Challenges in Europe

EDITED BY GULSHAN SACHDEVA

CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

INDIAN PERSPECTIVES

Challenges in Europe

Gulshan Sachdeva Editor

Challenges in Europe Indian Perspectives

Editor Gulshan Sachdeva Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-13-1635-7    ISBN 978-981-13-1636-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018951605 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustrations: © young84/iStock/Getty Images Plus and exdez/DigitalVision Vectors/ Getty Images Cover design by Ran Shauli This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgements

The Challenges in Europe: Indian Perspectives is an outcome of two years of interactions among scholars of European Studies in India. All the authors of this volume are keen observers of European developments. I am grateful to all the contributors, who enthusiastically agreed to become part of the book project. Apart from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), scholars working on Europe and the European Union (EU) at the Central University of Gujarat, the Centre for Science & Environment, Jadavpur University Kolkata, the Indian Council of World Affairs, Mangalore University, Pondicherry University and the South Asian University participated in the project. Some of the ideas that finally became chapters in this volume were formally and informally discussed at various gatherings in India. In their most recent form, they were finally presented at a workshop in JNU in September 2017. The Jean Monnet Chair in European Economic Integration and Energy Security at the Centre for European Studies, JNU, sponsored this workshop. The support provided by the Chair is acknowledged. I am thankful to our students and colleagues who participated in the workshop and provided useful insights to improve our papers. The authors also appreciated high-level participation from the EU delegation in India and the JNU administration at the workshop. I am thankful to the editorial team at the Springer Nature/Palgrave Macmillan for their extremely positive response and follow-up to keep the project within the agreed timeframe. Special thanks are due to Sagarika Ghosh and Sandeep Kaur. Constructive suggestions provided by anonymous referees to the broad book proposal and comments on specific v

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c­ hapters have greatly helped us to improve the manuscript. Thanks are also due to Vinodh Kumar V and his entire production team. I am also thankful to the Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union at the European Parliament for allowing some text and figures from my earlier study Evaluation of the EU–India Strategic Partnership and the Potential for its Revitalisation to be used in Chaps. 1 and 15 in the volume. Gulshan Sachdeva

Contents

1 Introduction   1 Gulshan Sachdeva 2 The European Union and Multilateralism: Preference, Performance and Prospects  15 B. Krishnamurthy 3 The European Union and the Changing Security Dynamics in Europe  43 Ummu Salma Bava 4 Brexit: End of Britain’s European Odyssey  61 Purusottam Bhattacharya 5 Nation-State Unsettled: Spain’s Catalan Challenge  85 Bhaswati Sarkar 6 Borders in Europe: From Westphalia to Schengen 111 Krishnendra Meena 7 The European Union and the Asian Security Order: Normative Aspirations and Strategic Interests 127 Manasi Singh

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Contents

8 The Right Matters in European Politics 147 Bhaswati Sarkar 9 Exploring the EU–India Leadership Dynamic on Climate Change 181 Vijeta Rattani 10 The Changing Contours of Europe–Russia Relations 197 Dinoj K. Upadhyay 11 The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Ukrainian Crisis 215 Teiborlang T. Kharsyntiew 12 The Nuclear Energy Debate in the European Union 237 Swati Prabhu and Gulshan Sachdeva 13 Migration and Refugee Issues 253 Vijayta Mahendru, Gulshan Sachdeva, and Neha 14 Multiculturalism in India and Europe: Policy and Practice  271 Sheetal Sharma 15 EU–India Economic Relations and FTA Negotiations 291 Gulshan Sachdeva 16 European Development Policy with Special Reference to India 321 Jayaraj Amin 17 Regional Integration: The European Model and the South Asian Experience 341 Dhananjay Tripathi Index 359

Notes on Contributors

Jayaraj  Amin is a Professor at the Department of Political Science, Mangalore University, India. He specialises in International Relations with a special interest in the European Union (EU). He is coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module on the European Union: Structure and Processes. Dr Amin was a recipient of the Austrian Salzburg seminar fellowship, the Sri Lankan Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) fellowship and the Erasmus Mundus fellowship. He has been a visiting faculty at the Universities of Wurzburg, Leipzig and Leiden. He has coordinated many European Commission-sponsored programmes at Mangalore University. He has published research articles in national and international journals and edited two books on the EU. Ummu Salma Bava  is Jean Monnet Chair and Chairperson, Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU. She is an expert on the EU, German, Indian foreign and security policy, regional integration, emerging powers, norms and global governance, and peace and conflict resolution. She has numerous publications to her name and has been Visiting Professor at the University of Würzburg, Leipzig and Université Libre de Bruxelles. She was awarded the prestigious Order of Merit (Bundesverdienstkreuz) by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany (2012). She is a board member on the Research Advisory Council, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin and Academic Advisory Board, the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. She holds a PhD in European Studies from JNU.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Purusottam  Bhattacharya is an alumnus of the Calcutta Presidency College, London School of Economics and Political Science and JNU is a former Professor and Head of International Relations and Erstwhile Director of the School of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He has visited a number of European and American universities and research institutes. Author, editor and coeditor of ten books and numerous research papers and articles of edited volumes and national and international journals, Professor Bhattacharya is also a regular participant in TV and radio programmes on international affairs. He is currently engaged in researching and writing a book on the future prospects for European integration. Teiborlang  T.  Kharsyntiew is Assistant Professor at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.  He previously taught at the Department of International Relations, Sikkim University, Gangtok. Besides working on EU-related issues, his research interests include the culture and identity of India’s northeast region. He holds a PhD in European Studies from JNU. B. Krishnamurthy  is Professor and Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies, and the Centre for European Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India. His specialisations include European Studies, International Relations, and Human Rights and Modern Diplomacy. He has published two edited volumes (with Geetha Ganapathy) entitled Changing World Order: India, EU and US—A Trialogue (2009) and European Convention on Human Rights—Sixty Years and Beyond (2012). He has been visiting scholar at the Paris 13 University, University of Warsaw and Aarhus University. Vijayta  Mahendru  is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU. She is interested in global migration, the resultant diversity and how societies deal with it. Her PhD research is on immigration and integration of the Sikhs in the UK. She has presented her research in a number of international conferences and also published some of her findings. Her research interests include the EU, migration, diversity, identity, citizenship and refugees. Krishnendra Meena  is Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. He teaches courses on geopolitics and political geography. His research interests include borders, the BRICS group of countries

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and the Indian Ocean region, and has published on these topics; he also regularly contributes to news magazines. He holds a PhD from JNU and is the author of British Geopolitics in South Atlantic (2016). Neha  is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.  Her PhD research is on gender justice, Muslim family law and the role of the state. She works as an Assistant Professor at the Pannalal Girdharlal Dayanand Anglo-Vedic (PGDAV) College, University of Delhi and has worked as a Research Assistant in a project entitled ‘Difference and Identity: A Study of Minority Rights’. As an Erasmus fellowship recipient, she has also attended summer school at the University of Amsterdam. Swati Prabhu  is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, where she is pursuing her research on the links between EU Development Policy and the environment. She has worked with the Energy and Resources Institute, where she regularly wrote on environment and climate change issues. She has also authored a children’s book entitled 50 FAQs on Climate Change and worked with the South Asia Forum for Human Rights. She has also contributed articles on energy for online portals and national dailies. Under Erasmus + mobility, she visited the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. Vijeta Rattani  is the Programme Manager at the Centre for Science and Environment, India. As a leading expert on global climate negotiations at the Centre, her work profile includes tracking, analysing and assessing developments globally on climate change negotiations, preparing policy briefs, reports and papers on various aspects of climate change, travelling to climate summits and making regular contributions to Down to Earth magazine. She has been visiting scholar at the Freie University of Berlin, Vrije University Brussels, the Bremen International Graduate Institute of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, University of Bonn and Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium. She holds a PhD in European Studies from JNU and was recipient of a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) fellowship during her doctoral research. Gulshan  Sachdeva is Professor of European Studies and Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He is awarded the Jean Monnet Chair in European Economic Integration and Energy Security by the European Commission. He is also Editor-in-Chief of International

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Studies (Sage India). He headed the Asian Development Bank and the Asia Foundation projects at the Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul. He has also been Chairperson, Centre for European Studies and Director of the Energy Studies Programme at JNU. His research interests include the European Union, Eurasian integration, Afghanistan, development cooperation and energy security. He was Indian Council for Cultural Relations Chair on Contemporary India at the University of Leuven; and Visiting Professor at the University of Warsaw, the University of Trento, the University of Antwerp, Corvinus University of Budapest, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona and Mykolas Romers University, Vilnius. He has written many project reports for industry and government ministries and published more than 100 research papers in academic journals and edited books. His recent publications include India in a Reconnecting Eurasia (2016) and Evaluation of the EU–India Strategic Partnership and the Potential for its Revitalization (2015). He is a regular contributor to print and broadcast media on both economic and security issues. He holds a PhD in Economics from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. Bhaswati  Sarkar is a Professor at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU. She is a political scientist by training. She graduated from Presidency College, Kolkata and completed her Masters and PhD at JNU.  Her research interests are ethnicity, nation, nationalism, European identity, immigration, integration, multiculturalism, minority rights, secularism and the persistence of religion in the context of Europe in general, and Central and Eastern Europe and the Nordics in particular. She has presented and published a number of papers around these themes. Her latest publications include the edited volumes India and the Nordics in a Changing World (2017) and Hope Unlimited: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (2016). Sheetal Sharma  is Assistant Professor at the Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, JNU.  She is coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module on Society, Culture, and Social Change in Europe. She was previously lecturer at the Institute of Technology and Management, Gurgaon, India. Her research interests include social and cultural issues in contemporary Europe and India and their historical roots, multiculturalism and diversity, the methodology of the social sciences, and gender issues and the empowerment of women. She has completed a video lecture series in sociology for the National Council of Educational Research and Training. In the Massive Open Online Courses, she is Principal Investigator

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at the national level for sociology. She holds a PhD in sociology from JNU. Manasi Singh  is Assistant Professor at Centre for Security Studies, School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat, India. She holds a PhD in European Studies from JNU. She was a Visiting Researcher at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), the Freie University Berlin and the University of Bonn. She previously taught international relations at the University of Delhi and has work experience in print journalism. She was briefly associated with the UN Millennium Campaign and spent two years working in the non-profit sector. Her research interests include the EU’s politics and external relations, global governance and multilateralism, regional security in South Asia, and India’s foreign policy. Dhananjay Tripathi  is Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India. He has authored Development Role of the European Union in South Asia (2011) and coedited Afghanistan Post-­2014: Power Configurations and Evolving Trajectories (2016). He has also contributed to edited volumes and peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Borderlands Studies, Economic and Political Weekly, Eurasia Border Review, Quarterly of International Sociology, USI Journal and Regions and Cohesion. His research interests include the regional integration process (Europe and South Asia), border studies and international political economy. He is also a member of the board of directors of the Association for Borderlands Studies. He holds a PhD in European Studies from JNU. Dinoj K. Upadhyay  is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi. He is engaged in research on the EU, India–EU relations, Central and Eastern Europe and Afghanistan. He regularly contributes—both through writings and discussion—to debate on issues related to Europe on multiple academic forums and has published in international journals and edited volumes. As a part of track-II diplomacy between India and the EU, he has been actively engaged in promoting academic interactions with European research institutions and think tanks. Under the Erasmus Mundus programme, he completed a Joint European Master in Comparative Local Development at the University of Trento, Italy and the University of Regensburg, Germany. He holds a PhD in European Studies from JNU.

Abbreviations

Af D ARF ASEAN BJP BNP BRI BTIA CECA CEE CFSP CiU COP CP CPI-M CSP EC ECJ EEAS EEC ENP ERC ESS ETS EU EUGS EURATOM FDI

Alternative für Deutschland ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bharatiya Janata Party British National Party Belt and Road Initiative Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Central and Eastern Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Convergence and Union Party Conference of Parties Centre Party The Communist Party of India-Marxist Country Strategy Paper European Community European Court of Justice European External Action Service European Economic Community European Neighbourhood Policy Catalan Republican Left European Security Strategy Emission Trading Scheme European Union European Union Global Strategy European Atomic Energy Community Foreign Direct Investment xv

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Abbreviations

FICCI FPÖ FTA GSP IEA ISIS JNU KP LDCs LOAPA MSI MWe NATO NGO NPD NPE NSA NSS OAPEC PCA PESCO PP PSC PSOE PVV SAARC SVP TwH UKIP UN UNFCCC UNGA UNHCR UNSC WNA WTO

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries Freedom Party of Austria Free Trade Agreement Generalised System of Preferences International Energy Agency Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Jawaharlal Nehru University Kyoto Protocol Least Developed Countries Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process Italian Social Movement Megawatt electrical North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organisation German National Democratic Party Normative Power Europe National Security Adviser National Security Strategy Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Permanent Structured Cooperation Popular Party Socialist Party of Catalonia Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party Party for Freedom South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Swiss People’s Party Terawatt Hours United Kingdom Independence Party United Nations United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UN Security Council World Nuclear Association World Trade Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 15.1 India–EU goods trade, 1996/1997 to 2016/2017 ($ million). Source: Export Import Databank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India Fig. 15.2 Indian exports to the EU, 2017/2018 ($ million). Source: Export Import Databank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India Fig. 15.3 India–EU trade as a percentage of total Indian trade, 1996/1997 to 2016/2017. Source: Author’s calculation based on Export Import Databank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India Fig. 15.4 EU FDI stock in India (million euros), 2004–2012. Source: Eurostat database Fig. 15.5 EU FDI flows to India, 2004–2013 (million euros). Source: Eurostat database Fig. 15.6 FDI stocks from India to the EU, 2004–2012 (million euros). Source: Eurostat database Fig. 15.7 FDI flows from India to the EU, 2005–2013 (million euros). Source: Eurostat database

297 298

299 304 304 305 305

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List of Tables

Table 8.1 Table 13.1 Table 15.1 Table 15.2 Table 15.3 Table 15.4 Table 15.5 Table 15.6 Table 15.7 Table 15.8 Table 15.9

Right-wing parties in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in West European states 150 Combined effects of increase in spending and labour force in the EU 262 Summary of different estimates of foreign investment in India 1921–1960 (in rupees crores) 294 EU–India trade in goods, 2005–2016 299 EU–India trade flows by Standard International Trade Classification section, 2013–2016 300 EU–India trade in services, 2012–2016 301 FDI inflows in India, April 2000–June 2017 (US$ million) 303 FDI from major European economies to India, 2004–2013 306 Greenfield investments by Indian companies in Europe, 2002–2012306 Some major acquisitions by Indian companies in Europe 307 Potential additional exports and jobs from FTAs with the EU and the UK 312

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Gulshan Sachdeva

The European Union (EU) is one of the biggest economies in the world. As a large trader and investor, the EU is deeply integrated in the world economy. Despite an economic slowdown in recent years, productivity levels are still high. As a result, most EU citizens enjoy fairly high per capita incomes. Until a few years ago, the EU project was considered a very successful model of integration. The end of the Cold War provided new opportunities for Europe. The European elite implemented two ambitious projects: enlargement and the introduction of a single currency, the euro. This was a time when every country in Central and Eastern Europe wanted to join the EU and membership of EU institutions was considered important to increase prosperity and political stability. In the last decade, however, the European elite has been struggling to deal with a series of crises. These include the Greek economic crisis, troubles in some of the eurozone economies, a conflict in Ukraine, a rise in populism, migration and the refugee influx, the British exit from the EU (Brexit), a stand-off in Catalonia and so on. In recent years, a series of terrorist attacks in Berlin, Brussels, Paris and elsewhere has also added new concerns for struggling European policy-makers. These terrorist attacks clearly show that instability in the geopolitical neighbourhood has started affecting Europe as well. The current political and security situation results G. Sachdeva (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_1

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from the EU’s economic difficulties, the failure of multiculturalism and partnering with the USA in its foreign policy adventures. Europeans still play a very important role in some of the core institutions dealing with global economic and political governance. The EU and its member states have been central to climate change negotiations, for example. As a result of policy initiatives, Europe is playing a significant part in emerging green technologies. Traditionally, Europe has been one of the largest donors of development finance and a leading player in the global development architecture. Out of a total of 30 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee, 24 are from Europe. Although the EU is normally seen by outsiders mainly an economic bloc, it has also started playing a significant role in international peace and security. The European influence was evident in the Iranian nuclear deal, for instance. Despite this, the image of Europe in the Indian media since 2008 has not been very positive. It has been seen as struggling to deal with one crisis after another. This started with the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, which later became a crisis in the broader eurozone. Although the EU has been able to manage the crisis, the institutional structure based on a single monetary policy and 28 fiscal policies seems unsustainable. Since austerity measures were advocated, there was a decline in growth and many EU nations witnessed very high youth unemployment. This has led to both right- and left-wing populism all over the continent. To some extent, elections in the Netherlands, France and the UK show that right-wing political parties have not been able to achieve the expected gains. Yet populist parties and leaders are now part of ruling coalitions in Austria and Italy. Some of them are already in control in Central and Eastern Europe. Even if populist leaders have not been able to win in countries such as France, right-wing political parties and populist leaders are still very active in many parts of Europe. As a result of a number of factors, which include the economic slowdown, a high influx of immigrants and refugees, and terrorist incidents, many of these parties will be able to find greater support in the coming years. Overall, however, the situation is not alarming and one can expect reasonable political stability in major countries such as France and Germany. Of course, the EU has been a pioneer in the regional integration model. It has also promoted regional integration all over the world. The Ukrainian crisis, however, showed its limitations. The competitive integration attempts by both the EU and Russia created a crisis in Ukraine. Both the

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EU and Russia had devoted a lot of time and energy to building a strategic partnership. The Ukrainian crisis, however, resulted in damaging the strategic understanding with Russia built up over years. The European elite may not consider the Russian Federation as an enemy today. Yet Moscow and Brussels are no longer ‘strategic partners’. European policy-makers, along with Washington, have been deeply involved in many global conflicts, including in Afghanistan. Apart from destabilising governments in Iraq, Syria and Libya, these conflicts have produced a large number of internally and externally displaced people. To a significant extent, these conflicts have also been responsible for the current refugee crisis in Europe. It has been accepting immigrants for decades due to its own demographic profile, which has been characterized by declining birth rate and increase in life expectancy.  In the present economic difficulties, however, immigrants are less welcome. Moreover, multiculturalism, where various cultures co-exist, has failed in Europe. And many in Europe see outsiders, particularly migrants from Muslim countries, as a serious social and security problem. Due to internal social and economic marginalisation, hundreds of radicalised youth from Europe were also attracted to the Islamic State (ISIS) and have fought in places such as Iraq and Syria. Many of these radicalised young fighters are becoming a serious security threat, as shown by terrorist attacks in France and Belgium. Furthermore, there are fears that a few radical fighters might have sneaked in as part of a liberal refugee policy implemented in countries such as Germany. Recent terrorist incidents are putting serious pressure on the liberal political and social order of the continent (Sachdeva 2016). The economic slowdown, the failure of multiculturalism and terrorist incidents have resulted in the rise of populism all across Europe. This is especially visible in Austria, Hungary and Poland. After Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory in the USA, the right-wing National Front under Marine Le Pen in France was optimistic about the next major shake-up in Europe. There is still uncertainty about how Brexit will be organised. Any poorly organised deal may not just hurt the UK but also the EU itself. At this point, things are uncertain. Overall, the Brexit is a major setback for the European integration project and the EU’s global ambitions. However, if at the end of Brexit negotiations, both the EU and the UK are able to find some compromise on the integration of their markets and the movement of people, it may help the EU in the long run. There is also a possibility that after Brexit, the EU may be able to implement some of its more ­ambitious integration projects. A plan has already been laid for including all member states in the Schengen area, the eurozone and the banking union.

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EU membership has increased from 15 states in 1995 to 28 today. With Brexit, it may come down to 27. No major enlargements are expected in the near future. Officially, countries such as Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are still looking to become members of the EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo also have the potential to become official candidates. Given the way the political situation has developed in Turkey, along with tensions between Ankara and a few European capitals, Turkey’s membership of the EU can be ruled out in the near future. Even if some small remaining successor states of the former Yugoslavia could become EU members in the next few years, they will not change the workings of the EU institutions in any significant way. After trying for almost two decades with the EU, Turkey is now building new alliances, including with Russia and Iran. As a result of these developments, it is becoming more complicated for the European elite to manage its security and immigration challenges. In addition, statements and policy announcements by US president Donald Trump have created new uncertainties about trade and security partnerships with the USA. His possible dealings with Russia have the potential to strain these ties further. Already there are signs of a trade war between the USA and the EU. Despite these difficulties, in 2016, a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy was announced. The idea has been to make the EU ‘more effective in confronting energy security, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare’ (EUGS 2016). Similarly, the EU institutions, as well as the political and economic capacities of its member states, have shown enough resilience in the past to somehow muddle through many of these crises. This has been evident in dealing with the Greek and eurozone crises. However, the rise of populism, in addition to the evolving security situation in Europe, will make it very difficult for Europe to pursue rational policy choices. This was manifest during the Brexit referendum. Political and economic difficulties associated with Brexit negotiations and its possible economic implications, however, have certainly had an impact on any other exit talk (from the EU or the eurozone) elsewhere. Even though many European politicians might like to blame the liberal approach towards immigrants for the prevailing security situation, the real security challenge comes from homegrown radicalised youth. The spread of radicalisation among the descendants of immigrants has resulted from the failure of their integration into European societies. But the question of how to integrate these citizens into the liberal social and political order is

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a much larger project—one for which most of the emerging populist leaders have no time. The Catalonian crisis shows that issues of national identity are still not settled. Many similar movements in Europe and elsewhere are carefully monitoring developments in Spain. Therefore, how the unfolding Catalan issue is resolved by Spanish and EU policy-makers in the coming years will have serious implications. In Europe these areas include the Basque country in Spain; Flanders in Belgium; and, of course, Scotland in the UK. The possible destabilisation effect of an independent Catalonia will be felt throughout Europe. Kosovo and Crimea were more or less a continuation of the process of disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless, this has not stopped the Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić from criticising the EU for its ‘hypocrisy’ for dealing with Kosovo and Catalonia differently (Filipovic and Savic 2017). In the Catalonian stand-off, ‘the issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of an established constitutional state are at stake. The EU and major European countries have taken a more “balanced” view of Catalonia compared to their earlier positions concerning other independence movements in the world. Of course, the “context” can always be explained differently, yet it will have some indirect impact on EU’s future positions on various independent movements. Now the territorial integrity of one of its own key member states is at stake’ (Sachdeva 2017). Policy-makers in other countries, including India, will be watching carefully to see how movements demanding independence are dealt with by democratic states within their constitutional frameworks. The core of the EU project has always been economic integration. As a result of various integration measures, starting from the Coal and Steel Community, EU member states have achieved unprecedented prosperity. In 2016, the EU economy was worth $16,408 billion, with an average per capita income of about $40,000. The EU produced about 17% of global economic output in 2016. If 28 states are considered a single trading partner, the EU’s trade exceeds that of China or the USA. In 2015, the volume of goods and services exported to non-EU countries by EU member states amounted to $2900  billion. The imports into EU amounted to about $2650 billion in the same year. As the result of some of the countries within the eurozone experiencing difficulties in the last few years, the whole eurozone project has come under attack. Interestingly, however, some of the peripheral countries,

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such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which have faced difficulties in recent years, were outperforming other EU countries in terms of growth just before the crisis. One of the main reasons for this was the sharp reduction in real interest rates in these economies after they introduced a single currency. This was mainly due to an improvement in their standing. Their credibility increased as they fulfilled the Convergence Criteria and also agreed to follow the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Since they fulfilled the tough criteria of low fiscal deficits of 3% of GDP, low public debt of 60% of the GDP, low interest rates and stable exchange rates, markets trusted in their future economic stability within a single economic zone. To reap the potential benefits, Western European banks and other financial institutions expanded their operations in these markets. As resources were now available at relatively low interest rates, households, firms and governments borrowed heavily. As a result of the surge in credit demand and a relaxation in credit supply, there was a sudden expansion in a few sectors of the economy. These included the real estate and financial sectors. Housing prices were also booming in these markets. ‘As a result of high economic activity, there was also increase in government tax revenues. Rapid growth in the peripheral countries provided good export market for countries like Germany. As rapid growth led to increase in demand for imports, there was a large deficit in current accounts, which was managed with easy external finance’ (Sachdeva 2012). The sub-prime crisis in the USA in 2007–2008 led to a global crisis of confidence in the financial sector. Many of the European financial institutions that were exposed to the US crisis also became very cautious about peripheral, risky markets within the EU.  During these troubled times, Greece announced that its 2009 fiscal deficit was 12.5% of GDP. This was much higher than agreed under the Convergence Criteria and even higher than predicted. It also revised its 2008 figures. These revelations shocked eurozone partners and led to a decline in Greek credit ratings. Later, doubts were also raised concerning Portuguese, Irish, Italian and Spanish debt. To control the situation, EU institutions, along with the International Monetary Fund, provided resources in the form of emergency funds to affected countries. Financial support was provided not only to Greece but also to Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Later institutional mechanisms such as the European Stability Mechanism were created. The European Central Bank, through its outright monetary transactions scheme, played a key role in overcoming the immediate crisis.

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It seems that most of the crises faced by the EU today are linked. The initial sovereign debt crisis put the whole banking system in Europe under stress. This was mainly due to its exposure to sovereign debt and possible defaults, which made banks very cautious about further lending. In addition, austerity measures were advocated as a part of bailout packages to many countries. Both these measures reduced new investments and created a growth and employment crisis, particularly in Greece and Spain. Slow or negative growth along with high youth unemployment created political discontent and led to a rise in both right- and left-wing populism. This was further fuelled by a high influx of refugees and some terrorist incidents. Therefore, unless high growth returns to European economies, the crisis will persist. The economic and financial situation in the EU is much better today. Yet the EU faces a fundamental challenge, one that has no easy answers. The institutional mechanism of a single currency based on one monetary policy and different fiscal policies needs revisiting. In recent years, there have been discussions on fiscal coordination and common eurobonds. In fact, the crisis in some of the eurozone economies has provided a new agenda for further integration. In September 2017, the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker in his State of the Union address advocated that all EU nations must be part of a single currency, the Schengen area and the banking union (European Commission 2017). However, unless member states transfer significant fiscal sovereignty to supranational institutions of the EU, eurozone difficulties are not going to disappear soon.

Impact on EU–India Relations Political and economic developments in EU member states and within EU institutions have significant impact on India–EU relations as well as on India’s bilateral ties with major European powers. After the end of the Cold War, a rising India’s global vision of a democratic, multicultural and multipolar world coincided with Europe’s. EU policy-makers also realised the importance of a bilateral partnership within an evolving Asian economic and security architecture. This led to the establishment of annual summit meetings from 2000. In 2004, the EU–India strategic partnership agreement was signed and a Joint Action Plan was announced in 2005 (Sachdeva 2014). Later, India was also invited to become a member of the Asia-Europe Meeting, an informal and multidimensional process of dialogue between Asia and Europe.

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According to the European Commission, bilateral efforts are centred on developing cooperation in the security field, in the light of the 2010 bilateral declaration on international terrorism; migration and mobility issues; implementation of the joint work programme on energy, clean development and climate change adopted at the 2008 summit and reinforced by a joint declaration for enhanced cooperation on energy in 2012; and cooperation in scientific research and innovation, reaffirmed by a joint declaration adopted in 2012. One of the major focuses of the India–EU partnership is re-starting negotiations for a Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) or a FTA. Following the launch of the Strategic Partnership in 2004, the Joint Action Plan in 2005 and the start of negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement in 2007, the mood on both sides was very optimistic. From 2009 onwards, though, the relationship lost its earlier momentum. This was mainly due to a deadlock in bilateral trade negotiations; the global economic slowdown; crises in some of the European economies; and, between 2010 and 2013, policy paralysis in India. With new leadership in both India and the EU, a new possibility emerged for rejuvenating bilateral relations. As economic and development issues became a priority in the Indian government’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it was hoped that the EU could become a focus area of engagement for India. The Indian government also announced several new initiatives—‘Make in India’, ‘Clean India’, ‘Digital India’, ‘100 Smart Cities’ and ‘Clean Ganges’. It was expected that the EU member states could become significant partners of and contributors to these programmes (Sachdeva 2015). As a result of these developments, relations seem to be back on track. After a gap of four years, the 13th EU–India summit was held in Brussels in March 2016. The agenda included trade and investment, energy and climate, water, migration, and foreign and security policy. Both partners also agreed on an ambitious Agenda for Action 2020 (MEA 2016). In the areas of foreign policy and security, the agenda included strengthening cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as Asia (including West Asia), Africa and Europe; exploring possibilities for development partnerships and triangular cooperation; identifying opportunities for strengthened cooperation and coordination in international fora, including possible ­dialogue on gender equality, humanitarian issues and disaster management. India and the EU also agreed to strengthen cooperation on

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­ on-­proliferation and disarmament, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism n (including counter-radicalisation) and cyber-security; sharing intelligence information; promoting maritime security, peace-keeping, peace-building, post-conflict assistance and fighting transnational organised crime. Both also reaffirmed their commitment to the bilateral human rights dialogue. Other agreed issues included trade and investment and business issues and the commitment to BTIA. Global issues and sector policy cooperation issues which were agreed on included climate change, energy and the environment (including establishing an Indo-European Water Partnership); establishing a new dialogue on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; urban development, research and innovation; information and communication technology; and transport and space. In people-to-­ people cooperation, issues agreed on in the agenda were migration and mobility, skills development and civil society linkages. Within the new institutional architecture under the strategic partnership, the EU–India Security Dialogue and Foreign Policy Consultations were merged under ‘Foreign Policy and Security Consultations’. A special emphasis was put on monitoring the implementation of the agreed agenda. These issues were further discussed at the 14th EU–India summit in New Delhi in 2017. Three separate joint declarations on counter-­terrorism, urban partnership and clean energy and the environment were also released. There was an indirect reference to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, where the issues of transparency, financial responsibility and accountable debt financing practices were underlined. However, there was hardly any movement on re-starting negotiations on the EU–India BTIA. Since there is only limited movement on the FTA, both Indian and EU officials have now started focusing on other areas. These include climate change, energy, counter-terrorism, maritime security, science and technology, development cooperation, migration and dialogue on regional and global issues. Apart from the improvement in India–EU ties, bilateral relations with key member states have also progressed further. Bilaterally, India has strategic partnerships with France, Germany and the UK. In the last three years, Modi has made bilateral visits to Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. In fact, he has made three visits each to France and Germany (both for bilateral or multilateral meetings). He has also made two visits to Switzerland. All these meetings, both at the bilateral and the EU level, have brought Europe back to the Indian foreign policy agenda, an element missing in the last couple of years.

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The Core is Still Economics Despite ups and downs in political relations, bilateral trade and economic relations have always been important. The process of further economic integration in the EU since the early 1990s and economic liberalisation since 1991 in India have created many new opportunities for enhanced interaction. With trade in goods and services worth more than 100 billion euros, the EU is India’s biggest trading partner. Over the last decade, foreign direct investment from EU member states in India has been higher than investments from the USA and Japan combined. In addition, the EU is becoming an important destination for cross-border investments and overseas acquisitions for Indian companies. Looking at the technical and financial collaborations approved by Indian authorities, it can be seen that the EU is one of the major sources of technology transfer to India. Encouraged by the positive developments, India and the EU started negotiations for a BTIA in 2007, which are still not concluded. In fact, the recurring postponement of the conclusion of trade talks has been a regular feature of many India–EU Summits. Despite some false starts, there are no clear indications that the EU and India are in any mood to restart these negotiations. Although a commitment has been made at almost every meeting with the EU or at bilateral summits with key member states, indications are not very encouraging. The ongoing Brexit negotiations have further complicated India–EU FTA talks. How EU–UK economic ties are settled will also have a significant impact on India–EU economic relations. If the UK is not part of any common economic area, India will also have to re-assess all its previous calculations and commitments. In the meantime, the UK is also keen to start informal talks on a bilateral FTA with India. Indian authorities have indicated that they are not averse to these bilateral negotiations either. Within these circumstances, it is not expected that an India–EU trade agreement is going to be ready in the next two or three years. Since negotiations on the BTIA will take time to conclude, both sides have slowly started moving towards other issues. Going Beyond Economics The EU has a significant economic presence in many parts of Asia and yet it does not figure prominently in emerging strategic scenarios. India is still in the process of discovering the EU’s relevance to the evolving Asian security architecture. Despite positive developments on bilateral ties and

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the convergence of interests expressed in various documents and action plans, most Indian policy-makers and analysts remain sceptical about the EU’s role as a major strategic player in Asia, with the result that it is hardly a factor in India’s current foreign policy debates. Many in India believe that the EU provides relatively little added value to India’s major security challenges relating to China, South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. The perception in India is also that the EU has a somewhat sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan. Although both believe in a democratic, multicultural and multipolar world, there is still a lack of convergence on specific foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the EU has been considered as a (role) model in regional cooperation and a significant player in norm-setting. However, a series of crises in the EU and subsequent negative reporting in the Indian media have affected its image in India. Despite both being democratic and multicultural entities, there has been a perception that India and the EU have somewhat different views on human rights, energy security and global governance issues. Since 1991, India has been in the process of reinventing its relations with all major powers. However, India has not yet fully explored its linkages with Europe. The EU, and Europe more generally, has been essentially absent from any discussion on Indian grand strategy. India’s major maritime security concerns are the traditional threats coming from China and Pakistan, and non-traditional threats arising from piracy and natural disasters. The US ‘pivot to Asia’, and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and its Maritime Silk Road Strategy have contributed to India’s decision to place maritime security at the top of the strategic agenda. India could become a key natural partner of the EU in maritime security and counter piracy. To operationalise cooperation, both need to develop a joint doctrine and standard operating procedures. On counter-terrorism, real cooperation will depend on the nature of the EU as an actor, the convergence of the EU and India’s threat perceptions and expectations, and on what both could really offer each other. Because of its own limitations, the EU looks at the issue of counter-­ terrorism more from a global perspective and favours a comprehensive approach which focuses on the root causes rather than immediate cooperation involving intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, as well as possibly joint operations. Energy security and the environment could bring the EU and India together. Despite different levels of development, both India and the EU face similar challenges related to their energy security. And despite perceptions

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that the EU and India hold opposite views on global norms concerning energy security and the environment, there is potential for them to work together as both are trying to diversify the energy mix and sources of energy supply. As India has shown a clear commitment to the Paris Agreement and has an ambitious programme of renewable energy, both are developing solid cooperation in this area. This is evident from emerging cooperation within the International Solar Alliance. On defence matters, India mainly deals directly with individual EU member states. New Delhi has established a framework of security and defence cooperation with major European powers under bilateral strategic partnerships (in 1998 with France, in 2001 with Germany and in 2004 with the UK). Unlike commercial exchanges, defence ties have a political dimension and involve a close understanding of geopolitical realities. As India has emerged as a major importer for the global arms industry, individual European member states also compete with each other in India. The Indian decision to buy 36 flight-ready Rafale fighter jets from France will improve strategic understanding between the EU and India. As a democracy, India is sensitive to allegations of human rights violations. Resolutions and concerns by EU institutions are not fundamentally different from issues being debated domestically. The best engagement strategy for both is to upgrade and expand the existing human rights dialogue. Constructive dialogue aiming at strengthening Indian institutions may lead to good results within India and may also facilitate EU–India cooperation in third countries and inside multilateral institutions. Global governance issues could test the limits of the EU–India partnership. Broadly, India admires European capacity for dealing with global governance; however, the existing dialogue mechanism has not been able to capture the different perceptions in a workable agenda. This is one area where dialogue could be most effective. It seems that between 2010 and 2015, the EU–India partnership was accorded low priority by the leadership and administrations from both sides. Bilateral re-engagement through summit meetings in 2016 and 2017 has brought the EU back on Indian policy agenda. The critical f­ actor that will determine the direction of EU–India relations in the coming years is the political commitment to the strategic partnership from the top leadership. There is already strong political and strategic cooperation between India and some major EU member states. However, some issues, when not resolved bilaterally, are brought up at the EU level. The case of two Italian marines who were accused of killing two Indian fishermen in 2012 impacted EU–India ties negatively for a couple of years.

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Development cooperation has become a significant aspect of Indian foreign policy and strategic thinking. India’s programmes abroad have expanded considerably in recent years. The entry of non-traditional donors in this area poses challenges to the EU but also presents new opportunities to work together in third countries. Apart from Afghanistan, there is immediate scope for working together in Myanmar, Central Asia and Africa. A large number of Indian civil society organisations have been able to build links with EU civil society. These exchanges have been able to bring some EU concerns such as climate change, human rights, the death penalty and so on, into Indian discourse. Within the context of declining bilateral aid to India by member states and suspicions raised by the Indian government, EU–India civil society links are already under stress. This is one area which will need constant EU engagement. Through the Joint Action Plan, India and the EU have agreed to start about 40 dialogues and consultation mechanisms in areas dealing with democracy, human rights, security, terrorism, regional cooperation, trade and investment, effective multilateralism, climate change, agriculture, space, education and culture. Besides trade, energy, education, science and technology, progress was limited in most areas. Under the Agenda for Action 2020, a renewed effort has been made to focus on some key areas. Due to some recent difficulties, the EU’s attraction as a successful model of integration has diminished somewhat. As Europe has been busy sorting out its own difficulties, the EU’s global ambitions have taken a back seat. Despite these difficulties, the EU is still a major economy with huge capacity to influence issues concerning global governance. Both the EU and India have outlined an ambitious agenda for cooperation for the next few years, including on issues related to foreign policy and security. There is every possibility that bilateral cooperation between India and the EU will expand in the areas of climate change, global governance, counter-­ terrorism, maritime security and development cooperation. Further strengthening of consultation is also possible on Afghanistan, Africa and West Asia. Inside the Book: The authors in this volume have analysed some of the key issues confronted by European policy-makers. These include effective multilateralism; a common foreign and security policy; multiculturalism; climate change; security challenges; the rise of right-wing political parties and populism; the stand-off in Catalonia; Brexit; the Ukrainian crisis and relations with Russia; and migration and refugee crises. Although these

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matters are being discussed in great detail in Europe, this volume makes a unique attempt to understand issues from an outside perspective, particularly by established scholars of European Studies in India. Every author in this volume has not only discussed European developments but has also tried to relate them to similar Indian developments. Although the focus of the book remains on evaluating developments within Europe, most contributors directly or indirectly hint at possibilities for cooperation with the EU in specific areas.

References EUGS (European Union Global Strategy). (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/ top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. European Commission. (2017, September 13). President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm. Filipovic, G., & Savic, M. (2017, October 2). Serbia Criticizes EU for ‘Hypocrisy’ After Catalan Vote. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-02/serbia-criticizes-eu-for-hypocrisy-on-catalan-kosovo-votes. MEA (Ministry of External Affairs). (2016). EU India Agenda for Action 2020. Retrieved from mea.gov.in/Images/attach/EU_India_Agenda_for_Action_ post_VC.pdf. Sachdeva, G. (2012, February 7). The Eurozone Crisis and India-EU Ties. IDSA Comment. Retrieved from https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ TheEurozoneCrisisandIndiaEUTies_gsacjdeva_070212. Sachdeva, G. (2014). EU-China and EU-India: A Tale of Two Strategic Partnerships. Strategic Analysis, 38(4), 427–431. Sachdeva, G. (2015). Evaluation of the EU-India Strategic Partnership and the Potential for Its Revitalization. Brussels: Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament. Sachdeva, G. (2016, December 24). Europe in a Corner. The Indian Express. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/europein-a-corner-assassination-russian-ambassador-4442344/. Sachdeva, G. (2017, October 12). What the Catalan Crisis Means for the Larger Europe Project. The Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/what-the-catalan-crisis-means-for-the-larger-europeproject/story-mI8M8BqDIpk1g2enE0mfeL.html.

CHAPTER 2

The European Union and Multilateralism: Preference, Performance and Prospects B. Krishnamurthy

Introduction The ‘European Project’, essentially a peace project, has ensured relatively uninterrupted peace and prosperity for the European continent and, thereby, has had a significant impact on the rest of the world. The European Union (EU) is not a state in the conventional sense, nor is it a non-state actor. It is neither an international organisation nor an international regime. In consequence, it is difficult to define it as an international actor in the classical sense. The prevailing consideration that sovereign states are the primary actors in international politics, the significant influence of traditional state-centric approaches to international relations, and the related tendency to consider that ‘high politics’ comprise a specific range of external activities of traditional foreign policy has led to the rejection of entities such as the EU as global actors by sovereign states and realist scholars. Nonetheless, while taking note of its significant presence and performance in nearly all international matters of consequence—economical, humanitarian or conflict-resolution issues—it can clearly be considered a power to be reckoned with on the international stage. By virtue of its political profile, the scope and spectrum of its policy, B. Krishnamurthy (*) Centre for European Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_2

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the size of its economy and its cumulative impact on the international polity and economy, the EU is an influential actor, maintaining more than 140 delegations or diplomatic missions scattered over every continent of the world. The conventional delineation and depiction of the EU as ‘an economic giant but a political dwarf and a military worm’ by the international relations analysts is far from the truth and a great disservice to the cause that the Union stands for (Viilup 2015). The EU represents a postmodern ideal, one worthy of the twenty-first century, and is potentially a more appropriate and benevolent global actor than the traditional type. The fact that the EU is an international actor that is a signatory to most of the 40 treaties and texts that remain the bedrock of global governance, while its member states have signed 34 of them, compared to 11 for the USA, 16 for China and 15 for India, needs to be taken seriously and makes the EU worthy of emulation (Laïdi 2008, 5). To be precise, the Union is a non-traditional, unorthodox, rule-bound and purportedly value-driven international actor—one that plays an exceptional and firstof-its-kind role in the international political and economic arena. The ‘essence’ of the EU essentially involves subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law. As a civilian and soft power, the EU continues to attempt the domestication of its foreign relations. The historical lesson learnt from the European post-war experience—that the emphasis should be ‘not power, but the transcendence of power’—is what many Europeans are convinced that they have to offer the world. Not only acquiring and exercising power, but also how and to what end, seems to be their primary concern. They also believe that their experience is something worth emulating by third countries for their own wellbeing and that of humanity as a whole. Their experience with successful multilateral governance has resulted in their ambition to model the global governance after their own system. Europe ‘has a role to play in world governance’, says Romano Prodi, a role ‘based on replicating the European experience on a global scale’. He asserts that in Europe ‘the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power […] power politics have lost their influence’; by ‘making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a method for peace’ (Prodi 2001). As such, the reproduction of the European success story of multilateral governance in rest of the world turned out to be Europe’s new mission civilisatrice (‘civilising mission’). The ambition of the Europeans is to convert the world through their solid and laudable example. The EU, an association of sovereign states, is a unique experiment involving international cooperation through inter-governmentalism, the

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best example of institutionalised multilateralism, and an organised network that involves the pooling and sharing of sovereignty for a common, benign purpose. Neither fully one country yet nor 28 fully separate ones, the EU is considered to be more than the sum total of all its constituent units. European integration has aimed at achieving ‘unity within diversity’ and this remains the most advanced form of multilateral governance. As it is the fruit of multilateralism in itself, it is quite natural for the EU to preach and practice multilateralism and to be obviously attuned to the multilateral approach. The bloc champions a rules-based system in the sphere of international economic relations as well. The entire process of European integration can be termed a painstaking yet persistent effort to rebuild intra-European relations grounded in a decision-making process and procedure rooted in international law, norms, rules and regulations. Hence, the Union has taken a positive role in the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the World Trade Organization (WTO) or in championing the Kyoto Protocol on environmental protection and in formulating binding solutions for climate change and global warming issues at the Copenhagen, Dublin and Paris conferences. The Europeans are convinced and try to convince others of the indispensability of the United Nations (UN) and other such institutions of global governance in promoting and ensuring global peace and prosperity. While the doctrine of multilateralism in general proposes ‘multilateralism as a political or economic means which is effective in combating new types of transnational problems and will outline conditions and rules governing the specific types of multilateral cooperation that is best suited to the particular challenges’ (Lazarou et  al. 2010, 6), the multilateralism advocated and sponsored by the EU in essence involves ‘support for legally binding commitments agreed upon by the largest number of nations possible through strong multilateral institutions’ (Ujvari 2016, 9).

Effective Multilateralism The member states, from whom the EU institutions derive their competence to act internationally, however, are parsimonious in sharing their sovereign authority with the Union. In their ambition to protect and promote their individual national interests, they intend to continue to play their due role in international politics. The third countries too prefer to maintain close and cordial relations with them on the bilateral level rather than directly dealing with the EU on the multilateral level. Such a ­predicament

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has warranted the EU to make an all-out attempt to define, project and establish itself as an authentic multilateral actor of considerable influence and as a prospective pole in the ensuing multipolar world order. The EU’s preference for multilateralism reveals itself at two levels: regional and universal. Firstly, the Union expects that the third countries must have direct relations with it at the multilateral level rather than with its member states bilaterally. As a natural corollary to this expectation, the EU expects that its members should have a self-effacing role and allow it to play its preferred role in international politics. At the second level, the EU professes multilateralism internationally with the UN at its core. This is in contrast to the American predilection for unilateralism and for unilateral action, with or without UN sanctions, thereby ignoring the international organisation and side-lining its allies. The EU has come to realise that the post-Cold War ‘unipolar’ world is slowly turning into ‘multipolar’ and that the West can no longer tackle global issues on its own. Furthermore, comparative analysis of the strategic vision of rising economic giants such as Brazil, Russia, India and China has convinced the EU that the most suitable policy mindset for it is not to become a normal hard-power player, but to project an image of a civilian and soft power. In their quest not only to survive but also to influence the outcome of the international order, Europeans feel that they must succeed in giving a multilateral dimension to the multipolarity. They also believe that they must be an integral party along with other global powers and regional heavyweights in defining and formulating the norms and rules that will prevent future clashes between competing forms of unilateralism. This conviction and yearning has moulded the EU into an ardent proponent of ‘multilateralism’ and of the UN; it insists on the indispensability of international laws, and on the treaties and agreements, rules and regimes and institutions that can enforce them. The Union sincerely advocates the position that violations of universally accepted norms must not be left unpunished and that structures of global governance have to be freed from the perpetual veto-paralysis that limited their effectiveness all through the Cold War era. The EU intends to promote governance at regional and international levels and it is quite confident that the international community will be able to deal with major global and regional issues squarely through the multilateral institutional architecture and arrangements. In the post-9/11 era, Europeans ‘qualified’ multilateralism with the adjective ‘effective’, thus hinting at their earnestness to go beyond obvious idealism and to opt for hard choices, if required. For them, it is a

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mechanism that would enable the international community to act in unison while confronting, tackling and resolving challenges and problematic issues. In their view, this mechanism should not become an instrument aiming at mutual containment and resulting in inaction and paralysis. For Chris Patten, former European Commissioner for External Relations, the ‘main role of the EU in international affairs must be to give teeth and bite to this multilateralism’ (Patten 2002). It is only natural that the EU and its member states together contribute more than half of the UN budget (Wouters 2007). The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 demonstrates that the Union’s commitment to multilateralism is fundamental to its external relations in general and to its security strategies in particular. The ESS has made the strengthening of the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, a European priority, and has placed the advocacy of ‘effective multilateralism’ at the core of its security strategy (European Commission 2003, 9). When it comes to world peace, the EU aspires for ‘international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken’ (de Vasconcelos 2008, 13, 22, 25–26).1 The ESS designated the UN Charter as the ‘fundamental framework’ for international relations and advocated the strengthening of the UN. The Europeans aim to embed their efforts in the overall multilateral strategies initiated and executed under the UN banner, as they sincerely believe that the challenges faced by today’s globalised and inter-­dependent world require common policies formulated in the multilateral fora. The EU envisages that international organisations, regimes and treaties should be effective enough in confronting threats to international peace and security, and that they must be ready to act when their rules are disregarded. Through the ESS, the EU reconfirmed its faith in the UN mechanism and reiterated its contributions towards world peace. Thus, effective multilateralism has become the EU’s hallmark and the Union is fully committed to the UN system and international law and to the idea that international legitimacy should be the guiding spirit of every action undertaken by the international community in response to global threats and challenges. This spirit is behind the Europeans assigning the lead role to the UN in efforts to control global warming and to the WTO in efforts to usher in free and fair international trade. This obligation to multilateralism is once again highlighted in the Lisbon Treaty. The EU is obliged to promote ‘multilateral solutions to

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common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations’ in its external relations (Article 21(1) Paragraph 2). Again, the Union is commissioned to ‘work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to […] promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ [Article 21(2)(h)]. The Europeans sincerely believe that global problems need global solutions and multilateralism is the most suitable mechanism to arrive at them. The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, which came out in June 2016, reiterates that the Union ‘will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core’. The strategy also emphasises that multilateralism is inevitable for European security and success in international politics, and maintains that a multilateral order well entrenched in international law and guaranteed by international organisation such as the UN ‘is the only guarantee for peace and security at home and abroad’ (European Union 2016, 15–16).

Multipolarity, Strategic Partnerships and the UN The Europeans have realised that without the cooperation and active involvement of the USA, the leading pole in the multipolar world, and that of re-emerging powers such as China and India, there will be no multilateral order. In its effort to face the traditional and, in particular, non-­ traditional security threats head-on, the ESS advocates strategic partnerships with likeminded global players. As such, strategic partnerships with other global powers are considered by the EU as a foreign policy concept as well as a tool to achieve their foreign policy goals and to shape a multilateral order. Renard is quite categorical when he maintains that one of the basic objectives of the strategic partnerships is to ­operationalise ‘effective multilateralism’, Brussels jargon to denote a multilateral order based on international rules and norms (Renard 2011, 6). The EU’s ambition to address politico-economic developments in the international arena due to the emergence of economic powerhouses such as China and India, to provide a multilateral alternative for reinvigorating diplomacy, which has continued to be dominated by the bilateral approaches, and to assert the supremacy of its collective diplomacy over the national diplomacies of the member states, motivates it to sign and formalise strategic partnerships (Renard and Biscop 2012, 196–197). It is

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pertinent here to note that the strategic partners of the EU are influential actors in shaping the present globalised, interdependent world and are prospective ‘poles’ in the ensuing multipolar world order. They are also critical partners in creating a rules-based international system built on ‘effective multilateralism’ and global governance as well as in maintaining international regimes. The objective of strategic partnerships also includes multilateralising the multipolar world order and the promotion of international law and norms in global governance. Moreover, it is an attempt to assert and strengthen the new image of the EU as an international actor that not only advocates but also adapts to multipolarity. Renard is emphatic when he maintains that strategic partnerships could become an important tool in shaping a multilateral order (Renard 2012, 4). Natalie Hess too believes that strategic partnerships have been an attempt by EU institutions to raise the profile of the bloc as an inspiring and influential interlocutor in the eyes of emerging countries in comparison with its member states (Hess 2012, 2). As such, strategic partnerships signed up to by the Union are ‘a necessary (sub-) strategy for the EU to cope successfully with the changing global order and to avoid global irrelevance’ and ‘a blueprint for a smart use of the EU’s power’ (Renard 2011, 11). Seeking an active role in the multilateral system under the UN framework, the EU plays its cards cautiously and consciously. Generally, France and the UK, the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), are expected to present the ‘common position’ of the EU on any international issue in Council meetings. In recent years, EU member states have been attempting to coordinate their positions in the UN General Assembly and related UN bodies as well, with considerable success. The reality that the EU can muster 28 votes from member states and considerably more when candidate associate countries are persuaded to vote in its side, has turned the EU into a power to be reckoned with in the UN system and it is not surprising that the Union is recognised among UN members as a formidable force. However, in the UNSC, where decisions are taken on key issues of international security, the Union does not enjoy such prominence, though the practice of presenting written and verbal statements on behalf of the EU has developed since 1993, with both the Presidency and High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy regularly addressing the Security Council (Laatikainen 2004, 4–9). Subsequently, enabled by the Lisbon Reform Treaty, which significantly strengthened the EU’s profile and standing in foreign and security policy matters, the EU has claimed a

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new status in the international political arena. The UN system also reacted favourably and the EU was offered extended observer status in the UN General Assembly and its committees. Most of the rights enjoyed by the member states, except the right to vote and the possibility of election as a non-permanent member to the Security Council, are granted to the Union (von Muenchow-Pohl 2012, 5). However, while analysing the issues related to the democratisation of the UN and reacting to the fact that Europe is over-represented in the UNSC, Shashi Tharoor points out: ‘If reform is delayed by another decade, there is a real risk that the position of London and Paris will not be so secure then; the clamour for replacing them with one permanent European Union seat would mount, and could prove irresistible’ (Tharoor 2012, 370). Even in the changed circumstances followed by the Brexit, challenge against a permanent seat for the UK in the UN Security Council is not going to subside. The issue of over representation of the European continent still remains valid and surely to cost the British their UNSC seat. In such a situation, the EU securing a single seat with veto power is worth considering. 

Multilateralism, the USA and the Emerging Powers Unfortunately for the EU, other global players, especially the USA, do not share its preference for multilateralism and its optimism about the effectiveness of the UN. The Americans attribute the EU’s preference for multilateralism, with the UN at its core, and its faith in negotiation as a tool to resolve international issues to the lack of capacity on the part of the Europeans. Robert Kagan, a noted American scholar of international relations, has contemptuously projected ‘the international identity of the EU through the figure of Venus, in contrast to the might of the American Mars’. In his opinion, Brussels’ civilian power ‘lacks the capabilities to deter non-compliance and to punish disobedience’ (Kagan 2002). The Americans accuse the Europeans of trying to push their own point of view and agenda on any international issue in the name of multilateralism. They believe that by insisting on multilateralism and the UN, the Europeans are attempting to impose their will and decisions on them and to prevent them from acting in their own national interest, unilaterally if necessary (Krauthammer 2004).2 This has resulted in the American tendency to defy the UN and their European allies, whenever convenient. Unlike Barack Obama, who took the position that ‘multilateralism regulates hubris’, his successor, Donald Trump, in his quest to put ‘America First’, has demonstrated a distinctive lack of interest in the institutions and

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instruments such as the UN and its agencies, which normally act as a forum for international cooperation and coordination. Many of his words and deeds indicate that the USA intends to withdraw from its leadership role in the post-world war international institutional architecture which it helped to establish and nurture (Boon 2017).3 Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017 left no one in any doubt that his administration has no intention of furthering institutions of global governance. The idea that he would not hesitate to reduce funding for multilateral organisations, or to sign executive orders resulting in the American withdrawal from international treaties, such as the Paris Accord on Climate Change, finalised by the earlier regimes, has bewildered many international analysts. Trump’s first National Security Strategy (NSS), brought out in December 2017, also failed to reassure Europeans about his commitment to multilateralism (Trump 2017). Critics point out that ‘multilateralism, in line with Trump’s nativist beliefs, finds no mention in NSS’ (Singh 2017). The USA’s partners and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, especially Turkey, were embarrassed by Trump’s formal recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, pending the final resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. This resulted in Palestinian sponsoring of a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) criticising the American provocation, along with Yemen. In the UNSC, the UK, Germany and France voted against the American action; in UNGA, they were joined by numerous other countries from the developing world, including India, in denouncing the unwarranted American action. This lifted the usual American anti-UN rhetoric to new heights and President Trump retaliated by pronouncing deep cuts to the American contributions to the UN. The USA, the largest contributor, which pays about 25% of the regular budget of the UN, announced significant cuts in its UN budget obligations for 2018–2019. The US mission to the UN said that the 2018–2019 budget would be slashed by over $285 million. In a statement, Nikki Haley, the US Ambassador to the UN, found fault with the UN over its ‘inefficiency and overspending’ (Associated Press 2017).  In such an environment, expecting the US backing for the European pet project of effective multilateralism with the UN at its core, became impracticable. While sharing the European ambition to establish a multipolar world order that includes them as poles, China and India are not fully positive about maintaining relations with the EU institutions at the multilateral level or in multilateralising the international order with an effective and influential UN. Though the Union is taken as more than just the sum of its parts, third countries are clear about which policy areas have been communitarised

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and when it makes sense to deal with the EU, instead of approaching EU member states individually (Hess 2012, 6). They prefer to maintain bilateral relations with the member states of the Union and are also adept in playing off not only the EU against its member states, but also the latter against one another. For many third countries, negotiating with the EU seems less rewarding, especially when its competences appear shaky or hazy. Situation becomes worse when the member states turn out to be stingy in sharing the competences with the Union, whose institutional architecture, while highly sophisticated, is off-puttingly complicated to member as well as non-member countries (Khandekar 2012, 118–119). Third countries are not inclined to invest more of their time and energy if they cannot expect much in return. While investing in infrastructure projects, China targets individual EU countries rather than the Union as a bloc. Besides dealing with the member states bilaterally, China also deals with them in groups of its choosing. For instance, China has hosted the 16 + 1 forum annually since its inception in 2012 with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where a series of investment announcements, including proposals to include the forum in the One Belt, One Road (or the Belt and Road Initiative) and to set up a $3 billion fund to finance projects in the region, were made without reference to the EU.4 Greece, which was shunned by the other members of the Union, was also patronised by China under this organisational set-up. To the chagrin and dismay of the Europeans, Beijing is reportedly lobbying for some such arrangements with Nordic and Mediterranean countries as well (Grieger 2016). India has always recognised the UN as the premier multilateral institution and instrument of global governance. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister and the main architect of the Indian foreign policy, sincerely believed that the UN could pave the way for a new form of internationalism; he recognised that it afforded a concrete opportunity for the newly independent India ‘to brand its image on the international stage and so pursue its interests with legitimacy’ (Raghavan 2013, 58). In a world dominated by two superpowers ready to deploy their considerable hard and soft power capabilities, India saw in the multilateral processes encompassed within the UN system a useful mechanism for securing strategic autonomy or the freedom of decision-making on any international issue, enabling it to judge each issue for itself on a case-by-case basis. India also preferred multilateral, rule-bound international regimes, which it believed would certainly limit the dominant powers from resorting to unilateralism, thereby denying it much-needed space to manoeuvre. India

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was also active in the process of negotiation on major global issues and on complex international legal instruments such as general and complete conventional and nuclear disarmament, the prescription and promotion of a more equitable and just international economic order, and the law of the sea convention, which would ensure equal rights to natural resources to developed and developing countries. However, India’s faith in the UN and the multilateralism that it presided over eroded quickly when it perceived that the system had become the handmaiden of its more affluent members, who not only dictated its agenda but also controlled the scope of activities. The fact that the relatively democratic functioning of the UN, which was its hallmark in the early years, was threatened as a result scarred India. Tension between India’s desire to promote global norms and its wish to prevent the derogation of its sovereignty convinced the country ‘to look at its own security interest through the narrower prism of nationalism, moderated less and less by an earlier spirit of internationalism’ (Saran 2013, 44). This dejection and the resultant maintaining of distance continued and intensified when the Indian government felt frustrated at the inability of the UN to move ahead on issues important for India, such as its bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, the finalisation and signing of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the ban on Masood Azhar, the chief of Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohamad. All these frustrations led Syed Akbaruddin, India’s envoy to the UN, to complain that the world body suffered from a ‘mix of ad hocism, scrambling and political paralysis’ (Haidar 2016). Under Premier Narendra Modi’s regime, there is a clear-cut preference for bilateralism and India currently articulates the concept of ‘engaging with all with different degrees of proximity, but allying with none’ and insists on maintaining ‘strategic autonomy’; this remains at the core of India’s international policy and is the defining value of its global engagements (Saran 2013, 54). However, against the general global tendency to identify and regard India as a multilateral ‘naysayer’ and ‘deal breaker’ while negotiating international rules or interacting on multilateral issues such as climate change, nuclear proliferation and trade, and to assert that it has either blocked multilateral efforts from going ahead, refused to accede to rules that others have agreed to or has torpedoed multilateral negotiations, Karthik Nachiappan argues that ‘India has been pragmatic in its multilateral interventions since the 1980s—to advance and defend its core interests through multilateral engagement, resist or abstain from international rules when

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necessary, and be open and willing to proactively shape and ratify such rules where national and global interests converge’ (Nachiappan 2017). What is said about the Indian attitude to the UN is equally true in the case of India–EU relations, and especially the philosophical divergence and practical deviation between the post-modern posturing of the EU and the realist positioning of the Indian external affairs establishment (Raja Mohan and Sahni 2012, 39). The European advocacy of multilateralism and supranational institutions is diametrically opposed to India’s emphasis on bilateralism and sovereign rights; as a result, India is more at ease with the USA and individual EU member states than with the Union in the pursuit of its national security interests. The member states of the EU have a considerable military presence in the region and they have maintained military dialogues, joint exercises, arms sales and technology transfers with India for decades; as such, it is quite obvious that India should continue to deal with them (Stumbaum et al. 2013, 11). Despite its strong relations with the individual member countries of the EU, such as the UK, France and Germany, the EU appears to be absent from India’s strategic planning. The Indian complaint is that the Union offers relatively little added value to tackling the security threats emanating from China, South and Central Asia and the Middle East; this impression results in the country shunning direct dealings with the EU and its institutions (Sachdeva 2015, 10). For many third countries, including India, it is hard to comprehend the actual role and competence of an entity such as the EU in a Westphalian world; hence it becomes difficult to accord credibility to the EU as an actor in several fields, particularly counter-terrorism. The EU’s persistent over-emphasis on multilateralism in trade negotiations under the framework of the WTO and on environmental negotiations followed by the signing of the Tokyo Protocol—and especially the European effort to corner India in the Copenhagen and Durban conclaves—dismayed and disheartened the country. Moreover, the Union’s inability to forge a common opinion on issues important to India, such as a permanent seat in UNSC and civilian nuclear cooperation, tends to drive the country to concentrate on building strategic ties with the big three of Europe—the UK, Germany and France— alongside its partnership with the EU.  Among the three, France has invested enthusiastically in nurturing a strategic partnership with India and took a positively considerate stand when the country conducted its nuclear test in 1998. It moderated the EU’s response to Indian brinkmanship and earnestly began to advocate the Indian case for ending its nuclear

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isolation and for fostering civilian nuclear cooperation with it by favourably redrafting the existing rules of nuclear trade. Moreover, France has emerged as its major source of military equipment, especially the Mirage 2000 fighter aircrafts, which have ensured India’s stronger air defence against its Asian adversaries, mainly China (Krishnamurthy 2005). On the issue of their offer of development assistance to India, Germany, the UK and France outstrip the European Commission; while in 2012, these three member states offered $736  million, $180  million and $160  million, respectively, the Union remained tenth among the top ten donors, with an amount of $91 million (Piccio 2013). It is no wonder that India considers the EU as an ‘insignificant donor’, one whose financial assistance comes with strings attached. The Foundation for National Security Research, a think tank of Indian foreign policy analysts and former diplomats in New Delhi, in its November 2015 study entitled India’s Strategic Partners: A Comparative Assessment,5 listed India’s strategic partnerships and graded them for present performance, sustainability and potential in political-diplomatic relations, defence cooperation and economic contacts. The study conveniently ignored the India–EU partnership without even referring to it, as if it were of no consequence, but rated the strategic partnership with France, one of its member states, as the most fruitful, thus snubbing the Union in the process (FNSR 2011). It is perceived by scholars that while the India–EU multilateral partnership is more than a ‘signalling device’ and enables the upgrading of bilateral relations, the bilateral strategic partnerships between India and the member states of the bloc tend to undermine and inhibit the process of multilateral negotiations and the potential for cooperation at the Union level (Stumbaum et al. 2013, 14).

Coordination Between the EU and Its Member States The member states of the EU have been and continue to be non-receptive to the bloc’s focus on multilateralism; they compete with each other to promote their individual national interests as well as acting with the Union and its supranational institutions, while seeking an influential role in international politics. They profess allegiance to the cause of a united and strong Europe with a ‘single’ voice, a common position and joint action on any international issue within the outline of the Common Foreign and

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Security Policy, on the one hand, while continuing to pursue their own foreign policy objectives, on the other. For instance, while the EU, as a civilian soft power, seeks to utilise development assistance as a tool to achieve democracy promotion, respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance in the third countries, the member states have precise preferences and nationalist agendas that are fruitfully pursued unilaterally rather than collectively. More than three-quarters of the development assistance continues to flow through the channel of the member states, clearly displaying their unwillingness to surrender policy instruments in the international arena to the EU institutions (Dinan 2005, 549). Incidentally, most of the member states want to maximise their own international influence while also benefiting from a collective effort through the European Commission. Ironically, the UK takes pride in projecting itself as ‘development superpower’, just as the USA does as military superpower, while the EU documents hail the Union, along with its member countries, as the purveyor of more than 50% of the development assistance dispersed by the developed world to developing countries. The preference of the third countries for maintaining relations with the member states rather than with the Union, to which reference has been made earlier, is reciprocated by the member states as well. For instance, they vie with each other openly to attract business contracts, investment and attention. The propensity of the EU member states to privilege their bilateral ties with China came out clearly when 14 among them acceded to the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank, an enterprise led by China, in a disjointed, and uncoordinated fashion without proper consultation at the EU level. In the same way, some of their eagerness to be part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, though the Union has its own apprehensions and misgivings, makes clear their intentions to be beneficiaries of Chinese investment in the sphere of infrastructure development in their respective countries (Krishnamurthy 2017, 142–154). The member states and EU institutions certainly share a number of objectives and interests, which can be considered ‘European interests’; these ‘reflect an indigenous and unique European quality’ (Smith 2004, 64). In regard to its efforts to protect the European interest and to counter American hegemony, the Union faces a serious limitation born out of the great admiration and attraction of a few of the member states, especially the UK, for the US.  The lack of coherence between EU member states, which feel free to choose between the Union and other multilateral military organisations, especially NATO, led by the Americans, as a forum

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for security cooperation, severely hampers the capacity of the EU to play a meaningful role in securing international peace and security (Wouters et al. 2010, 30–31). This lack of coherence in foreign and security policy formulations and initiations between the EU and its member states come to the fore over the issues of military or humanitarian intervention and of defence cooperation (Stumbaum et al. 2013, 9). While some scholars claim that the EU is the sum of its parts, Khandekar is precise when she maintains that the EU is ‘not the sum total of its member states but the lowest common denominator that emerges’, thereby highlighting the fact that only on few factors do the Union and the member states have convergence of opinion (Khandekar 2012, 111). In such an environment, it remains hard to imagine member states offering a free hand to the EU institutions in managing their external relations. Therein lies the limitation of European multilateral ambitions.

Divergent Views on the Multilateral Order For Europeans, ‘effective multilateralism’ means a rules-based multilateral order with the UN in the driving seat; they wish to ensure that the US does not give up on the UN. Their plea is that the Americans should not, by opting for unilateral action, abandon the international system that was established in the post-war period with great effort. The Europeans were disturbed by Trump’s campaign speeches and subsequently his pronouncements as American President, such as ‘NATO has become obsolete’ and that the European NATO member countries ‘must finally contribute their fair share and meet their financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying’ (Solletty 2017). His remarks belittling the EU and his slighting of the Union’s efforts to tackle the immigration problem, as well as his attitude towards and reactions to the Brexit referendum, have irked European leaders. They feel that Trump’s opposition to the multilateral order and its institutions are allpervading and not only targeted at the UN, but also at the EU.  They intend to ensure European security within the framework of NATO, underscoring that the trans-Atlantic alliance is at risk and that they can no longer rely on the Americans, as they used to do throughout the Cold War. As if in response to Trump’s address to the UN General Assembly, of which reference has been made earlier, Emmanuel Macron, the French president and an ardent European enthusiast, maintained during the

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course of his address to the UNGA on September 19, 2017: ‘in the current state of the world, there is nothing more effective than multilateralism. […] Each time we consent to circumvent multilateralism, we hand victory to the law of the strongest’ (Macron 2017). Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, also reacted strongly to the Trumpian rhetoric and his indifference to the EU in general and Germany in particular: ‘The times in which [Germany and, in extension, Europe] could fully rely on others are partly over. I have experienced this in the last few days’. She further added: ‘We Europeans really have to take our destiny into our own hands’ (Paravicini 2017). The Europeans have realised that they cannot bank on American support, especially with Trump at the helm, to achieve their dream of establishing a multilateral order. The Europeans also wish that Asian giants such as China and India remain involved in the UN system. Their apprehension is that the emerging powers may, sooner or later, tend to follow the American example. Solana’s outburst that ‘in twenty years’ time, it will be harder to convince giants like China, India and others that a rules-based international system is in their interest too’ (Solana 2005), was the outcome of European doubts about their allegiance to the cause of multilateralism. The EU has reservations about these powers for their predominantly defensive view of multilateralism and preference for selective multilateral engagement, while the Union conceives of multilateralism as a way of dealing with security challenges and as a means to overcome the limitations dictated by the conception of the inviolability of state sovereignty. The Europeans perceive that Beijing and New Delhi are seeking the construction of multipolar order to acquire a privileged status that will enable them to negotiate with the US on an equal footing. They were offended especially with the Indian attitude of not recognising the EU as a pole in the ensuing multipolar world, while the Chinese displayed no such reservations outwardly (Virmani 2005, 27–29).6 The EU considers India a questionable partner as it has a different perspective on multilateralism. The Europeans accuse India of displaying a rhetorical loyalty to multilateralism and of being cynical towards some of the flagship EU-led initiatives intended to regulate the use of land mines— through the Ottawa Convention to Ban the Use of Anti-personnel Landmines—and to punish human rights violators by establishing and empowering the International Criminal Court. Noted European scholars such as Álvaro de Vasconcelos maintain that ‘newer and aspiring world powers like India have a different conception of multilateralism from that

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of the EU, closer to the containment of the more powerful states and the assertion of their own sovereignty than to playing their part in building an effective multilateral system’. He unhesitatingly points out that India, as an independent power, aspires to Great Power status and seems attracted by the attributes of power, defined in the classic economic and military terms, sides with the US and tries to take benefit of its affinity with the latter. He also asserts that India’s stance favours bilateralism rather than multilateralism (de Vasconcelos 2008, 27). Vasconcelos goes on to say that India is ‘lukewarm on effective multilateralism and also constitutes a major obstacle to the pursuit and practice of effective multilateralism’ (de Vasconcelos 2008, 66). European scholars also explore the root of the Indian apathy towards the EU’s multilateral ambitions. Karine Lisbonne-de-Vergeron, who has studied the Indian perception of Europe, points out that the divisions within the EU push towards favouring bilateral relationships (Lisbonne-­ de-­Vergeron 2006, 7). The fact that there is little convergence between the major strategic interests of India and those of the EU comes out unmistakably from the way in which both the strategic partners cooperate with the UN system. The simple truth that India voted against the EU almost every other time in 2004–2009 suggests a diverging view between the two partners on the majority of the international issues (Renard and Hooijmaaijers 2011, 1). Sebastian Kastner finds fault with the EU’s normative approaches in distant regions, such as its attempts to pledge India to various international standards, from environmental to human rights, and maintains that this is not only slowing down the process and purpose of dialogue between the two strategic partners but also results in India’s preference for bilateral approaches with the EU’s member states (Kastner 2007, 47).

Contradicting Multilaterism Though the EU has ‘a vital interest in an international system based on norms and rules that facilitates the survival and expansion of its own model’ (de Vasconcelos 2010, 16) and unvaryingly preaches and professes ‘effective multilateralism’, it displays, at times, marked indifference and reservations to it. Multilateralism, as an equivocal and oblique concept, means different things to different actors, including the EU. The European perception of what constitutes ‘effective multilateralism’ varies accordingly. As a consequence, there is clear disparity in defining and applying

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this concept within the framework of the EU’s external relations. The ESS remains tenuous in this regard and fails to define ‘effective multilateralism’ and its implications unequivocally. Again, the strategy documents and declarations of the EU are not clear on ‘whether multilateralism is to be treated as a means to an end (an instrument) or as an end in itself (a multilateral global order) for the achievement of which other instruments (e.g. partnerships) can be used’, which pushes Lazarou to claim that ‘in practice the EU looks on the concept from both perspectives’ (Lazarou et al. 2010, 6). It is ironic that the Union is not very clear about one of the strategies that it advocates passionately and persistantly in response to global security threats, and in which it places inordinate faith and unflinching confidence. This self-confusion has confused others and resulted in frustration and self-pity. This ambiguity has also led at times to a resorting to bilateral ventures whenever it is convenient to Europeans. It appears that the shift from multilateralism to bilateralism is a well-thought-out strategy to achieve European collective interests. Scholars such as Renard feel that ‘the bilateral approach offers more flexibility but is also proving more effective to pursue the EU’s global and regional objectives, including promoting peace and stability, development and prosperity, and democracy and human rights in the region’ for the foreseeable future (Renard 2016, 29). As such, one could observe that there is a calculated shift from ­multilateralism, much preferred by the EU, to bilateralism, which often works nonetheless. The EU’s efforts to abandon multilateralism in favour of bilateralism and to clinch bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with large number of countries is a case in point. The EU has always favoured multilateral trade negotiations, previously within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade mechanism and later under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, the failure to seal the deal in its interest prompted the Union to revert to the bilateral mode. For instance, the EU intends to build on the WTO to achieve additional market access in major trade partners such as India, who maintain wide gaps between their bound and applied tariffs, an issue which could not be addressed within the WTO framework, given the special and legitimate differential treatment conferred on developing countries earlier. Vexed by the fact that the outcome on some of the key issues, such as goods, services, geographical indicators and the rules on anti-dumping  (a process through which a country undertake preventive measures to avoid export

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of highly subsidised goods from other countries flooding its market, thereby affecting native industry), remain outside the mandate of negotiations due to decisions that were taken beforehand at the insistence of developing countries, the Union believes that FTAs can build on the WTO and other international rules by going further and faster in promoting transparency and achieving deep integration. It is also felt that under such an agreement there is scope for tackling future issues for multilateral discussion; there is also the possibility of preparing the ground for the next level of multilateral liberalisation. The European Commission maintains that many key issues, such as investment, public procurement, competition, intellectual property rights enforcement and certain regulatory issues, can be managed through FTAs. The consideration that Europe’s prosperity is intrinsically connected to the relative wellbeing of other regions of the world, and essentially to that of emerging economies, and the determination that ‘where our partners have signed FTAs with other countries that are competitors to the EU, we should seek full parity at least’ prompt the EU to conclude that there is a need to go beyond the WTO—to WTO plus (European Commission 2013).7 European scholars such as Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis term the EU a ‘conflicted’ trade power, one that is blanketing the planet with bilateral trade agreements, while professing and pretending to champion multilateralism (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006, 906–925). The self-contradiction is too stark to be ignored.

Cooperative Multilateralism: A Way Out John Humphrey and Dirk Messner envisage that by 2025 or 2030, the US, China and India will constitute the three major power centres in the architecture of global governance and that if everything goes well with the EU, then Europe will be the fourth. The future interaction among them will substantially determine how the transboundary and international problems of the twenty-first century are dealt with. While analysing the interplay between the developed and developing countries in global politics and economics in the years to come, the scholars predict a state of ‘turbulent multilateralism’ (Humphrey and Messner 2006, 108). The EU, in its European and external actions, puts a premium on international organisations, multilateralism and a multipolar world order. It intends to play a role in international politics with its civilian, soft and normative power image intact. The Union sincerely believes that a system well

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founded on norms and rules not only ensures its survival and success in international politics but will also facilitate the extension of its own model. Otherwise, the European scholars are sure that in a power-based system, the Union could aspire to little more than playing a complementary role to that of the US (de Vasconcelos 2008, 18, 20). In this sense, the Union’s effective multilateralism is a response to American unilateralism. The Europeans believe in the legitimacy and capacity of the UN to deal with international security and other related issues. De Vasconcelos is correct when he maintains that the EU ‘needs a world governed by an encompassing and effective multilateral system if it is to exert its influence’ (de Vasconcelos 2008, 24). Overall, the EU alone is not in a position to guide the international system: it needs to seek and secure the unmitigated cooperation of other global powers as well as that of its member states. Unless the latter are generous in sharing their sovereignty with the bloc and stand by it, the EU’s ambitions and aspirations will be of no consequence. While engaging with all other powers, the EU should allow emerging powers such as India to have their due and the Union must seek their partnership to resolve shared global problems. This calls for engagement in a dialogue about what ‘effective multilateralism’ actually means or is supposed to mean and how to transform it into ‘cooperative multilateralism’. Again, ‘effective multilateralism’ calls for the EU to back the UN operations as a bloc and to coordinate its policy with it, instead of emphasising the need for the visibility of the Union as an end in itself. The bloc needs to realise that a lack of institutional coordination, even in the absence of palpable rivalries, is detrimental and damaging to human security (Solana 2005, 17). As emphasised repeatedly, the EU’s success in establishing ‘effective multilateralism’ hinges on the member states’ readiness to cede their competences to the Union as and when this is called for. Voluntary abdication of UNSC permanent membership by France and the UK in favour of a single seat for the EU will strengthen the Union’s stature in playing its due role in multilateral politics centred on the UN. This move, however, seems highly unlikely. For the Union to achieve its global mission, it is critical for the member states to self-efface their role in international politics, achieve their individual national interest through the EU’s efforts to ensure their collective interest and support the Union fully with all their potential strengths. The Indian dilemma is that, on the one hand, it is expected to take on greater responsibility in managing the ‘global commons’ by contributing to the ‘global public goods’. On the other hand, it continues to seek a just and equitable global order that will ensure the required resources and

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instruments are available to it in tackling the non-traditional threats and challenges that the country faces. This conditions India to approach multilateralism with utmost caution (Saran 2013, 55–56). This Indian dichotomy needs to be recognised and understood by the EU, which expects India to be its partner in establishing the multilateral order. New Delhi deserves positive consideration since ‘India, due to its democratic nature, traditional leadership of the non-aligned movement and the enduring influence of Gandhi’s non-violent tradition and the popularity of human security doctrines’ is more in line with the multilateral perspective that the EU stands for than global powers such as the US or China (de Vasconcelos 2008, 27). Noted Indian analyst C.  Raja Mohan argues that India, for its part, needs to recognise that multilateralism is indispensable for its future growth and national security; it has to reorient itself from being a conscientious complainer, perpetual rebel and a scheming rule-breaker to be an influential rule-maker/norm-setter and play a constructive role in shaping the international environment to its advantage. He points out that India ‘cannot treat multilateral diplomacy as a boutique corner of the foreign office dispensing moral platitudes’; it must use it as ‘a tool for the pursuit of India’s national interests as well as the expression of its universalist ideals’. While maintaining that Premier Modi, who has successfully recast key bilateral ties, has a chance to end Delhi’s traditional defensive approach towards the global power centres, Raja Mohan also advocates that India should use its economic weight and market depth as a bargaining chip ‘to negotiate effectively and generate sensible outcomes that are in tune with its national interest as well as global public good’. He further believes that if India pursues the path of pragmatic and cooperative multilateralism, the international community may come forward to accommodate its special interests on current and future global issues (Raja Mohan 2015). It is interesting to note that little more than half (53%) of Bharatiya Janata Party supporters opt for multilateralism over unilateralism and about half (49%) of Indians hold the view that in foreign policy India should take care of the interests of its allies, even if this calls for some compromises on its side. Again, it is worth noting that only a little over a quarter (28%) of Indians insist on India pursuing its own national interests in foreign policy, even when its allies strongly disagree. In line with their views on multilateralism, 40% of Indians have a positive view of the UN, while 17% are have a negative view (Pew Research 2016, 26). This positive environment needs to be exploited by Indian policy-makers.

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Till the EU succeeds in transforming the nature of international politics from the power politics of the earlier centuries to a normative politics worthy of the present century, it needs to develop into a fully fledged international security and strategic actor, one in a position to support third countries such as India in facing their non-traditional security threats and challenges. Unless the EU adds value, verve and vivacity in its dealings and bestows benefits on India greater than those that used to accrue through its traditional relations with the member states, the Union cannot convince, enthuse and impress India to prefer and to deal with it directly.

Notes 1. While advocating the need for ‘multilateralising’ multipolarity, De Vasconcelos defines multipolarity as ‘an expression of the way power is distributed at world level’ and multilateralism as ‘an expression of how that reality should be acted upon, in other words how that power should be used and to what ends’. 2. Krauthammer, the well-known American triumphalist, openly accuses the Europeans of maintaining that ‘the whole point of the multilateral enterprise (of the Europeans) is to reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the will and interests of other nations and it is an attempt to tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. It is designed to domesticate the most undomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planet of the Americans.’ 3. For instance, then President-elect Trump tweeted on 21 December 2016: ‘The United Nations has such great potential but right now it is just a club for people to get together, talk and have a good time. So sad!’ 4. The People’s Republic of China, in its intention to intensify and expand cooperation with 11 EU member states and five Balkan countries in the fields of investments, transport, finance, science, education and culture, initiated the 16 + 1 arrangement with them. Within its framework, China prioritised economic cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, high technology and green technologies. 5. The study has evaluated India’s strategic partnership with six countries— the US; Russia; France; the UK; Germany; and Japan—by grading them on a ten-point scale for present performance, sustainability and the potential of these partnerships for India in three areas of co-operation: politicaldiplomatic ties; defence ties; and economic relations. The report is categorical in maintaining that India’s strategic partnership with Russia is more beneficial to it than those with other countries. The report suggests that India should not bestow the ‘respectable nomenclature’ of a strategic part-

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ner on all countries, but only on those powers with which there is ‘a strong and mutually beneficial relationship’ in the three areas referred above. For a host of other partnerships, such as that with the EU, India needs to coin a ‘less serious’ nomenclature. 6. In early 2005, Arvind Virmani, then Director of Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, maintained that the world is fast becoming a tripolar world with the US, China and India as the three power centres. While analysing the possibility of the EU becoming the fourth pole in a consequent quadri-polar world, Virmani believed that this might happen only if Germany, the UK, France and Italy permit the Union to completely eclipse their individual global power or in an environment in which soft power has more impact than hard military power. 7. In the policy document ‘A Decent Life for All: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future’, the European Commission refers to the member countries of the BRICS, especially China and India, which have become the key drivers of global economic growth and have impacted the world economy significantly. It also points out that the balance is expected to shift further in their favour. Moreover, it is predicted that global economic growth will be predominantly generated in these countries by 2015. The Commission, without directly referring to India, mentions six countries which are expected to collectively account for more than half of all global growth.

References Associated Press. (2017). UN Operating Budget Cut by $285M. Retrieved December 27, 2017, from https://apnews.com/6558eea166404e769df6a93 ccdb10240/US-says-it-negotiated-$285M-cut-in-United-Nationsbudget?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=b967924718E M A I L _ C A M PA I G N _ 2 0 1 7 _ 1 2 _ 2 7 & u t m _ m e d i u m = e m a i l & u t m _ term=0_10959edeb5-b967924718-188969741. Boon, K. (2017). President Trump and the Future of Multilateralism. Emory International Law Review, 31, 1075–1081. Retrieved November 15, 2017, from http://law.emory.edu/eilr/recent-developments/volume-31/essays/ president-trump-future-multilateralism.html. Dinan, D. (2005). Ever Closer Union – An Introduction to European Integration (3rd ed.). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. European Commission. (2003, December 12). A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. Brussels: EUISS and European Commission. Retrieved January 24, 2018, from https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/ european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world. European Commission. (2013). A Decent Life for All: Ending Poverty and Giving the World a Sustainable Future. Brussels: European Commission.

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European Union. (2016, June). Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. Retrieved July 1, 2016, from http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en. Foundation for National Security Research. (2011, November). India’s Strategic Partners: A Comparative Assessment. New Delhi: Foundation for National Security Research. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from http://fnsr.org/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=95/. Grieger, G. (2016). One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China’s Regional Integration Initiative. Brussels: European Parliament Policy Brief. Retrieved May 18, 2017, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document. html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586608. Haidar, S. (2016, December 27). India Journeys from Multilateral to Bilateral. The Hindu. Retrieved December 29, 2016, from http://www.thehindu.com/ news/national/article16950810.ece. Hess, M.  N. (2012). EU Relations with ‘Emerging’ Strategic Partners: Brazil, India and South Africa. GIGA Focus No. 4. Retrieved September 10, 2017, from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf_international_1204.pdf. Humphrey, J., & Messner, D. (2006). China and India as Emerging Global Governance Actors: Challenges for Developing and Developed Countries. IDS Bulletin, 37(1), 107–114. Kagan, R. (2002). Power and Weakness – Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently. Retrieved September 20, 2014, from https://www.hoover. org/research/power-and-weakness. Kastner, S. (2007). Beneath Potentials? EU-India Relations. Retrieved November 23, 2017, from http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&rec ordOId=1320265&fileOId=1320266. Khandekar, G. (2012). EU-India Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism. In L. Peral & V.  Sakhuja (Eds.), The EU-India Partnership: Time to Go Strategic? Paris: The EU Institute for Security Studies. Krauthammer, C. (2004). Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World. Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute. Krishnamurthy, B. (2005). Indo-French Relations. Problems and Perspectives. New Delhi: Shipra Publications (Refer Chapter 6 on France and the Indian Defence Preparedness and Chapter 9 on Indo-French Nuclear Cooperation for Further Details). Krishnamurthy, B. (2017). China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Response of the EU.  In Area Specific Studies Programme: Europe (pp.  142–154). New Delhi: Foreign Policy Research Centre. Retrieved November 22, 2017, from http://www.fprc.in/area-specific-studies.php. Laatikainen, K. V. (2004). Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy. CFSP Forum, 2(1), 27. Retrieved November 16, 2017.

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Laïdi, Z. (2008). EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World – Normative Power and Social Preferences. London: Routledge. Lazarou, E., Edwards, G., Hill, C., & Smith, J. (2010). The Evolving ‘Doctrine’ of Multilateralism in the 21st Century. Retrieved September 10, 2017, from http://mercury.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/E-paper_no3_r2010. pdf. Lisbonne-de-Vergeron, K. (2006). Contemporary Indian Views of Europe. London: Chatham House, London. Macron, M.  E. (2017, September 19). Speech by the President of the Republic of France at the UNGA. New York. Retrieved December 19, 2017, from https:// www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/unitednations-general-assembly-sessions/unga-s-72nd-session/article/unitednations-general-assembly-speech-by-m-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the. Meunier, S., & Nicolaidis, K. (2006). The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), 906–925. von Muenchow-Pohl, B. (2012, May). India and Europe in a Multipolar World. South Asia: The Carnegie Papers. Retrieved May 11, 2015, from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/india_europe.pdf. Nachiappan, K. (2017). Debunking Myths About India’s Multilateralism. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/ KUenmyNMJOdo5yms24lArJ/Debunking-myths-about-Indiasmultilateralism.html. Paravicini, G. (2017). Angela Merkel: Europe Must Take ‘Our Fate’ into Own Hands. Retrieved December 29, 2017, from https://www.politico.eu/article/ angela-merkel-europe-cdu-must-take-its-fate-into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/. Patten, C. (2002, April 4). Developing Europe’s External Policy in the Age of Globalization. Speech by Chris Patten, the Then European Commissioner for External Relations. Retrieved January 13, 2018, from http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-134_en.htm. Pew Research Center. (2016, September). India and Modi: The Honeymoon Continues. Retrieved November 29, 2017, from www.pewresearch.org. Piccio, L. (2013, April 8). Leading Donors to India. Devex. Retrieved November 16, 2017, from https://www.devex.com/news/leading-donors-to-india-80663. Prodi, R. (2001, May 29). For a Strong Europe, with a Grand Design and the Means of Action. A Speech Delivered at Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from http://www.cie.gov.pl/futurum.nsf/0/89 E3C36770C7CBD8C1256CAB0028A5EE. Raghavan, S. (2013). India as a Regional Power. In W. P. S. Sidhu, P. B. Mehta, & B.  D. Jones (Eds.), Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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Raja Mohan, C. (2015, September 21). A New Multilateralism. Indian Express. Retrieved September 2, 2017, from http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/a-new-multilateralism/. Raja Mohan, C., & Sahni, A. (2012). India’s Security Challenges at Home and Abroad. NBR Special Report #39, Washington, DC: NBR. Retrieved May 10, 2017, from http://www.openbriefing.org/docs/indiassecuritychallenges.pdf. Renard, T. (2011, April). The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships. Egmont Paper 45. Brussels: Egmond: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved August 8, 2015, from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2013/09/ep45.pdf?type=pdf. Renard, T. (2012, April). The EU Strategic Partnerships Review: Ten Guiding Principles. ESPO, Policy Brief 2. Retrieved November 13, 2014, from http:// fride.org/descarga/PB2_EU_Strategic_Partnerships_Review.pdf. Renard, T. (2016). Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism? Assessing the Compatibility Between EU Bilateralism, (Inter-)Regionalism and Multilateralism. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(1), 18–35. Renard, T., & Hooijmaaijers, B. (2011, May). Assessing the EU’s Strategic Partnerships in the UN System, Egmont Security Policy Brief, No. 23. Brussels: Egmond: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved October 9, 2015, from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2013/09/ SPB24-RenardHooimaaijers.pdf?type=pdf. Renard, T., & Biscop, S. (2012). Conclusion: From Global Disorder to an Effective Multilateral Order: An Agenda for the EU. In T. Renard & S. Biscop (Eds.), The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Sachdeva, G. (2015). Evaluation of the EU-India Strategic Partnership and the Potential for Its Revitalization. Brussels: European Parliament. Retrieved April 13, 2017, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2015/534987/EXPO_STU%282015%29534987_EN.pdf. Saran, S. (2013). India and Multilateralism: A Practitioner’s Perspective. In W. P. S. Sidhu, P. B. Mehta, & B. D. Jones (Eds.), Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Singh, K.  C. (2017, December 23). Trump’s NSS Will Spell More Global Turbulence. Deccan Chronicle (Hyderabad). Smith, K.  E. (2004). The ACP in the European Union’s Network of Regional Relationships: Still Unique or Just One in the Crowd? In K.  Arts & A.  K. Dickson (Eds.), EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press. Solana, J. (2005, September 26). Speech to the Annual Conference of the European Union Institute for Security Studies. Paris. Retrieved July 21, 2015, from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/speech05-10.pdf.

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Solletty, M. (2017, May 28). 7 ‘Tremendous’ Trump Moments in Brussels. Retrieved December 2, 2017, from https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-europe7-tremendous-moments/. Stumbaum, M.-B. U., Mohan, G., Gippner, O., Zhao, J., & Britsch, F. (2013). Europe’s Role for Security in a Multipolar World: Views from India and China. NFG Report, New Delhi, NFG Working Paper No. 13, Berlin. Retrieved February 24, 2015, from http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/ MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_000000005915/Conference_ report_Delhi_new151104.pdf. Tharoor, S. (2012). Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century. New Delhi: Penguin Books India. Trump, D. (2017, September 19). Full Text: Trump’s 2017 UN Speech Transcript. Retrieved October 20, 2017, from https://www.politico.com/ story/2017/09/19/trump-un-speech-2017-full-text-transcript-242879. Ujvari, B. (Ed.). (2016, June). The EU Global Strategy: Going Beyond Effective Multilateralism? European Policy Centre, EGMONT. Retrieved August 22, 2015, from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2016/06 /160610-EU_global_strategy-going_beyond_effective_multilateralism. pdf?type=pdf. de Vasconcelos, Á. (2008, May). Multilateralising’ Multipolarity. In G. Giovanni & A. de Vasconcelos (Eds.), Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism  – EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia. Chaillot Paper, No. 109. Retrieved October 16, 2012, from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/ files/EUISSFiles/cp109_01.pdf. de Vasconcelos, Á. (Ed.). (2010, June). A Strategy for EU Foreign Policy. Report No. 7. Retrieved June 30, 2016, from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/EUISSFiles/A_strategy_for_EU_foreign_policy_0.pdf. Viilup, Elina “The EU, Neither a Political Dwarf nor a Military Worm”, Peace in Progress nº 23 - MAY 2015, THE EU: A TRUE PEACE ACTOR?, Retrieved September 1, 2018, from http://www.icip-perlapau.cat/numero23/pdf-eng/ Per-la-Pau-n23-ac-2.pdf. Virmani, A. (2005). A Tripolar Century: USA, China and India. ICRIER Working Paper No. 160, New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations. Wouters, J.  (2007). The United Nations and the European Union: Partners in Multilateralism. Working Paper No. 1. Leuven: Leuven Centre for Global Governance. Wouters, J., De Jong, S., & De Man, P. (2010, March). The EU’s Commitment to Effective Multilateralism in the Field of Security: Theory and Practice. Leuven Centre Working Paper No. 45. Retrieved May 5, 2017, from https://ghum.kuleuven. be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp41-50/wp45.pdf.

CHAPTER 3

The European Union and the Changing Security Dynamics in Europe Ummu Salma Bava

The end of Cold War in 1990 heralded a transformation of the political and security landscape of Europe. The end of bipolarity and the beginning of the unipolar moment also witnessed the political realignment of countries, especially within Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Moreover, the unification of Germany in 1990 proved to be a turning point for the transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC), which became the European Union after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Consequently, the fault lines that divided Europe politically and in security terms into the East and West were no longer tenable. What the continent actually witnessed was the return of the Central and Eastern European countries to Europe after 45  years of forced division and isolation. The combination of new borders and the change in the nature of security threats can also be seen as posing new challenges to and offering new opportunities for Europe. This chapter examines the changing security dynamics in Europe in the context of the EU as the lead actor, offering an overview of the kind of measures the bloc has taken to address issues in this transformed landscape.

U. S. Bava (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_3

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For the purpose of analysis, the period from 1990 to the present is divided into three distinct phases, each of which has brought in a distinct wave of security concerns and reorganisation: (1) The Post-Cold War Period and the Decline of Traditional Threats, 1990–2000; (2) 9/11 and the Rise of New and Non-Traditional Security Threats, 2000–2009; (3) The Lisbon Treaty and the Global Strategy: Reconfiguring the EU to Changing Security Dynamics; (4) EU–India Relations: Enhancing the Security Partnership.

The Post-Cold War Period and the Decline of Traditional Threats, 1990–2000 For over 45 years, the Cold War produced a distinct security environment in Europe, with fault lines dividing the continent into East and West. Consequently, for the alliances of the USA and the USSR, the traditional security threat was identifiable, defined and predictable, and the military response could be calibrated. Europe’s long peace was a product of the conventional conflict that bipolarity had produced during the Cold War. The prevailing mood in 1989–1990 could be encapsulated by Fukuyama’s famous phrase ‘The End of History’ and Mearsheimer’s assertion that ‘swords can now be beaten into ploughshares’ (Mearsheimer 1990, 5). However, this optimism was shattered by the outbreak of civil war in the Balkans, which took the newly created EU totally by surprise. The political reality of post-war Europe led to unprecedented regional integration in the western part between 1952 and 1990, which not only created a common market, the EEC, but over a period of time the new political objective of borderless travel. If borders within Europe after 1992, especially within the EU, started losing significance, borders outside Europe became points of growing confrontation. The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991–1992 reaffirmed the return of ‘instability in Europe’ (Mearsheimer 1990). In particular, the war in Bosnia Herzegovina brought attention to (1) the changing nature of security and the rise of non-traditional threats in Europe, (2) the return of nationalism and identity as points of contestation and conflict, and (3) the shift of the security challenge from inter-state to intra-state, raising huge questions about sovereignty and the ability of institutions and actors to respond to atrocities such as genocide. The launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the young EU did not indicate that Brussels could automatically respond: it was totally lacking in capability at not only at the decision-­ making level but also in material terms. In the final instance, in the first

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lesson for security in Europe and the EU after the end of Cold War, it was the USA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that responded: Bosnia became independent with the Dayton Accords of 1995. From an institutional perspective, Western Europe experienced from 1949 to 1990 a rich formal mechanism that offered stability, economic growth and security through the EEC and NATO. Article 5 of NATO’s extended deterrence provided for security and was essentially more important for Germany, since its Basic Law forbade it from having atomic, biological or chemical weapons. There was good burden-sharing between the NATO and the young EU and member states were happy with this division. The creation of the EU and the CFSP was significant as it produced (1) a massive push towards the idea of regional integration, the concept of ‘pooled sovereignty’ and supranationalism, and the process and outcomes of new identity-building (Risse 2005; Ginsberg 2007; Wiener and Diez 2009), (2) multi-level decision-making and governance model in the EU with the CFSP (Hooghe and Marks 2001), and (3) a new political, security and normative actor in Europe and the world (Ginsberg 1999; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). In this period, the focus was on the changing landscape within Europe as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were eager to return to Europe and anchor themselves within NATO and the EU (Zielonka 2004). Viewed from a security perspective, though the Balkans were witnessing civil war, for the first time in 45 years Europe did not have a direct security challenge. The USSR had imploded, creating new states, and what came in its wake was a truncated Russia which was not perceived as a security threat either by the European states or the USA. The process of the Central and East European Countries seeking membership of NATO and the EU, however, did create disquiet in Moscow as it witnessed its sphere of influence diminishing—a point that has become a bone of contention between EU and Russia since the turn of the millennium. The EU’s positioning of itself as a normative actor in the region and beyond has undoubtedly also created another narrative and contributed to a growing capability–expectation gap. In particular, Brussels has been unable to successfully project power along in its eastern flank bordering Russia (Haukkala 2008). Beyond Europe, the power vacuum created by the breakup of the Soviet Union led to the first Gulf war in 1990, which would bring a focus on Iraq. The 1990s witnessed the readjustment of states globally to the

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new reality of the unipolar moment with the hegemony of the USA as the undisputed power (Krauthammer 1990/1991; Cameron 2005). For the CEE countries, the return to Europe and membership in the EU and NATO came with a hard political and economic transition to democracy and new identity-building, the establishing of a market economy and the creating of concomitant institutions (Grabbe 2001; Young and Light 2001). The first ten years after the end of Cold War were also about the consolidation of the European space as actors, institutions and policies were revamped under the changed circumstances (Jørgensen et al. 2007). A result of this was the reduction in military expenditure across Europe and a cut-back in the weapons inventory on all sides: Europe did not expect to enter into a large-scale war ever again.

9/11 and the Rise of New and Non-Traditional Security Threats, 2000–2009 As the EU adjusted to the new realities of civil war in its own backyard and the collective action challenges faced by the CFSP in addressing the Balkan conflict, it received a massive shock from the September 2001 attacks on the USA, which ‘came as an unprecedented challenge’ to its role as a security actor and its ability to respond to the linked internal and external security concerns and threats (Boer and Monar 2002, 11). The 9/11 attacks reaffirmed more emphatically that the nature of global threats had dramatically changed; increasingly, the West and the world would have to confront non-state actors, such as terrorists, who were not amenable to any rules. The unfinished wars in Afghanistan that had drawn in both the USSR and the USA had left behind remnants that had reassembled, along with new elements arising from the first Gulf War. The rise of Al-Qaida brought attention to new kinds of conflict—in particular, terrorism—and a reaffirmation in NATO of understanding and responding to the changing security landscape, which was now characterised by increased vulnerability of risk in the face of the unpredictable nature of the threats. In a significant move, after 9/11, for the first time in the history of NATO, Article 5 was invoked by alliance members. However, the USA declined all assistance and launched its own ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan against al-Qaida, which had taken refuge in that country. Alliance solidarity was reflected in the fact that many European countries signed up to be part of it. However, this cooperation was to be short-lived as in 2003 the USA

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turned its attention to Iraq and launched a pre-emptive war that c­ reated discord between alliance members. In particular, while the UK and Spain supported US action in Iraq, the French and German refusal to participate in the American led war created political divisions within the EU. The years 2003 and 2004 can be considered a transformative period for they also coincided with the enlargement of NATO and the EU, altering both actors (Sedelmeier 2003). It was against this backdrop and as a first major step after the 1998 St Malo decision of the UK and France to enhance the security capability of the EU that the High Representative Javier Solana was tasked with creating a security strategy for the EU. The launch of the European Security Strategy in December 2003 came at a time when the EU found itself at a crossroads. The European Security Strategy (ESS), ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, indicated that the ‘new threats are more diverse, less visible and less predictable’ and identified five security threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime (European Council 2003, 3–4). The document indicated a shift in the perception of security and insecurity by Brussels and was a policy document that sought to give a coherent response to the new and changing security dynamics on the continent. There articulation of these threats by the EU for the first time indicated that Brussels (1) was trying to respond to the changing security configuration, (2) was realising that the drivers of insecurity had multiplied and its vulnerability has increased, and (3) that it saw that the new and non-traditional security threats could no longer be contained within a Westphalian framework. Europe’s security architecture has multiple institutions that provide for its sense of wellbeing and protection from threats. How is Europe’s security infrastructure coping with these new attacks? In an incremental manner, new agencies have been created to monitor the EU’s internal and external security concerns, including Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and the Schengen Information System. Between Brussels, the member states and the different agencies, more cooperation and coordination is required, along with enhancing cooperation with other countries in order to address the new threats. Creating a seamless mechanism that links internal and external security together is a pressing need in the EU. On the heels of the ESS, the 2004 enlargement of the EU—the largest for the bloc—totally transformed its eastern and southern flank. Ten CEE countries joined it, bringing the borders of the EU closer to conflict in the east and the south. Similarly, in the post-Cold War period, the ­transformation

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in the Maghreb and Sahel has meant that Europe and the EU’s vulnerability to security challenges coming across the Mediterranean has tremendously increased in an asymmetric manner and has led to the blurring of the lines between internal and external security (Lutterbeck 2005; Schroeder 2009). Expanding the security zone in the neighbourhood is a major policy priority for Brussels. Having likeminded states in its periphery reduces the scope for political instability, which has the potential to spill problems across its borders. At the same time, the enlargement has also transformed the composition of the EU.  Its member states now represent different areas of Europe but also have different histories and diverse perceptions of security and development, broadening the political landscape. Decision-­ making in Brussels on CFSP issues is no longer easy and in fact in the last ten years it has become one of the most contested areas among the member states (Stefanova 2005). The change in the nature of threats has also meant that the bloc needs a whole new policy and an operational toolkit to address the challenges. This toolkit would require diplomacy, political, economic, humanitarian development and military means. In other words, the EU’s ability to be a security actor will need to involve both military and civilian crisis missions. The EU thus had to enhance its operational capacity to undertake all the new goals it had set for itself in the 2003 European Security Strategy. The ESS  laid out the way forward in addressing the new threats by emphasising ‘effective multilateralism’ and enhanced cooperation with the United Nations (UN). With the EU’s strong commitment to multilateralism and a multipolar order, effective multilateralism reinforced the bloc’s vision of addressing the new challenges in partnership with others. The objectives set out in the ESS were also indicative of the fact that as a security actor, the EU would also look to security challenges outside Europe so as to ensure its own stability and security. The ESS was launched on the eve of the enlargement that transformed the bloc. The EU has also responded by building different kinds of capacity after the launch of the ESS.  In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was announced; this had two components, one addressing the east, the other the south. The ENP was developed further through the military and civilian crisis missions in Europe as well as in Africa and Asia, thereby launching the EU as a security actor and further elaborating its Common

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Security and Defence Policy. In all, as of December 2017 the EU has an experience of over 35 military and civilian missions. In 2008, the ESS was reviewed and further elaborated by expanding on the challenges that the EU faced, namely cyber security, energy security and climate change. The review reinforced that the position of the EU, that it was committed to multilateralism and working with the UN. The 2008 ESS review was critical as it came against the backdrop of the shifting geopolitical equations that appeared in subsequent years on both the eastern and southern flank of the bloc. Establishing that there is a strong security and development nexus, the review reiterated that state fragility was a key issue feeding conflict and thus a holistic approach was essential to eradicate its roots. To respond to the changing security environment, the EU would need to be more effective within its neighbourhood and in the world. As it reiterated, ‘to build a secure Europe in a better world’, the EU ‘must do more to shape events’ (European Council 2008, 12). The 2008 review that identified ‘greater engagement with the neighbourhood’ was far-sighted. In July 2008, the EU had adopted the Union for the Mediterranean—an intergovernmental institution that brought together the 28 EU Member States and the 15 countries from the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean with the aim to promote dialogue and cooperation.  The intention of the EU was to give new political momentum to strengthen its southern partnership by focusing on ‘maritime safety, energy, water and migration’. In addition, the eastern partnership with the six Eastern European and South Caucasus countries was to be upgraded through greater political, economic and trade relations. Reinforcing the eastern and southern partnerships, which constitute the ENP, indicated that the EU was acknowledging that it needed to reinforce its neighbourhood. In particular, the Union’s relations with Russia had come under strain due to Moscow’s conflict with Georgia. According to Rees, the EU’s external policy dimension response had two facets: ‘First, the EU has sought to impose its model of internal security upon its neighbours. Secondly, it has attempted to foster norms within the international community that will help to address transnational security challenges’ (Rees 2008, 97). This second phase saw the EU trying to adapt itself to the rise of non-traditional security threats and tackle its limitations arising from the global financial crisis, which also impacted some of the eurozone countries. Brussels would not have anticipated that it would soon be confronted by two other specific sets of issues that also had security implications: the Arab Spring of 2010 and the refugee crisis of 2015, which would bring into question the ‘normative EU’ capability to address these critical issues.

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The Lisbon Treaty and the Global Strategy: Reconfiguring the EU to the Changing Security Dynamics The 2009 Lisbon Treaty further transformed the EU, making it a legal entity and providing the necessary institutional and operational toolkit to make it into an even more effective security actor. All of this was part of the transformation of the EU, allowing it to become an even more coherent and articulate actor (Thomas 2012). Lisbon in particular made security a ‘community’ matter, thereby enabling a more collective approach to security challenges. Along with this, the necessary institutional capabilities were created through the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and through the European External Action Service (EEAS). This gave the bloc its own diplomatic voice and representation and almost equated its presence around the world with that of the member states. The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the feeling of togetherness among the member states by introducing under Article 42(7) the clause of ‘mutual defence’: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’ (Official Journal of the European Union 2007, 35). This could be read as a support for common values and to safeguard the individual and collective interests of member states. Following the terrorist attacks on Paris on 13 November 2015, France invoked Art 42(7), seeking support from other member states. The spate of terrorist attacks across Europe—the 2004 Madrid, 2005 London bombings and later in Brussels, Paris, Nice, Berlin and London— all drew attention to (1) the growing vulnerability of Europe, (2) the rise of asymmetric conflict and (3) the expanding footprint of non-state actors fighting a war on their own terms and at their choosing. These terror attacks in turn also fed the growing political polarisation within Europe and boosted the morale and support of many far-right political parties, who viewed the refugee influx and radicalised Islamists as the source of all problems and threats. There has been a tightening of internal and external security through a range of measures, some which are seen as being intrusive on the rights of the people. The rise of non-state actors has had the largest impact on how security is organised in Europe. Mitigating terrorism requires a concerted action on all fronts with coordination between

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the member states and Brussels on intelligence and policing, and a shift to a comprehensive information-sharing policy. Adding to the list of new challenges is the risk and threat posed to everyday life and critical infrastructure through cyber-attacks. Energy security is also high on the list of the EU’s concerns; energy imports and the search for resources have only added to the vulnerability of the bloc. The shift in the EU’s response has also brought attention to the need for balance in its area of freedom, security and justice. The big challenge for the EU is that decision-making is complex and slow and that national capitals still have the right to veto decisions pertaining to security. According to Aggestam and Johansson, there exist ‘role conflicts over the formal leadership functions in EU foreign policy and the emergence of new informal leadership practices by EU member states’ (Aggestam and Johansson 2017, 1203); these undermine the EU as a credible security actor. Amidst this changing security landscape in Europe, the EU adopted its Internal Security Strategy in 2010 with a focus on coordination, centralisation and standardisation. Those critical of EU functioning feel that given the vast asymmetry between the member states with respect to their security issues, the challenge lies in how to create a unified response and a common strategic culture. This point was reiterated in the light of the developments following the Arab Spring and the crisis in Ukraine. Despite the active engagement of the Arab world within the ENP and the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean, Brussels was totally unprepared for the Arab Spring in 2010 and the initial response was more national than collective. Subsequently, the EU launched the ambitious Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. This has three components: support for transitioning into democracy; partnership with the people; and economic development (European Commission 2011). However, in the absence of any prospect that these countries would be able to join the EU, these measures have had a limited impact in the transformation of the southern partnership countries. It has been amply observed that enlargement has been a very effective instrument in the transformation of state and society. However, since enlargement is not possible to the south of the EU, this has blunted the impact and the role of the bloc in this region. Against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, the EU reviewed its ENP in 2011 and offered a ‘more for more’ principle that soon came to be characterised by the ‘3Ms’—money, markets and mobility. Despite these measures, the biggest security  threat to the EU came

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from this region as a result of the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the civil war in Syria. These had the cumulative impact of creating a mass refugee problem for Europe and since 2010 has emerged as the source of the biggest threat to European prosperity, security and its liberal values. The 2015 review of the ENP—or the ‘New ENP’—is, according to Schumacher, ‘a blow for reform actors in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood and for anyone who was hoping that the EU was serious with its normative and values-based approach’ (Schumacher 2016, 1). The EU’s neighbours to the east and the south have both been sources of concern at two levels due to high migration and perceived security risk. Its new neighbourhood policy once again displays the dilemma of balancing values and interests. In the east, the relations with Russia have gone downhill steadily; the annexation of Crimea in 2014 added to the growing unease in the West as Putin rewrites borders and had also offered a competing vision of regional association through the Eurasian Economic Union. While democracy has been a casualty in Russia, geopolitics is squarely back on the European chessboard. For Moscow, the biggest loss and concern has been that its former allies have turned their back on it and have found membership in both the EU and NATO, thereby reducing its sphere of influence. Russia’s revamped foreign policy is confronted with a transformed Central and Eastern Europe and the growing influence of EU polices. There has been a transformation of the security identity of the CEE countries through participation in the EU and NATO. The developments in Ukraine in 2014 and the annexation of Crimea have only served to exacerbate relations between Moscow and the West, creating disequilibrium in the region. Russia’s attempt to counter the influence of Brussels through the Eurasian Association is but one of the many issues emanating from the region, which is part of the nexus of narcotics, small arms and trafficking. As democracy withers away in Russia, its foreign policy edge has been blunted by the fall in global oil prices. However, this has not reduced Russian influence in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU; this area is seeing many frozen conflicts becoming active in the past decades, thereby contributing to growing instability at the periphery of the EU. In the last four years, the biggest source of concern for the EU grappling with the eurozone crisis was the refuge influx from North Africa, where multiple conflicts and civil wars have led to thousands fleeing their homes. Identity issues have become more acute in the face of the growing

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refugee influx. Parallel to this has been the rise of right-of-centre political parties all across Europe. These have also managed to gain a foothold in the national parliaments of some countries. Not only has this development impacted the way security is discussed in Europe, but it also brought into sharp question the whole issue of the solidarity and the viability of the post-war project—the integration of Europe. In the wake of the refugee influx into Europe, security concerns have restricted the flow of people into the bloc. Elsewhere, the tightening is also a response to what is coming out of Brussels. In this context, the debate within Europe, in particular the EU, on issues pertaining to security has become polarised and the nature of threat assessment has increasingly become geopolitical. While Brussels has tried to convey a common position, the disjointed voices coming from Poland, Hungary and Austria all reflect the divisions in the idea and spirit of collective action and solidarity. How the political leadership takes their own people and Europe collectively ahead is of paramount importance today. Europe is facing a series of unprecedented crises, from financial to human, and the implications reflect on the EU’s ability to deal with these, drawing attention to both its capability and capacity for collective action and its ability to find sustainable, all-encompassing solutions that will keep the bloc together in the light of the challenges posed by Brexit. The civil war in Syria and the rise of the ISIS and increased political unrest in the region has created a human exodus from the Middle East across the Mediterranean. Waves of humanity have been using all possible land and sea routes to get to the shores of Europe; geography has only compounded the problems of the peripheral countries, such as Greece, Italy and Turkey, as migrants move through Bosnia into the CEE and from there into Germany. The crisis has led to a fragmentation in the EU’s ability to undertake collective action in the field of CFSP. On the one hand, the response to the ongoing financial crisis meant that the appetite for common action was already wearing thin. Migration is at the top of the political agenda as the problem cannot be wished away. The EU has to examine different external policies—those touching on security, development cooperation, the neighbourhood policy and internal policies dealing with the migration problem, refugees and economic migrants. The cleavage in the society of East and West and in particular the response of the CEE countries—the Visegrad Four (see below)—is clear: they are against Muslim refugees. In  the wake of the refugee crisis, national preferences dominated the

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discourse, preventing a European consensus from being forged and also showing the lack of solidarity among member states. ‘A European consensus on the migration crisis has not come forth as national borders have become stronger calling into question the European solidarity at this time of crisis’ (Bava 2015). The end of the Cold War has brought a different meaning to the idea of periphery and centrality for these countries. Similarly, there has been a transformation of the security identity through participation in the EU. ‘German Chancellor Angela Merkel took a bold step in 2015, when she suspended the Dublin regulation with respect to Syrian refugees and confirmed the country would take in more refugees. This action also unleashed a larger wave of refugees attempting to cross Hungary and Austria to reach Germany. Merkel’s call for a unified European migration policy has not resonated within the EU, [despite the EU indicating that it would move in that direction]’ (Bava 2015). Furthermore, ‘[t]he Visegrad four—Hungary, Poland, Czech and Slovak republics—rejected the proposal of migrant quotas. Rather, Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, said the crisis was a “German problem”. Both Hungary and Austria enhanced controls within and the border checks can be seen as violating the EU’s open-border policy’ (Bava 2015). The humanitarian crisis has multiple implications but, more importantly, calls into question how security is constructed, given that Schengen rules allow member countries to erect temporary border controls under extenuating ‘public policy or national security’ circumstances. Amidst the refugee crisis, in June 2016 two events with far-reaching consequences took place within the EU. While the first—the Brexit vote— shook the Union and has implications for how the collective solidarity will be organised, the launch of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) almost did not make headlines as it followed the Brexit vote. The EUGS, launched by the bloc in June 2016, should be seen and evaluated in the context of the EU reimagining itself for an even larger security role. The strategy identifies five core priorities: security; strengthening of the resilience of states and societies; an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; cooperative regional orders; and global governance for the twenty-first century (European Commission 2016). The coming of the Trump administration and a revitalised Putin in Moscow has drawn further attention to how Europe envisions, organises and provides for its own security. The idea of extended deterrence, which

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has safeguarded Western Europe since 1949, when NATO was launched, is running low. NATO’s role as a security provider, guarantor and balancer can no longer be seen as a given for Europe. The transatlantic partnership is at its weakest, with the USA not wanting to invest in this relationship. The Paris attacks and the subsequent Brussels attack highlight the vulnerability of open and liberal societies. With refugees being seen in the popular perception as creating a security threat and in order to create more security the state has to become more intrusive. Europe’s border crisis and its response to it has brought into sharp focus the EU’s freedom, security and justice interface and the way it responds to the human rights of the refugees. The growing number of terrorist attacks across the capitals of Europe has only exacerbated the securitisation discourse and has once again focused attention on the vulnerability of the public spaces. Together with the more recent influx of refugees from North Africa, which has also allowed some terrorists to gain access to Europe, a new sense of fear has permeated European societies. In an attempt to respond to it at both the EU and member state level, there has been a greater attempt at the use of technology, surveillance and intrusion into privacy (as claimed by some). Attempts to regulate mobility have often run into conflict with civil liberties groups, who see rights being compromised by the state in the name of security. In a significant development, in November 2017, the EU launched its Permanent Structured Cooperation, aimed at ‘deepening defence cooperation among the EU Member States’. High Representative/ Vice-President Federica Mogherini on 12 December 2017 said: ‘We did it. In the most ambitious and inclusive manner, with 25 Member States, we launched PESCO together. The 25 have taken binding commitments to improving their cooperation, and we will start with a first set of very concrete 17 projects spanning from common military training, to providing medical support to our operations. The possibilities of the PESCO are immense’ (EEAS 2017). The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a start in terms of how the EU takes the next steps to building and consolidating its role as a security actor at the regional and global level so as to enhance its own and its citizens’ security. It is this context that the EU’s response to the emerging global threats will be impacted by its relations to other states. This aspect of cooperation with other states and partnerships assumes salience as Brussels cannot address these threats alone.

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EU–India Relations: Enhancing the Security Partnership In this context, the ESS can be seen as a first step towards ‘forging a global Europe’ (Biscop and Andersson 2008). The EU’s development as a security actor in response to the changing security dynamics in Europe and beyond, especially since 9/11, indicates that the EU is going global. This emphasis on the ‘global’ can be seen to involve (1) recognising the threats becoming global, (2) emphasising that the framework for response would be also ‘global’, based on ‘effective multilateralism’, and (3) identifying ‘global’ partnerships for collective action. This is where the EU’s relation with India comes into the spotlight as this country was indicated in the ESS as one of the strategic partners. EU–India relations have slowly evolved over the last five decades beyond trade, which has been the cornerstone of this relation; in 2004, both sides signalled a Strategic Partnership (Bava 2008). The Joint Action Plan 2005 and the review in 2008 laid out a broad roadmap for cooperation across political, economic and cultural fields and for an extended period there was a significant push on both sides to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)—this has not, however, materialised. After a lull in relations, one can discern a new drive towards engagement between New Delhi and Brussels; this seeks to expand the partnership beyond trade and focus on security, which is increasingly occupying the agenda on both sides. In 2016, the EU Ambassador to India, Thomas Kozlowski, emphasised that ‘EU–India security cooperation has become an imperative’. This statement has to be read along with the EU–India Agenda for Action 2020 adopted by both sides at the conclusion of the 13th European Union–India Summit on 30 March 2016. Foreign Policy and Security Cooperation was given top billing in the Agenda. When taken together with the EUGS 2016, taking forward the strategic partnership in this area automatically follows. Unlike in the past, when both Brussels and New Delhi looked at each other from the vantage point of trade relations—the EU has been India’s largest trade partner, after all—perhaps what has shifted is the political perception on both sides about the other. In 2015 the then Indian foreign secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, stated that ‘India wants to be a leading power rather than just a balancing power’ (Jaishankar 2015). Both the EU and India’s foreign policy ambitions are growing within a shifting geopolitical terrain in which the changing strategic balance also requires a rethink about partners and partnerships.

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As New Delhi has to overcome its reluctance to look at non-traditional security actors and view the EU as a new security actor, so has the EU to expand its vision of partners in Asia beyond China. As India is ‘prepared to shoulder greater responsibility’ (Jaishankar 2015), engaging the EU on new security concerns, as identified in Action 2020, could be mutually beneficial as it will improve and extend capabilities in security, cyber-­ security, counter-piracy and non-proliferation, maritime security, regional areas and other issues. With the resumption of the EU–India Summits since 2016, one can discern a new receptivity on both sides to each other’s security concerns, which is a first step to strengthening the strategic partnership. In a globalised world, all neighbourhoods, whether European or Indian, are interconnected and vulnerable to security threats as they can easily escalate and spill over across regions. For EU and India, as ideationally connected actors, the global challenges offer the opportunity to enhance their partnership by reimagining how they could together augment security-related global public goods.

Conclusion There is no denying that the security dynamics in Europe have irrevocably changed since the end of the Cold War and more dramatically after the growing footprint of terrorism on the continent after 9/11. The EU found itself in disarray in responding to the US action in Iraq in 2003; this also put a strain on the transatlantic partnership. An enlarged bloc since 2004 has transformed the borders of the EU, bringing new challenges and raising the spectre of growing uncertainty at its periphery. Brussels has been forced to respond and the ESS was a significant first step: the Union articulated how it located itself in terms of the growing non-traditional security threats. In the move from the ESS to the EUGS, one can discern the maturing of the EU as a security actor, but it has also significantly raised expectations of how it would perform. This transformed security situation in Europe has also been impacted by the return of geopolitics in the region and beyond. The EU’s eastern and southern flanks have emerged as new fault lines as it seeks to address these challenges collectively. Coherence of action and solidarity of the member states of the EU have come under greater global scrutiny as both these aspects have been impacted by the disruptions in the economic, political and security spheres, both at the regional and the global level.

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The Lisbon Treaty created a new institutional mechanism by which the EU acquired greater foreign policy visibility; coupled with the growing military and civilian missions, it has slowly accumulated experience. The EU, however, needs to build new security partnerships and focus on alliances and beyond at multilateral engagements. In a globalised world, regional integration and the way complex security challenges are responded to have lessons for other parts of the world since they draw attention to how collective action can address a matrix of global issues that call for partnerships. The EU offers a fine example of how partnerships can be built when the necessary political will can be mustered and collective interest convergence triumphs narrow ideas. The challenge for the EU is to keep a sustained level of solidarity and commitment in a dramatically changing and dynamic security landscape.

References Aggestam, L., & Johansson, M. (2017). The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(6), 1203–1220. https://doi. org/10.1111/jcms.12558. Bava, U. S. (2008). The EU and India: Challenges to a Strategic Partnership. In G. Grevi & A. de Vasconcelos (Eds.), Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia, Chaillot Paper No. 109 (pp. 105–113). Paris: EUISS. Bava, U. S. (2015, September 14). Migrant Crisis: Europe Feels the Pinch of a Continental Shift. The Hindustan Times. Biscop, S., & Andersson, J. J. (2008). The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe. New York: Routledge. Boer, M.  D., & Monar, J.  (2002). 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(1), 11–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.40.s1.2. Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2006). The European Union as Global Actor (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. Cameron, F. (2005). US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? New York: Routledge. European Commission. (2011). A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels: European Commission. European Council. (2003). A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 1–15.

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CHAPTER 4

Brexit: End of Britain’s European Odyssey Purusottam Bhattacharya

Britain’s European Odyssey On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to determine whether it would continue to be a member of the European Union (EU), which it joined in 1973 after a prolonged and agonising debate about its place in Europe. The UK decided to leave the EU by a majority of 52% to 48%. The history of the evolution of British attitude towards and its participation in the European integration movement since the end of the Second World War has been a chequered one. Having initially balked at responding positively to the Franco-German initiative of the European Coal and Steel Community project in 1952, which ultimately paved the way for the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the UK was forced to change course when it found out that its trading and commercial interests were being hit by the EEC’s Common External Tariff and that the British Commonwealth was no longer a viable market for British manufactured products. The much-vaunted ‘special relationship’ with the USA was also looking rather jaded after the Suez fiasco of 1956. The UK’s entry into the EEC was blocked twice by the then French president, General Charles De Gaulle, ostensibly on the grounds that the UK’s commercial interests were not compatible with those of the P. Bhattacharya (*) Formerly of the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_4

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six founding member states: France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. However, De Gaulle’s real objective was to prevent the arrival into the EEC of a country which still wielded considerable global influence and could prove to be a rival of France, the de facto dominant force in the Community at the time (Bhattacharya 1994). The UK finally gained entry in 1973 under more favourable circumstances. However, the divisive nature of the issue was never resolved and the history of British membership of the EC—subsequently renamed the European Union (EU) in 1993—has been one of constant wrangling between the UK and its EU partners, even as the Union enlarged itself from the original six to the present 28. As a consequence, the UK earned a reputation for being an ‘awkward’ partner as wrangling continued under various British prime ministers—Conservative as well as Labour—on issues such as the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, an elaborate farm support project that never benefitted the UK, which has a small agricultural sector, the high British contribution to the EU budget and, most fundamentally, on the issues of the Schengen single border and the European single currency project, the euro. The UK remained outside the two crucial EU projects which ensure a borderless Europe of 26 European countries (22 of which are EU members) and a 19-member ‘eurozone’ where the common currency prevails. Moreover, the UK never subscribed to the European dream of ‘ever-closer union’, which many in the UK feared would turn the EU into a super-state, consigning British sovereignty and identity to oblivion. The lingering fear about where the EU was headed and the geopolitical reorganisation of the UK from imperial state to EU member state in the latter half of the twentieth century created and ignited crises of collective identity within British political institutions and civil society that found expression in the rise of Euroscepticism (Gifford 2008). In British domestic politics, Europe has always been a divisive issue— both in terms of party politics and public opinion. The two major political parties—Conservative and Labour—have both been wracked by bitter divisions between their pro-EU and anti-EU factions. These divisions stem from a fundamental question: is Britain ‘European’? As Anthony Eden, the then British Foreign Secretary, said in a speech at Columbia University on 11 January 1952, ‘Britain’s story and interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe. Our thoughts move across the seas to the many communities in which our people play their part in every corner of the world. These are our family ties. That is our life. Without it we should be

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no more than some millions of people living on an island off the coast of Europe, in which nobody wants to take any particular interest’ (Eden 1960, 40). It is far from clear if today’s UK has been able to move away from this British dream—however imperceptible it may appear on the surface—which was so powerfully articulated by Eden 65 years ago. The referendum on EU membership was initiated by the then British Prime Minister David Cameron, who was seeking to negotiate better terms with the EU in February 2016. Cameron aimed to replicate only what Harold Wilson, Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair, former British prime ministers, were able to extract from their EU partners of the day—largely cosmetic concessions which sought to demonstrate to the British electorate that they were able to stand up to the ‘European bullies’ in defence of British interests. All British prime ministers have played to the domestic gallery when it comes to Europe. Cameron raked up the issue of British membership of the EU for two reasons, in addition to the domestic compulsions mentioned above. First, he had objected to the prevailing EU rule under which subjects of any EU member states enjoy the automatic right to claim social security benefits after moving to another member state in the event that they are not able to secure employment on arrival. Unemployment benefits enjoyed by British and other EU nationals in the UK are substantial; they comprise weekly pay-outs to the spouses and for each of their children. In addition, they are entitled to subsidised accommodation and free education for their children in state schools. Second, Cameron wanted to ensure treaty reform guaranteeing that the UK would never subscribe to the core EU objective of ‘ever-closer union’—an objective implying the possible emergence of a European super-state. The deal, announced after intense negotiations in Brussels on 19–20 February 2016, was a compromise on both sides. The EU made certain compromises that went a long way towards meeting the British demands as the EU leaders were anxious to keep Britain in. Cameron too had to make concessions. He did not manage to secure one of the fundamental British demands for curbs on EU migrants in the UK in terms of employment and social security benefits (BBC 2016a). However, the exercise proved to be futile: defying the will of Cameron and his government, the Labour opposition, a majority of MPs, big business, the warnings of then US President Barack Obama and the European leaders, the Bank of England and international financial institutions, the UK electorate voted in favour of leaving the EU in June 2016.

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Brexit: The Underlying Causes Many observers believe that Brexit was driven in large part by the anti-­ immigrant rhetoric of important segments of the British political establishment, particularly of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), who had long called for Britain to shut its borders, not only to non-EU migrants but also to EU migrants as well. UKIP had drawn votes since 2012 largely from older Conservatives who disapproved of EU membership and immigration. The UK had witnessed large inflows of EU nationals over the 10-year period that preceded the referendum. This was the result of the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 that brought in a number of new Eastern European member countries (Goodwin 2017). While Britain did not join the EU single border scheme known as the Schengen agreement and kept border controls in its own hands, it was unable to keep out migrants from the member states of the EU because the Treaty of Rome, which founded the EU, guaranteed the free movement of people within the Union. For UKIP and other hardcore supporters of Britain leaving the EU, especially in the Conservative Party, the only way to stop this migration from EU member states to Britain was for the UK to leave the Union. One of the immediate casualties of the referendum result was Cameron himself. He had put his job on the line by strongly campaigning in favour of the ‘Remain’ campaign and took the honourable decision to resign when the result went against him. The other consequences of the verdict, both short and long term, are still uncertain but many analysts expect them to be significant as they relate to EU integration and severe on the British economy (in terms of trade, investments and jobs, not to mention political influence in the world) (Smith 2017). Immigration, however, was not the only issue driving Brexit. An understanding of the dynamics of the referendum verdict at the regional level makes clear the underlying political geography. A large majority of voting areas in England backed Brexit while the more ethnically diverse, socially mobile and affluent constituencies of London and the university towns such as Cambridge and Oxford voted to remain in the EU. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, a majority voted to remain in the EU.  The drift towards Brexit reflected a slow but persistent shift in the overall structure and attitudes of the country’s electorate. The social changes since the 1960s reflected the rise of a new, more professional and socially mobile middle class, alongside a rapid expansion of the higher education sector,

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leading to the emergence of a large bloc of socially liberal voters. As opposed to this development, the extremist and populist insurgent parties found a space to forge connections with less educated white working-class voters, who were economically left behind and remained socially conservative. So, it is no surprise that the strongest support for Brexit across the entire country emerged in working-class, economically disadvantaged and Conservative-held districts near the east coast, and also in areas where large percentages of the population had left school without any formal qualifications or were pensioners. These voters displayed political apathy, distrust and dissatisfaction, which was reflected in their support for Brexit (Goodwin 2017).

The Negotiations Britain will be the second member state, after Greenland in 1985, ever to leave the EU. Therefore, there is a great deal of uncertainty about how this will be achieved. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, any exit of a member state will be guided by Article 50 of the Treaty. The member state wishing to leave has to ‘trigger’ Article 50 (that is, serve official notice to the EU of its intention to leave) and the process of the exit will be put into motion; this will last two years. At the end of two years, the process will be deemed to be complete; this will mark the formal departure of the concerned member state (assuming that negotiations between the departing state and the EU have been successfully concluded). Cameron’s successor, Theresa May, who was originally a supporter of the ‘Remain’ campaign, has taken an appropriate line by declaring that she will honour the will of the British people and will carry out Brexit as per the Lisbon Treaty. May confirmed in October 2016 that she would trigger Brexit by March 2017, which would begin two years of formal negotiations. However, much to the government’s chagrin, on 3 November 2016 the UK Divisional Court upheld a legal challenge brought against the government by ‘Remain’ campaigners and ruled that the government could not use the royal prerogative to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty; as a result, the UK could not leave the EU without reference to Parliament. The court’s judgement meant that the process must be subject to full parliamentary control and oversight (Giannoulopoulos et al. 2016). The British government decided to appeal against the High Court order to the Supreme Court, which ruled that

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MPs and peers had to have a say before Article 50 was triggered by the government. The government complied with this ruling and duly unfolded its EU Bill in early February 2017 with a roadmap (spelled out in a White Paper) laying out the government’s ‘12 principles’, including migration control and ‘taking control of our own laws’. “These include: (1) Trade: The UK will withdraw from the Single Market and seek a new customs arrangement and a free trade agreement with the EU. (2) Immigration: A new system to control EU migration will be introduced, and could be phased in to give businesses time to prepare. The new system will be designed to help fill skills shortage and welcome ‘genuine’ students. (3) Expats: The government wants to secure an agreement with European countries on the rights of EU nationals living in the UK and Britons living in Europe. (4) Sovereignty: Britain will leave the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and seek to set up separate resolution mechanisms for things like trade disputes. (5) Border: The objective is to aim for ‘as seamless and frictionless a border as possible between Northern Ireland and Ireland’. (6) Devolution: Giving more powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as decision-making is brought back to the UK.” (BBC News 2017a). On 1 February 2017, MPs backed the EU Bill by 498 votes to 114. It was subsequently approved by MPs with an overwhelming majority, rejecting all amendments moved by the opponents of the government and giving May the authority to invoke Article 50. It may be noted in this connection that the debate in the UK has raged primarily on whether the country should have a ‘hard Brexit’ (coming out of the single market) or a ‘soft Brexit’ (staying in the single market) (BBC 2017b). On 29 March 2017, Theresa May triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty with a formal notification to the EU of the UK’s intention to leave the bloc. The letter reiterated Britain’s general objectives, such as leaving the single market, but reaching mutually beneficial terms on trade and other issues. In response, the European Council president, Donald Tusk, came out with draft guidelines for the Brexit negotiations; these ruled out starting free trade talks with the UK before ‘sufficient progress’ had been made on other issues. These other issues include the fate of three million EU nationals living in the UK and the one million British nationals in the EU.  In late February 2017, the European Commission president, Jean-­ Claude Juncker, had warned the UK that the divorce from the EU would come at a hefty price. Some reports suggested that the UK could have to pay the EU up to 60 billion euros after Brexit talks had started. The amount

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would cover the UK’s share of the cost of projects and ­programmes it signed up to as a member, as well as pensions for EU officials (BBC 2017c). While the shadow boxing between the UK and the EU continued, Theresa May surprisingly announced in late April 2017 a snap election for 8 June 2017, ostensibly to strengthen her position in the Brexit negotiations with a bigger majority in the House of Commons; such a result was looking a distinct possibility on the basis of opinion polls at the time. However, the gambit failed spectacularly with the Conservatives losing their overall majority (down from 331 to 318 in a parliament of 650) and the government is now dependent on the support of the Democratic Unionist Party. The situation in which the UK finds itself after the electoral gambit failed is anything but enviable. The future of Theresa May and her government look uncertain and pundits are betting on another election in the near future if not the replacement of Theresa May herself. EU leaders had indicated earlier that they were patiently waiting for the elections to be over and they were not concerned with the strength or weakness of the British government but were keen to begin the negotiations as soon as possible. The first round of negotiations was held on 19 June 2017. It was agreed in the meeting between Brexit Secretary David Davis, from the UK side, and Michel Barnier, from the EU side, that the initial focus would be on expat rights, a financial settlement and ‘other issues’. Discussions aimed at preserving the Good Friday Agreement (which brought an end to the 30-year-old sectarian strife between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland) and the common travel area with Ireland after Brexit has also figured in the negotiations (while both the UK and Ireland are not part of the Schengen area, with the UK’s impending departure from the EU the issue of the common travel area between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland needs to be settled). The UK, which was insisting on simultaneous trade talks, gave ground on that issue as Barnier said that the UK’s future relationship with the EU, including trade, would only be decided once the European Council felt ‘sufficient progress has been made’ on the other issues (BBC 2017d). While the inconclusive election results in the UK and the consequent uncertainty in Britain added yet another dimension to the Brexit talks, May was quick to zero in on the expat question; this, as already noted, appears to be the highest priority for the EU. May unveiled the initial British proposal at an EU summit in Brussels on 22 June 2017, offering to grant EU

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nationals who had lived in the UK for five years at the cut-off date—yet to be announced but expected to be between March 2017 and the moment the UK actually leaves the EU—new ‘UK settled status’. Those who qualify for the settled status will be allowed to stay in the country and access health, education and other benefits. The plan would affect the 3.2 million EU citizens now living in the UK, around a million of whom have lived in the country for less than five years. How these people would be affected is subject to an agreement between the UK and the EU.  Initial responses from the EU side to the proposals on the expat question made by May were not particularly positive. While the German Chancellor Angela Merkel described the UK plans to safeguard EU citizens’ rights in Britain after Brexit as a ‘good start’, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker described them as ‘a first step’ but added that it was ‘not sufficient’. Members of the European Parliament comprising four political groups who make up two-thirds of the European Parliament, including the parliament’s chief Brexit negotiator Guy Verhofstadt, said the proposal was a ‘damp squib’. It offered Europeans in Britain fewer rights than Britons had in the EU. They also pointed out that they had the power to reject any Brexit deal before it could go ahead because the European Parliament must approve the withdrawal agreement. These assertions have been contested by the UK side, who argue that the ‘basic rights’ of the 3 million EU citizens living in the UK now would be ‘preserved’. However, the UK proposals would be dependent on the EU granting Britons living in other EU countries the same rights (BBC 2017e). The issue was taken up in the second round of negotiations, which was held in mid-July 2017, when the UK Brexit Secretary urged both sides ‘to get down to business’. He also said that it was time to get to the ‘substance of the matter’. The call ‘to get down to business’ from Davis was meant to signal that the Brexit talks were entering a serious phase and, according to press reports, the issues of citizens’ rights and finance were discussed. The atmosphere of the talks also improved after the acknowledgement by the UK that it had obligations to the EU which would survive its withdrawal and needed to be resolved. The government’s official position, confirmed in a parliamentary statement in early July 2017, is that it would ‘work with the EU to determine a fair settlement of the UK’s rights and obligations as a departing member state, in accordance with law and in the spirit of our continuing partnership’. The next few rounds of talks were deemed crucial as progress in the three issue areas by October 2017—on citizens’ rights, finance and the border question in Ireland—

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was to determine if the all-important trade issue would find a place in the next round of negotiations (BBC 2017f). The immediate economic fall-out from the referendum had appeared less damaging than feared for the post-Brexit period. This provided some relief to the government as international markets came to understand that negotiations over the terms of exit and the nature of Britain’s future relations with the EU would take at least two years and probably longer to settle. Many hoped that their fears about Brexit had been exaggerated. However, in the weeks following the vote in June 2016, speculation centred on how Britain might work out a deal that would preserve its access to the European single market. EU leaders, especially Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s former president François Hollande, had publicly hinted that if Britain wanted access to the single market on terms available to an existing member (warnings which were subsequently reinforced by Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker earlier in 2017), it would also have to accept the free movement of EU citizens into Britain, which would be anathema to any British prime minister committed to the essential elements of the referendum verdict—reclaiming control of borders and laws. Even after several rounds of negotiations, no agreement had been reached on the three issues of EU and UK nationals, financial arrangements and the Irish border. It was against this background that May delivered a wide-ranging speech in Florence, Italy on 22 September 2017 unfolding the UK’s position on the issues that were blocking progress. While she did not mention any figure, which her EU interlocutors were keen to hear, May hinted—for the first time—that the UK would ‘honour commitments’ made while it had been a member to avoid creating ‘uncertainty for the remaining member states’. This was construed as meaning the UK would fulfil its financial commitments for two years after it leaves in March 2019, though she did not specify how much the UK would be prepared to continue to pay into the EU. (This figure has been estimated as being at least 20 billion euros for the EU budgets in 2019 and 2020.) After five rounds of negotiations, the EU remains insistent that there will be no negotiations on a transition period (the UK wants at least a two-year transition period after March 2019 for existing market access arrangements to apply to give it space and time for adjustments) or on future relations (trade and other related arrangements), until financial commitments have been clarified (it is estimated by many financial experts that the final overall bill might amount to as much as 60 billion euros) (BBC 2017g).

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In her Florence speech, May also proposed a ‘bold new strategic agreement’ on security co-operation. On trade she said the two sides could do ‘so much better’ than adopt existing models and there was ‘no need to impose tariffs where there are none now’. The UK was also prepared to make ‘ongoing contributions’ to projects it considered greatly to the EU and the UK’s advantage, such as science and security projects. The UK did not want to ‘stand in the way’ of the closer EU integration outlined a few days earlier by Jean-Claude Juncker (BBC 2017h). The Brexit negotiations figured again at the EU summit on 19 October 2017. Speaking at the end of the two-day summit, Tusk said that reports of deadlock over the negotiations may have been exaggerated; progress was ‘not sufficient’ to begin trade talks but that did not mean ‘there is no progress at all’ (Barnier had said earlier in October that the talks were deadlocked). Giving a clear insight into the fact that the EU president and the chief negotiator were not on the same page on the status of the talks, Tusk said while he was not at odds with Barnier, his own role was to be ‘a positive motivator for the next five or six weeks’. Tusk further added that he felt there was ‘goodwill’ on both sides and that explained why he was more optimistic than Barnier, emphasising that they had a ‘different role’ (BBC 2017i). Over the few weeks following the October 2017 Brussels summit, the EU27 (the 27 remaining member states of the EU) engaged in an internal discussion about the transition process post-March 2019 and the nature of a future relationship. They would not talk directly with the UK about these issues until December 2017 at the earliest and only then if ‘sufficient progress’ had been made on all the ‘divorce’ arrangements, including money. It is being speculated that the EU27 would probably offer to prolong all existing EU rules and regulations, which would mean that after Brexit (March 2019)—for ‘about two years’ (that is, for the length of a transition period)—the UK would be bound by EU rules by accepting EU budget payments, EU regulations and the jurisdiction of the ECJ.  This indeed was the biggest take-away for May from the Brussels summit on 19 October as all EU leaders knew that the British Prime Minister was in a politically difficult situation and did not want her to go home empty-­ handed; in consequence, they had promised they would start talking among themselves about trade and transition deals (crucial to Britain) as early as October 2017 (BBC 2017j). However, the details of trade and transit deals the EU27 have in mind are difficult for the hard-line UK Brexiteers to stomach. This has a direct bearing on the British domestic scenario, which is contributing to the

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mounting confusion in the negotiations. Even 16 months since the referendum in June 2016, Britain remains a house divided—almost down the middle. For instance, a poll carried out for The Times newspaper found that 42% of the people thought that Britain was right to leave the EU, while 47% thought it was wrong, the biggest gap since the referendum. So far as British politics is concerned, in spite of a clear majority of MPs in all the parties favouring a soft Brexit (May herself is trying to achieve a balance between a hard and a soft Brexit while working strenuously not to alienate the hard Brexiteers in her party in order to safeguard her own position as party leader and prime minister), it is the zealots who rule the roost when it comes to leaving the EU, with the moderates effectively side-lined. Both Labour and the Conservatives are riven with divisions between ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’, hard and soft Brexiteers. For the Conservatives, the division is not just about a hard or a soft Brexit. It is also about economic policies that cut across the Brexit divide. Take, for example, the post-Brexit agricultural policy. One section of the party would end all subsidies to farmers and allow the market to take its course. For others, especially in rural constituencies dependent on the farm vote, such a policy would be suicidal. On the question of the potential economic damage to the British economy in the event of a hard Brexit, the gung-ho confidence of the hard Brexiteers in the cabinet, led by the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, is all the harder to explain away in the face of cold reality (Menon 2017a). So far as the Labour Party is concerned, there is a curious ambivalence at the leadership level, with Jeremy Corbyn, the party leader, unenthusiastic about discussing Brexit in public (Corbyn’s critics accused him of not campaigning sincerely enough against a Brexit, despite his public profession that he sided with the Remainers). Labour is divided between those who are more interested in exploiting the ‘civil war’ within the Conservative Party and the Cabinet over Brexit and using it to win the next general election, whenever it is held, even if it means a hard Brexit, and those who are alive to the cost of a hard Brexit (most economists think that a hard Brexit would slice about 3% off UK GDP). In such a scenario there will be less money available for social welfare programmes which will bring justice for the ‘many’ (Menon 2017b). Such a polarisation within the two major parties is reflective of the state at the national level and each politician acts according to what suits his or her career interests; in the process, the moderates in both the major parties who could prevent a hard Brexit have been largely marginalised and are silent. What all this Machiavellianism in British

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politics boils down to is further uncertainty over the next course of Brexit negotiations (Menon 2017c). As the talks appeared stalemated, a ‘breakthrough’ was announced in Brussels on 8 December 2017 by the European Commission president when he said that sufficient progress had been made, paving the way for talks on the future UK–EU relationship. May, who travelled to Brussels after overnight talks on the Irish border, said there would be no hard border and the Good Friday Agreement would be upheld. EU citizens in the UK ‘will be able to go on living as before’ and their rights will be enshrined in law and protected by British courts. Likewise, UK citizens living in the EU will also continue to enjoy the same rights as before. Juncker said: ‘Today’s result is of course a compromise.’ May added that reaching this point had ‘required give and take from both sides’. The Irish prime minister also welcomed the deal. It will be premature at this point to speculate about the precise implications of these developments. On the face of it, in the absence of more concrete information, the UK seems to have made the greater concessions. The prime minister may not find it easy to secure the support of the Democratic Unionist Party as they have expressed their unhappiness about the border agreement. In early December, the European Parliament urged EU leaders to allow the next phase of Brexit negotiations to start. Later, the European Council also agreed to move to the next phase of negotiations. The EU also proposed that a ‘transition period’ after the UK leaves the EU should not continue beyond 31 December 2020. The details of the transition period are still to be negotiated between the EU and the UK (BBC 2017j). The EU has outlined that all EU rules and regulations will apply in the UK during the transition phase. However, the UK will not be involved in decision-making in the EU institutions.

Implications for the EU The impact of Brexit on the EU itself has also been a subject of much debate, both preceding and following the referendum in June 2016. First and foremost, the exercise of power by the EU, which has established itself as a leading international actor in recent times, is dependent on unity among its member states. With the UK scheduled to leave the bloc in less than two years, unity will not be any easier to achieve, though London has at times been an awkward club member (Bhattacharya 1994). The ­principal basis of the EU power in international relations is the size of its

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single market. To quote a noted EU expert, ‘the combined gross domestic product of the 28 member states is slightly larger than that of the United States or China, and these three big players have similar shares of world trade in goods. Because of the EU’s size and wealth, countries want to trade with it. In principle, this gives the EU leverage. Brexit will diminish that leverage. British gross domestic product accounts for approximately 19 per cent of EU GDP. Although the EU without the UK will still be one of the top three largest markets in the world, it will be almost a fifth smaller than it had been before Brexit’ (Smith 2017, 84). Brexit also negatively impacts other EU foreign policy instruments. With the UK currently contributing almost 15% of all EU funding for developing countries, the EU’s aid budget will be substantially reduced. With the loss of British experts, the EU External Action Service will also be affected and this loss will be keenly felt as EU diplomacy is dependent on the diplomatic capacities of its member states. The UK may not have been at the forefront of recent EU diplomatic efforts, such as mediation in the Ukraine–Russia conflict or the management of relations with Turkey regarding the refugee crisis (when Ankara agreed to act to stem the flow of Syrian refugees through Turkish territory on their way to Europe in search of a better life), but it did play a notable role in this arena, especially during negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue (Smith 2017). The UK has not been a notable actor in EU defence cooperation and in fact was ranked among the most reluctant member states in this regard. It was also not a major contributor of troops to EU military missions. However, a withdrawal of British defence capabilities will surely be felt as the UK has provided crucial resources to some missions. Notable among these was providing the operational headquarters for the EU’s anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. Brexit, nevertheless, will not necessarily preclude future British participation in EU missions abroad as mechanisms already exist allowing ‘third countries’, including Norway and the USA, to do so (Smith 2017). Another area where the EU will undoubtedly feel the absence of the UK, one of its key member states, is in the arena of soft power (what could be called its ‘power of attraction’). The EU’s global image has already taken a battering as it has battled a succession of crises and has an apparent inability to resolve any of them satisfactorily. Consequently, its ability has been reduced to convince other states to support its preferences without having to resort to its other sources of power, such as trade. There is also the fear in the EU that Brexit will fuel anti-EU populism in several other

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member countries. However, this apprehension dissipated somewhat after anti-EU populist parties lost elections in Austria, the Netherlands in March 2017 and, most significantly, in France in May 2017, when the far-­ right candidate of the Front National, Marine Le Pen, lost to the centre-­ left candidate, the strongly pro-EU Emanuel Macron, by a huge margin. The EU also partially overcame the next big test in this regard when the sitting German Chancellor Merkel won the German elections in September 2017, though German voters fired a warning shot across her bow by giving support to the far-right Alternative for Germany, which operates on an open anti-immigrant platform. Since her ruling coalition did not win an outright majority, the talks undertaken by Merkel with other prospective partners have run into difficulties following the somewhat inconclusive elections in September 2017. Germany now faces a great deal of political uncertainty in regard to the formation of the next government, putting Merkel’s political position at stake. This has grave implications not only for Germany but for Europe as a whole as Berlin, in tandem with Paris, continues to hold out hope for thorough reform of the EU.

Implications for India–UK Relations The British decision to join the then EEC in 1973 had a dramatic impact on India–UK relations, which was strongly felt in the changed pattern of India–UK trade. Even before Britain moved into the EEC (its entry was delayed because of French resistance in the 1960s), a sharp acceleration in the weakening of the Indo-British bond took place during the 1960s, perhaps as a result of the mutual mistrust and ill-feeling generated by the British move, which India had viewed as a threat to its vital trade interests in Western Europe (since the EEC was a customs union, Indian exports to Britain were no longer eligible for preferential access, as they had been before) (Bhattacharya 1994). While the British move into the EEC was a setback for India, at least in the short term, the history of the last 44 years has been one of an astonishing opening-up of Western Europe—and subsequently the whole of Europe—for the comprehensive development of India’s relations with the EU in terms of trade, investment, the transfer of technology, development cooperation, political dialogue and a whole gamut of other activities (India has been one of the ten ‘Strategic Partners’ of the EU since 2004 and there is an annual summit between the two sides) (Bhattacharya 2012).

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The EU is also one of the major ‘Strategic Partners’ of India while, as a bloc, it is India’s largest trade partner. Against this overall framework of the relationship between India and the EU (of which Britain has been a part these 44 years), the individual trade ties between India and the UK are modest. In 2013, the UK received 3.1% of India’s exports, while the UK accounted for just 1.5% of India’s imports. The long-term trend since 1947 is certainly sharply down. Britain has struggled to maintain its position as an exporter to India; it has ranked behind other European states (namely Switzerland, Belgium and Germany). The investment scenario is more optimistic. The 1991 economic reforms in India have certainly made it easier for British companies to access India’s ‘emerging market’ and numerous joint ventures have been launched. While subsidiaries of UK companies with a longstanding presence in India have been able to expand their operations, Indian companies with sufficient capital have found it easier to extend their overseas operations, taking advantage of the UK’s permissive financial regime and its attractive location to use it as a base. The UK has been a leading investor in India in recent years. As per Indian Ministry of Commerce data, between April 2000 and September 2017, the UK was the fourth largest investor in India, behind Mauritius, Singapore and Japan. Notwithstanding their limitations, India–UK ties had showed some promise, at least in appearance, ever since Cameron’s victory in 2010. Cameron himself visited India three times during his tenure as British Prime Minister. Economic issues were highest on his agenda on all three visits. However, the British arms industry suffered a setback when India indicated a preference for the state-of-the-art French Dassault Rafale combat aircraft rather than the British-backed Eurofighter in January 2012. This setback fuelled the debate within the UK about the desirability of continuing economic aid to India (as if the quid pro quo was that India would buy British arms and in return Britain would continue to give India economic and development aid), further souring the diplomatic atmosphere (Wyatt 2016). As things stand, it is not clear if Britain will continue to have access to the EU single market of 500 million people with its substantive purchasing power, which is where the vast bulk of British exports are marketed. It is already a subject of hard bargaining on both sides. While the debate on a ‘hard Brexit’ or a ‘soft Brexit’ raged in the UK, Prime Minister May embarked on a visit to India in the first week of November 2016 with the

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hope of forging a stronger relationship with New Delhi, particularly on the economic (trade and investment) front (May obviously chose India as the first country she visited outside Europe not only because of the traditional close ties between the two countries but also due to the fact that India is the fastest-growing large economy in the world with a 1.25 billion population, a significant section of which has strong purchasing power). The British are keen on striking a free trade deal with India once the UK is out of the EU (under EU rules, it cannot do so while still an EU member). But the government is also keen on bringing in curbs on migration to the UK so that the level remains below 100,000 per year rather than the 300,000 it was on average during the five-year tenure of Cameron. The visit was the first major test of whether the May government could combine the twin objectives of cementing stronger partnerships with non-EU countries while introducing the tougher immigration regime that the government believes was mandated by the Brexit verdict. While critics have argued that the two approaches are fundamentally inconsistent, the Conservative government firmly clings to both policies as no Conservative Prime Minister can afford to ignore the clear anti-immigration message of the referendum verdict. In fact, the May government is confident that Britain has the chance to forge a new global role after Brexit. In India’s case, New Delhi is clearly in no hurry to establish the kind of comprehensive economic and trade relationship Britain wants. On the trade front, all that the May visit to India in early November 2016 yielded was the setting-up of a joint working group on trade, signalling willingness to start discussions on a free trade pact once Brexit becomes a reality. During the visit, May expressed her keenness to increase ‘the depth and detail of our trade and investment talks’ and identify how Indian and British industry and business could collaborate and work closely together even before Britain formally leaves the EU. British officials indicated that informal groups had already been set up for a possible engagement on a trade pact (BBC 2016b). However, the reality is that forging a free trade agreement between India and the UK will not be an easy task. With the nature of Brexit (hard or soft) becoming less clear following the electoral setback May suffered, and the pace of the bilateral negotiations so far, the British strategy for possible trade deals around the world is conjectural at present; India will ultimately want to be assured that Britain is truly open for business and that it will treat Indian business people, students and tourists fairly. Though economic and trade liberalisation was rolled out in India from

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1991, the fact remains that it still has comparatively high barriers to foreign imports. India has been doing well with those high barriers and it will want very significant concessions before agreeing to a free trade pact. This has been borne out during the free trade negotiations between India and the EU since 2007. There have been 16 separate rounds of formal negotiations, but progress has been limited. The principal sticking points are in the area of professional services such as accounting, insurance, banking and legal services, sectors which are among the strongest that Britain has and which it wants India to open up. However, New Delhi has reservations about opening up its services sectors, primarily on two counts. Firstly, opening up these sectors to the extent that the EU and other advanced countries want will be detrimental to India’s own services industry in these sectors, throwing a large number of people out of work. Secondly, India is keen to bring in the IT sector (an area of strength) within the ambit of trade talks and wants more temporary visas for its professional IT workers in Europe, which the EU has refused. In any trade negotiations between the UK and India, New Delhi would expect concessions on the very issues on which the India–EU free trade talks are stalled. Easier movement of people is expected to be a stumbling block, but there are other issues that also need to be solved. Apart from deals on ease of software exports and the movement of software and healthcare professionals, New Delhi also wants lower duties on textile and garment shipments. Britain wants concessions on financial services exports. On the face of it, May’s government is unlikely to be forthcoming in this regard, though what a much-weakened May government would do remains to be seen. Its policy is that the number of immigrants needs to be cut more drastically. At the Conservative Party Conference in October 2016, the Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, hinted at more curbs on foreign workers and students. This is rhetoric that does not go down well in India. As a former advisor of Narendra Modi’s electoral campaign put it, ‘the impression Britain is giving to countries such as India is we want your business but not your people’ (Ram 2016). May, however, did not return empty-handed. She sealed deals worth 1 billion pounds, laying the groundwork for more than 1300 jobs in the UK. However, hardcore observers feel that Brexit will definitely have an impact on Indian business in the UK.  Indian companies have invested more in the UK than anywhere else in Europe. They have seen the UK as a bridge to the rest of Europe and that bridge is about to be broken. That will mean Indian business will be less attracted to the UK than to the rest

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of Europe. What complicates the issue is the mixture of trade and business with immigration. The British government has consistently included overseas students as migrants, thus giving a false picture of net immigration into the country. Previously, overseas students were allowed to work for two years after the completion of their studies in the UK. However, that policy was reversed some time ago and overseas students (including Indian students) now face all kinds of restrictions if they wish to stay on at the end of their studies (May, as Home Secretary in the Cameron government, was on record as saying that ‘I want international students to leave the day they graduate’). Earlier, there was talk of taking international students out of the net migration figures. However, to the dismay of the Indian government, this did not happen. Nor did it happen during May’s visit to India. May did propose speeding up the application process of India’s businesspeople but said that other changes would be considered only if deportation of Indians who had overstayed their visas could be speeded up. She also pointed out that genuine Indian students were not facing problems in getting a visa (9 out of 10 applications were accepted). It does not look likely that the face-off on immigration will end soon (especially in the current climate in the UK). And notwithstanding British invocations of traditional ties and old sentiments, India does not feel it owes any special debt of gratitude towards Britain now that London has to chart a new course in the world following Brexit. (Nirmala Sitaraman, the then Indian Commerce and Industries Minister had this to say to a BBC reporter: ‘the status of India as an old friend of Britain had changed to a “tight professional engagement”. India was now looking at its own strengths and demanding “due place” in any trade deal’ (BBC 2016c).) The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI) brought out a survey in July 2016 on the possible impact of Brexit on Indian business in the UK, the education sector and immigration from India to the UK, among other issues. The survey highlights that the real impact of this historic move will take time to unfold. The FICCI conducted a quick survey among companies which have deep ties with the UK in terms of trade and investment links. Responses were received from 45 companies operating in sectors such as education, information technology, tyres, pharmaceuticals, steel and steel products, cars, textiles, apparel and financial services. The respondents were of the view that it was too soon to assess the impact of Brexit on the global economy and India. A lot would depend on what comes out of the negotiations between the UK and the EU. The respondents felt that the overall global economic ­situation

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would remain difficult over the next two to three years. The global recovery remains frail and Brexit is likely to be detrimental to global economic health. So far as future investments in the UK are concerned, it was felt that the UK’s position as a gateway to Europe would be adversely impacted over the near term. The survey further confirms fears about further restrictions on immigration to the UK. The respondents in the survey felt that restrictions on EU immigrants would be limited for political reasons, while Indian immigrants might have to feel the actual heat. However, on a positive note the respondents also felt that Brexit might offer a chance for India to explore new opportunities. As far as impact on Indian businesses in the UK are concerned, the survey indicates that Brexit has created some amount of uncertainty. Even though over half of the respondents reported that they do not intend to set up in any other EU country because of Brexit, they seemed concerned about the impact on intra-­company transfers/movement of professionals and Indian migration over the medium term. Companies also expected investments to the UK to take a beating over the next three to five years. Nevertheless, the companies have a cushion period to work out the mitigation strategies as the deal between the UK and the EU will take some time to materialise (FICCI 2016). The survey paints a somewhat optimistic picture about the education sector, which seems—in my view—misplaced. It feels that educational opportunities for Indian students will open up more as EU students face more restrictions following Brexit, especially in terms of fees and scholarships (FICCI 2016). However, as noted above, since the British government has tied up the issue of intake of international students with the question of immigration, Indian students will not necessarily feel more attracted to UK higher educational institutions than they did before. In fact, the number of Indian students in the UK has been dramatically falling over the past five years, not only due to curbs on immigration but also because of other factors (which we need not go into here). On the issue of trade, the respondents in the survey feel that a free trade agreement between India and the UK (taking on board the outcome of the UK–EU negotiations) incorporating the free movement of professionals between the two countries will go a long way towards mitigating the negative impact of Brexit (FICCI 2016). It may be noted here that though the FICCI survey was carried out in July 2016, the overall assessment from the Indian side has not changed much in view of the fact that the Brexit negotiations have not made much progress and until there is greater clarity, the future shape of India–UK relationship will be hard to predict.

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India–EU Relations Whatever happens to the India–UK relationship post-Brexit, the India– EU relationship suddenly looks more promising than ever. As discussed, the India–EU relationship had been placed on a firm foundation even before Brexit. The visit to Germany, Spain and France by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi (late May–early June 2017) presented New Delhi as an attractive partner in the eyes of the EU leaders who matter—Merkel and the newly elected French president, Emanuel Macron, more so after the abandonment of the Paris Climate Change agreement by US President Donald Trump (TOI 3 June 2017). The EU, as a bloc, continues to be India’s largest trade partner, an important investment partner and a supplier of cutting-edge technology to India, especially in developing clean energy. Notwithstanding the logjam on the proposed India–EU Free Trade Agreement, the very successful visit of Modi to the three important European capitals has given a fillip to India’s political relationship with Europe. The British desertion of the EU, the recent defeats of ultra-­ nationalists in the Netherlands and France in elections, and the weakening of the trans-Atlantic link has stiffened the backs of Berlin and Paris in particular and the remaining 27-nation EU as a whole in putting up a united show, as evidenced during the 60th anniversary summit in Rome on 25 March 2017. All this gives New Delhi an opportunity to forge a truly strategic partnership with the post-Brexit EU, which no longer looks down and out; at the same time, it also gives India options to refashion its traditionally strong ties with the UK. The 14th India–EU Summit held in New Delhi on 6 October 2017 was an opportunity for fresh stock-taking in this regard. While no decision was taken on initiating talks to break the logjam on the Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement—the European Council President Donald Tusk conceded its sensitive nature—both sides reiterated their commitment to ‘an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement which should be mutually beneficial and acceptable to our respective constituencies’. Donald Tusk was also confident that Brexit has made the EU27 more determined in a sense that the bloc has a common European future; it will only strengthen the European determination to speak with one voice and reap the benefits of world markets and global co-operation. There are new areas of cooperation for the EU and India to explore. Digital cooperation, space exploration, peace-keeping in Africa and elsewhere, maritime security and the challenges of global migration and climate change are areas of cooperation on the agenda of the partnership (European Council 2017).

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Final Thoughts Keeping the historical perspective in mind, Brexit appears to be a logical conclusion of the saga of Britain’s unending quest for a role following the end of the Second World War. This is a narrative that has been recounted numerous times by historians and foreign policy experts. One is reminded of the famous remark of the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that Britain had lost an empire but was yet to find a role. The entry into the EU in 1973 seemed, at least on paper, to be an end of that quest, finding a strong endorsement in the referendum held in 1975 (Bhattacharya 1994). However, things did not work out the way envisaged and before long the partnership between Britain and the EU member states soured. The long festering bitterness and resentment in the UK found a natural expression in the referendum of June 2016, setting Britain on yet another quest for a new role and identity in a post-Brexit world. The Brexit negotiations, which were stalemated, are currently on the move again and are expected to enter the second phase, when the crucial issue of trade will be taken up. It is important to remember that everything hinges on the final outcome of the negotiations between the UK and the EU (though there is no certainty that a mutually satisfactory agreement will be found in March 2019). It is a sobering thought, even when an initial breakthrough has happened at the time of writing. It is also important to remember that uncertainty is the last thing the world of trade, industry and business wants. However, that is precisely what the outcome of the British general elections generated—both in the UK as well as the EU. The overtly self-confident band of hard Brexiters in the UK who engineered the crisis that Brexit and now an inconclusive election in the UK has spawned look set to propel the two sides into some sort of hard bargaining in the next few weeks and months. The negotiations are at a delicate stage and it is almost impossible to form an opinion about the direction they will take in the near future. Likewise, the future of India–UK relations also hinges on the outcome of the final settlement. The UK is keen on a free trade deal with India but negotiations on this can take place only once an outline of the final a­ greement appears visible. In the ultimate analysis, an optimist would look at the picture both as a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge and an opportunity for the UK and India to build a new partnership, keeping in mind the realities of a post-Brexit world. It is a challenge and an opportunity for the UK to reformulate its political, economic and strategic priorities, if not its

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very identity, which always posed a question mark to its 43-year membership of the EU. It is a challenge and an opportunity for the EU to re-unite the post-Brexit Europe behind Germany and France, the two countries who forged the original European project in the first place, and initiate the kind of reforms that people across Europe are calling for to save the EU. Finally, it is also a challenge and an opportunity for India to look at the UK and Europe in a new perspective as both matter very significantly to New Delhi. Such a reconfiguration is inevitable in a post-Brexit world, whenever that comes about.

References Bhattacharya, P. (1994). Britain in the European Community: Implications for Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations. New Delhi, Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & CO. Bhattacharya, P. (2012). Quest for a Strategic Partnership: India and Europe in the 21st Century. In R.  Kothari (Ed.), Emerging India as a Global Player: Growing Ties and Challenges (pp. 219–237). New Delhi: Atlantic. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2016a, February 20). EU Deal Gives UK Special Status, Says David Cameron. Retrieved from http://www.bbc. com/news/uk-politics-35616768. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2016b, November 6). Theresa May Says Migration Curbs Won’t Damage Trade. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/uk-politics-37908605. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2016c, November 8). India Wants ‘Due Place’ in UK Trade Deal: Hard Talk: Nirmala Sitharaman. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04fl7x3. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017a, June 27). Hard or Soft Brexit: What’s the Difference? Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-40418736/what-s-the-difference-between-a-hard-or-soft-brexit. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017b, February 22). Jean-Claude Juncker: UK Faces Hefty Brexit Bill. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/uk-politics-39042876. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017c, June 19). Brexit Negotiations: Barnier Rules Out ‘Concessions’. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/ uk-politics-40321271. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017d, July 10). Brexit: Theresa May’s Offer to EU Citizens ‘Falls Short’. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/uk-politics-40552318.

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British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017e, July 17). Brexit Talks Resume: Get Down to Business, David Davis Urges. Retrieved from http://www.bbc. com/news/uk-politics-40627328. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017f, September 22). Brexit: What Did We Learn from Theresa May’s Florence Speech. Retrieved from http://www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-41360901. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017g, September 22). Theresa May Urges EU to Retain Trade Terms for Two Years After Brexit. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-41355642. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017h, October 20). Brexit: Talk of Deadlock Is Exaggerated, Says Donald Tusk. Retrieved from http://www.bbc. com/news/uk-politics-41684111. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017i, October 19). How Are the Talks Really Progressing? Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-41657248. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017j, December 20). EU Says Brexit Transition to End by 31 December 2020. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/uk-politics-42426542. Eden, A. (1960). Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. London: Houghton Miflin. European Council. (2017, October 6). EU-India Summit: Joint Statement and Joint Declarations. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2017/10/06/india-summit-statements/. Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce (FICCI). (2016, July). Brexit: Views and Suggestions from India Inc. New Delhi: FICCI. Giannoulopoulos, D., Nice, G., Chigara, B., Petley, J., de la Rasilla, I., & Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, K. (2016, November 17). The Article 50 Ruling Means Parliament Must Not Merely Rubber-Stamp Brexit with a Three-Line Bill. Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/11/17/the-article50-ruling-means-parliament-must-not-merely-rubber-stamp-brexit-with-athree-line-bill/. Gifford, C. (2008). Euroscepticism in Britain: Identity & Economy in a Post-­ Imperial State. Farnham: Ashgate. Goodwin, M. (2017, March). What Brexit Means for Britain. Current History, 116(788), 107–111. Menon, A. (2017a, October 16). Centrist MPs Could Save Us from Hard Brexit – But They Have Gone Silent. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/16/mps-back-soft-brexit-centreground-disappeared. Menon, A. (2017b, September 26). Labour’s Stark Division over Hard Brexit. The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/labours-starkdivision-over-hard-brexit-m8qmqr5bj.

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Menon, A. (2017c, October 26). Will Brexit Spell the End of the Conservative Party? New Statesman. Retrieved from https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/10/will-brexit-spell-end-conservative-party. Ram, V. (2016, October 20). Britain’s Indian Litmus Test. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Britain%E2%80%99sIndian-litmus-test/article16076765.ece. Smith, K. E. (2017, March). The European Union in an Illiberal World. Current History, 116(788), 83–87. Wyatt, A. (2016). India and the United Kingdom: Finding a New Equilibrium. In S.  Ganguli (Ed.), Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy Since 1947 (pp. 226–244). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 5

Nation-State Unsettled: Spain’s Catalan Challenge Bhaswati Sarkar

Introduction The 1990s, in many ways, were a turning point in international politics. The post-Second World War order had collapsed with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The new unipolar order that replaced it was hailed by scholars such as Fukuyama as ‘the end of history’. The 1990s was also a decade of rapid globalisation. The economic, political and social impact of this globalisation on the international order, one based on sovereign states, has been copiously discussed. Analyses have focused on whether globalisation was a new phenomenon and whether it differed fundamentally in scope and impact from earlier movements within and across states; on how the information and communications revolution and the growth of multinationals impacted the Westphalian sovereign states’ capacity for independent action; and on the transformative impact of globalisation on the culture of states and the societies they embodied. In the context of Europe, the 1990s was also the period when the post-Second World War European integration project quickened, widened and strengthened, with the former Soviet bloc countries of Central and East Europe vying for European B. Sarkar (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_5

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Union (EU) membership. As an integration project structured around the pooling of sovereignty, the EU also had serious implications for ­nation-­states and their functions. Nation-states, many argued, had had their day—the ‘post-national’ was the flavour of the times. There were others, however, cautioning against writing off nation-states too soon (Mann 2005, pp. 279–300). Focusing on the developments in Europe, this chapter argues that notwithstanding the post-national, the nation-state and national identity itself is far from being a settled question in Europe, both in the east and the west. Nation-states, which to follow the modernist perspective on nation and nationalism originated in Europe, were not necessarily homogeneous constructs. In many cases, they embodied groups with distinct sub-­national identity, which at times fitted into and at times challenged the nation-state. Nation-states, in other words, apart from dealing with the impact that globalisation and regional integration had on their authority, have also had to deal with the pressures of sub-national identities. Northern Ireland, Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Kosovo, to give some examples, all represent that challenge. This chapter focuses on the current Spain–Catalonia stand-off. It is divided into five sections. The first gives a synoptic presentation of the theories of the nation and nationalism, focusing especially on minority nationalisms. The second focuses on Spain’s nation-building and how it set out to accommodate sub-national identities. The third analyses the Catalan challenge—the history of the Spain–Catalonia encounter and the current sticking-points. As the EU has come to epitomise regional integration moving beyond nation-states, the fourth looks at the dynamics between the supra-national—the national and the sub-national. It is argued that this added supra-national EU dimension, going by the EU’s response to the crisis, can be characterised as nation-state-centric. The fifth looks at the lessons, if any, which India has to offer; this is followed by a conclusion.

Understanding Sub-National Challenges Nation-states have been the principle form of political organisation since the Treaty of Westphalia. Nation-states, nations and nationalism have been extensively written on and broadly analysed from two perspectives: primordial and modern. Primordialists focus on common descent, territorial belonging and shared language in explaining nationalism and nation-­ states. They see nations as evolving organically out of a pre-existing ethnicity. It is this that explains the underlying emotional bonds and feeling

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of attachment which nationalist language and symbols evoke. Ethnicity is central to the primordialists’ understanding of nationalism, in the sense that nationalism is understood as a subsequent development of much older processes of ethnicity. In analysing what a nation is, Walker Connor states: ‘it is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group that can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family’ (Connor 1985, 202, in Hearn 2006, p. 28). While Connor readily concedes that the belief in blood, descent and ancestry may be a myth, he argues it is a powerful myth; it is based on which people associate with which other people, and trying to explain this association rationally does not work. The language of kinship works precisely because ‘the national bond is subconscious and emotional rather than conscious and rational in its inspiration’ (Connor 1994, 204 in Hearn 2006, p. 28). It is because of this emotional aspect that music and poetry have often been central to nationalist discourse. ‘The core of the nation has been reached and triggered through the use of familial metaphors which can magically transform the mundanely tangible into emotion-laden phantasma’ (Connor 1994, 205  in Hearn 2006, p. 28). Kinship is often understood as closely linked to territory. Connor (2001), for instance, also speaks of a ‘homeland psychology’. This is reflected in the terms such as ‘fatherland’, ‘motherland’ and ‘Blut und Boden’ (‘blood and soil’) which nationalist discourses abound in. In national and ethnic conflicts, a call in the name of the homeland helps mobilise people ‘either to defend existing state borders, or to liberate an ethnic heartland, or to purge a country of those perceived to be “alien”’ (Connor 2001 in Hearn 2006, p. 31). Grosby argues that we are all born to someone, somewhere, and the group we are born into, and the place we are ‘from’, become fundamental categories of thought for understanding our place in the world and our general wellbeing (Grosby in Hearn 2006, p. 32). A third key element in this nexus of essential bonds is language. In the late eighteenth century, Herder underscored the importance of language in developing the sense of national identity when he wrote, ‘has a nationality anything dearer than the speech of its fathers? In its speech resides its whole thought domain, its tradition, history, religion and basis of life, all its heart and soul. To deprive a people of its speech is to deprive it of its one eternal good […] With language is created the heart of a people’ (Herder 1783, quoted in Fishman 1972: 1 in Hearn 2006, p. 33). Fishman stresses the way language implies for many nationalists an almost mystical link with the past and stands as a testament to the nation’s authenticity.

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Language conveys a kind of cultural history, encoded in its words, grammar and rhetorical styles—one that has been passed down over generations (Hearn 2006, pp. 34–36). Arguing from the other perspective, modernists such as Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm make industrial development and the coming of industrial society central to their understanding of nation, nationalism and the nation-state. For Gellner, the advent of industrialisation meant that agrarian society was no longer viable; industrialisation had its own requirements that made nations possible (Gellner 1983). Anderson similarly identified the coming of print capitalism as critical in making the ‘imagination of nation possible’ (Anderson 1991). Hobsbawm conceives of national identities as complex formations built both from the bottom up, out of the raw materials of language, descent and religion, and from above, by states seeking to homogenise their subject populations to facilitate governance. With regard to the ‘top down’ processes, he advanced the concept of ‘the invention of tradition’. This concept, captured ‘the new national states’ role in synthesizing and fabricating a national culture to encourage national loyalties’ (Hobsbawm, in Hutchinson and Smith 1994, pp. 177–184; Hearn 2006, pp. 70–71). Breuilly sums up the difference between modernists like him and primordialists like Smith as lying in the fact that where Smith is struck by continuities, he finds discontinuities more salient (Hearn 2006, p. 46). In the course of the development of the modern state system in Europe, modernists and diffusionists argued that conflicts based on ethnic or cultural divisions would disappear. For modernists, the modernisation of society would ultimately lead to ‘homogenized nation-states with convergent economies’ (Olsson, in Karolewski & Suszycki eds 2010, p.  117). Similarly, the diffusionist theory of social integration predicted that the culture and values of the core community of states would gradually diffuse throughout the peripheral communities to produce territorial homogeneity (Olsson, in Karolewski & Suszycki eds 2010, p. 117). However, the fact remains that while societies have industrialised and modernised, ethnic identities have not necessarily weakened. On the contrary, since the 1960s there has been a resurgence of minority nationalist movements in Western Europe and Canada, challenging the modernist and diffusionist position. Nation-states thus are continuing to face ethno-national challenges. For Smith, the materialism of the modernism on which they base their explanation of nation and nationalism is misleading. Nationalism, he argues, can emerge in all kinds of socio-economic milieu—in rich areas such as Quebec or Catalonia, or poor regions of Africa, in pre-industrial

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as well as industrial conditions. Ethnic nationalism finds itself at odds with the civic territorial nationalism of the French Revolution. Smith argues that the civic nationalism is one of order and control. This status-quoist nationalism benefits the dominant ethnicities of the existing national states. It has by its very nature little or nothing to offer the many ethnic minorities which may also be part of these nation-states. Scotland, Quebec, the Basques Country and Catalonia represent this clash (Smith and Gellner 1996). Just as nation-states are a reality, so too are minority nationalisms challenging state boundaries. Kymlicka and Straehle (1999, p. 66) differentiate between state nationalism and minority nationalism. The former they define as nationalist movements conducted by states that ‘have adopted various “nation building” policies with the objective of giving citizens a common language, identity and culture’. Minority nationalisms, on the other hand, are ‘ethno-cultural minorities within a larger state who have mobilized to demand a state of their own’. Michael Keating differentiates among three types of regions, one among them being ‘historic nationalities’ or minority regions characterised by a strong sense of culture and linguistic or historic identity, their own civil institutions and networks (with or without national pretensions). Here again Scotland and Catalonia, among others, find mention as examples (Olsson in Karolewski and Suszycki 2010, p. 111). Guibernau similarly distinguishes between ‘nations without states’ and ‘regions defined purely on economic terms’ (Olsson in Karolewski and Suszycki 2010, p. 111). Nationalism is thus, as many rightly argue, not just going to go away. Minority nationalism cannot simply be demobilised, deconstructed or dismissed as reactionary: it is a reality that states all over must confront and tackle (McGarry and Keating 2006, p. 7). While one can academically and rationally argue that secession and the redrawing of boundaries, which most minority nationalism aim at, is not an answer— because (1) states are notoriously reluctant to give away territory and (2) there will always be minorities in the new states created (McGarry and Keating 2006, p. 7)—this argument does not inform the politics of either the dominant or minority nationalisms. This is what we will see in the next sections; these focus on the Catalan push for independence from Spain.

Spain: Building a Nation Whether one finds the primordial or the modern the most rational explanation for nation and nationalism, the fact remains that 1978 is an important date in Spain’s history as a nation; it was when the years of Franco’s

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authoritarian regime came to an end and Spain emerged as we know it today as a member of the European family of nation-states. A new constitution committed to democracy marked this turn. The constitution also had to grapple with the fundamental and rooted historical diversity that Spain represented. This diversity can be traced to 1479, when the joint rule of Ferdinand and Isabella over Castile and the Crown of Aragon, of which Catalonia was the strongest member, brought these two very different areas under the same monarchs—or to 1137, when the Crown of Aragon originated, as a result of the marriage of one-year-old Petronilla of Aragon with 24-year-old Raymond Berenguer IV of Barcelona, which explicitly aimed at the merger of the Kingdom of Aragon and the County of Barcelona (with the County of Provence, Girona, Cerdanya, Osona and other territories) to deal with an ascending Castile. Neither the 1137 merger nor the 1479 Union of Crowns translated into the standardisation of local laws and customs. Catalonia and Aragon were constituent parts of the Crown of Aragon but remained separate for centuries. Within Aragon the king’s power was clearly bounded. For instance, anyone arrested by order of the king could put himself under the jurisdiction of a justicia; this individual held his office for life and was therefore independent of the king’s pleasure. It was this highest judge who crowned the kneeling king and made him swear to observe the fueros, the laws and privileges, of the kingdom. The kings power was guided by this understanding: ‘We who are as good as you, swear to you, who are no better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided you accept all our liberties and laws; but if not, not’ (Harris 2014). Ferdinand did not attempt to change this position either with respect to Aragon or Catalonia. The fueros continued to hold good. Spain represented a ‘patchwork of local legal systems, special rights and complex protocol’ (Greenwood 1985, p.  209). However, over a period of time, as the king’s position strengthened around the time of Philip II, attempts to ‘rationalise’ the administration began; this process meant that the central authority now started limiting and suppressing the local privileges (fueros). The attempt inevitably met with resistance and in the process strengthened and crystallised regional identities. For Catalonia, the rule of Philip IV was a turning point; in 1621 he appointed Count Duke of Olivares as chief minister, entrusting him with the explicit task of creating a powerful absolutist state. All commitment to regional diversity was done away with. The Catalans resented, resisted and united to revolt against the harsh treatment of Castile in 1640—this was the Revolt of the Reapers (Guibernau 2000, p. 56). During the next few

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decades Catalonia put up resistance and continued to its enjoy rights and liberties. However, in 1714 Barcelona surrendered after a damaging Franco-Spanish onslaught. Thereafter, Philip V ordered the dissolution of Catalan institutions. The Catalan language was forbidden; Castilian was proclaimed the official language (Guibernau 2000, p.  56). Renaixenca (‘Rebirth’) marked the resurgence of Catalan nationalism in the 1850s with the revival of Catalan language, theatre and press. Along with this grew the demand for Catalan autonomy. In the twentieth century Catalonia went through phases of autonomy (Mancomunitat, 1913–1923; Generalitat 1931–1938) and suppression (Primo de Rivera, 1923; Franco regime, 1938–1977). And it is this last phase of suppression, the Franco years, that the Constitution of 1978 was replacing. To understand the current Spain–Catalonia stand-off we need to focus on 1978 and Spain’s constitutional moment. The constitution was the outcome of a consensus between the main political parties, who after years of resentment and division argued for ‘national reconciliation’. But reconciliation was a challenging task. One of the pressing questions was accommodating the rights of national minorities after years of repression. But this had to be balanced with the idea of an indivisible Spain. The reading of the 1978 constitution clearly indicates the recurrent tension between the need to grant autonomy to constituent units, especially to the historical ones—Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia—and central control. The preamble states that ‘The Spanish Nation […] proclaims its will to among other things—protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions.’ Article 2 goes on to state that ‘the Constitution is founded upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards and recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions integrated in it and solidarity among them’ (Spanish Constitution 1978, p. 3). This right to autonomy embodied in Article 2 was guaranteed through symmetrical decentralisation. It opted for the ‘coffee for everyone’ model, whereby the whole of Spain was divided into 17 autonomous communities. Devolution and right to self-government was implemented through the Statute of Autonomy. Under this model both the historically and culturally distinct regions such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and the newly created ones such as La Rioja and Madrid were to enjoy autonomy (Guibernau 2004 in seymour ed, p. 239). The only difference was that historical communities were to enjoy autonomy straight away, while

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others for the first five years would enjoy restricted autonomy. Thereafter there would be no distinction among communities. This model of autonomy worked for some years but it fell short of recognising the historically rooted differences of identity and therefore left open grounds for discontent. What we witness today is the acute manifestation of that discontent and the culmination of central control. The initial years of decentralisation and power devolution through the Statute of Autonomy soon looked like surging out of control. The period 1979–1980 may be characterised as a phase of regionalist chaos. This period experienced multiple pulls: jurisdictional clashes between overlapping regional and national bureaucracies; the growth of regional parties undermining the national party system; and discord over proper use of regional symbols and languages, leading to political tensions (Spain: Regional Autonomy and Political Stability 1983, p. iii). By 1981 the military perceived that autonomy was getting out of control and on 23 February 1981 disgruntled military officers objecting to excessive regionalism attacked the Chamber of Deputies. This attempted military coup failed but the fear of future military rebellion conditioned Spanish politics in the following years (Spain: Regional Autonomy and Political Stability 1983, p. iii). One effect was a slowing down of the regional devolution process. In 1982, the Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA) was passed. This immediately triggered demonstrations in regions such as Catalonia (Spain: Regional Autonomy and Political Stability 1983, p. 5). The LOAPA, in other words, aggravated tensions instead of easing them. All players agreed to refer it to the Constitutional Court. The situation eased with the coming of the socialists to power in 1982 with an overwhelming majority. They performed especially well in the regions. But the socialists did not use this majority to ram through measures that were against regional interests, easing tensions. The regional governments were assured that LOAPA would not reduce autonomy, which had already been granted. In addition, the government appointed well-qualified and sympathetic interlocutors to act as ‘Delegates of Government’ in regions. Prime Minister Gonzalez himself met with Jordi Pujol and Carlos Garaikoetxea, Presidents of Catalan and Basque Autonomous area respectively (Spain: Regional Autonomy and Political Stability 1983, p. 7). The strains and tensions between regional autonomy and central control were once again visible with the change in government in 2000, when the socialists were ousted and the Popular Party (PP) formed the government, which was headed by José María Aznar. The Party had started mak-

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ing gains in 1993 and managed to form a minority government in 1996. The PP had its antecedents in the Popular Alliance. This Alliance was formed in the 1970s by Manuel Fraga Iribarne as a union of seven conservative political parties. Iribarne, incidentally, was a prominent cabinet member under Franco. While the Alliance did come out in favour of democracy, it had strong reservations about regional devolution and opposed to any moves in that direction. In 1979 at its national congress, the party was renamed the Popular Coalition. The reformed party scored well in subsequent regional and local elections. The growing unpopularity of Spain’s main centrist party, Adolfo Suárez’s Union of the Democratic Centre (Unión de Centro Democrático), and its collapse around this time helped the fortunes of the Popular Alliance to soar. This was reflected in the 1982 elections, when the Popular Coalition won a fourth of the votes and became the official opposition to the governing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). Since then, as is the case with all political parties, its fortunes have fluctuated but the party has been a major player in Spanish politics and is currently in government (Share, Encyclopaedia Britannica). Having outlined how post-Franco Spain set out to resolve the pressing questions of the recognition of historical differences and diversity (and inbuilt tensions), the question of why the current crisis erupted remains. The next section looks at what rolling out the Statute of Autonomy meant for Catalonia—what issues were resolved and what sticking points remained.

Catalonia: From Negotiated Nationalism to Secession Catalonia has moved from ‘negotiated nationalism’ to ‘secession’. Spain as a country stopped short of acknowledging the national content of the historical nationalities but the Catalans and the Basques have understood their identity as more than being simply different groups of people. They have understood their differences in national terms. However, for Catalonia to begin with this nationalism and national identity was comfortably negotiated within the Statute of Autonomy that the 1978 Constitution offered. For the first 23 years, between 1980 and 2003, Catalonia was under the leadership of Jordi Pujol of the Convergence and Union Party. Pujol rooted Catalan identity in the Middle Ages, highlighting the role of lan-

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guage and culture as integral to Catalan identity. The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was the result of different historical paths. However, he did not see any contradiction in or conflict between these two national identities. The Catalan national identity or Catalan nationalism in Pujol’s scheme of things sat comfortably within the Spanish nation-state. Pujol’s nationalism thus did not strive to create a separate state: Catalonia was a part of Spain. Catalonia was to be an open and generous space where all those who lived and worked were Catalans, irrespective of their ethnicity (Guibernau 1997, pp. 89–111). Devolution of power through the Statute meant that Catalonia had its own elected government and came to enjoy powers in many areas such as culture, education, health, housing, local transport and agriculture. Catalonia also came to have its own autonomous police force. Other areas, such as defence, international relations and economic planning and the administration of justice, remained within Spain’s ambit (Guibernau in Seymour ed 2004, p. 140). In Catalonia, the Convergence and Union Party (CiU), Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC), Catalan United Socialist Party and the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) were major players. For the socialists and communists, federalism was desirable and the autonomous communities system would eventually turn Spain into a federal state. The ERC, on the other hand, was convinced that nations cannot survive without their own state and therefore its objective was to create a new Catalan state. The CiU’s nationalist discourse, as already noted, did not require independence (Davis 2004). In 2003, there was a change in government with all the left-wing parties—PSC-PSOE, ERC and ICV-EUiA (initiative—forming a coalition government headed by Pasqual Maragall (the result of the November 2003 elections). One of the key goals of the new government was to overhaul the existing Statute of Autonomy. The run-up to the elections and the campaign clearly shows that Spain–Catalonia power sharing was a central agenda. The CiU’s loss in the elections was as much a result of Pujol stepping down as it was of the growing unhappiness of the electorate with CiU’s decision to support minority governments of the PSOE in 1993 and of the PP in 1996. For the 2003 elections, all contending parties focused on power-sharing. The CiU proposed increased autonomy—increasing Catalan judicial powers, including the ability to issue pardons (Davis 2004, p. 143), increasing Catalan ‘embassies’ (like those in Morocco and Poland) and sharing responsibility with Spain for patrolling the international border. The CiU’s new leader, Artur Mas, stressed the need to preserve Catalonia’s

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distinctiveness from other communities in Spain by running a Catalan government that had no direct link with Spain. The socialists won the elections  by  apart from focusing on social issues such as social security and housing by also focusing on what Maragall had been arguing for years—a pluri-national, asymmetrical federalism and networked vs radial Spain (Davis 2004, p. 143) and for moving entire government departments outside the Spanish capital. The ERC, with its stated goal of full independence, pushed for a highly decentralised ‘free association’ with Spain. The ICVEUiA, which was part of the ruling coalition of 2003, were eco-socialists who also supported a restructured statute. Reworking the statute was thus a focal issue for all political parties in the fray and the change of government set the process of reworking the statute in motion. Pasqual’s government set up a committee to review and rework the statute. Members of all five political parties represented in the parliament were part of the committee. The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, committed to regional devolution, provided a receptive and encouraging context (Andreu 2007, p. 95). The Catalan parliament passed the new statute on 30 September 2005 with the backing of four out of the five parties in parliament. It then had to be hammered out in the Constitutional Committee of Spain’s lower house and in the process underwent substantial modifications. As a result, Zapatero’s final version of the statute was voted against by one of the architects of the new statute in the Catalan Assembly—the ERC, who argued that it was a ‘fundamental cutback’ on the proposed Catalan version. ERC president Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira made clear its stand: ‘What ERC wants for Catalonia is not a regional statute, but a state. Nobody should lose sight of this, especially not us. We know that with 16 per cent of the vote, we do not have the majority, so we should have a gradual approach. I think every nation wants a state, though not all nations have one.’ Rovira went on to add: ‘I’m a separatist and I want a republic’ (Mitchell 2006, p.  2). The PP voted against the statute for diametrically opposite reasons. Mariano Rajoy, the then PP president, clearly stated that the Catalan s­ tatute was ‘the beginning of the end of the state as it was designed by the Spanish people in 1978 (Mitchell 2006, p. 3). Rovira and Rajoy’s statements bring out the unbridgeable gap between the two positions. The sticking-point was not so much the enlarged power of the region as the question of Catalan identity. This question of identity has been a recurrent one, not only for the Catalans but also for the other historical culturally and linguistically distinct communities of Spain—the Basques, the Galicians and the Valencians.

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In fact, in 2006 itself the Spanish Parliament, with the agreement of both the Socialist Party and PP, passed reform of the Statute of Valencia. However, prior to that, the 2003 Basque Country proposal for a reframed statute was rejected by the Spanish parliament on the grounds that the confederal or bilateral nature of its proposed relation with Spain went beyond the limits of the constitution (Andreu 2007, p. 96). The Basque proposed reformed statute echoed the 2002 proposal of the President of the Basque Republic, Juan Ibarretxe. Instead of devolution, this proposal pushed for not a federal but a confederal system, understood as a model of relationship with Spain based on free association and compatible with the development of a compound, pluri-national and asymmetrical state (Jauregui 2006, pp. 240–252). Even earlier, in 1998, the main nationalist parties in Galicia (the Galician Nationalist Bloc), the Basque Country (the Basque Nationalist Party) and Catalonia (the Convergence and Union Party) signed a joint declaration demanding official recognition of Spain as a multilingual, multicultural and multinational entity (Guibernau in Seymour ed 2004, p. 241). Their main demand boiled down to recognition of their regions as nations within the Spanish state (Guibernau 2004, p. 242). Both the main Spanish parties—the Socialist Party and the PP—rejected the Barcelona Declaration (Guibernau in Seymour ed 2004, p. 242). Apart from the issue of identity and the court ruling, the issue of tax collection acted as a clear catalyst in ultimately radicalising the demand for Catalan autonomy (to a greater extent than in the Basque Country). The Catalan government, like the Basque government, wants the right to collect its own taxes. This right of tax collection Catalan leaders had actually rejected 30 years previously. ‘They called it a relic,’ recalls Iñigo Urkullu, president of the mainstream Basque Nationalist party. ‘But 30 years later they’ve realized what a vital tool it is—it’s thanks to that we were able to reconstruct our economy and build self-government’ (Gardner, Financial Times, 22 August 2012). The Basque economy is doing better; fiscal autonomy has allowed the government to create an industrially diverse and export-oriented economy. The banking system is sound and it spends a large amount on research and development. The government has also been able to keep debt and the budget deficit under control, provide good education and public services, and transfers about eight times less per capita to the central government than Catalonia. Catalonia, by contrast, with an economy the size of Portugal, has the heaviest debt burden of any region: 41.8 billion euros. ‘We can’t have a situation where we are the fifth [region] in per capita income, but we end up being ninth after the share-­

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out’ because of transfers, says Mr Heribert Padrol, advisor to the Catalan premier Artur Mas on plans for greater fiscal autonomy. He argues that it is due to this that the demand for independence has travelled from the political fringe to ‘the people who wear ties’ because ‘either you control your own resources or as a country you’re dead’ (Gardner, Financial Times, 22 August 2012). The disquiet with the tax regime was aggravated by the general downturn that the economy faced from 2008 and the central government’s proposed budget squeeze. In 2012, while the central government indicated that it would step in to assist debt-strapped regional governments with a new 18 billion euro liquidity fund, Finance Minister Montoro was quick to point out that those regions would have to accept strict conditionality, much as had Greece and Portugal in terms of their EU bailouts. Catalonia, like all regions except the Basque Country and the adjoining province of Navarre, which raise their own taxes, was adversely affected, as it is dependent on central funding. Many officials see this as an attempt by Madrid to strike at the very heart of self-government, which fuelled the move towards independence (Gardner, Financial Times, 22 August 2012). In September 2017, the Financial Times reported that Spain’s government had indicated its willingness to discuss giving Catalonia more money and greater financial autonomy, provided the region backed down from its demands for independence. Luis de Guindos, Spain’s economy minister, said that if the Catalan government gave up on its separatist demands, Madrid would be willing to open talks on reform of funding for the region. ‘Once independence plans are dropped, we can talk,’ said de Guindos, adding that any discussions would be within the framework of the constitution. ‘Catalonia already has a great deal of autonomy, but we could talk about a reform of the funding system and other issues’ (Stothard, 21 September 2017). However, notwithstanding this offer, that the Catalan government went ahead with the independence referendum proves that resource and distribution of resources is only part of the problem. What is therefore evident in trying to understand the current crisis is that the constitution of 1978 was a great step forward in its democratic content and the devolution of power to the historic communities in the context of the persecution they faced in the Franco years but that it left a strong urge for community identity recognition unresolved and unanswered. On the other hand, it clearly set limits to that recognition by characterising Spain as a unitary state and the unity of Spain as ‘indissoluble’. Catalonia under Pujol did not essentially question the constitutional framework. Pujol was able to convince an uneasy electorate of CiU’s sup-

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port for national governments of both the socialists and the PP, arguing that it allowed for concessions and also benefitted Catalonia economically. But once the PP gained an overwhelming majority they openly came out with their dismissive response to the claims of greater autonomy and the advantages all but disappeared (Guibernau in Seymour ed 2004, p. 243). The basic differences between the nationalist parties, especially the PP and the regional parties, on the question of autonomy and devolution escalated when, in 2010, the Constitutional Court gave its decision on the 2006 statute, which PP challenged in the Court. After four years of deliberation, the Court in its decision on 28 June 2010 struck down 14 and curtailed 27 of the statute’s 223 articles (O’Neill 2017). The question of language and national identity that were at the heart of the Catalan revised statute were the ones that were struck down. Provisions that put the Catalan language above Spanish in the region were struck down. Regional powers over courts and judges were declared unconstitutional and, more importantly, it was ruled that ‘the interpretation of the references to “Catalonia as a nation” and to “the national reality of Catalonia” in the preamble of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia have no legal effect’ (Calamur Krishnadev, The Atlantic, October 2017). The ruling immediately triggered massive protests in Catalonia and its president, Artur Mas, declared that he would call for an independence referendum if his party won re-election with a sizeable majority. That it did and a non-binding vote was held in November 2014. The voters were asked whether they wanted Catalonia to become a state. And if so, whether they wanted Catalonia to be an independent state. While an estimated 80% said yes to both questions, the turnout was low between 37% and 41% (Calamur Krishnadev, The Atlantic, October 2017). Following the 2015 elections, Mas was forced to step aside and Carles Puigdemont took charge. Puigdemont, who had been advocating for Catalan independence long before it became popular, now used his position to press for a binding independence vote. Despite clear warnings by the Rojoy government that such a referendum would be unconstitutional and would not be allowed, Puigdemont went ahead with the referendum on 1 October 2017. What followed was massive retaliation by the Spanish government, who sent in police to forcibly stop people from reaching polling stations and casting their vote. The police brutality left more than 750 injured and images of people resisting and being assaulted flashed across the globe (Minder and Barry 2017). The Catalan government claimed that 42% of the 7.5 million Catalans had cast their vote and that 90% favoured independence (Statista 2017). Subsequently, the Spanish government on 27 October dismissed the Catalan

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government, evoking Article 155, hours after Catalan MPs in the 135-seat regional parliament voted for independence by a margin of 70 votes to 10. Rajoy went on to call for fresh elections on 21 December 2017. Puigdemont and other leaders were charged with rebellion, sedition and the misuse of public funds for their role in Catalonia’s declaration of independence in October 2017. Puigdemont and his allies were accused by their opponents of ignoring the views of the majority of Catalans who wished to continue to be part of Spain. They argued that he had declared independence based on a ‘deeply flawed and undemocratic referendum’. Carlos Carrizosa of the centrist Ciutadans party remarked ‘You’re like gods, above the law. How can you imagine you can impose independence like this without a majority in favour […] and with this simulacrum of a referendum?’ Eva Granados of the Catalan socialist party asked: ‘Have you any idea how frightened many Catalans are?’ (The Guardian, 28 October 2017). Following the dismissal of the Catalan government, Puigdemont fled to Brussels, and addressing a press conference said: ‘I have decided to come to Belgium, no, to Brussels, the capital of Europe, to work without threats’ (Birnbaum 2017). Earlier in January 2017, he had said ‘the Catalan proposal for a referendum follow[ed] a firmly Europeanist inspiration’ and that ‘Catalonia as a whole is deeply involved in participating in the European project’ (Maurice, 26 December 2017). Throughout their independence effort, Catalonia’s leaders have been careful to retain the EU’s blue-and-gold flag alongside their own, even as they removed the national flag of Spain. In the December 2017 elections the pro-­ independence parties won, which meant the impasse between the national and regional government was back where it started. Puigdemont, by pushing for the referendum, and Rajoy, by rejecting and resisting it, have both backed themselves into a corner. Both sides have played their final card. Having declared independence, the Catalan leadership has done the maximum that could be done to pursue the Catalan cause and interest. Following the move towards an independence referendum, there were also pro-Spain demonstrations in Catalonia (BBC News, 29 October 2017; also see The Guardian, 7 October 2017). But these demonstrations, while showing commitment to a united Spain, do not negate Catalan identity. While they may have come out in favour of Spain it would be incorrect to assume that they would support the erosion of autonomy or the highhanded approach Rajoy has adopted to the Catalan leaders. This is exactly what happened in the December 2017 elections, went the separatists regained control. A sympathetic treatment of Puigdemont and other leaders would have seen more pro-Spain demonstrations, strengthening Rajoy’s hand.

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The EU in a Bind The EU as is a bloc of states, a unique project of regional integration that had its inception in the post-Second World War attempts of Europe’s political elites to prioritise peace and make war an impossibility. Many have characterised the EU as a post-national entity with a pooling of sovereignty, and overlapping and multiple forms of identity linked to the overarching European identity; they have argued that it indicates the erosion of nationalism and the nation-state (McGarry and Keating 2006, p.  4). However, this seems far from reality—while there has undeniably been pooling of sovereignty, it can also equally be argued that integration has been state-driven and state-directed. The EU, for instance, has over the years put in place many common policies—the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Common Energy Policy, the Common Immigration and Asylum Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy—the implementation of which have frequently raised questions about the commonality that they project as states have pursued their own interests. The same is the case for the various issues and crises that the EU has confronted of late—the euro crisis, Brexit, the refugee crisis, Turkey’s EU membership, the Ukrainian crisis and sanctions against Russia. Member states have taken up different positions based on a calculation of their national interest. The EU’s motto since 2000—‘United in Diversity’—and its grounding of EU citizenship in member-state citizenship are also acknowledgements of the power and legitimacy that the nation-states enjoy. Within nation-states, all questions of identity have not been settled and the EU has tried to address these strong sub-national, regional identities through the Committee of the Regions, where they were given a consultative role in decision-­making. But by and large, the EU’s approach to sub-national regional identities and their claims have been to direct them to the state. In 2002, speaking at a meeting with the presidents of the European regions with legislative powers, Romano Prodi, the President of the EU Commission, acknowledged the significance of the regions and local government for the European project but also urged the EU not to interfere in the relationship between member states and their regions and not to establish a uniform EU norm to deal with regions (McGarry and Keating 2006, pp. 221–222). In two recent cases of sub-national assertion—Scotland and Catalonia— the EU’s nation-centric approach has been evident. In the case of Scotland, which held a referendum on independence in 2014 but was enthusiastic about EU membership, the EU made it clear that for an independent

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Scotland membership of the Union would not be automatic but would have to be renegotiated. In the end, the Scots voted against independence by a margin of 55% to 45% and this had arguably much to do with the stance EU took on its membership. Interestingly, for the Brexit referendum Scotland voted to remain in the EU, though that voice was nullified in the overall vote to leave. In the case of Catalonia too, during the current impasse and the heavy-handed response of Spanish government, the EU by and large has remained a mute spectator. All for the Catalan leaders’ commitment to the European project, the EU’s position has been woefully wanting. Being essentially a project of and for European states, its hesitation to intervene in what it termed an ‘internal matter’ of a member state is understandable; but the fact that it could not even urge the Spanish government to find a political solution to a political problem is incomprehensible. On 4 October  2017, the EU parliament in a special plenary session held a debate on the constitution, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Spain in the light of events in Catalonia. The European Parliament President, Antonio Tajani, summed up the position expressed by a majority—that in a democracy, the only way forward is to work together for harmony and unity. The Catalan events were not taken lightly, he said, by anyone. ‘However, unilateral decisions, including declarations of independence from a sovereign state, are contrary to the European legal order and bound to provoke dangerous divisions. From this Parliament, there is a call for calm and profound deliberation, which will encourage dialogue in Spain while respecting the constitutional framework, including the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, and which will return politics to the institutions’ (European Parliament Press Release 4 October 2017). In discussing the EU approach, one cannot but look at another case of a unilateral declaration of independence in Europe: the Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008 (The Independence Declaration, 17 February 2008). The declaration was declared illegal by Serbia, which approached the International Court of Justice hoping to obtain a ruling against the declaration. In December 2009, the proceedings began and the member states presented their arguments for or against the declaration. In its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, the court, by a vote of 10 to 4, declared that the adoption of the declaration of independence of the 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law because international law contains no ‘prohibition on declarations of independence’. The court further noted that the adoption of the declaration of independence

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did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244, since the resolution had not described Kosovo’s final status. The reaction of the countries to the decision varied. Countries that had already recognised Kosovo hailed the decision, saying it was ‘unique’ and did not set a precedent, while countries that did not recognise Kosovo said they would not change their position as the ruling, they feared, could set a precedent for endorsing secession in other places (International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, pp. 53–54). The public hearings opened on 1 December 2009. Most of the European states favoured the declaration, advancing various arguments. Germany, for instance, argued that the existence of the state of Kosovo could not be ignored. Its existence is based on the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Kosovo (Verbatim Report, ICJ, 2 December 2009a, CR/2009/26, p. 32). In the case of Kosovo, Susanne Wasum-Rainer, representing Germany, went on to argue ‘all three elements which are required by the traditional doctrine of statehood are present: State population, State territory and government.’ At the same time, Germany, like many other states, who validated Kosovo’s declaration pointed to the specifics of the case: ‘Kosovo is not a precedent’ (Verbatim Report, ICJ, 2 December 2009a, CR/2009/26, p. 31). Articulating the Netherlands’ position in favour of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Dr Liesbeth Lijnzaad argued that Serbia had failed to ‘respect and ­promote the right to self-determination in Kosovo […] and all effective remedies to settle the status of Kosovo have been exhausted’ (Verbatim Record, ICJ, 10 December 2009c, CR/2009/32, p.  16). Deliberating on the issue, Austria argued that ‘no rule of international law has been identified which prohibits the population of a certain territory represented by its elected leaders to issue declarations of independence’ (Verbatim Record, ICJ, 3 December 2009a, CR/2009/27, p. 6). It concluded that ‘international law does not address the legality of declarations of independence per se […] there is no rule of international law prohibiting the Declaration of Independence by Kosovo’ (Verbatim Record, ICJ, 3 December 2009a, CR/2009/27, p.  16). Denmark also argued that the proclamation of independence was not in contradiction with international law because international law ‘neither authorizes nor forbids’ declarations of independence (Verbatim Record, ICJ, 7 December 2009b, CR/2009/29, p. 70). However, Denmark also went on to argue that ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence has unique factual and legal characteristics. It cannot and should not serve as a precedent for secessionist movements’ (Verbatim

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Record, ICJ, 7 December 2009b, CR/2009/29, p. 73). For France, the declaration of independence of Kosovo could not in any way be considered as not being in conformity with international law. The cases of Katanga, Rhodesia, Cyprus and the Bantustans cited by Serbia were different as they involved violations of fundamental rights, unlawful use of armed force and foreign intervention (Verbatim Report, ICJ, 9 December 2009c, CR/2009/31, p. 21). International law, it argued, neither authorises nor forbids secession and declarations. Finland’s representatives also argued passionately in favour of Kosovo. Births of states are not ‘other’ state dependent. ‘For every State, its statehood is sui generis, and dependent on its own history and power, not on the discretion of others’ (Verbatim Report, International Court of Justice, 8 December 2009b, CR/2009/30, p. 54). Declarations of independence are always an act of ‘domestic illegality’ (CR/2009/30, p.  55). International law comes in later and examines it on the basis of territorial integrity, human rights and self-determination. The United Kingdom succinctly argued in support of Kosovo: ‘Serbia has made it quite clear that it will never accept an independent Kosovo. Kosovo, for its part, has made it quite clear, that, given the legacy of abuse, it cannot again become part of Serbia […] courts do not order estranged spouses to continue in a broken marriage’ (Verbatim Record, 2009c, International Court of Justice, CR/2009/32, pp. 38–39). These various positions of the European states need also to be understood against the backdrop of international law. The Montevideo Convention on Statehood 1933 comes closest to defining a state. Article 3 of the Convention holds that ‘the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence […] to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts’ (O’Neill 2017). Article 6 reinforces this view, holding that ‘the recognition of a state merely signifies that the state, which recognizes it, accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable’ (O’Neill 2017). It is thus clear that Catalonia’s secession and declaration of independence is not a first in Europe. It is also clear that many European states found the act in the case of Kosovo legal and valid given the atrocities Kosovars had suffered under Serbia and that international law does not prohibit a declaration of independence. Some were cautious that their recognition should not be taken as a precedent. Spain is not Serbia, but its

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response to the independence referendum for an established democratic state was non-compromisimg and heavy handed. Catalonia’s demand for a reworked statue of autonomy and the Rajoy government’s complete dismissal of the demand created the same estrangement that the British had alluded to in the case of Kosovars and Serbs. Ernest Renan in his essay ‘What is a Nation’ argues that nations are about the past and the present, specifically the present will to live together; the nation is therefore a daily plebiscite (Renan, in Hutchinson and Smith 1994, pp. 17–18). The members have to continuously renew this will. In the case of Spain and the Catalans that will has all but collapsed and the only solution to the current impasse is to reinvent and renew it.

The Indian Experience India is not just the largest democracy in the world but also unique in its diversity. An amazing array of languages, religions, foods, clothing types, customs and cultures is the Indian reality. After independence, many scholars articulated their doubts about whether India would hold together as it came out of colonial rule economically weak and poor, partitioned and bruised. However, defying the odds, India has not only been able to hold together but is much more comfortable with its diversity than many comparable states. The detractors, as Mahajan argues, have been proved wrong, primarily because the existing framework of democracy makes room for diversities of various kinds—religious, linguistic and ethnic (Mahajan n.d., p. 112). A robust framework of constitutionally guaranteed rights and vibrant civil society activism has by and large enabled India to deal with demands arising from social heterogeneity. In the case of India, one can broadly distinguish the challenges of diversity at two levels—one that needs substantial internal negotiation and the revisiting of stated positions, the other that impinges on the territorial integrity of the state, much in the same way as Catalonia does. So far as the first level is considered, India has displayed considerable flexibility. In the early years of independence, for instance, the Indian government decided to shelve the question of the linguistic division of states, fearing instability in the face of Andhra agitation for a Telugu language state. In response, the government set up the State Reorganization Commission to examine the issue of linguistic states on an all-India basis; in 1956, the commission recommended that state boundaries be redrawn to take into account linguistic realities (Sarangi 2009; Laitin 1989; Windmille 1954).

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Unlike Spain, which has resisted the demand for a federal arrangement, India opted for federal system of governance. This offered a way for diverse communities to come together and derive the strength from unity while retaining their identity. It is no exaggeration to say that the stability of India as a nation depends critically on the strength and flexibility of its federal structure. Maintaining an appropriate balance between the centre and the states in a federation is, to quote Buchanan, ‘like keeping a satellite in place, with centrifugal and centripetal forces keeping each other in check’ (Bagchi 2003, pp. 21–42). Given the situation at the time of independence, India’s federal experiment to begin with had a strong unitary bias—a centralising tendency. With the Congress as the dominant party, this unitary bias was not problematic but by the 1970s as political actors increased and other parties tasted electoral victory, centre–state relations became strained over questions of power-sharing. In the late 1980s, the Sarkaria Commission was appointed to review centre–state relations. The commission recommended that the states be allowed more autonomy. Over a period of time, centralised federalism has given way to cooperative and competitive federalism (Bagchi 2003). Apart from this, though more than 80% of the population of India are Hindus and religion was the basis of partition and formation of Pakistan, India did not declare Hinduism to be the official or established state ­religion. On the contrary, the Preamble to the Indian constitution declares India to be a ‘sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic’ committed to treating all communities as equal. Nehru understood secular state not as an irreligious state but one which respected and honoured all religions and gave them freedom to function (Ronojoy 2007, p. 5). Thus, Article 25 of the Indian constitution enshrines the right of the individual to freedom of religion, to ‘profess, propagate and practice’ their religion (Constitution of India). Community personal laws are recognised. Religious communities also have the right to set up their own religious and charitable institutions; they can establish their own educational institutions; above all, these institutions can receive financial support from the state. Moreover, symbolic recognition and inclusion through the declaration of public holidays, allowing particular dress in educational institutions and public jobs, the naming of public places have gone a long way to addressing the concerns of different communities living in India (Mahajan 1998). The Indian leadership has seriously considered and debated the liberal model. Liberal democratic principles were adopted innovatively to suit the demands of a diverse society. As Khilnani observes, ‘Nehru’s idea of

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Indianness emerged through improvised responses to constrained circumstances: its strength was not its ideological intensity, but its ability to steer towards an Indianness seen as layered, adjustable, imagined, not as a fixed property. While Nehru was attracted by the political and economic examples of the modern West, he was far less taken by its cultural models’ (Khilnani 2004, p. 167). So far as the second level of territorial integration challenges is concerned, as in the case of Kashmir or the North-Eastern States, India’s position appears to be nearer if not identical to that of Spain. For India, the current crisis in Spain in terms of Catalonia is of particular interest. Given its own experience with territorial challenges, India’s response to the Catalan independence declaration followed expected lines. The Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson stated, ‘We have noted the negative global reaction to this development. Neither Europe nor the world would benefit from instability. As a country that values and fosters unity in diversity, India would urge that issues of identity and culture are best addressed within the constitutional framework and with respect for national integrity’ (MEA 2017). The communiqué unequivocally highlighted the need to accommodate diversity within the available constitutional framework, respecting state integrity. India’s response mirrored that of host of other European states US, UK, France and the EU (Indian Express, 31 October 2017).

Conclusion Challenges to established states from within are not new. Such challenges can result as much from perceived systematic discrimination, marginalisation and persecution by various groups within the state as from economically powerful groups, one which nevertheless feel powerless to freely shape their destiny within states. The Catalan case falls into the latter category. It is a political challenge that Spain would do well to address by means of political solutions, negotiations and bargaining. The formation of new states may not be easy but it is a normal phenomenon in the international system. Spain–Catalonia power sharing has been problematic for quite some time, as has the issue of Spain’s reluctance to acknowledge the Catalans and the Basques as nations. The hardline approach opted for by Spain has its own limitations in the long run. A democratic state cannot be fearful of allowing citizens to communicate their opinion and will through democratic means. As is evident, even when Catalonian leaders were pushing for the independence referendum there were demonstrations favouring Catalonia’s continued presence in Spain. A flexible and nuanced

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approach by the Spanish political elite would strengthen this resolve. Constitutions are important reflections of how states visualise their destiny; however, constitutions are not etched in stone—if the peoples and states they are intended to serve require change, they can be revisited. The demand that Spain reworks its unitary structure towards a pluri-national, multicultural, federal one reflecting its cultural linguistic reality has been current for many years. Spain needs to evolve strategies for responding just as it did in 1978 through the Statute of Autonomy; its inability to do so has created the current impasse.

References Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (2nd ed.). London: Verso. Andreu, J. C. (2007). Spanish Autonomic State Reform: Catalonia’s New Statute of Autonomy 2006. Retrieved from https://www.senshuu.ac.jp/School/ horitu/publication/hogakuronshu/102/castella.pdf. Bagchi, A. (2003). Rethinking Federalism: Changing Power Relations Between the Centre and the States. Publius, 33(4), 21–42. Birnbaum, M. (2017, November 1). Catalan Separatists Counted on Support from the E.U. But They Got the Cold Shoulder. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/catalan-separatists-counted-on-support-fromthe-eu-but-they-got-the-cold-shoulder/2017/11/01/62df9380-be6b-11e79294-705f80164f6e_story.html?utm_term=.bb443af22a0e. Calamur, K. (2017, October 1). The Spanish Court Decision That Sparked the Modern Catalan Independence Movement. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-referendum/541611/. Catalonia Independence: Huge Barcelona Pro-Spain Rally. (2017, October 29). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41794087. Connor, W. (2001). Homelands in a World of States. In M.  Guibernau & J. Hutchinson (Eds.), Understanding Nationalisms. London: Polity Press. Constitution of India. Retrieved from https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/constitution-india-full-text. Davis, A. (2004). The November 2003 Elections in Catalonia: A Landmark Change in the Catalan Political Landscape. South European Society and Politics, 9(3), 137–148. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.10 80/1360874042000271906. European Parliament President on the Debate on Catalonia, Press Release. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/newsroom/european-parliament-president-on-the-debate-on-catalonia.

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Mahajan, G. (n.d.). Negotiating Cultural Diversity and Minority Rights in India. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/87f8/7d4bc9dbddb956b7 1341cd3ca99609de1487.pdf. Mann, M. (2005). Has Globalisation Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State. In P.  Spencer & H.  Wollman (Eds.), Nations and Nationalism: A Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Maurice, E. (2017, December 26). How the EU Failed to Prevent the Catalan ‘Train Crash’. Retrieved from https://euobserver.com/europe-inreview/139799. McGarry, J., & Keating, M. (Eds.). (2006). European Integration and the Nationalities Question. London: Routledge. Minder, R., & Barry, E. (2017, October). Catalonia’s Independence Vote Descends into Chaos and Clashes. The New  York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/world/europe/catalonia-independence-referendum.html. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2017, October 30). Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Question on Catalonia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Retrieved from http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/29074/Off icial+Spokespersons+response+to+a+question+on+Catalonias+Unilateral+Decl aration+of+Independence. Mitchell, P. (2006). The ETA Ceasefire, the Catalan Statute and the Fracturing of Spain—Part 1. Retrieved from https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/04/ eta1-a17.html. Nations & Nationalism. (1996, March 21). Warwick Debate: Anthony D. Smith & Ernest Gellner. Retrieved from http://tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/ nation/warwick.htm. Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Question of Catalonia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Retrieved from http://www.mea.gov.in/mediabriefings.htm?dtl/29074/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_question_ on_Catalonias_Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence. Olsson, in Karolewski, P.  I., & Suszycki, A. (Eds.). (2010). Multiplicity of Nationalism in Contemporary Europe. Maryland: Lexington Books. O’Neill, M. (2017, December 29). A Question of Recognition: A Potential Avenue for Catalonian Independence? Keep Calm and Talk Law. Retrieved from http://www.keepcalmtalklaw.co.uk/a-question-of-recognition-a-potentialavenue-for-catalonian-independence/. Preliminary Results of the Catalan Self-Determination Referendum. (2017, October 1). Statista. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/statistics/755833/catalan-self-determination-referendum-results/. Renan, E. (2004). Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? In H. John & S. Anthony (Eds.), Nationalism (pp. 17–18). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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CHAPTER 6

Borders in Europe: From Westphalia to Schengen Krishnendra Meena

Introduction The European Union (EU) is the epitome of free movement insofar as the mobility of people, goods, services and capital is considered across its 28 states. Monetary union, in effect since 1999, comprises 19 member states using a common currency, the euro. On the other hand, the Schengen Area functions as a single country for the purposes of international travel and follows a common visa policy. This is a unique arrangement given that prominent member states were involved in the Second World War, which led to an almost total annihilation of the continent. Furthermore, it needs to be stated that principles of state sovereignty and territoriality now prevalent in the international system were first elaborated, discussed and applied in Europe through the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The treaty established the European states as sovereign over their respective territories and states’ borders have become inviolable ever since. In this context it is ironic that such a free movement arrangement across states is now a very important feature of European life.

K. Meena (*) Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_6

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The chapter emphasises the changing nature of borders of European states since the end of the Second World War, which can be considered a major rupture and a new beginning in the European context. The end of the war did not cause an end to geopolitics on the continent. The gradual onset of the Cold War between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, had a tremendous impact on the borders of Europe. The European countries were divided on the basis of the spheres of influence—of either the USA or the USSR. This led to the creation of the ‘Iron Curtain’ or the division on the basis of ideology (capitalism versus communism) followed by European states. Most of the Eastern European states were under the influence of the USSR and Western Europe was defined as being under the protection of the USA for the period of the Cold War. Since the end of Cold War, these borders have become more flexible, differentiated and salient as the single European Market has re-configured the borders of the European Union (O’Dowd 13: 2003). The disintegration of the USSR and the fall of Berlin Wall signalled the end of Cold War on the European continent and a new vision of a united Europe began to emerge. The European nations had been deliberating on a ‘European Community’ through various small and specific cooperative arrangements, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, from the early 1950s. These efforts in Western Europe gradually led to the Schengen Agreement of 1985. A significant feature of the Schengen Area is that the EU allows free mobility to people who enter a European country, within its member states; however, the enforcement of borders at the edge of Europe is conducted at extreme levels for migrants and refugees from war-­ torn regions of Asia and Africa. Recent events on the Mediterranean Sea as well as at the land borders of EU have highlighted the problems of refugees and have put a strain on the EU policies in place for immigrants. In response to the migration, many European states have started to construct new fences; many have pressed to limit the number of refugees which the European states accommodate.

Post-War Borders in Europe The Westphalian notion of sovereign territoriality, which originated in Europe in 1648 through two treaties (Osnabrück and Münster) negotiated in Westphalia in Germany, led to the process of the formation of modern territorial states. The Peace of Westphalia formalised the principle of territorial sovereignty, using territorial demarcation and control as a

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state’s organising logic. The Peace of Westphalia can be regarded as the inauguration of the modern political order based on boundaries of sovereign, internationally recognised and territorially demarcated states (Laine 2015, 17). Everything that fell inside state borders became an object of claim for the state. For Popescu (2012), this claim had a twofold outcome for the nature of borders: First, it provided impetus for imagining territorially sharp border lines as state limits to avoid overlapping sovereignty claims. In political thinking and international law, borders became sharp lines of territorial sovereignty that separated states and contained social relations inside a state’s territory. Second, it generalized the use of sharp territorial border lines, making it systemic. (Popescu 2012, 34)

The treaty marked the beginning of the era of the nation-state and nationalism and gave rise to a new type of a political ideology—one that dovetailed a group of individuals with a nation (Laine 2015, 17). In part, these conceptions of hard territoriality were the reasons for the two global wars of the twentieth century. During the Second World War, the German expansion meant the occupation of the territory of weaker European states. However, the intellectual roots of German expansion and the plans to dominate the continent lay in the works of the late nineteenth-century geographer Ratzel, who rejected the conception of borders. Instead, he suggested that the state was a living organism and could not be hemmed in by immovable borders; it required living frontiers or borders that were dynamic and subject to change (Laine 2015, 19). The practical manifestation of this idea was the brainchild of another geographer, Karl Haushofer. Haushofer, like Ratzel, believed that the borders of a state were the most dynamic feature of its existence and that the occupation of territory outside the original national area reflected the vitality of the state and its status as an organism. The response to the violation of international norms by Germany during the 1930s, in terms of respecting sovereign territoriality and conventions, was an alliance of the UK, France and the USA. The Allied powers emerged victorious from the war and enforced the system of sovereignty based on states with more determination and the use of military force. This in turn had an impact on the borders within Europe as the lines demarcating territory became sacrosanct. During this period, the Westphalian culture of border control reached its full maturity (Zaiotti

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2011, 47). The fact that the continent had just emerged from a major war was a significant factor in the use of hard border controls and the deployment of force along the newly settled boundaries of Europe. As O’Dowd states, ‘the forty years after 1945 represented the phase in which the ­practical importance of state borders reached its zenith’ (O’Dowd 2002, 16). The conflict not only legitimised the trend toward the nationalisation of borders, but also gave national governments the capacity to accomplish it more effectively (Zaiotti 2011, 48). The war caused tremendous destruction in most of the European nations. Apart from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, many West European countries, especially France, Germany and the UK, suffered heavy human casualties and destruction. The reconstruction effort in the majority of these countries required a large number of workers, which Europe itself could not supply. The population of Europe was insufficient to carry out the huge task of reconstruction of the continent. ‘The new immigrants were drawn to Europe because, in the postwar capitalist boom from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, its industries were expanding and they needed labour. At first workers came from the less prosperous European periphery or were Europeans who were displaced by the War’ (Hayter 2000, 11). All the highly industrialised countries of Europe made use of temporary labour recruitment schemes, although in some countries, in particular Britain, such schemes were small, and spontaneous migration from colonies and former colonies predominated (Hayter 2000, 11). The European countries invited in guest workers from Turkey and Asian countries. The norms for their entry into these countries were eased to complete the reconstruction effort at a greater pace. Later on, many of these guest workers became residents in these countries (most prominently in West Germany) and invited their family members to join them (Castles 1985, 517). In essence, borders and bordering practices were lowered for the guest workers but, in general, the Westphalian principles of sovereign territoriality were strengthened across Europe. Migration and travel to Europe became difficult after the war. The regulation of immigration to Europe is an important issue as migrants from Africa and Asia have made strenuous efforts to cross the external EU border and enter any European country. Europe, for citizens of the poor countries of Africa which border the Mediterranean and further south and to people inhabiting the strife-torn West Asian region, is a lucrative destination in terms of economic opportunities, higher standards of living and security of life. This stream of migration has continued steadily since the war and was

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an important feature during the Cold War. More recently, owing to a number of human tragedies during attempts at illegal migration across the Mediterranean, the issue has garnered international attention. The main battleground for the Cold War was Europe and the ‘Iron Curtain’, its most visible symbol (Zaiotti 2011, 56). Zaiotti elaborates: The curtain was a heavily fortified barrier running uninterrupted from Stettino in the North Sea to Trieste in Mediterranean. It was used as a means to prevent people from crossing one side to the other (though this was truer for movements from east to west). These controls were particularly effective. The borders it included were in fact the most closed in European peacetime history. In terms of its function as a protective shield against external threats, the Iron Curtain was therefore a traditional kind of border. Yet, if seen through the light of a sovereign territorial ideal, it clearly represented an anomaly. The character of a border was not ‘national’. It overlapped with the borders of various countries across the Continent, and in one case (viz. Germany), it actually divided what previously was a unified state. Taken as a whole, the Iron Curtain functioned as a tool of collective defence. (Zaiotti 2011, 56)

The impact of the Cold War and its geopolitics pitted the capitalist economies of the USA and its allies (the West) against the ideology of Communism and its followers, dominated by the USSR (the East). This was represented in its most tangible and potent form through the Iron Curtain. The bipolarity of the Cold War had literally divided Europe into two halves. In terms of visibility and enforcement, the border between the East and West could not have been starker. The division was clearly governed by concerns of security in a charged atmosphere because a number of states in Eastern Europe were dependent upon the USSR for their security under the Warsaw Pact of 1954 (Cohen 2003, 69). On the other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) provided for the security of states in Western Europe from the London and Paris conferences of 1954 (Cohen 2003, 69). The Iron Curtain was unique in the sense that it followed the border of these states but the division was based on the split in ideology. Furthermore, it was also a ‘mental’ frontier dividing the two spheres, demarcating ‘good and bad, truth and error, justice and oppression, democracy and dictatorship’ (Anderson 2002, 17 cited in Zaiotti 2011). Zbigniew Brzezinski termed Cold War geopolitics as played out in Europe as the ‘Grand Chessboard’; the European states were pawns in the hands of the two superpowers (Brzezinski 1997).

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The Iron Curtain lasted till the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union disintegrated into a number of independent states and the Cold War was deemed to be over. The most potent symbol of the Cold War in Europe, the Berlin Wall, a border dividing the city of Berlin into two, was dismantled in the year 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall also signified the unification of Germany, which was divided by the victors of the war. The Iron Curtain, symbolic though it was, had a geographic centre: West Berlin. Since the end of the war, by agreement among the major allies fighting Nazi Germany—the USA, the UK and the Soviet Union—the USA, UK and France had occupied West Berlin. West Berlin had a democratically elected mayor. Despite Soviet protests, and despite an official status summarised in a 1971 treaty as ‘not a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not governed by it’, West Berlin was effectively part of West Germany. (Brager 2004, 4)

However, the seeds of the creation of a borderless Europe were sown during the Cold War itself and gradually came to fruition with the Schengen Agreement of 1985. A very important aspect and development of the European project was the Single European Act of 1986, signed in Luxembourg and The Hague, which has relevance here since it accorded to European citizens rights of mobility, employment and service across EU countries. The evolving nature of arrangements under the EU mean that a number of countries are part of the Common Market, meaning that the mobility of goods, services, people and capital are free under them. A number of them are part of monetary union, sharing a common currency, the euro, and a number of them have accepted the Schengen regime and allowed mobility to foreigners visiting the European space. The Schengen Regime: A Unique Arrangement The Schengen Regime has a longer history than is normally imagined; it stretches back to the late 1950s, when European countries had started to realise the reconstruction project after the war. The sovereign territorial ideal of the Treaty of Westphalia, which meant border control and the clear demarcation of territories, was first put under strain with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) (later the European Community (EC) and the EU). In the aftermath of the war, there was a realisation in

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Europe that the emphasis on the sovereign territorial ideal had to be renegotiated if the continent was to have a lasting peace. The conflict also showed the dangers of the territorially based system with its deep roots in the hard geopolitics of the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century. Territorial expansion had caused unprecedented damage in Europe. These perspectives about the dangers of the system led to the creation of the European Communities, now considered to be the precursors to the current form of the EU. The Community Project was officially launched in the year 1951, with the establishment of a new international organisation, the European Coal and Steel Community (Zaiotti 2011, 58). The key element of the initiative was that the power to take decisions about coal and steel was placed in the hands of an independent, supranational body called the ‘High Authority’ (Zaiotti 2011, 58). ‘In the year 1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed creating the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Communities’ (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). For the focus of the chapter, however, only the EEC is relevant, as it intended to lift the existing economic and political barriers on the flow of trade, goods, people and capital across Europe. The EEC dealt directly with the issue of borders in Europe. The main idea behind economic integration was to overcome the antagonistic attitudes prevailing since the war and the desire to bring about a durable peace on the continent. However, the intentions of the founding fathers of the EEC remained only a vision and the project could not immediately displace the Westphalian model. During the three decades following the creation of the EEC, there was a gradual reduction of economic barriers but mobility across borders proceeded at a very slow pace. ‘Progress in easing controls concerning the movement of people across borders was, in fact, minimal’ (Zaiotti 2011, 59). With this difficult background, the issue was considered too sensitive to be discussed at various meetings and conferences in the European Community (EC). Therefore, the policy area regarding border controls among the member states remained in the hands of national governments rather than shifting to the Community. A logical consequence of state control on borders was that the domain of foreign policy formulation for which the EC had legal rights remained with member states. The link between foreign policy, border controls and free movement is intricate and changes to one of them have an impact on the others. ‘Although the EC had the legal capacity to conclude ­agreements

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with third countries, the fear of overstepping member states’ powers in matters of freedom of movement meant that in the first three decades of its history the Community did not develop a formal foreign policy on the subject of border control and immigration’ (Zaiotti 2011, 60). The slow pace towards a common European space can be attributed to such apprehensions. Understood conceptually, the movement towards economic integration started causing challenges to and a strain on the Westphalian edifice of sovereignty based on territory. In practice, the EC had to arrive at a balance between economic integration and hard borders. Burgess and Vollard argue that territory always matters somehow in some way in social and political relations (Burgess and Vollard 2006: 7). Global events and consequent transformation during the 1970s, specifically the ascendancy of neo-liberal capitalism and the removal of restrictions on the flow of goods and people and the subsequent gradual growth of these flows, led to a revision on the stance on borders. ‘State borders came to be seen primarily in terms of costs of exchange and barriers to trade that have to be overcome to allow unimpeded trade flows essential to the existence of free markets’ (Popescu 2012, 49). However, in Europe, the NATO alliance in the geopolitical context of the Cold War was instrumental in maintaining the status quo on borders and bordering practices. Conversely, there were other factors, local to Europe, which posed challenges to the system of hard bordering. Economic stagnation leading to rising unemployment, security concerns emanating from the threat of increasing instances of terrorism on the continent and their links to the issue of immigration provided impetus to the creation of an overarching vision of a common European space with no boundaries. ‘The main objective, therefore, of the European Economic Communities was to lift the existing economic and political barriers for the free flow of trade, goods, capital, and people’ (Zaiotti 2011, 58). Furthermore, there were apprehensions about the ‘European Project’ which were gaining intensity, not only in Europe but globally. Doubts were expressed related to the idea of a borderless Europe. Therefore, Ansell and Di Palma note a trend toward the increasing prominence of subnational regions in national, European, and international affairs—a territorial rebundling that arguably results from the very factors seen as making territoriality increasingly irrelevant (Ansell and Di Palma 2004: 5). Against this background of scepticism surrounding the project of a common European market, five states—Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, the Netherlands and France—signed an agreement on 14 June

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1985 in the town of Schengen near Luxembourg. ‘It proposed measures intended to gradually abolish border checks at the signatories’ common borders, including reduced speed vehicle checks which allowed vehicles to cross borders without stopping, allowing residents in border areas freedom to cross borders away from fixed checkpoints, and the harmonisation of visa policies’ (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri =CELEX:42000A0922(01)). There was a gradual increase in membership, with 2004 marking the largest single expansion of the EU in terms of population, states and territory (McCall 2015, 182). A unique feature of the Schengen Agreement in its current form is that it has 26 members, with goods, traffic, capital and people able to move freely without any border controls. Acknowledging the developments in Europe since the end of the Second World War, the seasoned former US diplomat Henry Kissinger said, ‘What a journey Europe had undertaken to reach this point’ (Kissinger 2014, 91)?

Recent Challenges to Schengen The Community envisaged under the European Schengen Agreement for all practical purposes performs its functions as one state, with citizenship rights for one state extended to citizens of all the other member states. A common visa policy is in place for these 26 member states. However, if the arrangement affords a number of benefits to the people inside the Schengen area, it excludes outsiders, just as a normal nation-state does. Therefore, it has been the object of severe criticism. This exclusion, however, reflects the anxiety within the EU over increasing incidents of terrorism. The eastward enlargements since 2004 have increased perception of risks and threats from ‘international terrorism’, international crime and contested migration that have been deemed to require a response securing protection for EU citizens (McCall 2015, 183). More recently, the EU policies of exclusion at the edge of the Schengen territory have led to multiple crises because of the huge influx of refugees from the conflict-­ affected countries of West Asia, especially Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country. ‘Schengen [is] under more strain now than any time in its thirty-year history as a result of the dramatic increase in irregular migration and some member states implementing border checks’ (Johnson 2017, 780). The EU, it is argued, is not properly equipped to accommodate the huge number of people migrating and therefore has evolved in response stringent parameters for entry into the territory of the bloc. ‘It

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also established new standards for the external border of the EU, set up a stricter technocratic visa surveillance system […] and provided new mechanisms for cross-border police and judicial cooperation’ (http://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33020). The tremendous economic opportunities and the higher standards of living that the EU offers attract a huge number of migrants from Asia and Africa. Beginning in the 1990s, the member states of the European Union (EU) began to restrict the entrance of third-country migrants and, as a result, a greater number of asylum applicants began to resort to clandestine methods of immigration to enter the EU (Clochard and Dupeyron 2007: 19). A recurring feature of the illegal migration to Europe is that an increasing number of people lose their lives while trying to cross the Mediterranean from Asia or Africa each year. On the other hand, the EU policies at the edge of Europe are strict and exclusionary, creating what some scholars have called ‘Fortress Europe’ in reference to the severe nature of the bordering practices in effect at the edge of Schengen territory (Tassinari and Lucht 2015; van Houtum and Pijpers 2007; Welch 2004). ‘Clear symptoms of re-bordering tendencies within various nation-­ states in the EU can be recognized in discussion on neo-nationalism, protectionism and illegal migrants crossing the EU’s external borders—leading even to suggestions, as in the case of the Greek-Turkish border, of constructing formidable barrier fences’ (Scott 2012, 83). The background, again, as with borders everywhere, is heightened concerns for security. The French Presidency of the EU during 2008 brought into focus the issue of the EU’s external borders and pressed for the securitisation of the issues of migration. ‘As an approach it is based almost exclusively on policing, while its emphasis on the security aspects of the border policies has given rise to the idea of Fortress Europe, by way of analogy with the enclosed medieval (European) political space’ (Castan Pinos 2009). However, 2015 proved to be a catalytic year for EU’s immigration policies and bordering practices. It is estimated that since January 2015, the number of migrants to Europe has exceeded a million people. These migrations turned into a crisis when 1200 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe in April 2015. The spate of tragedies at this sea frontier reached alarming proportions. The immediate consequence of the crisis was that the EU upgraded its Border Agency, Frontex. Created in 2005 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, the agency was renamed in 2015 the European Border and Coast Guard

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Agency as a fully fledged border management organisation of the EU (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 52016AE0688&rid=3). But the terminology of Frontex still lingers. ‘Following a 2014 study by the European Commission on the state of the external border and subsequent discussion as part of the European Agenda on Migration, in 2016, Frontex was officially renamed the “European Border and Coast Guard Agency” […] but is still commonly called Frontex’ (Johnson 2017, 781). The agency was also reinforced with a new mandate, extra powers and an increased number of personnel, and an incremental budget to carry out the tasks of border management effectively. Frontex in its original version relied heavily for its tasks of border control and management upon the EU member states on the eastern and southern expanse of the Schengen Area and only had a supportive role. That changed during 2015. Moreover, decision-making related to the borders of Europe happens at two levels. ‘Decisions about border enforcement practices in the EU are not made exclusively by policy makers in, and agents of, border states themselves, but also in distant EU institutions and by agents of an increasingly Europeanized regime of border enforcement’ (Johnson 2017, 773). This two-tier decision-making process has contributed to the hardening of border controls. In its current version, Frontex works with enhanced powers at both the EU’s land and sea borders. Schengen border guards, whether positioned on road, rail, or at sea crossings or airport portals, have considerable discretion in the exercise of their gate-keeping powers, with checks at some border crossings lasting up to five minutes on average (McCall 2015, 187). However, the presence of the border is most prominent in the states neighbouring the EU. Schengen presents a countervailing dynamic to cross-border cooperation between the EU and neighbouring states through its manifestation of the EU’s ‘external frontier’ as a hard barrier (McCall 2015, 187). McCall further emphasises that ‘cross-border mobility for border people became much more difficult with the price of the Schengen visa (in terms of money and time invested clearing bureaucratic hurdles) prohibitive for many’ (McCall 2015, 187). A ‘local border traffic regulation’ is aimed at easing cross-border mobility for border people living within 50 km of the border through the issue of ‘local border traffic permits’ (McCall 2015, 187). Zielonka focuses on the social divisions the Schengen border causes and comments that ‘Schengen has become the symbol of exclusion of the poor and allegedly less civilized European nations by wealthy and arrogantly superior ones’ (Zielonka 2002 cited in McCall 2015, 187).

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The larger impact of the hard-border policies of the EU and their implementation by Frontex causes the most severe and disastrous consequences for thousands of migrants from Asia and Africa, who try to cross into the European territory. Annually, there are reports of hundreds of migrants losing their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean and reach EU territory (islands belonging to Greece or Italy). On the other hand, the 2015 expansion of powers of Frontex only creates difficulties on the sea as well as at the land borders of the EU. There have been many cases where the operations of Frontex to discourage migration and to capture illegal vessels have resulted in deaths. For example, the Italian Operation Mare Nostrum (2013–2014) deployed air and naval surveillance to deter illegal migration from the Mediterranean, causing many vessels overloaded with people to collapse. However, the Italian Navy and Air Force were able to save many of these migrants after their boats capsized at sea. A very interesting case of the EU’s Mediterranean border is that of Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are located on the northern tip of the African continent. The enclaves are territories carved out from Moroccan territory, with Ceuta located on the Strait of Gibraltar and Melilla located further east on the Mediterranean coast. These geographical locations afford aspiring African migrants to Europe a chance to cross into Europe without risking their lives. On the other hand, the EU and Spain follow a very strict policy of keeping the illegal migrants out. ‘At the same time, the external border has been “pushed out” and globalised to include border enforcement activities well beyond the territory of the EU on the High Seas and in cooperative states in Africa, Southwest Asia and elsewhere’ (Klepp 2010, cited in Johnson 2017). This policy has been backed up by state-of-the-art fencing separating the two enclaves from Morocco. Though it offers the safest option for migrants from Sub-­ Saharan Africa to enter Europe, the level of bordering practices encountered here are severe. With the fencing equipped with very high-resolution cameras, scanners and border guards with the best technology possible, it resembles very much a ‘war zone’, which by its very appearance deters the migrants. ‘Fortress Europe’ seems to erect racial, ethnic and religious boundaries (Castan Pinos 2009, 4). The EU, which aims to build bridges, has created infrastructure at the edge of its territory that leads to discrimination and the reinforcement of the boundaries between the global haves and have-nots.

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Border Policies in Europe: Relevance for India The most relevant lesson to be learnt from an institution such as the European Union for any other region in the world is that of cooperation among its constituent states. The erasure of borders among the member states of the EU and the resultant flow of goods, people and services also serves as a pertinent example for countries in South Asia, specifically for India. India is the most dominant actor in the region in terms of its economy, international standing and security, and is the regional power in South Asia. The country, therefore, has the required capacity to organise the region as a space for the free mobility for various goods, services and people. An organisation, has existed since the 1980s as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Established in 1985, objectives of SAARC include economic progress, social progress and cultural relations and improving the quality of life of the peoples of the region. However, due to certain stark and deep-rooted differences amongst its members, it remains an entity mainly on paper. Furthermore, internationally there has been a growth of regionalism and regionalisation, which has accrued benefits to the member states of respective regional organisations. In the case of South Asia, India and Pakistan, the dominant actors in the region, will have to overcome their differences to make it a viable regional entity. The connectivity and mobility under such an arrangement may bring benefits to the entire region. The territorial and border disputes which are a common feature of South Asian existence may also be mitigated and will have a lesser impact on relations between the member states. This connectivity may further be extended to the Asian nations in the east as India implements its Look/ Act East policy. Similarly, on the western and northern expanse, South Asia may easily connect with West and Central Asia and may become part of the larger connectivity network being built across the continent. However, these conjectures will remain such if South Asian states subscribe to hard notions of territory and are not able to envisage a borderless future for South Asia.

Conclusion During the twentieth century, Europe underwent drastic changes in terms of its territorial composition. Since many European nations were colonial powers, the impact of these changes and transformations was felt

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­ orldwide. Due to deep-rooted antagonisms and animosities, Europe w suffered two world wars, leading to destruction on an unprecedented scale. The ramifications of these two wars are still being felt on the continent. However, the near annihilation of the continent also had wideranging implications for European politics. It was realised that the Westphalian notion of sovereign territoriality had caused the wars, because the quest for territory on the continent and the accrual of geopolitical advantage meant that powerful states were constantly involved in a struggle for territory. This meant that borders on the continent were constantly changing. The wars also meant direct interference on the European continent by the USA. At the end of the Second World War, the victorious Allied powers put in place boundary demarcations on the continent. The original aggressor of the war, Germany, was divided into two, West and East Germany. Hard manifestations of territory were reinforced during this phase. The geopolitics of the Cold War, in which the world was divided into a bipolar system, one half under the leadership of the USA and the other under the USSR, deeply impacted Europe. The division manifested itself into the ‘Iron Curtain’. Apart from the state borders in Europe, the curtain divided the continent into nations following either capitalism or communism. On the ground, the division reflected the demarcation of East and West Germany, remnants of which are still visible in the European landscape. However, many of the East European countries in the twenty-­ first century became part of the borderless system of the Schengen regime initiated by the West European countries. The seeds of the EU as it is known today were sown in the 1950s. The Schengen Area, for all practical purposes, functions for the 26 member states as a singular state without any border controls and bordering practices for the movement of goods, people and services. For non-Europeans, this means a single visa for the Schengen territory and freedom to travel. It is a unique arrangement. However, there have been contradictions and negative impacts, which have gradually started to emerge in the European edifice. Many scholars argue that the EU itself mocks the ideals of free movement and a borderless system. Within the EU, there are no borders but these ideals are regularly violated at the EU’s external borders. The EU’s border control and bordering practices at its external borders are among the harshest anywhere in the world. This in turn has ramifications for the thousands of migrants who seek to enter the EU for a better life. Thousands of aspiring migrants have lost their lives while trying to enter the EU.  The

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events of 2015 led to the reconstitution of Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. The border controls and practices show no signs of easing in the near future. Moreover, new fences have been erected in some of the member states to deter illegal migration, causing hardships to many of the refugees fleeing war in West Asia and Afghanistan. On the other hand, West European states such as Germany, which are the main target of the migrants, have decided to accept more refugees into their territory. The EU in terms of its borders represent a duality: its internal barriers are removed but, at the same time, borders on the edge of the EU are characterised by hard-border practices. The best example of the dilution of the Westphalian system now invites severe criticism for its discriminatory practices at the external border. Nonetheless, the EU remains the best example of regional cooperation, overcoming the destruction of the Second World War.

References Ansell, C., & Di Palma, G. (2004). Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and United States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brager, B.  L. (2004). The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe. Philadelphia: Chelsea. Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Perseus Books. Burgess, M., & Vollard, H. (Eds.). (2006). State Territoriality and European Integration. Oxon: Routledge. Castan Pinos, J. (2009). Building Fortress Europe? Schengen and the Cases of Ceuta and Melilla. Centre for International Borders Working Paper Series, Queen’s University Belfast. Castles, S. (1985). The Guests Who Stayed: The Debate on ‘Foreigners Policy’ in the German Federal Republic. The International Migration Review, 19(3), 517–534. Clochard, O., & Dupeyron, B. (2007). The Maritime Borders of Europe: Upstream Migratory Controls. In E.  Brunet-Jailly (Ed.), Borderlands: Comapring Border Security in North America and Europe. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Cohen, S.  B. (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Eur-Lex. (2017). Journal of the European Union. Retrieved January 28, 2018, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:420 00A0922(01).

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Hayter, T. (2000). Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls. London: Pluto. Johnson, C. (2017). Competing Para-Sovereignties in the Borderlands of Europe. Geopolitics, 22(4), 772–793. Kissinger, H. (2014). World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History. London: Allen Lane. Laine, J. P. (2015). A Historical View on the Study of Borders. In S. Sevastinov, J. P. Laine, & A. A. Kireev (Eds.), Introduction to Border Studies. Vladivostok: Dalnauka. McCall, C. (2015). State Borders in Europe. In S. Sevastinov, J. P. Laine, & A. A. Kireev (Eds.), Introduction to Border Studies. Vladivostok: Dalnauka. O’Dowd, L. (2002). Analysing Europe’s Borders. Boundary and Security Bulletin, 9(2), 67–79. O’Dowd, L. (2003). The Changing Significance of European Borders. In J. Anderson, L. O’. Dowd, & T. M. Wilson (Eds.), New Borders for a Changing Europe: Cross-Border Cooperation and Governance. London: Frank Cass. Popescu, G. (2012). Bordering and Ordering in the Twenty-First Century. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Scott, J. W. (2012). European Politics of Borders, Border Symbolism and Cross-­ Border Cooperation. In T. M. Wilson & H. Donnan (Eds.), A Companion to Border Studies. Chichester: Blackwell. Tassinari, F., & Lucht, H. (2015, April 29). Fortress Europe: Behind the Continent’s Migrant Crisis. Foreign Affairs. van Houtum, H., & Pijpers, R. (2007). The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-Faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU. Antipode, 39(2), 291–309. Welch, R. (2004). From Iron Curtain to Fortress Europe and Beyond. In V. Pavlakovich-Kochi, B. J. Morehouse, & D. Wastl-Walter (Eds.), Challenged Borderlands. Aldershot: Ashgate. Zaiotti, R. (2011). Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

CHAPTER 7

The European Union and the Asian Security Order: Normative Aspirations and Strategic Interests Manasi Singh

The grand European integration project stands at a crossroads. The European Union (EU), faced with crises unfolding at different levels, is struggling to keep the house in order. Despite being hailed for its diplomatic astuteness, the EU today is finding it hard to make an effective impact, whether this is on international negotiations on climate change or crisis management in Ukraine and Syria. A post-Brexit EU needs to resurrect itself to effectively combat challenges such as terrorism, migration and the volatility of its neighbourhood. The timing of the EU Global Strategy 2016 is thus critical in helping the EU establish a road map for economic recovery and social cohesion, and to assert its ‘actorness’ while dealing with pressing economic and political questions. A rules-based global order anchored in norms is at the core of the EU’s institutional matrix. The emphasis on and preference for soft power defines the EU as a global actor with its well-developed laws, technological competence and crisis management skills. The coming of the Trump administration and the uncertainty

M. Singh (*) Centre for Security Studies, School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_7

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surrounding the future of US foreign policy thus opens up new horizons for the EU. The shift from the Atlantic era to the Asian century also throws out questions about what the nature of Europe’s strategic engagement could be in the region—especially in terms of strengthening inter-­ regionalism and playing crucial roles in the evolving Asian security order. The EU’s interests in trade and maritime security make it a relevant actor in the dynamic region of Asia. As the EU grapples with multiple challenges in the form of a refugee influx, Brexit and a crisis in Ukraine, its presence as a more coherent foreign policy actor needs renewed attention. Therefore, how effective the EU is as a global player becomes even more relevant, particularly with the Trump administration’s keenness to disengage from some of its overseas commitments. Interestingly, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) 2016 emphasises a fully fledged EU role in Asia, emphasising economic diplomacy, inter-regionalism and scaling-up Europe’s security role in the region. The EU is caught up with security issues in its neighbourhood. However, given its economic and maritime interests in Asia, it is keen to ‘pivot’ towards the region. This chapter discusses the EU’s normative aspirations to reinforce and expand a rules-based global order, while it balances its strategic interests in terms of regional powers in Asia. It also explores the context and conditions creating an opportunity for the EU to enhance its strategic engagement with Asia. The first section discusses the normative power of Europe and the challenges confronting its commitment to the multilateral system. The second attempts to problematise the conception of the EU as a normative actor in Asia. The third analyses the EU’s role in the evolving Asian security order. Next it is argued that the alignment of interests between India and the EU can be vital for shaping the Asian security order. The concluding section presents an analysis of the dilemma on the part of the EU to balance its normative agenda with its strategic interests in Asia.

The EU’s Normative Power The literature on description of the EU as a global actor has used terms such as ‘civilian’ (Duchêne 1971; Smith 2000), ‘soft’ (Nye 2004), ‘post-­modern’ (Cooper 2004), ‘ethical’ (Aggestam 2008) and ‘responsible’ (Mayer 2008). Each qualifying adjective makes the EU stand apart from other blocs in terms of its ambitions, tools and instruments—and in terms of its preference for non-military means. Among these, Manners’ (2002) conceptualisation of ‘normative power Europe’ (NPE) has been the most talked about attribute of this novel international actor. The ‘brand EU’ has designed its for-

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eign policies and regional strategies based on certain core values. The power flows from the EU’s identity based on the export of values such as multilateralism, social solidarity, non-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance; this power positions it as an influential player on the diplomatic chessboard. The European integration and enlargement projects have helped transform Central and Eastern Europe. Another competence of the EU lies in exercising its normative power through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The EU’s support for the International Criminal Court and for the abolition of the death penalty are also noteworthy instances (Lucarelli and Manners 2006). The EU as a normative actor thus has its legitimacy enhanced in dealing with international issues and providing ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau 1995, 15). The NPE concept offers an ideological framework to study the aspirations and motivations of the EU foreign policy. To understand the EU’s role a global actor, this conceptual paradigm serves as a useful template, emphasising the ideational role of the EU. Despite being classified as an influential global actor with normative attributes, however, the EU today struggles to match not just its capabilities and its expectations (Hill 1993) but also its normative aspirations and its strategic interests. The debate on the normative power of the EU has been further informed by bringing in ‘interests’. Hyde-Price (2006) perceives the EU as a realist power promoting its own interests, while Seeberg (2009) argues that the EU uses a normative disguise to conceal the pursuit of its foreign policy. Youngs (2004, 415) and Martin (2011, 188) call it ‘strategic use of norms’. Others argue that the EU uses ‘moral norms in the public legitimation and self-rationalisation of geopolitical interest and commercial gains’ (Langan 2012, 243). Scholars also highlight the inconsistency or selectivity of norm application in certain situations (Falkner 2007). There is a growing divergence of views regarding the EU’s ‘normativeness’, especially in terms of countering it as primarily Eurocentric (Sjursen 2006). For instance, Diez (2013) brings in the concept of hegemony when analysing normative power. Laïdi (2007) attributes NPE to universal norms, while some see it as deeply engrained in European history (Bicchi 2006). The paradox of this rationale is that the ‘outside’ view of norms seems to be in conflict with the ‘inside view’. One of the core norms of the EU is democracy, which has served as an important condition for membership of the European Community. The idea was to create the same ideological footing and resist the upsurge of communism during the Cold War period. What was originally the found-

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ing principle for internal cooperation and unification of Europe, was also enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) as one of the primary objectives of European foreign policy. This was critical in shaping Europe as a cohesive and coherent actor in international relations. However, the EU today is juggling the task of creating a rules-based global order while attending to its security concerns; democracy promotion becomes another utility-­ maximising strategy for the EU to export its model beyond its borders. Thus, while protecting its normative identity, the EU is able to promote its security and economic interests. The normativity reflected in the EU’s external relations and foreign policy is also contingent upon transnational challenges and security issues. Its objective and motivations and what potential role it would play in a crisis, is assessed after careful cost–benefit calculations and clarification of the level of expediency (Maier-Knapp 2014). The EU’s engagement with its neighbourhood represents one of the most critical areas of its foreign and security policy—one which will also have implications for its future evolution and capability as a global actor (Dannreuther 2004). The logic of stabilisation (associated with the need for secured and properly managed EU borders) stems from the requirement for an increased cooperation in fighting against trans-border threats, a high priority agenda for the EU and its citizens. The societal resilience inside the bloc and the stability in its vicinity are inter-related. Democracy promotion and reform reflect the enlarged Union’s ambition to enhance its normative and strategic engagement more broadly in Europe. However, such a pursuit represents a tightrope for the EU; it is fraught with dilemmas and challenges arising out of conflicting logics. The challenge is how to synchronise the promotion of a normative agenda with the pursuit of political and economic interests. As became evident during the Arab uprisings in 2011, the normative aspirations of the EU in expanding the ‘zone of prosperity, stability and security’ beyond the EU’s borders have not translated into success. The Arab Spring proved to be a laboratory of ideas and discourses challenging the EU’s normative and ideational project (Singh 2016, 32). The crisis in Ukraine was another jolt to the NPE and EU–Russia relations. The normative hegemony of the EU (Haukkala 2010) in viewing Russia as a recipient of norms proved to be problematic for a constructive engagement between Brussels and Moscow. Russia felt side-lined in Europe and blamed the EU for creating the either Russia or EU choice for countries in their common neighbourhood (Stewart 2009).

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With the rise of emerging powers and geopolitical shifts, the EU is not a very attractive model to emulate. The transatlantic partnership faces uncertainty which is forcing European leaders to search for stability, security and influence in global affairs. The EUGS 2016 comes at a time when the EU is facing an existential crisis coping with internal and external shocks. The document puts forth a strategy for the EU to define its international role and security interests in a dramatically changed landscape. With the global shift of power towards Asia and China’s growing assertiveness, the EUGS calls for a deepening of economic diplomacy and an increased security role for the EU in Asia. For the EU, the need to engage constructively with the Asian powers and pursue effective multilateralism for global governance are crucial. The question, however, is how the EU is perceived as an actor within Asia. In addition, what are the areas of competition, convergence and divergence?

The EU as a Normative Actor in Asia: Conception and Contestation ‘Actorness’ is described as the ability to carry out certain tasks (Hänggi et  al. 2006, 6). In case of the EU, which is often described as a post-­ Westphalian actor, it is therefore of interest for scholars to capture this distinct entity, which has elements of a state as well as of an international organisation (Buzan and Little 2000, 359). The question is how the EU uses its repository of tools and instruments and to what extent these capacities define its agency in international politics. Presence also becomes an indicator to measure actorness through the flow of ideas and perceptions and recognition by other actors in the international arena (Allen and Smith 1990, 22). The EU’s presence in an issue area influences the external and internal dynamics associated with that domain of activity. This in turn shapes complex bargaining and problem-solving mechanisms as the EU’s involvement facilitates socialisation and the dissemination of ideas and understanding (Smith 2003, 570). Through its varied tools and capacities, the EU is able to influence the external environment. Therefore, the EU can be construed as a novel international actor going beyond the traditional conception of states as the only actors in international politics. The bloc represents a post-modern actor combining both supranational as well as intergovernmental features (Hill 1993, 309).

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The EU as an actor has a range of interests in Asia. The long-standing contacts can be traced to the colonial past and span economic and trade relations, research and innovation and major contributions to development cooperation or humanitarian assistance. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, as the EU emerged as a more coherent entity to play a role in the international arena, the Commission came up with the Asia Strategy of the EU (1994). It outlined several objectives: to maintain peace stability in Asia, enhance its economic engagement with the region and promote its core values such as rule of law, respect for human rights and other international obligations. Thus, Asia provided a strategic interest for the EU to deepen its political ties and invest in the region (European Commission 1994, 7).

This was further articulated in documents such as the 2001 Europe and Asia Communication. The 2003 European Security Strategy also mentioned Kashmir, the Korean Peninsula and nuclear risks in South Asia as security flashpoints impacting European interests. However, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 dramatically changed the Union’s strategic environment. The expansion of its borders further east brought new concerns and challenges for the EU. Since then, the EU has been primarily preoccupied with the issues and crises in its neighbourhood. Nevertheless, its interests in Asia are rekindling. Asia is experiencing a resurgence on the global landscape in terms of growing economic capacities and increasing political confidence. The evolving Asian security order engages all the major players, including China, India, Japan, Russia, the USA and Australia. It is also important to investigate the EU’s motivations in fostering inter-regionalism, particularly in the case of Asia, given the region’s growing economic clout and strategic importance. The European Commission’s Regional Programming for Asia Strategy Document for 2007–2013 called for boosting regional integration efforts to intensify cooperation between the EU and Asia. Regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and inter-regional platforms such as Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) can facilitate these initiatives (European Commission 2007). The Union seeks to enhance its influence by shaping regional orders and institutions. While promoting inter-­ regional dialogue, the EU claims to pursue the normative objectives of mutual understanding and learning. For instance, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the EU encouraged inter-regional dialogue and cooperation to create structures and mechanisms where there was scope for influence with regards to global governance (Maier-Knapp 2014).

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Strong regional bodies underpinned by a commitment to multilateralism are also needed to influence the shape and direction of global governance. The EU also sees regionalism as a coherent negotiating strategy for d ­ ealing with policy issues. However, on many occasions, the EU behaves as an interest-oriented actor, applying norms instrumentally. In matters of trade and investment, the EU serves its own purposes of safeguarding its exports to Asia (Maier-Knapp 2014). Unlike Europe, Asia has yet to see a highly evolved cooperative security mechanism providing regional peacekeeping and conflict management (Acharya 2012). In this context, there is a clear recognition within the EU of the importance of engaging with Asia. Given its resources and normative appeal, the EU will give itself more room for manoeuvre in Asia if it focuses on its partners’ needs. The EU aspires to the promotion of multilateralism, institution-building and stability in Asia. It is persuasive as a normative actor because of its apolitical and technical nature invoking popular understandings of compassion and appropriateness. What it needs is a well-defined strategy to sustain this engagement and offer an attractive partnership to the regional players. Post-Brexit, the EU is in the process of a diplomatic overhaul—an exercise to present itself as an actor to be reckoned with on the global stage. This is an appropriate time for the EU to rethink its engagement with Asia against a background of growing security challenges and the uncertainty of the transatlantic partnership. In the wake of current developments recasting the EU as a global actor, it is plausible to ask what kind of a normative actor the EU is in Asia. How is it perceived within the region? As in many other parts in the world, the EU has often been presented as a model for Asian regionalism. The EU has invested considerable material and intellectual resources in promoting its brand of regional integration around the world (Börzel and Risse 2009). It serves as a normative and institutional template for other regions. However, to be a credible actor, it is important for the EU to make room for identity formation. There is a growing body of literature focusing on norm-recipients or norm-receivers. A study of the EU’s external image reveals that it is largely seen as a distant actor—one more prominent in West Asia and Africa. This perception indicates that the EU is not considered visible enough in Asia or relevant for Asian discourses (Chaban and Holland 2005). The exercise of the EU’s normative power is strictly dependent on the expectations of other actors and the legitimacy of norms that it seeks to promote (Lucarelli 2014). It is a process that facilitates its perception building with the actors/partners that it seeks to engage. The EU can be

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considered a legitimate norm promoter only when the targeted audience shares its discourse and agenda (Larsen 2014). In the Asian context, the EU has attempted to export norms ranging from economic integration and institutionalisation, the rule of law and labour rights to political norms such as democracy and human rights. However, to analyse the EU’s normative role in Asia, it is important to investigate its effectiveness in norm-diffusion in relation to other actors in the region. To what extent is there is any convergence over norms? Are there any ‘norm entrepreneurs’ competing with the EU in Asia? To enrich this debate, Acharya (2004, 252) offers an interesting methodology by focusing on the history of ideas and local norm entrepreneurs. He calls this a process of ‘constitutive localisation’ whereby local actors engage with ‘external’ or ‘global’ norms and customise them to suit a local context and conditions. Norms evolve incrementally and are deeply embedded in the socio-political culture of a country. This approach is useful in understanding why certain norms become influential while others remain inconsequential. The EU is not the only normative actor in Asia; it faces other competitors in the form of regional and extra-regional powers. In case of Asia-­ Pacific, there is the USA, China, ASEAN and India. In Central Asia, other actors include Russia, China, the USA, Iran, Turkey and India. There are a host of external stakeholders interested in regional dynamics (Kavalski 2007). The Chinese leadership is aggressively investing in normative diplomacy and attaching more values to China’s international image (Crossick and Reuter 2007). China’s new grand narrative has found expression in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a strategy primarily aimed at enhancing economic activity along China’s periphery. However, it has ambitious underlying objectives to use the BRI to enhance connectivity projects articulating its normative power and strategic interests. The Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised the adherence to shared beliefs and norms of conduct to expand regional cooperation (Jinping 2014). Thus, China’s growing efforts to make strategic inroads into Eurasia, the prevailing uncertainty of power transition and increasing concerns regarding soft security issues throw up a question: is there a potential role to play for the EU in this international environment? The following section looks at the challenges and opportunities for Brussels in the evolving Asian security order.

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Brussels in the Asian Security Order The display of hard power, both as an idea and as a practice, is still relevant, even in this interconnected and globalised world. Amidst a growing emphasis on fostering regional cooperation and the potential of norms and institutions, the USA is very visible in the Asian theatre, where its military presence counterbalances China’s. The US ‘pivot to Asia’ is based on strengthening its diplomatic and military presence on the Asian continent. Russia has established close ties with China and India. Within this scenario, can the EU play a diplomatic and geopolitical role in Asia? In addition, what are its aspirations, interests, capabilities and deficiencies as a security actor in Asia? The current developments unfolding within Europe necessitate stocktaking, both in terms of ensuring the sustainability of the project and in terms of strengthening the EU’s global footprint. The EU’s core interests remain security and prosperity for its citizens and the promotion of a democratic, rules-based system within Europe. Therefore, countering terrorism, ensuring energy security and securing cyber-space form the core priorities of the EU’s foreign and security policy. There is also an emphasis on developing an integrated approach to conflicts and crises as well as effective regional cooperation (European Commission 2016). The resurgence of Asia and China’s growing assertiveness raises questions about the future world order. Given the current dynamics in Asia, it will be interesting to analyse the shift in the existing order and in the region’s institutions. China’s BRI may pose new challenges and thereby create new kinds of insecurity for states. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, for instance, could adversely affect India–China relations as it passes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Similarly, the increasing Chinese influence in the Eurasian space has made Russia anxious about its hold in the region. This in turn could spark off new constellations of power and parallel structures. China has launched several initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to challenge the traditional Western-led world order. Within the area of regional security, China is increasingly using its own forums, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to advance structures that restrict the US engagement in managing conflicts in the region (SIPRI 2015). In this context, the announcement of the EUGS 2016 is crucial in making a relevant case for discussion of the EU’s role in shaping the Asian security order.

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The EU, despite facing criticism over its capability–expectations gap and struggling with in-house troubles, still retains the attraction of its soft power. As the biggest trading bloc and a storehouse of innovative technology, the EU also boasts expertise in non-traditional security issues. The Asian financial crisis and the post-9/11 era provided a context for the EU to increase its involvement with soft security issues in Asia. This has included a comprehensive understanding of security, such as addressing concerns related to social security and welfare, counter-terrorism, environmental challenges and support for ASEAN integration. The EU’s widening security engagement in the region comes from the acknowledgment that stability within European borders needs to be complemented by cooperation with trading partners and security of its trading and maritime routes. However, the EU is largely perceived to be absent as a security actor in Asia, although the lack of visibility could be attributed to the fact that the EU’s influence is more indirect in nature. The EU has given funds to the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime and International Maritime Organisation for counter-piracy efforts and is also investing in regional maritime capacity-building (EEAS 2016). It also funds major drug-related projects in countries such Afghanistan, mainly via EU Regional Programmes. In Myanmar, the EU set up a task force in 2013 to help the country in transition by bringing together all the tools in its repertoire: development aid, peace process support and investment (European Commission 2013). Eyeing the region as a potential area to capitalise on gains and strategic partnerships, the EU therefore sets out to make greater practical contributions to Asian security. It is looking to move beyond existing areas of cooperation, that is, trade and investment, development aid, crisis management and counter-terrorism measures. For instance, Afghanistan offers an opportunity for the EU to redefine its strategic engagement in the region by ensuring a more visible political presence and coordinating with regional actors. Even Asian states are interested in something more substantial on the part of the EU, offering a deeper exchange. Maritime security is a potential area for the EU to strategically engage in Asia, given its rich experience in coordinating maritime activities. Illegal fishing, piracy and a host of other issues related to the blue economy may be relevant for littoral states. The EUGS spells out explicitly the EU’s ability to explore a potential role in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca as part of its contribution to global maritime security, taking its cue from its experiences in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean (European Commission 2016). Since the EU is a signatory

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of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it can steer cooperation in the field of maritime security. The EU’s handling of the refugee influx inside its territories is another area where lessons can be shared with Asia, which currently faces crises such as that involving the Rohingya. The inter-regional cooperation with regard to migration and related security issues can increase awareness of the common problems, areas for mutual learning and human rights protection. The EU’s diplomatic efforts in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal can be further extended to harmonise interests and positions on other salient issues such as energy, human rights, environment and refugees (Mousavian 2016). Deepening strategic engagement with Iran will also prove crucial for regional stability and cooperation in West Asia. Europe seeks to adapt its ‘civilian power’ to changing realities and project itself as a ‘smart power’ combining both hard and soft power. The aim is to meet foreign policy priorities through strategic diplomacy and a ‘joined-up approach’ (European Commission 2016). By doing so, it seeks to improve its own profile by drawing on its core areas of competence, anchored in economic power with strategic and security implications. This approach is based on both realistic assessment and idealistic aspiration: ‘principled pragmatism’ (Cross 2016). The EU needs to be more sensitive and realistic in promoting its normative agenda (Cameron 2017). A realistic objective for the EU would be to establish itself as a significant interlocutor on Asian foreign and security policy matters and thereby forge convergence on global policy issues as well (Engelbrekt 2012). The EU needs to move past beyond its conventional image as an economic actor in Asia despite all efforts to push the political and security dimension, including non-traditional security issues. As the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini urged states during the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2015 not to restrict seeing the EU only as offering extensive trade opportunities but also as a security and defence partner (Mogherini 2015). The reluctance to welcome the EU into the East Asia Summit, which includes the USA, China, India, Russia, Japan and Australia, indicates that the EU is not seen a relevant player in shaping the Asian security order. This also relates to the issue of coherence in EU policymaking. A divergence of views exists among the EU members on the strategic importance of Asia and whether the region should be a foreign policy priority. The EU is unable to engage with forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus as it concerns matters of defence, which are exclusive to each EU member state. Thus, a coherent

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position by the Union concerning military and defence in Asia is lacking. At present, the EU is only a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is in a dormant state. As plethora of multilateral forums has emerged in Asia for security cooperation, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia; it would be interesting to observe how best the EU can leverage a potential role for itself here. Given its experience and expertise in institution-building, the EU can seize this as an opportunity to reenergise ARF for enhanced security cooperation in the region (Weber 2013). While the EUGS 2016 emphasises regional multilateralism and inter-­ regional groupings to cement a strong relationship with Asia, it singles out China as a key partner to address various challenges in Asia. It calls for a coherent approach to respond to China’s connectivity efforts (European Commission 2016). The BRI offers a range of opportunities and a context for the EU to strategically articulate its foreign and security policy objectives, especially in Central and South Asia. In such a scenario, the EU has an opportunity to enhance its engagement with China on non-traditional security issues and to strengthen regional multilateralism. In addition to economic engagement, China’s grand scheme of connecting continents and reviving old routes needs a comprehensive assessment: how will it unfold in terms of influencing the geopolitical and security dynamics of the countries it passes through? This in turn can have implications for security issues such as political stability, terrorism, peacekeeping and conflict resolution and peace-building, particularly in South Asia.

Rekindling the India–EU Strategic Partnership Although they have been in a strategic partnership since 2004, both India and EU are yet to realise its full potential. For Indian policy-makers, Europe does not rank high on influencing strategic issues; it is rather viewed as a reluctant player in the Asian politics. The EU itself remains constrained in its role as a security actor and continues to rely on the military and intelligence assets of its member states. India has therefore shown alacrity to engage bilaterally with the UK, Germany and France on hard security issues and does not consider the EU as a significant player in its strategic thinking (Britsch 2014). A lack of convergence over issues resulted in a stalemate, with the annual EU–India Summit postponed for four consecutive years, since 2012. At the 2017 Summit held in New

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Delhi, the two sides issued a lengthy joint statement detailing progress on many areas of cooperation, mainly related to developmental and technical matters. Although the free trade agreement negotiations remain deadlocked due to a lack of agreement on various issues, what deserves attention is the intensified engagement on a political and strategic partnership. India and the EU, as ‘natural partners’ (Juncker 2017), can identify potential areas for cooperation and for enhancing their strategic engagement in Asia. The EUGS 2016 re-emphasises a full spectrum approach for addressing some of the pressing security challenges. As India seeks to expand its global footprint, it can approach the EU as a potential partner while engaging with challenging regions such as West Asia. The EU cannot ignore India’s rise and strategic role in fast-changing Asia. Similarly, with growing proximity between Russia and China, an enduring European liaison has become an urgent Indian priority (Raja Mohan 2017). Given the uncertainty in the current international order and the shifting distribution of power, India has carefully chosen multi-­ alignment in its foreign policy, seeking to diversify options to balance China. Rather than pursuing any particular normative agenda in international relations, India has preferred ‘normative hedging’ to pursue its foreign policy objectives, manage key security challenges and accelerate its economic development (Hall 2017, 279). A multipolar word required India to build bilateral relationships with all key players (Jaishankar 2015). The EU, on the other hand, needs to deepen its engagement in Asia in order to understand the changing dynamics in the region—of which India is a crucial part. Driven by a changing global environment, New Delhi is reaching out to Brussels for enhanced cooperation in security domains such as cyber-space and intelligence sharing. Having witnessed a spate of terrorist attacks in the recent past, both India and the EU have stepped up cooperation on counter-terrorism. Both sides realise that much common ground needs to be explored while engaging with global security challenges. India and the EU have adopted a comprehensive action plan on combating terrorism and expanding security cooperation. This includes sharing of experiences with regard to radicalisation, preventing terrorist financing and increasing cooperation under the UN framework. A range of issues can be tabled on the agenda for India and the EU to engage with and strengthen their strategic partnership. The India–EU Security Dialogue has discussed issues such as cyber-security, counter-­ piracy and non-proliferation. Moreover, both sides have stressed their shared concerns or interests regarding regional security hotspots such as

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Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and West Asia (Saran et  al. 2016). India and the EU have raised some concerns related to the BRI and are cautious about growing Chinese inroads in the Eurasian heartland. The joint statement at the India–EU Summit 2017 indicated that the connectivity issues must be based on ‘universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and international law’ (Press Information Bureau 2017). India, as part of the Quad—India, the USA, Japan and Australia—aimed at balancing the rise of China, serves as a recognition of its leadership credentials and geopolitical importance in shaping the international order. India, which is seen as a ‘net security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific region, underscores its growing stature and is a key player in the evolving Asian security order. New Delhi is augmenting its engagement with ASEAN, ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting to strengthen defence relations with ASEAN countries through the sale of equipment, conducting joint combat operations, and participating in training and exchange programmes forming a crucial part of its ‘Act East’ policy (Kundu 2017). The ‘Act East’ is an upgraded version of India’s highly successful ‘Look East’ policy initiated in 1991.

Conclusion Regional integration in Asia is based on the Westphalian idea of territorial integrity and sovereignty. In such a scenario, a post-Westphalian actor such as the EU needs to devise novel forms of engagement. An advantage with the EU is that it has no competing claims on territory or military interests in Asia. This can give it a stronger and more objective authority as an actor, allowing it to underscore respect for international law and importance of multilateralism. In matters of strategic importance such as the South China Sea, the non-claimant status of the EU can be helpful. The soft security challenges open up new possibilities for the EU to stress its actorness. The challenge for the EU is to strategically engage Asian states which are currently distracted by US–China competition for geopolitical balancing (Youngs 2015). The EU, while strategising on the nature of its engagement in Asia, has to bring in partners whose values, international outlook, norm compliance and regard for international law are compatible with Europe’s perspectives and interests. Thus, its natural partnership with India can be leveraged to articulate a coherent strategy for Asia. As a result, a new narrative to overcome its strategic marginalisation is needed, focusing on best practices, areas of strength (such as ­developing a rule-based regional

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architecture), conflict management (through upholding the rule of law) and enhanced cooperation in the fields of cyber and maritime security. The EUGS 2016 attempts to underline the fact that if not the key actor, Europe is certainly not a fence-sitter in Asian security. A better understanding of the regional dynamics is possible only through constructive engagement. The foremost task that lies ahead before the EU is to counter the prevailing and popular narrative that it lacks capacity, interest and resilience in shaping Asian security order. The EU should set a minimum benchmark for balancing its normative agenda with commercial and strategic interests. For this, it would be more pragmatic for the EU to tread cautiously and identify potential areas in Asia to forge security partnerships. As its neighbourhood will always remain a top priority for its foreign and security policy priority, the EU may look at targeted interventions and adopt a selective approach while engaging as a security actor in Asia. This could include conflict resolution, maritime security, border management, migration, humanitarian assistance and cyber-security. Overall, the EU needs to rise above declaratory proposals and rhetoric if it aspires to be seen as a credible and desirable security actor in Asia. It needs to more clearly delineate its role in the Asian security order, its vision for governance in relation to other important stakeholders, including not only the USA and China, but also India and Russia, middle powers and local actors. At present, the EU seems busy with resolving more local crises and lacks a strategic conception of the type of regional order it envisions for Asia. China’s growing footprint in Eurasia makes it imperative for the EU to bring in all possible stakeholders. Rather than discussing the region as an outsider, the focus should be on holding dialogue with partners within the region. Therefore, it would be more pragmatic for the EU to invest in its ‘beyond China, beyond trade’ agenda and upgrade the multidimensional nature of its strategic relationships across Asia.

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CHAPTER 8

The Right Matters in European Politics Bhaswati Sarkar

For Europe and the European integration project, 2017 promised to be a critical year. Coming on the heels of the refugee crisis and Brexit, three significant European Union (EU) states—the Netherlands, France and Germany—were due to hold elections amid the growing strength of right-­ wing parties across Europe in general and in these states in particular. In May 2016, Europe came very near to electing its first far-right head of state since 1945 when Norbert Hofer of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) narrowly lost to Alexander Van der Bellen, the former Green Party leader, in the Austrian presidential elections (The Economist, 24 May 2016). Following Donald Trump’s victory in the American elections of 2016, the right wing in Europe appeared emboldened. In that year the right-wing populist group in the European Parliament held a convention in the western German city of Koblenz. Right-wing leaders Frauke Petry of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Marine Le Pen of the National Front (France), Geert Wilders of the Party for Freedom (the Netherlands) Matteo Salvini of the Northern League (Italy) came together in a show of strength. In her speech during what was her first public appearance in Germany, Le Pen said that ‘2016 was the year that the Anglo-Saxon world woke up,’ adding that Britain’s vote in the previous year to leave the European Union would have a ‘domino effect’ across the bloc (Brady 2017). Right-wing political B. Sarkar (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_8

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parties are in the ascendant across European states and they have come to substantially influence the politics of these states. This appears surprising when one recalls the horrors of the Second World War, which ultimately ended with the defeat of fascism, an ideology that represented extreme right-wing politics; Europeans resolutely went on to establish liberal democratic states in much of Europe. It is important therefore to focus on why in recent years right-wing parties have been successful, what the issues they focus on are and how their presence and performance has affected the political discourse and policies in their respective countries. As the title of the chapter indicates, it begins with the given that the right matters in Europe; it essentially probes why it matters and how we have arrived at this given. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first deals with the definitional aspect. The second looks at the movement of these parties from the margins to the centre by cataloguing their performance in various European states; it argues that the right may have been at the margins but was present all along. It also looks at the internal disputes and dissent within some of these parties as they adjusted their strategies in the new democratic milieu. The third looks at the issues that these parties focus on, arguing that these issues have been reinforced under globalisation. This has resulted in the emergence of a new generation of right-wing parties, which can be characterised as products of the post-industrial context.

Defining the Right Wing Right and left entered the political lexicon in 1789, the year of the French Revolution. On 29 August that year the Assemblee Constituante had to decide whether they wanted to allow the king veto rights; those in favour were asked to move to the right and those against to the left (Ignazi 2010, p. 4). This then came to represent the political distinction between ‘traditionalists/conservatives and modernizers/renovators’. Though right-­ wing extremism and parties have been extensively discussed, like most social science concepts an unequivocal definition of right-wing extremism is hard to come by. Drawing on the available literature, it can be argued that such extremism refers to a particular ideology, a distinct political style, behaviour, strategy, organisation and electoral base (Carter 2005, p. 14). Mudde’s analysis of the literature found as many 58 different features defining right-wing extremism. Five of them—nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democratic sentiment and a preference for a strong state— appear to be common to most of them (Carter 2005, p. 15).

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This understanding, however, is not without its problems. Carter argues that anti-democratic and anti-constitutional political extremism can be as much a product of the left as of the right. The two can be distinguished, as Carter argues, by their attitude towards the ‘principle of fundamental human equality’. Extremism of the left accepts and supports this principle while extremism of the right strongly rejects it and emphasises the notion of individual inequality (Carter 2005, pp. 16–17). There is also disagreement among scholars on whether these parties should be termed radical or extremist. Radical groups or parties, many argue, are those that critique the constitutional order with no anti-democratic behaviour or intention (Carter 2005, p. 22). Extremist parties are those that are anti-­ democratic, anti-constitutional and hold anti-liberal values or intent (Carter 2005, p. 22). Another point of contention in the debates and writings on right-wing extremism is how far these parties resemble the fascist parties of inter-war years. The overwhelming understanding is that ‘fascist regimes can be paradigmatic instances of extreme right-wing politics, but this should not be taken as implying that all extreme right wing movements are necessarily fascist’ (Billig 1989, p. 146). Today’s extreme right is very much the product of contemporary developments, and not a return to a fascist or Nazi past. Just like the communist parties, the fascist parties were the by-­ products of the Industrial Revolution. The extreme right parties of the 1980s have come about in a very different context as by-products of post-­ industrial society. In post-industrial societies, ‘material interests are no longer central and class distinctions are neither sharp nor radically antagonistic’ (Merkl and Weinberg 2004, pp. 33–34).

From Margin to the Centre: The Continued Presence Right-wing political parties have increasingly become an acceptable part of European politics. That they have been able to overcome the legitimacy and credibility problem they suffered after the Second World War is proved by the increasing inroads that these parties are making electorally and the way they are setting the agenda of political discourse. These parties now feature in every state, though they do differ significantly in terms of their strength and the political space they occupy.

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While the extreme right-wing parties are today gaining increasing visibility and ground, they have been part of the political milieu of European states even after fascism and Nazism stood completely discredited after the Second World War. They had not really gone anywhere. Table 8.1 lists the parties espousing a fascist right-wing ideology that were part of many European states in the years immediately after the war (1945–1970s). Table 8.1  Right-wing parties in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in West European states Country

Party name

Year of Foundation

Italy Germany

The Italian Social Movement Association for Economic Reconstruction German Conservative Party/German Right Party Action Group/European People’s Movement for Germany Socialist Reich Party German Community Refugees and Victims Injustice Block German Reich Party National-Democratic German Party Young Nation National Union of Independents and Republicans Union for the Defence of Shopkeepers and Artisans Front National Wolves Austrian Association of Gymnastics Alliance of Liberal Students National Democratic Party Belgian National Party Young Europe Flemish Aggregation Order of Flemish Aggregation People’s Union Organization for Former Political Criminals Union of the Dutch People The League of Empire Loyalists White Defence League National Labour Party British National Party National Front Progress Party Andre Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction of Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention

1946 1945 1946 1949 1949

France

Austria

Belgium

The Netherlands United Kingdom

Denmark Norway

Source: Ignazi (2010)

1950 1950 1964 1949 1951 1954 1972 1940s 1952 1950 1967 1961 N/A 1949 1950 1954 1950 1971 1954 1957 1957 1960 1967 1973 1973

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Analysing the strong presence of extreme right-wing parties across Europe, Piero Ignazi classifies them as (1) old traditional and (2) new post-industrial extreme right-wing parties (Ignazi 2004, p. 53 in Merkl and Weinberg). The old traditional extreme right parties, he holds, are remnants of parties which came up as a result of the social clashes generated by industrialisation. The Italian Social Movement (MSI), the German National Democratic Party (NPD), the British National Party (BNP) and Centre Party’86 belong to this group and are part of the fascist tradition. The second group, the new postindustrial parties, includes the Austrian Liberal Party, the Flemish Bloc, the Belgian National Front, the National Front (France), The Republicans (Germany) and the Centre Democrats (the Netherlands). These parties on the other hand ‘have nothing to do with the fascist tradition and are outcomes of the conflicts of post-­industrial society where the class cleavages are neither sharp nor the only ones. In this society atomization and secularization have led to different cleavages and aggregations becoming important’. The traditional parties’ answers to the conflicts of post-industrial society have been found wanting and the new extreme right parties have filled that space. The new parties are not looking towards the rebirth or revival of fascism but focus on the defence of the national community; they desire more order, are impatient with democratic and representative procedures and search for a ‘charismatic’ leader (Ignazi 2004, pp.  52–55  in Merkl and Weinberg). In other words, Ignazi argues the new parties ‘are not old, disguised neo-fascist parties’ (Ignazi 2004, p. 54 in Merkl and Weinberd). Carter focusing on party ideology as reflected in their position on immigration, racist attitudes, attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism and pluralism, classifies right wing parties as - neo Nazi, neo-fascist, authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal xenophobic and neo-liberal populist (Carter 2005, pp.  50–51). Whichever typology one accepts as having greater explanatory potential, the fact remains that, even without getting into hair-splitting debates on what best characterises these parties, one can safely argue that they do belong to one family. A look at the old traditional parties during the early post-war years show how these parties struggled to adjust to the new liberal democratic set-up. This led the old traditional fascist parties to, at times, reinvent and tailor themselves to the new era. Just as mainstream parties are today meeting the right-wing challenge by co-opting many of their concerns and issues, post-war right-wing parties such as the MSI, instead of stressing the anti-system profile of the party, tried to find a place in the new democratic system. The MSI distanced itself from extra-legal right-wing groups and committed itself to democratic rules; its members realised that they were

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operating within a democratic anti-fascist regime and that they could only survive by accepting the new set-up and working within it. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, Oswald Mosley, who had formed the British Union of Fascists in 1932 after meeting Mussolini in Rome, formed the Union Movement in the post-war period. In its new incarnation, the Union Movement accepted—albeit reluctantly—the principles of democracy and also abolished ‘fascist symbolism and militia structure’ (Ignazi 2010, p. 175). However, this was not the case with all right-wing parties that emerged in post-war period. Furthermore, the distancing from fascist ideals and acceptance of liberal-democratic system, as many scholars have argued, has been tenuous. These parties are essentially at odds with the new system and its values. As Hainsworth (Hainsworth 2008, p.  12) argues, they may have given up on violence and ‘may “buy” into some of the trappings and institutions of the liberal-democratic system, but are not comfortable with the whole package’. These parties essentially aim not to change government but to put in place a qualitatively different system of political and social organisation. It is also evident that, irrespective of whether these parties openly accepted or challenged the democratic system, most experienced massive internal turmoil and conflicts. Again, to take the example of MSI, in 1950 the radical Giorgio Almirante was replaced by the moderate Alfredo De Marsanich, who advocated fitting into the system and striking electoral alliance with the monarchist party. This ploy paid off, with the party coming to govern important cities such as Naples, Bari and Catania alongside the monarchists and other minor conservative parties. But this electoral success did not mean that the moderate leadership did not face a challenge from the radical faction. There were repeated clashes, in 1956, 1960 and 1969, when the moderate leadership gave way to the radical Almirante (Ignazi 2010, pp.  35–41). In Germany, the NPD tasted electoral success between 1966 and 1968 when it overcame the 5 percent threshold in seven of the eight Länder. In the 1969 elections, however, when it failed to repeat its electoral success, there was an immediate inner party crisis—internal splits and the resignation of the party leader, Adolph Von Thadden (Ignazi 2010, p.  67). In the Netherlands, the Union of the Dutch People, formed in 1971, was authoritarian and anti-parliament and advocated promoting ethnic homogeneity by expelling ethnically diverse persons. It was a party with an unambiguous neo-fascist inspiration. But the extremist and radical position did not yield electoral success. In fact, in the local elections of 1978 it was debarred from standing by the Amsterdam court (Ignazi 2010, p. 164). The party

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suffered a split in 1980 when a group of members formed the Centre Party (CP). The CP aimed at preserving Dutch culture but distanced itself from NVU’s extreme nationalism. In 1982, it managed one deputy in the parliament, its leader Hans Janmaat. But by 1984 he himself was expelled from the party by the radical fringe, which felt he was too moderate and did not come from the ‘right extremist milieu’ (Ignazi 2010, p.  165). Though CP managed, minus its leader, to get six local councillors elected, its performance in the 1986 general elections was poor. In the summer of 1986, it was shut down and re-emerged a week later as Centre Party’86 with a modified world view, drifting towards ethnic nationalism, national revolution and an anti-Western, corporatist third way (Ignazi 2010, p. 165). Meanwhile, Janmaat’s new party, the Democratic Centre espoused a more moderate position. But even the Democratic Centre opposed parliamentary democracy and favoured a plebiscitarian democracy. The party’s electoral success met a strong reaction from anti-fascist and anti-racist organisations and, ironically, ostracism within the elective assemblies (Ignazi 2010, p. 167). The post-war extreme right parties in Britain were by and large unable to reap success. The first attempt was made by Mosley in 1948, when the Union Movement was put together. However, it did not succeed electorally, even when Mosley himself stood for elections in 1959. There were other attempts in the 1950s and 1960s. Colin Jordon founded the White Defence League in 1958 and John Tyndall formed the National Labour Party in 1957. The two merged in 1960 to form the BNP. These parties, which took up the issue of immigration early on, however, did not impact the British political scene as the issue was also quickly taken up by the Conservatives and controlled. Another attempt was made in 1967 by Martin Webster and Tyndall to put together an extreme right organisation—the National Front. The National Front attracted members, especially disillusioned Conservatives, and was a reasonable force in the 1970s, though again not electorally successful. Internal strife and divisions further weakened the party. In 1982, the BNP was formed from the National Front; however, the BNP itself became noteworthy after Nick Griffin took over as leader from Tyndall. By and large, the BNP has been successful in local council elections. In 2008, it did manage to gain a seat in the London Assembly and the following year had two members elected to the European Parliament. The 2010 Assembly elections were again a setback for the BNP (Husbands 2011, pp. 106–110). In West European, countries as Italy, France, Austria, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Germany the right wing parties are important

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­ olitical players. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which estabp lished democratic models of government after the systemic collapse, right-wing parties were quick to come up and strengthened especially after the advent of EU membership. In the well-performing countries of the Nordic region too (discussed here separately), right-wing parties are increasingly gaining strength. The electoral performance of these parties, whether old or new, clearly indicate their ascendance across Europe. According to Weinberg (Merkl and Weinberg 2004, p. 273), the best way to measure popular support for these parties is to look at national electoral returns and place them in historical context, comparing these parties, in other words, with their fascist predecessors of the inter-war period. This he, however, goes on to argue is problematic because for the Central and Eastern Europe countries competitive elections are a recent phenomenon. However, the electoral performance of these parties, even without reference to the historical context, can be a sufficient measure of their strength. The other indication of their strength is that the issues that the right wing has focused on are influencing political debate, discourse and policy. When in 2000 Jörg Haider was set to form part of the government in Austria there was a strong reaction in most European states; the EU threatened to impose sanctions in such an eventuality. This furore ignored the fact that the first post-war right-wing government was in fact formed in Italy by the MSI. The MSI, as indicated earlier, is among the group of old fascist parties. Formed in 1946, it was the first post-war right-wing party. In the inter-war period, Fascist Italy as the closest ally of Nazi Germany was guilty of many despicable crimes. However, the MSI used this past selectively to garner support. As Mattioli argues, the crimes have been deleted from the collective memory. ‘Instead, the final phase of World War II, in which Italy was occupied by Nazi Germany and was thus a victim itself, is put into the center of the remembrance discourse’ (Hausen 2013). In the first elections it contested in 1948, the MSI won six seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the next two decades, 1950s to the early 1970s, it secured on average 25 seats. The electoral support for the MSI fluctuated at around 5%, with its support peaking in 1972 at almost 9%. Votes for the MSI came from protest votes, those who were nostalgic, those who supported traditional values and from those southerners who resented the north of the country. Though the moderates, initially worried about the MSI’s success, also at times relied on MSI votes, as in 1960, for example, when the MSI was a part of the parliamentary

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majority. This led to protest riots, which caused the Christian Democratic government to collapse. In the 1972 general elections, the MSI joined the right-wing party, the Italian Democratic Party of Monarchical Unity, to form an alliance known as the National Right (Encyclopaedia Britannica). In the 1980s, the party saw a resurgence. In 1983, it gained 42 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Subsequently support for the party dipped and in 1994 it refashioned itself as the National Alliance (AN). In the following year the MSI was formally dissolved. From the mid-1990s, under Gianfranco Fini’s leadership, the party distanced itself from its fascist heritage. Fini himself disowned previous statements he had made calling Mussolini the greatest statesman of the twentieth century and referred to fascism as an ‘absolute evil’. For the parliamentary elections of 1994, The National Alliance formed an alliance with newly formed centre-right parties, Forza Italia and the Northern League. The alliance succeeded in sweeping the 1994 elections. The National Alliance polled 13.5% of the vote and managed six cabinet posts in the new government (Ignazi 2010, pp. 35–50). The governing coalition could not complete its term but the National Alliance saw its share of the vote increase to 16% in 1996. In 2001 the National Alliance was back in power as part of centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Fini was appointed deputy Prime Minister and foreign minister in 2004. However, once again, the coalition collapsed in 2006 (Encyclopaedia Britannica). The following year, 2007, the National Alliance joined with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia to create a new centre-right political grouping, the People of Freedom. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, this grouping gained power. In 2009 the National Alliance formally merged with Forza Italia. This resulted in the emergence of a single party of the centre right, the People of Freedom (Chiarini 2011, p. 48). However, to begin with, many of their members did not follow the new line. They continued as smaller extreme right-wing factions. The Social Action group led by Mussolini’s granddaughter Alessandra was one such faction; it also subsequently merged with Berlusconi’s party. In 2010 Berlusconi and Fini again fell out. Apart from the old traditional MSI, Forza Italia and Lega Nord are two important right-wing parties in Italy. In 1994, Silvio Berlusconi transformed the political landscape in Italy with his party Forza Italia; within months, in the March elections Forza Italia won 21% of the proportional representation votes and 15.7% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. It was after this that right-wing parties Forza Italia, Lega Nord and MSI/AN formed a coalition and the right-wing established themselves as credible

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political actors and stakeholders in the crisis prone Italian political system. Patrick McCarthy argues that Berlusconi had two advantages: as the owner of TV networks and of AC Milan football club, he could engage in politics as spectacle; in addition, Berlusconi depicted himself as a man of the people, which was crucial in a country where populism, whether left-­wing or right-wing, cultural or political, was endemic. This advantage did not last long and, in 1996, Forza Italia lost, only to be back in office in 2001. In and out of power, Berlusconi finally resigned in 2011 when he came under increasing criticism for his inability to tackle the debt crisis. He has since then been trying to re-launch Forza Italia and fight elections—without much success. The other party, Lega Nord, led by Umberto Bossi, is also right of the spectrum. The Lega Nord, as the name suggests, was formed in the northern part of Italy (in 1991), the most highly developed and modernised region of the country. Lega’s voter base was in the north. The party from its very inception had stressed on the agenda of conserving the north—its material prosperity and traditional values. Its demands have vacillated between federalist reform of the state (1992–1993) to an split, decentralisation, devolution and back to federalism. The Lega has protested against taxation and security policy. But what puts it in the ‘right’ basket is its anti-immigrant politics. The rejection of foreigners played a major role in the electoral decisions of Lega voters. The party severely criticises the ‘open door’ policy for people from outside the EU. For them, ‘immigration from the Third World subverts society and leads to fascism’ (Chiarini 2011, p. 152). They openly called for the persecution of foreigners. One can mention two such calls that appeared on Facebook: the ‘game’ ‘Bounce the illegal immigrant’ was suggested by Bossi’s son to ‘scare off’ illegal immigrants, while the call, ‘Illegal immigrants: Torture them! It’s self-defence!’ was printed on a flyer produced by the Lega (Chiarini 2011, p. 153). Bossi led the party from 1991 to 2012. Under his leadership, the party was part of governing coalitions in 1994 and between 2001 and 2011. Currently, Matteo Salvini leads the party, having defeated Bossi in a leadership election in 2013. Under Salvini, the party has abandoned its demand that Italy become a federal state, it has made inroads in the south, focusing on nationalism, immigration, law and order. Salvini is seeking to step into the vacant space Forza Italia’s collapse has created and to that end is reaching out to extreme right-wing parties inside and outside Italy. In the 2015 regional elections the Lega succeeded in making inroads in Tuscany, the left-wing bastion of the country, wining 20% of the vote. Opinion polls in

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2016 suggest that if general elections were held the Lega was likely to receive 16–17% support, a vast improvement from the 2013 historic low of 4% that had kept it out of the Senate (Paravicini 2016). Another party that has gone on to gain extreme popularity in Italy is MoVimento 5 Stelle (M5S) or the Five Star Movement, established in 2009. It has become one of the most ‘voted-for parties’ in Italy. Giuseppe Peiro Grillo started the Five Star Movement with his web strategist and the editor of his blog, Gianroberto Casaleggio, to bring people together to campaign on local issues. The five stars stand for the five top issues that the movement is pursuing: public management of water; sustainable mobility; development; connectivity; and the environment. Its policies, like those of other right-wing parties, have been anti-establishment, environmentalist, anti-globalist and Eurosceptic, but it is difficult to categorise it as a right-wing party as it draws support across the political spectrum (Pazzini 2014, p. 71). Given their professional background, the founders’ focus was on revitalising local participation and reclaiming power lost to the political and technocratic elites. Grillo floated the idea of online democracy/e-democracy substantiated by offline local-level participation where citizens would contribute in person (Pazzini 2014, p. 74). In the 2013 general elections, Five Star bagged 30% of the vote and became Italy’s biggest opposition party and Europe’s biggest elected anti-­ establishment party. In 2014, it was placed second among Italian parties in the European Parliament elections. Since then, it has won municipal polls in many large cities, including in Rome, Turin and Livorno, and in dozens of small ones, especially in the south, which suffers from high levels of youth unemployment (The Globe and Mail, 24 March 2017; BBC, 20 June 2016). France has recently been in the news as, following the Brexit shock, the whole of Europe waited with baited breath to see what French voters would deliver. France went to the polls at a time when the popularity of Front National under Marine Le Pen was at an all-time high and the established parties struggled with voters’ disillusionment. A spate of terror attacks from 2015 to 2017 had thoroughly discredited the established parties and provided fertile ground for the right wing. A strong extreme right has been a permanent feature of French political life and has been identified with the Front National since the party’s inception in 1972 (Camus 2011). It was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was its undisputed leader till he resigned in 2011, leaving his daughter Marine Le Pen in charge. Apart from the Front National, there are other

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extreme-right players in France—the Mouvement National Républicain, the Parti de la France and the Bloc Identitaire—but none have made a mark like the Front National. The first local councillor for the Front National was elected in the city of Dreux, in September 1983 (Camus 2011, p. 83). The following year the Front National tasted its first nationwide success in the European elections. Though the mainstream conservative parties decided avoid any agreement with Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Front National’s ideas had already caught the imagination of a wide segment of the French electorate. As a result, the right influenced the political agenda on issues such as immigration, law and order, multiculturalism and the definition of national identity. Following the election of President Sarkozy in 2007, his mainstream party leaned heavily towards the right-­ wing agenda, which adversely affected the performance of the Front National. By 2010, however, the Front National had recovered in the polls (Camus 2011). Under Marine Le Pen, the popularity of Front National grew and it performed well in local, regional and European elections. In 2014, the party won in several municipalities. In the regional elections, it got just under 28% of the vote and in the European Parliament elections in the same year it received 25% of the vote (The Economist, 26 May 2014). By 2015, the Front National had established itself as the largest political force in France. In the 2017 Presidential elections, however, she failed to capitalise on her anti-EU, anti-immigrant populist propaganda and lost out Emmanuel Macron. In the parliamentary elections her party won 8 of 577 seats and Marine Le Pen entered the National Assembly for the first time (The Telegraph, 19 June 2017). Apart from Front National, there are small players in France such as the Mouvement National Républicain, founded in 1999 by Bruno Mégret, the Front National’s former second-in-command, Parti de la France, led by Carl Lang, another leading member of the Front National, who left in 2008, and the Bloc Identitaire, launched in 2009 and headed by Fabrice Robert (Camus 2011). As in France, 2017 was an election year for the Netherlands and Geert Wilders’ populist right-wing party—the Party for Freedom (PVV)—was expected to outperform the established parties. Wilders is a former member of the Conservative-Liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. He left it in 2004 because of the party’s positive stance on Turkey’s proposed EU membership. In parliament, Wilders has been an anti-Islam voice. In the 2006 elections his new party, the PVV, won nine seats in parliament.

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Wilders has made criticism of immigration, support for freedom of speech, and attacks on the fundamental beliefs of Islam and the presence of young Moroccans in the cities the main planks of his party and politics. In 2008, he produced a 15-minute anti-Islam, anti-Koran film, Fitna, which included images of bombing, beheadings and Koranic verses alluding that the Koran teaches and permits such violence (Crouch, New York Times, 28 March 2008). The following year, on 21 January 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ordered Wilders’ prosecution for ‘incitement to hatred and discrimination’. On 12 February that year, the UK Home Office banned Wilders’ entry on the grounds that he threatened ‘one of the fundamental interests of society’. The ban was subsequently lifted following an appeal. In the post-9/11 period, Wilders’ anti-Muslim feelings have struck a chord among many in the Netherlands and have gained popularity. Wilders has never engaged in any debate; his soundbites inside and outside parliament, however, have given him high visibility. His party has no structures and he handpicks the individuals who run for election. He follows a simple operating procedure. For instance, he might send out an SMS or Tweet saying that Muslims are the cause of the traffic jam problem in the country. Ridiculous as such a claim may seem, the media publishes this, inviting politicians and experts to comment; in the process Wilders dominates the media space for days. Wilders has unabashedly asserted that the Koran is a fascist book that should be banned, demanded an end to Muslim immigration and said that he wants all anti-­discrimination articles from the Dutch penal code deleted, asserting ‘Because I WANT to discriminate’ (Eissens and Bronkhorst 2011, pp. 127–128 in Langenbacher & Schellenberg). This is not to argue that Wilders has succeeded because of his tactics. He has succeeded because a significant section of Dutch society agrees with Wilders that Muslims are a danger to their society. They feel that the leftist-controlled media demonises anyone with alternative views. PVV voters are not illiterate masses swayed by Wilders. In fact, research shows that 16% of PVV voters have higher education qualifications and most of them are male and atheist. Surveys also show that they are disappointed in and do not trust what is called ‘the multicultural establishment’. In their opinion, it is this establishment that is to be blamed for all the ills of society, and above all for the presence of what they identify as the main culprit: the Muslims (Eissens and Bronkhorst 2011, p. 129 in Langenbacher & Schellenberg).

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For the 3 March 2010 local elections held for the Dutch city councils the PVV ran in only two cities, Almere and The Hague. In Almere, the PVV won nine seats and in The Hague eight (Eissens and Bronkhorst 2011, p. 130). Wilders and his associates were ecstatic but in neither The Hague nor in Almere did the PVV succeed in forming a coalition with the other parties. But this isolation did not last long; in the general election of 9 June 2010, the PVV won 24 parliamentary seats. This was the election when the Christian Democratic Party, led by outgoing Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, lost half its seats—it was reduced from 41 to only 21 seats. The social democrats of the Labour Party and Mark Rutte’s conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy were neck and neck, securing 30 and 31 seats respectively (van Kessel 2010). Rutte went on to form the government propped up by Wilders’ PVV, which he characterised as ‘a normal party’. Two years later, Wilders withdrew his support, leading to fresh elections in which the PVV suffered heavy loss and was reduced from 24 to 15 seats. However, in the 2017 elections, the PVV was expected to emerge as the major party in the Dutch Parliament. This did not happen, much to the relief of most European leaders, but the PVV still registered a clear improvement on its previous 15 seats, increasing this to 20. Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s party (the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) managed to retain its majority, holding on to 33 seats but actually suffered a loss of eight seats (Daily Mail, 15 March 2017). This recent upsurge of right-wing extremism in the Netherlands started towards the end of the 1980s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, right-­ wing extremist groups revived in the Netherlands. The one that seriously attempted to participate in elections was the CP.  It was led by Hans Janmaat, a disaffected social studies teacher who had been a member of most of the mainstream parties in the Netherlands. The party’s agenda was openly racist, blaming foreigners for all the ills of the country. The party split into two factions—one extreme, the CP’86, and the other moderate, the Centre Democrats. The more extreme CP’86 won four seats in Dutch municipal elections in 1990, and five seats in 1994, but collapsed due to internal radicalisation (Eissens and Bronkhorst 2011, p.  124  in Langenbacher & Schellenberg). It was officially banned as a criminal organisation in a court verdict of 1998. The moderate Centre Democrats, for their part, managed to get elected to a number of Dutch city councils. 1994 marked the height of their popularity; they gained a total of 77 seats across the country and in the general elections that year also managed to win three parliamentary seats (Eissens and Bronkhorst 2011, p.  125).

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However, they lost all their seats in the general elections of 1998 and have not recovered from the setback. The other right-wing party in the Netherlands was Lijst Pim Fortuyn. Though it had completely disappeared from the political map by 2006, its charismatic leader, Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered in 2002 by an extremist animal-rights activist, can arguably be said to be a precursor to what Wilders has now come to represent. In an interview in 2002, Fortyun stated that he intended to abolish the first article of the Dutch constitution—the article guaranteeing equality and non-discrimination. In the general elections scheduled and held days after Fortyun’s murder, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn won 26 parliamentary seats and formed part of the new coalition with the Conservative Liberals and Christian Democrats. The coalition lasted for only 86 days; it was followed by fresh elections. Minus its leader, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn returned with only eight seats in parliament (Eissens and Bronkhorst 2011, p.  127  in Langenbacher & Schellenberg). Like Italy, Austria has a history to contend with. In the aftermath of the Second World war, Austria went on to establish a consociational model of politics and grand alliances to keep extremists at bay. Two parties dominated Austrian politics—the Social Democrats and the centrist People’s Party—but by the mid-1980s right-wing populist parties such as the FPÖ had managed to crawl from the margins to the centre and under Jörg Haider became a well-established force. Till about the 1970s, the FPÖ remained on the fringes but thereafter as it gradually moved away from an extreme position to a moderate one was accepted into the Liberal International in 1979; in 1982, under party leader Norg Steger, it became a part of the governing coalition with the Social Democratic Party. However, this moderate move did not go unchallenged and the radical faction under Haider stressed a nationalist, populist stance. Haider’s power within the party grew and he was, by 1986, able to take control of the party. This led Social Democrat Chancellor Franz Vranitzky to formally dissolve the SPÖ–FPÖ governing coalition and call for new elections; in these, Haider’s FPÖ garnered 9.7% of the vote. In the Carinthia regional elections, the FPÖ polled 29% of the vote and Haider became the regional president. A year later, the FPÖ gained 16.6% of the vote in the general elections. Haider further consolidated his position within the party by removing both liberal and extreme fringes and filling the positions with local loyalists, including television personalities, business tycoons and Olympic skiers (Art 2011, pp.  136–138). In the national elections of

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1994, the FPÖ gained 22.5% of the vote. This success continued throughout the remainder of the 1990s; in elections to the national parliament and the European Parliament, the party won over 20% of the vote. In 1997 the party moved towards denouncing immigration, multiculturalism and globalisation. The EU sanctioned its position in 2000. In the following elections of 2002, the FPÖ experienced its worst electoral performance since 1986, winning only 10% of the vote. This led to the usual party infighting, so much so that Haider left FPÖ and founded the Alliance for the Future of Austria in 2005, which managed to gain 4.1% of the vote in the 2006 general elections. In 2008, the party recovered to poll 10.7% of the vote. The FPÖ meanwhile continued to perform well under its new leader Heinz-Christian Strache, winning 14.8% in the Viennese state elections of October 2005 and 11% in the parliamentary elections of 2006. In 2008, the FPÖ received 17.5% of the vote (Pasquarè Roberta n.d., p. 41). The FPÖ continued to be an active player, to such an extent that in 2016 FPÖ’s Norbert Hofer was slated to win the presidential elections. Opinion polls put Hofer and Alexander Van der Bellen neck and neck and most observers expected a keen contest. In the end, after 11 months of acrimonious campaign in the context of refugees, unemployment and disillusionment with regular mainstream parties, the Austrians narrowly elected the Greens-backed independent candidate Van der Bellen with 53.3% of the vote, against Hofer’s 46.7% (Fox News, 4 December 2016). In the October 2017 parliamentary elections, immigration dominated the campaign. The results put the Conservatives at the top, with the new Austrian People’s Party getting 31.5%/62 seats followed, by the liberals with 26.9%/52 seats and the FPÖ a close third with 26%/51 seats (Austrian Embassy Washington, October 2017). The People’s Party and the FPÖ formed a government in December 2017, with eight and six cabinet posts respectively. This time around there was no repeat of the 2000 outcry from the EU. The FPÖ bagged key portfolios of the interior, defence and foreign ministries (BBC News, 16 December 2017). Another important country to look at is Germany, which has had its share of right-wing parties. 2017 was also an election year in Germany. The right-wing party which has been in news of late is Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The AfD’s initial supporters were prominent economists, business leaders and journalists. Its first public presence came in April 2013 when it held its first convention in Berlin, elected the party leadership and adopted a party platform.

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In the 2013 federal election, the AfD, with 4.7% of the vote, narrowly missed the 5% electoral threshold required to enter the Bundestag. In the European election, however, it managed seven seats (AfD, ipfs). Thereafter AfD’s has consistently bettered its electoral performance. In May 2013, it gained its first representation in Hesse state parliament (AfD, ipfs). In August 2014, AfD won 14 seats in Saxony state; in September of the same year, it won 11 seats each in the Thuringian and Brandenburg state elections (AfD, ipfs). In February 2015, it won eight seats in Hamburg, and a few months later in May it won five seats in Bremen (AfD, ipfs). In 2016, against the backdrop of the migrant debate, the party further improved its vote share. In the three states of Baden Wurttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony Anhalt, it received 15.1, 12.6 and 24.2% of the vote, respectively translating to 23, 14 and 25 seats (Kuzmany 2016). In Merkel’s home state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, it polled 20.8% of the vote, securing 18 seats (AfD, ipfs). At its party congress of 2016, the AfD, like many of its right-wing counterparts, adopted a policy platform based on opposition to Islam, calling for a ban on Islamic symbols including the burka, the minarets and the call to prayer, under the slogan ‘Islam is not a part of Germany’ (Bellon 2016). Right-wing parties, however, are not new to Germany. One of the most successful radical right-wing parties, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)—the National Democratic Party of Germany—was set up as early as 1964. Between 1966 and 1968, the party won seats in seven regional assemblies but in the 1969 general election the NPD failed to reach the 5% requirement for entry to the German parliament (Ignazi 2010, p. 67). It was only in the late 1990s that the party was able to come out of the margins under the leadership of Udo Voigot. In 1998, the party came up with its ‘three pillar’ strategy: the ‘battle for the streets’, ‘battle for the minds’ and ‘battle for the voters/representative assemblies’ (Schellenberg 2011, pp. 58–59). Apart from the NPD, there were other right-wing parties, such as the Republicans and the German People’s Union, which also registered some electoral success. In 2004, the NPD and the German People’s Union entered into an electoral pact and managed to register electoral success in the Saxon and Brandenburg assemblies, respectively (Schellenberg 2011, p. 62). Switzerland, known for its robust democracy, is another country with a long tradition of right-wing populism. Since the 1960s, seven different right-wing populist parties have been electorally successful enough to win

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seats in the national parliament, but until the early 1990s they by and large operated at the fringes. However, even then using the mechanisms of direct democracy they succeeded in pursuing an ‘anti-foreigner agenda’ (Cultures Contexts 2017). The fringe right thus managed to set the tone for the immigration debate by using the threat of a referendum to force the mainstream to make serious concessions. In the early 1990s, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) established itself as the main right-wing party. It successfully used popular support for anti-­ immigration issues for electoral gain. The party dates back to the 1920s and has been part of governing coalitions since 1959. Over the years, especially since 1999, under the leadership of Christoph Blocher, the party has gone from strength to strength. In election after election since 1991 it has improved its electoral performance. In 1991, it had 11% of the vote/25 seats; in 1995, this increased to 14.9%/29 seats, which further increased in 1999 to 23% of the vote/44 seats. In the 2003 elections it again performed well, garnering 26.7% of the vote/55 seats; in 2007, the SVP won 29% of the vote/62 seats (Hainsworth 2008, pp. 44–45). In 2011, its vote share reduced to 26.6%, only to bounce back to 29.4% in the most recent election in 2015 (Bernhard 2016). Led by Blocher, its goal is to defend the ‘Christian West’ and its values against the alleged threat of Islamisation. Blocher said, ‘We had the Turks at the gates of Vienna once, we don’t need that again’ (Schulz 2011, 31). They used posters of the ‘black sheep’ or a woman in a burka standing in front of a minaret to drive home their point (Schulz 2011, 39). Skenderovic also identifies the Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland established in 1975 as an early important player (Skenderovic, 2011, 160  in Langenbacher and Schellenberg). Its electoral success has been modest but it has with like minded smaller players been able to initiate and keep debate and discourse on immigration alive. The party entered the Swiss National Council in 1991 with one seat, and in 2003, gained a second one (Dardanelli, 2005, 126). In 2007 it was reduced to one seat, only to lose it in 2011; it lost its seat in the Assembly elections (EDU-UDF, Election Results). Since the late 1980s, the populist right has negatively affected a range of issues. For instance, as Riding points out, ‘it has prevented facilitated naturalization of children and grandchildren of immigrants, forced a tightening of asylum laws, and in 1992 ensured the defeat of Swiss ­participation in the European Economic Area […] which many believed to be the stepping stone towards EU membership’ (Riding 1992). On 9 November 2009, in a nationwide referendum, 57.5% of voters approved

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a ban proposed by the Swiss popular initiative against the construction of new minarets (Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger 2009; also see Pommereau 2009). In February 2014, the political right for the first time managed to pass a measure that would limit immigration, in clear violation of existing treaties with the EU (BBC News show 9 February 2014).

Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe has been in the news especially during the recent refugee crisis in Europe, when countries in this region stuck a discordant note by refusing to take in refugees. They have had their share of right-wing populist parties. But given the recent history of this area, nationalism pervades as an ideology as much for the right wing as the mainstream players. The radical right in this region is more oriented towards the past. Romania had right-wing parties, such as the Romanian Cradle (Vatra Romaneasca) and the Party for Greater Romania (Partidul Romania Mare), which became active in the early years after the systemic collapse of the socialist system. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar’s party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, which was in power in the early days of Slovak independence had nationalism, national identity (based on ethnic identity) and the Slovak language high on its agenda. Similarly, the Slovak National Party has been a nearly constant feature in the Slovak National Council from the first elections and has had deputies serving in government several times between 1992 and 1998 and again from 2006 to 2010, despite criticism from the EU.  Of late, the right wing ‘The People’s Party Our Slovakia’ has been gaining momentum. In 2013, the right wing registered success when Marian Kotleba became the regional governor of Banska Bystrica, in central Slovakia. In 2016 his party organised marches against the Roma minority and took 8% of the vote, translating into 14 seats in the 150 strong Slovak parliament (Jancarikova 2016 and Aron 2017). In Hungary, Jobbik was formed in 2003 on the foundations of the Right-Wing Youth Community (Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség). The Right-Wing Youth Community was an association of radical-nationalist students established four years earlier at Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest. Since 2003, Jobbik has participated in all National Assembly elections held in Hungary, in 2006 in alliance with István Csurka’s Truth and Justice Party (MIÉP) and independently in 2010 and 2014. In 2006, running with the Truth and Justice Party, it won just 2.2% and registered

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a sharp increase in 2010 when it won 16.7% and then 20.3% in the 2014 general elections. Currently Jobbik has 24 members in the Parliament and is the second largest opposition party. Jobbik or Jobbik-supported independent candidates also won mayoral elections in 24 municipalities in Hungary in 2014 local elections (The Orange Files, 9 July 2016). Two years later, in April 2016, opinion polls showed that Jobbik, garnering the support of 11 to 15% of the country’s eligible voters, had established itself as the most popular opposition party, leaving old established parties such as the Hungarian Socialist Party behind (The Orange Files, 9 July 2016). Jobbik has over the years consciously attempted to repackage itself and maximise its reach among voters. During the 2014 National Assembly election campaign, its president, Gábor Vona described Jobbik as a ‘people’s party’. Jobbik, in his opinion, had the capacity to attract Hungary’s moderate right-wing voters and build a broad base of support among them. This was the beginning of what has been called Jobbik’s ‘people’s partyization’ (néppártosodás) or ‘de-radicalization’. However, it signalled more of a change in style than content—a point Vona made clear when he said that what was needed was ‘radicalism in content and not radicalism in style’ (The Orange Files, 9 July 2016). Since 2006, the virulently anti-­ gypsy, anti-Semitic Jobbik has made measures designed to curtail ‘Gypsycrime’ the central element of the party’s political platform (Thorpe, 15 November 2016). In August 2007, Jobbik established the Hungarian Guard, a paramilitary organisation partially to fight ‘Gypsycrime’ in rural Hungary (Chance, 21 October 2007). Since then, the Hungarian Guard and its successor, the New Hungarian Guard, have held rallies against ‘Gypsycrime’ in Budapest and various cities in Hungary. Over time Viktor Orban’s ruling Fidesz party has wholeheartedly co-opted much of Jobbik’s anti-migrant, anti-Gypsy stance. Post-communist Poland represents a great success story. The country was quick to adopt democratic norms and move towards a free market economy. The Law and Justice Party currently governs Poland. It is a right-wing nationalist party established in 2001 by Jarosław Kaczyński. Since coming to power in 2016, Kaczyński and his followers, rather than focusing on Western Europe and the EU, have focused on Poland’s past, which they see as defined by home, family and church; they are committed to promoting the Polish nation and its history. In the first few months, the new government moved to gain control over the country’s public media, civil service and the judiciary. The Constitutional Tribunal was also by and large neutralised. This was not the first time that the party had been voted

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into power. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, Law and Justice edged out the Civic Platform as the largest party and soon after that, Jarosław’s twin brother Lech Kaczyński defeated Donald Tusk of Civic Platform to become the president. In addition, in Poland a significant far-right party was the League of Polish Families, a populist xenophobic and Eurosceptic party. It gained approximately 8% of the vote share in two election cycles, 2001 and 2005 (Aron 2017, pp. 53–57 and Europeum). Alarmed by the developments in 2016, the EU decided to adopt a resolution warning Poland that it could be stripped of its vote. But since such decisions must be unanimous and since Viktor Orban has stated that he will defend Poland, there is little real chance of Poland losing voting rights. As Adam Bodnar, Poland’s official ombudsman, puts it, ‘The lesson learned from Orban is not only about the weakness of European institutions but also about how you can buy time by playing with the EU. Meanwhile, you can make systematic changes in the way the government operates’ (Traub, New York Times, 2 November 2016).

Nordic Countries One cannot complete an overview of the right-wing parties in Europe without looking at the Nordic countries—Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland—which figure at the top of league tables of everything from economic competitiveness and social health to happiness. However, this does not mean that these states are an exception so far as anxiety over questions of immigration, integration and national identity are concerned. Sweden has its anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats party. In the 2006 parliamentary elections, the vote share of the party was 2.9%, which translated to no seats in the parliament. Subsequently, in the 2010 elections, they received 5.7% of the vote, or 20 seats in the parliament (Nyberg 2010, CNN); this rose further in 2014 to a vote share of 12.9%, translating to 49 seats (Deloy 2014). In the May 2014 European Parliamentary elections, they secured two seats (Liljeqvist 2014). The political environment in Sweden reflects a growing concern with immigration; immigrants have come to be perceived as a problem to be tackled rather than an asset. A theme of the election speech given in August 2014 by the then leader of the Swedish Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson, was that Islamism was ‘the Nazism and Communism of our time’ and must be approached with ‘the same disgust and much stronger resistance’ (Crouch, The Observer, December 2014).

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In December 2014, four politicians from Sweden’s conservative Christian Democrat and Centre parties wrote in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter that while the Sweden Democrats were wrong to call for an immigration cut of up to 90%, the country’s immigration and integration strategies did need open discussion and critical scrutiny (The Local, 5 December 2014). 2018 is an election year for Sweden. The Sweden’s Party Preference Survey of May 2017 showed that if elections were held in May 2017, the ruling alliance of Social Democrats and Green Party would poll 35.6% and the opposition Alliance 37.6, the Sweden Democrats 18.4%, the Left Party 6.3% and other parties 2.2% of the vote (Political Party Preference Survey, May 2017, Statistical News from Statistics Sweden 2017). Though in 2017 the Social Democrats, with 27.8%, continued to be most popular, the Sweden Democrats substantially improved their ratings from 12.9% to 19.3%. Traditionally, the moderates who have been Sweden’s main rival to the Social Democrats have fallen behind at 17% (Political Party Preference Survey, May 2017). In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party is stridently anti-immigrant. In 2013, for instance, Mikkel Dencker, a mayoral candidate for Hvidovre from the party, drew public attention to missing pork meatballs, a traditional element of Danish cuisine, from their kindergartens (Higgins, New York Times, 8 November 2013). That some day care centres have removed meatballs from their cafeterias in deference to Islamic dietary rules, Mr Dencker said, is an example of how ‘Denmark is losing its identity’ under pressure from outsiders (Higgins, New York Times, 8 November 2013). Such an observation had the desired effect, with angry reactions from sections of the majority. The Danish People’s Party has been arguing that mainstream parties ‘run away screaming at the thought’ of putting immigration to a popular vote. Given the large number of immigrants entering Denmark, it was, in their opinion, only reasonable that the Danes were asked about it. ‘Here one might be inspired by the way in which democracy is in Switzerland, where there is a much greater respect for ordinary people’s views,’ Mr Henriksen, the Immigration and Integration spokesman for the Danish People’s Party, said (Financial Times, 14 February 2014). General elections in Denmark are scheduled for 2019. 2017 surveys show that the Danish People’s Party’s vote share ranges from between 18% and 20%. In the 2015 elections, the centre-right group beat the centre-­left coalition. The centre-left government of Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt was voted out. The Danish People’s Party, with 37

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seats, emerged as the biggest force. It was part of the blue opposition bloc led by Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the leader of the Liberal Party, which had 90 seats in the parliament, versus the red bloc’s 85 (Gani, 19 June 2015). For the Danish People’s Party, nativism, which Mudde (Mudde 2007, pp. 18–20) explains as a belief that the state should belong only to the native group of people, is visible throughout its entire programme—it talks of importance of Danish culture, the unique role of Christianity and democracy: ‘Denmark is not an immigrant country and never has been […] thus we will not accept transformation to a multi ethnic society’ (Party Programme of the Danish People’s Party). In Finland, the True Finns, a Eurosceptic party led by Timo Soini, has come to represent interest of Finns against immigration. Immigration, which historically has been a rather minor issue, became one of the top themes of the 2011 parliamentary elections. In 2011, in fact, the True Finns won 19% of the vote, though they did not join the governing coalition. Four years down the line in the 2015 elections, in its new incarnation as The Finns, the party came second, securing 38 of the 200 seats in parliament and joining a coalition government led by Juha Sipila, whose Centre Party took 49 seats (The Economist, 25 April 2015). In his Facebook page, the MP Olli Immonen of The Finns wrote that he was ‘dreaming of a strong brave nation that will defeat this nightmare called multiculturalism, this ugly bubble that our enemies live in will soon enough burst into a million little pieces […] we will fight until the end for our homeland and one true Finnish nation’ (Winneker 27 May 2015; Crouch 27 July 2015). In Norway, the counterpart to these parties is the Progress Party, which also holds that Norway should follow Switzerland’s example and conduct a referendum on immigration. In the 2013 election, the Progress Party was part of the centre-right coalition that won a majority and formed a government. The Progress Party is strict on immigration and looks at immigration as a threat to Norwegian culture and welfare. In the 2013 elections, they registered 16.3% of the vote (DW, 11 November 2013).

Common Right-Wing Issues Right-wing parties are identified by their stand on a host of issues, such as immigration, national identity, European integration and economic policies. The strident opposition to immigration has often led observers to characterise these parties as ‘single issue’ or ‘anti-immigration’ parties (Hainsworth 2008, p. 70). These parties are specifically opposed to Third

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World, non-white immigrants, who they depict as threats to the jobs, social benefits, security, culture, health and lifestyle of the natives. The opposition to immigration extends to refugees and asylum seekers. Since the 1970s, for instance, the Front National has had a clearly anti-­immigrant focus. In the 1980s, the Front National’s Jean-Pierre Stirbois, who was second in line to Le Pen, advised migrants to ‘get back to their huts from across the Mediterranean’ (Hainsworth 2008, p. 71). A few years later in 1991, the French nationalist politician Bruno Megret came out with a comprehensive document for the Front National called Immigration: 50 Mesures Concretes, which included measures such as curtailing family reunification, enforcing the concept of national preference, and putting in place tougher procedures for asylum seekers and refugees (Hainsworth 2008, p. 73). The Front National’s vehement opposition to immigration some observers argue stems from their notion that ‘white women [are] under threat from the interloper’ (Durham 1998, p.  93). Hainsworth argues that in Italy, both the AN and the Lega Nord have targeted immigration, especially illegal immigration, and their immigration discourse is closely intertwined with ‘ethnic nationalism, cultural relativism and anti-­ egalitarianism’  (Hainsworth 2008). Equal rights and opportunities for immigrants are resisted on the grounds that they limit opportunities for Italian nationals. In Austria the FPÖ in its pre-Haider days was linked with themes of German nationalism and economic liberalism, but under Haider’s leadership from 1986 onwards the party followed a populist path where opposition to immigration, refugees and asylum seekers was the central theme. In fact, in 1993 the FPÖ initiated the ‘Austria First’ referendum, which asked the Austrian people to approve 12 points targeting immigration and foreigners. It proposed measures such as a freeze on immigration, compulsory identity cards for immigrants, restrictions on school numbers and no early access to citizenship or voting rights for citizens. The referendum fell through but the stand taken by FPÖ on the issue of immigration was abundantly clear (Hainsworth 2008, pp. 72–73). These parties have been quick to connect with people using catchy slogans, such as ‘France for the French’, ‘Germany for the Germans’, ‘ Rights for Whites’, ‘Vienna for the Viennese’ (Hainsworth 2008, p.  73). The anti-immigrant stance of these parties also extends to their strong reservation about multiculturalism and Islam. In 2013, Salvini came out strongly against Italy’s first-ever black minister, Cécile Kyenge, describing her appointment as the action of the ‘hypocritical, do-gooding left’ (National Post, 1 May 2013). Another Lega member and senator Roberto Calderoli

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went as far as to suggest that Kyenge had the ‘features of the orangutan’ and would be better off working as minister ‘in her country’ (The Guardian, 14 July 2013). In the Netherlands, both Pim Fortyun and Geert Wilders came out strongly against Islam and the Koran. In Switzerland, the SVP in the 1990s had made opposition to multiculturalism a central part of its programme. In other countries, such as Italy, Germany, Norway and Denmark, the right-wing parties could be identified by their all-out opposition to Islam. Controversy over mosques and minarets became common. In the Central and Eastern Europe, until recently the main targets were Roma and minorities, but of late—in response to the refugee crisis—Islam and Muslims have been included in the list. Immigration in the right-wing discourse has also increasingly come to be linked with the question of crime. Crime is portrayed as a result of immigration and the presence of foreigners. These parties thus support strong law and order policies, tough prison terms and the return of the death penalty. However, right-wing parties alone cannot be blamed for the hostility to immigration, or, to be precise, non-white immigration, Islam and globalisation. In the 1960s, the British politician Enoch Powell in his famous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech argued against non-white immigration as likely to lead to violence (The Telegraph, 6 November 2007). Powell belonged to the mainstream Conservative Party. In France, the mainstream politician Jacques Chirac, French president from 1995 to 2007, commented on the ‘smell and noise’ from immigrants (Riding, 23 June 1991). What the right-wing parties have done is to make immigration the centrepiece of their political campaigns. The other issue that these parties hold dear is nation, nationalism and national identity. The nation is idealised and understood as a homogeneous cultural entity. They define the nation as ‘a unit of individuals who share the same culture and ethnic origins and a clearly defined territory’ (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi in Hainsworth 2008, p.  78). The nationalism they espouse is narrow, exclusive and ethno-centric, with clearly demarcated insiders and outsiders. Resident outsiders are perceived as threat to the integrity of the nation and its people. Public funds and benefits are to be first and foremost, if not exclusively, used for the insiders. Mudde calls this ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Mudde 2000, pp. 174–175). Given the Second World War history, these parties walk a tightrope in that they risk ­allegations of racism of the classical/biological type. Notwithstanding this, an indirect racist discourse is apparent. While one of the criticisms of these parties

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against Islam is on the question of gender equality or rather the lack of it, these parties have their own understanding of the role of women in nationbuilding. Parties such as MSI in Italy and the Front National in France support the provision of a maternal income or wage to enable women to stay at home, rear children and boost the birth rate of the indigenous community as their contribution to the nation (Hainsworth 2008, p. 80). The Front National in France proclaimed its opposition to abortion as ‘official anti-French genocide’ (Durham 1998, p. 66). Right-wing parties in Italy, Belgium and Germany all share similar views on abortion and the importance of marriage and family. The centrality of the nation in rightwing discourse also means they are suspicious and critical of globalisation. Both the economic and cultural impact of globalisation is seen as a threat to the national control of the economy and traditional cultural norms and values. This criticism of globalisation as a threat to nation and national identity is extended to the project of European integration that the EU represents (Hainsworth 2008, pp. 81–85). According to Hainsworth by and large, right-wing parties, with the exception of AN (Italy) and New Democracy (Sweden, a short lived right wing party 1991–94)), tend to perceive the EU as ‘encroaching, bureaucratic and elitist’ and are suspicious of its top-down approach. However, it is equally true that these parties may have begun with an integration-­ supportive stance, only to become ‘integration-sceptic’ down the line. The FPÖ in Austria, for instance, supported EU membership as a means of bringing Austria closer to Germany, but by 1990s Haider had moved to take a Eurosceptic approach (Hainsworth 2008). In Germany, the Republicans similarly adopted a pro-EU position, only to change it by the 1990s (Hainsworth 2008). In Italy too, the Lega Nord, due to its coalition, took a Eurosceptic stand (Hainsworth 2008). Notably, the right-­ wing parties are not alone in exhibiting Euroscepticism; parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party have vehemently opposed to the EU. One may recall its then leader Nigel Farage’s comment on the Brexit referendum: the people had clearly said ‘we want our country back’. Interestingly, many of the small right-wing parties who have not been able to gain representation through national elections have managed to win seats in the European Parliament. In 1984, the Front National entered the European Parliament and a Group of the European Right was formed. Subsequently, other groups, such as Technical Group of Right, Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group, were formed. Enlargement has also been a concern for right-wing parties. They are averse to Turkey’s entry

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into the EU (but so are other mainstream parties); some years ago in Central and Eastern Europe these parties were apprehensive about enlargement, fearing loss of sovereignty after years of Soviet rule. These parties have targeted groups who have not benefitted from the economic and social processes of change. The current phase of globalisation is quite unequal and many have been affected adversely. They have lost out in terms of labour, income, prestige and access to opportunities in health and education. In Western Europe, the right wing has a ready audience in these people from the working and lower middle class. In Central and Eastern Europe, this could also well include the middle class. The radical right in Europe has managed to cash on the disconnect that has developed between the mainstream parties and the citizens at large. Their slogans and campaigns challenge whether ‘the people’ are being represented by the politicians in power. They project the political class as corrupt, elitist and engaged in promoting their own interests. The right-­ wing parties have called for tough action to be taken in order to uphold the interests of the people. The right-wing parties have come to successfully present themselves as the ‘true voice’ of the people and as representatives of ‘the man in the street’.

Europe Is Not Alone Europe is not alone in experiencing an upsurge in right-wing parties and politics. While in Europe right-wing parties have managed to influence and set the political agenda, or form part of ruling coalitions, India, the largest democracy in the world, is headed by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under the leadership of Narendra Modi. The BJP won the parliamentary elections of 2014, showcasing a development agenda and countering its upper caste Hindu image with its slogan of ‘Sabka Sath, Sabka Vikas’ (‘Development for All’). In the politics and policies that unfolded post-election some of the issues central to right wing became evident. The ‘nation’ is thus at the centre of the discourse. Externally, Modi has aggressively projected the national image and interest in a host of world capitals that he has visited. Initiatives such as Make in India or the popularisation of yoga are a case in point. Internally, the nation is defined in terms of the Hindu rashtra (‘Hindu nation’), where the minorities can be accommodated as equals provided they accept the pre-eminence of Hindus. Cow protection, the beef ban and the playing of the national anthem in movie halls (the audience must stand in respect), scrutinising

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foreign-funded non-governmental organisations and constant reference to India’s glorious past of cultural and scientific achievements have been high on the government agenda. Alluding to these developments, the Independent ran an article ‘Trump is tame compared to India’s newly strengthened Prime Minister Narendra Modi’ (The Independent, 17 March 2017). Though there are voices of protest and resistance, by and large the government has been able to hold on to its popularity and the opposition parties appear weak, struggling and ineffective in holding the government to account. The right-wing political party is in control not only at the centre but in many federal units and states; it continues to set the social, political and economic agenda. Any threat to its current hegemony of the political space is likely to see an increase of the leadership’s leaning on its hardcore, religion-focused core (Stratfor, 25 March 2016 and 6 June 2016).

Conclusion This overview of the right-wing parties in Europe indicates that such parties stood discredited and marginalised in Europe after the Second World War. Though they had been driven to the margins, they never completely disappeared. The right-wing parties of the 1970s and 1980s may have largely dissociated themselves from the fascist/Nazi past and accepted the liberal democratic state as a given, but they target the ‘other’ in promoting the interest of the majority. Their persistent anti-immigrant, at times also anti-Semitic, anti-Roma and anti-EU rhetoric has pushed these issues to the forefront of political debate and discourse across states in Europe. In many countries, the right-wing parties by their willingness to talk about these sensitive issues have better connected with the electorate and reaped electoral benefits. However, it is equally true that their fortunes have fluctuated; the recent Austrian, Dutch and French elections are a case in point. However, this does not mean that the time has come to write them off. The fear of immigration, Islam, refugees and terrorism is very real, as is the discontent over unemployment. So long as these issues continue, the right-wing political parties will thrive in Europe. Lastly, not only have the right wing pushed these issues onto the agenda, they have forced other parties to act tough. This means that though these parties are out of power or even when elected are shunned by other parties, their agenda and their understanding of how to organise a society, economy and polity have gained common acceptance—and therefore legitimacy.

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CHAPTER 9

Exploring the EU–India Leadership Dynamic on Climate Change Vijeta Rattani

Introduction From the European Union (EU), the issue of climate change has brought forth an internationally significant body of responses in terms of objectives, policies and practices. Climate change has involved the EU’s interests since the issue gained significant political attention in the early 1990s. The global community’s attention to climate change subsequently led to the formation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994; this is the global climate regime created to address the climate change issue. For a long time, the EU has been reckoned a leader in addressing the issue of climate change. However, its clout has weakened in the past few years with other actors, namely the USA and emerging countries, including India and China, coming to the fore. In the present scenario, with the USA having pulled out of the Paris Agreement, the global agreement adopted in 2015 to address climate change, the EU is forging alliances with actors such as China to establish joint leadership, given that unilateral leadership does not hold out high probability of acceptance. Although, from the EU’s point of view, India is a significant player in climate change, the word ‘leadership’ has never been brought up V. Rattani (*) Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_9

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in relation to climate change cooperation. Additionally, EU–India ­relations over the years have been overshadowed by the deadlock in trade negotiations. The resumption of annual meetings in 2016, however, provides new hope for the relationship to reach its full potential.

The EU’s Leadership in Climate Change There is no single understanding of the concept of leadership in climate diplomacy. While leadership can be demonstrated by diplomatic capabilities to forge alliances, with the leader acting as a mediator or bridge-­ builder, it can also evolve through delivering on commitments—thus leading by example. In the case of climate change, which is a global challenge, the EU has worked well to combine both areas and has claimed leadership. The EU has played a pioneer role in climate change in terms of raising the global environmental awareness by (1) advocating a European model to address climate change based on a burden-sharing approach, thereby allowing different emission reduction targets for different countries based on their responsibilities and capabilities; (2) being the most climate sensitive region of the world; and (3) introducing novel measures, such as the European Climate Change Programme, the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), which is the largest carbon stock market in the world, and policies to switch over to renewable sources of energy (Oberthuer and Kelly 2008). Through its actions, the EU must be lauded for breaking the link between economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions. The EU has set norms and standards on the climate change issue within its domestic set­up and has repeatedly endorsed its measures in its external competencies. Under the UNFCCC, the parties came up with a legal instrument, the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which set quantified emission reduction targets for developed countries. The KP was adopted in 1997 and came into force in 2005 (UNFCCC 2005). The biggest blow to it came when the Bush administration opted out of it in 2001 on the grounds that it was unfair because China and India had no quantified emission reduction targets, unlike countries in the developed world. At that point, the Kyoto deal seemed dead; it had little chances of survival with the world’s biggest polluter opting out of the regime (The Guardian 2001). It was largely because of coalition-building and the use of the diplomatic capabilities of the EU that the Protocol finally came into effect in 2005, when 55 countries responsible for 55% of emissions ratified it, as per the mandate specified in

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the regime (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). As a matter of fact, the ­ratification of the KP is considered the most successful instance of EU’s environmental diplomacy. On the domestic front, the EU initiated various measures, including the European Climate Change Programme, ETS and Vision 2020, which vows to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020 (against 1990 levels). These steps have strengthened the EU’s vision of a low carbon economy and increased its reliance on renewable energy sources. It is even argued that the EU climate leadership role during the Kyoto period encouraged other countries to take on more ambitious climate change initiatives domestically. In some cases, it is argued that the EU’s initiatives resulted in other nations going so far as to copy EU policies such the EU ETS or the German Renewable Energy Act (German Watch 2013). However, as witnessed during and after the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, the EU’s leadership has declined considerably. The EU was largely a marginalised actor at the 2009 Summit, though there were high hopes that the EU would take on a pioneer role in the creation of another climate agreement that would replace the KP, scheduled to expire by 2012 (Groen et al. 2012). The hegemonic re-emergence of the USA in furthering the climate agenda at a global level, along with other factors, including global economic crises, the EU’s long and cumbersome decision-making process and its member states’ diversified approaches to climate change, can be stated as critical reasons for this. ‘Further, Brexit and rise of populist parties have generally decreased EU’s climate ambition as a whole including decreasing support for deployment of renewable’ (IES 2016, 2). The other critical reason was that emerging economies such as China and India and other developing countries have become pro-active, voicing their development needs and economic aspirations at the international climate arena. Ahead of the Paris Climate Summit, mandated to come up with a legal agreement that could replace the KP, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for EU leadership. Merkel also announced that the EU would be developing an ambitious climate action plan with a 40% target for emissions reduction by 2030 and greater renewable energy targets (Climate Home 2014). However, the inability of the EU to reassert its leadership can be gauged by the fact that the design and content of the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, was tailored to suit US needs, with China and island states playing a small part in the process of the formation of the Agreement. At the Paris Climate Summit, the EU, together with the USA,

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largely marginalised India and held it responsible for blocking ­negotiations on equity. Nevertheless, the French Presidency under the EU did neatly play the role of bridge-builder at Paris in the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Later, the Coalition for Higher Ambition, which comprised businesses, sub-state actors, mayors, regions, investors, trade unions and civil society groups, put out a press release urging EU leaders to set a course for a successful implementation of the Paris Agreement ahead of the Council meeting (Climate Alliance 2016). However, no such call was heeded and in different forums, the EU remained reluctant to lead on the climate issue. Ahead of the Marrakech Climate Summit, which was held in November 2016, the EU Council document was released, in which the EU reconfirmed its commitment to its climate target of a 40% emission reduction by 2030 (against 1990 levels). It also reaffirmed its commitment to scaling­up climate finance to help developing countries address climate change and switch over to low carbon growth economies. It further urged other countries to abide by their climate commitments. In the same document, however, there was no mention of taking up a lead role in addressing climate change (Council of the European Union 2016).

Climate Regime After the US Pull-Out US President Donald Trump’s move to pull the USA out from the Paris Agreement came as a shock to many. It raised questions about the future of the agreement. However, the US move was not completely unanticipated. In his campaign before the presidential election, Donald Trump infamously called climate change a ‘hoax’ and vowed to pull the country out of the Paris Agreement, as it did not serve US interests (New York Times 2016). After coming to power, Trump adopted a slew of measures in accordance with his electoral promises. These included, most significantly, the President’s Executive Order ‘Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth’, which is considered a complete reversal of former President Obama’s climate policies and initiatives on climate change (Rattani 2017a). The order called for the revoking, repealing and dismantling of most of the previous administration’s climate decisions, including the Clean Power Plan. This Plan was intended to reduce emissions from the electricity sector by an estimated 32% below 2005 levels by 2030, with a view to a shift away from coal-fired energy and a limit on the use of natu-

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ral gas. Additionally, Obama’s administration’s six moratoriums on ­climate change were also repealed. This made it clear that the focus of the US administration was on embedding fossil fuel use in the economy rather than achieving climate goals (White House 2017). On 1 June 2017, US President Donald Trump formally announced that USA would quit the Paris Agreement, citing it as ‘unfair’ to US economic interests (Los Angeles Times 2017). There is still a three-year lock­in period under the Paris Agreement for Parties to quit the Agreement; this implies that the USA would be part of the climate negotiations until late 2020, a period which overlaps the next presidential elections (UNFCCC 2015b).

The Climate Agenda and a Reluctant EU? The advent of Trump and his administration, which has included climate sceptics such as Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State, proved to be a huge setback to US climate change commitments. The political vacuum left by the USA under Trump, who has been extremely sceptical about climate change and the Paris Agreement, has provided a unique opportunity for other powers to rise to the occasion. China, in particular, has been keen to take up leadership, in accordance with its own domestic success at climate change efforts. Ahead of the World Economic Forum held in January at Davos, Switzerland, Xie Zhenhua, serving as China’s special envoy for climate change since 2015, pledged Chinese leadership in limiting the global temperature rise as well as being open towards collaborating with parties ‘to achieve economic restructuring’. Amid apprehensions that the USA under Trump could officially pull out of the Paris Agreement, China warned Trump against quitting and urged the USA to honour the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement (China Daily 2017). For China, assuming leadership on the climate issue seems a matter of self-interest. China is currently reeling under the deadly impact of air pollution in most of its cities and there is urgent need to secure its energy interests while at the same time reducing the reliance of its economy on fossil fuels. The Chinese leadership could help the emerging powers in reducing the choking pollution in their cities and seizing the economic opportunities offered by a low-carbon future (Yale Environment 2016). The fact that there was no opposition to the Chinese statements pledging leadership meant that it was relatively easy for the country to claim such a role. However, at Bonn, China did not deliver on its leadership intentions

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and there was no noticeable change of stance or strategy on the part of China in dealing with climate issue. The EU, however, is cautious about adopting a leadership role on climate change. Lauding the progress on climate action at the Climate Summit held at Marrakech in 2016, Miguel Arias Cañete, serving as the Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, reinforced the EU’s declared commitments to climate change and refrained from committing to leadership: ‘We will stand by Paris, we will defend Paris, and we will implement Paris’ (European Parliament 2016). This was mainly a response to the election of Donald Trump as US President. It was only in the inter-sessional climate talks held in Bonn in May 2017 that the EU signalled its intention to forge cooperation with countries such as China and Canada on climate change (Green Peace 2017). It is important to note that this intention has been driven by the clear vacuum that the USA has left in the climate regime and also because there is mounting pressure on the part of the global community and the EU’s own civil society for the bloc to resume its leadership. However, as explained above, the EU does not seem to be in a position to adopt unilateral leadership on climate change. In contrast to the Kyoto period, the EU is now an expanded actor and has not completely recovered from the economic crises. Brexit and rise of populist parties in many countries have decreased the EU’s strength diplomatically. Some member states such as Poland are not very enthusiastic. Actors such as India and China have emerged as important voices in the international forum on climate change. Therefore, in the current circumstances, joint leadership seems to be the most feasible option to carry forward the agenda of climate change and to fulfil the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The day President Trump announced the US exit from the climate regime, the EU and China held a bilateral summit (1–2 June 2017), at which the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to Paris Agreement and urged other parties to abide by their climate commitments (Europa 2017a). Ahead of the 23rd meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) at Bonn in November 2017, the Council of the EU released its resolutions on climate finance. These deal with the most pressing issues concerning EU’s commitment to finance, technology development and technology transfer, as well as capacity-building in developing countries. The resolution highlighted the importance of scaling-up the availability of capital for green and sustainable investment. It also stressed the role of the private sector and multilateral banks as key sources of climate finance (Council of

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the European Union 2017). Even though the private sector is important in mobilising finance, the role of public finance remains crucial and cannot be undermined (Rattani 2017b).

The EU at the Bonn Climate Talks, 2017 At the Bonn climate talks, the EU found itself in a difficult negotiating position and therefore had little success. It failed to deliver on many of the issues, for example on pre-2020 actions (climate actions until the Paris Agreement becomes operational) and procedural issues such as the global stocktake for collective assessment of climate actions, and the transparency framework for climate action and support. It was also unable to drive constructive discussions on equity. This is due to two main reasons. First, for the EU, initiating actions in the short term is not possible as it takes a long time to forge legal proposals and to pass them. Its 2020 targets were decided in 2008, and 2030 targets are currently subject to the legal process. Due to its internal processes, the EU took a long time to deliver on its ratification of the Doha Amendment to the KP (dealing with enahncing climate action till Paris Agreement becomes operational in 2020), which happened only at the end of 2017 (Droege and Rattani 2018). Second, the effort of the EU to push the narrative of equity in the light of emerging realities was aggressively opposed by developing countries, including China and India, who continue to abide by the narrative of equity, which is linked to differentiated responsibility, as enshrined in the UNFCCC Agreement. The Paris Agreement recognises that developed countries must take the lead in climate action and support but it also encourages emerging countries to engage on a voluntary basis (UNFCCC 2015b). The next COP will be hosted by Poland, which has not been a progressive player as far as climate agenda is concerned. Nevertheless, the next COP also offers another opportunity for the EU to demonstrate a commitment to global negotiations. Poland’s track record of being an obstructionist in climate agenda places the EU in a difficult position in terms of balancing its interests externally and internally. Many EU member states have shown an interest in climate action. In particular, the French President Macron has taken an active role in pushing for more international action on climate change and finance. France hosted the One Planet Summit on 12 December 2017 to raise climate finance for meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement (France Diplomatie 2017). The French President focused on discussing various aspects of c­ arbon pricing and climate risks in industries and highlighted the industry initiatives at the

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summit. It gave pivotal importance to industry and markets as effective solutions to addressing climate change issues while underlining the role of states and sub-state actions in tackling climate change. However, this summit witnessed a lack of commitments on public finance, especially in case of adaptation finance. The French government did not offer any significant plan on attaining this goal either. Therefore, it can be argued that, at present, though France is active in the climate issue, it would be premature to call it a leader.

The EU–India and Climate Change Unlike China, India has been sceptical about taking up a climate leadership and so far has refrained from making any public statement pledging leadership on climate change issues. Rather, New Delhi has welcomed the proposed EU–China partnership on climate change and has lauded the role of developing countries in any concrete response to climate change cooperation (MOEFCC 2017). While the EU has shown an interest in collaborating with China on climate action, it has been quiet about its engagement with India. At the 14th India–EU Summit that concluded in November 2017 in New Delhi, the two entities merely confirmed their commitment to the Paris Agreement and their climate change targets, though the platform provided more political space for a concrete proposal or pathway on moving ahead with climate change agenda in a constructive way, one that is also agreeable to both sides. EU–India bilateral ties over the years have been overshadowed by deadlocked trade agreement negotiations. There was even a gap in the yearly summit meetings. However, the resumption of the meetings in 2016 has provided new hope for the bilateral relation to realise its full potential, especially in areas of climate change and energy. The Joint Statement and Agenda for Action 2020, adopted in 2016, has a separate and elaborate section on climate change. Along with an affirmation of climate change commitments made under the Paris Agreement, it also mentions the need for regular climate change dialogue and increased cooperation on climate change issues, including through regular roundtables and working group events (Ministry of External Affairs MEA 2016). From the EU’s point of view, India is too important to be ignored in climate policies and more meaningful cooperation is aimed at through intensified talks with the country. There is also considerable exchange

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happening on the renewable energy front. Still, the EU officials have refrained from using the word ‘leadership’ in any political statement on climate change in relation to India. A more defined in-depth partnership with India on climate change would be a useful initiative, considering the strategic role of both in the climate regime and in the steps being taken by both to respond to climate change threats. Even though India is deemed a strategic player in climate change, currently it seems to be reluctant to assume a leadership role in international climate change debates. At the Bonn Climate Summit, the Indian side was seen as being more focused on procedural issues such as global stocktake, pre-2020 actions and the transparency framework, and on showcasing its domestic progress towards its 2020 climate targets. New Delhi’s energy and climate policy initiatives largely hinge on solar power generation and increasing energy efficiency and in its cultural traditions rooted in oneness with nature. At the World Economic Forum 2018, held in Davos, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi upheld the importance of collective responsibility for addressing climate change while accusing the developed countries of not upholding their promise of financial and technological support for developing countries (Hindustan Times 2018).

EU’s Recent Climate Initiatives The EU has put in place some positive initiatives which will have long-­ term implications for climate regime. In 2016, the EU and its member states provided nearly 21 billion euros as climate finance. However, closer analysis reveals that a large part of this is constituted by loans and directed towards middle-income economies, with Turkey being the biggest beneficiary (Act Alliance 2017). At Marrakech, the EU’s pledges accounted for a large portion (more than 90%) under the Adaptation Fund. Additionally, Germany pledged 40 million euros to the Adaptation Fund at the Bonn climate talks (UNFCCC 2017). The EU has also announced that by 2020 it will facilitate investments in the African continent with a view to increasing renewable electricity generation capacity by at least five gigawatts. EU’s richest member states are also active members of Insu Resilience Initiative which intends to provide climate risk insurance to most vulnerable people in developing countries (UNFCCC 2015a). Domestically, the EU has initiated recent measures, including new effort-sharing regulation for the period 2021–2030 (European Commission 2016). A draft reform of Europe’s ETS has already been

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considered and adopted by the European Parliament. The objective is to balance greater cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and to regulate protection for energy-intensive industries. New sectors such as agriculture are brought within the ETS (Euractiv 2017). Recently, the EU has also developed regulations to account for land use and land use change in carbon emissions (Europa 2017b). The EU has vast experience in the area of multilateral climate diplomacy. It has provided a domestically successful model of burden-sharing to the world. It has a wide array of political resources at its disposal. It has had a notable role in increasing the competitiveness of renewable energy. Considering the flux that the global climate regime has encountered, instrumental and directional leadership by the EU on the climate issue is required. Brussels is still the best-equipped actor to lead the climate agenda. However, given the present geopolitical scenario, it is also clear that partnerships are required.

The Way Forward Pooling Diverse Political Resources Considering the wide array of political resources available with the EU, it is politically best suited to leading the climate change issue. However, much of the climate responsibility rests with the Directorate-General for Climate Action. To enhance its negotiating capabilities, more political resources need to be pooled. While leadership at supranational level is strategically important—this at present comprises Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council—engagement with sub-national actors such as local officials, cities, industry, activists and civil society is also vital, allowing for a diverse and consolidated political leadership. Capitalising on Strategic Partnerships The strategic partnership forums provide significant political space and resources to make progress on the climate change front. In the case of India, for example, the relationship has been defined by trade and economics alone. The nature of the strategic relations needs to be recast in the interest of pressing issues confronting the global community.

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Leading by Example The best way to demonstrate leadership is to lead by example and there are several steps that need to be taken in this regard. First, the EU should ratchet up its targets in the next cycle of Nationally Determined Contributions in 2020 and subsequently for 2030 and 2050 as well. On a welcome note, in a first of its kind in the developed world, ahead of the Marrakech Climate Summit, on 6 October 2016, the European Parliament adopted a Conference of Parties resolution (COP 22) which discusses the insufficiency of the current climate targets for meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement and urges developed countries, especially the EU, to cut down their emissions below the stated current pledges (European Parliament 2016). Such discussions must result in a comprehensive, long-­ term EU climate and energy policy. Second, the EU needs to put in place a coal phase-out strategy by the next decade. A few countries in the EU, including Poland and Greece, have, in contrast, announced new coal power plants. Moving towards a Sustainable Lifestyle A leaked document of European Commission, cited by The Guardian in 2016, discusses the EU’s emphasis on the need for profound changes in lifestyle and consumption patterns if its climate targets are to be reached (The Guardian 2016). However, since then, there has not been any announcement of an official action plan or a strategy for achieving it. While the American model of lifestyle, though aspirational, is purely consumption based and does not serve to reduce the US consumption of primary energy, goods and services, the EU can work to provide a sustainable lifestyle model to the world. Dealing with the US The EU needs to forge a strategy for dealing with difficult players such the USA who are not making efforts to move their economies away from fossil fuel use and are thus greatly undermining the goals of the Paris Agreement. The USA, by its actions, also sets a bad precedent for other players. While a comprehensive response to climate change should involve meaningful cooperation with the USA, given that it has been an obstructionist and difficult player in the climate issue, the question of how to deal with the

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country is of strategic importance to the EU. In this regard, working with pro-climate forces and alliances within the USA at different levels of governance must form an important component of the EU’s strategy with the USA. Establishing Technical Cooperation The implementation of the Paris Agreement largely depends on fair and effective monitoring and reporting structures for reporting climate actions and support. The EU has the most advanced structures of this type in the world; other countries can learn from and adopt these. The second potential area is its ETS. Though heavily criticised for its gaps and challenges, this has nevertheless proved to be the most innovative of the EU’s policies to cut emissions from various sectors of its economy. The adoption of draft reform proposal indicates the EU’s reform of the ETS. Countries such as China who are in process of launching their national ETS must draw lessons and expertise from the EU. The third important lesson is in the area of renewable energy. At 276  gigawatts, the of the EU has the highest renewable energy capacity in the world. Data suggests that in 2015, renewables accounted for the majority (77%) of new EU’s generating capacity (REN 2017). Focusing on Adaptation, Loss and Damage At Bonn, adaptation, loss and damage issues suffered mostly due to conflicts on finance (UNFCCC 2017). The EU must engage with developing countries, focusing on attaining inclusive outcomes on such issues; this would help promote trust and address the issues which are also crucial elements of the Paris Agreement.

Conclusion In the Kyoto regime, the EU proved itself a credible actor, one responsible for saving the environmental integrity of the KP after the infamous US pull-out from the regime in 2001. As history repeats itself, the USA under President Trump has again pulled out from another climate agreement— the Paris Agreement. Unlike the Kyoto period, when the EU was eager to assume leadership on the climate change issue, its role in the climate issue has declined. This was evident during and after the Copenhagen Summit

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in 2009 and in the years leading up to the formulation and adoption of the Paris Agreement. The script of the Paris Agreement too was largely decided by the USA.  Despite the international community and green activists urging the EU to take on leadership in the implementation of Paris Agreement, the bloc has shown reluctance. However, as the USA pulls out of a climate agreement yet again, a unique opportunity has presented itself to the EU to use the climate change issue to strengthen itself as an actor internally and also prove its mettle internationally. With some of its initiatives, it seems the EU is preparing itself for a leadership role again to save the planet from the disastrous consequences of climate change. Compared to the Kyoto period, however, in the current circumstances, it seems unlikely that any EU leadership will be unilateral. Therefore, in the present scenario, joint leadership seems to be the best bet for pushing the climate goals enshrined in the Paris Agreement. Along with forging alliances with pro-climate players and forces around the world, the EU also needs to redefine its strategic partnerships to include issues of urgent importance, such as climate change. Though the EU has reached out to Canada and China in this regard, it has been relatively quiet about its cooperation with India on climate change. As EU–India relations are gaining momentum again and are moving beyond trade and investment, a committed partnership in the area of climate change seems a feasible way forward.

References Act Alliance. (2017). EU Needs to Reconsider the Approach to Climate Finance. Retrieved December 1, 2017, from http://actalliance.eu/news-post/euneeds-to-reconsider-the-approach-to-climate-finance/. China Daily. (2017). China Can Take Lead, Climate Envoy Says. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/cn_eu/2017-01/17/ content_27971833.htm. Climate Alliance. (2016). Press Release: Local Authorities, Businesses, Civil Society and Trade Unions Call for EU Climate Leadership. Retrieved June 10, 2017, from http://old.klimabuendnis.org/fileadmin/inhalte/dokumente/2016/ Higher_ambition_press_release.pdf. Climate Home. (2014). Merkel Returns to Climate Politics with Call for EU Leadership. Retrieved June 11, 2017, from http://www.climatechangenews. com/2014/07/14/merkel-returns-to-climate-politics-with-call-for-eu-leadership/.

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Council of European Union. (2017). Council Resolutions on Climate Finance. Retrieved November 21, 2017, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2017/10/10/conclusions-climate-change/. Council of the European Union. (2016). Council of the European Union: Outcome Proceedings of Proposal. Retrieved June 10, 2017, from http://data.consilium. europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12807-2016-INIT/en/pdf. Droege, S., & Rattani, V. (2018, January). International Climate Policy Leadership After COP 23. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) Commentary. Euractiv. (2017). European Parliament Adopts Draft Reform of Carbon Market. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http://www.euractiv.com/section/climateenvironment/news/european-parliament-adopts-draft-reform-of-carbon-market/. Europa. (2017a). The EU-China Summit. Retrieved June 10, 2017, from http:// w w w. c o n s i l i u m . e u r o p a . e u / e n / m e e t i n g s / i n t e r n a t i o n a l - s u m mit/2017/06/01-02/. Europa. (2017b). Regulations for LULUCF. Retrieved November 23, 2017, from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/13/ lulucf/. European Commission. (2016). Proposal for an Effort Sharing Regulation 2021–2030. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/proposal_en. European Parliament. (2016). Outcomes of COP 22 Climate Change Conference. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/ATAG/2016/593547/EPRS_ATA(2016)593547_EN.pdf. France Diplomatie. (2017). One Planet Summit. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from https://www.oneplanetsummit.fr/en/. German Watch. (2013). The End of EU Climate Leadership. Retrieved June 7, 2017, from https://germanwatch.org/en/download/8591.pdf. Green Peace. (2017). Press Release: Canada, China, and the EU to Reinvigorate Climate Cooperation. Retrieved December 1, 2017, from http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/Press-Center/2017/PRESS-RELEASE-CanadaChina-and-the-EU-to-reinvigorate-climate-cooperation/. Groen, L., Niemann, A., & Oberthür, S. (2012). The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen and Cancún UN Climate Change Negotiations. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 8(2), 173–191. Hindustan Times. (2018). Davos 2018: Modi Warns Against Protectionism, Highlights India’s Virtues. Retrieved January 27, 2018, from https://www. hindustantimes.com/india-news/globalisation-is-losing-its-lustre-modi-tellsdavos-summit/story-6wKXORU466klft7HEATY0J.html. Los Angeles Times. (2017). Trump Quits the Paris Climate Accord, Denouncing It as a Violation of U.S. Sovereignty. Retrieved June 20, 2017, from http://www. latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-paris-20170601-story.html.

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Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MOEFCC). (2017, November 16). Interview with Senior Indian Negotiator. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2016). EU-India Agenda for Action-2020. Retrieved November 4, 2017, from http://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/ EU_India_Agenda_for_Action_post_VC.pdf. New York Times. (2016). Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax. Beijing Says It Is Anything But. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from https://www. nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/china-trump-climate-change.html. Oberthür, S., & Roche Kelly, C. (2008). EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges. The International Spectator, 43(3), 35–50. Rattani, V. (2017a). Trump’s Executive Order Sounds Death Knell for Paris Climate Pact. Down to Earth. Rattani, V. (2017b). Industry Acquires Centre Stage at Climate Summit in France. Retrieved November 20, 2017, from http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/ private-finance-gets-a-boost-at-climate-summit-in-france-but-states-don-tcommit-much-59329. REN. (2017). Renewables Global Futures Report-REN21. Retrieved June 10, 2017, from www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GFR-FullReport-2017.pdf. Schreurs, M., & Tiberghien, Y. (2007). Multi-level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation. Global Environmental Politics, 7(4), 19–46. The Guardian. (2001). Bush Kills the Kyoto Deal. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews. The Guardian. (2016). Europe’s Climate Change Goals Need Profound Lifestyle Changes. Retrieved June 10, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/feb/15/europe-climate-change-goals-need-profound-lifestyle-changes-european-commission. The Institute of European Studies (IES). (2016). The European Union in Crises: What Is the Future of International Climate Crises. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from http://www.ies.be/files/IES%20Policy%20Brief%202016-18_The%20 European%20Union%20in%20Crisis.pdf. UNFCCC. (2005). The Kyoto Protocol. Retrieved December 1, 2017, from https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. UNFCCC. (2015a). Press Release: G7 Climate Risk Insurance Initiative – Stepping Up Protection for the Most Vulnerable. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http:// newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/resilience/g7-climate-risk-insurance-initiativestepping-up-protection-for-the-most-vulnerable/. UNFCCC. (2015b). The Paris Agreement. Retrieved December 1, 2017, from https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.

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UNFCCC. (2017). Bonn Summit Outcomes. Retrieved December 3, 2017, from http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_nov_2017/meeting/10084.php. White House. (2017). Press Release: President’s Executive Order. Retrieved June 15, 2017, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/ presidential-executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1. Yale Environment. (2016). With Trump, China Emerges as Global Leader in Climate Change. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http://e360.yale.edu/features/with_trump_china_stands_along_as_global_climate_leader.

CHAPTER 10

The Changing Contours of Europe–Russia Relations Dinoj K. Upadhyay

Introduction Europe’s interface with Russia has been critical in shaping regional and global geopolitical dynamics. Debate over Russian identity and the geopolitical construct of Europe has continued for a long time. Current internal political developments in Europe have the potential to influence the foreign policy orientation of the European Union (EU) and its member states. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new course of cooperation between Russia and Europe. Russian aspiration to integrate with the liberal democracies with their market economies did not last long, and a divergence in strategic interests caused competition and friction in the relationships. On the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, Mikhail Gorbachev noted that ‘instead of becoming a leader of change in a global world, Europe has turned into an arena of political upheaval, of competition for spheres of influence and, finally, of military conflict’ (Gorbachev 2014). The post-Cold War security policy pursued by the West has not been inclusive, and led to a rise in political tensions between Russia and European countries in recent times. Russia opposed NATO expansion in

D. K. Upadhyay (*) Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_10

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Eastern Europe. The recent military build-up and exercises on territory which Russia considers spheres of its ‘privileged interests’ (Clover 2008) have raised tensions. Russia has alleged the West has broken its promises and failed to dismantle an antagonistic security and political structure. Given fast-evolving strategic and internal political dynamics, the chapter analyses the changing contours of Europe–Russia relations in the postCold War era. While discussing the major changes in their relationship, it examines emerging trends in the relationship and future directions.

Initial Pro-Western Orientation After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia embarked on a new political and economic orientation. In the initial period, the then president, Boris Yeltsin, and then foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, pursued an effort to ‘join the West’. The Atlanticists considered Russia part of Western civilisation and they were in charge of its foreign policy towards the West. In the quest for creating the best possible external conditions for the nascent democracy and to promote economic reform, Russia sought greater cooperation with the West (Ivanov 2001, 8). Prevailing domestic problems, an economy spiralling downwards and a political crisis also compelled President Yeltsin to seek Western support for his economic reforms. Russia moved to improve relations with individual Western states and organisations (Donaldson and Nogee  2005; Dobriansky 2000, 136–137). This was a time when European integration and enlargement was advancing successfully. The end of Cold War provided a historic opportunity to unite the European continent. In 1994, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed between Russia and the EU which entered in force in 1997. Broadly speaking, the EU’s PCA aimed to provide: (1) a suitable framework for political dialogue; (2) support for strengthening democracy and economy; (3) assistance in the transition to a market economy; and (4) encouragement for trade and investment (Eurlex 2010). As the legal basis of the EU–Russia relations, the PCA covered a number of policy areas, ranging across political dialogue, the trade in goods and services, business and investment, financial and legislative cooperation, science and technology, education and training, energy, cooperation in nuclear and space ­technology, environment, transport, culture, and the prevention of illegal activities (Delegation of the EU to Russia n.d.). The initial ten-year agreement expired in 2007. Since then, the PCA has been renewed annually (European Union External Action 2017).

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The pro-Western orientation of Russian foreign policy did not last long. Opposition to this approach emerged as economic reforms did not yield the desired results. Russian policy-makers were increasingly disillusioned with the Western foreign policy approach, which they considered was still negative towards Russia. New geopolitical developments in the region caused concern for Russia. The NATO military attack on the former Yugoslavia and its eastward expansion led to further criticism of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev policy within Russia. Since then, Russian foreign policy orientation has been slowly changing.

Shifting Focus Despite the Altlanticists’ desire to develop a relationship with the Western powers and institutions, Russia gradually became disillusioned with the West. An alternative course in Russian foreign policy was pursued. There was a growing realisation that the West was taking advantage of current Russian weakness. New Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov reoriented Russian foreign policy towards the Commonwealth of Independent States, China, India and the Middle East. Primakov worked towards the construction of a multi-polar world order. He also advocated greater cooperation between Russia, China and India and advocated a strategic triangle between these three countries (Bhattacharya 2004). The idea was discussed to counter unipolar tendencies in global politics and to promote the construction of a ‘multi-polar world that would enable the creation of a just and fair international economic and political order’. In line with the pace of globalisation and post-Cold War economic trends, a common economic agenda was also part of the discussion on the strategic triangle (Bhattacharya 2004). Having served in the Arab world and also as an academic, Primakov was a great believer in Russia’s closer ties with Asia and the Middle East. He opposed the NATO expansion. Russia, however, dealt with hard geopolitical realities and signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Russia and NATO. Moscow explored the alternative to a West-dependent economic recovery and greater integration with the world economy as a supplier of raw materials.

Re-Convergence The advent of President Vladimir Putin is considered the beginning of a new phase in Russian foreign policy. It is argued that Putin brought changes in Russia’s conduct of external affairs. It became more centralised,

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coordinated and professional. After the 9/11 attacks, Russia again re-­ engaged with the West. Putin sought to pursue pragmatic cooperation in accordance with the internal and international environment. His coming to power was considered to be ‘good news’ for Europe. He said, ‘Russia is a very diverse country but we are a part of the Western European culture. No matter where our people live, in the Far East or in the South, we are Europeans’ (Jack 2006, 280). Russia was also victim of terrorism and was fighting its war in Chechnya. After the 9/11 attacks on the USA, Russia promised a concerted campaign against international terrorism with the West. President Putin was one of the first to express his concern over the terror camps in Afghanistan. As the web of terror expanded and began operating in Europe and Eurasia, Russia supported the USA in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan. Moscow gave its consent for the establishment of military bases in Central Asian Republics. These bases were important in war against Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition to supporting US efforts to fight international terrorism, Putin also emphasised Russia’s relations with Europe. In an interview in 2003, he noted, ‘For us, Europe is a major trade and economic partner, and our natural, most important partner, including in the political sphere.’ He reiterated that ‘Russia is not located on the American continent, after all, but in Europe. Of course, a large part of our territory is located in Asia, but Russia is still above all a country with a European culture. We are interested in developing relations with our partners in the United States, and on the American continent as a whole, and in Asia, but, of course, above all with Europe’ (The Kremlin 2003). Russia and Europe moved to enhance their economic and energy partnership. Energy comprises a crucial aspect of Russian foreign trade and Europe is the prime market for Russian energy. Apart from the economic and energy ties, Russia security approach also appeared to be ‘quite compatible’ with the large European nations. Russian joined European countries to oppose the war in Iraq and argued that use of force should be mandated by the United Nations. The EU and Russia also worked towards to expanding cultural and people-to-people contacts (Tsygankov 2013, 146). The EU and Russia agreed to reinforce their cooperation by creating four ‘common spaces’—deep policy cooperation in a number of key sectors—at the St Petersburg Summit in May 2003. Detailed ‘roadmaps’ for the implementation of each of these common spaces were adopted at the Moscow Summit in May 2005. The Common Economic Space covers economic and trade relations and aims to make Europe and Russia’s eco-

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nomic and regulatory frameworks more compatible, thereby boosting investment and trade. The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice covers justice and home affairs, the rule of law and human rights. The Common Space of External Security, which includes crisis management and non-proliferation, deals with bilateral and global cooperation between the EU and Russia. The Common Space of Research and Education allows for enhanced cooperation in these fields, including cultural aspects (European Commission 2011). The EU supported a whole range of sectors to facilitate smooth Russia’s transition. Financial cooperation with Russia began in the early 1990s under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States programme, which has in the meantime been replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Around 2.8 billion euros of assistance has been provided through the European Commission since 1991. The volume of financial assistance declined after improvements in fiscal positions. As Russia itself become a donor, financial cooperation was aimed to meet the objectives defined in the roadmaps to the EU–Russia common spaces. Cooperation is now carried out on the principle of cofinancing by the EU and Russia. Financial assistance is also provided for nuclear safety, democracy and human rights (European Commission 2011). Russia–EU cooperation is in place on a number of regional and international challenges, including climate change, drug and human trafficking, organised crime, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, Iran, and the G-8 and G-20. Russia, the EU, the UK, France and Germany were involved in successfully negotiating the Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015. The Trump administration in the USA has toughened its stance on the Iran Nuclear Deal, while the EU wants to preserve it. In this context, the support of Russia is also important. Cooperation between Russia and European countries is also needed to ensure peace and stability in Syria. Russia supported President  Bashar al-Assad but European countries demanded his removal. French President Emmanuel Macron has revisited France’s stance on Syrian President. He has indicated that removal of Bashar al-Assad is not necessary as there is no legitimate alternative.

Phase of Assertion Another turn has been observed in Russia–Europe relations in first decade of the twenty-first century. Discontent has emerged. Russia considers growing Western influence in the post-Soviet territories a threat. A series

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of uprisings, termed the colour revolutions, took place in former Soviet republics, including in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, in the 2000s. Russia alleged that these colour revolutions had the backing of Western nations. The country appeared more suspicious about the Western motives and their geopolitical interests. On 10 February 2007, President Putin delivered his keynote speech at the Munich Security Conference, challenging the post-Cold War establishment. He criticised a world in which the USA took unilateral decisions on the most important global issues. Putin called such a system inherently unfair, stating that it posed various risks to the world. He noted: ‘Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished […] And no fewer people perish in these conflicts—even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!’ He asserted that the use of force can be considered legitimate only if the decision is sanctioned by the UN, and stated that there is no need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN, arguing that the UN truly ‘unites the forces of the international community’ and can ‘react to events in various countries’. Otherwise, he warned, ‘the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied’ (RT 2017). The phase of assertion was noticed in the Russian approach towards Europe and against Western interventions and unipolar tendencies in global affairs. The crisis in Ukraine was a serious blow to EU relations with Russia. Geostrategically, Ukraine is important for both Russia and the EU.  Both have tried to maintain their ‘influence’ over the country. Ukrainian President Yanukovych was ousted after public protests in 2014. Russia supported him and extended economic assistance, agreeing to buy 15  billion dollars of Ukrainian debt and reduce the price of Russian gas supplies by almost a third. As protests increased, President Yanukovych suddenly disappeared from the country and appeared in Moscow. A pro-EU ­government came to power in the country. Russia alleged that the ‘Maidan Square protests’ were organised and supported by the West. Moscow reacted by annexing Crimea. It was argued that the crisis in Ukraine ‘marks the end of a generally cooperative phase in those relations’, and ‘opened a new period of heightened rivalry, even confrontation, between former Cold War adversaries’ (Trenin 2014). In response to alleged  Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU downgraded relations with Russia and NATO froze cooperation with Russia. The EU imposed economic sanctions on Moscow, ending bilateral cooperation,

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freezing the EU assets of individuals close to the regime, and targeting the Russian defence, oil and financial sectors. European sanctions have restricted access to Western capital markets for Russian businesses. Due to the sharp fall in the price of oil, Russian economy has slowed down. Overall economic engagement has been affected as a result of geopolitical tensions. The EU is Russia’s largest trading partner, while Russia is the EU’s third largest trading partner. Russia is the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU.  The EU is by far the largest investor in Russia. Russia has also banned nearly half of its agri-food imports from the EU, which has affected European farmers. The dairy, pork, beef and fruit and vegetable sectors are hit by Russian ban. Although it is not clear to what extent the EU and wider Western sanctions have affected the Russian economy, these have definitely played some part in Russia’s economic challenges. It is estimated that sanctions have had a significant effect on Russian GDP, amounting to a contraction of over 2% by 2017. However, sanctions are not the only factors in Russia’s economic performance. As Putin himself noted, sanctions ‘are definitely contributing to our current problems’ but they are ‘not our biggest problem’ (Haukkala 2018, 64). The EU’s financial sector also faces an increased risk of default on Russian debt. Some EU member states, such as Hungary and Greece, have criticised European sanctions on Russia. Other European leaders have talked about the lifting sanctions in a phased manner. The EU has extended economic sanctions on Russia and has decided to link the existing sanctions regime to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. This agreement, facilitated by Germany and France, was signed in February 2015. The agreement called for a complete ceasefire in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe would be allowed to monitor its implementation in the conflict zone. The agreement stipulates providing full control to Ukraine of its state border and the withdrawal of the foreign armed groups. Politically, the agreement has provisions for greater autonomy for the eastern part, which will include local elections in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the carrying out of constitutional reforms in Ukraine. The agreement also calls for the release of all hostages and other illegally detained people, in addition to an amnesty for figures involved in the Donetsk and Luhansk conflict (Ukraine Ceasefire: New Minsk Agreement Key Points 2015). The ‘Normandy Four’ (Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France) also agreed to extend the Minsk agreement in 2016. The security situation has improved after the

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ceasefire. However, the ceasefire agreement has been breached several times. European countries have alleged that Russia is supplying arms to rebels in the eastern part of Ukraine. Both Russia and NATO have taken military measures which could escalate tensions between them. NATO has decided to enhance its military presence in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries. The USA activated a missile defence system in Romania in 2016. Poland has been in process of establishing a missile defence system. NATO decided to deploy four battalions of troops in Poland and Baltic nations at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. Four groups will be stationed on a rotation basis in Poland and the Baltic countries. NATO conducted one of the biggest military exercises of the post-Cold War era in Poland in July 2016 (NATO alliance starts biggest military exercise amid tensions with Russia). Russia has also stepped up its military build-up on the periphery of the European NATO members. Moscow confirmed that it has deployed nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in its Kaliningrad region. NATO members, specifically Lithuania and Poland, have voiced concerns over the deployment of these missiles. The Baltic countries and Poland will come into range of these missiles. On the other hand, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that the deployment of these missiles is part of its regular drills. Ministry spokesman General Igor Konashenkov added that the Iskander missile system is a mobile one and the system is relocated in Kaliningrad as part of the training of the Russian armed forces.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership: Emerging Trajectories Emerging trends in US foreign policy under the Trump administration would also have implications for geopolitical dynamics in Europe. President Trump has been indicating changes in policy approach towards Europe and NATO. During his election campaign, he questioned the relevance of NATO. In an interview with the New York Times, he explained his view on security alliance and stated that it had become ‘obsolete’ (Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views). He argued that NATO was formed against the Soviet Union, which was bigger than Russia. He said that terrorism is a big threat. President Trump also insisted on more defence expending from European partners. He stated that NATO is economically unfair to the USA. He has repeatedly said that NATO member states should pay more for their US security guarantee. At the Brussels meeting in May 2017, he said, ‘This is not fair

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to the people and taxpayers of the United States, and many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years and [from] not paying in those past years’ (Donald Trump tells Nato allies to pay up at Brussels talks). European leaders are also unclear about the Trump administration’s policy towards Russia. Therefore, US policy towards NATO and other issues has created anxiety in Europe. European leaders have criticised Trump’s remarks, as well as his decision to withdraw from the Paris climate accord. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has talked about Germany and France taking the leading role in the EU. She has emphasised close cooperation with France, and in the medium term about the deepening the EU and the eurozone. In the wake of changing relations with the USA, she has also said that Europe must take a greater role in leading the world. Demand for closer military and security cooperation among EU member states has been observed. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, emphasised creating a European army. Germany seems keen on closer security cooperation among EU member states. The UK so far is opposed to the idea. The German security role will be crucial in the postBrexit security order. The shift in the German security role is discussed in its foreign policy establishment. Calls for expanding defence cooperation and increasing defence spending are important in shaping the expanding role of the EU in global affairs and dealing with global and regional challenges. Amid the changing dynamics of the transatlantic partnership, European countries are turning again towards Russia for support in resolving immediate disputes. Merkel travelled to Sochi in May 2017 in the first visit of Chancellor Merkel to Russia for two years. In a meeting with Putin, she discussed issues ranging from the conflict in Ukraine and Kremlin’s alleged meddling in Western elections to the conflict in Syria. Putin noted the pleasing developments in the peace talks, hinting at the possibility that sanctions against Russia should be lifted in return. However, lifting economic sanction would depend on the implementation of Minsk agreements. The German stand on maintaining economic sanctions against Russia are important. Although trade between two countries has declined, Germany still wants economic sanctions to continue. Chancellor Merkel also raised concerns over the reported persecution of gay men in Chechnya and other human rights issues. It seems that the President Macron also believes that political interaction should continue and that problems must be discussed. He has said that dialogue with Russia is vital in tackling a number of international

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disputes. President Macron hosted President Putin in Paris in 2017 at the seventeenth-century Palace of Versailles outside Paris. In the meeting, they discussed bilateral and regional issues. The National Front presidential candidate Marine Le Pen also visited Russia before the election and met President Putin. French President Macron said, ‘During the campaign, Russia Today and Sputnik were agents of influence which on several occasions spread fake news about me personally and my campaign’ (Rose and Dyomkin 2017). However, Russia has denied the allegation. President Macron wants to expand the importance of France’s role in resolving international conflicts. After the meeting with Putin, he therefore announced new initiatives such as the creation of a Syria working group and a civic forum with Russia. He is in favour of France and Russia working together on Syria and wants both to boost the sharing of intelligence to find a political solution to the conflict. The Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, also met with the French president in June 2017. They discussed bilateral issues between two countries and expanding economic cooperation between the countries (President of Ukraine 2017). After the meeting Macron, said: ‘France is committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty with its recognised borders’ (France’s Macron refuses to recognise the Crimean ‘annexation’). He also supported the negotiations for ending the conflict in Ukraine through the Minsk agreements. Montenegro joined NATO as its 29th member in June 2017. The inclusion of Montenegro will enhance NATO influence over the Adriatic Sea. The other Adriatic nations, namely Albania, Croatia and Italy, are already in NATO (Montenegro ratifies NATO membership in historic shift to western alliance). In response, the Russian government promised ‘retaliatory actions’ after NATO invited Montenegro. Moscow has banned imports from Montenegro’s largest winemaker, and the Russian foreign ministry warned that tourists could ‘expect provocations and detentions’ due to ‘anti-Russian hysteria’ (Luhn 2017). The Russian foreign ministry, in a statement, said that ‘given the hostile line taken by Montenegro’s authorities, Russia reserves the right to take response measures on the basis of reciprocity. As in physics, in politics for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017). NATO has also conducted military drills in Lithuania. The latest involved more than 11,300 troops from 20 NATO countries. The NATO Secretary General said that the drills were in response to a more assertive Russia. He added that the deployment of battle groups to the Baltic coun-

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tries and Poland aimed to send a clear message that ‘an attack on one NATO ally will trigger a response from the whole alliance’ (NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg warns Russia during Baltic military drills). However, he maintained there did not appear to be any immediate threat to a NATO ally. Russia also conducted a military exercise, Zapad, in September 2017. Russia said that the drills would involve around 70 aeroplanes and helicopters, 10 combat ships, along with 680 units of combat equipment, including 250 tanks and 200 machine guns, multiple launch rocket systems and other heavy weaponry. It also claimed that fewer than 13,000 troops would take part. However, European countries argued that number was much higher (Euronews 2017). European countries saw the military exercise as a provocation by Russian forces. Ben Hodges, the commanding general of the US army in Europe, also warned the exercise could be a ‘Trojan horse’ to bring Russian soldiers and weapons into Belarus and leave them there (Buckley 2017). European countries are also raising issues of interference in the election process. UK Prime Minister Theresa May criticised Vladimir Putin and accused him of undermining the West by meddling in elections and seeking to ‘weaponise’ information. The UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson claimed that Russia’s hostility towards the country and the West has not been as bad since the end of the Cold War (Lawrence 2017). The UK is also expanding defence cooperation with Poland. Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz said that a Polish–British defence partnership treaty would be signed in December 2017. The treaty would include all aspects of national security. The Polish foreign minister and defence minister visited the UK. The Polish defence minister said that talks between the UK and Poland were focused on bilateral and global security issues, including cyber-security. To deal with ‘fake news’ and interference in the election process, Macron has proposed a new law to fight online fake news. The president said, ‘We are going to develop our legal means of protecting democracy against fake news.’ He added, ‘If we want to protect liberal democracies, we must have strong legislation.’ The president said that the press would be consulted on the law and that any such law would be enforced only during an election campaign (Emmanuel Macron Proposes New Law Against Fake News 2018).

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Recent Trends in Russia Foreign Policy Given the persisting tensions with the West, it is argued that Russian foreign policy would be more focused towards Asian countries. Although Russia relations with China have always been important, the Ukraine crisis prompted the development of greater economic and energy cooperation. Both countries have tried to develop greater synergies on policies on regional and international issues. Russia has been looking eastward to diversify its energy supplies (Europe is its major energy importer). As the West has imposed sanctions, Russia has tried to reorient its economy toward China and secure a market for its energy resources. It also expected that such a move would lead to it gaining greater access to Chinese credit and technology. The strategic goal is not only to deepen the political relationship but also to reorient the Russian economy toward the East. It is hoped that China will become a major buyer of Russian energy and provide much-needed capital for Russian companies, facilitating the upgrading the country’s ageing infrastructure and allowing for technology to be shared. The new pivot would keep the Russian economy afloat and spur new sources of growth. However, the outcomes of the shift are mixed. If trends continue, Russia is likely to drift further into Chinese’s embrace (Gabuev 2016). It also seems that Russia has revisited its policy in Afghanistan and has been engaged in facilitating peace and stability in the country. Current phase of Russia–EU relations and the shift in Russian policy towards China or South Asia (including Afghanistan) would have an implicit and explicit impact on Russia’s relations with India. Greater strategic cooperation, particularly in areas of defence between Russia and China, may create concerns for India. The country maintains comprehensive defence cooperation with Russia. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia accounted for 68% of India’s arms import during 2012–2016, as compared to 14% from the USA and 7.2% from Israel. The nature of bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries has undergone positive change in recent years. There is now a greater emphasis on the joint design, development and production of high-technology military equipment (Gupta 2017). If Russia transfers technology and arms to China as well, it would be a matter of concern for India. Russia is also exploring opportunities for expanding energy cooperation. The St Petersburg Declaration (2017) states, ‘The economies of

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India and Russia complement each other in the energy sector. We will strive to build an “Energy Bridge” between our states and expand bilateral relations in all areas of energy cooperation, including nuclear, hydrocarbon, hydel and renewable energy sources and in improving energy efficiency.’ The declaration further adds, ‘India and Russia note that wider use of natural gas, an economically efficient and environmentally friendly fuel, which has become an integral part of the global energy market, is highly significant for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and will assist in fulfilling the provisions of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, as well as achieving sustainable economic growth’ (Energy cooperation in focus, India and Russia vow to widen scope of bilateral ties 2017; MEA 2017). Given Russian energy resources and India’s energy market, the prospects for energy appear to be substantial. However, the feasibility of the cooperation needs to be carefully examined. India shares a comprehensive partnership with Europe as well as with Russia. Strategically, both Russia and Europe are crucial for India. New Delhi recognises Russia as a ‘longstanding and time-tested partner’ (MEA, GoI 2017, 1). As both Russia and Europe are crucial for Indian foreign policy, stability in their relations is helpful for New Delhi. Russia–Europe interactions define the regional and global order; thus, a vibrant and dynamic partnership between Russia and Europe would be a desirable political environment for India. India has cautiously avoided taking a clear line on the dispute between Russia and Europe and has advocated a diplomatic solution of the political crisis between them.

Concluding Remarks Post-Cold War developments provided opportunities to Russia and Europe to develop a genuine partnership as well as to expand cooperation in several areas. These attempts led to a situation where both EU and Russia considered each other as ‘strategic partners’. Economic c­ooperation between Russia and Europe has huge potential, however, the divergence of geopolitical interest hindered cooperation between them. Contemporary regional strategic dynamics is not conducive for developing congenial relations between the two. Russia has serious apprehensions about NATO expansion and involvement close to its borders, as well as military build up in Eastern Europe. Although there is a difference among the Central and

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Eastern European countries over policy towards Russia, broader trends reflect their fear and hostility. Geopolitical rivalry is likely to persist, not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East. In Ukraine, a fragile ceasefire has reportedly been violated several times. The security scenario in the Middle East is also uncertain. EU–Russia cooperation will play a central role in the stability of Europe and its neighbourhood. The Russian role also seems to crucial to resolving the Syrian crisis, as well as in many other global issues, such as the nuclear issue in Iran and stability in Afghanistan. Changing transatlantic ties are also likely to affect these relations significantly. As the economies of both Russia and the EU member states are integrated with each other, they are likely to find some reasonable solutions to areas of tension in the coming years. The quality and openness of the discussions on the common interests reflect their shared determination to provide a substantial contribution to peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has asserted that the organisation supports improving ‘political dialogue’ and ‘military lines of communication’ between Russia and NATO (Sanders IV 2017).

References Bhattacharya, A. (2004). The Fallacy in the Russia-India-China Triangle. Strategic Analysis, 28(2). Retrieved April 2004, from https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ TheFallacyintheRussiaIndiaChinaTriangle_abhattacharya_0404. Buckley, N.  Neighbours Fear “Trojan Horse” as Russia Readies War Games. Financial Times. Retrieved August 27, 2017, from https://www.ft.com/content/f284d7ae-89b2-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7. Clover, C. (2008). Russia Announces ‘Spheres of Interest’. Financial Times. Retrieved August 31, 2008, from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e94697447784-11dd-be24-0000779fd18c.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4lP OBR0pU. Delegation of the European Union to Russia. (n.d.). The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/russia/eu_russia/political_relations/legal_framework/index_en. htm. Dobriansky, P.  J. (2000). Russian Foreign Policy: Promise and Peril. The Washington Quarterly, 23(1), 135–144. Donald Trump Tells NATO Allies to Pay up at Brussels Talks. BBC. Retrieved May 25, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40037776. Donaldson, R. H., & Nogee, J. L. (2005). The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (3rd ed. p. 258). New York: M E Sharpe.

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Emmanual Macron Proposes New Law Against Fake News. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved January 3, 2018, from http://www.dw.com/en/emmanualmacron-proposes-new-law-against-fake-news/a-42019719. Energy Cooperation in Focus, India and Russia Vow to Widen Scope of Bilateral Ties. Business Standard. Retrieved June 1, 2017, from http://www.businessstandard.com/article/news-ani/energy-cooperation-in-focus-india-and-russia-vow-to-widen-scope-of-bilateral-ties-117060101808_1.html. Eurlex. (2010). Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Retrieved from http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r17002. Euronews. (2017). Zapad 2017: What You Need to Know About Belarus and Russia’s Military Exercises. Retrieved September 15, 2017, from http://www. euronews.com/2017/09/15/zapad-2017-what-you-need-to-know-aboutrussias-military-exercises. European Commission. (2011). The EU-Russia Partnership  – Basic Facts and Figures, MEMO/11/104. Retrieved February 11, 2017, from http://europa. eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-104_en.htm. France’s Macron Refuses to Recognise Crimea ‘Annexation’. France 24. Retrieved June 26, 2017, from http://www.france24.com/en/20170626-francemacron-refuses-recognise-crimea-annexation-ukraine-poroshenko. Gabuev, A. (2016). Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis. Retrieved June 29, 2017, from http://carnegie. ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-afterukraine-crisis-pub-63953. Gorbachev, M. (2014). Gorbachev’s Full Speech During the Celebrations of the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Russia in Global Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2017, from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/ Gorbachevs-full-speech-during-the-celebrations-of-the-25th-Anniversary-ofthe-Fall-of-the-Berlin-Wal. Gupta, A. (2017). Deeper Defence & Security Cooperation with Russia Enhances India’s Strategic Choices. The Economic Times. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/deeper-defencesecurity-cooperation-with-russia-enhances-indias-strategic-choices/articleshow/62200689.cms. Haukkala, H. (2018). Negative Mutual Interdependence? The Clashing Perceptions of EU-Russia Economic Relations. In T. Casier & J. de Bardeleben (Eds.), EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions (pp. 53–71). New York: Routledge. Ivanov, I. (2001). The New Russian Identity: Innovation and Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy. The Washington Quarterly, 24(3), 5–13. Jack, A. (2006). Inside Putin’s Russia. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Lawrence, H. (2017). Boris Johnson Claims Russia’s Hostility to UK and West Is as Bad as Cold War. The Independent. Retrieved December 17, 2017, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-latest-russia-uk-west-hostility-cold-war-putin-foreign-secretary-a8115086.html. Luhn, A. (2017). Montenegro Finds Itself at Heart of Tensions with Russia as It Joins Nato. The Guardian. Retrieved May 25, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/25/montenegro-tensions-r ussiajoins-nato-member. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India. (2017). India-Russia Relations. Retrieved May 2017, from http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ India_Russia_May.pdf. Montenegro Ratifies NATO Membership in Historic Shift to Western Alliance. The Guardian. Retrieved April 28, 2017, from https://www.theguardian. com/world/2017/apr/28/montenegro-ratifies-nato-membership-in-historic-shift-to-western-alliance. NATO Alliance Starts Biggest Military Exercise Amid Tensions with Russia. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/nato-alliance-startsbiggest-military-exercise-amid-tensions-with-russia/a-19310946. NATO’s Jens Stoltenberg Warns Russia During Baltic Military Dills. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved June 20, 2017, from http://www.dw.com/en/natos-jensstoltenberg-warns-russia-during-baltic-military-drills/a-39339970. President of Ukraine. (2017). Meeting Between the Presidents of Ukraine and France: We Are Determined to Expand the Agenda of Our Bilateral Cooperation, President of Ukraine. Retrieved June 26, 2017, from http://www.president. gov.ua/en/news/mi-rishuche-nalashtovani-na-rozshirennya-poryadku-dennogo-na-42066. Rose, M., & Dyomkin, D. (2017). After Talks, France’s Macron Hits Out at Russian Media, Putin Denies Hacking. Reuters. Retrieved May 30, 2017, from https://in.reuters.com/article/france-russia-copy/after-talks-francesmacron-hits-out-at-russian-media-putin-denies-hacking-idINKBN18Q08S. RT. (2017). Wars Not Diminishing’: How Putin’s Iconic 2007 Munich Speech Sounds Today. RT. Retrieved February 10, 2017, from https://www.rt.com/ news/376901-putin-munich-speech-2007/. Sanders IV, L. (2017). NATO Chief Predicts Increased Dialogue With Russia in 2018. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved December 29, 2017, from http://www.dw. com/en/nato-chief-predicts-increased-dialogue-with-russia-in2018/a-41966005. The Kremlin. (2003). Interview with the ANSA Italian News Agency, Corrieredella Sera Newspaper and the RAI Television Company. Retrieved from http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22185.

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The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), GoI. (2017, June 1). Saint Petersburg Declaration by the Russian Federation and the Republic of India: A Vision for the 21st Century. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2017). Comment by the Information and Press Department on the Completion of the Procedure of Montenegro’s Accession to NATO. Retrieved June 5, 2017, from http://www. mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2775720. Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views. (2017, March 26). New York Times. Trenin, D. (2014). The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry. Carnegie. Retrieved July 2014, from http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf. Tsygankov, A.  P. (2013). Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. UK and Poland Play Down EU Problems to Focus on Russia. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved December 21, 2017, from http://www.dw.com/en/uk-andpoland-play-down-eu-problems-to-focus-on-russia/a-41896227. Ukraine Ceasefire: New Minsk Agreement Key Points. BBC. Retrieved February 17, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31436513.

CHAPTER 11

The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Ukrainian Crisis Teiborlang T. Kharsyntiew

Introduction Foreign and security policy cooperation, as enshrined under the ‘second pillar’ of the European Union (EU), has been viewed as an ambitious goal.1 Despite past failures, the EU has diligently tried to establish itself as an influential actor within the international system. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aims for the Union to speak with one voice; it thereby tries to establish a singular European voice in international affairs. However, with the existence of a multi-layered foreign policy-making, the process itself does not begin or end with the ‘second pillar’ of the Union, but extends to the corridors of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Presidency. The complexities inherent within foreign and security policy are further challenged by the intricacies of foreign policy processes at the national level of the 28 EU member states.2 The fall-out from these intricacies is that foreign policy-making in the EU is a complex, intertwined and cumbersome affair, involving a high degree of interplay between European, national and global politics. The Ukrainian crisis that erupted in 2014 represents a paradox in the EU’s common foreign policy. The crisis that started at Euromaidan calling T. T. Kharsyntiew (*) Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_11

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for a change of regime escalated with the referendum in Crimea. Although the immediate reaction of the EU and its Western partners was to boycott and sanction Russia, it is not clear whether these sanctions were effective. However, as this chapter shows, the dissonance between the EU and member states’ foreign policy objectives makes the EU’s foreign policy, despite its gradual evolution since the Maastricht Treaty, less important than member states’. This chapter is an attempt from an Indian perspective to understand how this interplay between domestic and international politics in European politics affects the EU’s foreign policy decision-­ making. It also encapsulates the Ukrainian crisis in the context of India’s historical ties with Russia and its emerging relations with the EU.

Foreign Policy-Making in the EU: The Setting Despite the complexities and paradoxes of foreign policy-making, various models and approaches of foreign policy analysis have attempted to explicate how such policy is made in the EU. Various schools of thought have sought to find a viable approach towards EU foreign policy analysis. Methods to understand the complexities of the EU’s foreign policy-­making include functionalism (Mitrany 1943, 1965); neo-functionalism (Haas 1958), neo-liberalism (Keohane and Nye 1989); liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1989); consociationalism (Pijpers et  al. 1988); intraorganisational bargaining (Bulmer 1983); and the two-level game (Putnam 1988). While liberal intergovernmentalism and intra-­organisational bargaining can partially explain the processes of EU integration through an explication of domestic and international politics in member states’ policy towards the EU, no individual theory on its own can explain the phenomenon as a whole. Although Robert Putnam’s theory of the two-level game on the dynamics of domestic–international bargaining theory is not sufficient to untangle the EU’s foreign policy on its own, the current Ukrainian crisis and the domestic constraints faced by the EU member states can at best be explained through the dichotomy of this game. This is not to diminish the viability of exploring a synthesis approach towards a better understanding of issues of EU member states’ foreign policies. Within the EU, while some of the decision-making that member states have transferred to the EU is done directly by the European Commission, the Council and Parliament, other decisions that are deemed core to member states’ sovereignty are still contingent on the national government deciding and negotiating at the intergovernmental conferences of the

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EU. It is here that preferences and bargaining are often negotiated between member states. Various domestic constituents, such as industry groups, political coalitions and representatives of economic and political interests, form an important part of understanding the correlation between member states and their preferences towards the EU’s foreign policy. In this environment, where sovereignty and national interest come to the forefront, constructing a platform for a CFSP becomes difficult and time-­consuming, and this has often robbed the EU of the time to deal with a crisis at short notice. Though the EU was able to speak with one voice to address the Ukrainian crisis, yet action came too late. The delay in addressing the issue meant delay in EU diplomatic outreach to engage other countries such as India and China and handed Russia the upper hand in the crisis. While some of its decision-making comes directly from Brussels, a large part of it is still dependent on national governments deciding and negotiating among themselves. In the area of the CFSP, difficulties of implementation are real for member states. It is more difficult when sovereignty and the national interest are foremost in constructing a debate on CFSP; member states are influenced not only by international obligations or regional politics but also by domestic politics. It is in such scenario that nationstates have sought to play Putnam’s (1988) two-level game. He argues that negotiations at the international level are determined not only by domestic or international conditions. For him, no particular condition— whether ‘domestic’ or ‘international’—singularly determines decision-­ making. Taking a clue from the Bonn Summit of 1978,3 he ­demonstrates how the interplay between domestic and international factors determines to a large extent an actor’s preferences in decision-making. Thus, in the matter of foreign policy, actors play a two-level game, one at the domestic level and the other at the international level, in order to maximise their gain from any type of negotiation (Putnam 1988). The absence of swift action against Russia can be attributed to the two-level game that member states were engaging in within the EU and against Russia.

Ukraine’s Geopolitical Conundrum: Between the EU–NATO and Russia The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 marked the culmination of the Ukrainian crisis, a stratagem that brought fresh challenges to EU foreign policy-making. Like other Central and East European (CEE) countries, Ukraine’s raison d’être for a ‘return to the Europe’ has been the

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subject of constant debate. The first attempt by the CEE countries to ‘return to Europe’ began with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in 1994. This agreement was a watershed moment because it initiated an increasing divergence of EU policy towards the post-communist regions of Europe, in which the EU and its member states’ policies towards post-communist CEE countries were framed separately from that of Russia (Hughes 2006). Ukraine, as the first member of the post-Soviet states, and a frontline of the EU’s Russia policy, thus became a launching vehicle for executing EU’s policy towards the CEE countries. From 1994 onwards, a series of agreements and instruments were concluded between the EU and Ukraine to reaffirm the latter’s independence, territorial integrity, democratic political, economic transformation and integration with the world economy (Kuzmin and Maksymenko 2012). However, the economic transformation of Ukraine into a market economy was complicated by the internal dynamics within Ukraine’s political economy. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine’s politics had been oscillating between the EU and Russia. The uncertainty was the result of physical, economic and regional disparity within Ukraine, which became obvious after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The eastern region, which was the most advanced region and was involved in manufacturing and production during the Soviet period, became the most economically depressed region in the post-Soviet period. Skryzhevska (2007) noticed that the economic crisis in the mining and manufacturing industries of the early 1990s forced many plants to shut down, affecting the unemployment rate to such a degree that it increased to 10–13%, thereby leading to a dramatic decline in living conditions. She observed that though positive change in the economy started after 2000, when real gross domestic product started to grow, the rate of growth was not even as some regions grew faster than others, broadening the differences in the quality of life experienced across the country. She also observed that in comparison to the eastern region, the western region of Ukraine exhibited a lower level of population decline and better health indicators (Skryzhevska 2007). These regional disparities could also be analysed from the cultural differences between the two regions. The eastern region, consisting of a majority of Russian speakers, the inhabitants trace their relationship with imperial Russia to the seventeenth century and cultural relations forged with Russia then exist even today. This historical affiliation has formed the basis of the current political crisis in Ukraine. On the other hand, the western part of Ukraine witnessed

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the dominion of European powers such as the Austro-­Hungarian Empire and Poland, which, to some degree, explains why people there felt a historical affinity towards Western-leaning politicians (Conant 2014). These dichotomies in the regional characteristics within Ukraine led to frequent shifts in Ukraine’s policy towards the EU and Russia. During the last two and a half decades, since its independence, Ukraine’s domestic politics have overlapped between the EU and Russia. Its geopolitical importance to the Western alliance is evident in the way the West has attempted to attract Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Russia has viewed these overt efforts as an act of encroachment posing a direct challenge to Russia’s influence and territorial boundary. Russian prerogative with regard to the sanctity of the post-­Soviet space can be traced back to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994. The memorandum signed between Ukraine, the USA, the UK and Russia, pledged to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine and to refrain from the use of threat or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine (United Nations 1994). The memorandum, though not a formal treaty, acknowledged the application of the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. In other words, a quid pro quo arrangement was put in place to ensure that Russia would not endanger the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and that the West would not encroach upon Russian border through expansion of NATO eastward towards Ukraine and the Black Sea—a region that is viewed as critical to Russia’s geopolitical strategy. When the Euromaidan protest reached its apex with the exit of President Viktor Yanukovych, the EU enthusiastically shouldered the responsibility to diffuse the crisis by holding to the argument that the majority of Ukrainians wanted a return to Europe through the EU. It went on to sign an Association Agreement (political chapters) with the new government in Kiev on 21 March 2014. The Final Act to this Association Agreement was signed on 27 June 2014 and thus set the stage for Ukraine’s first step towards full EU membership. However, this Association Agreement ran counter to Geneva Statement on de-escalation of conflict and constitutional reforms in Ukraine. The Geneva Statement which was agreed by the US, Russia, the EU and Ukraine on 17 April 2014 call for parties to the conflict to refrain from violence and to pave the way for a constitutional reform. It was agreed that the constitutional reform would be inclusive, transparent and accountable, and that reforms will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all

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of Ukraine’s regions and political constituencies (European Union External Action Service 2014). Looking from the Russian viewpoint, this agreement is an assurance that the future of Ukraine’s politics will take into account Russia’s concern. However, with the signing of EU-Ukraine Association Agreement of 27 June 2014 little scope is left for Russia to negotiate the future of Ukraine while the EU not only ran the risk of jeopardizing the agreement made in the Geneva Statement but also failed to measure its long-term foreign policy strategy by ignoring Moscow’s decades-old grievances (Borger and Luhn 2014). Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian economy has experienced significant economic growth, particularly during the early years of his presidency. This economic boom that Russia witnessed during the first and second term of Putin’s presidency equipped Russia with the ability to reassert itself in global politics in a new way. In this new scenario, the EU and NATO’s expansion towards the CEE countries eroded the buffer that the countries had hitherto provided between Russia and NATO.  In his speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, Putin categorically expressed his apprehension about NATO’s proposed new missile defence location in Central Europe (President of Russia 2007). This tension between the West and Russia was further magnified by the EU’s eastern enlargement of 2004, when ten CEE countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined the EU.  With the arrival of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, Russia’s perception of the West’s relations with its immediate neighbourhood dramatically changed and tensions became more visible. Gorbachev’s thesis of peaceful coexistence  with the West and ‘Common European Home’ was seen no longer viewed feasible because the rapacious expansion now represented a direct challenge to Russia’s traditional zone of influence. This was at a time when Russia under Putin was trying to reassert its definitive role, not only in the region, but also globally. Russia viewed these developments as contradicting the EU–Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997, which stipulated that political dialogue between the EU and Russia would be a continuous ‘convergence of positions on international issues of mutual concern’ (European Commission 1997). In this light, Joan DeBardeleben (2013) observed: European leaders either ignored or chose to overlook some of its potentially problematic implications since they saw it as ‘necessary’ and ‘inevitable’. Ironically, whereas NATO expansion elicited strong objections from Russia,

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its impact proved less significant than EU enlargement (which Russia ostensibly accepted with minimal protest). Integration into the EU had a deeper and more integral impact on the society, politics, and economics of the countries involved than did NATO membership, as evidenced by the stringent requirements of the accession process. Over time, leaders in most of the new member states turned their gaze to Europe rather than Russia as the focal point for their political, economic and geopolitical orientation. (DeBardeleben 2013: 46)

Together with its enlargement policy, the EU made attempts at demonstrating its normative power by relying on the promotion of norms and values through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European Union External Action Service 2016).4 However, the ENP, while working towards creating a ‘ring of friends’ around the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, also extended its jurisdiction to the post-Soviet space, which Russia sought to reclaim. Working towards the EU’s enlargement policy, the ENP, however, failed to negotiate between the EU’s objectives and Russian geopolitical concerns, and the result was a failure of the EU to frame an effective policy towards Russia (Haukkala 2008).

The CFSP and the Ukrainian Crisis: A Less Common Policy The complexity of the CFSP as an institution was also reflected in the Crimean crisis of 2014. Soon after the call for a referendum in Crimea was made by pro-Moscow groups, the EU ministers for foreign affairs held an extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 3 March, condemned the ‘the clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ and termed Russian aggression a breach of international law (Council of the European Union 2014a). The projection of a unified EU external policy on the crisis was followed by a series of action taken at the EU level during the same month with regards to additional sanctions, such as travel bans and the freezing of assets of Russian bodies (Council of the European Union 2014b, c). While on the surface these actions appear to be a collective decision taken by member states to condemn Russia’s annexation of Crimea, when analysed carefully, the sanctions were the minimum that could be agreed. While the demand for the EU to impose severe sanctions against Russia and the call for NATO to expand its military presence was put forward by the CEE countries, such a demand was mostly

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restricted to rhetoric as the impact of such sanctions on their domestic economies was of great concern to most member states. For example, when the proposal for an additional sanction was discussed, the UK was committed to the EU imposing ‘far reaching’ sanctions, but Germany and Italy initially resisted any attempt to impose additional economic and trade sanctions on Russia (The Telegraph, 20 March 2014b). This can be explained by the fact that member states’ economies are intricately linked to access to the Russian market and to the import of oil and natural gas for their domestic economies. Unlike the UK and France, both Italy and Germany are heavily dependent on Russian gas. In the case of Italy, given the decline in the supply from North Africa, Russia remains its biggest supplier for natural gas. In 2014, Italy imported 43.1% of its natural gas requirement from Russia, and 41.3% in 2016 (International Energy Agency 2016a: 125; 2016b). Similarly, in 2011, Germany, imported 36.7% of its natural gas from Russia (International Energy Agency 2013), 42.82% in 2015 (International Energy Agency 2015), and 46.6% in 2016 (International Energy Agency 2013, 2015, 2016c). The EU position was further complicated by the German–Italian struggle over access to Russian gas supplies and the construction of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which not only affected their respective relationships with Russia, but also restrained the EU’s efforts to consolidate a common approach to the Ukrainian crisis (De Maio 2016). Apart from energy, both Italian and German companies have a huge presence in Russia. For example, Italy’s relations with Russia extended to areas such as the banking sector. UniCredit, Italy’s largest bank by assets, was by 2014 the second-largest foreign bank in Russia by revenues (Financial Times 2014). Similarly, Germany, Russia’s main trading partner in Europe, had about 6,000 companies with about 300,000 German jobs depending on trade with Russia when the Ukrainian crisis was at its peak (The Economist, 15 March 2014). This unambiguity is also seen in the CEE countries. These countries, which have economies closely tied to both the EU and Russia, are boxed between Russia’s geopolitical ambition, their dependence on Russia oil and gas supply, and their commitment towards the EU. Frontline countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, apart from depending on Russian oil and gas, are also wary of Russia geopolitical assertion. These countries posed an existential question on their position during the Ukrainian crisis by criticising the growing presence and expansion of the Russian national gas company Grazprom in the European energy market, along with the numerous long-term bilateral energy agreements signed between individ-

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ual member states with Russia (Ratner et al. 2013: 7). While Poland was from the beginning firm on its position on the need for regime change in Ukraine and the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the position of the Baltic states was divided. While Latvia and Estonia were much more moderate and avoided open confrontation with Russia, Lithuania adopted a more critical position and did not believe that a pragmatic attitude towards Russia would yield any benefit (Vitkus 2015). In such a scenario, reaching a common decision on foreign policy matters becomes a long drawn-out process as member states are tossed between commitment towards the EU and their own domestic preferences.

CFSP and the Political Economy of the Ukrainian Crisis When the Ukrainian crisis started in 2014, member states agreed on the need for an action against Russia. Immediately, sanctions on Russian entities were imposed but what was missing was the level of sanctions. Member states were divided on the nature of sanctions to be imposed on Russia and instead focused on incremental sanctions. At the core of this division was the EU and its member states’ economic ties with Russia. One area that tied EU’s member states’ relations with Russia was their energy dependency on Russia. Eurostat’s data on EU energy dependence between 2005 and 2016 indicates the dependence of EU member states on the Russian supply of oil and natural gas (Eurostat October 2017b). Over the period of ten  years, the data indicated that the EU-28 dependency on energy imports increased from more than 40% of gross energy consumption in 1990 to 54% by 2015, and that Russia maintained its position as the main energy supply to EU-28 with crude oil and natural gas as the main components (Eurostat October 2017b). While some EU member states recorded a fall in their energy dependency rates between 2005 and 2015, other such as Denmark, the UK, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece and Germany, became increasingly dependent upon energy imports to satisfy their national consumption (Eurostat October 2017b). With the exception of the UK and Denmark, the other countries rely on Russia for their energy (Eurostat June 2017a).5 Similarly, the linkages between Russia and the EU can also be seen in the trade in goods and services. While Russia remains the fourth largest t­ rading

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partner of the EU (European Union External Action 2017), Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions, along with other external factors, such as the weakening the Russian economy, negatively impacted upon EU–Russia trade balances. The 2017 Report of the European Parliament indicated that between 2013 and 2016, EU exports to Russia were declining by 20.7% annually (European Commission 2017: 6). The Report estimated that the EU incurred export losses of USD 7.9 billion in 2014, USD 12.9 billion in 2015 and USD 13.9 billion in 2016, which amounted to 11% of total EU exports for 2014–2016 (European Parliament 2017: 40). Among the member states, Germany bore the brunt of the loss of exports in absolute terms with around USD 13 billion over the three-year period (European Parliament 2017: 33). Similarly, the shares of Russia in total exports of the Baltic countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary declined considerably, much more than for the EU as a whole (European Parliament 2017: 39). The impact of sanctions was related to the fall in oil prices; the depreciation in the rubble did have an impact on outflow and inflow in EU–Russia foreign direct investment (FDI). The sanctions imposed on Russia severely restricted the commercial opportunities available to politically connected Russian companies, thus preventing key firms operating in the financial, energy, and defence sectors from taking on new long-term debt, as well as importing dual-use technology (Szakonyi 2017: 2). By 2015, outward FDI flow from the EU came down to 2.1 billion euros from a high of 19.1 billion euros in 2012, and inward FDI flow from Russia rapidly dropped from 8 billion euros in 2012 to 4.5 billion euros in 2015 (Eurostat April 2017c). However, despite these lows, the trends were reversed by 2016, when the Russian economy started to recover. The EU’s FDI flow into Russia, which came to a halt in 2014 and 2015, resumed in 2016 (European Parliament 2017: 6). For instance, leading European ­companies, such as Volkswagen and Mercedes Benz, were opening new manufacturing plants in Russia (David Szakonyi 2017: 4). Similarly, mining and oil players such as Royal Dutch/Shell and BP, in collaboration with Rosneft, were negotiating on liquid natural gas projects on the Baltic Sea, and oil reserves in Siberia (David Szakonyi 2017: 4). Similarly, EU–Russia trade in services recovered and, despite the sanctions, in 2014 the EU maintained a surplus of 17.4  billion euros over the previous year; it managed a surplus of 13.6 billion euros and 12.5 billion euros in 2015 and 2016, respectively (European Commission 2017), thus making Russia EU’s sixth largest export destination for EU services (Eurostat June 2017d).

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When examining EU–Russia relations it is evident that Russia depends on the European market to sell its oil and gas, the EU-28 need Russia for uninterrupted and stable supply of oil and gas and for access to Russian market with its growing appetite for Western products, thus making the relationship complementary. However, this mutual dependence between the EU and Russia is constrained by the domestic exigencies of member states. Amidst political differences over the Ukrainian crisis, member states sought to adjust their relation with Russia by withholding or delaying stringent sanctions against Russia, while fat the same time pursuing bilateral economic relations. The result was pressure on EU external policy. While EU external policy is supposed to speak with one voice and action, such action by member states more often than not makes EU foreign policy weak and lacking in substance. It is therefore not surprising that by 2016, despite sanctions, inward FDI flow into Russia from the EU which came to a halt in 2014 and 2015, began to resume again (European Parliament 2017: 6) and any attempt to put further sanction on Russia was met with a lukewarm response from member states.

India’s Position As the Ukraine crisis unfolded, the international response was split between countries which supported sanctions against Russia, those who chose to remained on the sidelines as neutral observers and those who supported Russia’s actions. India’s response to the crisis is reflected in official statements and opinions in its English-speaking media. Historically, India’s relations with the Soviet Union were very close. The 1971 Indo– Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation made the Soviet Union India’s biggest benefactor in international forums and a dependable defence supplier. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberalisation of the Indian economy and the shift in India’s foreign policy over the last two decades, India–Russia ties remain strong. The strength of these ties can also be seen in the up-grading of bilateral relations from a strategic partnership to a ‘Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’ in 2010. Hence, when the Ukraine crisis erupted, India attempted to maintain a neutral position while at the same time being sensitive to Russia’s interest.

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India’s official position to the crisis can be discerned from the initial two statements. In response to a question at a press conference 6 March, the National Security Adviser (NSA), Shivshankar Menon, termed the crisis in Ukraine as involving internal issues of ‘legitimate’ interest to Russia and other parties involved, and that the issue should be resolved peacefully (Government of India 2014a). On the same day, the Ministry of External Affairs released a statement that emphasised India’s concern over the status its nationals in Ukraine and reiterated India’s neutrality on the issues by asking all parties to the conflict to find a peaceful solution through diplomatic means (Government of India 2014b). These two statements, particularly the emphasis on the word ‘legitimate’, was interpreted by many as India’s endorsement of Russia’s action in Ukraine. However, as Varun Sahni (2014) argued, India’s position on the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine was considerably more nuanced than might have been convenient for Putin to recognise. He bases his analysis by arguing that the National Security Adviser (1) refers to the crisis as Ukraine’s internal issues; (2) recognises that not only Russian, but also other interests were involved; and (3) emphasises the need for a peaceful settlement, reconciliation and negotiation (2014). Following the statement of the NSA, the Government of India tried to balance its position by expressing its concerns at the escalating crisis in Ukraine, urging ‘all sides’ to abjure violence and seek a political and diplomatic solution, one taking into account the ‘legitimate interests of all concerned’ (Government of India 2014c). While this official statement confirms Sahni’s analysis, the national media analysed it otherwise. Strategic analysts and reporters see the historical relations between India and Russia and India’s own experience of a Crimea-like situation in Sikkim in 1975 as reflected in India’s support for Russia. The Indian newspaper The Telegraph reported that according to Indian officials, India was convinced that the West’s tacit support for regime change in Ukraine had only weakened democratic roots in Ukraine (The Telegraph, 7 March 2014a). India’s position on the Crimean crisis began to develop when leading newspapers such as The Hindu, the Indian Express and other news portals and channels began to argue for India’s support to Russia. The Hindu newspaper on 5 March 2014 published an article that stressed that any further provocation by the West ‘would only prompt Russia to expand its reach to more areas in Eastern Ukraine’ (The Hindu, 5 March 2014a). The call for India’s unambiguous position and support for Russia’s action in Ukraine was more forthcoming when Firstpost on 19 March 2014 car-

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ried an article that argued for India’s support to Russia by reminding readers of Russia’s unstinted support for India during the war with Pakistan in 1971 (Firstpost, 19 March 2014). Similarly, when Putin, in his address to a joint session of the Russian Parliament on 18 March, said that he ‘greatly appreciate[d] India’s reserve and objectivity’, most of the Indian newspapers interpreted this as Putin’s acknowledgement of India’s NSA March 6 press conference statement (President of Russia 2014; The Indian Express 19 March 2014b; The Hindu 19 March 2014b; NDTV 19 March 2014). Thus, by 27 March when the Western-backed resolutions to condemn Russia’s action in Ukraine came up for voting in the UN General Assembly, India abstained from voting and refused to support Western sanctions against Russia. By the end of the year, India’s position was even more pronounced. During the Parliament session of December 2014, two questions related to the Ukraine crisis were directed to the Minister for External Affairs in the Upper House of the Parliament. The questions were: (1) whether the Russia–Ukraine crisis would have an impact on Indo-Russian relations, and if so, what would India’s stance be; and (2) whether India’s support of Russia would affect India’s relationship with the UK and US (Government of India 2014d). The nature of the question itself gained significance given that it implied that India supported of Russia. Replying to these two questions, the Minister categorically reaffirmed the House that the Government of India calls for “political and diplomatic solutions, involving all stakeholders, to restore peace and normalcy in Ukraine and in the region” (Government of India 2014d). The Minister also informed the House that India has also expressed support for the ‘unity and territorial integrity of all countries’ and that its ‘publicly stated position on the Ukraine Crisis’ is known both by the US and the UK and is not a factor impacting its relation with these countries (Government of India 2014d). These statements gained further importance during President Putin’s annual summit delegation to India in the same year. His delegation was accompanied by Sergey Aksyonov, a pro-Russia Crimean leader; this created a controversy with Ukraine expressing disapproval of India’s hosting the Crimean leader. Despite India’s feigning ignorance of the composition of the Russian delegation, it is highly unlikely that such an event would have taken place without New Delhi being aware of who was attending (Reuters, 12 December 2014).

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India’s foreign policy has undergone a series of changes since 1947. The shift in direction came in the early 1990s when India shifted gear to diversify and engage beyond the old Soviet-influenced countries. By the end of the 1990s, India’s foreign policy had deepened its engagement with countries such as United States and its allies in Western Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. This shift, however, did not hamper Indo-Russian relations. As India’s relations with Russia are historical in nature and are deeply imprinted in the Indian mind, official statements have often stated that Indian bilateral relations with Russia are historical and stand independently from those with the USA and others (Government of India 2014d). During the Ukraine crisis, these historical ties therefore influenced India’s position. Furthermore, the period during the Crimean crisis coincided with the onset of parliamentary election in India. The then United Progressive Alliance government was indecisive and had little room to manoeuvre. Support for sanctions against Russia will be seen in the public as a sell-out to the USA and against the interests of an Indo-Russia relations. In the official statement, it is, however, reported that India’s decision was influenced by its commitment to stand against the principles of unilateral sanctions imposed by a country or a group of countries (Indian Express 19 March 2014a). This was despite the fact that India had imposed unilateral sanctions on countries such as South Africa during the apartheid regime, Rhodesia in 1965, Fiji in 1987, Nepal in 1989 and 2015, and Pakistan in 2001 (Chauhan 2014). India did not support any Western sanctions against Russia. At the same time,  India also favoured Ukrainian integrity. New Delhi was  cautious about Crimea’s referendum.  Any move towards  independence from Ukraine or merger with Russia was problematic. Indian policy makers are aware that similar demands for self-determination would be legitimised by various separatist groups demanding separation from India. To India, the crisis is a regional conflict arising out of a collision between EU–NATO’s eastward enlargement and Russia’s concern over this enlargement. Finally, though the EU as a block remains India’s biggest trading partner, the imagination of the EU is often restricted in the corridors of the elite, who perceive the EU as a normative power (Jain and Pandey 2013). The notion of a normative power in itself is not fixed. Such a power is able to achieve its intended objectives only if it is accompanied by subtle elements of hard power, like the power to apply sanctions. To India, the image of the EU is limited to an economic powerhouse that can shape the norms and behaviour of small actors but not those who have the potential to retaliate, as in the case of Russia, China or India, where mutual dependence is at a higher

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level. Moreover, in matters of high politics, India still relies on bilateral channels with individual member states. From this followed the decision to abstain from voting in the UN and the subsequent actions of the new NDA government to host Sergey Aksyonov in December, pointing to an attempt by New Delhi to balance its position yet stay close to Moscow.

Conclusion The Ukrainian crisis confirmed yet again the complexity of foreign policy-­ making in the EU. When dealing with member states’ relations with the EU, defining foreign policy becomes problematic and non-definitive because in areas of high politics and on numerous occasions inconsistencies and an absence of consensus is what defines the EU’s common policy. This problem is more evident because the delineation of authority, power and processes within the EU institutions itself is complex and overlaps with the authority of national agencies such as national parliaments, bureaucracies, opposition parties and interest groups. Despite such a high degree of ideological convergence between member states’ foreign economic and monetary policy with those of the EU, at the policy level of ‘high politics’, member states’ interest has been significantly divergent from that of the EU, and from that of one another. The interplay between EU politics and the national politics has led to a significant amount of push and pull from within and outside the EU’s CFSP. The need to demonstrate a unified foreign policy, on more than one occasion, has clashed with the national agenda. The Ukrainian crisis witnessed this friction between the EU and member states’ foreign policy, where a union of 28 members states with divergent interests and ambitions could find little to no consensus in addressing the crisis. This is more pertinent today when the EU and NATO’s neighbourhood are at loggerheads with Russia’s strategy for the post-Soviet space. As differences between these regional powers magnifies, so does the impact on a global level. The war that Russia is waging against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria often operates beyond US and EU strategy. Russia’s assertion in region and beyond its border, as in Syria, puts pressure on the EU to deal with the crisis in its neighbourhood. As Russia looks to bargain with the West over its influence in the post-Soviet space of Ukraine and other CEE countries, the EU will face an existential crisis in its foreign policy-making.

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Notes 1. The Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 brought the ‘Pillar’ system to an end. 2. Negotiation on Brexit between the EU and the UK is currently underway and is expected to last till March 2019. Until that date, the UK remains a member of the EU. 3. The Boon Summit Conference of 1978 refers to the fourth economic summit of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The summit was held against the backdrop of disequilibrium in the international balance of payments: a large deficit suffered by the USA and its appetite for energy consumption, Japan’s large surplus and Germany’s trade surplus, and a high rate of unemployment. After intense negotiation that also involve a high degree of bargaining between the USA, Germany and Japan, the Summit agreed to boost economic growth and the USA agreed to reform its energy policy, whereas Japan and Germany improved their economic growth and contained unemployment. 4. According to the European Commission’s official website, the ENP of 2003 was launched with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. It is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. The ENP was reviewed in 2011. Under the revised ENP, stabilisation of the region, in political, economic and security-related terms are at the heart of the new policy. The revised ENP puts a strong emphasis on two principles: the implementation of a differentiated approach to the EU’s neighbours, to respect the different aspirations of its partners and to better answer EU interests and the interests of its partners; and increased ownership by partner countries and member states. 5. Two years after the first sanctions were imposed on Russia, member states such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Finland were still importing more than 75% of their petroleum oil and natural gas from Russia (Eurostat October 2017b). Other member states such as the Czech Republic, Latvia, Austria, Romania and Slovenia were importing more than 75% of their total national imports of natural gas from Russia. Similarly, Germany imported between 25% and 50% of its petroleum oil and between 50% and 70% of its natural gas requirement from Russia (Eurostat October 2017b). The Netherlands imported between 25% and 50% of its petroleum oil and natural gas from Russia; Italy imported less than 25% of petroleum oil but between 25% and 50% of natural gas from Russia, with Spain importing less than 25% of both petroleum oil and natural gas from Russia (Eurostat October 2017b).

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Brief. Retrieved December 30, 2017, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/18 0831/94b5e66db412bc9babce1d7ce447f876.pdf. Skryzhevska, Y. (2007). Inequalities of Regional Development in Ukraine: Causes, Consequenses, and Prospects. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http://www.miamioh.edu/cas/_files/documents/havighurst/2007/skryzhevska.pdf. Szakonyi, D. (2017, July 12). Foreign Direct Investment into Russia Since the Annexation of Crimea. Russian Analytical Digest, No. 205. Retrieved February 10, 2018, from https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/178780/RAD205.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. The Economist. (2014, March 15). Lovers, Not Fighters. Retrieved December 15, 2017, from https://www.economist.com/news/business/21599034-german-exporters-are-pushing-back-against-economic-sanctions-russia-loversnot-fighters. The Hindu. (2014a, March 5). Russia’s Revenge. Retrieved December 12, 2017, from https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/Russia%E2%80%99srevenge/article20734461.ece. The Hindu. (2014b, March 19). Putin Thanks India for Its Stand on Ukraine. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/putin-thanks-india-for-its-stand-on-ukraine/article5800989. ece. The Indian Express. (2014a, March 19). India Not to Support Western Sanctions Against Russia. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from http://indianexpress.com/ article/india/india-others/india-not-to-support-western-sanctions-againstrussia/. The Indian Express. (2014b, March 19). Putin Call PM, Thanks India’s Objectivity. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from http://indianexpress.com/article/world/ europe/putin-calls-pm-thanks-indias-objectivity/. The Telegraph. (2014a, March 7). India Bats for Russia Interests. Retrieved December 28, 2017, from https://www.telegraphindia.com/1140307/jsp/ frontpage/story_18054272.jsp. The Telegraph. (2014b, March 20). EU Leaders Divided Over New Sanctions to Punish Russia for Annexing Crimea. Retrieved January 11, 2018, from http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10710268/ EU-leaders-divided-over-new-sanctions-to-punish-Russia-for-annexingCrimea.html. United Nations. (1994, December 7). Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved June 14, 2017, from https://documents-dds-ny. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/507/64/pdf/N9450764. pdf?OpenElement. Vitkus, G. (2015, December). Baltic States’ Foreign Policies Vis-a-Vis Russia, in Light of the Ukraine Crisis. Russian Analytical Digest, No. 176. Vol. 4. Retrieved February 1, 2018, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195276/ RussianAnalyticalDigest_176.pdf.

CHAPTER 12

The Nuclear Energy Debate in the European Union Swati Prabhu and Gulshan Sachdeva

Introduction In the 1970s, the global economy and politics around the world were shaken by a severe crisis with the imposition of the oil embargo. The 1973 Arab– Israeli war reflected the growing tension between the Soviet Union and the USA, which supported opposing parties in the war. Soviet-backed Egypt and Syria were at loggerheads with the American-aided Israeli troops. As a result, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) abruptly wound up their petroleum production and imposed an embargo on oil shipments to the USA and the Netherlands. This international restriction on oil continued even after the war and created a major reaction among the global community. In addition, the gradual depletion of fossil fuels, such as coal and liquefied natural gas, only worsened the situation. In this scenario, the European Community (EC) was not left untouched. For instance, the then British prime minister, Sir Edward Heath, requested citizens to heat just a single room in their houses during the winter (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2013). However, from the days when the oil embargo was imposed in the early 1970s, the European Union (EU) has clearly experienced a mixture of S. Prabhu (*) • G. Sachdeva Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_12

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circumstances, compelling several countries to look towards alternate sources of energy, such as renewables and nuclear, so as to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels (Beilecki 2008). It also gave an impetus to environmentalism and concerns regarding climate change and the need for sustainable development. As part of this understanding, cutting carbon emissions was also identified as an important marker for conserving the environment (Energy Watch Group 2007). Given these circumstances, the EU took  recourse to nuclear energy. Several countries, such as France, Germany, the UK,1 Spain, Finland, Belgium and Italy, laid the foundations of nuclear power in their respective countries. This was considered to be a major development, as far as member states were concerned. More generally, the two Treaties of Rome (1957) culminated in the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community—known as EURATOM. Here, it should be noted that EURATOM is a ‘separate legal entity from the EU and is governed by the EU institutions’.2 The establishment of EURATOM marked a major landmark for the development of nuclear energy. It was mainly intended to promote the growth of the nascent nuclear industry for peaceful purposes. However, major nuclear mishaps, Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima Daiichi in 2011, cast a huge shadow over its future development. Many nations, including some of the member states of the EU, became cautious, because of the complicated economics and waste management that this type of energy required. At present, member states of the EU have their own set of ideas and approaches towards the formulation of their nuclear energy policies. Some of the member states, such as France, Hungary and Finland, strongly back the cause of nuclear energy. However, countries such as Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Italy and Greece oppose it. Spain, the UK and the Netherlands have opted for a weak strategy towards nuclear energy. Ireland and Austria are in favour of complete ban on nuclear energy. Neutral parties towards nuclear energy are Luxembourg and Denmark. Furthermore, the lack of a common ‘European stance’ on this issue has created confusion. The European Commission does not subscribe to a particular viewpoint on nuclear energy and has kept it open-ended. This ongoing debate has sparked huge uproar in several countries within the Union. Public opinion, the media and policy-makers are contemplating its future course, whether in the form of phase-outs, gradual abolition or cautious expansion. With climate change and sustainable development topping the European agenda, it would be appropriate to say

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that the status of nuclear energy could be one of the key factors determining energy security in Europe, with its influence on other economies, such as China and India (Prabhu 2018). 

Nuclear Energy in the EU Nuclear energy generates almost 30% of the electricity produced in the Union  (European Commission 2012). The EU has 128 nuclear power plants currently in operation in 14 member states. It has been observed that the EU adopted and developed nuclear energy in a very distinctive fashion. The oil crisis of the 1970s made it difficult for the member states to satisfy their demand for electricity. Even though renewables did appear to be a suitable option, this would have meant a longer period spent on research and development till its full potential could be realised. Hence, the establishment of nuclear energy was given the green light by the Commission. EURATOM was already established to take care of the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy in the Union. Interestingly, member states were given the freedom to decide their own energy policy (and also their nuclear energy policy). In addition to this, the topic of nuclear energy has been consistently discussed, giving it a special position in the history of the EU’s affairs.3 The current scenario of nuclear energy in Europe stems from its early origins. The six founding members explored the idea of using a new type of energy in the 1950s. The shrinking capacity of conventional sources of energy also compelled European nations to turn towards nuclear energy to fulfil the goals of energy independence. The price of setting up a nuclear power plant and its associated costs were very high—perhaps too high to be borne by an individual country. Hence, the major objective of the EURATOM treaty was ‘to contribute to the formation and development of Europe’s nuclear industries, so that all Member States can benefit from the development of atomic energy, and to ensure security of supply. At the same time, the Treaty guarantees high safety standards for the public and prevents nuclear materials intended principally for civilian use from being diverted to military use’ (EURATOM 1957). It should be noted here that the treaty applies only to certain entities (member states, physical persons, and public or private undertakings or institutions) which carry out some or all of their activities in an area covered by the Treaty, that is, special fissile materials, source materials and the ores from such source materials are extracted. The European Commission currently has no particular stance towards nuclear energy. There is a relative lack of clarity concerning energy

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diversification as it is difficult to control the decision-making mechanism of each member state. Many scholars have also pointed out that the energy infrastructure differs from country to country. Over the years, member states have shaped their energy infrastructure depending on their demands (Birchfield and Duffield 2011). Some countries freely use nuclear energy, some are completely against it and the rest are still debating it. In this context, Fernando de Esteban explains: When the authors of the European Atomic Energy Community drafted the EURATOM Treaty, thoughts of nuclear installation safety and radioactive waste were not uppermost in their minds. For several years there was no Community activity directly dealing with nuclear installation safety. It was not until 1975 that the Community woke up to the seriousness of the issue. By then, nuclear power programmes in its then Member States had progressed and diverged along very different routes. Moreover, not only were many of the installations very different, but the national systems regulating them were also very different. (Fernando de Esteban 2002)

The Current Energy Scenario Currently, the European energy sector is dominated by oil, natural gas and coal. Nearly 80% of the total energy consumed by the Union comprises oil, natural gas and coal. Out of these energy sources, 50% is imported and this is further expected to rise by 65% by 2030, making it the largest importer in the world (Eurostat 2017). Nuclear power constitutes about 12% of the EU’s primary energy consumption (as of 2016) and 30% of its electricity generation. According to the European Nuclear Society, as of March 2017, there were 128 nuclear power plant units in the EU with an installed electric net capacity of 119,421  MWe (megawatt electrical) in operation; four units with an electric net capacity 4392 MWe were under construction in three countries. The major policy concerns for the EU arise from rising energy imports, particularly of oil and more recently of gas, emphasising the importance of attaining security of energy supplies (Eurostat 2017). In October 2015, the EU nuclear industry association FORATOM put forth a goal of commissioning about 100 new nuclear power reactors between 2025 and 2045—a total of 122 GWe—so as to maintain the current nuclear capacity up to 2050 in at least 14 member states of the EU.

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In terms of the electricity generated by nuclear energy in 2015, France occupies the top spot with a share of 76%, followed by Slovakia with 56% and Hungary with 53%. However, with the recent accidents, faith in nuclear energy has been shaken. Opinions are divided between those supporting it and others who are focused on the dangers that nuclear energy can unleash. The ongoing debate on its utility holds the key to the energy security policy of the EU’s member states. It is estimated that the bloc’s contribution to nuclear generation would drop by 10% at the global level (European Commission 2015). The ageing nuclear reactors of the Union, if not given any extension, are sighted as one of the main reasons for this downfall in the demand and supply of nuclear power.

The EU Member States’ Stance on Nuclear Energy and Public Opinion The advent of nuclear power in the second half of the twentieth century raised a gamut of expectations among policymakers—the use of nuclear power for civilian purposes, being one of them (Commission of European Communities 1995). However, these expectations are far from being fulfilled. There are several obstacles that have obstructed the large-scale implementation of nuclear energy in the civilian arena, such as the risk to human health, the management of atomic waste, the financial investments involved in building a nuclear plant, to name but a few. According to Gawdat Bahgat (2006), the European public has become extremely cautious in the aftermath of the terrible nuclear accidents in different parts of the world. On the other hand, surprisingly, the European Commission has kept its nuclear policy open-ended and neutral: the individual member states have the liberty to decide their positions on nuclear power while formulating their energy policy (FORATOM 2014). Nevertheless, it is essential that the Commission prioritises the safety of the existing installations by ensuring that the radioactive waste is disposed of carefully without any damage to the environment (Uranium Information Center 2017). If one compares the trajectory of the EEC and EURATOM over the years, it is noticed that the former has been amended innumerable times taking the shape of the Union and the latter has not been given much attention; this is not to say that all member states of the EU share a common view on nuclear power. While the EEC treaty, and its subsequent amending treaties, has shown resolve for achieving a closer Union, the

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EURATOM framework has remained unchanged since 1957. Moreover, the individual member states have usually taken contradictory stances on what can be termed one of the most ‘politically contentious energy’ sources in the world. However, as Nuttall (2010) mentions, the member states have agreed upon the required safety standards, such as nuclear installation safety and radioactive waste management.4 Broadly, the EU member states are divided on utilising nuclear energy. This division holds the key in deciding the path the Union will take to ensure effective energy security. While going through the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Nuclear Association (WNA) country reports and the EU profile, William Nuttall (2010) has categorised member states as strongly positive, weakly positive, neutral, strongly negative and weakly negative. This is based on their policy perspectives and public opinion towards nuclear energy. France and Its Nuclearonomics ‘France does not have oil, but it has ideas’: this famous slogan was popular in the country during the Arab oil embargo. According to Herbst and Hopley (2007), France is considered to be a beacon of nuclear power industries in Europe. The country adopted nuclear energy during the oil embargo in the early 1970s. Since then there has been no looking back. In spite of the anti-nuclear feeling running high in the Union, France has gradually increased its use of nuclear power in order to curtail its dependence on expensive imported oil. At present, nuclear energy provides about 76% of its electricity generation. The first French commercial nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1963. As of May 2017, France possesses 58 nuclear power plants, operated by the Electricite de France, which has a total capacity of 63.2 GWe, supplying about 419 TWh (terawatt hours) of electricity (net) in 2017, 77.5% of the total generated (IEA 2017). Interestingly, about 17% of France’s electricity is from recycled nuclear fuel (World Nuclear Association 2013). It has also been observed that the country generated electricity with the help of nuclear energy more economically than the rest of the Europe. France has attained the status of the largest net exporter of electricity in the EU due to its very low cost of power generation. As of October 2017, the country earns 3 billion euros (World Nuclear Association 2013) from this source annually. Previously, it had been a net electricity importer, especially during the 1970s. Several experts credit this change to the rapid expansion of the

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nuclear industry in the country. As of 2016, France generates a total of 549.6 TWh of electricity, where nuclear occupies 73%, renewables 18%, coal 2% and gas 6% (IEA 2016). Presently, France enjoys a considerable level of energy independence, negligible carbon dioxide emissions per capita from electricity generation, and most importantly low-cost electricity in Europe. The 1974 decision has elevated its position towards a favourable scenario where over 90% of its electricity is from either nuclear or renewables. France does not have any sizeable deposits of fossil fuels, which also explains the country’s positive approach towards nuclear energy. Public opinion in France has been upbeat regarding nuclear power. However, in a curious turn of events it has been also observed that there are people who are neutral or have no opinion on it. As a result of recent accidents, the public mood is changing somewhat (Nuttall 2010). In a report published in World Nuclear News in June 2013, it was observed that although twice as many people favour nuclear power than oppose it, nearly half of the population is still unsure or non-committal about it. No Nuclear Energy for Germany During the oil crisis of 1973, Germany, like France, moved towards nuclear power to meet its energy requirements. The Germans felt insecure about their energy supplies and had no option but to resort to nuclear energy. In fact, the country had been using vigorously nuclear power since the 1960s. Since the 1970s, there has been considerable move in public opinion against nuclear power, which has led to the country’s decision to phase out nuclear energy entirely. At present, the country possesses eight nuclear power plants, which contribute about 14% of its power; this source formerly supplied more than one-quarter of the electricity (133 TWh net in 2010). Many experts attributed the phasing-out of nuclear energy in the country to the increased negative public opinion. The first phase-out session of nuclear power plants began in 2000, with the seeds sown by a coalition government of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party in October 1998. Interestingly, the last nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1989. The governments that came to power during these ten years had divergent views on nuclear energy. The phase-out also meant that substantial policy changes regarding the research and development undertaken for these nuclear utilities, spanning three decades. With German Chancellor Angela Merkel openly against nuclear energy,

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Germany is on the path to total abolition by 2022. The German government  aims to replace their policy of nuclear power with fossil fuels and highly subsidised renewables. This new emerging policy is popularly known as the Energiewende. Spain, the UK and the Netherlands: A Weak Nuclear Approach Spain, the UK and the Netherlands have presently halted the momentum towards expanding nuclear energy. At present, Spain has seven nuclear power plants. After a moratorium was imposed in 1983, the expansion of nuclear energy has slowed down. The conservative government that came to power in November 2011 was more pro-nuclear than its predecessor. In July 2012, the government reversed the decision by extending the operating license of the nuclear power plant located in Garoña beyond 2013. This certainly reflected a favourable attitude towards nuclear. On the other hand, public opinion stood in complete contrast to the government’s stance. In July 2014, an opinion poll conducted by Ipsos showed that about 54% of respondents opposed nuclear energy. A mere 29% accepted the nuclear stance of the government. However, the same opinion poll also revealed that 25% of respondents were in favour of building new nuclear reactors, while 33% thought that nuclear reactors should be operated until the end of their operational duration. Only 38% of them supported the progressive phase-out of nuclear power (Ipsos 2012). The opinion polls thus indicated a mixture of views. At present, the government’s commitment towards the future of nuclear energy is unclear. The UK presently has 15 well-functioning nuclear power plants but these will come to the end of their lives by 2023. The country has set up an elaborate and organised assessment process for new reactor designs and their siting. However, according to the classification of Nuttall (2010), the UK’s stance towards nuclear energy is that it is something of a ‘last resort’. In 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair made it very clear that nuclear energy was back on Britain’s agenda with a vengeance (Taylor 2007). The robust turn of events was characterised by the Labour government, which had earlier dismantled British Nuclear Fuels and later refocused their efforts towards modern nuclear research. Simultaneously, the Conservative Party also backed nuclear—in its own ‘nuanced’ way. These political events, according to Nuttall, reflect the interest of the UK in nuclear energy, although in an unusual way. Recently, the Chinese interest in UK’s nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point C has raised eyebrows in the international

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arena (Prabhu 2016). In the context of Brexit, although the UK is determined to leave the bloc, it has shown an inclination to maintain partnerships with the EU on energy matters, especially nuclear power. However, it has also been reported that Brexit might also imply UK leaving the EURATOM Treaty, which could prove to be a set-back for the UK nuclear industry. Despite Fukushima, public opinion concerning nuclear power has remained more or less positive in the UK.  According to the World Nuclear Association, the strong political support across all three main parties is one of the notable features of the nuclear debate. This also largely influenced the public mindset (Corner A et al. 2011). In 2012, YouGov conducted a survey and found that about 63% of the population supported the use of nuclear power; only 22% opposed the construction of new power plants, especially on brownfield sites. The same year in October, another YouGov survey found that 40% of respondents felt that the UK government should use more nuclear power than at present, which was up from 35% in 2011 (YouGov 2012). The Netherlands is slowly opening up to nuclear energy. There is growing public and political support for expanding nuclear power in the country. Interestingly, the country’s decision to phase out nuclear energy was reversed in September 2006 to further its plan of building a sustainable energy supply model (IEA 2017). At present, it possesses one nuclear power plant. Opposition to Nuclear Energy Staunch opposition to nuclear energy comes from Austria and Ireland. Both these countries continue with their anti-nuclear position. In 1978, a referendum was held in Austria regarding the future of nuclear energy in which more than 50% voted against Zwentendorf nuclear power plant. As a result,  the nuclear prohibition law was adopted. After major nuclear disasters in Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the Austrian media campaigned extensively against the use and expansion of nuclear power. Public acceptance of nuclear power is very low in the country. Similarly, Ireland discarded its plan of pursuing nuclear energy. The Irish bloc currently utilises both renewables and thermal energy sources to fulfil its electricity demands (Department of Communication, Climate Action & Environment 2018). In 2015, Ireland produced about 28 TWh (terrawatt hours), 20 TWh generated by fossil fuels, 7 TWh by wind and solar energy, 1 TWh by hydro and biofuels each (World Nuclear Association 2018). However, its

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no-nuclear policy has not dissuaded the country from being a part of several international organizations like International Energy Agency (IEA), the EURATOM treaty, Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), to name a few. The government has made it clear that it has no intention of pursuing nuclear policy in the future. The most noteworthy opposition now comes from the German camp, which is considered to be hub of activity and an opinion-maker in Europe. It is one of the most complex members of the Union as far as its national attitude towards nuclear energy is concerned. The German opposition to nuclear energy began during the coalition rule of the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party in October 1998. The ‘phase-out’ campaign was bolstered when Angela Merkel came into power in 2005. Even though the Eurobarometer in 2007 showed that the German public was not as negative about nuclear as the government portrayed, German ­policy-­makers appear to have made up their mind to move away from nuclear energy and replacing it with renewables. From the earlier ‘weakly negative’ stance, German position is now clearly negative. Sweden is also moving towards a phase-out policy  by shutting  four of its old  reactors by 2020 (World Nuclear Association 2018). Public opinion in Sweden has witnessed a mixed response over the years. Currently, the country operates eight nuclear reactors.

European Energy Debates and India While dealing with the issues of climate change, sustainable development and environmental degradation, India is aiming to orchestrate its foreign and security policy with a range of energy security issues. As one of the major energy consumers in the world, the EU is encountering several challenges, including: the mounting global energy demand and competition for clean energy resources from emerging economies; a growing need to establish alternative sources of energy to revitalise the climate change policy  (IEA 2008); and increasing instability in energy-producing regions. On the other hand, as an energy-deficient country, India also faces the challenge of diversifying its energy mix and sources of energy supply. Therefore, despite varied levels of development, both India and the EU face many similar challenges related to their respective zones of energy security. To a significant extent, nuclear energy debates within EU and India will also affect their energy security as well as bilateral relations in the areas of energy cooperation.

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Marred by its energy deficit, the Indian power sector is gradually striving to achieve a transition towards a low-carbon future (Ebinger 2016). However, there are various barriers to this, including: an increasing population; the overhauling of the economic sector by slowly moving away from the conventional agriculture and service industry to manufacturing and production; and rapid urbanisation (Sethi 2010). India’s heavy reliance on fossil fuel-based energy also appears to be a concern.5 In this context, nuclear energy plays a vital role in powering the country’s electricity generation, which at present stands at a meagre 3.2% (Central Electricity Authority 2017). During the Paris meeting, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Indian government claimed nuclear power as a ‘safe, environmentally benign, and an economically viable source to meet the increasing electricity demands of the country’, as part of its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. By 2032, India aims to achieve about 63 GW (gigawatt) of installed capacity for nuclear energy (INDC 2015). Devising a combination of both renewables and nuclear economics is something that Indian policymakers should focus their energies upon. The EU nuclear energy debate has certainly fuelled radical reactions across the international community. The risky proposition of nuclear economics, such as safety hazards and its radioactive waste management, influence Indian public perception too. The Koodankulum nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu, the Jaitapur nuclear power plant in Maharashtra and the Haripur nuclear project in West Bengal are a few such examples where grassroots movements have opposed these projects. Knowledgeable experts have concluded that considering all aspects (economics, the availability of resources and technologies to exploit resources and environment sustainability), nuclear power has to be a significant part of India’s energy mix (Grover 2017). Due to increasing opposition by certain civil society groups, they advocate, however, that ‘nuclear industry must continuously engage public and address their concerns in a language that is easy to understand (Grover 2017, 19). Forging partnerships with the EU is one of the key steps for enhancing India’s energy scenario. The EU–India partnership on Climate and Energy Cooperation and the Bilateral Partnership on Sustainable Urbanization are helping in improving their role as partners and global climate leaders (Khandekar 2017). The EU–India collaboration has extensively improved, especially in the field of research and innovation. The first science and technology agreement signed in 2001 can be aptly labelled a great start in this field. Since then, both the EU and India have shown significant coop-

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eration in this area through their Joint Statements and Action Plans. India has also been included as a partner in projects such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research or the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. EURATOM and the Indian Department of Atomic Energy are also exploring possible agreements in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This cooperation may help in the safe deployment of nuclear technologies in water, healthcare and medicine. Nuclear cooperation with some member states such as France holds special importance  (The Economic Times 2018). Since 2008, when a landmark agreement on civil nuclear cooperation was signed between India and France, cooperation has strengthened. France signed the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India in 2008, even before the USA, after the Nuclear Suppliers Group gave a unique waiver to India. France is building six atomic power reactors of 1650  MW each at Jaitapur. The French firm Electricite de France will build the six reactors with the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd as its operator. India and France have also jointly launched the International Solar Alliance. For the massive deployment of solar energy, the Alliance intends to mobilise more than USD 1000 billion of investment by 2030.

Conclusion With the ongoing debate on utilising nuclear power in Europe, it is evident that the Union is divided on this issue. The EU does not take any particular stance on this matter, but it does recognise the fact that nuclear energy plays a pivotal role in sustainable development and in mitigating climate change in the long run. Time and again, the European Commission has mentioned nuclear energy in its various green reports, strategy papers and declarations; it has never spoken openly on either encouraging it or banning it. Safety regulations and nuclear waste management has also been given due importance by the Commission, especially after the Fukushima accident. The member states maintain their independence in deciding which sources of energy to utilise and also the overall energy mix. The entire debate hinges not only on the legislation but also on public attitudes and opinion. Public concerns typically include safety, radioactive waste management, nuclear weapons proliferation and transparency in the approach to public consultation, climate change and energy security. Following the Paris Conference, environmentalism has dominated political debates and the EU is trying build a formidable base for achieving

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energy efficiency. At different points of time, the Commission has set emission targets, encouraged renewables and urged greater energy efficiency. With the establishment of the Energy Union, Europe is trying to tackle the problem of climate change, greater energy efficiency, the building of trust and solidarity among member states and—most importantly— the management of a fully functional internal energy market for the Union. As both EU and India are energy-deficient regions, broader energy debates and, in particular, nuclear energy debates in Europe will have a significant impact on Indian policy options. It can certainly be said that European energy policy experiences and technological developments are influencing Indian policy decisions. This is evident in the renewable sector. In the nuclear power sector, Indian policy-makers are clear that it will play an increasing role in the long run. There are also clear indications that India will cooperate in this sector with many European partners.

Notes 1. As of now, the UK remains a full member of the EU and the rights and obligations of membership continue to fully apply in and to the UK. 2. Refer to: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/nuclear-energy, last accessed September 10, 2017. 3. During the European Sixth Framework Programme Project CESSA Conference—Coordinating Energy Security in Supply Activities—Professor Gordon MacKerron mentioned that ‘nuclear power is special’ for Europe. 4. The recent communication of the Commission released in May 2017 on a Nuclear Illustrative Programmed talks about the necessity of applying higher standards of safety, security, waste management and non-proliferation as well as diversifying nuclear fuel supplies. Refer to: https://ec.europa. eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/nuclear_illustrative_programme_ pinc_-_may_2017_en.pdf. 5. The quality of coal produced by India is average with high ash content and low sulphur content, leading to even higher greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, it is reported that more than a third of Indian carbon emissions are directly linked to coal use.

References Bahgat, G. (2006). Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities. International Affairs, 82, 961–975. Beilecki, J. (2008). The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges. CRS Report for Congress.

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Birchfield, V. L., & Duffield, J. S. (Eds.). (2011). Towards a Common European Union Energy Policy: Problems, Progress, and Prospects. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Central Electricity Authority. (2017). All India Electricity Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/others/planning/pdm/2017.pdf. Commission of the European Communities. (1995, December 13). An Energy Policy for the European Union. White Paper COM (95) 682 Final, Brussels. Corner, A., Venables, D., Spence, A., Poortinga, W., Demski, C., & Pidgeon, N. (2011). Nuclear Power, Climate Change and Energy Security: Exploring British Public Attitudes. Energy Policy, 39(9), 423–433. Department of Communication, Climate Action & Environment. (2018). Nuclear Energy. Retrieved from https://www.dccae.gov.ie/enie/environment/topics/ environmental-radiation/nuclear/Pages/default.aspx. de Esteban, F. (2002). The Future of Nuclear Energy in the European Union. Deputy Director-General, Directorate for Energy and Transport, European Commission. Ebinger, C. (2016). India’s Energy and Climate Policy: Can India Meet the Challenge of Industrialization and Climate Change? Washington: The Brookings Institution. Energy Watch Group. (2007). Coal: Resources and Future Production. Berlin. EURATOM. (1957). Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Brussels. European Commission. (2012). Energy Roadmap 2050. Text of the European Commission’s Communication “Energy Roadmap 2050” (COM (2011) 885 Final of 15 December 2011, Luxembourg. European Commission. (2015). Factsheet on Nuclear Energy. Brussels European Nuclear Society. (2017). Nuclear Power Plants in Europe. Retrieved September 11, 2017, from http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/ n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm. Eurostat. (2017). Energy Statistics: Supply, Transformation and Consumption. Brussels. FORATOM. (2014). EU Nuclear Energy Policy Forecast 2014. Brussels. Grover, R. B. (2017). Resurgence of Nuclear Power in India. In N. Janardhanan et  al. (Eds.), Resurgence of Nuclear Power: Challenges and Opportunities for Asia (Vol. 3, p. 22). Singapore: Springer. Herbst, A. M., & Hopley, G. W. (2007). Nuclear Energy Now: Why the Time Has Come for the World’s Most Misunderstood Energy Source. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. IEA. (2008). European Union Is Leading on Climate Change and Energy Policies, But Needs to Increase Funding for Energy Research and Development. Press Release. Retrieved from http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2008/september/name,20250,en.html. IEA. (2016). World Energy Investment Outlook: World Energy Outlook Special Report. Paris: OECD/IEA.

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IEA. (2017). A World in Transformation: World Energy Outlook. Paris: OECD/ IEA. INDC. (2015). India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards Climate Justice. Retrieved from http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/India%20First/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20 UNFCCC.pdf. Ipsos. (2012). After Fukushima: Global Opinion on Energy Policy. Retrieved from https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/1970-01/ipsossriafter-fukushima-march-2012.pdf. Kalicki, J.  H., & Goldwyn, D.  L. (2013). Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition. Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. John Hopkins University. Khandekar, G. (2017). EU-India Relations Come Full-Circle. EurActiv. Retrieved December 31, 2017, from https://www.euractiv.com/section/globaleurope/opinion/eu-india-relations-come-full-circle/. Nuttall, W. (2010). Nuclear Energy in the Enlarged European Union. In F. Lévêque (Ed.), Security of Energy Supply in Europe (p. 314). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Prabhu, S. (2016). Chinese Nuclear Renaissance at Hinkley Point: A Perspective. IndraStra Global 002, 10: 0027. Retrieved from http://www.indrastra. com/2016/10/OPINION-Chinese-Nuclear-Renaissance-at-Hinkley-PointA-Perspective-002-10-2016-0027.html. ISSN: 2381-3652. Prabhu, S. (2018). Here Comes the Sun. The Telegraph. Retrieved March 31, 2018, from https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/here-comes-thesun-213107. Sethi, M. (2010). The Nuclear Energy Imperative: Addressing Energy Poverty, Energy Security, and Climate Change in India. India Infrastructure Report, Oxford University Press. Taylor, S. (2007). Privatization and Financial Collapse in the Nuclear Industry: The Origins and Causes of the British Energy Crisis of 2002. Abingdon: Routledge. The Economic Times. (2018). India & France Agree to Step up Cooperation in Space Technology. Retrieved March 31, 2018, from https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-france-agree-to-step-upcooperation-in-space-tech/articleshow/63247541.cms. Uranium Information Center. (2017). Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors. Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 14. Retrieved April 2017, from http://www.uic.com.au/ nip14.htm. World Nuclear Association. (2013). The Global Nuclear Fuel Market: Supply and Demand 2013–2030. London: WNA. World Nuclear Association. (2018). Nuclear Energy in Sweden. Retrieved from http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/countryprofiles/countries-o-s/sweden.aspx. YouGov. (2012). Nuclear Energy Polarises Opinion. Retrieved from https://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/03/08/nuclear-energy-polarises-opinion/.

CHAPTER 13

Migration and Refugee Issues Vijayta Mahendru, Gulshan Sachdeva, and Neha

Introduction International migration is one of the most important factors in global change. Persistent inequality between countries continues to impel a large number of people to move in search of better living standards. This movement of people can be voluntary or forced. Since the beginning of the 21st century, political and ethnic conflicts have emerged as one of the most important factors behind forced displacement. These migrants, fleeing violence and persecution, often experience abuse, exploitation and discrimination. Despite poor reception and conditions, migration is still preferable to the insecurity of staying in the home country. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are currently 65.6 million forcibly displaced people in the world—the highest number ever recorded. Out of this, 22.5 million are refugees (those who have managed to cross international borders), half of whom are minors. Most of the refugees are from Syria (5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million) and South Sudan (1.4 million). The countries that host the largest

V. Mahendru (*) • G. Sachdeva • Neha Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_13

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number of refugees are Turkey (2.9  million), Pakistan (1.4  million), Lebanon (1  million), Iran (980,000), Uganda (950,000) and Ethiopia (790,000) (UNHCR n.d.). However, none of the above countries has received as much international attention with respect to migration in the past few years as Europe. In 2015, the European Union (EU) recorded its highest-ever number of ‘first time asylum seekers’ (European Commission 2016a)—1.3  million from 147 nationalities. Out of this, Germany received the highest number of asylum applications at 441,800, followed by Hungary (174,400), Sweden (156,100), Austria (85,500), Italy (83,200) and France (70,600) (Eurostat n.d.). The numbers alone do not explain the extent of upheaval that the EU is facing. This is the third refugee influx in the last 25 years, coinciding with wars and political instability around the region. Resulting from the Yugoslav war, the number of asylum seekers to the EU-15 was close to 672,000  in 1992 and about 517,000  in 1993. The number declined but again went up to about 400,000 a year between 2000 and 2003. Since then the numbers have been close to 200,000 a year (Eurostat 2007). This latest wave of refugees is a result of the instability in the Middle East and North Africa region that began with the Arab Spring in 2011. Conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa, the securitisation of migration and borders, and human trafficking are some of the factors that have contributed to the refugee crisis in Europe. Immigration to Europe was encouraged due to labour shortages for post-war rebuilding but the resultant diversity was less welcome.1 From the 1980s onwards, Europe experienced dramatic changes led by globalisation, the collapse of the socialist system and the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia. This coincided with further integration within Europe resulting from the enlargement of the EU and the Schengen area. While the intra-Schengen borders were to be completely open for the free movement of goods and people, the exterior borders became increasingly securitised,2 leading to the sobriquet ‘Fortress Europe’. Right-wing politicians have taken this opportunity to highlight the ‘destabilising’ consequences of migration, implying it was a threat to public order. A number of studies (Huysmans 2000; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Karyotis 2007) have explored EU policies that securitise migration; these have led to heightened border security, deportations and surveillance of immigrants. Some authors emphasise the role of the EU as a leader in the securitisation of migration (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2007), while others (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002) claim that it is a phenomenon of ‘Western societies’ or even a ‘global phenomenon’(Tirman 2006). The securitisation of borders and migration

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is one of the major causes as well as a heightened manifestation of the ‘refugee crisis’ that Europe is currently facing. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948) recognises the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. The 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR 1951) established internationally recognised criteria defining a refugee. The document defines the concept of non-refoulement in Article 33.3 A Common European Asylum System was created in 1999 with a mandate to foster high standards of protection for refugees through collaborative efforts aimed at harmonising common minimum standards for asylum in the EU. This constitutes a set of directives such as the Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions, Qualifications, Eurodac and the controversial Dublin Regulation.4 With respect to the arrival of a large number of undocumented migrants on its shores in the recent times, the EU’s response, over the years, has been inadequate, both in terms of policy and implementation. Little success has come from its attempts to securitise borders and keep migrants away from its shores. Hundreds of thousands of migrants are not only entering the EU, but thousands are also dying in the attempt to reach Europe. The central Mediterranean route, from Libya to the Italian island of Lampedusa, has emerged as the deadliest route in international migration, resulting in well over half of all migrant deaths.5 This route opened up in its current form as a result of the death of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s dictator of 40 years. NATO countries intervened to dismantle the Gaddafi regime but lacked a serious post-Gaddafi strategy for the country, which led to sectarianism and the unravelling of the Libyan economy and security apparatus (Verhofstadt 2017). This resulted in the proliferation of smuggling networks all around the coast of Libya, spreading to many more parts of North Africa, which put to sea overcrowded and unseaworthy dinghies which often capsize en route to Europe. The other two prominent routes of undocumented entry to EU territory are the eastern Mediterranean and the western Balkan routes. The eastern Mediterranean route is from the coast of Turkey, host to the largest numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world, especially from Syria, to the Greek islands of Kos and Lesbos. For the migrants, however, Italy and Greece are not the target destinations. Most of them aspire to move northwards. From Italy, they cross to Germany; and from Greece, they continue to make way through Serbia, Macedonia, Hungary and Austria, and onwards. This is the ‘western Balkan route’, which involves crossing the physical boundaries of a number of countries.

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Hungary, a critical but particularly antagonistic country of transit, is the entry point to the Schengen zone. Facing large-scale entry into its territory, Hungary closed its borders in 2015. Asylum seekers had to take a detour from Serbia, and reach the Schengen state of Austria via Croatia and Slovenia. However, this crossing through multiple states which are strengthening border security day by day has become an extremely harrowing task and has resulted in the rise of traffic via the deadlier central Mediterranean route since 2016, leading to an increase in the death toll. As the number of shipwrecks increased in the Mediterranean, particularly on the central Mediterranean route, Europe saw a massive international backlash. In October 2013, Italy launched Mare Nostrum, the first search-and-rescue operation on the Mediterranean. This operated for a year and was successful in saving hundreds of thousands of lives. However, it was very expensive for Italy, so after 12 months it was replaced by operation Triton, run by Frontex, the EU border and coast guard agency. In addition to search and rescue, Triton also has the responsibility of tackling terrorism and cross-border crime such as human and drug trafficking. In 2015, a similar operation was launched focusing on Greece, called Poseidon (European Commission 2016b). However, both Triton and Poseidon are seriously understaffed and underfunded and have had very limited results (Barrigazzi 2017, Horii 2015). Once people enter EU territory, the Dublin Regulation, which mandates that asylum applications should be processed by the country of arrival in the EU, comes into effect. The alleged purpose of this regulation is to make the process of determining refugee status more efficient, prevent asylum seekers from applying in multiple EU member states and promote better monitoring mechanisms. However, it disproportionately imposes the responsibility of processing asylum requests on the southern states of Greece and Italy, which have been under immense economic stress since the 2008 eurozone crisis. Due to the restrictions of the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers have to stay in overcrowded refugee camps in compromised situations for indefinite periods till their applications are processed. Owing to the difficulties posed by this regulation, attempts have been made to reform it but serious problems persist (Mitchell 2017). In May 2015, the Juncker Commission, entrusted with the responsibility of establishing a comprehensive policy on migration, brought out the European Agenda for Migration. Introducing the plan, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, acknowledged that the EU was facing an unprecedented and dramatic

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situation—one which required unprecedented and dramatic action. She stressed that this issue could be effectively tackled only by sharing substantial responsibility by all member states. She insisted that the Union must deal with this issue effectively as it was important for its own credibility at the international level. The Agenda for Migration identified structural, long-term causes of the crisis as well as the immediate contingencies that required attention. To address the former, the Agenda declared increasing peace-building measures in the areas of conflict from where the majority of the people were fleeing and a goal of working for poverty eradication in source countries. They planned to cooperate with source and transit countries, particularly Niger, which served as the junction for migrants from western Africa. With regard to the immediate concerns, the first issue was to save lives in the Mediterranean, and then to take care of those who were saved, in accordance with international law. For disrupting the smugglers’ business model in the Mediterranean, along with the Common Security and Defence Policy naval deployment, funding for Triton and Poseidon were increased. With respect to taking care of migrants saved, in September 2015, the European Council launched an emergency scheme—the EU migrant relocation and resettlement scheme— which pledged that 160,000 people would be resettled in EU-28 countries over a period of two years.6 Each member state was to absorb a certain number of refugees depending on the country’s GDP, population size, unemployment rate and the number of asylum applications already processed (European Commission 2015). The bulk of the intake, 20% and 15% respectively, were to be taken my Germany and France. This deal faced heavy criticism from some of the Central and Eastern European nations, a number of whom, under the leadership of the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orban, challenged this scheme in the European Court of Justice. Their appeal was rejected by the court (BBC 2017a). In March 2016, the EU signed a ‘refugee deal’ with Turkey. The motive behind this deal was to check the overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers travelling from Turkey to Greece by allowing the latter to return to Turkey ‘all new irregular migrants’ who arrived after 20 March 2016. In exchange, the EU promised to increase the resettlement of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey and boosting existing financial support to Turkey for the refugee population (up to 6 billion euros). There was also a promise to expedite the process of visa liberalisation for citizens of Turkey and to restart EU membership talks. Collett (2016) notes that fol-

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lowing the agreement, Greece, already reeling under the multiple stresses of the crisis, had now to check on each individual, so that a person with a genuine claim to asylum was not sent back. There was also a high chance of disregarding the international law of non-refoulement. Additionally, the western Balkan route was completely closed down, leaving thousands of people in transit stuck in countries where they did not intend to be. 27 September 2017 marked the end of the two-year period during which the EU-28 were supposed to relocate 160,000 refugees according to the proposed quota system. Only a fifth of that number had been resettled. The EU has issued a new ‘Legal Migration Plan’ (European Commission n.d.), whereby they will take in 50,000 vulnerable people from North Africa and Turkey, with a new focus on the Horn of Africa. This, they believe, provides a legal alternative for those who risk their lives to reach Europe. Additionally, 500 million euros have been set aside to facilitate return programmes; at present, only about 36% of migrants are returned (BBC 2017b). In the State of the Union address for 2017, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, emphasised the security of European states and the temporary reintroduction of internal borders between Schengen countries (European Commission ­ 2017). In response to migrant arrivals, Norway, Austria, Denmark and Germany have reinstated border checks at certain points. Citing a persistent terrorist threat, France has also done the same. The EU’s approach so far has been that of securitisation. Most European countries have an average age above 40 years and are at sub-replacement fertility levels: the new generation is less populous than the previous generation, which is living a longer life post-retirement, aided by pensions and a robust public health system. A more meaningful debate on immigration could address limited income growth in low to medium skilled Europeans and how to absorb a new wave of immigrants from poor countries, who are going to drive these wages down further, but are needed to make up for the low fertility rates in the future. In contrast, the dominant narrative around immigration has been focused on keeping the refugees out of Europe (Rapoza 2017).

The Economic Impact of Migrants and Refugees The argument often given against the acceptance of migrants and refugees is that they usurp local jobs and drag down wages. However, studies on waves of immigration in Europe and the USA indicate that the adverse

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impact on employment and wage rate of the native people is limited and temporary (Peri 2007, 1). Investment usually increases in response to the increased aggregate demand for goods and services and the larger workforce that refugees create. Refugees have a multiplier effect as they expand the production activity of the economy. For instance, since 2011, Syrian refugees have set up over 4000 new businesses in Turkey. Only 10% of the 2.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey live in government-run camps; a vast majority lives in rented accommodation. In 2015, real estate prices in Turkey rose at the fastest rate in the world: 18.4% (Sethi 2016). Immigrants and natives may work in different sectors of the labour market; hence, one may not be substituted by the other. In some instances, the inflow of immigrants drives native workers to specialise in more advanced skills and so get better remuneration (Aiyar et al. 2016, 22–24). Labour market integration of refugees may be slow in those countries in which unemployment is high. However, displaced people generally seek asylum in countries with low unemployment rates and better economic prospects. Studies in the USA and the UK show that immigrants do not undercut local labour because they tend to do jobs at the very bottom of the economic ladder (Aiyar et  al. 2016, 22–24). Denmark increased its share of refugees from Bosnia, Iraq and Somalia in the population from 1.5% in 1994 to nearly 5% in 2008 (Foroohar 2015, 72–73). Yet there has been no negative impact on wages. This is mainly because native Danes adjusted by moving up the economic chain (Foroohar 2015, 72–73). According to Lordoğlu (2016, 30–31), the effect of a refugee influx on labour markets is not uniform. Lordoğlu’s research in five Turkish cities with large refugee populations reveals that in the more industrialised cities of Gaziantep and Hatay, unemployment actually fell as factories hired more workers to deal with increased consumer demand. In Gaziantep, exports across the border to Syria increased by a staggering 467% in 2014 in comparison to 2012. However, in three of the five cities surveyed, unemployment rose significantly as Syrians and Turks competed for the same low-wage agricultural and construction jobs. Lordoğlu (2016, 30–31) argues that, on the whole, it is not correct to say that Syrian refugees have taken jobs away from the Turkish people. A major determinant of the net fiscal impact of refugees is their age structure. Most of the refugees are young and eager to work. Around 70% of asylum seekers in 2015 were of working age. One-fourth of Syrian refugees have tertiary education. In Germany, 21% of the Syrian asylum seekers who arrived in 2013–2014 had tertiary education, which is roughly

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the same the native population (23%) (Aiyar et al. 2016, 17). According to the UNHCR, 40% of Syrian refugees in Greece are university educated. Eakin (2015) infers that as the cost of crossing border illegally is high, only the relatively richer and more educated individuals are able to pay for the journey. A recent report by the European Commission (2016a), however, suggests that average education level of asylum seekers is below that of natives and the relative economic impact differs substantially across EU member states. In 2016, Germany, at 6.4%, had the lowest unemployment level in 25 years. The employers’ federation estimates that German economy lacks 140,000 engineers, programmers and technicians (Buruma 2015). Similarly, the health and leisure sectors are short of qualified workers. In UK, the National Health Service has cautioned that accommodating fewer refugees could render hospitals severely understaffed (Buruma 2015). Decades of low birth rates and rising longevity have created the demographic problem of an ageing population in Europe. Eurostat estimates that in the absence of immigration, the ratio between the number of persons aged 65 and above and the number of people in the working-age in Europe will increase from 30  in 2015 to above 55  in 2050 (Clements et al. 2015). This will impose a huge burden on public finance, pension provisions and healthcare services. Migrants could provide a solution to ageing societies and slowing economies in Europe as the new immigrants are young and have higher fertility rates than the natives. Germany will need approximately 500,000 immigrants a year until 2050  in order to ensure the necessary workforce (Stefan 2016, 50–57). Outside labour can plug the loopholes in labour supply, particularly in blue-collar jobs. An example of this is the German Fire Brigade Association, which currently employs 3000 refugee fire fighters (Breitling 2017). Places such as Saxony in Germany are grappling with an economic depression and shrinking tax revenues. Refugees can repopulate these regions. They have a high motivation to work and tend to be more entrepreneurial compared to the natives (The Economist 2015). Refugees can also provide the necessary labour force needed to care for the elderly. In Hungary, they are being provided training to look after the elderly in care homes by non-­ governmental organisations (Womack 2018). Refugees can also support the cottage industries of Europe. According to the UNHCR, German companies that rely on craft skills suffer from labour shortages. Refugees can provide the necessary labour force for the small companies that depend on such skills. The refugees come from societies where handicrafts are still

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alive, and they are willing to do such work (Womack and Welters 2017). They are also willing to work harder for less money than the local population (Marcus 2015). According to a study conducted by the International Monetary Fund (Aiyar et al. 2016, 32), in the short run there will be a modest increase in gross domestic product growth because of additional public spending to provide support and services to asylum seekers. The European Commission (2016a, 4) estimates that the overall short-term economic impact of refugee inflow on the EU’s GDP is small and positive. In the long run, however, their integration into the labour market will be a key factor. From the low-skilled to the high-skilled scenario, the report indicates that the potential GDP increase for Germany in 2018 will be between 0.4 and 0.9%. On the other hand, as Table 13.1 highlights, if refugees’ integration into the labour force is not successful, government debt and unemployment rate may rise. Beyer’s (2016, 4) study in Germany shows that the gap in unemployment between the immigrants and natives diminishes with time. However, the unemployment rate continues to be 3% higher among immigrants in the long term. German language skills and a German degree helps in closing the gap. The lower employment rate among refugees in Sweden also reflects the fact that refugee women are less likely than Swedish women to seek employment (Salam 2016, 20–21). Effective policies of integration of refugees such as education, language skills, work permits, housing and active labour market policies, involve costs. This, however, can be offset by the taxes paid by refugees. Sweden is an example of successful introduction programme which has enabled refugees to achieve relatively high rates of employment (Aiyar et al. 2016, 20). It first assesses the experience and education of refugees, and then provides training in language, employment preparedness and basic knowledge of Swedish society and culture, which has helped in overcoming drawbacks such as lack of information and informal networks. Harnessing community compassion  and private sponsorship programmes in which local citizens become responsible for integrating refugees into communities have also proved useful. Canadian citizens have resettled 18,000 Syrians in recent years. It is argued that this kind of experience from Canada could be adapted in other parts of the world (Rummery  2017). The option of the resettlement of refugees in third countries is also being explored by European states and the UNHCR. Argentina is one of the countries that has agreed to resettle more refugees.

0.1 −0.1 0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.0

0.2 −0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.2 −0.1 0.0

Source: European Commission (2016a, 23)

Level difference compared to base-line scenario

GDP GDP per capita Employment Current account (% GDP) Real wages Gov. debt (% of GDP) Gov. balance (% of GDP

0.2 −0.1 0.3 0.0 −0.2 0.0 0.0

0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 −0.2 0.0 0.0

2018 0.2 −0.1 0.3 0.0 −0.2 0.0 0.0

2019 0.2 −0.1 0.3 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0

2020 0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

0.1 −0.2 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.1

2016

0.2 −0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.2 0.1 −0.1

2017

2015

2017

2015

2016

Low-skilled scenario

High-skilled scenario

Table 13.1  Combined effects of increase in spending and labour force in the EU

0.1 −0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.2 0.1 0.0

2018

0.1 −0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.2 0.2 0.0

2019

0.1 −0.1 0.2 0.0 −0.2 0.2 0.0

2020

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It grants humanitarian visas to Syrian refugees if there is a sponsor in Argentina willing to assist them during their first year there (Bernas 2017).

EU–India Migration and Mobility In the last three decades, global migration to Europe has grown and immigration and mobility issues are high on the EU agenda (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2014). In recent years, it has also become an important political issue in Europe. While India has still not a signed up to the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, it is a prominent refugee-­receiving country. India’s experience with refugees started in 1947 itself when the country became independent and was partitioned simultaneously. The next major movement was when the Dalai Lama, with more than 100,000 followers, fled Tibet and sought refuge in India. During the Bangladesh war in 1971, close to 10  million Bangladeshis took shelter in India. As per June 2016 UNHCR statistics, India has a total of 210,259 people of concern, which includes 19,924 from Myanmar, 14,464 from Afghanistan, 688 from Somalia and 1739 others. There are also religious minorities from neighbouring countries, for example, around 110,000 Tibetans and 65,000 Sri Lankans, who are assisted by the Indian government (WGHR 2017). Since 2012, there has also been a steady influx of Rohingya Muslim refugees belonging to the Arakan region of Myanmar. As there is no national policy regime to deal with migrants in India, there is no distinction between a ‘foreigner’ and a ‘refugee’ and many issues related to them have been dealt with politically. Broadly, Tibetans and Sri Lankans have been treated as refugees while others have been treated as economic migrants. The global and European refugee crises have also affected Indian policy-makers. The Rohingya issue is influenced by European discourse on refugees, regional geopolitics and domestic political calculations. Till 2015, New Delhi’s attitude towards Rohingya issue was sympathetic. When a few countries in Southeast Asia started turning Rohingya refugees away, it became a regional issue. A huge influx of refugees into Bangladesh created an emergency situation. In the context of growing Chinese influence in the region, New Delhi’s ties with Myanmar are sensitive. The pending Citizenship Amendment Bill 2016 now clearly excludes Muslim migration from neighbouring countries. Within this environment, Rohingyas have been termed as illegal migrants and threat to national security (The Indian Express 2017).

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Despite an increase in European numbers, India–EU migration has not increased significantly. A few exceptions are member states such as the UK and Italy and some select sectors such as information technology, health services, dairy and agriculture (Sachdeva 2015; Gupta 2013). Today India is a country with the largest number of its people living outside its borders. The Indian diaspora was estimated to be around 17 million in 2017 (United Nations 2017, 12–13). With $69 billion in 2017, India is also the top remittance-receiver country in the world. Although these remittances are important, they constitute only 2.8% of gross domestic product (World Bank 2018, 5). In 2010, around 15% of these remittances originated from the EU. Out of this, the UK accounted for three-fourths (Tumbe 2012). Given the fact that a multilateral framework for international migration governance is still not in place, both India and the EU are trying to increase bilateral engagement to facilitate an arrangement for productive migration. Attempts are also being made to increase cooperation in preventing the exploitation of migrants. The high-level dialogue on migration and mobility was launched in 2006. Since then it has met many times. One of the objectives of the dialogue is to develop a framework to f­ acilitate Indian development and also help the EU employment scenario through short-term mobility of highly skilled labour (Sachdeva 2015). Although the EU is the second largest destination for global migrants, Indian migration to the EU is relatively small (Fargues 2010). According to the Indian government, in 2017 out of a total of 31.23 million overseas Indians (including non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin), only about 9% of overseas Indians were in the EU. The largest number of overseas Indians were in the UK (1,825,000). This was followed by the Netherlands (235,000), Italy (197,301), Germany (169,902), France (109,000), Portugal (73,244), Spain (55,308), Ireland (34,000) and Austria (31,000) (MEA 2018). India has emerged as a leading source of high-skilled migration but this kind of migration is moving more towards the USA, Canada, Australia and the Gulf states. Through schemes such as the EU Blue Card, EU member states have attempted to attract skilled migration from India. The success, however, has been limited. The EU member states and India are major exporters of information technology and information technology-enabled services. EU–India trade in services has also increased. There is also a hope in India that the EU–India trade and investment agreement may further facilitate skilled labour mobility. In fact, one of the major points of disagreement in the stalled negotiations has been Mode 4 movements of skilled mobility from India. Mode 4 is

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one of the four ways through which services can be supplied to another country. Under this category, individuals travel from their own country to supply services to another country. Many Indian IT companies send their employees to work for short duration in another countries. Some experts have pointed out that ‘broader sectoral definitions, wider coverage, longer duration of stay, flexibility of movement within the EU markets and removal of restrictions such as economic needs tests, nationality and residency requirements under Mode 4’ (Mukherjee and Goyal 2013) may facilitate the movements of high-skilled Indian labour to Europe. This movement may have a multiplier effect (Tumbe 2013). It has also been argued that the Indian diaspora in the Middle East and the EU facilitates bilateral trade. A significant part of bilateral trade is in diamonds and is mainly facilitated by the Indian immigrants in Europe, Middle East and Africa (Tumbe 2013; Sachdeva 2015). Although there has been some positive change in recent years, in comparison to Australia, Canada and the USA, the EU members states have been relatively less successful in attracting skilled labour and students. The focus of the Indian government has also been mainly on workers in the Middle East. In 2016, at the EU–India summit, an India–EU Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility was established. The idea behind this agenda has been that cooperation on the issue of migration will be useful both for the EU and India. While an increasing number of educated and skilled Indian citizens are looking for good job opportunities, many EU member states are in facing shortages in certain skill areas. This is a framework for cooperation on migration management with four pillars: ‘(a) better organised regular migration and the fostering of well-managed mobility; (b) prevention of irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; (c) maximising the development impact of migration and mobility; and (d) the promotion of international protection’ (Kozlowski 2017).

Conclusion The successful European integration project has been an inspiration to others, showing that nation states can learn from the past and come together for mutual prosperity, liberal values, peace and stability. The way that some of the EU nations and its institutional mechanisms have handled the present refugee and migrant crisis shows limits to the European project, however. To some extent, Europe’s foreign policy adventures have also been responsible for the creation of this current crisis. Outside

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labour has played a significant role in Europe’s reconstruction and prosperity. It is also clear that it could help Europe in overcoming some of its demographic difficulties. Most analysis of the current migrant crisis shows that, economically, immigration is still positive for Europe, provided that migrants are properly integrated into the economy. Some countries, such as Germany, have clearly understood their responsibilities and the economic opportunities. Still, a large number of populist leaders and parties in many EU countries have treated this situation as a useful political tool. As a result, the Dublin Regulation is under stress. In the interest of greater solidarity and a fairer share of responsibility, the European institutions are in the process of reforming the Common European Asylum System, as well as Dublin procedures. As migrant numbers have come down and economies are recovering, it is hoped that the EU will find a reasonable solution in the coming years. However, migration has already become a political and security issue in Europe. Indian migration to the EU is very limited. However, migration and mobility issues are becoming important in bilateral conversations. The major focus is on establishing a framework for attracting talent and students to the EU and also on finding ways to improve orderly mobility and checking irregular migration.

Notes 1. Countries such as the UK recognised this in the 1960s and passed new immigration laws, such as the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 and 1968, which restricted immigration. 2. This is a concept associated with the Copenhagen School which suggests that security should be seen as a speech act, where the central issue is not if threats are real or not, but the ways in which a certain issue (troop movements, migration or environmental degradation) can be socially constructed as a threat. For more details, see: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/ view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0091.xml. 3. “No contracting state shall expel or return a refugee, in any manner, to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 4. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en. 5. According to data from the Missing Migrants Project of the International Organization of Migration, from 2014 to date, out of a total of 26,700 migrant deaths, 13,800 have been on this route alone. https://missingmigrants.iom.int/. 6. A small fraction of the total number of asylum seekers.

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Marcus, L. P. (2015, May 10). The Business Case for Europe’s Refugees. Project Syndicate. Retrieved from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ economic-benefits-europe-refugee-crisis-by-lucy-p%2D%2Dmarcus-2015-09. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2018, April 4). Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 6091. Retrieved from http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/29751/ question+no6091+indians+citizens+abroad. Mitchell, J.  (2017). The Dublin Regulation and Systemic Flaws. San Diego International Law Journal, 18(2), 295–324. Mukherjee, A., & Goyal, T. M. (2013). Examining Mode 4 Commitments in India and the EU’s Agreements: Implication for the India-EU BTIA. CARIM-India Research Report No. 16, European University Institute. Peri, G. (2007). Immigrants’ Complementarities and Native Wages: Evidence from California. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Rapoza, K. (2017). Here’s Why Europe Really Needs More Immigrants. Retrieved January 2, 2018, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/08/ 15/heres-why-europe-really-needs-more-immigrants/#1645e3994917. Rummery, A. (2017, November 15). Harnessing Citizens’ Goodwill Can Help Solve Refugee Crisis. UNHCR. Retrieved January 2, 2018, from http://www. unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/11/5a0c88234/harnessing-citizens-goodwillhelp-solve-refugee-crisis.html. Sachdeva, G. (2015). Evaluation of the EU-India Strategic Partnership and the Potential for Its Revitalization. Brussels: Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament. Salam, R. (2016). Does Europe Need Refugees? National Review, 68(11), 20–21. Sethi, A. (2016, June 21). Refugees Turn Entrepreneurs in Turkey. The Hindu. Retrieved July 5, 2017, from http://www.thehindu.com/todayspaper/tpinternational/refugees-turn-entrepreneurs-in-turkey/article8753348.ece. Stefan, A. S. (2016). Considerations Regarding the Social and Economic Impact of Migration. Case Study: Germany. Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre, 21(1), 50–57. The Economist. (2015, January 29). How Immigrants Can Save Dying Cities. Retrieved July 8, 2017, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =nVnDtqvjBbY. The Indian Express (2017, September 19) “Illegal Rohingya are a Security Threat: Govt. Tells Supreme Court”. Retrieved from https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rohingya-illegal-migrants-are-terror-threat-government-to-supreme-court-4849909/ Tirman, J.  (2006). Immigration and Insecurity: Post-9/11 Fear in the United States. Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies. Triandafyllidou, A., & Gropas, R. (2014). European Immigration: A Source Book. Surrey: Ashgate.

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CHAPTER 14

Multiculturalism in India and Europe: Policy and Practice Sheetal Sharma

Introduction With a multitude of ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural and regional differences, both India and Europe are multicultural. Having rich histories of traditions, cultural practices and values, both India and Europe present interesting patterns of ‘unity amidst diversity’. Embedded in their respective histories, cultural diversity in India and Europe presents a unique blend of tradition and modernity and a set of values, such as equality and liberty, freedom of expression, a commitment to democracy, constitutionalism, protection of human rights and the rule of law, which are fundamental for multicultural existence. At present, both India and Europe are confronting challenges in the process of maintaining their ‘unity amidst diversity’. This chapter attempts to analyse the nature and contours of multiculturalism in India and Europe and to discuss how multiculturalism exists as a reality. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section begins by defining the concept of multiculturalism, as a fact, a value and as a policy; the second discusses the nature of multiculturalism in India and Europe; the third discusses the challenges and potential sources S. Sharma (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_14

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of conflict in multicultural societies. Finally, the chapter posits and ­concludes that, despite criticism, multiculturalism has survived in Europe and has flourished successfully in India.

Conceptualising Multiculturalism In the literature, multiculturalism is explained or understood in two ways. First, ‘multiculturalism’ is perceived as a descriptive concept; second, it is defined as a policy option allowing the state to respond to cultural diversity. Multiculturalism is defined as the coexistence of diverse cultures, where culture includes racial, religious or cultural groups and is manifested in customary behaviours, cultural assumptions and values, patterns of thinking and communicative styles. The term ‘multiculturalism’ includes a wide variety of concepts, such as identity, linguistic affiliation, plurality, distinctiveness, equality, recognition and representation. Multiculturalism emphasises the significance of cultural affiliations and legitimises the desire to retain differences (Bhargava 2007). It advocates for a society that accords equal status to people and groups with distinct linguistic, ethnic and religious identity or to minorities in order to promote social cohesion and social order. According to Bhikhu Parekh: Multiculturalism is best understood neither as a political doctrine with a programmatic content nor a philosophical school with a distinct theory of man’s place in the world but as a perspective on or a way of viewing human life. Its central insights are three, each of which is sometimes misinterpreted by its advocates and needs to be carefully reformulated if it is to carry conviction. First, human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world and organize their lives and social relations in terms of a culturally derived system of meaning and significance. Second, different cultures represent different systems of meaning and visions of the good life. Third, every culture is internally plural and reflects a continuing conversation between its different traditions and strands of thought. This does not mean that it is devoid of coherence and identity, but that its identity is plural, fluid and open. (Parekh 2000, 336–338)

The literature attempting to define the nature and dimensions of multiculturalism and debates regarding the success and/or failure of multiculturalism have grown in recent years. A substantial amount of the existing literature primarily relates multiculturalism as a policy option for promot-

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ing social integration and as a political strategy. Identifying the difficulty in defining what exactly multiculturalism is, Will Kymlicka argues that there is ‘no universally accepted definition of “(liberal) multiculturalism”’, and any attempt to provide a single definition to encompass its different forms is too vague to be useful. There is a tendency to simplify complexity and reduce multiculturalism to a single principle or dimension. Multiculturalism is not a single principle of policy, but an umbrella of highly group-­ differentiated approaches; each of these approaches is multidimensional, incorporating economic, political and cultural elements in a variety of ways (Kymlicka 2007). Stuart Hall too observes that: ‘over the years the term “multiculturalism” has come to refer to a diffuse, indeed maddeningly spongy and imprecise, discursive field: a train of false trails and misleading universals. Even within single nation there have been contested interpretations of the policies and practices of multiculturalism hence it is difficult to formulate a specific corpus of tenets or practices defining multiculturalism’ (Hall 2001). As a policy option, multiculturalism seeks: ‘to extend equal status to distinct cultural and religious groups with no single culture predominating. Multiculturalism sometimes also allows for the extension of legal recognition to specific minority groups with special legal protection for members of (diverse) groups […] This also relates […] to the concept of diversity management whereby society is geared towards maintaining good relations between different cultural communities or, in other words, between immigrant minorities and the host population’ (European Union 2013, 11–12). The term ‘multiculturalism’ is thus used just not to describe a culturally diverse society, but also to refer to a policy option that intends to protect cultural diversity and also promote integration and harmony between culturally diverse communities living within a society. According to Bosswick and Heckmann, multiculturalism cannot be considered just a consistent philosophy, concept or practice: instead, it presents a confusing picture of divergent meanings and policies. In different contexts its meaning may vary: it may be descriptive or normative, positive or critical, or refer to public policies and practices as against individual attitudes. As a descriptive category, the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘multicultural society’ indicate a general trend of social change—in other words, it indicates a change in the nature and composition of the population or demography of a society. As a normative category, multiculturalism entails that in the era of globalisation and international migration, interaction between people from diverse

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cultures is inevitable and states must acknowledge that m ­ ulticulturalism is a fact; the nature and degree of multiculturality is bound to grow in modern societies. Hence states must be prepared to accept and accommodate its social, cultural, economic and political consequences and implications (2006, 7). Multiculturalism can also be a way of understanding the evolution of culture, implying that there is nothing like a ‘pure’ or ‘original’ culture; rather, every culture is a hybrid, a mix of few elements of different cultures. Inherent in the notion of the evolution of cultures through the mixing of elements of other cultures is the idea that multiculturalism can be perceived as having an element of personal attitude—it is an important component of societal norms (IFLA 2016). These norms guide the behaviour of the individuals of a particular society towards people from ‘other’ cultures. Further, as a behavioural trait, multiculturalism constitutes an element of an individual’s attitude; as a societal norm, it entails tolerance of ‘others’.

Multiculturalism in India and Europe Until the independence of India from British colonial rule in 1947, India had been ruled by a number of empires right from the history of the first known civilisation in the Indus River Valley, the Harappan (3000 bc). The rise and the fall various empires one after another,1 under different emperors, resulted in constant restructuring of territorial boundaries, relationships, cultural contacts and even conflicts between kingdoms. Throughout history successive empires left an indelible mark by assimilating a variety of customs, practices, norms, values, languages, festivals, ideas and technologies, creating the mainstream culture that characterises the spirit of Indian culture in the present times. The Mughals around the twelfth century conquered India, starting from the northern part of India, then moving into the Indo-Gangetic plains and gradually the whole of northern India. The roots of colonialism in India began soon after the Portuguese arrived in 1498. The British Empire controlled and consolidated the scattered and fragmented sovereignty of numerous kingdoms, weaving them into a unified entity called India. After independence, numerous kingdoms, which had a common cultural thread defining and binding them, coalesced to form the Union of India. India as a nation state aspired to, is and has (always) been a multicultural society with wide and deep religious, racial, regional, ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. For the people of India, despite these differences, there is a common past, social and political history, memories, achievements, traditions and religious beliefs—even

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failures. With multiple sets of beliefs and practices, there are layers of diversity. In India, plurality is taken for granted historically; multiculturalism exists as a fact, or reality, and is the norm. In fact, multiculturalism is the essence of Indian culture and is a ‘way of life’. Fascinated by the patterns of amalgamation of diverse cultures into a seamless fabric binding numerous people together over centuries, Jawaharlal Nehru (1961) wrote: India is a geographical and economic entity, a cultural unity amidst diversity, a bundle of contradictions held together by strong but invisible threads. Overwhelmed again and again her spirit was never conquered, and today when she appears to be a plaything of a proud conqueror, she remains unsubdued and unconquered. About her there is the elusive quality of a legend of long ago; some enchantment seems to have held her mind. She is a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive. It is fascinating to find how the Bengalis, the Marathas, the Gujratis, the Tamils, Andhras, the Oriyas, the Assamese, the Canarese, the Malayalis, the Sindhis, the Punjabis, the Pathans, the Kashmiris, the Rajputs and the great central block comprising the Hindustani-speaking people, have retained their peculiar characteristics for hundreds of years, have still more or less the same virtues and failings of which old tradition or record tells us and yet have been throughout these ages distinctively Indian, with the same national heritage and the same set of moral and mental qualities.

India is multicultural and the spirit of multiculturalism shapes the basic contours of Indian culture and society. The prevalent, practiced and appreciated way of life, food habits, dress patterns, norms, values, customs and practices, and so on, are all products of the hybridisation of a wide variety of cultural forms, collectively constituting Indian culture. The burqa, skullcap, niqab, turban or dhoti, or the display of any other religious symbol, does not attract the curious attention of the passer-by on streets in everyday life. The very social fabric is multicultural, and the manifest differences of style, language, appearance or habit are a routine part of everyday living and thinking in India. The multicultural way of life in India is a complex mosaic of distinctive socio-cultural traits, customs, traditions and sets of values that prescribe peaceful coexistence and respect for a wide range of diversity within the broad framework of equality, liberty and the rule of (secular) law (Sharma 2014a). Europe is multicultural with linguistic, cultural, ethnic, religious and regional diversity. Europe presents an interesting case of ‘unity amidst diversity’. A variety of historical processes and forces, such as philosophical

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and intellectual ideas of the Renaissance, Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, the rise of capitalism, the French Revolution, the experience of colonial expansion and so on have shaped the socio-cultural and political fabric of contemporary Europe in general and the European Union (EU) in particular. All member states of the EU are more or less culturally plural. Europe’s engagement with multiculturalism is more recent than India’s. Historically speaking, since the beginning of the seventeenth century, one of the most significant sources of cultural (not necessarily ethnic) diversity or plurality in European nation-states has been regional, often a result of overlapping economically, socially, culturally and ethnically disparate communities and places into single polities, binding them in discourse of nationalism based on a common language. Up to the Second World War, there was interplay between various material and intellectual forces in Europe. After the war, there has been large-scale movement of people not only across national boundaries within Europe but also massive immigration from developing countries, with immigrants seeking better socio-­ economic prospects.2 Through migration, ‘Europe is now home to millions of people from non-European backgrounds, many religious and cultural dispositions, and many networks of attachment based on Diaspora connections and cultural influences from around the world. Europe is as much a site of longings rooted in tradition—regional, national and European—as it is a site of transnational and trans-European attachments’ (Ash 2004, 1). In Western Europe, the use of the term ‘multiculturalism’ subsumes and acknowledges the permanent presence of immigrant populations and the formulation of policies aimed at the subsequent integration of immigrants (minorities) into the mainstream, whereas diversity in India is not the result of increasing numbers of immigrants. India has been a homeland of diverse communities for many centuries and its social fabric has always been plural (Sharma 2014b). In Europe, which has had a relatively new experience with multiculturalism as compared to India, multiculturalism is seen as a policy option and accepted as a part of public discussion; this acknowledges cultural pluralism as an inherent and ever-growing fact of contemporary European society. Across the EU, multiculturalism is understood more as a policy option (along with assimilation) that seeks to promote the integration of individuals, groups and communities with different cultural affiliations into different aspects of mainstream society: social, cultural and economic life (including in the labour market) (European Union 2013, 11). Assimilation

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policy, on the other hand, involves a process of socialisation in which individuals are integrated into, adapt to and eventually adopt the mainstream culture of the host society or group. Assimilation entails that in the due course, immigrants or communities from other cultures or with a minority background will become increasingly similar to the host population in terms of their norms, values and behavioural characteristics (European Union 2013, 12). In France, Italy and Spain, immigrant integration policies are predominantly based on the assimilation model; in Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, such policies are predominantly based on the multicultural model. Both multiculturalism and assimilation aim at promoting the overall social integration of people from other cultural background. Integration in this context implies social, economic, cultural and political or civic elements, which can be further classified in terms of three dimensions of integration: legal/political, socio-economic and cultural (European Union 2013, 13). After massive enlargement in the first decade of the century, and now with the refugee crisis, pressure has been mounting on member states to receive more migrants; at the same time, the rise of right-wing political parties has been a reality all across Europe, creating a hostile environment for multiculturalism policies (Lopes Paulos 2017). When compared to Europe, multiculturalism in India is as old as Indian civilisation and exists as a fact, a reality. The presence of vast cultural diversity historically has necessitated the adoption of policies aimed at safeguarding the interests of minorities. The Constitution of India promises all its citizens justice—social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity. It works to promote the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. The constitutional framework adopted by India recognises differences and diversity, guarantees equal citizenship and rights, and protects linguistic, cultural and religious minorities; it is multicultural in its spirit. Some of the major provisions in the Constitution of India providing equal opportunity and rights for all citizens are as follows: Article 14: Article 15: Article 21:

ensures equality before the law and equal protection by the law. prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. prohibits a person being deprived of his life or personal liberty except through the procedure established by law.

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ensures freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. Article 26: ensures the right to manage religious institutions, religious affairs, subject to public order, morality and health; Article 29: protects the right of minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. Article 30: provides for the protection of the interests of minorities by giving them a right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The State is directed not to discriminate against minorities’ institutions in granting aid. Article 350A: directs the State to provide facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education. Article 25:

Along with the constitutional provisions, there are a number of other directives that safeguard the religious and cultural practices of monitories in India. The freedom to practice one’s faith in everyday life and celebrate religious festivals are basic freedoms that minorities enjoy along with their counterparts of other major or minority religions. India has been able to sustain multiculturalism because its politics has incorporated elements of tradition and modernity, diversity and equality, and respect and dignity in a fine balance. Since 1947, the adoption of a democratic approach and the lack of a drive towards cultural homogenisation by policy-makers has been the basis of India’s unity in diversity. Due to the nature of cultural diversity and its well-defined contours, there has been no official attempt to impose blanket cultural unity among the culturally diverse groups in India. Multiculturalism in India is a way of life, inherent in the value system. It assumes that living together requires not just respect for other individuals but also concern for the distinctiveness of the ‘others’. In democratic India, the ideal of multicultural living is embedded in the Constitution and is manifest in freedom to practice one’s cultural way of life (Mahajan 2007).

Conflict in Multicultural Societies Modern democratic societies constitutionally guarantee equality among culturally diverse groups; multiculturalism in most of the cases is officially recognised as a policy for promoting the social integration of minorities and immigrants. However, it is also true that the everyday experience of interac-

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tion between individuals and communities with different cultural affiliations are not so harmonious in culturally plural societies. These encounters increasingly are resulting in violent manifestations of cultural intolerance and hegemony. In other words, however highly multiculturalism may be valued by the societies or states, there are inevitable and ubiquitous incidents and issues with the acceptance or even the understanding or recognition of cultural differences. The social reality of contemporary India and Europe exhibits an uneasy calm between culturally diverse groups; instances of cultural intolerance emerging out of differences of food habits (for example, halal meat, beef, pork), dress pattern (for example, the burqa), language and so on are growing. Turning violent at times, intolerance is manifested in the form of racism, xenophobia, extremism, communal hatred, tensions, minor clashes and verbal duels. Although there have been some large-scale conflicts or instance of violence, their number has been few, as compared to low-intensity violence and instances of friction between people belonging to different religious communities or having different cultural affiliations, or among ethnic, linguistic, communal or caste groups in India and Europe. Europe has been grappling with the issue of the social integration of immigrants in recent years.3 The debate between multiculturalism and assimilation has often been inconclusive and positions remain ambiguous, pitching those in favour of assimilationist policies, where the immigrant is expected to adopt the dominant values, mainstream culture and embrace the so-called common identity of the natives, against those who advocate multiculturalism, based on the idea of respect and recognition for the cultural identity of the immigrants or outsiders and the protection of cultural diversity of different groups. Past experience, however, demonstrates that ‘restrictive policies can lead to xenophobic attitudes and the inability to see the benefits of diversity’ (Sunderland 2016). Moreover, intolerance of communities from other cultural affiliations has increased in Europe and has been on rise ever since the refugee crisis. One can see xenophobic sentiment becoming more widespread with a rise in the number of refugees entering Europe. Far-right and right-wing populist forces are gaining ground in almost all countries in Europe. An anti-immigrant attitude is gripping people, as natives face problems of adjustments with the newcomers. There is fear related to economic, cultural and security threats, both real and perceived, regarding those who are seen as ‘others’. Regional elections in Germany, for example, showed the incredible growth of Alternative for Germany, an anti-euro and anti-immigrant movement challenging Angela Merkel’s party in some areas (Mammone 2016).

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According to the European human rights watchdog, ‘The EU referendum seems to have led to a rise in “anti-foreigner” sentiment in the UK’ (Independent 2016). France too has witnessed the growing popularity of the National Front party, now headed by Jean-Marie’s Le Pen daughter, Marine. Political parties and forces in Western Europe and the Central European countries are successfully exploiting xenophobic sentiments aggravated by the rising number of refugees visible on the streets (Euractiv 2016). Instances of friction involving immigrants in general and from Muslim background in particular have become frequent occurrences and are a source of social tension in Europe. These conflicts are largely rooted in marginalisation, exclusion and the position of relative disadvantage of immigrants in the host society. Minor and/or low-intensity conflicts emerge out of cultural differences between natives and outsiders on issues related to lifestyle. These instances are subtle, diffused and often go unreported. Such acts of discrimination are a major obstacle to the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities into the mainstream in Europe. At times, these instances have grown out of proportion and have also led to terrorist violence inspired by radical ideas (Islamic fundamentalism).4 The problems that Europe is facing in contemporary times are related only weakly to the cultural diversity or cultural mosaic that characterises the old continent and its culture; rather, these problems arise from increasing instances of racism and xenophobia against refugees and immigrants, who belong to different cultural communities. While multicultural policies have fallen short of achieving their targets, if not failed, then assimilation too is not a solution to the problems of a fracturing social fabric. If, on one hand, the newcomers have a right to retain their culture then they also have responsibility to uphold common values and shared traditions and respect the way of life of the host countries. In short, the continent is facing challenges of managing ever-increasing cultural diversity. The policies have neither failed outright and should be rejected nor have they been successful in their desired goals. Multiculturalism in the recent past has been pronounced a failure and a policy of assimilation is stated as being coercive in nature (Banting and Kymlicka 2010). The reasons for the so-called failure of multiculturalism are rooted in inherent ambiguities in the theory and practice of multiculturalism in European society. The contradictory tendencies of various political, institutional, social and economic factors render the project of the social integration of immigrants less effective, if not completely ineffective. These ambiguities emerge from a mismatch between different fac-

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tors. For example, Article 151 of the treaty establishing the European Community, relating to culture, does not specify the Community’s cultural policy but articulates the hope that it will ‘contribute to the flowering of the cultures of its member-states’ and will ‘encourage diversity along with promotion of shared values’. Although the EU works to preserve Europe’s shared cultural heritage and help make it accessible to all, however  Culture is not a common European subject and managing cultural diversity has become a challenge (EUROSTAT 2017). Multiculturalism in the European context has more to do with the management of diversity within existing structures and extension of liberal tolerance rather than the participation of immigrants in social, political and civic affairs. There is incompatibility and an integration lag between the different dimensions of social integration, namely, economic, social, political and cultural. Hence a sense of common European identity is missing even among the natives, let alone the immigrants, who are not even perceived as part of Europe despite having legal citizenship status (Horn 2015). Moreover, the ambiguity over the conceptualisation of social integration has led to a lack of consensus over policies, the goals of social integration and the appropriate strategies to achieve these. The member states of the EU have different ways and strategies for promoting the social integration of immigrants or people from different cultures into the mainstream culture. These programmes and initiatives are often a combination of several measures adopted from different approaches. The member states have accepted the broad framework of common EU policies on multiculturalism. Individual member states tend to operationalise these policies as per their domestic situations and demands. But what emerges as a general criticism of these policies is that they mainly safeguard and refer to the cultural rights of the immigrant population, and do not focus much on the participation of immigrants in the social and political life of the host society. Consequently, there has been the emergence of exclusionary practices among both the immigrants and the natives.5

Comparing India and Europe Since both India and Europe are multicultural in their own ways, some of the basic issues and challenges in promoting social integration remain similar. At the same time, however, the specificity of both the Indian and European experience in promoting social integration in their respective societies limits the possibilities for generalisation. Experience demon-

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strates that since multicultural societies exhibit a situation of the cohabitation of different cultures, any single political doctrine, ideology or policy option is insufficient to manage the scale of the resultant interaction between cultures, communities, their aspirations, beliefs and demands. There is no single explanation for the growing number of instances of discord between culturally diverse groups. Any attempt to generalise about the reasons for the growing chasm between cultural communities is fraught with the danger of oversimplifying a complex phenomenon. For instance, there are large numbers of barriers impeding the integration of immigrants throughout the member states of the EU. Some of these involve linguistic, educational and institutional factors. Internal factors (social, cultural, and religious norms, immigrants’ own opinions about themselves, a lack of motivation and intergenerational mobility) are also considered to be serious barriers to integration (EU 2013). If, on the one hand, low levels of education, skills, training and language knowledge are barriers to getting jobs in the labour market for immigrants, then, on the other, attitudes, stereotypes, perceptions and prejudices held by both natives and outsiders about each other hinder the process of integration and add to the nature, degree and extent of friction between the communities.6 The recent attacks in Europe—such as on the beachfront in Nice and another on a train in Bavaria—are likely to fuel existing anti-refugee, anti-­ Muslim fears in a Europe made uneasy by large-scale attacks in Paris and Brussels. ‘Across Europe, a median of 49  percent believe that the large number of refugees fleeing countries such as Iraq and Syria pose a major threat to their country. An even larger median of 59 percent says that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country. And a median of 43 percent have an unfavorable view of Muslims in their society’ (Stokes 2016). This growing Islamophobia sustains extreme right-wing parties throughout Europe, from France’s National Front to the UK Independence Party in Britain, Heinz-Christian Strache’s Freedom Party in Austria, to Nikolaos Michaloliakos’ Golden Dawn in Greece. However, the marginalisation of the other is not just limited to groups of immigrants or the new entrants. In some cases, even those people who have formally acquired citizenship and are members of groups that have resided in a particular country for generations have been targeted for belonging to ‘other’ cultural affiliations. According to Lopes Paulos (2017), in the last few years Europeans have not only seen high levels of social unrest but also ‘cultural unrest’.7 This cultural unrest is a consequence of the culture shock. For example, the Netherlands, which is often seen as one of the most liberal countries of the

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world, has been changing its multicultural policies. Similarly, in France the cultural unrest can be explained by several factors, including the increasing vote share being won by ultra-nationalist political parties. Over the last few years there has been an unprecedented rise in the number of immigrants, and lately refugees, in Europe coming from Muslimmajority countries. There is a growing fear of Muslims, who are stereotyped as conservative and as not willing to integrate into the mainstream culture. However, there is another way of understanding the pattern of social interaction between the natives and immigrants. Lopes Paulos (2017) cites an interesting study on the relations between Dutch and Moroccans. The study indicates that Dutch citizens who have visited Morocco were more open to and more readily accepted Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands. On the contrary, people who had never had any contact with Morocco had a pessimistic view and a negative perception of Moroccan immigrants. This indicates that travel and personal contact had influenced the way people think about a country and its local population, making those who travel more willing to accept immigrants in their own country. Despite being pronounced a failure, multicultural policies in Europe have shown that they have long-term effects and have the potential for promoting social integration. But the rise of right-wing political parties all across Europe are compelling states to opt for short-term policies with often detrimental or negative effect and repercussions  (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). National governments in member states are ­compromising multicultural policies in order to control the rise of the nationalist movements. In the current scenario, when Europe is facing one of the greatest mass migrations in its history, it needs multicultural policies to manage cultural diversity. Europe has always been a cultural mosaic. In the present context of ever-increasing plurality in the continent, governments should act to preserve their rich cultural diversity, accommodate populations of people with diverse cultural affiliations and promote tolerance and respect for all those who have decided to live in Europe (Lopes Paulos 2017). The prevalent debate in the European context shows that a line between the in-group and the out-group is clearly drawn between the natives and immigrants. However, the situation in India is different and complex. In the Indian socio-cultural landscape, one can see diversity in terms of caste, language, ethnicity and cultural practices. Although diverse groups are woven into a unique cultural fabric, yet they maintain their distinctive identity. In the last couple of decades, with the massive transformation in

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the socio-economic, political and cultural landscape of India, identity has acquired a new meaning and dimension—one that is purely instrumental in nature. Despite centuries of coexistence, history is punctuated with instances of conflict between culturally diverse communities and in the present times India has become: ‘a site for cultural conflicts rooted in ethnic, caste, and/or parochial identity. The bold assertion of socio-cultural differences and resultant demystification of a unitary identity of ‘Indianness’ characterize contemporary India … there is resistance emanating from those who proclaim their differences, anguish, and right to their alternative and autonomous identities. One can witness ethnic groups striving for autonomy (Tripura, Assam, Jharkhand), militant politico-religious associations expressing their discontent and searching for a new nation (Jammu and Kashmir), lower castes challenging Brahminism, politics of reservation, language, statehood, and women asserting their distinctive voice. No wonder, grand ideologies like ‘Hindu civilizational unity’ or, ‘Indian nationhood’ are being questioned’ (Pathak 2006). Emerging out of intolerance towards the cultural practices of other communities, friction between linguistic communities, religious and ­communal groups,8 caste groups9 and migrants10 are being routinely reported. In the last couple of years since the Bharatiya Janata Party government came to power cases of friction between majority and minority communities have become more frequent. There is greater vigour among communities and groups are asserting their identity and their social position in the social hierarchy. Obviously, these assertions have led to an increase in the number of instances of conflict rooted in socio-cultural identities and a rise in the number of formal reporting of these conflicts. The media, both national and international, may correlate the rise in the number of reported instances to the prevalent regime holding power in central government. The mob lynching over beef, love-jihad, the killing of right-wing and left-­wing radicals by rival groups and many more reasons have generated fear among both the communities. These cases have been highlighted, discussed and condemned by the media, government, masses, activists and respective groups and their occurrences cannot be ignored. But it is equally true that India has been a culturally diverse society for centuries, and some degree of friction between minority and majority communities has always been in existence. What is different now is that these cases have been perceived through a clear-cut communal lens even if this misrepresents the case. The Indian cultural fabric has been resilient to the shocks of communal and cultural discord. Moreover, in such a large

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social, cultural and demographic milieu, never in the past or even in the present times have these cases gone beyond an alarming proportion and stage. The constitutional framework has provided equal recognition for diverse groups, offering them a legitimate space to engage in politics and see their interests represented. Some scholars may have argued that identity politics have contributed to the democratisation of society (Pathak 2006). However, it is also true that this has also generated a crisis which, if it grows out of proportion, may be difficult to handle.

Conclusion India and Europe in particular, and all other multicultural societies in general, confront challenges of social harmony. According to Parekh, in the modern democratic societies the political theories, institutions, vocabulary, virtues, values and skill that we have developed in the course of consolidating and managing the affairs of a culturally homogeneous state during the past three centuries are of limited help—and sometimes even a positive handicap—in dealing with the challenges of multicultural societies (Parekh 1999). There is a need to find ways of balancing the aspirations of diverse communities, meeting and reconciling their legitimate demands for recognition, according status, and uniting them into the mainstream. The goal is to achieve political unity without cultural uniformity, and cultivating among the citizens both a common sense of belonging and a willingness to respect and cherish deep cultural differences (Parekh 2000). Achieving social equality is a valued goal in democracies. In order to achieve equality among culturally diverse groups, it is imperative to negotiate and establish a balance between cultural pluralism and cultural hegemony. As the forces of globalisation are bound to unite us, it is impossible to live in isolation and retain an exclusive identity amidst rapidly dissolving socio-cultural, economic and political boundaries. Those who perceive ‘other’ cultures and forces as a threat to their own culture take a one-­ dimensional, rigidly indistinguishable, static and impoverished view of culture and its evolution (Sharma 2014b). Multiculturalism has been pronounced a failure many times. Despite several obituaries written for multiculturalism in Europe, it is not yet dead. Multiculturalism, if perceived from a narrow perspective, will surely seem to have failed. However, multiculturalism is much more than just a policy option; it is a fact and a reality. Even in terms of a policy, it is a mix of multiple mechanisms and policy elements, such as civic integration, multicul-

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tural education, language classes, citizenship education, naturalisation ceremonies, and so on. Those who pronounce multiculturalism dead in Europe invoke the idea because of their vested agenda to promote division among people and communities, instil fear and stoke negative sentiment among both the minority and majority communities. They argue that multiculturalism will lead to the homogenisation of their culture, belief and practices and in the process they will lose their distinct identities. On the contrary, multiculturalism aims to make people aware that there are cultures beyond their own and they must blend with these cultures as well in order to enrich their own and evolve. If culture and cultural change is understood from this framework, then: ‘the cultures of immigrants are seen as enriching the cultures of the host societies. On a more superficial level, this form of multiculturalism sees some aspects of immigrant culture (language, folklore, food, lifestyles) as possible enrichments of ‘our’ or native culture. Sometimes, immigrants are seen as people with qualities that ‘we have lost’ (emotionality, stable family relations, spontaneity) and from whom the host population could learn’ (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006, 7). In the context of modern liberal democratic societies, this implies non-discriminatory behaviour towards immigrants and treating human differences with respect and humility. Multiculturalism is also not the same as cultural anarchy—a situation in which everybody lives according to the set of rules and customs of their own communities and disregards the other rules and customs of cultural groups that reside in the same country or continent. Multiculturalism in the ideal sense means freedom of cultural expression and mutual cultural enrichment within an accepted framework (Meyer 2015). If perceived from multiple dimensions, multiculturalism has survived and perhaps will continue to survive and overcome the criticism of it. In sum, cultural plurality demands essential political virtues, such as mutual respect and recognition of the otherness of the other; civility along with tolerance; appreciation of plurality; open-mindedness to embrace new ideas and understand different ideologies; empathy for the weak and the stranger; prevention of friction; and the avoidance of escalation of conflict and ability to resolve differences amicably. Multicultural policies and practices can be successful only in those societies which accept multiculturalism as a fact and cherish multiculturalism as a value. The policy can be effective only if the state is effective in providing a conducive environment where freedom of speech, expression, egalitarianism, equal ­opportunities and participation, protection of human rights are instituted both in letter and spirit.

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Notes 1. Some of the noted empires in the history were the Aryans (c. 2000 BC), the Mauryan Empire (326–200 BC), and the Gupta Empire (AD 320–550 BC). 2. As per the statistics released by Eurostat, the population of the EU was estimated at 510.1 million; there were 35.1 million people born outside of the EU-28 living in an EU member state, while there were 19.3 million persons who had been born in a different EU member state from the one where they were resident (EUROSTAT 2016). They represented approximately 6.8% of the total EU population. 3. In Germany, the official statistics reveal that last year there were about 1000 such attacks, five times the number reported in 2014. In the town of Bautzen, people cheered and clapped as a refugee shelter went up in flames after a suspected arson attack (Source: Hill 2016). 4. In 2005, violence swept across France for more than two weeks when two French Muslim teenagers were accidentally electrocuted while hiding in a power substation. Rioting by French youths spread to 300 towns overnight and the 11  days of unrest shocked the country. The urban unrest spread to neighboring Belgium and Germany (The Guardian 2005). 5. In Germany, for instance, Turkish people and other southern Europeans who arrived to work in German factories were considered ‘Gastarbeiter’ (‘guest workers’). As Chancellor Angela Merkel stated in 2012, Germans thought they would go back to their countries after two years, but instead they brought their families. Over decades, German nationality was denied to these people as the ‘jus sanguinis’ rule permitted only those with German parentage to have German nationality (Lopes Paulos 2017). 6. The Eurobarometer survey conducted on migrant integration found that one of the reasons for resentment against migrants is that natives feel that migrants are taking employment opportunities away from local people, and the sentiment is exacerbated in the wake of a recession and slow-down in many economies. This animosity leads to fear among natives; consequently, migrants also resist interaction and efforts at integration in general. Migrants feel more comfortable interacting with their those from their own countries. Fear and apprehension on both the sides, like a vicious circle, become a cause and consequence of distance between different communities, leading to ghettoisation, exclusion and discrimination. In such a scenario, efforts to make ‘outsiders’ part of the mainstream lose much of their potency. 7. A term coined in 2008 by Moufakkir defined as “the context where two cultures live together, but at a level of acceptance that has developed from a state of euphoria, apathy to annoyance, or even antagonism”.

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8. According to data released by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Uttar Pradesh has witnessed the highest number of communal incidents in India in 2017, with 60 incidents and 16 deaths reported from the state. According to the data, 2017 witnessed a total of 296 incidents of communal violence in the country. A total of 44 deaths was reported. In the preceding years, the number of incidents was 703 and 751 in 2016 and 2015, respectively. The number of deaths was 86 and 97, respectively (Outlook 2017). 9. Dalit groups have been victims of crimes and atrocities at the hands of the upper castes—largely on account of their low-caste identity—in the form of the rape of women, abuse by police personnel, harassment of lower-caste village council heads, illegal land encroachments, forced evictions, and so on (Sharma 2015). According to news agencies, a 21-year-old Dalit man was beaten to death allegedly by a group of men belonging to the upper caste Patel community for attending a garba event in Gujarat’s Anand district. In yet another incident, two Dalit men were allegedly thrashed by members of the Rajput community for “sporting a moustache” in two separate incidents at a village near Gandhinagar (Bhan 2017). 10. In Maharashtra, the presence of ‘others’ (migrants from a particular region with a different language and set of cultural practices) in a politico-linguistic area was vehemently opposed by the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena, led by Raj Thackrey, which was clearly a parochial and jingoistic move. The issue raised the emotional temperature, deliberately creating a divide between ‘indigenous’ and ‘migrants’ in order to garner popular votes and consolidate political position at the local level.

References Ash, A. (2004). Multi-Ethnicity and the Idea of Europe. Theory Culture & Society, 21(2), 1–24. Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2010). Is There Really a Backlash Against Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index. Working Paper 2012:4. Retrieved January 23, 2018, from http://www.su.se/ polopoly_fs/1.103203.1349356868!/menu/standard/file/SULCIS_ WP2012_4.pdf. Bhan, R. (2017, October 2). Dalit Man, 21, Beaten to Death Allegedly for Attending Garba in Gujarat. NDTV. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/dalit-man-21-beaten-to-death-allegedlyfor-attending-garba-in-gujarat-1757498. Bhargava, R., Kumar Bagchi, A., & Sudarshan, R. (2007). Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Democracy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bosswick, W., & Heckmann, F. (2006). Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities. European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) at the University of Bamberg, Germany: European Foundation for the Improvement

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of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/22/en/1/ef0622en.pdf. Euractiv. (2016, June 20). UN Refugee Chief: Worrying ‘Climate of Xenophobia’ in Europe. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/un-refugee-chief-worrying-climate-of-xenophobiain-europe/. European Union. (2013). Study on Practices of Integration of Third-Country Nationals at Local and Regional Level in the European Union. The Report Written by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES). Retrieved June 13, 2017, from http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/ Documents/sur vey_integration_3rd_countr y_nationals/sur vey_ integration_3rd_country_nationals.pdf. EUROSTAT. (2016, July 8). First Population Estimates. Newsrelease 134/2016. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ documents/2995521/7553787/3-08072016-AP-EN.pdf/c4374d2a-622f4770-a287-10a09b3001b6. EUROSTAT. (2017). Migration and Migrant Population Statistics. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics. Hall, S. (2001). The Multicultural Question. Papers in Social and Cultural Research No. 4, Pavis Centre for Social and Cultural Research, The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom. Retrieved June 12, 2017, from http://www. open.ac.uk/socialsciences/pavis/papers.php. Hill, J.  (2016, February 22). Migrant Attacks Reveal Dark Side of Germany. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-35633318. Horn, H. (2015, October 16). Is Eastern Europe Any More Xenophobic Than Western Europe? The Atlantic. Retrieved December 2017, from https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/xenophobia-easterneurope-refugees/410800/. Kymlicka, W. (2007). Multicultural Odysseys. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lopes Paulos, F. (2017, July 31). Multiculturalism in Europe. One Europe. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from http://one-europe.net/multiculturalism-in-europe. Mahajan, G. (2007). Multiculturalism in the Age of Terror. Political Studies Review, 5(3), 317–336. Mammone, A. (2016, October 7). In Europe, Xenophobia Is Winning Over Rationality. CNN International Edition. Retrieved December 12, 2017, from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/07/opinions/xenophobia-over-rationality-mammone/index.html. Meyer, H. (2015, November 18). A Note on Terrorism, Muslims and Multiculturalism. Social Europe. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from https://www. socialeurope.eu/2015/11/a-note-on-terrorism-muslims-andmulticulturalism/.

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Nehru, J. (1961). Discovery of India. Bombay: Asia Publishing House. Outlook. (2017, August 9). UP Witnesses 60 Communal Incidents, 16 Deaths in 2017, Highest in the Country. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from https://www. outlookindia.com/website/story/up-witnesses-60-communal-incidents16-deaths-in-2017-highest-in-the-country/300193. Parekh, B. (1999, December). What Is Multiculturalism. Seminar, No. 484. Retrieved May 3, 2017, from www.india-seminar.com/1999/484/484%20 parekh.htm. Parekh, B. (2000). Rethinking Multiculturalism. In Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2nd ed.). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Pathak, A. (2006). Modernity, Globalization and Identity: Towards a Reflexive Quest. New Delhi: Aakar Books. Sharma, S. (2014a). Social Integration in Multicultural Societies: A Comparative Study of India and Europe. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Multiculturalism in India and Europe (pp. 49–71). New Delhi: Aakar Books. Sharma, S. (2014b). Multiculturalism and the Social Structure in India and Europe. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Multiculturalism in India and Europe (pp. 1–25). New Delhi: Aakar Books. Sharma, S. (2015). Caste-Based Crimes and Economic Status: Evidence from India. Journal of Comparative Economics, 43(1), 204–226. Stokes, B. (2016, July 22). The Immigration Crisis Is Tearing Europe Apart. Foreign Policy. Retrieved December 14, 2017, from http://foreignpolicy. com/2016/07/22/the-immigration-crisis-is-tearing-europe-apart/. Sunderland, J. (2016, January 13). For Europe, Integrating Refugees Is the Next Big Challenge. World Politics Review. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from https:// www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/13/europe-integrating-refugees-next-bigchallenge. The Guardian. (2005, November 6). Violence Sweeps France in 10th Night of Riots. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2005/nov/06/france.davidsmith. The Independent. (2016, October 4). Brexit Vote Has Led to Noticeable Rise in UK Xenophobia. Watchdog Warns. Retrieved December 12, 2017, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-vote-has-ledto-noticeable-rise-in-uk-xenophobia-watchdog-warns-a7343646.html. The International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA). (2016, December 16). Defining “Multiculturalism”. Retrieved May 12, 2017, from https://www.ifla.org/publications/defining-multiculturalism. Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2009). Assessing the Backlash Against Multiculturism in Europe. MMG WP 09-04, Göttingen: Max Planck Institute. Retrieved January 26, 2018, from www.mmg.mpg.de/publications/workingpapers/2009/wp-09-04/.

CHAPTER 15

EU–India Economic Relations and FTA Negotiations Gulshan Sachdeva

Introduction1 The chapter argues that India’s economic relations with Europe are much deeper and more comprehensive than normally perceived in the context of contemporary India–European Union (EU) strategic partnership or free trade negotiations. To grasp the intricacies of this relationship, it has to be understood in the context of the colonial legacy, independent India’s economic and strategic ties during the Cold War and the emerging convergence between the EU and India since the mid-1990s. The chapter begins by tracing India’s economic interactions with Europe during the pre-­ colonial and the British period. After independence, these economic ties became limited as India diversified its links with countries other the UK and later with the socialist world. After the end of the Cold War, a rising India’s global vision of democratic, multicultural and multipolar world has coincided with Europe’s. This realisation led to the India–EU strategic partnership in 2004 and start of the trade and investment negotiations in 2007. It is broadly accepted that the core of India–EU ties is economics. Although the EU is India’s top trading and investment partner, this chapG. Sachdeva (*) Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_15

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ter tries to explain why certain political and economic factors may not allow trade and investment negotiations to reach a fruitful conclusion in the next few years.

Historical Background Indian economic interactions with Europe are very old. Long before British colonisation, European traders were coming to India from the end of the fifteenth century. From the Indian subcontinent, they exported goods not only to Europe but also to other parts of Asia. As a result, India slowly became an important centre of European trading activities in Asia and the Indian Ocean through the activities of the Portuguese as well as the Dutch, the English and the French East India companies. The English and Dutch East India companies challenged the initial Portuguese monopoly at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Later, these two companies dominated the trade between the two continents. Apart from the French East India Company, other companies such as the Danish, the Ostend and the Swedish, were never became very significant players in the trade with the subcontinent (Prakash 1998). These East India companies acted as a main vehicle of trading and financial exchanges between Europe and Asia. Over a period of time, the influence of European companies, together with that of private traders, reshaped maritime trading patterns. As a result of their important position in the market, these companies also imposed themselves upon local production, financial and agrarian systems. A particularly powerful influence was exerted upon Indian production by its exposure to competition from British manufactured goods (Chaudhuri 1978). Various studies have established that as a result of these interactions, the economies of the region expanded, were further monetised and were integrated into the pre-modern global economy. Some studies, however, question the benign view of an ‘age of partnership’ between the European companies and the Indian states. It is argued that this was a period of ‘contained conflict’ between them. Blockades, bombardments, ship seizures, massacres and abductions were regular practised by European traders in the seventeenth century (Subrahmanyam 1990). The English East India Company also exerted its military power in Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century. This facilitated its transition from a purely commercial company into an imperial power. The market-­ determined economic relationship between India and Europe changed with the establishment of a colonial relationship between Britain and the

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subcontinent. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, many fundamental changes in economic interactions took place. Instead of a source of textile products, the Indian subcontinent became an important market for the textile products of Manchester and Lancashire (Prakash 1998). At independence, India was host to extensive foreign capital, mainly British. As a feature of the colonial heritage, foreign investments were concentrated in extractive industries. For example, about 85% of tea plantation areas were foreign owned. Similarly, trade and ancillary services were dominated by foreign capital. Even in 1951–1952 (four years after independence) about 40% of India’s imports and exports were handled by foreign firms (Chibber and Mazumdar 1999, 211–212). A survey of 41 subsidiary companies in India which had Rs 1 million of paid-up ordinary share capital in 1950 and were registered in Calcutta and Bombay showed that most of them were either British or had a British majority. Two of them were Anglo-Dutch (Philips and Unilever) and one American (General Electric) (Tomlinson 1978, Appendix II). The London Economist reported in 1955 that British investors (who retained the major share of foreign investment in India) still owned large percentages of the tea (60.4%), mining (28.9%), jute (25.3%) and coal (14.5%) industries (cited in Spencer 1955, 41). However, British interests were slowly taken over by local merchants. It is estimated that in 1938 the British controlled about 61 large business groups. This number declined to only 25 in 1962 (Chibber and Mazumdar 1999). Although a number of estimates have been made, it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of foreign (and European) capital in pre-­ independence India. Several estimates confuse British investments with foreign investments and other focus on foreign control over areas of the Indian economy. Despite the difficulties, some excellent works have been produced on foreign capital during that period. Table  15.1 summarises various estimates of foreign capital in India between 1920 and 1960. Although in the early decades after independence, most of the foreign capital invested in the region came from the UK, independent India drew on a wide range of countries for technical assistance. For example, New Delhi focused on the USA for oil refineries, on Germany on steel making, on France on ship building, and on Switzerland for rail coach and for drug manufacturing. During the first decade of independence, the Indian economy was reasonably open. However, by the late 1960s it had become one of the most protectionist in the world. State interventions in economic activity had

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Table 15.1  Summary of different estimates of foreign investment in India 1921–1960 (in rupees croresa) Authority

Year for which estimated

Amount

V. K. R. V. Rao Economist G. D. Birla Prof Findley Shirras Sir Robert Kindersley Associated Chambers of Commerce Sir Robert Kindersley Statist Prof B. R. Shenoy Dr A. K. Banerji

1926–1927 1928–1929 1929 1930 1930 1931

328 180 (including Sri Lanka) 585 190 142 741

1936 1939 1939 1921

Dr A. K. Banerji

1938

Reserve Bank of India

1948

Reserve Bank of India

1948 (net valuation)

Reserve Bank of India

1953 (net valuation)

Reserve Bank of India

1960 (net valuation)

130 (including Sri Lanka) 866–931 565 302 (British share 240 crores) 413 (British share 302 crores) 320 (British share 230 crores) 226 (British share 206 crores) 392 (British share 326 crores) 566 (British share 442 crores)

Source: (Tomlinson 1978, 657–658) One crore = 10 million

a

become pervasive. Tariff and non-tariff barriers were extremely high. Attitudes towards foreign investments were hostile and stringent exchange controls were in place (IPS 2000). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and multinational corporations were viewed a modern form of colonialism (ADB 2004); even the presence of a multinational was regarded as a threat, raising concerns that these companies could influence domestic economic and political affairs. As a consequence of these attitudes, international investors did not see India as attractive investment destination. By the mid-1980s, a slow process of economic liberalisation began and with the 1991 economic reforms, the economic policy discourse was totally changed.

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At independence in 1947, a major portion of India’s trade was either with the UK or its colonies and allies. This pattern continued for some years. After independence, hostility to colonialism formed the basis for the policy of ‘self-reliance’ in India. As India established independent relations with other countries, trade also diversified. In later years, the former socialist bloc countries became major trading partners. With the advent of the Cold War and India’s policy of non-alignment and its closeness to the Soviet Union, the country’s interactions with Europe became limited and largely bilateral (Dixit 2000). However, trade and economic relations with Europe have always been very important for India and formed the core of India– European Economic Community (EEC)/EU relations (Sachdeva 2012). Realising the importance of economic relations with European countries, India was amongst the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the EEC in 1962. Later bilateral agreements were put in place in 1973 and 1981. In 1974, a comprehensive agreement was signed between India and the EEC; this covered a wide range of economic issues—trade, economic cooperation, industry, services, energy, telecommunications, tourism, private sector investment, science and technology, intellectual property, agriculture, development cooperation, the environment and human resources development (European Communities 1994). The agreement was the first signed by the European Communities (EC) with any non-associated developing country embodying the concepts of commercial and economic cooperation linked with trade. This agreement provided for a Joint Commission, three sub-commissions on (1) trade and commercial cooperation, (2) economic cooperation and (3) development cooperation. Six working groups in areas of agriculture and marine products, information technology, environment, textiles and consular issues were set up. In 2001, India and EU signed a science and technology agreement. To simplify customs procedures and develop trade facilitation actions in customs-related matters in accordance with international standards, both also signed a customs cooperation agreement in 2004. After the end of the Cold War, a rising India’s global vision of democratic, multicultural and multipolar world coincided with Europe’s. India and the EU started annual summit meetings in 2000 and signed the Strategic Partnership in 2004. A Joint Action Plan was also announced in 2005. Encouraged by positive economic trends, India and the EU started negotiations for a Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) in 2007. In the first three years, negotiations went well, particularly in the area of trade in goods. After 2009, however, they became more compli-

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cated due to trade in services and procurement issues. Although ­expectations were raised before every summit, outcomes were limited. At the 12th summit in 2012, it was declared that negotiations on the trade deal were ‘close to completion’. In 2013, negotiations were suspended and no summit meeting took place between 2013 and 2015.

Trade Ties At the start of the Indian planning process, the UK’s share of India’s total exports was about 24%. Similarly, about 21% of imports came from the UK. Another major trading partner was the USA. At the beginning of the 1960s, about 37% of Indian trade was with the countries of the EC. A large amount of that trade was with two countries in particular: the UK and West Germany. In later years, trade with some other countries also became important, particularly with the Netherlands and Belgium. Trade with the EC was an important component of Indian foreign economic relations throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Its relative importance, however, declined as India forged special trade and economic relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc. In 1971, the EC granted the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) facility to India, the first time to a country in Asia, aimed at encouraging exports of the manufacturing goods of poor developing countries.  Under the GSP, many developed countries provide preferential tariff treatment to select developing countries. Some studies have, however, concluded that owing to structural rigidities and the list of sensitive goods, the impact of the scheme has been marginal (Bhattacharya 2005). In recent years, Indian exports to the EU have increased from US$8.8 billion in 1996/1997 to US$53 billion in 2011/2012.2 Similarly, India imported commodities worth US$57 billion in the same year from the EU. These imports were only US$10.6 billion in 1996/1997. Due to the global economic slowdown, bilateral trade has declined slightly in the last few years, to 102 billion dollars in 2013/2014 (52 billion dollars in exports and 50  billion dollars in imports) and 89  billion dollars in 2016/2017 (47 billion dollars exports and 42 billion dollars imports) (Fig. 15.1). India’s major trading partners in the EU are Germany, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and France. In 2011–2012, these six countries accounted for about 80% of the trade with the Union. The remaining countries accounted for only 20% of total trade with the EU. In recent years, imports from Sweden have reached a new high. For many years, the

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Fig. 15.1  India–EU goods trade, 1996/1997 to 2016/2017 ($  million). Source: Export Import Databank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India

UK has been the major export market within the EU, accounting for 19% of exports to the EU-27 and about 4% of total Indian exports in 2013/2014. Some of the major exports markets for 2017/2018 are shown in Fig. 15.2. Although in absolute terms India’s trade with the EU has increased, there are some disturbing trends. In relative terms as a percentage of India’s total exports and imports, it has declined consistently over the last two decades. In 1996/1997, India–EU-27 trade accounted for about 26.5% of total Indian trade. In 2011/2012, it declined to 13.9% of total Indian trade (see Fig. 15.3). It further declined to 13.5% in 2016/2017. Exports to the EU accounted for only about 17% of total Indian exports and imports to the EU for only about 11% in 2016/2017. In fact, the growth rates of India–EU trade have not been able to follow the growth rates of total Indian trade. While looking at Indian trade growth between 2004/2005 and 2007/2008, it was estimated that India–EU trade growth during this period was about 25%. This was much lower than the average Indian trade growth of about 29% during the same period. This indicated that the EU companies were not taking full advantage of the Indian economic expansion (Sachdeva 2009). Countries which are integrating more with the Indian economy include China and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This explains why India has been in a

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Fig. 15.2  Indian exports to the EU, 2017/2018 ($  million). Source: Export Import Databank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India

hurry to sign trading arrangements with a number of Asian countries. From the European perspective, the EU–India trade is still a small portion of their overall global trade. It is now becoming significant as India is able to improve its export share in the EU markets (Table 15.2). The product composition of India–EU trade shows that India exports a wide variety of products to the EU. Major export items include manufactured goods, readymade garments, gems and jewellery, pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, leather goods, vehicles and machinery. Similarly, major imports include gems and jewellery, machinery, electronic goods, chemicals, iron and steel, and aluminium. The presence of similar items in both lists indicates that considerable intra-industry trade is also taking place. The product composition over recent years shows that the trade in agriculture products is rather limited. Major items of trade are manufactured products, including machinery and transport equipment (Table 15.3).

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Fig. 15.3  India–EU trade as a percentage of total Indian trade, 1996/1997 to 2016/2017. Source: Author’s calculation based on Export Import Databank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India Table 15.2  EU–India trade in goods, 2005–2016 Year

Exports (in million)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

21,250.2 24,241.2 29,181.0 31,356.1 27,499.4 34,984.6 40,648.3 38,594.9 35,958.5 35,636.2 38,111.8 37,764.3

Share of exports 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2

Imports (in million) 19,114.2 22,636.7 26,666.1 29,632.4 25,503.2 33,463.8 39,927.0 37,527.7 36,842.5 37,177.7 39,464.3 39,316.0

Share of imports 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3

Total trade (in million)

Trade balance (in million)

40,364.4 46,877.9 55,847.1 60,988.5 53,002.6 68,448.4 80,575.3 76,122.6 72,801.0 72,813.9 77,576.1 77,080.3

2135.9 1604.5 2514.9 1723.7 1996.2 1520.8 7,21.3 1067.2 −884.0 −1541.5 −1352.5 −1551.7

Source: Eurostat database

Trade in Services Both in the EU and in India, services are becoming more and more ­important. In fact, issues concerning services will significantly affect bilateral trade negotiations. In 2013, the share of services (excluding construction) in the eurozone by gross value added was 73.4%. In the same year, services accounted for about 57% of the Indian economy. The EU is the biggest

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Table 15.3  EU–India trade flows by Standard International Trade Classification section, 2013–2016 Imports value in million euros 2013

2014

2015

2016

Exports value in million euros 2013

2014

2015

2016

Total 36,843 37,147 39,464 39,276 35,949 35,625 38,125 37,745 Food and Live 2382 2655 2817 2717 179 210 302 445 Animals Beverages and 166 170 202 173 115 146 157 158 tobacco Crude 915 938 1003 962 1752 2017 1934 1799 materials, inedible except fuel Mineral fuels, 4963 2847 2133 1852 241 292 342 322 lubricants and related products Animal and 215 205 247 234 36 39 121 64 vegetable oils, fats and waxes Chemicals and 5640 5756 6436 6509 4375 4734 5043 5211 related products Manufactured 8493 9349 9636 9716 12,553 11,966 11,503 10,828 goods classified by material Machinery 5765 5918 6595 6867 13,110 12,557 14,503 14,696 and transport equipment Misc. 8057 9049 10,052 9976 2619 2603 2880 3059 manufactured articles Commodities 131 123 125 140 392 398 424 285 and transactions Other 116 136 136 130 585 663 920 878 Source: Directorate General Trade European Commission (2017)

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global player in the international trade in services. In 2008, the EU’s international trade in services recorded a surplus of 75.4 billion euros. Its total trade in services was 965 billion euros (520 billion euros exports and 445 billion imports). India, with 210 billion euros trade in services in 2013, is also becoming a significant player in the global services trade. India’s trade in services with the EU grew from 7.8 billion euros in 2004 to 23.7 billion euros in 2013. In recent years, India has recorded a surplus in travel, computer and information services, and communication services. The bilateral services trade is close to 30 billion euros annually and is now more or less balanced. For services trade, the UK has been India’s biggest market within the EU, followed by Germany and France. In recent years, Ireland has also become a significant exporter of services to India (Table 15.4). Table 15.4  EU–India trade in services, 2012–2016

Credit EU-28  Germany  Ireland  France  UK Debit EU-28  Germany  Ireland  France  UK Total EU-28  Germany  Ireland  France  UK Balance EU-28  Germany  Ireland  France  UK

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

11,840 1951 1352 1328 2561

11,672 1880 1521 1173 2393

12,471 1829 1964 1432 2770

14,434 2148 2337 1695 3161

13,844 2229 2576 1436 3078

13,012 2242 244 1420 4538

12,606 2684 292 1603 2990

11,745 2424 128 1746 2751

13,657 2868 356 1715 3593

14,651 3141 544 1754 4304

24,852 4193 2195 2748 7099

24,278 4564 1813 2776 5383

24,216 4253 2092 3178 5521

28,091 5016 2693 3410 6754

28,495 5370 3120 3190 7382

−1172 −291 1108 −92 −1976

−934 −804 1228 −430 −597

724 −595 1838 −314 18

777 −720 1981 −20 −431

−807 −912 2032 −318 −1225

Source: Eurostat database

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Investment Flows The EU member states are also major investors in India. Similarly, Indian companies are making significant investment and acquisitions in the EU markets. Despite different figures, both Indian and European sources highlight the importance of FDI from the EU to India. As per Indian government data, the EU’s share in India’s total FDI approvals during January 1991 to December 2005 was around 25%. Investment approvals rose from US$78  million in 1991 to US$2314  million in 2001. Since 2001, there has been a further increase in investments from the EU. Between April 2000 and June 2017, cumulative FDI inflows from the EU countries amounted to more than US$80  billion, which was about 24% of total FDI inflows into India during this period. This was about four times US investments and more than US, Japanese, Chinese and Russian investments put together in India. During this period, the UK was the EU’s top investor in India, followed by the Netherlands, Cyprus, Germany and France. The difficulty with Indian FDI data is that it is hard to accurately trace country-wise data, and there is a large amount of investments by European and American firms to India that may be routed through Mauritius. Between April 2000 and June 2017, about 34% of total FDI in India was reported from Mauritius. Similarly, investment from Cyprus is much bigger than France, Spain and Italy and Sweden (Table 15.5). The Eurostat database shows that by 2012 total EU FDI stock in India had reached EUR 42 billion, with EUR 14 billion invested in 2011 alone (Figs. 15.4 and 15.5). It appears from above figures that this has not been a case of one-way traffic. Indian FDI in the EU markets soared to about 11 billion euros in 2011. However, after 2008, the trend has not been very encouraging, a sign that negative economic forecasts about the eurozone economy might have affected Indian investments (Figs. 15.6 and 15.7). According to a study by the Europe India Chamber of Commerce, European companies invested about 198 billion dollars in India between 2004 and 2013. The UK, Germany, France and Switzerland led European investments to India (Table  15.6). Similarly, an earlier Europe India Chamber of Commerce study showed that Indian companies invested about 56 billion dollars in Europe between 2002 and 2012. Out of this, 18 billion dollars was invested in greenfield projects and 38 billion dollars was spent on mergers and acquisitions (see Tables 15.7 and 15.8).

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Table 15.5  FDI inflows in India, April 2000–June 2017 (US$ million) Country

FDI inflows

Total Mauritius Singapore Japan USA China Russia Switzerland Norway European Union  UK  Netherlands  Germany  Cyprus  France  Spain  Italy  Sweden  Belgium  Poland  Denmark  Finland  Ireland  Austria   Other EU member states

342,399 114,930 57,600 26,125 20,982 1668 1199 3901 210 81,421 24,731 21,265 10,496 9278 5823 2484 2413 1383 1115 666 468 419 361 334 185

% of total inflows 100 33.57 16.82 7.63 6.13 0.49 0.35 1.14 0.06 23.78 7.22 6.21 3.07 2.71 1.70 0.73 0.70 0.40 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.54

Source: Government of India, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, FDI Statistics

The EU is also one of the major sources of technology transfer to India. More than one third of all technical and financial collaborations approved by the Indian government are with European companies. Most technical collaborations are in the area of electrical equipment (including computer software), industrial machinery and chemicals. Germany has emerged as a clear leader in technical collaboration from the EU. Similarly, most financial collaborations are with British companies (Sachdeva 2012).

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Fig. 15.4  EU FDI stock in India (million euros), 2004–2012. Source: Eurostat database

Fig. 15.5  EU FDI flows to India, 2004–2013 (million euros). Source: Eurostat database

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Fig. 15.6  FDI stocks from India to the EU, 2004–2012 (million euros). Source: Eurostat database

Fig. 15.7  FDI flows from India to the EU, 2005–2013 (million euros). Source: Eurostat database

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Table 15.6  FDI from major European economies to India, 2004–2013 Greenfield ($ billion) Brownfield ($ billion) Total ($ billion) % of total UK Germany France Switzerland Italy Denmark The Netherlands Sweden Belgium

37.3 22.0 17.9 7.0 5.0 1.8 4.9 4.9 1.7

33.0 12.5 3.7 5.2 1.5 0.4 2.8 1.5 1.7

70.3 34.5 21.6 12.2 6.5 2.2 7.8 6.4 3.4

35.5 17.4 10.9 6.2 3.3 1.1 3.9 3.2 1.7

Source: Charlie (2014, 4)

Table 15.7  Greenfield investments by Indian companies in Europe, 2002–2012 No. of projects

No. of companies

Jobs created

244 101 33 31 23 16 15 14 10 7 17

161 94 28 30 19 16 12 14 8 7 15

24,903 4545 1205 1313 1675 1744 2239 545 456 281 893

8148 1512 2455 365 861 668 2003 201 1428 1834 956

571

321

39,709

17,517

UK Germany The Netherlands France Belgium Spain Italy Switzerland Denmark Sweden Other EU Countries Total

Capital invested ($ Million)

Source: Charlie (2012, 22)

India–EU FTA: Deadlocked Negotiations Some of the factors discussed above have been responsible for new thinking on bilateral economic relations. The collapse of the Doha d ­ evelopment round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations pushed many countries, including India, to look for alternatives to multilateral negotiations in order to improve their trade positions. Within this broader

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Table 15.8  Some major acquisitions by Indian companies in Europe Buyer

Target

Target headquarters

Target business

Tata Steel Bharti Airtel Tata Motors

Corus

London

Steelmaker

13.3

Jan. 2007

Zain Africa Jaguar and land Rover RePower

Amsterdam

Telecommunications

10.7

Feb. 2010

London

Luxury Sedans

2.3

Mar. 2008

Hamburg

Wind Turbines

1.74

May 2007

Suzlon Energy

Enterprise deal value ($ billion)

Announcement date

Source: Charlie (2012, 24)

framework, India has put its proposed regional trade agreements on a fast track since 2005. In the past, India adopted a cautious approach to regionalism and was engaged in only a few bilateral or regional initiatives, mainly through Preferential Trade Agreements or through open regionalism. Since 2005, it has started concluding Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements (CECAs) with many countries. The CECAs cover FTAs (with limited negative lists) in goods, services, investment and other areas of economic cooperation. Some important agreements signed include the South Asian Free Trade Area, and agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea and the Southern Common Market. Serious negotiations are underway with Australia, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, the EU, the European Free Trade Association, the Eurasian Economic Union, Egypt, Gulf Cooperation Council, Indonesia, Israel, the India-Brazil-South Africa Forum and New Zealand. On the recommendations of the High Level Trade Group (HLTG), which was set up under the Joint Action Plan in 2005, it was agreed at the seventh India–EU summit in 2006 at Helsinki that both sides would move towards negotiation for a BTIA. Both sides agreed on the negotiations on the following issues:

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1. Trade in goods: (1) achieving the elimination of duties on 90% of tariff lines and trade volume within seven years of the entry into force of the agreement; (2) developing modalities for the treatment of sensitive products, including review clauses and partial liberalisation. 2. Trade in services: (1) ensuring substantial sectoral coverage measured in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade and modes of supply— no mode of supply is to be excluded; and (2) providing for the elimination of substantially all discrimination between the parties. 3. Investment: (1) improving market access and providing for national treatment to investors; (2) ensuring that host and home states retain their right to regulate; (3) fostering transparency by clarifying the regulatory framework; (4) aiming at freeing the flow of payments and investment-related capital movements; and (5) seeking to facilitate the movement of investment-related natural persons. 4. Public procurement: putting in place a competitive procurement regime. 5. Technical regulations: establishing cooperation on technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. 6. Ensuring intellectual property and geographical indicators coverage in any future agreement. 7. Competition policy: establishing an agreement on framework in any future agreement. 8. Creating a dispute settlement DS mechanism. It is clear from the agenda that India and the EU were aiming at not just a simple FTA but a much larger pact which included services, intellectual property, public procurement, competition policy, and so on. At the beginning both sides were more ambitious. In the last few years, however, it has been realised that it was perhaps better to ‘do the doable’ first and go for comprehensive agreement later. Despite the environment being conducive to a trade deal, bureaucrats on both sides have been remarkably slow in negotiations; many deadlines have already been missed and more than a dozen rounds of negotiations have taken place, alternatively in Brussels and Delhi. At the ninth summit in France in 2008, leaders agreed to conclude the agreement by 2009 and double their trade in five years. At the 11th summit in Brussels, both sides fixed a mid-2011 deadline to conclude negotiations. After missing another

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deadline, the 12th summit in Delhi in February 2012 reiterated that ‘negotiations on an ambitious and balanced package are now close to completion’ and both sides would ‘monitor the progress of these negotiations for an early conclusion’. According to the Asia Regional Integration Centre database of the Asian Development Bank, India was involved at different stages in at least 29 trade agreements by June 2018, 13 of which were already signed; negotiations are ongoing for another 16 agreements (Asia Regional Integration Centre Database n.d.).3 So far, most of India’s engagements remain within Asia. One significant aspect of this phase of economic regionalism is India’s increasing economic cooperation with South East Asia through regional, sub-regional and bilateral engagements (eight initiatives). The context within which EU–India BTIA negotiations started in 2007 was very favourable; after successfully implementing enlargement and single currency projects, the EU mood was one of confidence. Similarly, the Indian economy grew very fast from 2007 to 2009 and policy-makers were aggressively pursuing FTAs. However, since 2009 the political and economic climate in both the EU and India have been more unfavourable, with the negotiators missing many deadlines. According to European Commission information about ongoing FTA negotiations (updated May 2018), so far 12 formal rounds have taken place, the last in 2013. In addition, more targeted clusters— expert-level inter-sessional meetings, chief negotiator meetings and meetings at a higher level—have discussed the matter. The ongoing negotiations are focusing on market access for goods (to improve coverage of offers on both sides), services, government procurement and sustainable development. It is reported that ‘the negotiations were brought to a de facto standstill in the summer 2013 due to a mismatch of the level of ambitions’. Since 2016 discussions have resumed and at the EU–India summit in 2017 both sides ‘expressed their shared commitment to strengthening the Economic Partnership between India and the EU and noted the ongoing efforts of both sides to re-engage actively towards timely relaunching negotiations for a comprehensive and mutually beneficial FTA’ (European Commission 2018). On the one hand, there are reports that FTA negotiations are deadlocked due to the EU’s concerns in certain areas, including high tariffs on cars and wines, insurance, banking, retail, legal services, geographical indication and public procurement. On the other hand, India has concerns

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about services; according to reports, the EU demands civil society monitoring of FTAs, which India is opposed to (Srivastava 2015). India would like liberalisation in terms of the movement of professionals and market access for agricultural products, pharmaceuticals and textiles and would press for improved market access together with a liberal visa regime under the Mode 4 quota of services trade, which will allow Indian information technology professionals to live and work temporarily in the EU. It would also like broader sectoral definitions, longer stay durations and flexibility of movement within EU markets under Mode 4. The EU has introduced a safeguard clause which will take effect whenever a 20% sector limit is reached. Since the safeguards are sectoral, this may affect the information technology sector, where Indian companies hope to win business. There were indications that India may take a ‘flexible approach’ on tariffs on wines and spirits and auto components in exchange for a ‘Data Secure Nation’ status being provided to India by the EU. Since India is not considered data secure by the EU, this affects the operating costs and competitiveness of Indian information technology companies looking for access to EU markets. On intellectual property rights, India will perhaps not go beyond WTO obligations; this has caused concern within the EU and has prompted requests for the support of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in breaking this deadlock. However, the Indian ambassador to the EU reported in the media that Modi had assured the European leadership that the BTIA would not suffer through a lack of ‘political will’ in India (Dasgupta 2015). It was becoming clear that the BTIA needed a push from the highest political level on both sides, otherwise it may not happen for some time. The global economic slowdown, as well as the crisis in the eurozone, has already affected EU–India economic ties, although the impact was limited as Germany, the biggest economy in the EU and India’s largest trade partner in Europe, was doing relatively well. However, Indian trade and investment with most member states have marginally declined in the last few years. Restarting negotiations in areas where agreement is possible would re-­ energise bilateral relations, whilst other items could be finalised at a later stage. It is certainly deemed necessary to show something concrete in the way of progress. Any agreement, even if not comprehensive, would be a good showcase for the leadership, both in India and the EU.  The EU ambassador to Delhi was hopeful that ‘once the negotiations start, a deal could be concluded within months’ (Johny 2015).

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Since negotiations have taken so long, many sectors in the industry have started lobbying. Earlier, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry had expressed concern that all items where Indian industry has a comparative advantage may not be covered by bilateral negotiations. The apex chamber suggested that the scope of the negotiations should be expanded to include 95% of goods (PTI 2008). The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) asserted that all details of the negotiations must be shared with the Indian Parliament. The Polit Bureau of the party was of the view that ‘such FTAs can turn out to be much more damaging for the livelihoods of our farmers, workers and other sections of the working people than the WTO agreements’ (CPI-M 2008). In 2013, the Polit Bureau reiterated its opposition. The party was concerned that the ‘entire negotiating process has been non-transparent, with a total lack of public consultation with affected sections, parliamentary oversight, or the involvement of state governments’ (CPI-M 2013). When in opposition, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) warned the government against ‘undue haste’ in negotiating an India–EU FTA ‘without political consensus’. In 2012, the party demanded that there should be ‘(a) an all party meeting to discuss FTAs/CECAs in general and EU—India FTA in particular (b) a comprehensive debate in parliament on all FTAs entered and especially on EU-India FTA (c) immediate release of negotiating text and impact assessment studies of FTAs/CECAs particularly EU-India’ (BJP 2012). In 2013, senior BJP leader and Chairperson of Public Account Committee in Parliament Murli Manohar Joshi argued that an India–EU FTA would ‘seriously jeopardize the interests of the Indian people with no obvious gains in trade or economic expansion’ (BJP 2013). A campaign group led by trade unions and non-profit organisations has already asked the government to halt the talks (Handique and Mishra 2009). There has been a serious campaign to argue that the proposed India–EU FTA will stop the flow of cheap drugs to the developing world (Boseley 2012). Similarly, the domestic industry lobby, the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers, argues that the proposed deal will kill investment and technology inflow and jeopardise targets set under the government’s own Automotive Mission Plan (Doval 2012). Similarly, it is also claimed to be against the government’s own ‘Make in India’ initiative (PTI 2015). Therefore, some domestic opposition, the difficult global economic situation and developments on other bilateral economic pacts have already affected the India–EU FTA negatively (Singh and Priya 2014).

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Despite more than ten years of EU–India FTA negotiations, academic studies on the subject are rather limited. Earlier, a joint study by the Consumer Unity and Trust Society International India and Sussex University argued that deeper integration between EU and India will be far more effective than only shallow integration. According to the authors of this study, deeper integration involves those institutions and policies which facilitate trade. These policies would include issues ‘such as customs procedures, regulation of domestic services production that discriminate against foreigners, product standards that differ from international norms or where testing and certification of foreign goods is complex and perhaps exclusionary, regulation of inward investments, competition policy, intellectual policy protection and the rules surrounding access to government procurement’ (Gasoriek et al. 2007, 4). It was also predicted that a bilateral trade agreement would increase FDI from Europe to India. Decreux and Mitoritonne (2007) also argued that the impact of trade agreement will be positive both for the EU and India. However, in India’s case strong positive results will arise only in areas where there is a sufficient level of liberalisation in services (for details, see Sachdeva 2008). Apart from academic studies, the government of India for the first time has highlighted some potential benefits of signing separate FTAs with the EU and the UK. As per these calculations, in the apparel, leather goods and footwear sectors, 3 billion dollars of extra exports and about 150,000 new jobs will be created (Table 15.9). Table 15.9  Potential additional exports and jobs from FTAs with the EU and the UK

EU UK Total

Apparel

Leather goods

Footwear

Incremental Gain in exports employment ($ Mn) (number)

Incremental Gain in exports employment ($ Mn) (number)

Incremental exports ($ Mn)

Gain in employment (number)

216.9 95.3 312.2

9966 4381 14,347

1483.6 603.3 2086.9

76,853 31,176 108,029

Source: Government of India (2017, 26)

416.9 103.8 520.7

18,542 4615 23,156

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Economic Ties Under the Modi Government When Modi became prime minister in 2014, both sides were hopeful that the India–EU FTA negotiations could be restarted. This was particularly so as Modi gave a priority to foreign economic relations in his foreign policy (Sachdeva 2015). Despite high expectations, movement has been limited. After realising that Europeans could contribute significantly to India’s domestic economic agenda, Modi has made many visits to Europe. He has already visited Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. New Delhi’s decision to buy Rafale fighters from France has further re-energised strategic engagement with Europe. The 13th EU–India summit, which was held in 2016  in Brussels, has brought the EU back on the Indian foreign policy agenda. The summit resulted in the Agenda for Action 2020 (MEA 2016). ‘After realizing that concluding negotiations on FTA may take time, both started focusing on other areas. These include climate change, energy, counter-­ terrorism, maritime security, science and technology, development cooperation, migration and dialogues on Asia and Africa’ (Sachdeva 2017a). The 14th EU–India summit in New Delhi in October 2017 resulted in a 53-paragraph joint statement, which included a convergence of views on bilateral, regional and international issues. Major issues mentioned include sustainable development goals, climate change and the environment, counter-terrorism, cyber-security and migration. Specific mentions were made of issues concerning Afghanistan, Myanmar, Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Ukraine, the Middle East peace process and peace and development in Africa (MEA 2017a). In addition, three separate joint declarations on counter-terrorism, urban partnerships, clean energy and the environment were also released (MEA 2017b). To some extent, this was a further confirmation of the Agenda for Action 2020. There was an indirect reference of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, where issues of transparency, financial responsibility and accountable debt financing practices were underlined. However, the real disappointment was again on trade and investment. There was hardly any movement on restarting negotiations on the EU– India FTA. The joint statement mentions the BTIA in such the diplomatic language that it means nothing. Modi did not even mention the FTA in his statement (MEA 2017c). The European Council president, Donald Tusk, mentioned it only in abstract terms (European Council 2017). He said that free trade agreements were important for companies and citizens to prosper and ‘they strengthen and defend the rules-based international

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order and our way of life’. After the summit, the European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker, however, was relatively clear when he said that ‘it is high time for an FTA between India and the EU. Once the circumstances are right—and only once the circumstances are right—we will resume’ (European Commission 2017). These statements give the impression that there is much hesitation even about restarting negotiations on both sides (Sachdeva 2017b). No one was expecting that even if negotiations began, it was going to be a quick exercise. Negotiations have been suspended since 2013. In the meanwhile, India has terminated bilateral investment treaties with a large number of countries, including 22 EU nations (Peacock and Joseph 2017). Although negotiations of a common investments treaty with the EU are part of proposed BTIA negotiations, the termination of large number of bilateral investment treaties creates uncertainty until the time negotiations are completed. The possibility of restarting BTIA negotiations is also affected by the Brexit negotiations. In the present circumstances, the possibility of any customs union or agreement on a common economic area between the EU and the UK is almost negligible. In the best of circumstances, EU and UK may agree on an FTA. However, the possibility of EU–UK FTA before 2019 is also very limited. It is also not clear if trade agreements already signed by the EU will also be applicable to the UK as well. In these circumstances, India will be looking at a trade deal with an EU of which the UK is not a part. Since the UK is India’s most important trade and investment partner within the EU, India will have to recalculate its earlier positions on many issues. In the meanwhile, the UK has also indicated that it is keen to start ‘unofficial’ negotiations on a separate India–UK trade deal. Although India has responded positively to such a possibility, any real negotiations are not possible until there is clarity on a Brexit deal. In these circumstances, even if negotiations are re-launched, it will take at least two to three years to finish negotiations. However, restarting negotiations would be a positive political signal and would reduce uncertainty created by the termination of investment treaties (Sachdeva 2017a). Despite some positive spin from the EU and Indian officials, the German ambassador to India, Martin Ney, has expressed his disappointment about the state of negotiations and asserted that both EU and India have ‘failed to live up to their potential’ (Haidar 2017). He also made it clear that ‘there is no decision to resume negotiations on a free trade agreement, including investment protection, despite the possibility at hand’ (PTI 2017).

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In recent years, it has become clear that FTA discussions are going nowhere. After realising this, both Indian and EU officials have rightly started focusing on other areas. These include climate change, energy, counter-terrorism, maritime security, science and technology, development cooperation, migration and dialogues on regional and global issues. In few areas, there has been some visible progress, particularly in student mobility under the Erasmus scheme and on dialogues on broader global and bilateral issues. So even without significant announcements on an FTA, the 13th and 14th summits have been able to create some political momentum in a relationship which was almost frozen for a few years. A meaningful partnership could also be built on urbanisation. The European Investment Bank’s growing involvement in urban transport (Lukhnow and Bangalore metro rail) and other renewable energy projects could strengthen the partnership further. There have been some joint public statements on counter-terrorism, maritime security, and regional and international issues. As the basic competence of the EU is in trade, investment and related matters, ultimately the EU–India partnership will be judged by developments in these matters. This can be done with or without an FTA. Unless both sides remove FTA negotiations from the summit agenda itself, there will always be some expectation from the summit. During the United Progressive Alliance-II regime under Manmohan Singh, the narrative of policy paralysis was blamed for the lack of development on many issues, including the India–EU FTA. Prime Minister Modi, with a massive popular mandate, was expected to change the policy environment in India. However, despite making commitments on an FTA at various bilateral summits with the European partners, including Germany, FTA negotiations are still at the same place as they were in 2013. It is currently difficult to know which side is more responsible for this. In the meanwhile, more complications—such as Brexit and the termination of bilateral investment treaties—have been added. In these circumstances, the 14th EU–India Summit surely missed the opportunity to provide a new direction to bilateral economic relations.

Conclusion India has strong historical economic ties with Europe. After independence, these relations were affected due to India’s close relations with the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, India–EU relations have become closer. The core of this partnership remains economics. The EU

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is India’s biggest trade and investment partner and Europe has emerged as an important destination for cross-border investments and overseas acquisitions for Indian companies. Similarly, collaboration in research and innovation has expanded significantly. As economic and development issues are becoming a priority within the Indian government’s foreign policy under Modi, the EU is becoming a focus area of engagement for India. It is felt that the EU member states can become significant partners and contributors to various national economic plans. This has resulted in Modi’s visits to various European capitals in the last four years and re-engagement through summit meetings, which were stalled for a few years. Despite these positive trends, there is hardly any movement on restarting FTA negotiations, which have been frozen since 2013. It is becoming clear that India–EU FTA negotiations are not only about resolving issues concerning certain sectors but are also affected by domestic political debates and attitudes towards former colonial powers and Western and European dominance in global governance. In these circumstances, as things stand, due to the 2019 general elections in India and the Brexit negotiations in the EU, the future of the India–EU FTA is uncertain and will remain so for at least the next few years.

Notes 1. Some parts of the text in this chapter were originally published in a chapter in 2012 by the same author entitled “India-EU Economic Ties: Strengthening the Core of the Strategic Partnership”, in L. Peral & V. Sakhuja (Eds.), The EU-India Partnership: Time to Go Strategic? The book was published by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Some text from this chapter is reproduced here with the permission of the Institute. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures used in this chapter are from various publications of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Reserve Bank of India. 3. https://aric.adb.org/fta-country.

References Asia Regional Integration Centre Database. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://aric. adb.org/fta-country. Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2004). Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Asia. In Asian Development Outlook 2004. Manila: ADB.

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Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). (2012). Press Statement Issued by BJP National Spokesperson & MP Shri Prakash Javadekar on the EU-India Summit. Retrieved from http://www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =7630%3Apress-bjp-national-spokesperson-shri-prakash-javadekar-on-the-euindia-summit&catid=68%3Apress-releases&Itemid=494. Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). (2013, April 10). Press Statement Issued by BJP Senior Leader, Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi. Retrieved from http://www.bjp.org/en/ media-resources/press-releases/press-bjp-senior-leader-dr-murli-manoharjoshi-on-free-trade-agreement. Bhattacharya, S. K. (2005). India and the European Union: Trade and Non-Tariff Barriers. New Delhi: Aakar Publications. Boseley, S. (2012, February 10). Does EU/India Free Trade Agreement Spell the End of Cheap Drugs for Poor Countries? The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/society/sarah-boseley-global-health/2012/ feb/10/hiv-infection-pharmaceuticals-industry. Charlie, A. (2012). Indian Companies in the European Union. Brussels: Europe India Chamber of Commerce. Charlie, A. (2014). European Companies in India: Reigniting Economic Growth. Brussels: Europe India Chamber of Commerce. Chaudhuri, K. N. (1978). The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company. New Delhi: S Chand & Company. Chibber, P. K., & Mazumdar, S. K. (1999). Foreign Ownership and Profitability: Property Rights, Control and the Performance of the Firms in Indian Industry. Journal of Law & Economics, 42(1), 209–238. Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPIM). (2008, September 27). Proposed India-EU Free Trade Agreement. Press Statement by the Politburo. Retrieved from https://www.cpim.org/content/proposed-india-eu-free-trade-agreement. Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPIM). (2013, April 5). Stop Indo-EU FTA. Press Statement by the Politburo. Retrieved from http://cpim.org/content/ stop-indo-eu-free-trade-agreement. Dasgupta, K. (2015, March 15). EU Pins Hopes on Modi to Boost Ties with India, but Obstacles Remain. Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www. hindustantimes.com/india/eu-pins-hopes-on-modi-to-boost-ties-with-indiabut-obstacles-remain/story-Uz4P7WV6mSy4f72NvOTgiI.html. Decreux, Y., & Mitoritonne, C. (2007). Economic Impact of a Potential Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and India. Paris: CEPII-CERAM. DG Trade European Commission. (2017). Trade in Goods with India. Brussels: European Commission. Updated 17 November 2017. Retrieved from http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113390.pdf. Dixit, J. N. (2000). India and Europe: Perceptions and Misperceptions. In R. K. Jain (Ed.), India and the European Union in the New Millennium. New Delhi: Radiant.

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Doval, P. (2012, May 16). Auto Industry Against Inclusion in India-European Union Free Trade Agreement. The Times of India. European Commission. (2017, October 6). President Juncker at the EU-India Summit. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/presidentjuncker-eu-india-summit-2017-oct-06_en. European Commission. (2018). Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations. Updated January. Retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf. European Communities. (1994, August 27). Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and the Republic of India on Partnership and Development. Official Journal of the European Communities, No. 1 223/24. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/135123.htm. European Council. (2017). Remarks by President Donald Tusk Following the EU-India Summit in New Delhi. Retrieved from http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/06/tusk-remarks-india-summit-delhi/. Gasoriek, M., Holmes, P., Robinson, S., Rollo, J., & Shingal, A. (2007). Qualitative Analysis of a Potential Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and India. Sussex: Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration and Jaipur: CUTS International. Government of India (GoI). (2017). Economic Survey 2016–17. New Delhi: Ministry of Finance. Haidar, S. (2017, October 10). India-EU Talks in a Muddle. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-eu-talks-in-a-muddle/article19829814.ece. Handique, M., & Mishra, A.  R. (2009, March 16). Amid Protests, EU-India Trade Talks Begin Today. LiveMint. Retrieved from http://www.livemint. com/Politics/ZZt1sp9eHBqWdilGMhYAhP/Amid-protests-EUIndia-tradetalks-begin-today.html. Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka (IPS). (2000, August 28–29). Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Integration of the SAARC Region. Mimeo, Paper presented at Second SENAI Conference, Kathmandu. Johny, S. (2015, April 29). India, EU “Not Far from a Deal on Free Trade”. The Business Line. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/CsxQ2F. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2016, March 30). EU-India Agenda for Action-2020. Retrieved from http://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/EU_ India_Agenda_for_Action_post_VC.pdf. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). (2017a, October 6). India-EU Joint Statement During 14th India-EU Summit. New Delhi. Retrieved from http://www.mea. gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29011/India++EU+Joint+Statement+du ring+14th+IndiaEU+Summit+New+Delhi+October+06+2017.

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CHAPTER 16

European Development Policy with Special Reference to India Jayaraj Amin

Since its inception, the development cooperation policy of the European Union (EU) has witnessed significant changes in its nature and direction. The framework of this policy had its origin in the ‘association’ of overseas countries and territories (former colonies of founding members) with the fledgling European Economic Community (EEC) for economic and social development at the insistence of the French in the negotiations in 1956 leading up to the Rome Treaty. Since then the policy has progressed both in terms of scope and reach (Bartels 2017). Development cooperation today constitutes the core of the EU’s relation with developing countries, and two of its aid funds—the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund, with budgets of 19.6  billion euros and 30.5  million euros respectively for the period 2014–2020—are major instruments of the EU’s external development action (Parry and Segantini 2017).

J. Amin (*) Department of Political Science, Mangalore University, Mangalore, India © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_16

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The Setting The policy of association took concrete shape with the signing of the Yaoundé Convention (1963) with 18 French-speaking Associated African States and Madagascar; this provided them with free access (with a few exceptions in the agricultural sector) to the community market. Subsequently, with the developing countries of Asia and Latin America, the European Community (EC) evolved framework agreements in which the content of cooperation was not specified in precise quantitative terms. This was different from the defined pattern of relationship that the EC had developed with ‘associated’ African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. This is evident from the Lomé Conventions and from the initial agreements with the Mediterranean countries. It was specifically made clear in the 1974 Council resolution that set out the principle of financial aid to Asia and Latin America countries (Frisch 2008). The EC had been equipping itself since 1971 to protect its interest by creating a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in relation to developing countries in which tariff concessions were given to their finished and semifinished products entering community markets; the benefits accorded were gradually regulated on the basis of the level of development in the target country. The string of GSP was held by the EC and could be modified unilaterally to suit its convenience.

The Transition In the post-Cold War period, the intricate system of economic relations that the EU shared with developing countries started changing. With the apparent triumph of liberal democracy and market forces, Brussels appeared determined to reclaim its global influence and promote its core values. Cogently asserting the values of liberal democracy and market economy first vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, and then with developing countries, the EU conveniently compromised its earlier policy of neutrality in development cooperation and began to use it as a tool to advance its goals. In addition to favourable market structures, demands for the incorporation of political factors such as human rights, good governance, environment protection, and so on, were now made of the aid-recipient countries. The EU aligned closely with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and with its member states. All were determined to have a rules-based regulatory global mechanism for market operation so that a

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sustained and consistent policy could be evolved. The paternal generosity was replaced by political dialogues of ‘equals’, but not without conditions attached. Support for sectoral and structural changes/adjustments replaced project-wise assistance. In this framework, non-government organisations (NGOs) and the private sector became indispensable agents of development and were roped in with agreements providing them space for increased action. The GSP that had become incompatible with the ‘equal treatment’ of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was now reformulated with more competitive partner countries ‘graduating’ from the GSP system, while others complying with various social and environmental standards became eligible under the novel ‘GSP+’ scheme.

Aid to Partnership The direction of this trend was provided by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which not only transformed the EEC into the EU, but also provided a legal basis for development cooperation. The treaty enumerated the objectives of development policy in clear terms—‘the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries’, ‘the smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into world economy’ and ‘the campaign against poverty’. The political expectations of the partners were clear and loud— ‘developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law’, ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Treaty on European Union 1992). It further stressed the principles of complementarity (of member states’ policies, programmes and EC action) as well as coordination (between two or more development partners and policies) and coherence (operation without contradiction in policies and programmes) to improve the effectiveness of the policy. These objectives and the policy framework that the treaty had given to the EU to pursue relevant development policies remained unchanged across several subsequent treaties. The Maastricht Treaty made it clear that the EU’s priorities in development framework had changed. Apart from human rights, sound resource management, sound management of ‘public affairs’ (good governance) and the fight against corruption now took centre stage in developmental assistance programmes. This partnership of ‘equals’ (distinct from the donor–recipient relation), along with political dialogues and mutual obligations, reciprocity, the participation of non-state actors and EU priorities, characterised as ‘essential elements’—human rights, democratic principles, good governance—were best expressed in the Cotonou

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Agreement that the EU signed with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (replacing the Lomé Convention) in June 2000 (revised in 2005 and 2010) (EUR Lex 2000; European Commission 2010a). The agreement also introduced the notion of ‘Economic Partnership Agreements’, which emphasised the principle of ‘reciprocity’ (duty-free access) in trade relations and introduced the idea of need- and performance-based partnerships (Article 3), abandoning the fixed allocations of earlier times (EUR Lex 2010). These additions have now become characteristic features of the EU’s development cooperation. This implies that the EU wielded its authority to judge the ‘performance’ of the partner country in these ‘partnership agreements’, and support for sectoral and structural adjustment was now extended in place of the earlier project aid. The aid was now more contingent on demands for reciprocity towards the recipient countries. Exception to the reciprocal duty-free access was provided to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the form of the ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative that entered into force on 5 March 2001. But the benefits were nullified by conditions on the rules of origin, especially pertaining to apparels, overlooking the fact that in LDCs input sourcing and production at all levels do not take place within the country. In fact, there are accusations that Everything but Arms has further impoverished the poor countries because of the stress on exports that are insensitive to the poor and local interests (Inclusive Development International 2013; Ethical Trading Initiative 2016). The Lisbon Treaty (EUR Lex 2007) further streamlined developmental assistance by bringing it under the larger framework of the ‘Union’s external action’, facilitated by the new European External Action Service (Article 13a) and High Representative (Article 9E), who is endowed with the responsibility of ensuring consistency in the EU’s external actions, such as security, environment, trade, diplomacy and development. This means that the external action of the EU in diverse fields will not be exclusive, but will be linked with each other with the mandate to the High Representative and the President of the European Council, to contribute to a stronger and unified EU voice in international affairs, including development matters, to make the EU a prominent global actor.

New Generation Agreements Since the European External Action Service was expected to consider the principles of the external action stated at the beginning of Chapter 1, the General Provisions of the Union’s External Action, Article 10A (democ-

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racy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity), development cooperation was to operate in tandem with the principles and act to ‘safeguard its (EU’s) values, fundamental interests, security’ beside others (EUR Lex 2007). Notably in the Lisbon Treaty, poverty eradication, one of the earlier essential goals, becomes the primary objective of development cooperation, and hence that of the EU’s external action, enabling EU to identify ‘eligible’ countries. The complementarity and coordination between the member states and the Union in development cooperation is given specific direction by the treaty, in Article 188D(a): ‘complement and reinforce one another’. This substitutes the earlier provision of the Union complementing the policy of member states and raises the importance of the Union, although development cooperation is still a ‘shared competence’ area of the Union and the member states. The increased focus of the EU on its own interest is further evident in its preference for bilateral ties and the stress on trade agreements. This route is also preferred as it is easier to effect convenient agreements bilaterally than at multilateral level. Trade agreement entails reciprocity and could lead to the liberalisation of ‘substantially all trade’. Hence, the EU has intensified its efforts to incorporate the free trade element in all new association agreements. This suggests that the development cooperation policy has steadily undergone revisions and changes. From ‘beneficial paternalism’, it has moved to serve the larger interests of the EU, barring a few exceptions. The reciprocity principle and political expectations in tune with EU values is increasingly finding a place in its development cooperation agreements. In the external policy framework, development is linked to trade, with sufficient attention to donor coordination so as to tighten its policy grip. Global changes and a belief in the supremacy of democratic values have prompted the EU to increasingly make use of its external policy framework to structure bilateral relations, as well as world economy, according to its perspectives. Indeed, the EU aims at improved strategic coherence between its aid, trade and development policies, and instances are not lacking where it has made use of its economic leverage, including the suspension of aid, to coerce the target country to accept its viewpoint. In fact, the New European Consensus on Development signed on 7 June 2017 to provide a common approach to development policy and a framework for action (replacing the European Consensus on Development

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of 2005) aligns the Union’s development policy with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The document focuses on ‘5 Ps’—people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership—and holds poverty eradication as the primary objective, in the belief that actions in some areas can help in realising the objectives. This includes investment and trade, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. New partnerships with more advanced developing countries to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, through a broader range of cooperation tools, such as trade, knowledge-sharing and technical assistance, is also agreed (The New European Consensus 2017; European Commission 2017). Hence, ‘economic cooperation’, substitute for a new type of development aid, aimed at improving the macroeconomic and business infrastructure of the target countries or regions through trade, investment and business promotion. The EU is now favouring this and such cooperation agreements are on the rise. Through these ‘new generation agreements’, the EU’s political concerns and priorities are often attached. The priority areas are human rights, democratic principles, environmental protection commitments, labour standards and good governance. The EU even has introduced a novel ‘GSP+ incentive to support ‘sustainable development and good governance’ if the ‘vulnerable’ country has signed 27 core international conventions covering human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance (European Commission 2016). In other words, the political priorities are closely aligned with the economic policies, as is evident in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) that the EU began to evolve from 2006 onwards. In these CSPs, which are designed for five years for each country, the objectives and basis of cooperation are clearly spelt out. To sum up, the EU’s approach to development today is not merely guided by poverty considerations, but also incorporates political elements and trade-related aspects. As the Cotonou Agreement indicates, in pursuing the objectives of development cooperation, the EU seeks to ‘establish a comprehensive partnership, based on three complementary pillars of development cooperation, economic and trade cooperation and the political dimension’ (European Commission 2010b). Second, because of its awareness of the challenges of shaping global order according to its choices, the EU increasingly showing its interest in bilateral agreements with countries and regional organisations (inter-­regional cooperation), but without giving space for unilateral concessions.

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Third, unlike the project-based assistance of earlier times, the EU is increasingly placing the emphasis on structural reforms and is aligning with national development strategies to focus on sectoral priorities to generate the intended result. The 2017 New European Consensus on Development suggests that ‘national governments have primary responsibility of implementing the Agenda 2030’ (para. 84), with all countries and all stakeholders acting in partnership, including the private sector and civil society (para. 72), and that the EU would support joint implementation (of the policies and programmes) in selected sectors or on specific cross-­ sectoral themes (para. 77) (The New European Consensus 2017). Fourth, there is now a marked emphasis on ‘dialogue’ as a means to structure development cooperation, and this often serves to achieve the EU’s political objectives. Dialogue, civil society, NGOs and good governance are all seen as part of the development strategy. The evolution from Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals based on sustainable development and human rights is consistent with the EU’s values and principles. As suggested in the New European Consensus, 2017 (para. 2), the EU considers multistakeholder partnership as key to Sustainable Development Goals implementation (The  New European Consensus 2017). This, in turn, has increased the number of actors and stakeholders in the process and the focus on ‘good governance’ in EU-supported projects. Fifth, there is an increasing stress on ‘reciprocity’ along the lines of the Most Favoured Nation concept set out in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO and lessening interest in the GSP scheme based on Special and Differential Treatment permitted by the WTO rules under ‘objective criteria’ (such as the level of development). This is particularly evident in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. Reciprocity and the increasing number of Economic Partnership Agreements have become a significant feature of the EU’s external relations today. Sixth, an increased move from unilateral trade preferences to capacity-­ building, regulatory mechanisms and an aid for trade policy (to increase the trade capacity of developing countries, including policy-making and negotiation, public-private networking, financial institutional reforms and improved infrastructure) to better integrate with the world trading systems. In this policy, trade and development goals are linked and the presumed benefit of market mechanisms such as inclusive growth, dynamic financial markets, macro-economic stability and institutional quality are held to be conducive to development and multilateralism. In this view, the

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market values of the EU are seen as universally applicable and ultimately beneficial to every country. The strategy aims to promote the business and economic interests of the EU compared to earlier aid programmes.

EU–India Development Cooperation India was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the six members of the EEC in 1962. Although initial focus of the bloc was on Africa, India was a major beneficiary of the Food Aid Convention (1967). It was the initial recipient of the first programme of financial and technical assistance to non-associated developing countries. During the period 1970–1974, India was the top recipient under the Food Aid Agreement of the EEC with 6.5% of the total aid committed, and between 1976 and 1978 it received assistance for its national projects on drought-­ prone areas, grain and fertiliser storage, cooperative storage and cyclone protection shelters (Birocchi 1999; Commission of the European Communities 1979). The provisions of the GSP were introduced in 1971. These became the framework for the Community’s trade relationship with India, which was similar to that maintained with most developing countries outside Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The entry of Britain into the EEC (1973) brought India closer to the EC and its member states and the relation began to strengthen. India signed its first Commercial Cooperation Agreement with the EC in December 1973, which was further supplemented by another agreement in June 1981. Both these treaties focused on traderelated issues without prescription of any economic or political conditions. However, the situation changed considerably with the end of the Cold War. In the new context, the EC was determined to increase its visibility and its influence in areas where it was not prominently present. The 1992 Council Regulation on ‘financial and technical assistance to and economic cooperation with the developing countries in Asia and Latin America’ made it clear that Asia was a fast-growing and attractive region for the EU. Simultaneously, the regulation clarified that the values preferred by EU—human rights, democratisation, good governance, protection of the environment, trade liberalisation—were all part of the development and priority areas in assistance (Official Journal of the European Communities 1992). The increased attention of the EU towards Asia was again evident in its 1994 Towards a New Asia Strategy (and its revised version in 2001), which advocated a pro-active policy in the region.

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The EU’s increased focus on new regions and countries in the 1990s, coupled with its stress on structural reforms for better governance and infrastructure, coincided with structural changes in India. In the early 1990s, India moved towards a market economy, undertaking a series of measures aimed at market liberalisation and deregulation. The impressive Indian growth in the 1990s made it attractive to EU policy-makers. Indian growth and liberal economic policies fitted well in the developmental framework of the bloc. Due to diverse problems in the region, the EU had to carve out country-specific strategies as grand regional strategies were not likely to succeed in South Asia,  and this was manifest in the ‘third generation’ agreements that EU signed with countries of the region.

New Perspective Towards India The ‘third generation’ cooperation bilateral agreement with India  was signed in 1994. Regular political dialogues led to annual summits from 2000 and a Strategic Partnership was concluded in 2004, making India one of the select ten global EU partners. The 2005 Joint Action Plan (revised in 2008) committed both partners to strengthen dialogue, deepen pluralism, democracy and regional cooperation, fight terrorism and encourage people-to-people contact. It also called for cooperation in other areas, such as science and technology, transport, environment and climate change, civil aviation, energy, and trade and investment, and provided a blueprint for cooperation (EEAS 2005). As a follow-up to the Joint Action Plan, many dialogues were instituted, such as foreign policy consultations at the level of secretaries, annual security dialogues and India–EU ad hoc dialogue on human rights, besides a joint commission dealing with economic and commercial issues, and a joint working group on the environment (Government of India 2013). The 1994 and subsequent cooperation agreements increasingly focused on structural reforms and alignment with government (sectoral) policies. The coherence and direction of the EU development policy was visible in the EU’s Country Strategy Paper for India, 2007–2013, which had with a budget of about 210 million euros; this sought to move the present pattern of development assistance to the pro-poor ‘sector reform’ policies (European Commission 2007). Structural reforms for increased economic growth were seen by the EU as necessary. It was presumed that increased economic growth would reduce poverty and developmental assistance would be replaced by developmental cooperation. Given

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India’s economic progress, the CSP expressed the hope that India’s need for development assistance would gradually decline. Significantly, the CSP stressed the deepening of structural reforms (including better governance and infrastructure in order to improve investment climate, boost productivity and accelerate growth) and social cohesion (inclusive development). It provided budgetary support to the social sector (health and education), encompassing best-practice models in good governance, decentralised decision-making and development, gender issues, institutional reforms and public sector management, apart from support for economic, academic, civil society and cultural activities (European Commission 2007). The EU contributed in two priority sectors of Indian government—health and education, where it joined hands with two Indian programmes, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and the National Rural Health Mission—and sought to effect changes across the sector, rather than provide aid for specific projects. The EU contributed to over 520 million euros to school education via the Indian Government’s Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan. These grants were used to set up new schools, improve existing ones, bridge gender and social gaps, provide toilets for girls, train teachers and enrol nearly all children in the primary school years (EEAS 2017; Indian Express 14 June 2017c). The EU contributed 110 million euros (2013) to India’s National Rural Health Mission, which focused on reproductive and child health. The programme highlighted human resource capacity, planning, development, monitoring and evaluation for decision-making, and gave close attention to gender issues and the mainstreaming of marginalised groups, including scheduled castes and tribes (Delegation of the European Union to India 2013).

Facilitating Development Cooperation—The Strategy This approach was supplemented by dialogues and exchanges in diverse areas. The EU supported sectoral dialogues and cooperation in trade, energy, science and technology, health, customs cooperation, academic exchanges and research and innovation. Furthermore, policy dialogues and sectoral actions were envisaged in a wide range of areas where both sides jointly identified scope for enhanced cooperation leading to better governance and policy-making (for example, in trade and industry, energy and

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environment). This resulted, for instance, in the EU–India Capacity Building Initiative for Trade Development (2013 to September 2017). The initiative had a total EU financial contribution of 9 million euros and aimed at mutual understanding at the technical level in different areas, such as food safety, technical regulations and customs, international property rights and technical assistance for skills development (2012–2017); it offered about 6 million euros assistance for increasing certified skilled labour in different sectors (European Union Delegation to India 2016, sec. 2.1). The EU engaged itself with large cities, in particular Mumbai, to address critical environmental, transport, economic, employment and social issues, and provided technical assistance for solid waste management and sewage treatment in two pilot cities, New Delhi and Mumbai (1 million euros). In June 2017, the EU committed 3.5 million euros under its Asia Investment Facility for implementing the Mobilise Your City initiative (to improve urban mobility and reduce the carbon footprint, benefitting Nagpur, Kochi and Ahmadabad) along with France (Indian Express 9 June 2017b). It also supported civil society projects to promote integrated water resource management (water conservation, increasing water use efficiency in agriculture, promoting clean drinking water and sanitation to reduce waterborne diseases and helping to prevent malnutrition) in around 370 villages, benefitting about 80,000 households (5 million euros), and the development of off-shore wind and solar-biomass hybridisation (12 million euros) (European Union Delegation to India 2016, sec. 2.2). Earlier, the European Commission proposed ‘thematic interventions’ in certain critical areas  where the  focus was  on the involvement of civil society. This included human rights, migration and mobility, inclusive development and the promotion of diversity, health, HIV, sexual and reproductive health, Millennium Development Goals, governance and public entitlement, and social and food security. In addition, the EU has undertaken sectoral cooperation with individual states in India. For instance, with Chhattisgarh, the EU has entered into a partnership programme for reform in several sectors, including forest-based livelihoods and strengthening decentralisation. With Rajasthan, the programme is directed towards sustainable and integrated water resource management. For each of these states, the EU committed 80 million euros (2007–2016) (European Union Delegation to India 2016, sec. 2.3). The direction of EU development cooperation in India mostly centres on the twin principles of pro-poor sector reform and development, including social sectors. Many of these programmes have been launched and

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supported by the EU in the faith that sectoral reforms and capacity building lead to economic growth and sustainable development, and ultimately to poverty reduction. This economic growth is expected to promote integration with the global trading system. In the conception of these programmes, the EU’s values, such as human rights, governance, environment, and so on, are emphatically included. Similarly, in terms of its operation and implementation, the private sector, civil society and NGOs are involved wherever possible. Further, the EU has synchronised its development cooperation policies with other donors. For instance, Sarva Siksha Abhiyan was coordinated with the World Bank and the British Department for International Development. All these actions are perfectly in tune with the objectives of development cooperation articulated in various treaties and policy documents, such as the Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon Treaty and the New European Consensus on Development. In fact, going beyond the traditional confines of development cooperation and in line with the 2006 EU Global Strategy, which seeks to reorient bilateral trade agreements through a new generation of Free Trade Agreements with a focus on intellectual property and access to raw materials (with a logic of openness and contribution to European growth and jobs) (European Commission 2006), the EU has been negotiating a Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement with India since 2007. Due to some contentious issues related to goods and services, wines, spirits and dairy products, as well as in public procurement issues, negotiations have not concluded (Wouters et  al. 2014; Khorana and Asthana 2014; Khorana and Garcia 2013; Schmidt 2015; Maes 2009). However, there is no gainsaying the fact that development cooperation between India and the EU has entered a new phase, going beyond the confines of the traditional donor–recipient relationship. Both of them can actually even work together in other developing countries to achieve common goals.

Divergent Perspectives India and the EU’s development cooperation has entered a new phase. The programmes envisaged are wide and deep and are based on equal partnership. As per latest official information, the EU is managing over 130 ongoing contracts, with an overall value of over 400 million euros in India (European Union Delegation to India 2016). At the 13th India– EU Summit held in Brussels, both reaffirmed their commitment to

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strengthening their strategic partnership based on shared values and principles, and endorsed the EU–India Agenda for Action-2020 (Government of India 2016a). This agenda provides a concrete road map for five years and aims at strengthening foreign policy and security cooperation, trade and investment, business and economy, global issues/sector policy cooperation (on climate change, energy and the environment) and people-to-­ people relation (Government of India 2016b). Notwithstanding the robust development cooperation between the two, there are concerns on both sides about the nature of development cooperation and its long-term impact. The EU is not a visible donor in India. The member states of the EU are better known in India than the EU.  Although in Indian official circles, there is general support for increased ties with the EU, some civil society groups, especially those opposed to indiscriminate globalisation and free trade agreements, are critical of the value-loaded words and objectives of development cooperation such as ‘smooth integration into global economy’ (Wouters et  al. 2014; Maes 2009). This is because structural reforms and the ‘smooth integration into global economy’ are not seen as necessarily leading to poverty eradication; on the contrary, this could increase the gap between the rich and the poor within the country and between the countries when asymmetrical economies are linked through market mechanisms that benefit the stronger. Moreover, India has large pool of educated youth, and the utilisation of youth power  could be more important than uncritical integration with the world economy. While the EU supports pro-poor policies, it also supports free trade, which is unlikely to benefit poorer sections of society, as global trade is largely dominated by developed countries and their multinational corporations, notwithstanding the entry of new players such as China or even India. In a situation where development is skewed in favour of the rich and the powerful, the EU’s universal advocacy of a minimum state, free trade and multilateralism can hamper efforts to reduce poverty. Free trade would affect the unorganised and small producers by exposing them to intense global competition. Insistence on labour and environment clauses could make the situation risky for developing countries, and could even worsen the condition of the poor. Therefore, the EU’s expectations in development cooperation and its linkages with trade are viewed by many with serious concern.

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The present EU’s development cooperation policy, with its free trade logic, norms and political preferences, are hardly seen as effective in addressing the conditions that breed poverty. Hence, the presumption of universal applicability of the Union’s preferred values and its efforts to enforce them are naturally viewed rather cautiously. Capacity constraints of the countries need to be addressed before advocating their integration into the global market. Their institutional and productive capacities need to be strengthened. The EU needs to consider all these issues as well as be sensitive to the diversities and distinctiveness of India. Aid and trade prescriptions tend to make relations lopsided and sound patronising, and India has consistently demonstrated its preference for the necessary policy space to implement its own development strategies. Similarly, the selective interpretation of the principles of multilateralism by the EU, as impacting development, is another concern. Despite WTO provisions, the EU continues to protect sectors that are extremely important for India, such as agriculture, leather and textiles through non-tariff barriers, anti-dumping clauses, and so on. The selective interpretation of multilateralism and capacity building largely ignoring areas such as exports in agriculture, textiles, clothing and footwear, and its reluctance to grant liberal access to workers (WTO ‘Mode 4’ services) in the developmental framework hardly makes the EU’s advocacy of development tenable. For its part, the EU has sufficiently examined its policy of development cooperation. A significant marker of this is its adoption of The Agenda for Change in 2011 where the focus is on helping those in most need; it calls for a ‘differentiated EU approach to aid allocation and partnerships’ as a ‘key to achieving maximum impact and value for money’ (European Commission 2011a,  b). The agenda focuses on 48 LDCs, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, to improve governance, social protection, agriculture and renewable energy. This policy is already viewed with great concern in some quarters as it is feared that it might harm efforts to finance water, sanitation and other projects in Latin America, Asia and other regions. It also affects poor people in middle-income group countries when only poor countries rather than poor people are considered (Euractiv 2013; Tindale 2013). The Agenda implies that countries that have witnessed substantial growth will not be considered for developmental assistance. The policy is conditioned by several other factors. The EU recognises its own vulnerability due to its sovereign debt crisis and economic slowdown. External trade relations serving the interests of the EU are seen as

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inevitable. But business with India is seen as difficult and the EU has raised a number of complaints against India’s high tariff rates, disproportionate Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) requirements,  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) varying from WTO agreements, export barriers to EU cars and pneumatic tyres, entry problems in retail and insurance services, alcoholic beverages, procurement policy, patent protection, and so on, viewing India’s trade regime and regulatory environment as comparatively restrictive (Report from the Commission 2016). On the other hand, given the steady progress of the Indian economy, India itself is not dependent on foreign assistance. In fact, India itself has become a major aid donor with its external development mechanism, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme, now touching 161 countries (Government of India 2018). In the financial year 2015/2016, India gave Rs. 7719.65 crores as development aid to other countries (Indian Express 22 March 2017a). India, while welcoming a partnership with the EU, has made clear that it is not going to be a passive receiver of EU prescriptions. As its own external development assistance pattern to other countries such as Afghanistan suggests, it considers infrastructure development most important and that aid should be provided without conditions attached. As Emma Mawdsley observes, an important characteristic of India’s development cooperation is its claim to respond to partners’ priorities instead of imposing policy conditionalities (Mawdsley 2014). This is in contrast with EU development policy, which has witnessed increasing demands from the partner countries. Indian policy-makers do not contest the importance of human rights, democracy, good governance and environment protection. They, however, assert that these are domestic matters for which the relevant safeguarding legal framework already exists. From the Indian perspective, these Western developmental paradigms are seen as interfering in the sovereign space of partner countries (Mawdsley 2014). The roles of NGOs in raising human rights-related issues are also viewed with concern in official circles and at times are seen as an obstacle for development in India. The EU has not adopted an overtly normative approach in development ­cooperation with India and has been pragmatic; however, India is on its guard on the issue of the EU’s increasing linkage of development assistance to its trade policy and political values. India has always regarded space for structural reforms on its own terms as essential and linking of trade with non-­economic or political values as unwarranted.

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Conclusion The EU developmental assistance to India has witnessed a downward trend for last couple of years, although ongoing projects are being completed and the thematic support of the EU to Indian projects continues. Clearly the development cooperation has become selective but more focused, and the concerns of both in the policy structure have made development cooperation rather cautious. It is therefore appropriate that the EU understands that the emerging power such as India would be sensitive to any prescriptions of norms by other countries and would resist any imposition of viewpoints by an entity that is perceived as bent on preserving its hegemony in the changing global context. India has clearly demonstrated that it is willing to forge relations with major countries of the world that are considerate to Indian sensitivities. The EU therefore needs to realise that any norm-setting would be counterproductive in the case of India, and hence has to focus on areas that are mutually beneficial. The partnership between the two needs to take a concrete form with long-term goal-setting and this calls for the efforts on both sides if it is to be realised.

References Bartels, L. (2017). The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union. The European Journal of International Law, 18(4), 715–756. Birocchi, F. (1999, February). The European Union’s Development Policies Towards Asian and Latin American Countries. DSA European Development Policy Study Group, Discussion Paper No. 10. Retrieved from https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/THE%20EU’S%20DEVELOPMENT%20 POLICIES%20TOWARDS%20ASIAN%20AND%20LA%20COUNTRIES. pdf. Commission of the European Communities. (1979, October 8). Annex. Second Progress Report on the Administration of the Programme of Technical and Financial Assistance to Non-Associated Developing Countries for 1976, 1977 and 1978. COM (79) 518 Final. Retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/4174/1/4174. pdf. Delegation of the European Union to India. (2013). The European Union and India Fifty Years of Partnership. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ archives/delegations/india/documents/publications/the_eu_and_india_ fifty_years_of_partnership.pdf.

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CHAPTER 17

Regional Integration: The European Model and the South Asian Experience Dhananjay Tripathi

Introduction Regional integration is now regarded as an essential part of international relations and much of the credit for this should go to the European Union (EU). At the end of the Second World War, most of Europe was in ruins. The reconstruction of Europe was the central question for the leaders of the different European countries. Attaining peace was not an easy task until the European leaders agreed on a common agenda. Moreover, there were new realities in the world order after the end of the war that needed attention. The European powers had lost much of their relevance in international politics and two non-European countries—the USA and the USSR—for the first time emerged as superpowers. The war not only brought physical destruction but also damaged the reputation of Europe as an economic and strategic fulcrum of the world. At that critical juncture, the idea of European integration was debated and implemented. The purpose of this integration was initially to bring old enemies, Germany

D. Tripathi (*) Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4_17

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and France, together. Peace in Europe was desirable and there was a general aversion towards power politics. These were favourable conditions for the pursuit of a pacifist agenda through regional cooperation. However, the realisation of this was a mammoth task. Due to historical reasons, there were justified apprehensions about the success of European integration. Cynics were finally subdued in 1951 with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. This Community gradually came to resemble a Banyan tree that kept growing, giving way to several offshoots such as the European Economic Community, the Single European Act, and so on. It is due to this solid grounding that despite recent crises, the EU is still one of the best examples of regional integration in the world. Contemporary South Asia is one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with a talented young populace; it is slowly integrating with the rest of the world. However, South Asia has a reputation for being one of the least integrated regions of the world. Unlike Europe, there is much in common in South Asia as far as the socio-cultural aspects are concerned. These countries share a common cultural past, face similar socio-economic challenges and aspire to be economic powerhouses in the future. Despite favourable conditions for South Asia to integrate, the progress has been limited, however. Efforts to initiate the process of regional integration in South Asia were formally attempted by Bangladesh under the leadership of late Ziaur Rahman. His ideas finally took practical shape in 1985 when the countries of South Asia signed an agreement to create the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This was a significant shift in the regional politics of South Asia with countries exhibiting the desire to realise regional cooperation. It was hoped that political differences between the South Asian countries would be resolved and the region subsequently would enter into an era of peace and prosperity. The enthusiasm did not last long. The cooperative idea lacked the drive towards implementation. The political differences in the region remain inadequately addressed. Bilateralism is still the preferred mode of conducting foreign policy within the region. Consequently,  from the perspective of regional integration South Asia is often described in the following manner: There is little cross-border investment within South Asia. The flow of ideas, crudely measured by the cross-border movement of people, or the number of telephone calls, or the purchase of technology and royalty payments, are all low for South Asia. In South Asia, only 7 percent of international telephone calls are regional, compared to 71 percent for East Asia. Poor connectivity, crossborder conflicts, and concerns about security have all contributed to South Asia being the least integrated region in the world. (Ahmed and Ghani 2007, 4)

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This abysmal performance in regional integration indicators in South Asia is a matter of concern. While praising the economic growth of South Asian countries, the World Bank has also noted that further stimulus to economic growth is contingent on regional integration (Ahmed and Ghani 2007). Neither a reversal nor stagnation of economic growth is an option for the region, which already scores low in the Human Development Index. This has called for a re-evaluation of the process of regional integration among the South Asian countries. SAARC’s long inactivity has dampened the spirit of regional integration in the region. At a time when South Asia requires innovative designs for regional integration, the prevalent intellectual inertia is worrying. In our effort to rethink South Asian integration, we are trying to investigate integration strategies beyond regional borders. In this context  European integration might provide  a few relevant clues to resolve the South Asian puzzle of regional integration. This chapter attempts to analyse if there are lessons from Europe for South Asia. It is therefore a comparative analysis of regional integration in two very different regions. The relevance of comparative studies in new regionalism is remarked upon by Hettne and Soderbaum (2002): ‘comparative analysis helps to guard against ethnocentric bias and culture-bond interpretations that can arise in a too contextualised specialisation. Since theory necessarily relies on some generalisations, comparative analysis is also crucial for theory building’ (Hettne and Soderbaum 2002, 37). A comparative study also offers new ideas for deliberation; these form the focus of this chapter. Excluding the brief introduction of the theme, this chapter is broadly divided into two parts. First, we discuss the European integration process. Here three relevant themes of European integration—economic imperatives, regional identity and soft borders—are described and analysed. The selection of these topics is based on the understanding that these are the primary roadblocks towards South Asian integration, while serving as defining aspect of European integration. The second part is devoted to South Asian integration from the perspective of the chosen themes of European integration.

The Experience: The European Integration Process There are various dimensions of the European integration process. One of the most important is that it helped the revival of the war-ravaged economies. The war also strained European political values, which are mainly derived from the liberal philosophy that respects individuality and free

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trade. Anti-Semitism in Germany, parochial nationalist discourses in other European countries and a staunch defence of sovereignty had almost offset the possibilities of attaining any type of cooperation. Conflict under these circumstances was inevitable and resulted in war. The post-war attempt to establish peace and order also required some solution to bind the people together at the regional level. This required a regional identity. Starting a narrative for building a regional identity was challenging but this identity would assist in regional integration (Slocum and Van Langenhove 2005). Creating a common regional socio-cultural space required massive work from the regional organisations. Today there is a sense of regional affiliation between the European peoples. This is a success of European integration. Likewise, one of the most visible and remarkable accomplishments of the EU is to make physical borders almost redundant for its citizens. The Schengen Agreement was a high point in the European integration project. Economic Imperatives The study of regional integration is overloaded with economic ideas, theories and approaches. In fact, for an extended period, regional integration was recognised as a study covered by the discipline of economics. There is a general and robust argument that economic interdependence between states will lead to the realisation of political peace. This has been repeatedly cited as a necessary condition for regional integration. The success of the German Customs Union, the Zollverein (1834), has been offered as the standard example of this. The Zollverein was an initiative that aimed to enhance economic activities and subsequently paved the way for the political integration of Germany (Roussakis 1969). It must be duly noted that European integration is enshrined in the concept of the liberal economic system whereby free trade was assumed to open up prospects for sustainable and peaceful relations between states (Gillingham 2003). This rationale arises from the view prevalent in international relations that accepts free trade as a solution for establishing peace in the world (Weede 1995). The founding leaders of the European integration accepted the principle of free trade. Still, it was not very clear how the process would begin. There were serious academic and intellectual debates on the issue. The most critical contribution to the European integration was by a Romanian-­ born British citizen, David Mitrany. As a critique of the League of Nations,

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Mitrany was of the opinion that the creation of formal institutional structures and agreements alone was not enough for cooperation between states. According to him, ‘people have gladly accepted the service when they might have questioned the theory’ (Mitrany 1966, 101). The intellectual intervention of Mitrany was later termed the functionalist theory of regional integration. This approach propounded that cooperation in areas that meets the demand of the general public is likely to generate a favourable result for the process of regional integration. Functionalism is the needs-based theory and a functional area of cooperation has to be practical and flexible; ideally it should link public and private interests. Amending the functionalist theory, the American political scientist E. B. Haas emphasised the importance of politics in regional integration. Haas applauded the role of regional institutions that give rise to regional bureaucracy and highlighted the interest-based approach to regional integration (Haas 1964). This is known as the neo-functionalist theory of regional integration. Both functionalism and neo-functionalism are about pursuing regional integration in areas that fulfil the needs of the people. Once people start benefiting from regional cooperation in some functional areas, it will have a ‘spill-over effect’, opening up possibilities for future collaboration. The liberal inter-governmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik examined European integration based on three areas—national preference formation, inter-state bargaining and the choice of international institution. According to Moravcsik, the first condition of regional integration is the involvement of domestic actors who put their demands to the national government. These primarily includes business groups and lobbies. Based on domestic demands groups, national governments negotiate at the regional level. Once agreements are reached, regional institutions are created to safeguard these. This is how regional integration proceeds. Liberal inter-governmentalism emphasises the relevance of powerful domestic groups which are in a position to pressurise the government. For his research, Moravscik examined the role of three powerful European states: West Germany, France and the UK.  He underlined that because these three countries pushed the process of European integration, they benefited immensely (Moravcsik 1998). It is clear now that free-market principles are the economic basis of European integration. The role of powerful countries in fostering regional integration is also clear and has been underscored by many scholars.

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Regional Identity How does the way we imagine spaces, territories and societies shape our viewpoints and responses? The cognitive description of allies and opponents influences the citizen’s response toward international politics. Anderson explains in this context that ‘nation-states are imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983). The perception of others, in this respect, is important when we are discussing cooperation between states. After the Second World War, while there was a desire to establish peace in Europe; its success and longevity were recognised as being dependent on the people’s support. One of the chief architects of European integration, Jean Monnet, was clear about acquiring support from the people for regional integration of Europe: ‘Nothing is possible without men.’ Monnet put faith in institutions that would ensure proper implementation of rules and regulation while noticing that the initial support for regional integration should come from the people (Burgess 2000). After the contribution of Alexander Wendt, in terms of contesting the state centric approaches by bringing the questions of identity and social norms, there was a change in the idea of world politics in the International Relations theory. From the statist analysis of the world politics by Realism and Liberalism, there was a slow shift towards an attempt to understand the social construction of a political position. With the advent of constructivist theory, scholars working on regional integration started examining the interplay of identities at the regional level. This was to grasp how identities contribute to the actions of individuals and can inhibit regional integration process. Globalisation and regionalisation are both antithetical to the Westphalian notion of the nation-state, challenging ‘state sovereignty, citizenship and territorialism/geographical boundedness’ (Slocum and Van Langenhove 2005, 140). Putting it in the context of European integration, Slocum and Langenhove make the following observation: Regional integration in Europe affects an ever-larger share of the activities of national governments and thus also of the life of European citizens. The so-called ‘democratic deficit’ refers to a gap between Europe and its citizens. In this type of discourse, the remedy to bridge the gap is more involvement of the citizens in the Europeanisation. And to have more participation, people need to identify themselves with Europe. The next step seems to be a promotion of sense of European identity. (Slocum and Van Langenhove 2005, 39–40)

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The European integration project started with cooperation in the production of two materials—coal and steel—but it soon started multiplying by bringing several economic sectors under regional control. With its overarching expansion, European integration was liable to influence and intervene in the lives of ordinary citizens, and was therefore likely to generate both positive and negative responses. It can be argued, for instance, that European integration in some ways has posed absolute limitations on its member states, even when they are exerting their sovereign rights. At times a member state, due to the regional agreement, has to give priority to the regional over the national. Relinquishing the national for the regional is theoretically a digression from the functions of the nation-state. For example, as a condition of being a part of a regional bloc, member states of the EU have less freedom to pursue economic activities on bilateral terms. Furthermore, exit from the regional agreement is not feasible in the case of deep integration. Under such circumstances, those sections of the society which do not benefit are likely to challenge regional integration. This leads to conflict in a society, therefore making regional integration a complex game for nation-states. Acquiring legitimacy from domestic constituencies for regional integration is not simple and requires ‘cognitive mobilisation’ favouring the cause (McLaren 2006). In the words of Jean Monnet, ‘if I could start again, I would start with culture’. This statement, from the person who worked consistently for the cause of integration, reflects the relevance bestowed on culture and identity. European institutions, well versed in the political character of Europe, always kept the focus on identity building, through different programmes and policies (Kraus 2008). ‘In the domain of European institutions, the career of the identity concept dates back to the early 1970s. More precisely, it begins in December 1973 at the EC summit held in Copenhagen where a Declaration on European Identity was adopted’ (Kraus 2008, 38). Different symbols of European integration, such as a flag, were produced and promoted all over the world. These symbols injected the idea of Europe as a single entity more in cultural terms. In this category, even the single European currency, the euro, could be viewed as having a psychological impact. Daily economic transactions in 19 countries (the members of eurozone) are in the euro. People carrying out economic exchange in same currency throughout 19 states of Europe have a sense of roaming in a zone of unity; in contrast, changing currency at a border draws a line of division for people. The use of the single currency blurs the partitions between people. The discussion on European identity will remain incom-

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plete if we ignore European institutions, notably the European Parliament. The Parliament is the most significant transnational democratic institution providing a right to the people of Europe to elect their regional representatives. The Parliament democratises the decision-making process in Europe, at the same time establishing a political connection between the citizens of member states. This is one distinct contribution of European policy-makers that come to the forefront when their sincerity towards building a regional identity is examined. As a result of this, a symmetry is created between regional and national socio-cultural spaces. Culture and identity issues are sensitive and could lead to confrontation (Barber 1995). Thus, local and regional cultural dichotomy consciously came to be considered by the EU in its policies. Regional culture and identity are two crucial pillars of the European regional integration process. Culture and identity building are also acknowledged as foundational themes for South East Asian integration (Katzenstein 2002). Soft Borders The strength of European integration can also be traced to the soft border policy. Borders are defined as having ‘a lot to do with rulers’ and governments’ attempts to control people’s freedom of movement’ (Laine 2015, 16). In other words, a border ‘constitutes the sharp point at which categories, spaces and territories interface. Once category ends, the adjoining category begins’ (Newman 2011, 37). These two meaningful but straightforward definitions of borders are in contrast to the broader objectives of regional integration. Bridging boundaries is essential to promote regional integration. Soft borders are a prerequisite for free trade regimes. European integration, as defined in this chapter, has roots in the liberal economic philosophy, endorsing a free trade approach for material prosperity and political stability. This means that there is an intrinsic relation between European integration and soft border. Initially, it was limited to reducing physical barriers to simplify the trade between countries but today it is about more than just trade. The revolutionary alteration in the border policy was brought in with the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985. This agreement aimed at reducing the internal border between the member states and was signed by five countries—France, Germany, Belgium,

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Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Five years later, in 1990, a convention was signed to implement the Schengen Agreement in practice. This convention covered issues on abolition of internal border controls, definition of procedures for issuing a uniform visa, operation of a single database for all members known as SIS-Schengen Information System as well as the establishment of cooperating structure between internal and immigration officers. (Schengen Visa Info 2018)

The free movement of citizens by the virtue of Schengen is one of the most notable achievements of the European integration. It directly creates a relationship between the EU citizens, who are allowed to cross borders easily within the Schengen area. Physical borders are redundant and mental borders are highly diluted in Europe. Borders also remain a source of conflict between neighbours. Before the start of European integration, border-related complications had engulfed the entire region. During the Second World War, Nazi Germany attempted to change the borders of Europe by invading its neighbouring states. However, during the Cold War, there were different borders in Europe—between the East and West, between the two zones of Berlin, and so on. Borders in contemporary Europe, however, are referred to as ‘contact zones rather than barriers’ (Wastl-Walter and Kofler 2000, 89). The basic goals of cross-border cooperative activities have been to overcome barriers and differences in these structures, to compensate for disadvantages pertaining to location and unequal development, and to design border regions that help the local population gain economic improvements as well as cultural and social interaction. (Wastl-Walter and Kofler 2000, 89)

As a part of European integration, borders in Europe transitioned from being the lines of division to being spheres of cross-country and community cooperation. An admirable example of this is Euregio—a cross-border region between the Netherlands and Germany established back in 1958. Euregio covers ‘spans some 13,000-square kilometre with about 3.37 million inhabitants’ (EUREGIO 2018). Today more than 70 of these regions are in operation. Such innovative policies potentially insulate Europe from the border-related skirmishes that are routine in other parts of the world. There is a two-way relation between soft borders and European integration. Soft borders strengthen European integration and vice versa.

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The South Asian Puzzle South Asian integration can be evaluated on the basis of the above discussion. The three themes of European integration can be taken as a guide for projects of regional integration in other parts of the world. Since the regions covered in the chapter is South Asia and Europe, we are evading the natural temptation to expand the scope of this comparison. For inquisitive students of regional integration, these three themes of European integration could be the key for a comparative study in other regions as well. The Economic Situation Regional integration historically is related to free trade. In this particular context, South Asia was a latecomer. Except for Sri Lanka, the rest of the South Asian countries started endorsing significant economic liberalisation only after the end of the Cold War. The thrust of liberalisation in South Asia was to connect national economies globally. The overall economic growth of the region that we now observe in the case of different countries of South Asia is a result of the post-liberalisation surge in economic activity. While there has been an effort from national governments throughout South Asia to work with the forces of globalisation, the same sincerity is missing when it comes to regional economic integration (Ahmed and Ghani 2007). There is a dismal record of intra-regional trade in South Asia and this exhibits a lack of regional integration from an economic perspective. On a relative scale, intra-regional trade in East Asia is at 35%; in Europe, it is as high as 60%; while in the case of South Asia, it is as low as 5% of the total trade. According to the World Bank figures, there is a potential for a 300% increase in Bangladeshi exports to India and the trade between India and Pakistan could surge from $3  billion to $20 billion (The World Bank 2016). The common understanding is that political differences between South Asian states obscure the chances for better trade. However, this may be appropriate only in the case of India and Pakistan. For the rest of South Asian states at present, there are no serious political differences. It is the lack of political willingness, bilateral distrust between countries and poor infrastructure that slows the pace of economic partnership in South Asia. There are bilateral and regional trading agreements such as the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement and the South Asian Free Trade Area agreement but these have not achieved the desired results. There are issues such

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as Non-Tariff Barriers that dampen the spirit of regional trade. For example, ‘ten to twelve documents are required for trade between India and Nepal and almost seven to nine documents are required for trade between India and Bangladesh’ (The Asia Foundation 2018). The lack of regional connectivity in South Asia, exemplified by the poor road networks, is also a problem in the promotion of trade. Some smaller countries do more trade within the region as compared to others. For example, the share of regional export in case of Nepal is 64% and for Bhutan is 88% but it is around 4.5% for India and approximately 8.5% for Sri Lanka (Export-­ Import Bank of India 2014). This indicates that South Asia may require some areas of functional cooperation. In simple terms, the region needs to locate its ‘coal and steel’ to give a push to regional integration. Electricity and higher education are two ideal areas of functional cooperation in South Asia. Since the region is growing at a high pace, it requires more energy, particularly electricity, and this could be one area of functional cooperation (Tripathi 2012). The South Asian population is also young and policy-makers often mention the demographic dividend. This provides huge scope for the prospects of regional collaboration in the education sector. In brief, regional cooperation in functional areas is still missing in South Asia. However, the activeness of regional organisations in South Asia, including that of the SAARC Secretariat, is not inspiring. While the creation of these regional organisations and the signing of regional agreements have at least stirred regional consciousness, the failure to carry forward the mandate is a matter of concern (Muni and Jetly 2008). There is weak regional bureaucracy and, similarly, organisations are not particularly able to stimulate and manage the regional integration process in South Asia (Dash 2008). Intra-regional investment in South Asia is less than 1% of overall investment. This indicates a near absence of regional entrepreneurs. There is a shortage of regional commercial actors who would take an interest in the promotion of South Asian integration. We saw the role of powerful countries in European integration. A similar synergy is missing in the case of South Asia. Although India has taken a lead in some major projects, a synergy with other major countries is absent. India and Pakistan are the two dominant countries of the region and each has its own set of political issues. The bilateral dispute between the two is mostly blamed for the difficulties in regional integration in South Asia.

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There is a long way to go if for the South Asian countries are to achieve some credible position in regional integration. Almost all the countries in the region are relatively liberal economies and are integrating with the global economy. Nonetheless, there are hesitations when it comes to regionalisation. As indicated by many scholars and multilateral organisation, the South Asian economies cannot afford to ignore the regional integration process any longer. Fragmented Regional Identity Concerning culture and diversity, South Asia is one of the most attractive regions of the world. The peoples of South Asia speak at least twenty major languages, and if one includes the more important dialects, the count rises to over two hundred. A panoply of very diverse languages and language families, South Asia has made enormous contributions to world literature from ancient to modern times. It has major accomplishments in the arts and maintains distinguished musical traditions. Adherents of every major world religion are to be found in the subcontinent. It is the source of two of the world’s great religions and the home to more devotees by a third than either the Middle East or Southeast Asia. (Bose and Jalal 1998, 4)

The people of the region are culturally close to each other but over the years the widening political divides have been responsible for creating wedges in South Asia. The political interest of regional elites in South Asia has slowly extinguished the possibility of shaping a supranational identity. National identities were given primacy in the post-colonial South Asia. There was an attempt to highlight national identities in newly independent countries, particularly India and Pakistan. The political differences are so stark that a new vocabulary was created to identify the region. The traditional term ‘Indian subcontinent’ was contested on the pretext that it was ‘India centric’ and South Asia was accepted for its neutral connotation (Bose and Jalal 1998). In the post-colonial South Asia, nation-building was given top priority by the political leadership and in creating this a distinct identity was a vital goal. The idea was to highlight the contrast with others instead of accepting the old deep-rooted cultural confluence of the region. Politically determined efforts were witnessed throughout South Asia to project new national identities. In the words of Ashis Nandy,

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‘South Asia is the only region in the world where most states define themselves not by what they are, but what they are not’ (Nandy 2005, 541). There are examples of states using different mediums to propagate false notions to create a separate national identity for its people. There is, for example, a distorted representation of India in Pakistani textbooks, to the extent that Aziz has termed this a ‘murder of history’ (Aziz 1998). It is hard to find examples where South Asian states have taken initiatives to promote regional consciousness. This is the opposite of the case in Europe where after the end of the Second World War, states realised the destructive potential of hyper-nationalism and wilfully worked towards developing a regional identity. In South Asia, parochial national appeals are part of domestic politics, subverting the idea of regional identity. These complexities about identity politics in South Asia have harmed the cause of regional integration. As they are tied to the aspirations of states, even regional organisations cannot go further in taking programmes and projects to disseminate the idea of South Asia. As a result, there is a lack of a general awareness about the region in South Asia. Taking a cue from European integration, reform is required at two levels—national and regional. At the national level, governments have to invest in the idea of South Asia. This is not about popularising formal structures such as SAARC but to propagate different aspects of South Asian cultures that are interconnected—food, music and culture. Once different states accept the responsibility for spreading the information about South Asia, this will have a far-reaching impact. Subsequently, regional organisations can work on the theme of regional identity. A reluctance to shape a regional identity on the part of national governments will ultimately curtail the creation of a functional space of regional ­organisations. A sense of belongingness amongst the people of the region will strengthen the prospect of integration, as was realised in the case of Europe. An Obsession with Border Security It is becoming clear that unless South Asian states opt for a drastic policy overhaul, there is a bleak future for regional integration. Across a large part of Europe, borders are redundant. Due to security issues, particularly cross-border terrorism, a border in South Asia is a matter of high security and states vehemently oppose any dilution of the concept. There is a strong security-centric understanding of borders in South Asia (Tripathi

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2015). A hard border blocks the flow of movement, hence curtailing regional cooperation. The unfavourable consequences of borders for regionalism were diagnosed in Europe and policy-makers addressed the problem. There are highly securitised borders in South Asia and mental borders intentionally created by the state supplement the obstacle. The anti-India school curriculum of Pakistan maintained by the state is to justify the statist political approach to India. These textbooks in Pakistan form a mental border that is absorbed within the individual and is carried forward (Tripathi 2016). The cognitive construct of an enemy converts the individual into a support to state policies even when such an attitude is irrational. Borders define contours of cooperation in South Asia and even a cursory observation is enough to show that the situation could be improved. In South Asia, ‘borders are agents of active politics’ (Banerjee 1998). At times, even supposedly peaceful borders can lead to a significant bilateral discord between states. This is something that we observed during the Madheshi movement in Nepal (2015). Dissatisfied with the new constitution, the Madheshi community in Nepal, as a part of their protest, blocked the India–Nepal borders. As a landlocked country that is dependent on India for access to the ports, the blockade of the border hampered the supply of essential commodities in Nepal. Kathmandu blamed India for tacitly supporting the blockade, bringing in bitterness to India–Nepal relations. Similarly, the Durand line between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an area of contention between the two. The India–Pakistan borders are highly securitised and ceasefire violations near the border are frequent. The only success story of border cooperation in the recent past is the land border agreement between India and Bangladesh (2015). How we should deal with the question of borders is an important research concern for South Asia scholars advocating regional integration. Border issues cannot be ignored, amidst efforts towards regional integration; this has been proved in the case of Europe. A border is also a mark of distrust between the individual and the state. Cross-border cooperation is the path for regional integration not being limited only to free trade. The movement of people across borders is an equally significant factor in the process of regional integration. It seems that dealing cooperatively with the border issue is not a priority for most South Asian policy-makers. For meaningful regional cooperation and integration to take place, South Asia will require a flexible border policy.

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Conclusion There is a general consensus on the merits of regional integration. In an integrated region, there are better prospects for peace, order and economic activity and this has been authenticated in the case of Europe. European integration is an outstanding example for other regions that aspire to acquire a respected position in world politics. Despite historical connections, the South Asian region is still one of the least integrated regions of the world. The chapter provides some explanation as to what is missing in the case of South Asia, particularly when it is compared with the European integration project. Economic liberalism in the case of regional trade is applied differently in the South Asia. Free trade principles might have helped in the process of European integration; it has not worked in a similar fashion in South Asia. The sensitive question of regional identity was meticulously handled in Europe. While there are problems, such as the rise of right-wing nationalism in Europe, the substantial support for European integration project in the member states has not been affected by this. In South Asia, a lack of regional consciousness is a serious weakness in the process of regional integration. Lastly, the EU has dealt with the border issues peacefully. Border cooperation is the ultimate achievement of European integration and offers lessons for South Asia. The hard border approach in South Asia is detrimental to the regional integration project.

References Ahmed, S., & Ghani, E. (2007). South Asia’s Growth and Regional Integration: An Overview. In S. Ahmed & E. Ghani (Eds.), South Asia Growth and Regional Integration (pp. 3–42). New Delhi: Macmillan Publisher. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso Books. Aziz, K. K. (1998). The Murder of History: A Critique of History Textbooks Used in Pakistan. New Delhi: Renaissance Publishing House. Banerjee, P. (1998). Borders as Unsettled Markers in South Asia: A Case Study of the Sino-Indian Border. International Studies, 35(2), 180–191. Barber, B. (1995). Jihad vs McWorld. London: Corgi Books. Bose, S., & Jalal, A. (1998). Modern South Asia History, Culture, Political Economy. New York: Routledge Publication. Burgess, M. (2000). Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950–2000. London: Routledge Publication.

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Dash, K.  C. (2008). Regionalism in South Asia Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures. London: Routledge Publication. EUREGIO. (2018). EUREGIO – Living Without Borders. Retrieved February 5, 2018, from http://www.euregio.eu/en. Export-Import Bank of India. (2014). Potential for Enhancing Intra-SAARC Trade: A Brief Analysis. Retrieved February 3, 2018, from https://www. eximbankindia.in/Assets/Dynamic/PDF/Publication-Resources/ ResearchPapers/43file.pdf. Gillingham, J. (2003). European Integration, 1950–2003 Superstate or New Market Economy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haas, E.  B. (1964). Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hettne, B., & Soderbaum, F. (2002). Theorising the Rise of Regionness. In S. Breslin, C. W. Hughes, N. Phillips, & B. Rosamond (Eds.), New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy Theories and Cases (pp.  33–47). London: Routledge Publication. Katzenstein, P.  J. (2002). Regionalism and Asia. In S.  Breslin, C.  W. Hughes, N. Phillips, & B. Rosamond (Eds.), New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy. New York: Routledge Publication. Kraus, P. A. (2008). A Union of Diversity Language, Identity, and Polity Building in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Laine, J. P. (2015). A Historical View of the Study of Borders. In S. V. Sevastianov, J. P. Laine, & A. A. Kireev (Eds.), Introduction to Border Studies (pp. 14–32). Vladivostok: Far Eastern Federal University. McLaren, L. M. (2006). Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mitrany, D. (1966). The Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. New York: Cornell University Press. Muni, S. D., & Jetly, R. (2008). SAARC: The Changing Dimensions. Retrieved March 27, 2012, from http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/ W-2008-8_01.pdf. Nandy, A. (2005). The Idea of South Asia: A Personal Note on Post-Bandung Blues. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 6(4), 541–545. Newman, D. (2011). Contemporary Research Agendas in Border Studies: An Overview. In D. Wastl-Walter (Ed.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies (pp. 33–48). Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company. Roussakis, E. N. (1969). The Common Market and the Zollverein: Experiences in Integration. Louvain Economic Review, 35(3), 201–208. Schengen Visa Info. (2018). Schengen Agreement. Retrieved February 5, 2018, from https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-agreement/.

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Slocum, N., & Van Langenhove, L. (2005). Identity and Regional Integration. In M. Farrell, B. Hettne, & L. Van Lagenhove (Eds.), Global Politics of Regionalism Theory and Practice (pp. 137–154). London: Pluto Press. The Asia Foundation. (2018). Intra-Regional Trade in South Asia. Retrieved February 3, 2018, from https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IndiaRegionalTrade. pdf. The World Bank. (2016, May 24). The Potential of Intra-Regional Trade for South Asia. Retrieved January 25, 2018, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/ news/infographic/2016/05/24/the-potential-of-intra-regional-trade-forsouth-asia. Tripathi, D. (2012). Energy Security: The Functional Area of Regional Cooperation for South Asia. Eurasia Border Review, 3(2), 91–102. Tripathi, D. (2015). Interrogating Linkages Between Borders, Regions and Border Studies. Journal of Borderland Studies, 30(2), 189–201. Tripathi, D. (2016). Creating Borders in Young Minds: A Case Study of Indian and Pakistani School Textbooks. Regions & Cohesion, 6(1), 52–71. Wastl-Walter, D., & Kofler, A.  C. (2000). European Integration and Border-­ Related Institutions: A Practical Guide. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 15(1), 85–106. Weede, E. (1995). Economic Policy and International Security: Rent-Seeking, Free Trade and Democratic Peace. European Journal of International Relations, 1(4), 519–537.

Index1

A Academic exchanges, 330 Acquisitions, 10, 302, 307, 316 Act East, 123, 140 Actorness, 127, 131, 140 Adaptation Fund, 189 Afghanistan, 3, 13, 46, 125, 136, 140, 200, 208, 210, 253, 254, 263, 307, 313, 335, 354 Africa, 8, 13, 48, 80, 88, 112, 114, 120, 122, 133, 254, 257, 258, 265, 307, 313, 328 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), 322 Agenda for Action 2020, 8, 13, 188, 313 Agriculture, 13, 94, 190, 247, 264, 295, 298, 331, 334 Ahmadabad, 331 Aid for trade (AfT), 327 Aksyonov, Sergey, 227, 229 Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO), 162

Alliance of Liberal Students, Austria, 150 Allied powers, 113, 124 Al-Qaida, 46 Alternative for Germany (AfD), 74, 147, 162, 163, 279 Aluminium, 298 Anglo-Saxon, 147 Anti-constitutional, 149 Anti-democratic, 149 Anti-democratic sentiment, 148 Anti-establishment, 157 Anti-globalist, 157 Anti-liberal, 149 Anti-Muslim, 159, 282 Anti-Semitism, 344 Arab Spring, 49, 51, 130, 254 Aragon, 90 Argentina, 261, 263 Article 50, 65, 66 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), 137, 140 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 138, 140

Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2019 G. Sachdeva (ed.), Challenges in Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1636-4

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INDEX

Asia, 7, 8, 10, 11, 48, 57, 112, 114, 120, 122, 128, 131–141, 199, 200, 292, 296, 309, 313, 328, 334 Asia and Latin America (ALA), 322, 328 Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), 7, 132 Asia Investment Facility (AIF), 331 Asian century, 128 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 294, 309 Asian financial crisis, 132, 136 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 135 Asian security order, 127–141 Asia Regional Integration Centre database, 309 Assam, 284 Assertiveness, 11, 131, 135 Assimilation, 276, 277, 279, 280 Assimilationist policies, 279 Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), 322 Association Agreement, 219, 220, 325 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 132, 134, 136, 140 Asylum, 164, 170, 254–260 Austerity measures, 2, 7 Australia, 132, 137, 140, 264, 265, 307 Austria, 2, 3, 53, 54, 74, 102, 150, 153, 154, 161, 170, 172, 224, 230n5, 245, 254, 255, 258, 264, 282, 303 Austrian Association of Gymnastics, 150 Austrian People’s Party (OVP), 162 Authoritarian xenophobic, 151 Autonomy, 24, 25, 91, 92, 94, 96–99, 104, 105, 203, 284 Azhar, Masood, 25 Aznar, José María, 92

B Balkan conflict, 46 Balkans, 36n4, 44, 45, 255, 258 Balkenende, Jan Peter, 160 Baltics, 204, 206, 207, 222–224 Bangalore, 315 Bangladesh, 263, 307, 342, 351, 354 Banking Union, 3, 7 Banska Bystrica, 165 Bantustans, 103 Barcelona, 90, 91 Barcelona Declaration, 96 Barnier, Michel, 67, 70 Basque country, 5, 86, 91, 96, 97 Bavaria, 282 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-­ Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 307 Belgian National Party, 150 Belgium, 3, 5, 62, 75, 99, 118, 150, 172, 223, 238, 287n4, 296, 303, 306, 313, 348 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 24, 134, 135, 138, 140 Bengal, 247, 292 Berlin, 1, 50, 74, 80, 116, 162, 349 Berlin Wall, 112, 116, 197 Berlusconi, Silvio, 155, 156 Bharti Airtel, 307 Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), India, 173, 311 Bhutan, 307, 351 Blair, Tony, 63, 244 Bloc Identitaire, France, 158 Borderless Europe, 62, 116, 118 Borders, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52, 54, 55, 57, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 87, 94, 111–125, 130, 132, 136, 141, 203, 206, 209, 219, 229, 253–256, 258–260, 264, 343, 344, 347–349, 353–355 Bosnia Herzegovina, 4, 44

 INDEX 

Boundaries, 89, 104, 113, 114, 118, 122, 124, 219, 255, 274, 276, 285, 348 Breakup of Yugoslavia, 44 Brexit, 1, 3, 4, 10, 13, 29, 53, 54, 61–82, 100, 101, 128, 147, 157, 172, 183, 186, 230n2, 245, 314–316 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 63, 66–70, 72, 76, 78, 99, 157, 162, 165, 257, 258 British Commonwealth, 61 British Empire, 274 British National Party (BNP), 150, 151, 153 British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), 244 British period, 291 British Union of Fascists, 152 Broad Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA), 8–10, 80, 295, 307, 309, 310, 313, 314, 332 Brussels, 1, 3, 8, 20, 22, 44, 45, 47–53, 55–57, 63, 67, 70, 72, 99, 130, 134–139, 190, 204, 205, 217, 282, 308, 313, 322, 332 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 115 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 219 Burqa, 275, 279 C Cameron, David, 46, 63–65, 75, 76, 78, 137 Canada, 88, 186, 193, 261, 264, 265 Capitalism, 88, 112, 118, 124, 276 Catalonia, 1, 5, 13, 86, 88–101, 103, 104, 106 Catalan United Socialist Party (PSUE), 94 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 1, 2, 24, 45–47, 52, 53, 129, 154, 165–167, 171, 173, 217, 218, 220–222, 229

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Central Asia, 11, 13, 26, 123, 134 Central Mediterranean route, 255, 256 Centre Democrats, Netherlands, 151, 160 Centre Party’86 (CP’86), 151, 153 Ceuta, 122 Chemicals, 45, 298, 300, 303 Chernobyl, 238, 245 Chile, 307 China, 5, 11, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26–28, 30, 33, 35, 36n4, 37n6, 37n7, 57, 73, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137–141, 181–183, 185–188, 192, 193, 199, 208, 217, 228, 239, 297, 303, 333 China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 135 Chirac, Jacques, 171 Christian Democratic Party, Netherlands, 160 Citizenship, 100, 119, 170, 277, 281, 282, 286, 346 Civic Platform, Poland, 167 Civilian nuclear cooperation, 26, 27 Civilisation, 198, 274, 277 Civil society, 9, 13, 62, 104, 184, 186, 190, 247, 310, 327, 330–333 Clean India, 8 Clean Power Plan (CPP), 184 Climate change, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 17, 23, 25, 49, 80, 127, 181–193, 201, 238, 246, 248, 249, 313, 315, 329, 333 Climate commitments, 184, 186 Climate finance, 184, 186, 187, 189 Coal, 5, 117, 191, 203, 237, 240, 249n5, 293, 347, 351 Coexistence, 220, 272, 284 Cognitive mobilisation, 347 Cold War, 1, 7, 18, 29, 43–46, 54, 57, 112, 115, 116, 118, 124, 129, 197, 198, 202, 207, 291, 295, 315, 328, 349, 350

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INDEX

Collaboration, 10, 224, 247, 303, 316, 345, 351 Colonialism, 274, 294, 295 Colour revolutions, 202 Commercial Cooperation Agreement, 328 Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMM), 265 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 62, 100 Common Economic Space, 200 Common European Asylum System (CEAS), 255, 266 Common External Tariff (CET), 61 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 13, 21, 28, 44–46, 48, 53, 100, 215–229 Common market, 44, 116 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 48, 257 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 199 Communal, 279, 284, 288n8 hatred, 279 Communism, 112, 115, 124, 129, 167 Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), India, 311 Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, 25 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), 307, 311 Conference of Parties (COP), 186, 187, 191 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), 138 Conservative Party, 64, 71, 152, 158, 171, 244 Consociationalism, 216 Constitution, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 101, 105, 107, 278, 354

Constitution of India, 105, 277 Constructivist theory, 346 Convergence Criteria, 6 Cooperative multilateralism, 33–36 Copenhagen Summit, 183, 192 Corbyn, Jeremy, 71 Cotonou Agreement, 323, 324, 326, 327 Counter-piracy, 9, 11, 57, 136, 139 Counter-terrorism, 9, 11, 13, 26, 136, 139, 313, 315 Country Strategy Paper (CSP), 326, 329, 330 Crimea, 5, 52, 202, 216, 217, 221, 223, 226 Crisis management, 127, 136, 201 Cultural intolerance, 279 Cultural practices, 271, 278, 283, 284, 288n10 Customary behaviours, 272 Customs union, 74, 314 Cyber security, 49, 57, 139, 141, 207, 313 Cyprus, 103, 220, 302, 303 Czech Republic, 220, 223, 224, 230n5 D Danish Peoples Party, 168, 169 Data Secure Nation, 310 Davis, David, 67, 68, 94, 95 Davos, 185, 189 Dayton accords, 45 Decentralisation, 91, 92, 156, 331 De Gaulle, Charles, 61, 62 Democracy, 12, 13, 32, 46, 51, 52, 90, 93, 101, 104, 115, 129, 134, 152, 153, 157, 158, 163, 164, 168, 169, 173, 197, 198, 201, 207, 230n4, 271, 285, 322–326, 329, 335 promotion, 28, 130

 INDEX 

Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, 67, 72 Democratisation, 22, 285, 328 Denmark, 102, 150, 167–169, 171, 223, 258, 259, 303, 306 Developing countries, 25, 28, 32, 33, 73, 183, 184, 186–189, 192, 276, 295, 296, 321–323, 326–328, 332, 333 Development aid, 75, 136, 326, 335 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 2 Development cooperation, 9, 13, 53, 74, 132, 295, 313, 315, 321–336 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 321 Diaspora, 264, 265, 276 Diplomacy, 20, 35, 48, 73, 128, 131, 134, 137, 182, 183, 190, 324 Diplomatic relations, 295, 328 Disaster management, 8 Discrimination, 106, 122, 159, 253, 277, 280, 287n6, 308 Dispute Settlement (DS), 308 Distinctiveness, 95, 272, 278, 334 Diversification of energy mix, 12, 246 Diversity, 17, 90, 93, 104, 106, 254, 271–281, 283, 331, 334, 352 Dominant values, 279 Donetsk, 203 Drug manufacturing, 293 Dublin regulation, 54, 255, 256, 266 Dutch Peoples-Union (NVU), 150, 152, 153 E East Asia, 342, 350 East Asia Summit (EAS), 137 Eastern Europe, 43, 114, 115, 165–167, 198, 209, 210, 322 East India Company, 292

363

Economic cooperation, 36n4, 206, 295, 307, 309, 326, 328 Economic interdependence, 344 Economic transformation, 218 Eden, Anthony, 62, 63 Effective multilateralism, 13, 17–21, 29, 31, 32, 34, 48, 56, 131 Egalitarianism, 286 Egypt, 237, 307 Electricite de France, 242, 248 Electronic goods, 298 Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), 182, 183, 189, 190, 192 Energiewende, 244 Energy, 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 24, 49, 51, 80, 137, 182, 184, 185, 188, 189, 191, 198, 200, 208, 209, 222–224, 230n3, 237–249, 295, 313, 315, 329, 330, 333, 351 Energy diversification, 239–240 Energy security, 4, 11–12, 49, 51, 135, 239, 241, 242, 246, 248 Enlargement, 1, 4, 47, 48, 51, 64, 119, 129, 132, 172, 173, 198, 220, 221, 228, 277, 309 Enlightenment, 276 Environment, 9, 11, 12, 29, 35, 37n6, 44, 49, 131, 132, 134, 137, 139, 157, 167, 198, 200, 209, 217, 241, 247, 277, 286, 295, 308, 313, 315, 322, 324, 328, 329, 331–333, 335 Environmentalist, 157 Equal citizenship, 277 Estonia, 220, 223, 230n5 Ethiopia, 254 Ethnic conflicts, 87, 253 Ethnic nationalism, 89, 153, 170 EU Blue Card, 264 EU budget, 62, 69, 70 EU Global Strategy 2016, 127, 128, 332

364 

INDEX

EU institutions, 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 17, 23, 28, 29, 72, 121, 229, 238 EU–India Summit, 8, 9, 57, 138, 265, 309, 313, 315, 333 Eurasia, 134, 141, 200 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 307 Euregio, 349 Euro, 1, 62, 97, 100, 111, 116, 347 Eurobarometer, 246, 287n6 Eurocentric, 129 Eurofighter, 75 Europe, 7, 16, 43–58, 74, 88, 111–125, 128, 173, 189, 197–210, 218, 239, 263, 271–286, 291 European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 117, 238–240, 242, 245, 248 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG), 120, 121, 125 European Central Bank (ECB), 6 European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), 182, 183 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 61, 112, 117, 342 European Commission, 7, 8, 19, 27, 28, 33, 37n7, 51, 54, 66, 68, 72, 121, 132, 135–138, 189–191, 201, 205, 215, 216, 220, 221, 224, 230n4, 238, 239, 241, 248, 254, 256–258, 260, 261, 309, 314, 331 European Community (EC), 62, 112, 116–118, 129, 237, 281, 295, 296, 322, 323, 328, 347 European Council, 47, 66, 67, 72, 80, 190, 257, 313, 324 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 66, 70, 257 European Development Fund (EDF), 321 European Economic Community (EEC), 43–45, 61, 62, 74, 117, 118, 238, 241, 295, 321, 328, 342

European External Action Service (EEAS), 50, 55, 136, 324 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 307 European Investment Bank (EIB), 315 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 48, 49, 51, 52, 221, 230n4 European Nuclear Society, 240 European Parliament (EP), 68, 72, 147, 153, 157, 158, 162, 172, 186, 190, 191, 215, 224, 225, 348 European People’s Movement for Germany, 150 European Security Strategy (ESS), 19, 20, 32, 47–49, 56, 57, 132 European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 6 European Union (EU), 1, 4, 15–36, 43–58, 61, 62, 76, 85, 86, 111, 123, 127–141, 147, 172, 181–193, 197, 198, 215, 237–249, 254, 263, 273, 276, 277, 291–316, 321, 323, 341 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), 4, 54, 56, 57, 128, 131, 135, 136, 138, 139, 141 Europe India Chamber of Commerce (EICC), 302 Eurosceptic, 157, 167, 169, 172 Euroscepticism, 62, 172 Eurozone, 1–7, 49, 52, 62, 205, 256, 299, 302, 310, 347 Ever-closer union, 62, 63 Everything but Arms (EBA), 324 Exclusion, 119, 121, 280, 287n6 Exploitation, 253, 264 Exports, 6, 74, 75, 77, 96, 129, 130, 133, 134, 224, 259, 293, 296–301, 312, 324, 334, 335, 350, 351 Extremism, 4, 148, 149, 160, 279

 INDEX 

F Far-right, 50, 74, 147, 167, 279 Fascist, 149–152, 154, 155, 159, 174 Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland (EDU), 164 Federalism, 94, 95, 105, 156 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, The (FICCI), 78, 79, 311 Five Star Movement, Italy (M5S), 157 Flemish Aggregation, 150 Flexible border policy, 354 Food Aid Convention, 328 Food habits, 275, 279 Food items, 279 Foratom, 240, 241 Forced displacement, 253 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 10, 224, 225, 294, 302, 303, 305, 306, 312 Foreign policy, 2, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 20, 24, 27, 28, 35, 51, 52, 56, 58, 73, 81, 117, 118, 128–130, 137, 139, 197–199, 204, 205, 208–209, 215–217, 220, 223, 225, 228, 229, 265, 313, 316, 329, 333, 342 Fortress Europe, 120, 122, 254 Forza Italia, 155, 156 Fossil fuels, 185, 191, 237, 238, 243, 244 France, 2, 3, 9, 12, 21, 23, 26, 27, 34, 47, 50, 62, 69, 74, 80, 82, 103, 113, 114, 116, 118, 138, 147, 150, 153, 157, 158, 170–172, 187, 188, 201, 203, 205, 206, 238, 241–243, 248, 254, 257, 258, 264, 277, 280, 282, 283, 293, 296, 301–303, 306, 308, 313, 331, 342, 345, 348 Freedom, 24, 55, 105, 118, 119, 124, 159, 239, 271, 278, 286, 323, 325, 347, 348

365

Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 147, 161, 162, 170, 172 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 8–10, 32, 56, 291–316, 332, 333, 350 French Revolution, 89, 148, 276 Frontex, 47, 120–122, 125, 256 Front National (FN), France, 74, 150, 157, 158, 170, 172 FTA negotiations, 291–316 Fukushima, 238, 245, 248 Functionalism, 216, 345 Functionalist, 345 G G-8, 201 G-20, 201 Gadhafi, Muammar, 255 Galicia, 91, 96 Gellner, Ernest, 88 Gems and jewellery, 298 Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), 296, 322, 323, 327, 328 Geographical indicators (GIs), 32, 308 Geopolitics, 52, 57, 112, 115, 117, 124 Georgia, 49 German Conservative Party/German Right Party, 150 German Customs Union, 344 German Fire Brigade Association, 260 German Reich Party, 150 German Renewable Energy Act (EEG), 183 Germany, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 23, 26, 27, 30, 43, 45, 53, 54, 62, 69, 74, 75, 80, 82, 102, 112–116, 118, 124, 125, 138, 147, 150–154, 162, 163, 171, 172, 189, 201, 203, 205, 222–224, 238, 243–244, 260, 261, 264, 279, 293, 296, 301–303, 306, 310, 313, 315, 341, 344, 348, 349

366 

INDEX

Gibraltar, 122 Global economic slowdown, 8, 296 Global governance, 11–13, 16–18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 33, 54, 131–133, 316 Globalisation, 85, 86, 148, 162, 171–173, 199, 254, 273, 285, 333, 346, 350 Good Friday agreement, 67, 72 Good governance, 28, 129, 140, 322, 323, 326–328, 330, 335 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 197, 220 Grazprom, 222 Greece, 2, 6, 24, 53, 97, 122, 191, 203, 223, 255–258, 260, 282 Greek-Turkish border, 120 Gross domestic product (GDP), 6, 71, 73, 203, 218, 257, 261, 262, 264 Growth and Stability Pact, 6 GSP+, 323, 326 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 307 Gulf of Guinea, 136 Gulf states, 264 H Haas, E.B., 216, 345 Hague, The, 116, 160 Halal, 279 Haripur, 247 Haushofer, Karl, 113 Heath, Edward, 237 Hegemony, 28, 46, 129, 130, 174, 279, 285, 336 High Level Trade Group (HLTG), 307 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy (HR), 137 Human Development Index (HDI), 343 Human resource development, 295

Human rights, 9, 11–13, 28, 30–32, 91, 103, 132, 134, 137, 201, 205, 230n4, 271, 280, 286, 322, 323, 325–329, 331, 332, 335 Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), 165 Hungary, 3, 53, 54, 165, 166, 203, 220, 224, 230n5, 238, 241, 254–256, 260 I Identity, 5, 22, 44, 52, 54, 62, 81, 82, 86–90, 92–100, 105, 106, 129, 130, 133, 158, 165, 167–172, 197, 272, 279, 281, 283–286, 288n9, 343, 344, 346–348, 352–353, 355 Ideology, 112, 113, 115, 148, 150, 165, 282, 284, 286 Immigration, 4, 29, 64, 66, 76, 78, 79, 114, 118, 120, 153, 156, 158, 159, 162, 164, 165, 167–171, 174, 254, 258, 260, 263, 266, 266n1, 276, 349 Imperial power, 292 Imports, 5, 6, 51, 75, 77, 203, 206, 208, 222, 223, 230n5, 240, 293, 296–301 Independence, 5, 89, 94, 95, 97–106, 165, 218, 219, 228, 239, 243, 248, 274, 291, 293, 295, 315 India, 5, 16, 74–79, 86, 123, 128, 173, 181–193, 199, 216, 239, 263–265, 271–286, 291–316 India-Brazil-South Africa Forum (IBSA), 307 India–EU partnership, 8, 27 Indianness, 106, 284 Indian Ocean, 136, 292 Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC), 335

 INDEX 

Indo-Gangetic plains, 274 Indonesia, 307 Indo-Pacific region, 140, 228 Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, 225 Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA), 350 Industrial Revolution, the, 149, 276, 293 Industry, 12, 75–77, 81, 114, 187, 188, 190, 217, 218, 238–240, 242, 243, 245, 247, 260, 293, 295, 311, 330 Infrastructure, 24, 28, 36n4, 47, 51, 122, 208, 240, 326, 327, 329, 330, 335, 350 Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV), 94, 95 Institution building, 133, 138 Intellectual property (IP), 295, 308, 332 Intellectual property rights (IPR), 33, 310 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, 247 Inter-governmentalism, 16, 216 International Criminal Court (ICC), 17, 30, 129 International Energy Agency (IEA), 222, 242, 243, 245 International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 136 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 6, 261, 322 International politics, 15–18, 20, 22, 27, 33, 34, 36, 85, 131, 216, 341, 346 International relations, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 72, 94, 130, 139, 341, 344 International Solar Alliance (ISA), 12, 248 International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), 248

367

Intolerance, 279, 284 Intra-industry trade, 298 Intra-organisational bargaining, 216 Intra-regional investment, 351 Intra-regional trade, 350 Investment, 7–10, 13, 24, 28, 33, 36n4, 64, 74–76, 78–80, 133, 136, 186, 189, 193, 198, 201, 241, 248, 259, 264, 291–295, 302–303, 307, 308, 310–316, 326, 329, 330, 333, 342, 351 Iran, 4, 73, 134, 137, 140, 201, 210, 254, 313 Iran Nuclear Deal, 137, 201 Ireland, 6, 9, 66–68, 245, 264, 277, 301, 303, 313 Iron and steel, 298 Iron curtain, 112, 115, 116, 124 Irregular migration, 119, 265, 266 Islamic fundamentalism, 280 Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS), 52, 53, 229 Islamophobia, 282 Israeli–Palestinian dispute, 23 Italian Social Movement, The (MSI), 150–152, 154, 155, 172 J Jaishankar, S., 56, 57, 139 Jaish-e-Mohamad, 25 Jaitapur, 247, 248 Japan, 10, 36n5, 75, 132, 137, 140, 230n3, 303, 307 Jharkhand, 284 Jobbik (Hungary), 165, 166 Johnson, Boris, 71, 121, 207 Joint Action Plan (JAP), 7, 8, 13, 56, 295, 307, 329 Joshi, Murli Manohar, 311 Juncker Commission, 256

368 

INDEX

Juncker, Jean-Claude, 7, 66, 68–70, 72, 139, 190, 205, 258, 314 Justice, 51, 55, 71, 94, 115, 165–167, 201, 277 Jute, 293 K Kaczynski, Jaroslaw, 166 Kaczynski, Lech, 167 Kagan, Robert, 22 Kaliningrad, 204 Kashmir, 106, 132, 135, 284 Katanga, 103 Kathmandu, 354 Kinship, 87 Knowledge-sharing, 326 Kochi, 331 Koodankulum, 247 Korean Peninsula, 132 Kos, 255 Kosovars, 103, 104 Kosovo, 4, 5, 86, 101–103 Kozlowski, Thomas, 56, 265 Kozyrev, Andrei, 198, 199 Kyoto Protocol (KP), 17, 182, 183, 187, 192 Kyrgyzstan, 202 L Labour market, 259, 261, 276, 282 Labour market integration, 259 Labour standards, 326 Latvia, 220, 223, 230n5 League of Empire Loyalists, The, UK, 150 League of Nations (LoN), 344 League of Polish Families (LPR), 167 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 324 Lebanon, 254 Lega Nord, 155, 156, 170, 172

Le Pen, Marine, 3, 74, 147, 157, 158, 170, 206 Lesbos, 255 Liberal inter-governmentalism, 216, 345 Liberalisation, 10, 33, 76, 225, 257, 294, 308, 310, 312, 325, 328, 329 Libya, 3, 255, 313 Linguistic affiliation, 272 Lisbon Treaty, 19, 44, 50–55, 58, 65, 66, 324, 325, 332 Lithuania, 204, 206, 220, 223 Lomé Convention, 322, 324 London, 22, 50, 64, 72, 78, 115, 293, 307 Love-jihad, 284 Luhansk, 203 Lukhnow, 315 Luxemburg, 348 M Maastricht Treaty, 43, 130, 132, 216, 323, 332 Macedonia, 4, 255 Machinery, 298, 300, 303 Macron, Emmanuel, 29, 74, 80, 158, 187, 201, 205–207 Madheshi, 354 Madrid, 50, 91, 97 Maidan Square, 202 Major, John, 63 Make in India, 8, 173, 311 Malaysia, 307 Mare Nostrum, 256 Marginalisation, 3, 106, 140, 280, 282 Maritime trading patterns, 292 Materialism, 88 Mauritius, 75, 302, 303 May, Theresa, 65–72, 75–78, 80, 207 Mediterranean, 24, 48, 49, 51, 53, 114, 115, 120, 122, 136, 170, 255–257, 322

 INDEX 

Mediterranean Sea, 112, 120 Melilla, 122 Member of the European Parliament (MEP), 68 Member state (MS), 2–5, 7–10, 12, 13, 16–22, 24, 26–29, 31, 34, 36, 36n4, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57, 62–65, 68–70, 72, 73, 81, 100, 101, 111, 112, 117–119, 121, 123–125, 137, 138, 183, 186, 187, 189, 197, 203–205, 210, 215–218, 221–225, 229, 230n4, 230n5, 238–242, 248, 249, 256, 257, 260, 264, 276, 281–283, 287n2, 302, 303, 310, 316, 322, 323, 325, 328, 333, 347, 348, 355 Menon, Shivshankar, 226 Merkel, Angela, 30, 54, 68, 69, 74, 80, 163, 183, 205, 243, 246, 279, 287n5 Middle East, 26, 53, 199, 210, 254, 265, 313, 352 Migration, 1, 4, 8, 9, 13, 49, 52–54, 64, 66, 76, 78–80, 112, 114, 115, 119, 120, 122, 125, 127, 137, 141, 253–266, 266n2, 273, 276, 283, 313, 315 Migration and mobility, 8, 9, 263–266, 331 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 327, 331 Mining, 218, 224, 293 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 8, 106, 188, 209, 226, 264, 313 Minorities, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 165, 171, 173, 263, 272, 273, 276–278, 280, 284, 286 Minority nationalism, 86, 89 Minsk agreement, 203, 205, 206

369

Mirage 2000, 27 Mitrany, David, 216, 344, 345 Mobility, 51, 55, 111, 112, 116, 117, 121, 123, 157, 264–266, 282, 315, 331 Mob lynching, 284 Mode 4, 264, 265, 310, 334 Modi, Narendra, 8, 9, 25, 35, 77, 80, 173, 174, 189, 310, 313–316 Mogherini, Federica, 55, 137, 256 Monnet, Jean, 346, 347 Montenegro, 4, 206 Montevideo Convention, 103 Moravcsik, Andrew, 216, 345 Morocco, 94, 122, 283 Moscow, 3, 45, 49, 52, 54, 130, 199, 200, 202, 204, 206, 220, 229 Most Favoured Nation (MFN), 327 Mouvement National Républicain (MNR), France, 158 Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, 165 Mughals, 274 Multiculturalism, 2, 3, 13, 158, 162, 169–171, 271–286 Multilateral governance, 16, 17 Multilateralism, 13, 15–36, 48, 49, 129, 131, 133, 138, 140, 327, 333, 334 Multilateral order, 20, 21, 29–31, 35 Multi-level decision-making, 45 Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 294, 333 Multipolar world, 7, 11, 18, 20, 21, 23, 30, 33, 199, 291, 295 Mumbai, 331 Muslim, 3, 53, 159, 171, 280, 282, 283, 287n4 Mussolini, 152, 155 Myanmar, 13, 136, 263, 313, 324

370 

INDEX

N Nagpur, 331 Nandy, Ashis, 352, 353 National Alliance, Italy, 155 National Democratic Alliance (NDA), India, 229 National Democratic Party, Austria, 150 National Democratic Party (NPD), Germany, 151, 152, 163 National Front, UK, 150, 280 Nationalism, 25, 44, 86–89, 91, 93–100, 113, 148, 153, 156, 165, 170, 171, 276, 355 National Labour Party, UK, 150, 153 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), 191 National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), 330 National Security Adviser (NSA), 226, 227 National Union of Independents and Republicans, France, 150 Nation-building, 86, 89, 172, 352 Nation-states, 85–107, 113, 119, 120, 217, 265, 274, 276, 346, 347 Natural partners, 11, 139 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 24, 105, 106, 275 Neo-fascist, 151, 152 Neo-functionalist, 345 Neo-liberalism, 216 Neo-liberal populist, 151 Neo-liberal xenophobic parties, 151 Neo Nazi, 151 Nepal, 228, 307, 351, 354 Netherlands, 2, 9, 62, 74, 80, 102, 118, 147, 150–153, 158–161, 171, 223, 230n5, 237, 244–245, 264, 277, 282, 283, 296, 302, 303, 306, 313, 349 New Delhi, 9, 12, 27, 30, 35, 37n6, 56, 57, 76, 77, 80, 82, 138–140, 188, 189, 209, 227, 229, 293, 313, 331

New Development Bank (NDB), 135 New European Consensus on Development, 325, 327, 332 New Zealand, 307 Ney, Martin, 314 Nice, 50, 282 Niger, 257 Non-government organisations (NGOs), 323, 327, 332, 335 Non-proliferation, 8, 57, 139, 201, 249n4 Non-state actor, 15, 46, 50, 323 Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 294, 334, 351 Non-traditional security issues, 136–138 Non-traditional security threats, 20, 36, 44, 46–49, 57 Normative, 31, 33, 36, 45, 49, 52, 127–141, 221, 228, 273, 335 Normative hegemony, 130 Normative power Europe (NPE), 128–130 North Africa, 52, 55, 222, 254, 255, 258 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 23, 28, 29, 45–47, 52, 55, 115, 118, 197, 199, 202, 204–207, 209, 210, 217–221, 228, 229, 255 Northern Ireland, 64, 66, 67, 86 Northern League (Italy), 147, 155 Nuclear energy, 237–249 Nuclear power, 238, 240–245, 247–249, 249n3 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL), 248 Nuclear power plants, 239, 240, 242–245, 247 Nuclear proliferation, 25 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 248

 INDEX 

O Occupation, 113 Oil refineries, 293 One Belt One Road, 24 Openness, 140, 210, 332 Operation Mare Nostrum, 122 Operation Triton, 256 Orban, Viktor, 54, 166, 167, 257 Order of Flemish Aggregation, 150 Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (LOAPA), 92 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2, 230n3 Organization for Former Political Criminals, Netherlands, 150 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 203 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 237 Overseas acquisitions, 10, 316 Overseas Indians, 264 P Pakistan, 11, 105, 123, 135, 140, 227, 228, 254, 350–352, 354 Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), 135 Parekh, Bhikhu, 272, 285 Paris, 1, 12, 17, 22, 23, 50, 55, 74, 80, 115, 183–184, 186, 205, 206, 247, 248, 282 Paris Agreement, 12, 181, 183–188, 191–193, 209 Parti de la France (PDF), France, 158 Partidul Romania Mare/Party for Greater Romania, 165 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 198, 218, 220

371

Party for Freedom (PVV), Netherlands, 147, 158–160 Patten, Chris, 19 Peace, 2, 9, 15–17, 19, 20, 29, 32, 44, 100, 112, 113, 117, 132, 136, 201, 205, 208, 210, 225, 265, 313, 326, 341, 342, 344, 346, 355 Peaceful coexistence, 275 People of Freedom, Italy, 155 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Netherlands, 158, 160 People’s Union, Belgium, 150 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 55 Personal liberty, 277 Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), Netherlands, 161 Piracy, 9, 11, 136, 139 Plurality, 272, 275, 276, 283, 286 Pluri national, 95, 96, 107 Poland, 3, 53, 54, 94, 166, 167, 186, 187, 191, 204, 207, 220, 222–224, 230n5, 303 Polit Bureau, 311 Pooled sovereignty, 45 Pooling of sovereignty, 86, 100 Popular Party (PP), 92, 94–96, 98 Populism, 1–4, 7, 13, 73, 156, 163 Populist, 2, 5, 65, 74, 147, 158, 161, 163–165, 167, 170, 183, 186, 266, 279 Poroshenko, Petro, 206 Portugal, 6, 9, 96, 97, 264, 313 Poseidon, 256, 257 Post-Cold War, 18, 44–47, 197–199, 202, 204, 209, 322 Post-communist regions, 218 Poverty, 37n7, 257, 323, 325, 326, 329, 332–334 Pre-colonial, 291

372 

INDEX

Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), 307 Primakov, Yevgeny, 199 Primordial, 86, 89 Principled pragmatism, 137 Private sector, 186, 187, 295, 323, 327, 332 Prodi, Romano, 16, 100 Progress Party, Denmark, 150, 169 Project-based assistance, 327 Public procurement, 33, 308, 309, 332 Public sector management, 330 Puigdemont, Carles, 98, 99 Pujol, Jordi, 92–94, 97 Putin, Vladimir, 52, 54, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205–207, 220, 226, 227 Q Quad–India, US, Japan and Australia, 140 Quantified emission reduction targets, 182 Quebec, 88, 89 R Racism, 148, 171, 279, 280 Radicalisation, 4, 139, 160 Rafale jets, 12, 313 Rahman, Ziaur, 342 Rail coach, 293 Raja Mohan, C., 26, 35, 139 Rajasthan, 331 Rajoy, Mariano, 95, 99, 104 Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA), 330 Realist, 26, 129 Referendum, 4, 29, 61, 63, 64, 69, 71, 72, 76, 81, 97–101, 104, 106, 164, 169, 170, 172, 216, 221, 245, 280

Refugee crisis, 3, 49, 53, 54, 73, 100, 147, 165, 171, 254, 255, 277, 279 Refugee deal, 257 Refugees, 2, 7, 53–55, 73, 112, 119, 125, 137, 162, 165, 170, 174, 253–266, 279, 280, 282, 283 Refugees and Victims Injustice Block, Germany, 150 Regional integration, 2, 44, 45, 58, 86, 100, 132, 133, 140, 341–355 Religious beliefs, 274 Remittances, 264 Renaissance, 276 Renewable energy, 12, 183, 189, 190, 192, 209, 315, 334 Renewables, 182, 183, 189, 192, 238, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247, 249 Republicans, the, Germany, 151, 163, 172 Rhodesia, 103, 228 Right-wing, 2, 3, 13, 147–152, 154–158, 160–167, 169–174, 254, 277, 279, 282–284, 355 Rise of capitalism, 276 Rohingya, 137, 263 Roma, 165, 171 Romania, 165, 204, 220, 230n5 Rome, 80, 117, 152, 157, 238, 321 Rosnef, 224 Rudd, Amber, 77 Rule of law, 16, 28, 101, 132, 134, 140, 141, 201, 230n4, 271, 323, 325, 326 Russia, 2–4, 13, 18, 36n5, 45, 49, 52, 73, 100, 130, 132, 134, 135, 139, 141, 197–210, 216–229, 230n5, 303 Rutte, Mark, 160

 INDEX 

S Salvini, Matteo, 147, 156, 170 Sanctions, 18, 100, 154, 202, 203, 205, 208, 216, 221–225, 227, 228, 230n5 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS), 308, 335 Sarkaria Commission, 105 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), 330 Schengen agreement, 64, 112, 116, 119, 344, 349 Schengen area, 3, 7, 67, 111, 112, 119, 121, 124, 254, 349 Schengen Information System (SIS), 47, 349 Science and technology (S&T), 9, 13, 198, 247, 295, 313, 315, 329, 330 Scotland, 5, 64, 66, 86, 89, 100, 101 Secession, 89, 93–99, 102, 103 Second World War, 61, 81, 111–113, 119, 124, 125, 148–150, 161, 171, 174, 276, 341, 346, 349, 353 Securitisation, 55, 120, 254, 258 Securitisation of migration, 120, 254 Security architecture, 7, 10, 47 Self-reliance, 295 Serbia, 4, 101–103, 255, 256 Services, 5, 10, 32, 77, 78, 96, 103, 111, 116, 123, 124, 191, 198, 223, 224, 247, 259, 260, 264, 293, 295, 299, 301, 307–310, 312, 332, 334, 335, 345 Sexual and reproductive health, 331 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 135, 138 Shangri-La Dialogue, 137 Ship building, 293 Singapore, 75, 303, 307 Singh, Manmohan, 315 Single European Act, 116, 342 Sitaraman, Nirmala, 78 Skill development, 9, 331

373

Skilled labour, 264, 265, 331 Slovak National Party (SNS), 165 Slovak republic, 54 Social Action (AS), Italy, 155 Social cohesion, 127, 272, 330 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 243, 246 Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPO), 161 Social fabric, 275, 276, 280 Social integration, 88, 273, 277–281, 283 Socialisation, 131, 277 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 5 Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC), 94 Socialist Reich Party, Germany, 150 Socialists, 92, 94, 95, 98, 99, 105, 165, 254, 291, 295 Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), 311 Soft border, 343, 348–349 Soft power, 16, 18, 24, 28, 37n6, 73, 127, 136, 137 Solana, Javier, 30, 34, 47 Somalia, 73, 259, 263 South Asia, 11, 123, 132, 138, 208, 329, 342, 343, 350–355 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 123, 342, 343, 351, 353 South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), 307, 350 South China Sea, 11, 136, 140 Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 307 South Korea, 307 South Sudan, 253 Sovereign debt crisis, 2, 7, 334 Sovereignty, 5, 7, 17, 25, 30, 31, 34, 44, 45, 62, 66, 86, 111–113, 118, 140, 172, 173, 206, 216, 217, 219, 221, 274, 344, 346

374 

INDEX

Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), 93, 94 Special and Differential Treatment (SDT), 327 Sri Lanka, 294, 307, 350, 351 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), 300 Steel making, 293 Stirbois, Jean-Pierre, 170 Straits of Malacca, 136 Strong state, 148 Structural reforms, 327, 329, 330, 333, 335 Sub-national, 86–89, 100, 190 Superpower, 24, 28, 112, 115, 341 Supranational institutions, 7, 26, 27 Supranationalism, 45 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 313, 327 Sweden Democrats Party, 167 Swiss People’s Party (SVP), 164, 171 Switzerland, 9, 75, 153, 163, 164, 168, 169, 171, 185, 293, 302, 303, 306, 313 Syria, 3, 52, 53, 127, 201, 205, 206, 229, 237, 253, 255, 259, 282, 313 T Tajani, Antonio, 101 Taliban, 200 Tata Motors, 307 Tata Steel, 307 Tea industry, 293 Tea plantation areas, 293 Technical assistance, 293, 326, 328, 331 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia (TACIS), 201 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 308, 335

Telecommunication, 295 Terrorism, 8, 13, 46, 47, 50, 57, 118, 119, 127, 138, 139, 174, 200, 204, 256, 282, 329, 353 Textile, 77, 78, 293, 295, 310, 334 Tharoor, Shashi, 22 Thatcher, Margaret, 63 Three Mile Island, 238, 245 Tibetans, 263 Tillerson, Rex, 185 Tolerance, 274, 281, 283, 286 Tourism, 295 Trade, 4, 5, 8–10, 13, 19, 25–27, 32, 33, 49, 56, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73–81, 117, 118, 128, 132, 133, 136, 137, 139, 141, 182, 184, 188, 190, 193, 198, 200, 201, 205, 222–224, 230n3, 264, 265, 291–293, 295–301, 306–316, 324–330, 332–335, 344, 348, 350, 351, 354, 355 Trade in services, 224, 264, 296, 299–302, 308 Traditions, 35, 87, 88, 91, 151, 163, 172, 189, 271, 272, 274–276, 278, 280, 352 Trafficking, 52, 201, 254, 256, 265 Transatlantic partnership, 55, 57, 131, 133, 205 Transparency, 9, 33, 140, 187, 189, 248, 308, 313 Treaty of Rome, 64 Tripura, 284 True Finns, Finland, 169 Trump, Donald, 3, 4, 22, 23, 29, 30, 36n3, 54, 80, 127, 128, 147, 174, 184–186, 192 Turkey, 4, 23, 53, 73, 100, 114, 134, 158, 172, 189, 254, 255, 257 Tusk, Donald, 66, 69, 70, 80, 167, 190, 313 Two-level game, 216, 217

 INDEX 

U Uganda, 254 Ukraine, 1, 2, 51, 52, 73, 127, 128, 130, 202–206, 208, 210, 217–221, 223, 225–229, 313 UN budget, 19, 23 Unemployment, 2, 7, 63, 118, 157, 162, 174, 218, 230n3, 257, 259–261 Unilateral declaration of independence, 101 Union for the Defence of Shopkeepers and Artisans, France, 150 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 5, 44–46, 112, 115, 124, 198, 254, 341 Union of the Dutch People, 150, 152 Unipolar, 18, 43, 46, 85, 199, 202 Unitary structure, 107 United Kingdom (UK), 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 21, 23, 26–28, 34, 36n5, 37n6, 47, 61–82, 103, 113, 114, 116, 138, 150, 152, 153, 159, 172, 201, 205, 207, 219, 222, 223, 227, 230n2, 238, 244–245, 249n1, 259, 260, 264, 266n1, 277, 280, 282, 291, 293, 295–297, 301–303, 306, 312–314, 345 United Nations (UN), 17–26, 29–31, 34, 35, 36n3, 48–50, 139, 200, 202, 219, 227, 229, 255, 264 United Nations Convention on Refugees, 263 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 137 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), 181, 182, 185, 187, 189, 192 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 23, 30

375

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 253–255, 260, 261, 263 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 136 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 21–23, 25, 26, 34, 102 United Progressive Alliance (UPA), India, 228, 315 United States (US), 4, 6, 11, 23, 57, 63, 73, 80, 81, 119, 128, 135, 140, 183–186, 191–192, 200, 204, 205, 207, 227–229, 296, 302, 303 Unity amidst diversity, 271, 275 Urbanisation, 247, 315 V Value system, 278 Vatra Romaneasca/Romanian Cradle, 165 Visa, 77, 78, 111, 119–121, 124, 257, 263, 310, 349 Visegrad, 53, 54 Vlaams (Flemish) Blok (VB), Belgium, 151 Volkswagen, 224 W War on terror, 46 Waterborne diseases, 331 Wendt, Alexander, 346 West Asia, 8, 11, 13, 114, 119, 125, 133, 137, 139, 140 West Asia and North Africa (WANA), 254 Western Africa, 257 Western Balkan route, 255, 258 Westphalia, 86, 111–125 Westphalian, 26, 47, 85, 112–114, 117, 118, 124, 125, 140, 346

376 

INDEX

White Defence League (UK), 150, 153 Wilders, Geert, 147, 158, 171 Wilson, Harold, 63 Wolves, Austria, 150 World Bank, 264, 322, 332, 343, 350 World Economic Forum, 185, 189 World Nuclear Association (WNA), 242, 245 World Trade Organization (WTO), 17, 19, 26, 32, 33, 306, 310, 311, 323, 327, 334, 335 World War II (WWII), 154

X Xenophobia, 148, 279, 280 Y Yanukovych, Victor, 202, 219 Yaoundé Convention, 322 Yeltsin, Boris, 198 Yoga, 173 Young Europe, Belgium, 150 Young Nation, France, 150 Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 4 Yugoslavia, 4, 5, 199, 254