Rightwing Populism

SPRINGER BRIEFS ON PIONEERS IN SCIENCE AND PRAC TICE  TEXTS AND PROTOCOLS 40

Klaus von Beyme

Rightwing Populism An Element of Neodemocracy

SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice Texts and Protocols Volume 40

Series editor Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, Mosbach, Germany

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11446 http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP.htm http://afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_vonBeyme.htm

Klaus von Beyme

Rightwing Populism An Element of Neodemocracy

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Klaus von Beyme Institut für Politische Wissenschaft Universität Heidelberg Heidelberg, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

Acknowledgement: The photo on page iii was taken on 1 June 2017 by © Mr. Meah Mostafiz (Bangladesh), a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the South Asian Institute of Heidelberg University who granted permission to use this photo. See more on this book at: http://afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_vonBeyme.htm. The book was translated into English by Dr. Vanessa Greatorex, Chester, England ISSN 2194-3125 ISSN 2194-3133 (electronic) SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice Texts and Protocols ISBN 978-3-030-03176-3 ISBN 978-3-030-03177-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018959266 © The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Copyediting: PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, AFES-PRESS e.V., Mosbach, Germany This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

1 Populism Typologies in the Age of Globalisation and Post-Democratisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Terminology and Characteristics of Political Groups . 1.2 Globalisation, Immigration and Populism . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Connecting Populist Ideologies to Political Theories of the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Definitions of Populism and Its Stages of Development . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 Parties and Populism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Parties Between Populism and Right-Wing Extremism 3.2 Right-Wing Populism in Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 International Collaborations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Reasons for the Rise of Populist Parties . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Populism and the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Government Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 Scenarios of Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4 Populism, Right-Wing Extremism and Neo-Nationalism . . . . . . . 4.1 Differences Between Populism und Right-Wing Extremism . . . 4.2 Nationalism as a Breeding Ground for Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Polls . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 Conclusion: The New Normative Debate About Democracy and the Merits and Failures of Populism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Merits of Populism in the Party System . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Consequences of Globalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Recommendations for Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Instead of Being a Threat to the Democratic System Is Right-Wing Populism an Approach to Neo-Democracy? References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1

Populism Typologies in the Age of Globalisation and Post-Democratisation

This contribution to the topical debate on right-wing populism seeks to analyse important aspects of the phenomenon with reasonable brevity: • Populism is conceptualised through scientific analysis building on the history of political theories and ideologies. • Definitions and stages of development are compared. • The analysis focuses on the party system in Western and Eastern Europe, reasons for the rise and decline of right-wing populist groups, international associations and the participation of national governments. • Right-wing populism is differentiated from right-wing extremism. • In summary, a few generalisations can be made that support the hypothesis that right-wing populism can act as a barrier to right-wing extremism, and, in addition to some negative ones, also has several positive effects on the development of neo-democracy.

1.1

Terminology and Characteristics of Political Groups

Although Germany is currently doing surprisingly well, pessimistic doom-mongering is on the increase. Thomä (2017: 35f), a philosopher from St. Gallen, drives criticism to the extreme: “That’s enough. The situation is dire. Those in charge are failing. Resistance is not futile. A reckoning with our broken present is possible”. Just one little point: “Resistance is not futile” means there are opportunities to change things for the better. This optimism is, however, soon watered down: “Resistance is quite dispersed. …Political protest is currently directionless, haphazard, clueless.” An alternative hypothesis preferred by the current author is: there is the possibility of an unorthodox populism which opens up opportunities to develop new methods in politics, interest groups and media and creates the direction, choices and recommendations which Thomä considered © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0_1

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absent. Other authors, such as Nassehi (2017: 42), have also criticised Thomas’s less empirical approach. The political debate is currently being conducted in a kind of crisis fever. Crisis theories are being reinforced by the unexpected consequences of increasing globalisation. Expressions containing the word ‘post’ proliferate. Post-democracy cannot be understood without an awareness of the theory of postmodernisation, a term which Inglehart (1997: 338) introduced into the debate at an early stage. To him, postmodernisation was a survival strategy which sought to improve chances of survival by maximising economic growth, with basic survival and well-being being superseded by improvements in lifestyle. A new term is making the rounds as a result of globalisation: ‘post-democracy’, coined by Crouch (2004, 2008). Populism seems to be a consequence of the developing post-democracy. It is identified by: • the erosion of political parties; • the medialisation of politics; • the rise of experts at the expense of party elites. ‘Post-democracy’, however, has rapidly dropped behind postmodernisation, because this stage of development is characterised by a combination of economic maximisation and neoliberal ideology. This has generated increasing protests by new action groups, who think populism might be capable of overcoming the alleged rigidity of representative democracy. When discussing the search for a new Leitkultur (leading culture), Tibi (2000: 183) expressed hopes that a new concept of cultural pluralism would overcome uncertainty about the social value of multiculturalism. However, the eager search for a new German Leitkultur quickly became the “model for the Extreme Right” (Hentges 2002: 95ff). The vague generalisations of actual social movements, such as populism, seem to be more promising than the search for an overall concept. The expression ‘populism’ has undergone a transformation in political debate, as previously occurred with ‘corporatism’ – the arch-enemy of populism – and is now happening with ‘globalisation’ and ‘governance’. The populism label became convenient when Seehofer was accused of confusing ‘popularity’ with ‘populism’. In politics the accusation of populism is frequently directed at unrealistic and uneconomic policies in opportunistic electoral campaigns. When postmodern democracy began to cut social spending, left-wing groups were hailed as defenders of the status quo and populists, a term previously applied to right-wing extremists. If national governments make excuses for policy failures by blaming the restrictions imposed by the European Union, the opponents of unsuccessful measures are criticised for their “populist irresponsibility”. An illuminating feature of populism is that populists rebel against alleged constraints, but unlike revolutionaries they do so largely within the rules of the democratic system. Populists – if they take any interest in theories – try to profit from the normative turn in postmodern political theory:

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• Negative connotations include the term ‘post-democracy’ (Colin Crouch). • Positive connotations are defined by terms such as “deliberative democracy” (Habermas) or “dialogic democracy” (Giddens). • My proposal (v. Beyme 2013, 2018) to replace the term ‘post-democracy’ with a positive expression like ‘neo-democracy’ is supported by the populism debate. Whereas post-democracy suggests the demise of democracy, and right-wing populism only analyses the negative consequences of this decline, the term ‘neo-democracy’ implies that democracy has not been completely ruined by recent developments. Populism is developing new, unconventional and spontaneous forms of participation which prevent right-wing populism turning into right-wing extremism. In any case, Daniel-Pascal Zorn’s theory (2017: 98) that populist thinking always leads to totalitarianism seems untenable. Post-democratisation has been portrayed as a new phase by numerous theoreticians, from Jacques Rancière, the radical-democratic disciple of Althusser, to Crouch (2008) and Wolin (2008), who, influenced by Tocqueville, calls it “democratic despotism”. Behind the façade of formal democracy and in the name of neoliberal theory, the self-government of the people is increasingly being replaced by controlling elites. In post-democracy the elites are increasingly receiving less deference and respect. The secrets of the “political class” are no longer tactfully respected by the media, although virtually all the formal components of representative democracy seem to have survived. Through an appreciation of the most important post-democracy theorists, Ritzi (2014: 2ff, 271f, 274) tried to argue against the widespread scepticism surrounding the term ‘post-democracy’. The elements of post-democracy theory are quite well-known. However, the current author (v. Beyme 2018, 274f) has tried to explain the term ‘neo-democracy’ by drawing parallels with the history of art. In art every ‘post’ term has been revived as a ‘neo’ term after a while, from Neo-Impressionism to Neo-Surrealism. I maintain doubts about the usefulness of the negatively orientated term ‘post-democracy’ while suspecting that the more positive expression ‘neo-democracy’ will perhaps also not last long. More important than the originality of terms is the emphasis on clear contents which enrich ideas about the social development they describe. The pioneer of populism research Müller (2016: 18, 16), who thoroughly understood why newer democracies are motivated to embrace populism, ultimately came to the conclusion that populism always has a tendency to be anti-democratic, although it often seems to be radically democratic. If that is correct, we must be careful about using the label “right-wing populism”. At least we should not automatically denounce ‘Thatcherism’ as neo-fascism because it breaks down the differences between the people and the government (see Weiss 2017: 242). The rise of Western European right-wing populism has been popularly assumed to have begun around the end of the 1980s, although by the late 1960s Ionescu/ Gellner (1969) had already published on the ‘phantom’ of populism, which pluralises and individualises values and leads to the decline of traditions. Traditional group loyalties towards the family, the local community and the nation were increasingly questioned. Populism found its way into not only an ideological but

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also an “aesthetic-cultural space for representation”, since the leaders of the people’s parties cultivated the lifestyle of urban middle-classes (Manow 2017). Whereas in the USA the weakness of left-wing liberalism, which is still liberal but no longer left, explains the rise of right-wing populism, in Germany it is social democracy, which has allegedly forgotten its traditional working-class supporters, which seems to be responsible for the wave of right-wing populism (Kaube 2017: 22). Populism has profited from the decline in the reputation of governments, political parties and professional politicians. Right-wing populist politics is above all identity politics. The agendas of populist groups are not usually based on coherent ideological strategies, but on constructions of cultural differences (Geden 2006: 209ff, 219). According to right-wing populist definitions, “the people” are predominantly virtuous and possess common sense, in contrast to the elites, who are mostly denounced as the “political class”. However, this evaluation causes problems for right-wing populists when they enter coalition governments (Hartleb 2004: 74ff, 122, 131; 2014: 222). Even then right-wing populists are not always consistent: criticism of the State in contrast to the glorification of the community does not prevent the State being strongly influenced by the community, as in the fight against crime and the prevention of illegal immigration. This does not prevent some occasionally invoking “Fortress Europe” to protect the continent against foreign immigration flows. Liberalist antipathy to too much State intervention does not prevent the occasional demand for State support in the economic development of one’s own country. Populism only became a significant topical theme in the new millennium and has increasingly become a battle cry in the political arena. Particularly since the rise of the AfD (Alternative for Germany), right-wing extremism has been discussed more frequently in Germany, the country that, according to the expert Mudde (2007: 303), has produced the most studies on right-wing extremism – see, for example, the comprehensive bibliography of Virchow et al. (2016/2017: 22–41). The two terms ‘populism’ and “right-wing extremism” have often either been conflated or treated completely separately. The wealth of applied terms listed by Mudde (2007: 11f), from “Extreme Right” to “reactionary tribalism”, have mostly included only individual aspects of right-wing populism. The chaotic terminology was attributed less to disagreements between authors than to lack of clear definitions. Historical change explains some of the differences. The terms have evolved with changes in the political system. In recent times, especially after the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War, systemic change in the democratic world has fostered many new groups that are not just political sects. New concepts had to be integrated into the landscape of the larger factions in party systems, but the majority of populism researchers accept right-wing populism as a notion that can be differentiated from both conservatism and right-wing extremism (Stöss 2013: 564ff). Right-wing extremism has become an established term since the German Constitutional Protection Service adopted it in 1974/75. A balance of left-wing and right-wing extremism was assumed to exist in many older symmetrical perceptions of party systems. It is only in recent times that the majority of researchers no longer believe in the equal role of left and right in the field of extremism. Bobbio (1994)

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explains the incomparability by noting that Leftists fight for social equality, while right-wing extremists believe in the inherent inequality of people. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union appear to have weakened left-wing populism in Europe. It has often moved closer to the centre to improve its chances of forming coalitions. In some countries, however, left-wing populism has remained far more consistent in its ideology and organisation than right-wing populism, the subject of this book (Chryssogelos 2011: 36). Analysis of right-wing populism seems to have developed little, because the term is often used to describe agitatorial behaviour and unsavoury methods of influencing the media. Occasionally, the propensity for violence has also been regarded as a characteristic of right-wing populism. With the populist enforcement of the party system, however, the inclination towards structural violence has been over-generalised (Salzborn 2015: 18). Right-wing populist and right-wing extremist attitudes are not always very far apart, according to a study conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Zick et al. 2016: 140). Astonishingly, the attitude of right-wing populists towards the homeless and long-term unemployed is even more negative than that of right-wing extremists. With regard to the willingness to use violence, the difference between right-wing populists (37%) and right-wing extremists (44%) is not as great as previously assumed. The term ‘populism’ was already in use in the nineteenth century, but it did not play a major role in general political discussions. After the defeat of Germany in 1945 even the concept of ‘Conservatism’ received relatively little attention. Indeed, ‘McCarthyism’ was the only expression which entered scientific discussion, as in the work of Seymour Martin Lipset. In older American populism, a so-called ‘producerism’ has been identified, which contrasts working people with unproductive groups, such as the long-term unemployed and people who depend on the State (Virchow et al. 2016/2017: 11). In the mid-1970s the “New Right” became an important topic of discussion. It was occasionally perceived as an offshoot of the Nouvelle Droite in France, which emerged from the alienation of the Extreme Right from Gaullism. Benoist (1985, 1986, 2014) was considered the head of the Nouvelle Droite in France. In Germany the New Right was popularised by Mohler (1950, 1989, 1958, 1974, 1993), forging an important international link between the two movements. Periodicals such as Criticón, which was edited for almost thirty years by Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing and covered a remarkable breadth of topics, Junge Freiheit (“Young Freedom”) and Nation und Europa (“Nation and Europe”) have become prominent discussion forums of the Right in Germany. These discussions contributed to the revival of conservatism, which was considered to have been discriminated against in Germany (Knöbl 2017: 6; Langebach/Raabe 2016: 566ff). Mohler’s favourite expression, “Conservative Revolution” – a forward – rather than backward-looking idea of conservatism, as outlined by Moeller van den Bruck – was rejected by many commentators as a contradiction in terms, as myth and fiction. All the same, the extreme New Right was no longer regarded as dictatorial and undemocratic as in the Weimar period (Traughber 1998: 19). However, in the style of the Weimar Republic, groups such as the German Republicans occasionally bandied about

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anti-European phrases, for instance that the Maastricht Treaty was a “Versailles without weapons”. In the EU the British National Party (BNP) and the Vlaams Belang (VB) were seen as encouraging anti-Humanist attitudes because they criticised uncontrolled immigration and the ‘Islamisation’ and weakening of Europe through globalisation. Rising crime rates were correlated with immigration, especially by the Swiss SVP (Vejvodová 2013: 378). Even a report by the German Institution of Constitutional Protection (Verfassungsschutz 1994: 157) denounced the New Right as an “intellectualisation of right-wing extremism”. The ideology of these groups was, however, classified as ‘thin-centred’ (Mudde 2004: 544). The German weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit filed a lawsuit at the Administrative Court in Düsseldorf on the grounds that such allegations were anti-constitutional, but the claim was rejected by the court (Stahl 2003: 24). By contrast, some authors, such as Backes/Jesse (1989: 136), regard the New Right as anti-constitutional. Backes, Jesse und Pfahl-Traughber (who worked for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution for ten years before becoming a professor) have been accused of developing a conception of right-wing populism that is orientated towards the needs of state security agencies (Büttner 2015: 20). Although this is probably an exaggeration by left-wing critics, the attitude of these authors towards right-wing populism is not very balanced. In the new millennium, the New Right fell out of favour as a discussion topic. Right-wing populism has replaced it as a central concept. For a while populism was classified at best as a “normal pathology”. Increasingly, however, some voices, including that of this author, have been saying that democracy needs to incorporate some elements of populism to help it align more closely with the views of the people. A rejection of every element of populism would be equivalent to the gradual abolition of democracy. According to democracy theory, a rapprochement with consumers of populism would become viable among uninitiated, disaffected and marginalised democrats (Hartleb 2014: 54). It is not entirely new to discover positive features of populism. ‘Pegida’ (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), for instance, has been dubbed a kind of “refreshing therapy for democracy” (Vorländer 2016: 146). The relationship between populism and right-wing extremism is relatively different and needs to be more carefully considered in the comparative analysis of democracy, especially with regard to party systems. My hypothesis is that in a neo-democratic phase of democracy populism acquires a positive meaning and is not the spectre that some suspect. Populist groups are by no means a negative elite but, as polls show, many populist beliefs are also shared by the average citizen. It is not only these hidden beliefs that are being articulated by populists. Occasionally their contributions to new topics also inspire traditional parties to implement plans more effectively. The most important thing seems to me to be that most right-wing populists are helping to limit the influence of radical right-wing extremism. In addition, in stark contrast to right-wing extremists, populist groups are able to form coalitions with Western democracies astonishingly fast (see Chap. 3). One reason for this is the decline of traditional parties in terms of members and ideologies. The erosion of these parties is splintering the party system – in Germany from formerly

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just three parties to six today – so coalitions are to be expected. Occasionally, traditional parties with declining numbers of members of parliament also assume populist traits in order to strengthen their position. Even if populism is flatly rejected, some traits and coalition opportunities must increasingly be taken into account by traditional parties. This leads to an invisible stabilisation of democracy, which can be described as neo-democracy because it opens up entirely new perspectives on policy-making (v. Beyme 2018). Only in this way can the insidious erosion of parliaments, management and some associations, such as trade unions, be stopped. Mudde (2007: 13f, 20) suggested that five distinct approaches could be used when comparing right-wing populist groups: (1) similarity between parties; (2) Max Weber’s mode of an ideal type; (3) accepting one existing party as the prototype of right-wing populism; (4) the lowest common denominator; (5) the largest common denominator. Despite all the differences, this fifth approach has highlighted astonishing similarities between Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. This has been partly explained by their common Germanic cultural roots, which in Belgium exist only in the Flemish region. Three ideological characteristics were identified: nativism, authoritarianism and populism, with populism regarded in this context as an ideological factor, not just a political style. The “right-wing trinity” of themes – corruption, immigration and security – in the policies of right-wing populists are often shared by the general population with regard to immigration (Mudde 2016: 10). It is difficult to generalise about similarities between right-wing populist groups because none of them develop a distinct ideology but draw on nationalism, neoliberalism and even social democracy. The adopted elements of these ideologies frequently contradict each other, a fact which is seldom recognised by propagandistic populists, who are not inclined to take a rational approach to defining their identity. The classification of populism as the ‘Right’ or “Extreme Right” is problematic because historically “the Right” was regarded as an opponent of modernity, which is not always true today. The current mixture of modern and pre-modern elements in populist ideologies makes it harder to classify parties within the traditional right-wing/left-wing scheme. Right-wing extremists are not the same as national-populist groups. The former are against the system, whereas the populists are only against the Establishment. Right-wing extremists are anti-pluralistic, but that is only partially true of populists. The party format among right-wing extremists is clearly authoritarian, whereas populists tend to develop a top-down party which is critical of other parties and has little internal democracy (Frölich-Steffen/Rensmann 2005: 10). ‘Extremism’ has increasingly replaced the term “political radicalism”. Extremism is usually associated with politically organised agitation against the democratic constitution (Jaschke 2006: 124). Particularly since the outlawing of the German Communist party (KPD), the German institution for the protection of the constitution (the Verfassungsschutz) has applied the term ‘extremism’ to opponents of the liberal-democratic perspective. In order to safeguard the democratic constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 5, 85: 141) deemed it necessary

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to consider imposing “restrictions on the political freedom of action of the opponents”. This attitude was not universally endorsed in political science research circles because it meant that the State was thereby giving itself the authority to determine how political movements should be defined. Since the spread of populism, which raises questions about the simplistic concept of a clear axis from right to left, this ‘statism’ seems even more dangerous than in Chancellor Adenauer’s era because it could hinder the development of new concepts of democracy. Even the Verfassungsschutz (the department concerned with the protection of the Constitution) has stopped discrediting the term ‘radicalism’ and accepted the idea of radical political critique, as there is no evidence of a unified extremist ideology (Kailitz 2004: 16). In other countries there are several different ‘radical’ groups which reflect their country’s own national history. In France, for example, there are the “counter-revolutionary nationalists”; the “revolutionary nationalists”, who are often pro-fascist and anti-religious; and authoritarian groups, which have sometimes been called ‘Bonapartist’. The term “right-wing extremism” seems easier to define. A common principle can be detected: the tendency of right-wing extremists to define the state as a vague “people’s community”. “The people” are considered to be simplistic and homogenous. These movements are associated with a certain anti-pluralism, an authoritarian concept of society and a tendency to think in terms of black and white alternatives (Pfahl-Traughber 2006: 14f). In more recent terminological developments this ‘community’ is not always racist, but is often regarded as being composed of several ethnicities. In countries with several ethnic groups, such as Belgium, the populist group Vlaams Belang supports the political independence of Flanders. Even where there are no linguistic differences, as in northern and southern Italy, the Lega Nord (“Northern League”) has tried to liberate the state from the so-called “south Italian parasites”. In counterpoint to ethnically mixed countries with factions which subscribe to populist arrogance stands Canada. In 2015 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said, “There is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada, just shared values” (FAZ 30. 6. 2017: 3). Mainstream parties often use the word ‘populism’ as a term of abuse, but this usage has not always been consistent: Gandhi and de Gaulle were regarded as ‘good’ populists, whereas Sinn Fein and Basque leaders were conventionally seen as ‘bad’ populists. Even in Nazi Germany National Socialism was classified as a “populist order” that did not represent democracy (Möllers 2009: 35). The main criterion for such classifications was rightly the tendency of a movement to sanction terrorist violence. In Germany, which was quick to constitutionalise the interdiction of political parties – a scheme sometimes imitated by other countries, such as Russia – the outlawing of populist movements was discussed. However, even in the case of clearly right-wing extremist parties such as Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD), people have become cautious about suggesting bans due to past failures to induce the Constitutional Court to issue them. Populist criticism of the official party system is not always consistent. Right-wing populist groups often start out as citizens’ initiatives with communitarian names such as ‘League’ (Italy), ‘Front’ (France), ‘Movement’ (Poland,

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Hungary), ‘Union’ (Ukraine) and ‘Alliance’ (Germany), but nevertheless constitute themselves with growing success as a ‘Party’. They are granted State privileges, even when they keep their old name. “People’s Party” (Slovakia) offers a terminological compromise between populist movement and party. Right-wing populism often seems closer to the middle of the spectrum of political movements than right-wing radicalism. The boundaries with conservatism are more blurred than with right-wing extremism. Right-wing populists usually avoid anti-democratic stances and specialise in particular issues, such as immigration, opposition to the “political class” and the European Union. But as the AfD (Alternative for Germany) has demonstrated, the term “right-wing populism” makes it hard to decide whether it describes a democratic or in fact an extremist party. Recent developments have greatly changed the political theories which underlie the theses about parties. Post-materialist theories were adopted and, with the decline of social democracy as the strongest force in the party system, neo-Keynesianism was temporarily superseded by neo-liberalism, characterised by a tendency towards non-intervention by the state and limiting State benefits and social support. It is therefore no coincidence that Scandinavian countries like Denmark and Norway pioneered the development of new right-wing parties. Liberal parties, like the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) and the Swiss People’s Party, turned to right-wing populism. By 2017 this development seemed to be on the decline again, although there had not been an economic crisis, as in 2008/2009. Most right-wing populists are considered anti-liberal. However, through their criticism of the State, some right-wing populists seem to be closer to traditional Conservatives and opposed to neo-liberalism, especially when they demand tax breaks for the middle classes and advocate the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. In this respect, Mudde’s (2016: 4) classification of neo-populists as ‘anti-liberal’ is a bit one-sided. However, there are few neo-liberal pleas for protectionist measures against exports from low-wage countries. The neo-liberal aspect of populists has been recognised as a departure from the fascist anti-capitalism of the NPD and the British National Party (BNP) (Camus in: Bathke/Spindler 2006: 22f). The closer right-wing populism gets to right-wing extremism, the closer it gets to economic protectionism – like the Front National in France (Hartleb 2004: 138, 140f). The main dividing line between right-wing extremism and right-wing populism remains its attitude towards the use of force. Whenever violence is glorified, tolerant populism theorists like Mudde (2016: 134), who was sceptical about the constant search for reasons to prohibit right-wing parties in Germany, have agreed to the outlawing of irascible parties in emergency situations. Despite some predictions, right-wing populists have not become a temporary phenomenon. This has contributed to right-wing populism being judged more harshly by social scientists. However, the development of right-wing populism has varied greatly in different European countries. Germany showed strong resistance to the establishment of a parliamentary party not because it was progressive, but because institutions like the five-per cent clause and federalism hinder the emergence of new parties in general, not just those on the right-wing side of the party spectrum. In countries once hailed by Gerhard Lehmbruch as stable concordance

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democracies, such as Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands, a party system which formerly seemed immobile seemed to be changing astonishingly fast. Given the different incentives for and obstacles to right-wing populist parties, it is not surprising that the European Parliament group Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS) could only survive for a short time. In the early days after the Second World War, populism was sometimes considered “normal pathology”, as in the work of Scheuch/Klingemann (1967: 12f). However, this theory was criticised because it levelled out the differences between right-wing and left-wing extremism (Salzborn 2015: 94ff). Since the spread of populism across Europe, the eminent author Mudde (2007: 296; 2016: 3) has developed the theory of “normal pathology” and spoken of “pathological normality”, which is classified as democratic but anti-liberal. The latter has proved to be only partially correct. After an initially normative condemnation of populism, there are more and more analysts in every democracy who consider a shot of populism necessary to achieve a closer relationship with “the people” (Hartleb, 2014: 54). Although the author of this book has occasionally been denounced in the Press as a “populist mind-setter”, he considers populism vital, if only because it helps to mitigate the development of right-wing radicalism and increase the number of options for coalitions. The “democracy of negotiation” is not the first choice of populists, but as soon as they have become established, they are ready to accept negotiation and reduce their glorification of plebiscites and referendums. Only a minority of populists have praised the council system – sometimes misleadingly called the Soviet system – as an alternative to the parliamentary system. A few theorists have identified parallels between council systems and populists, which has created a new synthesis (Puhle 2003: 28). However, this hypothesis has not contributed much to empirical research, since, almost from its inception, the “Soviet system” was combined with authoritarian dictatorships and rarely inspired groups who wanted to transform the parliamentary system into a less elitist rule. In Argentina the ‘justicialismo’ of Perón was vaunted as a third way between capitalism and socialism. The council system in its pre-Soviet form was not a dictatorship, but it was under Perón. Social democrats and Labour politicians have also occasionally dreamed of the “third way”. Criticism of existing political alternatives has played a significant role in this, along with a vision of new projects which could not be realised in a democracy of negotiation (Sturm 2010). However, empirical studies, especially in Switzerland, have shown that voting participation in referendums can be very low – often only 30%. An increase in the number of ballots does not encourage voters to vote. Public perceptions often turn out to be a mistake. Therefore, a well-organised minority which is directed by a powerful group can assert its opinion unilaterally. Early on, Puhle (2003: 26) saw parallels between council movements and populists, which allegedly led to amalgamations. However, this phenomenon is, at best, true in theory only. Otherwise, populist parties only tend to use referendums as a counterbalance to parliamentary decisions which favour the elite. There has hardly ever been a populist vision to transform a parliamentary democracy into a council democracy.

1.2 Globalisation, Immigration and Populism

1.2

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Globalisation, Immigration and Populism

The least differences in the right-wing populist camp seem to occur with regard to the topic of immigration. The mainstream parties, such as the German Social Democrats (SPD) and the French Socialist Party (PS), have shown less unity in this respect. Often concrete efforts at integration were also made at party level by local party officials (Volkert 2017: 331). That is also partially true of populist parties. Migration is not always rejected by right-wing populists, but immigrants are expected to assimilate to the culture of their adopted country. Support for integration fell short of cherished expectations, as many of the new immigration laws promoted exclusion rather than integration, such as the revocation of work and residence permits and the extension of the discretionary powers of public authorities (Reißland 2002: 42). For a long time, in enlightened states of Europe, globalism seemed the only serious goal of integration. The abstract debate on the tensions between globalisation and nationalism has taken on a new dimension because of the refugee crisis: with regard to human rights, it is not recognition of individual rights that is the goal of many migrants, but recognition of group rights that enable refugees and migrants to keep their existing cultural identity instead of being pressured to exchange it for that of the host country. Populist fears are derived from the tendency towards globalisation. Political disaffection is widespread among voters. The seamless integration of immigrants from non-European cultures is considered unlikely by both populists and many citizens who do not belong to political organisations. Nevertheless, the significance of immigration (see Table) and parties’ reactions to it differ greatly across Europe. The percentage of the population born abroad is more significant than the abstract number of immigrants born abroad (see Table 1.1). With 11.5 million people born abroad, Germany ranks top of the larger European countries – and is even ahead of the USA. But a higher proportion of the population was born abroad in smaller countries such as Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland. With regard to integration and support, Sweden and Germany were judged top, even though in Germany the question of whether to allow migrants’ families to join them has not yet been resolved. Germany had the highest proportion in 2015–16, with 1.1 million new asylum seekers, who made up 1.44% of the population – higher than the USA (434,700), Turkey (211,400) and Italy (205,400). But as a percentage of the population, the numbers of new asylum seekers in Sweden (1.83%) and Austria (1.47%) exceeded the German level. These figures seem to imply that immigration is falling. However, due to the relocation of migration routes, this judgement is premature, especially since the plight in Africa has changed the countries of origin of migrants. It seems certain that immigration has fostered both right-wing populism and right-wing extremism.

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Table 1.1 Proportion of the population born abroad in millions and percentages Country

Number born abroad in millions

USA 44.3 Germany 11.5 Great Britain 9.0 France 8.0 Canada 7.3 Australia 6.7 Spain 6.1 Italy 5.9 Switzerland 2.4 Netherlands 2.1 Belgium 1.9 Israel 1.8 Sweden 1.7 Sources OECD, FAZ 30. 6. 2017:19

1.3

Proportion of population in percentages (%) 13.5 14.2 13.9 12.3 20.3 28.0 13.2 9.9 29.1 12.2 16.6 22.5 17.1

Connecting Populist Ideologies to Political Theories of the Past

An early attempt to analyse extremist approaches can be seen in the work of Émile Durkheim, according to whom modern industrial society, with its division of labour, leads to social disintegration. From Talcott Parsons to Ulrich Beck, these thoughts have been developed many times (Kailitz 2004: 196). In the post-war period, the early forms of populism were often treated psychologicallypathologically, for example in the tradition of Reich’s Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) and Adorno et al.’s Authoritarian Personality (1950). These studies have correctly been criticised for being too narrowly concentrated on fascism and National Socialism (Mudde 2016: 4). Populists have helped to exaggerate the term ‘crisis’. Right-wing crisis talk was not taken seriously as a theoretical approach. But left-wing populism was supported by serious theories, such as the crisis typology of early Habermas (1973: 67). In addition to the much discussed economic crisis, this analysed the “rationality crisis” and the “legitimacy crisis” in the political system. In the social-cultural system, a “motivation crisis” was added. Above all, according to Habermas, the administrative system was responsible for a rationality crisis because it no longer produced the necessary rational decisions. Additionally, the legitimating system no longer provided the requisite level of generalisable stimuli and thus created the legitimation crisis. Even Habermas (1981 I: 18) – who, because of friction between his supervisors in the Frankfurt school, completed his habilitation thesis at the University of Marburg under the political scientist Wolfgang Abendroth – criticised political science because it only ever studied the subjective factors of crises and

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legitimation through surveys without considering any theoretical notions of legitimacy. Even economics – which focused far more on quantitative trends – was judged more favourably than political science because it took into account the concept of ‘crises’. According to Habermas (1981 II: 473), several processes threatened the living world, including monetisation and commercialisation imposed by “the system”. Bureaucratisation and jurisdiction were later no longer tackled from the perspective of a global crisis. However, civil society was constantly under threat from these processes, according to the later work of Habermas (1992: 446). More influential later analyses of populism emerged from the debate on postmaterialism. While postmaterialism departed from older materialistic and economic interpretations of social developments, it did help to explain some aspects of populist thought. By contrast, the type of youth movements which played a significant role between the two World Wars were regarded by theorists as having less influence on populism. It has been claimed that right-wing extremist attitudes were often inspired by subcultures that were fundamentally wrong, such as skinheads and hooligans. Right-wing extremists have often sought to forge links with militant youth cultures, such as skinheads, but police investigations indicate that less than 10% of modern-day hooligans show any interest in right-wing extremist activities. ‘Naziskins’ were not a German invention and first emerged in Great Britain. Government agencies had considerable difficulty in dealing with such groups. An initial ban on a hooligan group by the Interior Ministry in Saxony-Anhalt was overturned by the Supreme Administrative Court because the name “Blue White Street Elite” did not contravene the rules of the Associations Acts. In the USA the Alternative Right Movement grew stronger under President Trump. It was anchored in popular and consumer culture and chiefly spread on Twitter. Right-wing Trump supporters, Islam haters, racists and even neo-Nazis gathered in this movement. It was automatically assumed that the President himself belonged to it (Oehmke 2017: 67). In the new millennium it suddenly seemed that the 68ers (the generation born at the end of the Second World War and politicised by the student uprisings of the late 1960s) were not just inspiring a few Leftists, but starting to forge links between the Right and the old Left; the Right was no longer dominated by the middle classes but included confrontational rabble-rousers and was not just confined to narrow nationalist issues. Kubitschek (2007, 2016) is one of those right-wing populists who have been heavily inspired by the APO (Außerparlamentarische – extra-parliamentary – Opposition) and take no pains to hide it. Kubitschek was one of the founders of the New Right. His colleague Dieter Stein, however, considered this term inappropriate. Kubitschek’s track record in right-wing movements was somewhat comical. The AfD rejected his membership application in 2015, which was attributed to the then chairman Bernd Lucke. In 2007 he launched KSA (Conservative Subversive Action), which sporadically disrupted left-wing conferences. Priester (2012) summed up these actions as “incessant thirst for action with the charm of student events”. Since the early 1990s bans on extremist groups have reinforced decentralisation in right-wing circles and increased their distance from established organisations. Revolutionary self-confidence, violence and strong mobilisation characterised the

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newer right-wing extremist milieu (Schellenberg 2011). Insecure right-wing extremist groups hid within organisations such as the National Socialist Underground (NSU) (Bundschuh 2012: 28ff). The assumption of the well-known publicist Weiß (2017: 10f) that right-wing attitudes remained unchanged despite some shifts in the political mood seems hardly tenable to me with regard to populism in all its variants, which the author barely touched on. Democracy has been accused of constantly shifting its goal-posts, obliging conservatism, like right-wing extremism, to change too. Even Crouch (2008: 13), who popularised the concept of post-democracy, admitted that in post-democracy no rules had been developed which overtly challenged traditional democracy. The institutions have proven to be surprisingly stable. But right-wing populism has made a particular contribution to the institutions of democracy. However, the demand for referendums is not new, having been issued by the Greens and the Social Democrats and occasionally even been tried by regional branches of the Christian Democrats. The assertion “A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of populism” (Hillebrand 2015: 7) deliberately echoes the opening lines of Marx and Engels’s Communist manifesto. But although the term ‘populism’ has been heavily over-used in recent years, it hardly constitutes a spectre. According to Priester (2007: 8ff, 23f, 41; 2012: 3), it refers to relationships which can only be defined in terms of opposing concepts. Two aspects dominated: • The social-psychological level, which explored latent attitudes such as xenophobia, racism, ethnocentricity and anti-Semitism. Sometimes paradoxical results have come to light, such as the AfD recently portraying itself as Israel-friendly while party members nevertheless continued to hound Jews (Langer 2017). • The political style, appearance and rhetoric of populists. In a speech in Germany in October 2010 Geert Wilders viewed communism as in decline. But Islam has emerged as a quasi-equivalent. Criticism of Islam amounted to the resuscitation/resurrection of the old Friend/Enemy relationship. Communism was considered by some populists to be relatively short-lived, whereas the friction between Europe and Islam has lasted for one and a half millennia. “Libertarian, patriotic, critical of Islam” became the new order of principles in right-wing populism. Populism was portrayed as a consequence of social crisis and the representative democracy. The crisis is attributed to narrowing down politics to technocratic governance, which alienates the two pillars of democracy: the constitutional state and the sovereignty of the people. The constitutional state mistrusts on principle the self-regulation of a sovereign people. Populist movements are agenda setters and a progressive corrective for outdated institutions. Occasionally a distinction has been made between protest populism and identity populism.

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• Protest populism focuses on a single issue, such as taxation. It is extra-parliamentary and takes direct action. • Identity populism, on the other hand, is multi-dimensional and parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary (Priester 2012: 7). International populism has sometimes been regarded as somewhere between a communication style and an ideology, and some specialists have differentiated between a “strategy school” and an “ideology school” (Hartleb 2014: 42). However, a firm ideology was nowhere to be found. “Ideology without a world-view” seemed to activate ideological forms with variable content (Reinfeldt 2000: 3). This idiosyncrasy of populism readily led to one populist theory becoming the appendage of another ideology. It was therefore compared to other movements, such as feminism and environmentalism (Freeden 1996: 485). Such “thin ideologies” were accused of lacking a vision for the future due the absence of a political project and of being purely voter-orientated (Hartleb 2014: 44). The two aspects – political style and ideological theory – were rightly considered insufficient. The Revolt against the modern state involves an inadequately thought-through theory, rooted in the triangle of anarchy, liberalism and conservatism. It is considered a “popular variant of the conservative mindset”. The classic populist leitmotiv was “individual self-regulation”. The high degree of compatibility with different political ideologies was striking. However, the Left has developed at best a luke-warm relationship with populism. The accusation of populism against right-wing – and recently also left-wing – parties is widespread, and often seems to take the place of a proper analytical breakdown of the problems. To identify conservatism with populism seems rather perverse, especially since traditional conservatives are the least populist compared with other groups. The lack of consistency in populist ideologies makes the concept of populism hard to define in terms of coherent attitudes that remain stable over time. Some analysts (Abromeit 2016: 237ff) begin their discussions with the French Revolution and regard relatively rational theories, such as those of Abbé Sieyès and his famous pamphlet, What is the Third Estate?, as the origins of populism. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the French politician and founder of mutualist philosophy, was declared to be a populist socialist who retained his attachment to bourgeois economic theories. With his pessimism about human nature, his outlook seemed closer to that of counter-revolutionary theorists like de Maistre and Bonald than true socialists from Fourier to Marx. The anti-elitism of the early populists was apparent in their criticism of the aristocracy. Even if many historical judgements about individual theorists are rejected, it can be shown that early populism was in many ways related to the established three main ideologies – liberalism, conservatism and socialism. What developed as a revolutionary bourgeois theory was often partially adapted by everyone from socialists to the later fascists. In the nineteenth century populist movements such as the Russian Narodniki and the American People’s Party mainly targeted the rural population. In both cases populism certainly felt democratic. Some interpreters have exaggeratedly claimed that the Narodniki turned their back on peasants and placed their revolutionary

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hopes in terrorism (Pfahl-Traughber 1994: 17; Taggart 2000: 46–53; Wolf 2017: 5). This simplistic judgement does not stand up to theoretical-historical analysis (v. Beyme 1965). In Latin America populism did not emerge until the twentieth century. It has been quite successful there, at least if you classify Juan Domingo Perón, with his revolution of 1943, as a populist. Typically South American was the overthrow of the president by the military in October 1945. Radical-populist rebellions and general strikes forced the military to yield. In this way Perón was able to win the election as presidential candidate in February 1946. With her common touch, the endeavours of his wife Evita enhanced his popularity. Reforms which favoured the poor, who Perón championed, kept him in power for a long time. Although, on its emergence in the nineteenth century, the concept of populism was regarded in America as an “anarcho-conservative” theory for a ‘progressive’ movement of anti-capitalist farmers, in the twentieth century it was often polemically used against Conservative politicians like Margaret Thatcher. But, from feminism to environmentalism, even movements that steadily progressed have not been exempt from this hostile terminology. All movements which put forward controversial arguments and adopt a position contrary to that of the rest of the world are in danger of this. Populism has often been classified as a “rhetorical style”. This, however, has not made it readily distinguishable from other parties which had developed a similar style, insofar as they had charismatic leaders. Populists have often avoided using this concentration on style to spread unpopular theories (Mudde 2008: 13). Recently, populism has been associated with postmodernism, with which it shares an anti-hierarchical, anti-totalitarian and allegedly even anti-authority attitude, although the term populism has not been used by Welsch (1987: 319ff), a pioneer of postmodern theory. His “Pluralism as a Basic Image” of postmodernism is only partly true of most populist movements. It certainly does not apply to those who hold a uniform idea of the people. Even protectionism in economic concepts, which predominates in Eastern Europe populism, contradicts the positive image of postmodern pluralism in Welsch. The more strongly populism is perceived as predominantly right-wing populism, the more it is identified with nativist body politics, racism, xenophobia, sexism and, often wrongly and indiscriminately, anti-Semitism. Right-wing populism is often a foreign term. Many populists emphasise their liberalism. It is then interpreted as ‘conservative’ but not “right-wing extremist”. Often the commitment to ‘regionalism’ is a pluralistic counterpart to nationalist right-wing populism. In many cases populism was also used as a polemical term that contributed to the inflated use of the concept. Democracy was demanded but applied only unilaterally. In most cases the populist concept of democracy excluded the strict political and legal rules in the constitutional state that is the counterpart of modern democracy. As a country with a history of pronounced political metaphysics and Protestant traditions which was dealing with the aftermath of its years as an authoritarian state, Germany initially leaned towards right-wing populism less than other countries (Priester 2007: 27). Increasingly inflammatory political remarks have occasionally

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even led to a convergence with Nazi ideas, for example when Frauke Petry, as leader of the AfD, declared that the term ‘folkish’ – discredited because of the Nazis – should be revived (Welt am Sonntag 11.9.2016), or when the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte dropped a clanger by saying that all drug addicts in the country should be killed after the model of the Holocaust. The variety of populist variants, from traditional left-wing adherents to admirers of Hitler, is of little analytical use. The danger of a generic term like populism is that it risks leading to a search for general solutions (Nabers/Stengel 2017: 5f). A more restricted definition like Mudde’s (2007: 23) sees populism occurring where: • an ideology distinguishes between the “morally pure people” and the “corrupt elites” • and the proportion of its own ideology is so low that borrowing from other political concepts becomes necessary, which can lead to variations between right-wing and left-wing populism. According to Müller (2016: 3), on the other hand, populism is neither an ideology nor a political style, but a form of identity. Globalisation is regarded as one of the roots of populism because traditional cultures feel their existence is being threatened. Even the term ‘democracy’ is confined to specific regions. According to some theorists (Halfwassen 2017: 12), democracy as the sovereignty of the people can only exist if a nation exists as a sponsor. Universal states are considered incapable of democracy. A World State would therefore not be desirable, and even a European State has often been accepted only as a theoretical concept of “Europe of the Fatherlands” (de Gaulle). In time of globalisation, clear affiliations and clear boundaries are apparent in phrases such as “true Germans”. However, to widespread acclaim, Müller was criticised for defining categories too narrowly – only to the Right, not to the Left (Nabers/Stengel 2017: 11). Since populism is usually classified as right-wing, this is not very surprising. From the inception of right-wing and left-wing movements, the populist proportions of left-wing movements are more random and derive less from the core of leftist ideologies. Leftists tend to be more inclusive more than right-wing supporters, who chiefly exclude undesirables from their political statements. Left-wing criticism is still linked to the ideological foundation insofar as it is primarily directed at neoliberalism and contemporary forms of capitalism. The Greek radical-left party Syriza rails against the EU and the neoliberal austerity policies in Europe. However, this party is not fundamentally opposed to European integration and even advocates deepening the European Union (Stavrakakis/ Katsambekis 2014). This is taken as evidence that left-wing criticism of the EU is not as damaging to Europe as some of the views of right-wing populists. Right-wing populists are more interested in questions of national identity and aim for the exclusion of foreign immigrants and restrictions on their own nation. In America in the nineteenth century there was a populist movement of the exploited black minority fighting for equality (Ali 2010: 3). In a way, this represented a ‘counter-populism’ directed against the populism which aimed to transform the

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white race. Meanwhile, this transformation is in demand because as early as the year 2000 fifty per cent of Americans believed that whites already represented the minority in the country. However, on closer analysis, racists feared that non-hispanic whites had dropped below two-thirds of the white population, while in 1960 they accounted for 90% of it (sources citing Nabers/Stengel 2017: 19). Populist groups are divided according their intensity into moderate, radical and extreme (Decker 2016). It is only these subgroups which make it possible to judge the extent of the dangers posed by populist movements. The conditions for the emergence of right-wing populist parties can be ascribed to very different combinations of reasons: (1) One significant variable is based on the proximity and distance of the parties in the national system. Moderate populists can be the stimulus for political debate and coalition-building. Extremist populists, on the other hand, appear dangerous and certainly not capable of forming coalitions with parties of the centre. Occasionally, however, the literature suggests that mainstream parties such as the Christian Democrats and the Conservatives have moved towards populism (Schäfer 2010). Such a scenario has so far, however, only lasted a short time, as in Austria (2000–2002) and the Netherlands (2010–2012). The successes of right-wing populists have mostly been due to mistakes made by the Social Democrats, who chased the votes of new groups and left some of their core electorate out in the cold. In Denmark, Sweden and Finland the Social Democrats have suffered greater damage from right-wing populism than Conservative or Christian Democrat parties. In Norway, on the other hand, the success of the Progressive Party was mostly at the expense of the liberal-conservative Høyre. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats lost a similar number of votes to right-wing populists (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 23, 26f). In the Netherlands, the populism of Geert Wilders’ PVV has been blamed for the demise of the country’s Christian Democrat Party. In Germany, however, the populists have not really been able to weaken the CDU-CSU. In May 2017 the AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia got less than 10% of the votes, while the CDU succeeded in ousting the SPD, which had been in power for decades. There was also little correlation between the rise of right-wing populists and the question of which party was currently governing in any given country. In Germany the AfD grew because a grand coalition between the CDU-CSU and the SPD which made it difficult to identify which was responsible for unpopular policies. All these insights suggest that the rise of right-wing populists is related to the general loosening of ties between party supporters and their parties. (2) In policies that the parties sought to promote, European integration and the regulation of immigration played a prominent role in the development of right-wing populists. French Socialists were more open to immigration than the more cautious SPD in Germany, which therefore probably lost fewer votes to right-wing populists than its French counterpart. The CDU gained votes

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through a counter-campaign against the Red-Green coalition’s vision of a liberal naturalisation law (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 25f). Alongside the question of immigration, the attitude towards the EU is the key issue for right-wing populists. Occasionally, the focus has shifted from the immigration issue to the EU debate, as occurred with Wilders in the Netherlands. Not all right-wing populists are opposed to the EU. This is somewhat true of the “mild Eurosceptics”. Some populists regard Europe as merely too bureaucratic. Above all, the erosion of national sovereignty is lamented. (3) The institutional factor plays a reinforcing or softening role in the development of right-wing populism. Proportional Representation makes it easier for populist parties to develop. The boundaries are very different in Europe: the Netherlands at 0.67%, Denmark 2%, Austria and Norway 4%, Germany 5%. In Belgium and Slovakia the five-per cent hurdle applies only at electoral level. The majority voting system seems the best defence against right-wing populists. At a certain level, however, majority voting rights, such as in Great Britain, seem to trigger a greater strengthening effect. By contrast, the two-tier one-person majority system in France has even prevented populists entering Parliament when they have over 15% of the vote. It was not until 2012 that the Front National won two constituencies und was able to use Parliament to strengthen its position. (4) The media plays a crucial role in the rise of right-wing populism. Populists usually have a close relationship with the media. However, few populist leaders have developed such as close relationship with it as Berlusconi in Italy and Perón in Argentina. The boundaries of so-called politainment (political entertainment) have become fluid. It is irrefutable that the media promote populism because they encourage politicians to be populist and thus build a parasitic relationship with democracy. Populist leaders tend to present themselves as having emerged from the people. The internet provides an important platform for self-promotion (Diehl 2012: 2ff), but it is not uniformly effective. There are favourable media landscapes, as in Switzerland, Austria and Italy. They facilitated the rise of Jörg Haiders of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria). The Kronenzeitung in particular often reported favourably on the key policies of the FPÖ. (5) The role of charismatic leaders, such as Jörg Haider, Pim Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Christoph Blocher and the Kaczyńskis in Poland, had a decisive effect on the establishment of right-wing populist parties. In popular literature President Trump is often portrayed as a populist, based on the characteristics of self-expression. However, he could also be described as an anti-populist, as he usually torpedoes progressive populist projects towards emancipation and pays homage to chauvisism, anti-pluralism and unilateralism. His anti-pluralism was also branded anti-populist because he believed that he alone knew what the people wanted and gave himself the right to be intolerant against dissent (Nabers/Stengel 2017: 17ff, 22f). Trump broke all definitions of political

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stances: with regard to women, for example – although his daughter actually called him a feminist – he was considered a misogynist when he glorified Sharia law in 2008 because it allowed men to divorce without the wife’s consent (New York Daily News 1 January 2016). In foreign police, this egocentric position led to the assertion that the USA had been systematically ripped off and that environmental policy against climate change was an “expensive joke”. The five criteria are constantly shifting their weight, for example as a result of growing immigration and increasing the “European fatigue” of many citizens. Also important is the counter-strategy of the most affected conservative and Christian Democrat parties. Four countermeasures have been identified (Grabow-Hartleb 2013: 36): • Complete polarisation, as in Switzerland, Poland, Denmark since 2011, Sweden, Lithuania and Slovakia. • Partial rapprochement: the UMF in France and the Conservatives in the UK. • Toleration by central governments of right-wing populists: CDA in the Netherlands, 2010–12; KF in Denmark until 2011; CD&V in Belgium, 2007– 2008. • Formal coalition: ÖVP in Austria, 2000–2002; Høyre in Norway since 2013. These four attitudes have not remained permanent. Often Conservative parties, such as the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands, have revised their strategy. However, such changes carry serious risks. Old Conservative and Christian Democrat supporters may feel repelled by too strong a rapport with populists, as Sarkozy did in 2012, when a member of his group took a more hardline stance on immigration issues than Marine Le Pen. For a long time, the Christian Democrats have identified most closely with the EU. It is therefore harder for them to enter into ‘anti-European’ alliances with right-wing populists. In a visual representation of the conditions required for populist parties to triumph, the existence of a relevant right-wing populist party was questionable only for Germany (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 32) – hopefully a bit premature! There is also research into the “American-positive” variant of populism that brings together heterogeneous sections of the population and strives for more democracy (Grattan 2016: 10f). The leading populist researcher Mudde (2016) sees the emergence of populist movements as less dangerous than the adoption of many of the demands of these groups by mainstream parties. It seems to me, on the other hand, that this take-over represents the rapprochement of mainstream parties and populist challengers, neutralising the dangers of democracy. The Republicans have already been neutralised in this way in Germany. Such a rapprochement does not always lead to the collapse of populist groups, as in Germany and once in France during the Fourth Republic. Nevertheless, the immigration crisis has created an unprecedented situation: xenophobia and criticism of the elites in mainstream parties radiate from the mainstream parties. New social movements are a sign of the “Generation Social Media” times. For example, the Pirate Party insisted on total transparency, thereby threatening the

1.3 Connecting Populist Ideologies to Political Theories of the Past

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individual’s right to the protection of private intellectual property and trampling over the right to privacy (Hank 2012: 13). But populist movements cannot be denounced outright as ‘anti-modern’, as they propagate strong elements of modern political concepts. “Deliberative democracy” is a normative hope, but post-democracy has not come any closer to achieving it. Fundamental criticism of the system barely exists in globalisation theories. Former leftists like Hardt/Negri (2002), with their term ‘Empire’, no longer even hoped for a change to the system any more. Foucault’s attitude gained ground: every power structure contains its countervailing power. Populism is already offered by clever leaders as just such an element of ‘counter-power’. Giddens (1994: 112) had intended his “dialogic democracy” to be a positive development of representative democracy. It was not a question of new rights and representation as in the old system, but the promotion of cultural cosmopolitanism, which can be crucial for the “reconstruction of social solidarity”. The opposite of this normative concept has effectively already taken place: identity politics have often moved in the direction of segregation identity politics (v. Beyme 2007: 91ff). Even Crouch (2005, 2008: 119ff) was bleak about the possibility of developing populism in the direction of universal theoretical concepts. Identity politics is the slogan of post-democracy – but “Nor will populism be contested by trying to move beyond identity politics to a Third Way political appeal which tries to evade every idea of identity”. Political parties that pretend to represent the masses do so, as a rule, through definitions of the “Identity of the People”. The more these identities are artfully ‘reconstructed’, the more frequently alternative identities are neglected. Even before ‘post-democracy’ there were differences between “cultural fundamentalists”, who believe in “nation une et indivisible” (“one indivisible nation”) and the multiculturalists. Both make the same mistake of treating collective identities as an absolute (Möllers 2009: 51) – only they characterise this identity in different ways.

References Abromeit, John et al. (Ed.). Transformations of Populisms in Europe and the Americas. London, Bloomsbury, 2016. Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson and Nevitt Sanford. The Authoritarian Personality, Studies in Prejudice Series, Volume 1. New York: Harper & Row, 1950. Ali, Omar H.: The Lion’s Mouth: Black Populism in the New South, 1886–1900. Jackson, University of Mississippi, 2010. Backes, Uwe / Jesse, Eckhard: Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989. Bathke, Peter / Spindler, Susanne (Ed.): Neoliberalismus und Rechtsextremismus in Europa. Berlin, Karl Dietz Verlag, 2006. Benoist, Alain de: Kulturrevolution von rechts. Krefeld, Sinus-Verlag, 1985. Benoist, Alain de: Demokratie: Das Problem. Tübingen, Hohenrain, 1986. Benoist, Alain de: Mein Leben. Wege eines Denkens. Berlin, Junge Freiheit, 2014.

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v. Beyme, Klaus: Politische Soziologie im zaristischen Rußland. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1965. v. Beyme, Klaus: Föderalismus und regionales Bewusstsein. Ein internationaler Vergleich. Munich, Beck, 2007. v. Beyme, Klaus: Von der Postdemokratie zur Neodemokratie. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2013. v. Beyme, Klaus: From Post-Democracy to Neo-Democracy. Heidelberg, Springer, 2018. Bobbio, Norberto: Rechts und Links. Gründe und Bedeutungen einer politischen Unterscheidung. Berlin, Wagenbach, 1994. Bundschuh, Stephan: Die braune Seite der Zivilgesellschaft: Rechtsextreme Sozialraumstrategien. APuZG 62, B 18/19: 2012: 28–33. Büttner, Hans-Peter: Die Extremisten, der Staat und die gute „Mitte der Gesellschaft“. Eine Kritik der Grundlagen der „Extremismus“-Theorie. Kritiknetz: Zeitschrift für Kritische Theorie der Gesellschaft, 2015: 1–26. Camus, Jean-Yves: Die europäische extreme Rechte: ein populistisches und ultraliberales Projekt. In.: Bathke/Spindler 2006: 22f. Chryssogelos, Angelos-Stylianos: Old Ghosts in New Sheets: European Populist Parties and Foreign Policy. Brüssel, Centre for European Studies, 2011. Crouch, Colin: Post-Democracy. Cambridge, Polity, 2004, 2005. Crouch, Colin: Postdemokratie. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2008. Decker, Frank (Ed.). Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv? Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006. Decker, Frank: Die „Alternative für Deutschland“ aus der vergleichenden Sicht der Parteienforschung. In: Häusler 2016: 7–23. Diehl, Paula: Populismus und Massenmedien. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 2012: 16–22. Freeden, Michael: Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996. Frölich-Steffen, Susanne / Rensmann, Lars: Populistische Regierungsparteien in Ost-und Westeuropa. In: Frölich/Renmann, 2005: 3–34. Frölich-Steffen, Susanne / Rensmann, Lars (Ed.): Populisten an der Macht. Populistische Regierungsparteien in West- und Osteuropa. Vienna, Braunmüller, 2005, 2008. Geden, Oliver: Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs und Schweizerische Volkspartei zwischen Opposition und Regierungsbeteiligung. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006. Giddens, Anthony: Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics. Cambridge, Polity, 1994. Grabow, Karsten / Hartleb, Florian: Strategic Responses to the Populists Advance: Options for Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties: in: Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 399–409. Grabow, Karsten / Hartleb, Florian (Ed.): Exposing the Demagogues. Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe. Brüssel, Centre for European Studies, 2013. Grabow, Karsten / Hartleb, Florian: Europa – nein danke? Studie zum Aufstieg Rechts- und nationalpopulistischer Parteien in Europa. St. Augustin, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2013. Grattan, Laura: Populism’s power. Radical Grassroots Democracy in America. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. Habermas, Jürgen: Zur Verfassung Europas. Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2011. Habermas, Jürgen: Legitimitätsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1973. Habermas, Jürgen: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1981, 2 Bde. Habermas, Jürgen: Faktizität und Geltung. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1992. Halfwassen, Jens: Was ist Nationalkultur? FAZ 17. 5. 2017: 12. Hank, Rainer: Nichts geht über Transparenz. Piraten sind die Helden der Informationsfreiheit. FAS, Nr. 13, 2012: 38–39. Hardt, M. / Negri, A.: Empire – die neue Weltordnung. Frankfurt, Campus, 2002. Hartleb, Florian: Rechts- und Linkspopulismus. Eine Fallstudie anhand von Schill-Partei und PDS. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004. Hartleb, Florian: Internationaler Populismus als Konzept. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014.

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Puhle, Hans-Jürgen: Zwischen Protest und Politikstil: Populismus, Neo-Populismus und Demokratie. In: Werz, Nikolaus (Ed.) Populismus. Populisten in Übersee und Europa. Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2003: 15–43. Reich, Wilhelm: Die Massenpsychologie des Faschismus. Kopenhagen, Verlag für Sexualpolitik, 1933; Mass Psychology of Fascism. New York, Orgone Institute Press, 1946. Reinfeldt, Sebastian: Nicht wir und die da. Studien zum rechten Populismus. Vienna, Braunmüller, 2000. Reißland, Carolin: Kontroversen über Zuwanderung: Migrations- und Integrationspolitik unter neuen Vorzeichen? In: Butterwegge: Themen der Rechten 2002: 11–42. Ritzi, Claudia: Die Postdedemokratisierung politischer Öffentlichkeit. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2014. Salzborn, Samuel: Rechtsextremismus. Erscheinungsformen und Erklärungsansätze. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, 2nd Edn. Schäfer, Axel: Vorwort: Rechtsruck in Europa. In: Bauer 2010. Schedler, Andreas (Ed.): Electorial Authoritarianism. The Dynamic of unfree competition. Boulder, Lynne Riener, 2006. Schellenberg, Britta: Die radikale Rechte in Deutschland: Sie wird verboten und erfindet sich neu. In: Langenbacher, Nora / Schellenberg, Britta (Ed.): Europa auf dem „rechten“ Weg. Berlin, Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2011: 59–83. Scheuch, Erwin / Klingemann, Hans D.: Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften. In: Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik. Vol. 12, 1967: 11–29. Stahl, Alexander von: Kampf um die Pressefreiheit. Berlin, Edition Junge Freiheit, 2003. Stavrakakis, Yannis / Katsambekis, Giorgios: Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery: the case of Syriza. Journal of Political Ideologies 19, 2, 2014: 119–142. Steinbacher, Sybille (Ed.): Rechte Gewalt in Deutschland. Zum Umgang mit dem Rechtsextremismus in Gesellschaft, Politik und Justiz. Göttingen, Wallstein, 2016. Stöss, Richard: Der rechte Rand des Parteiensystems. In: Oskar Niedermayer (Ed.): Handbuch Parteienforschung. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2013: 574–577. Sturm, Roland: Rechtspopulismus. In. Dieter Nohlen / Rainer-Olaf Schultze (Ed.): Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft, Munich, Beck, 2010, 4th Edn.: 887ff. Taggart, Paul: Populism. Philadelphia, Buckingham Open University Press, 2000. Thomä, Dieter: Jetzt reicht’s - Die Lage ist schlecht. Diejenigen, die das Sagen haben, versagen, Widerstand ist nicht zwecklos. Eine Abrechnung mit unserer kaputten Gegenwart. Die Zeit, Nr. 33/2017, 10 August 2017. Tibi, Bassam: Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. München, Bertelsmann-Verlag, 1998. Tibi, Bassam: Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. München, Goldmann, 2000. Tibi, Bassam: Europa ohne Identität? Leitkultur oder Werte-Beliebigkeit, Berlin, Siedler, 2001. Vejvodová, Petra: A Thorny Way to find friends: Transnational Cooperation and Network-Building among right-wing and national populists. In Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 373–396. Virchow, Fabian et al. (Ed.): Handbuch Rechtsextremismus. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2016/2017. Volkert, Daniel: Parteien und Migranten. Transcript Verlag, 2017. Vorländer, Hans et al. (Ed.): Pegida. Entwicklung, Zusammensetzung und Deutung einer Empörungsbewegung. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2016. Weiß, Volker: Die vielen Gesichter des Konservatismus. Die Zeit, Nr. 34, 17. 8. 2017: 17. Welsch, Wolfgang: Unsere postmoderne Moderne. Weinheim, VCH, 1987. Wolf, Tanja: Rechtspopulismus. Überblick über Theorie und Praxis. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2017. Wolin, Sheldon S.: Democracy Incorporated. Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

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Chapter 2

Definitions of Populism and Its Stages of Development

According to key populism researchers (Canovan 2006: 544, 522; Priester 2011: 51), all attempts at a general theory of populism have failed. Therefore we must confine ourselves to descriptive typologies. The disadvantage of this abandonment of a general theory seems to be that the term populism has also become inflated in political debates, as once occurred with corporatism, the arch-enemy of populism, and is currently happening with globalisation and governance. In politics the accusation of populism is commonly used for an allegedly unrealistic and unaffordable policy in opportunistic election campaigns. Populism in the narrower sense is considered to be a reaction to ‘progress’, supported by groups who feel they are losing out because of the modernisation process (Puhle 2011: 30). Populism alludes to “the people”. But the definition of “the people” has varied in populist programmes from a select group (such the ‘Pirates’ Hackerszene [hacker scene]) to the original sense of “simple folk” (Becker 2012: 33; Canovan 2004: 248). Populism has happily appropriated the concept of “true democracy” for its own purposes. But genuine democracy also requires complex institutions. The referendum democracy itself, with its interaction between plebiscites and the surviving representative bodies and offices, is not straightforward enough for every citizen to understand. Populism was originally created in societies that seemed to be on the periphery of the international power system. The best-known examples are the Russian ‘Narodniki’ and the nineteenth-century American Populists. In contrast to postmodern systems, both movements were more likely to be located on the left of the party spectrum. In contrast to Marxist class parties, the ideological influences were partly anarcho-syndicalist. Even in the West, the Russian thinker Dugin (2014: 129ff), with his “Fourth Political Theory” of Liberalism, Fascism, and Communism, has been portrayed as an updated edition of the Narodniki. Capitalism was, for this advocate of a Eurasian cultural area, a vision of the future instead of allegedly worn-out Western capitalism. Dugin (2013: 212) branded the strategic hyperpower of the USA as contrary to the postmodern world. As an eclectic representative of ‘Eurasianism’, Dugin was accused of integrating fascist ideology and making Eurasianism a totalitarian approach (Salzborn 2014: 257). Dugin (2015: 196, 199) © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0_2

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was prematurely regarded as an adviser of Putin, but he claimed that he did not know him personally (Neef 2014: 123). He actually regarded the Russian president as more ‘Western’ in his advocacy of the Western market economy. However, this was masked by his strong emphasis on the sovereignty of Russia and the defence of Russian interests in the Asian territories of the former Soviet Union, which, according to Dugin, led to a “symbolic war”. Dugin dared to argue that Putin was virtually isolated in the Kremlin by a corrupt political elite. He declared Russia (ibid., 203) the natural ally of an independent Europe. Germany was considered by Dugin to be an American-led country governed contrary to its own interests. When he finally presented the ludicrously unprofessorial argument against Ukraine – “I believe we must kill, kill, kill. I say that as a Professor” – it was even too much for Moscow. The Moscow students had already been collecting thousands of signatures against the right-wing populism of Dugin for some time. Dugin’s contract was not renewed (Smirnova 2014; Leggewie 2016: 63). According to Micha Brumlik (2017: 8), the ex-city councillor for the Greens and, until 2005, head of the Fritz Bauer Institute in Frankfurt, this view had its western roots in the thinking of Heidegger and Alain de Benoist, the founder of the Nouvelle Droite, although they certainly did not predict the “suicide of the genre” but at most called for a radical change. All the same, Dugin (2011) wrote the script on “Heidegger: the possibility of a Russian philosophy”. Leggewie (2016: 81, 83, 90) and other authors cited by him suspected a distanced closeness of spirit and power in Putin’s Eurasian policy and saw him as a ‘whip’ in Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine. In any case, the solidarity of Russian and European right-wing populists is crucial for the populist issue in Western Europe, for example when over a thousand supporters of right-wing populist parties, who were covertly supported by the Kremlin, met in Milan in January 2016. In Third World countries where there were still no fixed institutional structures or legitimate party systems, populist movements, from the Chinese Kuomintang to the Latin American Peronism, were more the rule than the exception. Three types were classified (Mudde 2000): • agrarian populism • economic populism • political populism This simple trinity was later replaced by more complex typologies, such as (Lang 2007: 133): • • • • • •

Centrists Social populists National conservatives Agrarian populists Nationalists Radical ‘left’ populists

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The older populism had two main roots: • It was an answer to development crises and accelerated industrialisation. Populism has rightly been seen as an answer to modernisation crises (Spier 2006, 2008). • In struggles for national independence, strong movements mobilised “the people” in the fight against foreign and “nation-forgetful” rulers. Recently there emerged the Occupy movement, which, after the collapse of real socialism, embodied the most significant form of an anarchic left utopia of the future (Ebbinghaus 2012: 21). Only a few “Impulse generators” have become famous. Such movements are reluctant to speak of ‘leaders’ but, should the need arise, there are latent leaders in the background, such as Micah White and Kalle Lasn, who published the magazine Adbusters. They called themselves “mystical anarchists”. Common to these new left-wing populists is the commitment to the “project reference group” in contrast to conventional admission to a political party. Meanwhile, more and more new movements have appeared, such as the Pirates, who promoted themselves as an incarnation of the “true will of the electorate”. Traditional parties are moving towards the middle and fighting for “median voters”. Comparing German federal states, only the most conservative, like Bavaria, could afford to take a definite right-wing stance. Therefore it was possible for the CSU to defend itself against right-wing populist challenges. Populism claims, according to one critic (Möllers 2008: 33), “to express democratic will without democratic forms”. Certainly, received wisdom is to agree that there are differences between democracy and populism (Laclau 2007: 157ff), whereas populist propaganda likes to emphasise their similarity. But democracy requires orderly procedures. It is not enough to announce on the street that the movement is “the people”. Nevertheless, it is conceded that the well-organised minority and its actions have democratic significance without democratic form. It is necessary to react to populist initiatives, even when there are no rules within democracy about how populism should be handled (Möllers 2009: 33f). Populism and right-wing extremism are often discussed as relatively homogeneous phenomena. Differences over scope and timescales are ignored. After 1945 alone, three phases can be identified (v. Beyme 1988: 8ff): • After the Second World War right-wing extremist movements were still often openly neo-fascist, such as the Uomo Qualunque and the MSI in Italy, and the SRP, banned in Germany in 1952. • When, after the halcyon days of the reconstruction, new deprivations hit the people as a result of the first economic crisis and the oil crisis of 1973, moderate right-wing groups tried to appear serious and respectable and to avoid the methods of fascist propaganda. Adolf von Thadden, the leader of the NPD, who missed getting drafted into the Bundestag in 1969 by a whisker, acted as leader in a proper suit with a tie and not a uniform. • The third wave of populist movements was a response to globalisation and the growing power of the European Union. Slogans like “Europe yes – EU no!”

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sprang up. Growing immigration and rising unemployment fuelled the dissatisfaction. In some countries an orderly withdrawal from the Welfare State took place – in Sweden even with the cooperation of the unions. As a result, even in well-ordered Sweden, the late 1980s saw the emergence of populists who sought to win followers with innocuous names like “Swedish Democrats”. Quasi-fascist parties, even in Russia under Žirinovskij, invented misleading names like “Constitutional Democrats”, which tried to establish links with the liberal ‘Cadets’ of the late Tsarist empire. Many populists, like Haider (1994: 283) in Austria, acknowledged the EU only as a “loose confederation of peoples”. When national governments apologise for policy failures by pointing out the restrictions imposed by the European Union, the opponents of unpopular measures are blamed for their “populist irresponsibility”. This illuminates one element of populism: populists rebel against allegedly external constraints. Unlike revolutionaries, however, they do so largely within the rules of the system. Historically, the following are among the basic assumptions about populists: • Populist propaganda is not so much programmatic as moralistic. Since populists are often biased against science and allegedly inhuman rationalism, they readily appeal to widespread prejudices among the people, but are reluctant to participate in controversial rational debates. They favour conspiracy myths with assertions like “we’ve been cheated” or “the political class has neglected the people”. Political virtue, according to populist views, can only be found in the common people and their collective traditions. Liberalism has often been declared a “philosophy of marginal groups”. However, the great political ideologies, such as liberalism and socialism, have been ‘lost’, according to populists. Populist leaders like to parade themselves as champions of freedom, defending against allegedly “fundamentalist rescue ideas” (Haider 1994: 28, 24). • Populists pretend to fight against the corruption of established elites. They prefer the negatively charged term “political class” because the term ‘elite’ still carries positive connotations. • Populists have rarely developed a consistent doctrine, if only because many started out “single issue” movements. Populism did not emerge from a system of connected beliefs with a single ideology, but from the overestimation of a problem by each respective party. In the Third World a symbiosis of primitivism and progressivism developed in many ways, reminiscent of agrarian-socialist ideas, such as the mystique of the Aztec heritage in Mexico. • Populism and right-wing extremism increasingly cavort on the Internet in flash mobs. In view of the diffuse structures, bans on extremist messages on the Internet – as proposed by Sarkozy in March 2012 after the attacks on Toulouse – are unlikely to succeed. Social class became secondary in populist programmes. It was convenient for the populists that empirical research in the 1990s also liked to emphasise their

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‘milieus’ und ‘lifestyles’. Therefore, to the astonishment of some populist researchers, a serious problem for all ideologies, such as unemployment among populist followers, has not played the expected role (Betz 1994: 114; Faltin 1990: 81ff). Three out of eight developed milieus were the preferred recruiting grounds for populist movements: • the petty-bourgeois milieu • the hedonistic milieu • the alternative-left milieu. The materialistic hedonists, however, proved difficult to mobilise. New social movements have been widely regarded as “fuzzy systems”. Postmaterialism theories have also often overestimated the ability to translate proven populist attitudes into mobilisation and organisation. In the NPD ban debate in 2012, the magnitude of a party ban was often exaggerated. The NPD was already regarded by many neo-Nazis as “ancient populism”. The NPD is constantly losing members. Populism often began with the evocation of a mystical union with the people. This verbal symbiosis has been classified in the literature as only a ‘syndrome’ and not even as an ‘ideology’ (Wiles 1969: 166). Populist leadership seeks to establish direct communication with the people. In a media society in which the established elites also have channels for direct communication with the electorate, it is difficult for populists to gain an advantage. Demonstrations and rallies are no longer a privilege of individual groups, as non-populists have also discovered their preference for the “social movements” that confront traditional party concepts. Originally, populism began as a rural movement. In the era of globalisation it has become an urban phenomenon. Not infrequently, the competition from new immigrants was a stimulant for populist movements – as in the USA. Now that most of the highly industrialised countries have become immigrant societies – whether they have already processed this politically or not – xenophobia and populist agitation is generated everywhere, with the exception of left-wing ecologist populists. American left-wing populists initially adopted many socialist demands, such as the nationalisation of bans and big business. However, they proved resistant to socialist ideas for the collectivisation of agriculture. Saskatchewan und North Dakota have become strongholds of rural populism. Early populism was opposed to hyper-industrialisation. Populists preferred the small-scale “Black Forest” model to large-scale industry of the Ruhr Valley type. Since the 1960s populists and many right-wing extremists are still not supporters of big industry, collectivisation or planned economies. But unlike the early populists, many later developed relatively individualistic, even almost neo-liberal ideas, and at least accepted the market as an agent of opportunities for individuals to improve their lives. Only a few elements of neoliberalism filtered into right-wing populist groups. The main objection to the neoliberal development of the market economy after the end of “real socialism” has been that it has often had adverse effects: we see increased inequality, immoral commercialisation, increasing amalgamation of

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corporate and financial capital and dramatic fluctuations in financial markets. Rather like the neo-liberal detachment from established politics, ‘governance’ threatens to replace the democratic concept of political values. Whereas the early populism of the nineteenth century often appeared to be ‘anti-modernist’ and orientated towards state-owned agriculture, new populism has modernised itself, even if it is more orientated towards medium-sized and small-scale capitalism. Early populism was occasionally attributed to the liberal camp, which represented the interests of artisans and the self-employed, especially peasants. Today right-wing populists constitute a colourful mixture of different socio-economic demands, such as a liberal tax policy to protect the “little people” and an almost socialist conception of the Welfare State, mixed with statist-nationalist ideas about nationalisation, for instance of banking. In some policy areas they appear, rather than indifferent, to have no distinct stance of their own. Depending on the country, right-wing populists vary in their legal validity: the Norwegian Progressive Party acts as the most liberal party in the group. The French Front National and the Slovakian National Party (SND), on the other hand, appear to be the most authoritarian variants of right-wing populism. The regular supporters of right-wing populist parties were identified as mainly unemployed, low-skilled and barely qualified male workers under the age of forty and representatives of the lower-middle-class (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 20ff). Populism was also regarded as a modernisation of right-wing extremism, as in the case of the FPÖ and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). But even left-wing populism with anti-capitalist tones has been on the left more and more since Communist and Socialist parties were in decline. Even before the PDS in Germany the polemical foreign label did not stop. Populism often leaned towards apolitical behaviour. Anti-intellectualism led to the rejection of conventional institutions and their representatives. A dualistic view of the world often distinguished between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”. Anti-Institutionalism is driven by a preference for direct democracy methods in mass meetings and referendums. Occasionally, populism has been classified as ‘opportunistic’, which does little to suggest that it embodies any sense of an ideology. The ideological elements are barely coherent. Populism was rated a “poor man’s conservatism, in a sense its popular edition” (Priester 2007: 29). Populism is often considered to be anti-elitist, although it has definitely developed its own conception of ‘elite’, which appears to be strongly moralistic (Müller 2017: 3). Glistrup’s movement in Denmark and Blocher’s party in Switzerland, as well as the FPÖ under Haider, favoured a conservative populism directed against the Welfare State, which was decried as “social democratic” (Haider 1994: 181). Even leftist populists, who were close to left-wing libertarian ideas, shared the right-wing populists’ aversion to established authorities and advocated decentralised political decisions. In other respects, however, they were fundamentally opposed to right-wing populists. Some environmental populists have even supported greater immigration and preached in favour of a multicultural society, an attitude bitterly rejected by right-wing populists (Betz 1994: 179, 181).

References

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References Becker, Sven / Rosenbach, Marcel: Das Computerspiel Politik. Der Spiegel, Nr. 14, 2012: 26–28. Betz, Hans-Georg: Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Houndsmill, Macmillan, 1994. v. Beyme, Klaus (Ed.): Rightwing Extremism in Western Europe. London, Frank Cass, 1988. Brumlik, Micha: Zur Aktualität der identitären Ideologie. Die Vordenker einer neuen rechten Internationale. Böll-Brief. Demokratiereform. Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, 2, April 2017. Canovan, Margaret: Trust the People! Popuöism and the two faces of Democracy. London, Wiley, 2004. Canovan, Margaret: Two Strategies for the Study of Populism. Political Studies, No. 4, 2006: 544– 552. Dugin, Aleksandr: Vosmozhnosti russkoj filosofii. Moskau, 2011. Dugin, Alexander: Die Vierte Politische Theorie. London, Arktos, 2013. Dugin, Alexander: Euroasian Mission. An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism. 2014, transl. by the Heinrich-Böll Foundation, 2014. Dugin, Alexander: Konflikte der Zukunft. Die Rückkehr der Geopolitik. Kiel, Bonus, 2014. Ebbinghaus, Uwe: Wer hat Angst vor Anarchismus? FAZ, 28. 1. 2012: 21–22. Faltin, I.: Norm, Milieu, politische Kultur. Wiesbaden, DUV, 1990. Grabow, Karsten / Hartleb, Florian: Strategic Responses to the Populists Advance: Options for Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties: in: Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 399–409. Grabow, Karsten / Hartleb, Florian (Ed.): Exposing the Demagogues. Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe. Brüssel, Centre for European Studies, 2013. Haider, Jörg: Die Freiheit, die ich meine. Frankfurt, Ullstein, 1994. Ionescu, Ghita / Gellner, Ernest (Eds.): Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics, New York – London, Macmillan, 1969, Korte, Karl-Rudolf: Populismus als Regierungsstil in: Werz 2003: 209–222. Laclau, Ernesto: On Populist Reason. London, Verso Books, 2005, 2007. Ladurner, Ulrich: Einer ist noch da. In Frankreich und den Niederlanden haben Rechtspopulisten Wahlen verloren, in Deutschland zerlegen sie sich. Die Zeit, Nr. 23, 1. 6. 2017: 9. Lang, Kai-Olaf: Populism in «Old» and «New Europe»: Trends and Implications. In: Bútora, 2007: 125–140. Leggewie, Claus: Anti-Europäer: Breivik, Durin, al Suri & Co: Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2016. Möllers, Christoph: Demokratie – Zumutungen und Versprechen. Berlin, Wagenbach, 2008, 2009, 2nd Edn. Mudde, Cas: In the Name of Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 14, 2000: 33–53. Müller, Jan-Werner: Populisten. Woran man sie erkennen kann. FAZ. plus 15. 5. 2017. Neef, Christian: „Jeder Westler ist ein Rassist“. Gespräch mit Alexander Dugin. Der Spiegel 29, 14. 7. 2014: 123. Priester, Karin: Populismus. Historische und aktuelle Erscheinungsformen. Frankfurt, Campus, 2007. Priester, Karin: Definitionen und Typologien des Populismus. Soziale Welt 62, 2011: 185–198. Priester, Karin: Populismus: Theoretische Fragen und Erscheinungsformen in Mitteleuropa. In: Otten, Henrique / Sicking, Manfred (Ed.): Kritik und Leidenschaft. Vom Umgang mit politischen Ideen. Bielefeld, Transcript, 2011: 49–65. Puhle, Hans-Jürgen: Populismus: Form oder Inhalt? In: Otten, Henrique Ricardo / Sicking, Manfred (Hrsg.): Kritik und Leidenschaft. Vom Umgang mit politischen Ideen. Bielefeld, Transcript, 2011: 29–47. Salzborn, Samuel: Messianischer Antiuniversalismus. Zur politischen Theorie von Aleksandr Dugin im Spannungsfelde von eurasischem Imperialismus und geopolitischem Evangelium. In: Arnim Pfahl-Traughber (Ed.): Jahrbuch für Extremismus und Terrorismusforschung 2014, I: 240–258.

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Smirnova, Julia: Putins Vordenker, ein rechtsradikaler Guru. Die Welt, 11 July 2014. Spier, Tim: Populismus und Modernisierung. In: Frank Decker (Ed.): Populismus in Europa. Wiesbaden, VS, 2006, 33–57. Spier, Tim: Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistischer Parteien in Westeuropa. Diss. Göttingen, 2008. Wiles, Peter: A Syndrome, not a Doctrine. Some elementary theses on populism. In: Ionescu/ Gellner 1969: 166–179.

Chapter 3

Parties and Populism

3.1

Parties Between Populism and Right-Wing Extremism

The term PEP (populist extremist parties) appears in Anglo-Saxon literature (Goodwin 2011: 1). The list showed in detail that the difference we have identified between populism and right-wing extremism was not recognised. Populism is the result of a fundamental change in party systems, particularly since the Left was supplanted in the southern European countries and social democracy was in decline. Thus, the term ‘Wutbürger’ (“angry citizens”) could be named “Word of the Year” by the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (Association for German Language). Despite the rise of the Greens, some sections of society felt alienated. Above all, submissive attitudes have fostered a new political authoritarianism (Rathkolb/Ogris 2010: 37). When postmodern democracies began to cut social spending, left-wing groups were hailed as defenders of the status quo and populists, using a term that until then had largely been viewed as close to right-wing extremism. Mainstream parties are becoming more and more similar to large industrial enterprises. They avoid big risks and behave like corporations, making deals and investing in new identities (Crouch 2004: 120). Parties prefer to co-operate with certain groups, but avoid highly specialised populist groups. This is why the transformative power of new social movements was so overestimated in the 1980s. Populists tend to classify even factional discipline as proof of an alleged elite cartel. Populism fails to recognise that dissatisfaction with institutions and intermediaries in a democratic system is unavoidable but can always be corrected (Hartleb 2014: 58f). The idea that populist parties effectively avoid and expose corruption has also proved inadequate. For example, with regard to Jörg Haider in Austria there were quite astonishing forms of corruption. As a rule, populist movements initially polemicised against mainstream parties and tried to avoid applying the word ‘party’ to themselves. In the USA such groups called themselves things like ‘leagues’, as in the case of the Social Credit League. © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0_3

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Occasionally they have been completely misnamed, for instance the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) under Vladimir Žirinovskij, who has often been regarded by critics as a political clown and forced into a highly ambiguous position beneath Putin. Liberal and socialist variants of populism can be distinguished. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) has been recognised as a prototype of the social populist party. In the beginning populist groups were often not a party in the classical sense. The party in Europe which is most strongly modelled on right-wing populism, the Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen, was originally more a confederation of small radical groups when founded in 1972. Since its establishment in 1956, the Austrian FPÖ has been divided between a nationalist and a liberal faction (Mudde 2007: 41f). Populist leaders, such as Bernd Lucke when he was still in the AfD, have occasionally flirted with the term “new-type party”. This occurred at the founding convention of the AfD in mid-April 2013. This did not seem ironic to some viewers because the SED had once called itself that. Daring slogans were usually presented in a milder form, such as the slogan “The reintroduction of the DM should not be taboo” (Gebhardt 2013: 87, 90). The demand for a “Canadian immigration” law even sounded quite reasonable and was shared by members of other parties (Wahlprogramm Alternative für Deutschland 2013: 4). Even critics (Jesse/Panreck 2017: 75) classified the AfD as populist but not extremist. Right-wing populism strongly emphasises the charismatic leadership that Max Weber had already contrasted with traditional und rational types of organisations. Moral fundamentalism makes some populist movements verge on religious sects, especially in the USA. Charismatic leaders, from Perón to Berlusconi and Le Pen, have tried to build parties around themselves, although they have brought with them a certain antipathy to political institutions. Often these charismatic individuals invented conspiracy theories in which politicians, intellectuals or capitalists emerged as secret agents (Taggart 2000: 105). Empirical studies on smaller German parties that have been classified as populist – which seems problematic in the case of the PDS – showed strong differences in leadership style. Ronald B. Schill was considered an autocrat who treated his party like his own property. No wonder it was usually named after him by the public. However, Gysi always took care to preserve his reputation for integrity. The contrast between the leaders Schill and Gysi could not be greater, polarising with opposites such as absolute beginner and national big-shot, novice and professional, provocateur and charmer, powerful and limited (Hartleb 2004: 297f). There was a certain lack of interest in pluralistic democracy among populists. The vague perception of the political system is reflected in the generalised perception of one’s own group, a tendency that Friedrich Dürrenmatt denounced in 1950 in the novel The Judge and his Executioner when a Swiss National Councillor was caricatured as a member of the “Conservative Liberal Socialist Collection of Independents”. What seems new is that “opportunistic populists” like Donald Trump have been able to garner many working-class votes. The programmes of right-wing populist parties are usually vague and only slightly more precise on individual topics that they turn out to be exaggerating. Voters from all walks of life

3.1 Parties Between Populism and Right-Wing Extremism

37

are addressed, especially when their fears of the modernisation process can be appealed to. Their appeal is not usually tied to specific sectors. A new party has seldom been able to capture so many Social Democrat votes from those who were believed to have been loyal to a socialist party. Fears of social decline are likely to play a role. As well as populists assuming governmental responsibility, they run the risk of losing their voters quickly due to excessive demands as they move away from their rhetoric and make pragmatic demands.

3.2

Right-Wing Populism in Eastern Europe

Particularly among the new democracies in Eastern Europe there have been identity problems due to national irredenta and minority problems (Merkel 2010: 327). Thus it could be explained that Hungary – a country which under Communism was in the vanguard of democratic rebellion – became populist after the first honeymoon period of democracy under Orbán. One explanation for this was that after the two World Wars Hungary felt it was a “victim of the history of the twentieth century”, having lost large areas that were settled by Hungarians. In Austria, too, the rise of populism has been explained by historical alienation. In surveys it led to a majority of Austrians being in favour of the admission of Hungary to the EU but not for the admission of the Czech Republic or Poland (only 37%) (Rathkolb 2010: 89, 132). Many right-wing groups in Eastern Europe even found themselves identifying strongly with the symbols of fascist regimes of the 1930s and 1940s. In any case, Eastern European radical right-wingers have played a significant role in populist-authoritarian change, which threatens to endanger some democracies there (Minkenberg 2017: 144, 148). The new regimes have already been branded hybrid systems of “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2006). It is not only differences in the social layers of systems which become visible through the rise of right-wing extremism and populism. Germany was divided by its decades-long division in the party system, although, astonishingly, after reunification Kohl managed to maintain the CDU’s power in the East. The disappointment of the East German population over certain social consequences of the Reunification boosted right-wing populism and right-wing extremism, particularly in the Eastern states, which can be explained by the double modernisation. The usual catch-up modernisation in the ex-Communist countries coincided with the sudden import of West German modernity (Minkenberg 1998: 368). It exaggerated “paths to home-made terrorism” detected in a “specifically Saxon-East German national identity” (Schellenberg 2016: 331). After all, East Germany shows relatively little deviancy from the general susceptibility to right-wing populism and right-wing extremism in the ex-Communist countries of Eastern Europe, where groups like the Law and Justice Party under Jaresław Kaczyński were even able to form a coalition government quickly. The right-wing populist parties of Eastern Europe were often at the centre of the party system, not on the periphery (v. Beyme 1996: 433).

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Classifying Eastern European populists was difficult because they appeared to be even more contradictory than Western populists, and combined social-economic stances with conservative views in social and foreign policy. One type of Eastern European party was called a “couch party” when it lacked a clear organisational structure and an organised membership (Hartleb 2013: 355). “Hybrid systems” and “electoral authoritarianism” have been criticised many times (Schedler 2006). Radical right-wing groups can even threaten the Liberal-Democratic order, especially with regard to the EU. But only small groups have adopted symbols of the fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s. Worse was the attack on the existing borders that arose as a result of the Second World War and ruinous partisanships with Nazi Germany, as in the case of Hungary. Anti-Western ultra-Catholicism, such as Kaczynski’s appearance on Radio Maryja, proved to be a threat to democratic rule in Poland (Minkenberg 2017: 144ff). Historical conditions of right-wing populism were traditionally strong national ideas and authoritarian traditions in countries which felt threated by the major power, the weakness of the new party systems and the difficulties arising from transformation policies. In Eastern Europe opponents of right-wing populists and extremists, in contrast to the West, have been criticised for their regional and ethnic minorities, such as the Sinti und Roma. A highly respected thesis was that of Offe (2003) on the “Dilemma of Simultaneity”. A mutual blockage of democratisation and the construction of the capitalist market economy seemed to hinder development. Other authors have criticised that the development in Eastern Europe has often been too simplistically characterised as “catch-up Western-style modernisation”. Bos/Segert (2008: 323, 328) revised the catch-up thesis relatively early and suggested as a counter-hypothesis that the East is a kind of early warning system for the hazards which could threaten democracy in the West. Guido Tieman rightly pointed out that the usual rifts (centre versus periphery, State versus Church, town versus country, labour versus capital) do not affect party rivalry in Eastern Europe in the same way as in the West, because there is not yet a firmly rooted point of conflict in post-socialist countries. This was not least shown by the rapid changes in the party systems of the East. Noteworthy is the fact that there have been no attempts to restore the late socialist system. Market economy and democracy were already internally accepted by many players in the expiring socialist crisis system, especially in Poland and Hungary. However, conflicts between socialists and their opponents occasionally rekindled when the market-based democracy seemed to have drawbacks. The “centre versus periphery” conflict has in many instances not reached the same virulence in Eastern Europe as in some multi-ethnic states of the West, such as Spain. In some countries, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the contraction of their territory was responsible for conflicts not with ethnic minorities, but with particular groups, such as the Roma in the Czech Republic, and migration, which created new tensions (Bos/Segert 2008: 328). Romania and Slovakia, with substantial Hungarian minorities, were exceptions to this. Large numbers of the German-speaking Romanians had already left the country.

3.2 Right-Wing Populism in Eastern Europe

39

There are numerous ethnic minority problems in Russia, but the party system is so authoritarian that they are not reflected in political contests. Ukraine is a special case, where there are differences of opinion because of the strong historical and linguistic influences of the Russian-speaking citizens, who, according to some estimates, constitute half the population, not just in the eastern conflict area and certainly in East Galicia. The Czech Republic and Hungary seem to have developed comparatively stable party systems. However, the instability of government involvement also blunts healthy competition between political parties in these countries. Presidential elements which change the parliamentary system and consequently also the party system are influencing their political development. Eastern Europe became a new stronghold of populism because the party systems there were not very strong. The option to have a presidential or semi-presidential system led to the parties having less influence in political decision-making. Restrictive clauses – in Russia up to 7% – enabled the power to be concentrated in a few parties. Moreover it turned out that the official rules were often undermined by the unofficial behaviour of politicians. It has also been argued that the influence of State institutions was drastically reduced after the dismantling of socialist systems (Bos/Segert 2008: 331ff). All Eastern European populists have championed a sort of “economic nationalism” that should protect domestic industry and especially agriculture. Nevertheless, the Slovak National Party embraced a more liberal stance and seemed to be closer to the Christian Democrats. An anti-corruption movement was another feature which populist parties in Eastern Europe shared with their Western counterparts. Even so, there are many differences in populism across Eastern European. Bureaucracy and opposition to ethnic minorities were all that some researchers found these populism variants had in common (Pirro 2013: 615ff, 622). An approach that was not merely descriptive, as pursued by Merkel (2010: 549ff), developed in contrast to the negative consolidation: the positive consolidation of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe. It can be identified by four elements: • Constitutional consolidation, measured by institutional efficiency and transparency, as well as the ability of institutions to integrate. According to data from the Bertelsmann Foundation, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, Lithuania and Hungary were top in this field. Belarus ranked bottom, as in most statistics. Russia mostly lay in third-last place ahead of Moldova in second-last place. • Representative consolidation showed a different ranking, with Hungary at the top, ahead of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Croatia. • In terms of behavioural consolidation and comparisons of potential veto players, the danger posed by veto players, especially in the military, seems lower in Eastern Europe than in Third World countries. The leaders in behavioural consolidation were Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia. • Consolidation of democratic culture seems rather limited. “Strong democrats” are underrepresented. Nevertheless autocrats allegedly constituted only 10%.

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• With regard to overall consolidation Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary led. Finally, four democracy types were identified: • Most of the regimes seemed to be rule-of-law democracies. • Defective democracies were found in Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina. • Heavily defective democracies existed in Russia and Moldova. • Only Belarus was classified as autocratic at the time of the Bertelsmann data from 2005. In the meantime, a lot has probably shifted, especially in Russia and Moldova. Of the eighteen countries surveyed, seven were classified as hardly distinguishable from Western European democracies. Merkel (2010: 556) does not see any confirmation of the “dilemma of simultaneity”. One reason for that is the lack of significant variables, such as modernity, statehood and external players. The importance of the latter has already been demonstrated by the losers of the Second World War, especially Germany and Japan. The hope of joining the EU was an important external incentive for democratisation in Eastern Europe. Quantitative surveys do not negate the value of studies on individual Eastern European countries. The special case of Poland was much discussed. After some disappointments over expansion, many inhabitants, especially young people, opted for a nationwide special development programme. The powerful influence of “Uncle Germany” led to national counter-reactions – “first Poland, then Europe” – while the reverse is supposedly true in Germany. Trump’s speech in Warsaw before the G2 meeting in Hamburg in July 2017 has intensified Polish prejudice. Poland should assume a leading role in East-Central Europe so that it can communicate with Germany at eye-level in future. A “Three Seas Initiative” between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea was set up by Poland and Croatia with twelve countries in Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe on 25 August 2016. Trump participated in the second congress of the initiative in Warsaw in early July 2017, thereby strengthening the region’s self-confidence against the EU. This initiative seems to be a way to achieve more parity between the East and West, but fails to recognise that it will not succeed without the support of the EU, especially since the initiative has so far lacked a formal structure (Gnauck 2016: 103ff). Staniszkis (2016: 103ff), one of the original supporters of Kaczyński, later became a harsh critic of the politician. She criticised the “archaic concentration of power” the “infantile autocratism” and the development of an “eastern law culture”. Contrary to his reputation in the West, she regarded him as an “irreligious man, therefore also without any empathy for the people”. She did not look upon pressure from the EU to change course as a remedy, but on the other hand did not believe that Poland would end up as a dictatorship. The critic was populist in her own way when she said: “The Poles are much cleverer, on a higher level than their politicians.”

3.3 International Collaborations

3.3

41

International Collaborations

The EU was a significant point of conflict for right-wing populist parties. But it was not until the 1990s that neo-liberal populists became influential players in European politics. The Hungarian Jobbik movement even temporarily called for a withdrawal from the EU and a referendum in 2006. Later the EU was seen as a platform on which the “Hungarian interests would have to be pushed through without compromise”. In East-Central Europe the Slovak National Party was the populist group most in favour of joining the EU. One reason for this was the possibility of promoting regional cohesion in the country. But all populist parties – as in the West – rejected the Lisbon Treaty integration model and opposed the idea of the “United States of Europe” (Pirro 2014: 619). The strong national orientation of most populist and, above all, right-wing extremist parties has often stood in the way of international organisation. Jean-Marie Le Pen tried to change this. In 1997 the creation of a “European National Union” (Euronat) was announced that would agitate against the EU and NATO. Le Pen travelled to Eastern Europe and found his idea resonated in some places, for example in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Even the Swedish Democrats (SD) became a member of Euronat. However, some parties left the institution after a while (Vejvodová 2013: 381f). After the European elections in 1999, in which right-wing extremists had very little success, the collaboration between Euronat members declined. Occasionally there were also differences of opinion, as between the German People’s Union (DVU) and the Czech SPR-RSC with regard to the Sudetenland question. There were also disputes between Hungarians and Slovakians. A common goal was usually the rejection of Turkey’s entry into the EU. In this group only a loose confederation was in favour of Europe, which constituted a rejection of the European “super state”. In January 2007, on the initiative of the FPÖ after the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to the US, a group called Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS) was created, but it survived for only ten months and broke up when Alessandra Mussolini claimed that Romanians were “habitual law-breakers”. In 2009 there was a new coalition, the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM). In 2012 this group was recognised as a European political party. Twenty-five MPs are needed to form a political group in the European Parliament. At the end of 2011 Marine Le Pen left the AENM and became a member of the European Alliance for Freedom, which was founded in 2010. Three other alliances participated in the European elections of 2009. The FPÖ, an old initiator of collaborations, seemed isolated in the European Parliament at the beginning of the Parliamentary term. The group Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) included neither the FPÖ nor the Dutch Partij vor de Vrijheid. At the end of 2010 a new European party was founded, the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF), which was recognised as a European party by the European

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Parliament in Spring 2011 (Schiedel 2011: 32, 97ff). Time and again it turned out that nationalist parties could not cooperate well together. The protection of “European civilisation” as a goal was often not enough to foster unity. The spread of right-wing populism is considerable in Europe. There is already talk of a “Right-Wing International” (Ahr 2016). It includes: • • • • • • • • •

Hofer and the FPÖ in Austria Geert Wilders’ party in the Netherlands Marine Le Pen und the Front National in France Kaczyński’s Conservative Government in Poland Christoph Blocher and the Swiss People’s Party the Danish People’s Party – the second strongest in Denmark’s Parliament The Lega Nord in Italy The AfD in Germany Many Brexit supporters in the UK

The EU Parliament already has three right-wing groups. In the summer of 2015 at least thirty-six Eurosceptic MEPs from eight countries joined the ENF group, including Frauke Petry’s partner, Marcus Pretzell. Not all right-wing populist parties have close contact. The AfD initially did not want to have much to do with the Front National. Populist parties are increasingly successful in elections, unlike in their development before 1990. • In the last European elections populist parties gained 12.5% of the vote. Only Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia were missing from the list. • In about twenty European countries populists have won about 10% of the votes in national elections. • In five countries (Greenland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Switzerland) the populist party has become the strongest. In three countries (Hungary, Italy, Slovakia) right-wing populists have gained the majority of votes. In three countries (Finland, Norway and Switzerland) the populist party is part of the Government (see Table 3.1). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the vote share of right-wing populists between 1991 and 2011 was over 10% in only two states, as in the case of the Republicans in Baden-Württemberg in 1992 (10.9%) and the DVU in Sachsen-Anhalt in 1998 (12.9%). In Saxony the NPD came close to this boundary in 2004 with 9.2% (Stöss 2013: 596). It has occasionally been claimed that there can as little be a “Populist International” as a “Nationalist International”. Against this argument it has justifiably been observed that in the case of a common enemy, a populist as well as a nationalist International would be quite conceivable (Müller 2016: 126).

3.3 International Collaborations

43

Table 3.1 Right-wing populist parties in Europe Country

Right-wing populist party

Percentage of votes in last election

Participation in government (national)

Austria

Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) Vlaams Belang (VB) –

20.5% (2013)

No

3.7% (2014) –

No –

– – Usvit–Narodni Koalice

– – 6.9% (2013)

– – No

Dansk Folkeparti (DF) –

21.1% (2015) • (Last election 2017) • Previously 4.5% (2014) 17.6% (2015) 13.2% (2017) 4.7% (2013)

No –

7.0% (2015) 20.2% (2014)

No No

– 4.1% (2013) – – 5.3% (2016)

– No – – No

– 13.1% (2017) 16.3% (2013) 8.8% (2015) – – 13.1% (2016)

– No No No – – No

8.1% (2016)

No

8.0% (2016)

No

– –

– –

Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Estonia

Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxemburg Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Spain

Perussuomalaiset (PS) Front National (FN) Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Chrysi Avyi (XA) Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (JOBBIK) – Lega Nord (LN) – – Partija Tvarka ir Teisingumas (TT) – Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) Fremskrittspartiet (FRP) Kukiz´15 (K) – – Liberalno- Demokrati- českaja Partija Rossii (LDPR) Srpska Radikalna Stranka (SRS) L´udová Strana Naše Slovensko (L´SNS) – –

Yes No No

(continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Country

Right-wing populist party

Percentage of votes in last election

Participation in government (national)

Sweden Switzerland

Sverigedemokraterna (SD) Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) Vseukrajinske Ob´jednannja „Svoboda“ United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

12.9% (2014) 29.4% (2015)

No No

11.9% (2015)

No

4.7% (2014)

No

12.6% (2015)

No

Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom

3.4

Reasons for the Rise of Populist Parties

As the parties increasingly developed from class-bound mass parties into loose movements and professionalised electoral parties (v. Beyme 2002), populist elements gained the chance to move from the margins to the centre of the party system – as Berlusconi in Italy and many parties in post-Communist countries have shown. During this process populism lost some of its former image of State-obsessed petty bourgeoisie and increasingly found working-class supporters as well. Research into populism has focused on four dimensions: • the ideological and programmatic dimension; • the personal dimension of leadership; • the technical dimension of a simplistic, metaphorical style of political propaganda; • the growing importance of positive or negative campaigns in mass media which increasingly focus on ‘events’ and scandals. Populism has not turned out to be a one-way street. It was initially facilitated by the transformation of ideologies and the organisational models of parties during the decline of traditional party systems. They were characterised by a decline in party membership, identification with parties, and electoral turn-out. Anti-establishment feelings and anti-party sentiments soon spread. There is no reason to judge these developments negatively. The modern voter proved to be better informed than the old electorate in the days of class-related parties – less collectivist and more independent in his judgement of large mechanisms. However, an undesirable side-effect of this has been increased vote fluctuation (volatility) in elections. Regrettably, the reasons for the success of right-wing populists have not been extensively researched until now. Poland and Hungary have little immigration but large-scale populist representation in Parliament, so some researchers did not want to see immigration as a reason. But maybe immigration is so low precisely because the populists are so strong.

3.4 Reasons for the Rise of Populist Parties

45

The reasons for the rise of populist parties were stated by the Dutch populism researcher Mudde (2016: 71ff): • Significant problems have not been adequately handled by the elites. • Political elites are uniform and powerless in most countries. • Cognitive mobilisation has generated more education and the educated have become more critical of governments. • The media structure has become more open to underprivileged groups who gather together in populist parties. Where traditional media have remained obstructive, populists like Wilders in the Netherlands have gained attention via Twitter. In the international context, populism has been seen as a threat to democratic institutions in elections because populist election campaigns shatter confidence in the integrity of the election process and occasionally adopt practices that violate international standards of electoral integrity (Norris/Grömping 2017: 28). Such judgements are appropriate if all Third World countries are included in the analysis, but are exaggerated with regard to Germany and most other Western European countries. Also, the rise of populist groups was by no means always viewed positively, according to electoral surveys. Populist politicians threaten to promote fraud and corruption that could limit human rights and party competition. From Hungary to Australia, cases of unethical voting behaviour by populists have been demonstrated. The evidence is also getting stronger that Russia helped populist parties, like Marine Le Pen’s in 2014. That she visited Putin in 2017 is by no means considered a coincidence. The Dutch Freedom Party has even signed a cooperation agreement with Putin’s party (Müller 2016; Norris/Grömping 2017: 28). Early on there was talk of “electoral authoritarianism”, especially in Eastern Europe (Schedler 2006). Increasingly, Conservative parties are also said to lean towards right-wing populism, like that of Theresa May in the UK, who was allegedly one of the pioneers of xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiment and, as Home Secretary and later Prime Minister, reputedly knew no more important task than to reduce the number of immigrants to under 100,000 a year. Since she lost her majority in the 2017 elections, she has had to give in. She then tried to mitigate the legislative anti-Islamism which was supposedly “very present in British everyday life” (Schindler 2017: 97). The reorientation of some social classes played a significant role in the rise of populist parties. The Danish People’s Party (DF) and the Front National (FN) in France have exaggeratedly even been called “workers’ parties” which grew at the expense of the Social Democrats. In particular, populist parties mobilised the insecure lower middle classes, who felt economically vulnerable and had a low level of education. Originally in this context was the theory that cultural policy was even more important to these groups than economic concerns. This was visible in the rapidly emerging anti-Islamic stance (which, more correctly, was not opposition to Islam or the majority of Muslims, but to Islamic extremists engaged in acts of

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terrorism against the West). Comparisons of votes in certain British districts showed that populists performed most strongly in regions with large numbers of Muslim voters from Bangladesh or Pakistan, while areas with many Afro-Caribbeans or non-Muslim Asians were less inclined to vote for populists. Twice as many supporters of populist parties (81%) as other citizens (42%) believed that Islam posed a threat to Western civilisation. In surveys of Europe, Britain had the highest number of respondents who felt threatened by immigration, while in Spain unemployment was the greatest concern of under-privileged workers (Goodwin 2011: 8f, 10, 15). Attempts by scientists to demonstrate that immigration can bring economic benefits to a country did not appeal to those affected. In some countries a third already felt like foreigners in their own country. Germany, which in these studies gave comparatively enlightened answers, was 39% below the EU average on the question as to whether immigration might reduce wages, but this was negligible compared with the responses from citizens in Italy and France. On the question as to whether Muslim culture fits in well with the country’s own culture, Germany was uncharacteristically at the bottom of the scale of respondents who said yes. The survey looked for counter-strategies, such as the exclusion of immigrants, but there was no generalisable view for all countries. Radical exclusion even threatened to aggravate the situation. The most successful strategies for fostering a united society were activities at local level. In the past people tended to associate populist attitudes with respondents’ ages, but that theory could not be sustained. Astonishingly, less than 35% of young people (37% in the FN) were mobilised (ibid.: 19, 30). The most important question for democracy is whether the systems are armed against extremist challenges. They are not. However, Germany is considered a laudable exception because it has developed “defensive democracy” on the basis of the Weimar experience. With its very broad tolerance for diverse political behaviour, the USA is considered the counter-example (Mudde 2016: 129ff). The cited author pleads for this tolerant attitude because he believes in the therapeutic effect of freedom of expression. The extensive opportunities for expression strengthen the democratic sentiments of the populists and, above all, the democratic parts of the movement. The rise of populism has also been analysed on the hypothesis that the major parties of the centre have become more and more alike. Of course, there is no consensus among analysts about where the balance lies between extreme faction-building, as in the Weimar Republic, and post-democratic uniformity (Probst 2011: 61). In contrast to populism in the post-war years, however, the alienation of the citizens has not just turned into ‘Passivism’, which is reflected in ever lower electoral turn-out; it has often turned into “participatory protest democracy” (Niehuis 2011: 32ff), nourished by prejudice against the parties. The “angry citizen” does not tolerate political quietism. Angry citizens can also appear relatively calm, like the Pirate Party in Germany, which seems like an updated version of the liberal FDP and in many ways does not engage in left-wing agitation. Leadership was frowned upon in this party. Leading figures provide keywords for Generation Social Media. These keywords tend to be

3.4 Reasons for the Rise of Populist Parties

47

biased. The keyword ‘transparency’ is used to condemn the alleged surveillance mania of the State, which incessantly investigates suspicions of money-laundering, tax evasion and corruption (Hank 2012: 38). The counter-movement has branded transparency ‘semi-liberalism’ and downgraded the State to a service-provider. Even the Greens are already considered to be too established. The Pirates were attractive to the youth because they did not formulate a programme and sought radical equality (Pham 2012: 1). They are not an organisation, but a network, and fit in with what young people experience and practise on the Internet every day. Even conventional populism already seems obsolete to this radical participatory conception of democracy. This evolution to radical internet democracy has been reinforced by the rise of experts. Extra-parliamentary expert panels have greatly changed democracies. But only under Mario Monti has it come to “politics without politicians”. After Berlusconi’s departure, the Italian Cabinet was staffed exclusively by professionals. According to press reports, more than half the Cabinet were university professors. There had often been less radical experiments in multi-party systems. In the Weimar Republic, however, the “Sachwalter Cabinet” was usually not very successful. Party democracy repeatedly fulminated against the ‘Verbonzung’ (Helmut Kohl). However, empirical studies have shown that German Parliamentarians are more likely to have a restrained and business-like attitude towards office. In the German parliamentary study (DEUPAS) the mandate-holders of the four main democratic parties showed that they believed responsibility for social innovation lay with citizens and not with the economy or politics (v. Alemann et al. 2011: 32). The reason for this is the segmentation of politics, which also turns MPs into narrowly focused experts. One wonders, then, that the movement to strengthen the referendum democracy is not stronger. “Stuttgart 21” has made the voices in politics and science ever more sceptical (Merkel 2011: 49ff). In surveys the arbitration model proved to be very popular with citizens. Round tables have been around for a while. Here, however, a new form of citizen participation is being tried. However, this model can only be successful if critics and advocates of projects are given equal rights and a neutral moderator heads the negotiations (Brettschneider 2011: 42, 46). Many analysts are less optimistic about referendum democracy. They have contributed to the intensification of discourses on issues such as admission to the EU, especially as the question has not involved any of the usual personal debates. But in policy-orientated everyday democracy, these successes have hardly been apparent even in Switzerland. Plebiscites have not strengthened the people as a whole, but mostly just well-represented middle classes, thanks to their lobbying organisations (Merkel 2011: 52, 55). The less well-off lower middle classes often respond to these experiences of selective representation “of the people” by embracing populist attitudes. Switzerland has demonstrated that referendums are not a remedy for populism. Even in Germany the populism associated with Blocher upset the party system. This did not, however, prevent Peter Köppel (2011), editor-in-chief of Weltwoche in Zürich, repeatedly recommending the Swiss model to the Germans.

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Of most interest to our topic was an early threat: populist movements that blindly defend hardened traditional stances of a world endangered by capitalist modernisation. Civil society has become auto-poetic, as it were: it can only transform itself – society as a whole turns out not to be changeable. This was another rejection of power-hungry people intent on changing the system, such as populist demagogues who verbally incite systemic change. The crisis classifications in Habermas have infiltrated the populism debate despite his warnings about variations. It was branded by populists: • A distribution crisis exacerbated by rising unemployment. • A social identity crisis because of growing immigration. • A representation crisis, which fostered increasing alienation from parties and strengthened demands for direct democracy by “the people”. The new form of the crisis since the banking crash of 2008/09 has temporarily rendered populist agitators speechless. Despite the crisis, unemployment rose only slowly, and international governments have responded surprisingly quickly and effectively with emergency aid. The populists’ crisis-mongering was rendered somewhat ineffectual because suddenly the despised political elites and supposedly incompetent State were needed. There were other major adjustments: since Islamism was considered an adversary, right-wing populist parties have revised their a-Christian or even anti-Christian stance. This has, at any rate, been apparent with the Front National in France, which has made the Celtic cross its symbol, and neo-pagan motifs have been adopted by Alain de Benoist, whose roots already lay in the fascist Vichy Government. After 1945, liberal elements were incorporated into right-wing populist programmes, especially in Protestant countries, as Joppke (2017: 6) highlighted. He is a German sociologist who teaches in Bern and describes himself as a “reactionary Liberal”, a tendency that perhaps explains his emphasis on liberal features of populism. In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party internalised federalism and freedom as liberal elements. Because of Islamic fundamentalism, the tendency to promote gender equality in opposition to the burka was also advocated by right-wing populists in some countries.

3.5

Populism and the Media

Increasing importance is attributed to the media in the rise of populism. Journalists have been suspected of ‘co-politicism’. Unlike politicians, they are not responsible to anyone but their publishers or broadcasters. According to one critic (Meyer 2015: 169ff), in a market-orientated democracy mediocracy threatens to foster a distorted form of democracy: “delegative democracy”. While political journalists cannot be blamed for the total disintegration of representative democracy, they contribute to the fact that passive spectators of media events tend toward self-exclusion and no longer get involved as active participants (Merkel 2015: 473ff). At the same time

3.5 Populism and the Media

49

they increase the media-orientated behaviour of politicians who promote populism. In recent years the question has arisen as to why even the otherwise critical and illusionless Germany quality press has excused Angela Merkel’s outrageous whitewash and “populist-sedating story” of the German idyll (Meyer 2015: 175). There is little evidence that the media really believed these CDU fairy-tales, but they were impressed by their effectiveness in public. This split stance was permeated with an unobtrusive form of populism. Digital behaviour entered state parliaments alongside the Pirate Party. Legislation is pre-tested as if it were a computer game, as recently occurred with the application of the communications consultant Jan Hemme, who was catapulted from the laptop into the House of Representatives and immediately accepted with a large majority. Buzzwords like ‘Gamification’ were coined (Becker/Rosenbach 2012: 26). Representative and direct democracy increasingly seem to loosely complement each other in “liquid feedback”. The danger that an active minority on the Internet will prevail because only a tiny minority of the population participates in staged votes remains a shortcoming of this fluid conception of democracy. Of course, the possibility that people power can be optimised in the digital age is still fascinating: proposals, amendments, ballots – all can be sent direct to citizens within a few hours in a Liquid Democracy (Kurz 2012: 113). Whether high-quality discourse and not chaos will be the result of this process has yet to be seen. Vague personal accusations threaten to stand next to well-researched exposures. Strangers could become the objects of collective outrage and the scandal could spread everywhere (Pörksen/Detel 2012: 141). “Five-minute pirates”, who have just joined the party, can usurp the discussion and derail the work of previous parliamentary candidates in their attempts to grill them. This will promote less programmatic content than the simple method of talking together and participating in “computer involvement”. In common with conventional right-wing populists, the Pirates are mostly men, but they have a higher level of education. As with traditional populists, most support the party not because of its political programme but because of dissatisfaction with traditional parties. Populist behaviours have now also affected established parties, as can be seen with Blair and Schröder. Charismatic media democracy has also promoted populist style in conventional politics. On the occasion of the party convention of the SPD in June 2017, Olaf Scholz was famed for “a certain populism in the pension policy” (FAS 25, 6. 2017: 30). Populists are increasingly using the media for ‘infotainment’ – a mixture of information and entertainment. After a recent statement of the average number of daily messages in a month, the populist AfD was in first place, ahead of the FDP and the CSU (Fokus 23/2017: 28). Of course, the effect of these media campaigns should not be overestimated. The reports are usually event-orientated. However, background analysis is rare. The extent to which opportunities for self-promotion should be granted also remains controversial. Prejudice is spread because of the fixation with gossip about prominent populist actors and the drama of the events that give rise to them. Hypotheses and proven facts are often not sufficiently distinguished between (Schultz 2016: 160). In weakly institutionalised party systems, for instance

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Poland’s, some media, such as Radio Maryja, have even strongly supported xenophobic opinions like those of the League of Polish Families (LPR) in 2006. Similarly, the rise of the Hungarian Jobbik (“movement for a better Hungary”) was partly brought about by the media in 2010 (Goodwin 2011: 3). Manipulated public opinion proves to be particularly unstable. On one day the masses call ‘Hosanna’; on the next, if not “Crucify him,” at the very least, “Away with him”. The signs of fatigue in the public’s attention span are striking. It is even possible for politicians who are virtually blameless, such as Stoiber in Bavaria and Teufel in Baden-Württemberg, to be overthrown by mediocre party members – not to mention the instances in which a minor misdemeanour has occurred, as in the case of Lothar Späth. More populists that normal actors have experienced the fickleness of public opinion, as can be seen even with former leaders such as Haider’s FPÖ or the divisions in the German Republicans under Schönhuber.

3.6

Government Involvement

Government involvement by right-wing populist groups seems to be favoured by the fact that mainstream parties rarely carry their programmes through. They are – as Peter Mair once said – still responsible, but no longer responsive. This also indicates that not every protest party is also populist (Müller 2016: 102). For example, during the government coalition, the FPÖ endorsed measures that were in blatant contradiction to its former opinion as the Opposition (Geden 2006: 198). The role of populists in Conservative governments is judged differently. In 2002 the FPÖ’s popularity crashed from 27% to about 10%, giving rise to the belief that government participation is damaging to populists. This was not confirmed in Switzerland by the SVP, which became the strongest party in 2003. But the SVP made fewer major changes in its standpoint when in power than the FPÖ. This deviation from the above rule must also be interpreted in the context of the peculiarities of the Swiss system. There is no obligation to form coalitions, as in parliamentary systems. The SVP could occasionally behave like an opposition party while in government. Its initiative in expelling immigrants has brought it more benefits. In 2011 it lost only a few votes and remained the strongest Swiss party. Coalitions have thus only occasionally served “populist disenchantment”. The toleration model was portrayed as the worst strategy because populists have influence but cannot be held accountable. However, according to experts, there is no recipe for getting rid of populists. The most effective tactic in the fight against the rise of populists is to provide detailed reasons why their simplistic solutions are unfeasible. Populist simplification in propaganda can even act as a useful early warning system: citizens have perceived a problem, enabling mainstream parties to discuss it realistically (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 40ff). Die reaction of established centre parties, above all the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats, to advances by populist groups is difficult to generalise. There

3.6 Government Involvement

51

seem to be four options, as Karsten Grabow found in part through personal interviews (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 399ff): • Distancing of the Right by a kind of “cordon sanitaire”: (VP in Switzerland, Platforma Obywatelska [PO] in Poland, Konservative Folkeparti [Conservative People’s Party; KF] in Denmark until mid-2011, Moderata Samlingspartiet in Sweden, KOK in Finland, Høyre in Norway). • Taking on certain goals to compete with right-wing populists (Union pour un mouvement populaire, UMP in France). • Acceptance through silent support of populists (CDA in the Netherlands, KF in Denmark until 2011). • Formal coalitions with populists (ÖVP in Austria, 2000–2002). Naturally, these options are not uniform in European countries and they have often changed within the same parties. Distancing prevailed for a long time; cooperation remained rare. After two years of government involvement the FPÖ dropped from 27% of the vote to about 10% because they could not fulfil their election promises in the coalition with the ÖVP (Pelinka 2005: 98). The idea arose that populists could best be discredited through government involvement – a view that could not be confirmed by the SVP in Switzerland because of the particular conditions of the Swiss governmental system and the Party’s radical power initiatives. Complete severance from populists has paid off in Poland and Sweden. In Denmark and Switzerland, however, the attempt to exclude them has not paid off. Geert Wilders’ anti-EU propaganda has not been reflected in votes. The parties of the centre, especially the Christian Democrats, are advised to counter the negative campaigns of populists with a positive programme (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 406, 408). In this respect, populist campaigns seem positive, as they set up an early warning system. In this way social protests remain within the system and lead to new solutions. In 2002 Pim Fortuyn’s group unexpectedly grew to 17% and for a short time became a ruling party. Around 2007 populist parties were reckoned to have a fixed size. Contrary to expectations, populist parties have been able to maintain the loyalty of their voters over several legislative periods. Even the replacement of charismatic leaders like Jean Marie Le Pen, Fortuyn and Glistrup has not driven parties into the abyss (Goodwin 2011: 2). Nevertheless, in the literature (Bauer 2010: 14f) the governmental participation of populist groups has been judged sceptically. Unrealistic promises are made and radical solutions to problems are propagated. Both are hardly achievable in power, and lead to a credibility problem for populists. Right-wing populists can only remain successful if they can combine government involvement with opposition. This is most likely to be achieved in federal systems like those in Switzerland and Austria. But even in non-federal Scandinavian countries the position of populists has been successfully consolidated many times.

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3.7

3 Parties and Populism

Scenarios of Decline

Where populists at municipal level became important they lost votes after a few years, as in Italy in 2017. The Five Stars movement came last. Compared with the vindication of Beppe Grillo, the leader of the group, other politicians have found that the populist group did not live up to voters’ expectations (Bremer 2017: 3). Mainstream parties like the SPD, which plummeted and temporarily gained a high in polls by Schulz, are not the only ones to have suffered from unrealistic expectations. The newer and less structured a group, the more it must maintain uninterrupted success. 2017 should have been the year of European right-wing populists. However, Wilders did not win the elections in the Netherlands, Le Pen did not become the French President and Frauke Petry seemed to have become disempowered within her party. Only the Lega Nord in Italy, with 15% in the polls, held up well. The reasons given were that the party leader Salvini abandoned the separatism through which the Lega originally wanted to detach the north from the rest of Italy and instead now wants to protect Italy better from globalisation and the EU. For Salvini, north and south, and Right and Left, have become secondary in Italy. He wants to decouple Italy from the EU and defend it as “sacred territory” (Ladurner 2017: 9). In typically populist fashion, the extent of ‘uncoupling’ and whether it means leaving the EU remains blurred. Another source of decline is increasing internal conflict in populist parties. Frauke Petry learned this when she campaigned for a Realpolitik course in the AfD. The attempt to exclude Jens Maier from the party was avenged because this started a campaign against Petry and criticised her for always rejecting contact with Pegida and other right-wing groups (Locke 2017: 4). Success or failure is created not least by the harmonisation of the four struggles, which the NPD designated “struggle for the heads, for the street, for Parliament and for the organised will” (Schulze in: Braun 2009: 92ff). But the external perspective also needs to be seen, because it limits the campaign options of right-wing extremists and populists. The danger of party bans often leads to verbal moderation, which does not necessarily match the views of right-wing party elites or voters. Populists are classified as “tending to be anti-democratic”. Populists in power tend to damage democracy if they do not retreat from their demands for sole representation. Nevertheless, they should not be banned as long as they are manifestly not engaged in rabble-rousing (Müller 2016: 95f). It was argued that a populist party could be disenchanted fastest by co-government, as shown by the regional acting “Schill-Partei”, which failed because of its inner contradictions, although it still performed well in the State election in 2001. The comparison of Hartleb (2004: 289) with the PDS in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin remains oblique despite the defeats of the party because the PDS had a firm tradition and a clearly identifiable clientele. The decline through government involvement was often caused by the fact that a populist ruling party such as the FPÖ failed to prove that, once in power, it had not changed into the opposing camp (Geden 2006: 228).

3.7 Scenarios of Decline

53

In the 1990s it seemed puzzling, in international comparisons, that the apparently solid Scandinavian democracies were shaken by populist movements. But in the second decade of the new millennium there were signs of decline. The Danish People’s Party tipped the scales for a decade in a right-liberal minority government but has been banned from the Opposition since 2011. In all four Scandinavian countries approval ratings are stagnating and the populist parties are torn by leadership battles. The Sweden Democrats (since 1988) and the True Finns (since 1995) are under criticism because of personnel overlaps with right-wing extremists (Balzter 2012: 10). It has been shown since the German Republicans that the vague identity-building of populist parties is even more susceptible to decay than traditional major parties. Parties prefer to cooperate with selective groups, but avoid highly specialised populist groups. This is why the transformative power of new social movements in the 1980s was so greatly overestimated. These were most successful when they limited populist agitation and developed a willingness to compromise and co-operate, as ecologists and feminists have shown.

References Ahr, N. et al.: Die rechte Internationale. Die Zeit, Nr. 23, 25. 5. 2016: 13–15. v. Alemann, Ulrich et al.: Die Bürger sollen es richten. APuZ 44–45, 2011: 25–32. Balzter, Sebastian: Im Norden auf dem Rückzug. Die Populisten Skandinaviens verschleißen sich in parteiinternen Kämpfen. FAZ, 21. 4. 2012: 10. Bauer, Werner T.: Rechtspopulismus in Europa. Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010. Becker, Sven / Rosenbach, Marcel: Das Computerspiel Politik. Der Spiegel, Nr. 14, 2012: 26–28. v. Beyme, Klaus: Rechtsextremismus in Osteuropa. In: Falter et al. 1996: 423–442. v. Beyme, Klaus: Parteien im Wandel. Von den Volksparteien zu den professionalisierten Wählerparteien. Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000, 2002. Bos, Ellen / Segert, Dieter (Ed.): Osteuropäische Demokratien als Trendsetter? Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2008. Braun, Stephan et al. (Ed.): Strategien der extremen Rechten. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, 2nd Edn. 2015. Bremer, Jörg: Die Sterne sinken. Warum die Populisten in den Kommunen verloren. FAZ 13. 6. 2017: 3. Brettschneider, Frank: Kommunikation und Meinungsbildung bei Großprojekten. APuZ, 44–45, 2011: 40–47. Crouch, Colin: Post-Democracy. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, 2005. Falter, Jürgen W. / Jaschke, Hans-Gerd / Winkler, Jürgen R. (Ed.): Rechtsextremismus. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung. Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996. Gebhardt, Richard: Eine „Partei neuen Typs“? Die „Alternative für Deutschland“ (AfD) vor den Bundestagswahlen. Forschungsjournal soziale Bewegungen 3, 2013: 86–91. Geden, Oliver: Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs und Schweizerische Volkspartei zwischen Opposition und Regierungsbeteiligung. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006. Gnauck, Gerhard: Kaczyński, die PiS und Polens Weg nach Osten. Osteuropa, H. 1–2, 2016: 103–108. Goodwin, Matthew: Right Response. Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe. A Chatham House Report, 2011.

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Grabow / Hartleb: Strategic Responses to the Populists Advance: Options for Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties: in: Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 399–409. Grabow, Karsten / Hartleb, Florian (Ed.): Exposing the Demagogues. Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe. Brüssel, Centre for European Studies, 2013. Hank, Rainer: Nichts geht über Transparenz. Piraten sind die Helden der Informationsfreiheit. FAS, Nr. 13, 2012: 38–39. Hartleb, Florian: Rechts- und Linkspopulismus. Eine Fallstudie anhand von Schill-Partei und PDS. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004. Hartleb, Florian: Populism in Western and Eastern Europe Compared. In: Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 353–372. Hartleb, Florian: Internationaler Populismus als Konzept. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014. Jesse, Eckhard / Panreck, Isabelle-Christine: Populismus und Extremismus. Terminologische Abgrenzung – das Beispiel der AfD. Zeitschrift für Politik (ZfP), 1, 2017: 59–76. Joppke, Christian: Erst die Moral, dann das Fressen. Was verbindet die europäischen Rechtspopulisten von Viktor Orbán über Geert Wilders bis zu Marine Le Pen? FAZ. 6. 6. 2017: 6. Joppke, Christian: Is Multiculturalism dead? Crisis and Persistence in the Constitutional State. Cambridge, Polity, 2017. Köppel, Peter: Nehmt die Schweiz als Vorbild! Focus 48, 2011: 48–50. Kurz, Constanze: Keine Angst! Warum die anderen Parteien von den Piraten lernen müssen. Der Spiegel, 15, 2012: 212–213. Ladurner, Ulrich: Einer ist noch da. In Frankreich und den Niederlanden haben Rechtspopulisten Wahlen verloren, in Deutschland zerlegen sie sich. Die Zeit, Nr. 23, 1. 6. 2017: 9. Locke, Stefan: Revolte der Maier-Jünger. In Sachsen wächst der Widerstand gegen die AfD-Vorsitzende Frau Petry. FAZ 9. 6. 2017: 4. Merkel, Wolfgang: Gegen alle Theorie? Die Konsolidierung der Demokratie in Ostmitteleuropa. In: Schrenk / Soldner (Ed.) Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2010: 545–562. Merkel, Wolfgang: Krise der Demokratie: Mythos oder Realität? In: Bluhm, Harald et al. (Ed.): Ideenpolitik. Geschichtliche Konstellationen und gegenwärtige Konflikte. Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2011: 438–448. Merkel, Wolfgang: Ist die Krise der Demokratie eine Erfindung? In: Ders. (Ed.) Demokratie und Krise. Wiesbaden, Springer VS, 2015: 473–498. Meyer, Thomas: Die Unbelangbaren. Wie Journalisten mitregieren. Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2015. Minkenberg, Michael: Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich. USA, Frankreich, Deutschland. Wiesbaden, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998. Minkenberg, Michael: The Radical Right in Eastern Europe. Democracy under Siege? New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Mudde, Cas: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Mudde, Cas: On Extremism and Democracy in Europe. London, Routledge, 2016. Müller, Jan-Werner. Was ist Populismus? Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2016. Lizenzausgabe für die Bundeszentale für Politische Bildung. Bonn, Berlin, 2016. Müller, Jan-Werner: Populismus. Symptom einer Krise der politischen Repräsentation? Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66, 2016: 1–9. Niehuis, Edith: Die Demokratiekiller. Fehlentwicklungen in der deutschen Politik. Berlin, Lehmanns Media, 2011. Niehuis, Edith: Die Zerstörung der Parteiendemokratie von oben nach unten. APuZ, 44–45, 2011: 7–11. Norris, Pippa / Grömping, Max: The electoral integrity project. University of Sydney, 2017. Norris, Pippa/ Grömping, Max: Populist Threats to Electoral Integrity. The Year in Elections, 2016–2017. Harvard Kennedy School, May 2017. Offe, Claus (Ed.): Die Demokratisierung der Demokratie. Diagnosen und Reformvorschläge. Frankfurt, Campus, 2003.

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Pelinka, Anton: Die FPÖ: eine rechtspopulistische Regierungspartei zwischen Adaption und Opposition. In: Susanne. Frölich-Steffen / L. Rensmann (Ed.): Populisten an der Macht. Vienna, Braumüller, 2005: 87–104. Pham, Khue: Alles Piraten. Ist die neue Partei so erfolgreich, obwohl sie alles falsch macht oder weil sie alles falsch macht. Die Zeit Nr. 14, 2012: 1. Pirro, Andrea L.: Populist Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Government and Opposition, 2013, 2014, H. 4: 600–629. Pörksen, Bernhard / Detel, Hanne: Kollaps der Kontexte. In der Digital-Ära wird der Kontrollverlust zur Alltagserfahrung. Der Spiegel, 14, 2012: 140–141. Probst, Maximilian: Der falsche Frieden. Weil sich die großen Parteien in der Mitte immer ähnlicher werden, wächst der Extremismus – auch am rechten Rand. Die Zeit, Nr. 48, 2011: 61. Rathkolb, Oliver / Ogris, Günter (Ed.): Authoritarianism, History and Democratic Dispositions in Austria, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Innsbruck, Studienverlag, 2010. Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert et al. (Ed.): Pegida. Rechtspopulismus zwischen Fremdenangst und „Wende“-Enttäuschung? Bielefeld, transcript, 2016. Schedler, Andreas (Ed.): Electorial Authoritarianism. The Dynamic of unfree competition. Boulder, Lynne Riener, 2006. Schellenberg, Britta: Wenn der Staat versagt. Pfade zum „hausgemachten“ Terrorismus. In: Rehberg et al. (Ed.), 2016: 323–336. Schiedel, H.: Extreme Rechte in Europa. Wien, Edition Steinbauer, 2011. Schimmeck, Tom: Am besten nichts Neues. Reinbek, Rowohlt, 2010. Schindler, Jörg: Regierende Zynismus. Großbritannien. Der Spiegel 26, 2017: 96–97. Schultz, 2016: 160. Schultz, Tanjew: Rechtsextremismus und Journalismus. In: Steinbacher 2016: 150–165. Schulze, in: Braun 2009: 92ff. Staniszkis, Jadwiga: „Ein infantiler Autokratismus“. Kaczynski, die PiS und Polens Weg nach Osten. Osteuropa, 2016, No. 1–2: 103–108. Steinbacher, Sybille (Ed.): Rechte Gewalt in Deutschland. Zum Umgang mit dem Rechtsextremismus in Gesellschaft, Politik und Justiz. Göttingen, Wallstein, 2016. Taggart, Paul: Populism. Philadelphia, Buckingham Open University Press, 2000. Vejvodová, Petra: A Thorny Way to find friends: Transnational Cooperation and NetworkBuilding among right-wing and national populists. In Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 373–396.

Chapter 4

Populism, Right-Wing Extremism and Neo-Nationalism

4.1

Differences Between Populism und Right-Wing Extremism

Populism needs to be differentiated from two other movements: • the right-wing populism of Conservatism; • the populism of right-wing extremism. Right-wing populism values institutional rules far less than Conservatism and is opposed to intermediary institutions that seem to disturb the relationship between people and leadership. The problem of this neat demarcation seems to be that the recent neo-conservatism against the rise of populism is taking on some aspects of populism to stop the decline of the Conservative party. For quite a few observers it seemed euphemistic to call the AfD right-wing populist and thereby downplay its tendencies. One problem of such classifications seems to be the differentiation of the party system. The following list applies to the differences between the two movements (Table 4.1). The AfD stands to the far right in the German party system, but related groups in other countries sometimes have even more right-wing movements by their side. In Germany, through the decline of the Pirates, the impact of the AfD has lost its way a little. In party systems with moderate fragmentation, a party such as the AfD could become a coalition partner within a few years if it substitutes constructive policies for sweeping criticism and thus appears as the lesser evil compared to a perennial grand coalition. Systems like the Federal Republic face a dilemma when forming a government: grand coalitions breed alternative populists, but their very success threatens to reinforce the grand coalitions (Jesse 2016: 36f). A significant difference between populism and right-wing extremism seems to be that the latter prefers strong party organisation with a sort of “democratic centralism” while populists such as the American Populists and the Russian Narodniki © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0_4

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Table 4.1 Matrix: Differences between right-wing populism und conservatism Right-wing populism Volatile, unpredictable Anti-elitist Contempt for institutions ‘We’ versus ‘They’ politicisation Opportunism Source Hartleb (2011: 23)

Conservatism Stable, firm values Elitist Respect for institutions “We’re all in the same boat” (Integration) Spiritual groundswell

have remained decentralisers. The Russian Narodniki were unique in rejecting the representative-parliamentary constituency even before the country had acquired a constitution (see v. Beyme 1965: 132ff). Only occasionally are the differences between populism and right-wing extremism in some respects slight, as in the case of the progressive parties in Scandinavia and also the Austrian FPÖ under Haider (Decker 2006: 16). Fascist slogans sometimes stand alongside neoliberal attitudes. Where racism is an important credo, as in George C. Wallace’s movement – with its slogan “segregation for ever” – in the USA, the line with right-wing extremism seems to have been crossed (Hartleb 2004: 54). Right-wing extremism has sometimes been portrayed as homeless because it rejects and has been rejected by the existing society (Botsch 2016: 72). Some authors therefore only want to speak of right-wing extremism if ethnic and nationalist thinking is particularly strong. Right-wing populism, by contrast, is by no means homeless and has occasionally made itself indispensable in the era of neo-democracy. Even in the new democracies in Eastern Europe the boundaries between populism and right-wing extremism are occasionally fluid, as in the Hungarian Party for Justice and Life, the Slovakian National Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in the 1990s, the Czech Republicans and the League for Polish Families, which are all semi-authoritarian, xenophobic and right-wing extremist (Lang 2007: 128f). A limit to right-wing extremism seems to be a belief in the need to abolish “the system”, or at least change it radically. Right-wing extremists are usually less concerned with the constitutional rules that are accepted by most populist movements, albeit grudgingly. The changes required by populist movements are usually limited: minimum requirements are the right to elect the head of state and the introduction of referendums, as well as changes in representative suffrage. Where populists already have an elected president, as in Austria, they have complained with Haider (1994: 235) about the expensive duplication of power caused by competition with the Federal Chancellor. In contrast to the Third World, populist movements are rarely revolutionary in the North Atlantic region. They exert pressure to lead “the establishment” back to the “path of democratic virtue”. Populists have hardly ever accepted the myth of the proletariat and the need for class struggle. Revolutionary Marxists therefore classified them as “petty bourgeois” – as Lenin did with regard to the Narodniki in Russia. An alliance between

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them could only ever be temporary, such as that between the Bolsheviks and the left-wing Social Revolutionaries. Three differences between right-wing populism and right-wing extremism have increasingly emerged: • With the spread of terrorism around the world, the populists’ criterion became that they generally rejected terrorist acts as a political method. • In contrast to most populists, right-wing extremists are consistently ‘antiAmerican’, ‘anti-Semitic’ and usually also ‘anti-Islamic’. • Right-wing extremists have often completely rejected representative democracy as a model, while right-wing populists have generally rejected only certain “democratic methods” (Hartleb 2014: 177ff; Backes 2006: 232). • Most right-wing extremists have firmly rejected the European Union, while most populists have been more cautious on this issue, even if they are Eurosceptic. The soft form of Euroscepticism was aimed at rejecting certain elements of the European unification processes. “Europe yes – EU no” was occasionally bandied as a slogan. Among anti-Europeans, populists can be classified as ‘Revisionists’, who want to change certain positions and individual polices, and “Minimalists, who accept the status quo but do not seek integration. It is not the ‘whether’ of European unification that is being debated, but the ‘how’ (see the comprehensive classification of attitudes towards the EU in Hartleb 2014: 162ff, 2015: 33). Right-wing extremists usually fight the EU as an “American form of integration”. At best, “Europe of Regions” would be coined as a slogan that matches the regionalism of the Eurosceptics. Generalisations have turned out to be problematic because the new EU members in Eastern Europe have adopted a much tougher stance than Western Europeans, even though they owed so much to Europe. In Eastern Europe conflicts between minority groups have revived. But even central European countries, such as Belgium, have recently not held an exemplary attitude towards ethnic groups. Euroscepticism has occasionally been interpreted as an exclusive feature of right-wing populist parties, but even this assumption cannot be maintained since post-Communist left-wing parties also identify themselves as Eurosceptics. A new debate was opened in German political science when Wolfgang Streeck addressed the confrontation between capitalism and democracy in Europe. Only a minority of populists can be identified with right-wing extremism. Martin Lipset had already uncovered the “extremism of the centre” in his classic, Political Man (1960). His concept of extremism, however, was primarily aimed at Third World countries. With increasing Europeanisation and globalisation, this populism of the centre has spread in many ways. Losers in economic crises therefore like to denounce foreign powers, such as the European bureaucracy in Brussels of the CIA in the United States, as the ultimate guilty party. After the Second World War, a combination of liberal democracy and tamed capitalism was promoted as a recipe for success by the main parties from the right to the centre-left. Today this combination is in danger of disintegrating (Assheuer

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2016: 43). As long ago as 1509 Erasmus of Rotterdam’s Praise of Folly – as its title suggests – praised folly as a counterpart to cold rationalism as a recipe for success. Some of the names used for the new populist right-wing extremism are staggering. Nationalism, neonationalism and populism are the commonest terms for the new movements that make a splash right and left of the centre. But terms such as fascists, authoritarians, reactionaries, racists, right-wing radicalists and even Nazis are also circulating in the debates. The terminology is significant: a politician who called himself a National Conservative could potentially be invited everywhere. People would be less keen to talk to someone called a Salon Fascist. The designations are often the result of political controversy. This is how, in the Weimar period, the Social Democrats for the KPD became “Social fascists”. ‘Populism’ is the most common term, but at the same time is limited to methods of self-expression and can be identified with little clear content. Where the term ‘fascism’ is used flippantly, it does apply to a few methods, but overstates the ideologies and goals of populist movements. The term ‘authoritarianism’ in turn describes methods of domination but not aims such as racism and nationalism (Köckritz/Randow 2016: 7). Populism is a particular form of extremism insofar as it does not openly pit itself against democracy as an idea. It is also considered a consequence of globalisation. Wide-eyed forecasters had hoped that globalisation would spread democracy. Some critics rapidly feared the opposite: a tendency to strengthen a new authoritarianism. Populism operates by distinguishing between right-thinking people and a fundamentally flawed elite. The elite is perceived as the detached bureaucracy of a large welfare state with a multicultural attitude, or as a neo-liberal vicarious agent of the financial markets (Kaube 2016: 41). However, the formation of populist parties requires more than these two general factors. One catalyst is the belief that within the party system there is no effective opposition. The de-ideologisation of parties – most blatantly at present in the SPD – favours populist groups. Quite a few Social Democrat votes were lost to populist movements in recent elections across Europe. The criticism levelled at many institutions of democracy – or, as Crouch believes, post-democracy – has grown but is nothing new. Since 1968 a more left-wing populist component has been the consequence of the student revolution and its values. In Scandinavia populism began as opposition to the heavy taxes imposed by the State over the previous seventy years. If necessary, such tendencies could be traced back to the struggle between ‘Piazza’ and ‘Palace’ in the Early Modern period (Jörke/Selk 2015: 488). However, such historical derivations are not very instructive because today movements are related to with the modern or postmodern party state. Among mainstream parties the pattern of confrontation was predominantly ‘moralisation’ (Müller 2015). This was how Conservative politicians of the unions, passionate left-wingers and committed liberals engaged with each other. This approach has rightly been criticised because it strengthens rather than weakens populist tendencies. One danger of moralising is the dismissal of divergent opinions as invalid views that can be despised. This prevents a rational discussion taking place (Jörke/Selk 2015: 485f, 489). However, the moralising argument is supported

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by “the people”, as the populists like to call themselves in contrast to “the elites” or “the establishment”. This attitude reflects the experience of the gradual devaluation of individual values and ways of life in the globalised world. Critics like Rorty (1999) have complained that, after the student revolt, the phrase “search for a cultural identity” came too late because of the economic deprivation of the former middle classes. The party political consequence of this development is the erosion of the former coalition of associations and parties which link the working class with left-wing parties, such as the Social Democrats in Europe or the left wing of the American Democrats. The populist-authoritarian wave that swamped Europe created a novelty: “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 2008; v. Randow 2016: 3). Universal suffrage was charged with populism. It was indeed maintained, but the freedom of the people and the rule of law were decoupled. In Europe the Visegrád Group of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – once champions of the liberalisation and democratisation of the old Eastern Bloc – have already formed a pressure group for this form of desubstantiated democracy and tried to limit the influence of the EU on their national identity. This tendency also shifts the balance in world politics. Putin is suddenly praised by American and European populists. The resistance to Erdogan’s autocratisation would be even more half-hearted if, even in the eyes of most neo-populists, Turkey were not being used as the brake on the immigration movement. The neo-liberal wave, which seemed to promise rapid prosperity after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ended in disappointment with the system due to higher youth unemployment and inability to fund the Welfare State (Ther 2014: 346ff). Russia turned to Putin under a new form of State capitalism – a mixture of a quasi-market economy and political authoritarianism which is to be extended to the countries of the Eurasian Union and has been compared with ordo-liberalism. Certain formerly anti-Soviet movements, as in Hungary, seem to have been inspired by Putin’s model.

4.2

Nationalism as a Breeding Ground for Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism

Nationalism has always required subdivisions. In the literature on Nation-building Friedrich Meincke’s dichotomy of State and cultural nation has often distinguished between two forms of nationalism: • State-organised nationalism • cultural nationalism (Ther 2011: 24). Both could foster forms of populism. The debate over whether populist movements should be viewed as “right-wing radical” or a moderate form of right-wing extremism has not been silenced. Didn’t neo-fascists appear predominantly populist

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after the Second World War? Of course, this does not apply to all right-wing extremist parties. The NPD did not seem very populist. It has not lasted successfully as “national opposition” (Botsch 2012: 140). Recently left-wing populists have made it difficult to equate populism with right-wing extremism because some Green movements and left-wing parties in Germany have increasingly been classified as populist. Populists like Haider (1994: 53, 57) have always resisted the accusation of fascism, and Haider suggested populism as an alternative expression in the book Freedom, I mean. For him, populism was a necessary element of democracy because populists were fighting for command of the ivory tower of the political class, with its alleged “contempt for the people”. In the second half of the twentieth century, subnationalists from Scotland to Catalonia also operated as populists in Europe, even though they sought regional autonomy rather than national sovereignty for their region. Postmodern ethnopluralism is a good example of the democratisation of marginalised groups in society. In contrast to traditional racism and nationalism, ethnopluralism does not emanate from ethnic or racist superiority. It only fights against the danger of losing the identity of the group in the age of levelling and globalisation. Normally, no expansionist aspirations are associated with the movement unless the constructed territorial basis of ethnic identity transcends the current boundaries of nation states and regional sub-units, as in the case of the Basques (France), the Catalonians (France, Valencia, the Balearic Islands) and increasingly also the Kurds. However, loss of identity is now also feared by weaker nation states. Identity policy is increasingly directed against high immigration levels. As Le Pen once put it: “I love North Africans, but their place is in the Maghreb” (cited by Betz 1994: 183). This development has the advantage that right-wing populists become defenders not only of their own culture, but also the cultures of immigrants – even though they just don’t want churches to be turned into mosques.

4.3

Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Polls

It is unique to the age of populism that some elements – such as opposition to the EU – are found in the Right as well as the Left. Among younger age-groups, the Extreme Right, with its well-planned wealth of experience, plays a role in the lives of almost five per cent of young people aged fifteen years upwards, as a criminological research institute in Lower Saxony discovered in March 2009 (Braun et al. 2009: 9, 15). Such surveys have been criticised by empirical scientists because they often ask so few specific questions that even the answers of very moderate citizens come across as radical. More authoritative, therefore, are the real numbers concerning the rise of 16% in offences attributed to right-wing extremism. The classification of actors in the Extreme Right should therefore only take into account

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consolidated structural ties aimed at disseminating right-wing extremist ideas. Modern right-wing extremism was perceived as growing above all in territorially limited, mostly rural and peripheral areas like Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxon Switzerland (Edathy et al. 2009: 71). A recent Bertelsmann study (infratest dimap; Vehrkamp/Wratil 2017: 17ff) covered 1,600 eligible voters in the years 2015–2017. It had the disadvantage of not differentiating populist attitudes. The good news was that 85% identified themselves as pro-democracy. Hard to reconcile with this, party researchers such as Oliver Treib in Münster held that 29.2% were populist, 33.9% voted half and half on the question and only 36.9% clearly declared themselves to be anti-populist (Herholz/Linnhoff 2017: 2). The disadvantage of this survey is that the ideological position of populist voters on the Left-Right scale was not explicitly measured. The Union parties appear to be the most pro-European and the least populist. SPD voters also expressed themselves to be pro-European and called for social justice. Unlike the Union, the SPD had about the same number of populists and non-populists. The Greens were pro-European and refugee-friendly. The Left was moderately populist and in favour of more redistribution of wealth. Among the major parties, only the AfD was clearly right-wing populist and anti-refugees and migrants.

References Assheuer, Thomas: Ein autoritäres Angebot. Die Zeit, Nr. 23, 25. 5. 2016: 43. Backes, Uwe: Politische Extreme. Eine Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006. Betz, Hans-Georg: Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Houndsmill, Macmillan, 1994. v. Beyme, Klaus: Politische Soziologie im zaristischen Rußland. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1965. Botsch, Gideon: Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1949 bis heute. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012. Botsch, Gideon: „Nationale Opposition“ in der demokratischen Gesellschaft. Zur Geschichte der extremen Rechten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Virchow et al. 2016/2017: 43–82. Braun, Stephan et al. (Ed.): Strategien der extremen Rechten. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, 2nd Edn. 2015. Decker, Frank (Ed.). Populismus. Gefahr für die Demokratie oder nützliches Korrektiv? Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006. Edathy, Sebastian / Sommer, Bernd: Die zwei Gesichter des Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. In: Braun et al. 2009, 2015: 45–74. Haider, Jörg: Die Freiheit, die ich meine. Frankfurt, Ullstein, 1994. Hartleb, Florian: Rechts- und Linkspopulismus. Eine Fallstudie anhand von Schill-Partei und PDS. Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004. Hartleb, Florian: Nach ihrer Etablierung – Rechtspolitische Parteien in Europa. Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, Zukunftsforum Politik. St. Augustin, May 2011: 18–25. Hartleb, Florian: Internationaler Populismus als Konzept. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2014. Herholz, Andreas / Linnhoff, Carsten: Populisten in Deutschland sind meist nur enttäuschte Demokraten. Bertelsmann-Studie: Knapp jeder Dritte Deutsche gilt als Populistisch. Rhein-Neckar Zeitung, 26. 7. 2017: 2. Jesse, Eckhard: Alle gegen eine? So wird die AfD noch stärker. Focus 3, 2016: 36–37.

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Jörke, Dirk / Selk, Veith: Der hilflose Antipopulismus. Leviathan, 4/2015: 484–500. Kaube, Jürgen: Das Volk ist nicht auffindbar. Und sein angeblicher Wille ist nur eine Konstruktion: Über den Populismus, der nur die Reaktion auf einen Mangel an Opposition ist. Aber keine Alternative. FAS Nr. 21, 29. 5. 2016: 41. Köckritz, Angela / v. Randow, Gero: Wie soll man sie nennen: Faschisten, Autoritaristen, Populisten, Reaktionäre, Rassisten, Nationalisten, Rechtsradidkale, Nazis? Eine Suche nach dem passenden Etikett für Politiker wie Gauland, Hofer und Le Pen. Die Zeit, Nr. 23, 2016, 9. 6. 2016: 7. Lang, Kai-Olaf: Populism in « Old » and « New Europe »: Trends and Implications. In: Bútora, 2007: 125–140. Lipset, Seymour Martin: Political Man. London, Mercury Books, 1960. Müller, Jan Werner: Populismus: Theorie und Praxis. Merkur 69, 2015: 28–37. v. Randow, Gero: Vorwärts und nicht vergessen. In Frankreich, Österreich und Amerika könnten alsbald Autokraten an die Staatsspitze gewählt werden. Das gefährdet die Demokratie. Die Zeit, Nr. 33, 4. 8. 2016: 3. Rorty, Richard: Stolz auf unser Land. Die amerikanische Linke und der Patriotismus. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1999. Ther, Philipp: Die dunkle Seite der Nationalstaaten. Erhnische Säuberungen im modernen Europa. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011. Ther, Philipp: Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa. Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2014. Vehrkamp, Robert L. / Wratil, Christopher: Die Stunde der Populisten? Populistische Einstellungen bei Wählern und Nichtwählern vor der Bundestagswahl 2017. Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017. Zakaria, Fareed: Der Aufstieg der Anderen. Berlin, Siedler, 2008 (engl.: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York, Norton, 2008).

Chapter 5

Conclusion: The New Normative Debate About Democracy and the Merits and Failures of Populism

5.1

The Merits of Populism in the Party System

The rise of populism is occasionally explained by the “dominance of ethics” and the “Merkelisation of politics”, which has allegedly led to an infantilisation of politics (Sieferle 2017: 128f). On the other hand, anti-populism has sometimes seemed ‘helpless’ because it fails to recognise that political attitudes are the product of socialisation (Jörke/Selk 2015: 496). Lack of socialisation cannot be corrected by rhetorical professions of democracy. Modern democracies must plan more carefully to include the irregular behaviour of populists in political education. In the meantime, populism in science has sometimes been positively valued, especially with regard to two merits: • It sometimes proved useful in the area of agenda-setting and in highlighting new issues that were soon addressed by mainstream parties. • The negative concerns about the ruinous effect of populists on the system of representative democracy proved to be exaggerated. The initial verdicts against populism have been tempered by experience: • Populism was propagated by charismatic leaders like Poujade and Le Pen in France. But even Max Weber recognised the phenomenon of a “generalisation of charisma”. Routinisation and integration in the parliamentary process have often led populist movements to disintegrate rapidly. In some countries an ‘intellectualisation’ of populist conduct began, and the consequence was the erosion of support because “the people” soon became tired of global slogans (Stöss 2000: 178). Lack of professionalism in populist leaderships proved detrimental in everyday parliamentary business. Populist political styles spread among the old parties, and the smaller populist groups lost their initial advantage. This experience did not prevent committed scientists like Chantal Mouffe (2011: 5) suggesting great Emotionalisation. The policy of consensus in the social centre by the move of the Left towards the Right, which Colin Crouch © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0_5

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viewed as responsible for the slide into post-democracy, should be abandoned, because it has led to the irrelevance of democratic institutions. It overlooks the fact that this rapprochement has the advantage that the major parties join together in a defence strategy if populism drifts into dangerous right-wing extremism or appears to be in favour of terrorist action. • The routinisation of movements began the closer they came to sharing power. Therefore some populists have tried to maintain the purity of the fundamental beliefs through remaining in opposition. Nothing proved more compromising than compromise. When Haider in Austria and Gregor Gysi in Berlin participated in government decisions, they lost their ‘innocence’ and were blamed for political mistakes. The case of Berlusconi, who shook up the entire party system in Italy in the early 1990s, was unique. His “second Italian Republic” proved even more corrupt than the first, no matter how loudly Berlusconi attacked the old “classe politica”. Berlusconi was overthrown and astonishingly experienced a double comeback, which he crowned in 2009 by merging with a formerly neo-fascist coalition partner. Coalitions are always unstable, and populist coalitions have been even more so. But Berlusconi drew lessons from this experience by beefing up his party power. Berlusconi’s fall was also the beginning of the overthrow of Umberto Bossi, who had been a member of all the cabinets of the ‘Cavaliere’. In April 2012 he had to give up leadership of the Lega Nord because he, who had always loudly railed against corruption, had himself fallen victim to several corruption scandals. For the preservation of democracy even in populist politics, it is comforting to know that the “squeaky-clean” do not usually remain permanently ‘clean’. Populist movements try to set “elite-directing forms of politics” against traditional “elite-directed forms of politics” – two terms that Inglehart (1990: 338) distinguished even before the populist wave. Step by step the populists have benefited from the “participatory revolution” of the 1970s and 1980s: no more totalitarian ideologies, medium-range goals, specific questions and stronger individual candidates (Kaase 1984). The change in political theory could be rendered: populists claimed to represent “civil society” against the “political class”. But the concept of civil society would suffer if it could be identified with a party. Some critics of the development (Latour 1995: 68, 188) have already suggested that modern constitutional systems have become the victims of their own success, in imminent risk of being run into the ground by it. The mobilisation revolution – which the populists fully exploited – has created so many hybrid forms of representation that the constitutional order can hardly hold them together. In the light of postmodern normalisation, this seems to me an exaggeration. A post-modern constitutional order is not in sight and certainly not the utopia of a “reunion between nature and society”, as some ecological populists had hoped. Even a normative thinker like Habermas (1992: 446), a tireless campaigner for “deliberative democracy”, saw populism as the main threat to civil society when traditional identities were populistically championed. Today this danger is greater than the

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dangers of classical modernity with its eschatological-revolutionary transformation ideologies. The controversial theorist Thilo Sarrazin (2016: 20) defended populism although he constantly felt himself misunderstood as a right-wing populist. He saw populism as nothing strange, but as a degradation of the political. He saw every policy as Krypto-Schmittian based on a friend-enemy schematic. Groups work with simplifications out of necessity because otherwise they would not be able to communicate. Voters always rely on trust because they lack the expertise to lose confidence in elites in times of crisis. There have always been crises, and hence also populist movements since the Narodniki in Russia und the Populists in the USA in the nineteenth century. The current crisis is the result of mass immigration and export of jobs through economic globalisation. This deduction becomes absurd if immigration is to be considered positive only if immigrants are on average better qualified than the receiving population. Rather, the opposite is plausible because, in the case constructed by Sarrazin, far more middle-class people would feel discriminated against, whereas in the current crisis many analysts have correctly assumed that the endangering of jobs by less skilled workers and lower class people has led to the spread of more populist movements. Unfortunately, comparative analysis (Atkinson 2016: 36) has found that despite all good intentions – we would add to populists and mainstream parties those who want to limit populism by achieving results – progress in the fight against poverty is minimal.

5.2

Consequences of Globalisation

Globalisation has had two effects worldwide: • Economic output is increasing. • The need for low-skilled workers is decreasing. This tends to lead to greater inequality in wage levels. One way out of this which has been identified by economists (Fratzscher 2016: 124, 128) is adapting qualifications to suit the needs of a flexible national economy. The economic policy of individual countries is important if they want to succeed in reorientating the losers in the globalisation process or at least compensating for the losses of those affected. For a long time Germany has ideologically oversimplified its market economy because the globalisation crises show that it offers citizens only limited security. Redistribution by the State is considered inefficient because the wealthy often support other relatively wealthy people rather than the poorest. The amount of income is determined statistically not by diligence and dedication, but by the income and educational level of the parents (Fratzscher 2016: 242). The wealth of most Germans is lower than in many European countries. The education system needs to be more focused on equal opportunities. The same author (Fratzscher

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2014: 233) simultaneously considered Germany to have a leading role in Europe – as an economic engine and a defender of the collective rules of the European Union. Micha Brumlik (2017: 3ff) spoke of populism as an “identitarian movement” that is heading towards a project of authoritarian statehood versus multiculturalism, Islam and immigration. His counter-concept was a “European Keynesianism”, although even this was classified by many critics as impending globalisation. Blanket counter-theories are theoretically rarely useful and practically unworkable, except that the appeal to civil society never does any harm. However, targeted individual actions seem more meaningful than mere theoretical debates.

5.3

Recommendations for Political Parties

Several recommendations were issued to people’s parties: • • • • • •

credible and understandable explanation of complex relationships; promotion of European integration; exposing the empty formulae of populist groups; combating social exclusion and crime; consistent application of immigration regulations; explaining the successes of stabilisation policy (Grabow/Hartleb 2013; 6).

Oddly enough, the vote for immigration rules remains strangely unspecific. In essence, the established people’s parties would have to fight for an immigration law. Even the SPD missed this opportunity in the grand coalition. It is believed that an immigration law declared by Germany, as an immigration country, would temporarily hand right-wing populists more votes. On the other hand it should be made clear that an immigration law like Australia’s or Canada’s would allow the selection of useful immigrants and channel the influx of people who are allegedly persecuted in their own countries. The word is that it is not the poorest who try to migrate, since they could hardly give smugglers a few thousand Euros for their illegal activity. The advertising for the European Union seems even more difficult to achieve. Geert Wilders described the high salaries of the EU Commissioners as “common greed”. New social movements were most successful when they limited populist agitation and developed willingness to compromise and cooperate, like the ecologists, and tried to represent “civil society” against the “political class”. But the concept of civil society would suffer if it could be identified with a party. Optimism occasionally propagated the integration into parliamentary democracy of leaders such as Joschka Fischer who formerly appeared ‘extremist’ (Kailitz 2004: 226). In the interests of such democratic success stories, however, it should not be concealed that left-wing extremist populists have generally accepted more democratic values and could therefore be introduced into normal political procedures more easily than right-wing extremists. Are such success stories rather negative? Some critics of the

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development (Latour 1995: 68, 188) have already suggested that modern constitutional systems have become victims of their own success and are in danger of expiring. But despite the incessant scenarios of the “crisis of democracy”, no Golden Age of Democracy can be identified. The reformed society of the Adenauer era, Switzerland – partially without women’s suffrage – the illiberal-corrupt democracy of the Gasperi era in Italy and the time of racial conflicts in the USA before Kennedy were hardly the golden age of a crisis-free democracy (see Merkel 2011: 445). But such comparisons should not suggest that the symptoms of crisis should not be taken seriously in the transformation of democracies. The “mobilisation revolution” – which the populists fully exploited – has, according to one view, created so many hybrid forms of representation that the constitutional order can hardly hold them together any more. In the light of postmodern normalisation, this seems to me an exaggeration. A post-modern constitutional order is not in sight and certainly not the utopia of a “reunion between nature and society”, as some ecological populists had hoped. Even a normative thinker like Habermas (1992: 446), a tireless campaigner for “deliberative democracy”, saw populism as the main threat to civil society when traditional identities were populistically championed. Today this danger is greater than the dangers of classical modernity with its eschatological-revolutionary transformation ideologies. It seems to me that it is not the type of identity that is problematic in a democracy, but the way in which it is fought for. Civil disobedience is considered a populist virtue (Möllers 2009: 80). This disobedience is not a “democratic vice”, especially not the more the countervailing power in the system assumes authoritarian features. Resistance can serve democratic decision-making, as Rawls (1971: 319ff) already knew.

5.4

Instead of Being a Threat to the Democratic System Is Right-Wing Populism an Approach to Neo-Democracy?

Populist movements can have dual consequences: they can reinforce “democracy fatigue”. This arises from the alleged lack of conflict in the public sphere. The assertion “There is no alternative” was principally attributed to Chancellor Merkel. This reassuring mantra is in danger of leading to public passivity (Panreck 2016: 1, 28). But through new agenda-setting it can also stimulate participation. Right-wing populist parties are growing, according to the prognosis of established researchers (Grabow/Hartleb 2013: 38). Yet, in contrast to the situation in Eastern Europe, populism in Western European systems has never been a systemic threat until now. In the 1980s new populists still appeared, verbally, to be system changers; in the 1990s the change had become rhetorical, as Berlusconi demonstrated with the “Second Republic” he proclaimed in Italy and Haider (1994: 201, 239) with his “Third Republic” in Austria. Kaczyński had declared the end of the “Fourth

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Republic” in Poland. Revolutionary phraseology was soon reduced to “transformation jargon”. But the systems were transformed less than the populist movements. They were successful in agenda-setting and public debate. But in most countries they did not get more than ten per cent of the vote, with the exception of the SVP, the Front National in France, the FPÖ in Austria and the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party). The fluctuations were even greater than with the old parties. In some cases the movements went under, like Poujade in France. In others there was a lack of professionalism, as in German state parliaments, which led to the rapid decline of the NPD and Republicans. For a long time populism did not even pose a threat to European integration, as shown by the co-governments involving populists in Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria. Since Brexit in 2016, however, this theory is no longer tenable. Opposition to European institutions has become a key feature in the political programmes of many populist parties in the EU. Post-democracy theories underestimated the participatory revolution, which favoured quantitative and qualitative unconventional forms of political participation. A multitude of mediation procedures, from disputes over the Hamburg Elbe pit and the school dispute to the opposition to “Stuttgart 21” – in a town which previously hardly ever attracted attention with anomic forms of participation – steered these conflicts back to a civil channel when they threatened to drift off course. The disadvantage of this shift in participation seems to be the tendency for the lower classes to withdraw from politics, while the former bourgeoisie is increasingly engaged in unconventional ways. In the Hamburg School Dispute – in which a Black-Green coalition wanted to replace a four-year elementary school with a six-year primary school – the majority voted in favour of the status quo on 18 July 2010. The wealthier neighbourhoods were far more involved than the problem areas (Jörke 2011: 14, 16). The retreat into political disengagement or emotionalisation à la Chantal Mouffe (2011: 5) does not appear to do justice to the normative content of conceptions of democracy that embrace new forms of protest and do not immediately denounce them as ‘populist’. The problem with the new media is that the scene in right-wing populism and neo-fascism is becoming increasingly confusing. The NPD loses out to new members who propagate new groups and right-wing flash mobs and have become unmanageable. Even in clothing the groups increasingly appear neutral, so that is it harder and harder to distinguish between neo-Nazis and normal populists. This is even more true of the internet activities of such groups. Two forms of “in-built populism” have been identified in the literature: (1) Moderate populists – who are often associated with a democratic Left –accept representative democracy and want to strengthen it by including more groups and interests in a “deliberative democracy”. They often rely more on plebiscitary democracy. The moderates among the new Leftists, such as Fisahn (2008) and Wagner (2011: 131f), shy away from personnel plebiscites and concentrate their reform efforts on topical plebiscites. They do not assume that the results of these will always be progressive. In the case of one-point decisions at

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plebiscitary level, the heterogeneity of political motivations often becomes clear. They can also be misused as calculated power-strategies of political opponents of the Left. Nevertheless, the Moderate Left is in favour of enhancing plebiscitary democracy, for which they rely on Wagenknecht (2011), if direct democracy is not overburdened with unrealistic expectations. (2) More radical populists demand a plebiscitary democracy. They believe that ‘decisionism’ on the basis of an imaginary common will on the people should replace ‘deliberation’. The more radical populists are often prey to a longing for a “a bit of dictatorship” (Münkler 2010: 11), or what Losurdo (2008: 73) called “soft Bonapartism”. Occasionally, even former Liberal-Conservatives, such as Hans Herbert von Arnim, have been ranked among the “radical democratic demagogy of right-wing populists” who rhetorically take sides with the oppressed in the fight against the “bankrupt establishment” (Wagner 2011: 58). Arnim (2008: 137), though, counted the populists only insofar as he condemned “the functionaries within the parties who exploit not only the general public but also the parties themselves through their parasitic networks”. His obsession with the funding of political parties often led him to far-reaching, almost populist, conclusions that could not be deduced from the basic tenor of his writings. Only the second variant could be a potential threat to democracy; the first could even serve as an enrichment of political life. Early on, “Democracy needs populism” even became a headline in a daily newspaper (FAS 2. 12. 2001: 13). In a broad overview of the movements across the whole world, such as Puhle (2003: 29, 43) once undertook, major modernisation efforts by populists could be discerned in the Third World. In Europe restraint seemed to make more sense, if only because populism was hard to avoid due to the fragmentation of the party landscape. For a long time Germany was comparatively less threatened by populist movements within the structure of democracy because of its metaphorical Protestant-statism and Nazi past. These traditional elements resulted in a strong emphasis on welfare in the two largest people’s parties in the Federal Republic. Populist slogans are not always alien to the two major parties, which have twice formed a “grand coalition”. At the end of the twentieth century the parties increasingly fragmented. The dualism of Christian democracy and social democracy was softened. Occasionally even the grand coalitions barely achieved the necessary 50% of seats in state parliament, as shown in the 2016 state election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. It is not the most radical slogans of populist parties that now seem a threat to democracy, but the rivalry of mainstream parties in “populism of the centre”. In election campaigns unrealistic tax cuts and pension increases are promised, and “social parasites, criminal foreigners, greedy bankers and corrupt politicians” are presented as scapegoats. Thus people attributed the election victory of the CDU politician Roland Koch against the Red-Greens in the state election in Hessen in 1999 to a populist petition against dual citizenship (Seils 2010: 132, 177). It is not the return of Weimar conditions which is feared by pessimists, but a “Berlusconisation of German politics”. The migration theorist Nida-Rümelin (2017: 196) has seen a

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threat to democracy in the USA since the presidential campaign of 2016 because of an “unparalleled brutalisation of political communication”. In addition to the fragmentation of party systems, changes in political styles are increasingly playing a role due to the power of the media. A “global Conservative revolution” is already feared. Nevertheless, analysts must beware of pessimistic exaggerations which do not have any clear focus in Western Europe and at best seem reasonable in relation to retrograde movement in the democratisation of Eastern Europe. Right-wing populists were only moderately dangerous because they ultimately remained apolitical insofar as they rejected compromises. Populists want to mobilise for given goals. Of course, the result has often been manipulated pseudoparticipation. As soon as populist groups became open to compromise, they were integrated into the system and lost their uniqueness. This happened in particular with ecological groups in many European party systems. The Pirates were often compared with the Greens. But at first they barely had a coherent programme to offer, just a method of intelligence-gathering and dissemination that other groups could learn at lightning speed. On the other hand, in view of their attack on the intellectual property of the ‘Intelligentsia’, the intellectuals nearly united against them. My optimism could be dampened by the experience of defective democracies in Eastern Europe. Populists are more dangerous in new democracies than old because there is no tradition of a closely-knit party system, floating voters contribute to unstable party organisations, and ethnic differences are translated into more severe policies than in the West (for example in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia). “Institutional engineering” has not yet come to an end in this area. Consolidation research has meanwhile become more modest. Defects were increasingly discovered, even in old democracies of the West. From the Basque Country to Belgium and Scotland, ethno-pluralism became more militant. In the long term, however, I am also optimistic about the new EU members: • EU values shape the political cultures of Eastern Europe. In some party elites Euroscepticism even surpasses that of the people who these parties purport to represent, as polls repeatedly document (Rupnik 2007: 168). Among the people of Eastern Europe confidence in the EU is sometimes greater than trust in their own national governments. Party groups in the European Parliament have long-term influence on Eastern European party systems. • The judicial review of constitutional courts contributes to the domestication and integration of the Eastern European groups. The formerly American principle of the “judicial review” has also become increasingly prevalent in Western Europe in countries which did not have a fully-fledged constitutional jurisdiction, such as France in the “Conseil Constitutionnel”. In the East the systems developed in the direction of the “Austrian-German model” rather than in the tracks of the Supreme Courts of the United States (v. Beyme 2006). Orbán put constitutional institutions on a leash in the new constitution of Hungary, which was adopted in April 2011. In Parliament a four-fifths majority is

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required to have a law reviewed by the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, which had been weakened by the constitution since it came into force in January, declared that parts of the controversial media law, with its “gagging order”, were still unconstitutional in December 2011. The Constitutional Court has also overturned the controversial church law, according to which the number of recognised religions should be drastically reduced. A law was also annulled after prospective detainees were held for five days instead of the previous two days without being allowed access to a lawyer. Such defeats of authoritarian governments in court are significant because they give opposition parties impetus (Flückiger/Hubschmid 2011: 5). Andras Schiffer, the leader of the Green-Liberal opposition party LNP, hoped for a rethink by the people, which had already announced itself through new protest movements. Nevertheless, the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (2012: 25, 108f) notes a decline in the rule of law and the division of power in Hungary as well as in Macedonia and Slovakia, but above all in the successor states of the Soviet Union. • Economic slumps, like those which originated in Hungary, have crushed the spirit of nationalistic populism in Europe. In 2010 Orbán cancelled talks with the International Monetary Fund. He brashly declared: “If the IMF comes, I go.” Rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s suddenly downgraded Hungary to “trash level”. Orbán had to reach for the hand he had previously slapped. He had not expected Hungary to need the IMF as a creditor (Bota 2011: 9; Tenbrock 2012: 21). • The instability of populist movements was also evident in Eastern Europe, in accordance with the dictum: “Populism never lasts long – but it is somehow always around” (Deegan-Krause 2007: 144). Older behaviourist literature, for example that of Hans-Dieter Klingemann, occasionally called populism “perfectly normal pathology”. In the meantime, the motto could be changed to “perfectly normal populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004: 562). The populist Zeitgeist is constantly giving birth to new movements. Angry citizens united together in the movement ‘Occupy’. The financial centres in Spain, the USA and Frankfurt were occupied by protesters. With the Pirate Party a new grass-roots democratic-populist party was on offer, which moved into the state parliament in Berlin at its first attempt. In Hungary, Orbán had urged the transformation of his state with populist and nationalist slogans, but was overtaken by a new populist protest at the end of 2011. Tens of thousands hit the streets in December, more than any since 1989. The demonstrators called their movement ‘Solidarity’ in reference to the Polish Solidarność (Bota 2011: 9). Some European intellectuals and politicians have been calling for years for radical-populist parties such as the Hungarian FIDESZ to be expelled from the European People’s Party (EVP). But in comparison, Rights like CSU-Politician Manfred Weber hope that Orbán could be tempered if his party was allowed into the SVP (Mudde ZOiS 2017: 5).

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The first calls to “Be Outraged”, like those of Hessel (2011), who had eleven editions published in one year, remained relatively vague about how outrage could be translated into constructive policies. But “Generation Occupy” formed and in a New Year’s speech at the turn of the year 2011/2012 its spokesman, Mike Davis, presented the ten commandments of the revolt. He pleaded for good organisation by ‘temporary’ leaders, for the involvement of those affected in the planning of reforms, for the undermining of the media’s propensity for personalisation, for tolerance towards splinter groups if they were not just “cooking their own soup” and for use of the language of the people (Davis 2011: 60). The traditional people’s parties are losing their members and power. Professional politicians (Niehuis 2011: 180ff) also pleaded for greater modesty in people’s parties because in a specialised world political omnipotence is no longer believable. The deliberate opening up of parties to provide an arena for unions of self-organising citizens and civil societies should not be regarded as just a loss of power, but also as a gain of power, as parties can regain attention by acting as a transmission belt between people and political representation. This insight does not, of course, mean that all politics can be designed according to the model used by Heiner Geissler for “Stuttgart 21”. Only problems that can be answered with a yes or no are suitable for this form of grass-roots democracy. Even the total transparency demanded by the Pirate Party may not be practicable in all decision-making processes. Nor is it guaranteed that new genuinely democratic versions of populism will gain the upper hand. It is not exactly optimistic that Berlusconi, who called himself the “Jesus Christ of politics”, announced his come-back in Italian politics in mid-2012. Some authors (Weiß 2017 263) fear that that the global Conservative revolution will continue to rise after the victory of the Far Right in the USA, the Russian imperial restoration and Islam. Nevertheless a decline in democracy in Europe and North America is unlikely because populist challengers, thanks to their vague programmes and barely rational preoccupation with social developments, tend to be relatively short-lived phenomena as a rule – not least because they seek to avoid complex institutional arrangements which could facilitate longer-term reorientation (Taggart 2000: 102). Populists, who benefit from the decline of the traditional Right-Left model and achieved record votes in the European elections in 2014, are forced to integrate into institutions if they want to survive and constitute themselves – contrary to their original intentions – as parties. These are permanently subject to the laws of representative democracy, even if they initially relied heavily on direct democracy. In Greece the populist party Syriza has replaced the once dominant social democratic PASOK. In Spain, though, Podemos has not yet been able to overtake the socialists in terms of voter support, but has been able to change the party system, especially at local level in the fight against corruption (Müller 2016: 4). Thinkers of the Left (Camus 2006: 46), however, have less optimistically regretted that the Left has moved further from the ordinary people. Only the return to a plan that puts the State back in the centre of public action could bring about a change in favour of democracy. An astonishing return to traditional ideas! But this confirms the experience that populist groups in the sensory markets often fall back

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on traditional stocks of knowledge. However, at the same time, the programmes of right-wing populist parties are rarely consistent. But there are other options as well. Modernised right-wing extremism has occasionally also updated the fascist slogan “Leader, People, Fatherland” and replaced it with “Market, Privatisation of Social Risks and Deregulation” (Butterwegge et al. 2006: 28f). The current danger is the attempt of the New Right to put itself at the forefront of progress and combine neo-liberal ideas with traditional authoritarianism. In the end, it could happen that democratic counter-mobilisation accelerates the decline of right-wing populist parties in many European countries, as in the electoral defeats in the Netherlands and France. Then journalists in search of powerful headlines will be talking about “the end of populism”, and that will probably be premature as well. After the Republicans came the Pirates, with the AfD trailing in their wake. The fact that Germany is doing relatively well in the fight against right-wing populism is part of a certain tradition. The Unions have repeatedly challenged right-wing issues, from the question of reunification to the immigration of foreign workers (Jaschke 1945: 118). Chancellor Merkel’s cautious reorientation on the question of immigration could have a similar effect and weaken the Right. For the Unions, it is relevant in this rivalry that the CSU often adopts a more right-wing position than the CDU and can thus set up thematic approaches between “Centre Right” and ‘Right’. The end of liberalism was also predicted because elitist liberalism was increasingly criticised – and not just by populists. Whether “down-to-earth liberalism” (Goodhart 2015: 161ff) will follow it is, of course, not yet demonstrable. However, post-liberalism should include a dormant majority and offer a compromise between down-to-earth Liberals and elitist Liberals. This synthesis seems promising because it combines Centre-Left economic policy with a socially conservative world-view. According to this conception, post-liberal policies would establish important political priorities, such as restricting the expansion of the low-wage sector, curbing private debt, restricting immigration and building more housing. Meanwhile, the grand coalition in the Federal Republic recognised some of this in its last months in office, but too little to declare a new post- or neomovement. In the search for progressive counter-strategies against populism, a cordon sanitaire – that is to say, a hard demarcation or girdle in the sense of political correctness – was discussed, which shows that populists are being taken seriously (Misik 2015: 167ff). However, both options are only short-term emergency strategies. They cannot fight the roots of populist resentment. At best, this can be the “politics of recognition”, as Axel Honneth (1992) has long propagated and found agreement among populist researchers. What is needed is a radical policy that stems citizens’ dissatisfaction. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve in European party systems as long as the propaganda of populist groups further fuels the dissatisfaction of the lower social strata in order to compensate for their lack of political organisation in the area of representation. Mostly, however, there is a policy of recognition which gives citizens confidence in the system again, so that “right-wing populism can be permanently dug out of the water” (Hillebrand

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2015: 178). On the other hand, it seems to me that a differentiated recognition is also necessary with regard to right-wing populists so that “right-wing extremism” can also be dug out of the water. In answer to a question about their reasons for participating in the general election, a third (33%) of respondents in a recent Spiegel survey (Der Spiegel 31, 2017: 68) replied: “so that extreme parties do not become too strong”. This response was ranked higher than the response that people had faith in a party which represented their own interests (15%). What is pleasing about this finding is the fact that protection of the democratic system ranks higher than individual political interests. This could foster hope that a “cosmopolitan governance model” (Nylander 2017) with fewer power struggles, less inequality and reductions in population growth and crime – including terrorism – will not remain a mere illusion in the long run. Of course, such an impetus is not really in sight and is unlikely to emerge from peaceful insights into traditional political actors. Even before the election in September 2017 it was speculated that the “grand coalition” would be inevitable again. To critics (Seidl 2017: 41) it appears to be an institutional expression of the “general drowsiness” in Germany with a “leaning towards conflict avoidance, obedience and conformity.” In the media, frustration spread over the German results, which allegedly showed no promising traits. Now loudly proclaimed to counter “the drowsiness” is: “talk to Rights!” (Leo et al. 2017), which has long been true for this author. In the debate about post-democracy, populism has remained subordinate for too long (v. Beyme 2011; Hartleb 2012). Against the passivity in the established party landscape, populism – both right-wing and left-wing – may be beneficial because it brings new movement into the system without increasing the risk of authoritarian right-wing extremism. Of course, this only applies as long as it respects the institutions of representative democracy. Maintaining control over this will be difficult because the established political powers will be suspicious about the boundaries with right-wing extremism in various places. What is needed, however, is that traditional parties do not fall into the populist error of excessive addiction to delineations. Right-wing populists are accused of rejecting anything new, but nevertheless they do stimulate quite a few new things, even if other parties do not always like it. That is what the system has to deal with. Above all, the “fear-mongering” of some right-wing populists must be checked. “Conspiracy theories” are preferred by populists to scientific analysis. Alleged culprits are attacked, even in the face of objective research. ‘America’ and “Putin and the Russians” are happily abused in that way. With increasing prosperity and power, such a danger even threatens the Federal Republic of Germany. Right-wing populists are often accused of “seeking attention at any price”, but this obsession is not limited to them, as this accusation has recently been levied at President Macron in France, not to mention President Trump. Populist techniques can hardly be avoided in view of the de-traditionalisation and break-up of postmodern society. However, the media does not stop politicians at all, in particular because of the widespread addiction to Twitter, which President Trump used to excess. The use of

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fake news is also spreading in all political movements. Here traditional political movements and the media have an important educational function. Populists are said to consider only their own truth valid. But even the restrained Angela Merkel is resented when she frequently declares her opinions to be “no alternatives” and crushes each objection with sayings like “we can do it”. We must remember Foucault’s realisation that every power contains its countervailing power. Through new, unorthodox movements, an eroding ‘post-democracy’ should be transformed into a positively valued ‘neo-democracy’ which co-operates with right-wing populists and helps to embed them in the system of constitutional and political representation.

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About Heidelberg University

Founded in 1386, Heidelberg University, a state university of BadenWürttemberg, is Germany’s oldest university. In continuing its time-honoured tradition as a research university of international standing, the Ruprecht-Karls-University’s mission is guided by the following principles: • Firmly rooted in its history, the University is committed to expanding and disseminating knowledge about all aspects of humanity and nature through research and education. The University upholds the principle of freedom of research and education, acknowledging its responsibility to humanity, society, and nature. • According to its motto “Semper apertus” (“Always open”), Heidelberg University, in a spirit of open-mindedness and tolerance towards individuals and ideas, aspires to generate and harness knowledge and skills for the benefit of today’s and future generations. • Heidelberg University’s identity as a comprehensive university has grown out of its academic history, its commitment to the present, and its role in shaping the future. The research and educational efforts of the university are devoted to pursuing the central questions confronting humanity, concentrating on fundamental research and its application, and empowering Heidelberg’s students to participate in this scientific and academic endeavour at an early stage. • The disciplines taught at Heidelberg University encompass the humanities, the social sciences, law, natural sciences, and the life sciences, including medicine. • The tasks of a comprehensive university are – to advance outstanding individual disciplines, cross-linking them and addressing issues at the highest scholarly level; – to create and safeguard the conditions for comprehensive, interdisciplinary collaboration that will make possible essential contributions towards the solution of major issues facing humanity, society and government in an increasingly changing world; © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0

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About Heidelberg University

– to make research results available to society and encourage their utilisation in all sectors of public life. • Students, researchers, teachers, technical staff, and administrative personnel form an integral part of the university. Heidelberg University is a self-governing institution committed to the principles of good academic practice. • Heidelberg University connects the knowledge and expertise of its members across generations. It is dedicated to systematically advancing the careers of young scholars and scientists, offers established academics ample opportunity for independent research, and assures the continued presence of outstanding emeriti by conferring on them the rank of senior professors. This alliance of knowledge provides an excellent foundation for the identification and dedicated pursuit of new research questions. The University is thus ideally positioned to meet future challenges with an appropriate degree of flexibility. • The intricate connection between research and teaching provides for an education that is academic, practical, and continuous. • Heidelberg University is committed to providing equal opportunity for men and women, to ensuring the compatibility of professional work and family, and to upholding the principle of diversity and equality both within and outside the bounds of the University. • Heidelberg University will strengthen and extend its cooperation with non-university research institutions. • Heidelberg University intends to further cultivate its contacts with former students and graduates, friends and supporters, as well as its partners in business and industry to attract additional encouragement and support. • Heidelberg University’s international orientation is a long-standing tradition. Occupying a leading position in Germany and in Europe, the University is committed to proving its global competitiveness. It will continue to increase its attractiveness for outstanding international scholars and students and to expand its international networks in order to provide both junior researchers and senior faculty with the best possible opportunities for further qualifications and advancement. Source “Mission Statement and Principles”, at: http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/ university/profile/mission.html. Reprinted with the permission of Heidelberg University.

Institute for Political Science (IPW)

The Institute of Political Science (IPW) at Heidelberg University is among the oldest political science departments in Germany. Beginning with the first seminar taught on the “Science of Politics” by Dolf Sternberger in 1947 and followed by the founding of the Institute in 1958, the Institute of Political Science has consistently been held in high regard. The same can be said of the sub-fields comparative analysis of political systems, German politics, and comparative public policy. More recently, the Institute has been supported by the German Excellence Initiative as well as various programmes funded by the state of Baden Württemberg, which has greatly contributed to the expansion of the sub-fields comparative foreign policy and conflict research, modern political theory as well as international political economy and policy analysis. The Institute’s strong research profile is not only reflected by the German Association for Political Science (DVPW) rankings, but also by its members’ involvement in numerous national and international research projects (funded, for example, by the German Science Foundation, Thyssen Foundation, VW Foundation, Bertelsmann Foundation, and EU research programmes). The researchers at the department have contributed to a wide array of diverse and internationally recognised publications. Currently, six full professors and around forty faculty members cover the core political science topics in their teaching and research: • Empirical comparative democracy and autocracy research • International comparative public policy and policy analysis (in particular labour market, energy, climate, sustainability, welfare state, and environmental policy) • Analysis of decision making processes and state activities in the Federal Republic of Germany • International and comparative political economy • International security structures; security policy; and weapons of mass destruction • History of political ideas and theories © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0

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Institutional theory and urban studies Communal politics Justice theories and discourse Comparative analysis of political systems in the Global South, in particular Asia-Pacific, and in Western Europe • Empirical analysis of intrastate conflicts and disputes in international relations • Theories and empirical approaches to the study of political behaviours and attitudes

Integrated into one of eleven national Excellence Universities, the IPW has been able to successfully combine outstanding research with excellent study conditions and a multitude of international contacts. The Institute is part of the Faculty for Economic and Social Sciences at Heidelberg University. Moreover, the Institute’s second- and third-party funded research is embedded within the university’s research environment, for example, the interdisciplinary group Field of Focus 4: Self-Regulation and Regulation: Individuals and Organizations and the Research Centre for Distributional Conflict and Globalization at the Faculty for Economic and Social Sciences. The IPW is a member of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Its individual researchers are members of various national and international professional associations such as the German Association for Political Science (DVPW), the American Political Science Association (APSA), the International Studies Association (ISA), the European Political Science Association (EPSA), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), etc. These associations offer students, doctoral candidates, and young academics numerous opportunities to expand their qualifications (e.g., at summer or winter schools) as well as to present their research at workshops and conferences. The study of political science in Heidelberg covers all the core areas of the field: international relations, German and EU politics, political theory, comparative politics, policy analysis, and empirical research methods. Students get to know the full spectrum of topics and approaches to political science and are introduced to theoretical, empirical, and normative perspectives. Drawing on political science’s theoretical claims, empirical foundations, and methodological instruments, the teaching at the Institute aims to equip students with the tools necessary to identify political patterns with the goal of generalisation. Such an approach not only fosters factual knowledge, but also requires a solid understanding of theory and methodological approaches. Students are moreover encouraged to address the normative foundations of politics as well. This demanding approach is what sets apart the study of political science from ‘politics’ in general. Each winter semester we accept around 140 new Bachelor’s students majoring in political science. In addition, around 30 students start a minor in political science. We are able to accept 62 Master’s students per year – two-thirds of which begin in the winter and one-third in the summer semester. A Master’s of Education programme is currently under development that will replace the former teacher-training

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programme at the department. There are currently around 1050 enrolled students studying political science. In addition to the Bachelor’s and Master’s programmes, the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences also offers a Ph.D. programme in political science. Around 10–15 new doctoral candidates join the programme each year. Apart from the large introductory lectures in the Bachelor’s programme, most of the courses taught at the Institute have small class sizes. Undergraduates and graduate students benefit from the close proximity to current research at the department. The overarching goal of the degree programmes is to foster the theoretically grounded and methodologically sound analysis of complex issues and political ideas. There are numerous working groups and student initiatives at the IPW, such as the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), the Forum for International Security (FIS) and the Internet Governance Group as well as its student organisation. The Institute maintains a good relationship with the “Fachschaft Politik”, a group representing the political science students in Heidelberg. Many of our former students remain connected to the department through the group Alumni Scientiae Politicae. Source http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/politikwissenschaften/profil_en.html.

About the Author

Klaus von Beyme (Germany) is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of Heidelberg. He studied Political Science, History, History of Art and Sociology at the Universities of Heidelberg, Bonn, Munich, Paris and Moscow (1956–1961). From 1961 to 1962, he was a Research Fellow at the Russian Research Centre of Harvard University and Assistant to Prof. Dr. Carl Joachim Friedrich. He obtained his doctorate (1963) and his habilitation (1967) from Heidelberg University. He was Full Professor of Political Science at Tübingen University (1967–1973) and at the University of Heidelberg (1974–1999). In Tübingen he was also the University’s Rector for a short time (1971). He was President of the German Society for Political Science (DVPW, 1973–1975) and of the International Political Science Association (IPSA, 1982–1985). He taught as Visiting Professor at Stanford University (California) in 1979, at the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris (1985), and at the University of Melbourne, in Australia (1989). He served as a member of the Research Council at the European University Institute in Florence (1983–1990) and the Board of the Commission for Research into Social and Political Changes in the New Federal States (1990–1993), and he is member of the Academia Europaea and of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences. He received many awards for his scientific achievements, including – Honorary Membership of the Humboldt University in Berlin (1995), the University Medal of the University of Heidelberg (1998), and an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Bern (2001). He was honoured with the Schader Prize (2008) and in 2010 he received an Honorary Professorship at Lomonosov University in Moscow. In 2012, at the 22nd World Congress of Political Science of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in Madrid, he was awarded the Prize of the Foundation Mattei Dogan by the International Political Science Association for High Achievement in Political © The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0

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Science. In Germany 41 per cent of political scientists considered him as the most important representative of their discipline and he was ranked second regarding “professional political importance”. Twice (1988, 1998) Klaus von Beyme was amongst the most important representatives of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and History of Ideas and Comparative Political Science, System Comparison. Brief Curriculum Vitae of Klaus von Beyme 1934 1954–1956 1956–1961 1959–1960 1963–1967 1967–1973 1971 1974–1999 1973–1975 1979 1982–1985 1983–1990 1985 1988 1989 1992–1993 1993–1998 1995 1995 ff. 2001 2001 2005 2008 2010 2012

Born in Saarau, Silesia Apprentice in a publishing house in Brunswick Studies of Political Science, Sociology, History and history of art at the Universities of Heidelberg, Munich, Paris Exchange student at Moscow University (MGU) Research Fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University Assistant of Professor Carl J. Friedrich Professor of Political Science at Tuebingen For a short time Rector of the University of Tuebingen Professor of Political Science at Heidelberg President of the German Political Science Association Visiting Professor at Stanford University President of the International Political Science Association Member of the Research Council of the European University Institute, Florence Visiting Professor at the École des sciences politiques, Paris Member of the Academia Europaea Visiting Professor at Melbourne University Visiting Professor at the Science Center, Berlin Member of the Scientific Board at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin Honorary member of the Humboldt-University in Berlin Member of the Academy Berlin-Brandenburg Honorary doctorate, University of Berne, Switzerland Fellow at the ‘Wissenschaftskolleg’ Berlin Fellow at the ‘Maison des Sciences de l’homme’, Paris Schader award for applied social sciences, Darmstadt Honorary professorship at the Lomonossov University in Moscow Mattei Dogan reward for “high achievements in Political Science” of the International Political Science Association in Madrid

Among his authored English books are: America as a Model. The Impact of American Democracy in the World. New York, St. Martins’ Press 1987); Parliamentary democracy. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000; Economics and Politics within Socialist Systems. New York, Praeger 1982; Challenge to Power. Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Capitalist Countries. London, Sage 1980; The Political System of the Federal Republic of Germany. Aldershot, Gower/New York, St. Martins, 1983; Political Parties in Western Democraties. New York, St. Martins’

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Press, 1985); The Soviet Union in World Politics. New York, St. Martin’s 1987; Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. London, MacMillan 1996; Parliament as a Decision-Making Centre. The Case of Germany. New York, St. Martin’s 1998; Klaus von Beyme: Pioneer in the Study of Political Theory and Comparative Politics. Heidelberg, Springer, 2014; On Political Culture, Cultural Policy, Art and Politics. Heidelberg, Springer, 2018. From Post-Democracy to Neo-Democracy. Heidelberg, Springer, 2018. Among his edited and co-edited English books are: Theory and Politics. Festschrift für C. J. Friedrich. Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1971; (with Dante Germino): The Open Society in Theory and Practice. Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1974; German Political Studies. London, Sage, Vol. 1, 1974; German Political Systems (German Political Studies, Bd. 2). London, Sage, 1976; (with Max Kaase): Elections and Parties. Socio-political Change and Participation in the West German Federal Election of 1976 (German Political Studies, Bd. 3). London, Sage, 1978; (with Hartmut Zimmermann): Policy-Making in the German Democratic Republic (German Political Studies, Bd. 5). Aldershot, Gower/New York, St. Martin’s, 1984; (with Manfred G. Schmidt): Policy and Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany (German Political Studies, Bd. 6). Aldershot, Gower/New York, St. Martin’s, 1985; Right-wing Extremism in Western Europe. London, Frank Cass, 1988. His books, articles and book chapters and translations in many languages are listed in chapter 2 of PSP 14, and selected books are at: http://www.afes-pressbooks.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_vonBeyme.htm. Address: Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Klaus von Beyme, Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, Bergheimer Straße 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany. Email: [email protected]. Websites: http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_vonBeyme.htm and http://afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_20.htm.

About this Book

This book of a renowned German political scientist and specialist in political theory and comparative government analyses right-wing populism as a topical theme of postmodern party systems in Europe and the United States. The author concludes that right-wing populist parties, such as Action for Germany (AfD) in Germany, may not only be an expression of but also a solution to topical problems of democracy in Western systems of government. He introduces the concept of neo-democracy as a contrast to the notion of post-democracy. • The most recent English book of renowned German political scientist Klaus von Beyme • This book offers a topical overview of populist developments in Europe and the United States • The author addresses neo-democracy as a positive alternative to post-democracy • He is a former president of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). See more on this book at: http://afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_ vonBeyme.htm.

© The Author(s) 2019 K. von Beyme, Rightwing Populism, SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03177-0

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