all dependent on the same water resources. Apart from the physical maintenance, this qanat should always be guarded and overseen all the way from Mehriz down to Hasan Abad to make sure that water is not polluted or is not diverted from its own course whether intentionally or unintentionally. Such an inspection is carried out from the last exit point in the village of Hasan Abad up to the qanat mother well in the Mehriz territory, and the both villages of Hasan Abad and Dehno participate as well. Their participation is not limited just to the parts of qanat running within their own territories, but they maintain a close watch over the tunnel as a whole no matter where it is. Therefore, the qanat dynamics come to blur the territorial boundaries and accordingly dim the territorial identity, and as a result convergence and cooperation across the borders would be facilitated. The qanat of Hasan Abad always required a periodic maintenance and rehabilitation and passes across three territories all benefiting from the proper function of the qanat by establishing a cooperative management system which transcends the territorial borders and defies the territorial identity. In other words, in such circumstances the territorial boundaries become more uncertain, which in turn promote more cooperation between the neighboring territories, and again more cooperation between the territories gives rise to more uncertainty when it comes to territorial boundaries. Therefore, the most outstanding value of Hasan Abad qanat is the territorial cooperation which is rooted in a systematic

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Fig. 5.7  Maqsam built across the qanat flow to divide the water volume equally between the villages Dehno and Hasan Abad (Source: UNESCO-ICQHS)

r­elationship between the geographical conditions, the structure of qanat and the social fabric of the region. Water division of Hasan Abad qanat is managed through an effective system based on cooperation and social convergence. After one fifth of the qanat flow is diverted to Sadati quarter, the remaining fourth fifth is divided equally between the two villages Dehno and Hasan Abad at a special place locally called Maqsam. Maqsam means the place of division and is a special structure built across the water flow in order to divide it by volume (Fig. 5.7). As mentioned, the water of Hasan Abad qanat is divided by time, and in the region the unit of time is called Jorreh which equals 11 min. The whole water share of this qanat amounts to 1950 Jorreh which are distributed over a 7.5 irrigation cycle among the shareholders, though the actual irrigation cycle is 15 days. An irrigation cycle is a period of time during which the shareholders take turns irrigating their lands one after another according to the number of their Jorreh. Environmental changes and social transition caused the farmers to shorten their irrigation cycle, so that each shareholder takes half of his/her water share during the cycle. In some qanats, there is someone known as Mirab or literally water king who is responsible for the whole water division and qanat management, but in case of Hasan Abad qanat each day of the irrigation cycle is managed by a separate person or a water chief. A water chief was decided and appointed by all the shareholders on the same particular day of the irrigation cycle, and he can be ousted and replaced by

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someone else if things do not go well with him. The water chief can get a salary from the shareholders in return for his service in the form of extra water share. A water chief can gain 22 min irrigation as his wage for overseeing the water division every 24 h. This 22 min is shared out among the shareholders all equally. Therefore, the water division system of this qanat is very democratic in its nature, and it does not let the water chiefs amass a considerable authority or social influence. The water is shared out fairly among everyone regardless of their religion, and the followers of three different religions Islam, Zoroastrianism and Baha’i were equally entitled to the qanat water, and they used to live in perfect harmony and irrigate side by side over the past decades, albeit the Baha’i farmers were frowned upon after the 1979 revolution. In the village of Dehno, the mechanism of water division is similar to that of Hasan Abad, but they are different in the number of their shareholders, duration of irrigation cycle and the number of their water chiefs. In Dehno, the number of shareholders was once less than what we see today, but the water shares were repeatedly inherited and owned by more and more heirs over time, so that today the number of shareholders exceeds 700. The 8 day irrigation cycle is run by 15 water chiefs each of who is in charge of a half day (12 h), except for the third day that is entirely managed by one person. A water chief’s duty is not limited to water division, but he is supposed to collect the shareholders’ contribution for the regular maintenance of qanat. This money is called Nafaqeh which in fact means a regular allowance that a husband is expected to pay his wife according to tradition and religion. I think the word Nafaqeh is a remnant of an ancient ritual according to which a village woman married a qanat, and the qanat as her husband was supposed to pay the allowance. However, no one would be surprised if a qanat cannot do so, and the other villagers come together and make the payment instead. When the water of a qanat dwindled, they managed to find a widow in the village to marry her off to the qanat in the hope that the qanat becomes excited and brings more water (Semsar Yazdi and Labbaf Khaneiki 2017: 3). In most cases this ritual worked not because of its supernatural power, but because of the money collected from the qanat owners in the name of the bride’s allowance and then put into the rehabilitation of qanat. As mentioned, Sadati quarter in the town of Mehriz is traditionally entitled to one fifth of the qanat water. This water has been endowed to the prophet’s descendants who are called Seyyed and are revered by the local community. Seyyed persons are allowed to use this water free of charge for whatever purposes they wish, but the other people should pay its price if they want to irrigate with it. However, everyone has access to this water for drinking and sanitation free of charge. In Sadati quarter, the water shareholders are not so many that they need a water chief to look after their water division. Seyyed persons can divert the water to their farms and irrigate at will. This type of irrigation is called Dam Korti which is a wonderful boon to any farmer in such an arid region. Seyyed persons were exempted from paying for the qanat rehabilitation or taking part in the qanat maintenance. The reason why they are exempted from contributing to the qanat maintenance has something to do with their geological position which gave them an upper hand. They are located in the qanat watershed where the qanat is fed by the groundwater reserve

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and then appears first in their territory. They take one fifth of the water and let the rest pour down into another tunnel and flow down to the downstream lands. Therefore the downstream beneficiaries are expected to do something in return for the upstream people’s favor, who tolerated such an extensive water system in their territory and let most of the water go. Nevertheless the ancestry of Seyyed community which is seemingly traced back to the prophet of Islam is venerated by the local people, and probably contributes to their exemption from participating in the qanat maintenance. In the past, the farmers used to take part in the qanat rehabilitation in person by joining the working team and laboring in the qanat. Each shareholder had to labor in the qanat in turn, teaming up with the other workers to clean the tunnel or repair the damaged parts. The more water share one owned, the more he had to labor in the qanat. Nevertheless the elderly or disabled people or the high ranking men could hire someone else and pay him to work in the qanat on their behalf. Over the last decades more and more people tended to pay for the qanat maintenance rather than climb down the qanat and toil there, so that today the qanat workers are all hired and paid by the qanat shareholders. Almost every year two teams of workers handle the qanat maintenance by cleaning the tunnel out from Hasan Abad to Mehriz. Their wage is shared out among the qanat shareholders and the water chiefs in Hasan Abad and Dehno are responsible for collecting the money. The cleaning of qanat from Hasan Abad to Dehno is undertaken by the farmers of Hasan Abad and its cost is totally covered by them, whereas the cleaning from Dehno to Mehriz is carried out and financed jointly and equally by the farmers of Hasan Abad and Dehno both. The cleaning project is always ongoing in the qanat and even the crumbling parts of the gallery are shored up with proper lining if their available budget suffices. In the past, government had no role in the qanat maintenance, and the qanat affairs were fully at the discretion of its owners. However, at present the government intervenes in the qanat maintenance by funding a part of qanat related projects and overseeing the workers’ progress. At present the qanat of Hasan Abad is being managed by a council made up of the qanat representatives. The qanat council is headed by someone named Hasan Khaki who has taken on all the duties of the traditional water chiefs plus a new job imposed on him by the modern developments. His new job is the protection of qanat against the urban sprawl by suing different trespassers at the court. The following is a literal translation of one of his complaints to the court as an example to show how the qanat is struggling to survive the greedy modern urban sprawl these days: In the name of God Subject: illegal construction in the vicinity of Hasan Abad qanat and the destruction of qanat by the Yazd Charitable Housing Association (Anjoman-e Khayyerin-e Maskan Saz Yazd) Complainant: the council of Hasan Abad qanat Defendant: Yazd Charitable Housing Association Attachments: a copy of the official ownership document of Hasan Abad qanat To whom it may concern I would like to inform you that Yazd Charitable Housing Association is in the process of implementing a 66 unit housing project in the legal vicinity of Hasan Abad qanat in the face

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of our repeated verbal warnings which have unfortunately fallen on deaf ears so far. I would like to draw your kind attention to the fact that according to the UNESCO guideline, the qanat bound should be considered to be fifteen meters from each side of the qanat axis. However, the aforementioned project trespassed on the qanat bound, so that five shaft wells have been buried and lost under the homes ever built. Those wells were indispensable parts of the qanat, without which it is no longer possible to access the qanat gallery for its regular cleaning and repair. Moreover, this project has proceeded to dig five septic wells only two meters away from the qanat axis, which means a terrible source of contamination for our qanat. Also, our qanat used to enjoy a bypass tunnel which was used as an emergency access way, but it was totally destroyed by the housing project. It should be noted that our qanat was registered as a UNESCO world heritage on 15 July 2016, and the destruction of such a precious relic is not only reprehensible at national level, but can damage the reputation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the international arena. The destruction of a world heritage heralds the weakness and failure of the government, which does not exhibit a proper image of the country. Therefore, please order the trespassers to retreat from the qanat vicinity, and compensate for the damages that they have ever done to the qanat structure, and block and shut down the septic wells dug close to the qanat tunnel, according to the civil law the articles 136 and 138 on observation of qanat bound, also according to Water Fair Distribution Law, the article 14 and the Islamic Punishment Law ratified in 1996 regarding destruction of others’ properties, in addition to the international laws and regulations. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration. Best regards, Head of qanat council and representative of the qanat of Hasan Abad (ICQHS 2016)

At present there is a bank account in the name of Hasan Abad qanat, to which all the contributions are remitted, and then the qanat council can spend this money on the maintenance projects carried out by the contractors. Nowadays the qanat owners can apply to the ministry of agriculture for a subsidy that covers some 70 percent of the estimated cost of the qanat maintenance. This subsidy gets the farmers more dependent on the government, and manipulates the traditional relationships between them and the upstream farmlands. The farmers’ traditional contribution to the qanat maintenance was one of the reasons could gain such a perfect balance between their territories and their shared water resource. I remember that a dispute broke out between the farmers of Hasan Abad and Dehno in 2016 over a sum of 3000 USD. Yazd Cultural Heritage Organization wanted to give this money to the qanat as a governmental fund for the qanat rehabilitation after it was put on UNESCO World Heritage List. They wondered who is more eligible to receive this money, the representative of Hasan Abad or Dehno. The two villages jockeyed to prove that they have always had a more pivotal role in the qanat maintenance, so they more deserve this money. Actually centuries of cooperation and coexistence were about to be sacrificed for only 3000 dollars. In the end, the international center on qanats and historic hydraulic structures intervened and settled the problem between them. The traditional financial relationship between the farmers inside and outside their territories could regulate their water demand and exploitation of their shared qanat. The most important intangible heritage of this qanat was its special peculiarities which have given rise to such a perfect cooperation between three different territories; Sadati quarter in Mehriz, Dehno and Hasan Abad. As mentioned, the qanat tunnel is always in need of regular maintenance and cleaning; otherwise the

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Fig. 5.8  Direction of cooperation from downstream to upstream in return for water coming from upstream to downstream

c­ rumbling soil can obstruct the tunnel over time and stops the water from flowing down. The qanat of Hasan Abad stretches over three territories, and its maintenance requires everyone’s consensus and cooperation. The main source of the qanat or its mother well is located in Mehriz, and its tunnel runs down to the village Dehno and then continues to the village Hasan Abad, while irrigating the farmlands in the three territories. Thus water flows down from upstream to downstream, while a current of cooperation moves from downstream to upstream, as shown in the following figure. This cooperation leads to a more uncertainty of territorial boundaries and a more ambiguity of territorial attachment, which can in turn pave the way for more cooperation and better coexistence between the three territories (Fig. 5.8). As mentioned, in the past the qanat of Hasan Abad was owned by a few landlords who did not live in the village and did not deal with the qanat directly and in person, but used to oversee their tenants and manage the qanat related issues through their foremen in the village. The landlords took care of the qanat, and the maintenance cost was totally paid by them. After the farmers took possession of the qanat water and the number of the qanat shareholders increased, the village headman stepped in to regulate their utilization of qanat and manage the agricultural activities. The village headman or Kadkhoda in Persian used to mediate between the farmers and the government as well, and he took on some duties that traditionally belonged to the landlords. At the time most of the qanat affairs were taken care of by the village headman. The last headman was named Abdol Hossein Aminian who was in charge until the enforcement of land reform law in 1961. The qanat management team including the water chiefs, qanat representative, field watchman and ditch watchman all worked under the headman’s supervision and command. The water chiefs were responsible for water division among the shareholders as well as water market and ownership. The qanat representative was in charge of qanat maintenance, assessing the physical situation of qanat, hiring the required workers and overseeing the whole project. The field watchman or Dashtban in Persian used to watch over the farmlands to ensure that water is not squandered or the crops are not vandalized or stolen, when the farmers themselves are away. The ditch watchman or Jooban in

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Persian used to walk along the qanat course all the way and look into its situation to find out about any problem in the qanat system and then let the representative know. After the land reform program, the village council took the place of headman and carried out his missions in a deliberative manner. The village council continued even after the 1979 revolution. The water chiefs are the most important members of the qanat management organization, who are responsible for water division among the shareholders. The water chief’s job turns water as a potential reason for conflict into grounds for cooperation and social convergence. The water chiefs also collect the maintenance cost from the qanat shareholders, proportional to the amount of their shares. This money is delivered to the qanat representative to be spent on the qanat maintenance or repair wherever needed according to the ditch watchman’s report. Two groups of workers are dispatched to two different points of qanat to clean and repair there simultaneously. The workers are supervised by the qanat representative who evaluates their work and pays their wages. A field watchman is busy patrolling the farmlands to protect them against the thieves and wild animals like boar, though this job has been abolished due to the recent social and economic changes. Someone named Haj Abbas Saberi was the last field watchman who lost his job to the urban sprawl and shrinking farmlands that no longer needed a guard like him. The ditch watchman always keeps track of the qanat from its beginning to its end in order to make sure that no one is stealthily tapping water and nowhere along the tunnels or ditches is giving way. However, it was free for everyone to use the qanat water only for drinking and household chores. The ditch watchman is expected to remove the minor obstructions along the gallery or qanat ditch if he comes across them while patrolling. If the obstruction is so big that he does not afford, he reports to the representative who can send his workers to repair the damage. Any obstruction should be removed as soon as possible, because the accumulation of water in the gallery can result in more collapse and more obstruction and eventually an extensive damage to the whole system. In May 2016, Mr. Hossein Dehghan was the ditch watchman who received a monthly salary of about 200 USD half of which was paid by the shareholders of Hasan Abad and the rest by the shareholders of Dehno. In the past, the ditch watchman was not paid in cash. For example, Hossein Dehghan’s father had the same job too, and he was granted tenure of a land in return for his service. This land with an area of about 40 thousand square meters is located in Mehriz, and the right of its cultivation was granted to Hossein Dehghan’s father as his wage. It is said that this land belongs to the qanat of Hasan Abad, as its financial backup devised by Moshir in order to cover the cost of qanat maintenance by renting out or even selling the land in case there was no other financial sources. The former ditch watchman was allowed to take a small portion of the qanat water to irrigate a part of the aforementioned land and cultivate there. At present the land is no longer cultivated and the ditch watchman’s wage is paid in cash (Fig. 5.9).

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Fig. 5.9  Management organization of Hasan Abad qanat before the 1961 land reform program

5.6  Operation and Economic Aspect of Hasan Abad Qanat The qanat cultivated area was once 1.5 times larger than what we see today due to a decline in the qanat discharge. As mentioned, in the village Hasan Abad the qanat irrigation cycle is in fact 15 days, but it has been split in half since their lands no longer resisted such a long cycle. Therefore, the farmers take their water shares once every 7.5 days instead of the former 15 days. In the village Dehno the irrigation cycle used to be 16 days, but it has become 8 days for the same reason. In Mehriz Sadati quarter there is not irrigation cycle at all, and their water is so enough that they do not need to ration it through an irrigation cycle. An irrigation cycle is devised for regulating the water utilization and optimizing the irrigation efficiency, and it varies with numerous factors such as the number of shareholders, cropping pattern, climatic and soil conditions, etc. For example, the more people share a qanat, the longer the irrigation cycle. Cultivation of the plants with shallow and surface roots vulnerable to aridity leads to a shorter irrigation cycle, because the long intervals between irrigations can harm the crop. The climatic and soil conditions also affect the duration of an irrigation cycle. The dry and warm climates and very porous soils with lower capacity for keeping water entail a shorter irrigation cycle in order to better keep the root area moist, whereas in a moderate climate and in case of softer soils with higher capacity for retaining water, the irrigation cycle tends to be longer. The most important concept in traditional water management and local water market is irrigation cycle, because first of all it determines when everyone can get their water shares and how many times each shareholder can irrigate over a cropping year. Therefore we should pay attention to the irrigation cycle which in fact serves as an agricultural calendar. We should keep in mind that irrigation cycle is not always fixed in a particular place but may vary over time in response to the changing environment, like what happened to the irrigation cycle in Hasan Abad

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and Dehno. The cropping pattern and pedological conditions usually have great impacts on the length of the irrigation cycle. Some of the farm and orchard crops are more resistant to longer intervals between irrigations, and if their cultivation would be prevailing in the region, the irrigation cycle naturally tend to become longer. The very permeable soils which barely retain water in their pores for long cause the irrigation cycle to become shorter, otherwise the harvest considerably declines. The American geographer Michael Bonine tried to find a correlation between the various irrigation cycles and FAO pedological studies on Yazd region. According to him, in the saline sediments northwest of Yazd and in Rostaq the irrigation cycles ranges from 12 to 16 days, whereas in Anar with a different soil condition the irrigation cycles vary from 8 to 12 days. In the lime Lithosols in Miyan Kooh, the irrigation cycles ranges from 12 to 14 days and in Bayazeh region the cycles increase to between 21 and 22  days. In the Sierozems (brownish gray soils) and also in the Regosols, the irrigation cycles are usually between 8 and 14 days (Bonine 1982). Flood irrigation is the most common method of irrigation in the villages Hasan Abad, Maryam Abad and Dehno, though in case of vegetable cultivation like cabbage, melon, tomato and okra another method named infiltrating irrigation is practiced, which consists in some parallel furrows on which the vegetables are cultivated so that the plants are not in direct contact with water but only their roots can suck up the water seeping into the soil. Nowadays greenhouse cultivation is on the rise, where modern methods like drip irrigation is carried out. In the orchards the same traditional flood irrigation is still commonplace. Though the main ditches have been lined with cement and the farmers are skillful enough to prepare their lands in a plaid pattern in order to optimize the irrigation, the efficiency of flood irrigation has been calculated to be only 45 percent. The efficiency of infiltrating irrigation is 60 percent, whereas in the greenhouses where drip irrigation is applied, the efficiency has been estimated to be some 80 percent (Abavaran Dasht Kavir 2014). The role of Hasan Abad qanat in the people’s economic life is of great importance, when it comes to its water management system. This qanat is not only viewed as a cultural heritage or a historical value, but it still plays a crucial role in the local economy. In May 2016, in Hasan Abad village every 11 min of irrigation which is called one Jorreh was priced at about 4000 USD, albeit along with its related land. It is worth noting that each Jorreh (11 min of irrigation) involves 550 square meters of land including farm and orchard which may be located in different spots. For example a 100 square meter farm may be located in a cultivation area, whereas another 100 is situated somewhere else and so on, out of the 550 square meter land. The more integrated the land, the more expensive. Nowadays the orchards of Hasan Abad are scattered across the following locations: Kooche Abshahi, Khiyaban Ab Anbar, Khiyaban Shahid Abad, Kooche Mohammad Ali Khani, Khooche Tang, and Kooche Poolok. Also, the farms all lie at eleven cultivation units named: Pay Milok, Chel Kileyi, Kaka Siyah, Pay Bid, Shahid Abad, Haftad Kileyi, Karim Khani, Gonbeh Esmayil, La Zar, Pesteh, and Sahra No. As mentioned, since early 1980s transaction of water separately from land has caught on in the region in the wake of a socio-economic transition. Therefore, in 2016 a Jorreh without land or every 11 minute of irrigation cost about 1800 USD, and the same share of water was rented

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just over one irrigation cycle at the price of 3.5 USD. As a result, it has become possible to buy a piece of land without water share too. In Hasan Abad, the farms and orchards which have been left without water are salable at the price of 54 USD for each square meter but for the purpose of housing. Now that the water discharge of the Hasan Abad qanat has dwindled in the village Hasan Abad, the farmers have had to resort to a tube well nearby, for which they pay 3.5 USD per hour. The tube well that is located in the middle of Modarres Boulevard belongs to someone named Salman Zadeh who is running a lucrative business by selling water to the thirsty farms. The water of the tube well flows down a 200 m long ditch toward the qanat of Hasan Abad, and then pours down a shaft well into the qanat and eventually appears at the qanat exit after traveling a distance of 1500 m in the qanat tunnel. Thus the tube well water mixes with the qanat water to supplement it. The qanat of Hasan Abad with the length of about 40 km long needs a constant cleaning and maintenance. In the past the annual maintenance cost was estimated by the qanat master to be shared out among the qanat owners as their contribution proportional to their water shares. Nevertheless most of the farmers preferred to labor in the qanat, rather than spending money. The people not healthy or young enough to work had to pay in cash. At present the ministry of agriculture has a special budget to subsidize the qanat maintenance projects. After the qanat owners apply to the ministry of agriculture for a fund, an expert form the ministry is dispatched to the village to look into the qanat situation and give an estimate on its maintenance cost of which 70 percent would be covered by the ministry and the rest would be by their own arrangement. The ministry oversees the whole project and releases the fund by installments according to the progress made by the workers. The qanat maintenance from Hasan Abad village to Dehno is carried out only by the farmers of Hasan Abad, but from Dehno to Sadati quarter is handled jointly by the farmers of Hasan Abad and Dehno, and from Sadati quarter to the qanat mother well is also handled by them both. The qanat shareholders in Sadati quarter have no role in the qanat maintenance for the reasons before mentioned. At present, the qanat maintenance project is conducted by the qanat contractors. The qanat council uses the modern bank system by opening a bank account to which all the contributions are remitted. The qanat council spends the same money on the qanat maintenance by making the checks out to the contractors (Table 5.10, Figs. 5.10 and 5.11).

Table 5.10  the total budget spent on the maintenance of different parts of Hasan Abad qanat between the years 2011 and 2014 (Abavaran Dasht Kavir 2014)

Area of project Dehno – Hasan Abad Dehno – Hasan Abad Dehno Hasan Abad

Year 2011 2013 2014 2014

Sum (USD) 43,000 16,000 8000 5000

Fig. 5.10  Agricultural zone of Hasan Abad qanat with an area of 613 hectares (Source: Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization)

Fig. 5.11  Walled gardens in Hasan Abad irrigated by the qanat

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5.7  Q  anat of Hasan Abad in the Context of Modernity; Positive and Negative Impacts When it comes to the impact of developmental projects, the negative consequences of modern projects and their impact on the qanat is bandied about. But in reality, there are a few projects whose results benefit the qanat system, like the artificial groundwater recharge dam built in Abbas Abad near Mehriz. This dam has been constructed in 1989 by the provincial government of Yazd in order to harvest the seasonal runoffs. The water trapped behind this dam percolates into the ground and replenishes the aquifer that feeds the qanat of Hasan Abad. The dam wall is 700 meters long and 5.5 m high, with a capacity of 100,000 cubic meters of water. The dam can harness a great deal of seasonal runoffs and make them gradually seep into the aquifer upslope from the qanat of Hasan Abad. The same water turns up in the qanat gallery and flows down throughout the year. In 2013 another project was carried out, which proved complementary to the artificial recharge dam of Abbas Abad. That project pertained to the construction of a pipe line from Gharbalbiz spring to the dam of Abbas Abad. Gharbalbiz is a karstic spring whose discharge becomes considerable during the rainy seasons, but its water flowed freely without being used before the aforementioned pipe line project. The pipe line prevented the Gharbalbiz water from being squandered by transferring the water to behind the Abbas Abad dam where the water could seep into the aquifer to the benefit of qanat (Iran Zamin 2013: 11). Nevertheless there are some developmental projects which affect the qanat in a negative way, and unfortunately such projects outnumber the positive ones. One of the most important is a railway which crosses the qanat line at a place named Hossein Abad Rismani. The constant vibration caused by the passing trains can do serious damages to the structure of qanat running underneath. Therefore this part of the qanat gallery should be shored up with concrete hoops a far as 20 meters from the railway track. In the same Hossein Abad Rismani, the railway company has built some constructions in the qanat bound, which can directly affect at least 100 meters of the qanat length. Another project which threatens the integrity of Hasan Abad qanat is the Mehr housing project which was initiated at a national level by the former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which attracted a widespread criticism from different points of view. Mehr housing project has been carried out in Akram Abad where 250 meters of the qanat length were swallowed by the constructions, and as a result five of its shaft wells disappeared from the landscape. The qanat needs to be cleaned and refurbished at least once a year, and it is impossible to do so without its shaft wells which provide access to different points of the gallery. Trespassing on the qanat bound by putting up such constrictions on its shaft wells is a countdown to its demise. Moreover the damage of such projects is not only limited to the destruction of the qanat access wells, but their sewage wells in the vicinity of qanat can be the last straw. For example in case of Mehr housing project, a sewage well has been dug just one meter away from the qanat gallery, and it is obvious that the sewage leakage

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Fig. 5.12  People taking water from qanat of Hasan Abad for drinking

into the gallery can bring a serious contamination to a qanat whose water is of highest quality in the region and it has provided these people with safe drinking water for centuries. Mehriz municipality has recently diverted the qanat current to a public park, though this water used to flow in an underground tunnel and then enter a watermill and operate its turbine before reaching Pahlevanpoor garden. After the watermill was abolished and fell into decay, the water was no longer transferred through the same traditional tunnel, but it was diverted to an open ditch now running across a public park where people can picnic and even do some house chores like laundry. The qanat representative says that the garbage that people throw at the ditch always troubles the farmers, because it not only pollutes the water, but it also clogs the tunnel downstream. Moreover the open ditch has made it possible for some people to illegally pump the water up into their tankers and take it for sale. Nevertheless there a payab upslope from the town of Mehriz, which still provides people with safe drinking water. Payab is a stairway dug into the soil from the surface down to the qanat tunnel in order to access the qanat water for drinking and washing. This payab is the last spot in the qanat gallery whose water is still reliable for drinking, and everyday many people come and collect water in their plastic containers in the belief that this water is better to their health than their own tap water at home (Fig. 5.12). Mehriz industrial town is another source of threat to the qanat, which needs more attention from authorities. In some parts of the industrial town, some constructions have been built on the qanat course, which have made it almost impossible to access the qanat tunnel at this point. To our surprise, Cultural Heritage Organization which is supposed to preserve such cultural and historical values plays a role in the qanat annihilation, according to the qanat owners. Pahlevanpoor garden which is now in

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Fig. 5.13  The qanat water flowing across Pahlevanpoor garden in Mehriz

the custody of Cultural Heritage Organization is being irrigated by the water of this qanat at least in some parts of the garden, though the garden legally had no water share from Hasan Abad qanat and used to be irrigated by two other qanats named Shah Hosseini and Mazvir Abad which have both dried up. This issue drew objections from the qanat owners but all fell on deaf ears (Fig. 5.13).

5.8  Cultural Landscape of the Qanat of Hasan Abad The mother well of Hasan Abad qanat has been sunk in the desert environment which is the first thing that may pique a visitor’s interest. In this context, qanat seems a genius technology which made it possible for humans to survive such a harsh environment. Nevertheless, this landscape does not portray qanat as a means for harnessing nature or struggling with desert, but qanat seems more of a technique for a better adaptation to nature and coexistence with desert. in the cultural landscape of qanat, an integrated and systematic ecology is discernible, where qanat, human and desert are interwoven. In this landscape, humans have never tried to exert their hegemony over the other elements of the ecology, but they have established a sustainable and peaceable relationship with the ecology, which is manifest in the peculiarities of qanat. The structural and intrinsic traits of qanat pave the way for a longstanding coexistence and cooperation between human and nature, and accordingly between different human communities as well. I feel that it is not only water that gurgles down the qanat gallery, but a soul of cooperation and convergence

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also palpitates in the qanat, which ties up humans to nature. In case of Hasan Abad qanat, the soul of cooperation and convergence is very strong and obvious (Labbaf Khaneiki and Semsar Yazdi 2015). The most important element of the qanat cultural landscape is the existence of two division structures which divide water between Sadati quarter in Mahriz and the villages Dehno and Hasan Abad, ensuring territorial cooperation between them. Also, many hydraulic structures linked to the qanat of Hasan Abad are among the important elements which altogether make up the qanat cultural landscape. Qanat of Hasan Abad is very rich in having a variety of hydraulic structures which all embody the real identity of the qanat. For example, one can touch upon numerous payabs which provide direct access to the underground current of qanat. Payabs have always played a crucial role in the social life of the desert towns and villages. Also, the watermills are of great value, when we know that they used to generate energy out of qanat flow in order to grind wheat and barley. The watermills were part of the cooperative maintenance system of the qanat, since the qanat owners granted a concession for building a watermill in their qanat in return for an annual rent which was later spent on the qanat maintenance. The money earned from the watermill could supplement the qanat owners’ contribution. The watermill worked by the energy generated by the water pressure inside a flue or a special funnel-shaped well named Tanooreh. The qanat water was directed to the watermill flue where water accumulated and produced the required pressure. There was a small outlet at the bottom of the flue, through which water could spout out and hit the wooden blades of a turbine. The turbine spun and moved the upper millstone whose friction with the lower millstone could grind the grains. The water poured into another tunnel and flowed toward the earth surface after coming out of the flue and operating the watermill. The cisterns or water reservoirs are other parts of the cultural landscape created by the qanat of Hasan Abad. The water reservoirs are built partially underground with brick, stone and a mortar of lime and clay. The reservoirs used to be filled up with the qanat water, and their structures were composed of a water tank, covering dome, wind catchers and ventilation, access stairway and an entrance. The water reservoirs are considered public structures which have been built by charitable persons for supplying drinking water. These water reservoirs were associated with the qanat of Hasan Abad in two ways: 1- the qanat water went to the reservoirs to fill them up over two months every winter when the farmlands were not temporarily in need of irrigation. 2- Given that the reservoirs required a regular maintenance, their charitable builders also donated a share of qanat water whose revenue was spent on the reservoir whenever needed. This share of water was usually rented out to the volunteer farmers and its income was paid to the reservoir custodian for repairing and refurbishing. As mentioned the clean and cold water of Hasan Abad qanat during winter, which was also of high quality was ideal for filling the water reservoirs. This water did not replenish only the reservoirs of Hasan Abad and Dehno regions, but also used to fill some other reservoirs even in the city of Yazd like the reservoirs Mahmoodi and Zangi. Only in Hasan Abad and Maryam Abad there were eight reservoirs which were filled with the water of this qanat. For example the reservoir of Seti Pir or Ghale’ Asadan is noteworthy, which is located in a Zoroastrian temple

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Fig. 5.14  The reservoir of Seti Pir which was once filled up by the qanat of Hasan Abad

believed to date back to 1250 years ago. However there is an inscription in Persian calligraphy at the top of the reservoir entrance, revealing the date of its construction to be April 1936. The inscription reads that “this water reservoir was founded and built by Zoroastrian Bahram Rashid Nersi Abadi in the memory of his deceased parents Rostam Rashid and Morvarid Rostam Nersi Abadi, in the hope that everyone benefited prays for his salvation and his deceased ones”. In May 2016 I interviewed the temple custodian Mr. Bahram Rostam Atashband who was once one of the water chiefs of Hasan Abad qanat (Fig. 5.14). Another important water reservoir is called Orok which has been built in Hasan Abad near the village mosque. This water reservoir has been built in 1935 for the use of both Zoroastrians and Muslims as Hormozyar’s endowment. Hormozyar Forood Maryam Abadi was a Zoroastrian benefactor after whose name the reservoir was called. Orok is an abbreviated from of Hormozyar in the local accent. This water reservoir enjoyed two different stairways of which one belonged to the Muslims and the other for the Zoroastrian residents. Needless to say the both stairways led down to the same water tank but from two different directions. Also, another water reservoir named Ab Anbar No had two different stairways for the followers of the two religions, which was built by another Zoroastrian benefactor named Esfandyar Keykhosro. He also donated 8 Jorreh or a right of 88 min of irrigation out of the irrigation cycle of Hasan Abad qanat for the purpose of financing the reservoir maintenance. This water share used to be rented out to the farmers in return for cash which was spent on the reservoir repair by its custodian. At present, this water share is being used by someone named Fariborz Atash Band, though he has not long paid its rent. The development of modern urban water network and

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Fig. 5.15  Orok water reservoir with two separate stairways

easy access to tap water have made the water reservoirs redundant, and as a result the reservoirs have lost their traditional functions. People no longer care about the maintenance of the reservoirs whose abandonment ruled out the necessity of their maintenance (Fig. 5.15). There is another water reservoir just close to the mosque of Hasan Abad, but only with one stairway. This reservoir is part of a public compound including the mosque, shrine and public bath all of which were related to the water of Hasan Abad qanat. The qanat open ditch passes by the mosque entrance, providing the Muslims with the water they need for ablution before their daily prayers. The public bath was supplied by the same qanat water, and the reservoir filled up with the same water used to supply drinking water to the residents. The systematic relationship between the qanat of Hasan Abad and the social fabric of Hasan Abad village which has today become a quarter of Yazd city gave rise to the qanat cultural landscape. There is something interesting about the numbers of stairways in the reservoirs in the region. The reservoirs built by the Zoroastrian benefactors enjoy two separate stairways one for Zoroastrians and the other for Muslims, whereas those built by the Muslim benefactors have only one stairway, though there are two separate faucets at the bottom, out of which the right one is for Muslims and the left one for Zoroastrians. Perhaps the physical peculiarities of the water reservoirs are the reflection of a perfect adaptation to the mainstream culture that the Zoroastrian minority evolved over time. In the past a reprehensible belief was rampant among the Muslims that considered the Zoroastrians to be impure. According to them the Zoroastrians’ impurity could be transmitted and pollute the Muslims’ clothes and bodies if touched by their wet hands. However, later the Iranian supreme leader at the position of a clergyman

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Fig. 5.16  Zoroastrian and Muslim farmers in Hasan Abad, working and irrigating side by side

issued a new decree revoking the religious belief which could undermine the national integrity (bureau of preservation and assimilation of Ayatollah Khamenei’s thoughts 2015). Although the Muslims themselves were not so zealous in observing such a discriminative belief that they managed to build two separate stairways, the Zoroastrian benefactors’ hysterical prudence dictated the construction of two separate stairways in order to keep a low profile. They did not want to broach the subject of Zoroastrian’s impurity by building a single stairway reservoir which could put the minority in closer contact with their Muslim neighbors and risk them brooding about the issue again. Therefore the qanat and its related structures could serve as a ground for cooperation not only between the three different territories but also between the different religious communities in a geography whose harsh conditions have always harbored a high potential for competition, clash and conflict (Fig. 5.16).

References Abavaran Dasht Kavir Consulting Engineers Company. (2014). Report on comprehensive study on the Qanat of Hasan Abad Moshir (Persian), Iran Water Resources management company & international center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structures. Afshar, I. (1995). Memorials of Yazd (Persian) (Vol. 1, 2nd ed.). Tehran: Association for Cultural Heritages and Luminaries. Bonine, M. E. (1982). From Qanat to kort، traditional irrigation terminology and practices in Central IRAN، IRAN, Volume XX, London.

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Esfandyari, A. M. (2000). Archaeological excavations in Gharbalbiz in Mehriz (Persian). Qom: Tebyan Institute for Culture and Information. Ghorbani, F. (1990). Comperehensive collection of legal regulations and Laws, civil procedure (Persian). Tehran: Ferdowsi Publication. Hafiz Abroo Shahab al-Din Abdollah Khafi. (1996). Geography of hafiz Abroo (Persian) (Vol. 2). Tehran: Miras Maktoob Publication. ICQHS. (2016). Documentation of legal procedures of Qanats (Persian), ICQHS Organizational Archive. Iran Zamin. (2013). Newspaper (Persian). No. 2803, Thursday, 30 January 2014. Janebollahi, M. S. (1990). Water division, transaction and accounting in traditional irrigation in Meybod. Geographical Research Journal, 2(Summer 1990). Kazem Najand, E. (2016). Yazd cultural heritage, handicraft and tourism organization, Oral Interview (Persian), Unpublished. Kazemeyni, M. M. (2003). Yazd dignitaries encyclopedia (Persian) (Vol. 2). Yazd: Reyhanat al-­ Rasool Cultural and Research Foundation. Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2006). Water division Systems in Iran (Persian). Tehran: Iran National Water Treasury. Labbaf Khaneiki, M., & Semsar Yazdi, A. A. (2015). Qanat tourism (Persian). Yazd: Iran Water Resources Management Company & International Center on Qanats and Historic Hydraulic Structures. Lambton, A. (1983). Landlord and peasant in Persia (Persian translation)(Manoochehr Amiri, Trans) 3, Tehran: Scientific and Cultural Publications. Maserrat, H. (1997). Yazd; memorial of history (Persian). Tehran: Yazd Public Libraries Association. Mofid, M.  B. M. (2006). In I.  Afshar (Ed.), Jame’ Mofidi (Persian) (Vol. 3). Tehran: Asatir Publication. Nayini, M. J. B. M. H. (1974). In I. Afshar (Ed.), Jame’ Jafari (Persian). Tehran: National Heritage Association. Saadat Noori, H. (1966). “Mohammad Hasan Khan Iravani or Khan Baba Khan Sardar” (Persian). Vahid Journal, No. 1, 4(37). Safayi, H. (1969). Civil law (Persian) (Vol. 1). Tehran: Publication of Accounting High Education Institute. Semsar Yazdi, A. A., & Labbaf Khaneiki, M. (2017). Qanat knowledge; construction and maintenance. Netherlands: Springer.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Abstract  Water territorial cooperation can result in social capital, and in turn social and economic capacities of water territorial cooperation pave the way for sustainable development. Feeble territorial identity caused by qanat mechanism can facilitate cooperative connections in order to jointly utilize different vital resources scattered on both sides of a territorial border. In fact water territorial cooperation helps raise social capital which is a crucial prerequisite for sustainable development. This chapter sums up the arguments described in the last chapters, leading to the introduction of two cooperation models named as “livelihood differentiation” and “common benefit”. Livelihood differentiation pertains to the geographical differences that give rise to the formation of different economic structures within an environmental-­social nexus. The different economic structures exhibit different water demands which remain in harmony with the environmental capacities. However, the model of common benefit has been abstracted from the story of Hasan Abad qanat where several territories with similar economic structure could have developed a cooperative water management system that ensures sustainable water equality.

6.1  Introduction Before going to the point, I prefer to touch upon the research method deployed in this book. My research has been done through a qualitative method known as Grounded Theory. Grounded theory is made up of two interacting procedures; gleaning information and analysis. Sorting and coding the information are used as effective tools which facilitate my analysis. These two procedures eventually result in the formation of the conceptual model from which my theories can emanate. Therefore, grounded theory is in fact a process through which the final theories gradually take shape and appear (Glaser and Strauss 2006b: 31). Grounded theory was deployed by Glaser and Strauss for the first time in their book entitled “Awareness of Dying” (Glaser and Strauss 1965b). That book proves © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Labbaf Khaneiki, Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0_6

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to be a good example of grounded theory, which was followed by this study from methodological point of view. Later, this type of grounded theory was partly modified by Strauss and Corbin so that more structured and more organized questions were used, more important role was given to the researcher to play in the research process, the absolute reliance on the data waned, the researcher appeared as a more active and less passive element of the research process, and eventually the data were analyzed by more organized tools. However, in the initial version of grounded theory, the data directly and immediately end up in the production of theories. In this book, I tried to adhere to the initial version of grounded theory set out by Glaser and Strauss, though I have also used some techniques developed by Strauss and Corbin. In a nutshell, my research has been conducted through the following stages: 1. Questions: this book was focused on how and why the subjects occur in the study area, but our questions were sometimes broken down into slighter questions or were changed into other questions. Earlier in the Abarkooh basin, different territories could have gained a balance regarding exploitation of their shared water resources, whereas nowadays a disputatious condition prevails over the basin. Therefore the main questions were why and how the basin could enjoy such water cooperation, and why and how competition took the place of cooperation over the last decades. 2. Theoretical sampling: in my research, the interviewees led me to the main events which in turn constituted my conceptual model and final analysis. Every interview served as a clue which led me to more interviews, like different pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. My sampling was never random, but I deliberately selected my interviewees based on their knowledge, position and experience, and each interview put me in contact with more relevant people. This cycle continued until the point of theoretical saturation, when no more new data were obtained. Three target groups were envisioned for the sampling as follows: A) local community of water shareholders and beneficiary farmers B) water experts and practitioners C) managers and those who were in charge of water issues in the region. 3. Interviews: the participants were interviewed openly without trying to keep them in line with my own priorities and ideas, in order to explore more unknown aspects of water issues. The questions were asked indirectly through hours of friendly conversations. 4. Sorting and coding: The manuscripts of my interviews were sorted into many statements, each with a special code. All the statements which were placed under a particular category tell a similar story, occur in a similar context or yield a similar result. Afterwards the statements were grouped into some categories, and the categories were classified into some concepts. 5. Matrix of relations: The relationships between the concepts may be described as either causal or affective. The relationships are not only mutual, but they may form a complicated nexus of many multilateral interactions. Therefore, to better discover such relationships, I used a matrix where all the concepts were compared pairwise.

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6. Conceptual model: the aforementioned matrix helped me to better understand the relationships between the different concepts, and in fact a conceptual model shows both the concepts and their relationships at the same time in a more visual way. The conceptual model is considered a very important stage of the research process. 7. Drawing up the theories: in this book, interpreting the concepts and their relationships makes up my theories which in turn constitute my research findings. In a nutshell, based on the concepts extracted from my field researches, I can recognize two different models for territorial water cooperation; the model of “livelihood differentiation” and the model of “common benefit” of which the Abarkooh basin and Hasan Abad qanat are two good examples. Although both models result in the same water territorial cooperation, their external factors, their components and their systematic interactions are quite different. In the Abarkooh basin, the model of livelihood differentiation was once in place, which gradually lost its traditional function in the wake of some environmental changes and socio-economic transitions. In this model, water demand varies in the basin upstream and downstream, due to the different peculiarities of the production systems in each area. Different production systems entail different environmental requirements, paving the way for a functional harmony that prevents any potential conflict between them over the limited environmental resources. Therefore, the basin upstream and downstream can peacefully share their common water resource, despite the fact that they do not utilize equally. The basin downstream gets much more water than the upstream for its agricultural production, while the upstream needs less water for its animal husbandry but brings back the same water in the shape of virtual water by bartering its products for agricultural goods produced in the downstream. In the model of common benefit, another condition is predominant, which leads to the same territorial cooperation on water. The model of common benefit that takes place in the region of Hasan Abad qanat to date could have survived the ongoing environmental, social and economic changes to a large extent. According to this model, the production systems are similar in both upstream and downstream, and their structural characteristics resemble. As a result, the water demand of upstream is almost identical with that of downstream. Given the model of livelihood differentiation, one may conclude that a conflict between interests would be inevitable in the model of common benefit, though the opposite proves true. In this book, I tried to explain how in the model of common benefit, the interests of upstream and downstream gain a balance and how they end up extracting such a common water resource fairly and peacefully. The peculiarities of Hasan Abad qanat have fastened together the benefits of the upstream and downstream, such that everyone’s benefit would be maximized by cooperation and minimized by conflict. Thus, a complicated socio-­ economic structure has formed and evolved to the extent that water cooperation proves inevitable. Water flowing from upstream to downstream has made the downstream dependent on the upstream, because their aquifer is recharged in the upstream and a considerable length of their qanat gallery runs across the upstream territory. The upstream is also dependent on the downstream, because without their

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c­ ooperation it is almost impossible to maintain such a long tunnel with a total length of 40 km. Also, the traditional water share of the downstream is undeniable, and the upstream is never willing to risk such coexistence by depriving the downstream of their water share. Therefore, all those conditions beget a special socio-economic structure, paving the way for the model of common benefit.

6.2  S  ustainable Management of Shared Aquifers in the Model of Livelihood Differentiation Since 300 years ago until some 50 years ago, a kind of systematic balance has been in place between the basin upstream and downstream in Abarkooh, what I have called the period of livelihood differentiation. Livelihood differentiation refers to the settling of different livelihoods across a diverse geography according to their own intrinsic circumstances and requirements. We can treat the livelihood differentiation as a strategy for adaptation to the climatic and environmental conditions, where the Abarkooh basin stands out as a good example. As mentioned earlier, the nomadic communities based on animal husbandry tended to settle in the basin upstream, whereas the agrarian communities preferred the downstream lands where well lent themselves to the agricultural activities. In fact the division of space between the upstream and downstream took place based on their special requirements, and their different demands for water – due to their different economic structures  - prevented any conflict between them. However, such systematic balance between them was negated by a complicated socio-economic transition over the past 50 years, and as a result their cooperation turned into a relentless competition over the shared water resource, bringing their aquifer to the brink of annihilation. Nevertheless, we should note that the territorial water cooperation turning into water competition is not only associated with the aforementioned tangible and intangible factors, but it may also have something to do with other conditions that cannot be understood only through our field studies in the region. Those conditions can be depicted in a paradigm model as follows. A paradigm model facilitates analyzing the categories and concepts and their complicated relationships, taking into account the context conditions, causal conditions, intervening conditions, strategies and outcomes. In the last chapters, I tried to spell out these conditions and the influence they exert on the present situation of the shared water resources. For example, climate change, modernization, livelihood patterns, socio-economic dynamics and demography have all been regarded as context conditions. In a paradigm model, we do not fasten only on the data gleaned through the field studies, but we give a more important role to the researcher as an analyzing element of the research process. As an instance, if we draw up our theories by lingering over the field data, we miss out on such context conditions as climate change or demography which appear as a background for the other factors.

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Very probably the local interviewees do not touch upon such general issues or even have no idea on globalization, global warming, etc. Therefore, we have to rely on our own knowledge or other references in order to shed light on the context conditions that in fact encompass all the local processes. Such a combination between the field data and other sources of information can be labeled as paradigm model which helps protect us against myopic or unrealistic theories (Fig. 6.1). May be one can put forward a proposal on the law of transboundary aquifers, being inspired by the aforementioned model in the Abarkooh basin. In 2008, the Law of Transboundary Aquifers was adopted by the International Law Commission, and then was put on the agenda of the UN general assembly. Since then, this law has been discussed at three sessions of the UN general assembly in order to be finalized and ratified by the member states (Eckstein and Sindico 2014a, b). The articles of this law are still up for discussion, and it is still possible for the member states to comment on the existing articles or suggest a new article. Therefore, Iran can learn from its own indigenous potential as described in the case of Abarkooh basin, and then suggest a new article to smarten up the law of transboundary aquifers. The new article can be inspired by the indigenous experience on water territorial cooperation in order to enhance the law’s compatibility with the national conditions. Before suggesting such an article, we had better have a quick review on the draft law of transboundary aquifers. In the draft, the article 1 describes the subject which is focused on the extraction and management of the shared aquifers. Article 2 defines the terminology used in the draft. Article 3 explains the ownership right that the beneficiary countries may have to the shared aquifers. Article 4 clarifies the fair

Fig. 6.1   A paradigm model for the territorial tensions over the shared water resource in the Abarkooh basin

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exploitation of a shared aquifer. Article 5 points out to nine variations regarding the fair exploitation of a shared aquifer, which should be taken into consideration in every project or program in the beneficiary countries. Article 6 pertains to the preservation of the shared aquifers, observing the interests of all the beneficiary countries. Article 7 underlines the cooperation between the beneficiary countries on the fair exploitation of transboundary aquifers. Article 8 encourages an information exchange between the beneficiary countries in order to ensure an effective preservation and management for their shared aquifers. Article 9 envisages the mutual treaties between the beneficiary countries on the groundwater extraction projects in the transboundary aquifers. Article 10 emphasizes the environmental concerns and protection of ecosystem while the groundwater projects are carried out in the transboundary aquifers. Article 11 calls for a ban on the activities which impede the recharge of the shared aquifer in the upstream and jeopardize the profits of the downstream regions. Article 12 takes up the issue of groundwater pollution as well as the commitments of the beneficiary countries to curb the contaminating sources. Article 13 pertains to the monitoring of transboundary aquifers with the data provided by the beneficiary countries. Article 14 revolves around the implementation of the transboundary aquifers management. Article 15 mentions the consequences of the developmental projects and their impact on the shared aquifers. This article recommends that before carrying out any project, their effect on the quality and quantity of the shared aquifer should be studied. Article 16 recommends the technical collaboration with the developing countries in terms of preservation and management of transboundary aquifers. Article 17 explains the emergency cases regarding the shared aquifers as well as the commitments of the beneficiary countries in this respect. Articles 18 and 19 pertain to the condition of utilization and protection of the shared aquifers in case of war and the commitments of the beneficiary countries to abide by the international laws regarding transboundary aquifers (United Nations 2008b). Therefore we see that in the draft law of transboundary aquifers, there is no mention of the socio-economic story that unfolded in the Anarkooh basin, regarding their shared water resource. It seems that one of the reasons why a shared aquifer begets conflict is inattention to the geographical diversity and its importance in ecological planning. In other words, in many regions with a shared aquifer there is a disparity between the geographical possibilities and conditions for the basin upstream and downstream. In a traditional paradigm, such a disparity could spontaneously lead to the formation of different production systems each of which was well adapted to their own geography, resulting in the adjacent territories living in harmony. The water demand in the basin upstream was such that the water flow was not withheld from the basin downstream where the production system never faced any water scarcity caused by the basin upstream. For example, in Abarkooh, the basin upstream enjoyed enough water but lacked adequate arable soil, the opposite of the basin downstream. Thus, the basin upstream housed an economy quite consistent with such a geographical possibility by developing animal husbandry which could leave most of the water for the arable lands in the downstream. The basin downstream responded to its geographical condition by developing an agricultural

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production system as an adaptation strategy. Therefore, two different and at the same time interconnected production systems came into existence in the basin upstream and downstream and then evolved by fastening together the interests of the two areas. In this context, a peaceful extraction of the shared water source could ensure the sustainability of both production systems in the basin upstream and downstream. Therefore, we may be inspired by the Abarkooh model to pay more attention to the livelihood differentiation based on the geographical and ecological diversity across a particular basin even at an international level. From this standpoint, a new article as follows can be suggested to be added to the draft law of transboundary aquifers. The countries located in the basin upstream and downstream should refrain from a similar development with competitive water demands. Those countries should foster different production systems with different complementary water demands in accordance with the various geographical conditions, different ecological possibilities and diverse local capacities in the basin upstream and downstream.

6.3  S  ustainability and Resilience in the Model of Common Benefit As mentioned earlier, the region of Hasan Abad qanat follows another model which can be called the model of common benefit. Also, this model prevails over the village of Meymand to some extent. According to this model, an intricate set of socio-­ economic factors knits together the interests of the basin upstream and downstream. One of those factors is the spatial extension of qanat, which may transcend different territorial borders. Unlike wells, qanat is not just a point on the landscape, but it begins at a mountain base and stretches down to the less elevated lands, spanning tens of kilometers. In case of Hasan Abad qanat, the qanat’s mother well which is the last and deepest well is situated some 40 km away from the qanat’s exit point in the village of Hasan Abad. Annual maintenance of such a long gallery along with hundreds of shaft wells is quite unaffordable for the farmers of Hasan Abad in the qanat downstream, if there would be no one else to contribute. Moreover, the recharge area of the qanat’s aquifer is located in the upstream where a vast area of land has been allocated to the aquifer recharge. Thus, the downstream needs the upstream for their cooperation and the upstream can have a share of the qanat’s water in return. Also, it is almost impossible for the upstream to take care of the qanat without the cooperation of the downstream, so the upstream can ensure the qanat’s sustainability by observing the right of the downstream. Moreover, in the cultural landscape of Hasan Abad qanat, there are other factors which accentuate the common benefit. Some of those factors used to play a crucial role in creating the common benefit, but they have lost their traditional function today. As an instance we can mention the watermills which were built along the

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qanat gallery all the way from Mehriz to Hasan Abad. In the upstream the farmers managed to build some watermills whose revenue could cover a part of the qanat maintenance cost, to the benefit of the downstream as well. The qanat water was not used only for irrigation, but its high quality also lends itself to supplying drinking water to the three territories. The water reservoirs in the three territories were filled up with the water of Hasan Abad qanat, and the maintenance cost of the same reservoirs were paid through some charity water shares of the same qanat, which had been donated to public water supply. The charity water shares were rented out and their revenue was spent on the repair and maintenance of the water reservoir. The important role of Hasan Abad qanat in supplying drinking water galvanized all the beneficiaries into closer cooperation in order to maintain the qanat and its traditional functions. These complicated interactions underlie a special socio-economic structure that in turn gives rise to territorial water cooperation. Ostrom’s theory on common property can help us better understand the socio-economic structure behind this cooperation, answering the question why in the region of Hasan Abad, the relationship between the qanat upstream and downstream does not reflect the logic of prisoner dilemma as discussed in the Chap. 1. According to this logic, a tendency toward maximum benefit and minimum cost is the only factor that determines the relationship between the upstream and downstream. However, in realty there are other factors that rule the game, the factors that are embodied in the aforementioned socio-economic structure. This structure bestows sustainability and resilience upon the relationship between the upstream and downstream, ensuring a fair and peaceful exploitation of their shared water resource. Nevertheless, we should not content ourselves with interpreting the common benefit and the ensuing territorial water cooperation only by a couple of factors that we have discovered through the field studies. As shown in the following figure, we can come up with a paradigm model that gives a better insight into the territorial water cooperation in the region of Hasan Abad qanat and the socio-economic structure behind it. In this model, the context conditions, causal conditions, intervening conditions and eventually the strategies all exert influence on the main factors and their relationships, and all those interactions constitute an intricate socio-economic structure which gives rise to the territorial water cooperation (Fig. 6.2). Although in terms of Hasan Abad qanat the territorial water cooperation is still in force and is not replaced by a competitive confrontation, the main factors that underlie the common benefit are changing one after another. Those factors are like some strands tied together to form a rope, but the strands are being snapped one after another, and just a few strands are now left undamaged. The watermills have lost their traditional function and have sunk into oblivion. The water reservoirs have been made redundant by the modern tap water network, and no longer contribute to the region’s common benefit. Nonetheless, to date the agricultural activities have survived, and are still dependent on the qanat as a common water source which still knits together everyone’s benefit. However, agriculture will not be immortal under the pressure of climate change, urban sprawl and water mismanagement. If the

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Fig. 6.2   A paradigm model for the territorial water cooperation in the region of Hasan Abad qanat

modern development would not be reconciled with the environmental capacities, the last strand would be snapped soon and the agriculture, the qanat and its water cooperation would plunge into the abyss of annihilation.

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Index

A Abadeh, 97, 99, 108, 111, 115, 117, 118, 120, 125, 127 Abarkooh, 6, 7, 30, 97, 99–107, 110–112, 114, 115, 118, 120–122, 124–129, 140, 180–185 Abshahi, 167 Acadian, 26 Achaemenians, 26 Afghanistan, 41, 43 Africa, 17, 18 Aghda, 30 Ahmad Abad, 111 Ain Manavir, 33 Akkadian, 29, 31 Akram Abad, 170 Ali Abad, 110 Al-Meysar, 33 Amman, 36 Anar, 42, 43, 167 Anasazi, 34, 128 Arabia, 15 Arab League, 16 Ardakan, 30, 61 Ardameh, 56, 57 Ardebil, 104 Asiab, 56 Asia Minor, 26 Assyria, 15, 27 Austria, 17 Azam, 134 Azerbaijan, 96 Aztec Mexico, 35

B Babylonian, 29 Bahr Kooh, 110 Bajestan, 51, 52 Bakhtegan, 97 Bakhtiari, 96 Baluchistan, 96 Baqdad Abad, 155 Baraan, 58 Barzan, 110, 121 Basiran, 107, 122 Bavanat, 134 Bayazeh, 167 Bidestan, 110 Birjand, 31 Bone La, 77 Bon-e Meymand, 80, 89 Bulgaria, 17 C Caspian Sea, 95 Caucasus, 26 Caucasus mountains, 26 Celtic Culture, 35 Central Asia, 40, 103, 106 Central plateau of Iran, 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 27, 29, 30, 33, 44, 50, 51, 70, 83, 97, 103, 133, 134, 152 Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, 57 Chah Sangi, 112 Chalian, 125 Chel Kileyi, 167

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 M. Labbaf Khaneiki, Territorial Water Cooperation in the Central Plateau of Iran, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01494-0

195

Index

196 Chel Zari, 107, 108, 125, 126 Cheshmeh Chahak, 110, 121, 123 Cheshme Lakhis, 78 Cheshme Ra’na, 113 China, 12, 35, 40, 89, 103 Croatia, 17 D Damghan, 29 Damqan, 41 Danube, 16, 17 Danube-Black Sea Canal, 16 Dar Anjir, 97 Dar Baneh, 77 Dar Khuni, 77 Davazdah Imam, 155 Deh Akhoond, 91 Deh Arab, 111 Dehno, 14, 135, 136, 139, 141, 142, 145, 150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159–168, 173 Dowlat Abad, 139, 151 E Ebrahim Abad, 135 Egypt, 16, 33, 35 Elenjan, 58 England, 12 Eqlid, 97, 99, 100, 107, 113, 115, 117, 120, 125, 127 Estakhr, 105 Euphrates, 29, 129 Europe, 9, 10, 16 Ezheh, 30

Germany, 17 Ghale’ Asadan, 173 Gharbalbiz, 14, 137, 139, 159, 170 Ghareh Ghoom, 96 Goblot, H., 26, 27 Golbid, 51, 52 Gonabad, 29, 30, 46 Gonbad Sabz, 141, 151 Gonbeh Esmayil, 167 Gozgestan, 77 Greece, 35 H Hadde Kanooyiyeh, 73, 74, 78, 80–82, 85 Had Konuyiye, 77 Haftad Kileyi, 167 Hambar, 120, 121 Harand, 30 Harriet Nash, 50 Hasan Abad, 14, 110, 134–140, 152–155, 157–168, 170–175, 181, 185–187 Hasanalian, 28 Heray Rud, 41 Hittites, 34 Holland, 39 Hormozgan, 36, 37 Hossein Abad, 142 Hossein Abad Rismani, 170 Hungary, 17

F Fadan, 58 Faraqeh, 99, 100, 107, 111, 115, 118, 119, 123, 125 Fars, 18, 95, 97, 107, 112, 120, 123–125, 127, 134 Farshadi, 58 Fath Abad, 141, 150 Fin, 28, 29 Finland, 35 France, 58

I Ilam, 29 Imam Hossein, 46, 70 Incan culture, 35 India, 12, 15, 35, 40 Indus, 16 Iran, 1, 4, 10, 19, 26, 27, 45, 47, 50, 61, 69, 93, 95, 96, 100, 103, 104, 106, 107, 133, 134, 136, 137, 142, 143, 145, 151, 155, 156, 163, 183 Iranian, 26, 27, 46, 49, 52, 70 Iranian plateau, 26, 27, 31, 32, 60, 104–106 Iraq, 15, 130 Isfahan, 30, 37, 38, 50, 57–59, 100, 117, 118 Israel, 15, 16 Italy, 19

G Gashar, 99, 107–110, 115, 119 Gav Khooni, 30 Gazok, 110

J Jafar Abad, 124 Jahan Abad, 111 Jalal Abad, 153

Index Jalil Abad, 111 Japan, 10, 35 Jawa Dam, 36 Jazmoorian, 97 Jey, 58 Jeyhoon, 4 Jooye Asiab, 52 Jooye Gombeh, 52, 56 Jooye Hesar, 52 Jooye Joveyn, 52 Jooye Nasar, 52, 54–56 Jooye Pish Deh, 52, 55 Jooye Sardeh, 52, 56 Jordan, 15, 16, 36 Jordan River Basin, 15 K Kaka Siyah, 167 Kal Manduyiye, 77 Kaloo Meymand, 73, 74, 78–83 Kaloo Moradi, 73, 78, 79, 81, 85 Kal river, 97 Kal Shoor, 30 Karaj River, 43, 74 Karim Abad, 108 Karim Khani, 167 Karkhe, 29 Kashan, 28 Kasnaviyeh, 151 Kerarj, 58 Kerman, 29, 45, 71, 72, 85, 107, 140 Khanrood, 52–57 Khatoon Abad, 72, 89, 97 Kheyr Abad, 110 Khiyaban Ab Anbar, 167 Khiyaban Shahid Abad, 167 Khooche Tang, 167 Khoozestan, 18 Khorasan, 18, 28, 41, 43, 44, 50, 96, 100 Khorasan Razavi, 18, 51, 52 Khorrin, 72, 75, 86–88 Khosro Abad, 110 Kooche Mohammad Ali Khani, 167 Kooche Poolok, 167 Kooh Sorkhi, 135 Kord Shooli, 113 Kurdistan, 96 L Laft, 36, 37 Lagash, 15 Lahmian, 110

197 Lake Van, 31, 33 La Khis, 77 Lakh Mazar, 31 La Khurin, 77 Lash Karguyiyeh, 77 Lay Neyrizoo, 80, 82 La Zar, 167 Lelun, 77 Lenjan, 58 Loristan, 96 Los Angles, 3 Lout desert, 29, 30 M Madvar, 135 Mahan, 45 Mal Amir, 141, 151 Marbin, 58 Marvast, 97, 134 Maryam Abad, 111, 112, 120, 140, 141, 143, 151, 167, 173, 174 Mashhad, 46, 52, 54 Maya, 34, 128 Mazandaran, 96 Mazvir Abad, 172 Media, 26 Medians, 26 Mehdi Abad, 153 Mehr Abad, 107, 140 Mehrgan, 111, 112, 121 Mehriz, 14, 135, 136, 139–141, 150, 151, 155, 157, 159, 161–166, 170–172, 186 Mehrookan, 85, 88 Mend, 18 Merv, 41, 43 Mesopotamia, 26, 29, 35 Mesqal, 137 Meybod, 18, 30 Meymand, 71, 72, 74–93, 185 Middle East, 15, 31–33, 36 Mir Hasan Khan, 46 Mirza Ali Naqi Riabi, 46 Miyan Kooh, 167 Modarres Boulevard, 168 Mohammad Abad, 51, 52, 155 Moldova, 17 Molla Bashi, 142 Mong Abad, 140 Mongolia, 103 Moqan, 53–55 Morin, 77 Murghab River, 43

Index

198 N Nahr Ghadim, 110–112 Nahr Jadid, 110–112 Najaf Abad, 153 Nayin, 30 Neor Lake, 31, 104 Niasarm, 58 Nile, 16, 128 Nineveh, 37 Nishapur, 41 Noosh Abad, 110 North Africa, 36, 40 Nowkariz, 51, 52 Nuken, 77 O Oman, 27, 33, 50 Oman Sea, 95 Osto, 121 P Pahlevanpoor, 171, 172 Pakistan, 15 Pay Bid, 167 Pay Milok, 167 Persia, 35, 40 Persian Gulf, 95 Pesteh, 167 Pish Deh, 56 Pish Hesar, 52, 53, 57 Posht Asiyab, 110 Poshte Karm, 77 Q Qasabe, 33, 46 Qasem Abad, 47, 49 Qom, 42, 43 R Rahim Abad, 110 Rekhne Shahsavar, 80 Rez Malek, 77 Rhine–Main–Danube Canal, 16 Rig Zarrin, 134 Roman Empire, 19, 31 Romania, 17 Rome, 35 Roodashteyn, 58 Rostam Abad, 110

Rostaq, 167 Russia, 17 S Sadati, 14, 135, 139, 141, 142, 150–152, 155, 159–161, 163, 168, 173 Sadd-el-Kafara Dam, 36 Sadegh Abad, 110 Sadr Abad, 141, 151, 153 Safi Abad, 110, 111 Sahara, 17, 18 Sahra No, 167 Saleh Abad, 111 Sangi, 111 Sare Galleh, 77 Sare Jen, 77 Sargon, 32 Sar Marq, 52, 53 Sasanian Empire, 41, 57 Scythian, 31, 102 Semnan, 96 Serbia, 17 Seti Pir, 173, 174 Shah Hosseini, 82, 172 Shahid Abad, 167 Shahr Babak, 72, 77, 97 Shams Abad, 110 Sheykh Abad, 110 Shiraz, 108, 117, 118 Shirkooh mountain, 134, 135, 137 Shoosh, 29 Sialk, 28 Sirjan, 97 Sistan, 96 Siyah, 110, 111 Siyah Kooh, 97 Siyalk, 29 Slovakia, 17 Sori, 107 Surmaq, 99, 104, 106, 107, 115, 119, 121, 125 Syria, 16, 130 T Taft, 30, 46, 70, 135 Tahirid dynasty, 44 Tashk, 97 Teppe Bayas Abad, 30 Teppe Hesar, 29, 30 Teppe Yahya, 29 Teymareh, 42, 43 Tigris River, 15

Index Tila, 77, 85 Tisa-Danube Canal, 16 Tooran, 4 Toroq Dam, 54 Turkey, 27, 31, 33, 129, 130 Turkmenistan, 41 U Ukraine, 17 Umma, 15 UNESCO, 19, 71, 72, 82, 163 United Nations, 15, 184 Urartu, 26–28 Urmiya lake, 95 Uroomiye, 32 V Vakilabad, 45 Varzaneh, 30 Venice, 19–21

199 W Wadi Al-Garawi, 36 Western Roman Empire, 19 Y Yaqoobi, 141, 151 Yazd, 2, 9, 14, 18–21, 30, 39, 46, 47, 51, 61, 67, 70, 78, 95, 97, 98, 110, 117, 120, 124, 125, 127, 134–137, 140, 141, 145, 150, 151, 154, 158, 159, 162, 163, 167, 170, 173, 175 Z Zagros Mountains, 26, 28 Zard-Kuh Mountain, 57 Zard Rez, 77 Zariq, 43 Zarq, 43 Zayandeh Rood, 37