Plutarch’s Pragmatic Biographies: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in the Parallel Lives (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition)

Plutarch’s Pragmatic Biographies

Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition Editorial Board William V. Harris (editor) † Alan Cameron, Suzanne Said, Kathy H. Eden, Gareth D. Williams, Holger A. Klein, Seth R. Schwartz

Volume 43

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/csct

Plutarch’s Pragmatic Biographies Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in the Parallel Lives

By

Susan G. Jacobs

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustrations: (a) denarius of 62 BC, showing on the reverse Aemilius Paullus with his captives and on the obverse Concordia (ANS 1896.7.90), and (b) Syracusan silver stater from the period of Timoleon’s rule, with Athena on the obverse and Pegasus on the reverse (ANS 1980.109.25). Courtesy of the American Numismatic Society. Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition publishes monographs by members of the Columbia University faculty and by former Columbia students, and in addition the proceedings of conferences held at Columbia. Its subjects are: Greek and Latin literature, ancient philosophy, Greek and Roman history, classical archaeology, and the classical tradition in its mediaeval, Renaissance and modern manifestations. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2017032459

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 0166-1302 isbn 978-90-04-27660-4 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-27661-1 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by the Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York. This work is published by Koninklijke Brill NV. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

To my husband, Mark

⸪

Contents Acknowledgments xI Sources and Abbreviations xiii List of Tables xvi Introduction 1

Part 1 Training the Politikos under Rome 1 Plutarch and His Audience 13 1.1 Plutarch’s Concept of the Politikos 15 1.2 Plutarch’s Audience as Politikoi 25 1.3 Political Careers Open to the Educated Elite 31 1.4 Conclusion: Implications for Interpreting the Parallel Lives 38 2 Pragmatic Literature for Statesmen and Generals 39 2.1 Advice Literature 41 2.2 Pragmatic History 77 2.3 Individual Lives of Statesmen and Generals: Nepos and Plutarch 84 2.4 Conclusion: Implications for the Purpose of the Parallel Lives 92 3 Didactic Agenda of the Parallel Lives: Insights from the Prologues and Synkriseis 93 3.1 Statesmanship and Generalship in the Prologues 94 3.2 Statesmanship in the Synkriseis 108 3.3 Techniques for Reinforcing Pragmatic Lessons Across the Parallel Lives 118 3.4 Conclusion: Didactic Agenda of the Parallel Lives as Pragmatic Biography 120

Part 2 Political and Military Leadership 4 Pericles-Fabius Maximus 128 4.1 Introduction 128

viii 4.2 Life of Pericles 133 4.3 Life of Fabius Maximus 155 4.4 Insights from the Synkrisis 178 5 Coriolanus-Alcibiades 180 5.1 Introduction 180 5.2 Life of Coriolanus 183 5.3 Life of Alcibiades 204 5.4 Insights from the Synkrisis 225 6 Agesilaus-Pompey 227 6.1 Introduction 227 6.2 Life of Agesilaus 229 6.3 Life of Pompey 250 6.4 Insights from the Synkrisis 274

Part 3 Ruling and Being Ruled 7 Aemilius-Timoleon 283 7.1 Introduction 283 7.2 Life of Aemilius Paullus 285 7.3 Life of Timoleon 305 7.4 Insights from the Synkrisis 322 8 Demetrius-Antony 325 8.1 Introduction 325 8.2 Life of Demetrius 329 8.3 Life of Antony 345 8.4 Insights from the Synkrisis 365 9 Phocion-Cato Minor 367 9.1 Introduction 367 9.2 Life of Phocion 371 9.3 Life of Cato Minor 389 9.4 Insights from Analyzing Differences 414

contents

Contents

10 Conclusion 416 10.1 Plutarch’s Project in the Parallel Lives 416 10.2 Applying the Exempla 420 10.3 Reception of the Lives as Pragmatic Biography in the Western Classical Tradition 422 10.4 “Pragmatic Biography” versus “Explorations of Issues of Virtue and Vice” 429 Bibliography 431 Index 451

ix

Acknowledgments This book is an expansion of my doctoral thesis, completed at Columbia University in 2011, which examined deterrent lessons in statesmanship in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives. Along the way, I have benefitted from the suggestions and advice of many scholars. First and foremost, I thank Suzanne Said, my dissertation advisor, for her enthusiasm and encouragement, as well as her exacting review and commentary on the doctoral thesis central to this book. I am also grateful to my doctoral committee for their early contributions. In particular, Elizabeth Scharffenberger substantially broadened my perspective on issues of political philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, and her familiarity with the central concepts that applied to Plutarch’s conception of “political effectiveness” helped refine my thinking on this element of my argument. Rafaella Cribiore, in turn, provided thoughtful insights into the broader issues of ancient education, reception and Plutarch’s contemporary audience. I also wish to thank Deborah Steiner, the chair of my committee, and David Konstan for their suggestions on how to treat Greek theater and paideia. David Ratzan, my fellow graduate student, deserves my thanks as well for the lively discussions that helped clarify many of the issues I address in this book. I also deeply appreciate the steady support of Eleanor Dickey, not only during the graduate program at Columbia, but also while I expanded my dissertation into this book and prepared it for publication. A substantial debt of gratitude is also owed to the international community of Plutarch scholars, many of whom have offered helpful suggestions. Donald Russell, Tim Duff, Lukas de Blois and Luc Van der Stockt provided extremely useful feedback on the early formulations of my argument, while early drafts of specific chapters were kindly reviewed by several others. Specifically, I want to thank Frederick Brenk, Anastasios Nikolaidis, Christopher Pelling and Philip Stadter for their thoughtful critiques of individual chapters in Part 1, while Geert Roskam contributed valuable recommendations on the treatment of specific Lives. Special thanks are extended to Joseph Geiger for his instructive insights on my treatment of the advice literature in Chapter 2 and the Life of Cato and for suggesting that I describe the Lives as “pragmatic biographies”. Finally, I must express my gratitude to William Harris for his careful review of the complete manuscript and his critical insights and suggestions. It goes without saying that any remaining errors and shortcomings are entirely my own. I further thank the Stanwood Cockey Lodge Foundation for funding the cover images.

xii

acknowledgments

I also want to recognize the vital contribution of my parents, Gail Korneke and John A. Jacobs, whose entrepreneurial spirit and independent thinking have always been a source of inspiration energizing my pursuit of new goals. Above all, I must thank my husband, Mark Pitts, who has been an indispensable partner in all my efforts for nearly forty years. This book is dedicated to him.

Sources and Abbreviations All citations of the locations of passages from Greek and Latin sources have been taken from the Loeb Classical Library series. For Plutarch texts, the Loeb volumes have the same chapter divisions as the Teubner volumes, but because the “verse” partitions with­in each chapter are fewer in the Loeb texts, the exact citations differ slightly across the two series. The Greek texts for Plutarch reflect the fifth Teubner edition of Ziegler and Gaertner (2000–) for the Vitae Parallelae and the latest Teubner editions of Pohlenz and Hubert et al. for the Moralia (1929–). Latin texts are taken from OCT volumes, when available, and otherwise from the Loeb. The Greek translations are my own based on modifications of the Loeb translations of the Parallel Lives (by Bernadotte Perrin, 1914–26) and Moralia (by various translators, 1927–2004), while the Latin translations reflect those provided in the Loeb volumes. The individual Lives and Parallel Lives are cited using the abbreviations listed below. The synkrisis sections are cited using the name of the pair (e.g. Per-Fab) followed by the chapter and line as numbered in the Loeb volumes. The treatises of the Moralia are referenced by the English translations listed below.



Journals and Modern Works

AJP ANRW Anc. Soc. CJ Cl. Ant. CPhil CQ CR G&R GRBS Historia ICS JHS JRS LCL PCPS PIR TAPS TAPA

American Journal of Philology Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Ancient Society Classical Journal Classical Antiquity Classical Philology Classical Quarterly Classical Review Greece and Rome Greece, Rome and Byzantine Studies Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte Illinois Classical Society Journal of Hellenic Studies Journal of Roman Studies Loeb Classical Library Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society Prosopographia Imperii Romani Transactions of the American Philosophical Society Transactions of the American Philological Association

xiv

sources and abbreviations

Plutarch’s Works

Individual Lives

Abbrev.

Aratus Artaxerxes Galba Otho

Aratus Artax. Galba Otho

Parallel Lives

Abbrev.

Prologue

Synkrisis

Aemilius-Timoleon Agesilaus-Pompey Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi Alexander-Julius Caesar Aristides-Cato Maior Cimon-Lucullus Coriolanus-Alcibiades Demetrius-Antony Demosthenes-Cicero Dion-Brutus Epaminondas-Scipio (lost) Lycurgus-Numa Lysander-Sulla Nicias-Crassus Pelopidas-Marcellus Pericles-Fabius Maximus Philopoemen-Flamininus Phocion-Cato Minor Pyrrhus-Marius Sertorius-Eumenes Solon-Publicola Themistocles-Camillus Theseus-Romulus

Aem-Tim Aem. 1.1–1.8 Aem-Tim 1.1–2.12 Ages-Pomp — Ages-Pomp 1.1–5.1 Ag-Cl-Gracchi Agis 1.1–2.6 Ag-Cl-Gracchi 1.1–5.6 Alex-Caes Alex. 1.1–1.3 — Arist-Cato Mai — Arist-Cato Mai 1.1–6.2 Cim-Luc Cim. 1.1–3.3 Cim-Luc 1.1–3.6 Cor-Alc — Cor-Alc 1.1–5.2 Dtr-Ant Dtr. 1.1–1.8 Dtr-Ant 1.1–6.2 Dem-Cic Dem. 1.1–3.5 Dem-Cic 1.1–5.2 Dion-Brut Dion 1.1–2.7 Dion-Brut 1.1–5.4 Epam-Scip lost lost Lyc-Numa — Lyc-Numa 1.1–4.8 Lys-Sulla — Lys-Sulla 1.1–5.5 Nic-Cras Nic. 1.1–1.5 Nic-Cras 1.1–5.2 Pel-Marc Pel. 1.1–2.5 Pel-Marc 1.1–3.6 Per-Fab Per. 1.1–2.4 Per-Fab 1.1–3.5 Phil-Flam — Phil-Flam 1.1–3.3 Phoc-Cato Min Phoc. 1.1–3.5 — Pyr-Mar — — Sert-Eum Sert. 1.1–1.6 Sert-Eum 1.1–2.4 Sol-Pub — Sol-Pub 1.1–4.4 Them-Cam — — Thes-Rom Thes. 1.1–2.2 Thes-Rom 1.1–6.5

Sources And Abbreviations Moralia: Treatises Cited

Latin Title

xv Pages (Loeb)

Advice on Keeping Well De tuenda sanitate praecepta 122B–137F Affection for Offspring De amore prolis 493B–497E Against Colotes Adversus Colotem 1107D–1127F Consolation to Apollonius Consolatio ad Apollonium 101F–122A How to Profit from Enemies De capienda ex inimicis utilitate 86B–92F How to Tell a Flatterer Quomodo adulator ab amico 48F–74E internoscatur Old Men in Politics An seni respublica gerenda sit 783B–797F On Being Compliant De vitioso pudore 528D–536D On Borrowing De vitando aere alieno 827D–832A On Brotherly Love De fraterno amore 478A–492F On Control of Anger De cohibenda ira 452F–464D On Delays in Divine De sera numinis vindicta 548B–568A Vengeance On Exile De exilio 599B–607F On the Fortune of Alexander De Alexandri magni fortuna aut 326D–345B virtute On the Fortune of the Romans De fortuna Romanorum 316C–326C On the Glory of Athens Bellone an pace clariores fuerint 345C–351B Athenienses On Inoffensive Self–Praise De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando 539B–547F On Listening to Lectures De recta ratione audiendi 37C–48D On Listening to Poets De audiendis poetis 14E–37B On the Malice of Herodotus De Herodoti malignitate 854E–874C On Moral Virtue De virtute morali 440D–452D On Progress in Virtue Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat 75B–86A profectus On Talkativeness De garrulitate 502B–515A On Tranquility of Mind De tranquillitate animi 464E–477F Philosophers and Men in Maxime cum principibus philosopho 776B–779C Power esse disserendum Political Precepts Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 798A–825F Precepts of Health Care De tuenda sanitate praecepta 122B–137F Precepts of Marriage Coniugalia praecepta 138A–145F Sayings of Kings and Regum et imperatorum 172B–194E Commanders apophthegmata Table Talk Quaestionum convivalium 612D–748D To an Uneducated Ruler Ad principem ineruditum 779D–782F Virtues of Women Mulierum virtutes 242E–263C

List of Tables 2.1 Key components of statesmanship: Political Precepts 72 2.2 Exempla in the Moralia: Incidents tied to statesmen, philosophers and Homeric/literary characters 77 3.1 Prominent themes in the Synkriseis 109 4.1 Pericles as exemplum in the Moralia and Pericles 129 4.2 Episodes in the Life of Pericles 140 4.3 Episodes in the Life of Fabius Maximus 162 5.1 Episodes in the Life of Coriolanus 192 5.2 Episodes in the Life of Alcibiades 215 6.1 Episodes in the Life of Agesilaus 237 6.2 Episodes in the Life of Pompey 258 7.1 Episodes in the Life of Aemilius Paullus 292 7.2 Episodes in the Life of Timoleon 311 8.1 Episodes in the Life of Demetrius 335 8.2 Episodes in the Life of Antony 352 9.1 Episodes in the Life of Phocion 377 9.2 Episodes in the Life of Cato Minor 399

Introduction The question at the heart of the analysis of the six sets of Parallel Lives in this book is simple: What was Plutarch’s purpose in writing the Parallel Lives? Why did Plutarch design a framework that included a Prologue, two Lives and a synkrisis, rather than simply publish more individual Lives, like his Aratus or Artaxerxes, or another series like his Lives of the Caesars?1 Was his objective, as is now generally accepted, to spark moral improvement by fostering a more nuanced understanding of virtue and vice in private and public contexts?2 Or did he also intend, as I will argue, to provide pragmatic advice in how to handle specific practical challenges of political and military leadership? Because the Parallel Lives do not include a programmatic statement that directly explains their innovative framework3—an explanation that might have been provided in the lost Epaminondas-Scipio, the first pair in the series4—the question of Plutarch’s purpose has been a recurring issue. In the 18th and 19th centuries, scholars saw Plutarch as a would-be historian, who wrote the Parallel Lives as historical biography by reworking material from his ­predecessors.5 In the early 20th century, Plutarch’s intentions were re-interpreted to be those of a writer of moral biography, whose focus was not on “what” his subjects achieved (the subject of history) but on how the subject’s actions manifested 1  Only four of Plutarch’s individual (un-paired) Lives survive, of which two are from the Lives of the Caesars series (Otho and Galba) and two are stand-alone works—Aratus and Artaxerxes. Discussions of these works can be found in Georgiadou (1988; 2014), Ash (1997), Stadter (2005/2015), Almagor (2009; 2014a; 2014b) and De Blois (2014). See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 2  Duff (1999b: 70–71, 245–251, 257) and Duff (2011a) provide a succinct summary of this widelyaccepted view of Plutarch’s purpose. See below for a wider discussion. 3  Duff (2011b) provides an overview of the parallel framework and the function of each of its parts. 4  The first pair of Parallel Lives, Epaminondas-Scipio, which may have had a “programmatic” prologue stating the purpose of the four-part books and the series, has been lost. Whether Epaminondas was paired with Scipio Africanus or Scipio Aemilianus is unknown. For arguments on both sides see Herbert (1957) and summaries in Stadter (1989: xxviii, note 12) or Duff (1999b: 14, note 4). 5  See Duff (1999b: 5–9) for a description of the evolution of Plutarch scholarship. See Chapter 10, below, for a discussion of how the rejection of Plutarch as a reliable “historian” in the 19th century led to a rejection of the Lives as a source of pragmatic insights for statesmen and generals (as they had been used earlier), although they remained a respected source of inspiration to moral virtue.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_002

2

Introduction

key character traits (ἦθος).6 The Lives were expected to provide portraits of “paragons” of virtue or vice to inspire moral improvement, with lessons that were clear-cut and direct: “Imitate this statesman” or “Avoid the conduct of that one”. Plutarch’s focus on the character of the politikos was also recognized, and Plutarch’s lessons were seen as applicable to both public and private life. Indeed, the “politicus” and components of political aretē were the central focus of Wardman’s 1974 monograph on the Lives.7 In identifying “moral lessons” as central to Plutarch’s purpose, scholars had drawn inferences from the Prologues8 and synkriseis,9 largely relying on the content of the Prologues to five pairs (Nic-Cras, Alex-Caes, Per-Fab, Aem-Tim and Dtr-Ant) considered “programmatic” because their themes could apply to all of the Parallel Lives. In the Prologues to Nic-Cras (Nic. 1.1–5) and AlexCaes (Alex. 1.1–3), Plutarch distinguished his “Lives” from “History” and stated his desire to reveal “the signs of the soul” (τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα) (Alex. 1.3) of his heroes, including their “disposition” (διάθεσιν), “character” (ἤθους) and “temperament” (τρόπου) (Nic. 1.5). The other “programmatic” Prologues, found in Per-Fab (Per. 1.1–2.4), Aem-Tim (Aem. 1.1–8) and Dtr-Ant (Dtr. 1.1–8)10— focused on providing paradigms of behaviors to imitate or avoid. The process by which role models stimulate imitation was most clearly stated in Pericles, 6  The major shift towards treating Plutarch as a moral biographer began with Frederick Leo’s Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer litterarischen Form (1901). Shipley (1997: 2) describes the Lives as biographies that were “character studies” with a didactic purpose: “the exemplary moral, that is protreptic, purpose of the Lives was to encourage admiration and imitation of good characters”. See also Geiger (2014). 7  Wardman (1974: 19–20; 105–132) sees Plutarch helping men become “more useful and effective in politics, however local” and discusses virtues of the “politcus”. Stadter (1989: xxxiv) states that Pericles is written to inform and “to give the reader assistance in living the life of an active member of the political community”. On key virtues, see Martin (1960; 1961; 1995), Babut (1969), Russell (1973: 87–99), Frazier (1995; 1996; 2014a), Duff (1999b: 72–89), Verdegem (2005a). See Corvisier (1994) on how diseases and injuries illuminate character traits. 8  For a comprehensive review of the Prologues, see Stadter (1988), Duff (2008; 2011b; 2014). Duff (1999b: 13–51) examines five “programmatic” Prologues, while Duff (2004) reviews Dtr-Ant in further detail. 9  On function of the synkriseis, see Russell (1973: 110–113), Pelling (1986b/2002; 2005a), Duff (1999b: 249–286; 2000), Larmour (2014). 10  The key passages are found at Per. 2.2–4, Aem. 1.1–5 and Dtr. 1.5–6. As is widely recognized, these three Prologues echo the dynamic process of moral improvement Plutarch describes in the Moralia, whereby exposure to virtue automatically stimulates the observer to imitate it and emulate the virtuous man. For further discussion of key passages in these Prologues, see Chapter 3.

Introduction

3

where depictions of “virtuous deeds” were said to dispose spectators simultaneously “to be amazed” (θαυμάζεσθαι) at the deeds and “to strive to emulate the men who accomplished them” (ζηλοῦσθαι τοὺς εἰργασμένους) (Per. 2.2). Negative paradigms also played a role: by studying “base and blameworthy Lives” (τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεγομένων), readers became more eager to observe and imitate the better ones (τῶν βελτιόνων βίων) (Dtr. 1.6). Plutarch’s intention to spark imitation was clear. However, this approach to interpreting the “moral lessons” of the Lives was found to be problematic in practice because the definitive paradigms seemingly promised in these “programmatic” Prologues were not readily found in the Lives themselves.11 Not only were the heroes blends of virtue and vice—rather than “paragons” of goodness or evil—but particular types of action were sometimes praised, and sometimes criticized, depending on the context.12 As a result, the “moral biography” hypothesis has been replaced in recent decades by a new paradigm articulated in work by Pelling, Stadter and Duff13— and widely adopted by other scholars14—which has led to a new definition of Plutarch’s purpose as exploring virtue and vice from a variety of perspectives 11  The “disconnect” between the expectations created in the Prologues and the content of the Lives is discussed in Pelling (1988b: 10–13) and Duff (1999b: 66–70), raising questions about how Plutarch created pairs. Nikolaidis (2005: 316–317) suggests that Plutarch composed Lives one at a time and eventually matched up the pairs, and, in this way, could have strayed from his original intention. On the chronology of the Lives, see Jones (1966/1995). 12  The inconsistency appears both within and across Lives. Agesilaus’ violation of laws is criticized when he helps Phoebidas (Ages. 23.6–7), but praised after Leuctra (Ages. 30.4; Ages-Pomp 2.2–3). Refusal to yield to entreaty is praised when Fabius refuses to engage in battle (Fab. 19.2–4), but blamed when Phocion does not act against Nicanor (Phoc. 32.3–5). The ambiguity of Plutarch’s treatment of specific virtues and vices is discussed in Pelling (1988b: 13) and Duff (1999b: 70–71, 130–135). 13  Pelling (1988b; 1995/2002), Stadter (1988; 2000/2015; 2002a; 2003), Duff (1999b; 2004; 2007). Duff (1999b: 52–57; 70) explains this conclusion. Pelling (2004: 88–89, 97) asks whether the moral lesson was a maxim or more of a “mental exercise, stirring up our ethical sensibilities by making us wonder what it would be like to be in a very different, very challenging, moral situation”. See also Pelling (1995: 213–217/2002: 244–248). 14  Van Hoof (2010: 10), for instance, asserts that Plutarch improves his reader’s character “not through direct instruction, but through descriptive or exploratory moralism: by yielding insight into his protagonists’ characters, Plutarch not only invites the reader to form his own judgments on these, but also elicits a desire to imitate them.” Verdegem (2010b: 25– 27) finds both protreptic and descriptive moralism, while Liebert (2016) sees the Lives as political philosophy designed to engage readers in an exploration of philotimia and its role in relations between statesman and city, and between city and empire. See also Brenk (2008).

4

Introduction

and stimulating readers to reflect more deeply on problematic moral issues and derive their own paradigms. As explained by Pelling (1988b; 1995/2002), the “moralism” in the Lives was not simply “prescriptive” in narrowly-defined terms, but rather was often “descriptive” and pointed to general truths of human nature. Duff (1999b) expanded this treatment of the Lives as “descriptive moralism”, arguing that Plutarch intended to spur exploration of complex moral issues about which definitive judgments could not easily be made. This work was complemented by Stadter’s analysis of the function of the Lives as mirrors and the active role of the reader, who responded to the Lives not simply by casting judgment on the two heroes, but by also comparing himself to them and judging his own behavior.15 Based on this scholarship, the prevailing view is that Plutarch designed the Parallel Lives to highlight moral qualities in the heroes and explore complex moral issues—with the essential arguments articulated in Duff’s Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (1999).16 The Prologues are seen as introducing ethical and political themes,17 while the synkriseis18 challenge readers to reassess their judgments about the heroes’ characters and accomplishments as leaders. The content of each Life in the pair, the structure of the four-part “book” and the rhetorical devices used by Plutarch are seen as working together to involve the reader19 in an active analysis of the character and conduct of 15  Stadter (2000/2015; 2003). 16  This view is widely accepted. Pelling (1988b: 9) states that Plutarch’s moral points provide “lessons which would be useful in any sort of private or public life”, while Stadter (2000: 493/2015: 231) calls the Lives “adult moral education”. Duff (2007: 5) argues that shared values of Plutarch and his readers eliminate the need for explicit moralism. See also Pelling (1995: 217-218/2000: 246–247), Stadter (1997: 81/2015: 224), Duff (1999b: 70), Trapp (2004: 199–200), Van der Stockt (2008: 293). 17  The role of the Prologues is discussed by Stadter (1988: 283–287) and Duff (2008: 189–191). See note 8 above. 18  The synkrisis has attracted varied comment. Duff (1999b: 145) stresses “the lack of ‘fit’ between the synkrisis and the Lives” that makes the synkriseis more thought-provoking, while Stadter (2000: 507–510/2015: 243–245) describes how comparison between the Lives stimulates a third comparison to the reader himself. Verdegem (2010b: 27–32) recognizes the overlap in the political and ethical themes in the Lives and their synkrisis, but agrees that the synkrisis is intended to stimulate reflection on ethical issues. See also Erbse (1956), Pelling (1986b/2002; 2005a), Swain (1992b: 102–104), Duff (1999b: 249–257; 2000). 19  While there is general agreement that Plutarch wrote for an aristocratic audience, the age range is debated. Stadter (2000: 494–498/2015: 232–235) and Duff (2004: 276) include mature statesmen but exclude young men (like Menemachus of Political Precepts). Valgiglio (1992: 4027) includes young men based on the didactic tone of the comparative framework. Stadter (2002a: 5–6) lists Plutarch’s Greek and Roman friends, while Stadter (2002b/2015) examines the Roman audience. Duff (2007: 8–9) reconsiders the primacy of

Introduction

5

the heroes. Through this exercise, the reader derives paradigms to guide his own behavior, as well as food for thought about problematic issues where judgments are difficult to make. Ultimately, readers are expected to judge for themselves the relative merits of the heroes and which behaviors to imitate or avoid, rather than be guided to a particular conclusion.

Why Consider the Broader Paradigm of “Pragmatic Biography”?

Although the established paradigm for interpreting the Lives is generally considered “familiar and uncontroversial”,20 there are reasons to question ­whether this approach is able to capture all of Plutarch’s intended lessons. Several characteristics of the Lives suggest that a broader interpretive framework is needed. First, many Lives contain carefully-constructed descriptions of how the heroes resolved the practical challenges of managing cities, leading armies and bringing policies to fruition, including details that demonstrate how to deliberate, persuade different groups, manage rivalries and inspire obedience.21 The insights provided in these details go far beyond simply revealing the moral traits of the leader to also uncovering his strategic judgment as a statesman and general. Secondly, Plutarch often inserts authorial comments stating principles of effective leadership rather than highlighting issues of virtue or vice. For instance, Plutarch’s comments on the unreliable nature of public honors in Demetrius (Dtr. 30.4–5) or the perils of allowing weaker political allies to use one’s influence to their own ends in Pompey (Pomp. 46.2) contain a message that is instructive for statesmen rather than men in private life. Finally, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, the synkriseis pay far more attention to comparing degrees of excellence in the statesmanship and generalship practiced by the two heroes than they do in evaluating degrees of difference in their moral qualities. The pragmatic lessons specific to the public sphere can be integrated with the treatment of moral issues into a single interpretive framework if the broader paradigm of “pragmatic biography” is adopted.22 “Pragmatic biography”, as defined in this book, combines the focus of biography on the character of one Greek over Roman readers. See also Jones (1971: 48–64). See Chapter 1 for how the audience was expected to engage the text. 20  Tatum (2010b: 451) provides a succinct summary of key elements of the current paradigm. 21  For instance, deliberations are presented in Aristides (12.1–2), persuasion in Pericles (12.3– 4; 14.1–2), managing rivalries in Fabius (10.4–5) and inspiring obedience in Phocion (1.1–2). 22  The term “pragmatic biography” was suggested to me by Joseph Geiger to capture the joint objectives of revealing moral character and providing pragmatic lessons. Jacobs

6

Introduction

man and the events in his life from birth to death with the lessons in leadership included in pragmatic history.23 The ethical lessons place the spotlight on setting the proper goals in private and public life, while the means of accomplishing those goals are illustrated in descriptions of how a reputation for moral integrity, persuasive oratory and good strategic judgment lead to the successful resolution of practical problems. Unlike the current paradigm, pragmatic biography is centered on the practice of statesmanship rather than on the moral character of statesmen in isolation and, like pragmatic history, enables the reader not only to receive inspiration for moral improvement, but also to derive practical lessons in how to be effective as a political or military leader. As in pragmatic history, both the moral character of the leader—which explains his motivation and ability to win the trust and obedience of others— and the specific actions he took to produce a victory (or defeat) in particular circumstances become inseparable dimensions of the lessons for leaders. In this book, I argue that Plutarch included paradigms covering both the ethical and practical dimensions of effective leadership in his Lives, and the “pragmatic” component of these lessons, embedded in the narratives, authorial comments and synkriseis of the Lives, provided a central unifying element to the entire series.

“Good Man” versus “Effective Statesman”

When interpreted as “pragmatic biography”, the Parallel Lives are vehicles for helping the reader become, not simply “a good man”, but “a good man who is an effective statesman”. The hypothesis underlying the current study is that Plutarch wrote for an audience who had already received philosophical training in how to be good men, but still needed guidance in how to solve the practical problems they confronted in their political and military roles.24 In writing (2013; 2017a; 2017c) illustrates this approach to analyzing Plutarch’s treatment of leadership challenges in the Lives from various perspectives. 23  Pragmatic history is the category of historical writing often associated with Polybius and later historians who believed that history could provide lessons in leadership and generalship that readers could apply in their own careers. See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 24  As will be discussed in Chapter 1, the elite of Plutarch’s day, while unable to pursue empire or wage war, could benefit their cities in other ways: they could procure privileges and investment funds for their cities from the Emperor or his representatives, negotiate business deals with other cities in their province, hold magistracies in city administration and serve on embassies to the proconsul or Emperor. In the military sphere, opportunities for advancement and influence remained as well. Senior positions in senatorial and eques-

Introduction

7

his Lives as pragmatic biographies, Plutarch’s ultimate objective, I argue, was not simply to help readers “live well”, but to help them also “govern and lead well” as statesmen and generals. Recognizing Plutarch’s criteria for assessing whether an historical figure was “a good man and effective statesman” is essential to understanding the paradigms in the Parallel Lives. In a pragmatic context, political and military actions are evaluated on the basis of motives and consequences for the state, not on the basis of the action itself in isolation from surrounding circumstances. Thus, an action intended to benefit the state will be deemed more praiseworthy than the same action taken in pursuit of private interests, regardless of the outcome. For instance, Coriolanus is criticized for stopping the war and saving Rome because his motives were flawed: he acted to gratify his mother rather than to benefit his city (Cor-Alc 4.3–4). With regard to consequences, actions that produce lasting benefits for the state are applauded even if they require violations of moral principles for private life, while actions that injure the state—even if they are consistent with moral principles—are censured. Thus, for example, when Plutarch praises Phocion for refusing to bend the law to benefit his son-in law (Phoc. 22.3) while also praising Agesilaus for suspending certain laws after Leuctra (Ages-Pomp 2.2–3), he is consistently making his judgments based on the consequences for the state. Similarly, Timoleon is commended for his role in the murder of his brother, a would-be tyrant, because Corinth benefited (Tim. 5.1–2), while Cato is criticized for adhering to strict principles of moral integrity and, on this basis, refusing an alliance with Pompey that could have averted his partnership with Caesar (Cato Min. 30.6). The purpose of this book is to bring Plutarch’s pragmatic lessons for generals and statesmen into sharper focus, integrating his treatment of issues of moral virtue and vice with his practical insights into how statesmen of every era can select and implement policies that benefit the common welfare.

“Practical Ethics” versus “Pragmatic Biography”

The interpretation of the Parallel Lives as “pragmatic biography” shares several characteristics with the analysis of Plutarch’s treatises on “practical ethics”

trian careers included command of armies, with responsibility for managing the needs of the army, implementing strategies and assessing the threat of enemies on the frontier. For an overview of opportunities open to the elite, see Garnsey and Saller (1982; 1987), Braund (1988), Millar (1993; 1997; 2004), Lendon (1997), Duncan-Jones (2016).

8

Introduction

as presented by Van Hoof in Plutarch’s Practical Ethics.25 First, as Van Hoof explains, the treatises on practical ethics were not concerned with universal philosophical principles, but with how an individual should handle his interactions with his community in his private and public roles as a member of the elite.26 Plutarch in his practical ethics dealt with problems specific to the Graeco-Roman elite and offered advice on how to “avoid, or deal with, the failures, rejections and frustrations” that would arise in their social interactions and help them adopt “a more philosophical way of perceiving, evaluating and acting in society”.27 In this context, philosophy provided a foundation that worked in alliance with practical knowledge about how to meet real-world challenges.28 Similarly, the Lives, as pragmatic biography, focused on the realities of exercising authority in the Roman Empire, not on theoretical political philosophy, and demonstrated how moral character, combined with practical skills and good judgment, enabled a statesman to handle his practical responsibilities. As later chapters will show, Plutarch portrayed historical statesmen facing political and military challenges that paralleled those confronted by the politikoi of his own day and provided practical guidance in how to respond effectively. Secondly, the target audience for the practical-ethical treatises, as described by Van Hoof, was neither the masses nor philosophers, but the “politikoi and philologoi” who had received some education in philosophy and were now engaged in private or political affairs rather than philosophical study in their daily lives.29 In the same way, as I will show, the Parallel Lives were designed to address challenges faced by politikoi active in the political arena, as exemplified by the addressee of the series, Sosius Senecio.30 Finally, in both the treatises on practical ethics and the Parallel Lives, Plutarch not only stimulated readers to change their own attitudes and actions by illustrating the link between cer25  Van Hoof (2010: 257–258) includes the major “political” treatises in practical ethics, including How to Tell a Flatterer, How to Profit from Enemies, On Being Compliant, On Inoffensive Self-Praise, Philosophers and Men in Power, To an Uneducated Ruler, Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics. See also Van Hoof (2014). 26  Van Hoof (2010: 11–12; 37). 27  Van Hoof (2010: 11; 26). 28  Boulet (2014: 453) uses the term “alliance” to signify the relationship between philosophy and politics as viewed by Plato and Plutarch. 29  Van Hoof (2010: 22–25). 30  Sosius Senecio followed a senatorial path from quaestor in Achaea in the late 80s to senior commander in the Dacian Wars under Trajan. His career included the command of a Legion in Lower Germany, the governorship of Gallia Belgica, the consul ordinarius in 99, and another consulship in 107 (Jones (1971: 55–56)). See also Puech (1992: 4883), Titchener (2011: 40–43) and recently-updated PIR (second edition) on available details on Senecio.

Introduction

9

tain behaviors and their consequences,31 but also provided models of conduct to imitate or avoid.32 Indeed, many of the same historical statesmen, such as Pericles or Cato Minor, appear as exempla in the treatises and as subjects of the Lives, underscoring the contemporary relevance attached to the experiences of great statesmen of the past.33 Despite these shared characteristics, however, the treatises on practical ethics and the Parallel Lives differed in their ultimate objectives. While the trea­tises were constructed to effect internal changes in the reader in order to improve his sense of his own well-being,34 the Lives focused on enhancing the reader’s effectiveness in improving the well-being of his community.35 While having one’s moral character in order contributed to effectiveness, practical success also necessitated skills of communication and good strategic judgment about what action to take (and when, where and how) which had to be acquired through real-world experience, not training in philosophy.36 This orientation towards instructing readers in how to manipulate external circumstances to benefit the common good is not a central feature of most of the treatises on practical ethics, although in the political treatises, such as Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics, Plutarch provides practical advice on how to manage public affairs. For the most part, the treatises on practical ethics—which, in Van Hoof’s terms, fostered a “philosophical attitude” towards confronting a variety of pressures in public life37—complemented the larger agenda of the 31  Van Hoof (2010: 49–50) discusses krisis as the first step in recognizing the contours of the problem at issue. 32  Van Hoof (2010: 46–55) discusses askesis, the second step in the process of change, which includes both delineation of a program of “exercises” to cultivate new habits of behavior and the naming of particular men as positive or deterrent role models. Van Hoof points out that the same rhetorical practices of descriptive moralism—including comparisons and exempla—were employed in the treatises and the Lives. 33  Pericles, for instances, is cited nearly forty times in twelve different treatises, as listed below in Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, while Cato Minor is cited thirteen times in eight treatises. Phocion, Agesilaus and Alexander are also frequently used as exempla. Beck (2004: 107) lists Greek and Roman statesmen used as exempla in the Moralia. 34  Van Hoof (2010: 11, 34–41, 260–261). 35  Van Hoof (2010: 49, 258–259) considers the political treatises Philosophers and Men in Power, To an Uneducated Ruler, Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics as belonging to practical ethics because Plutarch offers advice on how to be successful, but she overlooks the extent to which the advice in the political treatises is designed to improve the quality of a reader’s decision-making on behalf of others, not simply his own sense of well-being. 36  Plutarch expresses the need for real-world experience in order to hone the practical judgment necessary to effective leadership at Old Men in Politics 790E–F, which is discussed below in Chapter 1. 37  Van Hoof (2010: 35, 40).

10

Introduction

Lives in promoting political and military effectiveness. By portraying historical statesmen who faced political and military challenges that paralleled his own day and linking their actions to helpful or harmful outcomes, Plutarch enabled his readers to profit from the experiences of their predecessors in city administration, diplomacy, military command and provincial governorships.

Structure of this Book

This book examines Plutarch’s project in three stages. Part 1 explores the underpinnings of Plutarch’s didactic agenda in the Lives, with chapters devoted to Plutarch’s concept of the politikos and the various public roles filled by the elite of his day, the practical advice offered to the elite in the political and practicalethical treatises of Plutarch and others, and the overlap between the themes in the treatises and the issues raised in the Prologues and synkriseis to the Lives. Parts 2 and 3 illustrate the range of pragmatic lessons for leaders supplied in six sets of Parallel Lives. Part 2, “Political and Military Leadership” draws on Pericles-Fabius Maximus, Coriolanus-Alcibiades and Agesilaus-Pompey to highlight the pragmatic advice directed to city archons, magistrates in Rome or the provinces, and military leaders, which centered on how to persuade the people or an army, how to manage political alliances and rivalries and how to identify the best policies or military strategies in different situations. Part 3, “Ruling and Being Ruled”, investigates the interactions between rulers and subject cities in Aemilius-Timoleon, Demetrius-Antony and Phocion-Cato Minor, each of which provides different lessons for the Emperor and provincial governors as “rulers” trying to secure obedience and for the provincial city leaders as “the ruled” attempting to keep Rome at bay. The final chapter summarizes the challenges of leadership that recur across the Lives and closes with a discussion of the reception of the Lives as “pragmatic biography” from the Renaissance until the 19th century,38 when doubts about Plutarch’s reliability as an historian led to a narrowing of focus to concentrate on his treatment of virtue and vice.

38  As discussed in Chapter 10, Plutarch is prominently used as a reference point for both practical and ethical insights in Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince, Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy and Art of War, Montaigne’s Essays and, among other American Founding Fathers, in the work of Alexander Hamilton. On the history of the Lives from the 14th century onwards, see Richard (1994; 2008; 2014), Pade (2007; 2014), Guerrier (2014), Frazier (2014b), Pérez Jiménez (2014), Mossman (2014).

Part 1 Training the Politikos under Rome

⸪

CHAPTER 1

Plutarch and His Audience Overview Plutarch of Chaeronea1 (c. 40/45–120) was one of the most prolific authors of the period spanning the turbulent final years of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and the more tranquil reigns of Trajan (98–117) and Hadrian (117–138). In the variety of his pursuits, Plutarch was fully a man of his time: as a wealthy,2 welleducated3 Greek living in Greece, he served his native Chaeronea as a local magistrate and ambassador;4 as a priest of Apollo at Delphi,5 he interacted with senior members of the Roman imperial apparatus; and as a Platonic philosopher, he actively engaged in philosophical discussions, wrote on a wide range of topics and is believed to have headed his own school in Chaeronea.6 Plutarch’s experiences in all of these spheres inform his writings, which include the essays, dialogues and philosophical treatises collected in the Moralia,7 the individual Lives of Aratus and Artaxerxes, two Lives (Galba and Otho) from his series Lives of the Caesars and, finally, the Parallel Lives of Greek and Roman 1  Plutarch (Dem. 2.2) mentions his choice to live in Chaeronea so that his small town would not become smaller. The town was the site of the defeat of the Greeks by Philip of Macedon in 338 BC and a later victory by Sulla (86 BC) over troops of Mithridates VI. See Jones (1971: 1–8) for background on the city’s history. 2  See Jones (1971: 8–9) on his family background and affluence at least adequate to qualify for equestrian status. 3  During his 20s, Plutarch studied under Ammonius in Athens and became a philosopher of the Platonic school. In choosing the Academy, Plutarch followed the practice of aligning himself with one of the major schools of thought—the main alternatives at the time being the Stoics and Epicureans (Trapp (2007: ix–xi)). Jones (1971: 14) places the date of Plutarch studying under Ammonius in the late 60s. Ammonius was not only a teacher in philosophy, but held the position of strategos at Athens three times, a position that involved him in city management and administration. Plutarch later acquired citizen rights there. 4  Plutarch’s activities as a local magistrate and ambassador are cited in Political Precepts 811B–C. 5  For Plutarch’s activities as a priest at Delphi, see Jones (1971: 10, 26, 28–34), Swain (1991), Stadter (2004/2015). 6  Plutarch is believed to have run a school in Chaeronea, but no details survive (Stadter (1989: xxii)). Russell (1973: 13–14) paints a picture based on comments in the Moralia. 7  Plutarch’s corpus includes nearly eighty essays and dialogues of the Moralia. The Lamprias catalogue lists additional works that are lost.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_003

14

CHAPTER 1

statesmen who were active before the advent of the Roman Empire under Augustus.8 As a Platonist, Plutarch addressed a broad array of concerns. In the Moralia, he treated themes ranging from theoretical controversies between Platonism and other schools (e.g. Against Colotes) to practical advice in various areas, including character development (e.g. On Control of Anger), daily conduct (e.g. Precepts of Health Care) and administration of public affairs (e.g. Political Precepts). His Lives, in turn, blended philosophical principles of moral virtue with practical insights into the dynamics of the political and military arenas. While other prolific men of philosophy of the late Republic or early Empire, such as Cicero and Seneca, produced works in a similar assortment of genres and range of topics, only Plutarch devoted extensive attention to Lives.9 Plutarch not only composed Lives in the formats adopted by earlier writers—namely, Lives of individual statesmen10 and of men grouped by profession11—but also created a new arrangement, the Parallel Lives, in which two Lives were paired in one book, introduced by a Prologue that brought the two subjects on stage and concluded with a synkrisis that analyzed differences between the men and their careers.12 The innovative layout of the Parallel Lives raises a variety of questions about Plutarch’s objectives in writing Lives of statesmen. To what extent did writing Lives in pairs offer an expanded treatment of issues of leadership raised in his individual Lives and political treatises? Were the paired Lives designed to provide fuller character portraits than were possible in the Moralia, where individual statesmen, such as Pericles, appeared as exempla only in narrow contexts, as Stadter (1997/2015) suggests? Did they extend Plutarch’s alliance 8  Plutarch supplies Lives of forty-six Greek and Roman statesmen in twenty-two extant pairs of Lives, with the Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi “pair” containing Lives of four statesmen. 9  See Momigliano (1971/1993) and Hägg (2012) on biography in antiquity. Stadter (2011a) demonstrates how Plutarch’s Lives fit into the genre. “Lives” tended to focus on the careers of the subjects (literary or public) with less attention devoted to private life than is found in the modern genre of biography. See also Wardman (1971). 10  Xenophon’s Agesilaus, Isocrates’ Evagoras and Polybius’ Philopoemen were prominent in the tradition. They were more encomiastic than Plutarch’s Aratus and Artaxerxes, but, like Plutarch’s Lives, combined details on youth, achievements and death. See Momigliano (1971/1993). 11  Nepos’ Lives of Illustrious Men appeared in the 30s BC, while Suetonius’ Lives of the Caesars were published under Hadrian. Nepos followed a long-standing tradition of grouping Lives by profession. 12  See Duff (2011b) for a comprehensive treatment of the content and function of the parts of the Plutarchan book.

Plutarch And His Audience

15

of philosophy and pragmatic lessons in the treatises to a new genre, pragmatic biography? Were they intended to provide paradigms readers could imitate in private and public roles and, if so, in what particular contexts? Finally, what realities did his audience face as statesmen and what practical guidance could they find in statesmen from the pre-imperial era? This chapter explores these questions, with two goals in mind. First, we examine the concept of the politikos—the political man—in the Moralia. Did Plutarch espouse Plato’s notion of the “philosopher-king”? What attributes were attached to the ideal politikos and what role did he play? Second, we take a closer look at the men in Plutarch’s audience and the functions they performed as politikoi. What political and military roles were open to them? What sort of pragmatic lessons would be useful to them in those roles? We close the chapter asking: What training or advice was available to help men acquire the practical skills and critical judgment needed to be successful? 1.1

Plutarch’s Concept of the Politikos

The concept of the politikos in Plutarch’s writing, while rooted in Platonic philosophy, is largely a practical, not a theoretical, construct. Although Plutarch wrote a Politika that might have addressed issues of the best constitution and role of the politikos from a theoretical point of view, this treatise has not survived.13 Nevertheless, Plutarch’s Platonism is evident from a variety of characteristics of his work, including in his frequent citations of Plato14 and his use of Platonic imagery and concepts in discussions of moral virtue and the role of the statesman.15 In the Moralia and the Lives, for instance, Plutarch refers directly to the concept of philosopher-king16 at Numa 20.9 and Cicero 52.4 and echoes this link between philosophy and the good ruler in the Prologue to Dion-Brutus (Dion 1.1–4).17 Moreover, Plutarch refers to the Platonic virtues 13  Aalders (1982) presents a summary treatment of the theoretical and practical aspects of Plutarch’s views of statesmanship as found in the surviving works. 14  Plato is clearly a primary reference point in Plutarch’s writings (Boulet (2014)). Various listings of parallels, citations and references between Plutarch and specific works of Plato can be found in Jones (1916: 109–153), Cohoon (1926), Helmbold and O’Neil (1959: 56– 63) and O’Neil (2004). Dillon (2014) discusses the extent to which Plutarch, as a Middle Platonist, adopted, or distanced himself from, various elements of the Platonist tradition. 15  Aalders (1982: 41, 62). 16  Plato’s concept of the philosopher-king can be found in Republic 6 and Politicus (592A7–9). 17  Boulet (2014: 449) discusses the overlap between philosophy and Plutarch’s “good ruler”. See also Duff (1999b: 90, n. 68).

16

CHAPTER 1

of “temperance, justice and practical judgment” (σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις) as the most perfect of all arts (αἵ τε πασῶν τελεώταται τεχνῶν) (e.g. at Dtr. 1.3) and quotes several Platonic maxims more than once, including the notion that solitude breeds self-will (Dion 52.5, Cor. 15.4); that it is better to be found suffering wrong than doing wrong (ἀδικούμενος ἢ ἀδικῶν, Phoc. 32.3); that the ruler should have more fear of doing than of suffering evil (τοῦ παθεῖν κακῶς μᾶλλον τὸ ποιῆσαι, 781C); and that a man must know how to rule and be ruled (Ages. 1.2–2.1, 15.4–5; 813E, 816F). Moreover, Plato is often used to illustrate exemplary conduct, including his advisory role to Dion (777A) and his use of the criticism of others to examine his own conduct, asking “Could that be me?” (“μή που ἆρ’ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος;”) (40D, 88E, 129D, 463E). However, despite the links that can be drawn between Plutarch’s comments and Plato’s works, Plutarch generally distances himself from the Platonic ideal when he depicts statesmen in action in the treatises of the Moralia and in the Lives. For instance, in On the Fortune of Alexander (328E), Plutarch describes Plato’s Republic as not implemented by others because of its austerity (διὰ τὸ αὐστηρόν).18 Elsewhere in Plutarch’s works, philosophers do not perform well as practicing politicians, as, for instance, when Xenocrates fails in negotiations with Antipater (Phoc. 26.2–4).19 Even in the Lives of Lycurgus and Numa, which come the closest to depicting Plato’s ideal state (in the Sparta of Lycurgus) and ideal king (in Numa), significant deviations from that ideal are integrated into Plutarch’s characterizations of these leaders.20 Moreover, in the Parallel Lives, Plutarch is not always consistent in applying Plato’s constructs: sometimes he portrays the people in Platonic terms—as wild beasts needing to be tamed—and sometimes as a group able to recognize and respond to virtue in a ruler.21 Even Plutarch’s notion that participation in politics is a noble choice for a philosopher is a departure from Plato, for whom the contemplative life was the best life.22

18  Boulet (2014: 449). 19  Van Raalte (2005: 93–94). 20  On Lycurgus-Numa, see Van Raalte (2005) and Boulet (2014). On Dion-Brutus as philosopherkings, see Dillon (2008; 2010). 21  Trapp (2004: 197). See Said (2004) on Plutarch’s depiction of the people. 22  Centrone (2005: 260) sees Plutarch using Plato as a catalyst for critical analysis of the concepts. Pelling (2014: 150–152) explains that Plutarch used Plato’s imagery and concepts as a backdrop against which his portrayals in the Lives could be compared and contrasted, thereby fostering reflection.

Plutarch And His Audience

17

These characteristics of Plutarch’s use of Plato are consistent with the Middle Platonism of his era,23 which incorporated elements of Peripatetic and Stoic thought. These elements included Aristotle’s notions of “the mean”, virtue as a habit24 and degrees of virtue25 and the Stoic concept of duties (τὰ καθήκοντα),26 which defined the proper behavior of the individual towards those with whom he had social or political relations. Hershbell (2004) argues that Plutarch saw politics and ethics as closely linked—rather than the unity they formed in Plato—and, like Aristotle, based his treatment of practical politics “more on personal experience than on theory”.27 Moreover, during the early Empire, philosophy was increasingly seen as a practical subject that instructed young men in the “art of living”, which required ongoing self-examination and character formation throughout adult life.28 Similar ideals of self-development were shared by Platonists, Peripatetics and Stoics, leading to a common focus 23  On the eclectic nature of Middle Platonism, see Dillon (1996: 207–222; 2014), Hershbell (2004: 151–154), Centrone (2005). 24  Plutarch adhered to Aristotle’s concept of virtue as a “habit” maintained through practice—rather than an ideal state to which one aspires—and as an action done for the right reason, at the right time and in the right manner. Plutarch’s theory of virtue and vice, presented in On Moral Virtue, largely corresponds to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. See Dillon (1996: 184–230), Trapp (2007). 25  Plutarch also accepted Aristotle’s notion of “degrees of virtue” (as opposed to absolute concepts of virtue and vice)—whereby actions could be compared based on whether they were closer to, or further from, the degree of passion appropriate to the situation. This concept is adopted in On Moral Virtue (243B–D) and On Progress in Virtue (83E– 84A). In the Lives, degrees of virtue are discussed in the Prologue to Phoc-Cato Min. (Phoc. 3.4–5) and are reflected in the assessments in the synkriseis, where the reader is expected to evaluate which man had a greater degree of virtue (or lesser degree of vice) in a particular area. For this reason, the pursuit of virtue required an ongoing effort as well as the ability to judge actions not readily categorized as unambiguously “virtuous” or “vicious”. On Aristotle in Plutarch, see Aalders (1982: 63), Hershbell (2004: 155), Becchi (2014). 26  Practical directives on how to incorporate philosophy into public dealings belonged to “duties” (τὰ καθήκοντα). Performing “duties” involved honorably managing real-world interactions to produce the best outcomes and often required a man to prioritize his obligations as a son, kinsman, friend, citizen, administrator, soldier or general. 27  Herschbell (2004: 155). 28  Although philosophia continued to be a comprehensive field—“combining”, as Trapp (2007: 10) explains, “the knowledge of reality, authoritative instruction in how to think and feel and live, and privileged access to the higher levels of the universal hierarchy”— there was a greater emphasis, compared to earlier periods, on the development of the individual. This approach to integrating philosophical principles into daily life is reflected in Plutarch’s On Progress in Virtue, which offered advice on how to monitor and improve one’s character.

18

CHAPTER 1

on four “cardinal” virtues: courage, justice, temperance and practical judgment (ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις).29 For Stoics and Platonists, a man educated in philosophy was expected to mold the character of the people in his community through his own example of virtuous conduct, prudent advice and continuous efforts on behalf of the common good.30 For Plutarch, as a Platonist, appropriate conduct towards the community meant placing the common welfare ahead of one’s own private interests, including acts of beneficence towards that community and initiatives to preserve the liberty, harmony and well-being of all groups within the state. The concept of “political virtue” (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή) embraced excellence in all of these activities—from cultivating moral improvement in others through one’s own virtuous character to taking effective action to improve the conditions of life in the community.31 Political virtue was deemed the “most complete” or “perfect” virtue (τελεώτατα)32 because it combined the qualities of a virtuous character (courage, temperance and justice), a willingness to place the good of the community ahead of self-interest (magnanimity) and effective action on behalf of the common good (φρόνησις).33 Thus, one of the essential elements of “political virtue” as defined by Platonists is practical experience acquired by managing affairs in the military and political arenas. It is the need for such experience that induces Plato to require the “guardians” be over the age of fifty, Aristotle to keep young men out of the ranks of the political leaders, and 29  Trapp (2007: 134). 30  Trapp (2007: 195). See also Trapp (2014; 2017). 31  The distinction between the “virtue” of a statesman (politikos) and of a “good man” is based on the sphere in which virtue is exercised (public versus private action) and those on behalf of whom action is taken (the common good of the state as a whole versus the individual caring for his soul). Both Aristotle and Plutarch agree that the highest expression of practical virtue for human beings is “political virtue”. Since public virtue benefits more people than private virtue, public virtue is a “higher degree” of virtue than virtue in private life. 32  Aristotle uses this same adjective when he states that the good of the state is “manifestly a greater and more perfect good, both to attain and to preserve” (μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν) than the good of an individual alone (NE 1.2.8). Also see Plato Politicus 303E–305E. This perspective is reflected in Philosophers and Men in Power (777A–B) where philosophers serve as advisors to men active in public life because moral virtue in a leader benefits the community as a whole. 33  The phronesis (practical judgment) of a statesman determining the best means to achieve a practical end is distinct from the phronesis needed to assess the degree of passion that is appropriate to each situation to achieve ethical virtue. The attributes statesmen must cultivate are presented in Political Precepts, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. On Aristotle’s treatment of phronesis, see Sherman (1989: 36–7, 53–4, 88–91), Price (2011).

Plutarch And His Audience

19

Plutarch to argue that old men should stay active in politics. In addition to ethical virtue, political virtue included excellence in the art of generalship, the art of persuasion and the art of administration. Plutarch, as a Platonist, embraces this comprehensive definition of political virtue and, therefore, in his writings for men in the political arena, he addresses conduct in all of these areas.34 From Plutarch’s perspective, therefore, failures in statesmanship could occur for a variety of reasons, often having nothing to do with moral vice. In many cases, statesmen injure their states through misjudgments about the best course of action or through an inability to persuade others to adopt the best course—challenges also recognized by Aristotle.35 The Parallel Lives depict a number of successes or failures in statesmanship caused by each of these factors, rather than by moral vices. For instance, Plutarch traces the war leading to the Battle of Leuctra to Agesilaus’ willingness to bend justice for his allies (Ages-Pomp 1.4) and the takeover of Athens by Cassander to Phocion’s misjudgment about how to manage relations with foreign legates (Phoc. 32–33). In the Lives, the ultimate basis for evaluating a man’s effectiveness as a statesman is the benefit or injury to his state under his leadership, regardless of the degree to which he can be rated a “good man” based on his self-mastery. Aalders (1982) argues that Plutarch’s political philosophy, while not traceable to one source, clearly centered on the Greek polis of the 4th century and the Greek ideals that good governance of the city was the “highest art” and that the ability to rule and be ruled was the essential virtue of the citizen.36 Plutarch’s comments throughout his corpus indicate that he defined good governance as moderate, attentive to the desires of the people and dependent on persuasion rather than force to win obedience.37 This picture was one of leadership by the consent of the governed—whose obedience to authority was based on good-will rather than coercion.38 The primary objective of the ruler was to foster happiness in his people by leading them toward virtue and

34   Political Precepts, for instance, instructs Menemachus not only to cultivate his moral character, but to develop effective skills of persuasion, constructive responses to challenges from opponents and enemies, and pragmatic approaches to meet threats to the prosperity, liberty, security and harmony in his state. 35  Aristotle at Politics 7.12.1–3 states that securing the common good requires more than ethical virtue: it is also necessary to identify the proper goal to aim for and to determine the practical actions needed to reach that goal. Failure to secure the common good can arise from errors in either one or both of these areas. 36  Aalders (1982: 10–11). 37  Aalders (1982: 32–33). 38  Pelling (2014: 158).

20

CHAPTER 1

liberty—key ingredients for the practice of virtue and achieving happiness.39 Moreover, these same principles could be applied not simply to the interactions between leaders and citizens in cities, but also to those between the ruler and subjects in an empire.40 In an empire, as in a city, the ruler was a guide for the attitudes and behavior of the people, and therefore his standards of moral conduct determined the “moral value” of the regime. Ultimately, Aalders concludes, for Plutarch “it is not the political system, but the quality of the ruler41 and the way in which he exercises rule that is of decisive importance.”42 While Plutarch’s surviving works provide only glimpses of his ideal state,43 his concept of the practicing politikos in his own day is revealed in treatises dedicated to narrower issues and considered part of his body of “practical ethics”.44 These treatises, which are fundamental to our interpretation of the Parallel Lives as pragmatic biography, fall into three general groups: philosophical treatments of the ideal ruler and his relationship to philosophy and philosophers (Philosophers and Men in Power, To an Uneducated Ruler45), treatises offering practical advice on how to manage a political career and administer a provincial city (Political Precepts, Old Men in Politics) and, third, targeted discussions of how to handle specific pressures facing men in the political arena (How to Profit from Enemies, On Being Compliant, On Inoffensive Self-Praise, How to Tell a Flatterer, On Exile, On Tranquility of Mind and On Control of Anger). Despite his fundamental allegiance to Plato, in none of these treatises did Plutarch place the “philosopher-king” at the center of his treatment of statesmen in action, but instead incorporated a more “disjointed” model in which “philosophy” and “political leadership”, rather than being fused into one entity, worked together in an alliance—a term used by Boulet46 to distinguish Plutarch’s conception from the “unified” Philosopher-King. This joint effort is 39  Van Raalte (2005: 97–100) quotes Lyc-Numa 2.1–4 on this point. 40  Aalders (1982: 62) and Centrone (2005: 575). 41  Aalders (1982: 45). Aalders (1982: 35–36) points to Numa (6.2–4, 20) as linking the good king to a man who is “morally principled, just, generous and peace-loving” and who is devoted to his subjects and administering justice. 42  Aalders (1982: 33). 43  Centrone (2005: 560) says the surviving works permit us only to reconstruct the general lineaments of Plutarch’s political theory. 44  Van Hoof (2010). 45  Here, and throughout the book, Philosophers and Men in Power refers to Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum (776B–779C), To an Uneducated Ruler to Ad principem ineruditum (779D–782F), Old Men in Politics to An seni respublica gerenda sit (783B–797F) and Political Precepts to Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (798A–825F). 46  Boulet (2014: 453).

Plutarch And His Audience

21

clearly depicted in Plutarch’s most theoretical political works, Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler, which approach the relationship between the philosopher and the ruler from opposite sides.47 In Philosophers and Men in Power,48 Plutarch advises philosophers to become counselors to political leaders, using arguments rooted in Platonic philosophy. By cultivating virtue in the ruler, philosophers not only helped him to live a better life as a private man, but also enabled him to better fulfill his functions as a ruler by dispensing justice (779B), inspiring confidence and obedience (777E–F) and being solicitous about the needs of his subjects (776D, 778F). In To an Uneducated Ruler,49 in turn, Plutarch appeals to the ruler to seek out the guidance of philosophy and to recognize that it is through philosophy that he can set a pattern for his subjects to follow (780B) and acquire the virtues that will make him a true representative of Zeus’ justice and goodwill (781F–782A).50 In these two works, Plutarch often illustrates key principles with statesmen and philosophers who appear in the Lives. In Philosophers and Men in Power, for instance, Plutarch cites Anaxagoras’ influence on Pericles and Plato’s influence on Dion to exemplify the principle that a philosopher who fills a statesman with a love of honor (ἀναπλήσῃ καλοκαγαθίας) benefits many through one (777A),51 and these relationships are included in the Lives as well (Per. 4.4–5.1; 6.1; Dion 4.4–7; 17.1–5).52 Similarly, in To an Uneducated Ruler, the principle that it is appropriate for a ruler to feel fear on behalf of his subjects “lest, without him noticing, they suffer harm” is illustrated both by Epaminondas patrolling 47  Boulet (2014) and Zecchini (2012) treat these works from this perspective. 48  For a comprehensive treatment of Philosophers and Men in Power, see Roskam (2009). 49  For key themes in To an Uneducated Ruler, see Roskam (2009: 66–68). 50  As Centrone (2005: 560) notes, this notion of the ruler as assimilated with God is rooted in Plato, and Seneca’s king is presented as God’s representative as well. 51  Because Plutarch was a philosopher, his discussion of statesmanship in the Moralia (as well as the Parallel Lives) is often seen as intended to incite contemporary statesmen to virtue. For instance, Stadter (2002a: 6) suggests that Plutarch, in advising statesmen, may be emulating Plato’s attempt to advise Dionysius. Jones (1971: 103–104) links Plutarch’s treatment of statesmanship to moral virtue. See also Stadter (1997/2015). 52  The Parallel Lives are replete with philosophers aiding statesmen. For instance, Socrates educates Alcibiades (Alc. 4.1–5; 6.1–4); Aristotle trains Alexander (Alex. 7.2, 8.5); Cato Minor has discussions with Athenodorus (Cato Min. 10.1–2; 16.1), Antipater the Tyrian (4.1) and Demetrius and Apollonides (65.5, 69.1); Phocion studies under Xenocrates (Phoc. 4.1– 2), Pompey consults Cratippus (Pomp. 65.3–4) and Philopoemen is trained by Ecdemus and Demophanes, who later believed that “through philosophy … they had made him a common benefit to Greece” (ὡς κοινὸν ὄφελος τῇ Ἑλλάδι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀπεργασόμενοι) (Phil. 1.4).

22

CHAPTER 1

the walls alone while the Thebans celebrated a festival and by Cato Minor making sure the Romans had safely embarked from Utica before he committed suicide (781C–D). The Platonic virtues of temperance, justice and practical judgment are central goals, but Plutarch’s ruler is also advised to emulate the kindness (φιλάνθρωπον), good order (εὐνομίας), truth (ἀληθείας) and mildness (πραότητος) of the divine (To An Uneducated Ruler 781A).53 For Platonists, therefore, a distinction could be drawn between “political virtue”, as exercised by men managing public affairs, and the more general attributes of “moral virtue”, which governed conduct in all areas of private and public life. Although both philosophers and statesmen could inspire moral improvement in others through their own virtuous conduct, their aims differed: the philosophos searched for truth and educated others in philosophy, while the politikos took an active role in governing the state.54 Plutarch describes the two ways of life in Old Men in Politics (796D–F), where each life is presented as an all-consuming activity, but while philosophers infused every activity with the goal of philosophy and truth, the statesman was dedicated to good governance of his city: Socrates … was a philosopher and was the first to show that life, in all parts and in absolutely all experiences and affairs, admits philosophy. This is the way we must think about statesmanship.… The man who is … truly statesmanlike … always acts as a statesman by (1) urging on men in power (παρορμᾶν), (2) guiding those in need of guidance (ὑφηγεῖσθαι), (3) helping those deliberating (συμπαρεῖναι), (4) turning those acting badly from their purpose (διατρέπειν), (5) encouraging men who are rightminded (ἐπιρρωννύναι) and (6) making it clear that he does not approach public affairs as a sideline (μὴ παρέργως), but, even if he is not present in person, he is present in thought and through inquiry. Old Men in Politics 796 D–F

Thus, although the activities of the philosophos and politikos both involved continuous effort, the challenges they faced in fulfilling their functions were

53  See Chapter 2 for a broader discussion of the details of Plutarch’s advice in this treatise. 54  Van Raalte (2005: 90–94, 103–108) discusses how the difference in perspective on philosophical and pragmatic roles shows up in Plutarch’s Themistocles, Pericles and Phocion and further recognizes that, in addition to moral principles, the philosophos needed the power to persuade. See also Trapp (2004: 192).

Plutarch And His Audience

23

different.55 This difference is directly referenced in Pericles, where Plutarch distinguishes Pericles’ need for wealth from Anaxagoras’ poverty:56 The life of a speculative philosopher (θεωρητικοῦ φιλοσόφου) and of a statesman (πολιτικοῦ), I think, is not the same thing. The former rouses his mind toward noble things without instruments and without need of outside material, while the latter, who mixes his excellence with the needs of mankind, sometimes might need wealth not only as one of the necessary things, but also one of the noble things, just as it was also for Pericles, who assisted many of the poor. Per. 16.6

As this example suggests, with respect to performing his practical duties, the politikos had less in common with the philosophos than he did with experts in other practical arts, such as pilots of ships or physicians, who also acted to protect the physical well-being of those under their care and brought their skills to bear on a constantly changing set of practical challenges.57 For this reason, different criteria had to be used in judging the conduct of a politikos as opposed to other men. In the Lives, for instance, Plutarch not only applies a different standard to Pericles and Anaxagoras in their attitudes to money, but in Phocion judges Phocion’s refusal to arrest Nicanor as acceptable conduct in a private man acting in his own interest, but as highly blameworthy in a general responsible for protecting his city (Phoc. 32.3–6). While the specific practical advice Plutarch offered to statesmen administering cities in his own day will be discussed in the next chapter, it is important to note here the overall scope of Plutarch’s concerns. Political Precepts treats a wide range of practical functions that require both a moral foundation of temperance, mildness, justice and dedication to the common good, as well as critical judgment about how to administer the city, maintain harmony 55  The goal of the politikos is to create an environment conducive to the practice of virtue— which required liberty, tranquility and prosperity. Reaching this goal involved endless struggles to resolve conflicts and implement good policies—efforts often characterized as “contests” (e.g. Dion 1.2, Pol. Prec. 798B, Old Men in Politics 783B). 56  Van Raalte (2005) discusses this example. 57  Moreover, the politikos, like any practitioner of an art, could only become proficient through “hands-on” experience and, early in his career, needed guidance until he acquired sufficient experience to make effective judgments on his own. The politikos under a “democratic and legal government” is a man who has accustomed himself to be ruled for the public good no less than to rule (ἀνδρὸς εἰθισμένου παρέχειν αὑτὸν οὐχ ἧττον ἀρχόμενον ὠφελίμως ἢ ἄρχοντα) (783D).

24

CHAPTER 1

between groups, foster prosperity and conduct diplomacy to protect its liberty and security.58 Indeed, in this treatise, moral virtue is not desirable for its own sake, but as a tool of effective leadership: it produces a reputation for incorruptibility that makes a statesman more persuasive, and it empowers reason to guide his judgment on behalf of his state.59 However, successful handling of relations with various groups (including the people, colleagues, rivals, friends, subordinates, superiors and the overlord), as well as effectively implementing the best policies, are less a matter of moral character than of good critical judgment which is acquired through real-world experience in tackling problems. Old Men in Politics displays the alliance of philosophy with practical statesmanship somewhat differently, since the focus is on convincing old men to stay active so that the state can benefit from their experience and judgment.60 Here, philosophy is the source of Plutarch’s argument that it would be dishonorable to abandon one’s city (783C) and that no greater pleasure exists than benefiting one’s fellow man (786B–D).61 The essay underscores the importance to the state of the practical judgment gained from experience, which can be transmitted by old men who become mentors to the young: Treatises on navigation do not make ship captains of men who have not often stood on the stern as spectators of the battles against wave and wind and stormy night.… Having read a book or noted down a lecture on statesmanship in the Lyceum, would a young man be able to rightly manage a state (πόλιν ... μεταχειρίσασθαι) and guide the people or the council (κυβερνῆσαι δῆμον ἢ βουλὴν) if he had not also acquired knowledge in the midst of dangers and problems, having often stood beside the driver’s rein and pilot’s oar, leaning this way and that with the popular leaders 58  On the purpose and content of Political Precepts, see Swain (1996: 161–183), De Blois (2004) and Trapp (2004). Summaries of the traits of the ideal statesman in Political Precepts can be found in Hamilton (1969: xxiii), Trapp (2004: 192–193), De Blois (2004: 57–58), Beck (2004: 108–109), Teodorsson (2008: 341–342). 59  Roskam (2008: 333) in his analysis of Plutarch’s advice on entry into public life comes to a similar conclusion: “the virtuous behavior is here not introduced as an end in itself, but as a means to gain fame and power. Accordingly, an attack on virtuous leaders is here rejected, not (only) because it is immoral, but (primarily) because it does not contribute to the power and fame of the politician”. 60  For discussions of Old Men in Politics, see Swain (1996: 183–184), Centrone (2005: 581), Trapp (2007: 194–195, 202–203, 223–224, 237–238), Pelling (2014: 153–154). 61  Trapp (2004: 194–195). The argument that virtuous conduct in a ruler on behalf of his subjects brings pleasure to the ruler is also presented by Seneca in De Clementia, which is discussed in Chapter 2.

Plutarch And His Audience

25

and generals contending for victory (ἀγωνιζομένων) with the aid of their experiences and fortunes? Old Men in Politics 790 D–E

Like Political Precepts, Old Men in Politics shows that training in philosophy, while essential, is insufficient to instill all the competencies and judgment needed to fulfill the role of the politikos.62 These two treatises, together with Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler, present the philosophical and pragmatic dimensions of Plutarch’s paradigm of the “politikos in action”. They are supplemented by treatises designed to help readers address specific challenges: properly using self-praise in debate (On Inoffensive Self-Praise), overcoming the reluctance to “say no” to other political figures (On Being Compliant), controlling anger or resentment at criticism or rejection in public life (On Exile, On Profiting from Enemies, On Tranquility of Mind) and recognizing flatterers among your associates (How to Tell a Flatterer). In these treatises, the reader’s dedication to cultivating moral virtue and eradicating vice is taken for granted, and the discussion focuses on conduct that will enable the politikos to perform his political and military roles honorably and to best effect for the common welfare.63 1.2

Plutarch’s Audience as Politikoi

Who exactly was the target audience for these treatises, which joined the philosophical concept of the politikos with his pragmatic functions in the Roman Empire? The work by Van Hoof (2010) on the treatises on practical ethics, as noted in the Introduction, has demonstrated that Plutarch was writing for members of the educated elite who could be categorized as philologoi or politikoi, but were not professional philosophers.64 A similar conclusion 62  Seneca makes a similar point in distinguishing between the benefits of reading versus observing men in action at Ep. Mor. 6.5–6: “You must go to the scene of action, first, because men put more faith in their eyes than in their ears, and second, because the way is long if one follows precepts, but short and helpful, if one follows patterns” (In rem praesentem venias oportet, primum quia homines amplius oculis quam auribus credunt, deinde quia longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla) (Ep. Mor. 6.5). This reasoning provides a context for interpreting Plutarch’s Lives as vehicles for training readers in proper conduct. 63  Van Hoof (2010). 64  See Van Hoof (2010: 22–25) on the audience of philologoi and politikoi, also discussed above in the Introduction.

26

CHAPTER 1

applies to the addressees named for the treatises on politics and the Parallel Lives, which also suggest that the targeted reader is a man active in public life.65 By age, the dedicatees of Plutarch’s political treatises66 range from Menemachus (Political Precepts), a young man from Sardis on the verge of beginning his public career, to Euphanes (Old Men in Politics), an “old man” considering retirement from his public career in Athens. In between, stand an array of men well-established in political careers and, possibly, Trajan himself (Sayings of Kings and Commanders).67 Philopappus (addressee of How to Tell a Flatterer), a descendant of the last King of Commagene, was adlected into the senate by Trajan, made a suffect consul in 109 and served as agonothete of the Dionysia in Athens; Cornelius Pulcher (How to Profit from Enemies) was descended from an old house in Epidaurus, had equestrian status and served as a procurator in Epirus under Trajan, as a iuridicus of Hadrian in Egypt and as high priest of the Achaean Council;68 and Herculanus (On Inoffensive SelfPraise) was a Roman senator from Achaea. Sosius Senecio, the recipient of the Parallel Lives, as noted earlier, rose along a senatorial path and held positions as quaestor in the 80s, consul ordinarius in 99 and 107 and as legionary commander in the Dacian wars.69 The only addressee named in the individual Lives was Polycrates,70 who, in Aratus, is described by Plutarch as a man who is not unworthy (οὐ καταισχύνεις) of his ancestor in either reputation or influence and for whose sons Plutarch had written Aratus to preserve an account of their ancestor’s achievements that would stimulate the young men to similar accomplishments when they had grown up (Aratus 1.3–4). As members of the politically-active elite, Plutarch’s audience for these political writings, including the Lives, shared the traits attached to the philologoi and politikoi who formed the audience for the treatises on practical ethics.71 The 65  See Jones (1971). Stadter (2002a: 5–6, 23 n. 25 and n. 26) summarizes the dedicatees of treatises, noting that Greek and Roman leaders are about equally represented, including ten works dedicated to nine different Romans and twelve works to eleven different Greeks. See also Stadter (2015). 66  See Jones (1971) for details on Menemachus (pp. 43, 110–111, 116–117), Euphanes (pp. 28, 110), Philopappus (pp. 32, 59, 76), Pulcher (pp. 45, 111), Herculanus (pp. 41, 46) and Sosius Senecio (pp. 55–57, 62). 67  Beck (2002) argues that Trajan is the addressee. 68  Pulcher is mentioned as having Political Precepts at hand for reference (How to Profit from Enemies 86D). 69  Stadter (2002a: 5) notes that Senecio was about fifteen years Plutarch’s junior. 70  On Polycrates, see Jones (1971: 40, n. 43). 71  For treatments of Plutarch’s Greek and Roman audience, see Stadter (2000/2015; 2002a; 2002b/2015; 2015), Duff (2007), Van Hoof (2005; 2010). For the perspective of Josephus’ Roman audience, see Cotton and Eck (2005).

Plutarch And His Audience

27

key attributes of this group included wealth, participation in social functions and entertaining imperial legates, service on embassies to Rome and euergetism in their communities.72 Routine references in the texts further suggest that the men were well-educated, proficient in Greek and familiar both with Greek literature and with the various schools of philosophy. Nearly all these treatises include references to Plato and other philosophers, to Euripides and other tragedians and to poets or historians whom the reader was expected to recognize. Moreover, some of the elite, such as Philopappus and Sosius Senecio, also took an interest in philosophical conversation, as reflected in their participation in Table Talk, which itself was addressed to Senecio. Through the variety of treatises addressed to him, Sosius Senecio exemplifies the broad range of philosophical and practical interests of Plutarch’s audience: On Progress in Virtue provided guidance on assessing one’s moral character and conduct in daily life,73 Table Talk sparked reflection and debate on a wide array of philosophical and practical topics74 and the Parallel Lives, as I will show, blended treatment of moral issues with pragmatic lessons in political and military leadership that Senecio could apply in his career under Trajan. The subject matter of the political treatises—as well as On Progress in Virtue—and the Parallel Lives format itself further suggest an audience that sought intellectual stimulation that required active engagement with the text, as opposed to passive entertainment. As noted above in the Introduction, Van Hoof describes the practical-ethical treatises as combining a descriptive moralism—wherein Plutarch linked certain types of conduct to favorable or unfavorable consequences without citing a general precept—with specific procedures for first assessing one’s own conduct and then pursuing a series of actions to train oneself to adopt different behavior.75 Similarly, in the Lives, Plutarch uses a variety of narrative techniques to engage the reader in self-criticism.76 Not only does Plutarch distinguish between readers seeking 72  Key passages, cited in Jones (1971: 43–44), include On Inoffensive Self-Praise (547D–F), On Exile (602C, 604B), Political Precepts (805A, 814D) and Table Talk (630, 632F, 679C). 73  Passages that “characterize” Sosius Senecio in On Progress in Virtue include direct address at 75B and Plutarch’s use of the second person singular verbs at 75D. 74  Sosius Senecio is addressed in the introduction to each book of Table Talk: 612C, 629C, 644F, 695E, 672D, 686A, 697C, 716D, 736C. He is host and speaker in Table Talk 1.5: 622C–623D; speaker in 2.1: 629E–F; speaker in 2.3: 635E; 636E–638A; speaker in 4.3: 666D–667A; and is addressed at the conclusion of Table Talk 9.15: 748D. He is also addressed directly in the Lives at Thes. 1.1, Dion 1.1 and Dem. 1.1 and 31.7. 75  Van Hoof (2010: 47–48, 57–64, 159) discusses the roles of krisis and askesis in first recognizing the flawed behavior and then taking steps to change one’s habits. See Introduction. 76  For discussions of Plutarch’s narrative techniques, see Pelling (1985/2002), Stadter (1988; 2000/2015), Duff (1999b; 2004; 2007; 2011a).

28

CHAPTER 1

entertainment and those seeking edification from what they read (Per 1.1–2.3; Dtr. 1.5), but he structures the Parallel Lives to involve the reader in comparison and contrast of the character and careers of the paired heroes. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the Prologues to several Lives refer to the upcoming exercise of analyzing the differences between the two men (Aem. 1.8, Dem. 3.5, Phoc. 3.5, Per. 2.5 and Agis 2.5), while the synkriseis often incorporate comments evoking a discussion about the relative merits of the heroes. Moreover, as Stadter (2000) notes, by creating Lives for individual statesmen, Plutarch was able to present a continuous narrative of edifying incidents mentioned separately in treatises addressing different precepts. Since the reader could more easily “see himself” in these unified portraits, the subjects of the Lives could better serve as “mirrors” before which the reader would compare himself and find areas in need of improvement.77 Although Plutarch targeted a similar audience with his political treatises and his Lives, readers were expected to respond differently to the two types of writings. While readers of practical ethics are seen as receptive to the spur to self-examination and to practical guidance in how to improve themselves and their effectiveness in public roles, the readers of the Parallel Lives are generally assumed to be seeking food for thought rather than a guide to action in situations where issues of virtue and vice become murky.78 Pelling (1988b; 1995/2002) described the moralism of Plutarch’s Lives as a blend of expository and descriptive moralism, in which specific directives about behavior to imitate or avoid were rare while illustrations of human nature and how character traits impacted the course of careers were dominant.79 Duff (2007) explains how the audience is expected to engage the text: since moral injunctions are unnecessary because the reader shares Plutarch’s values, the Lives serve as a catalyst for re-examining this value system.80 Moreover, it is widely accepted 77  The image of the mirror was also used in On Progress in Virtue (85A–B), where past statesmen were referred to as role models who served as mirrors, and Senecio was instructed to use his analysis of the actions of others as a catalyst for judging, not the character of other men, but his own. Plutarch also references historical statesmen as mirrors in the Prologue to Aem-Tim (Aem. 1.1) and in the Preface to Sayings of Kings and Commanders (172D). On the “mirror” image in Plutarch, see Duff (1999b: 32–34), Stadter (2000/2015; 2003), Zadorojnyi (2010), Frazier (2011). 78  See Introduction, n. 13. 79  According to Pelling (1995: 218–220 /2002: 247–249), the Lives offered new perspectives on well-known morals: it may seem that Plutarch is telling them what they already know, but readers are exposed to new perspectives on their initial presumptions, which provoke reflection rather than direct a change in behavior. 80  Duff (2007: 3).

Plutarch And His Audience

29

that Plutarch depicted key strategic decisions, not to provide lessons in leadership, but to reveal the presence or absence of specific moral traits in the hero.81 From this perspective, Plutarch chooses statesmen as the subjects of his Lives because he is writing for an audience of statesmen who would more readily emulate the moral qualities of men like themselves rather than philosophers or men living outside the political arena.82 Thus, despite the fact that the Lives present key incidents in the careers of statesmen and generals, Plutarch is widely assumed to have concentrated on descriptive moralism without providing significant pragmatic lessons in confronting political or military challenges.83 However, there are several reasons to reconsider this view of the reader’s involvement with the Lives. The conclusion that pragmatic political advice is absent from the Lives can be traced largely to the misinterpretation of three of Plutarch’s comments about “Lives” and the role of statesmen. First, in the Prologue to Alex-Caes (Alex. 1.1), Plutarch’s comment that “it is not History I am writing, but Lives” (οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους)—and that therefore he might include “a phrase or a jest” that reveals character rather than record details of major battles— has been interpreted to mean that Plutarch has also set aside the pragmatic lessons in leadership that history had to offer.84 However, it is worth noting that an emphasis on moral character and the omission of detailed accounts 81  For instance, Pelling (1995: 214–215/2002: 245–246) argues that the morals revealed in Philopoemen “are not enough to make this Life into a manual for contemporary statesmen and anyone seeking more specific political advice would search in vain.… Readers would be hard put to it to extract any specific guidance for their own political lives.” 82  The use of statesmen to provide lessons in moral virtue to an audience of statesmen is discussed by Jones (1971: 103–104), Stadter (1988: 292–293), Duff (1999b: 65), Stadter (2000: 494/2015: 233–234; 2003), De Blois (2004: 1–3) and Pelling (2004: 88). While Wardman (1974) recognizes that the “conduct of men in public life” lies at the center of Plutarch’s agenda, he still perceives the goal to be the creation of exempla of virtue and vice. Tritle (1992: 4266–4275) sees Plutarch elucidating Phocion’s character as a “virtuous politicus”. 83  Pelling (1995: 215–217/2002: 244–246) sees the overlap between the theme of contentiousness and greed in the Lives and the contemporary experience of Plutarch’s readers, but concludes, based on Political Precepts 814A–C, that Plutarch hoped his audience would be “too sensible to assume too close a correlation between the glorious deeds of the past and anything that might be practicable in present circumstances”. 84  Aalders (1982: 10), Pelling (1988b: 10–11) and Duff (1999b: 14–17) conclude that Plutarch’s comment that he is not writing history meant that his focus was moral character, implying that practical lessons in leadership were not a central part of his agenda. Lintott (2013: 1–2) interprets Plutarch’s separation of his Lives from “History” as an indication that Plutarch’s objective is to evaluate his subjects according to philosophical moral principles.

30

CHAPTER 1

of the greatest battles did not preclude Plutarch from providing pragmatic lessons in leadership—which were revealed by linking a leader’s relations in the public arena and his strategic decisions with their beneficial or harmful effects on the city, precisely the type of connections Plutarch routinely emphasizes in the Lives. Secondly, Plutarch’s comments in Political Precepts that the statesman should not use accounts of great military victories of the past to inspire the people (814A–B) and should take care not to provoke the Roman authorities (813E–F) are interpreted to mean that the present political milieu was divorced from the past in ways that prevented direct imitation of famous Greek leaders in the political arena of Plutarch’s day.85 Again, Plutarch’s recognition of the narrower scope of political activity compared with the Greek city-state did not indicate that he believed all of the meaningful parallels had been erased. To the contrary, Plutarch routinely used historical statesmen as paradigms of actions to take or avoid in practicing contemporary statesmanship in Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics, clearly signaling that he still saw significant overlap in the challenges faced by men of the past and present. Finally, Plutarch’s comments that one should not lie down at the doorstep of others (On Tranquility of Mind 470C–D) or miss one’s public duties (On Exile 602C–F, 604B–D) are misunderstood as rejections of public careers centered in Rome—a judgment which, if correct, would substantially reduce the need for pragmatic advice on managing relations between ruler and ruled.86 However, Plutarch’s remarks in these treatises relate to the motives behind such actions, not to the actions themselves: such conduct should be avoided unless undertaken to serve the common welfare of one’s state. The politikos willing to dedicate himself to advancing the welfare of his community by building his influence in Rome still had a key role to play. To the extent that parallels existed between the political arenas of the past and present, Plutarch’s depictions of political and military leadership in the Parallel Lives could become “mirrors” of effective and ineffective statesmanship that his readers could use to guide their own actions in similar situations. Plutarch’s use of historical statesmen to exemplify principles of contempo85  Van Hoof (2010: 27) notes that the changes in the political environment made the practical experience of past statesmen largely irrelevant to contemporary challenges. Trapp (2004: 189–200) discusses the sense of limits versus past statesmen. See also Desideri (2001: 83–91). 86  Pelling (1988b: 7–8) interprets Plutarch’s comments at On Tranquility of Mind (470C–D) and Political Precepts (814D–E) as an indication of Plutarch’s detachment from contemporary politics.

Plutarch And His Audience

31

rary political conduct in Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics suggests that he did in fact see such parallels. However, to appreciate the extent to which Plutarch used the Lives to exploit the potential for historical statesmen to provide paradigms of leadership for the elite of his own day, it is necessary first to understand the specific contexts in which the readers of the Lives would see parallels between the challenges they faced and those confronted by statesmen of the past. In this regard, several questions are key: What functions did they perform in the various roles open to them and what practical skills were needed to be effective? What criteria defined a “good performance”?87 Given the differences in political milieu versus the pre-imperial era, how would Plutarch’s audience put the pragmatic insights from the Lives to practical use in fulfilling their responsibilities in each position? 1.3

Political Careers Open to the Educated Elite

In the Roman Empire of the late first and early second century, the educated elite could pursue a variety of careers in public life.88 Because of the practice of euergetism throughout the Empire, whereby wealthy citizens of the cities were expected to finance major events and projects from time to time, no member of the wealthy elite was entirely disengaged from the life of his local c­ ommunity.89 However, for those seeking an active political career, three key avenues for advancement were open: military and political careers along the senatorial or 87  A good summary is provided by Trapp (2007: 166–168). In Duncan-Jones (2016), advancement appears to be heavily linked to family wealth and social standing based on the differences in how far men in various elite subgroups rose in the political structure. However, this analysis does not preclude competition for slots within those subgroups where merit could also have played a role. 88  Discussions of the career paths open to the elite of the first and second centuries can be found in Lendon (1997), Trapp (2007) and Duncan-Jones (2016). Salmeri (2000: 54–61) discusses the careers of men from Asia Minor who entered the Roman Senate. Hammond (1957) examined the changing composition of the Senate based on a sample of Senators whose origin was known (35–50% of the total) and found that the share of provincials among those of known origin rose from 16.8% under Vespasian to 34.2% under Trajan and that, among provincials, the share from Eastern provinces more than doubled from 16.7% to 34.6% over that period—a rise that suggests that the opportunities for advancement in Rome were growing for the Greek elite during Plutarch’s lifetime. 89  Dio Chrysostom, at Or. 34.1, states that “it is customary” both here and elsewhere for citizens to “mount the platform and give advice”, especially “those who have honorably performed liturgies for the state”.

32

CHAPTER 1

equestrian tracks—both centered in Rome—or a political career in the cities of the provinces. It was also possible for a man holding Roman citizenship to shift across these paths if he qualified for equestrian or senatorial status as a result of his wealth or a grant from the Emperor.90 Although these paths were not equally accessible to the members of the Greek and Roman elite—with no Greeks recorded as progressing to the most senior senatorial positions in Plutarch’s day91—the presence of both Romans and Greeks among Plutarch’s addressees suggests that the challenges and opportunities associated with all of the career tracks were of interest to his audience. The Senatorial Career Track Advancement in a senatorial career included alternating military and civic administrative posts. The path for young men whose families had achieved senatorial status began with a position either as a military tribune, whose duties included supervising a camp and disciplining troops,92 or as one of the vigintiviri, minor magistrates for overseeing lawsuits, managing prisons, minting coins or maintaining roads within the city of Rome. The young man could advance to the quaestorship at the age of twenty-five, when he became eligible for election93 to one of the twenty positions filled each year. As quaestor, he was attached to the Emperor, a consul or a provincial governor and had financial, judicial and military duties, the most important of which was tracking the receipt and disbursement of funds. This position also marked his entry into the Senate.94 This post might be followed by an aedileship (four per year), with administrative responsibilities in Rome, such as oversight of the streets, water supply or market. With subsequent attainment of a praetorship (twelve per year)—tasked with civil jurisdiction and criminal courts, overseeing (and financing) games 90  Pliny the Younger, for instance, began his career as an equestrian tribune, but entered the Senate by his early 20s through the patronage of family friends (Syme (1958: 75–84)). An equestrian could also be adlected by the Emperor and thereby admitted to the privileges and honors of the praetorship, quaestorship, aedileship or other public offices without having to perform the duties. 91  As discussed by Duncan-Jones (2016: 36–44, 70–72), Asia, Africa and the top military posts were still out of reach of the Greek elite in Plutarch’s day. 92  One of the six tribunes assigned to each of the roughly thirty legions had senatorial rank. Their duties included managing soldiers’ exercise, inspecting the guards, overseeing provisions and distribution of rations, punishing certain offenses and hearing complaints of the soldiers. See Digest, 49.16.12 and Campbell (2002: 166, n. 135). 93  After Tiberius, the Senate held elections, often ratifying the Emperor’s choices, especially for higher positions. 94  The Senate was restricted to 600 members after Augustus.

Plutarch And His Audience

33

and, at times, presiding over the Senate—a man received imperium as a magistrate and could then become governor of a public (senatorial) province or a legate of a legion in an imperial province.95 The highest civil magistracy, the consulship, had become, under the Empire, primarily an honorary position,96 but it made a senator eligible to serve as governor in the most important provinces (earmarked as proconsular).97 Provincial governorships held the greatest individual responsibility, overseeing all administrative, judicial98 and military matters, with assistance provided by quaestors and legates, as well as, on occasion, curatores99 appointed to investigate or supervise the finances of specific cities. The crown of a senatorial career was a governorship of either Asia or Africa, provinces whose governors were named by the Emperor and commanded an army. Trajan’s career reflects advancement along this path,100 as does that of Sosius Senecio.101 Throughout this progression, the senator could participate in the monthly meetings of the Senate, which continued to administer Rome, hear certain court cases, conduct debates and issue senatus consulta, which had the effect

95  Legates were senators serving on the staff of a military commander or governor. A legate of consular rank (legati Augusti) governed each imperial province except Egypt—which had equestrian officers. Each legion was commanded by a senator of praetorian rank (legatus legionis), subordinate to the governor. Legati Augusti rarely held more than two senior commands. In 68 AD of thirty-six provinces, eleven were senatorial and twenty-five imperial. Of the imperial, fifteen were under legati (senators) and ten under equestrian procuratores or praefecti. On duties of commanders, see Goldsworthy (2003: 164–185), Campbell (2002: 51–55). 96  The consulship was filled by either the Emperor or men he recommended for the post (through his commendatio). The number of consuls was often expanded to include additional pairs of suffect consuls after a brief tenure of the consules ordinarii who gave their name to the year. 97  Cappadocia, Dalmatia, Pannonia, Britannia, Germania (Upper and Lower), Moesia, Dacia, Syria Coele, Africa and Asia were proconsular provinces. 98  Governors visited the various assize centers (conventus) of their province according to a fixed rotation in order to hear cases and conduct judicial business. 99   Curatores were drawn from the ranks of senators, equestrians or provincial aristocracy. 100  Trajan, born into senatorial rank, was military tribune in the 70s, legionary legate in Spain in the 80s, consul in 91 and governor of Upper Germany in 97. Nerva adopted him as son and co-ruler in 97 and named him consul ordinarius in 98. See Syme (1958), Waters (1974), Goodman (2012: 73–75), Duncan-Jones (2016). 101  As noted above, Senecio was quaestor in Achaea in the 80s, tribune and praetor in the 90s, legate in Germany, consul ordinarius in 99 and 107, and a senior general under Trajan in the Dacian Wars (Jones (1971: 55–56)).

34

CHAPTER 1

of law.102 A senator could also serve on the Emperor’s consilium, where he might influence the administrative, judicial or military policy of the Empire. The Equestrian Career Track The equestrian track also included positions in military and civic administration.103 Equestrians generally received their office from the Emperor and reported directly to him. While being named a holder of the public horse (equo publico) or a juror on one of the four or five boards of jurors was largely honorary, appointments to the officer corps or procuratorships in the civil administration of the Empire were connected to specific duties. The young eques began his career with three military posts (tres militiae),104 followed by appointments to senior civil administrative positions, such as procurator105 responsible for financial administration of a province, prefect in charge of corn supply in Rome or the praetorian prefect in charge of the Emperor’s bodyguard. The pinnacle of an equestrian career was the prefecture of Egypt. By the late 1st century, several posts were reserved for equestrians,106 including a studiis (cultural and literary advisor), a bibliothecis (director of the imperial libraries) and ab epistulis (supervisor of imperial correspondence). A Career in the Provinces The third path for the educated elite—especially the Greek elite of the provinces—centered on city administration and managing relations with the 102  The Senate served as a source of rule-making (as senatus consulta acquired the force of law) and as a court when it tried its members (chiefly on charges of extortion). It also (from 14 AD onward) elected magistrates (often ratifying the selections of the Emperor) and conferred power on new emperors to establish their legitimacy. 103  Duncan-Jones (2016: especially Chapters 9–12) discusses the opportunities open to the equestrians. 104  The tres militiae included being prefect of a cohort (praefectus cohortis), a military tribune (tribunus legionis), and prefect of a cavalry unit (praefectus alae). 105  Ten provinces of the thirty-six in 68 AD were governed by equestrian procurators or prefects. Certain minor provinces (e.g. Judaea and Noricum) were governed by prefects or procurators, without any legions. 106  Bradley (1998: 4). Suetonius advanced through these positions under Trajan and Hadrian. Equestrians, like senators, could serve on the Emperor’s consilium. Earlier, Pliny the Elder achieved equestrian rank through the patronage of Q. Pomponius Secundus (consul 41) and served in Germany alongside Titus. After an active legal practice under Nero, he was the equestrian governor (procurator Augusti) in two minor provinces (70–77) and a member of the consilium of Vespasian and Titus before being given command of the fleet at Misenum (praefectus classis). See Syme (1958: 60–62), Pliny’s Epistulae (6.19).

Plutarch And His Audience

35

Emperor, the provincial governor, imperial procurators and other cities in the province. Rome was largely interested in two services from cities: maintenance of order and collection of taxes.107 However, demands also included supplying provisions, hospitality and transport to the Roman army when needed.108 The cities themselves were responsible for local administration, tax collection, law and order, city finances and building projects.109 The “price of admission” to a career in provincial politics was sufficient wealth to provide funds to meet the public expenditures associated with any particular post. Indeed, all rich residents, regardless of whether they held office (or were even citizens), were expected both to perform liturgies (especially the financing of games or roads) and to respond with additional assistance on new building projects and during emergencies (especially with corn purchases).110 Administrative positions in the cities paralleled the functions of the aediles, quaestors, praetors and consuls in Rome, but the positions in the provinces, unlike Rome, were unpaid.111 Moreover, nearly all posts in provincial government were tied to the direct financing of the public activities associated with that position, and magistrates were expected to absorb at least part of the expenses of their departments.112 The wealthy citizen also paid an “entry fee” upon joining the city council (βουλή), which was charged with selecting city officials and formulating the rules or regulations for the city which were then “ratified” by the votes of the assembly. The highest civic position—the archonship—was generally held for

107  Braund (1988: 1). 108  Campbell (2002: 86). Menander Rhetor (2.374) cites—as two manifestations of justice in a provincial governor—moderate burdens of taxation and troop support, as well as maintaining just laws and contracts. 109  Building projects often required approval from the governor, but they were executed, once approved, by the cities. At times, Rome intervened in financial matters of specific cities via curators or correctors. 110  Jones (1940: 172, 247) lists the most common liturgies. On euergetism, see Zuiderhoeck (2009). 111  Reynolds (1988: 31–33). See also Talbert (1996). 112  Jones (1940: 247). The magistrates in charge of the market and food supply (agoranomi and sitonae) were expected to provide food during a shortage; the gymnasiarch (in charge of the gymnasium) to assure supplies of oil; priests to furnish victims for sacrifice; the over-seer of the games (agonothete) to provide hospitality to athletes and artists at the games; the “high priest” to assure the funds for processions, public sacrifices and banquets; and even advocates and ambassadors to pay their own travelling expenses. See also Reynolds (1988).

36

CHAPTER 1

one year.113 The prestigious position of high priest of one of the cults was often held for one’s lifetime.114 A member of the aristocracy could also represent his city in a variety of diplomatic capacities: as a liaison with the governor, on missions to other cities in the region, as a member of the provincial council or as an ambassador to the Emperor in Rome. Friendly relations with the provincial governor, procurators and financial curatores were essential if a city were to retain or enhance its privileges and status.115 In this capacity, skills in oratory could be helpful, and famous sophists are often found performing these functions.116 While embassies could be ceremonial or honorific—and designed to build goodwill—they also could be tied to specific requests for funds for local projects, for changes in status, or for laws that would benefit the city.117 The provincial council (κοινά; concilium) served a variety of purposes, including communicating messages from the governor, proposing honors and overseeing ceremonies and games tied to the imperial cult.118 As noted earlier, Plutarch pursued a career in the provinces, holding a variety of administrative, religious and ambassadorial positions.119 Because of the operation of patronage in the granting of offices, a member of the elite from the Greek East could pursue an equestrian or senatorial career by being adlected by the Emperor into the appropriate rank or by acquiring access to lower positions through patronage.120 As noted earlier, the pace at which men from eastern provinces were granted senatorial status appears to have accelerated between the reigns of Vespasian and Trajan.121 Arrian, for in113  See Jones (1940: 162), Reynolds (1988: 25). 114  For details religious matters, see Jones (1940: 227–240). 115  The cities had to interact with the procurator in making their tax payments and often needed the approval of the governor before specific building projects could move forward. 116  Dio’s orations present him in these roles, which were not uncommon for sophists. See Bowersock (1969: 43–58). 117  The Emperor could grant (1) immunity from taxes; (2) approval to hold games or religious festivals; (3) permission to establish temples or cults to the Emperor; (4) changes in ranking that brought privileges, such as the right to hold the assize courts, to be the provincial capital or even to be labeled as a metropolis or first city. The status of an assize center was a high privilege, comparable to being named a center for the imperial cult. There was much rivalry among cities for these privileges (Reynolds (1988: 25)), as reflected in Dio’s City Orations. 118  See Reynolds (1988). 119  On Plutarch’s career, see notes 3–6, above. 120  For access through patronage, see Lendon (1997: 11–13, 66–67) and Duncan-Jones (2016). 121  See n. 88 above.

Plutarch And His Audience

37

stance, began his career in Bithynia, but after being adlected to senatorial rank by Hadrian, he was consul, served six years as legate of Cappadocia (131–137 CE) and held the archonship in Athens (145/6) in retirement. Perspectives on Cultural Identity The educated elite addressed by Plutarch included Romans who had been educated in the Greek intellectual heritage, as well as Greeks—such as Arrian—who were pursuing the social and political opportunities offered by Rome. These two groups would have approached Plutarch’s Lives from different perspectives.122 As noted by Wallace-Hadrill, the members of the Roman elite would have enjoyed social position based on their Roman ordo, but could acquire standing as “learned men” only from Greek paideia.123 Conversely, members of the Greek elite inherited their Greek cultural heritage, but their status within the Empire would depend on their involvement with the Roman imperial structure. Stadter describes the environment in Plutarch’s day as a “middle ground” between distinct identities and total fusion, a milieu in which “the Greek and Roman threads were still distinct but interwoven so as to form one cloth”.124 Plutarch’s treatises in the Moralia span the full range of overlapping and distinct elements. Among the political treatises, for instance, Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics address issues confronted by the Greek elites active in administering provincial cities and interacting with the Roman authorities as an outside influence best kept at a distance, to the extent possible.125 Other treatises, such as On Being Compliant or On Inoffensive Self-Praise, would have equal resonance for Greek and Roman readers.

122  The discussions of the extent to which the Roman and Greek cultural identities were distinct or intertwined cover a range of views. Bowie (1970) and Swain (1996; 1997) emphasize elements of distinctness, while Wolfe (1996) and Whitmarsh (2001) discuss a blending of identities. For a comprehensive treatment of these issues from various perspectives, see Gruen (1984), Preston (2001), Whitmarsh (2005), Wallace-Hadrill (2008), Madsen and Rees (2014), Cortés Copete (2015). Madsen (2009) discusses the cultural engagement between Bithynia and Pontus and the Roman Empire. Madsen (2014: 31–32) argues that Plutarch had a “double view “of Roman rule: while it had stopped the warfare among Greeks—and thereby imposed necessary law and order—it also threatened the Greek cultural values that ruled in provincial communities. 123  Wallace-Hadrill (2008: 3–7). See Duncan-Jones (2016) on the differences in the sources of status for the Roman and Greek elites. 124  Stadter (2015: 2). 125  For a broader discussion of these treatises, see Chapter 2.

38 1.4

CHAPTER 1

Conclusion: Implications for Interpreting the Parallel Lives

Two aspects of the political and military roles played by the educated elite are important in assessing Plutarch’s objectives in the Parallel Lives. First, despite the advent of the Empire, the practical challenges of executing administrative, judicial and military functions were similar in many respects to those faced by men in classical Greece and Republican Rome. As a result, the experiences of statesmen of the past in resolving problems in these areas could be instructive for Plutarch’s contemporaries. Secondly, the career paths included a variety of civic, diplomatic and military posts, and effective performance of the associated tasks often called for proficiency in specialized skills. While descent, wealth and patronage might often have carried more weight than merit in securing a position, as Duncan-Jones (2016) argues, success in that position could require competency in finance (quaestor, procurator), law (praetor, consul, governor) and oratory (advocate or ambassador), as well as shrewd political and strategic judgment (as governor, archon or general). Moreover, with open positions often smaller than the number of men seeking them, the competition for these slots could be intense.126 From this perspective, Sosius Senecio, as well as others pursuing public careers, could benefit both from advice related to the skills of persuasion and from pragmatic insights about how to be more effective in the positions of authority open to them. Indeed, such assistance was being offered in specialized treatises, orations, letters, pragmatic histories and Lives of statesmen and generals. The breadth of topics covered in this “advice literature”, which in itself suggests wide recognition of the need for specialized instruction, is reviewed in the next chapter. As we will see in the next chapter, Plutarch provided specific pragmatic advice for his politically active readers in his Moralia and individual Lives. Will these same concerns of practical leadership carry over into his Parallel Lives as well?

126  Trapp (2007: 167) notes that positions were aggressively sought: “Beneath the apex of the pyramid of power, however, there was a rich array of subordinate positions of responsibility, which were both essential to the smooth running of the city of Rome and the central functions of empire, and coveted objects of aspiration and competition for the politically active elite: not only the old system of magistracies, inherited from the Republic, from aedile to consul, but also the new positions invented or reconceived for the new world of the imperial court, from secretary (ab epistulis), one each for Greek and Latin correspondence, to Prefect of the Praetorian Guard.”

Chapter 2

Pragmatic Literature for Statesmen and Generals Overview What kind of guidance, apart from “on the job training” was available to men after they had embarked on political careers demanding a variety of specialized skills? A course in paideia culminating in rhetoric or philosophy, while instilling the principles of moral virtue and honorable conduct, offered little exposure to, or practice in, the administrative and leadership skills needed in a public career.1 Under the Republic, the requisite skills and pragmatic insights were largely gained through experience in the public arena, beginning with the tirocinium fori2 when young men accompanied and observed their mentors in action. During the late Republic and early Empire, however, literary works offering advice on how to handle specific responsibilities of political and military life were available in a variety of forms. While the need for practical advice for statesmen may have been circumscribed in Plutarch’s day because authority ultimately rested with the Emperor, the range of works offering guidance on how to be effective in public roles suggests that this topic remained of considerable interest. Cicero’s De Officiis, Seneca’s De Ira, De Clementia and De Beneficiis, Book 12 of Quintilian, Pliny’s Panegyricus and Epistulae and Dio’s Kingship Orations and City Speeches were directed to the philosophicallyeducated man active in the political arena—the same audience targeted by Plutarch’s practical ethics and political treatises. Works containing practical lessons for statesmen fall into three categories: advice literature, pragmatic history and Lives of statesmen. “Advice literature” includes treatises, orations and letters that instructed men active in the public arena—from the Emperor and military commanders to municipal office holders and provincial leaders. Plutarch’s Political Precepts, as well as the works by other authors mentioned above, are examples in this category. “Pragmatic history”, as written by Polybius and later historians, offered advice indirectly. By going beyond reporting events to assessing related circumstances—such as 1  See Marrou (1956), Clark (1971), Bonner (1977) and Morgan (1998) on the normal course of paideia. 2  The practice of the tirocinium fori, whereby a young man was attached to a mentor, and other forms of apprenticeship are discussed in Marrou (1956: 191, 233–35, 290ff.), Clark (1971: 31ff.), Skidmore (1989: 18).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_004

40

Chapter 2

underlying causes, motives of the actors, challenges of implementing strategies and the long-term consequences of victories or defeats—these histories enabled readers to distil practical lessons to apply in their own careers.3 The Lives of statesmen, the third category, depicted their heroes as blends of virtue and vice, linked major achievements (or failures) to specific strategic decisions and offered pragmatic insights for statesmen and generals.4 All of these categories presented historical leaders as exempla. Crafting exempla to incite imitation was familiar in Greek literature, beginning with Homer’s Phoenix using Meleager’s example to motivate Achilles to return to battle (Iliad 9). In the Roman tradition, the reverence for ancestors as role models to emulate was also well-established.5 However, by the late Republic, exempla were no longer concentrated in Roman leaders, but included historical figures of all eras and nations based on their moral character and effectiveness in office. While this practice was evident in Cicero and Sallust, among others, it reached full expression in Valerius Maximus. As Skidmore6 explains, the decline in the character of the nobility after the defeat of Carthage—described by Sallust—meant that Roman aristocrats could no longer automatically be considered worthy of imitation.

3  This treatment of statesmen as exempla illustrates the “utilitarian” aspect of history, which went beyond entertainment to inspire readers to modify their behavior. On pragmatic history, see Walbank (1972: 55–60; 66–96), Sacks (1981: 122–144; 171–186), Fornara (1983: 104–134), Sacks (1990: 23–36), Eckstein (1995), Duff (1999b: 52–53, 57–59; 2003: 58–59). “Utility” also included distinguishing the effects of Fortune from good judgment and foresight, enabling readers to better evaluate the exempla offered by famous men (Walbank (1972: 60–65)). 4  Xenophon’s Agesilaus, for instance, emphasized virtues and discussed actions topically, not in chronological order. Nepos’ Lives, like pragmatic history, commented on character traits and depicted actions chronologically, with groups of Romans and Greeks presented in parallel to facilitate the examination of qualities specific to generals or statesmen in their public roles. See Geiger (1985; 1988) and Momigliano (1971/1993). 5  On exempla and exemplarity in the late Republic and Empire, see Chaplin (2000), Roller (2004), Kraus (2005), Barchiesi (2009), Langlands (2011; 2014; 2015), Cairns (2014), Möller (2015). On Valerius Maximus, see Skidmore (1989) and Bloomer (1992). See also Morgan (2007), Lowrie and Lüdemann (2015). On exempla in Cicero, see Van der Blom (2011), Baraz (2012: 50–54; 59–60); in Seneca, see Braund (2009: 61–64, 154, 238), Roller (2015; 2016). 6  Skidmore (1989: 19–21).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

2.1

41

Advice Literature

The pragmatic concerns of the politikos differed in Rome and the provinces. Officials in senatorial or equestrian positions largely enforced laws set by the Emperor, while officials in the provinces had some scope to expand the autonomy and improve the quality of life of their citizens—provided they maintained harmony in their city and paid the taxes owed to Rome.7 During the late Republic and early Empire, Roman and Greek writers offered advice ranging from general principles of honorable conduct to specific precepts on how to be effective in positions along the senatorial or equestrian cursus or in provincial administration. This advice was available for men entering public life (such as Cicero’s son, Marcus, Epictetus’ students or Menemachus, the recipient of Plutarch’s Political Precepts), as well as for men in authority, such as Nero and Trajan, Seneca’s Lucilius and other addressees,8 recipients of Pliny’s letters9 and, as discussed above, the dedicatees of Plutarch’s political treatises. The need to supplement theoretical principles with practical insights into how to manage specific situations is articulated by Seneca in Epistulae Morales 94 to Lucilius: Some say: “If one is familiar with upright and honorable dogmas, it will be superfluous to advise him.” By no means; for this person has indeed learned to do the things which he ought to do; but he does not see with sufficient clearness what these things are. For, we are hindered from accomplishing praiseworthy deeds not only by our emotions, but also by want of practice in discovering the demands of a particular situation. Our

7  For primary concerns of Roman oversight of subject cities, see discussion in Chapter 1. 8  As noted by Griffin (2005: 545) many of Seneca’s addressees were senators or equites pursuing political careers: Lucilius (De Providentia, Quaestiones Naturales, Epistulae Morales) was procurator of Sicily, Paulinus (De Brevitate Vitae) was Prefect of the Corn Supply and Serenus (De Constantia Sapientis, De Tranquillitate Animi, De Otio) was the Prefect of the Fire Brigade. Seneca’s Epistulae Morales indicate that Lucilius became an equestrian “through his own efforts” (44.1) and at the time of the letters had advanced to the position of procurator in Sicily (43.2, 45.2). On the Epistulae Morales, see also Griffin (1976: 347–353), Conte (1994: 413–415), Dihle (1994: 93–95), Trapp (2007: 56–58). 9  Pliny’s audience for his Epistulae included more than a hundred different addressees—apart from Trajan—including young men to whom he was serving as a patron, professional colleagues and older men who had assisted him earlier in his career. See Radice (1969b: 21–24) and Griffin (2005: 551–555). On Plutarch’s audience, see Chapter 1.

42

Chapter 2

minds are often under good control, and yet at the same time are inactive and untrained in finding the path of duty, and advice makes this clear. Seneca, Ep. Mor. 94.32

Such “advice”, Seneca continues, is delivered in the form of precepts that give order to duties (officia praeceptis disponuntur), including justice (iustitia) and practical judgment (prudentia) (Ep. Mor. 94.33).10 Seneca voices a view shared by other authors of practical ethics when he further states that both training (disciplina) and practice (exercitatio) are indispensable (Ep. Mor. 94.45): a man has to be trained if he is to understand “when he should do certain things, and to what extent, and in whose company, and how, and why” (quando oporteat et in quantum et cum quo et quemadmodum et quare) (Ep. Mor. 95.5).11 Without this training, a man cannot “strive with all his heart after what is honorable” (toto animo ad honesta conari) (Seneca, Ep. Mor. 95.5).12 The same problem is later voiced by Gellius.13 Like Seneca, other prolific authors, including Cicero, Dio Chrysostom and Plutarch, provided guidance for men across the political spectrum—from city magistrates to the Emperor—sometimes concentrating on general principles of good leadership (e.g. Dio’s Kingship Orations or Plutarch’s Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler) and sometimes providing practical step-by-step instructions on how to perform specific duties or handle common managerial and administrative challenges (e.g. Cicero’s De Officiis or Plutarch’s Political Precepts). The works of advice examined below are grouped into four categories: general advice for the political arena, advice for Emperors or provincial governors, advice for generals and advice for city leaders and magistrates. 10  “Honorable conduct is, to be sure, brought about by precepts, but not by precepts alone” (actiones honestas et praeceptis fieri, non tantum praeceptis) (Ep. Mor. 95.6). Seneca sees parallels between the practical arts of the pilot or physician and the art of living as taught by philosophy, but the art of living also requires mastery of forces such as greed, hope and fear (Ep. Mor. 95.8). The parallel tasks of solving crises are mentioned at Ep. Mor. 75.6–7. 11  See Van Hoof (2010: 48) and the discussion of krisis and askesis in the Introduction. 12  At Ep. Mor. 71.2, Seneca states this distinction: when a person decides what to do or avoid, he must first consider the relation of the action to the “supreme good” (ad summum bonum) and to the purpose of his whole life (propositum totius vitae). Actions must be in harmony with the chief purpose of a man’s life, and the supreme good is consistent with actions that are honorable. The equality of “what is good” and “what is honorable” is discussed at Ep. Mor. 71.4ff., 74.30, 76.16, 87.25ff. and 118.7–10. 13  Gellius makes a similar point when he complains that he receives only the general principle from philosophers, but not the practical guidance needed to know exactly what to do in each specific case (Attic Nights 1.3.15).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

43

General Advice for the Political Arena Works offering general advice for statesmen commonly treated one or more of three issues: (1) cultivating moral character as the foundation of an honorable life; (2) balancing expediency and moral virtue when acting on behalf of the common good; and (3) prioritizing duties and managing relationships in the political arena. Cicero, Seneca and Quintilian provided the broadest range of recommendations, while the contributions of Epictetus, Pliny and Dio were more narrowly targeted. Plutarch treated these topics in essays such as How to Profit from Enemies, How to Tell a Flatterer, On Inoffensive Self-Praise and On Being Compliant, often using statesmen who also appear as subjects of Parallel Lives to illustrate his central precepts,14 lending credence to the hypothesis that the Parallel Lives were written as pragmatic biography, providing paradigms of practical skills, as well as moral attributes. Cultivating Moral Character The first common concern was cultivating moral character as the foundation of an honorable life. Cicero designed De Officiis as a guide to how “a good man” lives an honorable life.15 The work, addressed to Cicero’s son, who was completing his studies in Athens, included both moral instruction (De. Off. 1.15– 26) and practical advice on how to conduct relations in private and political life, with special attention paid to how a man’s reputation for moral integrity 14  Citations of heroes from the Lives are widespread: How to Profit from Enemies includes Cato Maior (91D), Crassus (89A, 89E), Demosthenes (88C), Caesar (91A), Pompey (89E) and Themistocles (89F, 92C); How to Tell a Flatterer includes Agesilaus (52F, 55D), Alcibiades (52E, 69F), Alexander (58F, 65C–D, 65F, 71C), Cleomenes (53E), Demosthenes (69E), Dion (53E, 69F–70A), Epaminondas (52F), Lysander (71E), Phocion (64C), and Solon (58E, 69F); On Inoffensive Self-Praise includes Agesilaus (545A), Alexander (542D, 543E), Cato Maior (544), Cicero (540F, 542A), Demosthenes (541E–F, 542A–B, 543B), Epaminondas (540E, 542C, 545A), Lycurgus (541F), Pelopidas (540E), Pericles (540C, 543C), Phocion (541C, 546A), Scipio Africanus (540F), Sulla (542F), Themistocles (541D–E and Timoleon (542E); and On Being Compliant includes Agesilaus (533F, 534E), Brutus (530A), Cato Minor (534D), Demosthenes (531A), Dion (530C), Pericles (531C), Phocion (532F), Lysander (533E) and Themistocles (534E). 15   De Officiis is based on Panaetius’ “περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος” and addresses practical issues associated with managing relationships in private and public life. Through practice and experience, a man develops the ability to judge the potential consequences of different actions and choose the best possible course (De Off. 1.18.60; 1.22.81). On sources and content, see Griffin and Atkins (1991: xvii–xxviii), Dyke (1996: 17–18), Walsh (2000: xvii–xxx), Atkins (2005: 505–514), Trapp (2007: 120–1), Baraz (2012: 143–144; 211–222), Hammer (2014: 36–48).

44

Chapter 2

underpinned the confidence he could inspire in public debate.16 Quintilian similarly emphasized moral character and reputation. His Institutio Oratoria was intended to prepare young men to pursue honorable political careers17 which, in his view, required mastery of “all of the virtues of character” (omnis animi virtutes) and “principles of upright and honorable living” (rationem rectae honestaeque vitae) (Quint. 1.pr. 9–10).18 Real eloquence required the insight acquired through the study of philosophy, as evidenced in the links between Pericles and Anaxagoras, Demosthenes and Plato, and Cicero and the “walks of Academe” (Quint. 12.2.22–23). In deliberative oratory, a man had to be considered a man of excellent practical judgment (prudentissimus … et optimus) if he wanted others to trust his judgment “on what was expedient and honorable” (de utilibus atque honestis) (Quint. 3.8.13). Seneca and Epictetus, in turn, highlight the need both to avoid moral corruption19 amidst the pressures of political life and to meet reversals with equanimity. For Seneca, the happy life (beate vivere) and honorable life (honeste vivere) were guided by philosophy and included performing one’s duties

16  Cicero emphasizes pursuit of truth, justice, magnanimity of spirit and temperance (De. Off. 1.5.15). Precepts on moral duties apply to “the regulation of life in common with others” (ad institutionem vitae communis) (De Off. 1.3.7), including private and public life. “On the cultivation (colendo) of these duties and behaviors depends all that is honorable (honestas) and on their neglect (neglegendo) all that is dishonorable (turpitudo) in life” (De Off. 1.2.1). De Off. 2.5–2.12 addresses the qualities to cultivate in order to win goodwill, with special attention paid to acquiring a reputation for justice and self-restraint. 17  Quintilian wrote the work for his “friend Marcellus”, conjectured to be M. Vitorius Marcellus, addressee of Statius’ Silvae 4. It is intended as a contribution to the education of Marcellus’ son, Geta (Inst. Orat. 1.pr.6). 18  Without this foundation, an orator “can become neither a good man nor a man skilled at speaking” (nemo nec vir bonus esse nec dicendi peritus potest) (Quint. 12.2.1). Quintilian later adds that “no one will achieve sufficient skill even in speaking, unless he … forms his character on the precepts of philosophy and the dictates of reason” (Quint. 12.2.4). Thus, moral character was an essential component, but, in and of itself, was insufficient to produce effectiveness in the practice of the art (Quint. 1.1.19). On Quintilian, see Smail (1938: xiii–lvi), Austin (1948: v–xxxi), Kennedy (1962: 130–46), Dihle (1994: 185–188), Conte (1994: 512–518), Tellegen-Couperus (2003), Trapp (2007: 239–240, 246, 249–251). 19  For Seneca, progress in virtue was made through self-examination and efforts to eliminate vice (Ep. Mor. 5.3–4, 6.1–4, 25 and 28.9–10). Ep. Mor. 45 describes the perils of flatterers, who allow vices to creep in under the names of virtues. Virtues were “writ large” in statesmen, since they could indulge vices with impunity (Ep. Mor. 42.1–4; 44.5).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

45

(Ep. Mor. 16, 94) and serving the common good (Ep. Mor. 48, 49).20 Epictetus shared the view that mastery of moral principles was essential21 and alerted students22 to guard against the corrupting influences of the public arena, especially inclinations to flatter others for the sake of luxury (Epict. 1.9.26), to acquiesce out of fear (1.2. 20–21; 1.19) or to cry out against misfortune (1.9.18).23 In works focused on the moral foundation of effective political leadership, specific virtues or vices are emphasized because of their impact on a man’s ability to serve his state. In De Ira,24 for instance, Seneca links the salvation of Rome to Fabius’ ability to control his anger against Hannibal: How else did Fabius restore the broken forces of the state but by knowing how to loiter, to put off and to wait—things of which angry men know nothing.… But he took into consideration the well-being of the state … and he buried all thought of resentment and revenge and was concerned only with expediency and the fitting opportunity. He conquered anger before he conquered Hannibal. Seneca, De Ira 1.11.5

Similarly, Scipio Africanus and Aemilianus are cited as examples illustrating the principle that anger “is not expedient” (non est utilis) in battle or in war (De Ira 1.11.7–8),25 while anger is shown undermining a good man performing 20  Teaching citizens how to live a happy life served the common good (Ep. 48.9): “Tell them what nature has made necessary and what superfluous; tell them how … pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws.” 21  Like Seneca, Epictetus believed that learning to live in conformity with nature was the key to living according to one’s moral purpose (e.g. Epict. 1.2.5–6; 1.17.17–21). 22  Oldfather (1925: xiv) describes Epictetus’ audience as young men, the majority no doubt like Arrian, of high social standing and planning to enter public service. On Epictetus and Arrian’s Discourses, see Millar (1966), Brunt (1977), Easterling and Knox (1985: 633–635), Dihle (1994: 200–202), Sellars (2003: 129–146), Gill (2005: 607–11). 23  Epictetus believed that the goal of inquiry into every matter was to learn “how the good and excellent man may find the appropriate course through it and the appropriate way of conducting himself in it” (πῶς ἂν εὕροι ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν διέξοδον καὶ ἀναστροφὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν) (Epict. 1.7.2). 24  On De Ira, see Fillion-Lahille (1984; 1989), Harris (2001: 112–115, 220–223, 251–254, 324– 326), Van Hoof (2007). 25  In Coriolanus, discussed below in Chapter 5, Plutarch ties anger to “self-will” (αὐθάδεια) and illustrates the destructive effects of anger on a leader’s ability to perform his duties. Seneca presents anger as a response to the unexpected and traces it to excessive self-love (amor nostri nimius) (De Ira 2.31.3). For differences between Plutarch’s and Seneca’s approach to the topic, see Van Hoof (2007; 2010: 60–63).

46

Chapter 2

his duties in other contexts as well (De Ira 2.12.2). De Ira 2 and 3 explain how to bring it under control by training (disciplina) (De Ira 2.15.1).26 Plutarch’s practical advice for the cultivation of moral qualities and control of passions is also grounded in the implications for a man’s effectiveness in the public arena. Like Cicero, Plutarch advised the young man entering public life to keep his life and character free of blame and ill report (ψόγου καθαρὰ καὶ διαβολῆς ἁπάσης) (Pol. Prec. 800D) in order to acquire and sustain his influence over the people and lead them “towards what is better” (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον) (800B). In addition, Plutarch’s advice is often more detailed and ranges over a wider range of topics than is found in other writers. For instance, his On Progress in Virtue, How to Profit from Enemies, On Control of Anger and On Tranquility of Mind address issues raised in Cicero, Seneca and Epictetus, but provide more extensive instructions on how to cultivate virtue or eradicate vice for both private and public life. On Progress in Virtue, for instance, describes a process of self-evaluation and emulation of paradigms of virtue that the man educated in philosophy was expected to follow throughout his life. The reader is instructed to pursue reading that conveys “what is useful, substantial or beneficial” (τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ σάρκινον καὶ ὠφέλιμον, 79C)27 and to select role models—such as Plato, Epaminondas, Lycurgus or Agesilaus—who will serve as “mirrors” (ἔσοπτρα) before which he can adjust his conduct (85B).28 How to Profit from Enemies, in turn, provides a “method and art” (μέθοδον καὶ τέχνην, 86E) through which a statesman can use public criticism to spark closer scrutiny of his own character, and Plutarch instructs the reader to respond to criticism by “entering into his soul” (ἐνδύου τῇ ψυχῇ) and “looking about” (περισκόπει) to see if

26  At De Ira 2.15, Seneca associates anger with men who possess “better natures” (melioribus innascuntur ingeniis), drawing a parallel to rich soil, which “although it is neglected, produces a strong growth and a tall forest is a mark of fertile soil” (sicut valida arbusta laeta quamvis neglecta tellus creat, et alta +fecundi soli silva est) (De Ira 2.15.1). Plutarch similarly employs the concept of a “great nature” and uncultivated, but fertile, ground to describe Coriolanus’ natural abilities. The end of De Ira 2 and much of De Ira 3 is devoted to instruction in how to train oneself to anticipate and manage one’s propensity to anger. 27  The reading recommended by Plutarch includes philosophical writing or poems or history, looking for ideas that “tend to improvement of character or alleviation of emotion”(πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους ἢ πάθους κουφισμὸν, 79C). 28  A similar use of historical statesmen as “mirrors” is found in the Prologue to Aem-Tim, where Plutarch says that he “uses history as a mirror” (ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ) and attempts “to fashion and adorn his life in conformity with the virtues therein depicted” (κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον) (Aem. 1.1). See Chapter 1 (n. 77) and additional discussion below on the use of the image of the mirror in advice literature.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

47

there is “anything rotten” there (88D).29 Controlling anger and resentment, as well as responding with equanimity to misfortune, are treated in On Control of Anger, On Tranquility of Mind and On Exile,30 essays that provide plans of action and exempla to imitate or avoid, including fourteen men who are subjects of their own Lives: Aemilius, Alexander, Aristides, Camillus, Cato Maior, Cicero, Demetrius, Epaminondas, C. Gracchus, Marius, Pelopidas, Phocion, Solon and Themistocles.31 In these works, moral virtue and moderation are the foundation of effectiveness in the public arena rather than simply qualities critical for the man seeking happiness in private life. Balancing Moral Virtue and Expediency With his moral character in order, a second issue confronted the politikos: what should the statesman do if the public good requires violation of personal moral virtue, such as disobeying laws or using coercion, bribery, deceit or even murder? With regard to balancing expediency (utilene esset an inutile) and honor (honestumne an turpe) in such cases, Cicero argued that what was expedient for the state was always honorable,32 when “expediency” was defined as action that advanced the common good:

29   How to Profit from Enemies was provided to Pulcher as a supplement to Political Precepts (How to Profit from Enemies 86B), expanding upon Simonides’ quote that “On every lark a crest must grow” (πάσαις κορυδαλλίσι χρὴ λόφον ἐγγενέσθαι) (91E; 809B; Tim. 37.1). The notion that an ardent enemy helps root out vices is also discussed in On Progress in Virtue 82B. In other treatises, Plutarch associates this point with Plato’s asking himself “Could that be me?” when observing unseemly behavior, a saying often reported when Plutarch advises readers to benefit from others’ mistakes, as at Listening to Lectures (40D), How to Profit from Enemies (88D), Advice on Keeping Well (129D) and On Control of Anger (463E). 30  Van Hoof (2007) compares Seneca and Plutarch on anger, while Van Hoof (2010) discusses On Tranquility of Mind and On Exile in detail. 31  References to heroes from the Lives in On Control of Anger include Alexander (454E; 458B), Aristides (458C; 463E), Camillus (458C), Cato Maior (463E), C. Gracchus (456A), Marius (461F), Pelopidas (458E) and Phocion (459E); in On Tranquility of Mind include Aemilius (475A); Alexander (466D; 471E; 472D), Demetrius (475C); Epaminondas (467E; 472D) and Solon (472 D–E); and in On Exile, Alexander (605D–E), Camillus (605E), Cicero (605F) and Themistocles (601F–602A; 605E–F). 32  See De Officiis (3.2.7–3.19) for Panaetius’ analysis. Cicero concludes that “expediency can never conflict with what is honorable” (numquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere), when it is understood that an expedient action produces common benefits and inaction would produce harm (De Off. 3.3.11–12). The longer-term consequences for the state are taken into account in judging what is expedient. An action that saddles the state with a reputation for injustice and dishonorable conduct would not qualify as “expedient”.

48

Chapter 2

For it often happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong.… If anyone kills a tyrant—be he ever so intimate a friend—he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? … Has expediency, then, prevailed over moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand with expediency. CICERO, De Off. 3.4.19

On this basis, Cicero recommended that, in complex situations where “what is expedient” for the state (utile) appears to contradict moral virtue, “the good man” must take the action that best serves the common good, even if he must sometimes “evade what truth and honor would usually demand” (quaeque pertinent ad veritatem et ad fidem, ea migrare) (De. Off. 1.10.31).33 For instance, Cicero advises his son not to hesitate, when necessary, to use benefactions to build influence (De. Off. 2.15.52–2.21.72) and money to win favor (2.16.55– 2.19.67)—actions that may be “wrong” (vitiosa est), but nevertheless at times unavoidable because of political necessity (i.e. political practices demand it) or expediency (i.e. to resolve threats to the safety or welfare of the state) (De Off. 2.17.59–2.18.61). For Quintilian, questions of expediency involved not simply what to do, but also when, where, with whom or against whom, how and to what extent to do it (Quint. 3.8.35).34 Book 12 describes situations where an action that seems on the surface to be dishonorable—such as defending the guilty (12.1.34, 42–43), killing someone (12.1.37) or telling lies (12.1.38–41)35—is in fact part of the hon-

33  Book 3 of De Officiis is largely dedicated to situations where expediency would appear to contradict moral conduct—such as the killing of a friend who had become a tyrant. This exact situation is discussed by Plutarch in Timoleon, where the hero participates in the murder of his brother who had become a tyrant (Tim. 4.4–6.7; Aem-Tim 2.11–2). See Chapter 7 for a further treatment of this topic. 34  Book 12 is dedicated to issues of moral character (mores) and duties (officia) that arise after the student of rhetoric “has been dismissed by his teachers and is either proceeding under his own power or seeking greater assistance from the innermost shrine of philosophy” (a dicendi magistris dimissus, aut suo iam impetu fertur aut maiora sibi auxilia ex ipsis sapientiae penetralibus petit) (Quint. 12.pr.3). Other problematic issues include: (1) how to decide which cases to pursue and which to refuse (Quint. 12.7); and (2) which positions to take in public debates. On Quintilian’s treatment of expediency in Book 12, see Austin (1948) and Ussani (2003). 35  To illustrate this, Quintilian uses the example of defending a general guilty of a crime because without him the state cannot defeat its enemies, pointing to Fabricius helping to

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

49

orable practice of oratory because the action was intended to serve the common good: There are many actions that are made honorable or the reverse not by the nature of the facts but by the causes from which they spring.… We should assuredly take into consideration not solely and simply what the nature of the case is which the good man undertakes to defend, but what his reason and what his purpose are in doing so. Quint. 12.1.36–37

Thus, for Quintilian, specific actions are deemed honorable or dishonorable based, not on the action itself, but on the circumstances and the motive of the actor. Moreover, the orator must educate himself about harmful uses of the art of rhetoric so that he can “detect and refute such things more easily” (ut ea facilius et deprehendamus et refellamus) (Quint. 12.I.34).36 The blending of issues of moral virtue with practical constraints was also apparent in the work of Valerius Maximus, whose Facta et Dicta Memorabilia was a compilation of anecdotes illustrating manifestations of different moral qualities, designed primarily to provide a “short-cut” for those who needed examples or proofs to use in rhetorical contexts (Valerius Praef.). However, as Rebecca Langlands (2011) explains, Valerius also treats the difficult topic of “situation ethics”, an approach to judging actions that takes circumstances and motives into account when assessing whether an action is appropriate or inappropriate. Situation ethics is also shown by Langlands to be more broadly characteristic of Roman exemplarity, as reflected in Cicero’s De Officiis.37 From this perspective, the exempla in Valerius, as in Cicero’s De Officiis, demonstrate how to apply virtue in particular circumstances, not general rules for every occasion: Understood within the framework of situation ethics articulated by both Cicero and Valerius Maximus, exempla can be seen as constituting a moral tool that goes some way towards providing a practical solution to elect Cornelius Rufinus consul because he was a good commander and war was imminent (12.1.43). Cicero (De Orat. 2.268) and Gellius (4.8.8) make similar points. 36  Quintilian concludes: “The orator must therefore know his adversaries’ plans as the general does the enemy’s” (debent ergo oratori sic esse adversariorum nota consilia ut hostium imperatori) (Quint. 12.1.35). Plutarch makes a similar point in the Prologue to Dtr-Ant (Dtr. 1.2–3). 37  Langlands (2011: 100–103).

50

Chapter 2

the ethical problem of how to reconcile universal executive virtues with the need for situational sensitivity. Langlands (2011: 122)

Thus, by accumulating a variety of exempla from different situations, the reader acquires the capacity to apply virtue appropriately to any circumstances that arise. Plutarch does not directly address the potential “conflict” between moral virtue and expediency in the Moralia, but in the Lives repeatedly portrays his subjects grappling with this dilemma.38 In the context of pragmatic biography—just as in pragmatic history—the ability to recognize when and to what degree moral virtue must be “violated” for the sake of expediency is central to pragmatic lessons in leadership, since facility in this area of critical judgment is central to a leader’s success in producing the greatest possible benefits for his state. In the Lives, Plutarch flags decisions that seem to violate principles of moral virtue in the interest of the safety or survival of the state as acts of “political necessity” (πολιτικὴ ἀνάγκη)39—or an expedient action that prevents great harm to the state but violates the law, conventions of family duty or other principles of virtuous action in private life. The Parallel Lives offer examples both of violations of legal precedent praised for their public benefits—such as Cicero’s execution of the Catilinarians (Cic. 19.5–7 and 23.6; Dem-Cic 3.4) or Agesilaus’ temporary abrogation of the laws after Leuctra (Ages-Pomp 2.2)— and of adherence to moral virtue and legality that is criticized because it was detrimental to the state, such as Cato’s failure to form an alliance with Pompey (Cato Min. 30.6). Duff (1999b) discusses Plutarch’s intended lessons in PhocionCato from the perspective of this trade-off between moral virtue and political success, a topic we will address further in Chapter 9. Prioritizing Duties and Managing Relationships The third widely-covered topic of general advice for the political arena concerned how to prioritize and perform various duties and how to manage relations with different groups. Cicero, in De Officiis, provides detailed precepts to guide conduct in each sphere of political engagement and states the considerations that should guide men in setting priorities in a context where duty toward country was second only to duty to the gods and took precedence over parents or friends (De Off. 17.58–59; 1.45.160): 38  Duff (1999b) discusses the apparent conflict between virtue and expediency in several Lives, especially in connection with Phocion-Cato. See also Martin (2011). 39  The term is used, for instance, at Cim. 2.5 and Ages-Pomp 2.2.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

51

Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to remember two of Plato’s rules: first, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own interests, they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest. CICERO, De Off. 1.25.85–86

Administering the government (procuratio reipublicae), Cicero continues, is like being a trustee (ut tutela) acting on behalf of those under his care, not for his own private interests (De Off. 1.25.85). In his practical guidance for executing duties, Cicero focuses on conduct that enhances effectiveness in administering justice and protecting property rights—which he considers the statesman’s most important duties (De Off. 2.21–24).40 Four attributes receive the most attention: a trustworthy reputation, persuasiveness,41 practical experience and good judgment in balancing expediency and virtue. Such qualities will breed confidence in a man’s judgment and intentions, which, in turn, will attract the cooperation of others.42 Cicero cites Panaetius in stating that all successes are joint ones: “no one, either as a general in war or as a statesman at home, could have accomplished great things for the state, without the hearty cooperation of other men” (neminem neque ducem belli nec principem domi magnas res et salutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse) (De Off. 2.5.16).

40  Plutarch expresses a similar concern for property rights when he instructs Menemachus that “the statesman, so far as is possible, should permit no outrageous conduct (ὕβριν) towards the citizens, no confiscation of other’s property (δήμευσιν ἀλλοτρίων), nor distribution of public funds (κοινῶν διανέμησιν)” because such actions nourish “swarms of drones with stings” (κηφῆνα … κεκεντρωμένον) as they did in the days of Cleon and his partisans (Pol. Prec. 818C). 41  Persuasive oratory is discussed at De Off. 2.5–14, where Cicero goes beyond De Oratore 2.42–53, which provides rules for exciting emotion and countering opponents with passionate rather than rational argument. 42  Of particular importance for eliciting a positive response are (1) goodwill, (2) esteem based on his worth, (3) confidence that he will act in the common interest and (3) fear of his power (De Off. 2.5.22). However, in some circumstances, a statesman may have to rely on promises to deliver favors or gifts, admittedly “the meanest and most impure motive, both for those swayed by it and those who use it to get into office” (quae sordidissima est illa quidem ratio et inquinatissima, et iis qui ea tenentur et illis qui ad eam confugere conantur) (De Off. 2.6.21).

52

Chapter 2

Other writers also offer practical instruction on how to perform specific duties. In De Beneficiis,43 for instance, Seneca concentrates on “rules to govern conduct” (quae regunt mores, 7.1.2) in granting and receiving benefactions,44 which he considered a means to simultaneously improve the common good and enhance a statesman’s reputation for generosity.45 Seneca defines rules for selecting the “most deserving” recipients and the appropriate magnitude of gifts, while also recognizing the practical constraints of limited resources.46 For Quintilian, training an orator was like training a wrestler: both had to have a variety of “moves” from which to draw, depending on the challenges of the situation at hand. An orator had to be able not simply to instruct, but also to move and delight his audience (Quint. 12.2.11–12) and to “guide the people from the path of error to better things” (popularis error ad meliora ducendus) (12.1.26). From this perspective, his students were being prepared to “manage public and private business” (publicarum privatarumque rerum administrationi), including “guiding cities by his advice” (regere consiliis urbes), “giving them a firm basis by his laws ( fundare legibus) and “putting them right by his judgments” (emendare iudiciis) (Quint. 1.pr.10). For Quintilian, skills of oratory, grounded on moral virtue, enabled a statesman to defend his friends in court (defendere amicos), advise the senate (regere consiliis senatum) and lead a peo-

43   De Beneficiis, like De Officiis, was based on an ancient source on the same topic, namely a work of Hecaton, a pupil of Panaetius. Cooper and Procopé (1995: 187 n. 21) note that Hecaton is cited at 1.3.9, 2.21.4, 3.18 and 6.37.1. On the structure and content of De Beneficiis, see also Griffin (1976); Conte (1994: 412); Cooper and Procopé (1995: 183–192); Griffin (2003; 2005: 541–551); Trapp (2007: 136); Griffin (2013) and Hammer (2014: 315–320). 44  After addressing how a benefit should be given (Books 1 and 2), Seneca discusses ingratitude (Book 3) and the general nature of the process of conferring and receiving benefits (Books 4–6). Seneca treats the topic from the perspective of the wealthy, influential aristocrat, such as his addressee Aebulius Liberalis, an equestrian well-educated in law (Griffin 1976: 455). The focus is on granting beneficii to individuals (as opposed to communities) and uses as exempla kings or Greek and Roman leaders of the past. 45  Seneca writes: “The first fruit of a benefaction is the consciousness of it; a man experi­ ences this from carrying out his gift as he wished; the second and the third are, respectively, the glory of it ( famae) and the things that may be bestowed in exchange (eorum, quae praestari in vicem possunt) (De Benef. 2.33.3). However, a man should not bestow a gift in order to get a return (which would place it in the category of money lending or a business transaction). 46  For instance, the reader is instructed to compare the intensity of need, the obligations tied to past exchanges of favors, and the priority of the category (kinsmen, friends, fellowcitizens) of potential recipient. Moreover, resources must be allocated to prevent impoverishing oneself or squandering funds on unworthy people.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

53

ple or an army in whatever direction he chose” (populum exercitum in quae velit ducere) (Quint. 2.16.19).47 Plutarch, in a number of separate treatises, provided pragmatic insights into habits of interaction that would enhance a man’s effectiveness at all stages of a political career. Political Precepts gave instruction in oratorical techniques for persuading different audiences as well as insights into how to manage political relations with the people, friends and opponents while always placing the good of the state ahead of family or friends.48 On Inoffensive Self-Praise instructed the reader in how to use self-praise without aggravating listeners or provoking envy in situations where he must tout his own past successes to promote a policy beneficial to the state (539E–F),49 while How to Tell a Flatterer detailed the signs by which a man could detect a flatterer,50 using Cleopatra’s flattery of Mark Antony as one of the prime examples of this peril to statesmen (56E, 61B).51 Yet another threat to effective statesmanship is examined in On Being Compliant, which addresses the tendency to give in too easily to appeals from others and provides specific examples of how to refuse a demand from a powerful man.52 Throughout these treatises, historical statesmen are cited 47  Quintilian highlights the role of oratory in reviving the courage of frightened soldiers, in inducing people to come together to found cities and in restraining mankind to submit to the servitude of the law (Quint. 2.17.7). 48   Political Precepts, like De Officiis, addresses (1) managing one’s character; (2) cultivating a trustworthy reputation; (3) developing persuasive oratory; (4) placing the good of the state ahead of family or friends; and (5) managing relations with others. 49  In On Inoffensive Self-Praise, Plutarch instructs the reader to avoid “what is frivolous and aggravating” (τὸ κενὸν καὶ δυσχεραινόμενον) (540A) and offers advice on how to use selfpraise properly. A statesman is not to praise himself for personal glory or pleasure, but only because “being trusted and enjoying good repute affords the means for further and yet nobler actions” (τὸ πιστεύεσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν χρηστὸν εἶναι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων πράξεων ἀφορμὰς δίδωσι) (539E–F). 50  In How to Tell a Flatterer, Plutarch recommends that readers watch for inconsistencies (52B–53B), excessive agreement (53C–54B) and a refusal to claim first place (54C–D) or to introduce anything unpleasant (54E–55E). In the treatise, Plutarch first describes the traits of a flatterer versus a friend (50E–52A) and then discusses methods of exposing a flatterer by (1) observing the uniformity or variability of his tastes (52B–54D) and (2) monitoring whether praise is directed at an action or at the man (55E–59B). 51  For statesmen from the Lives who are positive or negative exempla in How to Tell a Flatterer, see n. 14 above. 52  The reader is advised to train himself to “say no” in private matters so he can easily deny a request in great affairs “when a king is present or when the assembled people put one out of countenance” (βασιλέως ἐντυγχάνοντος ἢ δήμου δυσωποῦντος) (531B). See n. 14 above for statesmen from the Lives used as exempla.

54

Chapter 2

as exempla, drawing parallels between the pragmatic challenges faced in the political arenas of the past and present. Advice for the Emperor and Provincial Governors In works advising the most powerful men—the Emperor and provincial governors—writers focused on the ideal qualities in a ruler and how to win the goodwill and obedience of subjects.53 Often, rather than delivering specific directives, writers used the portrait of the “good king”—such as Xenophon provided in Cyropaideia54—to serve as a “mirror” reflecting the image of what the Emperor or governor should aspire to become.55 Both Seneca (De Clem. 1.1.1)56 and Plutarch (Sayings of Kings and Commanders 172D)57 cast their works in the terms of a mirror, while Dio, in Or. 1, expects the Emperor to compare himself to the Kings depicted in his oration: This speech, itself in itself, points out the king who is like a good king and praises him to the extent that he is like the good king (καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιος), and refutes and reproaches the one who is unlike him. Dio, Or. 1.15

53  As discussed by Griffin (1976: Chapters 5 and 6), in many cases the earlier Greek and Roman treatment of monarchy and kingship, including the ideal of the “good king”, were transferred to the Roman emperor. Advice for rulers could also be embedded in biographical depictions of historical figures, such as Philo’s Joseph or Tacitus’ Agricola, who exemplified the ideal qualities of the “good king”. 54  The Cyropaedia was still “required reading” for men active in political life (Cicero, Ad Quint. 1.22–25). 55  The proper exercise of monarchical power was revealed in encomiastic descriptions of the virtues manifested in the ruler’s actions. The blueprint for such oratory directed at the Emperor or governor is found in Menander Rhetor. On the “mirror” image in advice literature, see Chapter 1 (n. 77). 56  Seneca uses the image of a “mirror” to explain his purpose in De Clementia.: “I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on the subject of mercy, in order to serve in a way the purpose of a mirror (ut quodam modo speculi vice) and thus reveal you to yourself (te tibi ostenderem) as one destined to attain to the greatest of all pleasures” (De Clem. 1.1.1). On this passage, see Braund (2009: 154), Hammer (2014: 281). 57  Plutarch, in the preface to his Sayings of Kings and Commanders, refers to the “pronouncements and unpremeditated utterances” (ἀποφάσεις καὶ ἀναφωνήσεις) of the kings and commanders as “mirrors” (ἐν κατόπτροις) in which Trajan could observe “the workings of the mind of each man” (τὴν ἑκάστου διάνοιαν) (Sayings 172D).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

55

The ruler, in turn, served as a “mirror” for his subjects and a role model to imitate.58 The advice for Emperors and provincial governors can be placed in two broad categories: general attributes of a good ruler—such as moral virtue, attention to justice and being solicitous for the well-being of subjects—and practical advice for how to perform specific duties to best effect and win eager obedience from subjects. Works addressed directly to Emperors often provided advice through general precepts and the examination of the conduct of either historical or literary Kings and rulers, focusing on desirable qualities that earned affection and obedience. Dio’s Kingship Orations (Orations 1–4)59 provide a broad presentation of the attributes of a good ruler, using examples drawn from Greek mythology, literature and history.60 The king’s primary duty to tirelessly care for his subjects—the king’s “own work and art” (ἔργον αὑτοῦ καὶ τέχνην), not a sideline (οὐ πάρεργον) (Or. 3.55)—is also illustrated through the familiar analogies to the shepherd, herdsman, bull, father, ship captain or pilot, physician, general and even the sun.61 The key attributes of a good king—against which the reader could judge himself (Or. 1.35)—included piety (1.15–16), humanity (1.17–20), endurance (1.21–23),62 generosity and love of doing good works 58  As Plutarch states in To an Uneducated Ruler (780B), the ruler, through his own conduct and moral character, provided an example his subjects would imitate. 59  On design and content of Dio’s Kingship Orations (Or. 1–4), see Moles (1983; 1984; 1990), Anderson (1993: 189–190), Méthy (1994), Swain (1996: 192–206) Gill (2005: 604–605), Sidebottom (2006), Trapp (2007: 180–181). 60  Dio’s examples were drawn from the mythology of Zeus and Heracles (Oration 1), Homer (Oration 2), the ideal king (Oration 3) and the history of Philip and Alexander (Oration 4). Ultimately, Zeus sets the standards by which a King himself is ruled (Or. 1; Or. 4.39– 43): “Yet the gods, who are his superiors, he must follow, …, recognizing in them his own masters and rulers” (Θεοῖς γε μὴν τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν ἕπεσθαι, … δεσπότας αὑτοῦ καὶ ἄρχοντας νομίζοντα ἐκείνους ) (Or. 2.72). 61  Analogies are made to the shepherd or herdsman (Or. 1.6, 17–18, 128; 3.41; 4.44–45), a bull (2.65–70), father (1.18; 3.5), ship captain or pilot (1.28; 3.28, 56, 63–65; 4.25), physician (Or. 3.28; 4.25), general (3.66–67) and the sun (Or. 3.11, 57; 73–81). Dio provides an extended comparison between the bull and the good king (Or. 2.65–70), highlighting how a bull (1) uses his strength to benefit the herd, (2) exercises his authority through goodwill, and (3) knows how to rule those dependent on him while himself being ruled “by reasoning and practical judgment” (λογισμῷ δὲ καὶ φρονήσει, Or. 2.70). These attributes of the bull provide a “training and lesson in kingship for temperate kings” (παίδευμα καὶ δίδαγμα βασιλικὸν τῶν σωφρόνων βασιλέων) (Or. 2.70). 62  The attributes also include an aversion to unscrupulousness (πανουργίαν) and deceit (ἀπάτην) and affinity for sincerity (ἁπλότητα) and truthfulness (ἀλήθειαν) (Or. 1.26); a respect for the military (φιλοστρατιώτης) and refusal to “continuously flatter the foolish

56

Chapter 2

(1.23–25), simplicity and frankness (1.26) and seeing himself as king, not in his own self-interest, but for the sake of all men (1.23). As is often the case, Heracles, Philip and Alexander exemplify good kingship.63 Dio’s pre-requisites for good kingship include competencies highlighted by other writers as well, including skill in oratory,64 training in philosophy and moral virtue65 and the practice of justice, self-control, courage and practical judgment, through which a king brought greatest benefit to his subjects.66 Seneca’s De Clementia focuses more narrowly on the specific attribute of clemency, counseling Nero to exercise restraint in meting out punishment,67 not merely as an act of moral virtue, but also as a means of attaining the goodwill and affection of the people, which would be conducive to his safety and legacy.68 Augustus is cited as a ruler who spared the vanquished and, as a result, was “popular and beloved” (gratum ac favorabilem) among the people and earned lasting good repute (De Clem. 1.10.2). Seneca further asserts that the ruler who is secure in the affection of his subjects understands that the duty and unarmed masses” (τὸν δὲ ἀνόνητον καὶ ἄνοπλον ὄχλον διατελεῖ θωπεύων) (Or. 1.28). These qualities feature prominently in both Plutarch’s Moralia and the Lives, as well as in other writers. 63  Dio cites Heracles (Or. 1.59–65, 83–84; Or. 4.31–35), Philip (Or. 2) and Alexander the Great (Or. 2 and Or. 4.1–10). 64  Homer’s portrayals of Phoenix and Achilles, as well as of Diomedes, Odysseus and Nestor, are used to illustrate the imperative that a king must master the art of persuasion (Or. 2.19–20). 65  Philosophy and moral virtue are common themes, including at Orations 1.12–14, 2.19–24, 3.2–7 and 4.31–38. 66  These themes are especially important in the first and third Orations (1.44–46; 3.2–7, 4–11, 39). Dio’s ideal king considers these four “cardinal” virtues “an absolute necessity for himself” (αὑτῷ … ἀναγκαῖον) because he is above the law, has control over the weightiest matters, can gratify any appetite or passion with impunity and is responsible for the safety of all (Or. 3.9–11). At Or. 3.58, courage (ἀνδρείαν), self-control (ἐγκράτειαν) and practical judgment (φρόνησιν) are deemed necessary (ἀναγκαίας) even for tyrants, if they intend to survive. 67  As Seneca defines it, clemency means “restraining the mind from vengeance when it has the power to take it, or the leniency of a superior towards an inferior in fixing punish­ me nt” (temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis)(De Clem. 2.2.3). On structure and content of De Clementia, see Griffin (1976: 133–171; 194), Griffin (2005: 539–543), Conte (1994: 412–413), Cooper and Procopé (1995: 119–127), Trapp (2007: 177–180), Braund (2009), Schofield (2015). 68  Clemency makes rulers not only more honored (honestiores), but safer (tutiores), while being the glory of sovereign power (ornamentumque imperiorum) and its surest protection (certissima salus) (De Clem. 1.11.4). The rewards include glory (1.3.3) and safety (1.13.1).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

57

of a ruler is that of a father and therefore adopts the milder course whenever possible (De Clem. 1.14.1–2).69 The good ruler is also “affable of speech, easy of approach and access, and loveable in countenance, which most of all wins the affection of the people” (sermone adfabilis, aditu accessuque facilis, vultu qui maxime populos demeretur amabilis), while being well-disposed to just petitions and intolerant of unjust ones (De Clem. 1.13.4).70 Pliny, in his Panegyricus addressed to Trajan, also “instructed through praise”,71 applauding a range of qualities that would have positive effects on men active in the political arena, including advancement of men based on merit (Pan. 69.2–70.8) and discouragement of excessive honors (Pan. 54.5–55.1).72 Although Pliny does not ground his praise in philosophical concepts of good kingship,73 he nevertheless pays homage to virtue in the Emperor and the moral example he sets for his subjects (Pan. 45.3–45.6). 69  The duty (officium) of a prince is the same as that of a good father: he is most forbearing (temperantissima) in his care for the interests of his subjects, subordinates his own interests to theirs (suaque post illos reponens) and resorts to punishment only after he has exhausted all the gentler means of correction (De Clem. 1.14.1–3). Such a man fulfills his role as “Father of his country” (Patrem Patriae, 1.14.2). This characterization—and the qualities attached to a good ruler (De Clem. 1.13.4–5)—echo themes in De Officiis and Dio’s Kingship Orations. 70  Seneca’s description of the good ruler overlaps Plutarch’s depiction of the temperate man (ὁ σώφρων ἀνὴρ) in politics who “calls each thing by its own name” (αὐθέκαστος) and is affable, generally accessible and approachable for all (εὐπροσήγορος καὶ κοινὸς ὢν πελάσαι καὶ προσελθεῖν ἅπασιν) (Political Precepts 823A). These qualities are also precisely the ones Plutarch points out as lacking in the uneducated ruler at To an Uneducated Ruler 780A. 71  Griffin (2005: 541–544) notes that Pliny’s approach of “instructing through praise” without couching arguments in philosophical theory can also be found in Cicero’s Pro Marcello (9, 12, 18) and Pro Ligario (29–30). 72  Pliny’s Panegyricus highlighted the moral qualities of the emperor, the prosperity and security that resulted from the end of civil war, and specific changes in Trajan’s governance. Pliny praises Trajan’s willingness to advance young men on the equestrian or senatorial path based on merit rather than influence, and describes how this approach has energized men in the political arena throughout the Empire. On Panegyricus, see Radice (1968; 1969a), Morford (1992), Dihle (1994: 225–226), Conte (1994: 525–526), Griffin (2005: 543–544), Gibson (2011), Rees (2014). See also Hammond (1938). 73  Griffin (2005: 543) points out that Pliny emphasizes the quality of civilitas in a ruler, which will mask the reality of his power behind his conduct as a “citizen among citizens”: “Whereas Seneca was moved by the counter-example of Claudius to concentrate on jurisdiction, Pliny was inspired by detestation of Domitian to preach accessibility and appreciation of talent, discouragement of flattery, refusal of excessive honors.” Further discussion of civilitas can be found in Wallace-Hadrill (1982: 32–48).

58

Chapter 2

Plutarch’s Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler,74 described in the prior Chapter, treat the same themes found in Dio and Seneca, while bringing additional emphasis to Platonic ideals of virtue in the ruler and the ruler’s duty to protect his state, administer justice and pursue the common good.75 Philosophers and Men in Power depicts the ideal ruler as a man who has a soul that is “solicitous for many” (φροντίζουσαν) and is “obliged to be prudent and temperate and just in behalf of many” (φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν) (776D).76 To an Uneducated Ruler, in turn, advises men in power to learn the lessons of philosophy in order to fulfill their duty “to serve god for the care and preservation of men” (ἐπιμέλειαν ) (780D–E). To this end, Plutarch instructs the ruler to cultivate virtue in himself and administer justice, which he calls the “work of the ruler” (ἄρχοντος ἔργον) (780E). In both treatises, Plutarch uses leaders who appear in the Lives as exempla, including Epaminondas, Cato Minor, Alexander, Cimon, Lucullus, Scipio Aemilianus and Dionysius.77 Plutarch directly addresses an emperor (Trajan78) only in the preface to Sayings of Kings and Commanders (172B), where he states that the collection was compiled for Trajan’s benefit. No direct advice is offered, but the sayings are intended to spur Trajan to reflection. The incidents convey moral traits, as well as tactics for resolving various political or military difficulties.

74  In recent treatments, these treatises are seen as dealing with ideal rulers/statesmen rather than practical issues, including in Beck (2004), Trapp (2004), De Blois (2004), Roskam (2008) and Dillon (2008). Teodorsson (2008: 349) sees Plutarch’s outlook on statesmanship as idealistic in the Moralia and realistic in the Lives. 75  The “common good” in a state refers to internal harmony, administration of justice, liberty, security and prosperity that together provide the means and opportunity to pursue virtue. Through philosophy, the ruler becomes a “common good” (κοινὸν ὄφελος), “dispensing justice, making laws, punishing the wicked and strengthening the equitable and the good” (δικαιοδοτῶν, νομοθετῶν, κολάζων τοὺς πονηρούς, αὔξων τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ ἀγαθούς) (Phil. and Men in Power 779B). 76  This comment echoes the role of philosophy in good oratory in Quintilian (12.21.5). The principle that the ruler acts on behalf of the ruled is reinforced with an analogy to dogs watching over sheep “not for their own sake but for the sake of those whom they are guarding” (οὐχ ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλαττομένων) (To an Uned. Ruler 781C). 77  Epaminondas (781C), Cato Minor (781C), Alexander (781B, 782A), Cimon (782F), Lucullus (782F), Scipio Aemilianus (782F) and Dionysius (782C) illustrate attributes rulers should adopt or avoid. 78  Beck (2002).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

59

While the orations and treatises addressing Emperors might touch briefly on specific practical matters—such as Dio’s mention of the importance of employing friends as co-workers (Or. 3.86–89, 104–107)79 and appointing men of merit, rather than flatterers, to the key positions of governors, executives and generals (Or. 3.132)—works advising provincial governors, such as Cicero’s Ad Quintum 1 and Pliny’s Epistulae, make specific recommendations about how to handle specific administrative responsibilities. In his first letter to Quintus (Ad Quint. 1.1),80 Cicero points to Xenophon’s “good monarch”81 as the blueprint for fulfilling the role of proconsul in Asia and then gives specific advice in four areas: (1) personal moral integrity (1.1.7–9), including controlling anger (1.1.37– 41); (2) managing subordinates (1.1.10–14);82 (3) exercising justice impartially (1.1.19–221);83 and (4) conducting relations with the provincials (1.1.15–16).84 Ad Quintum (1.1.18–20) notes that if people see moral integrity in the governor and good conduct in his associates, they accept any necessary severity without resentment.85 Quintus is instructed to leave no doubt that he is impervious to bribes or to influence channeled through his associates (Ad Quint. 1.1.13–14), while being careful about accepting honors, which were “worthless if showered indiscriminately and trivial if conferred from interested motives” (si vulgares

79  The importance of friends in achieving political effectiveness is discussed at Political Precepts (807C–D; 819 B–C) and is a theme in Pericles. 80  On Ad Quintum, see Braund (1988: 5–7). 81  As defined by Xenophon in Cyropaideia (Ad Quint. 1.22–25). Braund (1988: 5–7) discusses Cicero’s concept of a good governor and its relation to traditional attributes of good monarchy. Ideally, Quintus should use Cyrus as a model of the just ruler, who blended firmness (gravitas) and courtesy (comitate) and retained the support of his subjects (Ad Quint. 1.1.22). On Cyropaideia, see Carlier (2010), Stadter (2010a), Gray (2011). 82  Cicero advised Quintus to make sure the officials subordinate to him (e.g. legates, quaestor) and his entire household and entourage adhered to his values and were not permitted to use their authority for personal gain. 83  Cicero instructs Quintus (1) to dispense justice consistently and impartially; (2) to make sure everyone under him does the same; and (3) to demonstrate a readiness to listen ( facilitas in audiendo), a mildness of manner in delivering judgment (lenitas in decernendo) and conscientiousness in arguing with suitors and answering their complaints (in satis faciendo ac disputando diligentia) (Ad Quint. 1.1.21). 84  Quintus should form ties of hospitality and friendship with the most distinguished provincials, but avoid close intimacy, which is likely to be prone to flattery and jealousy because of their subordinate status to Rome. 85  On similar traits in Tacitus’ Agricola, see Braund (1988: 8–10). Plutarch illustrates these themes in Fabius, Demetrius and Cato Minor, discussed below in Chapters 4, 8 and 9.

60

Chapter 2

essent, vilis, si temporis causa constituerentur, levis) (1.1.31).86 By governing in this way, Quintus would perform honorably and acquire lasting repute:87 That means you will take thought for all, find remedies for men’s misfortunes, make provision for their welfare, aiming to be spoken of and thought of as the father of Asia. CICERO, Ad Quint. 1.1.31

Ultimately, Cicero’s letter explains how to win the ready obedience of provincials, while being solicitous about their welfare—the primary objectives of a good ruler in writers of the era.88 Several themes from Cicero’s letter are echoed in Plutarch’s Political Precepts advising leaders in the cities, including the recommendation that a statesman avert envy by limiting acceptance of offices (Pol. Prec. 811D–812B) and honors (820A–821E), sharing responsibility with others (811C–813A), living an open and modest lifestyle (800B, 823B) and showing oneself to be indifferent to wealth (819E).89 Similarly, several of Pliny’s Epistulae90 include advice on how to cultivate harmonious relations with men in the provinces (Ep. 6.22, 8.24, 9.5).91 For instance, in Ep. 8.24 to Valerius Maximus, who was heading out to be a corrector in Achaea, Pliny gives instructions on how to interact with men of the free cities in his province. Here he recommends that Valerius (1) show respect for 86  Instead, honors should be warranted by truly meritorious actions to benefit all men in the province. 87  Cicero employs the image of the political arena in Asia as a theater in which actions on stage resound widely, and he compares Quintus to both good poets and hard-working actors (poetae boni et actores industrii), who must take their greatest pains in the final phase of the performance (Ad Quint. 1.42–46). Quintus is advised to view his final year as governor as the last act of a play: “the most highly finished and the best fitted out” (perfectissimus atque ornatissimus) (Ad Quint. 1.46). 88  Cicero provides a summary list of the traits of a good ruler at Ad Quintum 1.1.24–25. 89  The issue of honors is illustrated in Dtr-Ant (Chapter 8), the benefits of delegating in PerFab (Chap. 4), and the effects of lifestyle on goodwill and reputation in Ages-Pomp (Chap. 6) and Cor-Alc (Chap. 5). 90  On Pliny’s Epistulae, see Radice (1969a; 1969b), Sherwin-White (1969: ix–xi), Hoffer (1999) and Griffin (2005: 551–555). 91  Pliny’s Ep. 6.22 instructs Calestrius Tiro, a provincial governor, “to trust no one very far” (nec cuiquam satis fidas, 6.22.7), while Ep. 9.5 praises him for achieving the proper balance between making concessions to, and refusing requests of, influential men: as a result, he is loved (amari) by the humble and esteemed (diligare) by the aristocrats (9.5.1). Balancing kindness and severity is a key topic among writers advising statesmen and is a theme in the Prologue to Phocion-Cato Minor.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

61

the Greek heritage of the province, (2) not detract from anyone’s dignity, independence or pride (nihil … ex dignitate, nihil ex libertate, nihil etiam ex iactatione) (Ep. 8.24.3)92 and (3) win people over without being hard or domineering (Ep. 8.24.5–7).93 Advice for Generals Men exercising supreme authority as military commanders also had access to specialized advice on how to perform their functions. Since the specific tactics of warfare had changed, these treatises were useful not so much on the details of tactics in particular military contexts of the imperial period, but instead in strategic thinking, communication with troops and fellow generals, interactions with defeated enemies and even challenges related to geography or supply lines that confront generals of every era in some form.94 Although generals no longer had the power to independently make decisions about war or peace, military acumen was still required to advance to senior positions of the senatorial and equestrian career tracks.95 The skills needed to achieve military victory motivated several authors, including Strabo, Onasander and Frontinus, to design works to assist generals in making the tactical and strategic decisions associated with commanding an army. Their work extended the body of “handbooks” on specific areas of military training that had existed since Xenophon’s treatises The Cavalry Commander and the Art of Horsemanship, Aeneas Tacticus’ Siegecraft on tactics associated with defending one’s city from attack and Asclepiodotus’ work on phalanx tactics.

92  Pliny’s advice on respecting the cultural past of the Greeks is emphatic: “Always bear in mind that this is the land that provided us with justice and gave us laws, not after conquering us but at our request. Remember that it is to Athens you go and Sparta you rule, and to rob them of the ‘remaining name and shadow of freedom’ would be an act of cruelty, ignorance and barbarism.” (Pliny, Ep. 8.24.4). 93  Plutarch’s Aemilius illustrates these principles in his relations with the Greeks after Pydna (see Chapter 7). 94  While the practical relevance of ancient military treatises has been the subject of discussion, most scholars believe that these works covered topics of general relevance for military commanders of the imperial period. See Momigliano (1944: 111–112), Campbell (1987), C.J. Smith (1998), Formisano (2011) and Chlup (2014). Formisano (2017) provides a wide-ranging treatment of “tension between theory and practice” in these works. 95  See Campbell (2002) and Duncan-Jones (2016) for a summary of the military career paths open to the elite—especially equestrians desiring to move upward.

62

Chapter 2

In his Geographia,96 Strabo emphasizes the “utility” (ἡ χρεία) of his work for statesmen and generals who depended on their knowledge about the regions in which they operated (Geogr. 1.1.16–17). To fully benefit, however, a “statesman” (πολιτικὸν) had to also be trained in philosophy: By “statesman” I mean the man who is not entirely uneducated, but has taken the round of courses usual for freemen and students of philosophy. For the man who has given no thought to virtue and to practical judgment (μηδὲν ἐμέλησεν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως), and to what has been written about them, would not be able even to censure or praise well (οὔτε ψέγειν … οὔτ’ ἐπαινεῖν); nor yet to judge (κρίνειν) the matters of historical fact that are worthy of mention. Strabo, Geogr. 1.1.22

In his “pragmatic geography”,97 Strabo highlights details about topography, ethnography and geography that would be useful for generals conducting military operations and provisioning armies. Onasander’s Strategikos98 focused more broadly on generalship and was cast as “training for good generals” (στρατηγῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄσκησις) (Proem 4) that revealed the practical judgment (φρονήσεως) inherent in precepts of generalship (Proem 3).99 In order to isolate the pragmatic insights or mistakes that determined outcomes—and provided lessons—Onasander netted out the role of Fortune:100

96  On Strabo’s work, see Sihler (1923), Dihle (1994: 139–140; 148–151), Dueck (1999; 2000). Sartre (2015) compares the attitudes towards Roman rule found in Strabo and Plutarch’s Political Precepts. 97  The term “pragmatic geography” is based on Dueck (2000: 159–165). 98   Strategikos is addressed to Veranius, consul in 49, but dedicated “to Romans, especially those … who have attained senatorial dignity and through the wisdom of Augustus Caesar have been raised to consul or general”. On Onasander and his work, see Oldfather (1928: 343–367), Campbell (1987), Dihle (1994: 153–154), C.J. Smith (1998), Formisano (2011; 2017), Chlup (2014). 99  Onasander further bases his work on the actual exploits (διὰ πείρας ἔργων) of the men “from whom has been derived the whole primacy of the Romans down to the present time” (Proem 7). The term “ἄσκησις” is part of practical-ethical vocabulary, discussed in Van Hoof (2010: 48). 100  Distinguishing merit from Fortune echoes the theme of Plutarch’s essays on Alexander, although Onasander’s focus is more practical. On Plutarch’s On the Fortune of Alexander, see Asirvathan (2005).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

63

We will know, if nothing else, for what reason (παρ’ ἣν αἰτίαν) some generals have stumbled and fallen, but others have prospered and been raised to fame. … Men who make defeats chargeable to Fortune alone, rather than to the negligence (ἀμελείας) of the generals—as well as men who attribute successes to Fortune, rather than to the experience (ἐμπειρίας) of the generals—are foolish. Onasander, Strat. Proem 4–6

Like Strabo, Onasander considered moral character the foundation of effective military leadership (Onas. Strat. 1) and highlighted the importance for the general of the qualities that would make him trustworthy (temperance, absence of avarice and good reputation) and able to interact effectively with his officers and army (affability, calm and the right balance of leniency and harshness) (Strat. 2.1).101 Most of the work, however, is dedicated to specific areas of military decision-making, such as forming an advisory council (Strat. 3), selecting locations for camps or battles (Strat. 8–9), inspiring troops (Strat. 13–14) and handling prisoners and captured cities (Strat. 38, 42).102 Frontinus’ advice for generals was also distilled from past deeds, but was presented in two separate works. Art of War, which is lost, reduced military science to a system of precepts, while Strategemata illustrated these precepts in past events.103 In the opening chapter of Strategemata, Frontinus stated his goals in providing these supplementary “sketches” (commentariis): For in this way commanders will be furnished with examples of planning and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds (excogitandi generandique similia facultas). There will result the added advantage that a general will not fear the issue of his own stratagem, if he compares it with experiments already successfully made. Frontinus, Strat. 1.1

101  The goal for the general was to be “not so lenient as to be despised, nor so fearsome as to be hated” (μὴ οὕτως ἐπιεικὴς ὥστε καταφρονεῖσθαι, μήτε φοβερὸς ὥστε μισεῖσθαι) (Onasander, Strat. 2.1). 102  Many of the issues of good generalship described by Onasander are emphasized in the Lives as well, especially those of the great generals, including Fabius, Pompey, Alcibiades, Agesilaus, Aemilius and Antony, discussed in Parts 2 and 3. 103  On Frontinus and Strategemata, see Bennett (1925: xiii–xxxiv), Campbell (1987), Dihle (1994: 153), König (2017).

64

Chapter 2

Frontinus draws illustrative incidents from the careers of both Greek and Roman generals, with Alexander (seventeen times), Epaminondas (fifteen), Pyrrhus (eleven) and Philip (ten) most often mentioned among Greeks, while Caesar (twenty-eight), Pompey (sixteen) and Scipio Africanus (fifteen) are most prominent among Romans.104 His broad pragmatic emphasis is reflected in the coverage of strategies before battle (Book 1), during battle (Book 2), and during sieges (Book 3), along with other general issues (Book 4). Although Plutarch’s works do not include a treatise dedicated to military strategy, many of the principles articulated as practical precepts of generalship by Onasander and Frontinus are illustrated in his Parallel Lives. As we will see in the six pairs of Lives in Parts 2 and 3, Plutarch took pains to describe the process of deliberation about whether to engage an enemy, as well as the strategic judgments about deploying an army, designing a strategy and overcoming unexpected hurdles that determined victory or defeat in major battles—including battles at Cannae in Fabius Maximus (Chapter 4), in Ionia and the Hellespont in Alcibiades (Chapter 5), at Pharsalus in Pompey (Chapter 6), Pydna in Aemilius Paullus (Chapter 7), Crimesus in Timoleon (Chapter 7) and at Philippi and Actium in Antony (Chapter 8). Advice for City Leaders and Administrators Detailed advice was also directed to men in administrative or judicial capacities in Rome or the provincial cities. One early work was a short treatise by Varro, referenced by Gellius (Attic Nights 14.7) but now lost, that instructed Pompey on how to manage affairs in the Senate after he had returned from his campaigns. Managing relations among various groups within one’s city, as well as diplomatic relations between cities or between one’s city and Rome, received the most attention. Advice for city magistrates and leaders can be grouped into three categories: (1) general advice applicable in Rome and provincial cities; (2) advice for maintaining internal harmony in provincial cities; and (3) advice for conducting diplomacy with imperial authorities and other cities in one’s province. General Advice for Administrators The works offering advice that would benefit men active in Rome or the provinces cover a variety of different challenges faced in the political arena. 104  Frontinus’ exempla also prominently feature Alcibiades and Agesilaus (each eight times), Pericles (six) and Themistocles (four) among the Greeks, and Marius and Sulla (each eleven times), Fabius Maximus Cunctator (nine) and Aemilius Paullus (three) among the Romans.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

65

Quintus Cicero’s Commentariolum Petitionis105 addresses the challenges of canvassing for office (Comm. 1) and provides instruction on building a broad base of support. The treatise focuses on four areas: recognizing the hurdles created by being a “new man” (Comm. 2–12); energizing and focusing the efforts of friends and clients (Comm. 13–24); establishing friendships among influential senators, equestrians and men in the Italian cities (Comm. 25–40); and winning over the people (Comm. 41–58).106 The theatrics necessary to gain the support of the electorate receive special comment: Then, be determined that what you lack by nature should be so well simulated (ita simulandum) that it seems a natural act (ut natura facere videare).… What you urgently need is ingratiation (blanditia), which may be a base fault in the rest of life, but in a canvass it is indispensable (necessaria est). For it is vile when flattery is used to corrupt a man, …, but indispensable for a candidate, whose facial expression and conversation must be modified and adapted to the humor and the inclination of all whom he meets. QUINTUS CICERO, Comm. 42

In practicing such unavoidable deception,107 Quintus admits that the “good candidate” (boni petitoris) differs from “the good man” (boni viri) (Comm. 45)—a reflection of the principle that a statesman must balance virtue and expediency to achieve political success.108 While attracting wide-ranging 105  On Commentariolum Petitionis see Taylor (1949: 58–59, 64–66), Balsdon (1963), MorsteinMarx (1998), Shackleton Bailey (2002: 395–403). While the authenticity of the work as written by Quintus Cicero is in question, what is important here is the intention of the writer to provide practical advice to readers active in political affairs. 106  Skillful manipulation of the dynamics of patronage was required—both in “calling in” obligations (Comm. 21–24) and in promising to respect obligations created by newly-won support (Comm. 25–27). At the same time, Quintus warns that “all things are full of deceit, snares and treachery” ( fraudis atque insidiarum et perfidiae plena sunt omnia) (Comm. 39)—including alliances with friends—and that moral character is forgotten “when bribery enters in” (largitione interposita) (Comm. 55–57). 107  Quintus suggests various tactics for securing “respectful attendance” (adsectationis), including (1) callers at one’s house, (2) escorts from one’s house and (3) a crowd of followers wherever one went (Comm. 34–38). 108  The candidate is instructed to avoid scandal and refrain from affairs of the Senate and assembly while he seeks office. “Let the Senate deem you a man who will uphold their authority; the knights see you as devoted to peace and quiet times; and the People see you as favorably inclined to their interests” (Comm. 53). Moreover, in dealing with the

66

Chapter 2

s­ upport was less essential under the Empire, its continued importance is suggested by Plutarch’s treatment of the same topic in Political Precepts, where he advises Menemachus to study the character of the people and accommodate his actions to what pleases them in order to gain influence (Pol. Prec. 799B–800A). Pliny offered general advice on managing political challenges “on the way up”, especially in the area of accepting requests to plead cases in court. For instance, in Ep. 6.29 to Ummidius Quadratus, Pliny recommends that decisions to accept or refuse requests to plead cases for the Senate take into account the “fame and reputation” (gloriae et famae) to be gained,109 the potential to set legal precedent, obligations towards one’s patrons and the needs of friends.110 These criteria are illustrated more fully in letters that deal with specific cases (e.g. Ep. 3.4, 4.7, 4.15).111 Similarly, Quintilian devotes attention to how to pick cases (Quint. 12.7), while Plutarch raises the issue in Political Precepts when he discusses the prudent choice of court cases as a means to build one’s influence in a provincial city, where taking on a major problem could be a fast track to prominence (Pol. Prec. 805 A–B).

people, one must be wary of the anger that erupts when requests are refused: a candidate confronted with a request he cannot perform is advised to simply agree to the request, rather than decline it (Comm. 45–48). 109  Defending or prosecuting provincial governors was one area in which a senator could gain reputation. In Ep. 6.29, Pliny mentions acting for the people of Baetica against Caecilius Classicus when the question at issue was whether provincials should be penalized for being the governor’s allies and accomplices (Ep. 6.29.8) and acting for the prosecution again when Marius Priscus was charged with taking bribes (Ep. 6.29.9). 110  The calculus of the exchange of favors is further illustrated in the letter to Minicius Fundanus, urging him, when he became consul, to select Asinius Rufus’ eldest son as quaestor—an action that would oblige a family that included a praetor and several consuls (Ep. 4.15.5–10). Similarly, Pliny urges Pompeius Falco to make a young man from his native district a military tribune (Ep. 7.22). In another instance, Pliny famously made a gift of money to a friend to enable him to qualify for equestrian status (Ep. 1.1.19). On issues of patronage, see Braund (1989), Wallace-Hadrill (1989). 111  In Ep. 3.4 (to Caecilius Macrinus), Pliny explains how his decision to take the case against Caecilius Classicus was based on ties of patronage, a desire to build goodwill with Baetica, and the potential to more readily refuse the Senate in the future by accommodating them at present. The importance of requiting earlier favors is reflected in Pliny’s assertion in Ep. 4.17 that he would without hesitation defend the daughter of Correllius, the man who had sponsored Pliny and served as his “guide and counsellor” (consiliator et rector, Ep. 4.17.6) early in his career.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

67

Detailed instruction in how to perform the duties of a particular administrative office is found in Frontinus’ De Aquis Urbis Romae,112 which was written to help men handle the responsibilities of the Prefect of Water Supply, the magistrate who maintained the aqueduct system. Frontinus includes the physical details about the aqueduct system (De Aq. 1.4–22), as well as instruction on how to prevent theft (De Aq. 2.112–115), manage slave gangs (2.115–118) and oversee maintenance of the network (2.119–129). Frontinus’ explanation for writing this handbook reveals the need for practical advice among men pursuing political careers: when senators or equestrians moved through appointments that lasted only 1–3 years, inexperience made it necessary to defer to the knowledge of assistants if reliable outside guidance was not available.113 I believe … that there is nothing so disgraceful for a decent man as to conduct an office delegated to him according to the instructions of assistants. Yet precisely this is inevitable whenever a person inexperienced in the matter in hand has to have recourse to the practical knowledge of subordinates.… I have gathered in this sketch (into one systematic body, so to speak) such facts, hitherto scattered, as I have been able to get together, which bear on the general subject and which might serve to guide me in my administration. FRONTINUS, De Aquis 1.2

Concerns about water supply affected the provinces as well, as reflected in Pliny’s letter discussing Rome’s involvement in the construction and financing of an aqueduct in Nicomedia (Ep. 10.37–39).114 Maintaining Internal Harmony For leaders in the provincial cities, the primary challenges lay in maintaining internal harmony and the efficient running of key services. Dio Chrysostom’s 112  Frontinus presents his role as water commissioner as “an office that concerns not merely the convenience but also the health and even the safety of the City” (officium ad usum, tum ad salubritatem atque etiam securitatem urbis pertinens) and therefore familiarized himself with the business (De Aquis 1.1). On De Aquis, see Bennett (1925: xxvi–xxvii), Dihle (1994: 153). 113  Plutarch illustrates Cato Minor pursuing similar “background study” ahead of his term as quaestor (Cato Minor 16.1–3). See Chapter 9. Likewise, Gellius (14.21) describes his efforts to find books on the duties of a judge when he was assigned to private suits. 114  Since such an administrative post was held in every province or large city, Frontinus’ general method of inquiry into the network and operation could have provided a model that others could apply in their own local area.

68

Chapter 2

pragmatic advice to Greek cities is found in his “city orations”,115 especially Orations 34–51,116 which often focus on dispelling discord within a city or among the cities of a province. Dio recommends that cities avoid advisors who are “foolish” (ἀνόητοὶ) “notoriety hunters” (δοξοκόποι), lacking in “sound judgment” (γνώμης ἀσφαλοῦς) and in understanding (συνέντες) and who clamor for the applause of the crowd, which sweeps them along in its direction (Or. 34.31).117 Instead cities should select “a man of nobility and practical judgment” (γενναῖον δὲ καὶ φρόνιμον ἄνδρα) who is really devoted to his own country (κηδεμόνα ὄντως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος) (Or. 34.30)118 and not swayed by the reaction of the crowd: But, as for me, I say that the counsellor who is a good counsellor and worthy to be leader of a city should be prepared to withstand absolutely all those things considered difficult and especially the vilifications and anger of the mob.… He should be wholly unaffected by such outbursts, and neither if they applaud him should he on that account be elated (ἐπαίρεσθαι), nor if he feels he is being insulted should he be depressed (ταπεινοῦσθαι). Dio, Or. 34.33

The topic of concord (ὁμόνοια) was central to Orations 44–46, in which Dio addresses various relations between wealthy citizens and the council,119 between the council and the people and amongst the people themselves. Orations 45 and 46, for instance, instruct the people of Prusa to resolve complaints about the market without riots, while the potential for internal concord to help Prusa 115  On Dio’s City Orations, see Jones (1978), Swain (1996: 206–241), Desideri (2000: 103–107), Salmeri (2000), Trapp (2007: 185–200), Desideri (2011: 91–94). 116  Pragmatic advice is prominent in Orations 34 (to Tarsus), 38 (to Nicomedia), 39 (to Nicaea), 40 (to Prusa), 41 (to Apameia) and 44–51 (to Prusa). 117  Such an advisor is like a ship pilot who steers his ship in the direction that the passengers desire, creating a situation in which “it would take no great storm to overturn the ship” (οὐ μεγάλου τινὸς αὐτοῖς δεήσει χειμῶνος, ὥστε ἀνατρέψαι) (Or. 34.32). 118  A man of nobility and practical judgment will seek and speak the truth, and his advice, if followed, “insures better management and the attainment of some blessing” (ἄμεινον οἰκεῖται καὶ μετέσχηκεν ἀγαθοῦ τινος) (Or. 34.30). 119  Issues that could arise between benefactors and their cities are illustrated in Oration 40, in which Dio describes the hurdles he is facing in the financing and construction of a project he initiated on behalf of Prusa (Or. 40.5–7) and the broader benefits for a city’s standing and privileges that can result from upgrading its public buildings.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

69

earn status as an independent city is discussed in Or. 44. In this area, Athens and Sparta are cited as positive examples as cities that became illustrious through the orderly conduct of internal affairs (Or. 44.11).120 Plutarch also devotes considerable attention to harmony in the cities, but goes further than Dio in providing detailed instruction on how to deal with the day-to-day challenges of administering provincial cities. Plutarch’s specific guidance is found in Old Men in Politics and Political Precepts, covering city administration, diplomacy and managing relations with others in the political arena—including the people, colleagues, friends and adversaries.121 In both treatises, as noted earlier, the exempla are overwhelmingly taken from careers of historical statesmen, including many subjects of the Parallel Lives, underscoring the pragmatic orientation of these works.122 In Old Men in Politics, Plutarch offers advice on how best to channel one’s efforts, as an old man,123 to continue to serve one’s city.124 Plutarch emphasizes the contribution old men make in helping the common welfare (ὠφελεῖν τὸ κοινὸν), especially in deliberations in the assembly, where they contribute both practical judgment (φρόνησις) based on experience and good counsel (εὐβουλία) based on foresight, frankness, sensible speech and prudent thought (Old Men in Politics 789D, 792D–E, 797E). These strengths balance the problematic traits of the young—especially ambition (φιλοτιμία), contentiousness (φιλονικία), love of glory (φιλοδοξία) and the desire to be first and greatest

120  Across the Orations, Athens and Sparta are variously presented as models to follow (Or. 50.1, where they are Greek cities of first rank) or not follow (Or. 48.12, where Athens could not save itself from the costs of internal dissension) in managing internal affairs. In Or. 51.6, Pericles symbolizes the greatness of a city that results from entrusting a good leader to supervise affairs, but even he was not always selected for office. Oration 39 (to Nicaea) celebrates renewed concord within that city, comparing it to a chorus singing in harmony, a body in health, a ship with agreement between pilot and crew and a charioteer in control of his horses (Or. 39.4–7). 121  In many areas, these precepts overlap those in Cicero’s De Officiis. 122  Heroes from the Lives referenced most often in Old Men in Politics and Political Precepts are: Pericles (nineteen times), Phocion (twelve), Epaminondas (eleven), Cato Maior (eleven) and Cato Minor (eight). 123  The issues surrounding older versus younger men in politics were also addressed by Cicero in De Officiis (1.34.122–123), where he described the maturation of a statesman. 124  The commitment of an old man to serve his city forms the basis of Plutarch’s admonition that it is dishonorable voluntarily to disengage entirely from public affairs after one has chosen the way of life of a politikos. On Old Men in Politics, see Chapter 1, n. 60.

70

Chapter 2

(ἡ τοῦ πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ μέγιστον ἐπιθυμία) (Old Men in Politics 788E).125 The different characterizations of the old and young in public life imply a maturation process that can be accelerated through the active engagement of experienced statesmen.126 Older men play an essential role in training (παιδοτριβῶν) the young “in community affairs and political contests” and preparing each one to be a “speaker of speeches and doer of deeds” (μύθων τε ῥητῆρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων) (Old Men in Politics 795E).127 The older statesman is instructed to “direct, guide and support the young” (ὀρθοῦντα καὶ χειραγωγοῦντα καὶ τρέφοντα) not only “with good instructions and advice”, but also by giving them access to public posts that bring honor and reputation without being associated with unpopular issues (Old Men in Politics 796B–C). The relationship between a young man and an older mentor—whereby the young man observes experienced generals and statesmen in action (Old Men in Politics 790D–E)—is, in effect, an apprenticeship through which the young man acquires a “statesmanlike mind” (νοῦν πολιτικὸν) (790D–E). Several subjects of the Parallel Lives are prominent as exempla of long-lived statesmen who demonstrated unflagging commitment to public affairs, including Agesilaus, Aristides, Cato Maior, Pericles and Phocion.128 Political Precepts echoes many of the same themes129 but deals in far greater detail with the administrative and advisory functions performed by statesmen. In this treatise, Plutarch is less like a philosopher instilling virtue in a ruler 125  The consequences that flow from these four traits are central themes in the Lives. In Old Men in Politics, young men are eager to score a victory (784D), while also being “thirsty for reputation and power” (διψώντων δόξης καὶ δυνάμεως) and not possessing a statesmanlike mind (790D). Older statesmen must mix their own discretion (εὐλάβεια γεροντικὴ) with “boiling” youth “drunk with reputation and ambition” (βακχεύουσαν ὑπὸ δόξης καὶ φιλοτιμίας) in order to remove “what is insane and too untempered” (791C). See also Old Men in Politics 789D–E. 126  ”The perfect statesman engages in public affairs, first while still a learner and a neophyte and finally as a teacher and initiator” (ὁ τελέως πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα μανθάνων ἔτι πολιτεύεται καὶ μυούμενος τὰ δ’ ἔσχατα διδάσκων καὶ μυσταγωγῶν) (Old Men in Politics 795E). Older men must teach young men that statesmanship is more than holding office and being active in the assembly and council—it is a way of life (796C). These principles are illustrated in the Lives we examine later, including Aemilius (Chapter 7) and Cato Minor (Chapter 9). 127  On this common depiction of older men mentoring the young—taken from Phoenix’s speech to Achilles at Iliad 9.443—see n. 132 below. 128  Twenty-three heroes from the Lives are cited as exempla in Old Men in Politics. 129  In effect, Political Precepts presents in summary form the lessons in “managing the state” (πόλιν δὲ μεταχειρίσασθαι) and “persuading the people or council” (κυβερνῆσαι δῆμον ἢ βουλὴν) mentioned in Old Men in Politics (790D–E) as skills a young man must acquire

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

71

than like a trainer preparing athletes for competition.130 Statesmen, in turn, are compared not only to athletes competing against rivals, but also to physicians curing the diseases of the state.131 Plutarch casts himself in the role of a Phoenix, or an old man of Old Men in Politics, mentoring a young man to make him “a speaker of speeches and doer of deeds” (Pol. Prec. 798B).132 Plutarch’s pragmatic advice in Political Precepts is designed to make his readers more effective in accomplishing the primary goals of statesmanship under Rome: (1) winning over the people and one’s colleagues to the best policies for the city; (2) solving administrative problems internally without Roman intervention; (3) using diplomacy to expand privileges enjoyed by one’s city and (4) resolving disagreements that arise among competing factions within the city. Key areas of concern and role models are summarized in Table 2.1. Special attention is given to skills that helped a statesman quickly dispel factional discord and promote harmony, “the greatest and noblest function” of what may be called the art of statesmanship (τῆς πολιτικῆς ὥσπερ τέχνης) (824C).133 The precepts are illustrated by statesmen—including more than twenty subjects of Lives134—and several, such as Themistocles, Pericles and Philopoemen, are a positive model in one area and a deterrent model in another. from older men. See Chapter 1 (n. 58) for summaries of the traits of the ideal statesmen depicted in Political Precepts. 130  Imagery of “athletic competition” is commonly used to describe the life of a statesman in an oligarchy or democracy in the Moralia and Parallel Lives (e.g. 795A, 798B or Dion 1.1–3). See Fuhrmann (1964: 41–42; 48–53). 131  By contrast, in Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler, the philosopher is compared to the physician (Philosophers and Men in Power 776D; To an Uneducated Ruler 779F). In Political Precepts, Plutarch uses the metaphor of the physician most often (809E, 814F, 815B, 818B, 818E, 824A, 825D), but also employs the helmsman (801D, 801F, 812C) and carpenter (807C–D). In Old Men in Politics, the dominant metaphor is the ship of state and its helmsman (785E, 787E, 788C–D, 790D). Both metaphors frequently appear across the Lives. 132  Quintilian also compares himself to Phoenix, who taught his pupil “to speak and to act” (dicere ac facere, 2.3.12), quoting Iliad 9.443, which is cited again at 2.17.8. Cicero (De Orat. 3.57) cites Phoenix to illustrate the need to combine instruction in oratory with instruction in ethical action. Dio (Or. 2.19) refers to Phoenix uniting the art of discourse to the ability to act (also citing Iliad 9.443) when Alexander discusses Achilles’ education. 133  Resolving factional discord and restoring harmony are themes in the Lives of Fabius, Coriolanus and Cato Minor. On overlaps between Political Precepts and Demosthenes, see Cooper (2008). 134  The subjects of the Lives who are cited most often include Agesilaus (805E, 808A, 809B); Alcibiades (799D–E, 800D, 804A, 804F, 823D), Aristides (805F, 809B, 823E), Cimon (800D, 802C, 812F, 818D), Pericles (800C, 801E, 802C, 803A, 803B, 803F, 805C, 808B, 810C, 811C–D,

72

Chapter 2

Table 2.1

Key components of statesmanship: Political Precepts

Area

Sections

Positive models

Cultivating one’s moral character Eloquence and persuasion Relations with the demos

800B–801B

Pericles, Themistocles Alcibiades, Cleon, Cleophon Pericles, Phocion Nicias

Managing friendships

807A–809A

801C–804C 799B–801B; 818A–824A

Managing enmities and 809B–811A rivalries Sharing power with others

811B–813D

Conducting diplomacy with overlord Cooperating with colleagues

813D–816A 816A–817F

Pericles, Cato Maior, Epaminondas, Aristides Pericles, Phocion, Timoleon

Deterrent models

Alexander, Alcibiades, Cleon

Agesilaus, Solon, Cato Minor, Themistocles Pericles, Themistocles, Pericles, Demosthenes, Aristides, Cato Philopoemen Maior Pericles Themistocles, Cleon, Philopoemen, Hannibal Pericles, Polybius, Pardalas Areius Philopoemen, Timoleon

Conducting Diplomacy The third area of concern for city leaders was conducting diplomacy on two fronts: in relations with imperial authorities and in relations with other cities in their province. Practical guidance for city leaders on speech writing is found in Menander Rhetor’s handbook on how to structure public speeches for various occasions—a specialized skill needed in Plutarch’s day by men serving on 812D–E, 813D–E, 818D), Phocion (803A–B, 805F, 803E, 805E–F, 808A, 809A, 810D, 819A, 822E), Themistocles (800B, 805C, 806F–807B, 808F, 809B, 812B), Cato Minor (804C, 808E, 809D, 810C, 818D), Cato Maior (803C, 805E, 805F, 811A, 825D) and Pompey (800D, 804F, 805C, 805F, 806A–B, 806D, 810C, 815E–F).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

73

delegations or receiving imperial authorities in their city.135 Although the work dates to the 4th century, it “formulates much of the practice of the great age of the Second Sophistic”.136 It provides instruction, for instance, in how to construct a speech to the Emperor or provincial governor, which required that the man’s character and entire political and military career be applauded and the praise reinforced by comparisons to leaders of the past:137 Always divide the actions of those you are going to praise into the virtues (there are four virtues: courage, justice, temperance and practical judgment). (2.373) … You should then proceed to the most complete comparison, examining his reign in comparison with preceding reigns.… You must not forget our previous proposition, namely that comparisons (synkriseis) should be made under each head; these comparisons, however, will be partial (e.g. education with education, temperance with temperance), whereas the complete one will concern the whole subject, as when we compare a reign as a whole and in sum with another reign. MEN. RHET. 2.377 (Trans. Russell and Wilson, 1981).

The process of comparison described here echoes the sequential comparative assessments, and final summary judgments, found in the synkriseis of the Parallel Lives. Pliny’s correspondence with Trajan supplied indirect instruction in another area: managing relations between imperial authorities and the provincial cities.138 The letters to Trajan, collected in Book 10, reveal the wide range of issues on which cities needed approval from the Emperor and the considerations (such as dignity of the city, Ep. 10.23; or past unrest, 10.34) that impacted the granting or refusal of a request.139 Concerns raised included city finances, construction of new buildings (e.g. public baths, theaters or gymnasia), water 135  On Menander Rhetor, see Russell and Wilson (1981). See also Pernot (1993) on rhetorical practices of the era. 136  Russell and Wilson (1981: xi). 137  Comparing whole careers was not an uncommon practice in the study of rhetoric. See Kennedy (2003: 52–54, 83–84, 113–115, 162–163, 212–213). On comparison and historical figures, see also Pernot (1993: 690–98, 739–62). 138  On Pliny’s Epistulae, see Radice (1969a; 1969b), Dihle (1994: 226), Conte (1994: 526), Griffin (2005: 551–555), Noreña (2007). 139  For instance, Pliny recommends approval of Prusa’s request for a new public bath as “worthy of the town’s prestige and the splendor of your reign” (et dignitas civitatis et saeculi tui nitor postulat) (Ep. 10.23.1), while the idea of creating a fire department in Nicomedia is

74

Chapter 2

supply, local legal issues or setting pre-requisites for entering a provincial senate.140 The letters demonstrate the importance for a city seeking approval for its projects to have a reputation for moral integrity, internal stability and competent administration of its affairs. With regard to relations with Roman authorities, Dio echoes Pliny in emphasizing the need for a city to cultivate a reputation as stable and well-disposed to Rome in order to reduce Roman involvement in its internal affairs141 and to increase the potential for new privileges, such as assize courts, higher status or lower taxes.142 For instance, Dio advises Tarsus not to acquire a name as a city that brings malicious prosecutions (Or. 34.9)143 and warns Prusa that no activities—and especially rioting or discord—go unnoticed by the proconsuls (Or. 46.14).144 Dio offers guidance on managing relations with other cities as well, in which sphere it was important not to gain a reputation as a bully rejected by Trajan because such societies had been responsible for political disturbances in the province in the past (Ep. 10.34). 140  Specifically, concerns raised in the letters to Trajan include: city finances (e.g. in Prusa, Ep. 10.17; in Claudiopolis, 10.39); construction of new buildings (e.g. such public baths in Prusa, 10.23, or the theater and gymnasium in Nicaea, 10.39); water supply (e.g. the aqueduct in Nicomedia, 10.37–39); and various legal issues (e.g. prisons, 10.19; foundlings, 10.65; or setting pre-requisites for entering provincial senates, 10.79–80). 141  Prusa is later advised to greet the new consul with applause and goodwill—rather than complaints—so that he will view them as a healthy city rather than one in need of his attention (Or. 48. 2). Plutarch emphasizes this same point in Political Precepts (815A–C). 142  The key privileges include not only buildings, festivals, independent administration of justice, and exemption from standing trial away from home—all mentioned at Or. 40.10—but also freedom from taxation, control over revenue-generating activities, roads, resources or ports in one’s vicinity and being considered as a “free” city. Dio addresses issues of diplomacy in Orations 45 and 46, where he provides an account of his embassy to Trajan—when he won assize courts for Prusa—and in Oration 47.12–19, where he discusses the suspicions that could arise from cozy relations with Rome. Plutarch’s Phocion illustrates various aspects of the dynamics between the cities and imperial governors. See Chapter 9. 143  At Or. 34.9, Dio comments that the people of Tarsus had “shown themselves to amount to something” (τὸ φανῆναί τινας ὄντας) when they prosecuted Roman governors who had been violent, but had to be careful not to become known for being unwilling to submit to authority. Dio advises that they not challenge every burdensome action on the part of the overlords—only those that are truly intolerable—and that they be willing at times to concede and yield to the complaints of smaller cities and even occasionally submit to wrong rather than leave quarrels unresolved (Or. 34.40–45). Tarsus, in effect, had to cultivate a reputation as a city that could harmoniously rule and be ruled. 144  Dio’s advice in Oration 46 was that the people, rather than rioting and drawing the attention of Rome, should demand that their market be supervised either by men who

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

75

towards the cities under one’s sway (Or. 34.10–13). In Orations 34, 38 and 40, for instance, he addresses the need for a powerful city to be gracious and slow to take offense in dealing with smaller cities.145 Dio recommends that Tarsus do nothing against cities resisting its authority since even false charges could give it the reputation of being “odious and oppressive” (ἐπαχθῆ καὶ βαρεῖαν) (Or. 34.10–15) and similarly instructs Prusa not to be “too precise in defending its rights” (μὴ σφόδρα ἀκριβῶς περιέχεσθαι τῶν δικαίων) in its quarrel with Apameia (Or. 40.20–22) since the “rules of the game” are more strictly enforced against powerful cities and the weaker cities will naturally feel resentment. He further recommends that rivalry with other cities be avoided because it is not advantageous: it diminishes the city’s reputation with the Emperor (Or. 34.9–10; 38.33–34), incurs costs without any real prize (Or. 34.48; 38.21, 26–31)146 and gives tyrannical power to the entities (e.g. smaller cities) at the center of the squabble (Or. 38.36–37, 50). Athens and Sparta exemplify how rivalry leads to ruin (Or. 34.49–51; 38.25; Or. 38.39–42).147 Plutarch devotes one section of Political Precepts (813E–816A) specifically to relations with Rome. In this area, Plutarch recommends that provincial leaders stay within the bounds defined by Rome, “imitating actors” (μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, Pol. Prec. 813E) and “not going beyond the rhythms and measures permitted by those in authority” (μὴ παρεκβαίνοντας τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς διδομένης ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων, 813F). In addition, the city magistrate should show himself and his city as blameless toward the rulers (814C), maintaining internal concord “in order to prevent the need for physicians are financially able and have not performed liturgies or by men chosen by the people (Or. 46.14). 145  See, for instance, Or. 34.10–13. The objectives for cities, as rulers of others, were the same as for the Emperor or provincial governor: behave mildly and considerately, without hostility and hatred, in order to elicit willing acceptance of one’s leadership (Or. 34.47). 146  In Or. 34, Dio comments that the prizes have changed: Athens and Sparta possessed “real power and great utility (ἀληθῆ δύναμιν καὶ μεγάλας ὠφελείας), if it be correct to call self-seeking (πλεονεξίας) by that name” (Or. 34.51). The quarrels among Greek cities in Dio’s day were akin to “fellow-slaves quarrelling with one another over glory and preeminence” (ὁμοδούλων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐριζόντων περὶ δόξης καὶ πρωτείων) (Or. 34.51). It is an “ass’s shadow” (περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς) over which they quarrel: the right to lead and wield authority belonged to others (Or. 34.48). Nicomedia is advised to stop competing with Nicaea for the title of “first city” and instead to benefit the smaller cities and be pre-eminent in reality (Or. 38.30–31). 147  In Oration 45, Dio even floats the idea of making Prusa the head of a federation of cities which would bring benefits to all—in imitation of Epaminondas in Boeotia, Theseus in Attica and the people of Mytilene in Aeolis and the Hellespont (Or. 45.15).

76

Chapter 2

and medicine drawn from outside” (ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰατρῶν καὶ φαρμάκων δέοιτο, 815B). Like Dio, Plutarch wanted provincial cities to adopt policies that would preserve as much autonomy—and bring as little interference by Rome—as was possible under imperial rule. Maintaining internal harmony in one’s city was central to achieving this goal. As we will see, these principles of resolving internal conflicts and mediating with overlords are illustrated from various perspectives in the pairs of Lives examined in Part 3, especially in Phocion-Cato.

Common Concerns in the Advice Literature for Statesmen and Generals While their specific works for political and military leaders often emphasized different challenges, Plutarch and other authors offering advice had a common perspective regarding the duties of statesmen and the methods of resolving difficulties in public life. First, training in philosophy and the principles of moral virtue were commonly considered to be the foundation of good statesmanship and generalship, and the same core virtues of temperance, courage, justice and practical judgment were highlighted as essential attributes. Second, it was agreed that the duty to secure the safety and well-being of one’s state took precedence over any specific needs of family, friends or any other private interest. Third, the actions of statesmen were judged on the basis both of the motives behind them and of their success in benefiting the state or saving it from harm. To achieve success, the statesman had to recognize the dynamics of the immediate situation and act expediently in the common interest, regardless of whether expedient action required violations of principles of moral virtue for private life: ethical traits and pragmatic judgment were complementary elements enabling the politikos to produce the best results. Finally, all of the writers advising statesmen and generals used leaders from the distant Greek and Roman past as role models for meeting political and military challenges in imperial times, indicating that the leaders of the past and present faced parallel challenges. Plutarch, for instance, overwhelmingly used historical statesmen—over philosophers or literary figures—as exempla in the treatises addressing issues of contemporary statesmanship. As shown in Table 2.2, below, Plutarch’s political treatises advising statesmen feature historical leaders or Homeric figures as the primary exempla, while practical-ethical treatises emphasizing moral qualities for private and public life—such as On Moral Virtue, On Tranquility of Mind and On Exile—cite more philosophers. This widespread use of statesmen in works advising statesmen and generals is

77

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals table 2.2 Exempla in the Moralia: Incidents tied to statesmen, philosophers and Homeric/ literary characters Treatise (addressee)

Statesmen

Philosophers

Homeric/Literary

Political Precepts (Menemachus) Old Men in Politics (Euphanes) How to Profit from Enemies (Pulcher) On Inoffensive Self-Praise (Herculanus) On Being Compliant On Control of Anger

81

11

14

39

5

1

23

11

7

18

4

10

16 12

9 11

1 9

How to Tell a Flatterer (Philopappus) On Progress in Virtue (Sosius Senecio) On Tranquility of Mind (Paccius) On Exile On Moral Virtue

25

35

57

18

25

2

13

24

6

6 1

24 25

5 8

consistent with the didactic agenda of providing “mirrors” readers could use to adjust their conduct. This practice of highlighting moral traits and practical skill was also followed by the pragmatic historians, who also supplied detailed depictions of the dynamics of effective and ineffective leadership. 2.2

Pragmatic History

Like the authors of advice literature for statesmen, writers of “pragmatic history”, such as Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (and, to a lesser extent, Diodorus Siculus), examined the dynamics of the past as an instructive frame

78

Chapter 2

of reference for contemporary political and military conduct.148 While the term “pragmatic history” was initially adopted to highlight a focus on the dynamics of specific events (pragma) rather than the broader “universal” trends of history, the term has come to be associated with history with a specific didactic agenda: providing pragmatic lessons that would be “useful” for leaders.149 Duff (2003) describes the combination of attention to moral character and to practical lessons in political and military leadership found in pragmatic history: This usefulness is conceived not so much as teaching moral lessons, although the mutability of fortune and the corresponding need for moderation in success and resilience in adversity are a constant theme. Rather this usefulness is seen in terms of training future statesmen in the practical conduct of war or politics. Duff (2003: 59)

It is in this sense of “practical training” for statesmen that the methods adopt­ ed in “pragmatic history” are a useful backdrop for our analysis of the Lives as “pragmatic biography”.

148  The depiction of famous statesmen as paradigms of political effectiveness was less prominent among (extant) Roman historians. Livy’s project placed less emphasis on the dynamics of cause and effect based on truth than on presenting actions of famous leaders as manifestations of particular virtues rewarded with success or unwarranted penalties. Fornara (1983: 117–118) characterizes Livy as molding characterizations “to elaborate stereotypes agreeable to the prejudices and expectations of readers and writer alike”. See also Levene (2011). 149  Fornara (1983: 112–113) explains that Polybius’ purpose in writing history was “political utility”, found in historical accounts that combined the moral component already present in history with the usefulness of descriptions of the dynamics underlying political and military events: “it is pragmatic because a causative history of contemporary politics presents the politician with a guide for future action.” Duff (2003: 58–59) distinguishes between Polybius’ reference to his work as “pragmatic history”—meaning that it is the history of deeds (praxeis) rather than a broader treatment of events on and off the stage of politics and war—and his reference to his work as “apodeiktike historia”, or “explanatory history” that links causes to effects and provides guidance to future leaders. On pragmatic history and Greek historiography, see also Walbank (1972: 66–96), Hau (2014).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

79

While the goal of infusing history with “practical utility” (ὠφέλεια) was already evident in Thucydides (1.22.4)150 and Xenophon,151 this aspect of historical writing became a more prominent priority from Polybius onward. By identifying the full range of causes underlying major events—including, among other factors, the moral character and practical skills of leaders, as well as their strategic judgment—and then linking these causes to positive (or negative) results in specific political or military situations, pragmatic historians intended to provide a “road-map” of sorts for future leaders confronting similar circumstances.152 To in fact provide such practical benefits, these historical accounts had to be as realistic as possible in describing the dynamics of events: both the virtues and vices of leaders had to be conveyed, as well as analysis of the underlying causes of their successes and failures. A brief overview of the objectives of such historians contributes in two ways to the interpretation of the Parallel Lives as “pragmatic biography”.153 First, pragmatic histories aimed at an “unvarnished” version of public careers in which leaders combined virtue and vice and experienced both successes and failures—the same blend of characteristics routinely attached by Plutarch to 150  Sacks (1990: 22) notes that the goal of Hellenistic historians to write history that provided benefit (ὠφέλεια) and utility (τὸ χρήσιμον) to readers could be traced to Thucydides’ comment at 1.22.4 that he was presenting events that would “in all probability, happen again in the same or a similar way” for readers who would find this useful. 151  In Hellenica, for instance, Xenophon inserts a comment to explain why he has included details about Teleutias’ ability to win over the Athenian sailors at a critical moment: “I think it is worthwhile for a man to understand what it was that Teleutias did to dispose the men toward him in this way” (τί ποτε ποιῶν ὁ Τελευτίας οὕτω διέθηκε τοὺς ἀρχομένους) (Hell. 5.1.4). The focus initially is on the result that Teleutias obtained, but the account reveals the elements of moral character and shrewd judgment that enabled Teleutias to generate that result. Duff (2011a: 60–61) discusses this passage in the context of ancient readers, who were expected to be able to extract general lessons from historical accounts to apply “in the more mundane circumstances of their own lives”. 152  Sacks (1981: 122–123) explains Polybius’ approach to supplying utility to his reader: “the historian who draws from his own experience (autourgia) in order to understand similar events (autopatheia) can present an account with emphasis. From such a work, the reader might transfer his understanding of these events to similar occurrences of his own day and so benefit.” 153  Duff (1999b: 52–53) notes the similarity between Plutarch’s programmatic statements and the goal of pragmatic history to provide utility rather than pleasure, but limits the “utility” in Plutarch’s Lives to “a utility which is moral rather than political or military”. As I will demonstrate in Parts 2 and 3, the utility of the Lives was much broader and, like pragmatic history, also included useful lessons in military and political conduct.

80

Chapter 2

statesmen in his treatises and Lives.154 Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 8.60.1–2), for instance, comments that “it was impossible that all the virtues should be found together in a human being’s nature” (οὐ γὰρ ἐν δυνατῷ ἦν ἅμα πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι φύσει). Secondly, the leading figures in pragmatic histories are shown deliberating alternatives and implementing strategies in difficult situations that could confront leaders of any era, and, therefore, their “success” or “failure” could be traced to specific decisions that could be imitated or avoided by contemporary leaders in similar circumstances. As we will see in Parts 2 and 3, the practice of linking policies to results was integrated into the narratives of the Parallel Lives, where the heroes are depicted as paradigms of effective or ineffective leadership in confronting specific problems. Polybius, Diodorus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus each clearly articulated both the questions that guided their historical analysis and the practical utility they believed their histories would have for their readers. Polybius155 considered “the history of actual events” (ὁ δὲ πραγματικὸς τρόπος) to be of “greatest practical utility” (ὠφελιμώτατον) because it provided readers with “a method for dealing with any contingency that might arise” (πᾶν τὸ παραπῖπτον ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ὡς ἂν εἰ μεθοδικῶς δύνασθαι χειρίζειν) (Polybius 9.2.4–5). To this end, Polybius explains, his history investigates a broad range of questions beyond the basic narrative of events, including what preceded (τῶν πρότερον), what accompanied (τῶν ἅμα) and what followed (τῶν ἐπιγινομένων) each deed: For if we remove from history the discussion of why (διὰ τί), how (πῶς) and wherefore (τίνος χάριν) each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably expected, what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson (ἀγώνισμα μέν, μάθημα δ’ οὐ) and, while pleasing for the moment, of no practical utility for the future (οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ). Polybius 3.31.11–13

For Polybius, the lessons of history lay in the “why?”, “how?” and “with what consequences?” of each action,156 since, without such knowledge, the states154  Polybius’ description of Aratus’ strengths and weaknesses is one example. Plutarch’s description of Aratus in Aratus is similar, as discussed below. 155  On the content and method of Polybius’ history, see Walbank (1972), Sacks (1981), Fornara (1983), Weil (1988), Schepens (1990), Eckstein (1995), Walbank (2002), Pitcher (2009; 2011), Marincola (2011a: 123–127), Pelling (2011a: 245–250). 156  Cicero echoes this concept of history in De Oratore 2.15.62–63, where Antonius states the necessity of treating not only words and deeds (quid actum aut dictum sit), but also the deliberations that preceded an action (consilia), the manner in which it was carried out

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

81

man could not “deal properly with circumstances” (κατὰ τρόπον χειρίσαι τῶν προσπιπτόντων) (Polybius 3.7.5–6).157 While Diodorus Siculus placed a greater emphasis on the “moral utility” of his history in spurring readers to live better lives,158 he explained the purpose of his history in utilitarian terms: to be of practical utility to the common welfare (ὠφελῆσαι τὸν κοινὸν βίον) (Diodorus 1.1.1). He saw it as a “schooling in what is advantageous” (διδασκαλίαν τοῦ συμφέροντος) that was free of danger while also providing excellent experience (καλλίστην ἐμπειρίαν) that enabled a reader “to discern in each instance what is beneficial” (τῶν χρησίμων ἕκαστα διαγινώσκειν) (Diodorus 1.1.1–2). His history offered an alternative to learning by one’s own experience, with all the attendant “toils and dangers” (Diodorus 1.1.2). Moreover, by understanding the failures and successes of others, a reader was in a position to make better decisions when facing similar situations:159 It is an excellent thing to be able to use the ignorant mistakes of others (ἀγνοήμασι … χρῆσθαι) as paradigms for the correction of error (πρὸς διόρθωσιν … παραδείγμασι), and, against the vicissitudes of life, instead of investigating the things being done at the moment, to be able to imitate successes achieved in the past (μίμησιν τῶν ἐπιτετευγμένων). Diodorus 1.1.4

Diodorus expected such practical lessons in leadership to have widespread benefits: the young were to receive the “intelligence of the old” (τὴν τῶν γεγηρακότων σύνεσιν), the old to multiply their experience (πολλαπλασιάζει τὴν (quomodo) and the results the followed it (eventus). Moreover, in discussing results, history requires details about the causes—“whether they originate in accident, discretion or foolhardiness” —as well as about the life and character of the leaders (De Orat. 2.15.63). 157  Polybius (2.56.11–13) states that truth takes precedence for historians, whose task is “to instruct and convince for all time” (εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι). Cicero agrees: “For who is ignorant that it is the first law of history not to dare to say anything false?” (ne quid falsi dicere audeat?) (De Orat. 2.15.62). 158  Sacks (1990: 24–25) argues that the utility aimed at by Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus was both moral and practical, while Diodorus Siculus concentrated on fostering moral improvement. Thus, while Polybius and Dionysius want to enhance the effectiveness of leaders in resolving specific challenges, Diodorus’ goals center on spurring the reader to live a better life. Sacks (1990: 24, n. 2) summarizes the scholarship on issues of moral and practical utility in Thucydides, Polybius, Dionysius and Diodorus. See also Marincola (2011b: 176–178). 159  Onasander (Strat. proem 4–6) and Frontinus (Strat. 1.1) similarly express this purpose for distilling lessons from the successes and failures of generals, as discussed above.

82

Chapter 2

ὑπάρχουσαν ἐμπειρίαν), private citizens to “acquire qualifications for leadership” (ἀξίους ἡγεμονίας κατασκευάζει), leaders to be inspired to attempt noble deeds for the sake of glory and, finally, soldiers, also for the sake of glory, to be prepared to face dangers on behalf of their countries (Diod. 1.1.4–5). Dionysius of Halicarnassus,160 in turn, like Polybius, saw truth—”the source of both practical judgment and wisdom” (ἀρχὴν φρονήσεώς τε καὶ σοφίας)—as central to historical writing that could be “of great practical utility” (πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν) (Rom. Ant. 1.1.2).161 In his view, readers of history could not derive “sufficient utility” (οὐχ ἱκανόν ἐστιν εἰς ὠφέλειαν) from the simple narration of deeds, but needed to also learn the causes (τὰς αἰτίας), the ways in which things were done (τοὺς τρόπους τῶν πράξεων), the motives of the men who did them (τὰς διανοίας τῶν πραξάντων) and the instances of divine intervention (τὰ παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου συγκυρήσαντα) (Rom. Ant. 5.56.1). Details about the life and character of a commander were also “absolutely necessary” (πάνυ ἀναγκαίαν) if statesmen were to acquire “paradigms to use in the various situations that arise” (Rom. Ant. 5.56.1):162 I am absolutely convinced that it is appropriate for writers of history not only to narrate the warlike deeds of distinguished leaders and whatever noble and salutary political measures (πολίτευμα καλὸν καὶ σωτήριον) they may have discovered for their cities, but also to exhibit their lives, if they were moderate (μέτριοι), temperate (σώφρονες) and continued to adhere to the customs of their homeland. Dionysius, Rom. Ant. 5.48.1

Dionysius envisioned a wide audience for his work, including those who involved themselves in political debates or philosophical speculations, as well as those simply seeking undisturbed entertainment (Rom. Ant. 1.8.3). Indeed, Dionysius believed his work to be of “greatest benefit” (χρησιμώτατα) because it provided many “noble and profitable paradigms” (καλῶν καὶ συμφερόντων 160  On Dionysius of Halicarnassus, see Fornara (1983), Schultze (1986), Gabba (1991), Fox (1993), Pitcher (2009), Marincola (2011a: 126–127) and Pelling (2011a: 252–258). 161  In contrast, Xenophon’s Cyropaideia was widely recognized to be a highly fictionalized account. Wiseman (1979: 34–35) discusses “plausibility”, rather than truth, as the key to inspiring readers: the historian’s success depended on linking actions that earned glory to specific virtues and competencies, letting the glory stimulate others to imitation. 162  Schultze (1986: 138) does not take this aim seriously: “While this may be part of Dionysius’ intention, it has to be admitted that in the context of contemporary Rome or even of the Greek cities of the empire, it is not a wholly realistic aim.”

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

83

παραδειγμάτων) not only to lawgivers and leaders of the people, but also to all who aspired to take part in public life and govern the state (πολιτεύεσθαί τε καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν) (Rom. Ant. 5.75.1). These three historians clearly targeted their message to men active in the political arena. Their emphasis on the practical utility (ὠφέλεια) of history suggests that they considered the challenges faced by historical leaders sufficiently parallel to those of contemporary times to make their histories a guide to action in the present. Their depictions of leaders could therefore supply role models to other writers wanting to use historical statesmen to exemplify principles of contemporary leadership. They also formed an important source for men writing the Lives of statesmen and generals, which could now more readily provide practical lessons in leadership—as reflected in the work of Nepos and Plutarch.163 Livy also aimed at creating exempla for readers, but described his audience more broadly as educated elite who could be inspired by historical figures.164 In Livy’s “exemplary history” (Chaplin 2000), the portraits of historical leaders of Rome were designed to enable readers “to extract what is worthy of imitation and what to avoid” (quod imitere capias, … quod vites, Livy, Praef. 10). The purpose of these exempla was two-fold: first to recognize the moral truths embedded in the historical account and second, to incorporate these truths into one’s own behavior.165 In addition, however, Livy constructs exempla that cover practical matters, such as battle tactics, which supply pragmatic insights into how to solve practical problems in generalship and statesmanship. Such pragmatic lessons are often incorporated in the direct speeches in which key figures explain the reasons they have chosen a particular policy and rejected others in pursuit of a specific objective. Thus Livy’s history, which becomes a primary source for several of Plutarch’s Lives, provides material for both ethical and pragmatic lessons for statesmen and generals.

163  The Lives of Suetonius are placed in a different category because they are exclusively Lives of Caesars, while Nepos and Plutarch wrote Lives of men active in the free Greek city states and the Roman Republic. 164  On Livy’s approach to exemplarity, see Chaplin (2000). For a broader discussion of examplarity in the late Republic and early Empire, see n. 5, above. 165  Chaplin (2000: 2).

84 2.3

Chapter 2

Individual Lives of Statesmen and Generals: Nepos and Plutarch

A pragmatic perspective also became more prominent in the “biographical” genre of Lives, as reflected in the work of Nepos and Plutarch. Before Nepos, works on political figures—such as Xenophon’s Agesilaus and Cyropaideia or Isocrates’ Evagoras—were often encomiastic, treating the “great deeds” of a statesman as vehicles for showcasing his virtues,166 with both his achievements and moral qualities embellished (and failures minimized) in the interest of sparking moral improvement.167 This practice continued in Suetonius’ Lives, which retained the structure of encomium in separating the accounts of deeds from the listing of virtues and vices and focused less on pragmatic lessons than on leading readers to certain judgments about the Emperors.168 Nepos and Plutarch adopted a different approach. Like the pragmatic historians, they largely presented incidents chronologically and integrated a leader’s moral qualities with his practical skills and judgment in portraying his role, periodically inserting authorial comments to highlight a pragmatic principle of leadership. Tacitus’ Agricola occupied a middle ground: while Agricola’s life is told chronologically from birth to death and includes details about his conduct as military tribune (Agric. 5), legion commander in Britain (7–8), praetor in Aquitaine (9) and governor of Britain (18–22), Tacitus emphasized Agricola’s virtues, effectiveness as a leader and achievements, without clarifying general principles of leadership for readers to adopt.169 166  Xenophon expresses this intention in Agesilaus 1.6, when he announces that he will now give an account of Agesilaus’ deeds, “for I believe that, from his deeds (ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἔργων), his qualities of character will best become manifest (τοὺς τρόπους … καταδήλους ἔσεσθαι)”. For discussions of the trends in biographical writing before Nepos, see Momigliano (1971/1993), Stadter (2011a: 528–531), Hägg (2012). 167  Cicero describes Xenophon’s portrayal of Cyrus as being “not according to historical truth, but as the pattern of a just ruler (non ad historiae fidem scriptus sed ad effigiem iusti imperi), creating a “matchless blend of firmness and courtesy” (summa gravitas ... cum singulari comitate) (Ad Quint. 1.1.23). 168  While pragmatic insights into how to handle political and military challenges are embedded in Suetonius’ Lives, they are not a central focus of his authorial comments. On Suetonius, see Townend (1967), Wallace-Hadrill (1983/1998), Stadter (2011a: 534–536), Hägg (2012: 214–232), Power and Gibson (eds.) (2014). 169  While Agricola was not “pragmatic history”, but an encomiastic biography, it provided useful lessons to readers by portraying the moral character of Agricola along with the causes and consequences of his choices at each stage of his career. See McGing (1982), Bastomsky (1985), Braund (1988: 7–10), Turner (1997), Clarke (2001), Whitmarsh (2006), Sailor (2008: 1–118), Stadter (2011a: 533–534).

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

85

In comparison to their predecessors and contemporaries, Nepos and Plutarch offered Lives that were “pragmatic” in the sense that the narratives, like those of pragmatic historians, included practical lessons for military and political leaders along with the usual concerns with moral character. In both authors, the pragmatic lessons are often accentuated in authorial comments.170 Nepos’ Lives of Illustrious Men and Plutarch’s “individual” Lives—including the separate Lives of Aratus and Artaxerxes as well as Galba and Otho from his Lives of the Caesars—incorporated details about the process of exercising authority, including deliberating, implementing strategies and managing relations among groups in the political and military arenas. They also used major failures—as well as successes—to provide pragmatic insights into how to develop and execute strategies. Since these features are central to Plutarch’s Parallel Lives as well, a brief examination of the Lives of Nepos and individual Lives of Plutarch will be instructive for identifying the pragmatic lessons for statesmen in the Parallel series. Nepos’ Lives of Illustrious Men Of Nepos’ extensive corpus, only the volume containing the Lives of the Illustrious Men of Foreign Peoples and two independent Lives of Cato and Atticus have survived.171 The illustrious men whose Lives have survived include twenty Greek generals, as well as Hamilcar and Hannibal plus a compilation of brief comments on various kings.172 Nepos’ pragmatic emphasis in these Lives is reflected both in his departures from other extant historical accounts and in his authorial comments. In Miltiades, for instance, Nepos includes details not found in Herodotus on the deliberations about whether the Athenians should keep their army inside the walls or go out to meet the Persians at Marathon.173 In Nepos’ Life, Miltiades’ recommendation and his reasoning are both reported:

170  Hillman (1994), for instance, provides insightful analysis of the authorial comments in Plutarch’s Ages-Pomp. 171  On Nepos, see Jenkinson (1967), McCarty (1974), Geiger (1985; 1988), Wiseman (1987), Dionisotti (1988), Moles (1989), Tuplin (2000), Titchener (2003), Pryzwanksy (2007), Beneker (2009), Stadter (2011a: 532–533), Hägg (2012: 188–197), Stem (2012). 172  The brief comments on the careers of kings touch on, among others, Cyrus the Great, Xerxes, Philip, Alexander, the Diadochi, Demetrius and Dionysius the Elder. See Geiger (1979a) for a broader discussion. 173  Nepos’ account seems to imply that the decision to meet the Persians lay with the Athenians, who were influenced by the enthusiasm of 1000 Plataean soldiers eager for war to “give Miltiades’ advice preference over that of his colleagues” (Milt. 5.1–2). In Herodotus, Callimachus was the tie-breaking eleventh vote and was won over by an

86

Chapter 2

Miltiades alone persistently urged them to take the field at the earliest possible moment; stating that if they did so, not only would the citizens take heart when they saw that their courage was not distrusted, but for the same reason the enemy would be slower to act, if they realized that the Athenians dared to engage them with so small a force. Nepos, Miltiades 4.5–5.1

In addition, Nepos describes the strategic thinking behind positioning the Athenian army for battle at Marathon: Miltiades chose a place where the army would be protected from behind by the mountain, while scattered trees would prevent the Persians from surrounding the army (Miltiades 5.3). In Herodotus, by contrast, Miltiades is portrayed as one of five generals who advocated meeting the enemy and no mention is made of geography or strategic positioning of the army (Herod. 6.109–111).174 By choosing a version of events that amplified the role of Miltiades and included his strategic thinking, Nepos, unlike Herodotus, provided practical lessons specifically for statesmen and generals. Nepos also integrates his portrait of the strengths and weaknesses of his generals with pragmatic insights into the dynamics of the political and military arenas in which they operated. In his Life of Dion, for example, Dion is described as a man of “many natural advantages, including a receptive mind, affability and aptitude for the highest accomplishments” (multa alia ab natura habuit bona, in iis ingenium docile, come, aptum ad artes optimas) (Dion 1.2), but Nepos focuses on Dion’s relations with tyrants (the elder and younger Dionysius) before he, according to Nepos, became one himself (Dion 6.4–7.3). An authorial comment conveys the central lesson that “no rule is secure that is not founded on the devotion of its subjects” (nullum esse imperium tutum nisi benevolentia munitum) (Dion 5.3).175 Similarly, although Alcibiades “was never excelled either in faults or in virtues” (nihil illo fuisse excellentius vel in vitiis vel in virtutibus) (Alc. 1.1), Nepos appeal to fight for freedom rather than give strength to the faction favoring the Medes within Athens (Herod. 6.110). 174  With regard to positioning the army, Herodotus mentions only the command of the wings and center (Herodotus 6.111). The challenge of choosing the time and place for battle is discussed in Frontinus (Strat. 2.1–2). 175  The principle that a ruler must retain the support of his subjects is reiterated after Dion’s assassination: “absolute power is hated and the life is wretched for a man who prefers to be feared rather than loved” (invisa sit singularis potentia et miseranda vita, qui se metui quam amari malunt) (Dion 9.5). Such a comment would resonate with the men in Plutarch’s day who were advising the Emperor or were exercising supreme authority as provincial governors.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

87

emphasizes the impact of Alcibiades’ traits on his political effectiveness, rather than the traits themselves. For instance, Nepos refuses to report on the various love affairs of Alcibiades because he has “other more important topics” (maiora potiora) (Alc. 2.3). The Life portrays how Alcibiades’ talents and personal qualities provoked fear in both the Athenians (Alc. 3.5) and Spartans (Alc. 5.1).176 When Alcibiades is in his second exile (Alc. 7.2), Nepos states the “lesson” for statesmen: exceptional ability can be an impediment in the public arena: Therefore I am convinced that nothing was more to his disadvantage than the excessive confidence in his ability and valor; for his countrymen feared him no less than they loved him, thinking that he might be carried away by good fortune and great power, and wish to become a tyrant. Nepos, Alc. 7.3

Nepos also addresses generalship, using Alcibiades’ advice to Philocles at Aegospotami (Alc. 8.2–5) to illustrate competent strategic thinking and foresight.177 Plutarch’s Individual Lives In his individual Lives of Aratus, Artaxerxes, Galba and Otho, Plutarch devotes more attention than Nepos to the process of exercising authority, including greater detail about how heroes deliberated alternatives, selected strategies, persuaded others and overcame unexpected obstacles as strategies were implemented. Plutarch’s intended lessons in practical leadership are revealed in his assessments of successes and failures, as well as in his authorial comments clarifying the specific principles at issue. As we will see, the same approach is used to evaluate the performance of statesmen in the Parallel Lives.178

176  The Athenians, for instance, were filled with the highest hopes (spem maximam) as well as fear (timorem) because Alcibiades “was capable of doing a great deal of harm, as well as a great deal of good” (et obesse plurimum et prodesse poterat) (Nepos, Alc. 3.5). A similar reaction is provoked in the Spartans, who, after acquiring great advantage because of Alcibiades, begin to fear him (Nepos, Alc. 5.1). 177  Alcibiades explains that the key to defeating the Spartans lay in forcing their fleet to engage or sue for peace—an outcome he could force through his influence with the King of the Thracians (Nepos, Alc. 8.2–3). The implication is that, had the Athenians taken Alcibiades’ advice, they might have avoided defeat (Nepos, Alc. 8.5). 178  Indeed, Aratus plays an important role in Plutarch’s Lives of Agis and Cleomenes, where Aratus appears in much the same character as in his own Life. Aratus is cited in AgisCleomenes as already having been written.

88

Chapter 2

Aratus179 illustrates Plutarch’s characterization of statesmen based on a blending of their moral traits and effectiveness in public roles. Plutarch highlights both the qualities that made Aratus “a natural statesman” and the weaknesses that harmed the state: Aratus was a statesman in temperament (τῷ τρόπῳ πολιτικός), highminded (μεγαλόφρων) and more exact (ἀκριβέστερος) in public affairs than in his private relations.… But he clearly came to war and conflict without courage (ἀθαρσὴς) and with little confidence (δύσελπις).… Therefore, although he won many unexpected successes in which he showed daring, he seems to have lost no fewer favorable opportunities through over-caution (δι’ εὐλάβειαν). Plutarch, Aratus 10.1–3

This portrayal of Aratus as a man who blended strong and weak character traits180—and who had both successes and failures in his public career—is reminiscent of Polybius’ comment that Aratus had all the qualities that make “a perfect man of affairs” (τέλειος ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον) but suffered military defeats because he was slow in planning (νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις), timid in performance (ἄτολμος) and devoid of personal courage (Polybius 4.8.1–8).181 The similar concern shown by Plutarch and Polybius to trace success and failure to moral qualities and practical competencies (or deficiencies) suggests that both writers were interested in political effectiveness—rather than moral character alone—and that Plutarch’s Aratus reflected Polybius’ pragmatic approach to assessing leaders.

179  On Aratus, see Georgiadou (1988; 2014), Almagor (2014b). 180  This blended character portrait is far removed from the kind of descriptions found in encomiastic biography. See, for instance, descriptions in Xenophon’s Agesilaus (1.1; 10.1–2): or Isocrates’ Evagoras 1.8; 73–77. Indeed, in Agis-Cleomenes, Plutarch criticizes Aratus for bringing Achaea under the sway of the Macedonians, but adds the comment that his criticism is made “out of pity for the weakness of human nature, which, even in characters so notably disposed towards excellence, cannot produce nobility that is free from blame (Cleomenes 16.3). A similar blend of praise and blame for this period of Aratus’ career can be found in the individual life of Aratus. 181  Polybius calls the blend of virtue and vice—along with competencies and deficiencies— part of “something multiform” (τι πολυειδές) in the nature of men’s minds (Polybius, 4.8.7). Pelling (1988a: 264–267/2002: 288–291) discusses the differences between the passages characterizing Aratus in Polybius and Plutarch.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

89

Plutarch’s intention to use Aratus to provide practical guidance to­ statesmen182 is further suggested by his authorial comments on the specific strategies Aratus adopted in difficult situations. For instance, Plutarch applauds Aratus’ success in acquiring money for his city from Ptolemy, but gives greater praise to the manner in which Aratus used these funds to resolve the conflict between the exiles and landholders and to bring “safety and security” (σωτηρία καὶ ἀσφάλεια) to the city (Aratus 14.1). Moreover, Aratus shared power with others and worked cooperatively to accomplish this objective: His moderation (μετριότης) in the exercise of such great power (ἐν δυνάμει τοσαύτῃ) is amazing. For after he was appointed independent mediator, with absolute power for settling the money affairs of the exiles, he did not submit to do this alone, but enrolled in addition to himself fifteen of his fellow citizens, with whom … he completed the task and established peace and friendship (συνήρμοσε φιλίαν καὶ εἰρήνην) among his fellow citizens. Plutarch, Aratus 14.1–2

Here, Plutarch provides both moral and pragmatic lessons not only by validating moderation as a virtue in Aratus, but also by describing the specific actions through which Aratus put that moderation into effect to produce harmony in his city. The contemporary resonance of Plutarch’s analysis is found in the correspondence between the actions praised by Plutarch and the principles of statesmanship in Political Precepts: in setting his goal as the internal harmony of his city, Aratus fulfilled the primary duty of the statesman “always to instill concord and friendship” (ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ φιλίαν ἀεὶ) (Pol. Prec. 824D), while in sharing power and responsibility with colleagues he followed Plutarch’s prescription for “making action more effective by cooperation” (ἐνεργοτέραν ποιεῖ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τὴν πρᾶξιν) (Pol. Prec. 812C–D). Plutarch also uses Aratus to display the perils of friendship with kings and tyrants (Aratus 45.2, 52.1–3)—another lesson with direct implications for Plutarch’s audience. Artaxerxes183 addresses issues of pragmatic statesmanship from a different perspective. Plutarch does not attribute virtues directly to Artaxerxes, but 182  In the prologue to Aratus, addressed to Polycrates, Plutarch cites his intention to present Aratus as a model for Polycrates’ sons to use in patterning their own lives (Aratus 1.4). In Galba, Plutarch’s intention to provide a lesson in the management of political and military affairs is reflected in the general discussion of the topic of managing the army and securing its obedience in the introductory chapters. See Duff (1999b: 28–29; 68). 183  On Artaxerxes, see Mossman (2010), Almagor (2009; 2014a; 2014b), Mossman (2010).

90

Chapter 2

instead reports on how his virtue and reputation compared to that of others. For instance, Artaxerxes is described as “milder” (πραότερος) and “gentler” (μαλακώτερος) than his brother Cyrus (Artax. 2.1), while “having a reputation” (δόξας) of being mild and fond of his subjects, in contrast to the cruelty and violence of his son (Artax. 30.5). In military matters, the battle against Cyrus is used to convey lessons in generalship, including Artaxerxes’ effective deployment of his troops (Artax. 7.3–4) and the mistakes made by Cyrus and Clearchus (Artax. 8.2–7). Indeed, Plutarch’s critique of Clearchus is the most extensive authorial comment in the Life and charges that, by poor reasoning and flawed motives, Clearchus “ruined everything” (τὸ πᾶν διέφθειρεν) (Artax. 8.7). Other pragmatic insights are contained in the experiences of the people killed at the behest of Artaxerxes’ mother or because they violated the king’s wishes, stories striking a cautionary note for men who engaged with supreme authority in Plutarch’s day as well. The same dual objectives of highlighting ethical traits and illustrating principles of effective political and military leadership are reflected in the Lives of the Caesars. In Galba,184 Plutarch presents a man who possessed many virtues, but whose political and military effectiveness was impeded by the corrupt character of his era. Although Galba lived simply and had a reputation for mildness (πράῳ) (Galba 3.3), he was poorly suited to control an army motivated by “greed and license” (φιλοπλουτίας καὶ ἀκολασίας) (Galba 1.4–5; 2.3).185 Moreover, as commander, Galba placed his confidence in a man who undermined his policies and reputation (Galba 17.1, 29.4).186 Key lessons lie in the mistakes and misjudgments that prevented Galba from securing the obedience of the army. Again, Plutarch addresses issues that had contemporary resonance in Political Precepts, where statesmen are advised to delegate authority to friends who share their priorities (Pol. Prec. 812 D–F) and to blend severity with concessions to win the people over (818A–D).

184  On Galba, see Georgiadou (1988), Stadter (2005/2015), Pelling (2010b), De Blois (2014), Georgiadou (2014). Stadter (2005/2015) argues that the purpose of the Lives of the Caesars should not be defined by the purpose of the later Parallel Lives, noting that Galba and Otho did not provide an account from birth to death, but instead focused on “how an emperor came to power, how he exercised it and how he left it.” As we will show later, when the Parallel Lives are viewed as pragmatic biography, these very issues of acquiring and exercising power become central to the purpose of the Parallel Lives as well. 185  Plutarch describes his comments on managing the soldiery as part of his “duty” (προσήκει) in writing the Lives of the Caesars not to omit “such incidents as are worthy of mention” (ὅσα δ’ ἄξια λόγου) (Galba 2.3). 186  This misjudgment is on display in Pompey and Phocion, as well, as discussed below in Chapters 6 and 9.

Pragmatic Literature For Statesmen And Generals

91

Otho,187 in contrast, portrays a leader who displays a more varied blend of base and honorable traits, but, unlike Galba, wins the obedience of soldiers and an honorable death. The actions taken by Otho to secure this obedience constitute the central lessons in leadership in the Life. Otho takes up the story of Otho’s career, which had begun in Galba, where Otho was introduced as a man corrupted in childhood by luxury and pleasure-seeking (τρυφῇ δὲ καὶ φιληδονίαις, Galba 19.2) and whose “lavish prodigality” (τὴν ἀσωτίαν) had made him first an intimate of Nero (Galba 19.3) and later a man with great facility in flattering influential men and winning the support of the army (Galba 20.3). The Life of Otho begins when Otho takes power as Emperor and shows himself to be mild and conciliatory (Otho 1.1–2). This moderate behavior by Otho as Emperor, along with the strict military discipline of his general, Spurina, eventually wins the lasting obedience of the army (Otho 6.1–2)—providing a positive lesson in leadership. Moreover, Otho’s conduct in caring for his soldiers and for overseeing the departure of the senators before his suicide (Otho 16–17.3) is reminiscent of Cato’s conduct at Utica after Pharsalus.188 The deterrent lessons are embedded in the strategic mistakes as a general that led to Otho’s defeat at the hands of Vitellius (Otho 8–12). Although Nepos and Plutarch describe the processes of debating and implementing strategies—traditional concerns of pragmatic history—they distinguished their “Lives” from “History”. Nepos, in his Preface to the series and at Pelopidas 1.1, justifies including in his Lives details that might seem personal and trivial in historical accounts, while Plutarch uses this distinction at Galba 2.3 to explain why his Life will provide, not a comprehensive narration of all details and circumstances, but “incidents worthy of mention” in “the deeds and misfortunes” (τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ πάθεσι) of the Caesars. While these comments might suggest that the Lives are more concerned with moral character than pragmatic lessons in statesmanship or generalship,189 such a conclusion is not consistent with the content of the Lives or the authorial comments clarifying specific lessons in effective leadership. Instead, the definition of the genre as “Lives” shifts the perspective from the great events in the lives of nations to the moral character, competencies and accomplishments of individual s­ tatesmen. 187  On Otho, see Georgiadou (1988), Stadter (2005/2015), Pelling (2010b), De Blois (2014), Georgiadou (2014). 188  After the defeat at Bedriacum, Otho thinks about Cato’s experience after Pharsalus, when he was criticized for refusing to yield and accused of squandering the lives of many brave men in Africa, even though he was fighting in defense of freedom. Otho decides to avoid such a charge by seeking peace (Otho 13.2). 189  For further discussion of the implications of these comments distinguishing Lives from History, see Chapter 1 (n. 84).

92

Chapter 2

A similar distinction is noted by Plutarch in his Parallel Lives, where he also states that he is writing Lives and not History (Alex. 1.1–3) and similarly employs authorial comment and detailed descriptions of deliberations and implementation of strategies to provide pragmatic lessons for statesmen and generals. 2.4

Conclusion: Implications for the Purpose of the Parallel Lives

The review of the pragmatic literature for statesmen in this chapter contributes in three ways to our assessment of Plutarch’s Parallel Lives as pragmatic biography. First, it demonstrates that practical advice for statesmen and generals was provided by a wide array of writers in a variety of forms. Secondly, it highlights the view that moral character was an essential foundation of political or military effectiveness in every area in which advice was being offered, whether in oratory, euergetism, city administration, diplomacy or generalship. Finally, this review has shown that the “pragmatic” goal of historians to present events in a way that would provide utility to politically-active readers was echoed in the design and content of the individual Lives of Nepos and Plutarch. In addition, in his individual Lives, Plutarch integrated the goal of revealing a man’s character and disposition with the complementary objective of providing practical lessons in deliberation, persuasion and implementation of policies and military strategies. Against this backdrop, Plutarch’s treatment of political careers in the Parallel Lives will be interpreted within a framework that integrates concerns about moral virtue and honorable conduct with the goal of providing pragmatic lessons in effective political and military leadership. The potential for this “pragmatic” paradigm to capture a broader array of Plutarch’s intended lessons for readers is further strengthened by his common practice in his treatises on practical ethics and politics to use statesmen who are subjects of their own Lives to exemplify the practical actions he is recommending to readers who are active in the administration of their cities. An overlap between incidents in the political treatises and in the Parallel Lives would suggest that this practical dimension of statesmen as exempla in the Moralia was incorporated into the comprehensive treatment of the careers of these same men in their Lives. To examine this possibility more closely, we will approach the Parallel Lives in coming chapters with a new question: To what extent did the Lives pursue the dual objectives of revealing moral character and providing practical lessons in statesmanship? We begin in the next chapter with an examination of the didactic agenda reflected in the Prologues and synkriseis to the Parallel Lives.

Chapter 3

Didactic Agenda of the Parallel Lives: Insights from the Prologues and Synkriseis Overview Like other authors, Plutarch used his political and practical-ethical treatises and individual Lives to provide advice on both the ethical and pragmatic dimensions of leadership. On this basis, the readers of the Parallel Lives of statesmen and generals could expect to find both inspiration for moral improvement and pragmatic insights into how to perform their duties in public office and military command. Just as the political treatises, as shown by Van Hoof (2010), offered advice both in how to adjust one’s attitude and in strategies to produce positive outcomes, the Parallel Lives, as pragmatic biographies, delivered paradigms related both to character and action. The Lives showed readers both how to prepare one’s moral character and how to be more effective in performing the duties of public office—especially in managing subordinates, working with colleagues, outmaneuvering rivals, persuading superiors and identifying the best policies in each situation. In this chapter, the hypothesis that the Parallel Lives are broadly concerned with the practical challenges of statesmanship—of which issues of virtue and vice are only one component—is examined from the standpoint of the Prologues and synkriseis of the Lives.1 First, we review the content of the thirteen extant Prologues.2 To what extent do the topics in these sections overlap issues raised in the Moralia and individual Lives or issues raised in the advice literature? Second, Plutarch’s comments in the synkriseis come under scrutiny. Does Plutarch use these sections to introduce ethical issues for further discussion, to evaluate relative proficiencies of the heroes in meeting practical challenges or to serve some other purpose? Do the themes in the synkriseis correspond to, or expand upon, the concerns raised in the Prologues or Moralia? 1  In particular, work by Stadter (1988) and Duff (1999b; 2011b; 2014) on the Prologues and by Pelling (1986b/2002; 2005a), Swain (1992b), Duff (1999b) and Stadter (2000/2015) on the synkriseis is used as the backdrop against which the pragmatic themes are analyzed, as discussed below. See also Introduction (n. 8, 9, 15). 2  The extant prologues include Aem-Tim, Ag-Cl-Gracchi, Alex-Caes, Cim-Luc, Dtr-Ant, Dem-Cic, Dion-Brut, Nic-Cras, Pel-Marc, Per-Fab, Phoc-Cato Min, Sert-Eum and Thes-Rom.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_005

94 3.1

Chapter 3

Statesmanship and Generalship in the Prologues

The thirteen prologues all serve the general purpose of bringing the Greek and Roman subjects on stage and often point to similarities in character traits or the common political and military challenges faced by the two statesmen in their careers. The introductions of the heroes are preceded by the treatment of a broad theme linked to the ethical or pragmatic challenges of leadership,3 often touching on issues raised in works offering advice to statesmen, including Plutarch’s treatises in the Moralia. As noted in the Introduction, the Prologues have been examined from a variety of perspectives, including as rhetorical pieces to attract reader interest,4 as indicators of Plutarch’s purpose in writing the Lives5 and as the first part of a four-part book designed to spur analysis and reflection on challenging issues of virtue and vice.6 In some cases, the Prologues also address issues related to effective leadership, elucidating specific competencies needed to overcome practical challenges in political and military settings. Indeed, specific pairings are often assumed to be guided by both the character traits and the political and military roles of the two heroes.7 In the Prologues, taken as a group, four key themes recur: (1) revelation of character in the words and deeds of statesmen, (2) statesmen as exempla of behavior to imitate or avoid, (3) the role of fortune in public careers and (4) pragmatic principles of effective political or military leadership. This combination of themes suggests that the Lives and the pairing of heroes were designed to provide both ethical and pragmatic guidance to men in public roles. 3  The Prologues establish the backdrop of philosophical training as a key component of the subject matter of the Lives. At the same time, the principles of conduct that benefits the common welfare are also covered. 4  Rhetorical aspects of the Prologues are discussed in Stadter (1988). 5  “Programmatic” prologues describing the underlying principles of the series are examined in Duff (1999b: 13–51). 6  On the role of the Prologues in raising problematic issues, see Duff (1999b: 66–71) and Duff 2011b. 7  For discussions of the Greek-Roman pairings, see Erbse (1956), Geiger (1981/1995, 2002, 2005). Hamilton (1969: xl) explains that similar political careers facilitate comparisons of character traits since the statesmen are reacting to similar circumstances. Stadter (1997: 66) summarizes the current view: “The protagonists are chosen because of their fame as leaders and their accomplishments in the political and military realm.” Verdegem (2010a: 27–28) further argues that Plutarch believed that comparing the conduct of two “morally similar persons” was an excellent way to gain insight into virtues and vices and that the synkrisis was integral to fulfilling his purpose. For additional perspectives see Teodorsson (2005a), Marincola (2010), Stadter (2010a), Tatum (2010a).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

95



Revelation of Character as the Goal: Alex-Caes, Nic-Cras and Cim-Luc As noted in Chapter 2, works advising statesmen highlighted the need for a solid foundation in moral character and good practical judgment in managing public affairs. These concerns are raised in the Prologues to Alex-Caes, Nic-Cras and Cim-Luc, where Plutarch explains his criteria for including or excluding details about a hero’s career.8 In the brief Prologue to Alex-Caes (Alex 1.1–3), as discussed by Stadter (1988) and Duff (1999), Plutarch reminds readers, as he had done at Galba 2.3, that he is writing Lives, not history, and that readers therefore should not expect descriptions of great contests (τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας), but instead look for insights into the character (ἦθος) of the heroes. Plutarch compares himself to a painter capturing his subject through certain features (the face and expression of the eyes), just as he himself captures the “signs of the soul” through certain deeds, comments or jests in which there is a manifestation of virtue or vice (δήλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας) (Alex. 1.2). The Prologue to Nic-Cras (Nic. 1.1–5) also steers the reader’s expectations away from the content they would find in history. Here, Plutarch notes that his Nicias will not attempt to compete with Thucydides or imitate Philistus or Timaeus, but instead will incorporate deeds that reveal the hero’s temperament and disposition (τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν) and other details that “further the appreciation of his character and temperament” (τὴν πρὸς κατανόησιν ἤθους καὶ τρόπου) (Nic. 1.2–5). The dimensions of “character and temperament” revealed in the Parallel Lives are clarified in the Prologue to Cim-Luc (Cim. 1.1–3.3). Here, Plutarch compares a Life to a “truthful” portrait, which must incorporate a man’s flaws but need not emphasize them. Thus, while the stains on a man’s career—such as those caused by passion or political necessity (ἐκ πάθους τινὸς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀνάγκης)—are included, they are treated as shortfalls to virtue rather than deep-seated vice (Cim. 2.4).9 In portraying both positive and negative qualities in the character of a statesman, Plutarch adheres to a principle he articulated in On Listening to Poets that no man should be imitated in everything: to be an effective role model, a man must be “plausible”—that is, his actions must indicate “virtue and vice commingled” (καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς σημεῖα μεμιγμένα, On 8  On the Prologues to Alex-Caes, Nic-Cras and Cim-Luc, see Stadter (1988), Duff (1999b: 14–51). 9  At Cim. 2.5, Plutarch describes human nature as producing “no character which is absolutely good and indisputably set towards virtue” (καλὸν οὐδὲν εἰλικρινὲς οὐδ’ ἀναμφισβήτητον εἰς ἀρετὴν ἦθος). This disavowal of “paragons of virtue” undermines the notion that “paradeigmata” referenced in the Prologues should be associated with clear-cut exempla of moral virtue or vice.

96

Chapter 3

Listening to Poets 25C)—and therefore each action must be judged separately (26C).10 Moreover, Plutarch’s promise to portray Cimon’s virtues and faults is also consistent with his practice in the individual Lives, where both virtues and vices are explored in comments on the motives and consequences of individual actions, as discussed in Chapter 2. In these three Prologues, Plutarch directly broadens the topic to issues of leadership when he explains the pairings. Alexander and Caesar are united by the overwhelming volume of their achievements (τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑποκειμένων πράξεων, Alex. 1.1), while military disasters in Parthia and in Sicily are central to the decision to pair Crassus and Nicias (Nic. 1.1). The importance of performance in political and military matters as the criterion for pairing heroes is even clearer in the case of Cimon and Lucullus, who are joined on the basis of their brilliant campaigns against barbarians (πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους λαμπροί), mildness in political matters (πρᾷοι δὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ) and the respite from civil strife they provided to their states (τῶν ἐμφυλίων στάσεων ἀναπνοὴν ταῖς πατρίσι παρασχόντες) (Cim. 3.3). All of these attributes would have contemporary resonance for Plutarch’s readers, who were being advised by Plutarch and other writers to practice mildness in public life and foster harmony in their cities and who, if they were serving as generals, may well have been facing “barbarians” on the border of the Empire. Exempla and Reception of the Lives: Per-Fab, Aem-Tim and Dtr-Ant Having recognized the “signs of the soul” of a statesman, what was the reader expected to do next? Plutarch provides an answer in the Prologues to Per-Fab, Aem-Tim and Dtr-Ant, in which he discusses how the audience should interpret and respond to the Lives.11 As is widely recognized,12 these three Prologues echo the dynamic process of moral improvement described in the Moralia, especially in On Listening to Poets and On Progress in Virtue where exposure

10  See Hunter and Russell (2011) for further discussion of the didactic implications of this approach. 11  As discussed in Chapter 1, these prologues are often used to give insight into the nature of Plutarch’s audience. 12  On these three “programmatic” prologues, which have Plutarch’s most explicit statements about exempla to inspire imitation or avoidance, see Stadter (1988), Duff (1999b: 14–51). Verdegem (2010b: 19–20) cites Aem. 1.1–6 in support of his view that the Lives have a moral purpose. For additional analysis on Per-Fab, see Podlecki (1987; 1998), Stadter (1989: 53–61), Duff (2001); on Aem-Tim, see Swain (1989), Pelling (2011c: 17); and on Dtr-Ant see Pelling (1988b: 10–12), Duff (2004).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

97

to virtue stimulates the observer to imitate it.13 Again, Plutarch’s description overlaps the approach to self-improvement reflected in the advice literature for statesmen. At the same time, Plutarch clearly reveals that the Lives also demonstrate how to manage public affairs, touching on themes raised in the political treatises, especially Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics. The most complete treatment of the process of self-improvement envisioned by Plutarch is found in the Prologue to Per-Fab (Per. 1.1–2.4), which highlights deeds “arising from virtue” (ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς) as objects worthy of attention because they inspire imitation: But virtuous action immediately so disposes a man that he no sooner admires the works of virtue than he strives to emulate those who performed them.… The Good rouses activity towards itself (ἐφ’ αὑτὸ πρακτικῶς κινεῖ), and implants at once an active impulse (πρακτικὴν … ὁρμὴν). Per. 2.2–3

In further instructing his readers to investigate deeds that manifest virtue (τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου) because they furnish a cause for action (τὴν προαίρεσιν παρεχόμενον) (Per. 2.3),14 Plutarch echoes his advice in Progress in Virtue that the young man in his reading seek what is “useful, substantial and of practical utility” (τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ σάρκινον καὶ ὠφέλιμον) (Progress in Virtue 79C).15 Plutarch brings the focus specifically to issues of statesmanship by describing 13  The notion that exposure to virtue stimulates the observer to imitation is common across writers offering advice to statesmen and using historical statesmen as exempla, as discussed in Chapter 2. 14  The language used at Per. 1.4 and Per. 2.3 closely matches Philosophers and Men in Power 776C–D where Plutarch provides a similar description of the power of philosophy to stimulate virtue in a ruler. See Duff (1999b: 40 n. 79). In mentioning deeds arising from virtue (τοῖς ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς ἔργοις, 1.4; τῶν δ’ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς τὰς πράξεις, 2.3), Plutarch refers to “investigating” them (τοῖς ἱστορήσασιν, 1.4; τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἔργου, 2.3), signaling a need to study actions closely in order to distinguish the force of virtue versus the other factors that could be behind them. 15  In On the Fortune of Alexander (334D), Plutarch addresses a similar principle using Alexander as an exemplum: Alexander is portrayed as “knowing in what matters he should be merely a spectator and listener, and in what he should contend and work at himself” (εἰδὼς τίνων δεῖ θεατὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τίνων ἀγωνιστὴν καὶ αὐτουργόν). Dio presents Alexander in much the same terms in his 2nd Kingship Oration, where Alexander does not want to emulate the poets in writing poetry, but the deeds of the Homeric heroes (Or. 2.18–19).

98

Chapter 3

Pericles and Fabius as men who were “of greatest practical utility to their countries” (ὠφελιμωτάτων ταῖς πατρίσι) because they manifested mildness and justice (πρᾳότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην) in their actions and were able “to endure the follies of their peoples and their colleagues in office” (φέρειν δήμων καὶ συναρχόντων ἀγνωμοσύνας) (Per. 2.4)—praiseworthy traits repeatedly emphasized in the Moralia16 and in works of other authors advising statesmen under Rome. The process of emulation in a mature statesman—namely, Plutarch himself—is depicted in the Prologue to Aem-Tim (Aem. 1.1–8). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Plutarch describes how he uses “history as a mirror” and attempts to mold his own behavior to match the virtues of his heroes (Aem. 1.1).17 Through the study of history, he carefully observes the actions of his heroes, selects those that are “most authoritative and beautiful to know” (τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κάλλιστα πρὸς γνῶσιν) and then uses their example to repel “any base, malicious or ignoble suggestions” that arise in his “unavoidable associations with others” (Aem. 1.3–5). While Plutarch’s description of this process as “very efficacious for the correction of character” (πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἠθῶν ἐνεργότερον, Aem. 1.2) points to benefits in both private and public life, the spotlight shifts to statesmanship with his introduction of Timoleon and Aemilius as the “noblest of his paradigms” (τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν παραδειγμάτων, Aem. 1.5) and poses a closing challenge to readers: The men were alike not only in the good choices (αἱρέσεσιν) but also in the good fortune (τύχαις ἀγαθαῖς) they experienced in their conduct of public affairs, raising a question about whether the greatest of their successful achievements were due to their good fortune or their practical judgment (εὐποτμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ φρονήσει). Aem. 1.7–8

16  In Political Precepts, Plutarch addresses the importance of maintaining one’s composure in managing the people (818A–819A), enmities (809B–811A) and colleagues in office (816A–817C). See discussion in Chapter 2. 17  In On Progress in Virtue, Plutarch also uses the image of mirror (οἷόν τι πρὸς ἔσοπτρα κοσμοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς, 85B) and evokes a similar process of benefiting from the study of exempla: “the thought and recollection of good men almost instantly comes to mind and … in every onset of the emotions and in all difficulties keeps them upright and saves them from falling” (85B). The image of the “mirror” is central to Plutarch’s creation and use of exempla: exempla need to be plausible so that readers “see themselves” and try to adjust their appearance. See Chapter 1 (n. 77).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

99

This effort to differentiate the effects of fortune and merit is a familiar one in the assessment of victories and defeats in the advice literature for statesmen, including Plutarch’s treatises as well as works by Onasander and the pragmatic historians, as discussed earlier. Plutarch’s reference to the later analysis of the strategic choices made by the heroes suggests that Aemilius and Timoleon will inspire imitation as paradigms of political and military leadership. The power of negative examples as a further spur to imitating noble paradigms is addressed in the Prologue to Dtr-Ant (Dtr. 1.1–8).18 Here, Plutarch treats statesmanship as an “art” (τέχνη) whose mastery, like that of any art, requires the cultivation of judgment about appropriate (οἰκείου) and inappropriate (ἀλλοτρίου) action (Dtr. 1.2). He dismisses the notion that ignorance of vice is an excuse, commenting that “a naiveté that prides itself on inexperience of evil” (τὴν ἀπειρίᾳ τῶν κακῶν καλλωπιζομένην ἀκακίαν) is foolishness (ἀβελτερίαν)19— casting the negative lessons of the Lives as failures in the practice of a τέχνη where experience is necessary (Dtr. 1.3). Statesmen—whose art encompasses the “most complete arts of all” (τελεώταται τεχνῶν),20 namely, temperance, justice and practical judgment21—are compared to physicians and musicians, who study disease and disharmony to produce their opposites (Dtr. 1.3). 18  Negative exempla are a routine feature of Plutarch’s didactic essays, as well as of the works of other writers of advice literature. For Quintilian as well, the study of vice was important since “in fact, the nature of virtue is revealed by vice, its opposite” (Verum et virtus quid sit adversa ei malitia detegit) (12.1.35). Like Plutarch, Quintilian compares studying injustice to a physician studying disease: “Justice becomes yet more manifest from the contemplation of injustice” (et aequitas fit ex iniqui contemplatione manifestior (12.1.35). It is not useless, therefore, to consider how to speak in defense of falsehood or injustice, since such an investigation will “make it easier to detect and defeat them” (ut ea facilius et deprehendamus et refellamus)—“just as the physician who has a thorough knowledge of all that can injure the health will be all the more skillful in the prescription of remedies” (quem ad modum remedia melius adhibebit, cui nota quae nocent fuerint) (12.1.34). The topic is also raised at Quint. 12.2.5. 19  Polybius expresses the same contempt for men who do not study what can go wrong: “And as for saying “I should never have thought it” or “Who would have expected it to happen?”, that in a general is a most manifest sign of inexperience and slowness” (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν ὡς “οὐκ ἂν ᾠόμην” “τίς γὰρ ἂν ἤλπισε τοῦτο γενέσθαι;” μέγιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ σημεῖον ἀπειρίας στρατηγικῆς καὶ βραδυτῆτος) (Polybius 10.32.11–12). 20  Similarly, in calling these virtues “τελεώταται τεχνῶν”, Plutarch uses vocabulary that at Arist-Cato 3.1 is applied specifically to “political virtue” (τῆς πολιτικῆς … ἀρετῆς) as being “more complete” (τελεωτέραν) than any other virtue. 21  At Old Men in Politics (797E–F), the same three virtues (δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ φρόνησις) “acquire their proper quality late and slowly” and thereby make old statesmen most valuable for leading and governing a state. Thus, old men are prized for their

100

Chapter 3

Likewise, statesmen must study conduct that is base and blameworthy “in the exercise of power or in great undertakings” (ἐν ἐξουσίαις καὶ πράγμασι μεγάλοις) in order to make better judgments (κρίσεις) about what is “noble, just and of practical utility” (καλῶν … καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὠφελίμων) (Dtr. 1.3–4). Familiarity with such deterrent models is expected to inspire imitation of noble paradigms (Dtr. 1.5–7). Demetrius and Antony are introduced as “great natures” who exhibit great vices and great virtues, with many reversals of fortune, and whose careers display conduct men in power should avoid (Dtr. 1.7–8).22 The Prologues to Per-Fab, Aem-Tim and Dtr-Ant suggest that Plutarch intended to present paradigms of “good and bad statesmanship” rather than simply of “good and bad men”. The emphasis on the virtues of justice (Per. 2.4, Dtr. 1.3–4), temperance or mildness (Per. 2.4, Dtr. 1.3–4) and practical judgment (Aem. 1.7–8, Dtr. 1.3–4)—combined with the need to make judgments about what is “of practical utility” for the state (Per. 2.4, Dtr. 1.3–4)—echoes the priorities for statesmen in the Moralia.23 Role of Fortune: Dion-Brut, Sert-Eum and Dem-Cic The role of fortune (τύχη) in the careers of statesmen is mentioned in passing in several Prologues—including as a cause of success (Aem. 1.8) or of major reversals and rebounds (Dtr. 1.7)—but it is a more prominent theme in the Prologues to Dion-Brut, Sert-Eum and Dem-Cic.24 As discussed in Chapter 2, this theme is important in advice literature, since men in public life must respond with equanimity to prosperity or adversity (e.g. On Tranquility of Mind, Political Precepts, Seneca’s Epistulae Morales) and must be able to distinguish the role of fortune from merit in order to derive lessons from the successes or failures of other men (e.g. On the Fortune of Alexander, Onasander’s Strategikos). advice (βουλῆς), foresight (προνοίας) and prudent thought (φροντίδα πεπνυμένην) (789D). See Chapter 2. 22  Plato defined “great natures” as men with potential to do great harm or great good to their cities (Rep. 495B), while Plutarch in On Delays in Divine Vengeance (552 B–C) defines them as having potential for both great harm and great good and illustrates the concept with statesmen, including Miltiades, Cimon, Themistocles and Alcibiades. Duff (1999a; 1999b: 47–49, 60–65) discusses the Platonic roots of this concept, which is an important dimension of Plutarch’s Cor-Alc (Duff 1999b: 207–208, 224–228). 23  The same vocabulary appears at Philosophers and Men in Power to describe the virtues in the ruler advised by philosophy: “a soul that is solicitous for many and is under obligation to be wise and temperate and just in behalf of many” (ψυχῆς … ἣν ὑπὲρ πολλῶν φροντίζουσαν … καὶ πολλοῖς φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ὀφείλουσαν) (776D). 24  On these prologues, see Stadter (1988) and Duff (2011b); on Dem-Cic see Lintott (2013: 47–48).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

101

Plutarch’s deployment of this concept, as described by Swain (1989) falls into several categories, including accident, providence and actions of a divinity that either assists or opposes a statesman or his state. In the Prologue to Dion-Brut (Dion 1.1–2.7), Plutarch joins philosophical training to practical challenges of the political arena, where outcomes are determined by four major factors: practical judgment, justice, influence and fortune. Dion and Brutus are introduced as men who shared not only their foundation in Platonic philosophy—the “training school” (παλαίστρας) from which they set out “for the greatest contests” (ἐπὶ τοὺς μεγίστους ἀγῶνας) (Dion 1.1–3)25 —but also an adverse fortune in public life, where their careers demonstrated that success depended on more than moral virtue and merit: They bore witness to the doctrine of their teacher in virtue that practical judgment and justice (φρονήσει καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ) must be united with influence and good fortune (δύναμιν … καὶ τύχην) if public careers are to take on beauty as well as grandeur. Dion 1.3

An assessment of a man’s career requires consideration of all four factors. The challenge of distinguishing the influence of fortune behind military victory or defeat is addressed more completely in the Prologue to Sert-Eum (Sert. 1.1–6), where Plutarch uses comparisons of Sertorius with other famous generals to identify the qualities associated with great generalship. Fortune— described as ever-changing in its course (ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλως ῥεούσης, Sert. 1.1)—is isolated as the key attribute in which Sertorius was inferior to Philip, Antigonus and Hannibal, whereas he was their equal or superior in temperance towards women (σωφρονέστερον), good faith towards friends (πιστότερον), mildness towards enemies (ἡμερώτερον) and intelligence (συνέσει) (1.4–5). Fortune is also described as a “more difficult” adversary than Sertorius’ “open foes” among the Roman generals, against whom he made himself the equal of Metellus in experience (ἐμπειρίᾳ), of Pompey in daring (τόλμῃ) and of Sulla in good fortune (τύχῃ) (Sert. 1.5).26 The attributes and challenges that justify the pairing with Eumenes reflect the pragmatic perspective of the pair: they not only shared the “harsh and unjust fortune” of suffering death as a result of plots among their own men, but they also were born to command (ἀρχικοὶ), given to wars 25  The images of the “philosopher as trainer” and of “public life as a battleground” are familiar from Political Precepts. 26  Fortune is similarly portrayed as an adversary of Cato Minor, who puts up an heroic fight that prolongs the survival of the Republic (Phoc. 3.3). See Chapter 9.

102

Chapter 3

of stratagem (σὺν δόλῳ πολεμικοί), exiled from their own countries and given command over foreign soldiers (Sert. 1.6). All of these characteristics touch on topics of generalship discussed in Frontinus and Onasander, as well as in the pragmatic historians.27 The role of fortune in political—as opposed to military—careers is discussed in the Prologue to Dem-Cic (Dem. 1.1–3.5). After explaining that this pair examines the political careers of the two men in order to compare (πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐπισκεψόμεθα) their natures (φύσεις) and dispositions (διαθέσεις) (Dem. 3.1), Plutarch introduces fortune as a rival to nature, in a competition that readers will have to judge: So that, if there should be a competition between nature and fortune, as between artists (καθάπερ τεχνίταις), it would be difficult to decide whether the one made the men more alike in their characters (τοῖς τρόποις), or the other in the circumstances (τοῖς πράγμασιν) of their lives. Dem. 3.5

Correspondingly, their shared attributes include qualities associated with statesmen—namely, love of distinction (τὸ φιλότιμον) and love of freedom (φιλελεύθερον)—as well as circumstances traceable to fortune, including coming into conflict with kings and tyrants, being banished and being recalled with honor (Dem. 3.3). The themes of restraining ambition, managing relations with tyrants and dealing with exile are recurring topics in the advice literature, including Dio’s Orations and Seneca’s Epistulae Morales, as well as Plutarch’s own political treatises and essays On Exile and On Tranquility of Mind.

Public Roles and Principles of Effectiveness: Thes-Rom, Pel-Marc, Ag-Cl-Gracchi and Phoc-Cato While shared political or military challenges as a basis for pairing the heroes is a common feature in the Prologues, a central focus on a specific role (cityfounder) or a fundamental principle of military or political effectiveness is found only in the Prologues to Thes-Rom, Pel-Marc, Ag-Cl-Gracchi and PhocCato.28 The contemporary resonance of these Prologues is revealed in the overlap with themes emphasized in Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics, especially in treating challenges of how to promote harmony within a city and manage relations with the people. As in other Prologues, the closing sum27  Onasander (Strat. 1), for instance, discusses the range of moral attributes a general should possess. 28  In addition to Stadter (1988) and Duff (2011b), on Phoc-Cato see Duff (1999b: 137–141).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

103

maries highlight both the ethical traits and practical challenges the paired heroes shared. The brief Prologue to Thes-Rom (Thes. 1.1–2.2) explicitly positions Theseus and Romulus as rivals in a competition justified by their roles as city-founders (Thes. 1.2). The criteria for uniting these two heroes also include their similarities in origins and domestic misfortunes, in the strength and sagacity (μετὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ τὸ συνετὸν) reflected in their actions as warriors, and in their common experiences in kidnapping women and colliding with their fellow citizens (Thes. 2.1–2). Plutarch makes no reference to specific virtues or vices, but focuses exclusively on their conduct and accomplishments as statesmen. Similarly, the Prologue to Pel-Marc (Pel. 1.1–2.5) pays little attention to ethical qualities, but instead discusses the importance of judgment and experience to good generalship. Plutarch establishes the general principle that circumstances and motives determine whether death is met or shunned with honor or dishonor (Pel. 1.1–4) and then applies it to a military leader, whose first duty is to defend himself from harm, “especially if he governs a city or commands an army” (μάλιστα δ’ ἄρχοντι πόλεως ἢ στρατεύματος) (Pel. 1.5). This precept of good generalship forms the central theme of the Prologue: as Plutarch explains, the appropriate action for a general will depend on circumstances: Where putting the general in danger tips the balance for the whole enterprise (εἰς τὰ ὅλα), there he must use arm and body unsparingly.… But where the advantage to be gained from success is small (μικρὸν τὸ περιγινόμενον), and everything is utterly destroyed along with him if he fails, no one demands that the general undertake the dangerous action of a common soldier. Pel. 2.4

Plutarch uses positive and negative examples from the careers of Iphicrates (Pel. 2.1), Callicratidas (2.2), Antigonus (2.2) and Timotheus (2.3) to reinforce the precept that the “first duty” of a general (πρῶτον ἔργον) is “to save the one who saves everything else” (σώζειν τὸν ἅπαντα τἇλλα σώζοντα) since his worth is great when “his experience is joined to virtue” (Pel. 2.2).29 These tenets form 29  Polybius makes the same point about Marcellus: “For what use is the general or commander who does not comprehend that he must keep himself as far away as possible from all partial encounters in which the fate of the whole army is not involved?” (τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἡγεμόνος ἢ στρατηγοῦ μὴ διειληφότος διότι τῶν κατὰ μέρος κινδύνων, οἷς μὴ συμπάσχει τὰ ὅλα, πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν δεῖ τὸν ἡγούμενον) (Polybius 10.32.9).

104

Chapter 3

the backdrop for introducing Pelopidas and Marcellus as extraordinary generals who were the “most valiant of fighters” in the “most illustrious campaigns” against “the most formidable adversaries”, but who nevertheless “were careless of their lives” (ἠφείδησαν ἑαυτῶν) and were killed taking unnecessary risks at a critical time (Pel. 2.5). This Prologue prepares readers for paradigms to imitate and avoid as military commanders. A different challenge is the central theme of the Prologue to Ag-Cl-Gracchi (Agis 1.1–2.6): how to manage relations with the people and prevent turmoil in one’s city. As noted in Chapter 2, this topic was prominent in Political Precepts (818A–D; 821A-E) and Old Men in Politics, as well as in Dio’s Orations.30 After comparing “lovers of glory” (τοὺς φιλοδόξους) embracing a “false image of virtue” (τῆς ἀρετῆς ὥσπερ εἰδώλῳ τινὶ) to Ixion embracing a false image of Hera (Agis 1.1), Plutarch calls statesmen who chase glory “servants of the multitude”, who change course in step with the desires of the people (Agis 1.1–2).31 Such efforts may lead to great office (ἐξουσίας μεγάλης), but they ruin the statesman: Excess (τὸ δ’ ἄγαν) is always precarious (ἐπισφαλές), but in men with political ambitions, it is ruinous (ὀλέθριον). For it sweeps them away into manifest madness and derangement as they grasp at great office, whenever they are unable to see that what is noble is glorious (τὸ καλὸν ἔνδοξον), but instead think that what is glorious is good (ἀγαθὸν … τὸ ἔνδοξον). Agis 2.2

Plutarch uses the backdrop of ambitious men becoming servants of the people to introduce the Gracchi as men who were most noble in their natures (φύντας), upbringing (τραφέντας) and political principles (τῆς πολιτείας ὑπόθεσιν), but who were ruined (ἀπώλεσεν) by their fear of losing glory (Agis 2.4). In a second comment, Plutarch describes the process through which this fear eventually generated a cycle of expanded services followed by appreciation that spun out of control:

30  See Chapter 2 for a discussion of Dio’s city orations concerning concord in the cities. 31  Plutarch also uses the imagery of Ixion grasping at clouds to illustrate the deceptive appearance of glory in To an Uneducated Ruler 777E–F. In Old Men in Politics, old men have escaped from the passions and impulses named here, which unavoidably motivate young men to become active in public affairs, especially “love of contention, love of fame, and the desire to be first and greatest” (φιλονεικίαν, φιλοδοξίαν, τὴν τοῦ πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ μέγιστον ἐπιθυμίαν) (Old Men in Politics 788F).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

105

In this way, after they had kindled (ἐκκαύσαντες) equal ambition in themselves towards the people and in the people towards themselves, without being aware of it (ἔλαθον), they engaged in affairs in which it was no longer noble to persist and already shameful to stop. Agis 2.5

After providing this explanation, Plutarch points to the issue of chasing glory in ignoble ways as a matter the reader will have to judge for himself from the narrative (ἐπικρινεῖς αὐτὸς) (Agis 2.6).32 The common challenges of restraining the people and resolving internal discord joins the Gracchi to Agis and Cleomenes who, like the Gracchi, tried to exalt the people (τὸν δῆμον αὔξοντες) and restore an honorable and just polity but who, in the process, incurred the hatred of the nobles (Agis 2.6). Unlike most other Prologues, the pairing of the Roman and Greek leaders in this set of Lives is entirely based on the political challenges they had in common and how they handled them: Plutarch mentions no specific similarities in their ethical virtues or private circumstances. As in Pel-Marc, this Prologue focuses the reader on issues of political and military effectiveness, rather than moral virtue. The same challenge of managing the people is treated from the opposite perspective in the Prologue to Phoc-Cato (Phoc. 1.1–3.5), which also touches on the role of fortune and issues of moral virtue and vice. In contrast to Ag-Cl-Gracchi, Phoc-Cato examines the dangers of too little, rather than too much, flexibility in relations with the people.33 The general principle at issue is presented in an extended comment explaining why a statesman, like the sun, should follow a course that is “slanting and slightly-inclined” (λοξῷ καὶ παρεγκεκλιμένῳ) rather than too straight (ὄρθιος ἄγαν) (Phoc. 2.4):

32  With regard to the fear of losing glory in the eyes of the people, Plutarch further asserts that a statesman “whose goodness is complete and finished off” (ἀπηκριβωμένος καὶ τελείως ἀγαθὸς) does not need glory for himself, “except so far as glory gives him access to achievement by reason of the confidence men have in him” (πλὴν ὅση πάροδον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις [καὶ] διὰ τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι δίδωσι) (Agis 2.1). 33   Phocion-Cato and Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi depict behaviors at two ends of the spectrum, in an attempt to clarify the boundaries of the “middle ground” that statesmen must target. In other cases, extremes are addressed within one pair: for instance, Coriolanus and Alcibiades are opposites in paideia, rapport with the people, temperance in private life, and management of money.

106

Chapter 3

In administering a city, the course that is too straight and goes against the popular will in all things is harsh and severe, just as, in turn, it is precarious to be dragged along with (συνεφελκόμενον), and help to strengthen, the things in which the people are in error. But the dominion and government of men that is conducive to safety is one which yields in return to men who obey (ἀνθυπείκουσα πειθομένοις)—granting them what will please them (τὸ πρὸς χάριν) and then demanding what is advantageous for the state (τὸ συμφέρον). Phoc. 2.4–5

In noting further that the appropriate degree of flexibility requires a blend “of gravity and reasonableness” (τὸ σεμνὸν … τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ) that is hard to attain (Phoc. 2.5), Plutarch names two qualities emphasized in Political Precepts and in works of other writers (e.g. Ad Quint. 1.1 and De Clementia). Plutarch also adds new perspectives on Fortune as an adversary and on moral virtue as a tool of persuasion. Phocion’s Athens is described as a “shipwrecked state” (τὰ ναυάγια τῆς πόλεως) in which Fortune, in the form of “grievous and violent times” is an adversary (ἀνταγωνιστῇ) to Phocion’s virtue (Phoc. 1.1–3). Cato’s Rome, in turn, is heading for shipwreck amidst “much tempest and surge” and his career is a great contest against Fortune (μέγαν ἀγῶνα τῇ τύχῃ) (Phoc. 3.2–3). In such states, the people do not tolerate frank speech and, therefore, a virtuous statesman has limited power and only two options: he either faces ruin before the city (προαπόλλυσι) if he is frank with the people, or he is ruined with the city (συναπόλλυσι) if he indulges them (Phoc. 2.1–3). Plutarch uses the reputation for virtue enjoyed by both Phocion and Cato to expand his treatment of the power of virtue in public affairs. Phocion and Cato are described not only as “good men and statesmen” (ἀγαθῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν), but also as being “of one and the same stamp, shape and color” in their blending of key virtues.34 In contrast, in other statesmen virtues often differ in quality:35 For there is surely a difference between the bravery (ἀνδρείας) of one man and that of another, as between that of Alcibiades and Epaminondas; 34  They are “of one and the same stamp, shape and color” (ἕνα χαρακτῆρα καὶ μορφὴν καὶ χρῶμα κοινὸν) in their blending of severity and kindness, caution and bravery, solicitude for others and fearlessness for themselves and avoidance of baseness and the eager pursuit of justice (Phoc. 3.5). 35  The concept of “degrees of virtue” is implicit in discussions in the synkriseis, but it is explicitly employed only here in the Prologues. See Virtues of Women (243B–D) and Stadter (1965: 9–12). The mention of degrees of virtue has created grounds for seeing Plutarch’s purpose in the Lives as improving the readers’ understanding of virtue.

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

107

between the practical judgment (φρονήσεως) of one man and that of another, as between that of Themistocles and that of Aristides; between the justice (δικαιοσύνην) of one man and that of another, as between that of Numa and that of Agesilaus. Phoc. 3.4

Here, Plutarch’s concern with issues of leadership is apparent both in his focus on three of the “cardinal virtues” of statesmen (bravery, practical judgment and justice) routinely emphasized in the advice literature and in his comparisons across statesmen who are also subjects of Parallel Lives. Conclusion: Statesmanship in the Prologues Although the topics in the Prologues vary widely, they all touch on aspects of political or military leadership discussed in works advising statesmen, including Plutarch’s treatises. Two conclusions are key. First, by interpreting these sections through the lens of Plutarch’s treatment of moral virtue and political action in the political treatises, all of the Prologues can be seen as addressing the central theme of effective leadership from different perspectives.36 Secondly, the Prologues that emphasize the purpose of the Lives as the revelation of the characters of the heroes highlight behaviors that apply equally to private and public contexts. Plutarch’s view that moral virtue is the foundation of effective leadership makes issues of moral character an indispensable component of paradigms in how to exercise authority advantageously for one’s state, but not the only important one. Indeed, the strongest indication that the Lives were designed to provide lessons in leadership is the centrality of pragmatic issues of generalship and statesmanship in Prologues to Pel-Marc, Ag-Cl-Gracchi and Phoc-Cato. In five cases, the Prologues refer to the later task of analyzing differences between the heroes (Aem. 1.8, Dem. 3.5, Phoc. 3.5) or evaluating Plutarch’s judgments (Per. 2.5, Agis 2.5). These comments clearly set up the reading of the paired Lives as the first step in the larger analytical exercise of comparing the heroes in terms of both their moral character and their achievements as generals and political leaders, and evaluating the two men according to a general set of standards that the reader would also be applying to his own career. To what extent do the synkriseis complete this exercise?

36  If, instead, Plutarch’s focus is assumed to be moral reflection and self-improvement, the Prologues are better viewed as sections that spark interest in the attached pair, since several Prologues do not raise moral issues at all.

108 3.2

Chapter 3

Statesmanship in the Synkriseis

The synkrisis, or analysis of differences, survives for eighteen pairs, with only Them-Cam, Pyr-Mar, Alex-Caes and Phoc-Cato lacking this section.37 In On Listening to Poets, Plutarch discusses the instructive power of analyzing differences between the actions taken by men in similar circumstances and between reactions (positive or negative) elicited by different behaviors: by applying such analysis to characters in poetry, the young man can distinguish between conduct to imitate or avoid (On Listening to Poets 28E–39C). While the synkriseis have been variously interpreted as completions of the project stated in the Prologues from the standpoint of comparing moral character,38 within the framework of pragmatic biography, they give sharper definition to the paradigms of political and military excellence (or deficiency) offered by the heroes and therefore constitute an essential final step to the project. The synkriseis also help readers distil lessons by tracing the major successes and failures in each statesman’s career to specific decisions and motivations, rather than to fortune alone.39 As shown below in Table 3.1, the synkriseis address the same range of ethical and pragmatic issues as the Prologues. While each synkrisis focuses on a different set of moral qualities and practical challenges, they all trace the key victories and defeats in each career to particular virtues, vices, practical skills and critical judgments (or misjudgments) that determine the outcomes. Thus, Plutarch’s assessments center on two areas: (1) degrees of virtue or vice embedded in the actions and (2) the effectiveness of the political and military strategies chosen. In both areas, Plutarch takes into account the relative severity of the challenges facing each hero and in

37  Whether or not the synkriseis were omitted or lost is the subject of ongoing debate. 38  As noted in the Introduction (n. 18), the synkriseis have been viewed as attempts to summarize key points in the Lives, as sections where new perspectives can be injected as catalysts for re-examining prior conclusions and as completions of the project set up in the Prologue. The function of the synkrisis is examined by Pelling (1986b/2002), Swain (1992b: 102–104), Duff (1999b: 249–257), Stadter (2000/2015), Pelling (2005a), Larmour (2014). Duff (1999b: 145) stresses that “the lack of ‘fit’ between the synkrisis and the Lives” makes the synkriseis more thought-provoking: “To regard the synkriseis as failed summaries of the moral import of the narrative is to miss the point and to do them and Plutarch an injustice.” See Introduction (n. 18). 39  Plutarch’s analysis links outcomes—both positive and negative—to the different “habits and passions” (ἠθικὰς καὶ παθητικὰς) that underlie them, rather than to fortune (δαίμονος) (Thes-Rom 3.1).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives table 3.1

109

Prominent themes in the Synkriseis

Rise to Power:a Was the statesman self-made or the beneficiary of inherited advantages of wealth, influence and education? Personal Virtue and Vice:b Did a virtue reinforce or a vice hinder effectiveness in office by affecting reputation, the ability to retain trust at critical moments or clarity of reasoning? Respect for Laws and Justice:c Did he abide by the laws and enforce them impartially? Did he over-ride laws to serve the common welfare or private interests? Military Accomplishments:d In the major victories or defeats, what role was played by generalship (practical judgment), quality of antagonists or his own army, and fortune? Political Actions:e Did the statesman maintain proper conduct in his pursuit of offices and in interactions with the people, colleagues, allies and opponents? Common Good over Private Interest:f Were there major instances where the statesman acted for the good of the state and against his own private interests? Actions Promoting Freedom and Liberty:g For what reasons and how intensely did the statesman fight tyranny or promote liberty on behalf of his own state or others? Attitude to Money/Wealth:h Did avarice, extravagance, bribery or pursuit of personal enrichment influence the effectiveness of the statesman in office? Circumstances surrounding Death:i Did the statesman precipitate his own downfall or death? What qualities of character did he exhibit when facing death? How did his countrymen and enemies respond to his death? a Examples include: Dtr-Ant 1.1, Ages-Pomp 1.1, Sert-Eum 1.1–3, Lys-Sulla 1.1–3, Dion-Brut 1.1–4, Arist-Cato Mai 1.2–4 , Thes-Rom 1.1–2, 4.1–2. b Temperance: Dtr-Ant 3.1, Cor-Alc 1.3, Lys-Sulla 2.3, Arist-Cato Mai 6.1 and Cim-Luc 1.2–4; treatment of enemies: Dtr-Ant 2.3, Pel-Marc 1.1, Ages-Pomp 3.2; self-praise: Arist-Cato Mai 5.2–3, Dem-Cic 2.1–2; sacrilege and piety: Dtr-Ant 4.2, Nic-Cras 5.2, Thes-Rom 6.5, Cor-Alc. 2.1; anger: Dion-Brut 3.1, Phil-Flam 1.3, Cor-Alc 2.4–5, Thes-Rom 3.1–2. c Ages-Pomp 2.2–4. d Pel-Mar 1.2, Cor-Alc 1.1, Ages-Pomp 3.1, Nic-Cras 4.1, Lys-Sulla 4.4–5, Dion-Brut 3.1 and 4.1, AristCato Mai 2.1–2 and 5.1, Cim-Luc 2.1, 2.4, 3.1, and 3.5, Aem-Tim 1.2–3, Per-Fab 2.1–4, Sol-Pub 4.1, Phil-Flam 1.2 and 2. e Ag-Cl-Gracchi 4.1, Lys-Sulla 2.1, Arist-Cato Mai 2.3, Aem-Tim 2.1–2, Per-Fab 3.1, Sol-Pub 2.1, 3.1 and 4.2, Lyc-Numa 1.2, 2.1–2 and 3.1–4, Thes-Rom 6.1–2. f Ages-Pomp 2.3 and 3.3, Nic-Cras 3.4, Lys-Sulla 5.2–3, Dion-Brut 1.6–7 and 3.8, Aem-Tim 2.1, SolPub 1.3, Thes-Rom 1.3–4, Dem-Cic 4.3–4, Phil-Flam 3.1–2. g Dtr-Ant 2.2, Lys-Sulla 5.4, Dion-Brut 2.1, 3.6, Sol-Pub 3.1, 4.2, Lyc-Numa 2.4, Phil-Flam 1.1. h Cor-Alc 3.1, Ag-Cl-Gracchi 1.4, Nic-Cras 1.4, Lys-Sulla 3.1–4, Dion-Brut 1.5, Cim-Luc 1.5, Aem-Tim 2.8, Per-Fab 3.3–4, Sol-Pub 1.5, Dem-Cic 3.5. i Dtr-Ant 6.1–2, Pel-Mar 3.1, Ages-Pomp 5.1, Ag-Cl-Gracchi 3.2 and 5.6, Sert-Eum 2.3–4, Nic-Cras 5.2, Dion-Brut 5.1–4, Sol-Pub 1.4, Dem-Cic 5.1.

110

Chapter 3

his final judgments both heroes usually attract praise and blame on different grounds for different actions.40 Assessing Degrees of Moral Virtue or Vice In judging the relative strength of the moral qualities of the two statesmen, Plutarch compares their actions in light of two broad considerations: the various factors influencing motives and the pressures created by circumstances, which may prompt actions out of “political necessity”. Although each synkrisis emphasizes a different mix of these criteria, all share the goal of obtaining a clearer view of the degree of moral virtue or vice at work by netting out the “special factors” that assisted or hampered only one of the heroes.41 While the paradigms that emerge could spur action in both private and public life, Plutarch’s emphasis on key public virtues—especially justice, bravery and dedication to the common welfare—suggests that he highlighted paradigms applicable to action in political and military contexts. Motives The motives behind actions are traceable to three broad influences: reasoned calculation, passion or appetite; the age of the statesman—which makes some lapses more “excusable” in a young man—and the traditions and conventions of the community. In the synkriseis, motives are routinely compared when actions appear similar on the surface or in cases where a strategy led to harmful results for the state.42 Two questions are central: On whose behalf did the statesman act—in his own interest or on behalf of the common good? And, secondly, was the statesman driven by a rational plan or by passion? Thus, for instance, Romulus, because he acted to serve the common good of Rome rather than to satisfy personal lust, is less harshly criticized for kidnapping women than Theseus (Thes-Rom 6.1). Similarly, Coriolanus is blamed more than Alcibiades for engaging in deceit because Coriolanus’ “motive made his action baser” (ἡ δ’ αἰτία φαυλότερον ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον, Cor-Alc 2.2): unlike Alcibiades, Coriolanus acted 40  This distribution of praise and blame in a comparison is a common feature of ancient rhetorical exercise. 41  Plutarch assesses degrees of virtue from various perspectives in other Lives, including the relative nobility of Philopoemen and Flamininus (Phil-Flam 3.2–3), the relative incorruptibility of Aemilius and Timoleon (Aem-Tim 2.1–2) and the relative effort required by Demetrius and Antony to launch their careers (Dtr-Ant 1.2). See Martin (2011) for a discussion of Plutarch’s treatment of virtue, fortune and outcomes in his assessment of heroes. 42  In On Moral Virtue, Plutarch, like Aristotle, defines virtue as right action for the right reason. See Chapter 1.

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

111

“not out of ambition or political struggle or rivalry, but out of anger” (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ φιλονικίας οὐδὲ πολιτικῆς μάχης ἢ ἁμίλλης … ἀλλ’ ὀργῇ χαριζόμενος, Cor-Alc 2.3). Even in the case of disaster, motives matter: Plutarch argues that either both Crassus and Alexander, or neither, deserve criticism for their expeditions to Parthia because it is “unfair to judge a beginning by its end” (Nic-Cras 4.5). Age differences also impact the assessments of similar actions. Consistent with comments in Old Men in Politics,43 Plutarch censures vices less vigorously in ambitious and passionate young men than in older men, who are expected to exercise self-control. On this basis, Cimon’s extravagance as a young man is less blameworthy than Lucullus’ luxurious living in retirement (Cim-Luc 1.2–3). Greater experience in older men is also a factor, as reflected in the criticism of Pompey’s decision at Pharsalus: The excuse offered in defense of these things is the greatest accusation against a general of [Pompey’s] years. For that a young commander should be frightened by uproars and outcries into weakness and cowardice and depart from his safest calculations (τῶν ἀσφαλεστάτων ἐκπεσεῖν λογισμῶν) is natural and pardonable. But, in the case of Pompey the Great, … how could anyone find it tolerable that he was all but forced by the scoffs of Favonius and Domitius … to hazard (ἀναρρῖψαι … κίνδυνον) the supremacy and freedom of Rome (περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας) ? Ages-Pomp 4.2–3

As a rule, Plutarch is lenient in criticizing blameworthy actions of ambitious young men early in their careers unless the harmful behaviors persist after that man is in power. Thus, for instance, the criticism of Alcibiades and Octavian (in Cicero, Brutus and Antony) for disreputable actions in their youth is not allowed to overshadow the positive role models they became later in their careers.44 A third consideration in evaluating motives is whether a statesman was forced to violate established conventions of his community in order to 43  See, for instance, Old Men in Politics 788E and 789D–E, discussed earlier. 44  As discussed in Chapter 5, Alcibiades’ unconventional and lawless conduct in youth was followed by excellence as a general and leader in the second half of Alcibiades, as well as exemplary conduct in his final exile. Octavian’s problematic conduct is found in Cicero and the first half of Antony, while his laudable actions emerge in the second half of Antony and are reflected in the anecdotes about Octavian after he had become “Augustus”. See Jacobs (2017b). Similarly, in the individual Lives, Otho’s conduct in youth is found in Galba, while his praiseworthy maturity is in Otho.

112

Chapter 3

a­ ccomplish his great feats. This distinction is often made when a statesman pursues virtue in a degenerate state. For instance, Agis and Cleomenes are credited with “sturdier natural gifts” (φύσις ἐρρωμενεστέρα) because, unlike the Gracchi, they were raised amidst corrupt ways of living and therefore had to “make themselves” (αὑτοὺς … παρέσχον) leaders in “simplicity and temperance” (Ag-Cl-Gracchi 1.2). Similarly, Aemilius was made “incorruptible and just” (καθαρῶν καὶ δικαίων) by the laws and customs of his country, while Timoleon “himself made himself so” (τοιοῦτον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν παρέσχε) (Aem-Tim 2.1). Environment also affects comparisons of family history or upbringing, as with Antony and Demetrius (Dtr-Ant 1.1–2) or Sertorius and Eumenes (SertEum 1.2–3). Pressure of Circumstances and “Political Necessity” The pressure of immediate circumstances also influences a statesman’s choice of actions independently of the factors that impact his motives. Key considerations include situations that either require the statesman to sacrifice his own interests for the sake of the public good or force him to violate standards of personal moral virtue in taking expedient action in the common interest. Plutarch routinely notes the extent to which heroes sacrifice private interests on behalf of the state. Indeed, this yardstick is one of the clearest indicators that Plutarch’s topic is leadership and not only moral virtue. Brutus, for instance, is applauded for making political alliances with personal enemies for the sake of the common good (Dion-Brut 3.8), and Sulla is praised for “setting the public interest before his own” (τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ οἰκείου πρόσθεν θέμενος) when he refused Mithridates’ assistance against Rome (Lys-Sulla 5.3). In contrast, Pompey is criticized for acting in the interest of the state only when serving his own interests as well (Ages-Pomp 2.3). Dedication to public service is also a factor in assessing Aristides’ poverty: if poverty results from devotion to the state, it is a sign of a lofty spirit (Arist-Cato Mai 4.1). Plutarch also examines the pressure of circumstances that limit the options open to a leader. This consideration is especially important when a statesman adopts a policy that seems to hurt his state or violate basic principles of moral virtue. In Sol-Pub, for instance, the relative merits of Solon’s recovery of Salamis and Publicola’s loss of Roman territory are assessed in the context of the broader political challenges faced by each man, and Plutarch concludes that they both did what the situation required. The general principle that guides his conclusion is clearly stated:45 45  In this passage, Plutarch uses vocabulary tying the statesman (ὁ πολιτικὸς) to “managing affairs” (μεταχειρίσεται), as at Old Men in Politics 790D–E.

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

113

We must view men’s actions in the light of the situations that call them forth (πρὸς τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιροὺς). The subtle statesman will handle each issue that arises in the most feasible manner (ᾧ τρόπῳ τῶν ὄντων), and often saves the whole by relinquishing a part, and by yielding small advantages secures greater ones. Sol-Pub 4.3

Similarly, although Numa and Lycurgus led their people toward the same praiseworthy goals of independence and temperance, they had to adopt different policies regarding courage and justice because they operated within different traditions (Lyc-Numa 2.1–2). In other cases, circumstances force a leader to violate normal rules of moral virtue out of “political necessity”. A prime example of this situation is found in Agesilaus’ temporary suspension of the laws when he confronted the necessity (εἰς ἀνάγκην καταστὰς) of abrogating the laws in order to save his fellow citizens (Ages-Pomp 2.2). Philopoemen is also praised for ignoring the law when he acted in the public interest although he was not the elected general: Having the nature of a leader (ἡγεμονικὴν φύσιν), he knew how to rule not only according to the laws (κατὰ τοὺς νόμους), but also to rule the laws for what was advantageous to his state (τῶν νόμων ἄρχειν ... πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον), not thinking it necessary to have received the power to rule from those being ruled, but serving them when the situation required it (ὅπου καιρὸς εἴη), thinking that the man who was prudent on their behalf rather than the man elected by them was their real general. Phil-Flam 3.2

Plutarch’s judgment here is consistent with the general directive in the Moralia and other advice literature that statesmen must do what each situation demands (rather than adhere to rigid principles of personal moral virtue) in determining which actions to take on behalf of the welfare of their state.46 Another common “circumstance” explaining differences across statesmen is the political regime within which each man is acting.47 Although most 46  Cato Minor’s refusal to take command in Africa illustrates this same issue. See Chapter 9. 47  While Plutarch does not directly discuss a theory of “transformation of constitutions”— as offered by Plato in Republic 9 or Polybius—he applies the concept in the Lives. Polybius describes a “cycle of political revolution, the course appointed by nature in which constitutions change, disappear, and finally return to the point which they started” (Polyb. 6.9.10): monarchy devolves into tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy and then

114

Chapter 3

statesmen are paired with someone at a similar point in the cycle of the risepeak-fall of his city, in six cases Plutarch reminds readers that the heroes operated in different environments.48 In Cim-Luc, for instance, Plutarch notes that Lucullus’ Rome was in a “distempered state” (ἐν νοσούσῃ … τῇ πατρίδι) while Cimon’s Athens was “at the acme of her power” (Cim-Luc 1.1–2)—a difference also applied to the Lysander-Sulla and Philopoemen-Flamininus pairings. Differences in political arenas are especially important in assessing a statesman’s tactics, since a reputation for virtue may be indispensable in some environments, but ineffectual in others. Thus, while Solon, “because of his own virtue and high repute” (ἀρετῇ καὶ δόξῃ) (Sol- Pub 3.2), is able to prevail over the men who opposed the remission of debts, Caesar must adopt aggressive practices (including bribery, violence and lawlessness) in order to acquire power in Rome and become “a most gentle physician” (πρᾳότατος ἰατρός) to a state that now required a monarchy (Dion-Brut 2.2). By recognizing varied constraints across political milieux, Plutarch reveals his intention to evaluate the quality of statesmanship rather than moral character alone. In environments where the people do not respond to virtue—as described in the Prologue to PhocCato49—the statesman must adopt whatever tactics will produce the best outcomes. On this basis, Cato Minor is criticized for refusing an alliance with Pompey that could have benefitted Rome because he considered Pompey corrupt (Cato Min. 30.2–6). Assessing Political and Military Effectiveness In comparing the major accomplishments of the heroes, Plutarch’s focus shifts away from motives and circumstances to the critical judgment at work when certain policies or strategies were adopted to meet particular practical challenges. Plutarch’s analysis is presented in two separate sections devoted, in turn, to political and military achievements—sections which in Per-Fab (1.1) are described as revealing the “political and military virtue” (πολιτικῆς καὶ πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς) of the heroes. The reader receives pragmatic lessons in how to solve similar problems in his own political and military career. ­ obocracy before starting over. The cycle is unavoidable and Polybius predicts the same m for Rome (Polyb. 6.4.6–13, 6.9.4–9). 48  This distinction is made at Cim-Luc (1.1–2), Lys-Sulla (1.1), Phil-Flam (2.1), Arist-Cato Mai (1.2–4), Lyc-Numa (1.3) and Per-Fab (1.2–4). 49  As discussed above, the plight of Phocion and Cato reflected their “unseasonable” virtue (μὴ καθ’ ὥραν, Phoc. 3.1) in states either already shipwrecked (Athens) or on stormy seas (Rome) (Phoc. 1.1–2.3).

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

115

Political Achievements In the sphere of “political achievements” (ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς), Plutarch highlights many of the challenges discussed in Political Precepts and his other political treatises, especially in the areas of how to manage the people or the army and how to outmaneuver rivals. Insights into how to manage the people are provided in several synkriseis. Plutarch states in Cim-Luc that “the most important task of a leader (μέγιστον ἔργον ἡγεμόνος) is to secure prompt obedience through goodwill (εὐπείθειαν … δι’ εὐνοίας) (Cim-Luc 2.3) and, on this basis, Cimon is praised for inducing a growing number of allies to come under Athenian leadership (Cim-Luc 2.3–4). Both Alcibiades and Coriolanus, in contrast, are censured for their tactics to attract support: It is disgraceful to flatter the people (τὸ κολακεύειν) for the sake of power, but to become strong by being fearsome (ἐκ τοῦ φοβερὸν εἶναι) and mistreating and oppressing the people is worse because it is also unjust. Cor-Alc. 1.4

At Ag-Cl-Gracchi (4.2), Plutarch rejects the use of violence to bring the people under control “except under the most extreme necessity” (ἄνευ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης), since it demonstrates a lack of skill (ἀτεχνίας) as well as injustice and cruelty. Instead, as noted in Dem-Cic 2.1, a political leader had to prevail through his eloquence, a skill referred to as a “bulwark” (πρόβλημα) and efficacious weapon (δραστήριον ὄργανον) in the hands of Cato Maior (Arist-Cato Mai 2.4). Nicias provides a deterrent model in this area, as a man who displayed the experience and calculation of a prudent leader (ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ λογισμῷ … ἡγεμόνος ἔμφρονος) (Nic-Cras 4.1) but who was unable to prevent the expedition to Sicily because in his speeches he was “too cautious” (μετ’ εὐλαβείας) (Nic-Cras 2.1). Here, Plutarch echoes themes raised in his treatment of oratory in Political Precepts (801C–804C), where Nicias is also a negative model (802D). Principles for managing alliances and rivalries—discussed in Political Precepts (809B–813D, 816A–817F)—are also frequently addressed. Dion, for instance, is criticized for selecting associates who betrayed him: either he chose unwisely (κρίνας κακῶς) in trusting bad men, or his own conduct turned them from good to bad, neither of which “are fitting for a man of practical judgment” (Dion-Brut 4.7). Nicias, in turn, is criticized for allowing his rival, Cleon, to gain power: However, when a man lives in a city receptive to virtue (ἀρετῆς αἰσθανομένῃ) and is superior in power, he must not give a footing to base men, nor rule

116

Chapter 3

to men not fit to rule (ἀρχήν μὴ ἀρχ οὖσιν) nor trust to men not to be trusted (πίστιν ἀπιστουμένοις) Nic-Cras 3. 1

In Plutarch’s view, Nicias’ failure to outmaneuver Cleon reflected timidity and cowardice in the public service and subservience to the most wicked men, qualities that “deserve the severest censure” (Nic-Cras 2.2). Crassus, in contrast, offered a positive paradigm in this area because he took on his rivals directly and recognized that “in the supreme struggles of a political career” it was necessary to adopt a course that would “dazzle men”, not one that would “awaken no envy” (Nic-Cras 2.4)—a precept discussed in Political Precepts (804D–805E). Military Achievements In the case of principles of good generalship, Plutarch’s comments in the synkriseis do not echo any treatise of the Moralia, but are consistent with the principles presented in Onasander, Frontinus and the pragmatic historians. In the Prologues, as noted above, specific precepts for generals are discussed only in Pel-Marc, where Plutarch highlights the general’s duty to save himself when the safety of all depends on him (Pel. 2.4). In the synkriseis, several other principles are articulated in Plutarch’s comments, which underscore both ethical virtues and practical insights that together produce excellence in generalship. Coriolanus and Alcibiades, for instance, are deemed comparable in their military careers because they accomplished deeds “of daring and courage” (τόλμης καὶ ἀνδρείας) as soldiers and “of skill and foresight” (τέχνης καὶ προνοίας) as commanders (Cor-Alc 1.1). In assessing the relative merit of military outcomes, Plutarch takes account of the quality of the resources at the disposal of a leader and whether he was in sole command or one of many commanders, applying the principle that “when equal successes follow an unequal equipment (τὰ γὰρ ἀπ’ οὐκ ἴσης παρασκευῆς ἵσα κατορθώματα), the greater credit will accrue to the commander who was at a disadvantage” (Aem-Tim 1.5). This criterion is applied, for instance, in comparing the generalship of Flamininus when Rome was powerful to that of Philopoemen when his state was in decline: Therefore the success of Philopoemen was his own work (τοῦ μὲν ἴδιον), while that of Flamininus was the result of a community of effort (τοῦ δὲ κοινὸν); for the latter was commander of good soldiers, while the former, as commander, had to make his soldiers good. Phil-Flam 2.1

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

117

In the same vein, Cato Maior’s military achievements are deemed superior to those of Aristides because Cato was one of two consuls, while Aristides was one of ten generals (Arist-Cato Mai 2.1–2). Plutarch also uses the planning and execution of a military strategy in a specific incident to illustrate principles of good (or flawed) generalship. For instance, Brutus’ success in the plot to kill Caesar is attributed to “the highest ability and generalship” (δεινότητος ἄκρας καὶ στρατγηγίας) because his plan was devised over a long period and he selected people who were loyal to him (Dion-Brut 4.5). Similar praise for careful analysis and planning is directed at Dion, who is described as a consummate general (ἄμεμπτος … στρατηγός) who achieved his best results when he himself made the plans and who restored and bettered a situation where failure was due to others (Dion-Brut 3.1). Pericles also exemplifies excellence for his strategic insights as a general in comparison to Fabius: And if it is necessary for the good general not only to deal with present circumstances (χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν), but also to make correct judgments about the future (τεκμαίρεσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὀρθῶς), for the Athenians the war ended as Pericles understood beforehand and foretold, …, but it was against the calculations of Fabius that the Romans sent Scipio out against the Carthaginians and entirely prevailed. Per-Fab 2.3

On this basis, the defeat of Athens manifested Pericles’ sagacity (καλῶς ἔγνω) (Per-Fab 2.4) Paradigms of conduct to avoid as a general are also included. Despite Pompey’s legacy as a triumphant general, Plutarch uses his decision to fight at Pharsalus to provide a pointed deterrent lesson in generalship. Not only, as discussed above, was Pompey’s motive flawed—since his decision at Pharsalus was motivated by the scoffs of others—but his strategic thinking as a general was unsound: The chief task of a good general (ἔργον … ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ) is to compel his enemies to fight when he is superior in forces , but not to be compelled to fight when he is in inferior. By doing this, Agesilaus always kept himself unconquered; but in the case of Pompey, Caesar escaped him without being harmed when he was inferior to Pompey, but when he was superior to Pompey, he forced him to fight out the whole issue with his army and be defeated. Ages-Pomp 4.1

118

Chapter 3

Plutarch reinforces his criticism of Pompey’s strategic error by pointing to better alternatives that were rejected: either fighting at Rome in the first place or imitating other commanders, such as Fabius, Marius, Lucullus or Agesilaus, who chose the time and place for major battles (Ages-Pomp 4.4). However, the praise of Fabius in this area of generalship is balanced in Per-Fab in criticism in the area of foresight, where Fabius revealed a critical flaw when he opposed Scipio’s campaign in Africa: It is as much an error for a general to fall into disaster because he did not look for it (μὴ προσδοκήσαντα), as it is for him to throw away an opportunity because of lack of confidence (ἀπιστίᾳ): for one thing—inexperience (ἀπειριᾳ)—as it seems, both engenders rashness and takes away courage. Per-Fab 2.4

Here, Plutarch points to the need for experience in military affairs in order to determine whether a situation presents an “opportunity for success” (κατορθώματος καιρὸν) or the potential “to fall into disaster” (κακῷ περιπεσεῖν). Other generals flagged as deterrent models of generalship are Lucullus (CimLuc 2.4) and Demetrius (Dtr-Ant 6.1), both of whom were unable to retain the support of their troops. Finally, Pelopidas and Marcellus, lauded as generals in other respects, are criticized for violating the principle, stated in the Prologue, that a general should not risk his life if the safety of the army is not in danger (Pel. 2.4): in rushing to attack their enemy when there was no immediate crisis, they “uselessly sacrificed their other virtues” (τὰς ἄλλας κατανάλωσαν ἀρετὰς) as if their death affected themselves alone and not their countries, friends and allies (Pel-Marc 3.5). 3.3

Techniques for Reinforcing Pragmatic Lessons Across the Parallel Lives

Several other features of the synkriseis further suggest that the Parallel Lives are designed as pragmatic biography. First, in each of the major areas of comparison, Plutarch often uses incidents from the two Lives to juxtapose the two heroes as offering one positive and one negative paradigm of the same attribute, thereby magnifying the power of the positive model to spur imitation (and of the deterrent model aversion) as described in the Prologue to Dtr-Ant (Dtr. 1.5). For example, Plutarch amplifies the detrimental effects of Coriolanus’ unsociability on his inability to win the support of the people by demonstrating how Alcibiades’ affability drew people to him (Cor-Alc 3.2–3). Similarly, in treating

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

119

exile and recall, Plutarch brings sharper focus to the principles at issue by portraying each man as a positive model in one area and a negative model in the other. Thus, Demosthenes is criticized for the reason prompting his exile as a convicted thief as opposed to Cicero’s honorable act of ridding his country of “pernicious men” (Dem-Cic 4.2). However, Demosthenes is a positive paradigm for working on behalf of his state both during his exile and after his recall, in contrast to Cicero’s inactivity during exile and passivity upon his return (DemCic 4.3–4). Such positioning of the heroes as positive and deterrent paradigms of the same ethical quality or principle of leadership is found in nearly every synkrisis. Secondly, in the few instances where Plutarch ranks the statesmen (PhilFlam 3.2–3, Lys-Sulla 5.5, Cor-Alc. 5.1–2 and Ag-Cl-Gracchi 5.6), he awards his “prizes” both for particular virtues and for practical skills. Thus, for instance, “the crown for military experience and generalship” (τὸν ἐμπειρίας πολεμικῆς καὶ στρατηγίας στέφανον) is given to Philopoemen and “the one for justice and goodness” (τὸν δικαιοσύνης καὶ χρηστότητος) to Flamininus (Phil-Flam 3.2–3), while Sulla receives the nod for “generalship and bravery” (στρατηγίας καὶ ἀνδρείας,) and Lysander for “self-control and temperance” (ἐγκρατείας καὶ σωφροσύνης) (Lys-Sulla 5.5).50 This blending of ethical and pragmatic criteria points to the larger subject of political and military leadership as the focus of the Lives, within which issues of moral virtue and vice comprise one subcategory of the larger topic. In addition, Plutarch uses statesmen from his other Lives as exempla primarily of principles of military and political action rather than particular moral virtues for private or public life. Twenty-two of the thirty-two statesmen cited as exempla in the synkriseis are subjects of Parallel Lives and are most often associated with good practical judgment in difficult situations. Thus, for instance, Themistocles exemplifies an effective military strategist (AgesPomp 4.2), a man living in exile but not harming his state (Dem-Cic 4.4) and a man who, in contrast to Nicias, bought off a candidate for office “in order to prevent a worthless (φαῦλος) and senseless (ἄφρων) man from ruining the city” (Nic-Cras 3.3). Epaminondas, in turn, is a role model for refusing to flatter the people and “cherishing no anger for their folly” (Cor-Alc 4.5–6) and for dying a noble death in battle while rallying his men and assuring them victory 50  In other cases, Coriolanus is superior to Alcibiades in temperance and superiority to wealth (σωφροσύνης καὶ χρημάτων ἐγκρατείας), but also has vices—arrogance (τὸ ὑπερήφανον) and ambition (τὸ φιλότιμον)—that Alcibiades lacks (Cor-Alc. 5.1–2). Agis receives the award for “fewest errors” (ἐλάχιστα δ’ ἡμαρτηκέναι) and Cleomenes for achievement and daring (πράξει καὶ τόλμῃ), while Tiberius is seen as far ahead in virtue (ἀρετῇ) (Ag-Cl-Gracchi 5.6).

120

Chapter 3

(Lys-Sulla 4.2). Furthermore, as noted above, Fabius, Marius and Lucullus are generals who chose the best time and place for battle (Ages-Pomp 4.4). In these cases, the statesmen are paradigms of actions that can be imitated or avoided only in the political or military arenas, not in private life. 3.4

Conclusion: Didactic Agenda of the Parallel Lives as Pragmatic Biography

The Prologues and synkriseis clearly position the reading of the two Lives in a pair as only the first step in completing the project envisioned in the Parallel Lives. Plutarch’s assertion in the synkrisis to Per-Fab that the Lives of Pericles and Fabius provided “many noble paradigms of political and military virtue” suggests that the paradigms promised in the Prologue to Dtr-Ant (Dtr. 1.5) were those of statesmanship and generalship, not simply models of moral virtue and vice for private or public life. In addition, the synkriseis in some cases seem to complete the analytical exercise of the pair by highlighting the same moral traits and political and military challenges as the Prologues. Although the Prologues and synkriseis suggest that Plutarch’s intended paradigms have both an ethical component (e.g. eradicate anger) and a pragmatic one (e.g. do not attack an enemy without considering its ability to keep itself provisioned), these two elements at times must be carefully extracted. Thus, for instance, one particular action—such as being inflexible in dealing with people—can be motivated by a variety of intentions, as will become evident in our analysis of the Lives in Parts 2 and 3. Pericles (Chapter 4) is inflexible when he believes the survival of Athens is at stake; Coriolanus (Chapter 5) when he is angry at the people or fellow citizens for slighting him or challenging his will; and Cato (Chapter 9) when he refuses to compromise his standards of personal moral integrity to accommodate the mood of the electorate. In each of these cases, the pragmatic lessons for statesmen lie in the consequences for the welfare of the state that flowed from inflexibility in those particular circumstances—that is, in the survival of Athens in the case of Pericles, the tumult and disharmony in Rome in the case of Coriolanus and the loss of the consulship and rise of Caesar in the case of Cato. While all of these Lives counsel the reader to control anger and inflexibility from an ethical and attitudinal perspective, their pragmatic lessons focus on helping the reader identify situations where inflexibility—regardless of its ultimate cause—benefits the state and where it leads to harm. The contemporary resonance of the concerns raised in the Prologues and synkriseis for statesmen in Plutarch’s day is revealed by the overlap with the

Didactic Agenda Of The Parallel Lives

121

ethical and pragmatic concerns in the Moralia and other works advising statesmen in the imperial era. At the same time, the Prologues and synkriseis use the same statesmen as the Moralia to exemplify the same principles of political and military leadership. Thus, although the subjects of the Parallel Lives lived centuries earlier, their careers were considered instructive for illustrating effective strategies for men active in the imperial era. In Parts 2 and 3, we examine six sets of Lives, each of which offered a different perspective on common challenges faced by leaders in Plutarch’s day and provided definitive paradigms to help readers meet those challenges. We turn to these Lives with new questions in mind. How did the two Lives in work together with the attached prologue and synkrisis to reveal the intended paradigms? What adjustments to the historical accounts and which narrative techniques did Plutarch use to direct readers to the intended lessons? We begin with Pericles-Fabius Maximus in the next chapter.

Part 2 Political and Military Leadership

⸪

Part 2

Political and Military Leadership The three pairs of Lives in this section deliver lessons for the politikos educated in philosophy who is active in provincial city government or holds a position of military command, providing illustrations of the principles articulated in Political Precepts, Old Men in Politics and the other political treatises in the Moralia. The central incidents offer pragmatic lessons in how to manage relations with the people or one’s army, with colleagues and rivals, and with friends, as well as insights into strategic thinking in crisis situations, where the safety or well-being of fellow-citizens is at risk. As we will see, the arts of statesmanship and generalship are manifested in a leader’s ability to “do what the situation requires”, that is, to discern whether or not to take action, which strategic option to adopt when action is necessary and how to implement the selected option effectively. Success requires good judgment about what to do, at what moment and in what way—judgments that require vast amounts of experience, some of which can be gleaned from careful study of the Parallel Lives. The qualities of character and practical competencies that enabled city leaders or generals to benefit their states lie at the center of lessons of leadership in the Lives in Part 2. Principles familiar from the Moralia are especially prominent. In the area of ethical conduct, Plutarch demonstrates that the reputation needed to win the trust and goodwill of the populace or army is grounded on moderation, temperance and just conduct in all areas of one’s life, while also illustrating the injury a statesman does to his state when his conduct undermines confidence in his leadership or when he allows anger to determine his actions. The pragmatic lessons are concentrated in four areas addressed in Political Precepts: (1) which techniques of persuasion to adopt with different groups; (2) how to respond to public rejection (e.g. election losses, exile or condemnation); (3) how to outmaneuver opponents without harming the common welfare; and (4) how to stand by one’s best thinking in the face of ridicule and slander without losing one’s authority to direct events. Added insights on each of these topics are found in other treatises, including On Control of Anger, On Being Compliant, On Inoffensive Self-Praise and Old Men in Politics. The format of a “Life” enabled Plutarch to treat all of these issues—examined one-by-one across the treatises—in a more dynamic context, where all character traits, attitudes and strategic judgment were operating simultaneously, making it possible to produce a well-rounded illustration of their influence

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_006

126

Part 2

on political and military effectiveness. As we will see, the narrative structure of each of the Lives follows a similar pattern. As described by Duff (2011b), the Lives open with the hero’s ancestry and parentage, a summary comment on his natural talents and moral attributes (virtues and vices) and incidents from childhood that revealed these qualities. Throughout each Life, these traits are exhibited in private and public contexts and create the reputation that either enhances or diminishes the hero’s persuasiveness in public roles. Incidents in his public career demonstrate how his educational and moral foundation interacted with his practical skills, growing experience in political and military affairs, and his critical judgment as a leader to produce his record of political and military successes and failures. While the “ethical” lessons lie in the motives driving an action, the pragmatic lessons reside in the connections between that action and its consequences for the common welfare, linkages revealed in the purposeful construction of key incidents. Plutarch uses several techniques to arrest the reader’s attention on specific episodes and their broader implications, including (1) authorial comments that tie the episode to a universal principle; (2) literary citations that evoke similar situations; and (3) comparisons to other statesmen. Plutarch often embellishes key episodes with direct statements by the hero or others, which further emphasize the broader significance of the inherent difficulties of a situation and the hero’s deliberation about the best course of action. To facilitate the comparison of Plutarch’s treatment of similar political and military challenges across the Lives examined in this book—and bring his intended lessons into sharper focus—each chapter is structured to highlight three areas of interest. The “Introduction” contains a brief summary of the historical record, followed by a review of extant historical accounts, appearances of the hero in literary works (e.g. comedy or philosophy) and the contexts in which the hero served as an exemplum in the advice literature of the era. This section provides a backdrop against which the choices open to Plutarch in characterizing his heroes can be recognized, as well as the preconceptions his audience may have brought to their reading of the Lives. The second section of each chapter, “Moral foundation and reputation”, highlights key aspects of upbringing and paideia that underlay the virtues and vices that impacted the hero’s reputation—areas already examined by scholars from a variety of perspectives that have revealed Plutarch’s nuanced treatment of these topics. The third section, “Pragmatic lessons in political and military leadership”, investigates the pragmatic insights embedded in the accounts of key political, military and diplomatic incidents in each Life. This chapter structure is designed to reveal how Plutarch used each pair to examine different dimensions

Political And Military Leadership

127

of effective leadership and how the series as a whole provided a range of clearcut paradigms readers could draw upon when confronting parallel situations. The subjects of the first set of Lives in this section, Pericles and Fabius Maximus (Chapter 4), are presented as positive role models in most areas of political and military leadership. Conversely, Coriolanus and Alcibiades (Chapter 5) illustrate a wide array of behaviors to avoid: Coriolanus is a deterrent example in most areas except superiority to money and moral integrity in private life, while Alcibiades demonstrates the failures in statesmanship that result from cultivating a reputation for wantonness and lawlessness in private life. Agesilaus and Pompey (Chapter 6), in turn, are powerful models both of behaviors to imitate and of actions to avoid: Agesilaus combines the strengths of moral character and the ability to withstand criticism with the weaknesses of uncontrolled anger and “flexible” justice in the case of friends, while Pompey blends moral integrity and absence of anger with both a lack of restraint towards opponents and a tendency to be compliant towards his colleagues. Finally, all six heroes—except Pompey in his alliance with Caesar and at Pharsalus—illustrate acuity of practical judgment in a variety of political and military situations that parallel the challenges of Plutarch’s day.

Chapter 4

Pericles-Fabius Maximus 4.1 Introduction In Pericles-Fabius Maximus, Plutarch joined two statesmen who enjoyed long careers during which they encountered a wide array of political and military challenges. Pericles was active in the political arena for over thirty years— beginning in the mid-460s and extending to his death in 429—while Fabius played an active role in Roman politics from the 230s until his death in 203 BC. During their careers, Athens and Rome faced extraordinary threats, and the survival of these cities was generally attributed to the firm leadership and foresight of these two leaders. By tying their achievements to the moral character and critical strategic decisions that produced them, Plutarch provided lessons in behaviors readers should imitate or avoid—the objective stated in the Prologue to the pair. Per-Fab is well suited to launch our examination of the Parallel Lives as pragmatic biography. First, of all the sets of Lives, this pair provides the broadest overlap with the exempla of good statesmanship in the Moralia. As shown in Table 4.1, Pericles is mentioned nearly forty times in the Moralia, largely in the context of his role as leader in Athens. He is used fourteen times to illustrate principles of leadership in Political Precepts1 and is a prominent example of why old men should stay active in public affairs in Old Men in Politics.2 Fabius, in turn, illustrates excellent generalship and constructive approaches for old men to engage the young and train them for public service.3 Secondly, as noted above in Chapter 3, both the Prologue and synkrisis to Per-Fab praise the men for their political and military achievements. In the Prologue (Per. 2.4), Pericles and Fabius are applauded for their mildness (πρᾳότητα) and justice (δικαιοσύνην)—virtues emphasized in the Moralia as essential for men 1  Fourteen of the thirty-nine references to Pericles in the Moralia are in Political Precepts, and only three of these fourteen are absent from his Life. Alexander is the only statesman mentioned more often in the Moralia, which included two essays devoted exclusively to his achievements. 2  Pericles is mentioned in five different contexts in Old Men in Politics, second only to Cato Maior (seven). Phocion (three) and Agesilaus (two) and Solon (two) are also used as exempla in multiple contexts. 3  We will see Cato Minor performing the same role in different circumstances in Chapter 9.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_007

129

Pericles-fabius Maximus Table 4.1

Pericles as exemplum in the Moralia and Pericles

Topic

Moralia

Life of Pericles

Political Precepts Changed habits in private life Democracy in name, rule of Pericles Story of Archidamus, Thucydides and Pericles Bidding Athenians to remove eyesore of Piraeus Pericles’ speech after the plague Prayer before speech not to utter an extra word Pericles attacked by Simmias Pericles says he is “a friend as far as the altar” Pericles avoided abusive speech to enemies Pericles kept self for important matters Pericles delegated to Menippus and Ephialtes Pericles divided power with Cimon Pericles reminded self he ruled free men/Greeks Public acts to gratify the people

800C 801E 802C 803A 803B 803F 805C 808B 810C 811C–D 812D 812E 813D–E 818D

7.4 9.1 8.4 8.4 Not mentioned 8.4 35.4 Not mentioned passim Delegated 9.4 10.4 Not mentioned 12 - Acropolis

Old Men in Politics Pericles to greatest power in old age (start of war) Stop Athenians from fighting in inopportune time Unseemly to urge Pericles, Cato or Phocion to retire Don’t advise Pericles to leave democracy in lurch Pericles’ eloquence inspired Demosthenes

784E 784E 789B 790B–C 795D

31.1–32.3 33.3–34.1 passim passim Not mentioned

On Inoffensive Self-Praise Pericles: “ I love my country and cannot be bought” 540C–D passim Pericles: “No Athenian put on mourning because of me” 543C 38.3 On Being Compliant Pericles: “As far as the altar, I am a friend.”

531C–D Not mentioned

130 Table 4.1

Chapter 4 Pericles as exemplum in the Moralia and Pericles (cont.)

Topic

Moralia

Life of Pericles

On the Glory of Athens Pericles listed among greatest statesmen Pericles’ diligence in adorning Acropolis; speed of completion Pericles’ temples, colonies, Propylaea, Chersonese Pericles prouder than Agamemnon after defeating Samians

345D 348C; 351A 349B–C 350D

passim 12; 13.3–5 11.4–5; 12–13; 19 28.5

On the Fortune of Alexander Pericles’ eloquence and statesmanship Used tribute to adorn Acropolis with temples

343A 343D

8.4–6 12.1–14.1

Philosophers and Men in Power Statesman associated with philosophy; taught by Anaxagoras

776B; 777A

passim; 4.4–6.3

On Borrowing Pericles made gold removable to cover expenses

828B

Different reason

Consolation to Apollonius Bore sons’ deaths without neglecting public affairs 118E–F Called “Olympian” due to reasoning and understanding 118E–F

36.4 39.1–3; 8.2–3

Affection for Offspring Xanthippus never heard Pericles harangue the people

496F

passim

Table Talk Pericles reminded self “you govern free men”

620C

Not mentioned

On Delays in Divine Vengeance Pericles came from a family under a curse Pericles was killed by the plague

553B 558F

Not mentioned 39

Pericles-fabius Maximus

131

in power—as well as for their ability “to endure the follies of the people and colleagues in office” (φέρειν δήμων καὶ συναρχόντων ἀγνωμοσύνας), a quality explored in depth in On Being Compliant. The synkrisis, in turn, opens with a reference to “paradigms of political and military excellence” (Per-Fab 1.1) and then compares the achievements of Pericles and Fabius in these areas. The pragmatic lessons for leaders lie in their decisions regarding strategy and tactics suitable to each situation and in their management of the people and their armies to implement the best plans. Pericles is widely recognized as exemplifying Plutarch’s ideal statesman as described in Political Precepts.4 Stadter (1989: xxx) attributes a three-fold purpose to the Life: to demonstrate Pericles’ possession of πρᾳότης and δικαιοσύνη through his actions; to refute contrary views about Pericles; and to induce the reader to foster these virtues in himself.5 Another prominent issue is the apparent inconsistency between Pericles’ early career as a demagogue—emphasized in Plato’s portrait—and his later career as an aristocratic leader governing in a “kingly” manner, who was admired by Thucydides.6 Breebart (1971) argues that there was no change in character, but that Pericles’ early career illustrated his “political opportunism” in taking the best course open to him given Aristides’ strength in the aristocratic party. Pelling (1986a/2002) discusses demagoguery in connection with Fabius as well, based on Fabius’ opposition to Scipio. As a rule, Fabius comes in “second” in comparisons with Pericles.7 Xenophontos (2012) examines the links between ethics and generalship in Fabius. The shift to pragmatic biography as an interpretive framework adds a new dimension to this analysis of moral qualities and conduct of the heroes as leaders: it shines the spotlight as well on the consequences for the state of the actions taken (or not taken) in specific military or political contexts. Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, the effectiveness of Pericles’ strategies for calming unrest among the people or outmaneuvering rivals is central to the lessons for statesmen, while Fabius’ generalship supplies pragmatic insights both when 4  See, for instance, Stadter (1975: 81–82/1995: 159–160), Stadter (1989: xxxiii–xxxiv), Mueller (1995: 297–298), Beck (2004: 107–109). 5  The focus on πρᾳότης as a central theme is reinforced in Martin (1960), De Romilly (1988), Mueller (1995: 297), Pelling (2010a: 228). 6  This topic is also raised by Gomme (1945: 65–69), Stadter (1987; 1989); Duff (1999b: 90), Said (2004: 24–25), Pelling (2010a: 229). Mabel Lang (1972) argues that practices of “demagogues” changed after Pericles: through Pericles’ leadership, demagogues increased the power of the people in order to outmaneuver rivals, while after Pericles (especially with Cleon), the meaning of being a demagogue changed to manipulating the people to support certain policies by playing on their fears and emotions. 7  Stadter (1975: 80–81, 85/1995: 158–159, 163).

132

Chapter 4

Fabius resists Minucius’ initiatives as well as when he works in cooperation with Marcellus—with essential principles of generalship often clarified by Hannibal’s comments or actions in battle. In addition, Plutarch evaluates the major strategic decisions of the heroes with regard both to the practical demands of the situation and the extent to whether they produced beneficial outcomes. Thus, for instance, Pericles’ period as a demagogue is assessed in terms of the competitive pressures of the political arena at the time, as well as the positive and negative results his policies produced for Athens. While the Lives complement each other—with Pericles focusing more heavily on political leadership and Fabius on military command—the synkrisis becomes more complex, since Pericles’ competencies in the civic arena must be contrasted to Fabius’ military record. In Pericles and Fabius, as in all of the Lives, Plutarch uses a variety of narrative techniques to reveal his lessons in leadership for men of his own era. His primary concerns are reflected in his selection of incidents to emphasize or ignore, as well as in his molding of historical accounts to draw parallels to situations faced by the men in his audience.8 In addition, he inserts authorial comments to clarify the universal principles being illustrated, often echoing precepts from his political treatises. By using these techniques to showcase public policies and military strategies for resolving challenges still commonly faced in the Imperial era, Plutarch transforms Pericles and Fabius into paradigms of political and military effectiveness.9 Even within the series of Parallel Lives, Plutarch shows other heroes using Pericles and Fabius as role models. As we will see, the contemporary relevance of Plutarch’s emphasis in each Life is reflected in discussions of the same issues by other writers, such as Cicero, Seneca, Dio, Pliny and others, as discussed in Chapter 2.

8  See Pelling (1979/2002; 1980/2002) on Plutarch’s manipulation and adaptation of his source material in the Lives. 9  For instance, Plutarch cites Pericles as a model of incorruptibility and bravery to which Demosthenes did not measure up (Dem. 13.5) and criticizes Pompey for not using Fabius as a model of generalship to imitate at Pharsalus (Ages-Pomp 4.4). In addition, Pericles is cited as a model of effective leadership by the heroes in other Lives, including by Phocion (as a general and orator, Phoc. 2.3); by Cicero (as a model Pompey should have imitated, Pomp. 63.1); by Demosthenes (as a man “whose formality of speech and bearing, as well as his refusal to speak suddenly or on every subject” he emulated, Dem. 9.3) and by Cato Maior (as one of the leaders with whom no “King” was worthy to be compared, Cato Maior 8.8). All of these references highlight proficiencies needed to be effective in the political arena, not particular moral virtues that should be imitated.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

4.2

133

Life of Pericles

Overview In writing a Life of Pericles, Plutarch treated the career of one of the most famous Athenian statesmen, whose legacy was visible in the Acropolis at Athens. The historical record shows that Pericles (c. 495–429 BC) came to prominence in Athenian politics when the party favoring the people—headed by Themistocles (until his exile in 472) and then Ephialtes (until 461)—was gaining power and in 461 was able to limit the authority of the Areopagus. Pericles appears in the political record when he leads an unsuccessful prosecution of Cimon in 463/462 and then in 461 succeeds in having him ostracized. After Ephialtes’ murder in 461, Pericles was the leader of the popular party and dominated Athenian politics until his death in 429. During the 450s, he was known for advancing policies that favored the people, including instituting pay for men serving on juries (454). He also initiated the law limiting Athenian citizenship to those with Athenian parents on both sides (451). The transfer of the treasury of the Delian League to Athens (454) led to an influx of wealth that, by the 440s, generated accusations against Pericles of profligacy in spending public funds. The rebuilding of the Acropolis—including the Propylaea, the Parthenon and the golden statue of Athena—was launched in the late 440s. Pericles’ primary opponent in the aristocratic party after Cimon’s death (in 449) was Thucydides son of Melesias, who was ostracized (at the instigation of Pericles) in 442. From this time forward, Pericles was elected every year as one of the ten generals managing Athenian affairs and was unchallenged as the leading politician in Athens. He was general in the Samian War (440–439)—the last major war until the Peloponnesian War began in 431. Pericles died from the plague in 429. Accounts of Pericles’ career have survived in Thucydides (1.111–2.65), Diodorus Siculus (11.85–12.46) and Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens (27–28). While comic poets widely targeted Pericles, only Aristophanes’ works (Peace, Acharnians, Knights and Clouds) have survived in full. Pericles’ leadership attracts comment in Plato’s Alcibiades 1, Gorgias, Menexenus, Meno and Phaedrus and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.10 Xenophon includes a dialogue between Pericles and Alcibiades in Memorabilia (1.2.39–45) and refers to Pericles as his country’s wisest counsellor in Symposium (39). Among the orators, Pericles is a model of eloquence and statesmanship and is often paired with Solon, Themistocles and Aristides as one of Athens’ most illustrious statesmen: he is mentioned in this context in Isocrates (Team of Horses 28–29; On the 10  Comments by Plato are unfavorable, while Aristotle’s views are generally favorable.

134

Chapter 4

Peace 126–129, Antidosis 232–236), Lysias (Against Nicomachus 28), Aeschines (Against Timarchus 25) and Demosthenes (3rd Olynthiac, 21–26). His ties to Anaxagoras, his oratorical skill and his statesmanship are also cited by Dio (Or. 49, 51) and later writers.11 Among Latin authors, Cicero mentions Pericles in a variety of contexts in his political works—including De Officiis,12 De Republica13 and Ad Att. 7.1114—while in De Oratore,15 Brutus16 and Orator,17 Pericles is the model of a near-perfect orator. He is cited for his oratory nine times in Quintilian18 and is a standard of eloquence in Pliny (Ep. 1.20.19). Valerius Maximus includes seven incidents illustrating Pericles’ virtues, eloquence and training by Anaxagoras.19 Frontinus mentions Pericles six times in five different categories of generalship.20 In the Moralia, Pericles is connected most often with his eloquence (118E, 343A, 496E–F, 803A–B, 803F), statesmanship (345D, 784E, 801E) and the rebuilding of the Acropolis (343D, 348C, 349B–C, 351A), rather than with particular moral virtues. Two sayings of Pericles recur: that he “will be a friend as far as the altar” (μέχρι τοῦ βωμοῦ φίλος εἰμί) (531C–D, 808B) and that he reminded himself in going to address the assembly that “he ruled free men” (ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις) (620C, 813D–E). In the Parallel Lives, Pericles is mentioned in seven of ten Athenian Lives21—including Alcibiades (five times), Aristides (four), Cimon (four), Demosthenes (two), Nicias (three) and once each in Phocion and 11  Lucian also viewed Pericles as a positive political model (Nigrinus 7, Timon 10, The Dance 36, and The Scythian 11), while Aelius Aristides provided an extended assessment of his qualities as a leader in In Defense of Oratory (2.318–323; 340–341) and challenged Plato’s view that Pericles hurt Athens in In Defense of the Four (3.11–127). 12   De Officiis 1.107 (lacking mirth); 1.144 (orderly conduct); 2.16 (benefiting the state); and 2.60 (Propylaea). 13   De Republica 1.25 (the eclipse); 4.10.11 (being attacked by the poets). 14   Ad Att. 7.11.3 comments on Pericles remaining in Athens, rather than abandoning his city as Pompey had done. 15   De Oratore 1.216, 2.93, 3.59 and 3.71. 16   Brutus 6.26–28 and 10.44–45. 17   Orator 4.15, 8.29, 29, 34.119 and 34.122–127. 18  Quintilian 1.10.47, 1.16.19, 3.1.12, 10.1.82, 12.2.22, 12.9.13, 12.10.24, 12.10.49 and 12.10.64. 19  Valerius Maximus 2.6.5, 3.1.ext 1, 4.3.ext 1, 5.10.ext.1, 7.2.ext.7, 7.9.ext 2 and 8.11.ext.1. 20  Frontinus cites Pericles in sections on “determining the character of the war” (1.3.7), “escaping from difficult situations” (1.5.10), “how to arouse an army’s enthusiasm for battle” (1.11.10), “dispelling fears inspired in soldiers by adverse omens” (1.12.10) and “attacks from an unexpected quarter” (3.9.5, 3.9.9). 21  Pericles is one of Plutarch’s ten Lives of Athenian statesmen, which also include the Lives of Theseus, Solon, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Nicias, Alcibiades, Demosthenes and Phocion.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

135

Themistocles—as well as one time each in Lycurgus, Cato Maior and Pompey.22 He appears in a variety of contexts, playing a direct role in some Lives—e.g. as a rival in Cimon, a predecessor in Nicias and a guardian in Alcibiades—and in others serving as an exemplum of excellence in oratory, generalship and managing the people. Plutarch’s paradigm of pragmatic biography integrates this assessment of Pericles’ qualities as a statesman and general into a framework that also evaluates his effectiveness in resolving specific problems that confronted him as a political and military leader. Below, after a brief overview of Plutarch’s portrayal of Pericles’ moral attributes and reputation—already well covered in other analyses of Pericles—we will examine how Plutarch uses the major successes and failures in Pericles’ career to deliver pragmatic lessons for leaders both in how to acquire and retain influence and in how to exercise authority to benefit one’s state. Moral Foundation and Reputation In the early chapters of the Life (Per. 3–6), Plutarch expands beyond the mildness, justice and ability to endure the follies of others mentioned in the Prologue to focus on Pericles’ philosophical training and his purposeful cultivation of a public persona that could inspire trust. The alliance of philosophy and effective statesmanship, which lies at the core of lessons embodied in pragmatic biography, is illustrated in the contributions of Damon the sophist and Zeno the Eleatic23 to Pericles’ oratorical ability and of Anaxagoras24 to his conduct as a statesman. Plutarch ties the training under Anaxagoras to specific traits that underlay Pericles’ powerful eloquence, including (1) “a solemn spirit” (τὸ φρόνημα σοβαρὸν); (2) discourse that was “lofty and free from reckless effrontery attractive to the mob” (ὑψηλὸν … καὶ καθαρὸν ὀχλικῆς καὶ πανούργου βωμολοχίας), (3) a composure of countenance that “never relaxed into laughter” 22  Pericles is mentioned at Alc. (1.1, 2.1, 6.3, 7.2, 14.1), Arist. (1.7, 24.2–3, 25.6, 25.3), Cim. (14.4, 16.1, 17.6, 23.5), Dem. (9.2; 12.5), Nic. (2.2, 3.1, 23.3), Phoc. (7.3), Them. (2.3), Lyc. (16.4), Cato Ma. (7.7–8) and Pomp. (63.1). 23  Damon is called a “masseur and trainer” (ὰλείπτης καὶ διδάσκαλος) to “Pericles, the political athlete” (Περικλεῖ … καθάπερ ἀθλητῇ τῶν πολιτικῶν), while Zeno the Eleatic is credited with advancing Pericles’ ability to win debates, having perfected (ἐξασκήσαντος) “a certain skill of cross-examining through counter-arguments, which reduced the opponent to perplexity” (ἐλεγκτικὴν δέ τινα καὶ δι’ ἀντιλογίας εἰς ἀπορίαν κατακλείουσαν … ἕξιν ) (Per. 4.2). 24  Anaxagoras did the most “to clothe Pericles with a majestic demeanor” (περιθεὶς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα) that “had more weight than any demagoguery” (δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον) and “lifted on high and exalted the worthiness of his character” (ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἤθους) (Per. 4.4).

136

Chapter 4

(ἄθρυπτος εἰς γέλωτα), (4) “a mildness of carriage” (πρᾳότης πορείας); (5) a presence (καταστολὴ περιβολῆς) that was undisturbed by any emotion while he was speaking and (6) a tone that was “far from raucous” (ἀθόρυβον) (Per 5.1).25 Moreover, Anaxagoras’ doctrines of natural science enabled Pericles to rise above superstition (6.1)26 and to far excel other speakers (8.1). This training is linked to Pericles’ effectiveness in the political arena: as a result of it, Pericles “struck all his hearers with wondering amazement” (θαυμαστῶς ἐξέπληττε) (5.2) and, throughout the Life, inspires awe when he speaks (7.1, 8.3, 14.2 and 28.4). This portrait of Pericles as an orator displays in action the principles of effective oratory emphasized in Political Precepts, as well as in works on oratory by Cicero and Quintilian as a skill statesmen should develop in order to become persuasive speakers in the political arena.27 Superiority to Wealth and Bribery Plutarch further emphasizes how Pericles’ superiority to wealth and the reputation for incorruptibility reinforced the effectiveness of his eloquence: And the reason for this success was not merely the power of his speech, but, as Thucydides says, the reputation of his life (ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον δόξα) and the trust (πίστις) in him, a man who was manifestly incorruptible (ἀδωροτάτου περιφανῶς) and superior to money (χρημάτων κρείττονος). Per. 15.5

Plutarch magnifies the significance of Pericles’ reputation for being impervious to bribes by presenting it against a backdrop of the endless opportunities for self-enrichment open to powerful men in an Empire—an environment familiar to Plutarch’s readers. Not only did Pericles “keep himself untainted by corruption” (ἐφύλαξεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνάλωτον ὑπὸ χρημάτων) over his long career (Per. 16.3–4), but he did not make his estate “a single drachma greater” than it was when his father left it to him (Per. 15.5).28 In the synkrisis, Plutarch 25  For the opposite characterization of Cleon as a demagogue, see Political Precepts. 26  This training is illustrated in Pericles’ response to the solar eclipse: to calm his steersman, Pericles holds his cloak over the man’s eyes and convinces him that the darkness is simply caused by something larger (Per. 35.1–2). As elsewhere in the Lives, the eclipse foreshadows an impending reversal—in this case, the upcoming plague and actions to remove Pericles from office and fine him (Per. 35.3–4). 27  As noted above, both Demosthenes (Dem. 9.2) and Phocion (Phoc. 2.3) emulate Pericles as an orator. 28  Plutarch reinforces this portrait of Pericles by describing Pericles’ careful oversight of his own estate, which he managed in a “most exact” way (ἀκριβεστάτην) (Per. 16.3) through

Pericles-fabius Maximus

137

r­ eiterates Pericles’ incorruptibility, noting that he “kept himself pre-eminently incorruptible and pure” (ἀδωρότατον ἑαυτὸν καὶ καθαρώτατον ἐφύλαξεν) and never took any gifts at all (Per-Fab 3.3–4). Plutarch’s repeated mention of this trait speaks to the importance of the threat of corruption among political leaders of his own day and the need for statesmen to guard against it. Ability to Endure Public Criticism Pericles’ ability to “endure the follies of the people” points to a quality of character that manifests itself in a variety of responses to public provocation.29 Pericles’ composure in the face of pointed attacks is a constant theme in the Life, beginning with Pericles’ calm tolerance of the man who insulted him on his way home from the Agora (Per. 5.2–3). Plutarch uses specific accusations from poets and others, which are reported eighteen times,30 to reinforce his portrait of Pericles as a statesman under constant attack who nevertheless ignored public pressure, advanced the best policies and saved Athens. Pericles is shown withstanding attacks in all forms—including public ridicule, slander and false accusations, threats and denunciations from his enemies, mockery from the poets and insults about his generalship—while also resisting entreaties from his friends (Per. 33.6). This blend of a philosophical attitude and pragmatic conduct—the behavior fostered by the treatises on practical ethics (Van Hoof 2010), as discussed in the Introduction—is characteristic of the lessons for leaders in the Lives. The ability to endure slander and ridicule with equanimity was one of the most problematic (and pervasive) challenges facing Plutarch’s statesmen and generals. The lesson for statesmen lies in Pericles’ unwavering focus on the interests of the state:

the “exactitude” (ἀκρίβειαν) of his servant (Per. 16.5), eliciting complaints from his sons that he provided funds to them under “most exact restrictions” (εἰς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον at Per. 16.4; τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκρίβειαν at 36.1–2). 29  See Stadter (1989) on this characteristic of Pericles. Pericles and Fabius are positive paradigms of how to deal with one of the most injurious tendencies of men in public life: a desire to escape disapproval. The techniques for controlling it are found in On Being Compliant (528E–536D) and are illustrated often in the Lives. Pompey is a prominent negative model of a man who acquiesced to pressure to give battle at Pharsalus and produced disastrous results for Rome. See Chapter 6. 30  Attacks appear at Per. 3.2–3; 4.2; 5.2–3; 5.3–4; 10.6; 12.2; 13.9–10; 16.1–2; 24.6; 25.1; 26.1; 28.1– 2; 30.4; 31.2–32.3; 33.6; 34.3–4; 35.4; and 36.3. It is only after Pericles is ousted from office and his sons and friends die of the plague that the slanders stop.

138

Chapter 4

However, Pericles was moved by none of these sorts of things, but mildly and silently (πρᾴως καὶ σιωπῇ) withstanding the ill-repute and odium (τὴν ἀδοξίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν ὑφιστάμενος), he remained in the city and kept it safe and under control until the Peloponnesians departed. Per. 34.1

When Pericles refuses to allow the Athenians to attack Archidamus, Plutarch compares him to a pilot in a storm who exercises his skill (χρῆται τῇ τέχνῃ) and ignores the entreaties of the passengers:31 Pericles similarly exercises his own judgment (ἐχρῆτο τοῖς αὑτοῦ λογισμοῖς) and gives little consideration to the men who were discontented and shouting him down (Per. 33.5). He never defends himself or responds in anger, thereby exemplifying the reaction to insults recommended in Political Precepts (810 C-D) and for which he is named as a positive model. Moreover, by reporting, and then discrediting,32 the wellknown accusations and slanders of other authors, Plutarch reinforces his own positive portrait of Pericles as a statesman to imitate. Cultivating a Reputation for Incorruptibility Pericles provides one of the few cases in the Lives where Plutarch delivers a specific “pragmatic lesson” in how to cultivate a trustworthy reputation through purposeful public actions specifically designed to foster confidence.33 Pericles is shown deliberately adopting a restrained manner in public after he decided to enter political life: he appeared in public only going to or from the agora and council and declined invitations to dinner parties, where conviviality could “break down and overpower” any majestic demeanor and where “the dignity assumed for appearance’s sake” (τὸ πρὸς δόξαν σεμνόν) would be “hard to maintain” (δυσφύλακτον) (Per. 7.4–5). Pericles’ calculated molding of a public image illustrates one element of the “theatricality” required of statesmen when they want to attract the support of the people and, furthermore, is entirely consistent with Plutarch’s advice in Political Precepts.34 Such a lesson would resonate 31  The imagery of a pilot dragged along by desires of those on his ship is used to criticize Pompey at Pharsalus for not withstanding scoffs and accusations (Pomp. 47.4). See Chapter 6. 32  For instance, he closes his discussion of Aspasia (Per. 24.5–6) with his own opinion that she played the role of a loved wife, not political advisor, to Pericles. This conclusion is then used to undercut the notion that she controlled the strategy on Megara. 33  Themistocles also changed his public persona when he entered public life, imitating Miltiades (Them. 3.3–4). 34  As discussed in Chapter 2, Plutarch advises Menemachus to live “as on an open stage” and to put his moral character in order (or, at a minimum remove or repress his most

Pericles-fabius Maximus

139

both with men in the early stages of establishing themselves in the public arena and those taking up new commands or positions in the provinces. Pragmatic Lessons in Political and Military Leadership Plutarch’s careful depiction of the philosophical foundation of Pericles’ character and his deliberate creation of a reputation for incorruptibility sets the stage for a range of pragmatic lessons in how good repute works in alliance with oratorical skill and good critical judgment to generate successful outcomes in a variety of political and military contexts.35 Three challenges of leadership highlighted in the advice literature are showcased in the Life: (1) Relations with other Athenians; (2) Relations with rivals and (3) Military command. Plutarch conveys his lessons both in single incidents and in the patterns that emerge over the course of Pericles’ career as he interacts with the people and rivals in different political contexts and resolves difficulties in a variety of military situations. Episodes in each area of political engagement are listed below in Table 4.2, where Pericles’ career is subdivided into five phases based on critical turning points. In Phase 1 (Chapters 3–10), Pericles receives his education and launches his career, first in military contexts and then in the political arena, where he engages in prolonged rivalry with Cimon. In Phase 2 (11–14), Pericles administers his building program on the Acropolis and spars with Thucydides the son of Melesias. The ostracism of Thucydides leads into Phase 3 (15–28), where Pericles exercises full control over matters in Athens, and the focus of the narrative shifts to a series of military actions that illustrate Pericles’ strengths as a general, culminating in his victory in the Samian War (25–28). Phase 4 (29–35) presents the events leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and conditions in Athens during the plague, ending with Pericles being removed from power and fined. Pericles’ final political initiatives and death are depicted in Phase 5 (36–39). While Plutarch incorporates familiar details from well-known accounts—thereby adding to the plausibility of his own portrayal—he carefully crafts his version of events to present Pericles as a well-defined exemplum of actions to imitate or avoid in positions of political and military authority.

conspicuous faults) because a reputation for moral integrity is necessary to being considered trustworthy in political life (Pol. Prec. 800B–C). Cicero similarly advises Marcus to cultivate a reputation for justice as a means of winning over the populace (De Off. 2.9–10). In both cases, moral virtue is promoted as an aid to effective leadership. 35  Conversely, Alcibiades, discussed in the next chapter, illustrates how the absence of a reputation for moral integrity can lead to failures in the public arena.

140

Chapter 4

Table 4.2 Episodes in the Life of Pericles Relations with other Athenians

Relations with rivals

Military command

Phase 1: Early life; rivalry with Cimon (Chapters 3–10) 1–2- Prologue to Per-Fab 3- Family, birth 4–6- Education, character; Anaxagoras, science versus seers 7- Launches career as demagogue; changes way of life; limits exposure 8- Style of rhetoric

7- Launches military career out of fear of ostracism

9- Rivalry with Cimon; ostracism 10- Cimon recalled; Elpinice

10- Battle of Tanagra

Phase 2: Rivalry with Thucydides; rebuilding the Acropolis (11–14)

12–13- Acropolis building program; slander against Pericles and Pheidias

11- Rivalry with Thucydides; policies to gratify the people 14- Thucydides ostracized

Phase 3: “Virtual monarch”; military actions through the Samian war (15–28) 15- Change in relating to demos 16- Superior to money; private estate

24- Aspasia

17- Pan-Hellenic league rejected 18- Tolmides’ expedition and defeat at Coronea 19- Chersonesus; Peloponnesus 20- Euxine Sea; resists expansion 21- Delphians 22- Pleistonax and Cleandridas 23- Euboean revolt 25–28- Samian War

141

Pericles-fabius Maximus

Relations with other Athenians

Relations with rivals

Military command

Phase 4: Peloponnesian war begins; Archidamus invades; plague; Pericles fined (29–35) 29- Rivalry with Cimon’s sons 30- Reasons for Megarian decree 31–32- Why decree not rescinded 34- Soothes demos in Athens; plague erupts; Pericles blamed 35- Pericles fined and dismissed

29- Corcyraeans; Megara, Aegina and Potidaea complain 33- Archidamus invades Attica 34- Archidamus ravages Attica 35- Eclipse; Pericles’ failed expedition to Peloponnesus

Phase 5: Final years (36–39) 36- Family affairs; deaths 37- Restored to power; citizenship law changed 38- Illness, death, character review 39- Implications for Athenian polity

Relations with Other Athenians To a greater extent than other statesmen, Pericles offered Plutarch the chance to illustrate a long list of the precepts provided in Political Precepts,36 including (1) how a statesman must first “accommodate himself to the people’s character” until he has built up his influence, and then to use that influence to lead the people in the best direction (799B-800B); (2) how to engage in “give-and- take” to maintain the support of the people, by giving way in small things in order to oppose them stubbornly when their desires would harm the state (818A–B); and (3) how to use public funds to benefit the community as a whole (818C–F). Plutarch constructs the incidents in the Life to demonstrate how Pericles put these principles into practice to benefit Athens. The depiction of Pericles’ actions—combined with his reasons for adopting particular policies and the results he obtained—provide pragmatic lessons for provincial leaders in how to manage their cities. These lessons would resonate especially with city archons 36  The overlap between the principles in Political Precepts and Pericles’ conduct in the Life is widely recognized.

142

Chapter 4

charged with maintaining calm and persuading the people to accept legislation beneficial for the city and its relations with Rome—issues that occupied Dio in several of his City Orations (including Or. 39, 44 and 46). Accommodating the People to Gain Prominence In the Life, Pericles initially positions himself as a demagogue and accommodates the people’s desires while he is building his political influence and outmaneuvering aristocratic rivals. Plutarch portrays Pericles’ decision to begin his career as a demagogue—a choice that was against Pericles’ nature (παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν) (7.2)37—as an act of “political necessity”, or “political opportunism” as described by Breebart (1971): Pericles is forced to this strategy by his belief that his resemblance to Peisistratus in speech and appearance, as well as his wealth, lineage and influential friends, would make him vulnerable to ostracism if he were to enter as an aristocratic contender (Per. 7.1), while, as a demagogue, he could secure the ostracism of his rivals (Cimon at 9.4; Thucydides son of Melesias at 14.2).38 Plutarch concedes that during this early period, Pericles used public funds to “bribe the people” (συνδεκάσας) (Per. 9.3) and “give them free rein” (τὰς ἡνίας ἀνεὶς) (Per. 11.4) in order to win their support. From such actions, Pericles was later accused of causing the people to fall into habits of luxury and wantonness (Per. 9.1)—a view challenged by Plutarch based on Pericles’ later spending projects which had positive effects on Athens as a whole. The pragmatic lessons for readers lie in Pericles’ calculations about the best entry into public life—a strategic decision discussed in Political Precepts (804D–806F)—and how he designed an approach that could succeed.

Engaging in Give-and-Take to Lead the People Toward What is Best Plutarch uses Pericles’ exercise of uncontested power after Thucydides’ ostracism (Per. 14.2) to illustrate the principle that engaging in “give-and-take” in

37  Plutarch describes Pericles’ nature as “least of all akin to the common people” (ἥκιστα δημοτικὴν οὖσαν) (7.2). 38  Indeed, the ostracism of a man like Cimon, who “was second to none in wealth and lineage, had won the most glorious victories over the Barbarians, and had filled the city full of money and spoils” is seen by Plutarch as a measure of how powerful Pericles had become (Per. 9.4).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

143

relations with the people enables a statesman to lead them “towards what is better”.39 Plutarch describes the change in Pericles’ conduct at this time: But [Pericles] was no longer the same man nor was he similarly submissive (χειροήθης) to the people and ready to yield and give in (ῥᾴδιος ὑπείκειν καὶ συνενδιδόναι) to the desires of the multitude like a steersman to the breezes. Rather … he struck the high tone of aristocratic and kingly statesmanship, and applying it for what was best for all (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον) in a straight and undeviating way (ὀρθῇ καὶ ἀνεγκλίτῳ), he led the people, willing for the most part, by persuading and instructing them (πείθων καὶ διδάσκων). Per. 15.2–3

Plutarch adds that, when the people resisted, Pericles “tightened the reins” (κατατείνων) and forced them into the most advantageous course, acting like a physician by treating a disease with both harmless indulgences that pleased the patient and bitter medicine that saved him (Per. 15.3). He was able to handle the various “outbreaks” of passion among the populace by managing each case suitably (ἐμμελῶς ἕκαστα διαχειρίσασθαι) (Per. 15.4): By using the people’s hopes and fears, like rudders, he protected them against their own audacity (συστέλλων τὸ θρασυνόμενον) and dispelled and assuaged their despondency (τὸ δύσθυμον ἀνιεὶς καὶ παραμυθούμενος). Per. 15.4

The techniques described in literary terms in Plutarch’s comment are illustrated in practical terms later in the Life, where Pericles prevents the Athenians from attacking Archidamus: he tries to calm the people who want to fight, refuses to call an assembly “fearing that he would be constrained against his better judgment” (δεδιὼς βιασθῆναι παρὰ γνώμην) and puts all parts of the city under safe garrison (Per. 33.4–5). These actions are balanced, after Archidamus withdraws, with policies that are designed first to soothe the people (θεραπεύων) 39  Plutarch refers to Pericles being in “sole control” during this period, based on the effect of Pericles’ influence as described by Thucydides (2.65.9), who commented that Athens in Pericles’ day was “in theory a democracy but in reality the rule of its foremost citizen” (λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή). Plutarch cites Thucydides’ comment at Per. 9.1 and imports this same perspective into his account of Pericles’ leadership.

144

Chapter 4

and win their favor with distributions of funds and allotments of lands (Per. 34.1) and then to console them (ἦν … τις παρηγορία) by attacking the Megarians and in the Peloponnesus (34.2).40 Plutarch’s intention to illustrate this particular principle of effective leadership is reflected in the absence of any motive to appease the people in Thucydides’ accounts either of the allotment of lands— which instead is explained, in the case of Aegina, as a strategy to secure the island from rebellion (Thuc. 27)—or of the invasion of Megara, which is simply presented as a campaign in the war (Thuc. 31). Indeed, in Diodorus’ version of events, after Archidamus’ retreat, Pericles was praised for his ability as a general, not as a statesman able to manage the people (Diod. 12.42.6–8).

Gratifying the People with Spending that Benefits the City as a Whole Plutarch uses Pericles to give a give fuller treatment to his recommendations that statesmen try to direct public funds to projects—such as festivals, religious celebrations or parks (Pol. Prec. 818C–E)—that benefit the community at large. While in his early career, as noted earlier, Pericles engaged in spending that effectively “bribed” the people to support him, Plutarch places greater emphasis on Pericles’ other initiatives that produced widespread benefits, such as spending on military expeditions and public construction projects that employed craftsmen and laborers over long periods.41 As Plutarch explains:

40  In this context, Plutarch in Political Precepts draws an analogy to medicine: “Just as a physician (ἰατρός), after drawing off a great deal of infected blood, supplies a little harmless nourishment, so the statesman (ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ), after doing away with something big which was discreditable or harmful, appeases (παρηγόρησεν) the spirit of discontent and fault-finding (τὸ δυσκολαῖνον καὶ μεμψιμοιροῦν) by some slight and kindly act of favor” (818E). 41  Plutarch lists materials and craftsmen in various sectors who found employment in these projects (Per. 12.6–7). Other beneficial initiatives are also cited: Pericles established colonies or settlements in the Chersonese, Naxos, Andros, Thrace and Thurii (Per. 11.5), among Sinopians (Per. 10.2), in Hestia (Per. 23.2) and in Aegina (Per. 24.2). He also manned sixty triremes with citizens under pay each year in order so that (1) more citizens could acquire the art of seamanship; (2) the city could be “lightened of its mob of lazy and idle busybodies” (ἀποκουφίζων μὲν ἀργοῦ καὶ διὰ σχολἠν πολυπράγμονος ὄχλου), (3) the poorer people would have a means of gaining resources and (4) the allied cities would be less likely to rebel (Per. 11.5). At Per. 12.7, each “art is compared to a general (ἑκάστη δὲ τέχνη, καθάπερ στρατγηὸς) who keeps his own throng of unskilled and untrained laborers in compact array” (τὸν θητικὸν ὄχλον καὶ ἰδιώτην συντεταγμένον εἶχεν).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

145

In his desire that the disorderly mob of common workers not be without a share in the public receipts, nor receive a share while idle and at leisure, he proposed to the people large public construction projects and designs for works that required many skills (πολυτέχνους) and much time (διατριβὴν) in order that there might be a pretext for those who were idle to be helped and receive a share (ὠφελεῖσθαι καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν) from the public funds. Per. 12.5

Pericles’ reasons for selecting these projects are key to the pragmatic lesson, because he is depicted solving a problem also faced by the city administrators in Plutarch’s day: how to keep laborers employed rather than allowing them to become a burden to the city.42 The benefits and challenges of managing public construction projects are addressed in even greater detail in Plutarch’s account of Pericles’ initiation and oversight of rebuilding the Acropolis. Two long chapters (Per. 12–13) are devoted to the description of the Acropolis project from its inception to its completion, including the controversy that surrounded the use of funds collected for this purpose. Plutarch highlights the positive impact of this project on employment and prosperity in a direct speech by Pericles defending his spending: It is proper for the city to turn its abundance to these projects, from which there will be everlasting glory when they are completed (γενομένων) and ready abundance while they are in process (γινομένων). They call forth every sort of work and varied demands, which, by arousing every skill and stirring every hand, put under pay nearly the entire city, which from its own resources at the same time adorns and supports itself. Per. 12.4

Pericles is also shown dealing with problems that arose when accounting for the project was questioned and false accusations were thrown at him and his associates (Per. 13). Nevertheless, when completed, it was “the greatest delight and ornament” to Athens and a source of amazement to visitors (Per. 12.1). Plutarch’s deliberate effort to use his account of the rebuilding of the Acropolis to create paradigms for city leaders of his own day is suggested by the absence of any similar discussion in extant sources. Stadter (1989), for 42  As discussed by Azoulay (2014: 67–83), these initiatives reflected the potential economic benefits that could have been derived from Athens’ leadership of the Delian league and the great inflow of revenue.

146

Chapter 4

instance, notes that this extensive treatment of the economic benefits is not found elsewhere in ancient accounts, raising the question of whether the motivation attributed to Pericles was found in a source now lost (and was a genuine area of parallel experience between the 5th century and Plutarch’s day) or was largely a reflection of the thinking of the imperial era.43 While it is impossible to answer this question definitively, it is clear from comments in Dio and Pliny that concerns about employment and prosperity were being confronted in the provincial cities. In Oration 7 (104–132), for instance, Dio discusses the plights of poor people in the city for whom “useful” employment (τίνα χρήσιμα, 7.124) was hard to find and suggests public policy to address the issue.44 Dio’s Oration 35.15, in turn, describes the economic benefits of the assize courts: they “bring together an unnumbered throng of people” and enable those with goods to sell “to obtain the highest prices”, and “nothing in the city is out of work”. Dio further echoes Pericles’ objectives and difficulties in Oration 40, where he describes how he undertook a construction project in order “to put the city into better shape and make it more impressive as whole” (τὴν πόλιν ἄμεινον κατασκευάζειν καὶ σεμνοτέραν ποιεῖν ἅπασαν) only to find himself facing financial problems and accusations about the harm he was doing (Or. 40.5–7).45 He even points to the Propylaea and the Parthenon as examples of buildings that bring glory and repute to cities (Dio, Or. 40. 6–7). Several of Pliny’s Letters (e.g. Ep. 37–40) address similar topics. The overlap in the perspectives articulated by Dio, Pliny and Plutarch in his Pericles suggests that Plutarch’s readers would see contemporary parallels. Frost (1964) even suggests that Plutarch’s presentation of Pericles being willing to fund the Acropolis on his own account (Per. 14.1) might have been designed 43  Stadter (1989: 153–155). In an extensive comment on this passage in his commentary on Pericles, Stadter explains that the contemporary resonance of these themes among Plutarch’s audience does not imply that they are anachronistic when attached to Pericles’ Athens. However, comparison to 20th century “full employment” policies would be anachronistic to the extent that building programs generally occurred in response to surplus or a sudden influx of funds. Frost (1964: 390–392) discusses the overlap between the motives attributed to Pericles and the situations in the cities under the empire in Plutarch’s time. 44  In closing the discussion of useful employment, Dio comments: “For the study of employments and trades and, in general, of the life fitting or otherwise for ordinary people has proved to be, in and of itself, worthy of a great deal of very careful research” (ἡ γὰρ περὶ ἐργασιῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σκέψις καὶ καθόλου περὶ βίου προσήκοντος ἢ μὴ τοῖς μετρίοις καὶ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἀξία πέφηνεν πολλῆς καὶ πάνυ ἀκριβοῦς θεωρίας) (Or. 7.127). 45  From Dio’s perspective it was important not to fall behind the other major cities in the province in being able to attract attention and favors from Roman authorities.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

147

to inspire the Emperor. Indeed, in the synkrisis, Plutarch again points to the glory subsequently enjoyed by Athens (Per-Fab 12.1) and by Pericles (Per-Fab 3.5), reinforcing the motives for euergetism in Plutarch’s day. Relations with Rivals In contrast to Pericles’ exemplary conduct in his relations with the people, his relations with his rivals offer both positive and deterrent paradigms for statesmen. The principles at issue are discussed in Political Precepts 809B–811A, where the statesman is advised to be “stern and inexorable” (δεινοὶ καὶ ἀπαραίτητοι) towards rivals only when the public good is at stake (809E), but otherwise to engage opponents with urbanity and wit rather than abuse and rancor (810C–E). Moreover, a statesman should not be vexed at the honors and accomplishments of his rivals (809F) and should even be willing to defend them against malicious prosecutions or slander (810A). In the Life, Plutarch uses Pericles’ rivalries with Cimon and Thucydides son of Melesias to address a variety of issues in this area and to create both positive and deterrent paradigms for statesmen. Later, in Fabius, Plutarch will address the challenges of rivalries in the military arena. As noted earlier, in the imperial era, dealing effectively with rivalry and promoting cooperation was a concern of both civic and military leaders, who had to outmaneuver other contenders for the limited number of new appointment made each year. The same challenges emerged in the provinces, especially in the competition among cities for hosting imperial celebrations or the courts—topics raised by Dio in Orations 34, 38 and 40.

Competing Against Rivals with Complementary Strengths: Pericles and Cimon Plutarch’s depiction of Pericles’ rivalry with Cimon can be divided into two periods separated by Cimon’s ostracism (Per. 9). In the first period, Pericles is establishing himself in political life and devotes his efforts to removing Cimon from Athens. To this end, Pericles participates in the prosecution of Cimon on a charge of treason and then has him ostracized (Per. 9.4). The scenes of rivalry with Cimon (Per. 9.2–10.7) largely convey deterrent lessons for statesmen: Pericles focuses on advancing his own standing with the people, rather than Athenian interests and, when Athens loses at Tanagra in Cimon’s absence (Per. 10.1–2), he has seemingly allowed excessive rivalry to endanger his city. Pericles’ recall of Cimon is also tainted by self-interest: he drafts the decree of recall out of a desire “to gratify the multitude” (χαρίσασθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς) (Per. 10.2), having already come to an agreement (via Elpinice) that Cimon would take charge of the fleet and allow Pericles to maintain supreme authority

148

Chapter 4

in Athens (Per. 10.4). The negative portrayal of Pericles’ rivalry with Cimon is reinforced by an “extra” appearance by Elpinice (one that is absent from Cimon): after Pericles has given his funeral oration over the dead in the Samian War, Elpinice chides him for losing citizens in a war against other Greeks rather than against the Phoenicians or Medes, as her brother had done (Per. 28.4).46 The deterrent lesson is reiterated in the synkrisis, where Pericles is censured for his contentiousness towards Cimon (Per-Fab 3.1). Plutarch’s purposeful depiction of Pericles’ rivalry with Cimon to convey a negative paradigm for statesmen becomes clear when the account of Cimon’s recall in Pericles is compared to Plutarch’s version of the same events in Cimon, where Pericles’ role is less prominent in both the ostracism and recall of Cimon. While in Pericles, Cimon’s ostracism results from Pericles’ influence over the people, in Cimon the action is attributed generally to the Athenians, who felt “envy and a certain ill-will” (φθόνον … καὶ δυσμένειάν τινα) towards Cimon for seeming to favor the Spartan way (Cim. 16.4) and, when they were angry at Sparta, used a “trifling pretext” (μικρᾶς … προφάσεως) to ostracize him (Cim. 17.2). Similarly, whereas “Pericles’ friends” send Cimon away from Tanagra in Pericles (10.2), in Cimon the action is taken by the Council of the Five Hundred (Cim. 17.4). Finally, in Pericles, Pericles drafts the decree to recall Cimon to gratify the people (Pericles 10.3–4), but in Cimon the emphasis is different: Pericles is motivated by a concern for the greater good: Thus, at that time, differences were political in nature, while personal feelings were moderate and easily recalled to what was expedient for the state (πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι συμφέρον), and ambition, which prevails over all passions, gave way to what was advantageous for the country (τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει καιροῖς). Cim. 17.6

Cimon’s recall is also used for different purposes in the two Lives. In Pericles, Pericles’ stipulation that Cimon exercise authority outside Athens reinforces Plutarch’s portrait of Pericles as a man intent on expanding his own power, not on finding a way to cooperate with his rivals. In contrast, in Cimon, Pericles plays no role: it is Cimon himself who initiates the expedition to Egypt and Cyprus as way to divert Athenian energy away from conflict with Sparta and towards the Persians (Cim. 18.1–2).

46  The same sentiment is expressed as an authorial comment at the end of Cimon (Cim 19.2).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

149

By shifting away from this portrait of Pericles’ “noble rivalry” in Cimon to Pericles’ aggressive stance in Pericles,47 Plutarch accomplishes two goals: he is able to portray Pericles as a deterrent model of the “factious opposition” statesmen are advised to resist in Political Precepts (809D–F, 815A–D, 816B–C, 823F–825F), while also preparing an instructive contrast to the “reasonableness and mildness” (ἡ ἐπιείκεια καὶ πρᾳότης) that will characterize Fabius’ rivalry with Marcellus in the paired Life—a contrast highlighted in the synkrisis (Per-Fab 3.1). Importantly, the dynamics attached to the direct rivalry between Pericles and Cimon in both Lives cannot be traced to any extant historical source. Neither Thucydides (1.107.2–108.1) nor Diodorus (11.80) mention Pericles or Cimon at Tanagra, and the agreement between Pericles and Cimon to divide power is also not attested elsewhere. Similar dynamics of potentially harmful rivalry are on display in the account of Pericles’ contention with Cimon’s son, Lacedaemonius. Pericles is described as being “in general, prone to thwart”(κολοὑων) the sons of Cimon and for this reason dispatches Lacedaemonius to Corcyra with only ten ships “as if to maliciously insult him” (οἷον ἐφυβρίζων), hoping that Lacedaemonius would be “all the more slandered” for his sympathy for Sparta if he failed (Per. 29.2). The deterrent paradigm resides in the potentially harmful results for Athens, which are revealed when Pericles is “harshly criticized” for furnishing “scanty aid” to Athens’ allies, but providing a “great pretext for war” to its enemies (Per. 29.3). Again, Plutarch purposely constructs his account to convey a deterrent lesson, adopting a version that contradicts Thucydides (1.45–1.54) in giving Lacedaemonius (rather than three generals) command of the fleet and in making Pericles (rather than “the Athenians”) the prime decision maker. By investing Pericles with the power to determine the size of the fleet and to name the general in charge, Plutarch reinforces his portrait of Pericles as a model of behavior to avoid in political rivalry.

Competing Against Rivals with Overlapping Strengths: Pericles and Thucydides Son of Melesias Plutarch uses Pericles’ rivalry with Thucydides son of Melesias, in turn, to provide a positive paradigm of dealing with rivals. Because Thucydides’ strengths lay in domestic politics rather than military matters, his rivalry with Pericles is 47  In neither case does Plutarch echo the emphasis in Political Precepts, where the PericlesCimon partnership is an example of beneficial power-sharing illustrating the principle that “the statesman who gives others a share in the government makes action more effective by co-operation” (ὁ πραγμάτων ἑτέροις ἐν πολιτείᾳ μεταδιδοὺς ἐνεργοτέραν ποιεῖ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τὴν πρᾶξιν) (Pol. Prec. 812E-F).

150

Chapter 4

characterized as a series of “wrestling bouts” (συμπλεκόμενος) which brought the administration into “even poise” (εἰς ἀντίπαλον) (Per. 11.2).48 In the Life, Pericles demonstrates how to successfully engage in public debate over a contentious issue with an articulate competitor without adopting abusive speech and instead employing eloquence and a reputation for integrity to win over the people—illustrating principles presented in Political Precepts (800D–801D, 822F). Plutarch’s illustration of this rivalry centers on the debate about the Acropolis project: speeches presenting opposing views precede (Per. 12.1–4) and follow (14.1) an extensive description of the construction and its effects (12.1–13.12). When Thucydides denounces Pericles for “throwing away public funds and destroying the revenues” (14.1),49 Pericles responds in a straightforward way. Upon asking the people their opinion and hearing that they believed he had spent too much, Pericles simply says that he will cover the expenses and dedicate the structures in his own name (Per. 14.1). The reaction provoked by this comment demonstrates the power of oratory combined with a reputation for moral integrity: Therefore, after Pericles had said these things, whether because they were amazed at his magnanimity (τὴν μεγαλοφροσύνην αὐτοῦ θαυμάσαντες) or because they were moved by jealousy of the glory of his works (ἀντιφιλοτιμούμενοι), the people cried out and exhorted him to spend from the public funds and defray the costs, sparing nothing. Per. 14.2

Pericles’ ability to win over the people by a positive argument and the force of his eloquence, rather than by slandering his opponent, provides a lesson for statesmen. The significance of this lesson is reflected in the absence of an account of Pericles’ rivalry with Thucydides son of Melesias in other extant

48  Thucydides son of Melesias is selected to head the aristocratic party to prevent the power of Pericles from being “an out and out monarchy” (κομιδῇ μοναρχίαν) (Per. 11.1). Thucydides’ success in organizing the aristocrats into an effective “counterpoise in the balance” (ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ῥοπὴν) induced Pericles to increase his gratification of the people (Per. 11.3). 49   The project is also criticized for robbing Athens of the “most seemly excuses” (εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν προφάσεων) for transferring funds from Delos and for “insulting Hellas and subjecting it to tyranny” (δεινὴν ὕβριν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ὑβρίζεσθαι καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι)( Per. 12.2).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

151

sources, where even the details about Thucydides’ career and ostracism are scant.50 Military Command The military episodes are concentrated in the period after Thucydides’ ostracism, when Pericles is presented as having full control and determining Athens’ strategy regarding the allies and Sparta (Per. 15.1).51 The accounts of Pericles’ expeditions and battles illustrate two guiding principles in Pericles’ military strategy: (1) maintain the status quo, rather than expand the empire and (2) refrain from military confrontations that could be resolved by other means. The pragmatic lessons would resonate with readers involved in military matters of the Empire, as well as those trying to restrain local contentions between provincial cities. Dio, for instance, advises citizens of Tarsus not to provoke the resentment of other cities by being overbearing (Or. 34.10–14), and argues in Prusa that friendship with other cities is more profitable than enmity (Or. 40.26–33). Indeed, in works advising statesmen, including Dio’s Or. 45, the rivalry between Athens and Sparta was used as a deterrent example to motivate provincial cities to limit their aspirations to expand their authority at the expense of other cities. Maintaining the Status Quo The portrayal of Pericles’ interactions with other Greek cities opens with his failed attempt to create a Pan-Hellenic Council (Per. 17.1–2)—an effort that exhibits Pericles’ intention to use Athenian power to advance the common cause of Hellenes rather than Athens’ sway over her allies.52 The same attitude 50  Frost (1964: 386) reports that few details survive about any direct rivalry between Pericles and Thucydides son of Melesias. Andrewes (1978: 1) concludes that Plutarch’s description of the rivalry at Pericles 11–12 and 14 “is worthless and has seriously distorted our picture of this period and of Athenian attitudes to the empire.” Stadter (1989: 131–132, 183–184) summarizes references to Thucydides and his ostracism in extant sources. See also Krentz (1984). 51  Earlier in the Life, Plutarch mentions only Pericles’ initial choice of a military career to avoid the threat of ostracism (Per. 7.1) and his presence at the battle of Tanagra, where he was thought to have fought “sturdily” (ἐρρωμενέστατα) and exposed himself to danger conspicuously (πάντων ἐπιφανέστατος, ἀφειδήσας τοῦ σώματος) because his friends had banished Cimon from the field (Per. 10.2). Early in Pericles’ career, it was Cimon who was associated with military excellence, while Pericles was linked to the beneficial impact of military expeditions on keeping the young constructively employed (Per. 11.4, 12.5). 52  The wars among Greek cities—which Plutarch considered to be civil wars—are a persistent lament in the Lives.

152

Chapter 4

emerges later, when Pericles refuses to accommodate Athenians’ desire to conquer new lands: He did not defer to the impulses of the citizens (συνεχώρει), nor did he rush out together with the citizens (συνεξέπιπτεν) when they were excited to lay hold of Egypt again and to meddle in the realms of the King along the sea. And many were held by that love-sick and ill-starred passion for Sicily, which Alcibiades and his associates kindled into flame later.… But Pericles used to hold back (κατεῖχε) this sortie and curtail (περιέκοπτε) the tendency to meddle, and directed most of their forces to the protection and stability of their existing holdings. Per. 20.3–21.1

Plutarch complements this portrait of restraint with an account of Pericles’ aid to allies, which included protecting them from the Thracians (Per. 19.1) and assisting in expelling tyrants (Per. 20.1).53 The comparable contentiousness in Plutarch’s day involved securing rights and privileges from the imperial authorities at the expense of other cities—an area in which Dio advises restraint and cooperation. In the account of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Plutarch keeps the spotlight on Pericles’ motives. Although the motives suggested by other writers are reported54—such as the influence of Aspasia (Per. 25.1; 30.4) or a private grudge (Per. 21.1)—Pericles is consistently portrayed, as in Thucydides, as working to sustain the status quo, and thereby becomes a positive role model for statesmen who need to manage the aspirations of their own cities. In this way, Plutarch establishes a basis for his later praise of Pericles’ foresight and generalship in the synkrisis: it was only when Athens abandoned this principle and “undertook too much” (πολυπραγμονοῦντες) that it lost its empire (Per-Fab 2.3). The importance of depicting Pericles’ actions towards Greek 53  In the Chersonese (Per. 19.1–2) and Euxine Sea (Per. 20.1), Pericles assists allies and leaves colonists behind to prevent future rebellion; he engages in the Sacred War to return Delphi to the Phocians (Per. 21.1–2); the Samian War is precipitated by Samos’ refusal to accept arbitration over Priene and its revolt, rather than any aggressive action on Athens’ part (Per. 25.1–3); and the refusal to reverse the Megarian decree was publicly linked by Pericles to Megara’s appropriation of land that belonged to Eleusis (Per. 30.2). 54  Other motives cited include: that the actions against Samos and Megara were instigated by Aspasia (Per. 25.1; 30.4), that Pericles’ refusal to reverse the Megarian decree reflected a private grudge against the Megarians (Per. 30.2), and that Pericles’ absence from Samos was due to an attempt on Cyprus (Per. 21.1).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

153

states as high-minded rather than self-serving is reflected in the absence in other accounts of the Pan-Hellenic Council55 and the limited overlap between Pericles’ generalship (or even expeditions) in the Life—apart from the Samian War—and actions recorded in Thucydides or Diodorus Siculus.56

Exercising Caution in Military Confrontations: Don’t Take Unnecessary Risks This portrait of Pericles’ disinclination to expand Athenian power over other states is reinforced by the principles of prudent generalship that guide his military strategy: In his capacity as general, he was famous especially on account of his prudent caution (διὰ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν), neither engaging in a battle involving great uncertainty and risk nor vying with and imitating generals who, by exposing themselves to great danger (ἐκ τοῦ παραβαλέσθαι) experienced a brilliant fortune and were admired as great generals, and always saying to the citizens that, as far as was in his power, they would remain immortal for all time. Per. 18.1

These military principles are illustrated in the incidents that follow in the narrative. Tolmides’ unsuccessful incursion into Boeotia—which ended in his defeat and death in the Battle of Coronea—is presented as evidence of Pericles’ “prudent caution” and foresight in advising against it (Per. 18.3).57 However, Pericles’ caution is more often demonstrated in incidents where he is slow to engage in battle and wins through other tactics. Thus, when Pleistonax approached Attica with the Spartan army, Pericles assessed the situation and found a way to “win” without fighting, namely by bribery:

55  Stadter (1989: 201–202). 56  Stadter (1989: 213–218). 57  Pericles gives the famous advice that Tolmides would “do well to wait for the wisest of all counsellors, time” (σοφώτατον οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται σύμβουλον ἀναμείνας, χρόνον), but, nevertheless, the “bravest and most ambitious men of military age ”were persuaded by Tolmides’ previous good fortune and great honors to volunteer for this campaign (Per. 18.3). The inclination among generals to take great risks is a recurring theme in the Lives, including incidents in Fabius Maximus (Flaminius and Minucius), Phocion (at Coronea) and Pompey (at Pharsalus).

154

Chapter 4

He did not dare to engage in battle with many good hoplites calling out a challenge, but seeing that Pleistonax was extremely young, and the advisor he especially consulted was Cleandridas, … he secretly tested this man (ἐπειρᾶτο τούτου κρύφα) and, after quickly corrupting him with money (διαφθείρας χρήμασιν), he persuaded him to lead the Peloponnesians out of Attica. Per. 22.2

A different strategy to achieve victory without direct battle is displayed at Samos, where Pericles walls up the city, preferring to capture it at the price of money and time (δαπάνῃ καὶ χρόνῳ), rather than of the “wounds and deadly perils of his fellow citizens” (Per. 27.1). In this case, Pericles had to distract his own soldiers and devised a “game” by which the troops who picked the white ball were excused from fighting for a day (Per. 27.2).58 A third strategy of caution is displayed when Pericles responds to the invasion of the Spartans under Archidamus by sending one hundred ships to plunder Spartan lands to induce them to withdraw (Per. 34.1)—the kind of strategy advocated by Scipio and resisted by Fabius in the paired Life (Fab. 25–26). The effectiveness of each of Pericles’ strategies provides pragmatic lessons for generals in how to achieve “victory” without giving battle. Again, Plutarch’s description of Pericles’ tactics in each of these cases is not found in other sources. While the tactics themselves echo practices described in other contexts—such as the description of rotating duty or the selection of a white bean from black ones59—the combination of elements in Plutarch’s version is unique. The inclusion of so many unsubstantiated anecdotes underscores the importance of the characterization of heroes as paradigms of generalship as well as statesmanship in the Lives. Summary: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in Pericles In Pericles, Plutarch creates clear paradigms of behaviors to imitate and avoid. Men active in city politics gain practical lessons in cultivating a reputation for incorruptibility, in acquiring and exercising influence over the people and in advancing employment and prosperity in one’s city through spending projects. 58  Pericles’ ingenuity was needed to restrain his troops “in their impatience of delay and eagerness to fight” (δυσχεραίνοντας τῇ τριβῇ … καὶ μάχεσθαι προθυμουμένους)—another common challenge for generals in the Lives—and, to this end, he introduced the practice of allowing one division per day, selected by lot, to feast and take their ease rather than fight (Per. 27.2). 59  Stadter (1989: 252).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

155

At the same time, Pericles is a deterrent model of excessive rivalry when he uses slander and direct attacks to undermine Cimon and his son, contributing to Athens’ loss at Tanagra and nearly providing a pretext for war to its enemies. The Life also illustrates the critical importance of refusing to acquiesce to policies that endanger one’s state in order to escape public censure and ridicule. Plutarch’s description of Pericles restraining the Athenians is designed to amplify the message that a statesman must not be compliant. In military matters, Pericles displays a variety of tactics for defeating enemies without taking the risk of direct battle. In most cases, Pericles purposeful crafting of the Life to deliver these specific lessons is evident in the difference between the Life and other accounts. In Fabius, the same themes of managing relations with the people and with rivals are explored from new perspectives, while new challenges of generalship and managing subordinates at times of crisis are brought under scrutiny, including insights into how to train capable young men to be effective in public life, one of the primary roles of “old men” in public affairs in Old Men in Politics. 4.3

Life of Fabius Maximus

Overview Fabius Maximus was one of the most prominent Roman generals over the fifteen years extending from Hannibal’s entry into Italy in 218 BC and his departure in 203 BC. Although Fabius’ public career before Hannibal arrived in Italy included two consulships (233, 228), one triumph (over the Ligurians in 233), a censorship (230) and a dictatorship (221), Plutarch’s Fabius focuses on the war with Hannibal. Over this period, Fabius was dictator after the defeat at Lake Trasimene in 217 and later, after the disaster at Cannae in 216, he served as consul three times (215, 214, and 209). Fabius became famous for his cognomen “Cunctator” (Delayer), earned when he steadfastly insisted on a military strategy of shadowing Hannibal and waiting for him to run out of resources rather than engaging him in direct battle. In the early years of the war in Italy, the Roman armies were routinely routed when they confronted Hannibal directly—at Trebia (218), Trasimene (217) and Cannae (216)—and each defeat added credibility to Fabius’ strategy. Although his final major military success was the re-taking of Tarentum in 209—for which he celebrated a second triumph—Fabius remained active in debates about military strategy until his death shortly after Hannibal’s departure from Italy in 203. The primary historical accounts of Fabius Maximus’ career during the Hannibalic War are found in Livy (Books 22–30) and Appian’s Hannibalic War

156

Chapter 4

(Roman History, Book 7). In Polybius, only the account of Fabius’ dictatorship has survived (Histories 3.87–105). Among other writers, Ennius60 and Virgil61 presented Fabius as a savior of Rome. Cicero, for instance, quotes Ennius’ praise of Fabius for acting in the best interests of Rome even when his reputation was being disparaged: One man—and he alone—restored our state by delaying. Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety; Therefore now does his glory shine bright and it grows ever brighter. CICERO, De Off. 12.84

Cicero in De Republica (1.1) lists Fabius among the men who had been “the salvation of this republic” (saluti huic civitati), while Seneca, in De Ira (1.11.5), credits Fabius with “restoring the broken forces of the state” (affectas imperii vires recreavit). Fabius’ success as a prudent general and defender of his policy in the face of intense opposition dominates his later reputation. He is repeatedly mentioned in these contexts in Cicero’s works, including De Oratore, where Fabius is an example of the art of generalship (De Orat. 1.48.210), and in De Senectute, which includes extensive praise of Fabius by Cato Maior (De Senec. 4.10–13, 6.16, 12.39 and 17.61).62 In Quintilian (11.2.30), Fabius is an exemplum of the attribute of “caution”, while Seneca praises Fabius’ strategy as both the absence of anger (De Ira 1.11.5) and as the salvation of Rome (De Beneficiis 4.27.2). Valerius Maximus refers to Fabius under ten headings, including constantia (3.8.2), moderatio (6.1.5) and liberalitas (4.8.1).63 In Frontinus’ Strategemata,

60  Ennius is also cited by Livy (30.26.9), Seneca (De Benef. 4.27.2) and Cicero (De Senectute 4.10). 61   Aeneid 6.845–6: “quo fessum rapitis, Fabii? tu Maximus ille es, unus qui nobis cunctando restituis rem”. 62  Fabius’ caution in dealing with Hannibal is also praised at De Republica 5.10. 63  The full list includes: Religious scruples (1.15, when he renounced his first dictatorship because of a mouse), Ancient institutions (2.1.10; 2.2.4, when he dismounted when he met his son as consul), On resolution (constantia: 3.8.2, when he refused to become angry at Minucius’ elevation or at criticism of his strategy or taunts from Hannibal), On moderation (6.1.5), On liberality (4.8.1, when he ransomed prisoners himself), On the grateful (5.2.3 on burial by the people; 5.2.4 on Minucius calling him Father), Shrewd deeds and sayings (7.3.7, on winning back allies with rewards); On old age (8.13.3, on the report that Fabius had been augur for 62 years); and On anger (9.3.1, when he advises Livius to be careful before he engages Hannibal). Most of these incidents are in the Life.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

157

Fabius is cited seven times as a positive model of generalship64 and once as the general outmaneuvered by Hannibal (Strat. 1.5). In the Moralia, Plutarch mentions Fabius Maximus three times: twice as the mentor of Cato Maior (Old Men in Politics 791A; Pol. Prec. 805F) and once as a member of “Virtue’s choir” (ὁ τῆς Ἀρετῆς χορὸς) in The Fortune of the Romans (317D–Ε), where the Fabii Maximi are grouped with the Fabricii, Camilli, Decii, Cincinnati, Claudii Marcelli and the Scipios. In the Parallel Lives, Fabius plays a role both in Marcellus (as a fellow general in the war against Hannibal and coconsul in 214) and in Cato Maior, where he is Cato’s mentor and role model. In Caesar (15.2), Fabius is among the generals who set the standards for military excellence that were surpassed by Caesar, while in Ages-Pomp (4.4) he is cited as an exemplum of a general who, unlike Pompey, exercised his own judgment in choosing the time and place for battle. These characterizations paint Fabius as a positive paradigm in a variety of pragmatic aspects of effective leadership, which are amplified and developed in a more nuanced way in Fabius. In Fabius Maximus, Plutarch found a statesman who complemented Pericles in several respects. First, while the action in Pericles was concentrated in the domestic political arena, in Fabius battlefields dominate. Thus, Plutarch could address the same leadership principles from a military perspective, while also treating other challenges, such as motivating and training subordinates. Secondly, while both heroes faced opponents in the political and military arenas, Plutarch used Pericles to showcase skills needed to outmaneuver rivals in political situations and Fabius to illustrate strategies to outmaneuver rivals in military contexts—including both other Roman generals and Hannibal. In Fabius, it is the military general Hannibal who serves as the primary opponent of the hero, as opposed to Cimon and Thucydides who were Pericles’ political rivals. In addition, both Fabius and Pericles needed to restrain those under their authority—the army or the people—from acting rashly under the influence of passion. Finally, by pairing Fabius with Pericles, Plutarch was able to draw on the parallels between the Hannibalic War and the Spartan invasions of Attica to illustrate the efficacy of a strategy of restraint in different situations. In a Roman Empire beset by threats along its perimeter—and one in which writers like Frontinus cast Fabius as a role model of good generalship—these topics would have immediate resonance for Plutarch’s readers serving as generals, including Sosius Senecio. 64  Frontinus cites Fabius in six categories: On determining the character of the war (Strat. 1.3.3), On distracting the enemy (1.8.2, 3), On ambushes (2.5.22). On the means by which the enemy can be reduced to want (3.4.1), On goodwill and moderation (4.6.1) and On sundry maxims (4.7.36, where Fabius rewards a soldier to prevent his desertion).

158

Chapter 4

Moral Foundation and Reputation In discussing Fabius’ moral character, preparation for public life and the reputation he cultivated through his conduct as a young man, Plutarch focuses on Fabius’ most noteworthy qualities of character and the impression they made on the Romans. The Life opens with a brief account of Fabius’ birth, family heritage,65 upbringing and the nickname Ovicula (little lamb) that reflected his “mildness and slowness” (πρᾳότητα καὶ βραδυτῆτα). A summary of other traits exhibited from childhood follows: For his calmness and silence (τὸ ἡσύχιον … καὶ σιωπηλὸν), the great caution (πολλῆς … εὐλαβείας) with which he engaged in childish pleasures, the slowness and arduousness (βραδέως … καὶ διαπόνως) with which he received his lessons and his good nature and submissiveness (εὔκολον … καὶ κατήκοον) towards his friends led men from the outside to suspect him of a certain sluggishness and stupidity. But there were a few men who perceived the resoluteness (δυσκίνητον) in his depth and the highmindedness and leonine qualities (τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ λεοντῶδες) in his nature. Fab. 1.3

Plutarch’s focus on public perceptions of a statesman’s character and competencies, rather than on the presence or absence of particular virtues, underscores the practical function of moral character and reputation in the political arena.66 As discussed by Stadter (1975/1995; 1989), these qualities are manifested in Fabius’ actions throughout the Life, especially at times of crisis. His mildness, gravity and calmness are visible in his responses to Minucius (Fab. 9–13), Varro (Fab. 14) and errant soldiers (Fab. 20), as well as in his actions when he took charge after the defeats at Trasimene (Fab. 4) and Cannae (Fab. 17). His silence and resoluteness underlie his ability to remain composed in the face of criticism, ridicule and the unprecedented appointment of a co-dictator (Fab. 8–9).67 Finally, Fabius’ caution is displayed in his military strategy

65  Fabius’ family traces to Hercules. Fabius Rullianus earned the cognomen “Maximus” during the Gallic invasions, a period mentioned in the Life in discussions before Trebia (Fab. 3.1) and after Cannae (Fab. 16.4). 66  Plutarch notes a similar misinterpretation of Coriolanus, who also exhibited apatheia (Cor. 1.3). See Chapter 5. 67  Plutarch compares Fabius’ attitude to that of Diogenes: “but he was like Diogenes the wise man, who, when someone said to him, ‘these folk are ridiculing you’, said, ‘But I am not

Pericles-fabius Maximus

159

throughout his career, including his final opposition to Scipio’s suggestion that the war be taken to Carthage (Fab. 26). Enduring Public Criticism: Placing the Public Good First Fabius provides another instructive portrait of how “to endure” the follies of citizens and colleagues—the capacity highlighted in the Prologue (Per. 2.4). Like Pericles, Fabius operates in the midst of a steady onslaught of criticism and opposition,68 yet responds with calm resolve (Fab. 9.1). In describing Fabius’ response to Minucius being named co-dictator, an action that the people supposed would make Fabius feel “altogether humbled” (ταπεινὸν παντάπασιν) (Fab. 10.1), Plutarch presents Fabius’ reasoning: Thinking that only those are ridiculed who give in and are thrown into great confusion by these sorts of things, thus Fabius bore the incidents insensibly (without passion) (ἀπαθῶς) and easily (ῥᾳδίως) as far as it concerned him (ὅσον ἐπ’ αὐτῷ), falling in with the axiom of philosophers for worthy men that the good and serious man can neither be insulted nor dishonored. But he was vexed (ἠνία) by the folly of the multitude for the sake of the common welfare (διὰ τὰ κοινά). Fab. 10.1–2

Because Fabius believed that the people had decided to give opportunities to a man with a “diseased” (οὐχ ὑγιαινούσῃ) military ambition (Fab. 10.2), he headed back to camp as soon as possible, and in secret, in order to prevent a disaster. Plutarch thus uses this episode both to draw the distinction between the proper attitudes to private and public matters and to portray Fabius as a role model for maintaining one’s focus on the common good. The principle is again on view later when Fabius’ son, as consul, orders his father to approach him on foot and Fabius praises his son for adhering to the spirit of Rome that ridiculed’ ” (Fab. 10.1). The comment illustrates the power of philosophy in training a man to assess events as far as they impact himself. 68  For his conduct of the first campaign against Hannibal, Plutarch reports that Fabius “was ill-spoken of and disdained” (κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι καὶ καταφρονηθῆναι) after Hannibal’s escape and was further slandered when Hannibal spared Fabius’ fields while burning those of others (Fab. 7.1–2). Moreover, the tribunes were constantly denouncing him and when the senate angrily refused to honor his agreement with Hannibal for the exchange of prisoners (Fab. 7.3–4), Fabius “bore the anger of the citizens with mildness” (τὴν μὲν ὀργὴν ἔφερε πρᾴως) and sent his son to Rome to sell his field and bring him the money (7.5). Fabius later refuses to take any re-payment from the prisoners, an act of liberality praised in the synkrisis (Per-Fab 3.3).

160

Chapter 4

“makes parents and children always secondary (ἐν δευτέρῳ) to our country’s good” (Fab. 24.1–2).

Cultivating a Reputation For Dispassionate Decisions, Caution and Steadfastness Plutarch presents Fabius, like Pericles, making a deliberate effort to acquire the practical skills needed for the political arena (Fab. 1.4–5). Because Fabius saw that “the conduct of the state was a great task and that the wars must be many”, he trained his body for war and his speech “as an instrument of persuasion of the people” (ὄργανον πειθοῦς) (Fab. 1.4).69 Unlike Pericles, Fabius cultivates his reputation, not by theatrically crafting a specific persona, but by revealing the true qualities of his nature as manifested in his actions after he entered public life: He made it clear even to the multitude that his seeming lack of energy was insensibility (ἀπάθειαν) and that his caution was good counsel (εὐβουλίαν) and that his never being quick nor even easy to move made him always steadfast and sure (μόνιμον καὶ βέβαιον). Fab. 1.4

The misunderstanding of Fabius’ insensibility noted here is also found in other Lives,70 where the associated “insensibility” to the force of passion can be a source of strength or a weakness. Plutarch’s focus on public perception of this quality, as well as the reputation gained from other qualities of character, underscores his concern with the practical consequences for political and military effectiveness that flow from certain common character traits in leaders. Fabius’ reputation, combined with his equanimity and dedication to his city revealed in these character sketches early in the Life, form the backdrop against which Plutarch showcases Fabius’ judgments as a statesman and actions as a general, which together provide the pragmatic lessons in leadership. 69  He gave his speech a form that “suited his manner of life” (τῷ βίῳ πρεπόντως) in having no affectation or empty grace and was rendered “weighty by an abundance of maxims” (Fab. 1.5). This style was fitting for speech to the people in Pol. Prec. (803 A–B) and marked a difference from the characterization of Pericles’ eloquence as “lofty” (Per. 8.1). 70   “Apatheia” in Stoicism means freedom from the influence of the irrational force of pathe. Such a notion contradicts the Aristotelian concept of the mean (which more closely aligns with Plutarch’s treatment of virtue) and in Plutarch the term is used more generally to mean “insensibility” or “imperturbability. See Peters (1967: 18–19). For Plutarch’s various references to ἀπάθεια, see Dillon (2016). The trait is also tied to Cato Minor and Coriolanus.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

161

Pragmatic Lessons in Political and Military Leadership Plutarch provides pragmatic lessons through the judgments and strategies that enabled Fabius to resolve the challenges he faced as a general and political leader at times of crisis. Plutarch uses Fabius’ career to expand his treatment of political relations in Pericles to include a portrait of a man serving temporarily as dictator, while also addressing rivalry in the military arena and a wider range of issues of generalship. In addition to questions of military strategy, Plutarch presents insights into how to deal with insubordination and to inspire troops in battle, using comparisons between Fabius and the other generals— including Hannibal—to bring his lessons into sharper focus. Major incidents in the Life are listed below in Table 4.3. Plutarch offers practical lessons for leaders in three areas: (1) Relations with other Romans, (2) Relations with the army and (3) Military strategy versus Hannibal. Fabius’ career can be divided into five separate phases based on when he was in or out of office as a commanding general. Phase 1 (Chapters 1–3) summarizes Fabius’ upbringing and political career through the defeat at Lake Trasimene, while Phase 2 (4–13) includes incidents that occurred during his period as dictator after Trasimene, including his conflict with Minucius. After a brief period out of office that extended through the defeat at Cannae (Phase 3, 14–16), Phase 4 (17–23) extends from Cannae through the re-taking of Tarentum, during which Fabius was consul three times and general alongside Marcellus. Phase 5 (24–27) presents Fabius’ conduct during the years leading to Scipio’s campaign in Africa and concludes with his death and burial after Hannibal’s departure from Italy. Plutarch incorporates an extensive portrait of Hannibal into the narrative, repeatedly describing his strategic thinking and quoting him (in both direct and indirect speech) expressing views about Fabius’ generalship and the course of events. The characterization of Hannibal in the Life not only helps to clarify the strengths in Fabius’ strategic assessments, but also introduces additional lessons in generalship. Relations with Other Romans Fabius provides paradigms for meeting two challenges faced by his elite audience in managing relations with the people in their cities: (1) reviving the spirits of the people after a catastrophic event and (2) controlling rivalry with opponents in public debate. Plutarch portrays Fabius as a positive paradigm in reviving a city’s confidence after a disaster, an exemplum that could be applied by provincial leaders whose cities had either suffered a natural disaster or had provoked Rome—a situation raised in Political Precepts (815 D–F). In contrast, Fabius, like Pericles, is a deterrent paradigm in excessive rivalry—but the topic is treated from a new perspective in this Life.

162

Chapter 4

Table 4.3 Episodes in the Life of Fabius Maximus Relations with other Romans

Relations with the army

Military strategy vs. Hannibal

Phase 1: Early career; others conduct war against Hannibal (Chapters 1–3) 1- Birth and heritage; character traits 2- 1st Triumph (Ligurians) 2- Fabius vs. Flaminius: military strategy

2- Roman defeat at Trebia 3- Flaminius defeated at Trasimene

Phase 2: Fabius as dictator; conflict with Minucius (4–13) 4- Fabius named dictator; revives spirits of Romans 9- Minucius made co-dictator

5- Fabius vs. Minucius 7- Ransoms captives 10- Fabius vs. Minucius 13- Minucius submits to Fabius

5- Strategy vs. Hannibal 6–7- Hannibal’s escape 8- Minucius attacks Hannibal 11–12- Fabius saves Minucius’ army

Phase 3: Fabius advises Aemilius Paullus; Defeat at Cannae (14–16) 14- Consulship goes to others

14–16- Varro and Paullus at Cannae

Phase 4: Fabius as consul; general with Marcellus; Tarentum re-taken (17–23) 17–18- Fabius revives spirits of Romans; Varro welcomed back

19- Fabius vs. Marcellus 20- Relations with soldiers

23- 2nd Triumph

19- Fabius and Marcellus hold Hannibal at bay 21–22- Fabius takes Tarentum 23- Hannibal reacts to loss

Phase 5: Rivalry with Scipio; death and burial (24–27) 24- Son becomes consul; son’s death 26- Fabius opposes Scipio 27- Fabius’ death; Fabius’ burial

25- Fabius vs. Scipio: military strategy 26- Scipio wins victory in Africa; Hannibal recalled from Italy 27- Scipio defeats Hannibal

Pericles-fabius Maximus

163

Reviving Spirits of the Populace Plutarch uses Fabius’ actions as dictator after the defeat at Trasimene (Fab. 4) and as consul after Cannae (Fab. 27–28) to showcase techniques that revive the spirits and secure the obedience of the people after a demoralizing disaster. After Trasimene, the Romans turn to Fabius to be dictator because they needed a man “who could wield this authority with energy and without fear” (τοῦ μεταχειριουμένου ταύτην ἀθρύπτως καὶ ἀδεῶς) (Fab. 3.5). Plutarch emphasizes two actions that enhanced Fabius’ effectiveness. First, in order to make the citizens more “submissive and obedient” (ὑπηκόοις … καὶ πειθηνίοις), Fabius immediately displayed “the magnitude and majesty” (τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸν ὄγκον) of his office by appearing with his full complement of twenty-four lictors with their fasces and forcing the other consul to approach him as a private citizen (Fab. 4.2). Secondly, to distract the people from their fear of the enemy, Fabius directed them to propitiate the gods: By instructing (διδάσκων) the people that it was because of the disdain and contempt of the general towards the gods, and not because of the worthlessness of the men fighting, that [Flaminius] was defeated, he induced them (προὔτρεπε) not to fear their enemies, but instead to propitiate and honor the gods, not making them superstitious but encouraging their virtue (θαρρύνων … τὴν ἀρετήν) through reverence for the gods. Fab. 4.3

These actions succeed in making the people “more cheerful for the future” (Fab. 5.1),71 thus providing a pragmatic lesson in shifting the people from fear to hope. After Cannae, the Romans similarly turn to Fabius based on his skills as a leader, including his foresight as evidenced in his warnings before Cannae,72 his intelligence and his practical judgment (Fab. 17.3–5). Again, Fabius adopts 71  Fabius uses divine explanations with the people, but himself believes that success depends “on virtue and practical judgment” (δι’ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως) (Fab. 5.1). This sentiment echoes Polybius 10.5.8: “Men without an ability to analyze opportunities, causes and the dispositions of each thing (τοὺς καιροὺς μηδὲ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ διαθέσεις ἑκάστων), either from lack of natural ability or from inexperience or from indolence (ἢ διὰ φαυλότητα φύσεως ἢ δι’ ἀπειρίαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν ), attribute to the gods and fortune what is done by shrewdness, calculation and foresight (δι’ ἀγχίνοιαν ἐκ λογισμοῦ προνοίας ἐπιτελουμένων)”. 72  Fabius’ foresight about the potential for disaster at Cannae seemed to the Romans to be “no mere human calculation (οὐδ’ ἀνθρώπινος … λογισμός), but rather a divine and marvelous intelligence” (θεῖόν τι χρῆμα διανοίας καὶ δαιμόνιον) (Fab. 17.3).

164

Chapter 4

a public stance that inspires confidence: when all others are cast down “in boundless grief and helpless confusion”, he is the only man to walk “with a calm step, composed countenance and gracious address” (Fab. 17.5). Fabius also makes a concerted effort to continue normal political functions: He both persuaded the Senate to convene and encouraged (παρεθάρσυνε) the magistrates, being the strength and power of every magistrate since they paid attention only to him. Fab. 17.5

At the same time, while rites for propitiating the gods were duly performed (Fab. 18.3), Fabius set limits to public lamentation (17.5, 18.1), put guards at the gates to prevent Romans from abandoning the city (18.1) and cancelled the festival of Ceres in order not to showcase the magnitude of the calamity (18.2). The success of these actions is reflected in the people regaining their confidence about the future. While Plutarch largely echoes Livy in describing Fabius’ actions in Rome after Trasimene (Livy 22.9.8–11; 22.11.6) and Cannae (Livy 22.55.4–8), he also includes details not found in Livy that explain how Fabius magnified his influence at that time. For instance, Livy does not present Fabius’ actions as dictator as an attempt to make the citizens more submissive and obedient. Similarly, Plutarch expands Livy’s account after Cannae by describing the aspects of Fabius’ demeanor in public that enabled him to exude composure amidst panic (Fab. 17.3). In both cases, the added details underscore the power of the theatrical element of effective leadership, which is less prominent in Livy. Expressing Opposition in Political Debate Plutarch designs his account of Fabius’ opposition to Scipio (Fab. 25–26) in the debate about military strategy to illustrate the detrimental impact of excessive rivalry on reputation and effectiveness in the political arena. In this area, Fabius provides a counter-example to Pericles’ opposition to Thucydides in the prior Life. In Plutarch’s opinion, Fabius’ opposition may have initially reflected his “great caution and foresight” (ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἀσφαλείας καὶ προνοίας), but over time Fabius went to greater lengths out of “ambition and contentiousness” (φιλοτιμίᾳ … καὶ φιλονικίᾳ) (Fab. 25.4). When Scipio promotes the idea of taking the war to Africa, Fabius tries to provoke fears that the Romans would be empowering a “foolhardy youth” (ἀνδρὸς ἀνοήτου καὶ νέου) whose strategy would put the city in gravest danger (Fab. 25.2). This conduct elicits a highly negative response from the Romans:

Pericles-fabius Maximus

165

To the people, it seemed that it was on account of jealousy (διὰ φθόνον) that [Fabius] attacked Scipio’s success and feared that, if Scipio should accomplish something great and brilliant—and either end the war or drive it out of Italy—he himself would appear idle and faint-hearted, having not brought the war to an end in so much time. Fab. 25.3

This negative assessment by the Romans is reinforced by Fabius’ subsequent use of a variety of questionable tactics to stop Scipio, including his efforts (1) to dissuade Scipio’s co-consul and young men from supporting Scipio, (2) to prevent funding of the war and (3) to have Scipio recalled from Africa on the grounds that his good fortune could not be expected to last (Fab. 25.5–26.4). As a result, Fabius acquires a reputation as a man who was “troublesome and slanderous” (δύσκολος … καὶ βάσκανος) and had lost his courage and confidence (Fab. 26.4). This concerted effort to undermine a rival in power offers a new perspective on an important issue raised in Pericles: while Pericles’ rivalry with Cimon and Lacedaemonius put his city in peril at Tanagra (Per. 10.2) and Corcyra (Per. 29.2–3), Fabius’ conduct not only put his state at risk of never defeating Hannibal but also irreparably damaged his reputation. Plutarch’s deliberate use of Fabius’ conflict with Scipio to convey a deterrent lesson in excessive rivalry is revealed by the differences between the accounts of this episode in Plutarch and Livy. In Livy (28.40.3–43.22), Fabius’ opposition to Scipio’s strategy is presented in a speech that details not only the strategic risks of transferring resources to Africa, but also supplies an array of historical examples of failed expeditions—including the Sicilian Expedition, which was led by “a young man as energetic as he was noble” (aeque inpigro ac nobili iuvene) and “in a single naval battle permanently ruined their prosperous state” (Livy 28.41.17). Livy’s Fabius refers to Scipio as “a brave and energetic man” (viri fortis ac strenui) (Livy 28.40.4)—not a “foolhardy youth” as in Plutarch—and Fabius opposes him out of concern about the merit of the strategy, not out of ambition. Moreover, Livy does not report that Fabius’ conduct offended the Romans or hurt his reputation, consequences Plutarch uses to convey a pragmatic lesson in the detrimental consequences of unrestrained rivalry with opponents in public debate. Plutarch also associates Fabius with excessive ambition when, after his victory at Tarentum, he has the Bruttians killed in an effort to hide his use of treachery to take the city (Fab. 22.4). This effort to protect his reputation in Rome ultimately fails: the killing of the Bruttian is considered by the Romans to be both a breach of trust and cruel. Plutarch’s intention to portray Fabius’

166

Chapter 4

killing of the Bruttians in Tarentum as a deterrent lesson is suggested by two changes from Livy’s account (27.16.6–7). First, Livy reported the killing of the Bruttians as part of general killing by the Roman soldiers of “other men everywhere” (alios passim sine discrimine) and not as the result of a specific order from Fabius to kill the Bruttians first. In addition, Plutarch omits the other possible motives for killing the Bruttians suggested by Livy, including that it may have been a mistake or driven by old hatreds. Instead, in the Life, Plutarch presents his own version as uncontested, thus adapting the historical record to provide a clear deterrent lesson. Relations with the Army The scenes of Fabius interacting with fellow generals and his troops address two common challenges facing men pursuing military careers: (1) how to manage rivalries with fellow generals and (2) how to discipline talented soldiers without destroying their spirit. Some aspects of these issues are discussed in Old Men in Politics (784C–D; 791C) and On Being Compliant (529A), while among other writers these themes are treated by Cicero, Frontinus and Onasander. In Fabius, Plutarch illustrates techniques for effective cooperation between generals who disagree about the best strategy. In no case does Fabius regard another general’s military defeat as a pretext for permanent disgrace, nor does he regard mistaken impulses by colleagues or subordinates (e.g. inopportune attacks on the enemy or violation of army protocol) as an excuse for harsh punishment. Instead, Fabius allows his colleagues and soldiers to learn from their mistakes and embraces them as partners in later military ventures. Thus, in this area, Plutarch’s positive paradigms prominently display the alliance between philosophical principles (mildness and humanity) and effective leadership that characterizes pragmatic biography. Managing Rivalries with Fellow Generals Rivalry among generals is commonly found in two forms in the Lives: (1) the premature, or ill-advised, attack by one general who does not want to wait and share the glory of victory with a fellow general who has not yet arrived; and (2) disagreement among generals sharing command as to whether the best strategy is to attack or delay. Plutarch constructs his episodes of Fabius’ relations with the army to demonstrate the dynamics of both forms of rivalry, as well as practical strategies for dealing with them. In particular, Plutarch crafts his presentation of Fabius’ co-dictatorship with Minucius (9–13) and the coordinated partnership of Fabius and Marcellus after Cannae (19) to illustrate the judgments and behaviors that enable a general to deal with opposition without harming his state.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

167

Fabius and Minucius Plutarch designs his account of Fabius’ relations with Minucius to portray both men as instructive paradigms in managing rivalry in the military arena. As a younger and less-experienced general, Minucius exhibits the impatience for action and over-confidence often displayed by vigorous, young generals in the Lives, such as Tolmides in Pericles (18.2–3).73 Fabius is portrayed as a seasoned general who is not only well aware of Minucius’ vocal opposition to his strategy of delay, but also understands the risks to the Roman army associated with it. After Fabius learns in Rome that, in his absence from the army, Minucius has attacked Hannibal and is elated at his success against a small detachment of Hannibal’s army (Fab. 8.2), he rushes back to camp saying that “he was more afraid of Minucius’ success than he would be of his failure” (Fab. 8.3).74 Plutarch brings the focus to the general principle of managing rivalry by inserting Fabius’ speech admonishing Minucius—who is “puffed up with conceit” (τετυφωμένον) (Fab. 10.3)—for misdirecting his rivalry: Fabius reminded [Minucius] that his contest (ἀγῶνος) was not against Fabius, but, if he were sensible, against Hannibal; but if he was eager to compete (φιλονικεῖ) with his colleague in office, he should see to it that the man who had been honored and victorious should not appear to be taking less account (ὀλιγωρῶν) of the safety and security of the citizens than the man who had been vanquished and spitefully insulted by them. Fab. 10.4–5

Fabius’ comment flags a common failing among generals who, in the Lives, are often more eager for personal glory than for coordinated efforts to defeat the enemy and, as a result, expose their army to defeat and their country to great harm by either acting too soon or delaying until it is too late. Pompey, for instance, unsuccessfully attacked Sertorius in advance of Metellus’ arrival

73  In Aemilius Paullus (discussed in Chapter 7), Nasica exhibits the same impatience to act that is characteristic of ambitious young men across the Lives, and Aemilius calmly restrains him (Aem. 17.3–4). 74  Indeed, the success “filled Minucius with measureless boastfulness and his soldiers with boldness” (αὑτόν τε μεγαλαυχίας ἀμέτρου καὶ θράσους τὸ στρατιωτικὸν ἐμπεπληκώς) (Fab. 8.2). The experience of Minucius echoes that of Flaminius, who, earlier in the Life, also became elated at an unexpectedly successful attack on the Gauls that had also been opposed by his colleague and subsequently, with great confidence, attacked Hannibal at Lake Trasimene (Fab. 2.4–3.5).

168

Chapter 4

in Spain, in an effort to claim victory for himself (Pomp. 17), as we will discuss in Chapter 6. The precautions Fabius takes in response to Minucius’ misguided ambition are also instructive for generals. First, Fabius divides the army rather than alternating days of command of a unified army with Minucius, and, secondly, he keeps careful watch on Minucius (Fab. 12.1–2). As a result of this foresight, Fabius is able to react without panic when Minucius’ army is in trouble: he simply rouses his own army and quickly launches into action, calling out to his army to “hurry to Minucius’ aid” (Fab. 12.2). Plutarch’s purposeful construction of this incident to convey a lesson in generalship is reflected in his choice of an account of the decision to divide the army that mirrored Livy rather than Polybius. In Polybius (3.103.5–7), Fabius offers Minucius the choice, and Minucius chooses to divide the army. In Livy (22.27.6–11), in contrast, Minucius tells Fabius he wants to command the unified army on alternate days and Fabius refuses, saying that “in accordance with his own plans he would save what he could, since he was not permitted to save everything” (suisque consiliis, quoniam omnia non liceret, quae posset servaturum). This portrait of Fabius’ foresight is reinforced by his advice to Aemilius Paullus (ahead of Cannae) to restrain Varro. Unlike Fabius, however, Aemilius did not have the power to divide the army and therefore had no reserve with which to save the day at Cannae (Fab. 14–16). Fabius and Marcellus Although Plutarch devotes only one chapter (Fab. 19) to the coordinated efforts of Fabius and Marcellus in the years after Cannae—noting (at 19.2) that this period had been addressed in Marcellus75—he includes details that convey an instructive portrait of rivalry that is managed to the benefit of the state. The two generals are described as direct opposites, a characterization captured in Marcellus being called the sword (ξίφος) because he was by nature “fond of battle” and “eager for the fray” (ἀγερώχους), while Fabius was called the shield (θυρεόν) because he maintained his strategy of shadowing Hannibal (Fab. 19.2–3).76 Plutarch reports that the combination of “resoluteness and 75  Plutarch uses similar terms to describe the two different styles of generalship at Marc. 9.1–4 and Fab.19.2. Their joint consulship (214) is mentioned at Marc. 13, but apart from a comment comparing Marcellus’ actions after taking Syracuse to Fabius’ actions after taking Tarentum (Marc. 21.3) and a coordinated strategy when Fabius made an attempt on Tarentum (25.2), Fabius’ actions are not discussed. 76  Similar terms are used when Pompey assures Caesar that he would come against those who threaten swords with “both sword and shield” (Pomp. 47.5), but with very different implications, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

169

prudent caution of the one” of the one with the greater eagerness for battle in the other was generally considered to have been “the salvation of Rome” (Fab. 19.3). Moreover, this partnership illustrated the advantages of the cooperation among men with different talents and experience advocated by Plutarch in Political Precepts (812C–F). The benefits of their cooperation—achieved by a division of their spheres of responsibility, not unlike the accommodation reached by Pericles and Cimon in Pericles (Per. 10)—are magnified against the backdrop of the consequences of the confrontations of Fabius and Minucius over differences in strategy. Disciplining Young Men without Destroying Their Spirit Plutarch also uses Fabius to provide a positive paradigm for how to engage constructively with young men in military contexts. This issue is a theme in Old Men in Politics, where old men with experience are needed both to balance excessive ambition in capable young men and to correct them when they make mistakes (Old Men in Politics 790D–F; 791C). In the Life, Fabius illustrates effective techniques for dealing with two common problems facing generals in every era: (1) dealing with youthful inexperience that challenges the experienced general and (2) dealing with insubordination without destroying the transgressor’s enthusiasm. The most prominent example of Fabius’ effective management of younger generals is revealed in the dynamics of his relations with Minucius after he has rescued Minucius from Hannibal. Not only did Fabius not reprimand Minucius directly, but he praised him as a “brilliant man and lover of his country” who “was eager to drive away the enemy” (Fab. 12.2).77 This simple action of saving Minucius’ army without comment prompts a positive change in Minucius: he relinquishes his authority as co-dictator and places his army under Fabius. The change in Minucius’ attitude reflects the effectiveness of Fabius’ tolerant response: Minucius’ aggressive ambition is “corrected” without destroying his desire to serve his country, precisely the goal advocated in Old Men in Politics (796B–E). Plutarch also reports that Fabius believed that discontent or revolts among the allies should be restrained through gentle and mild measures rather than harshness (Fab. 20.1). The effectiveness of this approach is illustrated in several incidents in which Fabius exercises mildness and foresight in dealing with young men who had been insubordinate. When Fabius learns that a Marsian soldier was considering defection, he rewards him for his service: as a result, the Marsian becomes “the most faithful and most zealous” (πιστότατον …

77  The Romans exhibit a similar “dignity and mildness” (τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν πρᾳότητα) when they welcome Varro back to Rome after Cannae (Fab. 18.4–5).

170

Chapter 4

καὶ προθυμότατον) man in Fabius’ army (Fab. 20.1–2).78 Similarly, a competent Lucanian soldier who was leaving camp to meet a woman is retained by bringing the woman to him (Fab. 20.3–6). Plutarch explains the principle that induced Fabius to be lenient with young men: Fabius thought it terrible that a trainer of dogs and horses would use “care and intimacy” (ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ συνηθείᾳ) to remove their “obstinacy, anger and discontent”, but that a commander of men would discipline with harsh punishments rather than “favor and mildness” (Fab. 20.3). While Fabius’ conduct provides positive paradigms for generals, Minucius is a positive role model for young men who, through ambition, rashness or inexperience, dismiss the caution of experienced commanders as cowardice and take precipitous action that causes great harm. A direct speech by Minucius to his army articulates the principles at issue for young generals: To err in nothing in great affairs is more than is possible for man, but for the man who has erred (τὸ δ’ ἁμαρτόντα) to use his false steps (χρήσασθαι τοῖς πταίσμασι) as lessons for the future (διδάγμασι πρὸς τὸ λοιπόν) is the mark of man who is good and sensible.…. For what I did not perceive for such a long time, I was taught (πεπαίδευμαι) today in a short time, learning that I am not able to rule over others, but need to be ruled by another and that I was ambitious to vanquish men by whom it were better to be defeated. Fab. 13.2

This passage describes the process of advancing one’s proficiency in military leadership by combining self-knowledge with learning from the example of more-experienced men, not unlike the approach recommended in Plutarch’s political and practical-ethical treatises. Military Strategy versus Hannibal Fabius’ skill at assessing the military action (or inaction) appropriate to each situation—central to the art of generalship—may have been masked by his label “Cunctator”, but was clearly on display in a variety of situations where Fabius actively engaged in battle or offered his opinion on the best strategy. Plutarch presents Fabius in battle only twice in the Life: when he saves Minucius and when he takes Tarentum.79 In other episodes, Fabius is shown identifying the 78  Frontinus (Strat. 4.7) tells a variant. A parallel episode between Marcellus with Bantius is found at Marc. 10.2–5. 79  Here, Fabius exercises the military skills cultivated in youth (Fab. 1.4) and exercised in his early career (2.1).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

171

best strategy for other generals, with the exception of his failure to recognize the merit of Scipio’s plan.80 Hannibal is also portrayed commenting on Fabius’ generalship, as well as illustrating new pragmatic lessons in generalship on his own account.81 In this area, Plutarch relies largely on Livy’s expansive portrait of Hannibal, but also illustrates principles of the art of generalship articulated by Polybius (e.g. 3.81.1–11; 9.2.1–9). Identifying and Defending the Best Strategy Plutarch uses the battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene, Cannae and Tarentum to highlight the difficulties of adapting military strategies to different situations and different enemy generals, with Fabius emerging as a clearly positive model in devising strategies. Controversy about military policy is “front-and-center” beginning with the debate about whether or not to confront Hannibal after the defeat at Trebia. The senate opposes action because of bad portents (Fab. 2.3), while the consul Flaminius wants to attack Hannibal, partly because an earlier victory over the Gauls has made him over-confident (Fab. 2.4) and partly because he does not want to repeat Camillus’ experience in being forced to defend Rome itself (Fab. 3.1).82 In contrast, Fabius’ recommendation is based on a careful assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of this particular enemy (Hannibal and his army) in the present circumstances: Having learned of the small number and lack of resources of the enemy (τὴν ὀλιγότητα … καὶ τὴν ἀχρηματίαν), [Fabius] exhorted the Romans to be patient and not to fight against a man who had an army exercised through many battles for this very thing, but to send to the allies for help and keep the cities under control and allow Hannibal’s culminating strength to slowly expire (μαραίνεσθαι), like a flame that has flared up from a small and insubstantial material. Fab. 2.5

80  Fabius’ misjudgment at the end of his career is not unlike Pompey’s mistake at Pharsalus. Moreover, the strategy that Fabius rejects outright is precisely the one Pericles successfully used against Sparta, when he ravaged Spartan land and induced Archidamus to withdraw from Athenian territory (Per. 34), as noted earlier. 81  In Marcellus, Hannibal not only plays a similar role as commentator and source of pragmatic lessons in generalship, but is also shown in direct battle against the Roman hero (e.g. Marc. 25–26 at Canusium) and overseeing the treatment of Marcellus’ body and ashes after his death (30.1–4). 82  See Plutarch’s Camillus.

172

Chapter 4

By reporting the analysis behind Fabius’ strategy of “delay”, Plutarch illustrates the process of evaluating military options, a fundamental skill that is emphasized in Polybius (3.81.1–11).83 While Fabius’ strategy does not change when he is named Dictator (Fab. 5.1), opposition to it becomes more vehement. Plutarch uses this intense opposition to present Fabius’ practical reasons for standing by his own judgment, using direct speech to articulate a central precept of good generalship: “Thus, however”, he said, “I would be more cowardly than I am now thought to be, if scoffs and abuse frightened me and I should fall away from my own calculations (ἐκπέσοιμι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ λογισμῶν).… But to be panic-stricken (ἔκπληξις) because of the opinions of men, and their slanders and censures, is the mark of a man not worthy of so great an office, a man who makes himself a slave of the misguided men over whom it is fitting that he hold sway and be master. Fab. 5.6

Fabius’ constancy in ignoring insult and criticism is displayed in a variety of incidents throughout the Life, and he is praised in the synkrisis as a man “who would not abandon his own calculations” (Per-Fab 1.4). For this resolve, Fabius becomes a positive counter-example to Pompey’s ruinous change in strategy at Pharsalus in response to criticism, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. The importance of this principle for generals is reflected in Plutarch’s amplification of Livy’s account (22.15.1) with a direct statement in which Fabius not only recognizes the widespread criticism, but further states the principle of good generalship guiding him. Plutarch’s descriptions of the defeats at Trasimene and Cannae reinforce Fabius’ status as a positive paradigm of generalship, since both defeats result from a rejection of Fabius’ policy of not engaging Hannibal. Although Fabius was not present at Cannae, Plutarch uses this battle to strengthen the positive portrait of Fabius’ generalship. Here, Aemilius Paullus also faces the challenge of restraining an over-eager colleague, Terentius Varro, who is characterized as a flatterer of the people who was rash, inexperienced, overly-bold and prepared to “stake the entire issue on the hazard of a single throw” (τὸν περὶ τῶν 83  Fabius’ analysis of his situation is precisely Pompey’s assessment of Caesar’s resources and options before Pharsalus (Pomp. 67). But, unlike Fabius, Pompey succumbs to appeals to start the battle. The significance of this lesson is reflected in references to this challenge in other Lives, including Agesilaus, Aemilius, and Pericles, as noted earlier. At Ages-Pomp 2–4, Fabius is one of the generals Pompey should have imitated.

Pericles-fabius Maximus

173

ὅλων ἀναρρίψων κύβον) (Fab. 14.1).84 Fabius advises Aemilius to “restrain the madness of his colleague” (Fab. 14.4) and struggle to save his country not so much from Hannibal as from Terentius Varro:85 The latter, [Fabius said] was eager to do battle because he did not see his own strength and the former because he saw his own weakness. Fab. 14.4

Plutarch’s comment on Hannibal’s inexplicable failure to continue on to take Rome after the battle underscores the importance of Fabius’ advice.86 This account of the reasoning and motives of the generals before Cannae not only reveals Fabius’ foresight, but also the magnitude of the disaster that was averted earlier by his own decision not to split the command with Minucius. The retaking of Tarentum, in turn, demonstrates the importance of determining action or inaction based on a careful consideration of the circumstances at hand. Here, Fabius initiates a strategy to deceive and outmaneuver Hannibal: he sends a Tarentine soldier to the city to pose as a traitor and convince one of the guards to defect (Fab. 21.1–4) while simultaneously ordering a garrison to overrun Bruttium and Caulonia to serve as “bait” (δελεάσας) to draw Hannibal away from Tarentum (22.2). The success of this strategy—and the retaking of Tarentum—highlights the need for strategic versatility.87 Misjudging the Potential of an Alternate Strategy Plutarch rounds out his account of Fabius’ successes as a military strategist with an incident in which Fabius’ strategic thinking was deficient, namely his disagreement with Scipio about the efficacy of taking the war to Africa. Scipio 84  Plutarch’s Varro echoes Polybius’ description of Flaminius as a “mob-courtier and demagogue” (ὀχλοκόπον μὲν καὶ δημαγωγὸν) with “no talent for the practical conduct of war (πολεμικῶν πραγμάτων χειρισμὸν οὐκ εὐφυῆ) (Polyb. 3.80.3). 85  Before he plunges back in to battle, Aemilius Paullus asked Lepidus to tell Fabius that he “was vanquished first by Varro, and then by Hannibal” (“ἐνικήθη πρότερον ὑπὸ Βάρρωνος, εἶθ’ ὑπ’ Ἀννίβου”) (Fab. 16.7). 86  Had Hannibal marched on Rome, the disaster would have been complete (Fab. 17.1). See Polybius (10.36). 87  When Tarentum is retaken by the Romans, Hannibal is described as an athlete whose “hugs and grips no longer had their old time vigor” (ἅμματα καὶ λαβὰς οὐκέτι τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχούσας τόνον) and as a general whose forces “had lost their power due to luxury and wealth” (διὰ τρυφὴν καὶ πλοῦτον) and “were blunted, as it were, and worn out by their unremitting struggles” (ὥσπερ ἐξήμβλυντο καὶ κατατέτριπτο τοῖς ἀλωφήτοις ἀγῶσιν) (Fab. 23.2).

174

Chapter 4

believed that the “hand to hand struggle against Hannibal in Italy” was an outdated strategy (Fab. 25.2) and would never achieve victory, while Fabius argued that moving Roman forces to Africa would leave Rome vulnerable to Hannibal (Fab. 26.1)—echoing the concerns of the direct threats to Rome early in the war (Fab. 3.1). Fabius magnifies his error when he advocates Scipio’s recall even after Scipio has captured the king of Numidia, taken two camps in Africa with their men, arms and horses, and prompted Carthage to recall Hannibal (Fab. 26.2–3): Fabius asserts that Scipio’s “good fortune” could not reasonably be expected to last (Fab. 26.4).88 In the synkrisis, Plutarch casts this opposition to Scipio as a fundamental failure in generalship because it was a failure “to make a correct judgment about the future”, which is an essential quality in a good general (Per-Fab 2.3).89 Thus, like all generals in the Parallel Lives, Fabius is not without a weakness. This episode, as constructed by Plutarch, also conveys a lesson for older statesmen not to allow caution—the great virtue of the older statesman in Old Men in Politics—to become automatic in opposing the ideas of younger men. In contrast to Minucius, Scipio was a young general who had extraordinary military experience90 and was promoting a strategy that could defeat Hannibal. Hannibal’s Perspective on Fabius’ Generalship Plutarch uses Hannibal as an alternate judge of Fabius’ generalship, which is constantly opposed by Romans who doubt the efficacy of his strategy of delay and consider it a reflection of cowardice and lack of energy (Fab. 5.4–5; 8.3–4; 25.2; 26.4). Hannibal is the only observer who recognizes Fabius’ adeptness in depriving him of what he wants most: direct engagement with the Roman army: Hannibal, and Hannibal alone, comprehended Fabius’ cleverness and the manner in which he was determined to wage war. Having made up his mind that there had to be a push towards battle (κινητέος ἐστὶν εἰς μάχην) by every art and force or else the Carthaginians were outdone—being unable to use their weapons, in which they were superior, while reducing and spending to no purpose their men and money, in which they were 88  Fabius’ failure to properly distinguish the roles of Fortune versus good strategy—the issue central to Onasander’s analysis—is a major flaw in Fabius’ thinking. 89  See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this passage. 90  Scipio is a young general (in his early 30s) who has just returned from victories over Carthaginians in Spain with “incomparable goodwill and fame” (εὔνοιαν … καὶ δόξαν … ὅσην ἄλλος οὐδείς) and been elected consul (Fab. 25.1).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

175

inferior—he turned to and tested (τρεπόμενος καὶ πειρώμενος) every form of strategic device and maneuver (σοφισμάτων καὶ παλαισμάτων), just like a clever athlete seeking to get a hold. Fab. 5.3

Plutarch’s intention to use Hannibal to provide pragmatic lessons is reflected in his reporting of Hannibal’s strategic analysis of the situation he faced91 and his use of the analogy to athletic competition. In this passage, Hannibal validates Fabius’ analyses of the military situation after Trebia (Fab. 2.5) and before Cannae (Fab. 14.4).92 Plutarch also presents Hannibal’s assessment of the coordinated efforts of Fabius and Marcellus: Hannibal’s forces were “shaken and swept away” (ἐσείετο καὶ παρερρηγνύετο) by frequent encounters with Marcellus and were “worn away and consumed” (ὑπερειπόμενος καὶ δαπανώμενος) by the stealthy hostility of Fabius which kept them in fear (Fab. 19.4).93 By allowing Hannibal to describe the even greater impact of the coordinated efforts of Fabius and Marcellus—generals with opposite views about the best strategy— Plutarch amplifies the usefulness of his advice on cooperation in Political Precepts. Finally, when Fabius uses deception to retake Tarentum, Hannibal, who was known for his own successful ambushes and tricks,94 remarks that “it appears, then, that the Romans have another Hannibal, for we lost Tarentum even as we took it” (Fab. 23.1) and further concedes that the Carthaginians no longer had the resources to conquer Italy—an indication that Fabius’ strategy of delay had worked. By including these comments by Hannibal, Plutarch sharpens his portrait of Fabius as a paradigm of a general who excelled at reading his enemy and devising strategies to outmaneuver him.

91  Indeed, the principle raised here echoes Plutarch’s comment at Ages-Pomp 4.1, that a good general determines the best time for battle based on whether he or his enemy is in a superior position, discussed above in Chapter 3. 92  Hannibal’s awareness that Fabius always had the capacity to attack—if required—is revealed after Fabius saves Minucius’ army. At that time, Hannibal comments that he had often prophesied that “the cloud hovering about the heights” would one day burst on them in a furious storm (Fab. 12.4). 93  At Marc (9.4), Hannibal is quoted as saying that “he feared Fabius as a tutor (ὡς παιδαγωγὸν), but Marcellus as an adversary (ὡς ἀνταγωνιστήν); for by the one he was prevented from doing any harm (κωλύεσθαι κακόν τι ποιεῖν), while by the other he was actually harmed” (καὶ πάσχειν). 94  Although Hannibal demonstrated skill both in ambushes and in open battle, the ambush was considered his “forte” in Frontinus, who cites him as an exemplum in this category of military skill (Strat. 2.5.13–27).

176

Chapter 4

Hannibal’s Generalship Just as Fabius adapted his strategy to target Hannibal’s weak spots, Hannibal does the same in focusing on deceptions and ambushes to maintain pressure on the Romans. While Hannibal was famous for his escape from Fabius by attaching fire to the horns of the cattle (Fab. 6.4–7.2),95 acts of ambush and treachery are scattered throughout the Life (Fab. 11.2, 19.5–6; 21.1). By describing Hannibal’s reasoning and tactics, Plutarch provides several pragmatic lessons in generalship that supplement the paradigms provided by Fabius. For instance, when Minucius is ambushed by Hannibal, Plutarch describes how the ambush was planned, detailing Hannibal’s watchfulness, his use of a strategic hill—deliberately left unoccupied—as a lure and his careful placement of his soldiers in the ditches and hollows (Fab. 11.2).96 Plutarch also displays Hannibal’s facility in sizing up a field of battle and deploying his troops: at Cannae, Hannibal notes the nature of the terrain and puts the wind at his back—forcing the dust to fly in the faces of the Romans (Fab. 16.1)—and stations his troops so that a weak center would give way and draw in the Romans. Hannibal also provides a lesson in how to use humor to inspire troops intimidated by a massive enemy. Ahead of Cannae, Hannibal dispels the tension in his army by making a joke: Putting on a serious look (συναγαγὼν τὸ πρόσωπον), Hannibal said, “Gisco, another thing has escaped your notice that is more amazing than that.” And, with Gisco asking what sort of thing, he said, “The fact that out of such a great number of men no one among them is called Gisco!”. With the jest being unexpected, they all burst into laughter (ἐμπίπτει γέλως πᾶσι), and as they were coming down from the ridge they reported the joke to those they encountered, with the result that throughout the multitude there was much laughter and the men around Hannibal could not recover themselves. Fab. 15.2–3

The lesson for generals lies in the reaction of the soldiers: the sight of Hannibal and his staff laughing “infused courage” (θάρσος παρέστη) into the 95  The incident is included in Frontinus (Strat. 1.5.28) under the section ”On escaping from difficult situations”. The incident is also found in Livy (22.16–17) and Appian (Hann. 14–15). 96  Later Hannibal ambushes Marcellus (Fab. 19.5) and takes Tarentum by treachery (21.2), but fails to lure Fabius to Metapontum with false letters because Fabius turns back when the auspices are unfavorable (21.6).

Pericles-fabius Maximus

177

Carthaginians, who reasoned that their general must have contempt for the enemy “if he laughed and jested in this way in the face of danger” (Fab. 15.3). While both Polybius (3.111) and Appian (Hann. 7.3.21) report that Hannibal gave a speech to encourage his soldiers, neither provides any direct speech nor the use of laughter. Plutarch expands this episode to illustrate a “theatrical” aspect of effective generalship often needed when facing a fearsome enemy.97 Like Fabius, however, Hannibal is associated with one major failure in generalship: his decision to not follow up on the victory at Cannae to win the war by taking Rome, but instead to turn to other parts of Italy (Fab. 17.1–18.1). Plutarch presents Hannibal’s “hesitation and timidity” (μέλλησις αὐτοῦ καὶ δειλίασις) at this time as inexplicable—unless attributable to an evil genius (δαίμονος) or the inspiration of a divinity (θεοῦ)—especially given the advice Hannibal received from his friends and the support from Italian cities (Fab. 17.1–2). Hannibal’s error is underscored by Barca’s angry comment that Hannibal know how to win a victory but did not know how to use it (Fab. 17.1).98 Summary: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in Fabius Maximus In Fabius, Plutarch reinforces the lessons in political rivalry and withstanding public criticism delivered in Pericles, while broadening his treatment of principles of generalship. Between the disaster at Trebia (Fab. 2.2) and the defeat of Hannibal in Carthage (27.1), six leading generals in addition to Fabius and Hannibal appear in the Life: Flaminius, Minucius, Varro, Aemilius Paullus, Marcellus and Scipio. Plutarch’s accounts of their strategies, victories and defeats provide practical guidance in military leadership precisely in the areas emphasized in treatises on generalship: sizing up the enemy and targeting its weakness; working with other generals; inspiring troops before battle; dealing constructively with opposition and insubordination; treating captured cities justly; and adhering to one’s best judgment despite criticism. At the same time, the incidents involving the other generals illustrate various aspects of military rivalry. Minucius and Varro model confrontational 97  The theatrical aspects of successful generals are also on display in key incidents in other Lives. For instance, Aemilius feigns fearlessness ahead of Pydna (Aem. 19.2–4) and Timoleon escapes the Carthaginians by a ruse in Rhegium, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. 98  In Caesar, Plutarch’s makes a similar observation about Pompey, who “either from excessive caution or by some chance” (ὑπ’ εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ τύχης) did not follow up on his victory at Dyrrachium, inducing Caesar to comment “Today victory would have been with the enemy, if they had had a victor in command” (“Σήμερον ἂν ἡ νίκη παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦν, εἰ τὸν νικῶντα εἶχον”) (Caes. 39.8). Caesar’s comment is repeated at Pomp. 65.5.

178

Chapter 4

rivalries—and the destructive outcomes that can result—while Marcellus displays the benefits of cooperating and making room for multiple strategies. The debate with Scipio highlights the benefits that can be lost when alternative strategies are too quickly rejected. While Fabius is portrayed as a positive paradigm in most areas, he supplies negative models of excessive rivalry and lack of foresight in his relations with Scipio and of excessive ambition after taking Tarentum. By choosing to present Fabius’ debate with Scipio as a deterrent lesson in excessive rivalry, Plutarch enhances the instructive power of the Life: this “stain” on Fabius’ record keeps him from being an implausible “paragon of virtue” and enhances his power as a role model. Finally, the rivalry between Fabius and Hannibal—often compared to a wrestling match—reveals many positive lessons in generalship. Both men provide positive paradigms of (1) carefully assessing each situation and the resources of one’s opponent, (2) incorporating the advantages of particular geography, (3) inspiring the troops, and, in the case of Fabius, (4) resisting the impulse to abandon one’s best judgment in order to escape public criticism and ridicule. Fabius is shown adapting his strategy to what each situation required, including engaging in direct battle to save Minucius, shadowing Hannibal to exhaust the Carthaginian’s resources, and utilizing treachery and deception to take back a city. 4.4

Insights from the Synkrisis

The synkrisis to this pair draws attention to the areas of “political and military excellence” in which Pericles and Fabius either faced different types of challenges or were not equally adept in handling similar situations. In addition, both men are presented as positive exempla in some areas and negative models in others. Plutarch begins by pointing to the different problems posed by the populace in a prosperous city (Athens) versus one that has been humbled by disaster (Rome) (Per-Fab 1.4), underscoring the status of Pericles as a role model of the skills and judgment needed to control a populace, while Fabius exemplifies clarity of judgment and resolution in times of crisis and confusion. In comparing their military achievements, Plutarch recalls several incidents from the Lives—including Samos, Tarentum, the rescue of Minucius and the escape of Hannibal—but gives greatest attention to the difference in the foresight exhibited by two heroes as generals. Although Pericles allowed the Peloponnesian War to erupt, he is not held responsible for the Athenian loss, but is instead praised for his foresight in recognizing that Athens would lose her empire if she did not limit her aspirations to maintaining the status quo

Pericles-fabius Maximus

179

(Per-Fab 2.3). Conversely, despite Fabius’ success in saving Rome from Hannibal, Plutarch strongly criticizes his lack of foresight with regard to Scipio’s strategy. In the area of statesmanship, Plutarch compares parallel challenges in the two Lives, while also addressing two topics from Pericles that had no direct parallel in Fabius: namely, Pericles’ willingness to face war rather than make concessions to Sparta and his rebuilding of the Acropolis. However, a direct comparison is made concerning their treatment of rivals, for which Pericles’ animosity towards Cimon and Thucydides compares unfavorably to Fabius’ courtesy towards Minucius. With regard to their attitudes toward money, both men are praised for different reasons: Pericles for not taking payments or bribes despite being at the head of an empire and Fabius for being liberal with funds at his disposal (Per-Fab 3.3–4). Both assessments speak directly to the concerns of Plutarch’s audience. Plutarch closes with praise of the rebuilding of the Acropolis—another area that would have resonated with readers. In the Lives presented in the next two chapters, Plutarch addresses a different set of challenges in relating to the people, managing rivalries, withstanding opposition and commanding armies. In Cor-Alc, to which we now turn, Plutarch focuses on how to respond to election losses or banishment and how to reconcile with one’s state, while illustrating military excellence in new contexts.

Chapter 5

Coriolanus-Alcibiades 5.1 Introduction While Pericles-Fabius Maximus presented heroes who were largely positive role models of political and military leadership, Coriolanus-Alcibiades joins two statesmen long viewed as negative figures by historians and other writers. Coriolanus was often labeled as a traitor to his country because he had defected to the Volscians and served as their commander-in-chief in the war against Rome, while Alcibiades famously aided the Spartans against Athens. In presenting the Lives of these two figures within the paradigm of pragmatic biography, Plutarch offered a more nuanced treatment of major incidents in the careers of both men, distinguishing effective strategies to imitate from those that harmed the state and should be avoided. Neither hero is portrayed as vicious or evil by nature, but instead both are depicted as men whose political and military effectiveness was undermined by specific character flaws and misjudgments that readers should correct or eliminate in their own careers. At the same time, however, both Coriolanus and Alcibiades also supply positive paradigms in some areas of leadership, and the synkrisis finds conduct to praise and censure in both statesmen. Although the Prologue to Cor-Alc has not survived, a number of similarities justify the pairing. Both lost their fathers early in life, with Coriolanus raised by a widowed mother (Cor. 1–2) and Alcibiades by Pericles (Alc. 1). Both men were exiled at the height of their careers and joined the enemy to fight against their native states. Both were undefeated as generals. However, in their character traits, Coriolanus and Alcibiades are presented as virtual opposites: temperance, rigidity and anger characterize Coriolanus, while Alcibiades is wanton, flexible and affable. This difference in moral character marks a sharp departure from Plutarch’s other pairings: both Pericles and Fabius, for instance, share the traits of moderation, justice, and composure, while, as noted in the discussion of the Prologues in Chapter 3, Phocion and Cato are described as men who were “of one and the same stamp, shape and color” (Phoc. 3.5) in the blend of virtues and vices in their characters. The marked differences in Coriolanus and Alcibiades can be traced, at least in part, to the two men being opposites in their paideia: Coriolanus lacks training in philosophy (Cor. 1.4), while Alcibiades is sought out and educated by Socrates himself (Alc. 4.1–4). Plutarch also points to the different political arenas in which the two men

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_008

Coriolanus-alcibiades

181

operate, with a contrast being drawn between the absence of bribery and corruption in Coriolanus’ Rome (Cor. 14.3) and the dominance of these factors in Alcibiades’ Athens, where democracy was “extreme” and demagogues catering to the people often determined policy (Cor. 16.3). The fact that both men, despite their different virtues and vices, experience similar failures in political life (condemnation and exile) suggests that Plutarch intended to use this pair of Lives to offer new insights into how ruptures with the people can arise from a variety of behavioral flaws—all of which statesmen must address in order to be effective in public affairs. The absence of a Prologue denies us an explanation for Plutarch’s decision to present the Roman statesman first—Cor-Alc being one of only three pairs (along with Aem-Tim and Sert-Eum) in which the Roman Life is placed before the Greek. Geiger (1981/1995) suggests that the reversal was a literary technique rooted in the material of the two Lives—with the second Life expanding on issues raised in the first—and Pelling (1986b; 2001)1 argues that the second Life delivers a more complex and nuanced assessment of a common set of issues. In the case of Cor-Alc, the chronological timing could also explain the order, since Coriolanus lived earlier. However, as we will see, Alcibiades’ recall to Athens and second exile offered an opportunity to explore a wider range of issues tied to rejection, exile and reconciliation and in a more challenging and subtle way than was possible in Coriolanus’ career. Cor-Alc has been analyzed from a variety of perspectives. While the pair is generally viewed as “negative”, neither hero is found to be wholly vicious, and Plutarch’s portrait is seen as ambiguous.2 Russell (1963/1995) considered both heroes to be examples “of vice and moral failure” and Coriolanus as part of “a tragedy of ambition and anger”.3 While Duff (1999b) believes the Life can be viewed as a “practical counterpart” to Plutarch’s On Control of Anger,4 he focuses more broadly on Coriolanus’ lack of paideia and Alcibiades’ individuality, without identifying outright condemnation by Plutarch of their “vices”. Verdegem (2010a), in turn, argues that Alcibiades was written as a study in

1  Pelling (1986b: 91/2002: 357). 2  Verdegem (2010b: 59). 3  Russell (1963:22/1995: 358). In later analysis, Russell presents Alcibiades as a “brilliant enigma” who lacked temperance and moral integrity and whose “character changes” were deliberate and reflective of the “versatility of the successful refugee” (Russell (1973/2001: 122–23)). On inconsistencies, see Fulkerson (2012). 4  Duff (1999b: 89).

182

Chapter 5

moral character to explore specific weaknesses.5 Paideia is widely seen as a central theme,6 although, as Pelling (1986b) notes, it is not a determinant of success or failure: despite Alcibiades being the opposite of Coriolanus in paideia and rapport with the people, he does not prove more successful in his public career.7 The relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates is also examined as part of Plutarch’s treatment of ethical education.8 When Cor-Alc is analyzed as pragmatic biography, these assessments of the effects of paideia and moral character on the careers of Coriolanus and Alcibiades are integrated into a broader examination of Plutarch’s pragmatic lessons in political and military effectiveness. In particular, this pair provides deterrent paradigms in four areas of leadership: (1) relations with the people (based on flattery or anger), (2) interactions with colleagues in public life; (3) actions against one’s state while in exile and (4) responses to offers of reconciliation. In several of these areas, Cor-Alc supplies negative paradigms to counterbalance the positive exempla in Per-Fab. While Pericles and Fabius modeled effective management of the people, Coriolanus and Alcibiades illustrate attitudes and conduct that alienate a leader from them. In addition, the challenge of maintaining equanimity in the face of political opposition, a central theme in Per-Fab, is addressed from the new perspectives of election losses, exile and reconciliation, topics discussed in On Control of Anger, On Tranquility of Mind and On Exile.9 Finally, this pair provides deterrent paradigms in managing political rivalry, highlighting the challenges of restraining ambition (φιλοτιμία) 5  Both Duff (1999b) and Verdegem (2010a) highlight the difficulty of making judgments about capable men with moral flaws—with Verdegem concluding that the central idea of the pair is that “a politician needs political as well as private virtue” (2010a: 38). 6  On paideia as a theme, see Russell (1963/1995; 1966a/1995; 1966b/1995), Swain (1990a; 1996: 244–249), Duff (1999b: 205–210). As David Konstan noted in our discussions about this Life, paideia is one factor that enables Alcibiades to regain the path of noble statesmanship later in his Life, while Coriolanus never changes his conduct. See also Lehman (1952), Russell (1982), Roskam and Verdegem (2016). 7  Pelling (1986b: 92/2002: 358). 8  Xenophontos (2016: 12–18; 100–107) examines the relationships between Alcibiades and Socrates and between Coriolanus and Volumnia in the context of the dynamics of ethical education integrated into the Lives. 9  Plutarch touches on the issue of the proper response to rejection or exile in On Control of Anger, where Camillus, Metellus and Aristides are singled out for their mildness, forgiveness and moderation (πραότητος … καὶ συγγνώμης καὶ μετριοπαθείας) (458C) after being exiled. In On Tranquility of Mind (467C, 468B, 476D), exile is included among the experiences a man should take in stride, since adaptability to the vagaries of the public arena is essential for effective statesmanship: the appropriate response is tied to being moderate (μετρίως), good-natured (εὐκολώτατος) and mild (πραότατος) (468E). On Exile argues that each man makes his own

Coriolanus-alcibiades

183

and love of reputation (φιλοδοξία), passions that in the Moralia and Lives are essential catalysts for young men seeking prominence, but destructive forces if misapplied.10 While Coriolanus is a negative model in all of these areas, Alcibiades, in each area, supplies both positive and deterrent paradigms of actions that either benefit or harm one’s city—with the behaviors to avoid portrayed in the period through his first exile and the positive paradigms in his conduct after his recall. The failures of both men as leaders can be traced to the combined effects of personal vices—anger in Coriolanus and wantonness in Alcibiades— and misjudgments specific to political and military affairs. In Cor-Alc, Plutarch places the spotlight on challenges that were pertinent to the politically active readers of the Lives, who routinely faced the challenges of managing the people or being rejected for office, not to mention the threat of exile should their conduct displease the Emperor. The importance of these themes is further underscored by their prominence in the advice offered by Cicero, Quintilian and Pliny, as well as by Dio, who discussed his own exile and recall in his Orations. 5.2

Life of Coriolanus

Overview Gaius Marcius Coriolanus belongs to the early decades of the Roman Republic after the expulsion of the Kings (c. 510 BC), during which the Secession of the Plebs (494 BC) led to the establishment of the office of Tribune of the Plebs.11 Rome was gradually expanding its territory in frequent wars with its neighbors, and Gaius Marcius acquired his cognomen “Coriolanus” in a battle to take Corioli from the Volscians (493 BC). While details of his subsequent career are few—except that he never became consul—it is believed that he was exiled judgment about misfortune and can chose to focus on positive elements that remain, such as wealth and friends (600A). 10  Excessive ambition (φιλοτιμία) induces men to engage in rivalries that injure their states, while the love of reputation (φιλοδοξία) that caters to the approval of a mother (Coriolanus) or to the appetites of the masses (Alcibiades), rather than to public recognition for noble deeds, can lead to dishonorable conduct and catastrophic policies. The qualities are especially important in Agesilaus-Pompey, Agis-Cleo-Gracchi, Lysander-Sulla and Pyrrhus-Marius. See Wardman (1974) and Duff (1999b) on the importance of these traits in the Lives. 11  Plutarch uses the famous “Secession of the Plebs” at the time to illustrate Coriolanus’ ineffectiveness in sustaining positive relations with the people. The perspective in other accounts is mixed.

184

Chapter 5

for mishandling a grain shortage and subsequently joined the Volscians. The city was saved by an appeal from his mother, whose success was memorialized in a temple to Fortuna. After the Volscians withdraw from Rome, he fades from the record. Coriolanus received mixed reviews as a statesman in historians and other writers. His career is given generally favorable treatment by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 6.92–8.62), while Livy’s account (2.33–40) is more critical.12 In other writers, Coriolanus is variously perceived. He is both a positive and negative exemplum in Valerius Maximus, where he is cited five times in connection with themes that are central to Plutarch’s Life as well.13 However, Cicero (Ad Att. 9.10.3, De Amicitia 11.1, 12.42) and Seneca (De Beneficiis 5.16.1) depict him unequivocally as a traitor who fought against his native state. Frontinus (Strat. 1.8.1) cites Coriolanus’ strategy of promoting discord among the enemy by leaving patricians’ lands unscathed. In the Moralia, Coriolanus appears only in connection with the Temple of the Fortune of Women (318F, 322E), and he is not mentioned in any other Lives. Plutarch designed Coriolanus to illustrate how Coriolanus’ actions and flawed judgment not only contributed to the strife and disharmony in his city, but also precipitated the major setbacks of his career, including his failed bid for the consulship (Cor. 15), his exile (Cor. 21), his war against Rome (Cor. 22–30) and the dishonorable nature of his final “reconciliation” with his native city (Cor. 36).14 In explaining these events, Plutarch focuses on the combined influence of three character flaws widely examined in connection with this Life—namely (1) inflexibility (unwillingness to compromise) in relations with the people and fellow senators; (2) unrelenting anger and resentment; and (3) deference to ties of kinship over duty to the state. These character traits and behaviors could also undermine the public careers of Plutarch’s readers, whether they held magistracies in the provinces (where leaders had to maintain control over the people), or in Rome, where they had to withstand the frustration of being “passed over” in appointments to desirable positions 12   Russell (1963/1995) examines Plutarch’s reliance on Dionysius’ account in writing Coriolanus. 13  Citations tied to Coriolanus in Valerius Maximus include references to Coriolanus’ being kept by his mother’s prayers from destroying Rome (1.8.4; 5.2.1; 5.4.1), to his indifference to wealth (4.3.4) and to his exile, which compared unfavorably to that of Scipio, who “denied his ashes to her whom he had not let collapse into ash” while Coriolanus, with his violence, “struck his country with terror” (5.3). 14  Coriolanus’ “reconciliation” is simply a withdrawal of the army threatening Rome, rather than an ending of the war and his return to Rome. The quotation marks mark a contrast with Alcibiades’ more genuine reconciliation.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

185

and to resist pressures to comply with inappropriate requests from friends or family. Moreover, the tensions between the aristocracy and the plebs during Coriolanus’ career, combined with the prominence of incidents surrounding a shortage of grain, gave Plutarch the opportunity to address challenges faced by leaders in provincial cities. Moral Foundation and Reputation As in the other Lives, Plutarch opens Coriolanus with a description of Coriolanus’ family background and paideia, laying the groundwork for both positive and deterrent lessons in leadership. Because Coriolanus’ lacked ­paideia, Plutarch characterizes him as a “great nature” whose aptitude for virtue was not fully developed (Cor. 1.2),15 resulting in a blend of beneficial and harmful qualities in his character. Plutarch describes Coriolanus’ “strength and potency of judgment in all things (τὸ ἰσχυρὸν … τῆς γνώμης καὶ καρτερὸν) as productive of great impulses and the accomplishment of noble deeds” (Cor. 1.3), but ties the other traits perceived as virtues and admired by the Romans to Coriolanus’ “insensibility” (ἀπάθεια):16 They admired his insensibility toward pleasures, toil and money, which they named self-control, justice and courage. Cor. 1.3

Coriolanus’ “insensibility to money“ enhances his good repute among the soldiers, who admire him for refusing honors after Corioli (Cor. 10.3–4).17 In the synkrisis, Plutarch re-emphasizes “temperance and self-control over money”

15  The agricultural metaphor of an “untended but fertile field” (ὥσπερ εὐγενῆ χώραν ἐν γεωργίᾳ θεραπείας μὴ τυχοῦσαν) used to describe Coriolanus (Cor. 1.2) is an image that is common in Plutarch and Plato (e.g. Rep. 6, 491D). The concept of a “great nature” is directly mentioned in the Prologue to Dtr-Ant (1.7). See Duff (1999a; 1999b: 20, 60–65, 205–208, 224–228) for a broader discussion. 16  ”ἀπάθεια” (insensibility; imperturbability) is a mixed trait. “Virtue” is associated with mastery over passions, not their absence: the virtuous person is sensitive to pleasure and pain and seeks praise for actions. While ἀπάθεια explains Coriolanus’ “virtues” and “vices”, ultimately, the reader must focus on the consequences of these traits, since they appear even in men who have received paideia, such as Cato Minor (Cato Min. 1.2) and Fabius (Fab. 1.4). See above Chapter 4 (n. 70). 17  Valerius Maximus (4.3.4) cites Coriolanus as being above money, recounting his rejection of great rewards for military valor and his request for the life of one prisoner, which is reported in Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 6.94) as well.

186

Chapter 5

(σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ χρημάτων ἐγκρατείας) as virtues in which Coriolanus was “worthy to be compared to the best and purest of the Greeks” (Cor-Alc. 5.2). Anger and the Inability to Tolerate Rejection This praise of Coriolanus’ positive qualities balances Plutarch’s primary focus on the harmful impact of other dimensions of his “untrained” nature, namely “undiluted anger” (θυμοῖς … ἀκράτοις) and “inflexible contentiousness” (φιλονικίαις ἀτρέπτοις) (Cor. 1.3).18 The passion that underlies most of Coriolanus’ misjudgments is anger, a flaw Plutarch attaches to Coriolanus’ lack of paideia in an authorial comment about Coriolanus’ reaction to losing the election for the consulship: Marcius [Coriolanus] himself was neither moderate nor equitable (οὐ μετρίως … οὐδ’ ἐπιεικῶς) regarding the result, in as much as, for the most part, he indulged the passionate and contentious part of his soul, thinking it held greatness and high-mindedness. However, dignity and mildness (τὸ δ’ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ τὸ πρᾷον), which have the greatest share in political virtue (ἀρετῇ πολιτικῇ), were not mixed in, since he was not under the influence of reason and paideia. Cor. 15.3

In this passage, Plutarch reiterates the attributes that constitute the “virtue of a statesman”—moderation, equity, dignity and mildness—the precise qualities that enabled Menenius Agrippa, earlier in the Life, to resolve the Secession of the Plebs (Cor. 6.2–4). Plutarch also uses Coriolanus’ reaction to his election loss to highlight a second character flaw traceable to defective education: an inability to tolerate rejection that is traceable to “self-will”:19 Nor did he know that it is necessary for a man who manages public affairs (ἐπιχειροῦντα) to avoid self-will (αὐθάδειαν … διαφεύγειν) … and to mingle 18  Again, this characterization of Coriolanus echoes that of Cato Minor (Cato Min. 1.2–3), who also is described as “inflexible” (ἄτρεπτον) and inexorable (δυσπαραίτητος) once he became angry. See Chapter 9. 19  Plutarch quotes Plato calling self-will “the companion of solitude”—a saying repeated in the synkrisis (Cor-Alc 3.2). This flaw is also prominent in Dion, where Plato advises Dion in a letter “to be on guard against self-will, which was a companion of solitude” (Dion 8.4). This quality in Dion is also mentioned at Dion 15.2 and 17.2 and is linked to a certain harshness and rudeness in his interactions that induced Plato later in Athens to advise him to associate with men who indulged in “graceful pleasantries” in order “to temper and sweeten his disposition” (15.3–4).

Coriolanus-alcibiades

187

with men and be a lover of the forebearance (ἀνεξικακίας ἐραστήν) that is much ridiculed by some men. Cor. 15.4

The “forbearance” mentioned here is the same trait Plutarch associates with control over anger in On Control of Anger (459C, 464C).20 Plutarch further notes that Coriolanus misunderstood the true meaning of “bravery”, misconstruing as “the work of bravery” angry reactions that were actually signs of “weakness and effeminacy” (Cor. 15.4). These comments reveal the absence of the “alliance with philosophy” that Plutarch considered essential to effective statesmanship. In the synkrisis (Cor-Alc 3.2), Plutarch again points to Coriolanus’ self-will and anger and contrasts his conduct to that of Metellus, Aristides and Epaminondas who, when they were rejected, “did not become angry at their countrymen” (Cor-Alc 4.6).21 Here, Plutarch points precisely to Coriolanus’ deficiencies in the precise areas in which Pericles and Fabius excelled: their mildness and ability to endure ridicule and criticism (Per. 2.4). Coriolanus’ anger and desire for revenge lead him to serve as general of the Volscians against Rome, while the Volscian general, Tullus, remained behind to defend the cities of the Volscians (Cor. 27.1). Plutarch’s intention to depict Coriolanus’ actions in exile as motivated by revenge is revealed in the differences between his account and those of Livy and Dionysius. While Livy (2.39) reports the Volscians’ expedition to ravage non-patrician lands as a routine strategy in conducting a war, Plutarch links it to Coriolanus’ urgent desire for vengeance, which induces him to act quickly so as not to “miss his best 20  At On Control of Anger 458C, Plutarch states that such a situation called for mildness, forgiveness and moderation in passion (see above, n. 9). The theme of appropriate responses to election losses recurs in other Lives. Cato Minor, for instance, who shares Coriolanus’ rigidity and self-will, also responds badly to his failed bid for the consulship—Cato does not become angry, but he withdraws from running for office (Cato Min. 44–50). Aemilius Paullus, in contrast, calmly accepts his election loss and instead focuses his attention on the education of his sons (Aem. 6). His subsequent acceptance of the request to serve as consul later, provides a positive paradigm for statesmen facing similar challenges under imperial rule. 21  Metellus and Aristides, as noted earlier, are positive models for calmly accepting injury in “On Control of Anger” (458C). Socrates is also included in this list, and his example is echoed in Plutarch’s depiction of Phocion, who, in his Life, accepts his condemnation with equanimity. Similarly, in his Life, Aristides responds to being ostracized by calmly departing, praying that no crisis would overtake Athens that would compel her to “remember Aristides” (Aris. 7.6). Later, when the Athenians fear Aristides will attach himself to the enemy’s cause, Plutarch comments that “they misjudged the man” (οὐκ ὀρθῶς στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ ἀνδρός, Arist. 8.1) and his dedication to Greek freedom.

188

Chapter 5

opportunity of action” (τὸν καιρὸν ἀφέληται τῆς πράξεως) (Cor. 27.2). Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 8.12), in turn, does not report the divided command whereby Tullus stayed behind while Coriolanus attacked Rome, but instead shows Tullus attacking the Latins while Coriolanus attacked Roman territory. Plutarch concentrates the decisions in Coriolanus’ hands and obtains a more substantive deterrent paradigm.22 Ambition and Ties of Kinship versus the Public Good Plutarch’s also uses the discussion of Coriolanus’ moral character to put the spotlight on two additional potentially problematic forces that motivate men in the public arena: ambition and filial duty, both of which can foster actions that are beneficial or harmful for the state.23 Plutarch describes both positive and negative effects of Coriolanus’ ambition, which was rooted in a “firm and serious spirit” (ἐμβριθῆ καὶ βέβαια φρονήματα) stimulated by honors to achieve what was noble (Cor. 4.1). On the one hand, Coriolanus competes against himself (αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ζῆλον, Cor. 4.2) and is “ashamed to fall behind his own reputation instead of surpassing it by his actual exploits” (Cor. 4.1)—a praiseworthy aspect of ambition.24 However, on the other hand, Plutarch reports that Coriolanus’ ultimate goal in pursuing noble deeds was “his mother’s gladness” (Cor. 4.3)—and not simply the glory of serving his state—drawing attention to his deference to filial duty (a private virtue) over duty to the common welfare in his state (a public virtue), an error in judgment that will ultimately undermine his political effectiveness.25 22  Because Tullus is not active in the campaigns, he is one of the Volscians who are later described as men who “have long been oppressed and jealous at his power” (βαρυνόμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καὶ φθονοῦντες) and is “aggravated (ἤχθετο) to find his reputation wholly obscured and himself neglected by the Volscians” (Cor. 31.1). When Plutarch later reports the plot against Coriolanus, Tullus is described as “having long hated him and been oppressed with jealousy” (μισῶν πάλαι καὶ βαρυνόμενος διὰ φθόνον, 39.1). Plutarch’s version also provides a basis for Tullus’ later envy, a force a statesman is expected to alleviate since it can undermine his political effectiveness. 23  The beneficial and harmful dimensions of ambition and filial duty are discussed by Wardman (1974), Pelling (1986b: 84–87/2002: 350–353), Pelling (1988a: 267–271/2002: 293–297), Pelling (1995: 210–215/2002: 242–247), Duff (1999b: 83–87). 24  Caesar is similarly described at Caes. 58.5: “What he felt was therefore nothing else than emulation of himself, as if he had been another man, and a sort of rivalry between what he had done and what he purposed to do” (τὸ μὲν πάθος οὐδὲν ἦν ἕτερον ἢ ζῆλος αὑτοῦ καθάπερ ἄλλου καὶ φιλονικία τις ὑπὲρ τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ πεπραγμένα). 25  The tension between loyalty to family and to one’s state is a prominent theme in the Lives. Fabius articulates the principle when he addresses his son as consul, as discussed above in Chapter 4, and it also appears in Agesilaus, Timoleon and Phocion examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 9, below.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

189

Plutarch treats the potential conflicts between ties of kinship and duties as a citizen in his account of the fourth Roman embassy to Coriolanus (Cor. 34– 36)—the one in which Coriolanus’ mother, Volumnia, plays the leading role as speaker—and illustrates the principle that a statesman must advance the interests of the state he serves, regardless of his personal duty towards family. To clarify the different forces at work, Plutarch divides Volumnia’s speech into two parts—one examining Coriolanus’ duty as a statesman (Cor. 35.3–4) and the other his duty as a son (Cor. 36.1–3).26 In the first part of the speech, Volumnia articulates the honorable standards of statesmanship Coriolanus is violating when he allows his actions as a general to be guided by anger and resentment: But unless I can persuade you to put friendship and harmony (φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν) in the place of disagreements and enmity and to be a benefactor of both (ἀμφοτέρων εὐεργέτην) rather than the destroyer of one, then be minded and prepare yourself that you will not be able to go against your fatherland before you step over the dead body of the woman who bore you. Cor. 35.3–4

Here, Volumnia encapsulates the virtues of statesmen in Political Precepts (824D–E). In the second part of her speech, she inserts the topic of his duty as a son, asking if it is right to yield everything to anger and resentment (ὀργῇ καὶ μνησικακίᾳ πάντα συγχωρεῖν), but wrong “to gratify a mother (μητρὶ χαρίσασθαι) in a prayer like this?”(Cor. 36. 1–3). This appeal induces Coriolanus to withdraw the army from the walls of Rome to please her, echoing his motives for seeking glory as a young soldier (Cor. 4.3). By dividing Volumnia’s speech into two parts, Plutarch leaves no doubt that Coriolanus saved Rome not to perform his duty as a Roman citizen or general of the Volscians, but as a devoted son. This distinction provides grounds for the pointed criticism of Coriolanus’ statesmanship in the synkrisis: After harshly treating the supplications of the people, the entreaties of the ambassadors and the prayers of the priests, to then gratify his mother in withdrawing the army, was not an honoring of his mother (οὐ τιμὴ τῆς μητρὸς ἦν), but a dishonoring of his country (ἀτιμία τῆς πατρίδος), which was saved by pity and intercession for the sake of a single woman, on the grounds that it was not worthy to be saved for its own sake. Cor-Alc 4.4

26  As a Roman citizen (ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ), Coriolanus feels personal anger and bitterness, but his duty is to act as general on behalf of Volscians (ὑπὲρ τῶν Οὐολούσκων) (Cor. 30.4).

190

Chapter 5

This passage focuses not on the salvation of Rome, but on Coriolanus’ flawed motives for halting the war: after rejecting every form of entreaty from fellow citizens, he accepts the appeal of his mother. Plutarch reiterates this critique in a second comment censuring Coriolanus for stopping the war for his mother’s sake: “The honorable course would have been, not to spare his country for his mother’s sake (οὐ διὰ τὴν μητέρα), but his mother together with his country” (σὺν τῇ πατρίδι τῆς μητρός) (Cor-Alc 4.3). When Plutarch equates the “honoring of a mother” with the “dishonoring of one’s fatherland”,27 he explicitly separates virtue in private life from the virtue of a statesman. Clearly, filial devotion and a desire to gratify one’s mother are personal virtues to be applauded in private life. Yet, Plutarch depicts such motivations as indisputably negative as a driver of actions in a statesman.28 The importance of this principle for Plutarch is reflected in his departure from the accounts of both Livy and Dionysius, neither of whom criticized Coriolanus’ withdrawal of the army. Dionysius’ account included a lengthy speech by Coriolanus’ mother which covers a wider range of principles of good leadership—including an emphasis on a moderate reaction to exile as exemplified by Collatinus (Rom. Ant. 8.49.5–6), which Plutarch omits. Livy, in turn, includes a briefer speech by Coriolanus’ mother admonishing him for attacking the city that held his mother, wife and children and for not letting go of his anger, but without any further discussion of principles of leadership (Livy 2.40.6–9). By adopting a version that highlights the conflict between filial duty and duty as a citizen, Plutarch is able to treat a theme—addressed from various perspectives across the Parallel Lives29—from the standpoint of a favorable outcome for Rome traceable to an expression of filial piety that was dishonorable in a leader. The forces that derail Coriolanus’ political career—including his anger, misdirected ambition, and his inclination to place his filial duty ahead of his duty to the state—continued to be hazards for men in Plutarch’s day, as reflected in their prominence the advice literature, including Cicero’s advice to his son Marcus (De Officiis) and his brother Quintus (Ad Quintum 1.1), Seneca’s De Ira and De Clementia, and Dio’s advice to cities (especially in Orations 34, 38, 40) to curtail their ambitions for glory (in an empire where prizes were trivial) 27  Fittingly, the Romans respond to the peace not by honoring Coriolanus, but by honoring the Roman women. 28  The same principle applies to Cato Minor’s refusal to form an alliance with Pompey on the basis of concerns about maintaining his personal moral integrity rather than concerns about preserving the Republic, as discussed in Chapter 9. 29  On issues of addressing the conflict between duty to one’s family and to one’s state raised in the Lives, see n. 25, above.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

191

and to restrain anger in resolving disputes with other cities, as discussed in Chapter 2. From the perspective of practical leadership, which requires that philosophy work hand-in-hand with pragmatic know-how, Coriolanus demonstrates that military competence, when it is allied with anger and inflexibility, cannot produce effective political or military leadership. Pragmatic Lessons in Political and Military Leadership These qualities--which prevented him from interacting with other men easily or harmoniously30—not only undermine Coriolanus’ ability to persuade the Romans at critical junctures, but also cloud his critical judgment as a statesman and general, providing key lessons for leaders. Plutarch constructs key incidents in the Life to convey largely deterrent paradigms of conduct to avoid in managing the people and in serving as general. He goes beyond the focus in other writers on Coriolanus’ anger and resentment to evaluate the strategic decisions Coriolanus made as a leader, highlighting both the harmful strategies that he adopted and the beneficial alternatives he overlooked. Plutarch focuses on three areas of leadership: (1) Military command; (2) Relations with other Romans and (3) Exile and reconciliation. Key episodes are listed in Table 5.1. Plutarch’s presentation of Coriolanus’ Life can be separated into five phases based on the major turning points in his career. In Phase 1 (Chapters 1–7), Coriolanus rises to prominence and participates in the debate leading to the Secession of the Plebs. He then expands his influence through military feats at Corioli, but loses his bid for the consulship in Phase 2 (8–15). Phase 3 (16–21) details his loss of influence and exile, while Phase 4 (22–29) describes his alliance with the Volscians and the war against Rome. In Phase 5 (30–39), Coriolanus negotiates with Roman embassies and then withdraws from the vicinity of Rome after his mother intercedes. The Life ends with his murder and burial among the Volscians. The pragmatic lessons are reflected in the connections drawn between Coriolanus’ decisions as a leader of the Romans and Volscians and the benefits (or harm) that flowed from them. Military Command Plutarch uses various incidents in Coriolanus’ career as a general to demonstrate that a general is judged not simply by the outcomes of his battles (victory or defeat), but also on the motives that determine his actions. Although Coriolanus was undefeated as a general, his Life supplies both positive and deterrent paradigms for generals. In Coriolanus’ early exploits at Lake Regulus 30  In contrast, being able to interact “harmoniously” (εὐάρμοστον) with others will be a key strength for both Agesilaus and Pompey, who, as a result, enjoy great goodwill throughout their careers. See Chapter 6.

192 table 5.1

Chapter 5 Episodes in the Life of Coriolanus

Military command

Relations with other Romans

Exile and reconciliation

Phase 1: Early life; rise to prominence (Chapters 1–7) 1–2- Early life; training in military skills 3–4- Lake Regillus; receives oak wreath 4- Ambition; desire for Mother’s joy

5- Debate with Plebs over debts 6- Secession of the Plebs; Menenius Agrippa 7- Tribunate established

Phase 2: Expanding influence among senators (8–15) 8–10- Battle at Corioli 11- Acquires “Coriolanus”; digression 12–13- Enrollment crisis on cognomen 13- Campaign to Antium 14- Canvass for office; digression on democracy 15- Failed bid for consulship Phase 3: Loss of influence; banishment (16–21)

19- Campaign to Antium

16- Debate over grain distribution 17- Older senators resolve situation 18- Charged by tribunes 20- Faces trial and is exiled 21- Leaves Rome

Phase 4: Fights against Rome with Volscians (22–29)

24–25- Bad omens in Rome 27- Attacks Roman territory 28- Attacks Latins and allies

29- Plebs want to make peace; senators refuse

22–23- Joins Tullus in Antium 26- General for Volscians; wages war on Rome

193

Coriolanus-alcibiades

Military command

Relations with other Romans

Exile and reconciliation

Phase 5: Negotiations with Rome; reconciliation; death and burial (30–39) 30- Leaves Lavinium; heads to Rome 30- Senators want to make peace 30- 1st embassy from Rome 31- Ravages Roman territory 31- Volscians resent withdrawal 31- 2nd embassy from Rome 32- 3rd embassy from Rome 33–36- Women’s embassy 36- Army withdraws 37–38- Reaction in Rome 39- Coriolanus’ murder and burial

(Cor. 3–4) and Corioli (Cor. 8–10), his skills as a soldier are on display and he is stimulated to pursue ever greater achievements by the honors he receives (Cor. 4.1)—such as the oak crown at Lake Regulus (Cor. 3.2–3). However, later in his career he becomes a deterrent paradigm of a general who neglects the interests of the state whose interests he has committed to serve. The incidents depicting Coriolanus as a general are grouped in two separate periods which bring two aspects of his generalship into focus: his ability to win the respect of soldiers is displayed in Phases 1 and 2, while his failure to serve the interests of the Volscians is found in Phases 4 and 5. Winning Respect of Soldiers While several successful campaigns are mentioned in the first half of the Life, only the battle at Corioli (Cor. 8.1–11.1) provides a detailed portrait of Coriolanus’ military skills. At Corioli, when Coriolanus sees that the Romans are in flight, he charges forward with a small band of men whose initial success then inspires others to follow (Cor. 8.3). He follows the retreating enemy back to their city and again, with a small band, pushes his way into the city and is able, through his “prowess of arm, speed of foot and daring of soul” to overwhelm the enemy and make it possible for Laertius to approach (Cor. 8.5–7). Then, while other soldiers turned to plundering—a common problem for generals in the Lives—Coriolanus focused on the battle still being waged by the consul, and, again, led a small band to find him (Cor. 9.1–2). Not only did Coriolanus’ report that the city had been taken revive the spirits of the army, but his charge against the enemy led to their speedy defeat (Cor. 9.5).

194

Chapter 5

While Plutarch’s account demonstrates the military successes that can be achieved when a commander is able to exhort even a small band to follow him, a second positive lesson lies in the favorable reaction of his fellow soldiers to Coriolanus’ refusal of honors after the battle. In place of the tenth of the spoils offered to him by the consul, Coriolanus asked for the release of his guest-friend among the Volscians, who had been taken prisoner. As a result, the envy felt towards his honors disappears and the admiration of the soldiers grows: More men were amazed at the man not being overpowered by money than at his bravery in war. For, the same men who had harbored some jealousy and rivalry (φθόνου τι καὶ ζῆλου) towards him because he was honored above others now considered him worthy of a great reward because he did not take one (τῷ μὴ λαβεῖν). Cor. 10.4

The influence Coriolanus thus gained within the army was later reflected in the sympathy and support he received from the young patricians after he lost his bid for the consulship: He was their leader and friendly instructor in the art of war on their campaigns (διδάσκαλος … τῶν πολεμικῶν) and taught them to pride themselves when victorious on rivalry in virtue without jealousy of each other (ζῆλον ἀρετῆς ἄνευ φθόνου). Cor. 15.5

This sequence of episodes illustrates Plutarch’s advice in Political Precepts (818C–D), where he counsels moderation in accepting honors as means of averting envy and attracting goodwill. Plutarch’s purposeful structuring of his account of these events to provide a pragmatic lesson for leaders is evident in the comparison with the versions found in historians. Dionysius presents Coriolanus’ motive for rejecting honors to be a deliberate effort to “secure himself as far as possible against envy” (ἀνεπίφθονον ὡς μάλιστα βουληθεὶς ἐμαυτὸν παρασχεῖν) (Rom. Ant. 8.30.3), while Livy (2.33.4–9) describes Coriolanus’ role in the victory at Corioli, but does not mention any specific rewards. Serving the Interests of the City Perhaps surprisingly, Plutarch does not criticize Coriolanus as a “traitor” who fought against his own people; instead the lessons in generalship center on how well Coriolanus performed the duties of command when he served

Coriolanus-alcibiades

195

as general first of the Romans and later of the Volscians. As noted earlier, Coriolanus’ conduct as general of the Volscians is not designed to serve their interests—in itself a violation of the duty of a leader, as later articulated by Volumnia (Cor. 35.4)—but instead to gratify his own desire for revenge against Rome (23.3, 27.3; 30.1). However, Plutarch uses Coriolanus’ command of the Volscians to highlight two strategic misjudgments to which a general of any era could be vulnerable. First, Coriolanus accepts a thirty-day truce at a point when the Volscians could have taken Rome (Cor. 30.5)—a lapse in generalship that Plutarch criticizes through the voice of the Volscians: [Those Volscians who were discontent] called the marching off a betrayal (προδοσίαν), not of city walls and armies, but of golden opportunities (καιρῶν)—by which these and all other things are saved or again destroyed—since thirty days had been given in war, where great changes occur in no less time. Cor. 31.2

Second, Coriolanus’ final withdrawal of the army from the vicinity of Rome (after the intercession of his mother) threw away another chance to secure victory (Cor. 36.4–5). In both cases, Coriolanus’ failure to seize an opportunity for victory constituted bad generalship—not unlike the failures of Hannibal to take Rome after Cannae (Fab. 17.1) and of Fabius Maximus to support Scipio’s plan (Fab. 25–26), as discussed in Chapter 4.31 Plutarch reinforces this critique of Coriolanus’ generalship in the synkrisis, where the failure to serve the interests of the city that had named him general is directly mentioned: He did not end the enmity, but, although the war continued, he utterly lost and destroyed the golden opportunity (ἀπώλεσε τὸν καιρὸν καὶ διέφθειρε); for he ought to have withdrawn after having persuaded the men who had placed their trust in him (πείσαντα … τοὺς πεπιστευκότας). Cor-Alc 4.2–3

Moreover, Coriolanus’ conduct is considered dishonorable because he left the Volscians “in the lurch” (ἐγκαταλιπεῖν) when they were treating him with perfect fairness (Cor-Alc 2.6), Thus, in the end, Coriolanus becomes a negative

31  Pompey provides another illustration of this misjudgment when he does not take Caesar’s camp at Dyrrachium (Pomp. 65.5).

196

Chapter 5

paradigm of generalship, not because he lost wars he could have won, but because he threw away the opportunities to win them.32 Plutarch’s intention to cast Coriolanus as a deterrent model of generalship that determines strategy based on filial duty rather than duty to the city he serves becomes apparent in comparisons to accounts in Livy or Dionysius. Livy treats the withdrawal from the vicinity of Rome briefly, simply reporting that Coriolanus left after the conversation with his mother, but later perished under the weight of the resentment this act caused (Livy 2.40.10). Dionysius describes Coriolanus first holding an assembly with the troops to explain why he would end the war and to ask the soldiers to forgive him and remember the benefits they had received (Rom. Ant. 8.54.5) and, later, upon returning to the territory of the Volscians, distributing all of the booty to his soldiers, who were welldisposed to him (8.57.1). Plutarch chooses a version that places the spotlight on the principle that a general must place the interests of the city he serves ahead of any private concern, including appeals from a parent. Relations with Other Romans Plutarch uses the incidents in Rome in the period between Coriolanus’ early military career and his later generalship of the Volscians to deliver a variety of pragmatic lessons for leaders active in the political arena. In political relations, the people were aggravated at Coriolanus’ “insensibility” (ἀπάθεια) which they found to be odious, ungracious and oligarchical (ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ἄχαριν καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν) (Cor. 1.3–4). With regard to managing relations with the people, Coriolanus concentrates on two challenges: (1) resolving factional disputes within a city and (2) retaining the support of the people. The general principles at issue are articulated in Political Precepts—that a statesman must understand the character of the people (799B–800A) and he must engage in give-and-take with the people (818A–818D)—and were illustrated in positive contexts in Pericles. Coriolanus, in contrast, is presented as a negative model of actions and attitudes that provoke hostility and disharmony. The deterrent lessons in these areas are brought into sharper focus by the positive counter-examples provided by the Roman senators and consuls, who successfully defuse crises and restore harmony through compromise and moderation. Plutarch highlights sources of contention that paralleled those that still existed in the provincial cities of his own era, where the primary roles of the archon and other city leaders were to resolve factional disputes, elicit obedience 32  Coriolanus’ failure to “seize opportunity” touches on a common theme in the Lives: Antony also missed the opportunity for action, but for a different reason (his fixation on Cleopatra). See Chapter 8.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

197

to the laws, and maintain flows of essential food and other supplies to the people, as discussed in Chapter 1. Dio’s Oration 46, for instance, directly addresses responses to popular unrest in Prusa caused by a grain shortage. By describing the process by which harmony was restored and the people brought back under control, Plutarch supplies readers with a guide for action when confronting similar disruptions in their own cities. Resolving Factional Disputes Plutarch uses the Secession of the Plebs (Cor. 5–7) and the grain debate (Cor. 16–17) to showcase both ineffective and effective techniques for resolving unrest between factions in a city. In the dispute that led to the Secession of the Plebs, Coriolanus provides the negative paradigm of ineffective leadership: he refuses to compromise over debt relief for the Plebs, opposes colleagues who want to relax the severity of the law and exhorts magistrates to put a stop to the insolence and daring (ὕβρεως, θρασύτητος) of the mob rising up against the laws (Cor. 5.4). Plutarch amplifies the deterrent elements in Coriolanus’ conduct by providing a positive counter-example in the conciliatory, and ultimately successful, approach used by Menenius Agrippa.33 The specific steps of the successful negotiation are described at Cor. 6.2–4: (1) Menenius takes a delegation of the senators who were “the most equitable and disposed towards the people”, (2) entreats the people, (3) talks frankly (παρρησιαζόμενος) on many matters on behalf of the senate and (4) explains the Senate’s role using the fable of the body and the belly—illustrating a technique recommended in Political Precepts.34 This conciliatory approach is again illustrated in the debate over grain distribution (Cor. 16–17). In this episode, Plutarch portrays Coriolanus as even more unrestrained in his attacks both on the Plebs and on the patricians proposing more moderate policies (Cor. 16.3–4). He calls efforts to accommodate the Plebs “subservience out of fear and flattery” that simply maintains the Plebs in their disobedience, and he advises that the tribunate be taken away (Cor. 16.3–4).35 This threat inflames the people, who are “carried away by 33  Menenius Agrippa is applauded for his statesmanship in Livy (2.33.10–11) and Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 6.96.1–4). 34  This fable of the body and the belly is also presented in Livy (2.32.9–11) and Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 6.86). Political Precepts 803A notes the acceptability of using maxims, mythology and tales in political oratory. 35  In this speech (Cor. 16.3–4), Coriolanus refers anachronistically to “extreme democracies in Greece” (Ἑλλήνων οἱ κράτιστα δημοκρατούμενοι) (which had not yet emerged during Coriolanus’ time), building a second bridge to Alcibiades. Earlier, in discussing the

198

Chapter 5

anger” and a tumult ensues (Cor. 17.1–2). This sequence of events illustrates how hostility in a statesman will provoke a reciprocal hostility in the people. The consuls provide the positive paradigm: [The consuls] urged [the senators] to consider how they might soothe and calm (πραΰνωσι καὶ καταστήσωσι) the multitude using equitable words (ἐπιεικέσι λόγοις) and useful propositions (δόγμασι χρηστοῖς), since it was not a time for ambition or rivalry for glory, if they were sensible, but a crisis that was perilous and sharp, requiring measures that were reasonable and kind. Cor. 17.3

Plutarch then describes the specific actions that restored harmony: the consuls (1) “held discussions and appeased” the people (διελέγοντο καὶ κατεπράϋνον), (2) “answered their accusations in an equitable manner” (ἀπολυόμενοί τε τὰς διαβολὰς ἐπιεικῶς) and (3) “made only a moderate use of admonition and rebuke” (τῷ νουθετοῦντι καὶ δάκνοντι μετρίως χρώμενοι) (Cor. 17.4). Again, the principle of reciprocity is on view, as the conciliatory tone of the consuls induces the people to become amenable as well: The tribunes stood up and said that, with the Senate acting in a temperate manner (σωφρονούσῃ), the people would yield to it in return (ἀνθυπείξειν) as many things as were honorable. Cor. 18.1

The key to resolving the conflict lay in the people being “brought under control and charmed” by the reasonable manner of the consuls rather than by force (Cor. 18.2). Plutarch’s descriptions of the processes of unsuccessful and successful negotiation with the people provide negative and positive pragmatic lessons in effective leadership for men confronting discontent and unrest among the people. The importance of these lessons is further reflected in the difference between Plutarch’s version of these events and those of the historians. Neither Livy (2.29.9–30.1) nor Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 63.2–67.5) present Coriolanus as active in this debate, but instead have the extreme oligarchical viewpoint presented by Appius Claudius, whose proposals are described by both historians a­ bsence of bribery in Roman politics during Coriolanus’ bid for the consulship (Cor. 14.4), Plutarch had mentioned Anytus—Socrates’ accuser and Alcibiades’ lover (Alc. 4.5)—who was the first to bribe jurors in Athens.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

199

as harsh and severe. By attributing Appius’ conduct to Coriolanus, Plutarch was able to provide a vivid deterrent paradigm of how inflexibility and hostility provoke the people, thereby reinforcing the positive paradigm embedded in the actions of Menenius Agrippa and the group of Roman consuls. Attracting and Retaining Political Support Plutarch constructs his account of the enrollment crisis (Cor. 12–13) to examine the challenge of winning and retaining political support. By this point in his career, Coriolanus has acquired his cognomen at Corioli (11.1) and has become “full of pretension” (μεστὸς … ὄγκου) and lofty in spirit (μέγας … τῷ φρονήματι) (Cor. 13.3).36 After the Plebs demand lower corn prices and refuse to enroll or colonize, Coriolanus musters his own clients to go on a campaign to Antium in defiance of the Plebs. When the army returns laden with booty, the people are jealous of the soldiers and are “aggravated at Marcius” (ἄχθεσθαι τῷ Μαρκίῳ), whose “reputation and power” they now consider oppressive (βαρύνεσθαι) and opposed to them (Cor. 13.4). Subsequent events demonstrate that such defiant display of authority produces only short-lived benefits and that, as stated in advice literature on Kingship, effective rule requires that a statesman cultivate goodwill and elicit willing obedience. Plutarch’s intention to illustrate this principle is reflected in his departure from Dionysius in explaining Coriolanus’ motives during this period. Dionysius reports the dissatisfaction of the citizens when Coriolanus’ army returned from Antium, but their resentment is directed, not at Coriolanus, but at their own leaders whom they blame for depriving them of good fortune (Rom. Ant. 7.19.2–5). Plutarch designs his depictions of Coriolanus’ failed bid for the consulship (Cor. 14–15) and of his trial and banishment (Cor. 16–18) both to reveal the negative consequences of a reputation for being oppressive and to illustrate the importance of a leader’s “stage presence” to his political effectiveness, an issue that was prominent in Pericles as well.37 Plutarch presents the sequence of events leading to Coriolanus’ loss: Coriolanus enters the forum escorted by patricians; the people, seeing this spectacle as pompous (σοβαρός), then become suspicious that he will use his power to deprive them of their liberty; 36  This description echoes the inflated attitudes (φρονήματα … ἐκίνησε καὶ τὰς γνώμας ἐπῆρε) and pretension (ὄγκον) set in motion when Demetrius agreed to being called “King” (Dtr. 18.3). See Chapter 8. 37  As discussed in Chapter 4, Pericles cultivated a very controlled public image which distanced him from the Athenians without attracting the charge of haughtiness, while Fabius appeared in public in all the regalia of his office as dictator to elicit obedience to his authority at a time of crisis.

200

Chapter 5

and, as a result, they “fall away” from their goodwill towards him and elect others (Cor. 15.1–2). In the synkrisis, Plutarch makes a general comment that “self-will” (αὐθάδεια) and pretension (ὄγκος) make a statesman’s deeds “odious” (ἐπαχθεῖς) to the people they are intended to benefit (Cor-Alc 3.2). Plutarch’s depictions of Coriolanus’ defense (Cor. 18.3–5) and trial (21.1–5)— on charges that he attempted to violate the constitution and abrogate the powers of the people—re-emphasize the same themes in a new context. Coriolanus absolutely refuses to make any gestures to pacify the people and again turns their goodwill into anger, this time by making a speech that displayed a “fearlessness not far from contempt and disdain” (τὴν ἐγγὺς ὑπεροψίας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας ἀφοβίαν) (Cor. 18.3): his subsequent banishment (20.4) is thus presented as the result of his own offensive conduct.38 Plutarch’s lesson is clear: had Coriolanus approached the Plebs in a conciliatory way, he could have remained in Rome. Plutarch’s intention to make Coriolanus responsible for his own banishment is revealed in comparisons with the accounts in Dionysius and Livy, which offer two different versions of these events. While Coriolanus does not even appear at his trial in Livy (2.35.3–6),39 in Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 7.34.5) Coriolanus not only is present but delivers a speech which lacks “calculated deference” (εὐλόγιστος αἰδώς) and “prudent caution” (σώφρων εὐλάβεια) and instead expresses “undiluted wrath” (ἄκρατός τις χολὴ) and “oppressive contempt” (βαρεῖα … ὑπεροψία). By having Coriolanus attend his trial and speak, Plutarch conveys the negative effects of an inimical and overbearing approach towards the people instead of accommodating his behavior to suit the character of the people in order to win them over, as recommended in Political Precepts. Exile and Reconciliation Plutarch uses Coriolanus’ exile to treat a range of issues that confronted men in his own era, when banishment based on political differences followed by 38  Plutarch reports that the leaders sought either to humiliate Coriolanus and induce him to appeal for forgiveness—which they knew would be contrary to his nature—or to prompt him to do something that would justify their wrath (Cor. 18.2). Plutarch’s account mirrors Dionysius (Rom. Ant. 7.34.2). 39  Livy (2.35.3–6) presents the dynamics quite differently, with the tribunes demanding that Coriolanus face trial in the assembly and Senate, concluding that they had to “sacrifice one man” to appease the anger of the Plebs (Sed adeo infensa erat coorta plebs, ut unius poena defungendum esset patribus, Livy 2.35.3). When Coriolanus does not appear at his trial, men’s attitudes harden, and he is condemned in his absence and goes into exile (Livy 2.35.6). In Dionysius, the Senate is in the process of voting on a decree to permit the trial when Coriolanus agrees to stand trial before the Plebs (Rom. Ant. 7.57.1–58.1).

Coriolanus-alcibiades

201

recall and reconciliation was not uncommon. Indeed, Plutarch treats this topic in On Exile and On Tranquility of Mind, while Cicero, Seneca and Dio, as noted earlier, all experienced exile and recall and discussed this topic in their writings. Readers commonly are advised to do three things: (1) accept exile with equanimity; (2) remain alert to opportunities to benefit one’s state while in exile and (3) to welcome reconciliation as soon as it is offered. Plutarch portrays Coriolanus as a deterrent paradigm in all three of these areas. In the Parallel Lives, apart from Coriolanus and Alcibiades, several other heroes confront ostracism or exile with varying degrees of success in adhering to these precepts—such as Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Demosthenes and Cicero. Plutarch designs the episodes describing Coriolanus’ conduct in exile to emphasize deterrent lessons in actions to avoid in reacting to exile and in responding to offers of reconciliation with one’s state. Responding to Exile At one level, Coriolanus’ reaction to his election loss and later exile is another manifestion of the anger and resentment that often motivated his actions—precisely the opposite of the equanimity promoted by philosophers and exemplified by statesmen who took their exiles in stride, such as Aristides, Epaminondas and Aristides who are mentioned in the synkrisis (Cor-Alc 4.5–6). In contrast to these exempla, Coriolanus angrily channels his energy into finding a way to take revenge on Rome (Cor. 21.1; 21.4; 23.3–4),40 a decision that lacked “calculation, mildness and moderate endurance of what happened” (Cor. 21.1). He chooses the Volscians both because they are wellsupplied and because, in the face of their recent defeats, they harbor “contentiousness and anger” against Rome (Cor. 21.4). Coriolanus explicitly states to Tullus that he has come “not for the sake of security and safety” (οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἀδείας καὶ σωτηρίας), “but with a desire to take vengeance” (δίκας λαβεῖν χρῄζων) (Cor. 23.3). These motives set up a clear contrast to the less-objectionable reasons that will be attributed to Alcibiades’ defection to the Spartans in the paired Life, where Alcibiades is shown to act out of fear for his life.41 The pragmatic lessons lie in the negative outcomes for Coriolanus among both the Romans and Volscians: he loses his good repute among the Romans, who do not honor 40  Plutarch’s language here closely echoes Cor. 15.3–4, discussed earlier, where Coriolanus, after losing the election, “was neither moderate nor reasonable towards what happened” (οὐ μετρίως ἔσχεν οὐδ’ ἐπιεικῶς πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός), but went away “full of indignation and bitterness” (ταραχῆς μεστὸς ὢν καὶ πικρίας). 41  In the paired Life, Alcibiades’ reason for changing sides is exactly the opposite: he does so only “for safety” when his life is danger (Alc. 23.1, 24.3, 28.1).

202

Chapter 5

him in death (Cor. 39.5), while, among the Volscians, he leaves himself open to the accusation that he threw away their victory (Cor. 39.1–4). Again, Plutarch’s purposeful description of Coriolanus’ conduct in banishment as driven by suppressed rage and a desire for vengeance becomes apparent in a comparison to Dionysius and Livy. Dionysius reports that Coriolanus did nothing unworthy of his greatness: As for himself, Marcius was not seen either weeping for, and loudly lamenting, his fortunes or saying or doing anything else whatsoever unworthy of his own magnanimity; but still more he showed the nobility and the strength of his mind when he arrived home and saw his wife and mother.… For he was not at all affected by the tears and laments of the women, but merely embraced them and exhorted them to endure their misfortunes nobly. DIONYSIUS, Rom. Ant. 7.67.2–3

It is only when Dionysius describes the formation of the alliance with the Volscians that he raises the motive of resentment and the desire for revenge (Rom. Ant. 8.1.1). Livy (2.35.6–7) reports that Coriolanus went into exile “uttering threats against his country, and even then breathing hostility” (minitans patriae hostilesque iam tum spiritus gerens), adding that he readily secured an alliance with the Volscians, who received him with kindness (benigne excepere) because they also hated Rome. Achieving Reconciliation with One’s Native City Plutarch constructs his account of Coriolanus’ failure to reconcile with Rome to supply both positive and negative paradigms for statesmen attempting to reconcile with their cities. The conflict between resentful actions that prevent reconciliation and the high-minded concessions that seek it is first illustrated in the scenes in Rome, where the Plebs’ proposal to recall Coriolanus is rejected by the patricians, who were motivated either by “contentiousness against all the things the people desire” or by anger (Cor. 29.3–4).42 However, when the city is in terror and confusion, the Senate seeks peace, having realized its mistake in “holding on to anger and resentment (ὀργῆς καὶ μνησικακίας) when it had been well to end it” (Cor. 30.2). This “change of heart” provides a positive example against which Coriolanus’ refusal to follow suit can be judged. 42  Plutarch also reports the view of a third group, which faults Coriolanus for injuring his entire state when he had been injured by only part of it. He reiterates this point in the synkrisis at Cor-Alc 2.5.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

203

The four embassies to Coriolanus and his eventual withdrawal from Rome highlight behaviors that keep statesmen from achieving the goal of reconciliation and concord. The first three embassies to Coriolanus each portray inappropriate responses to offers of reconciliation. The first embassy of kinsmen and friends from Rome (Cor. 30) approaches with friendliness and arguments that are “equitable, kind and suitable to its position” (ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ φιλανθρώπους ἐν ἤθει τῷ πρέποντι)—reminiscent of Menenius Agrippa’s approach to his negotiations with the Plebs earlier in the Life—but it is received by Coriolanus “seated with pretension and insufferable oppressiveness” (μετ’ ὄγκου καθεζομένῳ καὶ βαρύτητος οὐκ ἀνεκτῆς) (Cor. 30.3).43 When the second embassy entreats Coriolanus “to abate his anger” (Cor. 31.4), he responds with the same hostility that characterized his speeches in Rome and, towards the third embassy, he makes no concession and acts and speaks “no more gently”, but tells them to settle on his terms or accept war (32.2). In each case, Coriolanus’ refusal to let go of his anger and resentment prevents him from reciprocating with conciliatory gestures that would have enabled him to end the war. Again, differences versus Dionysius point to Plutarch’s deliberate focus on the misjudgments that could be traced to Coriolanus’ anger and inflexibility. Instead of becoming increasingly overbearing with each embassy, as in Plutarch’s Life, Dionysius’ Coriolanus engages the ambassadors with courtesy and rational discussion, as, for instance, when he envisions his life if he were to accept their terms: Shall I choose the course that is safe and free from danger and, going after the offices and honors and the other good things of which I think myself worthy, submit to courting the mob that has authority over these things? In that case, from being good I would become base and I would have no benefit from my former virtue. But if I maintain the same character and defend the same political principles, will I be setting myself against those who do not make the same choice? Isn’t it clear that the people would then fight against me again and think it right to exact other penalties? No one can say otherwise. DIONYSIUS, Rom. Ant. 8.31.2–3

By omitting this type of reasoned exchange with the Roman patricians, Plutarch paints Coriolanus as a man who is blinded by resentment and stubbornly inflexible and who, for these reasons, throws away opportunities to 43  Again, Coriolanus’ conduct is evocative of Demetrius’ haughty attitude after he has become King (Dtr. 42), as is discussed below in Chapter 8.

204

Chapter 5

make peace with the citizens who exiled him. His downfall supplies a clear deterrent paradigm that will be balanced by a positive counter-example in the paired Life, in which Alcibiades will eagerly accept the offer of recall and will show contrition when he returns. Summary: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in Coriolanus Like Pericles and Fabius, Coriolanus provided pragmatic lessons in behavior Plutarch’s politically-active readers should adopt or avoid in their own careers, especially in the area of dealing with election losses, banishment and recall. Although Coriolanus, in his actions at Corioli, supplies a positive role model both in achieving a military victory through concentrated effort at the head of a small band and in dispelling envy by refusing special rewards, he is used by Plutarch primarily to illustrate conduct that undermines political and military effectiveness. In particular, Coriolanus’ tendency to indulge feelings of anger and resentment, combined with a refusal to compromise in order to re-establish harmony, prevent him from maintaining positive relations with his native city, from serving that city in exile and from reconciling with it when opportunities are offered—three challenges still faced in Plutarch’s era. These pragmatic lessons are amplified by authorial comments underscoring the principles at issue, including two comments on reactions to rejection and exile (Cor. 21.1–2, 26.3) and one about reconciliation for dishonorable reasons (Cor-Alc 4.2–4). In addition, Coriolanus’ negative example is reinforced by the positive counter-examples of Menenius Agrippa (Cor. 6) and the Roman senators (17, 18). A further positive counter-example is found in Alcibiades in the paired Life, to which we now turn. 5.3

Life of Alcibiades

Overview Alcibiades (c. 450–404 BC), son of Cleinias and a ward of Pericles, was prominent as a politician and general during the time of Socrates and the Peloponnesian War. He emerged on the political scene in connection with an alliance of Argive cities against Sparta, which led to the disruption of the Peace negotiated by Nicias between Athens and Sparta in 421 and a defeat of the Athenian coalition at Mantinea in 418. He was famous as a prime instigator of the Sicilian Expedition (415–413) and was one of the three generals (along with Nicias and Lamachus) named to lead it. He left the Athenian fleet shortly after its arrival in Sicily to face trial on religious charges, but escaped en route back to Athens and defected to the Spartan side, which he aided until 412.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

205

After leaving Sparta, he allied himself with the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, until rejoining the Athenian forces in Samos and leading them to a string of victories in the Hellespont (412–407). He returned to Athens in 407 having been cleared of the religious charges, but again lost his position as commander after his fleet, in his absence, was defeated at Notium (406). Alcibiades then established himself in Thrace, from where he was said to have warned the Athenian generals ahead of their final defeat at the Battle of Aegospotami (405), and afterwards took refuge with the Persian Pharnabazus. He was murdered in Phrygia in 404. Alcibiades’ career is known largely from Thucydides (Books 5–7), Xenophon’s Hellenica (Book 1) and Diodorus Siculus (12–14),44 although a variety of incidents from his life and career were recorded by the orators, poets and philosophers who were his contemporaries or who lived in the decades after his death.45 While the historians recognize Alcibiades’ private excesses, they concentrate on his excellence in military matters, the circumstances of his exile and recall, and the mixed response of Athenians, who both admired him and feared that his lawlessness would lead him to try to become a tyrant.46 In money matters, there is no common view of the extent to which Alcibiades lived within or beyond his means. In other writers, Alcibiades became famous especially for three events in his life: his association with Socrates, his role in provoking the Sicilian Expedition and his defection to Sparta to fight against his native city—all areas which lent a negative cast to his reputation and legacy. Alcibiades appeared in a wide array of genres, including philosophy, history, oratory, comedy and “biography” in the form of encomia or Lives, each of which highlighted different aspects of his character. Philosophical writings focused on his relationship with Socrates, and in Xenophon (Memorabilia) and Plato (especially Symposium, Alcibiades 1 and 2) he was famous for not applying the lessons of philosophy in his life. Both authors characterize Alcibiades as wanton and extravagant in his private

44  See Verdegem (2010b: 35–48) on the depiction of Alcibiades in Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodorus and Nepos, 45  For a discussion of images of Alcibiades in the literary record, see Gribble (1999), Verdegem (2010b: 48–58). 46  Lawlessness and violation of conventions are mentioned by Thucydides (6.15.4), implied by Xenophon (Hell. 1.4.13–17), criticized in Lysias (14.37–40) and portrayed directly in Plato (Symposium 212C-223A).

206

Chapter 5

behavior, but Plato also emphasizes that he is repentant when Socrates censures him.47 The extraordinary and contradictory qualities of Alcibiades’ character were a conspicuous feature of his persona—an incongruity famously showcased in Aristophanes’ Frogs (1427–1433). Orators made the case on both sides. Lysias (14.30–40) and Andocides (Against Alcibiades) censured Alcibiades on three primary grounds: his alliance with Sparta against Athens, his lawless and unrestrained behavior in Athens, and his extravagant spending to win political support.48 Isocrates (De Bigis 41–44), in contrast, provided a positive picture that refuted these allegations and focused instead on Alcibiades’ unjust exile (which excused his alliance with Sparta), his military excellence (which brought Athens back from the brink), and his continuous efforts to serve Athens. Demosthenes referred to both sides of Alcibiades’ character in Against Meidias (143–150), citing his insolent private behavior as well as his beneficial actions on Athens’ behalf. Among Latin writers, Alcibiades also had a mixed reputation. Valerius Maximus cites five incidents that reflect Alcibiades’ mixed character and his relationship with Socrates,49 while Nepos’ biography points to great virtues and great vices as his outstanding feature.50 Frontinus draws incidents from Alcibiades’ career to illustrate principles of good generalship in seven different areas.51 Not surprisingly, Plutarch includes Alcibiades in the Moralia in a variety of contexts where he is a model of military excellence, as well as a bad example of 47  Plato describes Alcibiades’ repentant behavior at Symposium 216B–C. In Aristotle, regret for vice is one sign of the akratic individual who knows what virtue is, but still practices vice and afterwards is ashamed (NE 7). 48  Of these three criticisms, Plutarch places greatest emphasis in the Life on Alcibiades’ unrestrained behavior in Athens, while largely glossing over his alliance with Sparta and his extravagant spending to win political support. 49  Alcibiades is cited in Valerius Maximus five times (1.7.ext 9; 3.1.ext 1; 6.9.ext 4; 7.2.ext 7; and 8.8.ext 1), including the mixed opinion about him and the difficulty of judging whether he did more harm than good to Athens (3.1.ext 1; 6.9.ext 4) and his advice to Pericles to look for a way not to render accounts (3.1.ext 1). 50  Nepos depicts Alcibiades as a blend of virtue and vice when he states that “In this man, Nature seems to have tried to see what she could accomplish; for it is agreed by all who have written his biography that he was never excelled either in faults or virtues” (constat enim inter omnes qui de eo memoriae prodiderunt nihil illo fuisse excellentius vel in vitiis vel in virtutibus) (Nepos, Alc. 1.1). 51  Frontinus cites Alcibiades in the areas of “ambushes” (Strat. 2.5.44, 45); “on concealing reverses” (2.7.6); “on deceiving the beseiged” (3.2.6); “on distracting a hostile garrison” (3.6.6); “on attacks from an unexpected quarter (3.9.6); “on pretended retirements” (3.9.3) and “on stimulating the vigilance of one’s own troops” (3.12.1).

Coriolanus-alcibiades

207

private excess. In On the Glory of Athens, Alcibiades is praised for his “spirited exploits” (345D) in the Hellespont and the victories that “revived the city laid prostrate by her failure in Sicily” (349E), as well as for orchestrating the alliance of the Mantineans and Eleans against Sparta (351B). With regard to Socrates, Plutarch portrays Alcibiades as a young man with great natural ability who has difficulty embracing the lessons of philosophy.52 In How to Tell a Flatterer, for instance, Socrates’ friendship towards Alcibiades illustrated the need to be severe towards a friend carried away by “pleasure or anger or insolence” (69F).53 However, in On Delays in Divine Vengeance, Alcibiades is grouped with Militiades, Cimon and Themistocles as men whose “great natures” induced them to “drift about on heavy seas” (ἐν σάλῳ διαφέρονται) engaging in some disreputable conduct before coming to rest “in their abiding and settled characters” (εἰς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεστηκὸς ἦθος) (552B–C) and producing great benefits for their states.54 Plutarch constructs the Life to bring to light both phases of Alcibiades’ evolution as a great nature from a man harming his state to one trying to help it. As a statesman, Alcibiades appears in several negative contexts in Old Men in Politics and Political Precepts. First, he exemplifies the flaws in young statesmen, including daring and contentiousness (Old Men in Politics 784C–D) as well as insolence and luxuriousness (Pol. Prec. 799E). Alcibiades also uses lavish expenditures—a form of flattery—rather than virtue to attract the demos (Pol. Prec. 823D). Plutarch’s most emphatic criticism, however, is linked to the destructive impact of Alcibiades’ wantonness and lawlessness on both his reputation and his consequent inability to retain office at critical moments:

52  This view is expressed in “On the Fortune of Alexander”, where Plutarch compares the positive impact of Aristotle’s teaching on Alexander to the disregard of philosophy by Alcibiades (328B–C). 53  The theme of Alcibiades’ incomplete learning also emerges in On Progress in Virtue when Plutarch cites the need not simply to admire and commend—even to the point of shedding a tear like Alcibiades—but more importantly to act upon what one learns (On Progress in Virtue 84D). 54  Plutarch’s concept of a great nature is described in On Delays in Divine Vengeance as a man of great natural ability capable of doing great harm and great good to his state, and who also may need to mature into his full potential to benefit his state. In contrast, Plato’s concept was less dynamic, implying a nature that either produced good or harm, depending on the quality of his nurturing. As presented by Plutarch, Alcibiades’ character traits and history closely match Plato’s descriptions of the attributes and corruption of a great nature in Republic 5–6 (478A, 491B-492A, 494B–495A).

208

Chapter 5

What need is there, for instance, to speak of Alcibiades, who, though he was most active (ἐνεργότατον) of all citizens in public affairs and undefeated (ἀήττητον) as general, was ruined by the lack of restraint and audacity (ἀναγωγία καὶ θρασύτης) in his way of life, and who, because of his extravagance and licentiousness, deprived the State (τὴν πόλιν ὰνόνητον ἐποίησε) of the benefit of his other good qualities? Pol. Prec. 800D

Ιn this passage, it is Alcibiades’ own conduct—rather than the Athenians or unscrupulous opponents—that causes his ruin and prevents him from saving Athens from defeat. In the Lives, Alcibiades plays an active role in Pericles (20.2–3; 37.1, as Pericles’ ward), Nicias (8–15, as a rival), Lysander (3.1; 4.1; 4.5, 5.1–5; 11, as an enemy general) and Agesilaus (3.1–2, as a lover to Timaea and father of Leotychides). In Pericles, he incites Athenians “with an ill-starred passion for Sicily” (Σικελίας ὁ δύσερως) (Per. 20.2–3)—in direct contrast to Pericles’ strategy of maintaining the status quo—and also is one of the friends who convince Pericles to return to public life after he had been removed from office and fined (Per. 37.1). Alcibiades is also mentioned in various contexts in Lycurgus (16.3–4, on his nurse and tutor), Numa (8.10, as one of the “most prudent and bravest of the Greeks” (τὸν φρονιμώτατον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρειότατον Ἑλλήνων), Aristides (7.2–3, on his deflection of ostracism onto Hyperbolus), Demosthenes (1.1, on the encomium for his victory at the chariot race), Phocion (3.4, where his bravery is contrasted to that of Epaminondas) and Antony (70.1, in reference to Timon’s view that Alcibiades would cause trouble for Athens). In Alcibiades, Plutarch unites the positive and negative elements of Alcibiades’ legacy in a portrait of flawed statesmanship. The Life illustrates how Alcibiades’ audacity and lack of restraint during his early career ultimately led to an inability to retain support in Athens at critical moments, which prevented him from saving Athens from catastrophe in Sicily and from defeat in the Peloponnesian War. However, Plutarch also presents Alcibiades as a positive paradigm in generalship as well as a model of serving one’s state in exile and enthusiastically reconciling with one’s city. Moral Foundation and Reputation In Alcibiades, Plutarch provides a new perspective on the alliance of philosophy and political effectiveness. In the Life, Alcibiades was sought out and trained by Socrates, but he neither practiced temperance in his private life nor did he cultivate a reputation for moral integrity in the public arena. In his initial summary of Alcibiades’ character, Plutarch flags the twists and turns in his

Coriolanus-alcibiades

209

career, as well as his love of rivalry and of being first, the key natural attributes of young men destined for renown: His character later showed many inconsistencies (ἀνομοιότητας) and changes (μεταβολὰς), as is reasonable in the midst of great deeds and varied fortunes. But, by nature, of his many great passions, his contentiousness (φιλόνικον) and love of being first (φιλόπρωτον) were the strongest. Alc. 2.1

Plutarch uses the early chapters (Alc. 1–12) to showcase Alcibiades’ intelligence and bravery (2.2–3.1), as well as his unconventional and ostentatious conduct from boyhood on.55 While the stories from childhood present Alcibiades breaking established conventions (Alc. 2.2–5; 3.1), incidents from his youth (4–9) demonstrate how he acquired a reputation for wantonness through drunken revelry (4.5, 19.1), violence and lawlessness (3.1, 7.1, 8.1 and 16.4), relations with courtesans (8.3–4, 16.5) and extravagant ways of gaining and spending money (5.1–3, 8.2, 11.1, 13.2–3). With regard to his skill as an orator, Plutarch quotes Theophrastus’ comment on Alcibiades’ ability to discern what was “required in any given case”56 and presents Alcibiades winning over every type of audience (Alc. 13.3–5, 15.2–3, 14.7, 17.2).57 Guidance of Socrates Plutarch’s assessment of Alcibiades as a great nature is reflected in repeated references to the “εὐφυΐα” recognized by Socrates58 (Alc. 1.3, 4.1–2, 6.1, 7.3) 55  See Duff (2005), Verdegem (2005b; 2010b: 121–128). 56  To attest his skill in oratory, Plutarch quotes Theophrastus’ comment that Alcibiades was “of all men the most capable (πάντων ἱκανώτατος) of discovering and understanding what was required in a given case (εὑρεῖν … τὰ δέοντα καὶ νοῆσαι)” (Alc. 10.3). 57  Alcibiades diverts ostracism onto Hyperbolus (Alc. 13.3–5), convinces Argos and Patrae to build long walls (Alc. 15.2–3), induces the Spartans to trust him instead of Nicias (Alc. 14.7) and “fans into flame” (ἀναφλέξας) the Athenians’ desire to take Sicily (Alc. 17.2). 58  Plato’s agricultural imagery of a great nature as a fertile field in need of proper cultivation is echoed in Socrates’ view of Alcibiades as a “plant in bloom”(ὥσπερ φυτὸν ἐν ἄνθει) whose fruit could become useless if he were corrupted by the “throng of citizens, foreigners and allies” (ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ συμμάχων ὄχλον) who would try to “pre-empt his affections by flattery and favor” (προκαταλαμβάνοντα κολακείαις καὶ χάρισιν) (Alc. 4.1). The image of Alcibiades’ “great nature” as fertile soil is even clearer in Nicias, where Alcibiades’ nature is compared to the soil of Egypt that produced both good (ἐσθλὰ) and deadly (λυγρά) drugs and is described as “great and illustrious, flowing towards both [good and evil]” (ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα πολλὴ ῥυεῖσα καὶ λαμπρά) (Nic. 9.1).

210

Chapter 5

and Alcibiades’ attachment to Socrates (6.2–4, 6.6, 7.4). Plutarch asserts that, because of his “good natural parts” (ὑπ’ εὐφυΐας), he ultimately “saw all that was in Socrates and clung to him”(Alc. 4.2) and, in Socrates’ presence, became “humble and cautious” and aware of “how great were his deficiencies and how incomplete his virtue” (6.4).59 This characterization of Alcibiades’ relationship with Socrates serves two purposes.60 First, Alcibiades is established as a great nature who has internalized Socrates’ teaching, but fails, as a young man, to consistently integrate it into his conduct. When he first enters the political arena, flatterers (τοῖς κόλαξι) appeal to his love of pleasure (Alc. 6.1), while corrupters (οἱ διαφθείροντες) use his ambition and love of reputation to lure him into disreputable conduct (Alc. 6.3). Both vulnerabilities are shared by young men in every era—including Plutarch’s younger readers who might see an instructive deterrent example in this description.61 Secondly, the attachment to Socrates sets the stage for Alcibiades to mature into more restrained behavior (On Delays in Divine Veng. 552B–C), thereby justifying Plutarch’s lenient interpretation of his first exile and his consistent portrayal of Alcibiades acting in the interest of Athens whenever he served as her general and throughout his second exile. Indeed, in the second half (Alc. 25–39), after Alcibiades’ recall, Plutarch does not report any wanton or outrageous conduct, but instead pre­ sents Alcibiades as a paradigm of effective statesmanship and generalship in a variety of contexts.62 By presenting Alcibiades as a great nature who settles into laudable conduct later in his career, Plutarch creates a portrait that contrasts sharply with the ongoing deterioration in the conduct of Coriolanus who, unlike Alcibiades, lacked training in philosophy.63 Dedication to One’s Native City Despite Alcibiades’ exiles, Plutarch’s Life emphasizes his dedication to the well-being of Athens. Plutarch shows Alcibiades simultaneously seeking glory 59  Plutarch repeats the same assessment at Alc. 6.1: “The love of Socrates … somehow mastered Alcibiades. For, he was of good natural parts, and the words of his teacher took hold of him and wrung his heart and brought tears to his eyes”. However, Alcibiades’ resolve would disappear when he was not with Socrates, and it is only in the period after his first exile that the lessons seem to finally be bearing fruit. A similar “akratic” tendency is noted in Plutarch’s characterization of Antony, as discussed in Chapter 8. 60  On Alcibiades’ relationship with Socrates, see Duff (1999b), Pelling (2005b), Verdegem (2010b). 61  Antony as a youth similarly is lured into despicable conduct by Curio (who “fell on him like a pest” (ὥσπερ τινὰ κῆρα προσπεσεῖν)) and then by Clodius (Ant. 2.3–4). See Chapter 8. 62  Verdegem (2010b) discusses this change as central to the lessons of the Life. 63  Pelling (1988b: 25) notes a similar contrast between the ongoing decline in Demetrius’ conduct and the late improvement in Antony.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

211

for himself and serving the needs of Athens, especially as a general (Alc. 15.3; 21.6).64 Alcibiades’ love of Athens forms the basis for Plutarch’s argument that Alcibiades was fully committed to Athens’ victory after becoming commanderin-chief of the Athenian forces (Alc. 35.1). Plutarch—like the historians—unequivocally links Alcibiades’ absence from the fleet at the time of Antiochus’ defeat at Notium to the performance of some military duty: either, as Plutarch asserts, to collect resources for his men (Alc. 35.5–6)65 or, as others suggest, to link up with another general (Xen. Hell 1.5.11) or to assist allies (Diodorus 13.71.2).66 Moreover, Alcibiades’ decisions to fight against Athens and later change sides (several times) are consistently tied to his fear for his life (Alc. 23.1 to Sparta; 24.3 to Tissaphernes; 26.3 to the Athenians at Samos).67 Plutarch’s ­intention to soften criticism of Alcibiades’ conduct as “traitorous” during his first exile is reflected both in the brevity of his treatment of this period (Alc. 22–25) and in his emphasis on how Sparta (Alc. 23.1) and then Tissaphernes (Alc. 24.3) each turned against Alcibiades and forced him to change allian­ ces. Unlike Coriolanus, Alcibiades is never depicted as wanting to destroy Athens—a point Plutarch reiterates in the synkrisis when he suggests that 64  Thus, in the Mantinean alliance (Alc. 15.1) and the aid to the Argives, he “acquired favor and power for himself no less than for his city” (οὐχ ἧττον ἑαυτῷ κτώμενος ἢ τῇ πόλει χάριν καὶ ἰσχύν) (Alc. 15.3). 65  This version of events is also implied in Lysander (4–5), where Alcibiades’ absence from the fleet (Lys. 5.1) is reported immediately after Lysander has visited Cyrus and procured funds to raise sailors’ pay to 4 obols per day—which “soon emptied the ships of his enemies” (Lys. 4.4–5). 66  While the other historians do not report Alcibiades collecting money at the time of the defeat, they do repeatedly mention periods when Alcibiades—or the other generals—are absent collecting money to pay the sailors and finance supplies. Plutarch adopts a variant that would more readily raise suspicions of wanton behavior and give a firmer basis for the credence given to the claims that he neglected his duty. 67  The historians also explain Alcibiades’ changing alliances as motivated by self-preservation. In Thucydides, Alcibiades tells the Spartans: “And it is not, as I conceive, against a country still my own (οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι) that I am now going, but far rather one no longer mine (τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν) that I am seeking to recover (ἀνακτᾶσθαι ). And the true patriot is not the man who, having unjustly lost his fatherland, refrains from attacking it, but he who in his yearning for it tries in every way to get it back (ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν)” (Thuc. 6.92.4). Nepos, in turn, quotes Alcibiades as saying that he “waged war, not against his country, but against his personal enemies (non adversus patriam, sed inimicos suos), since they were also the enemies of their country; for although they knew that he could be of great service to the state (se plurimum prodesse posse reipublicae), they had caused his banishment, having an eye rather to their own resentment than to the public welfare (plusque irae suae quam utilitati communi paruisse)” (Nepos, Alc. 4.6).

212

Chapter 5

Alcibiades associated with Tissaphernes in order to prevent “the Athens to which he longed to return from being utterly destroyed” (Cor-Alc 2.7). The problematic first exile forms the backdrop for the portrayal of Alcibiades as fully dedicated to Athens’ welfare during his second exile, which provides a positive counter-example to the conduct of Coriolanus, who changed sides out of revenge and stopped serving Rome for its own sake. Finally, the process of reconciliation brings to the fore other fundamental qualities of character that also differ from Coriolanus. Alcibiades is shown to have retained an ambition for reputation acquired from noble deeds—the sentiment Socrates sought to foster in Alcibiades at Potidaea (Alc. 7.3) —when he delays his return to Athens (after his recall) until he can return with glory (ἐνδόξως, Alc. 27.1). Even in his second exile, Alcibiades’ concern for Athens induces him to warn the generals ahead of the Battle of Aegospotami because he could not “stand by and watch with indifference” (οὐ περιεῖδεν οὐδ’ ἠμέλησεν) (Alc. 36.5).68 In the synkrisis (Cor-Alc 2.4), this conduct makes Alcibiades worthy of comparison with Aristides as a positive paradigm of putting the welfare of one’s state ahead of private concerns, public rivalries or resentment at rejection. Cultivating a Reputation as Unworthy of Public Trust As in Pericles, Plutarch provides a “road-map”, of sorts, in behavior to adopt or avoid in order to cultivate a trustworthy reputation, which helps a statesman influence policy at critical moments. Despite Alcibiades’ eventual maturation into his “settled character”—the process described in On Delays in Divine Vengeance, noted above—his outrageous conduct as a young man has a lasting negative impact on his reputation and undercuts his effectiveness as a leader. This “indelible” stain constitutes one of the central deterrent lessons for statesmen in the Life—especially for the young men who still had the option of cultivating a good reputation in the manner of Militiades and Pericles (Political Precepts 800C). The precept at issue is stated clearly in Political Precepts (800B– E): Educate your character and put it in order because the people hold the

68  Xenophon (Hell. 2.1.25) simply reports that Alcibiades approached the generals before Aegospotami but does not discuss motives, while Diodorus (13.105.3–4) links Alcibiades’ offer to help the generals to initiate battle to a renewed desire to “achieve by his own efforts some great success for his country and through his benefactions to bring the people back to their old affection for him” (Diod. 13.104.4). Nepos, like Plutarch, attributes Alcibiades’ approach to the generals as motivated by “an inability to renounce his love for his country” (neque tamen a caritate patriae potuit recedere) (Nepos, Alc. 8.1).

Coriolanus-alcibiades

213

opinion that governing and public office should be “clean of all eccentricities and errors” (καθαρεύειν…. πάσης ἀτοπίας καὶ πλημμελείας). In this dimension of his statesmanship, Alcibiades is the exact opposite of Pericles, who refused to attend dinner parties and allowed himself to be seen in public only in connection with public business, as discussed in the prior chapter. Alcibiades, in contrast, is shown deliberately cultivating a reputation for outlandishness: for instance, when everyone is “railing against him” (λοιδοροῦσιν αὐτὸν) for cutting off his dog’s tail, he bursts out laughing and says, “That’s just what I want; for Athens to talk about this, that it may say nothing worse about me” (Alc. 9.1). Among reputable citizens, his actions provoke aggravation (δυσχεραινόντων, Alc. 4.5; 16.2), irritation (συναγανακτούντων, 8.1) and loathing (τοῦ βδελύττεσθαι, 16.2) and undermine the good repute he was acquiring as a political and military leader: But in the midst of these sorts of political actions and eloquence and high-mindedness and cleverness, there were, in turn, his very luxurious way of life, his insolent actions in drinking and love affairs, the effeminacy of his purple robes trailing after him through the marketplace and his prodigal extravagance.… Reputable men … feared his disdain and lawlessness (ὀλιγωρίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρανομίαν) as tyrannical and monstrous (τυραννικὰ καὶ ἀλλόκοτα). Alc. 16.1–2

The flaws listed here—luxury (τὴν τρυφὴν τῆς διαίτης), insolence (ὑβρίσματα), and extravagance (πολυτέλειαν)—are often linked to failed leadership in the Lives.69 The central role of reputation is illustrated forcefully in the consequences of the resulting suspicions about his motives in public life. The discrepancy between Alcibiades’ strengths as a statesman and his private indulgences—described as “the unevenness of his nature” (τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀνωμαλίαν)—caused public opinion about him to be undecided (ἄκριτος) (Alc. 16.6), with resulting vacillation in support preventing him from retaining power. This divided opinion is a recurrent theme in the Life (for instance, at Alc. 16.5 regarding the painting of Nemea; at 34.6 regarding the procession to Eleusis; and at 39.5 regarding his death). By creating a link between Alcibiades’ uncertain reputation and his exile, Plutarch creates a negative paradigm of how a failure to 69  Many of the same traits are associated with Demetrius and Antony (Dtr. 1.7), discussed in Chapter 8, as well as with some kings and tyrants, such as Dionysius, Perseus and the Diadochi across the series.

214

Chapter 5

manage reputation undercuts political effectiveness: his outlandish conduct in private life caused people to mistrust his motives in public office, making it easier for Alcibiades’ enemies to have him removed from command at critical moments—precisely the point Plutarch makes at Political Precepts 800D. After his departure for Sicily, his enemies tie the charges that he defaced the Hermes and violated the Mysteries to a conspiracy to overthrow the government (Alc. 20.3) and were eventually are able to have him condemned (23.1–2). The importance of this lesson is reflected in Plutarch’s decision to echo Thucydides rather than Diodorus.70 Like Thucydides (6.15.4), Plutarch links the fear that Alcibiades aimed at tyranny to a reaction to his lifestyle, rather than incorporating Diodorus’ view (Rom. Ant. 13.5.1–2) that this fear was tied to the attempts by Alcibiades’ friends to overthrow democracy in Argos. By choosing a version that placed the “blame” for the suspicions about Alcibiades on his private excesses, Plutarch makes Alcibiades ultimately responsible for their effect in later preventing him from retaining power and saving Athens. Pragmatic Lessons in Political and Military Leadership Alcibiades is designed to treat relations with the people, exile and reconciliation from a different perspective than was presented in Coriolanus. Plutarch conveys two distinct portraits of Alcibiades, not unlike his portrayal of Pericles: first, as a youthful statesman before the Sicilian Expedition (10–16) and, secondly, as a mature statesman after he rejoins the Athenian forces at Samos (25– 39).71 The two characterizations are divided by a brief account of Alcibiades’ alliances with Athens’ enemies (17–24). By separating Alcibiades’ early and later careers in Athens, Plutarch is able to cast Alcibiades as a deterrent paradigm of a statesman whose effectiveness as a mature leader suffers as a result of his conduct as a young man. Coriolanus’ Life also included two “careers” (one in Rome and one among the Volscians), but the nature of Coriolanus’ statesmanship did not change. Plutarch structures Alcibiades to provide both positive and deterrent paradigms in three spheres: (1) Relations with other Athenians, (2) Military command and (3) Exile and reconciliation. The sequence of episodes in Table 5.2 is 70  Verdegem (2010b: 37–38) discusses how Thucydides portrays Alcibiades as provoking the suspicions that enabled his enemies to successfully accuse him. 71  The pattern of problematic behavior early in a career and of honorable conduct once in power is common in the Parallel Lives, including Pericles, Cimon and Caesar, to name a few. Plutarch’s characterization of Octavian in Antony follows a similar trajectory of improvement, as we will discuss in Chapter 8.

215

Coriolanus-alcibiades table 5.2 Episodes in the Life of Alcibiades Relations with other Athenians

Military command

Exile and reconciliation

Phase 1: Incidents from boyhood and youth (Chapters 1–9) 1- Family history; childhood 2–3- Stories from boyhood 4–6- Socrates and other lovers 8–9- Provocative conduct

7- Potidaea and Delium; Service alongside Socrates

Phase 2: Entry into public life; rise to prominence (10–16) 10- Debut in the assembly 11–12- Victories in Olympics; appropriates Diomedes’ chariot 13- Ostracism of Hyperbolus 14- Disrupts Peace of Nicias 16- Summary of private reputation

15- Mantinean Alliance; actions in Argos and Patrae

Phase 3: Fall from power; conduct during first exile (17–25) 17–18- Sicilian debate 19–21- Charges related to Hermes 22- Impeached and condemned

21- Reaches Sicily; departs when 22- Prevents Athenians from summoned to trial in Athens taking Messana 23- To Sparta for safety; relations with Timaea 24- Advises Spartan generals; brings Ionia to revolt from Athens; to Tissaphernes for 25- Contacts fleet in Samos safety

Phase 4: Reconciliation with Athens; second rise to prominence (26–34)

27- Athenians recall Alcibiades

26- Appointed general in Samos; prevents attack on the Piraeus 27- Victory at Abydos 27- Imprisoned by Tissaphernes 28- Escapes from Tissaphernes

216

Chapter 5

table 5.2 Episodes in the Life of Alcibiades (cont.) Relations with other Athenians

Military command

32–33- Returns to Athens

28- Victory at Cyzicus 29- Routs Pharnazbazus; sets up trophy at Abydos; treaty in Bithynia 30- Victory at Chalcedon 30- Victory at Selymbria 31- Victory at Byzantium 34- Escort to Eleusis

Exile and reconciliation

Phase 5: Second fall from power; conduct during second exile; death and burial (35–39) 35- Named general in Athens 36- Deposed as general

38- Athenians regret casting Alcibiades aside and want him back

35- Fails to capture Andros; Antiochus is defeated at Notium 36- Goes to his fortress in 36- Advises Athenian generals Thrace for safety ahead of Aegospotami 37- After Aegospotami, goes to Bithynia; plans to go to Artaxerxes 38- Critias, Lysander and Pharnabazus want Alcibiades killed 39- Alcibiades is killed in Phrygia; buried by Timandra

allocated across these spheres, and Alcibiades’ career is divided into five phases. In Phase 1 (1–9), Plutarch presents Alcibiades’ boyhood and youth, including his association with Socrates. Phase 2 (10–16) describes his rise to prominence before the Sicilian Expedition, while Phase 3 (17–25) covers the Sicilian debate, Alcibiades’ banishment and his alliances with Athens’ enemies. In Phase 4 (26–34), Alcibiades rejoins the Athenians in Samos, achieves numerous victories in Ionia and the Hellespont, returns to Athens and escorts the procession to Eleusis, while Phase 5 (35–39) describes the path to his second exile and his conduct after Athens’ defeat. The Life closes with Alcibiades’ death and burial. While the deterrent paradigms are concentrated in the early phases of Alcibiades’ Life, and the positive lessons later, Plutarch also demonstrates the

Coriolanus-alcibiades

217

lasting negative impact an untrustworthy reputation created in youth can have on political effectiveness throughout one’s career. Relations with Other Athenians Plutarch’s presentation of Alcibiades’ relationship with the Athenians is concentrated in the early chapters of the Life, which is crowded with incidents illustrating the unconventional, extravagant and, at times, lawless behavior that earned Alcibiades a reputation for being unpredictable and untrustworthy. However, the pragmatic lessons for statesmen and generals reside in the ­choices and conduct that caused Alcibiades to be unable to retain the support of the people at critical moments. Plutarch links this deficiency to two factors: (1) his reliance on lavish expenditures rather than virtue to gain the support of the people and (2) his early reputation for excesses in private life. In both areas, Alcibiades violates precepts of statesmanship for which he is cited as a negative example in Political Precepts (799D–E; 800D; and 823D–E) and makes himself vulnerable to vacillating support (and sudden rejection) by the people and false accusations from his rivals. The Life thus reinforces the importance of reputation which is emphasized in Cicero’s De Officiis and in Quintilian, as discussed in Chapter 2. Attracting Support through Virtue, Not Spending As a corollary to his private excesses, Alcibiades tries to win over the people through lavish spending, beginning with his first entry into the public arena when he sought applause in an assembly by making a contribution (Alc. 10.1). In this conduct, he violates the general precept that statesmen should solicit support through virtue, since the support gained by other means is unreliable: theatrical performances, distributions of money and gladiatorial shows only produce a reputation that is “ephemeral and uncertain” (ἐφημερὸν … καὶ ἀβέβαιον) (Pol. Prec. 821F). Indeed, Alcibiades is cited as an example of a statesman valued for paying the bill more than for his advice (Pol. Prec. 823D). In the Life, Plutarch points to expenditures as one of the primary means Alcibiades relied upon to win over the Athenians: For his voluntary contributions (ἐπιδόσεις), his support for choral exhibitions (χορηγίαι), the unsurpassed magnificence of his actions for the city, the reputation of his ancestors, his powerful eloquence and the comeliness and strength of his body, together with his experience and prowess in war, made the Athenians accept and tolerate everything else. Alc. 16.3

218

Chapter 5

The deterrent lesson lies not in the use of spending, per se, to gain support, but in the unstable quality of that support. Plutarch captures this instability by quoting Aristophanes’ comment that the people “yearn for him, hate him, but want him back” (Ποθεῖ μέν, ἐχθαίρει δέ, βούλεται δ’ ἔχειν) and illustrates it in the account of Alcibiades winning support for the Sicilian Expedition (Alc. 17.2–3), only to have the people, shortly after his departure, pass a decree in anger, “dashing against him like a torrent” (21.5; 22.2). Similarly, after Alcibiades returns and leads the procession to Eleusis, the people “of the humbler and lower sort” (τοὺς δὲ φορτικοὺς καὶ πένητας) are eager to make him tyrant (Alc. 34.6), but are also quick to remove him from office in anger after the defeat at Notium (35.5–6). Later, after the war has been lost, they want him back (Alc. 38.1–2). This fickleness in popular support is one of the characteristics of the people that a statesman must take into account in his public conduct in Political Precepts, and Plutarch crafts his account of Alcibiades’ relations with the Athenians to demonstrate how Alcibiades’ failure to recognize this fickleness undermines his ability to retain office. This theme frequently recurs across the Lives, including in Phocion, which we discuss in Chapter 9. Limiting Vulnerability to Slander A second deterrent lesson lies in Alcibiades’ vulnerability, in the absence of a reputation for virtue, to false accusations that readily gain credence. Although Plutarch does not describe any disreputable conduct by Alcibiades after his appointment as a general leading the Sicilian Expedition (Alc. 18.1)—only unsubstantiated charges of impiety (Alc. 19.1–2; 20.2–5) and various rumors (23; 39), including of his liaison with Agis’ wife—the reputation Alcibiades created earlier has ruinous effects. In his absence, his enemies easily stir up mistrust among the people on charges that he violated the Mysteries (Alc. 19–21), charges Plutarch describes as the political maneuvering of Alcibiades’ enemies (Alc. 20.3). Similarly, Alcibiades’ reputation lends credibility to their charge that it was Alcibiades’ neglect of duty that led to the defeat at Notium (Alc. 36.1–2). In both cases, the people are persuaded to support decrees against Alcibiades, making it impossible for him to save Athens from defeat in Sicily or in the Peloponnesian War. Thus, his disreputable conduct in private life ultimately harms his city. In explaining the second exile, Plutarch integrates both aspects of the “unevenness in character” mentioned at Alc. 16.6: Alcibiades’ exceptional abilities raised expectations of victory, while his reputation for wanton conduct made the accusations of licentiousness and neglect of duty believable

Coriolanus-alcibiades

219

(Alc. 35.2).72 Plutarch’s interpretation echoes Nepos’ comment in his Alcibiades (Nepos, Alc. 7.2) that a man can be ruined by a reputation for invincibility. Nepos, however, also ties Alcibiades’ removal to renewed fears of tyranny (Nepos, Alc. 7.3)—which, while present in Plutarch’s Life, do not motivate his exile. By connecting Alcibiades’ reputation for private indulgence to his final dismissal from office—rather than fear that he aimed at tyranny—Plutarch sharpens the contrast between Alcibiades’ love of Athens on the one hand and the tarnished reputation that made that love suspect, on the other. Military Command In contrast to the deterrent paradigms provided by incidents in Athens, Plutarch’s accounts of Alcibiades’ military exploits supply an array of positive paradigms.73 By passing over Alcibiades’ military actions against Athens during his first exile, Plutarch is able to paint a highly positive picture of Alcibiades as a military genius who applied his skills on behalf of his native city before and after his first exile. Incidents in military life are concentrated in the period after Alcibiades abandons his alliances with Athens’ enemies (Alc. 23–25) and reunites with the fleet in Samos (Alc. 26). The pragmatic lessons for generals are concentrated in two areas: (1) discerning the best strategy in each situation and (2) winning over the army to the best plan. While his actions at Potidea and Delium (Alc. 7.3–4) propel his first rise to prominence, his competency in additional areas fuels his return to power later. Discerning the Best Strategy for Each Situation Plutarch’s accounts of the battles in the Hellespont and Ionia not only place the full range of Alcibiades’ military skills on view, but also provide instructive paradigms of effective generalship. Plutarch includes summaries of the strategies that brought Alcibiades victory at Abydos (Alc. 27.2–3), Cyzicus (28.2–6), Chalcedon (30.1), Selymbria (30.2) and Byzantium (31.2–5), as well as a demonstration of Alcibiades’ foresight ahead of Aegospotami (36.5). Alcibiades’ successes are traced to a variety of strategies and tactics, including positioning of troops, clever appeals to citizens to surrender before battle, ambushes and tricks—areas of generalship in which Alcibiades is mentioned in Frontinus’

72  Xenophon links Alcibiades’ removal from command after Notium to accusations of neglect of duty or wanton conduct. His explanation of Alcibiades’ absence, however, corresponds with Plutarch’s (Xen, Hell. 1.5.16–17). 73  For a discussion of Alcibiades’ military skills and his reputation, see Verdegem (2005c).

220

Chapter 5

Strategemata, as noted above. For instance, to buy time in Selymbria until his entire army could arrive, Alcibiades ordered a formal proclamation be made that Selymbrians not bear arms against Athens, thereby undercutting their eagerness to fight in hopes of a peaceful settlement (Alc. 30.4).74 Later, in Byzantium, Alcibiades deceives the garrison by letting it be known that he had to return to Ionia and then sailing off in broad daylight, only to return at night and take the city (Alc. 31.2–4). At Aegospotami, he informs the generals of several weaknesses in their position: their anchorage was bad, their source of supplies too far away, and their practice of allowing crews to wander about on land was unwise in the face of an enemy “trained to do everything silently and at a word of absolute command” (Alc. 36.5). In contrast to Thucydides and Diodorus, who both attribute most of the victories to the Athenian generals working together, Plutarch places the spotlight exclusively on Alcibiades and places his fellow generals—Thrasybulus, Thrasyllus and Theramenes—in the background.75 Indeed, Plutarch’s depiction of these victories echoes the characterization of Coriolanus in the paired Life as a general whose presence or absence alone determined which side would prevail. By placing Alcibiades at the center of Athens’ comeback after the Sicilian disaster, Plutarch conveys the possibility that Athens would have defeated Sparta had Alcibiades retained its trust76—an impression reinforced by his description of Alcibiades trying to “give the generals a lesson” (ἐδίδασκε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, Alc. 36.5) ahead of Aegospotami. Persuading the Army to Support One’s Strategy Plutarch also uses actions after Samos to present Alcibiades as a positive paradigm in other areas. First, like Pericles and Fabius, Alcibiades is a model of resolute resistance to pressures to abandon his best thinking when he restrains the fleet from attacking Piraeus: Plutarch describes him as “a great leader” (ἄρχοντι μεγάλῳ) because he refused to gratify the desires of the multitude “as an ordinary man” (ὁ δ’ οὐχ οἷον ἄν τις ἄλλος) would have done (Alc. 26.4). Instead, he “manifestly saved Athens” by opposing the men in their “blind fury” 74  When Alcibiades realized that the Selymbrians were actually disposed towards peace, he sent his Thracian soldiers out of the city to prevent them from plundering it and did no more harm to the city, simply accepting a payment and setting up a garrison (Alc. 30.5)— actions reminiscent of Pericles winning without fighting. 75  The other generals are mentioned only at Alc. 26.6, 27.2, 29.1–2, 31.1, 31.4. This presentation matches the reaction to Alcibiades’ return, when “the people did not deign so much as to look at the other generals” (Alc. 32.4). 76  The possibility that Athens would have won is also implied in Plutarch’s criticism of Alcibiades at Pol. Prec. 800D.

Coriolanus-alcibiades

221

and averting a fatal mistake (Alc. 26.4–5). Plutarch uses the episode to illustrate how to persuade men to abandon a disastrous policy, tying Alcibiades’ success to his skill in oratory and one-on-one appeals: Which war Alcibiades alone, for the most part, prevented from happening, by not only persuading and instructing the multitude (πείθων καὶ διδάσκων), but also, one by one (καθ’ ἕνα), entreating some (ἀντιβολῶν) and holding back others (ἐπιλαμβανόμενος) . Alc. 26.5

Alcibiades averts disaster by “persuading and instructing” the multitude rather than believing that he must “gratify them in all things and oppose them in nothing” (Alc. 26.4). The emphasis on Alcibiades’ statesmanship offers an instructive contrast to Coriolanus’ belligerent attitude toward the people. Exile and Reconciliation Plutarch designs his account of Alcibiades’ exiles and reconciliations to widen the array of issues addressed in these areas in Coriolanus. Although Alcibiades goes into exile for different reasons than Coriolanus did, he is still responsible for creating the conditions that led to his condemnation and banishment. However, unlike Coriolanus, Alcibiades readily reconciles with his city when recall is offered. In addition, Alcibiades faces a second rejection and self-imposed exile, during which he supplies the positive counter-example of an honorable exile—one that was not only free of anger and resentment, but also full of efforts to assist his native city. The “love-fear” relationship between Alcibiades and Athens established early in the Life gives the sequence of exile and reconciliation a less vengeful tone than it had in Coriolanus, and the ebb and flow of support for Alcibiades enables Plutarch to use Alcibiades’ two exiles—in combination with Coriolanus’ exile—to deliver both positive and negative paradigms in how to handle injury at the hands of one’s state and achieve reconciliation. Serving One’s State in Exile In his first exile, Alcibiades provides a deterrent paradigm of an improper response to rejection. Although he joins Sparta only after Athens has condemned him to death,77 Alcibiades still brings “ruin and destruction” to his native city (διειργάσατο καὶ κατοικοφθόρησε τὴν πόλιν) (Alc. 23.2). However, Plutarch 77  Plutarch does not criticize Alcibiades for assisting Sparta because he had been condemned to death by Athens and was therefore in fear for his life (Alc. 30). Alcibiades is presented as ultimately wanting to return to Athens.

222

Chapter 5

downplays both Alcibiades’ actions against Athens in alliance with the Spartans (Alc. 23.1–24.3) and his attempts to induce the Athenians to recall him by exaggerating his ties to Tissaphernes (Alc. 25.3–4). Instead, Plutarch moves the narrative quickly on to Alcibiades’ efforts on behalf of the Athenians after breaking with Sparta and rejoining the fleet in Samos—and devotes five chapters (Alc. 26.4–31.6) to the great military victories that brought cities back into alliance with Athens. Plutarch designs his treatment of the second exile to present Alcibiades as a clearly positive paradigm of how to benefit one’s state while in exile. Alcibiades provides security to Hellenes on the border of Thrace (Alc. 36.2), offers advice to Athenian generals on how to fix a strategic weakness before Aegospotami (36.5) and, after Athens’ demise, seeks help from Artaxerxes on behalf of Athens (37.4). In the synkrisis, Plutarch draws a parallel between Alcibiades approaching the generals at Aegospotami with Aristides approaching Themistocles ahead of Salamis (Cor-Alc 2.4)—a comparison that magnifies the praiseworthy nature of Alcibiades’ efforts to aid his native city while out of favor. Plutarch’s deliberate crafting of an account that would portray Alcibiades as a positive model of conduct in exile is reflected in differences versus other historians. Plutarch’s treatment of Alcibiades’ plans to approach Artaxerxes is more expansive than versions in Nepos (Alc. 9.4–5) and Diodorus (14.11.1–4). Nepos (Alc. 9.4) reports that Alcibiades “could not endure the idea that Athens was vanquished and enslaved to the Lacedaemonians” (neque Athenas victas Lacedaemoniis servire poterat pati)—but does not convey Alcibiades’ determination to take action to free his state. In addition, while Nepos (Alc. 9.5) and Diodorus (14.11.1–4) both show Alcibiades planning to win Artaxerxes’ gratitude by informing him about Cyrus’ secret plans to make war on him, Plutarch emphasizes other motives: [Alcibiades] expected to show himself no worse than Themistocles (μὴ χείρονα Θεμιστοκλέους) if the King tested him and stronger in his pretext (κρείττονα τὴν πρόφασιν): for he intended to render service and ask for the forces of the King not against his fellow citizens, as that man, but on behalf of his fatherland against their enemies. Alc. 37.4

By showing Alcibiades emulating Themistocles in exile and fighting on behalf of Athens, Plutarch not only portrays a statesman integrating the exemplum of an admired predecessor into his own decisions—as promoted in On Progress

Coriolanus-alcibiades

223

in Virtue (85A)—but also highlights Alcibiades’ eagerness to reconcile with his state, in contrast to Coriolanus.

Fostering Reconciliation through Beneficial Actions and Conciliatory Gestures Plutarch constructs the sequence of incidents leading to Alcibiades’ return to Athens to illustrate strategies for reconciling with one’s state. First, as noted above, Alcibiades responded to his recall by the Athenians (Alc. 27.1) by embarking on a series of campaigns to win back cities for Athens before he returned (32.1). Upon his arrival in Athens, Alcibiades addresses the people and laments his own suffering, casting “only little and moderate blame” (ἐγκαλέσας δὲ μικρὰ καὶ μέτρια) on the people and instead ascribing the entire incident to “a certain evil fortune and envious genius of his own” (Alc. 33.2). The effectiveness of this approach is displayed when the people respond by crowning Alcibiades, electing him general, restoring his property and revoking the curses (Alc. 33.3). Alcibiades’ conduct recalls that of the Roman senators in the paired Life, who resolved the grain crisis by mollifying the people and making “only a moderate use of admonition and rebuke” (Cor. 17.3–4), marking a second positive counter-example to Coriolanus’ inflammatory and accusatory speech that renewed the anger against him (Cor. 18.3–4). After his second exile, Alcibiades’ desire to reconcile is evident in his actions on behalf of Athens, while the Athenians, after the war has been lost, regret their actions in dismissing him after Notium and again place their hopes in him as a man who would be unwilling to stand by and watch (περιόψεται) while Athens suffered the insolence of the Spartans and madness of the Thirty (Alc. 38.1–2). Summary: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in Alcibiades Plutarch uses Alcibiades to expand the range of negative paradigms presented in Coriolanus, while also protraying the positive evolution of a statesman from a disreputable youth into honorable maturity. In the first half of the Life, Alcibiades is a strongly deterrent paradigm of actions to avoid in political relations and in exile: his wanton and lawless conduct makes him appear tyrannical and untrustworthy, a lack of confidence that is reinforced when he joins Athens’ enemies against his city. Ultimately, his reputation for lawlessness makes it impossible for him to refute the charges that he violated the Mysteries, that he neglected the fleet in Notium to spend time with courtesans or that his advice ahead of Aegospotami was self-serving. Each of these failures to retain the trust of the Athenians led to disaster: the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, the revival of Spartan forces and the final defeat of Athens

224

Chapter 5

in the Peloponnesian War. The force of this deterrent message is amplified by the positive portrait of Alcibiades’ generalship in a variety of situations, his ability to establish a strong rapport with a variety of groups and his persuasiveness as an orator. After his recall (27.1), Alcibiades provides positive paradigms in how to reconcile with one’s city. Not only does he readily accept the first offer of recall, but he decides to return with spectacular honor by achieving great victories for Athens beforehand. In each area, Plutarch’s purposeful crafting of the narrative is evident. First, Plutarch adapted historical accounts of Alcibiades’ career to bring these pragmatic lessons into sharper focus. As noted above, Plutarch distances himself from characterizations of Alcibiades as a self-serving demagogue and traitor to Athens by presenting Alcibiades in public office as simultaneously serving his personal ambitions and the greater good of Athens.78 Secondly, authorial comments are used to underscore incidents that illustrate key principles of leadership in which Alcibiades was a positive role model—including his conduct in preventing the fleet from attacking Piraeus (Alc. 26.4) and in intercepting the Phoenician ships (26.6–7). In addition, by relegating the other Athenian generals to the background, Plutarch magnified Alcibiades’ status as an undefeated (and seemingly invincible) general and reinforced the perception that Athens’ survival depended on one man—thereby creating a stronger parallel between Alcibiades and Coriolanus as men who could change the course of a war by changing sides. This magnification of Alcibiades’ role gave relations between Alcibiades and the Athenians greater significance, since the breakdown in these relations made the difference between victory and defeat. While each hero in this pair has two “careers”—Coriolanus in Rome and among the Volscians and Alcibiades before and after his first exile—only Alcibiades gives evidence of improvement. Unlike the ongoing deterioration in Coriolanus’ conduct in his Life, Alcibiades’ statesmanship evolves along a positive trajectory that eventually leads to actions worthy of comparison to those of Aristides (Alc-Cor 2.4). It is in this context of this improvement that the difference in paideia across the two men has the most resonance. Although Alcibiades did not apply the philosophical principles of Socrates in his youth, he does adopt them later and shifts to the path of noble statesmanship— an adjustment Coriolanus never considers, in part because he lacks the selfmastery acquired through paideia.

78  Plutarch downplays the significance of the deceit that undermined the Peace of Nicias, simply commenting that, while no one approved of the action, its effects were great (Alc. 15.1).

Coriolanus-alcibiades

5.4

225

Insights from the Synkrisis

In the synkrisis, the over-riding deterrent force of this pair of Lives becomes evident, as Plutarch uses the opposing character strengths and faults of Coriolanus and Alcibiades to reiterate his pragmatic lessons in actions to avoid. Plutarch assesses degrees of blame in various areas of leadership by differentiating the motives and consequences of the flawed behavior of each hero. Thus, for instance, in using deceit to provoke war, Alcibiades’ motive of political rivalry and the favorable consequences of the Mantinean alliance make his disruption of the Peace of Nicias less objectionable than Coriolanus provoking a war to gratify his anger and causing innocent cities to be sacrificed to his rage (Cor-Alc 2.1–3). However, Plutarch devotes his most extensive analysis to two areas emphasized in the Lives: relations with the people and dealing with exile and reconciliation. In comparing their relations with the people and aristocracy, Plutarch reiterates the criticisms of both men contained in their Lives and emphasizes the different behaviors that provoked hostility: The exceedingly wanton conduct (τὴν ἄγαν λαμυρὰν) of Alcibiades as a statesman and the stain of his unrestrained behavior (τὸ μὴ καθαρεῦον ἀναγωγίας) and buffoonery (βωμολοχίας) in consorting with the people to gain their favor were loathed by sensible men, but the utter ungraciousness (ἄχαριν) and arrogance (ὑπερήφανον) and oligarchical demeanor (ὀλιγαρχικὴν) of Marcius was hated by the Roman people. So then, neither course is to be commended. Cor-Alc 1.3–4

This passage reflects the complementary nature of the deterrent paradigms in these Lives: Plutarch has illustrated two flawed approaches to winning support and leading the people, who, as stated in Political Precepts (821D–832E), must be led by virtue. Nevertheless, Plutarch further differentiates the “degree of blame” in each strategy, calling Alcibiades’ “flattery of the people for the sake of power” a disgrace (αἰσχρὸν), while Coriolanus’ efforts to gain power through “fear, violence and oppression” were both disgraceful and unjust (πρὸς τῷ αἰσχρῷ καὶ ἄδικον) (Cor-Alc. 1.4). Importantly, Plutarch’s assessment centers on the methods used to acquire and exercise power—including the reactions provoked in the aristocrats and the people—rather than on the moral character of the statesmen themselves. Plutarch’s treatment of exile and recall in the synkrisis underscores the portrayal of Coriolanus as a deterrent model in this area of statesmanship.

226

Chapter 5

In an extended comment, Plutarch not only points to Metellus, Aristides and Epaminondas as positive models of reacting to injury with equanimity and reconciling readily, but also explains the contempt for political honors that enabled them to avoid anger and to respond with kindness when recalled (Cor-Alc 4.5–6). Alcibiades’ service to Sparta until his life was threatened, his eagerness to reconcile with his native city and his love for Athens all serve to amplify the deterrent paradigm contained in Coriolanus’ unwarranted abandonment of the interests of the Volscians, his rejection of repeated embassies and his decision to save his city to gratify his mother rather than for love of the city itself (Cor-Alc 2.4–7). These comparisons perhaps explain why Coriolanus came first: it offered a portrait of the effects of relentless anger and unwillingness to compromise that was sharpened by a portrait of Alcibiades designed to highlight the deterrent messages of the first Life. The final sections of the synkrisis step back from the concentrated focus on the detrimental effects of anger, pride, self-will and lawlessness on a man’s effectiveness as a leader, and draw other traits into the frame. Plutarch’s final comment that Coriolanus in other respects was “worthy to be compared with the best of the Greeks”, while Alcibiades lacked self-control with regard to money (Cor-Alc 5.2), brings greater balance into the assessment of the heroes. This shift in emphasis reflects Plutarch’s broader purpose of highlighting both the ethical qualities and practical actions in which each hero provides instructive paradigms of traits essential to effectiveness in positions of power. In the next Chapter, we turn to Agesilaus-Pompey, in which Plutarch addresses three new challenges: restraining ambition, managing alliances and rivalries and balancing expediency with the administration of justice. Again, both heroes illustrate a range of pragmatic insights in effective and ineffective leadership.

Chapter 6

Agesilaus-Pompey 6.1 Introduction Agesilaus-Pompey, like Coriolanus-Alcibiades, unites two generals renowned for their military exploits, but in this case the generals were not undefeated. Although their early military campaigns, in Plutarch’s view, made them comparable to Alexander the Great,1 both Agesilaus and Pompey were associated with catastrophic defeats that marked irreversible turning points for their cities: for Sparta at Leuctra (371 BC) and Rome at Pharsalus (48 BC). In the absence of a Prologue, the precise similarities that prompted Plutarch to pair these men are not known.2 However, Plutarch’s comments in the two Lives and in the synkrisis suggest that political events that “ended an era” explain the pairing.3 In Ages-Pomp, Plutarch places stronger emphasis than in Per-Fab and CorAlc on the challenges of managing political alliances and restraining ambition.4 These themes are important throughout the Parallel Lives and have been widely discussed.5 While Pericles and Fabius also included negative lessons tied to excessive rivalry in both civic and military contexts, Agesilaus and Pompey examine the impact of ambition on a wider array of relationships and in a greater variety of situations. In addition, the issues that are raised in Cor-Alc regarding the cultivation of good or bad repute and its implications are addressed from a broader perspective. In Ages-Pomp, Plutarch examines the two major 1  See, for example, Ages. 15.3 and Pomp. 46.1. 2  Shipley (1997: 9–14) highlights similarities in fortune, situation and nature that do not persist as the Lives unfold. 3  Similarly, Plutarch paired Nicias and Crassus based on the catastrophic expeditions to Sicily and Parthia (Nic. 1.1). 4  Competitiveness is integral to the desire to stand out and attract glory. Various types of rivalry are depicted in the Lives: against predecessors (Themistocles vs. Miltiades), contemporaries (Alcibiades vs. Nicias) or one’s own past record (Coriolanus (Cor. 4.2) and Caesar (Caes. 58.5)). Themistocles’ emulation of Miltiades is cited in the Moralia (84B, 92C, 184D–185A, 800B) and Them. (3.3). Alcibiades’ disruption of the Peace of Nicias is tied to contentiousness (φιλονικίας) and “rivalry in a political struggle” (πολιτικῆς μάχης ἢ ἁμίλλης) (Cor-Alc 2.3). 5  On Plutarch’s treatment of ambition, see Wardman (1974: 115–124), Pelling (1986a/2002; 1988a/2002; 1995/2002; 2012), Duff (1999b), Stadter (2011b/2015), Nikolaidis (2012).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_009

228

Chapter 6

dimensions of ambition—love of reputation and contentiousness—and illustrates how these passions become liabilities if they are excessive or persist after a man achieves prominence.6 Moreover, Agesilaus’ inappropriate assistance to friends who had violated the law, when combined with his excessive ambition, is shown bringing disgrace on himself and disaster to Sparta.7 Similarly, Pompey’s love of reputation and his submissiveness to others are revealed to be instrumental in facilitating Caesar’s rise to power, his own downfall and the demise of the Roman Republic. Relations with the people are also examined from a new standpoint in this set of Lives. While Pericles, Fabius and Alcibiades were often able to win the support of the people at times of crisis, they were constantly targets of aggressive opposition and slander. In contrast, both Agesilaus and Pompey enjoyed exceptional goodwill that was the foundation of stable support from the people throughout their careers. By describing the private and public actions that fostered and sustained this goodwill, Plutarch portrays his heroes as strong positive paradigms in this critical area of effective leadership. The consistency of Plutarch’s portrait of Agesilaus and Pompey as two men who were praiseworthy in many areas of moral virtue but disastrously ineffective in certain areas of leadership helps explain divergent views about Plutarch’s intended message. Moreno (1992) calls the Life of Pompey “one of the most laudatory Plutarch ever wrote”, while Hamilton (1992) sees Agesilaus as a blended portrait of praise and blame.8 Shipley (1997)9 treats Agesilaus and Pompey as occupying a middle ground in which they are neither simple models for emulation nor negative examples of behavior to avoid. Pompey also is examined from the perspective of various character traits. Stadter (1995) highlights Pompey’s eros,10 and Beneker (2005b) examines the “mishandling of sexual relationships” as a cause of failure and symptomatic of a deeper weakness.11 Beneker (2012; 2014) explores eros more fully as an element undermining Pompey’s ability to win in the struggle with Caesar. Xenophontos 6  As discussed in the prior chapter, ambition and love of reputation are on display in Alcibiades, while contentiousness is a central theme in Coriolanus. Ambition is also central in Marius (excessive ambition) and Pyrrhus (excessive contentiousness). For a broader discussion of Pyrrhus-Marius, see Buszard (2005). 7  Plutarch’s criticism of Agesilaus’ treatment of friends distinguishes his account from Xenophon’s Agesilaus, which praised him for his actions as a friend. 8  Moreno (1992: 138) and Hamilton (1992: 4205–4206). 9  Shipley (1997: 15–16). 10  Stadter (1995) highlights the incident in which Pompey gives up Flora to Geminius at Pomp. 2.3–4. 11  Beneker (2005b: 69–80).

Agesilaus-pompey

229

(2016)12 includes Cornelia’s relationship with Pompey in her discussion of the ethical influence of wives on decisions and public policy in the Lives. In addition, the links between Plutarch’s characterization of Pompey and other heroes of the Lives have received attention. Pelling (1979; 1980) presents Plutarch’s composition of Pompey as one of several Roman Lives researched together, while Beneker (2005a)13 argues that Plutarch established characterizations for Caesar, Pompey and Crassus that he maintained them across the Lives and, as a result, had to explain what held Pompey and Crassus back. By shifting to the paradigm of pragmatic biography, the range of positive and deterrent lessons in Ages-Pomp can more readily be identified. In addition to specific character traits that impacted the effectiveness of their leadership, problematic misjudgments in dealing with friends and colleagues are also at issue: Agesilaus’ willingness to bend justice for his associates and Pompey’s submissiveness toward less-experienced subordinates pave the way to disastrous outcomes for their cities. In addition, both Lives offer positive and negative paradigms of generalship. The defeats at Leuctra and Pharsalus provide a dramatic backdrop to the deterrent lessons, which center on three areas: exercising hegemony over allies, managing political alliances and implementing best strategies in the face of criticism. The character flaws emphasized in this pair—including excessive ambition (φιλοτιμία), love of reputation (φιλοδοξία), contentiousness (φιλονικία) and being compliant (δυσωπία)—are common themes throughout the Moralia (especially in Political Precepts and On Being Compliant) and had particular resonance for Plutarch’s readers, who faced competition for open slots for advancement and a complex network of patron-client relationships, as discussed in Chapter 2. Pliny’s Epistulae and Tacitus’ Agricola, for instance, illustrate the various alliances that drove the dynamics of political advancement. The pragmatic lessons in Ages-Pomp provide guidance in how to attract and sustain the goodwill of patrons, clients and colleagues, as well as how to constructively manage political partnerships and rivalries. 6.2

Life of Agesilaus

Overview Agesilaus II (c. 445–359 BC) was a King of Sparta for about 40 years. Over this period, he conducted campaigns against Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes 12  Xenophontos (2016: 123–124). 13  Beneker (2005a: 315). For additional perspectives, see Beck (1999), Trego (2012).

230

Chapter 6

in Asia (396–395) and took part in the Corinthian War (394–387), which included major battles at Coronea (394), Corinth (394–391) and Acarnania (389). After Sparta violated the “Peace of Antalcidas” (or the”King’s Peace” of 38614) by occupying the Cadmeia in Thebes (382), a coalition under Thebes defeated Sparta at Tegyra (375) and Leuctra (371). Subsequently, Thebes liberated Messenia (370/69) and by 366 the Peloponnesian League, the mechanism through which Sparta had exercised hegemony for over 200 years, had broken up. Agesilaus defended Sparta from attacks in 370 and 362, and then served as a mercenary in Asia Minor (364) and Egypt (361–359), before dying on his way back to Sparta in 359. Agesilaus is included in Xenophon (Hellenica 3–8) and Diodorus Siculus (14.79–15.93) and is the subject of an encomium by Xenephon (Agesilaus) and a Life by Nepos (Agesilaus).15 Isocrates (To Philip 87; To Archidamus 12–14) praises Agesilaus as self-controlled, just and statesmanlike, but critiques his failed efforts in Asia as the result of ambition and an attempt to accomplish incompatible objectives (restoring his friends to power and defeating the Persians). Among later writers, Agesilaus is a positive model as King and general. He exemplified various aspects of good kingship in Cicero’s De Officiis 2.4, Ad Quintum 1.2.7 and De Amicitia 22.7, while Valerius Maximus mentions Agesilaus once (7.2 ext. 15) in connection with the temporary abrogation of the laws of Lycurgus to stamp out a conspiracy. Dio (Or. 56.7) and Menander Rhetor (2.4.389) refer to Agesilaus’ immediate obedience to the ephors summoning him home from Asia in the midst of a successful campaign, with Menander Rhetor also citing Agesilaus as a positive model for his conduct in Ionia and the Hellespont and his enthusiastic reception by the people. In Frontinus, Agesilaus illustrates six different aspects of good generalship.16 In the Moralia, Agesilaus is associated with a range of qualities. On the positive side, he is cited for his virtues and is one of the statesmen Sosius Senecio should use as a “mirror” (ἔσοπτρα) when facing challenges in public life (Progress in Virtue 85A). He is linked to four strengths: the ability to anticipate a weakness and avoid it, as shown by his refusal of a kiss from a boy (31C, 81A 14  The Peace (386) returned hegemony of Greek cities in Asia to the Persians. Under this agreement, the Greek cities were to remain independent of other Greek cities. 15  The histories examine factors leading to Leuctra, while the encomium and Nepos’ Life largely ignore it. 16  Frontinus cites Agesilaus as a model for how to lead forces through infested areas (Strat. 1.4.2, 3), distract the enemy (1.8.12), restrain an unseasonable demand to attack the enemy (1.10.3), arouse an army’s enthusiasm for battle (1.11.5, 17), let an enemy escape to relieve the sense of desperation (2.6.6) and pretend to retire (3.11.2).

Agesilaus-pompey

231

and 209D); straight speaking (52E, 52F); a general commitment to justice (78D, 190F, 213C, 545A); and his active role in serving his state in old age (784E). On the negative side, however, Agesilaus is censured for helping associates circumvent justice (807F, 808B) and for mistreating his mentor, Lysander—towards whom he exhibited “untimely ambition and jealousy” (φιλοτιμίας ἀκαίρου καὶ ζηλοτυπίας) (805F).17 In other Lives, Agesilaus plays an active role in Lysander (in which he is an ally, then later a rival), and in Artaxerxes, where he is an invading general.18 He is cited in Timoleon (36.1, 36.4), along with Epaminondas, Pelopidas and Timotheus, as a model of great generalship that involves laborious effort; in Phocion (3.4), along with Numa, as a model of justice; and in Cimon (19.3) as the first man to perform great deeds in Asia after Cimon’s death. Agesilaus is mentioned in Lycurgus both as a model of Sparta’s excellence (Lyc. 30.5)19 and as a man who violated the rhetra of Lycurgus by making frequent incursions against the same enemies (Lyc. 13.6). Finally, at Agis 3.1, Agesilaus is mentioned as the ancestor of King Agis, who was sixth in descent from him. In the Life, Plutarch refers to the earlier Lives of Lycurgus (Ages. 4.4) and Epaminondas (Ages. 38.4), which form part of the backdrop of Agesilaus. In Agesilaus, Plutarch shows how Agesilaus’ excessive ambition towards Lysander and contentiousness towards Thebes provoked disharmony within Sparta and war with Thebes, areas in which Agesilaus served as a negative model in Political Precepts (819F–820A). These topics would have resonated with provincial leaders, who had to maintain harmony and manage rivalries with other cities, and were routinely raised in Dio’s City Orations. Plutarch integrates these elements into a portrait of a statesman offering both positive and negative paradigms for political and military leaders. Moral Foundation and Reputation In contrast to the other Lives we have examined, Plutarch uses his discussion of moral foundation and reputation in Agesilaus to highlight the dynamics of 17  Other mentions of Agesilaus are found at 85A, 343A, 399C, 482D, 533E, 534E, 578E, 644B, 809B and 1099B. 18  In Lysander (Lys. 22–31), Agesilaus is a man whom Lysander helped to gain power, only to later be rejected by his protégé; in Artaxerxes, he is the general whom Artaxerxes causes to be recalled from Asia by sending bribes to the Greeks (Art. 20.1–3); and, at Art. 22.3, he is a Spartan sent to Egypt after Leuctra because Sparta needed money. 19  Agesilaus (Lyc. 30.5) is one of the Spartan commanders welcomed by Greeks of other cities—including Gylippus by Syracuse, Brasidas by the Chalcidians, and Lysander, Callicratidas and Agesilaus by the Greeks in Asia.

232

Chapter 6

creating and sustaining goodwill. Agesilaus’ moral foundation was provided by the Spartan agoge training, which he had received because he was not expected to become King (Ages. 1.1–2.3). Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus the key virtues traditionally associated with Lycurgus (e.g. Lyc. 7, 11, 30), including knowing how to rule and be ruled, temperance, mildness and indifference to money, traits manifested in Agesilaus’ actions throughout the Life.20 Learning “to rule and be ruled” (ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν)—considered by Agesilaus to be “the most beautiful of all lessons” (τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ κάλλιστον) (Ages. 20.2)21—is emphasized as the foundation of his harmonious relations with the Spartans: But Agesilaus was distinctive in this also, that he came to rule not uneducated in being a subject (ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ ἀπαίδευτον τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι). Wherefore he offered himself to his subjects as the most accommodating (εὐαρμοστότατον) of the Kings by far, having acquired, in addition to his kingly and commanding nature, kindness (φιλάνθρωπον) and a tendency to favor the people (τὸ δημοτικὸν) from his agoge training. Ages. 1.3

Plutarch’s reference here to Agesilaus’ “commanding and kingly nature” suggests that Agesilaus is a “great nature.”22 Obedience to Those in Authority Agesilaus’ obedience to the ephors’ command to return from Asia (Ages. 35.3–4; 37.1)—an action also praised by Nepos23—was one of the most highly lauded actions in the Life because it demonstrated that Agesilaus placed the welfare of 20  Incidents are found throughout the Life manifesting temperance (Ages. 19.4, 12.1–2, 14.1–2, 36.4–5), indifference to money (4.1, 5.1–2, 10.4, 11.4) and mildness (15.1, 20.4, 35.4). Xenophon also emphasizes these traits in his Agesilaus, including temperance (Xen. Ages. 5.1–2), simplicity (8.6–8) and indifference to money (4.1–5). 21  Agesilaus urges Xenophon to educate his sons in Sparta to learn to rule and be ruled (Ages. 20.2). The importance of a statesman knowing how to rule and to obey is discussed in Political Precepts, where Spartan kings are used to illustrate the principle (816F-817A). Aristotle considered both qualities essential for a ruler of free men (Politics, 3.2.10). Xenophon (Ages. 2.16) describes Agesilaus’ decision to return from Asia as choosing “to rule and be ruled at home according to the constitution” (οἴκοι τὰ νόμιμα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὰ νόμιμα δὲ ἄρχεσθαι). 22  Duff (1999a) and Duff (1999b: 60–65, 205–8, 224–228) discuss Plutarch’s concept of the “great nature” and its application to the heroes of the Lives. 23  Nepos praises Agesilaus’ patriotism in returning “even though he was at the head of a victorious army and had the fullest confidence in his ability to conquer the kingdom of Persia” (qui cum victori praeesset exercitui maximamque haberet fiduciam regni Persarum

Agesilaus-pompey

233

the community (ὠφέλει τὸ κοινόν) above his own power and reputation (AgesPomp 2.3).24 Plutarch emphasizes Agesilaus as a paradigm of obedience to the law by comparing Agesilaus’ obedience to the ephors’ command to abandon his expedition with the resistance exhibited by Hannibal and Alexander at similar crossroads: Wherefore, Hannibal, although he was already faring badly and being pushed out of Italy, with great difficulty submitted (μάλα μόλις ὑπήκουσε) to the men calling him to the war at home, and Alexander, when he learned about the battle of Antipater against Agis, went so far as to make a joke. Ages. 15.4

Plutarch reiterates this praise in the synkrisis, where Agesilaus’ immediate return is called “an inimitable act” (τὸ ἀμίμητον ἔργον) that stemmed from his “political virtue” (πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν) (Ages-Pomp 2.3).25 Agesilaus’ respect for Spartan law, combined with his modest lifestyle and kindness, earned him lasting goodwill (Ages. 4.4). This characterization of Agesilaus’ relations with the people illustrates the principle from Political Precepts—exemplified by Spartans (817A–B)—that a statesman should obey those in office because, by respecting their authority, a statesman acquires “true reputation, which comes from goodwill” (τὴν ἀληθινὴν…,τὴν ἀπ’ εὐνοίας, δόξαν) (817B). This goodwill is indispensable to Agesilaus’ political and military effectiveness because it inspires a reciprocal obedience of the Spartans to his commands. Indeed, this reciprocity is a central lesson for statesmen in the Life. Ability to Stand by One’s Plans Despite Taunts and Ridicule As in the case of other successful statesmen and generals in the Lives—such as Pericles and Fabius Maximus—Agesilaus adheres firmly to his own best plans even in the midst of widespread opposition and ridicule. This quality is illustrated in two key episodes. First, after the defeat at Leuctra, Agesilaus is shown potiundi) (Ages. 4.2). Xenophon (Hell. 4.2.3) notes that Agesilaus was disturbed at the lost opportunity, while Diodorus (14.83.1–3) simply records Agesilaus’ obedience to the order. 24  Plutarch praises Agesilaus’ immediate return from Asia as “a paradigm of justice and obedience to authority (παράδειγμα πειθαρχίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης) (Ages. 15.4). His subsequent victories preserved Spartan hegemony. However, Plutarch also uses this return to fight wars in Greece to underscore the ignoble nature of the wars among the Greeks compared to the nobility of the war against the Persians (Ages. 15.3, 16.4). 25  In Coriolanus, Plutarch uses “political virtue” to describe mildness as “the greatest virtue of a statesman” (τὸ πρᾷον, οὗ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀρετῇ πολιτικῇ μέτεστιν) (Cor. 15.3).

234

Chapter 6

withstanding the taunts of Epaminondas and the Theban army positioned outside the walls of Sparta. Not unlike Pericles when Archidamus was outside Athens, Agesilaus refuses to allow the Spartans to fight, instead lining the most commanding parts of the city with his most powerful soldiers (Ages. 31.3). This resolve is also given expansive treatment in the account of Agesilaus’ campaign in Egypt, which Plutarch constructs to provide an even more forceful positive paradigm, even though he criticizes Agesilaus’ motive for conducting such a campaign to acquire funds to make war on Greeks.26 In Egypt, Agesilaus had to endure taunts from his Egyptian allies for not immediately attacking an army that surrounded their city, but he “endured the slanders quite mildly” and “looked for the proper moment for his stratagem” (προσεῖχε τῷ καιρῷ τοῦ στρατηγήματος) (Ages. 39.1). Submissiveness to Appeals from Friends In two areas, however, Plutarch portrays Agesilaus as a deterrent paradigm: being compliant towards friends and contentious towards Thebes. Agesilaus is shown deferring inappropriately to the interests and desires of his personal associates. His willingness to join his friends “even in their unjust practices” (Ages. 5.1)27—illustrated at several points in the Life (10.6, 13.3, 13.4)—proves disastrous for Sparta when Agesilaus’ unlawful assistance to Sphodrias and Phoebidas sparks war with Thebes (24–26). Again, Plutarch’s treatment echoes Political Precepts (807E), where Agesilaus is the primary negative example

26  Agesilaus’ campaign in Egypt is censured by the Spartans, who oppose his service as a mercenary because the cause is questionable and his age too advanced (Ages. 36.2). This criticism is absent from other accounts. Xenophon’s encomium asserts that Agesilaus wanted to punish the King and liberate the Greeks in Asia (Xen. Ages. 2. 28–31), while in Diodorus Sparta fights with Nectabanis as part of its effort to regain Messenia (Diod. 15.90.5) and Agesilaus is chosen as general because of his courage and skills in the art of war (Diod. 15.92.2). Nepos (Ages. 7.1–2) presents the command in Egypt is a sign that Agesilaus “never ceased to aid his country in whatever way he could” (numquam Agesilaus destitit quibuscumque rebus posset patriam iuvare). In the synkrisis, Plutarch adds his own judgment that the campaign was undertaken “for no honorable reason, nor of necessity” (οὔτε καλῶς οὔτ’ ἀναγκαίως) but for money “to make war upon the Greeks” (Ages-Pomp. 5.1). 27  Agesilaus aids a guest-friend’s lover in entering the Olympics (Ages. 13.3) and requests that his friend Nicias be acquitted (13.4)—showing that “although in other matters he was exact and law-abiding (ἀκριβὴς καὶ νόμιμος), in matters of friendship he thought rigid justice was a mere pretext (πρόφασιν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ λίαν δίκαιον)” (13.3).

Agesilaus-pompey

235

of a man who harmed his state because he was “very weak and submissive” (ἀσθενέστατος καὶ ταπεινότατος) in dealing with his friends’ solicitations.28 Excessive Ambition and Contentiousness Agesilaus’ second major character flaw, which receives even greater emphasis in Plutarch’s portrait, is excessive ambition and contentiousness. As a young man, Agesilaus is described as “the most contentious”, “the most high-spirited” and “desiring to be first in all things”,29 while possessing a “vehemence and fury” (τὸ σφοδρὸν ἔχων καὶ ῥαγδαῖον) that “none could contend with or overwhelm” (ἄμαχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον) (Ages. 2.1).30 These attributes continue to drive Agesilaus’ behavior when he is King, inducing him to take the actions against Thebes that ultimately bring an end to Spartan hegemony—providing a forceful deterrent lesson in leadership. Plutarch reports that the allies believed that Agesilaus was pursuing war “out of anger and contentiousness” (Ages. 26.3) and later asserts that Agesilaus “brought the war to pass” by a decision made “from anger more than from calculation” (28.4–5). Plutarch later ties Sparta’s survival to Agesilaus’ renunciation of these very traits: But, all men agreed that Agesilaus was the reason Sparta was saved at that time, because having set aside (ἀποστὰς) his inherent passions of ambition and contentiousness, he treated circumstances with an eye to prudent caution (ἐχρήσατο τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀσφαλῶς). He was unable, however, to restore the power and reputation of the city after its defeat.…. A single error and turn of the scale brought down the entire prosperity of the city. Ages. 33.1–2

28  At Political Precepts (808B), Plutarch asserts that “the failure to punish Sphodrias and Phoebidas … did a great deal to make Sparta enter into the Leuctrian War”. The broader principle is that a statesman should help friends “only so far as conforms to any law, equity or advantage the neglect of which leads to great public injury” (ἀλλ’ ἄχρι παντὸς νόμου καὶ δικαίου καὶ συμφέροντος, ὃ παροφθὲν εἴς τινα μεγάλην βλάβην ἀναφέρει καὶ κοινήν) (808A). 29  Alcibiades’ strongest passions are also contentiousness (τὸ φιλόνικον) and love of being first (τὸ φιλόπρωτον) (Alc. 2.1). Similar qualities are associated with Coriolanus, who lacks the paideia to keep them under control. 30  Plutarch notes that Agesilaus’ lameness brought his ambition into clearer focus: “it led him to decline no hardship and no enterprise on account of his lameness” (Ages. 2.2). The infirmity plays virtually no role in the Life, except as a hurdle to his accession to the kingship because of the oracle warning Sparta to be on guard against a lame king (Ages. 3.4). In Lysander, Plutarch also emphasizes an element of jealousy in Agesilaus (Lys. 23.2)—a vice that is de-emphasized in Agesilaus.

236

Chapter 6

Thus, although, Agesilaus is not present at the defeats at Tegyra (Ages. 27) and Leuctra (Ages. 28), he nevertheless is held responsible for the entire sequence of events. This renunciation of the character flaws that have been tied to the defeat at Leuctra constitutes a central lesson for leaders in this Life. The significance of Plutarch linking the defeat at Leuctra to excessive ambition and contentiousness is reflected in the differences versus other accounts of Agesilaus’ role in provoking war with Thebes. Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.4, 5.1.33) recognized Agesilaus’ animosity towards Thebes, but did not make it a central determinant of Agesilaus’ actions, while Diodorus described Agesilaus as a man “who was by nature energetic, fond of war and desirous of dominance over the Greeks” (Diodorus 15.19.4), but attributed Sparta’s decision to make war on Thebes to a reaction to the growth of Theban power, which Sparta feared could break its supremacy (15.50.5). The highly laudatory accounts of Xenophon’s Agesilaus and Nepos’ Life of Agesilaus, in turn, neither associate Agesilaus with these weaknesses, nor link him directly to Leuctra. Moreover, in the accounts of Xenophon, Diodorus and Nepos, the decisions concerning Spartan policy towards Thebes are made by “Sparta”, not by Agesilaus. For instance, in Xenophon’s Hellenica, it is the Spartan assembly that decides to attack Thebes (Hell. 6.4.3). By composing a portrait in which Agesilaus’ excessive ambition and contentiousness determine Spartan policy towards Thebes— rather than fear of its rising power—Plutarch obtains a deterrent paradigm illustrating how the failure to repress these passions can lead to catastrophic misjudgments. Pragmatic Lessons in Political and Military Leadership Plutarch integrates his portrait of Agesilaus’ moral attributes and reputation with his practical judgment at times of crisis to characterize him as a “physician and arbiter” (ἰατρῷ καὶ διαιτητῇ) called upon to resolve perplexities of the state (Ages. 30.2). Plutarch’s pragmatic lessons in political and military leadership in the Life highlight the strategic insights and practical skills that produced Agesilaus’ greatest successes on behalf of Sparta, as well as the misjudgments that led to his failures. Key paradigms are provided in three spheres: (1) Relations with Sparta; (2) Military command and (3) Relations with Greek States. The episodes in each area are shown below in Table 6.1, distributed across six phases of Agesilaus’ career. Phase 1 (Chapters 1–5) contains incidents of his early life and rise to prominence, while in Phase 2 (6–15) Plutarch pre­ sents Agesilaus’ expedition to Asia and re-call to Sparta. Phase 3 (16–23) and Phase 4 (24–28) detail the battles among the Greek states, with the Peace of Antalcidas closing Phase 3 and Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra marking the end of Phase 4. The defense of Sparta after Leuctra and the failed peace efforts are

237

Agesilaus-pompey Table 6.1

Episodes in the Life of Agesilaus

Relations with Sparta

Military command

Relations with Greek States

Phase 1: Early life; Rise to prominence (Chapters 1–5) 1- Early life; agoge training 2- Ties to Lysander; character traits 3- Accession to Kingship 4- Relations with ephors, senators and citizens 5- Digression on ambition Phase 2: Expedition to Asia to free the Greek cities; recall to Sparta (6–15) 6- Secures command of expedition to Asia

10- Given command of the fleet; appoints Peisander 13- Relations with son of Pharn. and friends 15- Immediate obedience to ephors

6- Sacrifice at Aulis disrupted 7–8- Relations with Lysander in Asia 9- Campaign against Tissaphernes 10- Deception of Tissaphernes; terms with Tithraustes 11- Relations with Spithridates and Megabates 12- Relations with Pharnabazus 14- Lifestyle in Asia 15- Recall to Sparta halts expedition

Phase 3: Campaign against coalition of Greek States; Peace of Antalcidas (16–23)

19–20- Lifestyle in Sparta

16- Return via Hellespont and Thrace 17–18- Peisander's defeat; eclipse; battle in Boeotia 21–22- Campaign against Argives and Thebes

23- Peace of Antalcidas

238 Table 6.1

Chapter 6 Episodes in the Life of Agesilaus (cont.)

Relations with Sparta

Military command

Relations with Greek States

Phase 4: Road to Leuctra; Spartan violation of peace; rivalry with Thebes (24–28)

26- War on Thebes 27- Defeat at Tegyra 28- Defeat at Leuctra

24- Phoebidas seizes Cadmeia; Agesilaus prevents punishment 24–26- Agesilaus helps Sphodrias be acquitted despite attack on Piraeus 28- Agesilaus derails peace efforts

Phase 5: Defense of Sparta after Leuctra; refusal to make peace (29–35) 29- Spartan reaction to Leuctra 30- Lets laws “sleep”

31–32- Defends Sparta from Thebes 33- Battle against Arcadians 34- Defends Sparta from new Theban attack under Epaminondas

Phase 6: Actions as mercenary in Egypt; death (36–40) 36- To Egypt to help Tachos 37- Shifts alliance to Nectabanis 38–39- Routs enemy from Mendes 40- Heads back to Sparta; dies en route

34- Refuses peace with Thebes after Messene is built 35- Resists peace with Greeks even after Epaminondas dies at Mantinea

Agesilaus-pompey

239

portrayed in Phase 5 (29–35), while Phase 6 (36–40) presents Agesilaus’ actions in Egypt, death and burial. Agesilaus is largely a positive paradigm in the early and final phases of the Life, while the deterrent lessons emerge from his actions during the campaigns against other Greek states. Relations with Sparta Plutarch uses the scenes from Spartan politics to provide paradigms in two areas: managing relations with a mentor and administering justice to serve the common welfare. The principles at issue regarding mentors are discussed in Political Precepts (805F), while Philosophers and Men in Power and To An Uneducated Ruler, in addition to Political Precepts, present the impartial administration of justice as the foremost duty of a statesman, as discussed in Chapter 2. Plutarch also uses Agesilaus to address the complex issues of what can be termed “pragmatic justice”, or the practice of taking into account the consequences for the common welfare before strictly enforcing specific laws. From a “pragmatic” perspective, violating laws is dishonorable if done to serve one’s own interests, but honorable if done as an act of “political necessity” to serve the interests of the common good (Political Precepts 811C). The contemporary relevance of the challenge of balancing adherence to the law with expediency is revealed in the treatment of this topic in Cicero’s De Officiis (Book 3) and Quintilian Book 12, as noted earlier. Managing Relations with a Mentor: Agesilaus and Lysander Plutarch transforms relations between Agesilaus and Lysander into a pragmatic lesson for statesmen by illustrating the process by which Agesilaus’ rivalry with Lysander placed Sparta in jeopardy. Although he had won the kingship31 and secured command of the expedition to Asia through the efforts of Lysander (Ages. 6.1–3), Agesilaus humiliates and re-assigns him in Asia (7.4–8.3) because he finds the deference paid to Lysander “odious and oppressive” (ἐπαχθὴς καὶ βαρεῖα) (7.1). Plutarch also ties Agesilaus’ action to fear that Lysander would be given credit for any accomplishments : And then Agesilaus himself, although he was not a jealous man (μὴ φθονερὸς) nor vexed with men being honored (ἤχθετο τοῖς τιμωμένοις), was exceedingly ambitious and contentious and was afraid that if his actions

31  Xenophon’s Agesilaus (3.2–5) overlooks this process and instead portrays Agesilaus as a paradigm of piety. In Hellenica (3.2), Agesilaus directly challenges Leotychides, rather than following Lysander’s lead, as in the Life.

240

Chapter 6

produced anything brilliant, it would be credited to Lysander because of his reputation. Ages. 7.3

This fear of another general taking the glory for military exploits is a common manifestation of ambition in the Lives—including in the paired Life of Pompey (Pomp. 19.1). The lesson for statesmen, however, is contained in the subsequent threat to Sparta when Lysander’s wrath and resentment toward Agesilaus induce him to plot revolution (Ages. 8.4). Even after Lysander was reinstated as an emissary to Spithridates in the Hellespont—having suffered through a humiliating demotion to the post of “meat-carver” (Ages. 8.1)—his anger did not dissipate: But he did not lay aside his anger (οὐκ ἔληγε δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς), but bore it heavily (βαρέως φέρων) and now plotted how to take away the kingship from the two houses and restore it to all Spartans to contest. And it was thought that he would have produced great political upheaval because of this quarrel if he had not died beforehand while making an expedition into Boeotia. Ages. 8.3

By linking potentially dangerous consequences to Agesilaus’ disdainful treatment of Lysander, Plutarch delivers a pragmatic lesson in leadership. The principle is clarified in a second comment: Thus ambitious natures in commonwealths, if they do not guard against what is excessive (τὸ ἄγαν μὴ φυλαξάμεναι), do greater harm than good. For even if Lysander were burdensome, as he was, and was going beyond what was suitable to the occasion because of ambition (ὑπερβάλλων .. τὸν καιρόν), Agesilaus was surely not ignorant of another less blameless way to correct a man of high repute and ambition when he “struck a false note” (πλημμελοῦντος). Ages. 8.4

Plutarch concludes his comment with the observation that both men, in fact, suffered from the effects of excessive ambition, which made the one man unable to recognize the authority of the King and made the King unable to endure being ignored by his friend (Ages. 8.4). This passage echoes Plutarch’s comments in Lysander, where the criticism of Agesilaus is even more direct, stating that “casting off and insulting” (ἀπορρῖψαι καὶ προπηλακίσαι) a benefactor and a friend for the sake of reputation was unworthy of the character of

Agesilaus-pompey

241

Agesilaus (Lys. 23.5). This account of Agesilaus’ treatment of Lysander is balanced in the paired Life by the positive counter-example of Pompey’s laudable support for Sulla even after their relations had deteriorated (Pomp. 15.3). Plutarch’s purposeful depiction of the relations of Agesilaus and Lysander to demonstrate how ambitious rivalry can injure one’s state is revealed in the departures from other accounts. While Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.9–10; 3.5.6) and Diodorus (14.13.1–6) recognize Agesilaus’ annoyance at the attention Lysander attracted in Asia, no negative consequences for Sparta are tied to it. Nepos, in turn, reports that Lysander plotted revolution, but for a different reason: he was aggravated at the ephors who overrode his arrangements for decarchies in the cities of Asia (Nepos, Ages. 3.1–5). By linking Lysander’s revolutionary plot to resentment provoked by Agesilaus, Plutarch attaches an extremely injurious consequence to Agesilaus’ ambition.

Administering “Pragmatic Justice”: Balancing Law Enforcement and Expediency In two instructive episodes in the Life, Plutarch examines the issue of when it is appropriate to “relax” the laws in response to special circumstances. In one case, Agesilaus provides a negative paradigm when he bends the law to benefit Sphodrias as a favor to his son (Ages. 25.5), an action that not only violated the principle that a statesman should not slip with his friends (Pol. Prec. 807D),32 but also generated detrimental consequences both for his own reputation in Sparta and for Sparta’s standing among the Greeks. Even more importantly, the action put Sparta at risk of going to war: But after Sphodrias was acquitted and the Athenians, on hearing about it, turned in the direction of war, Agesilaus was harshly criticized, it being thought that, on account of a strange and childish desire, he had been an impediment to a just trial (ἐμποδὼν … κρίσει δικαίᾳ) and made the city an accessory (παραίτιον ἀπειργάσθαι) to such great transgressions against the Greeks. Ages. 26.1

The Spartans’ objection is not based on injustice, per se, but on Agesilaus’ involvement of the city in a crime that could provoke war. In the synkrisis, Plutarch reiterates these criticisms (Ages-Pomp 1.4). 32  The statesman is not to slip with his friends when they go wrong (οὐ δεῖ συνολισθάνειν αὐτοῖς παραβαίνουσιν) but instead is expected to prevent them from erring even in ignorance (ἀλλὰ προσέχειν ὅπως μηδ’ ἀγνοούντων αὐτῶν ἐξαμαρτάνωσι) (807D). The same issue concerns Gellius at Attic Nights (1.3.13–15).

242

Chapter 6

In contrast, Agesilaus is depicted as a positive role model when his failure to enforce the law serves the greater interests of Sparta. When Agesilaus, after Leuctra, allows the laws “to sleep for a day” (σήμερον ἐᾶν καθεύδειν, Ages. 30.4) so that the survivors could remain in the Spartan army, he is portrayed unambiguously as a positive paradigm in exercising justice to benefit the state. Plutarch asserts that he “at once saved (ἐφύλαξε) the laws for the city and the men from infamy” (Ages. 30.4), adding in the synkrisis that “there was never another political device like it” (οὐ γέγονεν ἄλλο σόφισμα πολιτικόν) (Ages-Pomp 2.2). Similarly, in two later incidents, Agesilaus is praised when he ignores the law to quell an insurrection (Ages. 31.3–32.5) and executes conspirators without trial (Ages. 34.4–5).33 By presenting several contexts in which “political necessity” required laws to be ignored in order to preserve the state, Plutarch provides pragmatic lessons for men facing similar challenges in the provincial cities.34 The importance of this pragmatic lesson in administering justice is again revealed in the divergence of Plutarch’s account from other sources. Not only is Plutarch’s version of Agesilaus “letting the laws sleep” not found in the other accounts, but his description of Agesilaus’ actions to save Sparta from Theban attacks (Ages. 31.3–34.5) is far more elaborate than those in Xenophon (Ages. 2.24, Hell. 7.10–13) and Diodorus (15.83.2–5), who treat these attacks only in general terms. Nepos briefly reports that Agesilaus’ “quickness of wit” (celeritas eius consilii) suppressed a rebellion and saved the city—commenting that “if it had not been for him Sparta would at that time have ceased to exist” (nisi ille fuisset, Spartam futuram non fuisse) (Nepos, Ages. 6.2–3). Valerius Maximus, in turn, praises Agesilaus for abrogating laws, not on behalf of Spartan soldiers, but in order to execute conspirators: He [Agesilaus] provided for two things at once, that salutary punishment should be neither unlawful nor hindered by law. So that the laws should exist for always (ut semper esse possent), they ceased to exist temporarily (aliquando non fuerunt). Val. Max. 7.2, ext. 15

33  The same issue arises in Cicero’s treatment of the Catilinarians (Cic. 22.1–8) and Aristides’ expedient action to stamp out a conspiracy ahead of Plataea (Arist. 13.2–3). 34  Cato Minor is a deterrent model in this particular aspect of statesmanship, especially when he rigidly adheres to the precedence due a pro-consul and allows Scipio to take command after Pharsalus even though he was an inferior general (Cato Min. 57.3 ). See Chapter 9.

Agesilaus-pompey

243

By crediting Agesilaus with overriding the laws to preserve Sparta three times, Plutarch paints a far more instructive paradigm for how “pragmatic justice” is administered to benefit the common welfare. Military Command The incidents depicting Agesilaus’ generalship serve two purposes. On the one hand, they showcase paradigms of how to adapt strategies to suit the nature of the enemy, how to inspire troops and how to quell rebellions—common themes in the advice literature for generals. On the other hand, they provide a deterrent lesson in how repeatedly engaging in minor battles gives one’s enemy “training” in war. The positive paradigms for generals are concentrated in Agesilaus’ campaigns in Asia and Egypt, while the deterrent lessons are rooted in the wars in Greece. Agesilaus’ recall to Sparta (Ages. 15) is a turning point where Agesilaus shifts from fighting the Persians to fighting against other Greeks35—the equivalent of civil war in Plutarch’s eyes. In Xenophon (Ages .7.5–6) and Nepos (Ages. 5.2), this shift away from defeating the Persians is noted as well,36 but the emphasis is on the glorious nature of the earlier cause rather than the dishonor of internecine Greek warfare. The parallel contemporary situation would be provincial cities turning from coordinated efforts to hold Rome at bay to squabbling among themselves, a prominent topic in several of Dio’s city speeches.37 Devising Strategies to Suit the Situation at Hand Agesilaus’ expedition to Asia puts his skills as a general on display. To defeat Tissaphernes, who had violated a treaty, Agesilaus lured him to Caria by letting it be known that the Spartans were heading there, and then led his troops into 35  Although Agesilaus quickly becomes absorbed in the contentions among the Greeks and loses sight of the nobler goal, Plutarch, at this point in the narrative, inserts Agesilaus’ lament (in direct speech) at the change in focus (Ages. 16.4) and then adds his own author­ ial comment on the huge costs imposed on Greeks by their continuous wars (15.1–3). A similar lament is included in the paired Life before the Battle of Pharsalus (Pomp. 70.1–4). 36  Nepos records this sentiment after the Battle of Corinth: “Yet Agesilaus was so far from feeling boastful arrogance, that he lamented the fortune of Greece, because through the fault of his opponents his victory had cost the lives of so many of her citizens: for with that great number, if the Greeks had been sensible, they might have been able to take vengeance on the Persians” (tantum afuit ab insolentia gloriae, ut commiseratus sit fortunam Graeciae, quod tam multi a se victi vitio adversariorum concidissent: namque illa multitudine, si sana mens esset, Graeciae supplicium Persas dare potuisse) (Nepos, Ages. 5.2). 37  In Or. 34 to the Tarsians and Or. 38 to the Nicomedians (on concord with the Nicaeans), for instance, Dio advises cities to restrain their rivalry and instead form profitable alliances. See Chapter 2.

244

Chapter 6

Phrygia, taking cities and much treasure (Ages. 9.2–3), demonstrating thereby that “in outsmarting one’s enemy (τῷ παραλογίζεσθαι) there is not only justice, but also great reputation and profit mixed with pleasure” (Ages. 9.3). He is also shown devising a plan to build a cavalry in Asia by imitating Agamemnon38 in allowing the well-to-do to avoid military service if they f­urnished a man and a horse—a strategy that enabled him not only to build his cavalry quickly, but also to acquire “a large force of warlike horsemen instead of worthless men at arms” (Ages. 9.4). Later, on his way back to Greece, Agesilaus rejects the suggestion that he winter in Acharnania to prevent the people from sowing their crops, explaining that the Acharnanians would fear war more— and would more readily come to terms—if their crops were flourishing; the strategy proves successful when the Acharnanians make peace the next year (Ages. 22.5). In each of these episodes, Plutarch provides a pragmatic lesson by including a description of the practical problem, the reasoning behind the strategy adopted and the ultimate outcome. Plutarch constructs his account of Agesilaus’ campaigns in Egypt to create additional paradigms of effective generalship. First, Agesilaus comments on the capabilities of the Mendesian army opposing them, which Nectabanis, his ally, views as a “mixed rabble of artisans” whose inexperience makes them contemptible: Agesilaus, to the contrary, is wary of its “inexperience and ignorance” (τὴν ἀπειρίαν … καὶ τὴν ἀμαθίαν) which will make stratagems less effective: For stratagems (αἱ ἁπἁται) set the unexpected (τὸ παράδοξον) on men who, if they suspect and await them, turn to defending themselves; but the man who neither awaits nor suspects (ὁ δὲ μὴ προσδοκῶν μηδ’ ὑπονοῶν) does not give any hold (λαβήν) to the man who is trying to outsmart him, just as the opponent who does not move gives no opportunity to the wrestler. Ages. 38.2

Agesilaus’ recommendation to attack immediately to prevent the city from being surrounded is ignored, and the city is surrounded (Ages. 37.2–4). Second, Agesilaus devises a plan to eliminate the enemy’s advantage in numbers—another common challenge facing generals in the Parallel Lives—and, by constructing a ditch around most of the perimeter forces the enemy to attack the city through a narrow passage, enabling Agesilaus’ own smaller forces to be victorious (Ages. 39.2–5). By withstanding the taunts of the soldiers (who 38  In allowing rich men to supply substitutes, Agesilaus (Ages. 9.4) deliberately imitates Agamemnon, believing he “had done well” (τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιῆσαι καλῶς) in accepting a good mare in place of a cowardly rich man for military service (Iliad 23.296ff.).

Agesilaus-pompey

245

wanted to attack immediately) and waiting for the right moment, Agesilaus won the battle. Plutarch’s deliberate choice to use this victory in Egypt to convey a positive lesson in generalship is revealed by its absence in other accounts. Not only do other writers not report this specific battle, but in no battle in Egypt do they describe Agesilaus withstanding taunts as he waits for the right moment to act. Xenophon, for instance, simply reports that Agesilaus “inflicted a crushing defeat” (μάχῃ νικήσας χειροῦται) on Nectabanis’ foes (Xen., Ages. 2.31), while Diodorus (15.93.2–5) shows Agesilaus being ignored by the Egyptian leader but nevertheless encouraging the troops and winning a victory against a much larger army.39 Plutarch’s version of the battle is clearly intended to emphasize Agesilaus’ ability to withstand scoffing until the best moment for action—not only reiterating a prominent theme in other Lives, including Pericles and Fabius, but also creating a precedent against which Pompey’s decision to fight at Pharsalus will stand out more prominently in the paired Life. Indeed, Plutarch mentions this parallel in the synkrisis (Ages-Pomp 4.4–5). Inspiring Troops with Confidence Plutarch describes several incidents in which Agesilaus effectively responds in varied circumstances to raise the spirits and confidence of his troops. In Asia, he alleviates the fear his soldiers felt at the impressive equipment of the Persians by putting the clothes and possession of prisoners in one area and presenting the “utterly white and delicate” naked bodies of the Persian prisoners to the soldiers so they could see that the men they were fighting were not fearsome (Ages. 9.5). A second pragmatic lesson is depicted in Agesilaus’ response, immediately ahead of a battle near Chaeronea, to a partial eclipse of the sun that coincided with the report that his navy had been defeated and the admiral killed: In order to prevent his soldiers from feeling dejection and fear as they went into battle, Agesilaus ordered the messengers to say that the Spartans were victorious, while he came forward with a garland on his head to oversee sacrifices to celebrate the good news (Ages. 18.3).40 Additional paradigms are supplied by Agesilaus’ actions after Leuctra. Agesilaus first instils new spirit into the surviving Spartan soldiers by making an incursion into Arcadia 39  Nepos simply refers to Agesilaus’ service in Egypt as a sign that he never stopped serving his country (Ages. 7.1) and was indifferent to wealth (Ages. 7.3–4, 8.3–5), without providing details of the campaign. 40  A similar stratagem is used by Timoleon when his army encounters a cartload of parsley on its way to take on the Carthaginian army: Timoleon coverts this “bad omen” into a good omen of victory (as in the Isthmian games) by wreathing his head with it and having his captains and soldiers do the same (Tim. 26.1–5). See Chapter 7.

246

Chapter 6

(Ages. 30.5), and later, when provincials and Helots begin deserting the Spartans, he has the weapons of the deserters collected and hidden before daylight so that the Spartan soldiers would not become discouraged (Ages. 32.8). Again, by explaining the reasons for Agesilaus’ actions and their ultimate objectives, Plutarch transforms these details into lessons in effective generalship. Using “Pragmatic Justice” to Deal with Rebellion Agesilaus provides two paradigms of “pragmatic justice” administered to quell rebellions after Leuctra. In one case, about two hundred rebels seize the Issorium containing the temple of Artemis. Agesilaus resists the desire of other Spartans to directly attack and retake the area: instead, he approaches the rebels with only one servant and shouts out to them that they have misunderstood his order about where they should gather, pointing to another location. After they left the Issorium—”delighted, because they supposed that their design was undetected” (ἥσθησαν οἰόμενοι λανθάνειν)—Agesilaus had only about fifteen of the conspirators arrested and put to death by night, while allowing the others to go free (Ages. 32.4–5). In the second case, the conspiracy was larger and Agesilaus adjusted his strategy. Given the confusion in Sparta, the size of the group made it “impracticable” (ἄπορον ἦν) either to bring them all to trial or to ignore the plot. Agesilaus met with the ephors and the men were executed without trial, the first time such an expedient was used in Sparta (Ages. 32.6). Giving the Enemy the Chance to Practice in Small Battles Plutarch associates Agesilaus with one major strategic misjudgment that ultimately contributed to the Spartan defeat at Leuctra: Agesilaus engages the Thebans in many battles, which enable them to gain valuable military experience they could ultimately use against Sparta later. This mistake is highlighted by Agesilaus’ expedition into Boeotia, during which his army experiences both victories and reverses and he himself is wounded (Ages. 26.2). Afterwards, Antalcidas tells him that this is the fee he has earned “for teaching [the Thebans] how to fight when they did not wish to do it, and did not even know how” (Ages. 26.2). Plutarch reinforces this view, commenting that the Thebans had become more warlike because of the many Spartan expeditions against them “by which they were virtually schooled in arms” (ὥσπερ ἐγγυμνασαμένους) and citing Lycurgus’ rhetra that the Spartans not make frequent incursions against the same enemy so it would not learn how to make war (Ages. 26.3).41

41  This charge against Agesilaus is also made in Lycurgus (13.5–6), where Antalcidas’ comment is also cited.

Agesilaus-pompey

247

Relations with Greek States Incidents in Agesilaus’ relations with Greek states supply largely negative paradigms in creating discord rather than harmony among states. Two episodes in which Agesilaus’ actions harm Spartan interests are key: when Agesilaus condones Spartan violations of the Peace of Antalcidas (Ages. 24) and when he repeatedly refuses to make peace with Thebes (34–35). Both actions violate the core principle that it is the statesman’s duty to promote concord, a theme that is prominent in Dio’s Orations. Adhering to Treaties: Occupation of the Cadmeia Plutarch uses the Spartan occupation of the Cadmeia to illustrate the harmful effects on relations with other cities of violating a treaty and tolerating injustice against them. Although Agesilaus had overseen the enforcement of the King’s Peace (Ages. 23.3), he “does not hesitate” to help Phoebidas after he has seized the Cadmeia (Ages. 23.3–4) and justifies his own conduct on the grounds that the Spartans should judge the action based on “whether the act itself was serviceable or not” (εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἔχει) (23.4).42 This action generates a variety of detrimental consequences. Not only does it irritate the Greeks (ἠγανάκτουν) and make the Spartans angry (χαλεπῶς δ’ ἔφερον) (Ages. 23.3), but it contradicts his own assertions that justice was the most important virtue: And yet, in his discourse, he always declared that justice was the first of the virtues (πρωτεύειν τῶν ἀρετῶν); for when justice was not present there was no benefit to courage (οὐδὲν ὄφελος), but if all men were just, there would be no need for courage…. But, in his actions, he no longer maintained this opinion, but was often carried away by ambition and contentiousness, and especially towards the Thebans. Ages. 23.5–6

The damage to Sparta’s reputation is exacerbated when Sparta is persuaded to occupy the Cadmeia on its own account (Ages. 23.7). In the synkrisis, Plutarch references this incident in his charge that Agesilaus “kindled the Boeotian war” (ἐκκαύσας) out of anger and contentiousness (Ages-Pomp. 1.4). 42  A similar violation of an agreement occurs when Agesilaus, chafing under a subordinate position of command, gains cover for changing sides from Tachos to Nectabanis (an act of “treachery” in Plutarch’s view) by eliciting an order from Sparta to “see to it that the interests of Sparta should not suffer” (ὁρᾶν … ὅπως πράξει τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ συμφέρον, Ages. 37.6)—an attitude that Plutarch claims defines the Spartan’s notion of honor and justice (37.2–6).

248

Chapter 6

Again, by concentrating Spartan decision-making in Agesilaus, Plutarch can convey a pragmatic lesson by linking the destructive consequences for Sparta’s position among the Greeks to Agesilaus’ willingness to violate treaties. In other writers, the acrimony of the Greeks is directed at Sparta, and not at Agesilaus,43 and it is Sparta’s failure to renounce Phoebidas’ action and withdraw from the Cadmeia that becomes one of the most widely vilified actions of Sparta in works about this period and a sign of gross arrogance of power (Isocrates’ Panegyricus 126, Xenophon’s Hellenica 5.4.1, Nepos’ Pelopidas 6 and Polybius 4.27.4). By attributing the decision to Agesilaus, Plutarch makes him responsible both for the occupation of the Cadmeia and for its aftermath in the defeat at Leuctra, transforming the incident into an instructive paradigm for provincial governors and city leaders. Fostering Peace Among Greek Cities: Refusal to Come to Terms Plutarch also goes beyond other accounts in censuring Agesilaus for Sparta’s repeated refusals to make peace with Thebes both before and after Leuctra. Here, Agesilaus’ obstinacy is reminiscent of Coriolanus’ rejection of proposals from various embassies, as discussed above in Chapter 5. In five cases, Agesilaus is shown rejecting peace out of anger towards Thebes and leaving Sparta vulnerable to the subsequent defeats at Tegyra and Leuctra. Agesilaus first ignores the Theban envoys at Corinth because “he had always hated that city, and was thinking this an advantageous time also for insolence towards it” (συμφέρειν ἐνυβρίσαι) (Ages. 22.1). He then rejects peace after the defeat of Sparta at Tegyra because he is angered by Epaminondas at the peace conference; instead, he seizes the pretext for delaring war on Thebes (Ages. 18.2).44 Even after Leuctra, Agesilaus twice refuses to make peace because he is unwilling to cede Messenia (Ages. 24.2)— thereby keeping Sparta vulnerable to attack (34.3–4). When he still rejects offers

43  The decision to maintain the occupation of the Cadmeia is attributed to “the Spartans” (Diodorus 15.20.2) and in Nepos (Pelop. 6.1) Agesilaus is not mentioned. 44  Epaminondas—who was paired with Scipio in the first pair of Lives (not extant)—was extensively praised by Diodorus (15.39.2–3, 15.88.1–4), who devoted a chapter to an encomium of Epaminondas after reporting his death. Diodorus describes Epaminondas as man who “surpassed his contemporaries not only in skill and experience in the art of war, but in equity and magnanimity as well” (μὴ μόνον τοὺς καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ στρατηγικῇ συνέσει καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπιεικείᾳ τε καὶ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ) (Diodorus 15.88.1). Xenophon (Hell. 7.5.7–9) praises him for his foresight and daring as a general.

Agesilaus-pompey

249

after Epaminondas is killed, criticism mounts from the Spartans that Agesilaus was violating his duty as their leader:45 Agesilaus was therefore thought to be violent, harsh and insatiable of war, in every way undermining and disparaging the general peace. It was his duty to stop the evils (δεὸν ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν), when the opportunity for this had arrived (περιήκοντι τῶν καιρῶν), and not, having lost the entirety of so great an empire—cities, land and sea—to struggle over the possessions and revenues in Messene. Ages. 35.3–4

Yet again, the loss of Spartan hegemony is presented as Agesilaus’ fault, and his failure to resolve differences even after the empire was lost is therefore even more blameworthy. This account of Agesilaus’ rejection of opportunities to reconcile finds a parallel in the paired Life, in which Pompey also refuses to resolve his differences with Caesar in order avert a major confrontation and possible defeat. Summary: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in Agesilaus Plutarch’s Agesilaus contains a larger number of incidents absent from extant accounts than the other Lives we have examined: only in Plutarch’s account is Agesilaus responsible for Lysander’s revolutionary plot (Ages. 8.4), the occupation of the Cadmeia (23.7), the battle of Leuctra (28.5), the later salvation of Sparta (30.4) and the victory over the men of Mendes in Egypt (38.1–39.5). By linking Agesilaus’ actions to harmful or beneficial consequences for Sparta, Plutarch supplies paradigms to guide readers managing relations with mentors, the people and other cities in their province. Similarly, in portraying Agesilaus as a positive paradigm of standing by his best thinking in the face of the taunts of Thebans near Sparta (31.3) and of the Egyptian army (39.1), Plutarch also supplies a version that is absent from Xenophon, Diodorus and Nepos. While Plutarch may have based his account on a source now lost, the decision to depart from Xenophon suggests that he constructed his Life to provide specific lessons. Agesilaus also illustrates the operation of “pragmatic justice”, whereby a statesman overrides enforcement of existing laws in order to serve the welfare 45  Agesilaus’ uncompromising stance is reminiscent of the intransigence of Coriolanus in the face of repeated offers to reconcile, as described in Chapter 5. However, unlike Coriolanus, Agesilaus resolves the situation by relinquishing his contentiousness. Like Minucius in Fabius (Fab. 13.1–5), Agesilaus changes his behavior after seeing his error.

250

Chapter 6

of the state. The Life includes both deterrent examples of situations where ignoring the law harms the interests of the state (Sphodrias, Phoebidas), as well as circumstances in which suspending the laws enables the state to thwart internal and external threats to its survival (Ages. 30.4, 31.3–32.6, 34.4–5). The importance of these incidents is underscored by Plutarch’s use of them to provide role positive and deterrent models of exercising justice in Political Precepts. Plutarch also casts Agesilaus as a positive paradigm in cultivating lasting goodwill by deferring to commands of the rulers, practicing temperance in his private life and demonstrating superiority to wealth. In the paired Life of Pompey, Plutarch addresses the issues of contentiousness and deference to others from a new perspective, while providing deeper insight into the complex area of managing political alliances. While the only major alliances or rivalries in Agesilaus involved Lysander or Thebes, Pompey’s career comprises a long series of changing alliances that begin with his mentoring by Sulla and subsequently include partnerships and rivalries with Lucullus, Cicero, Clodius, Caesar and Cato. In addition, Pompey is not as driven by ambition and contentiousness, as was the case with Agesilaus, but is influenced instead by an excessive love of reputation and inappropriate compliancy (deference to others), which together undermine his effectiveness as a statesman and general and lead to the defeat at Pharsalus. 6.3

Life of Pompey

Overview Like Agesilaus, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106–48 BC) enjoyed a long career and ultimately played a central role in the wars that ended an era for his city. Pompey enters the public arena serving under his father, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, at Asculum (89 BC) and subsequently rises to prominence as a supporter of Sulla in the wars against Marius. He was awarded three triumphs: in 81 for defeating both Carbo in Sicily and Domitius Ahenobarbus and King Iarbas in Africa; in 70 for defeating Sertorius in Spain; and in 62 for his victory over Mithridates VI, having taken over command from Lucullus in 67 shortly after stamping out piracy in the Mediterranean. He formed an alliance with Caesar in 59, which, though renewed in 56, broke up in and after 53. Pompey was co-consul with Crassus in 70 and 55 and was sole consul in 52 before taking Metellus Pius Scipio as his colleague. As commander of Roman forces after Caesar invaded Italy in 49, Pompey transported the army to Greece and was defeated at Pharsalus in 48. He was murdered in Egypt later that year. Pompey is generally presented in Roman writers as a blend of strengths and weaknesses, receiving favorable treatment for his temperance in

Agesilaus-pompey

251

private life and restraint in using force to impose his power, but he is criticized for his partnership, and then rivalry, with Caesar. Pompey’s decisions to abandon Rome and then to give battle at Pharsalus are faulted by most historians—including Velleius Paterculus, Appian and Cassius Dio. While some writers—like Lucan—portray Pompey as a tragic figure and victim of Fate, his decision at Pharsalus is still recognized as flawed. Among other writers, Pompey was mentioned in Cicero’s De Officiis as a great general (1.76, 78; 2.20, 2.45), as a man who pursued power rather than what was morally right (3.82) and as a man who made great expenditures on public edifices and exhibitions (2.57, 60). Seneca describes him as pursuing power at the expense of liberty and as Cato’s opponent (De Beneficiis 5.16,4, Ad Marc. 14.3; De Providentia 3.14, Ep. Mor. 95.70, 104.29–31) and suggests that Pompey might have benefitted from an earlier death (Ad Marc. 20.4–6). Seneca also refers to Pompey’s reputation for kindness (De Brev. Vitae 13.6–7) and craving for glory (Ep. Mor. 94.64–66), while pointing to his defeat at Pharsalus and death in Egypt as reflective of man’s vulnerability to Fortune (Ep. Mor. 4.7, 71.9). Valerius Maximus mentions Pompey twenty-six times on topics touching every stage of his career and including both praise and blame.46 Frontinus cites twelve incidents from Pompey’s career in nine different categories of generalship.47 In the Moralia, Pompey appears seventeen times in eight treatises.48 References are made to the goodwill he enjoyed (319E), the triumph granted by Sulla (804F), his defeat of the pirates (779A), his pardon of Sthenno’s city (815E–F) and his criticism of Lucullus’ luxury (785F, 786A). However, Pompey also receives criticism for his effeminate habit of scratching his head with one finger (89E; 809D), his conduct in partnership with Caesar (819C) and his decision to give battle at Pharsalus (319B–D). Not surprisingly, his military victories are included in On the Fortune of the Romans (319A–B, 319E, 324A). Pompey plays a role in nearly half of Plutarch’s Roman Lives, including Sulla, Sertorius, 46  In Valerius Maximus, Pompey appears: under Sulla and as a general (5.2.9, 5.3.5, 5.1.9, 5.5.4, 5.7.ext 2, 7.6.ext 3, 8.15.8, 9.13.2); as a statesman in Rome (1.8.10, 2.4.6, 4.6.4, 6.2.4, 6.2.5, 6.2.6, 6.2.7, 6.2.8, 6.2.9, 7.7.2, 8.14.3, 9.5.3); at Pharsalus (1.6.12, 3.8.7, 4.5.5) and in Egypt (1.5.6; 1.8.9, 5.1.10). 47  The different categories include: on leading an army through enemy-infested lands (Strat. 1.4.8), on escaping difficult situations (1.5.5), on quelling a mutiny (1.9.3), on choosing the time for battle (2.1.12 and 2.2.2, in the war against Mithridates), on the disposition of troops (2.3.14 in Albania; 2.3.22 at Pharsalus), on ambushes (2.5.32, 33), on ensuring the loyalty of those one mistrusts (2.11.2), on sorties (3.17.2) and on determination (4.5.1). 48  Pompey appears in How to Profit from Enemies (89E, 91A), On the Fortune of the Romans (319D, 319E, 324A), Table Talk (8.717C; 9.737B), On Delays in Divine Vengeance (553B), On the Fortune of Alexander (336E), Philosophers and Men in Power (779A), Political Precepts (804D, 805C, 806A–B, 810C, 815E–F) and Old Men in Politics (785F–786A, 791A).

252

Chapter 6

Lucullus, Crassus, Caesar, Cicero, Cato Minor, Brutus and Antony.49 Each of these Lives presents different aspects of Pompey’s character as he evolved from being a protégé of Sulla, opponent of Sertorius and rival of Lucullus to being a partner in various alliances with Crassus, Cicero, Caesar and Cato in Rome and, ultimately, becoming the general who confronted Caesar and Antony at Pharsalus.50 At Dion-Brut 3.2–3, Brutus is compared unfavorably to Pompey, who faced adverse fortune with greater resolve although he had less confidence in his forces after his defeat at Pharsalus than Brutus did after his defeat at Philippi. Several themes in Pompey are familiar from Agesilaus, including the goodwill of citizens, military acumen, excessive ambition and inappropriate deference to others. Pompey’s career also follows a similar trajectory of brilliant victories in Asia followed by deterioration in political and military effectiveness after returning to his native land. However, Plutarch focuses on different aspects of ambition and being compliant: whereas Agesilaus was driven by excessive contentiousness and a willingness to bend the law for friends, Pompey has too great a love of reputation and is submissive to political partners. Key lessons lie in his relations with Caesar and his decision to fight at Pharsalus. Moral Foundation and Reputation As in Agesilaus, Plutarch crafts a characterization of the hero that brings his pragmatic lessons into sharper focus. Pompey displays an array of exceptional character strengths whose effects are diluted by two destructive flaws: being compliant in the face of public pressure and excessive love of reputation. Like Agesilaus, Pompey enjoyed enormous goodwill, although it was rooted in a different blend of traits. In Pompey, Plutarch examines the effects of goodwill from a new perspective, highlighting its potential to breed overconfidence and cloud a leader’s judgment about the perils of his situation. 49  The position of two of these Lives is reported in their Prologues (Dem-Cic is #5, DionBrut is #12), while Lys-Sulla and Cim-Luc are widely accepted as belonging in the first ten pairs based on cross-references with other Lives. Caesar (35.12 and 45.8) specifically refers to Pompey’s Life as upcoming, while Cato Minor (56.5) refers to details already given in Pompey. Whether the other Lives in which Pompey appears (Sertorius, Crassus, and Antony) were written before or after Pompey is not known. On the order of the Lives, see Jones (1966). 50  At the same time, the characterizations of Sulla, Lucullus, Cicero, Caesar and Brutus in their own Lives—all of which, as noted above, are assumed to have preceded AgesPomp—form part of the backdrop to Pompey.

Agesilaus-pompey

253

Cultivating and Sustaining Goodwill At the beginning of the Life, Plutarch summarizes the positive qualities that fueled Pompey’s rapid rise to power and created the affection Romans felt for him over his long political career: There were many reasons for loving this man (πολλαὶ τοῦ ἀγαπᾶσθαι): his temperate way of living, his training in arms, the persuasiveness of his speech, trust in his character and his accommodating temper in meeting people (εὐαρμοστία πρὸς ἔντευξιν), so that there was no one who asked for something more painlessly or assisted someone asking more ­pleasantly. For to his other graces were added both giving without offense (τὸ ἀνεπαχθὲς διδόντος) and receiving with dignity (τὸ σεμνὸν λαμβάνοντος). Pomp. 1.3

Here, Plutarch attributes to Pompey the essential qualities of the ideal statesman of Political Precepts. The reference to courtesy in the exchange of favors, in particular, would have resonated in Plutarch’s day, whether men were active in Rome or the provinces.51 During his rise to power, Pompey epitomizes the approach to subordinates, equals and superiors described at Political Precepts 816B: “A man ought to conciliate his superior, add prestige to his inferior, honor his equal and be affable and friendly to all”. All of these qualities—along with Pompey’s control over sexual passion (Pomp. 2.3–4; 36.3–6) and superiority to money (36.6–7)—are prominent in the first half of the Life, where they are illustrated in a variety of private52 and military53 contexts.

51  Seneca devoted De Beneficiis precisely to this topic. See the discussion in Chapter 2. 52  Pompey’s modest lifestyle is compared favorably to that of Lucullus (Pomp. 2.6), Metellus (18.2) and Demetrius (40.4–5). Even after his third triumph, his house “did not excite envy” (ἀνεπίφθονον) (Pomp. 40.5). Plutarch underscores Pompey’s rejection of courtesans by telling the story of Stratonice (Pomp. 36.3–6). 53  Pompey’s extraordinary talent as a general—which also contributes to the goodwill he enjoys—is illustrated in extensive coverage of the achievements that marked his rise to power. These included the victories as a general under Sulla (Pomp. 6.3–4 and 7.1–3 in Italy, 8.6 in Gaul, 12.2–5 in Africa)—which culminate in Pompey being addressed as Imperator (8.2) and then as Magnus (13.4)—and the major victories that follow in Spain (20.2–3, 28.2), in the Mediterranean against the pirates (28.2) and in the East (32.5–7). The power of Pompey’s reputation is underscored by the frequent defection of enemy soldiers to him (Pomp. 7.3, 11.2, 16.4, and 18.1).

254

Chapter 6

The full range of Pompey’s appealing character traits benefits his effectiveness in public life by eliciting the proverbial goodwill,54 which Plutarch describes in the opening sentence: No Roman ever enjoyed a heartier goodwill (ἔυνοιαν … σφοδροτέραν), or one that began sooner, or was in fuller bloom in his prosperity (μᾶλλον εὐτυχοῦντι συνακμάσασαν), or remained more constant in his adversity (πταίσαντι παραμείνασαν βεβαιότερον), than Pompey did. Pomp. 1.2

Plutarch repeatedly emphasizes this goodwill both in authorial comments (Pomp. 14.6; 18.2)55 and in descriptions of the crowds of people escorting Pompey when he leaves or returns to Rome (13.4, 21.4, 22.6, 27.1, 57.2 and 43.3). Even when Pompey abandons Rome, the affection is undiminished: But even amidst terror Pompey was a man to be envied for the universal goodwill felt towards him, because though many blamed his generalship (πολλῶν τὴν στρατηγίαν μεμφομένων), there was no one who hated the general (ουδεὶς ἦν ὁ μισῶν τὸν στρατηγὸν). Indeed, one would have found that those who fled the city for the sake of liberty were not so numerous as those who did so because they were unable to forsake Pompey. Pomp. 61.4

Goodwill of this magnitude and longevity is unique in the Parallel Lives— whose heroes are more likely to face periods of hostile opposition or outright rejection, such as those experienced by Pericles, Fabius, Alcibiades and even Agesilaus in the paired Life. Nevertheless, the gaining and retention of goodwill was a critical objective of statesmen in Plutarch’s day and a common topic in the advice literature, as noted in Chapter 2. By emphasizing the extraordinary goodwill enjoyed by Pompey, Plutarch is able to illustrate both the positive and destructive consequences of this trait for a leader’s effectiveness: while goodwill can win ready obedience to his commands or policies, it can also 54  In On the Fortune of the Romans, Augustus is said to have prayed that the gods bestow on his grandson “the courage of Scipio, the goodwill of Pompey and his own Fortune” (ἀνδρείαν μὲν … τὴν Σκιπίωνος, εὔνοιαν δὲ τὴν Πομπηίου, Τύχην δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ) (319E). 55  His celebration of a triumph before he was a senator “contributed not a little to win him the goodwill of the multitude” (πρὸς εὔνοιαν ὑπῆρχε τῶν πολλῶν οὐ μικρόν) (Pomp. 14.6), while Pompey’s moderate lifestyle in Spain earns him “an astonishing goodwill together with reputation” (θαυμαστὴν εὔνοιαν ἅμα δόξῃ) (Pomp. 18.2).

Agesilaus-pompey

255

foster over-confidence, blind him to threats, and induce him to be compliant in harmful policies out of fear of losing that goodwill. Ignores Opportunities to Seize Tyrannical Power The enduring affection for Pompey is reinforced by his refusal to take advantage of his popularity to establish a monarchy or tyranny in Rome, despite many opportunities when he returned from successful campaigns (Pomp. 13.2, 20.3–4, 21.3, 43.3, and 54.1).56 Instead, he makes himself strong through magistracies rather than attempting any revolutionary change (Pomp. 54.1).57 By depicting Pompey in this way, Plutarch obtains a sharp distinction between the goals and character of Pompey and those of his main rival, Caesar, while also establishing an essential backdrop to explain the different strategies and tactics of the two men in their competition for power. Plutarch’s purposeful portrayal of Pompey as a man who did not seek to become a tyrant is reflected in the divergence from the portrait of Pompey in most historians. Cassius Dio (41.53.3–41.54.2), for instance, argues that, despite differences in temperament, Pompey and Caesar were the same in the actions they were willing to take to achieve supremacy. Caesar (Bellum Civile 1.1–4), Cassius Dio (39.25–26, 30; 40.59.2) and Velleius Paterculus (2.48) present Pompey as routinely exerting direct pressure on Rome itself when his interests were threatened, while both Cassius Dio and Velleius Paterculus describe Pompey’s conflict with Caesar as a full-fledged contest for supremacy between two men similarly driven by ambition and greed.58 By portraying Pompey as relatively passive in the political arena, Plutarch can cast Caesar as Pompey’s polar opposite: a man aiming at monarchy from

56  At Pompey’s return from the East, Plutarch notes that the crowd around him was so large that “had he purposed any revolutionary changes at the time, he had no need of the army that he had disbanded” (Pomp. 43.3). Moreover, Pompey receives two commands granting him extraordinary power (the Gabinian Law to fight pirates at Pomp. 25.2–3 and the Manilian law to fight Mithridates at 30.1–5) which also could have inspired tyrannical aspirations. 57  His lack of interest in pursuing greater power in Rome is reinforced by Plutarch’s depiction of Pompey spending so much time with Julia (Pomp. 48.5, 53.3) and then Cornelia (55.3) that he is seen as neglecting public affairs. 58  Cassius Dio (41.54.1–2) asserts that they differed only to the extent that Pompey wanted to be supreme over people who were willing and loved him, while Caesar did not care. “The deeds, however, through which they hoped to accomplish all that they wished, were perforce common to both” (τὰ μέντοι ἔργα, δι’ ὧν ἤλπιζον πάνθ’ ὅσα ἐβούλοντο καταπράξειν, ἀμφότεροι ὁμοίως καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἐποίουν).

256

Chapter 6

the start of his career (Pomp. 25.4, 47.1–2).59 Moreover, Plutarch can more readily present Pompey as a “tyrant-fighter”, making his opposition to Caesar in the Civil War less a matter of rivalry for supreme power and more about a fight against a would-be tyrant on behalf of liberty. By dismissing the notion that Pompey’s conflict with Caesar was part of a self-serving struggle for power, Plutarch can better use Pompey to supply deterrent paradigms of excessive love of good repute, misguided submissiveness and mismanaged alliances. Submissiveness and Love of Reputation Plutarch highlights two character flaws in Pompey which undermine his effectiveness both as a statesman and a general. First, Pompey’s submissiveness induces him to choose policies that would enable him to retain the good regard of an ally or deflect public criticism, rather than to insist upon policies that were best for the state. Plutarch’s characterizations of Cato and Caesar clarify the nature of this flaw. On the one side, Cato’s inflexibility in defending law and precedent60 casts into sharper relief Pompey’s willingness to acquiesce, with Cato’s frequent appearances in Pompey underscoring the importance of this contrast (Pomp. 44.2, 52.1, 54.3, 54.6, 55.5, 56.3, 59.4, 65.1 and 67.2). At the other extreme, Caesar is completely willing to adapt to the corrupt practices of Roman politics and, to achieve his goals, is more aggressive than Pompey in engaging in bribery (Pomp. 51.1–3, 57.1), violence (48.1), intimidation (47.5), deception (46.2, 47.1, 47.6), flattery of the people (25.4, 47.2), violation of laws (60.2, 62.1) and manipulation of elections (48.2, 51.4, 58.1).61 59  This portrait of Caesar aiming at a monarchy is consistent across the Lives, and is found, for instance, in Cicero (20.6), Cato (22.4–5), Dion-Brut (2.2), Pompey (28.5–6) and Caesar (3.3, 4.7–9). The portrait is not necessarily negative, since Plutarch believed monarchy served the interests of the state at certain times, when it needed a “physician” to cure its “disease” (Caes. 28.6, Dion-Brut 2.2), as Caesar ultimately tries to do. Caesar did not devolve into the self-interested tyrant many of his contemporaries (including Cato) expected. For more detail on Plutarch’s characterization of Caesar in his own Life, see Pelling (2011c). 60  Cato’s strict adherence to the letter of the law is also central to Plutarch’s characterization of him in Cato Minor. See Chapter 9. 61  Appian (Civil Wars 2.12.86) comments that the perception of Pompey’s power as democratic emerges from the comparison to Caesar: without that contrast, Pompey’s power was essentially that of an autocrat: ”From his twenty-third to his fifty-eighth year he had not ceased to exercise power which as regards its strength was that of an autocrat, but by the inevitable contrast with Caesar had an almost democratic appearance.” (ἀπὸ γὰρ τριῶν καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν οὐ διέλιπεν ἐς ὀκτὼ καὶ πεντήκοντα τῇ μὲν ἰσχύι μοναρχικῶς δυναστεύων, τῇ δὲ δόξῃ διὰ τὸν Καίσαρος ζῆλον δημοτικῶς νομιζόμενος ἄρχειν).

Agesilaus-pompey

257

Pompey’s love of reputation—a passion that can spur bravery or cloud judgment—has positive and negative effects on his career. It is helpful during his rise to prominence,62 but has a corrosive effect after he has acquired power.63 In particular, his pursuit of glory makes him both envious of other generals—spurring provocative actions against Metellus Creticus (Pomp. 29.3–4), Lucullus (30.6) and Caesar after Crassus’ death (53.5, 67.4)—as well as unwilling to share the glory of victory (19.1, 21.2, 29.2), common themes in the Lives. This love of reputation, combined with submissiveness, become the levers through which Caesar is able to channel Pompey’s influence to advance his own power64—a process that forms one of the central pragmatic (and cautionary) lessons in the Life.65 Pragmatic Lessons in Political and Military Leadership Plutarch uses incidents from Pompey’s career to provide new perspectives on effective and ineffective generalship, while also addressing the challenges of managing political alliances and rivalries. As noted above, Pompey’s misguided actions often trace back to his love of fame and being compliant—topics discussed in Plutarch’s treatises on practical ethics as well as in discussions of managing ambition and partnerships in the advice literature of the era (e.g. De Officiis). As noted earlier, the issue of alliances was especially relevant in an environment where patronage and the exchange of favors were critical elements of political advancement—as reflected in Pliny’s Letters (e.g. Ep. 3.4, 4.15, 4.17, 7.25 and 7.22). In Pompey, Plutarch conveys pragmatic lessons in three areas: (1) Relations with other Romans; (2) Alliances and rivalries and (3) Military command. The episodes in each area are listed below in Table 6.2. Pompey’s effectiveness in each sphere declines over the course of the Life, which has been divided into six broad phases based on major turning points. In Phase 1 (Chapters 1–14), Plutarch presents Pompey’s early life and exploits through his first triumph. 62  Early in his career, Pompey is “in the chase for reputation from something incredible” (τὸ ἔνδοξον ἐκ τοῦ παραδόξου θηρώμενος) and for this reason seeks the “dazzling honor” (ὑπέρλαμπρον) of a triumph before he was a senator (Pomp. 14.6). 63  Pompey provides an instance of the same traits driving both the rise and fall of a statesman, a pattern noted by Pelling (1988b) and Duff (1999b) and often used to illustrate Plutarch’s ambiguous treatment of moral qualities. 64  Caesar uses these levers, for instance, to trick Pompey into foregoing early mustering of an army to fight against him (Pomp. 57.4–5). 65  Plutarch similarly portrays the “partnership” of Cicero and Octavian in Cicero (44–46), where Cicero helps Octavian become established in power, believing that he could manipulate Octavian only to find himself cast aside.

258

Chapter 6

Table 6.2 Episodes in the Life of Pompey Relations with other Romans

Alliances and rivalries

Military command

Phase 1: Early life; rise to prominence; 1st triumph (Chapters 1–14) 1–2- Family; core traits; Flora 4- Theft charge; marries Antistia 9- Marries Sulla’s step-daughter, Aemilia

3- Campaign with Strabo 5–8- With Carbo, Sulla and Metellus 10–12- Sicily, Africa; defeats Iarbas 13- Called “Magnus” by Sulla

14- 1st Triumph (Africa) Phase 2: Expedition to Spain; Servile War; 2nd triumph; first consulship (15–22) 15- Supports Lepidus over Catullus; honors Sulla

21- To Rome; disbands army 22- 2nd Triumph (Europe)

22- Supports Crassus as co-consul

16- Fights Lepidus and Brutus 17- Delays disbanding army in Spain 17–19- Fights Sertorius, Metellus 20- Defeats and kills Perpenna 21- Defeats fugitives from Servile War

Phase 3: Conquest of pirates; campaign in Asia; 3rd triumph (23–45) 23- Avoids envy by staying aloof

36- Sends booty to treasury 43- Disbands army

45- 3rd Triumph (Asia)

44- Conflict with Cato over elections 44- Cato rejects marriage alliance

24–28- Clears sea of pirates 29- Conflict with Metellus in Crete 30–38- Replaces Lucullus in East 39- Overlooks rapacity of army 42- Gives gifts in Rhodes, Athens

259

Agesilaus-pompey

Relations with other Romans

Alliances and rivalries

Military command

Phase 4: Alliances with Crassus, Clodius and Caesar (46–51) 46- Joins Clodius; betrays Cicero 47- Alliance with Caesar 47- Marries Julia 48- Devotes time to wife 49–50- Cicero returns; Pompey gets post overseeing harbors, trade

48- Uses army as threat; helps Caesar get provinces 51- Alliance with Caesar and Crassus

Phase 5: Co-consul with Crassus; deaths of Julia and Crassus; Pompey as sole consul (52–54)

53- Leisure with Julia; Julia and Crassus die

52- Co-consul with Crassus 53- Delegates duties as pro-consul 54- Seeks Cato’s advice 54- Sole consul with Cato’s help

Phase 6: Final break with Caesar; Battle of Pharsalus; death in Egypt (55–80) 55- Marries Cornelia (Metellus Scipio’s 55- Pressures jury in trial of Metellus Scipio daughter) 56- Caesar denied run for consul 58- Senate votes that both 57- Recovery from illness celebrated disband 59- Cicero’s settlement derailed 60- Caesar crosses Rubicon 61–62- Rome panics; Pompey 63–65- Victory at Dyrrachium leaves Rome 66–67- Deliberation and decision 68–72- Defeat at Pharsalus 73–80- Killed in Egypt

260

Chapter 6

Phase 2 (15–22) covers the period through his second triumph and first consulship, with Phase 3 (23–45) describing the conquests of the pirates and Mithridates and closing with the third triumph. In Phase 4 (46–51), Plutarch depicts alliances with Clodius, Caesar and Crassus, while Phase 5 (52–54) details the break-down of the alliance with Caesar and Pompey’s election as sole consul. Phase 6 (55–80) reports events leading to the Civil War, Pharsalus and Pompey’s death in Egypt. The pragmatic lessons lie in the connections between the decisions motivated by compliancy or love of reputation and their destructive impact on Pompey’s leadership. Relations with Other Romans Scenes depicting Pompey’s relations with the Roman people provide paradigms in two areas: (1) sustaining goodwill without becoming compliant or overconfident and (2) balancing private life with public duty. While Pompey’s moderate lifestyle contributed to the goodwill he enjoyed, his marriages undercut his effectiveness by distracting him from public duties and, as a result, harming his reputation. Many principles at issue are presented in On Being Compliant, which instructs readers on “saying no.” Sustaining Goodwill Plutarch uses Pompey’s conduct towards the people to illustrate two techniques for sustaining goodwill. First, after becoming powerful, Pompey demonstrates respect for the laws by routinely disbanding his army upon his return from campaigns. He dispelled the fears that he would use his army to become a tyrant by giving assurances beforehand, as illustrated in his return from Spain: Although there was such great honor and expectation of the man, nevertheless there existed a certain suspicion and fear (ὑποψία καὶ δέος) that he would not dismiss his army, but would proceed through arms and solerule directly to the polity of Sulla. … But Pompey removed this suspicion (ἀνεῖλε τὴν ὑπόνοιαν) by stating before hand (προειπὼν) that he would let his army go after his triumph. Pomp. 21.3–4

Secondly, upon his return to Rome, Pompey would assume a “low-profile” in a deliberate effort to avert the envy and loss of reputation that can arise when a successful general pushes himself into the political arena (Pomp. 23.3–4).66 As 66  In this respect, Pompey was also like Scipio Africanus, who spent much of his time in the country “thereby removing the weight of envy (τοῦ φθόνου τὸ βάρος ἀφαιρῶν) and “giving a breathing space” (διδοὺς ἀναπνοὴν) to men who felt they were “stifled” (πιέζεσθαι) by his

Agesilaus-pompey

261

Plutarch explains, political life is precarious (ἐπισφαλής) for those whom war has made great and “ill-suited for democratic equality” (πρὸς ἰσότητα δημοτικὴν ἀσυμμέτροις) (Pomp. 23.4).67 The success of this strategy is reflected in the enduring goodwill enjoyed by Pompey. Balancing Private Life and Public Duty Plutarch also crafts his account of Pompey’s career to provide a deterrent paradigm of a statesman who allows his private life to distract him from public duty. In Pompey’s case, the distraction is rooted in his married life, which at times keeps him from urgent political matters and undermines his reputation and effectiveness as a leader. First, in order to spend time with Julia in villas and gardens around Italy (Pomp. 48.5–49.2), Pompey neglects public affairs during Clodius’ turbulent tribunate (48.5) and delegates his provinces and armies to friends (53.1). As a result, he endures public ridicule led by Clodius (Pomp. 48.6–7), the anger of the senate (49.1) and the loss of favor with the people (53.1). Later, Pompey’s marriage to Cornelia elicits a more emphatic critique from the Romans, who see him as neglecting public affairs at a time of crisis: And those who were more refined thought that Pompey neglected the city (παρεωρακέναι), which was suffering misfortunes, to cure which the city had chosen him as physician (ἰατρὸν ᾕρηται) and had handed herself over to him alone. But he put on garlands and was celebrating his nuptials—a man who ought to have considered his consulship itself a misfortune. Pomp. 55.3

By including this description of Pompey as a physician neglecting his patient, Plutarch highlights how reputation can be damaged when a statesman privileges private concerns at times of crisis.68 However, the detrimental effect of glory (Pol. Prec. 812A). The goal for a statesman is to find the people fond of him when he is present and longing for his return when he is absent (Pol. Prec. 811F). 67  Pompey’s conduct echoes Pericles’ tendency to limit his public appearances to issues of great import in order that the people would not become satiated with his presence (Per. 7.5). Moreover, such conduct is consistent with Plutarch’s advice in Political Precepts that a man not seek too many offices or too often in order to avoid becoming the target of envy (811D-812B). 68  At similar times of crisis, Alcibiades and Agesilaus do not neglect the affairs of state. As noted in Chapter 5, Alcibiades was unable to “stand by and watch with indifference” (Alc. 36.5) when the generals were imperilling the fleet at Aegospotami. Agesilaus is also compared to a physician after Leuctra (Ages. 30.2), but, unlike Pompey, he remains focused on the interests of the state through the crisis.

262

Chapter 6

Pompey’s marriages on his reputation as a statesman is absent from other accounts, which present his marriage alliances only as tools of political advancement. Plutarch’s version distances Pompey from the concentrated pursuit of power attributed to Caesar. Indeed, in the Life, it is Pompey’s detachment that gives Caesar the opportunity to more easily outmaneuver him. Alliances and Rivalries Plutarch uses the varied alliances of Pompey during his long career to provide pragmatic paradigms in three key areas: (1) how to manage marriage alliances; (2) how to manage political alliances; and (3) how to prevent alliances from becoming rivalries. In contrast to Agesilaus, where Agesilaus was the protégé, Pompey presents Pompey both as a protégé of Sulla and as a mentor to Caesar. At the same time, Plutarch examines the more complex challenges of managing sequences of alliances (and rivalries) over the course of a career. Plutarch designs the narrative to convey three deterrent lessons: first, that marriage alliances can implicate a statesman in actions that hurt the state and disgrace his own reputation; second, that a statesman must be on guard against a protégé seeking to outmaneuver and displace him;69 and, finally, that a statesman’s duty to protect the common welfare must take precedence over political rivalry and spur him to reconcile before matters escalate to war.70 Plutarch flags the importance of these lessons in an authorial comment (Pomp. 46.1–2) inserted between the description of Pompey’s third triumph (Pomp. 45) and his renewed career in Rome (46.3), preparing the reader for an account of how Pompey’s carelessness in relations with Caesar brought about his own ruin: For the power in the city that [Pompey] had acquired from seemly activities (ἐκ προσηκόντων), this power he used on behalf of others in unjust ways; and, to the extent that he bestowed strength on those others (ὅσον ἐκείνοις ἰσχύος προσετίθει), he took away from his own reputation, and, without being aware of it (ἔλαθε), he was destroyed by the strength and magnitude of his own power. Pomp. 46.2

69  One of the lessons in Cicero, as noted earlier. 70  Both sides of Pompey’s rivalry with Caesar are important: on the one side Plutarch portrays Pompey deferring to Caesar’s agenda, while, on the other side, he shows Caesar consciously manipulating Pompey and taking advantage of the effectiveness of corrupt political practices in accomplishing a rise to dictatorial power.

Agesilaus-pompey

263

Plutarch here reiterates a theme treated in Caesar: without being aware of what was happening, Pompey was outmaneuvered by Caesar and lost his good repute (Caes. 13.4).71 The goodwill Pompey enjoyed made him the “perfect partner” for ambitious politicians who wanted to take advantage of that goodwill to advance their own power. The process by which Pompey allowed Caesar to use him to advance to supreme power conveys a pragmatic lesson in the risks of entering alliances with younger or less-experienced men who may use their power, once acquired, to outmaneuver their “mentor”—a situation that also played out in the relationship between Cicero and Octavian, as described in Cicero. Managing Marriage Alliances With regard to marriage alliances, Plutarch demonstrates how marriages, on the one hand, can serve as tools of political advancement, while, on the other hand, they can place a statesman’s reputation at risk by making him seem complicit in the affairs of his father-in-law. Plutarch presents Pompey’s marriages to Antistia (Pomp. 4.2–3) and Aemilia (9.1–3) as concessions to powerful men that contributed to his rise to power: through Antistia Pompey secures an acquittal in his trial for theft and through Aemilia steady advance in his military career.72 Similarly, his marriage to Julia is portrayed as an act of being compliant, viewed at the time as an indication that Pompey “had now wholly given himself up to do Caesar’s bidding” (ἤδη παντάπασιν ἑαυτὸν τῷ Καίσαρι χρήσασθαι παραδεδωκώς) (Pomp. 47.5–6). In the case of Cornelia (Pomp. 55.1–2), Pompey uses his influence to secure the acquittal of his father-in-law, Metellus 71  The image of Pompey as “unaware” was established in Caesar, where Pompey and Crassus unite their strength in support of Caesar and enable him to change the form of government “before they were aware of it” (Caes. 13.4). Caesar is said to further “avail himself of Pompey’s influence” (τῆς Πομπηΐου δυνάμεως ὑποδραττόμενος) by marrying his daughter Julia to him (Caes. 14.7). Plutarch reports that Pompey was late to recognize the threat posed by Caesar, whom he “had despised, feeling that it was no hard task to put down again the man whom he himself had raised on high” ( ὡς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἔργον ὃν αὐτὸς ηὔξησε καταλυθῆναι πάλιν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ) (Caes. 28.2). When he abandons Rome, Pompey is criticized “for having strengthened Caesar against himself and the supreme power of the state” (Caes. 33.4). In Pompey, Plutarch shows how Pompey’s character flaws made all this possible. 72  In the case of Antistius, Plutarch simply reports that “a secret agreement was made” (Pomp. 4.4), while the marriage to Sulla’s step-daughter Aemilia is described as “characteristic of tyranny” (τυραννικὰ) and “suited the needs of Sulla rather than the disposition of Pompey” (τοῖς Σύλλα καιροῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς Πομπηΐου τρόποις πρέποντα) (Pomp. 9.2). Pompey was required to divorce Antistia.

264

Chapter 6

Scipio, undermining his own reputation as a result (Pomp. 55.3–4). Plutarch’s portrayal of the positive and negative effects of these alliances alerts readers to the benefits and injury that can result. Managing Political Alliances Plutarch’s treatment of Pompey’s alliance with Caesar highlights the pitfalls of political partnerships and depicts the attitudes and behaviors that make a statesman vulnerable to being manipulated and outmaneuvered. Pompey’s tendency to let others use his influence to serve their own purposes is revealed in his early alliances in Roman politics—including those with Lepidus (Pomp. 15.1–16.6), Crassus (22.2–3) and Clodius (46.4–5). When Pompey enables Lepidus to win the election for consul by canvassing for him (Pomp. 15.1), Sulla issues a warning to Pompey that echoes throughout the Life: However, it is time for you not to sleep, but to be attentive to your own affairs (μὴ καθεύδειν, ἀλλὰ προσέχειν). For you have made your adversary stronger than yourself. Pomp. 15.2

The actions advised by Sulla are precisely the opposite of the passivity and neglect that Pompey later exhibits, as his public actions are increasingly manipulated by his allies and his reputation and political effectiveness suffer as a result (Pomp. 46.5, 49.1). The primary deterrent lessons for readers are contained in the account of Pompey’s relations with Caesar after the third triumph (Pomp. 45). By introducing Caesar as the rival whom Pompey nurtured—rather than as the man who induced Pompey to abandon Rome and face defeat at Pharsalus—Plutarch places the emphasis on the beginning of their alliance rather than the final conflict.73 Plutarch is able to magnify Pompey’s responsibility for creating the uncontrollable challenge from Caesar that ruined his career. The importance of the early period of partnership is underscored by Cato’s comment that the first and greatest evil to befall Rome was not the enmity of Pompey and Caesar but their concord (Pomp. 47.3, 48.4,60.5).74 This comment is repeated three 73  Cicero (Phil. 2.10.24), for instance, expresses the sentiment that Pompey should either never have partnered with Caesar, or, once he had made the alliance, should never have let it break up. 74  Cato’s direct warning to Pompey, which is mentioned indirectly in Pompey, is recorded in Cato Minor after Caesar has obtained his command in Gaul (Cato Min. 43.5).

Agesilaus-pompey

265

times: when Caesar is first mentioned (Pomp. 47.1–3), when Bibulus remains home-bound as co-consul to Caesar (48.4) and after Caesar has crossed the Rubicon (60.5). This repetition suggests that the outcome was foreseeable and that Pharsalus could have been avoided had Pompey been alert to the risks. The pragmatic lessons for statesmen lie in Plutarch’s depiction of the steps Caesar took to outmaneuver Pompey. Caesar is shown engineering Pompey’s reconciliation with Crassus in order to gain access to the consulship for himself (Pomp. 47.1–3). Moreover, not only did Pompey make it possible for Caesar to become consul, but he hurt his own reputation by expressing his willingness to back Caesar’s policies with violence:75 “Then” said Caesar, “if anyone should resist the laws, will you come to help the people?” “Yes, by all means”, said Pompey, “Against those who threaten swords, I will come carrying swords and a shield”. It was thought (ἔδοξεν) that Pompey, until this day, had neither said nor done (οὔτ’ εἰπεῖν οὔτε ποιῆσαι) anything more vulgar (φορτικώτερον), with the result that even his friends apologized for him, saying that the expression escaped him on the spur of the moment. Pomp. 47.5

Force becomes more prominent in Pompey’s later actions: he “fills the city with soldiers” and “carries all affairs with force” (Pomp. 48.1). Importantly, Plutarch includes both the reaction of Romans in general and of Pompey’s friends. Plutarch’s depiction of the agreement in Luca (Pomp. 51.1–5) reiterates Pompey’s lack of awareness of Caesar’s strategy. After Pompey has reconciled with the senate by recalling Cicero and has regained office as a general in charge of the corn trade (Pomp. 49–50), Caesar is described as contriving “cleverly and without being noticed” (ἐλάνθανεν ὑπὸ δεινότητος) to acquire the means “to thwart Pompey’s policies” (καταπολιτευόμενος Πομπήϊον) (Pomp. 51.1). The agreement reached in Luca between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus (Pomp. 51.5) leads to a deterioration in Pompey’s reputation, as he employs violence and intimidation to secure consulships for himself and Crassus (Pomp. 52.1–2) and violates law to keep Cato out of the praetorship (Pomp. 52.2–3).76 The events 75  At Philippics 2.10.24, Cicero also states that “Pompey had wholly surrendered himself to Caesar” (se totum Pompeius Caesari tradidit) and on this basis explains why he (Cicero) was not to blame for Pompey’s action. 76  Pompey and Crassus receive consulships and proconsular commands, while Caesar retains Gaul (Pomp. 51.4).

266

Chapter 6

after Luca demonstrate that Pompey’s successes in regaining office, military commands and the affection of the people77 mask the weakening of his position vis-à-vis Caesar, who, through Pompey’s compliancy, has been given free rein to accumulate wealth and train his armies beyond the observation of the Romans.78 Again, Pompey is not alert to the danger, and Caesar is able to engineer the outcome: Caesar obtains a longer command in Gaul, during which he acquires resources to overpower Pompey. Plutarch’s detailed portrayal of how Pompey was outsmarted by Caesar provides an instructive pragmatic lesson for powerful statesmen in Plutarch’s day as well. Comparisons to other accounts of Pompey’s relations with Caesar indicate that Plutarch carefully crafted his version of events to produce this deterrent lesson in managing political alliances. In the historians, both men are intense competitors, and Pompey is maneuvering for power just as much as Caesar. Only in Plutarch’s Life is Pompey portrayed as the unwitting victim of Caesar’s machinations. By adopting this particular characterization, Plutarch creates a role model that perhaps could resonate more fully with the risks and vulnerabilities men in his own audience were facing in their own exchanges of patronage and mentorship in the political arena of the Empire. Preventing Alliances from Turning into Rivalries Plutarch also designs his presentation of relations between Pompey and Caesar to address the harm done to states when leaders engage in rivalry rather than reconcile in the interest of the common welfare. From this perspective, Pompey’s decisions not to make peace with Caesar, but instead to abandon Rome, become central to another deterrent lesson in statesmanship.79 Plutarch explicitly 77  Although he alienates the aristocracy, the opening of his theater wins the affection of the masses (Pomp. 52.4). 78  In Pompey, Plutarch focuses on the effects of Caesar’s actions, the motives for which had been explained already in Caesar. At Caes. 28.3, the assignments in Gaul are presented as part of Caesar’s “overall design from the outset” (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν ταύτην πεποιημένος); Caesar “like an athlete, had removed himself to a great distance from his antagonists, and by exercising himself in the Gallic wars had practised his troops and increased his fame”. At Caes. 20.3, Plutarch explains that “During all the rest of his campaigns in Gaul, unnoticed by Pompey (ἐλάνθανε τὸν Πομπήϊον), he was alternately subduing the enemy with the arms of the citizens, or capturing the subduing the citizens with the money which he got from the enemy”. 79  Among other writers, the refusal to allow Caesar to run in absentia is a failing. Velleius (2.30.3), for instance, asks “Who is there who does not feel surprise that this man, who owed his elevation to the highest position in the state to so many extraordinary commands, should have taken it ill that the Senate and the Roman people were willing to

Agesilaus-pompey

267

attributes Pompey’s conduct to several factors: (1) an unwillingness to initiate reconciliation; (2) deference to the views of others, including Cato (Pomp. 59.3–4) and (3) insatiable ambition (53.7), the element that receives the most criticism.80 All three attributes are violations of principles highlighted in Plutarch’s treatises on practical ethics, especially Political Precepts and On Being Compliant. Unlike other sources, Plutarch glosses over the failed negotiations with Caesar ahead of his crossing of the Rubicon—perhaps because the issue had been addressed earlier in Cicero and Caesar or because it was not central to the core lessons in this Life. In Pompey, Plutarch characterizes Pompey as disengaged from the negotiations with Caesar and ready to defer to the recommendations of Lentulus and Cato (Pomp. 59.3–4). At no point does Plutarch report Pompey’s best judgment about reconciling with Caesar: Pompey is shown simply reacting to the ideas of others. Caesar, in contrast, is portrayed making several attempts to prevent a protracted war, using Antony to carry proposals to Rome (Pomp. 59.2) and sending Numerius to Pompey in Brundisium asking “to reconcile on equal terms” (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις … διαλλαγῆναι) (Pomp. 63.2). Plutarch reserves comment until the armies face each other at Pharsalus, at which point he traces the final confrontation to the effects of “greed and contentiousness” (τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλονικίαν), which could have been gratified by attacks on the Scythians, Indians or Parthians (Pomp. 70.2–3). This comment echoes the criticism of Agesilaus in the paired Life when he persisted in his contentiousness towards Thebes rather than reconciling before war broke out. Military Command Plutarch presents Pompey’s strengths and weaknesses as a general in two concentrated sections of the Life: Pompey’s campaigns through the third triumph (Pomp. 3–45) and his operations as pro-consul and general when the conflict with Caesar came to a head (Pomp. 53–72). Rather than concentrating on the strategic acumen or tactics the underlay Pompey’s great victories—which are also on display—Plutarch designs his account of Pompey’s military career to consider Gaius Caesar as a candidate for the consulship a second time, though suing for it in absentia?” 80  Plutarch inserts a lengthy comment about how human nature is not satisfied even if an empire is shared with only one other man: “So slight a thing is fortune when compared with human nature; for she cannot satisfy its desires, since all that extent of empire and magnitude of wide-stretching domain could not suffice for two men” (Pomp. 53.7). Similarly, ahead of Pharsalus, Plutarch discusses the contentiousness and greed behind the civil war, showing how “blind and frenzied” human nature is “when passion reigns” (Pomp. 70.1–2).

268

Chapter 6

highlight a series of deterrent lessons centered on mistakes and misjudgments that undermine the effectiveness of a general. Plutarch’s pragmatic insights focus on four areas: (1) containing jealousy of fellow generals, (2) guarding against over-confidence grounded on past successes and goodwill; (3) taking action based on calculation and (4) refusing to abandon plans in the face of criticism. These issues are addressed from various perspectives throughout the Lives and were routinely raised in advice literature for generals, including the comments inserted into the histories of Polybius (9.12.1–4, on the art of the general) or Livy’s speeches by generals explaining their strategies (e.g. 44.37–38). Restraining Jealousy of Fellow Generals Plutarch constructs his account of Pompey’s relations with Metellus Pius and Metellus Creticus to illustrate how Pompey’s jealousy of other generals— a common flaw associated with love of glory and ambition in the Lives— undermined his effectiveness as a general. First, although Pompey readily deferred to Metellus Pius’ seniority and energized his military efforts in Gaul (Pomp. 8.4–5), later in Spain he became “elated and full of pride” (ἐπαρθεὶς … καὶ μέγα φρονῶν) because of a victory over Herennius and Perpenna (18.3) and rushed to attack Sertorius in order to prevent Metellus from sharing in the glory of the victory (19.1). In an incident that echoes Minucius’ experience attacking Hannibal (Fab. 11–12), Pompey is saved from rout only by the timely arrival of Metellus (Pomp. 19.2–4).81 The incident offers a lesson especially to young ­generals—whose love of fame is most likely to urge them to act prematurely to avoid sharing credit for a victory. Pompey’s rivalry with Metellus Creticus provides a deterrent lesson in the sharply negative reaction of the Romans to the actions of Pompey’s officer fighting on the side of the pirates in Crete: [Pompey’s officer] made Pompey not only odious and oppressive (ἐπαχθῆ καὶ βαρύν), but also ridiculous (καταγέλαστον), since Pompey lent his name to profane and godless men and wrapped his own reputation around them (περιάπτοντα) like an antidote (ὥσπερ ἀλεξιφάρμκον) because of his jealousy and ambitious rivalry with Metellus. Pomp. 29.3

81  Also in the pattern of Minucius when he met Fabius after being saved from rout (Fab. 13.3–5), Pompey orders his lictors to lower their fasces out of deference to Metellus’ seniority when they meet after battle (Pomp. 19.5).

Agesilaus-pompey

269

Here, Pompey is motivated by ambition and jealousy, and the actions taken make him appear “odious, oppressive and ridiculous”82—adjectives that in the Lives are associated with erosion a statesman’s ability to win ready obedience. Pompey’s reputation suffers even among his friends (Pomp. 29.1). His jealousy of other generals is especially evident in his efforts to belittle and undermine Lucullus (Pomp. 30.6–31.7)—an effort that has the broader consequence of weakening Pompey’s influence among senators who considered his conduct “outrageous” (περιυβρισμένος) and who were subsequently inclined “to degrade his reputation” (κολούουσα τὴν δόξαν) and oppose his policies when he returned to Rome (46.3). Pompey thus is pushed towards the alliances and rivalry that ultimately led to Pharsalus. Guarding Against Overconfidence Fostered by Goodwill In the second half of the Life, Pompey is a deterrent paradigm of generalship blinded by overconfidence and compliancy rather than guided by calculation. His failure to prepare for war against Caesar, despite the Senate’s directive to do so (Pomp. 49.1),83 is linked to over-confidence fueled by two incidents. First, the celebrations after his recovery from illness in Naples (Pomp. 57.1–2) inflate Pompey’s confidence that he could easily put down any challenge from Caesar:84

82  The dynamics described here echo those that will re-appear in Pompey’s later alliances with Clodius and Caesar in Rome: Pompey lends his name (τοὔνομα κιχράντα) and reputation (περιάπτοντα τὴν αὑτοῦ δόξαν) to other men, who use it to serve their own ends and, in the process, bring dishonor and ridicule upon Pompey (καταγέλαστον ἐποίει) (Pomp. 29.3). 83  Phocion makes a similar mistake in not preparing for war, but his reasoning is clouded by other faults: he is too dismissive of the populace and places too much faith in the King’s legate (Phoc. 32.4–5). See Chapter 9, below. 84  Cicero (Tusc. Disp 1.35.86) and Velleius Paterculus (2.48.2) point to the public joy at Pompey’s recovery as a critical turning point because it inflated his confidence about being able to quickly raise an army. Cicero (Tusc. Disp. 1.6.12) also refers to the recovery, but does not tie it specifically to the overconfidence that left Pompey unprepared. Lucan (1.132–135) points to the applause Pompey enjoyed at the opening of his theater as “swaying him entirely” (totus … inpelli) and inducing him “to trust much to his former greatness” (multumque priori credere fortunae). Cassius Dio (41.6.3–4), in contrast, mentions the celebrations of his recovery, but indicates they did not alleviate Pompey’s concerns: “they inspired him with no sure confidence that they would not abandon him through fear of one stronger” (οὐ μὴν καὶ ἀκριβῆ πίστιν τοῦ μὴ οὐκ ἐγκαταλείψειν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τοῦ κρείττονος φόβον παρεῖχον).

270

Chapter 6

And yet, this more than anything is said to have been the reason for the war coming about. For, together with great joy, a spirit entered him that went beyond the calculations derived from facts (τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων λογισμοὺς). And, throwing out the caution (εὐλάβειαν) that had always made his success and deeds secure, he fell away into uncontrolled boldness (ἄκρατον … θράσος) and contempt for Caesar’s power (περιφρόνησιν τῆς Καίσαρος δυνάμεως), thinking that he would need neither weapons against him nor any arduous preparation, but would much more easily take him down than he had earlier raised him up. Pomp. 57.3

Here, Plutarch describes the damaging impact of enthusiastic goodwill on a man who loves good repute: in Pompey it causes arrogance, overconfidence and a neglect of “calculations based on fact”. Similarly, when Caesar returns Pompey’s legions, Pompey readily believes their commander, Appius, when he says that Caesar’s soldiers are disgruntled and will immediately change sides (Pomp. 57.4), again demonstrating how confidence born of goodwill and past success can blind a statesman to risks:85 Thus, then, Pompey was elated and, because of his confidence (διὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν), was full of such great disdain that he even laughed (κατεγέλα) at the men who feared war, … and with a smiling and calm demeanor urged them to have no care: “For anywhere,” he said, “in Italy I stamp my foot on the ground, there will rise up forces of foot and horse.” Pomp. 57.5

Pompey’s elation, as well as his disdain for Caesar and mockery of those who are worried, prove to be premature.86 In contrast to Caesar, which emphasizes Caesar’s strategy to have his legions spread misinformation in order to slow Pompey’s preparedness, Pompey amplifies Pompey’s vulnerability to his 85  In Caesar, Pompey’s vulnerabilty to manipulation by opponents because of his love of reputation is explicitly articulated, since Caesar consciously took advantage of it. The officers of the legions sent by Caesar spread stories that were “neither reasonable nor true” (οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς οὐδὲ χρηστοὺς) and ruined Pompey himself with vain hopes” (ἐλπίσι κεναῖς διέφθειραν) (Caes. 29.5), asserting that the forces in Gaul would change sides as soon as they passed into Italy. “All this fed Pompey’s vanity, and he neglected to provide himself with soldiers” (Caes. 29.6). 86  The comment about “stamping on the ground with his foot” (κρούσω τῷ ποδὶ τὴν γῆν ) to raise an army is repeated in Favonius’ criticism of Pompey’s unpreparedness (Pomp. 60.4), underscoring his over-confidence.

Agesilaus-pompey

271

own love of good repute by linking his lack of preparedness to inflated selfconfidence—a state of mind to which victorious generals in any era could be susceptible. Acting Out of Calculation, Not Confusion: Abandonment of Rome Pompey’s abandonment of Rome is presented by Plutarch as an unmitigated strategic misjudgment. Plutarch describes this decision not as a reasoned assessment of the military situation, but as a choice driven by the confusion of the moment (Pomp. 61.3).87 He critiques the action from a variety of perspectives, reporting that Caesar was amazed (ἐθαύμαζεν) that Pompey had left Italy when he had not only a large army, but also a fleet and reinforcements coming from Spain (Pomp. 63.1) and further citing Cicero’s criticism that Pompey had imitated Themistocles’ generalship when his situation paralleled that of Pericles (Pomp. 63.1).88 In the synkrisis, Plutarch delivers a more wide-ranging censure of Pompey’s decision to abandon Rome as a failure to perform his duty to protect the welfare of citizens: And having packed up his children and his wife, he left the other citizens behind helpless and fled, when it was his duty (δέον) either to be strong and fight on behalf of the fatherland (κρατεῖν μαχόμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος) or to accept peace (δέχεσθαι διαλύσεις) from the one who was stronger—for he was a citizen and relation by marriage. But as it was, to the man for whom he thought it a terrible thing to extend a term as general or be elected consul, for that man he made it possible to take the city and say to Metellus that he considered him and all the others his prisoners of war. Ages-Pomp 3.4–5

Plutarch here faults Pompey for failing as care-taker of the Romans and later compares him unfavorably to Agesilaus, who in even more dire circumstances refused to desert Sparta (Ages-Pomp 3.3).

87  Although he is general with unlimited powers (Pomp. 61.1), Pompey’s ability to assert authority is weakened by commotion in the city, where “no one will let Pompey follow his best judgment” (61.3). 88  At Ad Att. 7.11.3, Cicero thinks about the abandonment of Rome and draws historical comparisons.

272

Chapter 6

Refusing to Abandon Plans Based on Criticism The motives and judgments behind the decision to engage Caesar at Pharsalus are given extensive treatment by Plutarch, strongly suggesting that this is Pompey’s greatest failure, perhaps because its consequences were irremediable. Pompey’s independent deliberations (Pomp. 66), the deliberations of the Romans (67), the preparations for battle (68–69) and the battle itself (71–72) provide a well-rounded portrait of the strategic options and rejected alternatives that formed the backdrop for the final decision to launch the battle that marked the end of the Roman Republic. In recounting the war in Greece, Plutarch reports two incidents in which Pompey’s choice of a strategy is influenced by his concern about reputation. First, in the deliberations after Caesar’s retreat towards Thessaly, Pompey rejects Afranius’ suggestion that they return to Italy because “Pompey thought his reputation would suffer” if he ran away from Caesar a second time (Pomp. 66.5). Later, Pompey is shaken from his strategy of avoiding battle at Pharsalus89 by the ridicule and denunciations of his officers (Pomp. 67.3–4).90 His decision to wage battle against his own better judgment receives pointed criticism from Plutarch as an inexcusable breach of good generalship: Saying these things and many things of this sort, they forced (ἐξεβιάσαντο) Pompey—a man who was a slave to reputation (δόξης ἥττονα) and to shame before his friends (τῆς πρὸς τοὺς φιλοὺς αἰδοῦς)—to abandon his best calculations (προέμενον τοὺς ἀριστοὺς λογισμοὺς) and instead follow their own hopes and impulses. Pomp. 67.4

This passage highlights two flaws that are destructive of effective leadership throughout the Lives: Pompey was a “slave to reputation” and “to shame before

89  Plutarch has Caesar validate Pompey’s judgment (that a battle at Pharsalus was ill-advised ) when Caesar describes the pressures of lack of supplies that made him eager for battle. When Caesar arrays his troops for battle at Pharsalus, he comments that “the expected day had come, on which they would fight against men, and not against want and hunger” (Pomp. 68.4). Plutarch later comments that “Pompey made no greater mistake (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἁμάρτημα Πομπηΐου μεῖζον), and Caesar showed no abler generalship (οὐδὲ δεινότερον στρατήγημα Καίσαρος) than in removing the battle so far from naval assistance” (Pomp. 76.3). 90   This challenge to a general’s strategic judgment is a familiar one in the Lives, highlighted especially in Pericles and Fabius (Chapter 4) and in Aemilius and Timoleon (Chapter 7).

Agesilaus-pompey

273

his friends.”91 Plutarch reinforces this critque by drawing parallels between Pompey’s actions and those of ship pilots or physicians who give in to the objections of those under their care, adopting the same imagery used to praise Pericles’ defiant refusal to allow Athenians to attack the Spartans (Per. 33.5) This very thing would have been unseemly in a pilot of a ship, not to mention in the supreme general of so many nations and forces and a man who had praised physicians who never gratified the desires of their patients, but who now gave in to the diseased part of the army (τῷ νοσοῦντι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐνέδωκε), being afraid to cause pain for the sake of its salvation. Pomp. 67.4–5

Here, Plutarch flags Pompey’s decision as a failure in leadership for failing to preserve the well-being of those under his care. This criticism is amplified in the synkrisis: That Pompey the Great, … who was known … to have conducted all his campaigns most successfully as imperator, should be all but forced (παρ’ ἐλάχιστον ἐκβιασθέντα) by the scoffs of Favonius and Domitius—and in order not to be called Agamemnon—to put to the hazard the supremacy and liberty of Rome, who could tolerate this? Ages-Pomp 4.2–3

Here, Plutarch does not fault Pompey for the outcome of the battle, but for the reasons that motivated him to put the power and liberty of Rome at risk: his compliancy and love of reputation. In the Lives, Pericles and Fabius—not to mention Agesilaus—offer counter-examples of generals who were able to withstand similar ridicule because they did not share Pompey’s desire to preserve goodwill at all costs. Plutarch’s intention to emphasize these particular deterrent lessons in generalship is revealed in the divergences between Plutarch’s account of these events and those of other writers. While Plutarch places the responsibility for the decisions to leave Rome and to engage Caesar in battle at Pharsalus squarely on Pompey’s shoulders, in most other accounts, Pompey is not solely responsible for these decisions. By making Pompey responsible, Plutarch transforms these events into a deterrent lesson in statesmanship: had Pompey been willing to compromise his excessive desire for reputation, he could have reconciled with Caesar and preserved the Republic. Had he been willing to 91   On Being Compliant 528E defines “being compliant” (τὸ δυσωπεῖσθαι) as “excess of shame” (ὑπερβολὴ … τοῦ αἰσχύνεσθαι).

274

Chapter 6

withstand criticism and the urge to be compliant, he could have brought the conflict to a favorable end without another battle. Summary: Lessons for Statesmen and Generals in Pompey In contrast to the accounts of Appian, Cassius Dio, Paterculus and Lucan— in which Pompey is portrayed as a strong contender who is defeated by Fate more than by weaknesses in his own character—Plutarch’s Pompey specifically depicts Pompey as a critically-flawed statesman and general whose character flaws and misjudgments destroy his ability to be effective in the turbulent conditions of Rome. The Life conveys four key deterrent lessons in statesmanship. First, excessive love of reputation, when combined with jealousy of the successes of others, can undermine a statesman’s reputation among his colleagues and his ability to attract support for his policies. Pompey’s inability to win the backing of the senatorial party after his return to Rome because of his treatment of Lucullus illustrates this principle. Secondly, goodwill and love of good repute can have a debilitating effect on a statesman’s foresight in anticipating threats to himself and his state, as happened to Pompey when he failed to prepare to defend Rome against Caesar’s army. Third, an aversion to criticism that induces a statesman or general leader to defer to the opinions of less-experienced or mocking colleagues or subordinates can be catastrophic. Despite his legendary victories that earned him three triumphs, Pompey’s decision to give in to the men who mocked him at Pharsalus became one of the most prominent elements of his legacy as a general. Finally, Pompey provides new deterrent lessons in managing political alliances and rivalries—especially with highly talented protégés. In the digression at Pomp. 46, Plutarch flags Pompey’s alliance with Caesar as the central mistake in Pompey’s career: by deferring to Caesar’s policies, Pompey lost the strength to defeat him when the final conflict came. 6.4

Insights from the Synkrisis

In the synkrisis, Plutarch specifies a political context for his lessons at four points: he comments on transgressions of justice “in political life” (περὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ, Ages-Pomp 1.3), describes Agesilaus’ suspension of laws as a “political device” (σόφισμα πολιτικόν, Ages-Pomp 2.2) , calls Agesilaus’ obedience to the ephors “political virtue” (πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν, Ages-Pomp 2.3), and compares Agesilaus and Pompey for preeminence in “the virtue of a leader” (ἀρετῆς ἀνδρὸς ἡγεμόνος, Ages-Pomp 3.3). Plutarch uses the complementary strengths and weaknesses of Agesilaus and Pompey to reinforce his pragmatic lessons

Agesilaus-pompey

275

for leaders. First, Agesilaus’ major failures in statesmanship are magnified by Pompey’s positive counter-example. While Pompey came to power “in a very just manner” when he helped Sulla free Italy from tyrants and later respected his mentor (Ages-Pomp 1.1), Agesilaus used deception and disrespected an oracle to gain power and later cast his mentor aside (Ages-Pomp 2.1). More importantly, Plutarch notes that Agesilaus’ “violations of right and justice” in matters related to Sphodrias and Phoebidas “kindled the Boeotian war”, while Pompey’s career had no such overt provocation of war (Ages-Pomp 1.3–4).92 Conversely, in the area of generalship, Agesilaus’ positive counter-example brings the inherent deficiencies in Pompey’s decision-making into sharper focus in two central incidents: his departure from Rome and his decision at Pharsalus. Plutarch amplifies the deterrent quality of Pompey’s abandonment of Rome by comparing it to Agesilaus’ defense of Sparta under even more precarious circumstances: Agesilaus did not abandon or forsake his city, although the enemy was attacking with an army of seventy thousand men, while his hoplites were few in number and had recently been defeated at Leuctra. But Pompey, after Caesar had taken one Italian city with only fifty-three thousand men, departed from Rome in alarm (ὑπὸ δέους), either having yielded ignobly to so few (τοσούτοις εἴξας ἀγεννῶς) or falsely supposing that there were more (πλείονας ψευδῶς εἰκάσας). Ages-Pomp 3.3–4

This passage compares the competencies of the two men as generals—not their virtues as private men—and on the basis of their “deeds and calculations in war” Plutarch concludes that Agesilaus was far superior to Pompey as a leader (Ages-Pomp. 3.3). This comparison also helps explain why Plutarch amplified Agesilaus’ role in defending Sparta from the direct attacks of Thebes, as discussed above. Similarly, Agesilaus’ resistance to taunts in Sparta (Pomp. 31.3–4) and Egypt (39.1) provides the positive counter-example that accentuates Pompey’s failure as a general when he deferred to others at Pharsalus rather than exercising his own judgment. Plutarch faults Pompey for not emulating past generals in similar situations, including Fabius Maximus, Marius, Lucullus or even Agesilaus: 92  This comment in the synkrisis echoes the assessment voiced in the Life by the Thebans when they were attacking Sparta and called on Agesilaus to come out and fight for his country “since he had caused her misfortunes by lighting up the flames of war” (ὃς τῶν κακῶν αἴτιός ἐστιν ἐκκαύσας τὸν πόλεμον) (Ages. 31.3).

276

Chapter 6

Agesilaus … withstood no fewer outbursts in Sparta … and in Egypt endured the slanders and accusations and suspicions of the King … But, by applying his best calculations (χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις … λογισμοῖς), as he desired, not only did he save the Egyptians against their will and alone, … but always kept Sparta standing upright. Ages-Pomp 4.5–6

This passage echoes many of the details from Pompey’s decisions in the midst of confusion in Rome and mockery at Pharsalus, while also raising many of the themes that recur across the Lives. Indeed, to a greater extent than in other synkriseis, Plutarch integrates Pompey’s experience as a general with that of other generals portrayed in the Lives. By further censuring Pompey for not looking to the exempla of great generals of the past, Plutarch also alerts his own readers not to make the same mistake. Conclusion to Part 2: Lessons in Political and Military Leadership The three pairs of Lives examined in Part 2 are each tied to different lessons in the character traits, practical skills and critical judgments that determine political and military effectiveness in a variety of situations. Pericles and Fabius are positive models for dealing effectively with challenges in relating to the people, withstanding opposition and ridicule in order to implement best policies, selecting beneficial spending projects and developing military strategies suited to circumstances and the type of enemy. Coriolanus and Alcibiades, in turn, provide both positive and negative paradigms for dealing with election losses, exile and reconciliation with one’s state, while also highlighting the importance of cultivating an appealing and trustworthy reputation that will foster confidence in a leader’s advice. Finally, Agesilaus and Pompey are positive exempla in creating and sustaining goodwill, but, through misjudgments and misguided allegiances, they are also negative models for relations with friends, partners and rivals. As generals, they supply insights into military strategy, but also show how excessive ambition or love of reputation can cloud the judgment of even the best generals. In Part 3, we will examine three sets of Lives that more explicitly illustrate effective strategies for managing relations between the ruler (e.g. Rome or Athens) and the ruled (provinces, subject states, or allies). In the context of Plutarch’s day, these Lives provide pragmatic lessons for the Emperor, provincial governors and men in senior political or military posts as “rulers” and to provincial city leaders, men serving on embassies or men out of office as “the ruled”. The Lives in Part 3 highlight the skills needed by the ruler and ruled in these positions in order to create a harmonious partnership in which the ruler obtains obedience, revenues and peace and the cities as much prosperity and autonomy as possible.

Part 3 Ruling and Being Ruled

⸪

Part 3

Ruling and Being Ruled In Part 2, we focused on challenges facing generals during wartime and on issues facing men active in a competitive political arena, where magistracies are held for short periods, policies are subject to debate, and political alliances and rivalries must be carefully managed. While these areas of concern are necessarily addressed throughout the series of Parallel Lives—since all the heroes are generals and statesmen—several sets of Lives also provide pragmatic lessons in how to exercise supreme authority over others or to interact constructively with an overlord. In the imperial era, the challenges of ruling and being ruled were confronted in relations between the Emperor and his subjects, between provincial governors and provincial cities, and between senior bureaucrats heading administrative departments and their subordinates. In Part 3, we examine three of the pairs that include instructive episodes describing relations between Rome, Macedon or Corinth as an overlord and the territories, provinces or cities as “subject states.” At the same time, these Lives depict men performing the duties of lower magistracies, in which they set standards for, and had authority directly over, a group of subordinates, illustrating various approaches to handling responsibilities in similar positions under the Empire. In Political Precepts, the requirement that statesmen be proficient in both ruling and being ruled is addressed by Plutarch in two contexts: (1) how men out of office should engage with those in office and (2) how provincial city leaders should manage relations with Rome. In his discussion of appropriate relations with colleagues, Plutarch asserts that men should “pay highest honor to one who holds office” (ἄρχοντα δεῖ μάλιστα τιμᾶν) (816B) and refrain from actions that detract from his dignity or maliciously flout his policies (816C). Indeed, learning to be a good subject is an important part of political teaching: Most people say and believe that the work of political educaton (πολιτικῆς παιδείας ἔργον) is preparing men to be good subjects (τὸ καλῶς ἀρχομένους παρασχεῖν)—for each man rules for a short time, but is ruled for his entire life when he is a citizen in a democracy—with the result that the lesson that is most beautiful and most useful is being obedient to leaders (τὸ πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις), even if they happen to be deficient in power and reputation. Pol. Prec. 816F

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_010

280

Part 3

Indeed, Plutarch at 806F quotes Plato in asserting that no one can command well who has not first learned to obey (ὀρθῶς δουλεύσαντας).1 In this context, the Spartan Kings are named as a prime example of “rulers” who themselves are ruled by, and obedient to, the ephors (817A–B). Secondly, the dual capacity of ruling and being ruled is attached to leaders in the provincial cities in their relations with Rome. Plutarch advises Menemachus to remind himself that he is a subject who “rules” in a city controlled by Rome (Pol. Prec. 813E). The three pairs of Lives included in Part 3 address the challenges both of exercising authority over others to the benefit of all (“ruling”) and of obtaining the best possible conditions for one’s city when subject to the authority of others (“being ruled”). These Lives zero in on the qualities of the ideal ruler as he was conceived in Plutarch’s era2 and the strategies for harmonious interaction between the men in positions of power—who wanted obedient and productive “subjects”—and the ruled, who wanted security, liberty and justice. Again, as in the treatises on practical ethics discussed in Part 1, Plutarch’s instruction blends a foundation in moral virtue with specific actions to solve various practical problems encountered in fulfilling duties in political and military life. Indeed, for Plutarch and other philosophers advising statesmen, it was a fundamental principle of citizenship that a man had to master both how to rule and how to be ruled. The advice literature of the late Republic and early Empire, reviewed in Chapter 2, pointed to three major actions essential to being a good ruler: (1) maintaining one’s personal integrity in private and public life in order to inspire trust and readiness to obey commands; (2) administering justice promptly and impartially; and (3) being solicitous for those under one’s authority. These themes are illustrated in the Parallel Lives when statesmen are depicted exercising authority over political departments, cities or provinces or serving in senior military posts. Key texts offering advice included Cicero’s Ad Quintum 1.1, Seneca’s De Beneficiis and De Clementia, Dio’s Kingship Orations (Or. 1–4) and Pliny’s Epistulae. Plutarch provided his direct guidance on “ruling” in Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler, as well as in specialized essays such as How To Tell a Flatterer and On Control of Anger. As discussed earlier, Philosophers and Men in Power describes the ideal ruler as a man who is “solicitous for many” (ὑπὲρ πολλῶν φροντίζουσαν) and “is obligated to exercise practical judgment, moderation and justice on behalf of many” (πολλοῖς φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ὀφείλουσαν) (776D), while To an

1  Plato, Laws 762E. 2  See Chapter 2, above.

Ruling And Being Ruled

281

Uneducated Ruler directs the ruler to set an example for his people to follow (780D) and to place their interests ahead of his own: On the part of the ruler, the fear that is kind and not ignoble is this: to be fearful on behalf of subjects (ὑπέρ ἀρχομένων δεδιέναι), lest, without his being aware of it, they are harmed (μὴ λάθωσι βλαβέντες), “just as dogs keep watch around the sheep in the yard, listening for the stout-hearted wild beast”, not for their own sakes but on behalf of the ones being guarded (ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλαττομένων). To an Uneducated Ruler 781C–D

In the Lives in Part 3, the heroes often protect those under their care while remaining at risk themselves. Advice was also forthcoming for “the ruled”, especially for those in positions advising men in power or mediating between their cities and the imperial authorities. Plutarch provides specific direction in Political Precepts (813D–816A) and On Being Compliant, while many of Dio’s City Orations instructed the people on how to manage relations with other cities and the local provincial governor. Both Plutarch and Dio (e.g. Or. 34, 38, 44, 45 and 48) share the goal of limiting the involvement of Rome in the affairs of provincial cities, an area in which success required astute judgment on when, and to what degree, one needed to compromise with Rome in order to obtain the best terms for one’s city. While the Lives examined below include paradigms for men serving as governors, ambassadors and senior magistrates in city administration, pragmatic lessons in military and political leadership are also included—since only part of each man’s career centered on direct relations with subject states or an overlord. The lessons in statesmanship and generalship offer new perspectives on the challenges discussed in Part 2, and in some cases—such as Aemilius and Cato Minor—present the heroes, in their capacities as office holders at lower levels of the cursus honorum, as paradigms of effective “rulers” who train their subordinates to set high standards of performance in office and, in their own behavior, set a pattern for others to imitate. Moreover, issues tied to ruling over subjects and managing relations with overlords that were only touched on in Part 2 are addressed with greater strategic and tactical detail in the Lives in Part 3. Aemilius-Timoleon portrays largely positive paradigms of the character traits and practical actions that produce harmonious relations and effective control over subject states or one’s army, while Demetrius-Antony presents flawed rulers whose weaknesses, including susceptibility to flattery in various forms, undermine their judgment and

282

Part 3

effectiveness. Two important themes emerge: first, that a ruler cannot command lasting support based on force, but must win the “hearts and minds” of those under his authority and, second, that neglect of justice or the needs of one’s subjects leads to rejection and loss of authority. These themes were central to Dio’s Kingship Orations as well, especially respecting the importance of the administration of justice to winning the goodwill of subjects. Challenges related to “being ruled” are illustrated in Phocion-Cato Minor, where Phocion models actions to imitate and avoid in diplomacy with an overlord, including the problematic areas of balancing moral considerations with expediency and negotiating as much autonomy for one’s city as possible. Cato Minor provides added insights for men who are subject to the authority of magistrates, but want to limit encroachments on the liberty of individual citizens. In all of these pairs, Plutarch’s intention to focus on issues pertaining to ruling and being ruled is further revealed in the well-rounded portrayals of Kings and tyrants as counter-examples to the paradigms of effective or ineffective rule supplied by the hero, including Perseus and Dionysius the Younger in Aem-Tim, Antigonus, Pyrrhus, Seleucus and Octavian in Dtr-Ant, and Philip, Alexander, Antipater and Cassander in Phoc-Cato Min.

Chapter 7

Aemilius-Timoleon 7.1 Introduction Our examination of Lives offering pragmatic lessons in ruling and being ruled begins with Aemilius-Timoleon, a pair that describes the careers of two men active in ousting oppressive rulers from other states and settling relations with a newly-subjected local population. Plutarch uses Aem-Tim to illustrate successful management of a variety of aspects of the relations between ruler and ruled applicable to his own day, especially in winning the goodwill of subject states by engaging in courteous relations, administering justice and creating an environment in which subjects could prosper. As noted in Chapter 2, securing the willing obedience of subjects was a prominent concern in Cicero, Seneca, Dio and Pliny in their discussions of effective rule. Plutarch amplifies the principles at issue by carefully portraying the adversaries of Aemilius and Timoleon—Perseus and Dionysius, respectively—as “bad rulers”: that is, as men who lacked justice, temperance, moderation and solicitude for their subjects and whose actions in power, being focused on their private interests rather than the common welfare, injured their states. They were also associated with external pomp and extravagant living, a common feature of flawed leadership throughout the Lives. By including extensive portraits of the Kings who exemplified behavior to avoid in positions of supreme authority, Plutarch reinforced his pragmatic lessons in how to exercise authority to achieve the best outcomes for all. In this pair, Plutarch’s intention to provide paradigms to imitate in public careers is clearly stated in the Prologue. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the Prologue Plutarch identifies Aemilius and Timoleon as two of his “noblest paradigms” (τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν παραδειγμάτων, Aem. 1.5) whose conduct he uses “like a mirror” (ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ) to adjust his own behavior (Aem. 1.1). Plutarch points to their “choices and good fortune” (αἱρέσεσιν … καὶ ταῖς τύχαις ἀγαθαῖς) in public affairs as his basis for pairing the men, and he challenges the reader to evaluate whether their achievements were due more to good fortune (εὐποτμίᾳ) or to their practical judgment (φρονήσει) (Aem. 1.7–8). As noted in Chapter 2, distinguishing between the effects of fortune versus merit was a central concern in pragmatic history and the advice literature of the period, since instructive strategic thinking could be hidden beneath the perception of “good luck”, just as poor strategic decisions could underlie outcomes attributed to “misfortune”. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_011

284

Chapter 7

In these two Lives, Plutarch addresses the impact of good and bad fortune in a man’s career from two perspectives. On the one hand, fortune impacts both the particular practical challenges a statesman faces in each political or military situation and the opportunities that present themselves. In this case, a statesman’s practical judgment is put to the test as he attempts to identify strategies that will overcome the challenges or make the most of the opportunities. On the other hand, good fortune or misfortune can impact the private life of a statesman directly, and at such times a man displays his ability not only to accept good fortune without excessive elation and misfortune with equanimity, but also to restrain his anger and resentment at misfortune and maintain his focus on the common good. In Aemilius, Plutarch treats the challenges of responding to both good and bad fortune in private and public life, while in Timoleon, he highlights Timoleon’s good judgment and courage in taking advantage of the opportunities fortune offered and in publicly crediting Fortune for his success. Plutarch’s assessment of their responses to adversity in private life closes the synkrisis (Aem-Tim 2.10–12). Analysis of Aem-Tim largely centers on Plutarch’s treatment of fortune (τύχη)—with Swain’s (1989; 1992b) studies of providential, accidental and personified “Fortune” providing the starting point. Swain (1989; 1992b) and Holland (2005) examine the overlaps and differences between the Lives and historical accounts, and both conclude that Plutarch designed the pair to stimulate moral improvement and clarify the role of providence. Holland (2005) further argues that Plutarch assimilates Aemilius to a philosopher by attaching Socratic traits to his characterization. Teodorsson (2005a) explores the purpose of the implausible account of Timoleon’s career, concluding that the pair was designed to spark debate on the links between fortune and valor joined in Plutarch’s term “fortunate valor”. Xenophontos (2016) explores the interface between ethical education and generalship in Aemilius-Timoleon, especially the instructive role a “philosopher-general” can play.1 The analysis of Aem-Tim as pragmatic biography integrates τύχη into a broader framework where it is also a force that must be “netted out” of the accounts of events in order to reveal the practical competencies and strategic judgments that can serve as pragmatic paradigms for leaders. As we will see, the separate impacts of strategic competency and fortune on military outcomes are easier to identify in Aemilius than Timoleon, in which Plutarch must devote more time to distinguishing which aspects of each victory should be attributed to fortune and which could be credited to merit. Finally, Aem-Tim is 1  Additional perspectives on this pair are found in Geiger (1981/1995), De Blois (1997; 1999; 2000), Bremer (2005).

Aemilius-timoleon

285

one of the three pairs (with Cor-Alc and Sert-Eum) in which the Roman Life is first.2 As we will see, this order, as was the case with Cor-Alc, enables Plutarch to raise issues in the Roman Life that he explores more fully in the Greek Life. In Aemilius, Plutarch raises issues about fortune and achieving harmonious relations between ruler and ruled that are addressed in new and more varied contexts in Timoleon. These issues were especially important for men serving as generals or provincial governors and thereby had to be astute in recognizing both the challenges and opportunities of each situation. 7.2

Life of Aemilius Paullus

Overview Aemilius Paullus belongs to the period of Roman history often characterized by Plutarch and other classical writers as the time when the Roman Republic was reaching its peak and had not yet slipped into the decline that led to decades of civil wars and the end of the Republic. Aemilius Paullus (c. 229–160 BC), son of the Aemilius Paullus who was consul for the second time in 216 and died at Cannae,3 held posts as augur (from 192), praetor in Further Spain (191–189) and one of the ten commissioners who oversaw affairs in Asia after the defeat of Antiochus III at Magnesia (189). As consul in 182, he commanded an army in Liguria and remained there in 181 when he achieved victory over the Ligurians. During his second consulship in 168, he defeated Perseus at Pydna, bringing the Third Macedonian War to an end. He served as censor in 164 and died in 160. He famously gave up his two elder sons to be adopted—one becoming Fabius Maximus Aemilianus and the other Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (Scipio the Younger)—while his two younger sons died at the time of his triumph for Pydna. Among historians, the full account of Aemilius’ career is found only in Livy.4 Among classical writers, apart from being cited as the victor over Perseus, 2  Aem-Tim, Cor-Alc and Sert-Eum are the only pairs with the Roman Life first. The purpose of the reversed order is discussed in Pelling (1986b: 94–96/2002:357); 1988b: 23–26), Geiger (1981: 104/1995: 190), Duff (1999b: 206, n. 3). The conclusion that Plutarch was able to expand his treatment of central themes more broadly in the second life is validated by the content of Aem-Tim as analyzed in this chapter. 3  Aemilius’ father appears in Fabius (14–16). See Chapter 4. 4  Aemilius’ full career is found in Livy (35–46), while partial accounts survive in Polybius (28.3), Appian (Mac. 19) and Diodorus Siculus (30.1–31.26). In Aemilius, Plutarch specifically refers to lost accounts of Pydna by Scipio Nasica (Aem. 15.5; 16.3; 18.5; 21.7) and Poseidonius (Aem. 19.7; 20.6; 21.7), as well as to lost sections of Polybius (Aem. 15.5, 16.3, 19.4).

286

Chapter 7

Aemilius is most often mentioned as the father of Scipio Aemilianus,5 in connection with the eclipse at Pydna6 or as a man who was resilient in the face of the death of his two sons.7 Cicero cites Aemilius as an example of old age that did not lose its vigor (De Senec. 6.15) and of a man without avarice, as shown in his not benefitting from the wealth of Macedon (De Off. 2.12.76).8 In Valerius Maximus, Aemilius Paullus is mentioned fifteen times in a variety of categories,9 while Frontinus includes three incidents from his military career.10 In the Moralia, Plutarch names Aemilius as a role model five times. Aemilius is the excellent father of Scipio Aemilianus in Philosophers and Men in Power (777A) and, in Political Precepts (810B), he is an example of an excellent father who could be held up as a standard to induce a son to change his conduct. Aemilius appears in On the Fortune of the Romans (318B) as a man who “magnifies Fortune” (μεγαλύνει τὴν Τύχην) in his “tearless victory” (νίκην ἄδακρυν) over Perseus, while his composure at handing over his command to his successor in Macedonia—in contrast to Perseus’ distress at losing his power— illustrated how expectations determined tranquility in Tranquility of Mind (474E–F). Finally, Table Talk 1.2 (615E) includes the anecdote of Aemilius giving 5  Aemilius appears as the father of Scipio in Cicero’s De Senectute (6.15; 23.82) and De Officiis (1.32.115; 1.33.121), and in De Rep. (6.15.15–16.16) Aemilius instructs Scipio to “love justice and duty, which are indeed strictly due to parents and kinsmen, but most of all to the fatherland” (iustitiam cole et pietatem, quae cum magna in parentibus et propinquis, tum in patria maxima est) (6.16.1). 6  The eclipse is mentioned in Valerius Maximus (8.11.1), Quintilian (1.1.10.46), Cicero (De Rep. 1.15.23 and De Senec. 14.49) and Frontinus (Strat. 1.12.8). 7  The death of Aemilius’ sons is mentioned by Cicero (De Amic. 2.10; Tusc. Disp. 3.28.70– 71; Ad Fam. 249.1), Valerius Maximus (65.10.2) and Seneca (Ad Marc. 13.2 and Ad Polyb. 14.4–5). 8  Cicero’s other references to Aemilius include De Amicitia (2.10, 27.101); Tusc. Disp. (3.28.70– 71, 19.54; 5.40.118); Paradox Stoicorum (6.48); De Finibus (5.24.70); De Officiis (2.12.76, 1.32.116); Orator (70.232); Ad Att. (4.13.2); and De Republica (1.15.23, 1.19.31; 6.14.15–6.24.16). 9  In Valerius Maximus he is included under “Omens” (1.5.3), “Wonders” (1.8.1b on Rome receiving rumor of victory); “Of military discipline” (2.7.14), “Of majesty” (when the Macedonians carried his bier, 2.10.2.b); “Of abstinence and continence” (4.3.8, when he took no wealth for himself from Macedonia); “Of poverty” (4.4, since he gave his daughter to a poor man and died too poor to repay his wife’s dowry); “Of humanity and mercy” (5.1.1d, based on his treatment of Perseus after his capture); “Fathers who bear the deaths of their sons with equanimity” (5.10.2); as father of Scipio (6.2.3); “Of Electoral Defeats”(7.5.3); and “How great are the effects of the arts” on how Galus dispelled fears after the eclipse ahead of the battle at Pydna (8.11.1). 10  In Frontinus, Aemilius is cited three times: On disposition of troops (Strat. 2.3.20); On sorties (3.17.2); and for the maxim that “a general ought to be an old man in character” (4.7.3)—meaning that he should follow moderate counsels.

Aemilius-timoleon

287

well-organized banquets after his victory over Perseus and reports Aemilius’ comment that it was the same man’s duty to make infantry divisions terrifying and dinner parties as agreeable as possible, since both were the result of good organization. In Plutarch’s Lives, Aemilius Paullus is mentioned twice in the individual Lives and twice in the Parallel Lives. He is referenced at Aratus 54.3 as conqueror of Perseus and at Galba 1.1 as a general who, in contrast to Iphicrates, demanded preparation and obedience from his soldiers. In Cato Maior, Aemilius is named as the father of Scipio the Younger and victor over Perseus (Cato Maior 15.4) and as the commander who admired Cato’s son for retrieving his lost sword at Pydna (Cato Maior 20.6–7). In Sulla, Plutarch lists Aemilius, along with Titus Flamininus and Manius Acilius, as an exemplum of a Roman general adhering to traditional Roman values, which by the time of Sulla had degenerated to the point that the silver jar from Delphi was ordered to be cut into pieces so it could be transported away: [Aemilius, Flamininus and Acilius] not only kept their hands off the sanctuaries of the Greeks, but in addition bestowed gifts, honor and great reverence on them. Sulla 12.6

In respecting the people and their sanctuaries—while also being liberal with gifts—Aemilius conducted himself as an ideal statesmen from Political Precepts and a positive paradigm of honorable conduct in relations of “ruler with the ruled” as presented in the advice literature discussed in Chapter 2. Aemilius, like Flamininus, addresses relations between Rome and conquered territories, but emphasizes different aspects. In Flamininus, Plutarch recounts how Flamininus ousted the Macedonians and established the contours of the relations between Rome and the Greek states that persisted into Plutarch’s day: cities were granted local autonomy, subject to specific legal and political restrictions; were limited in their use of military force; and were required to pay taxes and tribute.11 Persuasion, justice and mildness are emphasized as the key ingredients of harmonious relations with subject cities: If the commander [Flamininus] had not been good by nature (χρηστὸς), had not used rational argument rather than war (λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἢ πολέμῳ), had not also been persuasive to men he asked to meet (πιθανότης) and mild to those who asked to meet him (πρᾳότης) and had not exerted himself most of all on behalf of justice (ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων), [Greece] would 11  See Chapter 1.

288

Chapter 7

not so easily have loved foreign rulers in place of the ones to which they were accustomed. Flam. 2.4

In Aemilius, Plutarch goes further, not only revealing the same qualities of mildness, persuasiveness and attentiveness to justice in Aemilius, but contrasting them to the blameworthy attributes of Perseus, who showcased the degenerate nature of the hegemony Rome displaced. As a result, Plutarch provides both positive and deterrent paradigms of how to conduct relations between ruler and ruled, offering pragmatic lessons for the imperial authorities and provincial leaders of his own day. Moral Foundation and Reputation Plutarch uses Aemilius to provide a detailed portrait of how a leader can cultivate a reputation that not only inspires confidence and imitation among the citizens of his city, but also attracts the obedience and trust of other states and subject peoples. In the early chapters, Plutarch reveals Aemilius’ qualities as a leader, as well as his preparation for public life. In particular, Plutarch highlights Aemilius’ actions to build a trustworthy reputation (Aem. 3) and his deliberate efforts to set an example and instruct others whenever he held public office (Aem. 3–4)—actions that exemplify the principles in Political Precepts, Cicero’s De Officiis and other works instructing young statesmen, as discussed in Chapter 2. In describing Aemilius’ family background, Plutarch also introduces the topic of Fortune,12 including the good fortune (εὐτύχησαν) in the family’s rise and the misfortune of Aemilius Paullus at Cannae (τὸ περὶ Κάννας ἀτύχημα) despite his practical judgment (φρόνησιν) and bravery (ἀνδρείαν) (Aem. 2.3).13 The response to good and bad fortune, which is prominent in works on Kingship, is a major theme in the Life. Cultivating a Trustworthy Reputation Plutarch presents Aemilius’ rise to prominence in a context that echoed contemporary times. First, Aemilius is presented as distinguishing himself in a highly competitive environment:14 12  See Swain (1989; 1992b) for a discussion of the role of Fortune in these Lives. 13  As presented in Fabius (14–16), Aemilius Paullus’ “misfortune” at Cannae lay in his being co-consul with a man determined to do battle despite Paullus’ opposition to the plan. He thus was obligated to follow the orders of a poor general who led the Romans into disaster. 14  Later in the synkrisis, Plutarch compares this environment to the more corrupt conditions in which Timoleon operated and which made Timoleon’s achievement of virtue somewhat greater (Aem-Tim 1.5).

Aemilius-timoleon

289

He did not plead court cases and entirely refrained from the salutations, canvassing and friendly greetings by which many men, becoming obsequious and eager, insinuated themselves in the good graces of the people, not because he was incapable of either activity, but because he was acquiring for himself what was stronger than both, namely, a reputation derived from courage, justice and good faith (τὴν ἀπ’ ἀνδρείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πίστεως δόξαν), qualities in which he immediately surpassed men of his age. Aem. 1.5–6

This summary portrays Aemilius cultivating a reputation centered on the virtues of the ideal leader of Political Precepts—bravery, justice and trustworthiness—and refusing to gain support through flattery, the avenue Alcibiades was criticized for using in his Life.15 The public success that flowed from Aemilius’ efforts to cultivate a reputation for virtue is reflected in his election as augur over twelve capable competitors (Aem. 3.1) and his ability later, as praetor and consul, to induce conquered cities in Spain (4.3) and Liguria (6.6) to readily come to terms, while the Macedonians after Pydna put themselves in his hands within two days (24.1). His refusal to enrich himself enhanced his reputation: he “was not richer by a single drachma” after his campaigns in Spain (Aem. 4.4) or Macedonia (Aem-Tim 2.8), and his indifference to wealth after Pydna won praise from the Macedonians: More than anything, men praised his liberality (ἐλευθεριότητα) and magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχίαν), because he did not wish to even look on the great quantities of gold and silver collected from the Kings, but transmitted them to the quaestors for the public funds. Aem. 28.10

As when Agesilaus similarly refused to enrich himself with treasures captured in the East (Ages. 9–10), Aemilius’ conduct provided the foundation for harmonious relations with the Macedonians.

15  As noted in Chapter 5, Plutarch criticized both Alcibiades’ use of flattery and Coriolanus’ use of force in relations with the people. In his Life, Alcibiades is also shown using flattery to ingratiate himself with the Spartans, Thracians and Persians, all of whom he mirrored by adopting their way of life (Alc. 23.3–6).

290

Chapter 7

Meeting Good and Bad Fortune with Equanimity Plutarch also casts Aemilius as a paradigm of a statesman’s proper response to Fortune. Aemilius is described as a man who “so adapted himself and set in order a mixture of circumstances” (οὕτως ἡρμόσατο καὶ κατεκόσμησε τὴν τῶν παρόντων σύγκρασιν) that “the bad were lost sight of in the good” and “his private sorrow in the public welfare” (Aem. 36.1). The general principle is stated by Aemilius in his speech after the death of his second son shortly after his triumph: For, he said, since he had always feared Fortune as the most untrustworthy and most variable agency of the gods (ὡς ἀπιστότατον καὶ ποικιλώτατον), especially with her being present, like a favorable wind, in the actions of this war, he had continued expecting some change and reversal (μεταβολήν τινα καὶ παλίρροιαν). Aem. 36.3

Aemilius not only goes on to state his relief that nemesis fell on his family rather than on his country, but he also endures its implications with equanimity (Aem. 36.7–9).16 In both areas, he becomes an exceptional role model in how to deal with an affliction that is experienced by many heroes who lose children or brothers in the Parallel Lives, including Pericles, Fabius, Timoleon, Antony and Cato Minor simply among the Lives in this book. Aemilius’ steadfast posture will provide a stark contrast to Timoleon’s dejection after he has joined in killing his brother, the tyrant, in the paired Life (Tim. 4–6). In the synkrisis, Plutarch judges Aemilius’ virtue to be “more perfect” (τελειότερος) than Timoleon’s because “in adverse fortune … he had no less greatness and no less dignity than in good fortune” (Aem-Tim 2.10). Aemilius’ reputation for moral integrity, dedication to country over private interests and composure in the face of varied fortune provide a foundation for additional pragmatic lessons in military, political and diplomatic leadership. Plutarch uses key episodes in Aemilius’ career to demonstrate how shrewd strategic judgment and persuasive speech, supported by a trustworthy reputation, enabled Aemilius to outmaneuver political opposition, win military victories and interact harmoniously with fellow Romans and subject states. In the process, Aemilius becomes a role model in how to be effective as a military commander and as a representative of Roman rule over subject states. 16  Velleius Paterculus (1.10.3) also recorded that Aemilius prayed to the gods that if they envied his achievements they vent their wrath on himself rather than the state.

Aemilius-timoleon

291

Pragmatic Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled Plutarch uses key incidents in Aemilius’ career to supply practical guidance for men serving in political positions in Rome, or as provincial governors, generals or emissaries between Rome and the provinces. Aemilius is portrayed as a largely positive model in three areas: (1) Relations with other Romans; (2) Military command and (3) Relations with Perseus, Greeks and Macedonians. Episodes in each area are presented in Table 7.1, where the Life has been divided into five phases. Phase 1 (Chapters 2–5) covers Aemilius’ upbringing, marriages and early career before his first consulship. Phase 2 (6–11) opens with Aemilius’ consulship in Liguria and ends when he becomes consul for the second time. In Phase 3 (12–17), Aemilius travels to Macedonia and prepares for battle at Pydna, while Phase 4 (18–27) contains the account of the battle and Aemilius’ response to victory. In Phase 5 (28–39), Aemilius settles affairs in Macedonia and Greece, before returning to Rome, where he remains until his death. Plutarch molds his accounts of key incidents to amplify Aemilius’ reasons for taking particular actions and his successful techniques for securing obedience—whether from the Romans, his soldiers, the Greeks or Macedonians. Plutarch highlights several familiar themes of effective rule, including how to win over subordinates and subjects with persuasion rather than flattery or force—discussed in works such as Plutarch’s political treatises, Seneca’s De Clementia and Dio’s Kingship Orations, as noted in Chapter 2. Relations with Other Romans From the perspective of lessons for the rulers and the ruled, Plutarch designs the episodes in Rome to emphasize two themes: (1) how the “ruler” (or city leader) “trains” fellow citizens by setting a pattern for them to imitate and (2) how to win the willing obedience of “subjects” without resorting to flattery. These principles of good rule were highlighted in To an Uneducated Ruler, Philosophers and Men in Power, Old Men in Politics and Political Precepts, all of which instructed rulers to use their own conduct and public spending to inspire the people towards behavior conducive to the common welfare. Both topics were also underscored in Dio’s Kingship Orations, where the King is advised to give proof of his character through his conduct (Or. 2.26) and receives suggestions on how to win over different kinds of subjects without flattery (Or. 3.128–132).

292

Chapter 7

Table 7.1 Episodes in the Life of Aemilius Paullus Relations with other Romans

Military command

Relations with Perseus, Greeks and Macedonians

Phase 1: Early life; rise to prominence (Chapters 2–5) 1- Prologue to Aem-Tim 2- Family; birth; education 3- Early career: aedile, augur, soldier

3- Actions as military tribune 4- Praetor in Spain

5- Marriages; divorce; children

Phase 2: First consulship (6–11) 6- Defeats Ligurians; makes terms 6- Defeated in bid for 2nd consulship 6- Focus on sons’ education

7–8- Digression on affairs in Macedonia; character of Perseus 9- Perseus’ victories and alliances

10- Aemilius elected consul 11- Speech to Romans

Phase 3: Second consulship to the eve of Battle of Pydna (12–17) 13- Perseus’ avarice 12–13- Aemilius to Macedonia 13–14- Aemilius instructs soldiers 14- New wells; digression on water 15–16- Crossing pass; his son Fabius and Nasica volunteer and succeed 16- Perseus changes location 17- Rejects Nasica’s advice to act 17- Ruse to establish camp 17- Eclipse; sacrifices and vows

293

Aemilius-timoleon

Relations with other Romans

Military command

Relations with Perseus, Greeks and Macedonians

Phase 4: Battle of Pydna (18–27)

22- Distressed about son Scipio

18–19- Early phase of battle 20- Salvius and Pelagians 20- Aemilius adjusts tactics 21- Marcus Cato retrieves sword 22- Army searches; Scipio returns

24- Romans hear rumor of victory 25- Digression on “Rumor”

21- Macedonians defeated 23- Perseus flees 24- Macedonians to Aemilius 26- Perseus surrenders

27- Aemilius’ discourse on Fortune

Phase 5: Settles affairs after Pydna; 2nd triumph; death; funeral (28–39)

30–31- Conflict over Triumph; Servilius’ speech 32–34- Triumph 35- Younger sons die 36- Speech after Triumph 38- Aemilius vs. Scipio; censor 39- Illness, death, burial; Scipio gives his share of estate to brother Fabius

28- Settles affairs in Greece 29- Settles affairs in Macedonia; allows pillaging of Epirus 34- Refuses to exclude Perseus from Triumph 37- Perseus in prison; death 39- Iberians, Ligurians and Macedonians help carry bier

294

Chapter 7

Setting a Pattern and Training the Young Plutarch presents Aemilius’ augurship (Aem. 3.3–5) as a paradigm in setting an example and training citizens. Aemilius “so carefully studied” (προσέσχε) traditional customs and “so thoroughly understood” (κατενόησε) the religious piety of the ancestors that he made the augurship appear as “one of the higher arts” rather than simply an honorary role held “for the sake of fame” (Aem. 3.3).17 He gave his duties his full attention and instructed (διδάσκοντος) his colleagues on the smallest detail of traditional ceremony and the reasons for adhering to it (Aem. 3.4), stating that “those who remit strictness in small matters break down also the guard set over greater ones” (3.5). Later, after losing his bid for the consulship,18 he educates his sons, Scipio Aemilianus and Fabius Maximus, training them not only “in the native and ancestral discipline”, but also, and “more ambitiously”, in that of the Greeks (Aem. 6.8–10).19 The positive results are displayed after Pydna, when the young men are described as “devoted to learning” (φιλογραμματοῦσι) and choose books from Perseus’ library (Aem. 28.10), while in the campaign both Fabius (15.4) and Scipio (22.3–9) display bravery and energetic pursuit of glory.20 Plutarch asserts that by reviving traditional values and practices, Aemilius “restored his fatherland” (ὤρθου τὴν πατρίδα) (Aem. 3.7). The importance of providing a role model for training young men to meet high standards in office is reflected in the expansive treatment of Aemilius’ augurship in Plutarch’s Life, compared with its absence from other accounts. Livy mentions Aemilius as aedile (Livy 35.10.11–12) and as praetor (35.24.6), while Polybius (28.35.4–6) and Diodorus (30.1–31.26) focus on Aemilius’ actions in the campaign against Perseus. Plutarch’s deliberate insertion of these episodes—which carefully portray Aemilius’ actions in roles still played by men in the imperial era, his motives in performing his duties and the impact he had on others—strongly 17  Cato Minor, as military tribune and quaestor, also devotes attention to training those under him. See Chapter 9. 18  Aemilius demonstrates a praiseworthy reaction to losing elections, in contrast to the deterrent examples found in Coriolanus (15) and Cato Minor (49–50). 19   Aemilius supplies one of the few portraits of the hero overseeing education of his sons— the other prominent one being Cato Maior (Cato Mai. 20.3–6). 20  Aemilius is said to “love Scipio especially” (ἐφίλει μάλιστα) because he saw that Scipio was “by nature more prone to excellence than any of his brothers” (πλεῖστον εἰς ἀρετὴν φύσει προὔχοντα τῶν ἀδελφῶν) (Aem. 22.3). The army admired Scipio because “beyond any other one of his family, he had a nature adapted for leadership in war and public service” (πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν καὶ πολιτείαν ὡς ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν συγγενῶν κεκραμένος τὸ ἦθος) (Aem. 22.6). This cameo of Scipio is one of several favorable portraits of young men in the Life, including Cato’s son (21.1–5) and Scipio Nasica (15.3–9, 17.3–4). Later, Scipio grants of his share of his father’s legacy to his brother (Aem. 39.10).

Aemilius-timoleon

295

suggests that Plutarch was providing pragmatic guidance that could be applied in the political arena of his own day. Acquiring Authority without Flattery Plutarch crafts his description of Aemilius’ appointment as commander against Perseus to show how Aemilius’ insistence on traditional values and refusal to flatter enhanced his political effectiveness. He is depicted as a man who refused “to court a second command during his first by gratifying and being mild to those under his command” (Aem. 3.6). Later, when he is offered leadership of the campaign against Perseus, Aemilius tells the Romans that they must not “make themselves his colleagues in command” (παραστρατηγεῖν) or “indulge in rhetoric about the war”, but must quietly supply the necessary provisions (Aem. 11.2). This frank and resolute approach won a positive reaction:21 By these words, he inspired great respect for himself (αἰδῶ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐνεποίησε) among the citizens and great expectations for the future, with all being glad that they had bypassed the flatterers and selected a general who had frankness and spirit (παρρησίαν ἔχοντα καὶ φρόνημα). Aem. 11.3

The depiction of Aemilius’ success despite adhering to strict discipline and tradition—at a time when others were obtaining titles and commands through flattery—is central to Plutarch’s pragmatic lesson in managing relations with the people. Plutarch revisits Aemilius’ ability to gain support without flattery in the final chapter: And this was also distinctive and extraordinary in Aemilius, that, although he was treated with respect and preeminently honored by the people, he remained a member of the aristocratic party, and neither said nor did anything for the favor of the multitude, but, in political matters, always aligned himself with the leading and most powerful men. Aem. 38.2

Plutarch reinforces this point by drawing a comparison to Scipio Aemilianus, who was later known for the goodwill he enjoyed because he “supported the people in most things” (αὔξων τὰ πλεῖστα τὸν δῆμον) (Aem. 38.6). By contrast,

21  Aemilius’ frank rejection of the clamoring of “armchair generals” is an important component of his characterization as a general in Polybius (29.1) and Livy (44.22).

296

Chapter 7

Aemilius was no less loved by the multitude, although he did not placate them and instead sided with the nobles.22 Military Command From the standpoint of pragmatic lessons for the “ruler” and “ruled”, Plutarch uses military episodes to illustrate how a general must set standards for soldiers in order to be effective in command, while also needing to exercise good strategic judgment in discerning the best course of action in each set of circumstances. Plutarch establishes a backdrop of the Romans’ dissatisfaction with their recent practice of granting military commands to generals who made promises to them and gratified their soldiers, but were unable win battles (Aem. 3.7; 7.1; 11.2). These generals were now seen as having conducted their campaigns “disgracefully and ridiculously” and “having suffered more harm than they inflicted” (Aem. 7.1).23 This period of poor generalship exacerbates one of the challenges illustrated in the Life: how to elicit obedience based on discipline from soldiers used to flattery.24 Plutarch also uses incidents from Aemilius’ military command to illustrate effective techniques for training one’s army and for dispelling the overconfidence of the young without destroying their ambition—central topics in the advice literature for generals. While these same issues were emphasized in Fabius, as discussed in Chapter 4, in Aemilius Plutarch expands the stock of paradigms of effective action to new contexts. At the same time, Plutarch’s account of Pydna presents strategies for responding to specific problems in battle. Training Soldiers Aemilius’ practice of adhering to traditional standards and training young men when he was augur is on display in the military arena as well. As general, he is meticulous in “scrutinizing and preserving military custom (ἐξεταστὴν καὶ 22  In his ability to win the support of the people, despite his refusal to flatter them, Aemilius resembles Phocion, discussed below in Chapter 9. 23  Plutarch includes a re-cap of the events that had transpired in Macedonia, first from the time of Antigonus (Alexander’s general and father of Demetrius Poliorcetes) through King Philip’s defeat by Titus Flamininus at Cynoscephalae (197) (Aem. 8.1–8.5) and then from Philip’s revival as a powerful enemy and the succession of Perseus, who had defeated a series of Roman generals before the appointment of Aemilius Paullus (8.6–9.6). 24  When, at the end of the campaign, the soldiers complain about their distribution and try to deny Aemilius a triumph (Aem. 30.4–8), they are accused by Servilius of preferring “to be wheedled and flattered … rather than commanded” (δημαγωγεῖσθαι μᾶλλον … ἢ στρατηγεῖσθαι) (31.10). The tribes, however, validate Aemilius’ conduct by voting him a triumph (Aem. 32.1).

Aemilius-timoleon

297

φύλακα): he thoroughly explains all the details and does not hesitate to punish transgressors, “thinking that the conquest of his enemies was hardly more than a sideline (πάρεργον) to the training of his fellow citizens (τοῦ παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας)” (Aem. 3.6–7).25 Aemilius’ relations with the army further illustrate how discipline and a refusal to flatter soldiers produces positive results. First, when Aemilius finds his soldiers in Macedonia “by reason of their former license” to be “impatient of delay” (δυσανασχετοῦντα) and “inclined to dictate to their general many impracticable things” (λόγῳ πολλὰ διαστρατηγοῦντα τῶν ἀπράκτων), he censures them and orders them to take no thought for anything except being prepared when their general gives the command (Aem. 13.6).26 With regard to the night watch, he orders that the men keep watch without their spears, assuming that their defenselessness if attacked would induce them to be more alert (Aem. 23.7). Aemilius also demonstrates techniques for restraining eagerness and preventing victory from breeding over-confidence, a challenge also explored in Fabius and Pompey, as discussed in earlier chapters.27 When the large Macedonian army has caused Aemilius to pause, but has made his young officers, including Nasica, eager for battle, Aemilius explains his reasons for not attacking: But Aemilius smiled and said [to Nasica]: “Yes, if, indeed, I was your age; but many victories teach me (διδάσκουσαι) the errors of the defeated (ἁμαρτήματα) and forbid me to join battle immediately after a march against a phalanx already drawn up and in place.” Aem. 17.3–4

By reporting Aemilius’ reasons, Plutarch turns the incident into pragmatic lessons in strategic thinking and in how to instruct younger officers. Aemilius demonstrates another approach to instructing young men when he uses the victory at Pydna as an opportunity to teach them how to properly respond to victory in battle.28 First, Aemilius poses questions that will prompt the young

25  Cato’s conduct as military tribune is similar. See Chapter 9. 26  A similar speech is found in Livy (44.34). 27  Minucius in Fabius and the younger officers under Pompey are only two of many examples in the Lives. 28  This speech by Aemilius on the need to be moderate in prosperity follows the accounts in Polybius (29.20) and Livy (45.4), who also emphasize various aspects of the role of Fortune in the private and public lives of statesmen.

298

Chapter 7

officers to think of their victory as a manifestation of a broader principle of how fortune operates in the lives of men:29 Is it right for a man, in the presence of success, to be emboldened and conceited because he has overturned a nation or a city or a kingdom? … Or is fortune, by setting this change before the warrior as a paradigm of a common weakness (παράδειγμα), teaching him (παιδεύει) to understand that nothing is safe and secure? Aem. 27.2

As a second step, Aemilius completes his “lesson” by articulating the specific actions the young men should take—and the attitudes they should adopt—in dealing with victory now or in the future: Will you not abandon, then, young men, this empty insolence and exultation of victory, and humbly crouch down (καταπτήξετε) regarding the future, always watching anxiously (καραδοκοῦντες) for the time when the deity will at last hurl down on each man his indignation at our present success. Aem. 27.5

The effectiveness of Aemilius’ instruction is reflected in the reaction to his speech: the young men go away with their boastfulness and insolence curbed “as if by a bridle” (Aem. 27.6).30 The entire sequence reveals the common didactic approach—and Plutarch’s own practice in the Lives—of converting experiences into paradigms for how to deal with circumstances that are likely to recur. Although the speech on fortune attributed to Aemilius is not found in extant sources—many of which, including Livy, are missing sections related specifically to actions immediately after Pydna—the depiction of Aemilius instructing his soldiers is consistent with other episodes in Livy. For instance, Plutarch’s direct speeches at other points can be traced to Livy’s (generally lengthier) accounts and in some cases—such as Livy’s extensive passage in which Aemilius explains to his troops his reasons for delaying battle with 29  Plutarch’s echoes this theme when he refers to Demetrius, after his loss to Ptolemy, acting like a sensible general acquainted with the reversals of fortune by focusing on preparing his army. 30  The image of the commander as a horse-trainer—familiar from Plato—also is found in the Life of Fabius, who sees the task of training the young soldiers under him in these terms (Fab. 20.1). See Said (2004).

Aemilius-timoleon

299

Perseus (Livy 44.37)—Plutarch omits the speech altogether. However, if the speech about Fortune is an embellishment, it is consistent with the attention Aemilius pays to the issue of the reversal of fortune in the historical accounts, including Livy (45), Diodorus (31.3–4) and Appian (Mac. 19). Adapting Military Strategy and Tactics to the Situation at Hand Plutarch characterizes Aemilius as a man who “clung to his purpose” and “tested every plan and method of attack” (ἐπὶ πᾶν βούλευμα καὶ πᾶσαν τρεπόμενος πεῖραν, Aem. 13.4) and uses Aemilius’ campaigns in Spain (Aem. 4), Liguria (6) and Macedonia (12–26) to provide pragmatic lessons in military strategy and tactics. In Spain, Plutarch reports that Aemilius’ success in defeating “the barbarians” in two pitched battles was “conspicuously due to his generalship” (τῆς στρατηγίας περιφανῶς γενέσθαι): in choosing a favorable location and crossing a certain river, he had “made the victory easy” (Aem. 4.1–3). After reporting Aemilius’ rout in Liguria of a force of 40,000 with an army of 8,000, Plutarch emphasizes the “kind and conciliatory terms” that induced the Ligurians to surrender (Aem. 6.4) and enabled Aemilius to use them as a buffer between Italy and the Gauls (6.5). These skills—of selecting terrain and winning over the conquered—are discussed in Onasander and Frontinus as well. In Macedonia, Aemilius faces the same sort of challenges that confronted Hannibal in Italy: how to get his own army into position and to lure his enemy into battle.31 Plutarch reports that “some say” that Aemilius induced the Macedonians to attack by driving out a horse without a bridle, leading to a collision between the Romans chasing the horse and the Macedonians (Aem. 18.1–2). Plutarch’s intention to present Aemilius as a positive model of generalship is revealed in an authorial comment which dispels the notion that Aemilius’ victory at Pydna was the result of good fortune: When I see that under his generalship the war was brought to an end (1) partly by the acuity of his daring, (2) partly by his good plans, (3) partly by the enthusiastic assistance of his friends and (4) partly by his courage in danger and employment of suitable calculations (λογισμοῖς ἀραρόσιν), I am unable to attribute his brilliant and conspicuous success to the socalled good fortune of that man, as in the case of other generals. Aem. 12.2

All four factors listed here are illustrated in Aemilius’ actions. He demonstrates courage when he rides past his troops without breastplate or helmet 31  See Chapter 4.

300

Chapter 7

to encourage them as they face the massive Macedonian army (Aem. 19.2– 3),32 while his ability to inspire “eager assistance” is reflected in the readiness of Scipio Nasica and Fabius Maximus to volunteer to scout (Aem. 15.3–4). Aemilius’ excellence as a planner is displayed in repeated references to his careful analysis of all factors before choosing a strategy (Aem. 13.6, 15.2, 17.3), including his deception of keeping one cohort in view as if prepared for battle while the others dug trenches and set up camp (Aem. 18.5). He is also shown making a rapid calculation in the midst of battle when he devises the plan to attack the phalanx where uneven ground forced it to open—the strategy that allowed Romans to come into close combat and win the battle (Aem. 20.7–9).33 All of these actions provide instructive paradigms for generals. While Plutarch’s account of Aemilius’ military exploits overlaps other major sources in most respects, two key incidents are not found in other works: Aemilius’ stratagem to start the battle and his strategy on how to fight the phalanx. While Livy (64.41), for instance, attributes the beginning of the battle to Fortune, Plutarch presents the start of the battle as a strategic decision: Aemilius ignores the appeals of his younger officers to begin battle and instead devises a scheme that will both delay the battle until the sun would not be in the eyes of his soldiers and induce the Macedonians to begin the fight (Aem. 17.6). Similarly, Livy presents the successful attack on the phalanx as fortuitous (Livy 64.41.6), while Plutarch asserts that Aemilius recognized an opportunity and transmitted it to his troops. Plutarch’s versions reinforce the portrait of Aemilius as a paradigm of effective generalship. The depiction of Aemilius as a successful general is amplified by Plutarch’s characterization of Perseus.34 Perseus’ avarice contrasts with Aemilius’ indifference to money—as a result of which the Roman military alliances were

32  Echoes of Hannibal’s reaction to his army’s trepidation ahead of Cannae (Fab. 15.2–3) are found in Plutarch’s mention of Aemilius’ response to seeing the interlocked shields of the phalanx: “Amazement and fear took possession of him, and he felt that he had never seen a sight more fearful; … But he, showing to his soldiers a glad and cheerful countenance, rode past them without helmet or breastplate” (Aem. 19.2–3). 33  Aemilius’ strategy of breaking into the phalanx provides another practical example of how to break up a large force into smaller units to fight. Agesilaus in Egypt (Ages. 39.2– 5) and Timoleon at Crimesus (Tim. 27.6) illustrate other strategies to solve the same challenge. 34  In Aem-Tim, Plutarch uses the defeated Kings (Perseus and Dionysius) to showcase behaviors his readers should avoid when they hold positions of authority in the provinces. In Dtr-Ant, it is the heroes themselves that illustrate the actions of bad rulers. See Wardman (1974: 33) for a discussion of this contrast.

Aemilius-timoleon

301

not undercut by the duplicity that alienated Perseus’ allies (Aem. 12.4–6, 13.1).35 Expecting to simply “wear out” (ἀποτρύσειν) Aemilius “with delay and expense” (Aem. 13.5), Perseus lacked the foresight to anticipate Aemilius’ ruse to take the pass and enter Macedonia and, when he learned about it, did not respond quickly (16.1–2).36 Most importantly, Perseus was absent from the battle (Aem. 19.4–10), while Aemilius observed it carefully and contrived a way to resolve the difficulty posed by the phalanx. Perseus’ defeat is thus tied to the absence of courage, planning and resolute action—the very strengths emphasized in the account of Aemilius’ generalship. Managing the Soldier’s Desire to Plunder The primary stain on Aemilius’ record as a general lies in the plundering of Epirus on his return from Macedonia, although, even here, Plutarch states that the actions were “contrary to Aemilius’ fair and worthy nature” (παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἐπιεικῆ καὶ χρηστὴν, Aem. 30.1) and were carried out under an order from the Senate (Aem. 29.1). Nevertheless, the strategy Aemilius adopted to catch all the inhabitants by surprise demonstrated the power of deception: Aemilius first sent for the ten leading men of each city and ordered them to bring whatever gold and silver they had (in their houses and temples) on a fixed day. He then sent them back to their cities accompanied by a “protective escort” purporting to assist in collecting the money, but in reality being positioned to launch direct plundering of the cities on a certain day (Aem. 29.2–4). The strategy was successful in enslaving all the people and sacking seventy cities within an hour (Aem. 29.4), but the amount received by the soldiers was very small. Indeed, these same soldiers later try to prevent Aemilius from being granted a triumph because they were dissatisfied with the distribution of spoils (Aem. 30.4). Plutarch’s account of these events, which is a significant embellishment of Livy’s version (Livy 33–34), suggests that Plutarch wanted to prevent Aemilius from being portrayed as a “paragon of virtue” without any blemishes on his record. Relations with Subject States: Greeks and Macedonians Pragmatic lessons for the ruler and ruled in the Lives are perhaps most vivid in episodes that portray the interaction between Rome (or Athens or Sparta) 35  A portrait of Perseus is included in all of the historical accounts, which uniformly point to his ruinous avarice as the cause of blunders that lost him his empire. See, for instance, Livy (44.23–27) and Polybius (28.9.5, 29.6–9). His avarice is contrasted to the liberality of Alexander and Philip, who did not hesitate to part with money when it furthered their cause of building empire (Aem. 12.10–11). 36  Aemilius faces challenges similar to Hannibal, while Perseus is in the position of Fabius.

302

Chapter 7

and either newly-conquered states or cities already under their hegemony, since these relations most closely paralleled the ties between Rome and the Greek provinces in Plutarch’s day. In Aemilius, Plutarch designs his account of Aemilius’ relations with the Greeks and Macedonians after Pydna to supply a positive paradigm of how a new governor can achieve harmony between the ruling power and the ruled by giving gifts, granting liberty, acting with courtesy and administering justice. Plutarch highlights actions recommended in the advice literature of his day aimed at the imperial officials heading out to serve as provincial governors–such as Pliny’s Epistulae (e.g. 2.24–7) and Cicero’s Ad Quintum (1.1), as discussed in Chapter 2. Plutarch magnifies the impact of his portrait by attributing directly to Aemilius alone decisions about policies that in Livy are ascribed to Aemilius in conjunction with a panel of ten commissioners sent from the Roman Senate, including granting autonomy to cities, reducing their tribute and setting up systems of justice (Livy 45.16.32). Establishing Cordial Relations with Subject States Plutarch provides his pragmatic lessons for the ruler by linking specific actions by Aemilius to favorable reactions from the Greeks or Macedonians. In touring Greece, Aemilius is shown engaging in a variety of beneficial actions that were “honorable and kind”, including reinstatement of popular governments and gifts of grain and oil to the cities (Aem. 28.1–3). He restored their cities to the Macedonians “in freedom and autonomy”, while imposing a tribute less than half the amount paid to Perseus (Aem. 28.6). He also sponsored games, processions, contests and banquets.37 All of these actions fostered goodwill: In the arrangement and order of his banquets, and in the seating and greeting of his guests, and in his perceptiveness of the degree of honor and friendliness due to each one, he was so exact and thoughtful that the Greeks were amazed that he did not leave even their pastimes without a share of his attention, but that, as a man involved in such great matters, he also gave trifles due attention (τοῖς μικροῖς τὸ πρέπον ἀποδίδωσιν). Aem. 28.8

The lasting goodwill that resulted from his courtesy towards the Macedonians— as well as his earlier humane treatment of the Ligurians—is on display at Aemilius’ funeral, in which Iberian, Ligurian and Macedonian youth carried

37  Aemilius’ comment that the organizational skills needed by a man setting up a banquet are similar to those needed by a general is cited at Aem. 27.9, and it is also referenced in most other accounts, including Polybius (30.14) and Livy (45.32.11).

Aemilius-timoleon

303

his bier and the elderly followed along praising Aemilius as the “benefactor and preserver of their fatherlands” (εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα τῶν πατρίδων) (Aem. 39.8): For not only on those occasions when he was victorious did he treat all men in a gentle and kind manner, but also through all the rest of his life he always continued doing something good and caring for them as if they were kinsmen and relations. Aem. 39.7–9

This final presentation of the exchange of benefactions and goodwill between the ruler and the ruled conveys the pragmatic lesson for readers. Perseus: Counter-Example of a Bad Ruler The characterization of Aemilius as a good ruler is sharpened by Perseus’ counter-example of a ruler whom Plutarch describes as a man whose character was “little and base” (διὰ μικρότητα καὶ μοχθηρίαν ἤθους) and whose strongest vice was avarice (φιλαργυρία) (Aem. 8.10).38 While Perseus is included in Plutarch’s summary of Macedonian affairs before Aemilius’ campaign (Aem. 8.9–9.6), his conduct as a ruler is illustrated during his retreat after Pydna (21–23), when he is quickly abandoned first by his companions (23.4) and soon after by his remaining supporters (26.2–4) because “they had more fear of his cruelty than of the enemy” (23.4). Indeed, Perseus later killed his treasurers when they censured him (Aem. 23.6). Ultimately, within two days of their defeat, the Macedonians abandon Perseus as their King and put themselves into the hands of Aemilius (Aem. 24.1). Later, when Perseus chooses captivity (and inclusion in Aemilius’ triumph) instead of death (Aem. 34.4–5), Plutarch brings the spotlight back to Perseus’ cowardice and love of life, qualities often associated with Eastern Kings who have been defeated.39 As we will see in the next Chapter, Demetrius also chooses a shameful life in captivity, while Cleopatra devises her own death specifically to avoid being part of Octavian’s triumphal procession after Actium. 38  Livy, Polybius, Diodorus and Appian all juxtapose Perseus with either Philip or Alexander, men who are presented as more pragmatic about the use of money to buy alliances and build empire. Perseus, through his avarice, was bringing the empire they made possible to an end. 39  Perseus’ choice to accept captivity marks a contrast with Plutarch’s earlier description of Perseus’ father, Philip, as man who felt that being King “by favor of the Romans” was more the part of a “captive satisfied with meat and drink” than of “a man possessed by courage and spirit”, and who, for this reason, decided to rebuild his forces and resume the war (Aem. 8.6–8).

304

Chapter 7

Summary: Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled in Aemilius Plutarch used Aemilius to emphasize the actions that would help statesmen of his own era to be effective as city magistrates, generals and imperial representatives managing affairs with the provinces. Aemilius is shown applying principles associated with good kingship: in his own conduct, he sets a pattern for others to follow and he is solicitous about the well-being of those under his authority. He also demonstrates how a commitment to traditional values, disciplining of subordinates and a refusal to flatter any group for the sake of office can lead to a trustworthy reputation and effective leadership of a city or an army. In addition, Plutarch presents Aemilius as an exemplum of how courtesy towards the ruled and the refusal to enrich oneself from the wealth of subject states creates goodwill towards Roman rule and its representatives—precisely the areas emphasized in Cicero’s advice to Quintus. The Life also provides an instructive portrait of generalship, especially in Aemilius’ careful preparation of troops and resources, his analysis of alternatives before battle, his shrewd adjustments during battle and his efforts to train younger men not to act too quickly or become over-confident in success. Moreover, Plutarch forcefully presents Aemilius as a general who refuses to flatter either the Romans or his soldiers (Aem. 11.2–4; 8.6–7; 31.10). These themes recur in other Lives, including Fabius and Pompey, but are treated in new contexts that expand the supply of instructive paradigms for readers. The absence of these qualities in Perseus reinforces their prominence in Aemilius. The only “stain” on Aemilius’ career—an essential element that prevents any hero from becoming an implausible paragon of virtue—occurs after Pydna, when Aemilius allows his troops to sack cities in Epirus (Aem. 29). Plutarch’s Aemilius mirrors the accounts in pragmatic histories more closely than the other Lives we have examined. In Polybius, Diodorus and Livy, Aemilius is an exceptionally capable general and statesman who set an excellent example for his sons, Fabius Maximus Aemilianus and Scipio Aemilianus Africanus. Aemilius’ direct and indirect speeches in the Life can be traced, in their import, to speeches reported in the histories, which highlighted Aemilius’ awareness of the vagaries of Fortune (26.10, 27.2–6, 36.3, 36.4–9), his refusal to flatter either the Romans or his soldiers (11.1–2 13.6–7), and his purposeful instruction of others in principles of managing political and military matters (3.4, 17.4, 29.1) .40

40  The Life includes nine direct or indirect speeches in which Aemilius instructs his fellow Romans (Aem. 3.4, 11.1–2, 36.3, 36.4–9), his army (13.6, 17.4, 27.2–6), the Macedonians (29.1) or Perseus (26.10).

Aemilius-timoleon

305

This depiction of Aemilius in the histories therefore closely suited Plutarch’s purpose in his pragmatic biographies.41 Finally, Plutarch provides one of his most positive paradigms of how a statesman should deal with good and bad fortune in private and public life, meeting good fortune with humility and bad fortune with equanimity. Indeed, two of Aemilius’ three direct speeches (Aem. 27.2–6, 36.4–9) are devoted to this topic. Moreover, Aemilius’ excellence in dealing with fortune becomes more vivid by comparison to Perseus’ counter-example of arrogance in prosperity and despondency in defeat. In Timoleon, Plutarch expands his treatment of how best to handle the effects of fortune, while at the same time providing new pragmatic lessons in generalship and in how to secure harmonious relations with subject states. 7.3

Life of Timoleon

Overview Timoleon, a Corinthian whose political career spanned the middle of the fourth century, is most frequently associated with two events: his participation in the assassination of his brother, Timophanes, who aspired to become a tyrant in Corinth, and his campaigns in Sicily to oust Dionysius the Younger from Syracuse (344) and to free other cities of Sicily ruled by tyrants. In the process, he defeated the invading Carthaginians at Crimesus (339) and restricted them to the western half of the island. Subsequent efforts to repopulate Sicily and establish institutions to support a new constitution laid the foundation for a revival of Greek Sicily after an extended period of decline. Timoleon died around 335. Of the histories, the accounts in Diodorus Siculus (16.65–90) and Nepos’ Timoleon survive, but Plutarch refers to several others which are now lost, including those of Timaeus, Theopompus, Ephorus and Athanis (Tim. 4.6, 36.2; 37.9). Apart from the historians, Timoleon appears in Polyaenus’ Strategemata—where the parsley omen, execution of the tyrant Mamercus

41  The consistently favorable and instructive portraits of Aemilius as a general and statesman perhaps explains Plutarch’s reference to his own “use of history, as a mirror” in his efforts to manage his own behavior (Aem. 1.1). The theme of noble characters as role models that help divert Plutarch from base actions—mentioned at Aem. 1.5—is also validated in the historical accounts and in the Life itself where Scipio and his brother are shown emulating the example set by their father.

306

Chapter 7

and Timoleon’s speech before Crimesus are mentioned42—and in other authors he is cited largely in discussions about Timaeus. In the Moralia, Plutarch refers to Timoleon five times. He appears in Political Precepts in two contexts: as a statesman who places his country ahead of family when he joins the men who murder his brother (808A) and as a man who built a sanctuary to Automatia (816E). In other treatises, he is mentioned as a man who not only credits his achievements to Fortune (542E) and converts signs into good omens (676D), but also is a beneficiary of delays in divine vengeance (552E). In Plutarch’s other Lives, Timoleon is named twice: Camillus (19.4) includes a reference to his victory over the Carthaginians in the month of Thargelion (described at Tim. 27.1–28.11), and Dion (58.10) refers to Timoleon’s capture and execution of Hicetas.43 Plutarch uses Timoleon to broaden his treatment of the role of fortune versus merit in military successes. The dimensions of Timoleon’s victories that could be attributed to skillful generalship are identified by Plutarch and become pragmatic lessons for generals. As in Aemilius, in Timoleon Plutarch includes a character portrait of a tyrant—in this case Dionysius the Younger. The foundation of the portrait was laid in Dion, where Dionysius is shown being corrupted by a poor paideia (Dion 9.2, 10.1) and associating with men who led him into lascivious and wanton habits (Dion 7.4) before Plato arrived and ignited, temporarily, an enthusiasm for philosophy and virtue.44 The portrait is completed in Timoleon (1.6, 13–15), where Dionysius’ response to his own reversals of fortune can be compared to that of Perseus in the prior Life.45 Together, 42   Polyaenus mentions Timoleon at Strat. 5.12.1 (parsley omen); 5.12.2 (execution of Mamercus); and 5.12.13 (speech before Crimesus). 43   Timoleon contains two references to Dion (Tim. 13.10, 58.4), plus a transitional “update” of events in Sicily in Tim. 1.1–6. In Dion, there is one reference to the Life of Timoleon in the account (at Dion 58.10) of Hicetas’ murder of Dion’s family and the later killing of Hicetas’ daughters by the Syracusans in revenge. The killing of the tyrant Hicetas by Timoleon (Tim. 32.1–2) is an instructive episode when compared to the actions taken by Dion and Brutus in similar situations: Dion suffered because of his reluctance to kill his rival Heracleides (Dion 47.1–48.1; 48.9; 53.1–5), while Brutus’ decision not to kill Antony along with Caesar was considered a mistake (Brut. 18.4–6; 20.1–2). 44  At Dion 12.2, Dion hoped that by exposing a “man in power” to the philosophy of Plato, he could “mitigate the arrogance and excessive severity of the tyranny” (τὸ δεσποτικὸν καὶ λίαν ἄκρατον ἀφελὼν τῆς τυραννίδος) and convert Dionysius into “a fit and lawful ruler” (ἐμμελῆ τινα καὶ νόμιμον ἄρχοντα). The same thinking underlies the process described in Plutarch’s treatises Philosophers and Men in Power and To an Uneducated Ruler. 45  The expulsion of Dionysius is considered by Plutarch to be “the strongest and plainest” of the paradigms illustrating the mutation of fortune” (κατὰ τῆς τύχης παραδειγμάτων ἐμφανέστατόν ἐστι καὶ μέγιστον) (Dion 50.4). In Timoleon, Dionysius is used to extend the theme of responding to reversals introduced in Aemilius, as well as to illustrate the

Aemilius-timoleon

307

Dion and Timoleon depict the challenges of eliminating tyranny and creating lasting harmony and prosperity in polities structured to govern themselves through a blend of aristocracy and democracy, but under the hegemony of another state. However, while Dion deals with efforts to remove tyrants by citizens of a city-state, Timoleon, like Aemilius, depicts the role of the outsider acting to free another state from tyranny and then serving as an overlord to maintain stability and foster prosperity in the region—challenges that were ongoing in Plutarch’s day as well. In establishing institutions of lasting liberty in Syracuse, Timoleon is a positive counter-example to Dion’s errors in pursuit of this same goal. The details about Dionysius and the other tyrants in Sicily serve to highlight the benefits that accrued to Sicily by replacing such rulers with the oversight of Timoleon—offering a parallel to the beneficial displacement of Perseus and establishment of Roman oversight of Greece and Macedonia in Aemilius. Plutarch in this way reinforces his portrait of Roman rule as motivated by the desire to free Greek cities from tyranny, not to impose its own. Thus, in addition to expanding the treatment of the proper response to good and bad fortune raised in Aemilius, Plutarch uses Timoleon’s career to provide pragmatic lessons in how to be effective in ruling over subject states and selfgoverning cities—topics addressed in Dio’s Kingship Orations, Cicero’s first letter to Quintus and a variety of Pliny’s letters, as discussed in Chapter 2. Plutarch’s portrayal of Timoleon’s success as an outsider stabilizing Sicily, and then fostering harmony and prosperity, provided a role model for men who were serving as prefects or pro-consuls in the provinces. Moral Foundation and Reputation In sketching Timoleon’s moral character, Plutarch includes qualities shared with Aemilius—such as Timoleon’s mildness and his love of his country— but also emphasizes Timoleon’s hatred of tyrants (μισοτύραννος) and base men (μισοπόνηρος), as well as his attributes as a soldier who was noble and even-tempered and who exhibited intelligence in youth and bravery through old age (Tim. 3.4–5). In the Life, these attributes are on display in Sicily, where Timoleon expels a series of tyrants—including Dionysius (Tim. 13), Leptines (Tim. 14), Hicetas (Tim. 21–22), Mamercus (Tim. 34) and Hippo (Tim. 24)— and treats conquered tyrants and their cities with mildness (Tim. 13.8; 24.1–2; 34.1–7; and 37.1–3).

beneficial effects of philosophy over the long run. Like Alcibiades, Dionysius does not modify his behavior early in life in response to philosophy, but later shows that the teachings took root (Tim. 14–15).

308

Chapter 7

Superiority to Wealth and Obedience to the Law Plutarch also associates Timoleon with indifference to wealth and obedience to the law. Timoleon twice leaves the plundering of Carthaginian wealth to his soldiers (Tim. 24.3, 30.1), sending his own booty back to Corinth instead. In addition, he does not intervene in the trials conducted against tyrants in various cities (Tim. 33.1–3, 34.4, 34.5–7),46 nor object to being called into court himself to answer charges in Syracuse (Tim. 37.2–3). Indeed, Timoleon restrains the efforts of others to protect him from appearing in court, saying that he had willingly endured the toils and dangers “in order that any Syracusan who wished might avail himself of the laws” (ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον Συρακουσίων) (Tim. 37.2). Timoleon’s willingness to be ruled by the law in both situations exemplifies the behavior of the ideal ruler in Plutarch’s political treatises and writings by Seneca, Dio and others. Placing Country before Family Plutarch uses the murder of Timophanes (Tim. 4–6) to provide both positive and negative paradigms in two essential qualities of statesmen that are emphasized in many of the Lives:47 placing the interest of country ahead of family and maintaining one’s resolve regardless of the consequences of a chosen action. In participating in the murder of his brother to save his country from tyranny, Timoleon is applauded by the “most influential men in Corinth” (Tim. 5.1), who recognized the nobility of murdering a brother for the sake of one’s state: They used to praise Timoleon’s hatred of baseness and his greatness of soul, because, although he was a good man and loved his family, he nevertheless put his country before his family and what was noble and just ahead of what was advantageous. Tim. 5.1

46  Timoleon does not interfere with the trials of Hippo in Messana (Tim. 34.4), of Mamercus in Syracuse (34.5–7) or of Hicetas’ wives and daughters in Syracuse (33.1–3). Plutarch criticizes Timoleon’s passivity with regard to Hicetas’ family, calling it “the most displeasing thing in Timoleon’s career” (τῶν Τιμολέοντος ἔργων ἀχαριστότατον), because he abandoned them to the wrath of the Syracusans, who wanted revenge. If Timoleon had opposed it, the women would not have been executed (Tim. 33.2–3). 47  In the Lives discussed earlier, Coriolanus places his mother’s good ahead of that of Rome, while Pericles, Agesilaus and Fabius are constant in the face of criticism.

Aemilius-timoleon

309

When Timoleon is later nominated as general, he is readily approved by the Corinthians (Tim. 7.2), indicating that his withdrawal from public life—while criticized by Plutarch as a sign of inconstancy, as discussed above—did not destroy his reputation as a man who served the interests of Corinth. Standing by One’s Best Judgment in the Face of Criticism In his account of Timoleon’s conduct after the murder of his brother, Plutarch examines the ability to withstand criticism from a new perspective—criticism of a deed already completed that cannot be undone, unlike the ridicule designed to manipulate a statesman to change his plan, as was the case with Pericles, Fabius, Agesilaus and Pompey, discussed earlier in Part 2. In this Life, Timoleon reacts to being called a fratricide and rejected by his mother after his brother’s murder by withdrawing from public life—a response sharply criticized by Plutarch in an expansive authorial comment (Tim. 5.4–6.7). For Plutarch, Timoleon’s reaction reflected “unsettled” (σείονται) judgment that was easily carried away “by casual praise and blame” (ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων) instead of showing “firmness and strength” based on “reason and philosophy” (Tim. 6.1): It seems that not only must an action be noble and just, but the conviction (τὴν δόξαν) from which it arises must be lasting and unchangeable (μόνιμον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον).… For repentance makes the noble action shameful, and the choice arising from knowledge and calculation does not change, even if the actions fail. Tim. 6.2–4

Plutarch’s comment speaks to the need for a statesman not only to stand by his judgment before action is taken, but also to stand by it after the outcome is known, when it is based on “knowledge and calculation (ἐξ ἐπιστήμης … καὶ λογισμοῦ). Indeed, this passage is one the most direct statements in the Lives that motives should be assessed separately from outcomes: it is motives that determine whether an action is noble or shameful.48 To reiterate this principle of standing by one’s best thinking regardless of the outcome, Plutarch compares Timoleon to Phocion, who opposed Leosthenes’ ultimately successful

48  Similarly, Nic-Cras 4.5 Plutarch states that in comparing the expeditions of Alexander and Nicias “it is unfair to judge a beginning by its end” (οὐκ εὖ τὰ πρῶτα κρίνουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων). Assessing outcomes, however, is still central to pragmatic biography, which distils pragmatic lessons in effective and ineffective strategies from them.

310

Chapter 7

expedition but said he was still happy for the advice he gave (Tim. 6.5)49 and to Aristides the Locrian, who told Dionysius he would rather see his daughter dead than married to a tyrant and, after she was executed, said that he did not repent his words (6.6–7). The importance of eliminating this flaw is further reflected in Plutarch’s comment in the synkrisis that Timoleon’s conduct revealed a character that was “fair and gentle”, but “lacking in greatness” (μέγεθος δ’ οὐκ ἔχοντος) (Aem-Tim 2.12). Pragmatic Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled The pragmatic lessons for rulers and the ruled in Timoleon reside in Plutarch’s treatment of three central challenges for rulers: (1) devising military strategies, (2) sharing credit with “fortune” to avert envy for one’s successes and (3) establishing security and liberty in subject cities. Timoleon’s campaigns in Sicily supply a range of pragmatic insights for generals, as well as a new perspective on the role of Fortune in military outcomes and how a general, by paying homage to it, can dissipate envy. At the same time, Timoleon demonstrates how fair dealing with subject states and a partnership between the subjects and the ruling city can foster harmony and prosperity. In this area, the Life illustrates the efficacy of recommendations in Plutarch’s Political Precepts and To an Uneducated Ruler, as well as in Cicero’s Ad Quintum, Seneca’s De Clementia, Dio’s Kingship and City Orations, and Pliny’s Letters. The lessons are contained in Timoleon’s conduct in three areas: (1) Relations with Corinth, (2) Military command and (3) Relations with subject states (Syracuse and Sicilian cities). Episodes in each area are show in Table 7.2, in which the Life has been subdivided into five phases. Phase 1 (Chapters 1–6) describes Timoleon’s early career and first retirement, as well as the developments in Sicily that prompted his recall to become general. Phase 2 (7–15) recounts the campaign in Sicily through Dionysius’ departure from Syracuse, while in Phase 3 (16–23) Timoleon takes Syracuse and settles the legal and financial affairs within the polity. Phase 4 (24–34) turns to the other threats facing Syracuse, including the tyrants who remained hostile and the Carthaginians, whom Timoleon finally defeats at Crimesus. The final chapters in Phase 5 (35–39) describe Timoleon’s relations with Syracuse as a trusted counselor after his retirement, as well as his death and funeral. Plutarch crafts his account—using direct speech, embellishments and authorial comment—to amplify paradigms for provincial leaders.

49  The incident is reported in Phocion 33.1–4.

311

Aemilius-timoleon Table 7.2 Episodes in the Life of Timoleon Relations with Corinth

Military command

Relations with subject states: Syracuse and Sicilian cities

Phase 1: Early life and career (Chapters 1–6) 1–2- Events in Sicily from Dion on; Carthaginian threat; Hicetas’ plans 3- Corinth receives request for help; Timoleon’s family and character 4- Murder of brother-turned-tyrant 5–6- Reactions to brother’s murder

4- Saves brother Timophanes in battle

Phase 2: Campaign to Sicily through surrender of Dionysius (7–15) 7- Timoleon elected general 8- Omens before expedition

7- Hicetas’ letter to Corinth 9–11- Evades envoys in Rhegium 12- Victory over Hicetas 13- Mamercus joins Timoleon; at Adranum Dionysius surrenders citadel 14–15- Digression on Dionysius

Phase 3: Campaign through taking of Syracuse (16–23)

23- Corinth sends settlers

16- Reinforcements in Thurii 17- Hicetas and Carthaginians besiege citadel 18- Neon takes Achradna; Hicetas’ failed expedition to Catana 19- Reinforcements cross to Sicily 20- Timoleon occupies Messana; Mago withdraws from Syracuse

16- Failed assassination attempt 18- Timoleon sends aid from Catana

21- Timoleon takes Syracuse 22–23- Settles affairs in Syracuse; repopulates; destroys palace

312

Chapter 7

Table 7.2 Episodes in the Life of Timoleon (cont.) Relations with Corinth

Military command

Relations with subject states: Syracuse and Sicilian cities

Phase 4: Ousting tyrants from other Sicilian cities; victory at Crimesus (24–34)

29- “Barbarian” spoils adorn city

24- Hicetas forced from power in Leontini; Leptines deported from Apollonia; troops plunder Carthaginian cities 25–29- Victory over Carthage at Crimesus 30- Mamercus ambushes auxiliaries 31–32- Hicetas defeated and killed 34- Mamercus and Hippo defeated

25- Establishes civil polity and laws

30- Defectors expelled and killed

33- Hicetas’ family put to death 34- Hippo put to death in Messana; Mamercus condemned

Phase 5: Settles affairs in Sicily; death and funeral in Syracuse (35–39)

36- Never returns to Corinth 37- Responds to false accusers

36- Comparison to Greek generals

35- “Re-founds” Agrigentum and Gela 36- Retires in Syracuse 38- Honored as advisor 39- Death and funeral; decree listing honors

Relations with Corinth Although little of the action in Timoleon takes place in Corinth, Plutarch uses Timoleon’s participation in the murder of his brother in Corinth to illustrate a process for potentially dissuading a man from tyranny, short of murdering him. Plutarch’s account of Timoleon’s relationship with his brother (Timophanes) begins with incidents showing his love for him and willingness to risk his life for him (Tim. 3–4)—a backdrop that magnifies the effort involved in setting

Aemilius-timoleon

313

this love aside for the greater good.50 Dealing with tyrants and tyrannicide— central themes in Brutus as well—had special relevance for men of Plutarch’s era, who had witnessed the assassination of Nero and the oppression of Diocletian.51 Dissuading Tyrannical Behavior in Leaders Plutarch describes the initial efforts by Timoleon to persuade his brother to step down peaceably: Timoleon first tried to reason with him and exhorted him to renounce his ambition (Tim. 4.5) and then approached him in company with a kinsman and a friend (4.6). The murder only took place after these appeals had been rejected, first “with scorn” (καταφρονήσαντος, Tim. 4.5) and then with “mockery, anger and violence” (καταγελῶντος, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἐκφερομένου καὶ χαλεπαίνοντος, Tim. 4.8). While the description of these early attempts distances Timoleon from the charge of fratricide, it also presents a pattern of action that could, in other circumstances, lead to a non-violent resolution. Plutarch’s intention to transform the murder of Timophanes into a positive pragmatic lesson in how to deal with a would-be tyrant is reflected in the more extensive treatment of Timoleon’s early efforts to persuade his brother to step down in the Life than is found in accounts of Diodorus or Nepos, neither of whom mentions any attempt to persuade Timophanes to step down. Instead, Diodorus (16.65.6–9) simply reports that Timoleon alone murdered his brother openly in the market place and that his appointment as general was made in part to vindicate him from the charge of fratricide (if he ruled Sicily fairly) or to confirm his guilt (if he ruled too ambitiously). Nepos (Tim. 1.2–6), in turn, focuses on Timoleon’s rejection by his mother and the negative reactions of Corinthians who thought Timoleon had acted out of jealousy, without 50  The details about Timoleon saving his brother’s life in battle at great risk to his own (Tim. 4.3) and his failed efforts to persuade his brother to relinquish power (4.5; 4.8) establish the purity of Timoleon’s motives when he “stood apart weeping” while his brother was murdered (4.8). 51  The fear that popular leaders might aim at tyranny is a recurring theme across the Lives, including Alcibiades and Pompey (as discussed above) and Antony (Chapter 8). Caesar is often perceived as a would-be tyrant and his murder as tyrannicide by heroes in the Lives (e.g. by Brutus and Cicero), although Plutarch presents him as a necessary cure to the evils of the day. Aem-Tim and Dion-Brut convey various strategies (with different degrees of success) in dealing with tyrants, including trying to instill philosophical precepts (Dion), trying to persuade them to change (Tim.), ousting them from power and banishing them (Dion, Tim.) and murdering them (Tim., Brut.).

314

Chapter 7

a­ rticulating the reasons other Corinthians found the deed laudable. Plutarch, by contrast, clearly paints the murder as an act of political necessity forced upon Timoleon when his brother was unresponsive to repeated efforts to make him back down. Later in the Life, Plutarch refers to this action as “the necessity surrounding his brother” (τὴν περὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀνάγκην) and compares it to the military victories which appeared to be accomplished with ease (Tim. 36.1–2). Military Command In Timoleon, the pragmatic lessons for rulers in military contexts center on the strategic judgment exercised by Timoleon to win victories in successive battles. As in Aemilius, Plutarch carefully attributes Timoleon’s military successes to shrewd generalship, rather than good fortune alone, and further states that the generalship of Timoleon, “to men of just and careful reasoning” was “a product, not of fortune, but of fortunate valor” (Tim. 36.4).52 Plutarch’s treatment of Timoleon’s military career differs from that of Nepos, who emphasizes the “incredible good fortune” that enabled Timoleon to drive Dionysius from Sicily (Nepos, Tim. 2.1) and later points to the “remarkable instances of good luck” (mirabiles … casus) in his battles (Nepos, Tim. 5.1). Plutarch instead distinguishes between the roles of fortune and merit in Timoleon’s victories and demonstrates the general principle that, while “fortune” provides the opportunity for a favorable outcome, victory is only realized if the general exercises foresight and is alert to the possibilities inherent in each situation. Plutarch’s effort to separate out the impact of merit versus fortune—which was also evident in Aemilius—echoes Onasander’s assertion in the Prologue to his Strategikos that such analysis was essential to knowing which victories truly deserved praise and which defeats censure (Strat. Proem 1.1). Plutarch conveys his pragmatic lessons in generalship in a wide variety of scenes that not only display various manifestations of fortune, but also demonstrate a range of skills and tactics that produce victory. In particular, Plutarch uses the military episodes to demonstrate (1) how to take advantage of opportunities in battle and (2) how to surmount obstacles in the midst of battle. By separating the role of Fortune from merit, Plutarch makes it possible to identify the strategies and tactics that provide paradigms to guide generals in similar circumstances. Taking Advantage of Opportunities in Battle In some cases, fortune provides an unexpected opportunity and Timoleon reacts quickly and prudently to take advantage of it—producing victories that 52  “Fortunate valor” is discussed as a central theme in Timoleon by Holland (2005).

Aemilius-timoleon

315

blend fortune and excellent generalship. At Arcanum, for instance, it is by “some freak of fortune” (πως ἀπ’ αὐτομάτου) that the armies of Timoleon and Hicetas arrive at the same time, creating an opportunity for Timoleon’s force of 1200 to defeat Hicetas’ 5000 by attacking immediately while the enemy was still in disarray (Tim. 12.4–9). The strategy required a change of plans on the spur of the moment: However, the captains and squadron commanders halted the vanguard, so they could eat and rest and become more eager for the fight; but Timoleon, when he came over, begged them not to do these things, but to quickly lead the men out and engage with the enemy when it was not in battle order, as was likely since they had just completed their journey and were now occupied with their tents and midday meal. Tim. 12.6

Theatrics come into play in Timoleon’s ability to transform this opportunity into a victory: he inspires his troops by taking up his shield, putting himself at the head and leading them “as if to certain victory” (ὥσπερ ἐπὶ νίκην πρόδηλον) and the soldiers follow, “emboldened by his example” (τεθαρρηκότες) (Tim. 12.7).53 Plutarch also recognizes the roles of fortune and good generalship in the taking of Syracuse, after Mago suddenly sailed off with the Carthaginian fleet to Libya, “for no reason that man could suggest” (Tim. 20.11). The rapid taking of the city by storm, however, is ascribed to the bravery (ἀνδραγαθίᾳ) of the soldiers and the cleverness (δεινότητι) of their general, while the fact that no Corinthians were killed or wounded was “the work of the good fortune of Timoleon” (Tim. 21.5). Surmounting Unexpected Obstacles in Battle In other cases, Fortune places seemingly insurmountable hurdles in the way of victory. By portraying Timoleon as nevertheless achieving victory in situations that appear impossible to others, Plutarch highlights tactics and strategies that can be effective in such circumstances. For instance, when “it seemed impossible” (ἀμήχανον) to the Corinthians that they could get around the Carthaginian fleet at Rhegium (Tim. 9.8), Timoleon contrived with the Rhegians to deceive the Carthaginians with a prolonged “debate” in the assembly, during which the Corinthian fleet could escape (10.1–5). Here, Timoleon displays theatrical 53  This action is reminiscent of Aemilius’ tactic to embolden his soldiers ahead of Pydna (Aem. 19.2–3).

316

Chapter 7

ability: while the Rhegians engaged in a series of lengthy speeches “protracting the time to no apparent purpose”, Timoleon led the Carthaginians to think that he was just about to stand up and address the people, until he slipped out unnoticed after the Corinthian fleet was safe (10.4–5).54 Plutarch constructs his account of Timoleon’s victory over the Carthaginians at Crimesus to provide additional paradigms for succeeding in difficult straits. In this case, the sense that the “mission” was “impossible” is conveyed by men too terrified to take up arms (Tim. 24.4) and by the seasoned mercenaries who turned back because of serious misgivings: [The mercenaries declared that] Timoleon was not of sound mind, but mad beyond his years (μαινομένου παρ’ ἡλικίαν), both because he was going against 70,000 of the enemy with 5000 foot soldiers and 1000 horse and because, in separating his forces from Syracuse by an eight-day march, it would be impossible either for the men who fled to be saved or for the men who fell to be buried. Tim. 25.5

In the face of such resistance, Timoleon demonstrates effective generalship: he ignores the deserters,55 encourages the remaining troops to follow him and later utilizes theatrics to embolden his troops: he wreathes his head with a garland of parsley as an omen of victory, as in the Isthmian games, to dispel the superstition roused when the army encountered wagons full of parsley, usually associated with the dead (Tim. 26.3–5). As in the case of Syracuse, the outcome of the battle is credited both to good fortune (in the form of wind and rain in the enemies’ faces and swollen rivers) and to Timoleon’s foresight not only in recognizing the effect of the river in breaking up the enemy’s phalanx into smaller units that could be attacked (Tim. 27.6),56 but also in devising a strategy to outmaneuver the chariots that were preventing his cavalry from coming to close quarters (Tim. 27.8–10). Again, his ability to inspire troops by 54  Valerius Maximus tells a similar story about Alcibiades holding the Agrigentines in “negotiations” in the theater as a ruse, giving the Athenians time to take the city when it was unguarded (Val. Max. 3.2.6). 55  Phocion (Phoc. 12.3) similarly ignores deserters in Euboea and inspires the remaining troops to victory. See Chapter 9. 56  A similar tactic was used by Agesilaus in Egypt when he took advantage of the terrain to break a far larger enemy army into small units that could be defeated (Ages. 39.1–5), as well as by Aemilius at Pydna in the paired Life (Aem. 19.2–3).

Aemilius-timoleon

317

his example comes into play, when he shouts out and leads the infantry, with shields locked, against the Carthaginians, while his cavalry attacked the flanks (Tim. 27.10). Plutarch’s intention to provide paradigms of effective generalship—as opposed to an account of good fortune in battle—is evident in the differences versus Diodorus, who provides similar details about the battles, but does not emphasize Timoleon’s strategic acumen as the key to victory. For instance, Diodorus simply reports a victory against Hicetas at Adranum (Diod. 16.68.9), without mentioning Timoleon’s decision to take advantage of the enemy in disarray or his “theatrics” to inspire his troops. Similarly, in his account of Crimesus (Diod. 14.79.5–16.80.4), Diodorus does not address the difficulties of attracting (and retaining) mercenaries or Timoleon’s strategy for attacking the phalanx. Plutarch rounds out his account of Timoleon’s victories by comparing their seeming ease to the “more laborious” accomplishments of Timotheus, Agesilaus, Pelopidas and Epaminondas (Tim. 36.1–3). Because of his reputation for good fortune, Timoleon’s victories had the potential to provoke envy, which he dispels by crediting Fortune and building a shrine for sacrifice to Automatia (Tim. 36.5–6). While not emphasized in the Life, in the Moralia Timoleon is a positive role model of a man who dissipated the envy that his successes could have fostered by diverting credit to the divine (Pol. Prec. 816E). Relations with Subject States: Syracuse and Sicilian Cities As was the case in Aemilius, the most direct lessons for “ruler” and “ruled” in Plutarch’s day are contained in the accounts of relations between Corinth and the cities under its “protection” in Sicily. Because little of the action in Timoleon takes place in Corinth, Plutarch is able to focus on principles of ruling that must be applied by men who, under orders of their states, are exercising authority over allied or subject states. Plutarch constructs the Life to illustrate the nature of the partnerships both between the prefect and his home state (i.e. Timoleon and Corinth) and between the prefect and subject states (i.e. Timoleon and the Sicilian cities). To this end, Plutarch provides a characterization of Corinth as a beneficent “partner” and Timoleon as a beneficent “prefect”, echoing Plutarch’s characterizations of Rome and Aemilius in the paired Life. Three roles of the statesman are emphasized: (1) establishing the relationship between the home country and the allied cities; (2) setting the parameters for the political constitution of the polities and (3) managing these polities at arm’s length. In this way, Plutarch expands his treatment of how to govern subject states in Aemilius to cover a wider array of challenges related to

318

Chapter 7

establishing and maintaining harmonious relations with self-governing cities in subject states.

Establishing Partnership with Allied States: Corinth as Beneficent “Partner” To a greater extent than in other Lives, Plutarch presents his hero glorifying his city and reinforcing its reputation as a beneficent force. A parallel can be drawn to the positioning of Rome as a benevolent influence in the pro­vinces in Pliny’s Panegyricus or Aelius Aristides’ On Rome. In Timoleon, Corinth twice receives its own characterization, in which Plutarch paints it with the attributes Rome traditionally associated with itself. First, Syracusans turn to Corinth for help based on the city’s reputation as a “lover of liberty” and “hater of tyrants”:57 [The Sicilian Greeks wanted to send an embassy to Corinth] when they saw that the city was always a lover of liberty and hater of tyranny, and had waged the most and greatest of its wars not for the sake of hegemony and greed (οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονίας καὶ πλεονεξίας), but for the sake of the liberty of the Greeks (ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας). Tim. 2.2

Second, when Corinth pays for the Sicilian exiles to return to Sicily, the city earns great praise because she was “liberating the land from its tyrants” and “giving it back to its rightful citizens” (Tim. 23.4).58 Plutarch’s descriptions of the unrest in Sicily, as well as the character and objectives of Hicetas (Tim. 1–2, 7) and Dionysius (Tim. 14–15), amplify the changes that came with liberty. Plutarch’s portrayal of Dionysius, which highlights his neglect of justice and the well-being of Syracusans, sharpens the portrait of Corinth as a liberating and beneficent force. 57  This characterization of Corinth is reinforced by the summary of Timoleon’s motives for sending back the spoils of Crimesus to Corinth: he wanted Corinth to be “envied by all men” (βουλόμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν πατρίδα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ζηλωτὴν εἶναι) as the only Greek city to display spoils acquired by freeing other Greeks from barbarians (Tim. 29.6). As in Agesilaus, Plutarch paints his hero with the qualities his native city was reputed to have, and thereby Timoleon’s actions on behalf of Syracusans and Sicily become representations of the attributes of a beneficent ruling power—an association that could parallel Rome and its imperial representatives in Plutarch’s day. 58  The difficulty of removing tyranny is also a central theme in Dion-Brut and Dtr-Ant.

Aemilius-timoleon

319

Setting Up Polities in Newly-Subject States Timoleon’s actions after the tyrants were deposed illustrate how rulers should engage subject states. Plutarch focuses on Timoleon’s policies for administering justice, re-populating cities and establishing a basis for economic prosperity— precisely the goals of Rome as overlord of Greek cities, from which it primarily sought taxes and peace, as discussed in Chapter 1. Timoleon’s first acts in Syracuse center on administering justice: he enlists the support of Syracusans in demolishing the buildings on the acropolis and then constructs courts of justice—a visible symbol of the demise of tyranny. Plutarch ties these actions to a deliberate effort by Timoleon to learn from Dion’s mistake of keeping the acropolis intact: When [Timoleon] became master of the citadel, he did not repeat the experience of Dion,... but guarding against the suspicion (ὑποψίαν φυλαξάμενος) that had maligned and then ruined that man, he proclaimed that those of the Syracusans who wished should come with iron implements and take part in tearing down the bulwarks of the tyrants. And when they had all come forward,… they destroyed and tore down not only the citadel, but also the houses and the monuments of the tyrants. Tim. 22.1–2

The “experience” Timoleon avoided repeating is described at Dion 53.2–6, where Heracleides publicly denounced Dion for not demolishing the citadel and for preventing the people from opening the tomb of Dionysius and casting out his dead body. Timoleon, in contrast, destroyed all vestiges of tyranny and reinforced his own reputation as a man dedicated to liberating the Syracusans. Timoleon supplies a second paradigm in how to administer subject cities when he establishes the civil polity and assists the lawgivers who had come from Corinth (Tim. 24.3). Plutarch’s account enables readers to visualize the process of integrating independent administration of a city with coordination with Rome. Timoleon is shown launching several initiatives to spur local prosperity, including (1) re-populating the city (with the help of Corinth) (Tim. 23.5); (2) overseeing the distribution of land and the sale of houses (23.7);59 and (3) devising means to build up financial resources, in part by the sale of 59  The program included the re-purchase of property by those who had been displaced by the tyrant. The settling of property disputes between returning exiles and those who had taken over the property in their absence was a challenge superbly handled by Aratus, who used funds procured from Ptolemy to achieve harmonious settlements and “safety and security for the entire people” (Arat. 14.1). For these services, a bronze statue was erected

320

Chapter 7

public statues (33.7–8)—all areas of contemporary concern in Pliny and Dio. Such strategies are shown to not only enhance a city’s prosperity, but breed goodwill towards the ruler. For instance, Timoleon’s attention to the needs of new settlers to Agrigentum and Gela wins their trust and goodwill: After not only affording the settlers security and calm after so great a war, but also supplying other things and eagerly helping them (συμπροθυμηθεὶς), he was loved like a founder (ὥσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἠγαπᾶτο). With the others being similarly disposed towards him, no conclusion of war, no establishment of laws, no colonization of lands, no arrangement of government was thought to be good, which that man had not touched and set in order, like a master builder (ὥσπερ … δημιουργὸς) adding some fitting grace pleasing to the gods to a work in the process of completion. Tim. 35.4

In these efforts, Timoleon constructs a civil polity that can largely operate independently and govern itself, a situation that paralleled in key respects the relations between Rome and the provincial cities. Plutarch’s account summarizes details provided by Diodorus (16.82.5) and Nepos (Tim. 3), but places added emphasis on the resulting goodwill felt towards Timoleon and the lasting benefits of his actions. Managing the Partnership between Ruler and Ruled The arrangement set up by Timoleon parallels the polity Dion had envisioned for Syracuse, which was to be a mixture of democracy and kingship rather than undiluted democracy (Dion 53.3–4).60 Plutarch shows the successful operation of the polity near the end of the Life, when Timoleon in retirement intervenes in Syracusan affairs only in particular areas where his input is actively sought:

in his honor, praising him for his “virtue and justice” because he had brought his native city “a sacred and heavenly reign of law” (Arat. 14.3). 60  Dion similarly sent for the assistance of the Corinthians. He wanted to prevent “unmixed democracy” (τὴν ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν … καταλύειν) in Syracuse and instead to establish a polity that “blended democracy and kingship” (μειξάμενος ἐκ δήμου καὶ βασιλείας), like those of Sparta and Crete where an aristocracy presided and “administered the most important affairs” and “little public business was transacted in the assembly of the people” (Dion 53.3–4).

Aemilius-timoleon

321

While they [the Syracusans] decided other matters by themselves, for the more important deliberations they summoned him (ἐκάλουν). Then he … after returning their greetings and allowing some time for their felicitations and praise, would then listen carefully to the matter under debate (διακούσας τὸ ζητούμενον) and pronounce his opinion (ἀπεφαίνετο γνώμην). And when this opinion had been adopted … the citizens sent him on his way with shouts of applause and proceeded at once to transact the rest of the public business by themselves (καθ’ αὑτοὺς ἐχρημάτιζον). Tim. 38.5–7

In depicting these principles in action, Plutarch provides paradigms for ruler and ruled. The people of Syracuse, on the one hand, call upon Timoleon to help them only on specific issues and then send him home. On the other hand, Timoleon does not actively impose his views on the Syracusans, but leaves them to manage their affairs themselves, intervening only when he is specifically summoned. This dynamic illustrates the ideal relations between a Greek city and the provincial governor as described in Political Precepts—where cities are advised to be their own “physicians” and not to rely on Rome to resolve conflicts—and in Dio’s City Orations 38 and 48, which advise cities to keep Rome at bay. The purposeful description of relations between Syracuse and Timoleon to provide paradigms for both ruler and ruled is suggested by the differences versus Nepos and Diodorus. Nepos states that after Timoleon’s retirement, “no public action was taken at Syracuse without first learning what TImoleon thought about it” (neque postea res ulla Syracusis gesta est publice, de qua prius sit decretum quam Timoleontis sententia cognita) (Nepos Tim. 3.5) and the Syracusans did not consider anyone else’s advice. Diodorus, in contrast, pre­ sents Timoleon as constantly involved in Syracusan affairs. Plutarch’s Timoleon operates in a middle ground that is more reflective of the ideal envisioned in his own day. Summary: Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled in Timoleon Plutarch used incidents from Timoleon’s career to convey concrete paradigms for generals and men exercising authority over provincial cities. Like Aemilius, Timoleon is a careful planner and skilled general, whose successes are attributed to shrewd judgment in taking advantage of the opportunities fortune offered. With regard to establishing harmonious relations with newly-independent or subject states, Plutarch expands the paradigms in Aemilius to provide greater insight into the economic policies and political roles through which an overlord can benefit self-governed cities. Timoleon is a deterrent model only in

322

Chapter 7

his conduct after the murder of his brother: he shows himself to be ambivalent about placing his country’s interests ahead of his family—although his actions are noble, his personal distress reflected a lack of resolve inappropriate in a leader. Timoleon’s deterrent example is underscored by Plutarch’s reference to Phocion and Aristides the Locrian as counter-examples. Plutarch’s intended lessons are further revealed in his divergences from Nepos and Diodorus Siculus in three instances, which sharpen the contours of his paradigms. First, unlike the brief reports of Timophanes’ murder in Nepos and Diodorus, Plutarch’s account of Timoleon’s role in his brother’s death presents both the positive and negative reactions to the killing as well as an authorial comment on the need for statesmen to be resolute and unapologetic in the decisions they make on behalf of the state. Secondly, in contrast to other accounts highlighting the good fortune and circumstances reflected in Timoleon’s victories, Plutarch shows fortune working together with effective generalship to produce victory, consistently pointing to Timoleon taking advantage of opportunities opened by fortune and producing victories by exercising foresight and judgment and by inspiring his troops to perform. Finally, while Nepos and Diodorus both describe the variety of initiatives taken by Timoleon to re-establish justice and prosperity in Sicily—as well as the goodwill reflected in Timoleon being revered as a second founder—only Plutarch depicts the Sicilian cities operating independently and inviting Timoleon to intervene only in specific matters. This portrait illustrates the ideal as presen­ted in Political Precepts. Plutarch reinforces his portrayal of Timoleon as both a positive and negative role model by making comparisons to heroes who are subjects of other Lives. In addition to the reference to Phocion, Plutarch compares Timoleon favorably to Agesilaus, Epaminondas and Pelopidas as generals who won great victories, but who had to make a far greater effort. Moreover, Plutarch shows Timoleon using other statesmen as models: he deliberately avoids repeating Dion’s mistake in not destroying the visible vestiges of tyranny (Tim. 22.1–3) and emulates Epaminondas (Tim. 36.1). In all cases, the heroes from the Lives are exempla of effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) in meeting political or military challenges. 7.4

Insights from the Synkrisis

In addition to assessing the degree of difference between the two heroes in two areas of ethical virtue—indifference to money and the ability to endure

Aemilius-timoleon

323

vicissitudes of fortune with equanimity61—Plutarch uses the synkrisis to reinforce two pragmatic lessons for rulers and generals: (1) that fortune provides opportunities but military success is determined by foresight and practical judgment and (2) that administration of justice and solicitousness for the common welfare earn goodwill and produce harmonious relations with subject cities, which benefit both the ruler and the ruled. In the process, Plutarch provides insight into the criteria he used to make judgments about degrees of difference in virtues or vices, as well as the relative magnitudes of the achievements of the two heroes. In evaluating their military accomplishments—which in both cases involved “far-famed” (περιβόητοι) victories over substantial opponents (Macedonians versus Carthaginians)—Plutarch assesses the magnitude of the challenges they faced, pointing to differences in the caliber of their opposing generals (Perseus versus Dionysius) and the training of their armies (trained Roman soldiers versus mercenaries) (Aem-Tim 1.2–4). Plutarch notes that Perseus was a strong antagonist, while Dionysius was greatly weakened before Timoleon arrived in Sicily. Conversely, Aemilius had an advantage in the quality of his soldiers—since they had been trained to obey orders—while Timoleon was faced with the challenge of managing mercenary troops who were motivated largely by self-interest. In making his judgment that Timoleon overcame the greater challenges, and therefore deserves greater credit as a military commander, Plutarch states the criteria for deciding: When equal successes follow an unequal equipment, the greater credit accrues to the commander with fewer resources (Aem-Tim 1.5). Plutarch’s assessment of the two men as representatives of a ruling power exercising authority over a subject state examines the extent to which each man was “just and incorruptible in power” (καθαρῶν οὖν καὶ δικαίων, Aem-Tim 2.1), as well as the hurdles they faced in cultivating those virtues. Again, Plutarch highlights differences not in their attainment of these virtues, but in the environment in which they practiced them. Aemilius’ conduct was supported by the laws and customs of his day, while Timoleon operated in an environment in which most men were corrupt (Aem-Tim 2.2–4). Indeed, Timoleon is compared to Gylippus, Pharax and Callipus—Spartan and Athenian leaders who in Sicily had been highly corrupt (Aem-Tim 2.4–7); in contrast, Timoleon did 61  Aemilius is judged to have a higher degree of both virtues: he did not gain “a single drachma” from his victory in Macedonia (whereas Timoleon received an estate in Sicily) (AemTim 2.8–9) and he did not let the death of his sons unsettle his dignity, in sharp contrast to Timoleon’s conduct after his brother’s murder (Aem-Tim 2.10–12).

324

Chapter 7

not seek power in Sicily—but was called there—and he laid down his office as soon as the tyrannies had been overthrown (Aem-Tim 2.7). In the next chapter—Demetrius-Antony—bad “rulers” become the central focus. DtrAnt also addresses issues of administering justice and being solicitous of the people, but illustrates actions to avoid.

Chapter 8

Demetrius-Antony 8.1 Introduction The positive paradigms in Aemilius-Timoleon of how to achieve harmonious relations between rulers and subject states provide a backdrop that magnifies the deterrent lessons in Demetrius-Antony, where flawed rulers and flattering subject states are on display. Antony is the only Roman statesman who exercises supreme authority during a substantial part of his political career, and Plutarch devotes much of the Life to Antony’s actions as a military commander and ruler in Egypt rather than to his political career in Rome. Because both Antony and Demetrius were notorious for their abuses of power, Plutarch could use them to provide deterrent lessons for those who were in the most powerful positions in the Roman imperial structure—men such as provincial governors, senior generals or city archons—as well as for the subjects or subordinates who had to interact with them. Demetrius I (Poliorcetes) (336–283 BC) and Mark Antony (86/83–30 BC) were both active during the period immediately following the sudden death of a formidable leader (Alexander in 323 BC and Caesar in 44 BC), when prolonged power struggles precipitated the reversals in fortunes mentioned in the Prologue to the pair (Dtr. 1.8). Plutarch uses the relationship between each of these men and those under his authority to highlight challenges facing rulers and the ruled in political conditions dominated by competition for supremacy. In such turbulent times, rulers are under constant threat of being displaced, while “the ruled” must be prepared to engage with a variety of rulers with different moral characters. The problems illustrated in these two Lives therefore were familiar to Plutarch’s readers, whose own positions could be under attack and whose cities needed to establish relations with new provincial governors every few years and periodically with new Emperors. Plutarch places many of the character traits and patterns of conduct associated with the tyrants Perseus and Dionysius in Aem-Tim at the center of the narrative in Dtr-Ant, enabling readers to observe more closely men who fell short in the “arts” (τεχνῶν) central to good leadership, namely “temperance, justice and practical judgment” (σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις) (Dtr. 1.3). As discussed in Chapter 3, in the Prologue to this pair Plutarch prepares readers for portrayals of flawed leadership by explicitly labelling Demetrius and Antony as men whose lives were “base and blameworthy” (φαύλων καὶ

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_012

326

Chapter 8

ψεγομένων, Dtr. 1.6) and who, in the “exercise of power and great affairs” (ἐν ἐξουσίαις καὶ πράγμασι μεγάλοις) were “conspicuous for badness” (ἐπιφανῶν εἰς κακίαν) (Dtr. 1.5). Plutarch makes it clear that his intention is not to deter his readers from imitating such blameworthy behavior, but to help them better understand how such rulers operate and prevent them from being caught off guard and saying “I would never have imagined this.” Plutarch’s comments in the Prologues have been widely interpreted as indicating that Dtr-Ant was intended to portray “paradigms of vice”. However, close readings of the two Lives have suggested that Plutarch ultimately was unable to do so.1 Indeed, the prominent character traits associated with the two heroes in the Prologue have mixed implications for the effectiveness of rulers. On the one hand, the qualities of being “driven by erotic desire, fond of drinking, extravagant and insolent” (ἐρωτικοί, ποτικοί, πολυτελεῖς, and ὑβρισταί) (Dtr. 1.7) are the traits usually associated with tyrants,2 or any ruler using his power to satisfy his own desires rather than the needs of those under his care.3 As emphasized in the advice literature, such behavior not only clouds a leader’s judgment on behalf of the state, but also can destroy confidence in his leadership.4 Moreover, private excess and flattery are widely discussed as ­forces that debilitate statesmen and generals.5 On the other hand, the other traits 1  Pelling (1988b: 15–16) sees Plutarch’s portrayal of Antony as sympathetic to his weaknesses and designed to elicit better appreciation of “human frailty” rather than aversion to vice. On these Lives not providing paradigms of vice, see Wardman (1974:34), Pelling (1980: 138/2002: 106), Duff (1996: 333; 1999b: 56–69; 2004). 2  As DeLacy (1952) notes, these traits are tied to Plato’s tyrannical man at Rep. 9, 573C–D, which cites “μεθυστικός, ἐρωτικὸς, μελαγχολικὸς, ἑορταὶ, κῶμοι, θάλειαι, ἑταῖραι” as activities of souls swayed by “the in-dwelling tyrant Eros.” 3  Polybius (6.7.6–8) uses similar terms of self-serving rule in discussing the devolution of kingship into tyranny when men receive office by hereditary succession. He describes tyrants as men who use their power to satisfy appetites rather than serve the state and who think that they must be distinguished from their subjects in dress and lifestyle. Demetrius and Antony portray similar devolutions. In contrast, Caesar, in Plutarch, is favorably presented as a necessary physician for the political turmoil of his time (Dion-Brut 2.2). 4  A leader’s private conduct determined his ability to be a good model for subjects and trusted as a leader in Political Precepts (800 B–C, 820 C–E, 823A), To an Uneducated Ruler and How to Tell a Flatterer, as well as in Cicero (De Officiis, Ad Quintum), Seneca (De Clementia), Dio (Kingship Orations) and Pliny (Epistulae). The good ruler in To an Uneducated Ruler regulates his own soul and then makes his subjects fit his pattern (780B). See Chapter 2. 5  Many studies highlight these aspects. Brenk (1992b: 4369) sees Antony as a portrait of moral deficiency, pointing to Antony’s assimilation to Nero in his extravagance. Pelling (1986b: 96/2002: 358) regards Demetrius as irretrievably corrupted but Antony as struggling to escape, and Ingenkamp (2004: 68) considers both as examples that could corrupt morals of

Demetrius-antony

327

ascribed to Demetrius and Antony can enhance a ruler’s effectiveness, including being soldierly (στρατιωτικοί) and generous with gifts (μεγαλόδωροι). Living on a level with the soldiers breeds loyalty—similar to the benefits of living on the same level as the masses6—while generosity with gifts, if not an effort to flatter the people, can build goodwill that helps a ruler win ready obedience.7 On balance, these traits provide the backdrop for positive and deterrent paradigms in ruling and being ruled.8 One clear indicator, however, that Plutarch intended to emphasize issues of defective rule is the greater prominence given to the imagery of tragedy9 and theater in this pair than in other Lives. In Lives offering largely positive paradigms, theatricality plays an instrumental role in particular areas, such as inspiring troops before battle, inducing the people to support unpopular measures or deceiving enemies.10 In Dtr-Ant, however, theatricality is also attached to the empty pageantry and pomposity with which the ruler presents himself readers. Pelling (1988b: 13–15) also examines the submissiveness that underlies Antony’s receptiveness to flattery. Beneker (2012) focuses on eros, with Antony providing a more extreme display of its destructive effect, while Beck (2016) ties comic elements to Antony’s excesses and failures as a statesman. 6  Political Precepts 823B. 7  Political Precepts 822A–F. As discussed earlier in connection with Pericles and Alcibiades, the proper use of money to attract the support of the people (without becoming subservient to its whims or engaging in blatant bribery) is a common theme in the Lives. It will also be seen in Cato’s corn distribution to quell unrest in Chapter 9. 8  Pelling (1986b/2002) argues that Plutarch undermines his ability to deliver the promised negative exempla by linking Antony’s rise and fall to the same traits. Pelling (1988b: 13) notes the dual role of individual traits in Antony, while Duff (1999b: 239) adopts a similar approach to Alcibiades, commenting that: “It is a typically Plutarchan analysis, showing that the things which make a protagonist successful are the same ones which lead to his downfall. Usually it is character-traits that are the cause of both a man’s rise and his fall”. See also Duff (2004), Billault (2005), Pelling (2016). 9  Aspects of tragedy are discussed by Mossman (1988: 84–85) and by DeLacy (1952: 163– 166; 168–171): tragedy is deceptive and equivalent to pretence in philosophy; the actor deceives rather than being truthful; and the related pomp manifests the false nature of the kingship. Mossman (1988: 85) highlights the tragic patterning in Antony and the links between Dionysus, Antony and disastrous actions, while Harrison (2005) notes a similarity between Antony and Ajax and ties Fortune to tragedy. See also Brenk (1992a/1995), Zadorojnyi (1999: 519), Duff (2004: n. 5, 45), Papadi (2008). On comic elements, see Swain (1992a), Monaco (2011), Xenophontos (2012a), Beck (2016). 10  In Political Precepts, Plutarch draws an analogy between the statesman in a democracy/ oligarchy and an actor who plays many parts—to win the support of the crowd (799A), to facilitate his rise to prominence (804D), to appease outside authorities (like Rome) (813E), or to coordinate with superiors and inferiors (817A–B).

328

Chapter 8

and, as such, it flags supreme rule not guided by principles of philosophy. The same imagery is tied to the “uneducated ruler” in To an Uneducated Ruler: For these rulers, by heaviness of voice (βαρύτητι φωνῆς), harshness of expression (βλέμματος τραχύτητι), a discontented manner (δυσκολίᾳ τρόπων) and unsociability in their way of living (ἀμιξίᾳ διαίτης), imagine that they are imitating the dignity and majesty of sovereignty (ὄγκον ἡγεμονίας καὶ σεμνότητα), but in fact differ in no way from collossal statues, which have a heroic and godlike form on the outside but on the inside are full of clay and stone and lead. To an Uned. Ruler 780A

In Dtr-Ant, theatrical imagery and pageantry highlight the gap between appearance and reality in statesmanship and are introduced more frequently as the heroes depart more widely from sound rule. At the same time, reversals of fortune—another common element in their careers (Dtr. 1.8) —are treated differently than in Aem-Tim, because the focus is now on men who experienced repeated cycles of victory and defeat. Moreover, in Dtr-Ant neither hero contemplates the influence of fortune in his career nor does Plutarch intercede with comments that assess the role of fortune in men’s lives. The paradigm of pragmatic biography brings a different emphasis to the interpretation of this pair. Plutarch’s treatment of Demetrius’ neglect of justice and the common welfare and Antony’s susceptibility to flattery and private excess become the underpinnings of pragmatic lessons for rulers, because these behaviors impact a ruler’s ability to win obedience. In contrast to the Lives in Part 2, which addressed the statesman’s urge to flatter the people or the army in order to acquire office—especially in Pericles, Fabius, Alcibiades and Pompey—Dtr-Ant illustrates the perils that “being flattered” holds for those in positions of supreme authority. Several dimensions of flattery receive attention: (1) its acceptance by rulers in the form of inflated public honors, titles or other public adulation (including from colleagues or subordinates), (2) its delivery by the individual flatterer who distracts and manipulates the ruler and (3) its impact on the states that grant excessive honors in order to flatter their overlord. As noted earlier, the detrimental effects of flattery were widely addressed in the advice literature.11 Dtr-Ant also illustrates how the failure to administer justice or to be solicitous about one’s subjects (or soldiers) 11  As discussed in Chapter 2, honors and other forms of flattery are addressed in Plutarch’s Political Precepts (820A–821A) and How to Tell a Flatterer, Dio’s Kingship Orations and Cicero’s De Officiis and Ad Quintum 1.1.

Demetrius-antony

329

undermines a ruler’s ability to retain power. In both Lives, the deterrent lessons are amplified by Plutarch’s characterizations of other “rulers”, including Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, Pyrrhus and Octavian, who cast the flaws of Demetrius and Antony into sharper relief. 8.2

Life of Demetrius

Overview Demetrius Poliorcetes (the City-Besieger) (336–283 BC) was the son of Antigonus Monophthalmos (the One-eyed),12 one of the generals (the Diadochi) who partitioned Alexander’s empire after his death.13 He served under his father and commanded the cavalry at the battles against Eumenes at Paraetacene (317) and Gabiene (316) and held an independent command at Gaza (312), where he lost an army to Ptolemy, and subsequently failed to displace Seleucus from Babylon (311). In 307, Demetrius “liberated” Athens from Demetrius of Phalerum, Cassander’s appointee, and in 306, after his victory over a Ptolemaic fleet off Cyprus, he and his father adopted the title of “King”. Demetrius’ year-long siege at Rhodes (305–304) earned him the moniker of “City-Besieger”. After his defeat with his father at Ipsus (301) against the combined forces of Ptolemy, Seleucus and Lysimachus, Demetrius retreated into Greece until an alliance with Seleucus—cemented by Seleucus’ marriage to Demetrius’ daughter Stratonice—yielded him Cilicia (299/298). Subsequently, he was involved in wars in Greece until invited to intervene in Macedon, where he murdered Alexander V and took the throne. Demetrius ruled for seven years (294–287), before being expelled from Macedon by the forces of Pyrrhus and Seleucus. After surrendering to Seleucus, he spent two years in captivity and died in 283. His descendants held the Macedonian Kingship from 276 until Perseus lost to Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in 168.

12  Demetrius’ father Antigonus Monophthalmos appears as a general in Alexander, a rival in Eumenes, and a King facing his final defeat in Demetrius, while Demetrius’ son Antigonus Gonatas launches his career in Demetrius and securely establishes his reign in Pyrrhus. 13  The other Diadochi were Antipater (c. 397–319) and Cassander (d. 297) in Macedon, Lysimachus (355–281) in Thrace and Asia, Ptolemy I (367/6–282) in Egypt and Seleucus I (358–281) in Babylon.

330

Chapter 8

In addition to historical accounts,14 anecdotes about Demetrius are preserved in Polyaenus’ Strategemata (4.7). In other writers, Demetrius appears in a variety of contexts. Cicero mentions the defection of Demetrius’ army to Pyrrhus as an example of how influence is better secured by love than fear (De Off. 2.26), while Seneca twice reports Demetrius’ encounter with Stilpo.15 Demetrius is also included in Athenaeus’ discussion of flattery and its effects in The Deipnosophists (6.252–255). In the Moralia, Demetrius appears five times in various contexts depicting arrogance and pomposity in power. In On Talkativeness, Demetrius complains that Sparta sent only one envoy (511A), while in Political Precepts he is mentioned as a ruler surrounded by flatterers who would address no other man as King (823D) and in On Delays in Divine Vengeance as an example of a vicious father who had a virtuous son, Antigonus Gonatas (562F). In addition, Plutarch cites Stilpo’s response to Demetrius in On Tranquility of Mind (475C–D). The broadest comment on Demetrius as a statesman, however, is found in On the Fortune of Alexander, where he is an example of an “ignoble King”: In the case of a man who has received great authority (μεγάλην ἐξουσίαν), for him to carry and administer (ἐνεγκεῖν καὶ μεταχειρίσασθαι) that authority and not to be beaten down or twisted about by the weight and magnitude of affairs is the mark of a man who has virtue and good sense and high-mindedness. Alexander was such a man.… Other men who have received a share [of office and power] and have tasted it are not able to control themselves.… Demetrius submitted (ὑπήκουε) to being called “The heaven-descended”. On the Fortune of Alex. 337E–338A

By associating Demetrius’ acceptance of an inflated title as inability to control himself in power, Plutarch indirectly refers to flattery as a choice. In the Life, this choice ultimately destroys Demetrius’ power. In the other Lives, Demetrius is mentioned four times. Demetrius is a protagonist in Eumenes and Pyrrhus: at Eumenes 18.3, he is with Antigonus at the 14  Partial accounts of Demetrius’ career survive in Diodorus Siculus (19.29–20.3)—which covers Demetrius’ activities through the eve of the battle of Ipsus—and in Justin’s epitome of Pompeius Trogus (Books 15–16). 15  When Demetrius, after taking Megara, asked Stilpo if he had lost anything, the philosopher famously said he had all his goods with him. The encounter with Stilpo is used to illustrate the principle that no injury can happen to a wise man. See Seneca’s De Constantia 5.6 and Ep. Mor. 9.18–19.

Demetrius-antony

331

battle of Gabiene (316) and advises him to allow Eumenes to live, while in Pyrrhus, he has a youthful Pyrrhus as an ally at Ipsus (Pyr. 4.2) and later fights against him in Macedon until his army defects to Pyrrhus in large numbers (7.2–11.5). He is also mentioned as Cassander’s rival at Demosthenes 2.3 and, at Aristides 6.2, his moniker “City-Besieger”, signifying the neglect of justice, is contrasted to Aristides’ surname “the Just”, and he is described as a king who cultivated “a reputation based on violence and power, as it seems, rather than on virtue”. Plutarch designed Demetrius to illustrate the negative effects on effective rule of failures in three key areas: (1) lack of restraint in private life; (2) acceptance of inflated honors and (3) neglect of justice. The pragmatic lessons for rulers are revealed in the connection drawn between Demetrius’ decision to accept inflated honors and to neglect the administration of justice, on the one hand, and his resulting inability to retain the support of either his people or his army, on the other.16 Such lessons would resonate especially with provincial governors and city archons, not to mention the Emperor. Moral Foundation and Reputation Plutarch’s characterization of Demetrius as a great nature in the Prologue to the pair (Dtr. 1.7) is essential to the deterrent lessons of the Life because it establishes a potential for nobility that was undermined by character flaws and misjudgments. Coriolanus and Alcibiades, as discussed in Chapter 5, also were portrayed as great natures, who displayed both strengths and weaknesses as statesmen. From this perspective, the “badness” in “the exercise of power and great undertakings” referenced in the Prologue (Dtr. 1.5) can be defined in terms of “lost opportunity” rather than outright vice. Indeed, in addition to the soldierliness and generosity (Dtr. 1.7) mentioned in the Prologue, Plutarch attaches several positive qualities to Demetrius: he is affectionate and obedient towards his father (Dtr. 3.1–3, 6.3, 15.1 and 28.1), by nature kind and fond of his companions (4.1), respectful towards philosophers (Stilpo at 9.5–6, Demetrius the Phalerean at 9.2 and Crates at 46.2) and possesses “a natural bent towards equity and justice” (εὐφυΐας … πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην) (4.4) that is manifested in his lack of vindictiveness towards cities that resist him (Athens at 34.4 and Thebes at 39.2 and 40.4). However, Plutarch qualifies these traits as present “in the beginning” (Dtr. 4.1), hinting that they will later fade.

16  Pelling (1988b: 25) also notes this downward trend in Demetrius’ conduct and contrasts it to Antony.

332

Chapter 8

“Liberator” of the Greek States Plutarch praises the motives of Demetrius and his father when they liberated Greek cities (Halicarnassus at Dtr. 7.3, Athens at 8 and Megara at 9.5) in campaigns spurred by a noble pursuit of glory:17 With the ambition of this deed [the rescue of Halicarnassus from Ptolemy] being of high repute (ἐνδόξου), an amazing impulse arose (ὁρμὴ παρέστη θαυμάσιος) in these men to liberate all of Greece, which had been enslaved by Cassander and Ptolemy. None of the Kings waged a war nobler or more just than this one. For the abundant resources they gathered as they humbled the Kings, they spent lavishly on the Greeks for the sake of good repute and honor (ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας καὶ τιμῆς). Dtr. 8.1

Plutarch reinforces the honorable goal of liberating Athens by praising the use of wealth gained from the East to benefit other Greeks rather than to fund civil wars, as Alexander’s other successors had done.18 By naming “good repute” and “honor” as the motives in these early wars, Plutarch sets up an instructive contrast with Demetrius’ later drive for dominion (Dtr. 23, 25). Plutarch also links these wars to a desire to build goodwill with the Athenians, the goal voiced by Antigonus: But [Antigonus] said that goodwill (εὔνοιαν) was a noble and unshakeable gangway (ἐπιβάθραν) and that Athens, as if it were the beacon tower of the world, would quickly throw light on the glory of all their deeds for mankind. Dtr. 8.3

As events progress, Demetrius’ inability to retain the goodwill of the Athenians is central to the pragmatic lessons for rulers in the Life.

17  In this passage, the process by which the praise of noble actions stimulated a desire to do more of them echoes the concept of “the Good” stimulating activity towards it as presented at Per. 2.2–3. See Chapter 3. 18  The nobility and justice (καλλίω καὶ δικαιότερον) of using wealth from the East to free Greeks (rather than finance war against Greeks) is a recurrent theme in the Lives (e.g. Ages. 15.1–3, 16.4; Pomp. 70.2–4). The comparison to the wars of Alexander’s successors sets Demetrius in the context of the broader struggles. See also Dtr. 3.3–4.

Demetrius-antony

333

Personal Power and Luxury as Goals Over the course of the Life, Demetrius is increasingly dominated by the flaws mentioned in the Prologue (Dtr. 1.8), especially after Antigonus has died.19 Demetrius also becomes more prone to the “rapacity” (πλεονεξία) that Plutarch attaches to his characterizations of Hellenistic kings.20 Antigonus, ahead of Ipsus, is described as unwilling to restrain his own “excessive passion for dominion” (τῆς ἄγαν φιλαρχίας) (Dtr. 28.1–2), while Seleucus is criticized for being “so needy … and beggarly” as to demand two cities from Demetrius when his own kingdom stretched from India to the Syrian sea (32.4). Demetrius is later described as “not prone to stay quiet” (Dtr. 41.1) and on a quest to regain his father’s empire (43.2).21 At the same time, idleness and luxury in peacetime are also common traits of the Kings. Plutarch explicitly links Demetrius’ conduct in captivity to behavior of “base kings” (φαύλοις βασιλεῦσι):22 Although he was seeking “the Good” (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) in arms and fleets and armies, now, without expecting it, he had discovered it in freedom from affairs, leisure and rest. For what other goal of wars and dangers exists for base kings, who are disposed to be wicked and foolish, not only because they pursue luxury and pleasure instead of virtue and honor, but also because they do not know how to truly experience pleasure or live luxuriously? Dtr. 52.2–3

19  Antigonus, who is a spur to Demetrius’ noble behavior to free the Greek cities, does not restrain Demetrius’ “wantonness and extravagance and drinking” in peacetime because they do not affect his performance as a general (Dtr. 19.3, 19.6). Thus, unlike Antony, who in the paired Life is censured for his excesses both by his step-father (Ant. 2.4) and Caesar (Ant. 10 .2), Demetrius faces no criticism of his excesses before he comes to power. 20  In Pyrrhus, both Demetrius and Pyrrhus are associated with “the disease of dynasties, rapacity” (τὸ σύμφυτον νόσημα ταῖς δυναστείαις, ἡ πλεονεξία) which made them formidable and suspicious neighbors (Pyr. 7.2). The Kings are described as men whose rapacity and inordinate desires know no bounds and who are perpetually at war, “because plots and jealousies are part of their natures” (τὸ ἐπιβουλεύειν καὶ φθονεῖν ἔμφυτον ἔχοντες) (Pyr. 12.2–3). 21  With regard to this constant quest for “more”, Plutarch quotes Plato (Laws 5, 736e) as urging the man who would be truly rich “not to make his possessions greater, but his inordinate desires fewer (μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν πλείω, τὴν δ’ ἀπληστίαν ποιεῖν ἐλάσσω), since he who puts no end to his greed is never rid of poverty and want” (Dtr. 32.5). Plutarch associates similar motives for invading Italy to Caesar, who, like Alexander and Cyrus, was driven by “an insatiable love of power and a mad desire to be first and greatest” (Ant. 6.3). 22  The adjective “base” (φαύλοις) repeats the term used in the Prologue to describe the Lives in this pair.

334

Chapter 8

Demetrius’ definition of the highest good as idleness and repose is similar to Pyrrhus’ assessment in his exchange with Cineas (Pyr. 14.3–7), where Pyrrhus points to “much repose and drinking cups” (σχολὴν … πολλήν, καὶ κώθων) as the final reward for his campaigns.23 Despite these shortcomings, Plutarch does not portray Demetrius as an evil man in the Life.24 Instead, Demetrius is, in many respects, the “uneducated ruler” of the Moralia, who lacks training in philosophy and therefore fails to set his sights on setting a good example, administering justice and caring for his subjects. The pragmatic lessons of the Life are contained in the connections drawn between these failures of Demetrius as a ruler, the reactions of “the ruled” and his eventual loss of the support of the Macedonians and his army. Pragmatic Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled After introducing Demetrius as a paradigm of flawed rule in the Prologue, Plutarch conveys his pragmatic lessons for the ruler by illustrating how Demetrius’ receptiveness to honors and his neglect of his subjects undermined his effectiveness in three areas: (1) Relations with Macedonians; (2) Military command and (3) Relations with subject cities (Athens). In each sphere of leadership—in turn, as King, general and hegemon—Demetrius’ conduct eventually alienates his subjects, troops and allies. At the same time, Plutarch provides pragmatic lessons for “the ruled” by illustrating how Athens’ excessive flattery of Demetrius generated a deterioration in his conduct towards the city.25 Episodes in each area are listed in Table 8.1, where Demetrius’ career is divided into five phases. In Phase 1 (Chapters 1–18), Demetrius is inspired by noble motives until he receives exaggerated honors from Athens (10–13) and acquires the title of “King” (18). In Phase 2 (19–29), Plutarch illustrates the negative impact of these honors on Demetrius’ rule until his defeat at Ipsus (29). Phase 3 (30–38) describes his comeback, at the end of which he becomes King of Macedon. In Phase 4 (39–45), Plutarch presents Demetrius’ conduct as King, closing with the defection of his troops to Pyrrhus (45). Finally, Phase 5 (46–53) 23  Plutarch criticizes similar activities for retired statesmen at Old Men in Politics (795D–E) and in the synkrisis to Cim-Luc (1.2–4), where he censures Lucullus for spending his retirement in luxurious living. 24  Wardman (1974: 35) describes Demetrius and Antony as men whose aptitude for virtue had gone wrong. 25  The treatment of flattery from the standpoint of the “flatterer” in Demetrius complements pragmatic lessons centered on leaders who either refuse to flatter subordinates (e.g. Fabius, Agesilaus, Aemilius) or those who use flattery to win support (Alcibiades). Additional perspectives will be found in Antony and in Phoc-Cato (Chapter 9).

335

Demetrius-antony Table 8.1

Episodes in the Life of Demetrius

Relations with Macedonians

Military command

Relations with subject cities: Athens

Phase 1: Family; career through liberation of Athens; receipt of excessive honors (Chapters 1–18) 1- Prologue to Dtr-Ant 2–4- Family; character traits

16- Obtains Lamia as booty 18- Flattery; title of “King”

5- Loss to Ptolemy at Gaza 6–9- Early exploits; noble 10–13- “Frees” Athens; receives motives inflated honors from Athens 14–15- Victory at Cyprus 17- Treats enemies humanely; Antigonus and Demetrius hailed as Kings.

Phase 2: Reaction to honors and title of “king”; Battle of Ipsus (19–29) 19- Private excesses; Antigonus is tolerant

20–22- “City-Besieging”; siege of Rhodes 25- Campaign in Greece; narcissism grows

23–24- “Frees” Athens again; receives more honors from Athens 26- Unlawful initiation 27- Lawlessness; Lamia in Athens

28–29- Loss at Ipsus Phase 3: Rebound from Ipsus; anger at Athens (30–38)

38- Digression on Stratonice

31–32- Chersonese; alliance with Seleucus 35- Peloponnesus to Sparta 36–37- To Macedon; becomes King

30- Athens refuses Demetrius entry 33–34- Siege of Athens; forced entry; appropriates Museium

336 Table 8.1

Chapter 8 Episodes in the Life of Demetrius (cont.)

Relations with Macedonians

Military command

Relations with subject cities: Athens

Phase 4: Conduct as king of Macedon; flight from Macedon (39–45)

42- Bad ruler in Macedon

39–41- Expands empire; fights Pyrrhus 43- Aims at regaining father’s dominion 44- Opposed by other kings; deserted by soldiers 45- Flees

Phase 5: Attempt at rebound; capture by Seleucus; death in captivity (46–53) 46- Threatens Athens 47–51- Fights Seleucus; is captured 52- Life in captivity 53- Death and burial

shows his final attempts to regain power, culminating in his defeat, captivity and death. Throughout the Life, theatrical imagery is used to emphasize the deterrent quality of Demetrius’ rule. Relations with Macedonians Plutarch designs the scenes depicting relations between Demetrius and the Macedonians to provide pragmatic lessons for “the ruler” in two areas: (1) how the neglect of justice undermines a ruler’s ability to secure goodwill and ready obedience from his subjects and (2) how the acceptance of inflated honors can weaken a ruler’s dedication to the welfare of his subjects. Plutarch uses Demetrius’ reaction to the honors received from Athens to highlight the need for rulers, or men in positions of supreme authority, to resist such distinctions— precisely the advice given to Menemachus in Political Precepts (820C–F), to Quintus in Cicero’s Ad Quintum (1.1) and to the Emperor in Dio’s 3rd Kingship

Demetrius-antony

337

Oration.26 Plutarch’s depiction of Demetrius echoes To an Uneducated Ruler (780A–B), while the positive counter-examples are Alexander and Philip, who were also contrasted to Perseus in Aemilius, as discussed in Chapter 7. Sustaining Goodwill and Willing Obedience While Demetrius’ private excesses in peacetime caused little harm as long as Antigonus was administering justice and caring for subjects,27 they distract him from the duties of a good ruler after he becomes King. The pragmatic lessons for statesmen reside in the links between Demetrius’ actions and the negative response he provokes in his subjects and political allies, who eventually withdraw their support from him. For instance, Plutarch reports that when Demetrius diverts tax revenue to Lamia28 and engages in a “wanton lifestyle”, he provokes “envy and jealousy” (Dtr. 27.3) on the part of his wives and friends and is seen as “oppressive” (ἐβαρύνοντο) by the Macedonians (42.1). Plutarch further links Demetrius’ loss of support to his neglect of justice. Like Plutarch’s uneducated ruler who, as discussed above, believes that he is imitating the “dignity and majesty of a ruler” by being irritable, unsociable and harsh (780A), Demetrius is portrayed as distant and inaccessible. In the eyes of the people, the worst of the oppressive aspects of Demetrius’ rule were the difficulties of gaining access and being in his company, while in meeting with others, he was “difficult and harsh” (Dtr. 42.1). The adverse impact of the neglect of justice on his effectiveness as a ruler is vividly portrayed in the reaction to his throwing petitions into the river: the Macedonians “felt themselves insulted, not ruled” (ὑβρίζεσθαι …, οὐ βασιλεύεσθαι) and compared Demetrius 26  Problems stemming from obsequiousness and flattery are treated at Ad Quint. 1.1.3 and Dio’s Or. 3.14–24. 27  Apart from placing himself in danger with Cratesipolis (Dtr. 9.3–4), Demetrius exhibits an ability to alternate between peacetime indulgence and military conquest that is commonly associated with the god Dionysus, whom he emulates (Dtr. 2.3). Diodorus (20.92.4) also notes Demetrius’ ability to separate military duty from private excesses and his emulation of Dionysus. The meeting with Cratesipolis, who had assumed power after the death of her husband Alexander, son of Polyperchon, may have been political but Plutarch implies a private motive. 28  Lamia enters the narrative as part of the “booty” in Demetrius’ victory over Ptolemy (Dtr. 16.3). In terms similar to those applied to Cleopatra in the paired Life, Lamia is described as a woman who “so conquered and restrained Demetrius by her charm (ἐκράτησε τῇ χάριτι καὶ κατέσχεν) that he was a lover for her alone” (Dtr. 16.4). “Conquering” is also tied to Lamia at Dtr. 19.4 (τῆς Λαμίας ἀναφανδὸν ἤδη κρατούσης). Verbs of capture (ἁλίσκεται, Ant. 25.1) and taking booty (ἥρπασεν, Ant. 28.1) also describe Cleopatra’s hold on Antony.

338

Chapter 8

unfavorably to Philip whom they remembered as “moderate and accessible in such matters” (Dtr. 42.3).29 The negative import of Demetrius’ failure to administer justice is reinforced in a comment that also echoes To an Uneducated Ruler (780E), where “justice is the aim and end of law, and law is the work of the ruler” (δίκη μὲν οὖν νόμου τέλος ἐστί, νόμος δ’ ἄρχοντος ἔργον) (To an Uneducated Ruler, 780E): For nothing is so fitting for a king as the work of justice.… But Demetrius was delighted to receive a surname unlike that of the king of the gods: for the latter was named City-Guardian and City-Protector, while the former was City-Besieger. In this way, under ignorant power (ὑπὸ δυνάμεως ἀμαθοῦς), what is shameful assaulted the territory of what is noble and combined injustice with fame. Dtr. 42.5–6

The key lessons for statesmen ultimately lie in Demetrius’ inabilty to retain the goodwill and obedience of the Macedonians—who reject him in favor of Pyrrhus (Dtr. 44–45). Accepting or Rejecting Honors from Subjects Plutarch also ties Demetrius’ inability to retain power as a ruler to the effects of his acceptance of the title of “King”—first from the Athenians after they were freed from Cassander (Dtr. 10.3) and later from the Macedonians after the victory over Ptolemy in Cyprus (18.1).30 In an authorial comment, Plutarch underscores the damage caused by the flattery of the simple title “King”.31 First, the two men changed the way they thought about themselves and presented themselves to their subjects: [Being called “King”] was not simply an addition of a name and complete change in fashion, but it also stirred their spirits and lifted their thoughts, and it introduced pretension and oppressiveness (ὄγκον ἐνεποίησε καὶ βαρύτητα) into their lives and interactions, just as tragic actors (καθάπερ 29  Again, a ruler’s moderation and accessibility are familiar themes from the Moralia (e.g. Phil. and Men in Power 778F, Pol. Prec. 823A). “ὑβρίζεσθαι” and forms of “ὕβρις” are used, as here, when referring to abuses of power. 30  A similar analysis of the negative effects of flattery is presented in Athenaeus’ discussion of the flattery of Alexander and his successors (Diepnosophists 6.62–67). 31  As DeLacy (1952: 169) notes, this description of corruption echoes Plato at Rep. 494D. See above, n. 2.

Demetrius-antony

339

τραγικῶν ὑποκριτῶν), along with their costume, change their gait, voice and manner of sitting at a meal and of addressing others. Dtr. 18.3

This description closely echoes the description of the uneducated ruler, cited above, who assumes an exterior appearance that he believes exudes majesty, but actually only masks the absence of the true spirit of Kingship. This absence became apparent, however, in the changes in how the two men ruled: Because of these things they became both more violent in their punishments (βιαιότεροι) and gave up their earlier dissimulation in office (εἰρωνείαν) which had often made them more lenient and gentler towards their subjects. So great is the strength of one voice of a flatterer and so great the change with which it filled the world. Dtr. 18.4

Plutarch here recognizes the “honor” of a great title as flattery that corrupts the recipient and prompts a more pretentious and tyrannical manner of exercising authority. Plutarch also introduces the theatrical imagery that will become a persistent metaphor for “counterfeit” rule in the rest of the Life.32 Indeed, throughout the Lives, costumes and pageantry epitomize “unworthy” statesmanship and label a leader as someone “playing a part” rather than promoting justice and the common welfare in his state. Military Command Plutarch uses the scenes from military life to provide additional deterrent paradigms of how the neglect of the well-being of those under his authority undermines a general’s effectiveness. The scenes of military command in the Life are divided into two periods: the early campaigns motivated by noble goals before Ipsus in which Demetrius enjoys a solid rapport with his soldiers (Dtr. 5–17) and his military campaigns as King which are motivated by the desire to retain or expand power rather than to serve the interests of the Macedonians

32  Demetrius’ soldiers class Demetrius with Alexander’s other successors who “did but assume the gravity and pretension of the man, like actors on a stage” (ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τὸ βάρος ὑποκρίνοιντο καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ ἀνδρός) (Dtr. 41.3). Demetrius’ extravagant cloaks and headgear magnify the artificial aspect of his rule (τραγῳδία μεγάλη) (Dtr. 41.4). Plutarch sustains this imagery in his comment that Demetrius’ funeral was “dramatic and theatrical” (τραγικήν τινα καὶ θεατρικὴν διάθεσιν) (Dtr. 53.1).

340

Chapter 8

(Dtr. 20–44).33 Plutarch presents the desertion of Demetrius’ army to Pyrrhus— who, in this Life, serves as a positive counter-example of a general worthy of comparison to Alexander34—as the direct consequence of Demetrius’ failures as a general in two areas: (1) conducting campaigns to serve the common interests and (2) avoiding unnecessary risks to the lives of soldiers. Conducting Campaigns to Serve Common Interests The erosion in the quality of Demetrius’ generalship first becomes apparent in the second campaign to the Peloponnesus (Dtr. 25), when he persuades the Sicyons to re-locate their city and changes its name to Demetrias (25.2), accepts the title of “Commander-in-chief of the Greeks” (25.3) and mocks anyone who uses the title “King” except his father and himself (25.3).35 Plutarch’s intention to use this campaign to illustrate how inflated self-regard fueled by excessive honors undermined Demetrius’ motives is reflected in the marked differences versus the account of this period in Diodorus (20.100.6–110.6), who consistently attributes laudable goals to Demetrius. In Diodorus, Demetrius liberates the Greek states to earn honor for himself (Diod. 20.100.6; 20.102.1) and, at Sicyon, relocates the city to make it more secure, reestablishes free government and helps the people build their houses (Diod. 20.102.2). Moreover, in Diodorus, the name change to Demetrias is one of the honors voted to Demetrius in gratitude, rather than the response to a command, as Plutarch implies (Dtr. 25.2). Avoiding Unnecessary Risks to the Lives of Soldiers Plutarch presents Demetrius as a deterrent model of generalship in other areas as well. As King, he undertakes sieges out of anger—at Rhodes (ἐθυμομάχει, Dtr. 22.1–4), Thebes (πρὸς ὀργὴν ἀναστρέψας, 39.3) and Athens (ὀργῇ … ἐπῆλθεν, 46.2). He also displays a corresponding lack of concern for his men, whose lives are put at risk out of contentiousness rather than need (φιλονικίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον 33  In this evolution, Demetrius becomes a “prototypical” Hellenistic King driven by “an excessive passion for dominion” (τῆς ἄγαν φιλαρχίας)—the motive attributed to Antigonus ahead of Ipsus (Dtr. 27.2), as noted earlier, but more generally applied to the Kings as described in the Moralia (e.g. On the Fortune of Alexander) and in Pyrrhus. 34  At Dtr. 41.3, Demetrius’ soldiers admire Pyrrhus as the only worthy successor of Alexander. Here, as in Eumenes and Pyrrhus, Alexander is the standard of generalship against which all generals are measured. Alexander’s superiority to his successors is a central theme of On the Fortune of Alexander. 35  By drawing direct comparisons to Alexander, Plutarch echoes the theme in the Moralia that Alexander’s successors did not match him as a king or general. Plutarch here presents the refusal to call other Kings by title as evidence of Demetrius’ pomposity, while reporting his pleasure at hearing “revelers” call the other Hellenistic Kings by mock titles, echoing Political Precepts 823C where Demetrius’ flatterers do so.

Demetrius-antony

341

ἢ χρείας, Dtr. 40.2). Criticism of such generalship is voiced by Demetrius’ son, Antigonus Gonatas: Antigonus, seeing them fall in great numbers, was greatly distressed and said, “Why, father, should we stand by and watch these men being squandered unnecessarily (παραναλισκομένους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως)?” But Demetrius became incensed and said: “As for you, why are you annoyed? Do you owe dead men a daily ration?” Dtr. 40.2

The anger and indifference attached to Demetrius in this passage marks a sharp departure from Demetrius’ early motives of seeking “glory and dominion” (Dtr. 5.3) against Ptolemy or “glory and honor” (8.1) in battles to liberate Greek cities from Cassander. The unfavorable comparisons of Demetrius to Pyrrhus underscore the deterrent lesson for generals: after Pyrrhus’ defeat of Pantauchus in Demetrius’ absence (Dtr. 41.2), the Macedonians admire Pyrrhus for making his conquests in person and see in Pyrrhus “the image of the daring of Alexander” (Dtr. 41.3). In Macedonia, defections are reported after Pyrrhus takes Beroea (Dtr. 44.3) and, subsequently, Demetrius’ soldiers seek “to be rid of Demetrius” (44.5) and the Macedonians are reported to be “tired of waging war in support of his luxurious way of life” (44.6). In the synkrisis, Plutarch suggests that Demetrius was accountable for the desertion of his soldiers because he “made them so hostile to him” (τὸ δυσμενεῖς οὕτω πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀπεργάσασθαι τοὺς μαχομένους) (Dtr-Ant 6.1).36 Plutarch’s intention to create a deterrent paradigm of the detrimental effects of private excess and inattentiveness on generalship is reflected in the differences versus his account at Pyrrhus 11.4, where the defections to Pyrrhus are explained as a reaction to Demetrius’ oppressiveness (βαρύτητος). The explanation in Demetrius keeps the emphasis on areas of misconduct that impacted the provincial governors and others in positions of high authority in Plutarch’s time. Relations with Athens Plutarch designs his account of the interactions between Demetrius and the Athenians to provide pragmatic lessons for both the ruler (imperial officials) and “the ruled” (provincial cities) of his own day. The lessons focus on two critical principles of effective relations between ruler and ruled: (1) rulers should 36  When Demetrius removes his “stage robes” (τῆς τραγικῆς ἐκείνης, Dtr. 44.6)—not like a King but an actor (ὥσπερ οὐ βασιλεύς, ἀλλ’ ὑποκριτής)—the association of the title “King” with the costume of tragic actors (18.3–4) is revived.

342

Chapter 8

be wary of the flattery of subject states and (2) “the ruled” should be wary of flattering their overlords. In a word, Plutarch illustrates the principle that honors can corrupt the ruler, leading to detrimental consequences for both the conduct of the ruler and the well-being of the subject cities. Plutarch carefully constructs a series of episodes describing relations between Demetrius and the Athenians to portray the deterioration in relations that resulted from the honors offered by Athens and accepted by Demetrius over the course of five separate visits (Dtr. 10–13, 23, 26, 30–34 and 46).

Accepting Honors from Subject States: Inflated Honors Breed Overconfidence Plutarch uses the breakdown in relations between Demetrius and Athens as the backdrop for a key deterrent lesson for rulers: be wary of honors that are not justified by virtuous acts. As noted above, the topic was raised by Cicero in his letter to Quintus (Ad Quint. 1.1.31) and was addressed indirectly in Political Precepts where Plutarch recommended that statesmen deflect honors into actions that could benefit others rather than those that provoke envy (799B, 820C–D). In the Life, Demetrius’ first encounter with Athens marks a major turning point in his career because he then receives the excessive honors that corrupt his statesmanship (Dtr. 10–13).37 After receiving additional honors on his second visit (Dtr. 23–24), anger and contentiousness emerge more frequently as motives for his actions towards the city and, as a result, he loses Athenian support. The Athenians’ refusal to admit Demetrius after Ipsus (Dtr. 30.1) explicitly reveals this change. By linking the change in Athenian attitudes to the growing oppressiveness of Demetrius’ rule, Plutarch demonstrates that Demetrius himself was the cause of his loss of Athenian support. The Life thus illustrates the principle that no supreme authority can survive amidst hatred: it must attract the goodwill and obedience of its subjects to preserve its power. The second pragmatic lesson is contained in Demetrius’ surprise at the loss of Athenian support. Since he had believed that “no refuge could be more secure than the goodwill of Athens” (Dtr. 30.2)—an echo of his father’s belief that the goodwill of Athens was “a noble and unshakable gangway” (8.3)—he was shocked to find their “apparent goodwill” (τὴν δοκοῦσαν εὔνοιαν) to be “empty and fake” (κενὴν καὶ πεπλασμένην) (30.4). Plutarch, however, in an authorial

37  Numerous other incidents in the Lives—including Coriolanus’ deflection of personal rewards into a request for the release of a guest-friend at Cor. 10.2–3 (discussed in Chapter 5)—make it clear that a statesman can reject honors when offered. Demetrius was not obligated to “submit” to the honors offered by the Athenians.

Demetrius-antony

343

comment, faults Demetrius for placing confidence in honors granted to him out of fear. Plutarch first articulates the principle at issue: For, the poorest proof, as it seems, of the goodwill of the mob for kings and dynasts is an excess of honors. The trustworthiness of goodwill, which holds what is noble in the intentions of the men granting honors (ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τῶν ἀποδιδόντων), is destroyed by fear: for the same decrees are passed both by those who are afraid and those who feel affection. Dtr. 30.4

This general statement is then supplemented by specific advice for the statesman: Wherefore, sensible men do not look towards statues or inscriptions or deifications, but rather to their own work and deeds, to determine whether they trust honors as true honors (πιστεύουσιν ὡς τιμαῖς) or mistrust them as compulsory (ἀπιστοῦσιν, ὡς ἀνάγκαις). Dtr. 30.5

This passage explains the deceptive nature of inflated honors and offers an instructive contrast to the “unshaken goodwill” anticipated by Antigonus after the initial liberation of Athens (Dtr. 8.2).

Granting Honors to the Overlord: Flattery Leads to Greater Oppression, Not Less Granting honors can also have detrimental consequences for “the ruled”. The destructive impact of Athens’ flattery of Demetrius on the quality of life in the city is prominently flagged by Plutarch at both the beginning and the end of an extended passage detailing the titles and honors bestowed on Demetrius after the “liberation” of the city (Dtr. 10–13). At the beginning, Plutarch simply states: And thus, after Demetrius had shown himself to be illustrious and great in his benefactions, the Athenians made him odious and oppressive (ἐπαχθῆ καὶ βαρὺν ἐποίησαν) by the immensity of the honors they voted him. Dtr. 10.2

In contrast to the criticism in On the Fortune of Alexander of Demetrius’ acceptance of honors as a mismanagement of power (337E–338A), noted above, Demetrius is here shown to be “acted upon” by the flattery of Athens, but not in the manner the Athenians expected. After ending Cassander’s siege of Athens,

344

Chapter 8

Demetrius receives “new and fresh flatteries” from the Athenians (Dtr. 23.2) yet becomes more insolent in his actions towards Athens: he acts impiously by engaging in wanton acts on the Acropolis (24.1) and “does not tolerate it moderately, but becomes irritated” when the Athenians block his efforts to intercede in the assembly (24.4). Later, Demetrius engages in many “offensive and lawless” acts (Dtr. 27.1)—including the lawless request that he be initiated into the Mysteries—and orders the Athenians to give money raised for his personal use to the courtesan Lamia (27.1). His forced entry into Athens after the siege (34) fully displays how the combined effects of flattery and anger have transformed Demetrius from a statesman pursuing honorable goals in liberating Athens early in the Life into an oppressive and tyrannical ruler at the end.38 The deterrent lesson for the ruled is encapsulated in the comment that the Athenians had imagined that “because they were rid of their garrison they therefore had their freedom” but discovered that, instead, they endured oppression of a different sort (Dtr. 24.5). Plutarch amplifies the deterrent lesson for “the ruled” contained in his account of events by inserting additional authorial comments that criticize the ostentatious forms of flattery initiated by Stratocles (Dtr. 9.1–2) and Dromocleides (13.1–2), twice calling their innovative honors “monstrous” (τὸ ὑπερφυέστατον, 11.1; ὑπερφυὲς καὶ ἀλλόκοτον, 13.1).39 This portrait of Athens as a city eager to flatter echoes the characterization of the city in Demosthenes and Phocion, where the inclination to subserviently accommodate Philip, and later Antipater, is also criticized. Plutarch’s intention to use Demetrius to depict the corrosive effects of inflated honors is further revealed in a comparison to Diodorus, whose account of Demetrius’ initiation into the Mysteries in Athens is far more benign. At Diodorus 20.110.1, Demetrius is “tarrying” in Athens when he gets word to join his father, and therefore asks the Athenians to initiate him early in light of his benefactions. In Plutarch’s Life, the initiation is made possible through the machinations of Stratocles (26.1–3) and thereby becomes flattery rather than an expression of gratitude for benefactions. 38  Here, Demetrius engages in the most extravagant theatrics of the Life: he orders (κελεύσας) all people into the theater, places armed men around the theater and stage and makes his own entrance like a tragic actor (ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοί). He allays the fears of the Athenians by deceptively engaging them in a friendly manner, a deception revealed when he puts a garrison in the Museium “so that the people might not again shake off the yoke and give him further trouble” (ὡς μὴ πάλιν ἀναχαιτίσαντα τὸν δῆμον ἀσχολίας αὐτῷ πραγμάτων ἑτέρων παρασχεῖν) (Dtr. 34.3–5). 39  This portrait of Athens echoes the characterization of Athens found in Athenaeus (Deip. 62 (252)- 66 (255)) in his description of the temples and drinking songs that were created in honor of Demetrius Poliorcetes.

Demetrius-antony

345

Summary: Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled in Demetrius Demetrius provides negative paradigms for both “the ruler” and “the ruled” in Plutarch’s day. For rulers, Demetrius is a deterrent model in two areas: (1) the inability to retain power if justice and the welfare of subjects are ignored and (2) the unreliable nature of honors based on fear rather than virtue. In the Life, Demetrius’ private excesses and the acceptance of the flattery of inflated titles result in arrogant and oppressive conduct that ultimately alienates his subjects, soldiers and Athenian supporters. For the ruled, Plutarch uses Athens’ relations with Demetrius to illustrate the risks of flattering men in power. Athens’ expectations that flattery would result in greater freedom are shown to be misguided: Demetrius becomes increasingly flagrant in his violations of the law, of religious piety and of moral restraint in public life. The centrality of these lessons is reflected in Plutarch’s authorial comments, which articulate the principles at issue. Plutarch includes four authorial comments related to honors: he analyzes the detrimental effects for statesmen of excessive honors (Dtr. 10.2, 13.2) and inflated titles (18.3–4), and provides separate advice on how much confidence to place in honors, depending on the reasons for which they are offered (30.4–5). In addition, Plutarch directly links the rejection of Demetrius by his subjects to his neglect of his duty to administer justice (Dtr. 42.5–6) and to his preference for private indulgence—further manifested in his slide into the life of a base king in captivity (52.2–3). The themes in Demetrius are explored from a broader perspective in Antony. The negative effects of private excesses and neglect of public duties are depicted in more extreme extravagance, violence and injustice, while the destructive impact of flattery is treated in greater depth through the presentation of the manipulation of Antony by Cleopatra. In closing Demetrius with the comment, “And now that the Macedonian play has been performed, let us introduce the Roman” (Dtr. 53.4), Plutarch signals that in the second Life we will again witness, not true statesmanship in action, but the political career of a man who only dressed up for the part. 8.3

Life of Antony

Overview Mark Antony (86/83–30 BC), like Demetrius, lived during a period of continuous warfare and intense competition for power. His crucial role in the military and political events of his time is too well known to need describing here. Suffice it to say that having been the right-hand man of Caesar, the popular dictator, he was for thirteen years after the Ides of March a man of enormous

346

Chapter 8

power, ruling the eastern Roman Empire from 40 BC onwards before eventually succumbing to the forces of Octavian at the Battle of Actium (31 BC). Unlike most of the other historical figures discussed in this book, Antony had frequently been used—indeed over-used—as a negative historical exemplum long before Plutarch took hold of him.40 The stream of negative writing went back of course to Cicero’s Philippics (mentioned at Ant. 6.1) and the other propaganda of the civil war period and its aftermath, such as Augustus’ autobiography, which Plutarch may have read, though the reference at Ant. 22.2 scarcely guarantees it.41 This negative tradition, represented for us by, among others, Seneca, Lucan and Suetonius, emphasized Antony’s maneuvering for tyrannical power after Caesar’s death and his part in the triumviral proscriptions, but above all his supposed subjection to Cleopatra.42 Two writers with a particular interest in exempla may be mentioned. In Valerius Maximus, Antony is heavily criticized for his proscription of Cicero (1.4.6; 5.3.4), Brutus’ defeat at Philippi (1.4.6, 1.5), his own defeat at Actium (1.7.7) and the punishment of enemies (5.76.4; 9.13.3), while also being cited positively for sparing Mevius, Octavian’s centurion, in tribute to his courage (3.8.8) and for arranging Brutus’ cremation and later punishing the freedman who stole Brutus’ cloak (5.1.11). 40  Pelling (1988b: 26–31) summarizes Plutarch’s sources for Antony. Apart from the accounts left by Cicero, Caesar and Velleius Paterculus, most sources of Antony’s story poten­ tially used by Plutarch are not extant—including Augustus’ Autobiography, Livy’s Books 109–133 (available now only in epitome) and histories by Sallust, Asinius Pollio, Dellius and Strabo. However, the accounts in the later sources—Suetonius, Appian (Civil Wars) and Cassius Dio (40–54)—provide instructive comparisons that elucidate Plutarch’s emphasis in the Life. 41  Antony is depicted as maneuvering for tyrannical power after Caesar’s death (Appian Civil Wars 3.3; Cassius Dio 45.5–9). The condemnation of the proscriptions—especially that of Cicero—is widespread (Velleius Paterculus 66.2–5; Cassius Dio 47.7–14), as well as the recognition of Antony’s virtual slavery to Cleopatra (Velleius Paterculus 85.5–6, Cassius Dio 48.2). Velleius Paterculus comes close to identifying aspects of virtue in Antony when he comments that Antony’s suicide “redeemed him from many charges of lack of manhood” (adeo ut multa desidiae crimina morte redimeret) (Vell. 2.87.1). 42  Antony is mentioned by Seneca as the man who proscribed Cicero (De Ira 2.2.3; De Clem. 9.9.1; Ep. Mor. 83.25), as Augustus’ political ally in regrettable actions early in his career (De Clem. 9.9.1–4) and his later rival (De Brev. Vit. 4.5; De Benef. 2.25.1) and as a man whose supreme power could not prevent the murder of his brother, an act he avenged at Philippi (To Polybius 16.1). Seneca’s most pointed criticisms, however, cited Antony’s desire to subject Romans to the sovereignty of eunuchs (De Benef. 5.16.6), his drunkenness and his love of Cleopatra, which overwhelmed his distinguished abilities (Ep. Mor. 83.25). Antony is often presented as the foil for Augustus’ virtue, as in Lucan (58–85) and Suetonius’ Divus Augustus.

Demetrius-antony

347

Frontinus includes Antony’s actions at Mutina and in Parthia to illustrate various principles of generalship.43 In the Moralia, Plutarch refers to Antony in two contexts: as the rival of Octavian and the lover of Cleopatra. In On the Fortune of the Romans, his relations with Cleopatra are considered part of Octavian’s good fortune (319E–F), a theme reiterated in the anecdote that Antony, who routinely lost in games against Octavian, was advised by an Egyptian seer to avoid him (320A). Antony appears twice in How to Tell a Flatterer to exemplify men manipulated by flattery of various types, including by flatterers who mask vices by using unobjectionable terms (56E) and inflame weaknesses (e.g. erotic passion) by charging a person with the opposite traits (e.g. neglect and indifference) (61A–B). In the Parallel Lives, Antony plays a role in Pompey, Caesar, Cicero and Brutus, which overlap the events of his rise to power, while his own Life concentrates on his career after the Battle of Philippi in 42. In Antony, the longest of Plutarch’s Lives, Plutarch uses the events of Antony’s career to amplify the detrimental impact of private excesses that distract a ruler from his duties, as presented in Demetrius, while significantly expanding the treatment of the threats posed by flattery. Flatterers (κόλακες) in Philosophers and Men in Power are grouped with slanderers (διάβολοι) and false accusers (συκοφάνται) as “men who always corrupt leaders or kings or tyrants” (οἱ ἀεὶ διαφθείροντες) (778D). In How to Tell a Flatterer (49B) their destructive power in making rulers unable to differentiate virtue from vice is spelled out in more detail. There, Plutarch advises statesmen to learn how to detect flatterers because they often “overturn kingdoms and sovereignties” (49C). These principles are illustrated in Antony, which provides practical insights both into detecting flattery and into its negative consequences for effective leadership. In Plutarch’s day, provincial governors in particular had to be on guard against flattery in order to maintain a reputation for integrity and impartiality, the basis of harmonious relations between the ruler and ruled. For this reason, flattery was addressed by writers advising powerful men, including Cicero (De Officiis, Ad Quintum) and Dio (especially Or. 3.86–107), as noted earlier. At the same time, Plutarch uses Antony’s conduct as a political ally, rival and general to convey pragmatic lessons in leadership. Again, theatrical imagery is used throughout the Life to underscore the flawed conduct on display. In this Life, more than in the others in this book, Plutarch illustrates the consequences of the absence of an alliance between philosophy and leadership. 43  Frontinus cites Antony in the categories of “how to conceal what we lack” (Strat. 1.7.5), “on the disposition of troops in battle” (2.3.15), “on ambushes” (2.5.39), “on retreating” (2.13.7) and “on discipline” (4.1.37).

348

Chapter 8

Antony displays a wider range of vices than other heroes—with violence, brutality and vindictiveness added to private excesses—and his resulting “reversals of fortune” are demonstrably linked to his own misjudgments and the negative reactions he provokes in the Romans. However, because Plutarch’s portrait combines virtues and vices, the pragmatic lessons for leaders are more complex than a simple “Don’t engage in private excess” or “Don’t engage in violence and brutality”. Plutarch provides several positive paradigms for leaders from events before Pharsalus, while the deterrent paradigms for rulers are illustrated in episodes afterwards. Plutarch’s lessons center on misjudgments that even rulers educated in philosophy could make, such as failing to recognize and resist flatterers. In the second half, Octavian serves as the positive counter-example of a good ruler who engages with subject states in ways that foster goodwill and obedience. Moral Foundation and Reputation As a “great nature” (Dtr. 1.7), Antony shared Demetrius’ potential to produce great good or harm for his state. While Plutarch attributes the same virtues and vices to both men (Dtr. 1.7), Antony illustrates these traits in more extreme forms.44 As in Demetrius, Plutarch attaches positive qualities to the hero to demonstrate that he was not vicious by nature, but instead squandered his potential. Indeed, Plutarch credits Antony with an ability to aim at virtue at times of adversity: But it was his nature to rise to the best in himself (ἐγίνετο βέλτιστος ἑαυτοῦ) in times of trouble, and when he was suffering misfortune he was most like a good man (ὁμοιότατος ἦν ἀγαθῷ). While it is common for men who have been defeated on account of some difficulty to perceive virtue, it is not common for all men to have the strength in the midst of reversals to imitate the things they admire (ἃ ζηλοῦσι μιμεῖσθαι) and avoid the things they scorn (φεύγειν ἃ δυσχεραίνουσιν) but some, because of weakeness, give into their habits even more and let their reasoning be shattered. Ant. 17.2–3

By tying Antony’s practice of virtue to the reversals in his career, Plutarch indicates that Antony’s potential for virtue was always present below the surface,45 44  Pelling (1986b: 94–96/2002: 357–359). 45  Plutarch adds that “when he did perceive his errors he showed keen remorse” (Ant. 24.6), indicating that Antony (like the young Alcibiades) had an “akratic” nature that knew what virtue was but did not act virtuously.

Demetrius-antony

349

marking a contrast with Demetrius, whose virtue eroded from a high point early in his Life to its low point in captivity (Dtr. 52.1–3).46 Antony’s nobility routinely resurfaces at times of military defeat—Mutina (Ant. 17–18), Parthia (45–50), Actium (66), Alexandria (74–76) and in his final moments with Cleopatra (77).47 Thus, although his virtues are “hidden” in peacetime, Plutarch keeps the reader aware of their presence. Antony’s potential for being a “good monarch” was destroyed by other traits named in the Prologue—especially licentiousness and insolence, which are the “cracks in the foundation” of Antony’s character.48 Plutarch introduces them early in the Life with Antony’s association with Curio (Ant. 2.3–4), and they dominate his behavior when he is not on campaign (2, 6, 9–10, 25–29, 56, 71).49 Other flaws include his brutality—especially in the proscription of Cicero (Ant. 20.2)—as well as his distorted ambition (φιλοτιμίας ἀνωμάλου, 2.5) and submissiveness to flatterers (24.7–8; 27–29). The significance of these flaws is reflected in the more pervasive theatricality in this Life than in Demetrius, including in private associations with actors (Ant. 21.1–2; 24.2–3), Antony “dressing up” to play a part (10.4–5; 29.1–2) and the opulent displays with Cleopatra in Egypt (26.1–2; 28.2–4; 54.3–6), all reinforced by periodic references to Dionysus,50 the god to whom Antony most likened himself (24.2–3;

46  Pelling (1988b: 25) expresses this view about Demetrius, which is well validated by Demetrius-Antony. 47  Antony becomes solicitous for Cleopatra and acutely aware of his identity as a Roman imperator, telling her “not to lament him for his last reverses, but to count him happy (μακαρίζειν) for the good things that had been his, since he had become most illustrious of men, had won greatest power, and now had been not ignobly conquered, a Roman by a Roman” (οὐκ ἀγεννῶς Ῥωμαῖος ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίου κρατηθείς) (Ant. 77.4). 48  His behavior closely tracks Plato’s description of the tyrannical man at Rep. 9, 573C–E. See n. 2. Liz Scharffenberger has noted that the “gender role reversal” between Antony and Cleopatra in Plutarch’s portrait captures the “feminized” aspect of Plato’s tyrant in Rep. 9. 49  The private excesses are immediately visible in his association with Curio, who “descended on him like a pest” (ὥσπερ τινὰ κῆρα προσπεσεῖν) and “threw him into drinking bouts, women and immoderate and extravagant expenditures” (Ant. 2.3). Later scenes of drunken revelry with “mimes and jesters” (Ant. 9.3, 21.1) depict the expanding scope of these vices, which reach their zenith in the East. Curio is said to be “uneducated” (ἀπαιδεύτου, Ant. 2.3) in his pleasures, evoking the image of Demetrius who did not know what true pleasure was (Dtr . 52.3). 50  By comparison, Demetrius imitates the god most directly in shifting between war and peacetime indulgence without his private pastimes distracting him from war. Antony also is tied to Heracles. In the synkrisis, Antony is compared to Heracles where “Omphale is seen taking away his club and stripping off his lion’s skin” (Dtr-Ant 3.3).

350

Chapter 8

26.3; 75.4).51 However, as in Demetrius, Plutarch’s primary concern is not the excessive behavior itself, but its negative consequences on Antony’s reputation among the Romans and his effectiveness as a leader. Desire to be Sole-Ruler In many respects, Antony’s provocative conduct parallels that of Alcibiades, but, unlike Alcibiades, Antony also had aspirations to become “sole ruler”, a goal Plutarch never attaches to Alcibiades. Antony’s ambition was first displayed on Caesar’s behalf in the attempt to place a wreathed diadem on Caesar’s head (Ant. 12.2), but became the driving force of his conduct after Caesar’s death.52 When Antony acquires virtual monarchical power, he manages everything “in autocratic fashion” (ἔπραττεν αὐτοκρατορικῶς) (Ant. 15.3) and then attempts to retain dictatorial power by opposing Octavian’s entry into political office (Ant. 16.2–4).53 After Mutina, Antony’s desire to become a “monarch” is realized, at least in terms of the external trappings, as triumvir in control of the Eastern empire (Ant. 24).54 Submissiveness While the incidents in Rome focus on the consequences of the disrepute caused by Antony’s private excesses and violence, his submissiveness to flatterers and 51  The themes of theatricality and Dionysus are far more prominent in Antony than Demetrius, flagging the more exaggerated manifestations of their shared vices in Antony. Dionysus enters the narrative prominently when Antony heads east and is greeted in Ephesus as “a Dionysus” attended by an entourage of performers (Ant. 24.2–3). In Alexandria, he takes the association to more extravagant levels, and on the eve of the final battle there are sounds of “Bacchic revelry” (μετ’ εὐασμῶν) as “the god to whom Antony always most likened and attached himself deserted him” (ἀπολείπειν ὁ θεὸς Ἀντώνιον, ᾧ μάλιστα συνεξομοιῶν καὶ συνοικειῶν ἑαυτὸν διετέλεσεν) (75.4). 52  Plutarch reports that Antony inflamed the multitude against Brutus because “he had hopes that he would surely be first in the state if Brutus were overthrown” (Ant. 14.3). Cic 43.1 also expresses this fear after Caesar’s funeral: “all men were fearful that Antony would make himself sole ruler” (ὡς μοναρχήσων). In Brutus, Octavian’s opposition to Brutus is tied to a desire to avenge Caesar’s murder by bringing Brutus to justice for killing the first magistrate without a trial (Brut. 27.4). 53  Antony’s conduct pushed Octavian into his alliance with Cicero, who helps him acquire praetorian status and his command of an army in the campaign of Hirtius and Pansa against Antony at Mutina (Ant. 16.2–17.1). 54  As triumvir, he divides up the empire with Octavian and Lepidus “as if it were an ancestral inheritance” (Ant. 19.1) and then participates in proscriptions driven “by wrath against those whom they hated” (Ant. 19.2). In proscribing Cicero and delighting in his death, Antony showed himself, in Plutarch’s view, to be a man who “is insolent in good fortune and disgraces his office” (ἐνυβρίζοντα τῇ τύχῃ καὶ καταισχύνοντα τὴν ἐξουσίαν, Ant. 20.2).

Demetrius-antony

351

its harmful consequences dominate the narrative after he goes East.55 This trait, which peaked in Antony’s virtual enslavement to Cleopatra,56 is evident from his first entry into public life, when Curio engages him in riotous living to “make him more manageable” (ὡς μᾶλλον εἴη χειροήθης, Ant. 2.3). Later, Plutarch comments that Cleopatra was indebted to Fulvia for Antony being “quite tamed (χειροήθη) and schooled at the outset to obey women” (Ant. 10.3). However, Antony’s submissiveness extends to non-flatterers as well—a sign of underlying virtue. Caesar is an “anti-flatterer” when he reacts to Antony’s wanton conduct by passing over him as co-consul and selecting Lepidus instead (Ant. 10.1)—spurring Antony to modify his conduct (10.3). Similarly, Octavia is seen by the Romans as having the potential to draw Antony back to a virtuous path (Ant. 32.2–3).57 This dual perspective on Antony’s reaction to criticism and flattery enhances his portrait as a great nature, whose potential to benefit his state was ruined by his susceptibility to flatterers. Pragmatic Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled In Antony, the pragmatic lessons for rulers center on the corrosive impact of Antony’s neglect of public duties and susceptibility to flattery on his effectiveness as a leader and general. His conduct eventually leads to the alienation of all of his associates in public life—including the Roman populace, his colleagues, his wife Octavia, his co-triumvir Octavian, his oldest friends and finally his own soldiers. Plutarch structures the Life to highlight Antony’s effectiveness in three key areas: (1) Relations with other Romans; (2) Relations with Cleopatra, Egypt and the eastern empire and (3) Military command. The sequence of episodes in each area is shown below in Table 8.2, in which Antony’s career has been divided into six phases based on the major turning points. In Phase 1 (Chapters 1–15), Plutarch portrays Antony’s early career and his association with Caesar, closing with Caesar’s death. Phase 2 (16–22) begins with Octavian’s arrival in Rome and extends through Philippi. In Phase 3 (23–35), Cleopatra enters the narrative and 55  While the narrative focuses on the debilitating effects of Antony’s association with Cleopatra on his performance as a general, the theme of Fortune favoring Augustus is also present in the background. Earlier in the Life, the theme was raised in Antony’s dream (Ant. 16.4) and in the report that a seer from Egypt told Antony that his guardian spirit was cowed and humbled by Augustus and would abandon Antony if he stayed in Rome (33.2). 56  The theme of Antony as a slave is reinforced by his dressing up as a slave four times: to escape to Caesar (Ant. 5.4), to play a trick on Fulvia (10.4), after Caesar’s murder (14.1) and wandering incognito with Cleopatra (29.1). 57  This concern induces Cleopatra to contrive to prevent Antony from meeting with Octavia (Ant. 53.3–6). Octavia is described as a “wonder of a woman” (χρῆμα θαυμαστὸν … γυναικός, Ant. 31.1) and is widely respected for her moral character. In contrast, Antony’s self-indulgence and wantonness is reinforced and expanded by Cleopatra.

352

Chapter 8

Table 8.2 Episodes in the Life of Antony Relations with other Romans

Relations with Cleopatra, Military command Egypt and the Eastern Empire

Phase 1: Early career; relations with Curio and Caesar; Pharsalus; Caesar’s murder (Chapters 1–15) 1- Family background 2- Corrupted by Curio and Clodius

3- Campaigns in Syria and Egypt 4- Rapport with soldiers 5- Campaign with Caesar in Gaul 6- At Caesar’s side; invades Italy 7–8- Battle of Pharsalus

5- Brought to Caesar by Curio 6- In Rome when Caesar is in Spain 9–10- Conduct as Master of Horse 11–13- Caesar’s murder 14–15- Antony calms Rome, then seeks sole rule Phase 2: Octavian’s arrival; alliance with Octavian and Lepidus (16–22) 16–17- Octavian comes; Antony named public enemy 19–20- Proscriptions; alliance with Octavian and Lepidus 21- Conduct as triumvir

17–18- Mutina

22- Philippi

Phase 3: Meets Cleopatra; marriage to Octavia (23–35) 23–24- Antony goes East 25–29- Cleopatra and leisure 30–32- Reconciles with Octavian; Marries Octavia 35- Octavia mediates

33- Ventidius to Parthia 34- Antony to Parthia

Phase 4: Returns to Asia; reunites with Cleopatra (36–54) 36- To Asia; gifts to Cleopatra 37–50- Parthian expedition 50- Has triumph in Alexandria 51- Reunites with Cleopatra

353

Demetrius-antony

Relations with other Romans

54- Octavia to Rome and mediates

Relations with Cleopatra, Military command Egypt and the Eastern Empire 52- Prepares to return to Parthia 53- Cleopatra versus Octavia 54- Distribution to Cleopatra and sons

Phase 5: Final rupture with Octavian; Actium (55–66) 55- Denounced by Octavian

58- Octavian prepares; will is read 59- Geminius deserts Antony 60- War declared on Cleopatra

56- Turns back from Parthia 56- Antony and Cleopatra to Samos 57- To Athens; Octavia to Rome 58- Postpones war 58- Friends start deserting 59- Refuses to send Cleopatra away 61–64- Prepares for Actium 65–66- Actium; Antony deserts army

Phase 6: Final days and death in Alexandria; Octavian as ruler; Cleopatra’s death (67–87) 67–71- Returns to Egypt; Timonium and Society of “Partners in Death” 72–73- Octavian will not negotiate

74–76- Final battle in Alexandria 76–77- Antony’s suicide 78–84- Cleopatra negotiates 85–86- Burial of Antony; death of Cleopatra

87- Antony’s descendants

354

Chapter 8

Antony’s decline as a Roman statesman accelerates, halted only temporarily by his marriage to Octavia and his return to Rome. Phase 4 (36–54) begins with Antony’s reunion with Cleopatra on his way to Parthia and culminates in Antony granting Roman territories to her. Phase 5 (55–66) extends from the final rupture with Octavian to the defeat at Actium, while Phase 6 (67–87) details Antony’s reaction to defeat, his failed attempts to mount a comeback, and his suicide. The final ten chapters of the Life provide a portrait of Octavian as a representative of Roman authority which supplies a positive counter-example to balance the deterrent import of Antony’s conduct.58 The principles at issue are familiar from Demetrius: to sustain the support and obedience of his people, a ruler must be solicitous for their welfare and administer justice. As Antony’s offensive and violence become increasingly extreme, his misjudgments become more destructive to his effectiveness as a general and ruler. As in Demetrius, Plutarch portrays Antony as a positive paradigm in select areas early in the Life, but as a deterrent paradigm of an ineffective ruler in the second half. Since the forces that derailed Antony’s career—private excesses, submissiveness to flatterers and neglect of public duties—were vulnerabilities shared by rulers of every era, the cautionary lessons would resonate with Emperors, provincial governors and imperial legates of Plutarch’s day. Relations with Other Romans In Antony, Plutarch is able to provide pragmatic lessons of value both to leaders in provincial cities and provincial governors interacting with Rome because Antony was active as a statesman under the Roman Republic before Pharsalus and as a triumvir responsible for the Eastern empire but answerable to Rome after Philippi. Antony supplies positive and deterrent paradigms for rulers in two areas: (1) Restoring order in a crisis and (2) Managing reputation. In the Life, Plutarch portrays Antony as a man propelled by his “distorted ambition”, who, like Demetrius, seeks power to serve his own interests rather than the common good. By constructing one episode in which Antony is a clearly positive exemplum of effective leadership, Plutarch conveys Antony’s “great nature” and shows how the potential to be a good ruler can be squandered by private excesses and misdirected ambition. Restoring Order in a Crisis While Plutarch constructs most scenes in Rome before Philippi to characterize Antony as a man whose conduct creates a reputation for oppressiveness, 58  Pelling (1988b: 14–17) emphasizes the portrayal of Cleopatra in the final ten chapters and its role in completing the depiction of Antony as a study in human frailty.

Demetrius-antony

355

licentiousness and brutality that repulses the Romans, he also presents Antony as a positive paradigm in one key area: restoring order in a crisis. After Caesar’s assassination, Antony is shown taking a series of expedient actions that restored calm: he gives his son as a hostage to induce the conspirators to come down from the Capitol, calls the Senate together, speaks in favor of amnesty, supports granting provinces to Brutus and Cassius and votes that Caesar’s directives be upheld.59 These actions earned praise from the Romans: So Antony went out of the Senate the most illustrious of men; for he was thought to have put an end to the civil war and to have handled matters involving great difficulty and extraordinary confusion in a most prudent and statesman-like manner (ἐμφρονέστατα … καὶ πολιτικώτατα). Ant. 14.2

In this passage, Plutarch implicitly makes a distinction between moral character and effective leadership: despite his earlier conduct in private life, Antony attracts admiration for his ability to handle matters (πράγμασι κεχρῆσθαι) in the midst of extraordinary confusion (ταραχὰς οὐ τὰς τυχούσας). Antony’s success in calming the situation further manifests the positive potential as an effective leader that Antony squanders for the sake of sole rule. Nevertheless, regardless of Antony’s true motives, his actions still produced a beneficial outcome in restoring calm. The importance of this laudatory episode to Plutarch’s intended lessons is indicated by its absence from extant historical accounts. In both Cassius Dio (62.29–33) and Appian (Civil Wars 2.124–135), the actions Plutarch attributes to Antony alone are credited to Cicero or to Antony together with Lepidus, while Antony is portrayed as primarily maneuvering for tyrannical power (Cassius Dio 45.5–9, Appian Civil Wars 3.3). Plutarch’s version highlights the potential for good leadership that was destroyed by Antony’s weaknesses.

Managing Reputation: Private Excess and Neglect of Duties Undermine Support The ruinous effects of Antony’s private excess and neglect of public duties on his reputation in Rome are presented from two perspectives in the Life: from the negative responses to Antony’s conduct first as a statesman in Rome and, later, as triumvir in Egypt. In Rome, Antony, as tribune, was considered “odious” (ἐπαχθής) because he did not administer justice and “listened angrily” to those who consulted him (Ant. 6.5). Later, as Caesar’s Master of Horse, his 59  Plutarch gives Antony’s role far less emphasis in his accounts of this period at Caesar 67.4 and Brutus 19.3.

356

Chapter 8

attack on Dolabella made him odious (ἀπηχθάνετο) to the multitude, while he was hated (ἐμισεῖτο) and loathed (βδελυττομένων) by the aristocrats because of his wanton and extravagant lifestyle (Ant. 9.3).60 Plutarch amplifies the negative reaction to Antony’s conduct by drawing a contrast to the orderly life of Pompey and the goodwill he attracted: And to [Antony’s] general ill-repute was added no small hatred (οὐ μικρὸν μῖσος) because of the house in which he lived, which had been the house of Pompey the Great, a man who was no less admired for his temperance and his orderly and democratic manner of living than for his three triumphs. Ant. 21.1

The contrast between lifestyles is amplified by a description of the different sorts of visitors welcomed by the two men, with the theatrical ties of Antony underscoring the flawed nature of his leadership: For, they were annoyed (ἤχθοντο) when they saw the house often closed to leaders and generals and ambassadors, who were insolently thrust away from the doors, on the one hand, while being full of mimes and jugglers and drunken flatterers, on whom were lavished most of the funds that had been obtained in the most violent and harshest manner. Ant. 21.2

Plutarch reinforces this portrait of Antony’s indifference to the public welfare by also reporting repeated instances of Antony’s political allies managing public affairs while Antony indulged in luxury, including Caesar after Pharsalus (Ant. 9.6), as well as Octavian (24.1), Fulvia (28.1) and Octavia (54.2–4) after Philippi. The ill-repute Antony created for himself enabled Octavian to establish a power base in Rome through an alliance with Cicero,61 which led ultimately to Antony being declared a public enemy (Ant. 17.1). 60  Again, these details illustrate the principle established in Political Precepts (800D) that a man’s private life is an important component of his public success because it affects his reputation. The Romans are also “distressed” (ἐλύπουν) at his extravagant excursions and costly banquets and consider it “terrible”(δεινόν) that he should “revel in luxury and be insolent towards his fellow-citizens” (τρυφᾶν τοῖς πολίταις ἐνυβρίζοντας, Ant. 9.6). 61  Antony is portrayed as the primary force behind Octavian’s alliance with Cicero: Antony’s repeated refusals to give Octavian the funds to pay Caesar’s bequests, along with insults and opposition to his bid for the tribuneship (Ant. 16.1–2), induced Octavian to join

Demetrius-antony

357

After establishing himself as triumvir in Egypt, Antony further undermines his support in Rome by violating Roman traditions and harming Roman interests in favor of Egypt and Cleopatra, acting less like a Roman Imperator and more like an eastern potentate.62 Antony is hated (ἐμισεῖτο) for mistreating Octavia (Ant. 54.2), and he “vexes” the Romans” (ἠνίασαν) and “is hated” for granting territory to his children by Cleopatra because “it was seen to be theatrical and arrogant (τραγικὴν καὶ ὑπερήφανον) and to evince hatred of Rome” (54.3). By celebrating a triumph in Alexandria, he further “distressed” (ἐλύπησεν) the Romans because he had bestowed his country’s sacred rites on the Egyptians (Ant. 50.4). In the end, Antony’s neglect of Roman tradition, and failure to defend Rome’s interests, lead to Octavian’s charge that Antony had abdicated his office to Cleopatra, on whom Rome declares war (Ant. 60.1).63 Relations with Cleopatra, Egypt and the Eastern Empire Plutarch devotes fifty-four of the eighty-seven chapters of the Life (23–77) to Antony’s career between his departure from Philippi to head to the eastern provinces (Ant. 23) and his suicide in Alexandria eleven years later (Ant. 72). While the relatively brief accounts in Antony of Antony’s early career under Caesar (Ant. 5–13) and his alliance with Octavian ahead of Philippi (16–22) may reflect an earlier treatment of this period in Caesar, Cicero and Brutus, the dominance of the period after Philippi in Antony places the spotlight on a central challenge facing rulers: namely, how to tell a flatterer from a friend. Plutarch delivers his pragmatic lessons in the debilitating effects of flattery on effective rule through his characterization of Cleopatra and her allies as flatterers and manipulators of Antony. The centrality of the dynamics of this relationship to Cicero, an alliance that enabled him to win the support of the Senate, the goodwill of the people and the backing of Caesar’s soldiers (16.3). 62  When Antony offers to help Monaeses flee from Parthia, he compares himself to Persian kings in his wealth and magnanimity (Ant. 37.1), while likening Monaeses’ flight to him to Themistocles’ flight to Artaxerxes. Octavian later describes Antony as a man “who had been drugged and was not even master of himself” (ὑπὸ φαρμάκων οὐδ’ αὑτοῦ κρατοίη) (Ant. 60.1)—an image commonly linked to the effects of flattery (e.g. How to Tell a Flatterer 49E). 63  Indeed, war is declared against Cleopatra (Ant. 60.1), which enables Augustus to be presented as acting on behalf of the Roman state rather than in his own desire for supreme authority over Antony. Plutarch’s account of Actium brings the role of good fortune back into view, echoing the views from treatise On the Fortune of the Romans (319F), where Cleopatra is named a part of Augustus’ good fortune, since she served as a “reef” (ὡς ἕρμα) on whom “even so great a commander as Antony was wrecked (κατέδυ) and crushed (συνετρίβη)”.

358

Chapter 8

Antony’s effectiveness as a representative of imperial power is reflected in an authorial comment inserted at the point when Antony arrives in Egypt: His passion for Cleopatra (ὁ Κλεοπάτρας ἔρως) entered as the culminating evil (τελευταῖον κακὸν), and after she awakened and roused to frenzy (ἐγείρας καὶ ἀναβακχεύσας) many of the passions which were still hidden and quiescent in Antony, she removed and destroyed (ἠφάνισε καὶ προσδιέφθειρεν) whatever good and salutary passions still held out. Ant. 25.1

This passage previews the focus of the narrative that will follow: how Antony’s uncontrolled passion left him open to flattery and how Cleopatra took advantage of the weakness to manipulate and destroy him. Antony’s conduct as ruler in the East provides pragmatic lessons in the various forms of flattery and their detrimental impact if they are not recognized and resisted. Plutarch goes beyond the simplistic advice, “Be on guard against flattery!”, to provide detailed descriptions of the techniques used by Cleopatra and others to flatter and ­manipulate Antony into actions that undermined his ability to exercise and retain power. Antony’s failings as a ruler find a positive counter-example in Octavian. Recognizing Flatterers and Their Methods Plutarch conveys his pragmatic lessons for rulers by examining flattery and its effects from two perspectives: the character flaws that make a ruler susceptible to flattery and the methods the flatterer uses to manipulate the ruler in different situations. In an authorial comment separating Antony’s victory at Philippi from his arrival in the East (Ant. 24), Plutarch draws a clear connection between Antony’s susceptibility to flattery and specific character traits: “simplicity (ἁπλότης) and slowness of perception” (βραδεῖα μὲν αἴσθησις), wantonness in mirth and jest and a tendency to be too trusting of his associates (24.6–7). Antony’s resulting passivity “spoiled most of his actions” (διελυμήνατο, Ant. 24.7): Since he could not believe that men who spoke frankly when they were joking (ἐν τῷ παίζειν παρρησιαζομένους) flattered him when they were serious (σπουδάζοντας κολακεύειν), he was easily captured by praise, not realizing that some men mingled frank speech, like a spicy seasoning, with flattery, in order to prevent Antony from becoming satiated with it. Ant. 24.7–8

Demetrius-antony

359

When Plutarch asserts that Antony is “easily captured” (ἡλίσκετο ῥᾳδίως)64 because he is ignorant about how flatterers manipulate men in power, he echoes the central theme in How to Tell a Flatterer, where Antony is cited as a man whose statesmanship was destroyed because he was not on guard.65 The portrayal of Antony’s manipulation by flatterers among his Roman entourage alerts men in senior posts in Rome or the provinces to be vigilant in looking for similar threats.66 The significance of flattery as a “tool” used by “the ruled” to distract and control “the ruler” is amplified by Plutarch’s description of the “mirroring” and theatrics behind Cleopatra’s flattery, which was rendered more powerful because of the erotic passion Antony felt for her. Her flattery is said to be distributed “not into the four forms of which Plato speaks, but into many”: she “kept Antony in constant tutelage” (διεπαιδαγώγει) by being present at all of his activities, including playing dice, drinking, hunting, military exercises and wandering at night dressed up as a servant (Ant. 29.1).67 Eventually, all of his actions with regard to his political allies and his military plans are guided by her views, and Antony is perceived as “an appendage” (προσθήκη, 62.1) of Cleopatra.68 Plutarch puts her techniques on display in describing how she prevents Antony from meeting with Octavia (Ant. 53.3): 64  Similar vocabulary (ἐκράτησε … καὶ κατέσχεν) is used to describe Lamia’s hold on Demetrius (Dtr. 16.4). 65   How to Tell a Flatterer (56E–F, 61A–B). The incident at Ant. 53.3–6, when Cleopatra feigns despair and employs her associates to also flatter Antony (a double dose), is one of the examples (61A-B). 66  In How to Tell a Flatterer, not guarding against flattery is like learning the effects of deadly drugs by tasting them: “For we must not wait for injury to open our eyes, but to avoid injury we must gain acquaintance with the flatterer and learn how to detect him; otherwise we shall be in the same case with those who try to learn about deadly drugs by tasting them first, and so ruin and destroy themselves in order to reach their decision.” (49E) 67  The description of Cleopatra’s method of “mirroring” Antony and sharing his activities echoes the portrait of Alcibiades as a flatterer during his first exile when he changed his lifestyle to match that of his latest ally as he moved from the Spartans to the Persians and finally the Thracians (Alc. 23.3–6). 68  At Brutus 29.10, Antony is called an “appendage” of Octavian at Philippi. Plutarch cites a letter from Brutus to Atticus saying that Mark Antony was paying a fitting penalty for his folly since “when it was in his power to be numbered with such men as Brutus and Cassius and Cato, he had given himself to Octavian as a mere appendage” (ἐν Βρούτοις καὶ Κασσίοις καὶ Κάτωσι συναριθμεῖσθαι δυνάμενος, προσθήκην ἑαυτὸν Ὀκταβίῳ δέδωκε).

360

Chapter 8

She pretended (τὸ δὲ βλέμμα προσιόντος) to be passionately in love, and reduced her body with light meals and put one a look (ὑπεφαίνετο) when he approached and showed herself pining and humbled when he departed; and, often contriving (πραγματευομένη) to be seen weeping, she would quickly “hide” her tears from him when he arrived, as if she did not want him to notice. Ant. 53.3–4

This passage is replete with the language of deception and manipulation, with Cleopatra pretending, contriving and striking poses to capture the attention of Antony. On top of these machinations, Plutarch also reports the actions of Cleopatra’s allies in flattery—namely her own flatterers—who reinforced her “theatrics” by reviling Antony about his being “hard-hearted and unfeeling” and the destroyer of a mistress who truly loved him, whereas Octavia was attached to him as a matter of public policy (Ant. 53.5–6).69 This combined onslaught of flatterers induced Antony not only to forego a meeting with Octavia, but also to put off his Parthian expedition to a less opportune time (Ant. 53.6).

Winning Over Subject States with Good Rule: Octavian as a Positive Counter-Example In Antony, the portraits of Octavian found in Cicero and Brutus are integrated into a fuller picture of the maturation of Octavian from the young man of eighteen entering the political arena after Caesar’s assassination to the leader, fourteen years later, who held Cleopatra as a prisoner70 and directed affairs as the sole ruler of the Roman Empire. The final ten chapters of Antony (77–87), provide the longest continuous depiction in Plutarch’s corpus of Augustus (as Octavian) exercising sole authority. While in Plutarch’s portrait Octavian’s early career is stained by his abandonment of Cicero and complicity in Antony’s reprehensible conduct ahead of Philippi—including the proscriptions—his conduct as a ruler of the western empire after Philippi is

69  This incident is an example in How to Tell a Flatterer (61A–B). See n. 65 above. 70  The extensive treatment of events leading to Cleopatra’s death and burial (Ant. 68–86) deepens her characterization as a queen in her own right and as a woman of “lofty spirit” (τὴν εὐγένειαν, 86.4) and shrewd judgment, who is able to flatter Octavian (83) and arrange matters so that she has time to receive the asp and avoid becoming a captive.

Demetrius-antony

361

characterized in largely positive terms.71 As sole-ruler after Actium, Octavian exercises generosity, moderation and fairness in his relations with the conquered.72 He is not vindictive and quickly settles affairs with Athens and distributes supplies (Ant. 68.4–5); he spares the people of Alexandria, as well as the philosopher Philostratus (80.1–3); and he is gracious in granting burial rights first to Antony (82.1) and then later to Cleopatra and her maids (86.4).73 In all of these actions, Octavian provides a positive paradigm for conducting relations with subject states in Plutarch’s day as well. By including this portrait, Plutarch demonstrates that, in the hands of a good ruler, rather than a selfserving one, monarchical power can be used to benefit all citizens and subject states.74 Military Command Plutarch presents Antony as a paradigm of the destructive impact of flattery on generalship in two areas: managing relations with troops and preparing military strategies suitable to each situation. Antony is a positive and deterrent model in both areas. Before Philippi, he depicts effective generalship, while between Philippi and Actium his performance as a general declines precipitously.75 Plutarch’s pragmatic lessons lie both in the strategic acumen and misjudgments that underlay Antony’s victories and defeats, as well as in the susceptibility to flattery that drove the deterioration in his generalship. 71  Jacobs (2017b) discusses the portrayals of Augustus at different stages of his career in Cic., Caes., Brut. and Ant. 72  The incidents chosen by Plutarch to characterize Octavian after Actium manifest the same qualities of character as the stories about his conduct as emperor in the other Lives: in Cicero, Augustus praises Cicero to his grandson and also names Cicero’s son a his co-consul (Cic. 49.5–6); in Brutus he is generous to Brutus’ close allies Messala and Strato after Philippi (Brut. 53.1–3) and is lenient with the people in Gaul who keep Brutus’ statues in place (Dion-Brut 5.1–3). In these actions, Augustus parallels Caesar’s clemency towards enemies as well as his sorrow at the death of his rival. Augustus sheds tears, as Caesar did when he received Pompey’s seal ring (Pomp. 80.5). 73  The passage also clarifies his portrait of Octavian,conveyed indirectly, via interactions with Antony, earlier in the Life. Apart from Antony’s oldest son, Antyllus, Augustus spares the children of Antony and Cleopatra (Ant. 87.1), and he kills Caesarian only after Cleopatra’s death on the advice of the philosopher, Areius (81.2). 74  Plutarch routinely refers to the government in Rome after Pharsalus as a “monarchy” (Brut. 47.7; Cic. 40.1, Pomp. 75.4 and Dion-Brut 2.2). 75  Pelling (1988b: 14) describes the decline in generalship reflected in Antony’s generalship in Parthia and Actium.

362

Chapter 8

Managing Relations with Soldiers Antony supplies vivid positive and deterrent paradigms in managing relations with soldiers, which Antony fostered through his soldierliness and generosity with gifts (Dtr. 1.7). Early in his career, Antony demonstrates how to establish a rapport with soldiers and elicit loyalty: his willingness to share the life of soldiers earns him an amazing amount (θαυμαστὸν ὅσον) of “goodwill and affection” (Ant. 4.2), while his generosity provides an illustrious beginning for “building his influence” and later “lifts his power to greater heights” (Ant. 4.3). In the account of the Parthian Expedition, Plutarch summarizes the attributes that cemented the loyalty of his troops, even at times of adversity: Their respect for him as their leader (αἰδὼς), their obedience and goodwill (πειθαρχία μετ’ εὐνοίας), and the fact that all of them equally—men of high-repute, men of ill-repute, commanders and private citizens— preferred honor and favor from Antony to safety and security, left nothing even for the ancient Romans to surpass. And there were many reasons for this, as I said earlier: his good birth, his power of eloquence, his simplicity, his love of giving and his largess in giving, and his liveliness in making jests and social relations. Ant. 43.2–3

Antony here has acquired for himself three of the most critical elements of effective generalship that are routinely emphasized in the Lives: respect, obedience and goodwill. This positive example of securing the loyalty of troops sharply intensifies the force of the deterrent paradigm centered on Antony’s desertion of his troops at Actium and their subsequent defection from him. Although Antony was largely absent from major campaigns after Philippi (Ant. 34.2–4)76 and his Parthian campaign was confused and unsuccessful (34.5, 37–50), the loyalty of his troops does not waver until he flees from Actium,77 and, even then, they keep fighting for seven days expecting him to return (68.2–3). The first defections occur after Actium when the troops in Libya (Ant. 69.2) and the dynasts in the East (71.1) change sides. Plutarch links Cleopatra to the final defection of 76  Antony’s successes in the East are often accomplished in his absence, including Ventidius’ defeat of the Parthians, Sosius’ success in Syria, and Canidius’ defeat of the Armenians, Iberians and Albanians (Ant. 34.2–6). 77  Antony’s abandonent of his troops (Ant. 66.4–5) showcases the powerful force of his passion for Cleopatra, which in most instances is operating in concert with her flattery to derail his leadership.

Demetrius-antony

363

Antony’s army in Alexandria, beginning with the soldier who receives the prize of valor after the first battle: And priding himself on the victory, [Antony] entered the palace still armed, kissed Cleopatra and presented the soldier (συνέστησεν) who had fought most zealously. And she gave him as the prize of valor a golden breastplate and helmet, while he, having received these things, deserted to Caesar during the night. Ant. 74.3

Here, Plutarch illustrates the manner in which Antony had relinquished his authority to Cleopatra, the charge levelled by Octavian when war was declared (Ant. 60.1).78 Designing and Executing Military Strategy Antony is also depicted as both positive and deterrent paradigms of military planning and execution. In the early campaigns in Syria (Ant. 3.1), Egypt (3.2–3) and Pharsalus (7–8), Antony displays a wide range of military skills, including an ability to defeat a larger with a smaller force (3.1), to capture cities (3.4) and to design maneuvers to outflank an enemy and achieve victory (3.4). For his “daring and sagacious leadership” (τόλμης … καὶ προνοίας ἡγεμονικῆς) in Egypt, he receives rewards of valor (Ant. 3.5) and it is Caesar’s recognition that Antony was “an energetic, brave and capable leader” (7.1) that earns him command of the left wing at Pharsalus (7–8). At Philippi, the victory is largely credited to him (Ant. 22). This paradigm of competence, however, forms the backdrop for the more critical deterrent lesson conveyed by the erosion in Antony’s generalship after he succumbs to Cleopatra’s flattery. Plutarch specifies the destructive influence of her flattery by explicitly attributing Antony’s actions to prepare for, and ­conduct, major battles to his desire to please her. It is “for the sake of Cleopatra” that Antony mismanages the Parthian campaign (Ant. 37.4), puts off a campaign against the Parthians until summer (53.6), delays the battle at Actium (58.2) and then fights it at sea (62.1), abandons his army (66.4–5) and continues to fight at Alexandria until he believes she has died (76.2). Moreover, Cleopatra drives a wedge between Antony and his oldest associates (Ant. 59.1– 4) and is implicated in the feasting in Samos which gave Octavian time to finish 78  The passage evokes Paris and Helen, but Antony comes to Cleopatra not for repose but to perform a military duty. In the synkrisis, Antony is again compared to Paris in abandoning campaigns for a woman (Dtr-Ant 3.3–4).

364

Chapter 8

his preparations—a delay said to be “among Antony’s greatest errors” (58.2). At Actium, Antony is deficient in all major dimensions of the art of generalship in which he had been proficient through the Battle of Philippi. His defeat at Actium thus becomes the consequence of his inability to recognize and ignore the flattery of Cleopatra. Summary: Lessons for Ruling and Being Ruled in Antony Plutarch portrays Antony as a deterrent paradigm in the same areas as Demetrius—private excesses that undermine support and submissiveness to flattery that derails judgment—but links him to different specific behaviors. Antony’s violations of justice and the common welfare are more violent and extreme than those of Demetrius, prompting declarations of war against him after he has been ousted. Similarly, whereas the injurious “flattery” in Demetrius takes the form of public honors, the flattery in Antony is tied to specific individuals who manipulate his actions as a ruler and general. Cleopatra functions to illustrate the many techniques used by flatterers to distract and influence a ruler, as well as the success with which such flattery can undermine not only the judgment of a ruler but also his relations with friends, advisors and even his army. The combination of Cleopatra’s flattery and Antony’s eros ultimately induces Antony to abandon his army in the midst of battle—perhaps the most egregious offense a general can commit. Antony, however, is also a positive paradigm in two areas: winning loyalty and obedience from one’s army and restoring harmony in the midst of a political crisis. Plutarch provides extensive descriptions of the benefits that flowed from Antony sharing in the struggles and lifestyle of the soldiers, both on and off the battlefield, which laid the foundation for the army that continued to fight even in his absence at Actium. Plutarch’s account of Antony’s conduct to restore calm after Caesar’s murder provides insights into compromises that can prevent civil war. Both of these positive paradigms are introduced by adapting the historical record and, thereby, Plutarch is able to cast Antony as a plausible blend of strengths and weaknesses rather than a thoroughly negative character. Plutarch’s presentation of Antony as a blend of virtue and vice differs from other sources in two significant ways that are instructive about his purpose. First, although his portrayal incorporates nearly all of the negative qualities highlighted in the other accounts, Plutarch pushes most of them into the background by glossing over much of Antony’s career in Rome. Thus, the period between Caesar’s murder and the formation of Antony’s alliance with Lepidus and Octavian is covered in only five Chapters (14–18), and within the next four

Demetrius-antony

365

chapters (by the end of 22) the battle of Philippi has been won and Antony is heading East. In addition, Plutarch’s positive vignettes of Antony’s virtue— such as his restoring calm after Caesar’s murder and his extraordinary rapport with his troops after Mutina—are not found in other sources. Secondly, Plutarch’s version of Antony’s death shows more nobility than other accounts, which simply report the suicide or even, as in Suetonius (Div. Aug. 17.4), assert that Augustus rejected an eleventh hour appeal to reconcile and forced Antony to commit suicide. Plutarch’s blended portrait makes Antony a more plausible exemplum for readers—who might have trouble “seeing themselves” in a caricature of evil, but may see their own weaknesses in Plutarch’s Antony and avoid repeating his mistakes in leadership. 8.4

Insights from the Synkrisis

The synkrisis completes Plutarch’s project, stated in the Prologue, of using the careers of Demetrius and Antony to provide deterrent paradigms of behavior statesmen should avoid. With positive counter-examples to each man presented in the Lives themselves (including Antigonus, Alexander, Philip and Octavian), the synkrisis is largely devoted to revealing differences in degrees of blameworthiness in actions that impacted their effectiveness as leaders. Plutarch revisits several themes highlighted in their Lives. With regard to the private excess, Antony is faulted for letting the “time for action slip”(πράξεων καιρὸς ἐξέφυγεν, Dtr-Ant 3.1) in military matters, while Demetrius is censured for allowing his licentiousness to extend to sacrilege in Athens (Dtr-Ant 4.2). Moreover, both men are blamed for their final defeats, caused in the one case by the desertion of the army and in the other by the desertion of the general (Dtr-Ant. 6.1). In death, Demetrius’ captivity—in which he allowed himself to be “tamed, like a wild beast, by way of his belly and by wine”—is deemed more blameworthy than Antony’s “cowardly, pitiful and ignoble” suicide before he was captured (Dtr-Ant 6.2). Plutarch further differentiates degrees of blame in his evaluation of their motives for trying to expand their power (Dtr-Ant 2.1). While Demetrius pursued power over “subjects accustomed to kings and subjection” (εἰθισμένων κρατεῖσθαι καὶ βασιλεύεσθαι), Antony’s intention to “enslave the Roman people when they had just escaped from the sole rule of Caesar” is judged to be “harsh and tyrannical” (Dtr-Ant 2.1). Similarly, Demetrius’ military deeds included the “liberation” of Greek cities, while Antony waged war at Philippi to deprive Romans of their liberty (Dtr-Ant 2.2).

366

Chapter 8

In the next chapter, we turn to Phocion-Cato, in which Plutarch provides additional pragmatic lessons for “the ruled”. This pair of Lives supplements the lessons in Dtr-Ant by examining more closely the process of negotiating with a ruler and managing internal affairs in a city to keep the ruler’s interference to a minimum. At the same time, we revisit the issues raised in Chapter 1 with regard to the “alliance” between philosophy and effective leadership.

Chapter 9

Phocion-Cato Minor 9.1 Introduction While Aem-Tim and Dtr-Ant center on men who exercise authority over allies or subject states, Phocion (402–318 BC) and Cato Minor (95–46 BC) did not hold such powerful positions. Phocion was a leader in democratic Athens until it came under the rule of Macedon after its defeat at Chaeronea in 338 BC. Cato, in turn, did not reach the consulship, nor was he a general in charge of any major military campaign. Although he was at times influential with regard to policy, he had to exercise his influence by persuading those holding the highest offices. Thus, in the Phoc-Cato Min pair, Plutarch’s perspective shifts to that of “the ruled” and the challenges of mediating between “the rulers” and one’s fellow citizens to achieve the greatest degree of liberty and prosperity for one’s city. At the same time, the issue of flattery remains a central topic, since just as the rulers must resist flattery when offered, the ruled must both refrain from flattering their rulers and refuse to be flattered (via gifts) by them. The challenges Phocion and Cato faced in promoting the welfare of their cities thus paralleled those confronted by Plutarch’s readers in mediating between their own cities and Roman authorities. Plutarch uses these Lives to offer pragmatic lessons to two categories of “the ruled”: city leaders who conduct negotiations with an overlord on behalf of their cities and men who are out of office in Rome or the cities, but want to influence policy. Phocion explores the dynamics of relations between city leaders and the overlord and provides both positive and deterrent paradigms in how to establish a rapport with the ruler while also maintaining the trust of one’s city. Cato Minor, in turn, addresses the challenges of affecting policy within one’s city when others hold office and it is necessary to exert influence by means of one’s reputation and good relations with the people and one’s colleagues. The principles at issue are discussed in Political Precepts in sections devoted to relations with Rome (813D–816A), conduct when out of office (816B–817F) and maintaining (or regaining) harmony in one’s city (824D–825F). Political effectiveness in these areas was especially important during turbulent times, when, as noted in the Prologue (Phoc. 1.1–4), a statesman had to engage in “give-andtake” in order to achieve harmony. While Pericles illustrated this principle as a guide to managing relations with the people, as discussed in Chapter 4,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_013

368

Chapter 9

Phocion-Cato expands its application to conducting relations with an overlord and to managing political alliances in an unstable political environment. Both men also served as “rulers” to the extent that they had authority and managed administrative departments in their cities. Phocion, as a city leader in Athens, and Cato, as quaestor and senator in Rome, implemented policies and managed subordinates to produce outcomes that benefitted their states. While such responsibility was temporary and circumscribed, their performance of such duties provided a context to showcase methods and initiatives that men holding positions of responsibility at any level could incorporate into their work. A critical element in a statesman’s ability to be successful in the turbulent times in which Phocion and Cato lived was good practical judgment in weighing considerations of personal moral virtue—as it applied to a man pursuing his own interests in private life—and of expediency with regard to the safety and well-being of the entire community. This issue was especially important in Phocion’s Athens—described as a “shipwrecked state”—and in Cato’s Rome, which was heading for shipwreck.1 As discussed in Chapter 2, the challenge of balancing of moral virtue and expediency when taking action in the public arena was a frequent topic in the advice literature of Plutarch’s era. In works ranging from Cicero’s De Officiis to Quintilian (Book 12), writers recognized that achieving the best outcomes for one’s state might require that a statesman harm a friend or kinsman, engage in deception, violate the law or even enforce a policy using force rather than persuasion. In Phocion-Cato, Plutarch illustrates the limits of principles of moral virtue as a guide to effective leadership by presenting a new set of deterrent and positive paradigms that highlight, on the one hand, situations where strict adherence to principles of moral integrity harms one’s state and, on the other hand, situations where the willingness of a leader to compromise these principles is essential to the safety and well-being of his city.2 Such paradigms complemented additional examples—familiar 1  In Plutarch’s view, Phocion’s Athens was “a shipwrecked state”(τὰ ναυάγια τῆς πόλεως) (Phoc. 1.1) and Cato’s Rome was “struggling with great tempest and surge” (πολὺν δὲ χειμῶνα καὶ σάλον ἐχούσης) (Phoc. 3.3). In Political Precepts 802F, Plutarch attributes this image to Demades. The image of Rome as a ship on stormy seas is also found in the other Lives of this period: at Caes. 28.5, the city in anarchy is “like a ship drifting about without a steersmen” (ὥσπερ ἀκυβέρνητον ναῦν ὑποφερομένην) and, at Pomp. 61.2, the city is in a storm (ἐν χειμῶνι). 2  The limitation of philosophy as a guide to action in managing practical affairs is also addressed in other Lives. In Dion, for instance, Dion releases Heracleides based on his studies at the Academy on “how to conquer anger, envy and all contentiousness”: as a result, he wished men to see that he was superior to Heracleides, “not so much in influence and practical judgment, as in goodness and justice” (μὴ τοσοῦτον δυνάμει καὶ φρονήσει κρατῶν ὅσον χρηστότητι καὶ

Phocion-cato Minor

369

from the other Lives—of circumstances in which strict adherence to principles of moral integrity immeasurably benefitted the state, while a willingness to relax those principles did irreparable harm. “Political virtue” required that a statesman not only be willing to relax standards of “personal” moral virtue when the situation required it for the sake of the common good, but also that he be able to discern when and by how much to compromise.3 Although they lived in turbulent times, both Phocion and Cato were known for their moral integrity, being called Phocion “the Good” and Cato “the Philosopher”. As noted earlier in Chapter 3, in the Prologue to the pair emphasizes their shared qualities: [Their characters], as if in equal measure (ἴσῳ μέτρῳ), blended kindness with severity, courage with security, solicitude for others with fearlessness for themselves, and similarly combined caution against what is shameful and vigorous exertion on behalf of justice. Phoc. 3.5

These shared virtues make Phocion and Cato ideal candidates for Plutarch to use to display the distinction between “the good man” and “the effective statesman”, which was discussed in the Introduction to this book. Phocion and Cato Minor convey two critical lessons: (1) that moral virtue alone is not sufficient for effective statesmanship and (2) that the philosopher is not necessarily the best statesman. Thus, this pair illustrates, more clearly perhaps than others in the series, Plutarch’s departure from Plato’s notion of a philosopher-king in his Lives of statesmen. Instead, Plutarch integrates the more pragmatic political philosophy of his political treatises—and other works on practical ethics—which advocated an alliance between philosophy and pragmatic action.4 Phoc-Cato illustrates the inadequacy of philosophy alone as a guide to effective δικαιοσύνῃ) (Dion 47.5–8). Later, however, he allows Heracleides to be killed on the grounds that as long as he was alive the city would not be free of tumults (Dion 53.5–6). Dion is also faulted for adopting a lifestyle suitable to the Academy, but inappropriate among mercenaries (Dion 52.3–4), and Plato directly criticizes him for a haughty attitude toward the people although his situation called for a “gracious demeanor” (χάριτος ἐνδεῶν) (52.5). 3  This principle was reflected, for instance, in Agesilaus’ decision to relax the laws after Leuctra. The ability to discern when, and by how much, to relax laws or moral virtue is acquired through experience in practical affairs. 4  In Political Precepts, Phocion and Cato exemplify the same principle in three instances: they both place the interests of their country above any private enmities (809D) and illustrate the proper ways to deal with opponents in public debates (810C, 810D) and to divert the people from actions destructive to the state (818D, 819A).

370

Chapter 9

political action by highlighting circumstances in which strict adherence to philosophical principles induced Phocion and Cato to injure their states. Plutarch’s “mixed message” of presenting the moral virtue of Phocion and Cato, on the one hand, and their errors in statesmanship, on the other, is widely recognized.5 The pair is often seen as a study in the conflict between moral virtue and expediency (political necessity), underscoring the importance of being willing to compromise to achieve the best outcomes.6 Other issues that receive attention include Cato’s Stoicism,7 his suicide and fight for liberty,8 and his portrayal as a virtuous man who incited imitation and as a statesman.9 The lack of a synkrisis to the pair has also drawn discussion as to whether this final section was purposely omitted or has been lost.10 5  Tritle (1992: 4266–4267) identifies this message as the central theme in the pair, citing Phoc. 2.1–5 as intended to “acquaint the politicus with the inherent problems of politics and to suggest a successful approach to government and ruler.” See also Tritle (1988). 6  Phocion and Cato demonstrate different aptitudes for managing the trade-off between moral virtue and expediency and for being open to compromise. Indeed, Cato’s inability to manage the trade-off is seen as central to his failures as a statesman. Swain (1990b: 197–199) notes that Cato as a statesman was less adept than Phocion in achieving the right mix. Similarly, Duff (1999b: 80, 131–160) argues that the pair illustrates that the good do not always win and further examines the role of τύχη when good men fail. On Phocion, see alsp Fialhoa (2010). 7  Both Pelling (1989: 228–32) and Duff (1999b: 131–132, 155–158) link Cato’s inflexibility to his Stoicism. Swain (1990b: 201) highlights the similarity between Cato and Brutus, who both face the same political situation and “display a like intransigence of principle”, but Cato is tied to Stoicism and Brutus to Platonism. Van der Stockt (2002: 115–140) treats the issue of Cato’s Stoicism from the perspective of setting limitations on friendship in public life. See also Nikolaidis (1995: 311–312), Frazier (1995: 155–160, 165–170; 1996). 8  On Cato’s suicide, see Geiger (1999) and Zadorozhnyi (2007); on his fight for liberty, see Geiger (1988). Trapp (2007: 494–496) considers the suicide of Cato versus the executions of Socrates and Phocion a reflection of the greater effort required by Cato to achieve his end, also noting the theatricality of Cato’s death versus the succinct simplicity of Phocion’s death. See also Geiger (1979b: 63; 1996a: 270–278). Geiger (1999: 357–364) explores the implicit parallels between the deaths of Cato and Socrates. See also Beck (2014). 9  On portrayals of Cato as a man to imitate and as a statesman, see Swain (1996), Ingenkamp (2004: 81–82). 10  Geiger (1988: 256) sees no need for a synkrisis “which would hardly add significantly either to our historical knowledge or to our psychological understanding of Plutarch’s characters”, while Pelling (1997: 230/2002: 377) suggests the dramatic death scene explains the absence of a synkrisis. Trapp (1999: 487) assumes there was no synkrisis because the suicide of Cato “is not an isolated final flourish, but rather the culmination of a process that

Phocion-cato Minor

371

In contrast to Dtr-Ant, where the alliance between philosophy and practical leadership was largely absent, Phoc-Cato Min presents two careers in which this alliance was robust, giving Plutarch the chance to examine the extent to which philosophers make the most effective leaders. As we will see, Plutarch crafts these two Lives to clearly distinguish circumstances where a dedication to philosophical principle enhances a statesman’s effectiveness in advancing the common welfare from circumstances where this dedication leads to harmful outcomes. When examined as pragmatic biography, Phoc-Cato becomes a source of paradigms for leaders in balancing considerations of moral integrity and expediency to produce the best outcomes for their city and state. As discussed in Chapter 2, this “gray area” of leadership was a primary concern of the advice literature. The key pragmatic lessons in Phocion and Cato Minor thus center on recognizing situations, especially in “diseased” political environments, that require a leader—whether in position as a ruler or among the ruled—to relax standards of “personal” moral virtue to serve the interests of his state. In the Prologue, Plutarch asserts that charting a course that preserves or expands security and liberty required the proper blend of frankness and leniency in dealings with the populace (Phoc. 2.4–5), echoing the principle from Political Precepts that a statesman must engage in give-and-take (Pol. Prec. 818A). The principles illustrated could be applied by men holding senior posts in city administration or military hierarchy or serving as intermediaries with the provincial authorities or the Emperor himself. 9.2

Life of Phocion

Overview Phocion (402–318 BC) was a leading Athenian between Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War (404) and the loss to Philip II at Chaeronea (338) and, between 371 and 318, was elected strategos forty-five times. He served under Chabrias as a young man at Naxos (376), commanded mercenaries in Cyprus (351/0), and led military campaigns in Euboea (348 and 341/0), Megara (343/2), Byzantium (340/39) and in the Lamian War (322). Phocion was active in the debates about Athenian policy towards Philip at the time of Demosthenes, Hypereides, Lycurgus and Leosthenes and opposed Demosthenes’ policy of begins in the opening chapter of the Phocion” and because the function of the synkrisis was accomplished in the Prologue.

372

Chapter 9

resistance. He negotiated with the Macedonians after Chaeronea and after the Lamian War. When Antipater I named Polyperchon as his successor instead of Cassander, turmoil erupted in Athens, and Phocion was condemned and put to death in 318. Phocion’s career is found in Diodorus Siculus (16–18) and in Nepos’ Life of Phocion. In other writers, Phocion is mentioned in Valerius Maximus in two contexts: as a model of resolution for standing by his advice, despite the success of the Athenians when they rejected it (3.3.ext 2) and as the object of ingratitude when Athens cast him out and did not permit him to be buried in Attica (5.3. ext.3.f,g). Dio (Or. 73.7) presents Phocion as a paradigm of how little “being trusted” matters to a statesman, while in Menander Rhetor (2.380), Phocion was used, along with Aristides, as a standard of “justice” against whom governors could be compared. In the Moralia, Plutarch often cites Phocion in connection with his frank speech. His comment to Antipater that “You cannot use me as both a friend and a flatterer” (οὐ δύνασαί μοι καὶ φίλῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι) appears three times (64C, 142C, 533A), and Political Precepts records several of Phocion’s quips deflecting challenges in debates (803B, 810D, 811A).11 In Old Men in Politics (789C, 791A, 792F), Phocion is a prime example of the benefits of old men in politics, while in On the Glory of Athens (350C) he is included among the great generals for his expedition to Byzantium by which he saved Athenian allies from “the insults and drunken lust” (ἐνύβρισμά τε καὶ παροίνημα) of the Macedonians. Phocion’s calm acceptance of condemnation (84F, 541C) and poverty (525C, 822E) provided a model of equanimity in the face of misfortune. In the Lives, Phocion’s comment on flattery is cited at Agis 2.2 and Alex. 39.1, while in Aratus (19.2) Phocion is a man who spurned gifts. Dem. 10.3 contrasts Demosthenes as “the greatest orator” with Phocion as “the most influential speaker”, and Phocion’s comment that he stood by his advice against a campaign that proved successful was used at Tim. 6.1 as a counter-example to Timoleon’s regret at assisting in his brother’s murder, as discussed above in Chapter 7. Phocion provides the most extensive portrait in the Parallel Lives of a man mediating between his state and a power that exercises hegemony over it.12 Thus, he comes closest to illustrating the challenges faced in the Greek cities 11  Phocion is cited nine times in Political Precepts: at 803B, 803E, 805F, 808A, 809D, 810D, 811A, 819A and 822E. 12  More limited portraits are found in other Lives: Philopoemen conducts relations between his city, Megalopolis, and the Macedonians; Aratus serves as an advisor to Antigonus and Philip after Sicyon comes under the sway of the Macedonians; and Solon becomes an advisor to Peisistratus after he instituted a tyranny in Athens.

Phocion-cato Minor

373

of Plutarch’s day by statesmen who needed to keep the Roman authorities at bay while managing internal conflicts—issues addressed directly at Political Precepts 814F–816A13 and echoed in Dio’s City Orations (especially Or. 38 and 48). Phocion provides paradigms for managing the people and negotiating with an overlord, both of which require a reputation for moral integrity and good critical judgment in balancing considerations of moral virtue and expediency. Moral Foundation and Reputation In Phocion, Plutarch illustrates the cultivation of moral character and skills of oratory as prescribed in Political Precepts, where Phocion, as noted above, appears as an exemplum. The impact of Plato’s philosophy as a foundation is especially prominent in this Life. The Life opens with Phocion’s education at the Academy under Plato and Xenocrates, as a result of which Phocion “became a follower of the noblest practices from the very beginning” (Phoc. 4.1).14 To the virtues ascribed to Phocion in the Prologue (Phoc. 3.5) and illustrated throughout the Life15—including kindness (e.g. 10.4–5, 22.3),16 bravery (6.2; 12.2–3; 14.4; 15.2, 25.1–2), solicitude for others (17.3, 34.5; 36.3)17 and the eager pursuit of justice (22.3)18—Plutarch adds temperance and simplicity (18.2, 20.3)19 and indifference to wealth (18.1, 21.3–4, 30.1).20 After Phocion’s death, the Athenians 13   Phocion gives pause to the prevalent view that the treatment of Rome in Political Precepts reveals that Plutarch sees little prospect for readers to directly implement the lessons in statesmanship derived from great statesmen of the past because they must always keep Roman supremacy in sight. 14  Like Alcibiades, Phocion is taught by the best philosopher of his day, but unlike Alcibiades he puts these principles immediately into practice. 15  Similar virtues are illustrated in the Life of Aristides, who also attracts a surname linked to virtue: “the Just”. 16  In private life, Plutarch illustrates Phocion’s kindness in helping adversaries in trouble (Phoc. 10.4–5) and educating the orphaned daughter of a courtesan (22.3). 17  Phocion’s solicitude extends to being willing to give his life for his fellow citizens (Phoc. 17.3, 34.5). 18  Phocion refuses to bend rules of justice to protect his son-in-law Charicles (Phoc. 22.3). Political Precepts 808A cites this example to illustrate the need for statesmen not to relax justice for their own friends and family. Agesilaus is the negative counter-example. 19  His temperance and simple lifestyle, in turn, are displayed through his wife (Phoc. 18.2, 20.3) and are amplified by the contrary example of his son, whom he sends to Sparta to train in the agoge (20.3). 20  Phocion is cited at Alex. 39.4 for refusing gifts. His virtue in poverty is noted at Political Precepts 822E.

374

Chapter 9

realize “what a patron and guardian of moderation and justice they had lost” (οἷον ἐπιστάτην καὶ φύλακα σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης) (Phoc. 38.1)21 Phocion’s virtues, combined with his tie to the Academy and his similarities to Socrates in various aspects of his attitudes and conduct,22 produce a reputation for virtue that forms the basis for trust in his character and for his surname “The Good” (τὴν τοῦ χρηστοῦ προσηγορίαν) (Phoc. 10.2).23 Thus, Phocion is portrayed as a man who possessed the virtues of the ideal ruler in the political treatises— temperance, bravery, justice, kindness, mildness and solicitude for others—and therefore his successes and failures can shed light on the benefits and limitations of the moral virtue of the philosopher on effective leadership. Refusal to Flatter Plutarch reports that, in his statesmanship, Phocion aspired to imitate Pericles, Aristides and Solon because they demonstrated excellence both as orators and generals (Phoc. 7.3). In his oratory, Phocion is described as a man who speaks frankly (ὁ παρρησιαζόμενος, Phoc. 2.1),24 as displayed in the brief anecdotes and quotes concentrated in Chapters 9 and 21.25 His frankness

21  Even after being condemned, Phocion evokes Socrates in his devotion to Athens when he sends a final message to his son that “he not cherish resentment against the Athenians” (μὴ μνησικακεῖν Ἀθηναίοις) (Phoc. 36.3). In calmly enduring condemnation Phocion not only imitates Socrates, but provides a positive counter-example to the reactions of Coriolanus and Alcibiades to their exiles. On the treatment of Socrates in this pair, see Trapp (1999). 22  Echoes of Socrates’ life and death are a unifying theme in the Life: Phoc. 4.2 and 38.2. See Geiger (1979b), Geiger (1996), Pelling (1997/2002), Trapp (1999). The image of Socrates is evoked through the principles that drive Phocion’s conduct, in contrast to Cato’s overt efforts in the paired Life to study Plato and directly imitate Socrates’ actions. 23  Both Nepos (Phocion, 1.1) and Diodorus Siculus (17.15.2) call Phocion “the Good”. Nepos points out that “Phocion was better known for the integrity of his life than for his work as a soldier” (multo eius notior est integritas vitae quam rei militaris labor) (Nepos, Phocion 1.1). 24  Exchanges with Demosthenes (Phoc. 5.4, 17.1), Leosthenes (23.2), Hypereides (23.2) and Demades (17.5) are reported in connections with debates that ended with Athens’ defeats at Chaeronea (338) and Crannon (322). Political Precepts cites Demosthenes’ comment that Phocion was the “cleaver of his speeches” (ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπίς) (803E) and Phocion’s comment that Leosthenes victory was “good for the short course; but it is the long course which I fear in the war” (καλὸν τὸ στάδιον εἶναι, δεδιέναι δὲ τοῦ πολέμου τὸν δόλιχον) (803B). 25  Many quotes are tied to his efforts to oppose other orators favoring war against Philip (Phoc. 16.1–2), Alexander (17.1) or Antipater (23.3). These quotations are consistent with

Phocion-cato Minor

375

and absolute refusal to flatter (or allow himself to be flattered)26 are shown to inspire confidence. Thus, although he consistently argued against war (Phoc. 8.1, 16.2, 23.1–2, 24.2–3), he was elected as general more often than any other man (8.1).27 Moreover, these same qualities enable him to work harmoniously with the allies (Phoc. 7.1, 11.1, 14.1, 15.2)28—a lesson for imperial legates of Plutarch’s day. Plutarch also associates Phocion’s rejections of gifts from both Alexander (Phoc. 18.1; 18.5) and Menyllus (Phoc. 30.1) as manifestations of his refusal to flatter overlords. Not only is Phocion shown rejecting repeated offers of money and revenues from both men, but he refuses to relent even when he risks angering Alexander, who had written that he could not consider a man his friend who did not want anything from him (Phoc. 18.4). Phocion, when he finds he cannot escape accepting a favor from Alexander, asks for the release of several men imprisoned in Sardis—an action reminiscent of Coriolanus’ request for the release of a guest-friend among the Volscians in place of a special share of the booty at Corioli (Cor. 10.3), as discussed in Chapter 5. These incidents reinforce the depiction of Phocion’s indifference to wealth (Phoc. 18.2–3) and reputation for integrity (18.1).

Plutarch’s comment in Political Precepts that political oratory (as opposed to forensic oratory) could admit “maxims, historical and mythical tales, and metaphors” (803A). 26  The comment that he cannot be both friend and flatterer also appears in How to Tell a Flatterer (64C), Precepts of Marriage (142B), Sayings of Kings and Commanders (188F) and the Life of Agis (2.2). 27  Peace and quiet are primary objectives for the statesmen in Political Precepts 815B. Phocion also adheres to Plutarch’s directive that statesmen not seek offices too eagerly or too often, nor refuse office if offered (813C). 28  Under Chabrias (Phoc. 7.1), Phocion deals with the allies “in a fair and straightforward manner” (ἐπιεικῶς καὶ ἀφελῶς), prompting them to rush out to escort him and readily provide the required contribution, in sharp contrast to their hostility towards other Athenian generals whom they treated as enemies (11.1). Phocion also elicits positive responses from Eretria (Phoc. 14.1), Byzantium (14.1) and Megara (15.2). When he leaves Eretria, the allies long for (ἐπόθησαν) his “goodness and justice” (χρηστότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην) (Phoc. 14.1), and he saves Byzantium because Leon, an associate from the Academy, vouches for him (14.4–5). Aristides illustrates similar effects of virtue in relations with allies: Aristides lured allies from Sparta, whose commanders were “odious and harsh” (ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ χαλεποὺς), and by “interacting with [the allies] in a mild and kind way” (πρᾴως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ὁμιλῶν), ultimately he stripped [Sparta] of the leadership “by consideration and diplomacy” (εὐγνωμοσύνῃ δὲ καὶ πολιτείᾳ) (Arist. 23.1).

376

Chapter 9

Severity The only problematic character trait included in Plutarch’s portrayal is Phocion’s severity (αὐστηρὸν), which had mixed effects on his relations with the Athenians. On the one hand, Phocion is described as “harsh, obstinate and inexorable” (τραχὺς ὢν καὶ δυσεκβίαστος καὶ ἀπαραίτητος) when fighting on behalf of public policies, but in his other relations as “well-disposed to all, accessible and kind” (εὐμενῆ πᾶσι καὶ κοινὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον) (Phoc. 10.4). On the other hand, his severity spawned rigidity in attitude that led him to resist the people out of habit29–reflecting the “stance that is too straight and opposed in all things to the popular desires” that Plutarch warns against in the Prologue (Phoc. 2.4). This attitude ultimately induces Phocion to neglect warnings about Nicanor and, as a result, to lose influence in Athens at a critical moment (32.5).30 Pragmatic Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled Plutarch’s pragmatic lessons for statesmen center on how to integrate philosophical precepts and expedient action in three areas: (1) Relations with other Athenians, (2) Military command, and (3) Relations with the overlord: Macedonian Kings. In each of these areas, Phocion supplies both positive and negative paradigms. Key incidents are listed in Table 9.1, where Phocion’s career has been divided into five phases. In Phase 1 (Chapters 4–10), Phocion rises to prominence and acquires his surname “The Good”. Phase 2 (11–16) details the events surrounding Chaeronea and ends with Philip’s death, while Phase 3 (17– 25) extends through the reigns of Alexander (336–323) and Antipater (323–319), closing with the Athenian defeat at Crannon (322). In Phase 4 (26–30), Phocion mediates with Antipater, while Phase 5 (31–38) presents the changes under Cassander and Polyperchon that eventually lead to Phocion’s trial and execution. While Phocion supplies positive paradigms of balancing philosophical precepts and expediency, especially in negotiations with the overlord, the deterrent lessons reflect the consequences of Phocion’s rigidity in relations with the people and excessive trust of the local prefect of the overlord. Such issues remained important to city leaders and men serving on embassies to Rome. 29  This attitude is displayed in his reaction to an oracle asserting that one man was at variance with the Athenians, to which he responds that the Athenians need seek no further; later, a positive response to his advice prompts him to ask “Can it possibly be that I am making a bad argument without knowing it?” (“Οὐ δήπου τι κακὸν λέγων ἐμαυτὸν λέληθα;”) (Phoc. 8.3). 30  To some extent, Phocion’s rigidity towards the people can be traced to a misapplication of a refusal to flatter the people: being willing to examine their warnings did not constitute flattery, but good statesmanship.

377

Phocion-cato Minor table 9.1 Episodes in the Life of Phocion Relations with other Athenians

Military command

Relations with the overlord: Macedonian Kings

Phase 1: Early life; rise to prominence (Chapters 4–10) 1–3- Prologue to Phoc-Cato 4–5- Family; core traits 7–8- Goals in public life; role models 9- Relations with Athens: anecdotes 10- Acquires cognomen: “the Good”

6- Early career; Chabrias as mentor

Phase 2: Actions during Philip’s rise to power; defeat at Chaeronea; general peace with Philip (11–16) 11- Allies prefer Phocion as envoy 12–13- Campaign to Euboea 14- Campaign to Byzantium and Hellespont 15- Campaign to assist Megara 16- Defeat at Chaeronea 16- Advises peace with Philip; Demosthenes prevails 16- Advises against general peace

16- General peace with Philip

Phase 3: Relations with Alexander the Great; transition to Antipater; defeat in Lamian War (17–25) 17- Opposes Demosthenes 17- Advises peace with Alexander 19–20- Phocion’s wife and son 21–22- Advises Athens; refuses help to Charicles in affair with Harpalus 23- Advises peace; Leosthenes prevails

17- Alexander destroys Thebes 17–18- Mediates with Alexander; refuses Alexander’s gifts

24- Leosthenes killed in battle 25- Defeats Micion at Rhamnus

23- Alexander dies 23- Antipater driven into Lamia by Athenian forces

378

Chapter 9

table 9.1 Episodes in the Life of Phocion (cont.) Relations with other Athenians

Military command

Relations with the overlord: Macedonian Kings

Phase 4: Defeat at Crannon; mediating Athenian autonomy with Antipater and Menyllus (26–30) 26- Athenians defeated at Crannon

30- Lifestyle; relations with son

26–27- Mediates with Antipater 28- Garrison imposed at Munychia 29- Negotiates return of exiles 30- Refuses Menyllus’ gift 30- Antipater dies; Cassander vies with Polyperchon for power

Phase 5: Dealing with disputed succession; mediating with Nicanor; condemnation and execution (31–38)

32- Warned about Nicanor 33- Deposed as general 34- Put on trial in Athens 35–37- Condemned and executed 38- Athenians repent

31- Nicanor sent by Cassander 32- Nicanor tries to take Piraeus 32- Ignores mustered army 33- Fails to lead army out in time 33- Embassy to Polyperchon

Relations with Other Athenians From the perspective of “the ruled” in provincial cities of the Empire, a city archon’s relations with the people involved a “balancing act” between addressing the desires of people and meeting the demands of Rome. Plutarch uses the incidents depicting Phocion’s relations with the Athenians to present positive and deterrent paradigms in how to meet the challenge of maintaining internal harmony in the city, while also winning the people over to policies that keep the overlord at bay. The pragmatic lessons center on the benefits and harm that can flow from inflexibility in dealing with the people in a city that answers to an external power.

Phocion-cato Minor

379

Standing by One’s Best Advice In episodes in Athens, Phocion is shown to be unflinching in defending policies he thinks best for Athens—even if they turn out to be wrong, reinforcing his reputation as a man who rejected submissiveness in any form.31 When he was challenged because the war he opposed against Antipater turned out well, Phocion famously said he was glad to have given the advice he did and commented that Athenians could force him to act against his wishes, but “could not compel him to speak against his judgment”(Phoc. 23.4).32 The primary benefit of Phocion’s unapologetic stance lies in the willingness of the Athenians to trust him at times of crisis: Phocion opposed them [the Athenian people] the most and never said or did anything to gain their favor (πρὸς χάριν). But, always being sober and serious with regard to commanders, they used to summon the man who, out of all the citizens, was the most severe and who had the best practical judgment (αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον) and a man who alone, or more than most, had set himself in opposition (ἀντιτασσόμενον) to their desires and impulses. Phoc. 8.2

Correspondingly, the Athenians seek Phocion’s guidance after Chaeronea (Phoc. 16.3) and the destruction of Thebes (Phoc. 17.2), while after Crannon they call him “the only man whom they could trust” (μόνῳ πιστεύειν ἐκείνῳ) (Phoc. 26.3).33 These episodes illustrate Plutarch’s assertions in Political Precepts (800B–801C) that the people are responsive to a virtuous statesman in difficult times. Plutarch also includes another instructive incident that illustrates a tactic for inducing the people to follow advice they initially reject. When the Athenians refuse to desist from a campaign, Phocion orders all men up to the age of sixty to prepare for the expedition and answers objections by saying 31  Here Phocion, like Agesilaus and Fabius, provides a positive counter-example to Pompey. 32  This incident, as noted earlier, provides the counter-example to Timoleon’s regret at Tim. 6.1. 33  Thus, Phocion illustrates the claim at Political Precepts 821B that “nothing makes a man willingly tractable and gentle to another man except trust in his goodwill and belief in his nobility and justice” (ἄνθρωπων δ’ ἀνθρώπῳ χειροήθη καὶ πρᾶον ἑκουσίως οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ πίστις εὐνοίας καὶ καλοκαγαθίας δόξα καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρίστησιν).

380

Chapter 9

that he himself was eighty (Phoc. 24.3).34 The Athenians respond by voting against it. Such ploys to induce the people to change their minds when they cannot be persuaded in debate contain useful pragmatic lessons for leaders.35 Responding Appropriately to the Concerns of the People Plutarch also conveys the harmful consequences when a “resolute” attitude becomes inflexible rigidity, especially when a statesman has also assumed the role as mediator with the overlord. After he was established as the key mediator with Macedon, Phocion was subject to misgivings in Athens that his loyalties were divided and that his inflexibility vis-à-vis the Athenians was a reflection of his desire to favor the Macedonians. When Athenians’ suspicions were aroused by the arrival of Nicanor as the commander from Cassander before Antipater’s death had been reported, the combination of Phocion’s stern demeanor and his failure to pay attention (οὐκ ἐφρόντιζεν, Phoc. 31.2) to Athenians’ concerns provoked criticism:36 Phocion was blamed and criticized on the grounds that he was aware of the situation beforehand (ὡς προαισθόμενος) and was silent about it as a favor to Nicanor. Phoc. 31.2

Later, Phocion pays no attention to reports of Nicanor’s movements and ignores the mustered army awaiting his commands (Phoc. 32.5), again provoking a negative response among Athenians: when he belatedly tries to organize for battle after Nicanor has attacked, he is “stormed at” (ἐθορυβεῖτο) and “held in derision” (κατεφρονεῖτο) (Phoc. 33.1). The deterrent lesson lies both in the illwill generated by Phocion’s abrupt dismissal of the people’s views and in his subsequent inability to persuade the Athenians to follow his command, which together result in injury to Athens. 34  This incident is also reported in Old Men in Politics (791F). 35  Other examples of dissuading an assembly are found in Solon’s pretended prophetic frenzy (Sol. 8.1–3) when he wanted Athenians to rescind the law stopping the war for Salamis and in Themistocles’ staging of signs from heaven and oracles to induce Athenians to leave the city, “setting up stage machinery, …, as a theatrical manager would for a tragedy” (Them. 10.1–3). 36  Phocion’s stern demeanor elicits the same sort of suspicious response seen in Coriolanus, when the people believe that he is going to use his influence against them (Cor. 13.4). See Chapter 5.

Phocion-cato Minor

381

Plutarch’s deliberate crafting of this episode to provide this lesson is suggested by comparisons with other accounts, in which Phocion plays a relatively minor role. In Diodorus (18.64.2), the delay in responding to the threat is attributed to Nicanor’s deception of the Athenian assembly, which agrees to wait a few days to learn of Cassander’s intentions. In Nepos’ Phocion (2.4–5), Phocion dismisses an early warning about Nicanor, but the mustering of the army and Phocion’s refusal to take charge occurs after the Piraeus is taken, not before. Plutarch magnifies Phocion’s fault by presenting him as the primary hindrance to a timely Athenian response, making him responsible for the ruinous effects that followed. Military Command The episodes depicting Phocion’s generalship belong to three periods in his career: actions before Chaeronea, actions between Chaeronea and Crannon and his action as a general after Athens came under Macedonian control. Although Phocion was elected general forty-five times, Plutarch includes only a few episodes to present both positive and deterrent paradigms for generals of his own day. On the one hand, the military actions which took place before Crannon convey pragmatic lessons in instilling confidence in troops and the allied states, while, on the other hand, Phocion’s final actions as a general provide a deterrent paradigm in failing to anticipate threats to one’s state. Instilling Confidence in Troops and Allies Before the defeat at Crannon (Phoc. 26), Phocion demonstrates excellent generalship in a variety of situations. When he confronts the larger army of Philip in Euboea, he finds the men of Euboea unwilling to join Athens and instead starting to desert. Phocion responds (at Phoc. 12.3) by assembling his best fighters on a hill and orders his leaders to ignore the men who ran away:37 He ordered his officers to pay no attention [to the deserters], for here [in the camp] they would be useless because of their disorder and harmful to the fighting men, and there [at home] having become conscious of these sorts of things they would decry him less (καταβοήσεσθαι) and not make false accusations at all (συκοφαντήσειν). Phoc. 12.3

37  Phocion’s attitude to the beneficial effects of deserters is similar to Timoleon’s decision to ignore the departure of the mercenaries ahead of the Battle of Crimesus (Tim. 25–26).

382

Chapter 9

The incident becomes a lesson when Plutarch reports Phocion’s reasons for not fearing the deserters. Moreover, Phocion’s army is victorious: after holding his forces quiet until the enemy attacks—believing the delay is due to cowardice—Phocion wins the day (Phoc. 13.1). Plutarch also uses the account of Phocion’s expedition against Philip in the Hellespont (Phoc. 14) to illustrate the positive reactions of allied states to fair and just treatment by their hegemon.38 In this episode, Phocion replaces Chares, a general who had caused the allies to become suspicious and to even refuse him entry to their harbors because he had simply exacted money from them without defeating the enemy (Phoc. 14.2). Phocion supplies the positive counter-example. First, he defends the allies: Then Phocion rose in the assembly and declared that they must not be angry at their allies who showed distrust, but at their generals who were distrusted: “For these”, said he, “cause us to be feared even by those who can be saved only by our help.” Phoc. 14.3

The emphasis here on earning the trust of subject states reinforces Plutarch’s theme that rulers must elicit willing obedience from subjects if they want to retain power. Subsequently, Phocion’s generalship in aid of Byzantium illustrates effective relations with allied states: his reputation for moral integrity— vouched for by his friend from the Academy, Leon of Byzantium—induces the people of Byzantium to receive the Athenians inside the walls. This mark of confidence leads to a reciprocal response from the Athenian army, which was not only “blameless and temperate” in their conduct, but also “most spirited” (προθυμοτάτους) in their defense of the city (Phoc. 14.4). Ultimately, Phocion saved Byzantium, drove Philip out of the Hellespont and recovered many cities—achievements made possible, in part, by the confidence attracted by his reputation for virtue (Phoc. 14.5).

38  Aristides (Arist. 23.1–2) and Cimon (Cim. 6.1–3) are also shown winning over allies not through force of arms but “by virtue of address and character” (λόγῳ καὶ ἤθει παρελόμενος, Cim. 6.2). Through the justice of Aristides (τὴν Ἀριστείδου δικαιοσύνην) and fairness of Cimon (τὴν Κίμωνος ἐπιείκειαν), the Athenians prove especially appealing by comparison with the rapacity and oppressiveness of Pausanias (τοῦ Παυσανίου πλεονεξία καὶ βαρύτης, Arist. 23.2) and the insolence (ὑβρίζοντος) and silly pretension (ὄγκον ἀνόητον) of the Spartans (Cim. 6.2).

Phocion-cato Minor

383

Anticipating Threats After Athens comes under Macedon, Phocion does not appear as general until the incident with Nicanor (Phoc. 32–33), which showcases defective generalship. Although Phocion is the leading general as events unfold, he neither acts to bring the Athenians under arms nor, when others have mustered the army, does he take charge in time to save the Piraeus from attack (Phoc. 32.5). Thus, in his culminating act as general, he fails to exercise foresight and take timely action—two of the most important duties of a general. The underlying cause of these lapses is traced to Phocion’s rigid opposition to the people and a misjudgment about the trustworthiness of the legate of the overlord (Phoc. 33.3). Plutarch’s portrait of Phocion’s generalship places far greater emphasis on Phocion’s lack of foresight than other accounts do. Nepos, for instance, reports only one warning that was ignored: But his downfall was due particularly to one offence, committed when he held the highest office in the gift of the people. On that occasion, being warned by Dercylus that Nicanor, one of Cassander’s prefects, was plotting an attack on the Piraeus of the Athenians, and being urged to take heed that the state should not be deprived of supplies, Phocion replied in the hearing of the people that there was no danger and promised to assume all responsibility. Nepos, Phoc. 2.4–5

Nepos also differs from Plutarch in presenting this incident not as a failure in generalship, but as the culmination of a pattern of neglect of Athenian interests that already made Phocion’s motives suspect. Plutarch’s version provides a clearer deterrent model for generals of his own day, who could also dismiss warnings too readily. Relations with the Overlord: Macedonian Kings While Phocion acted as a “ruler” in the relations with allied states, in his interactions with the Macedonians he was among “the ruled”. Plutarch constructs Phocion’s relations with the Macedonian Kings to illustrate the precepts for interacting with Rome as presented at Political Precepts 813E–816A, where he advises his readers to always remind themselves: You who are a subject (ἀρχόμενος) rule (ἄρχεις) a city that is controlled by proconsuls, the agents of Caesar. Pol. Prec. 813E

384

Chapter 9

In the treatise, Plutarch highlights four key principles for a city leader to follow in managing relations with Rome: (1) stay within the limits set by Rome (813E); (2) show oneself and one’s state blameless towards the rulers (814C); (3) have friends in high places (814C); and (4) maintain harmony in one’s city (815B). In Phocion, Plutarch demonstrates practical strategies to put these precepts into effect. In particular, Plutarch address three central challenges: accommodating the character of the overlord; balancing considerations of virtue and expediency in negotiations with the overlord; and blending trust and wariness in relations with local prefects. Like Plutarch’s contemporaries in provincial cities, Phocion attempted to obtain as much autonomy as possible for his city and terms that were advantageous for its prosperity—issues routinely raised in Pliny’s Epistulae and in Dio’s City Orations, as discussed in Chapter 2. The Life supplies positive paradigms of how to achieve these goals, while also delivering a cautionary lesson in the perils of placing too much trust in the prefects of the overlord.

Accommodating the Character of the Overlord: Negotiating on Behalf of One’s City In Phocion, Plutarch treats the challenge of engaging constructively with a series of provincial governors—who generally served short terms of three years or less—or Emperors who differed in character and temperament.39 In the Life, Phocion interacts with four Macedonian Kings and their prefects— including Philip (Phoc. 16), Alexander (16–18), Antipater and his prefect Menyllus (26–27), Cassander and his prefect Nicanor (30–31) and Polyperchon (33.3–6). These relations are a central element in the political environment of the Life, which itself opens (in the Prologue) with a reference to Athenian subservience to Antipater and the Macedonians (Phoc. 1.1–2), illustrated in the contrast between the flattery and obsequiousness of Demades and the frankness and integrity of Phocion in their relations with the Macedonian Kings.40

39  Duff (1999b: 155) contrasts Phocion’s willingness to mediate to ease the harshness of Macedonian rule to Cato’s inflexible stance. Beck (2004: 111–113) highlights Phocion’s ability to adjust to the demands of the times, again in contrast to Cato Minor. 40  In the incidents involving Antipater in the Life (Phoc. 26–30), Demades the orator provides a contrast that brings Phocion’s temperance and restrained attitude toward money into better focus (Phoc. 30.2–5). The conduct of Demades provides another perspective on the flattery and obsequiousness that characterized Stratocles and Dromocleides in Demetrius (Dtr. 10–11; 13).

Phocion-cato Minor

385

The pragmatic lessons for statesmen reside in the details Plutarch provides about the process of negotiation. Plutarch quotes two of Phocion’s principles for engaging overlords: first, “It is better to supplicate and try to persuade the victors (πείθειν καὶ παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς κρατοῦντας)—for both you and them—and not to fight” (Phoc. 17.3), and, second, “Either be superior in arms or be friends with those who are superior” (21.1). Plutarch provides several illustrations of how Phocion’s effectiveness in negotiations benefitted from his reputation for moral integrity, which elicited the trust of Philip and Alexander (Phoc. 17.4–6), as well as Antipater (26.4), and induced both Alexander (17.4) and Antipater (30.4) to take his advice and offer favorable terms to the Athenians. Plutarch also uses Phocion to showcase techniques for engaging with Emperors and governors with different temperaments. Plutarch links Phocion’s friendly rapport with Alexander (Phoc. 17.4–18.5) and Antipater (26.3–30.6) to his ability to adapt to the moral character of each leader. Phocion softens Alexander’s attitude toward Athens by saying many things “that suited Alexander’s nature and desires” (πρὸς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου φύσιν καὶ βούλησιν εὐστόχως) and, ultimately, is welcomed by Alexander as a friend (Phoc. 17.5– 6). However, Phocion adopts a different approach with Antipater, who not only exhibited “a certain ruthlessness and hatred of goodness” (ἀγνωμοσύνῃ τινὶ καὶ μισαγαθίᾳ) (Phoc. 27.2), but also was a “more odious” (ἐπαχθέστερος) master and tyrant, whose wrath was harder to appease (Phoc. 29.2). Phocion, therefore, did not provoke Antipater by resisting his demand for a garrison—­ unlike Xenocrates, who adamantly opposed it as unworthy of free men (Phoc. 27.4–5)—and instead preserved a friendly rapport and later obtained more lenient terms for exiles (29.3) and a delay in the payments due from Athens (30.4). Similarly, when Nicanor replaced Menyllus as the head of the garrison, Phocion interceded on behalf of the Athenians and “by interviews and discussions” rendered Nicanor “mild and gracious” (πρᾷον … καὶ κεχαρισμένον) to the Athenians (Phoc. 31.2). Phocion’s influence was reinforced by his success in maintaining harmony in Athens, where he managed affairs “mildly and according to the laws” and kept “busybodies and innovators” (πολυπράγμονας καὶ νεωτεριστάς) out of office (Phoc. 29.4). Plutarch’s purposeful depiction of negotiations to provide lessons for leaders is revealed by departures from other accounts. By comparison to Diodorus Siculus and Nepos, Plutarch amplifies Phocion’s responsibility for obtaining favorable terms from the Macedonians, presenting him as virtually the only negotiator with Alexander and Antipater. In Diodorus, in contrast, Demades, not Phocion, is envoy to Alexander and he succeeds through his eloquence (Diodorus 17.15.4–5). Furthermore, although both men are included in the embassy to Antipater, the results of negotiations are attributed to the group as

386

Chapter 9

a whole (Diodorus 18.18.1–6). Nepos, in turn, focuses on the hatred Phocion incurred with the Athenians on the grounds that, when serving as their ambassador, he had agreed with Demades to turn over the city to Antipater and had betrayed Demosthenes’ friendship in advising Athenians to exile him (Nepos, Phocion 2.1–3).41 By making Phocion the leader of negotiations and attributing his effectiveness to the trust inspired by his moral integrity and his adaptability to the character of each ruler, Plutarch provides positive paradigms for conducting relations with Rome.

Balancing Virtue with Expediency in Relations with the Overlord: Phocion and Xenocrates Phocion’s skill in negotiating with Kings is brought into sharper relief by the incidents involving Xenocrates (Phoc. 27.1–5, 29.4) in the embassy to Antipater. While Phocion is willing to compromise to reach an agreement that benefits Athens, Xenocrates rejects the agreement as unworthy of free men and refuses to participate as a full Athenian citizen thereafter.42 The contrast between Phocion’s adaptability and Xenocrates’ inflexibility highlights the difference between the judgment of a “πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ” and a “φιλόσοφος” in the area of public affairs—a distinction that underlies the major lessons of the PhocionCato Minor pair.43 Demades, portrayed as a man who obsequiously caters to the whims of the Macedonians (Phoc. 1.1), provides the negative example at the opposite extreme to Xenocrates. Again, Plutarch’s intended lesson for statesmen is clarified by the differences versus Diodorus and Nepos, in which Xenocrates does not even participate in the embassy to Antipater while Demades is included in it. By crafting 41   Plutarch distances Phocion from Demades throughout the narrative, opening the Prologue with the contrast between the baseness of Demades and the virtue of Phocion (Phoc. 1.1–2) and depicting their differences in policy and moral character (17.5, 30.2–3). In the case of Demosthenes, Plutarch simply presents Phocion’s opposition to the policies he advocated (Phoc. 9.5, 16.2, 17.1), without mentioning any further friendship or betrayal. 42  Xenocrates provides a preview of the uncompromising moral rectitude in public life that will characterize Cato in the paired Life. In both cases, the inflexible stance is ineffective in resolving the political crises at hand. 43  The distinction between assessing events with the standards of a philosopher and those of expediency is seen in a variety of contexts in the Lives, as, for instance, in Plutarch’s comment about Themistocles playing on Athenian jealousy toward Aegina in order to secure funds to build ships: “whether he did injury to the integrity and purity (τὴν ἀκρίβειαν καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν) of public life or not, let the philosopher rather investigate (ἔστω φιλοσοφώτερον ἐπισκοπεῖν). But that salvation of the Hellenes came from the sea … there are many proofs” (Them. 4.4).

Phocion-cato Minor

387

an account centered on Xenocrates rather than Demades, Plutarch recasts the nature of the agreement with Antipater that imposed the garrison on Athens and caused great resentment in the city, (Phoc. 28.1). Plutarch’s version makes it clear that Phocion had little prospect of inducing Antipater to leave Athens free: not only was Xenocrates, a man widely revered for his virtue, unable to move Antipater, but another Athenian ambassador, Callimedon, rejects outright Antipater’s offer to forego the garrison (Phoc. 27.5). As a result, Phocion’s acceptance of the garrison becomes an unavoidable compromise (an example of “political necessity”) that provides a paradigm for balancing considerations of moral virtue and expediency in relations with an overlord. At the same time, by introducing Xenocrates, Plutarch can also show the ineffectiveness of rigid adherence to philosophical principles when concessions are necessary to preserve a level of autonomy in one’s state. The same issue becomes important in the paired Life, where Cato’s effectiveness as a leader is also impaired by a refusal to compromise his moral integrity. In effect, Xenocrates and Demades, by illustrating the extremes of too much rigidity and too much submissiveness, add emphasis to the prudent flexibility Phocion used to achieve the best outcome possible in such situations.

Blending Trust and Wariness in Relations with Prefects: Phocion and Nicanor Phocion’s refusal to arrest Nicanor addresses the distinction between the philosopher and the statesman from another perspective. In this case, however, Phocion himself provides a deterrent example of misapplying a philosophical principle appropriate for private conduct to relations with local prefects. Phocion’s error is revealed in the two reasons he cites for not detaining Nicanor after being warned about him: (1) his confidence in Nicanor’s integrity44 and (2) his unwillingness to violate a philosophical precept:45

44  By basing his decision on a feeling of trust, Phocion essentially treats relations with Nicanor as a friendship based on virtue rather than a “friendship of utility” appropriate for the political arena in which men are serving the interests of different states. Aristotle makes these distinctions in NE 8.3–9 (1156a–1156b). This sentiment is consistent with comments elsewhere in the Lives that political virtue is the highest form of virtue in action (Arist-Cato 3.1). 45  While a monarch ought to be concerned about not wronging his subjects (To an Uneducated Ruler 781 C–D), a mediator or emissary to foreign states should not guide his behavior towards foreign counterparts by the same maxim because the two parties do not share the same interests with regard to their states.

388

Chapter 9

When Phocion was denounced for letting Nicanor go and and not detaining him, he said that he trusted Nicanor and expected nothing terrible from him, but in any case, that he preferred to be found being wronged than doing wrong (ἀδικούμενος ἢ ἀδικῶν). Phoc. 32.3

In an authorial comment, Plutarch explains why such reasons for inaction are unacceptable in a statesman charged with caring for his city: This might seem to have been spoken nobly and honorably by someone looking out for his own interests (ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ), but the man putting the safety of his country at risk, and that too when he is its commanding general, transgresses, I suppose, something greater and more important: justice towards the citizens (τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας δίκαιον). Phoc. 32.4

The deterrent force of Phocion’s reasoning is amplified by Plutarch’s further comment that there could have been a good reason for not arresting Nicanor— such as concern that such action would plunge Athens into war (Phoc. 32.3–5). Thus, Phocion’s error lay not in what he did, per se, but in his motives for doing it. With Nicanor, Phocion acts more like Xenocrates (Phoc. 27.1–2) in attempting to apply philosophical maxims to a situation where expediency required that he set aside such maxims for the sake of the best interests of Athens. For this reason, Phocion becomes a negative paradigm of how a statesman can cause great harm to his city when he guides his actions by philosophical principles rather than careful consideration of what each situation requires. Summary: Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled in Phocion In his Life, Phocion is portrayed as a positive paradigm in a wide array of political, military and diplomatic contexts that posed challenges for men in Plutarch’s audience. He refuses to flatter the people and stands by his recommendations whether they ultimately prove to be right or wrong—conduct that ultimately wins the trust of Athenians at times of crisis. Phocion’s reputation for moral integrity also contributes to his ability to readily attract the cooperation and support of the allied states, as well as successfully negotiate favorable terms with the overlord. As an ambassador to the Kings, he also illustrates how adapting one’s approach to suit the character of the ruler and being willing to compromise enables a statesman to secure the best possible outcomes for his city.

Phocion-cato Minor

389

However, Phocion is also a deterrent model in two areas. As noted above, he maintains a posture that is “too upright, and opposed in all things to the people” (2.4)—even in circumstances where yielding to popular desires would have been best for the state. Secondly, Phocion places too much trust in the representative of the overlord, Nicanor, and guides his conduct by philosophical precepts rather than considerations of expediency with regard to the safety of his city. Plutarch’s intention to highlight precisely these points is reflected in his supplementary comments and manipulation of sources to magnify the prominence of Phocion’s role as mediator with the Macedonians and as decision maker in Athens. The absence of a synkrisis leaves open the possibility that the deterrent force of these lessons would have been re-emphasized in the final comparison of differences. In Phocion, Plutarch presents a statesman who is a follower of Plato and whose career illustrates the benefits and limitations of moral virtue as a guide for statesmen. In Cato Minor, Plutarch explores the distinction between “philosopher” and “statesman” in new contexts, highlighting the perils of using moral virtue alone as the guide to action in a “diseased” state. Cato, like Phocion, enjoys a reputation for moral integrity, but rigidly applies standards of moral virtue to situations that require compromise. 9.3

Life of Cato Minor

Overview Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis (95–46 BC), the great grandson of Cato the Censor (234–149), had a relatively brief political career—spanning about two decades from his military tribuneship (67) until his suicide after the Battle of Thapsus (46)—yet he became one of the most eminent statesmen of his time. He was quaestor in 64 and tribune in 62, and as tribune-elect in 63 famously argued against Caesar in favor of executing the Catilinarian conspirators. In 58, Cato was appointed to oversee the annexation of Cyprus, and later, after losing to Vatinius in his first attempt (56), was elected praetor for 54. After supporting the election of Pompey as sole consul (52), Cato ran for the consulship and lost in 51. During the Civil War, he sided with Pompey and served in Sicily and Asia. He joined the Pompeians in Africa after Pharsalus and committed suicide in Utica after the defeat at Thapsus (46). Cato plays a prominent role in accounts of the period, including those of his contemporaries Cicero, Caesar and Sallust (Bellum Catilinae), as well as those of Velleius Paterculus, Lucan, Suetonius (Divus Iulius), Cassius Dio (37.22–43.13)

390

Chapter 9

and Appian (Civil Wars 2). Cato’s reputation for practicing virtue is the most frequently mentioned attribute across accounts, with Velleius Paterculus going so far as to comment that Cato “resembled Virtue herself, and in all his acts revealed a character nearer to that of gods than of men” (homo Virtuti simillimus et per omnia ingenio diis quam hominibus propior) (Vell. 2.35.1–2). Sallust (B.C. 53.6–54.6) presents Cato and Caesar as the two men “of immense virtue” (ingenti virtute) of his day, with Cato’s “uprightness” (integritate vitae), “austerity” (severitas), “incorruptibility” (nihil largiundo) and “steadfastness” (constantia) distinguishing him from the “generosity” (munificentia), “mildness” (mansuetudine), “forgiveness” (ignoscundo) and “good nature” ( facilitas) of Caesar. Cato’s reputed virtue became a “commonplace” in other writers as well. He is cited eighteen times in Valerius Maximus46 in a variety of contexts illustrating his self-restraint, way of life and strict adherence to law, as well as the high regard he enjoyed because of his rigid virtue. Seneca presents Cato not only as the ideal of virtue,47 but also—alongside Socrates, Rutilius and Regulus48— as an exemplum of an honorable death and the ability to withstand misfortune (including his election defeats) with equanimity.49 Cato is also portrayed by Seneca as doing battle with Fortune and prolonging the survival of the Republic50 before dying at the same time that freedom died in Rome.51 Cicero, in De Officiis, mentions Cato as a man whose suicide was consistent with his uncompromising character (1.31.112) and as a leader who was too rigorous in refusing to modify tax laws to promote harmony between the orders (3.22.87). In Quintilian, incidents from Cato’s life and career are cited twelve times to illustrate various rhetorical concepts,52 while Pliny refers to Cato both as a symbol 46  Valerius Maximus cites Cato at: 2.8.1; 2.10.7, 8; 3.2.3a, b; 3.2.14; 3.4.6; 3.6.7; 4.1.14; 4.3.2, 12; 4.6.5; 5.1.10; 6.2.5; 7.5.6; 8.2.1; 8.7.2; and 8.15.10. 47  For Cato as an exemplum of ideal virtue in Seneca, see Ep. Mor. (95.69–73; 104.22, 33), De Constantia (1.3, 2.1–2, 6.3), De Ira (2.32, 2; 3.38.2) and De Tranquillitate Animi (7.5, 16.1). 48  Seneca groups Cato with Socrates, Rutilius and/or Regulus at Ep. Mor. (67.7, 13; 70.17; 97.12; 104.27–29); and at De Prov. 3.4. 49  Seneca links Cato’s election defeats to misfortune or the corrupt times in Ep. Mor. (71.8, 71.11, 104.30–32, 113.5) and De Benef. 5.16–17. Vatinius—who defeated Cato with Caesar’s support—is used to exemplify corruption as the opposite of Cato’s virtue at Ep. Mor. (94.15, 98.4, 120.19) and De Constantia 1.3. 50  Seneca depicts Cato doing battle with Fortune at Ep. Mor. 104.29–35 and De Prov. (2.9; 3.4, 14; 4.1). 51  Seneca notes the simultaneous end of freedom and of Cato at Ep. Mor. 95.72; De Constantia 2.2; and De Tranq. Animi 14.1. 52  Issues raised by Quintilian include questions about Cato’s decision to marry and later to pass Marcia to Hortensius (Quint. 3.4.8–13, 110.5.13), his defeat to Vatinius for the praetorship (9.2.25) and his willingness to take on powerful men (9.4.75, 6.3.112, 12.7.4).

Phocion-cato Minor

391

of virtue (Ep. 1.17.3, 3.21.5, 4.27.4) and as an object of criticism by Caesar for his drunkenness (Ep. 3.12), a charge mentioned (and excused) by Seneca as well (De Tranq. Animi 17.4, 9). In Plutarch’s Moralia, Cato appears in nine treatises, including those on statesmanship.53 In To an Uneducated Ruler, his solicitude for the Romans before his suicide—making a proclamation that they be sent off by sea—is considered a positive illustration of the principle that a leader ought to be more fearful of doing harm than suffering it (φοβεῖσθαι … τοῦ παθεῖν κακῶς μᾶλλον τὸ ποιῆσαι, 781C ):54 And after he put them on board the ship and prayed for a safe voyage for them, he went back to the house and killed himself, instructing (διδάξας) us on whose behalf the ruler must have fear and what he must disdain. To an Uneducated Ruler, 781C–D

Cato is also a positive model of applying lessons of philosophy in public life in Philosophers and Men in Power (777A), and in Political Precepts he is used to illustrate behaviors to imitate in four areas—including oratory (804C), dedication to the common good (808E), relations with colleagues (810C) and relations with the people (818D)—and is a deterrent model of refusing requests with excessive harshness (808E).55 In the Lives, Cato plays various roles in Lucullus, Crassus, Pompey, Cicero, Caesar, Brutus and Antony. He is also listed among the descendants of the elder Cato as “Cato the philosopher, who was the best and most illustrious man of his time” (Cato Mai. 27.5). In Cato Minor, Plutarch treats the conflict between maintaining standards of personal moral virtue and doing what is expedient for the common welfare in a corrupt political environment. Plutarch places this issue on view when he introduces Cato at Phoc. 3.1–2 as a “fruit out of season” (τοῖς μὴ καθ’ ὥραν ἐκφανεῖσι καρποῖς), whose virtues won him fame but were not suited to the “corrupt and debased customs” (διεφθορόσι καὶ πονηροῖς ἔθεσι) of his time: The old fashioned character of Cato (ἀρχαιοτροπία), which after much time came upon corrupted lives and debased customs, had great repute 53  Cato is cited as a statesman of extreme austerity and integrity (e.g. How to Profit From Enemies 91D-E, On Being Compliant 534B), a model student (On Listening to Poets 28B) and loving brother (On Brotherly Love 487C). Cato’s suicide twice receives comment (On the Malice of Herodotus 856B and To an Uneducated Ruler 781D). In On Control of Anger (463E), he is paired with Aristides as a type of man who issues moral injunctions. 54  Cato, unlike Phocion (Phoc. 30.6), applied the principle properly to men under his care. 55  Cato’s harsh rebuff of Catulus is also cited in On Being Compliant (534D).

392

Chapter 9

and fame, but was not suited to the needs of the day (οὐκ ἐνήρμοσε δὲ ταῖς χρείαις) because the weight and magnitude of his virtue was out of proportion to the present times. Phoc. 3.2

Thus, virtue can be “disproportionate” (ἀσύμμετρον) to the political environment in which it is active. In Cato, Plutarch underscores the need for statesmen to adapt their policies to the “needs” and practices of their day if they intend to acquire power and implement the best policies for the common good. This theme is prominent in all of the Lives spanning the Late Republic,56 in which Plutarch adopts characterizations for Cato, Cicero, Pompey and Caesar that reflect different degrees of “flexibility” in relaxing standards of moral virtue and justice to accommodate the corrupt political environment.57 Caesar is consistently the most willing, and Cato the least willing, to adapt his conduct to the times. In Cato, Plutarch uses the other leaders as foils to bring into sharper focus the positive and negative effects of Cato’s unwillingness to compromise.58 Plutarch employs Cato Minor to convey strongly positive and deterrent paradigms for statesmen of his own era. The closest most politically-active men could come to being a “ruler” under the Roman Empire was to serve as a senior magistrate with the responsibility of either training or managing a group of subordinates, over which they had authority to punish or reward performance. Although Cato never held the office of consul, his conduct in other offices, as well as his relations with his colleagues and rivals in the Senate and with the leaders of his party, demonstrates how a man among “the ruled” can exert positive influence on those in power. In the Life, Plutarch crafts key episodes to deliver positive paradigms both in how to exercise authority over subordinates (“ruling”) and in how to exercise influence over those in power (“being ruled”). These lessons could be applied by men who held magistracies in the Roman imperial structure or, when out of office, could influence policies of men who occupied high positions, including, potentially, the Emperor himself. The key deterrent pragmatic lesson centers on Cato’s failure to seize opportunities to benefit his state because of his rigid adherence to philosophical precepts when expediency on behalf of the common welfare required compromise. 56  The nine Roman Lives tied to this period are Marius, Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, Crassus, Caesar, Cato, Brutus and Antony. The careers of the Gracchi are generally seen as marking the beginning of the decline. 57  The overlaps in characterization are discussed by Beneker (2005a). 58  Duff (1999b) discusses Cato’s inflexibility as his critical flaw as a statesman.

Phocion-cato Minor

393

Moral Foundation and Reputation Of all the heroes of Plutarch’s Lives, few, if any, enjoyed a stronger reputation for virtue than Cato.59 The Life immediately focuses on the political arena, opening with a reference to Cato the Elder as a man, who “gained the greatest reputation and influence through his virtue” (Cato Min. 1.1). Phocion’s virtues often emerge in Cato in a more extreme form. Cato is not only temperate (Cato Min. 4.1, 7.3), but his personal habits are “exacting and severe”(ἀκριβὴς καὶ σύντονος) (Cato Min. 3.6).60 Like Phocion, Cato is indifferent to money and honors61 (Cato Min. 6.4, 8.2, 10.3, 15.3, 39.3), but, with regard to bribery, Cato not only does not accept bribes, but diligently fights the practice (44.3–6).62 While Phocion’s bravery is depicted in both political and military contexts, Cato’s courage is on display primarily in his “battles” in Roman politics (Cato Min. 21.1, 27.3–6, 28.2 and 41.2–5).63 His solicitude for others is apparent in his repeated fights for justice (Cato Min. 20.3, 21.1–2, 41.5 and 54.3–5) and in his concern to send his followers safely to Rome before his suicide (65.3–4). Cato’s oratorical abilities also are exceptional—although, unlike Phocion, he is long-winded rather than brief.64 He purposely cultivates a style that can be 59  Aristides “The Just” and Phocion “The Good” come closest in their reputation for virtue. 60  His temperance surpassed that of other men, even his brother Caepio, who was admired “for his temperance and moderation” (ἐπὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ μετριότητι), but who thought that compared to Cato he was “no better than Sittius”, a man known for his luxury and effeminacy (Cato Min. 3.6). Cato’s extravagant memorial for his brother is the only major departure from this simplicity (Cato Min. 11.2–3). Like Phocion (Phoc. 4.2), he trains himself to endure extreme heat and cold (Cato Min. 5.3) and walks without shoes and tunic in Rome (6.3)—even as praetor (44.1). 61  Here, Cato echoes Phocion rejecting Alexander’s gifts and asking for freedom for associates instead (Phoc. 18.4). Such an action models the principle that a statesman ought to neither wish for nor accept honors, and, if he cannot reject them outright, he ought to divert them into some favor for others (Pol. Prec. 820C-D). 62  Plutarch discredits Caesar’s accusations in his Anti-Cato that Cato was avaricious (Cato Min. 11.4), a denunciation also tied to Cato’s sale of the merchandise in Cyprus to obtain the highest possible price for each item (36.3). Plutarch also rejects accusations that Cato’s re-marriage to Marcia had a monetary incentive saying that “to charge Cato with a sordid love of gain is like reproaching Heracles with cowardice” (Cato Min. 52.4). 63  The Life only includes Cato serving under Gellius (Cato Min. 8) and Rubrius (9) before Pharsalus and Thapsus. 64  From his first foray into the forum to preserve the Basilica Porcia, he is admired for his eloquence and high-mindedness (Cato Min. 5.1). Plutarch explains that although Cato’s speech was “upright, passionate and harsh” (ὄρθιος καὶ περιπαθὴς καὶ τραχύς), it had a “charm that captivated the ear” (χάρις ἀγωγὸς ἀκοῆς) and when combined with his character gave the severity of his sentiments “a smiling graciousness that won men’s hearts”

394

Chapter 9

effective with the multitude, “deeming it right that in political philosophy, as in a great city, a certain warlike element should also be maintained” (Cato Min. 4.2). Apart from the case against Murena (Cato Min. 21.6) and the failed attempt to prevent provinces being voted to Pompey and Crassus (43.3–4), Cato changes the minds of listeners when he is allowed to speak (5.1–2; 23.1– 3; 30.2, 31.1–2; 31.3). Plutarch makes Cato’s “energetic pursuit of justice” that “would not bend to equity or favor” (ἀτενὲς καὶ ἄκαμπτον εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ χάριν, Cato Min. 4.1) the hallmark of his political life and reputation in Rome (16.1–2; 17.4; 22.1; 40.1–2; 43.4).65 Cato not only adheres to the highest standards of public service in each office he holds (as a candidate for military tribune at Cato Min. 8.2, as quaestor at 16.1–2 and 18.1–5, and as senator at 19.1–2), but is also conscious of himself as a role model, setting a pattern for others to imitate (9.2–3, 12.4– 5, 16.3, 19.4–5, 38.3). Like Aemilius Paullus, as discussed in Chapter 7, Cato makes a deliberate effort to instruct others in how to conduct themselves in service to their state. Love of Philosophy Cato’s love of philosophy is a recurring theme in the Life,66 which addresses the limits of philosophy as a guide to effective political action. Cato routinely interacts with philosophers—including Antipater the Tyrian (Cato Min. 4.1–2), Athenodorus (10.1–2, 16.1) and Apollonides the Stoic and Demetrius the Peripatetic (65.5)—and engages in philosophical conversations, even discussing Stoic paradoxes before his suicide (6.1, 10.1–2, 16.1, 20.1 and 67.1–2). Plutarch ties Cato’s love of philosophy to his love of freedom and describes Cato battling Fortune for the sake of preserving the Republic: (ἡδονήν τινα καὶ μειδίαμα τῷ σεμνῷ παρεῖχεν οὐκ ἀπάνθρωπον) (Cato Min. 5.2). This description largely parallels the qualities that Plutarch considers essential in the oratorical skills of a statesman in Political Precepts (801C-D, 802F-803A). At Pol. Prec. 804C, Cato is singled out as an exemplum of a statesman with the oratory needed for the political arena. 65  His commitment to “rigid justice” is reflected in his enforcement of fraud laws (Cato Min. 16.1–2), his recovery of money from Sulla’s proscriptions (17.4), his opposition to clemency for the Catilinarians (22.1) and his defense of Clodius’ tribunate (40.1–2). Cato relentlessly defends precedent against Clodius, Pompey and Caesar, who use bribery and violence to force the passage of new laws—such as land distribution (Cato Min. 43.4). For Plutarch, Cato’s actions against the Catilinarians “proved the most important and most glorious of all” (Cato Min. 22.1). 66  Cato is shown routinely returning to philosophy during leisure (Cato Min. 10, 20) and spends his final evening in Utica reading Plato’s Phaedo and discussing philosophy (67–68).

Phocion-cato Minor

395

Although Cato was a statesman …, he nevertheless had a great contest with Fortune (μέγαν ἀγῶνα τῇ τύχῃ). For she seized and overthrew the commonwealth through others, but with difficulty and slowly, and after a long time and when it had come close to prevailing because of Cato and the virtue of Cato. Phoc. 3.3

Cato points to his love of liberty as his motive for action in numerous direct speeches, and his suicide is presented as a result of his recognition that the battle for liberty had been lost (Cato Min. 64–68). Love of Liberty In the Life, Cato bases his decisions to seek office on whether or not political involvement offered him an opportunity to preserve or expand the liberty of Romans. In reported speech, Cato describes himself—in terms that echo Old Men in Politics 783C and Political Precepts 798C–799A67—as a man who made a deliberate choice to pursue a political career to serve the common good: For neither for the sake of fame or riches nor accidently and by chance, like some others, did he fall into managing the affairs of the city, but choosing statesmanship as the proper work of a good man, he thought it was his duty to be more attentive to common affairs (προσέχειν τοῖς κοινοῖς) than a bee to its honey. Cato Min. 19.2

Plutarch shows Cato applying these criteria when he enters the political fray, while also rejecting thanks from Cicero and Pompey for his actions, saying that he acted for the sake of the state (Cato Min. 19.3) Plutarch directly ties Cato’s decision to commit suicide after Thapsus to his love of liberty and his belief that he no longer had a role to play in political life after the battle for freedom had been lost. Plutarch shows Cato explaining his decision in four contexts. First, in speaking to the 300 in Utica, Cato explains that he was “a victor now as far as he chose to be” (νικᾶν ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐβούλετο, Cato Min. 64.5). Later, he tells Lucius Caesar that he is “unwilling to be under obligation to the tyrant for his illegal acts” (Cato Min. 66.2) and in 67  At Old Men in Politics (783C), Plutarch describes himself making a similar choice and in Political Precepts 798C–799A recommends that young men, like Menemachus, enter public life for the same reasons. In Seneca’s De Tranquillitate Animi (1.10) the addressee articulates a similar goal for his own entrance into politics.

396

Chapter 9

comments to Demetrius and Apollonides voices his resolve to be master of his own course (69.1–3). Cato further advises his son to refrain from politics since to do so “worthily of a Cato” (ἀξίως Κάτωνος) was no longer possible and to do so otherwise would be disgraceful (Cato Min. 66.3). Cato’s explanation for his suicide illustrates a practical application of Plutarch’s precept that engaging in public life—or withdrawing from it—is a choice that must be based on self-knowledge (Pol. Prec. 798Ε–799Β), coupled with the widely accepted philosophical principle that a man was free to take his own life to avoid living without liberty. Severity and Inflexibility However, in addition to highlighting Cato’s love of philosophy and liberty, Plutarch emphasizes the inflexibility (ἄτρεπτον, Cato Min. 1.2) in his nature, which has negative effects on his statesmanship. It is said that Cato immediately from childhood both in his voice and expression and in his childish pastimes revealed a character that was inflexible (ἄτρεπτον), insensible (ἀπαθὲς) and stable (βέβαιον) in all things. While he was harsh and irksome to men flattering him (τραχὺς … καὶ προσάντης), he was still stronger against those who tried to frighten him. He was not moved to anger either quickly or easily, but once angered he was inexorable (ὀργισθεὶς δὲ δυσπαραίτητος). Cato Min. 1.2

Thus, Cato’s extensive association with philosophy does not save him from the inflexibility and insensibility (apatheia) that in Coriolanus was associated with a lack of paideia.68 Plutarch shines the spotlight on this flaw in the Prologue, where Cato is a man who did not achieve the needed balance between gravity and reasonableness (Phoc. 2.5). While Phocion illustrated rigidity in relations with overlords and the people, Cato shows how inflexibility can prevent a statesman from winning elections, outmaneuvering harmful opponents and turning the tide of war. By refusing to balance moral principles with expediency, Cato foregoes opportunities to benefit Rome and, thereby, illustrates the

68  The overlap in character traits between Cato and Coriolanus (πρὸς ὀργὴν, ἄτρεπτον, ἀπαθὲς, τραχὺς) speaks to a lesser role for paideia as an explanation for the presence or absence of certain qualities in a statesman. However, these qualities—regardless of their source—have similar detrimental effects on the political effectiveness of the heroes in both Lives. See Chapter 5.

Phocion-cato Minor

397

difference between “the philosopher” and “effective statesman” in the world of practical politics.69 Pragmatic Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled Plutarch’s portrayal of Cato’s dedication to philosophy forms the backdrop for pragmatic lessons for leaders that more directly treat the role of philosophy as a guide to action in political and military contexts. While Cato’s reputation for virtue and high performance standards in office proved beneficial to Rome in some situations, in other contexts his strict adherence to written law and philosophical ideals—and his corresponding unwillingness to adapt his behavior to the situation at hand—is shown to be highly injurious to the common welfare. As noted above, the challenge of achieving this balance was a prominent topic in advice literature, such as Cicero’s De Officiis and Quintilian’s Book 12, and remained a concern for the provincial leaders trying to maintain a good rapport with Rome. Because Cato, unlike most other heroes in the Lives, did not hold the highest political or military offices, Plutarch was able to use his Life to shed light on the challenges facing men serving in lower positions in the political or military hierarchy. While such men would have authority as “rulers” in the narrow area of their responsibility when in office, they largely exerted influence when out of office (and therefore among “the ruled”) through their political alliances and roles as advisors to the men holding the most powerful positions. Plutarch draws on the major incidents in Cato’s career to highlight both the benefits and limitations of using principles of personal moral virtue as a guide in three areas of decision-making in public life: (1) Balancing private life and public roles; (2) Performing duties in office and (3) Managing relations with allies and rivals. The episodes in each sphere are listed in Table 9.2, where the Life has been divided into six phases. After describing Cato’s devotion to philosophy in private life in Phase 1 (1–7), Plutarch pre­ sents Cato’s career through the Catiline conspiracy in Phase 2 (8–23). Phases 3 (24–30) and 4 (31–46) present Cato’s opposition to Pompey and the alliance with Caesar, while Phase 5 (47–55) details the period during which Cato supports Pompey, ending with Pharsalus. Phase 6 (56–73) portrays Cato’s actions in Africa. The Life closes with Cato’s death, Caesar’s reaction and Cato’s 69  Cato’s refusal to modify his behavior spurred Cicero to claim that it was because Cato acted as if he lived in the Republic of Plato rather than “the cesspool of Romulus” (Phoc. 3.1) that he had not become consul. Elsewhere, Cicero criticized Cato as a man “with more resolution and integrity than, it seems to me, judgment and intelligence” (constantia magis et integritate quam, ut mihi videtur, consilio aut ingenio) (Ad Att. 1.18.7).

398

Chapter 9

descendants. Plutarch uses these incidents to illustrate positive paradigms of how to set an example as a magistrate and to train subordinates—which would resonate with men advancing through various political and military posts—while also depicting mismanaged alliances and refusals to compromise that would provide cautionary lessons for men operating within the patronage system. Private Life and Public Roles Plutarch constructs his presentation of Cato’s conduct in private life and his study of philosophy to address two pragmatic questions for statesmen: when to enter public life and when to withdraw from it. The first question was discussed in Political Precepts (798C–799A) where Plutarch explained that the decision to enter public life meant accepting a range of undesirable conditions, such as exposure to public slander, intense factional opposition and even danger of exile or death. For this reason, a political career was not the right choice for everyone: each man had to examine his own character to determine whether he was suited to this way of life. Old Men in Politics, in turn, discussed the proper time for old men to retire from political duties. Determining When to Run for Office Cato’s career supplies positive and deterrent paradigms of the decision to enter the political arena—in the context of how the decision might benefit Rome. Plutarch puts Cato’s pattern of reasoning on display in his account of Cato’s decision to run for tribune. Initially, Cato does not pursue this office because he does not want to expend the force of this magistracy, “just as a strong medicine” (ὥσπερ ἰσχυροῦ φαρμάκου), on affairs that did not require it (Cato Min. 20.1). However, when Cato learns that the tribuneship was being sought by Metellus Nepos, a man he expected to “fall on the state like a thunderbolt and throw everything into confusion” (Cato Min. 20.2), he returns to Rome to oppose him and wins a tribuneship.70 Plutarch amplifies the incident by inserting direct speech in which Cato explains that he is canvassing for tribune to save the state from harm and to advance his struggle on behalf of liberty (Cato Min. 20.3). Once elected, Cato exerts influence over the people—based on his reputation for justice—to hinder Metellus’ policy initiatives (Cato Min. 29.1–2). Cato’s later decision to seek the consulship is similarly driven by the goal of saving Rome from harm—in this case from Caesar, whom Cato wanted to strip of his army and expose as hostile to the Republic (Cato Min. 49.1). 70  Nicias is a negative example in this area for not taking action to prevent an opponent from harming the state when he defers to Cleon as commander of forces in Pylos (Nic. 8).

399

Phocion-cato Minor table 9.2 Episodes in the Life of Cato Minor Private life and public roles

Performing duties in office

Relations with allies and rivals

Phase 1: Early life; rise to prominence (Chapters 1–7) 1-Family background and traits 2–3- Stories of boyhood and youth 4- Priest of Apollo 4- Lifestyle; study of philosophy 6–7- Suppers; relations with women

5- Defends Basilica Porcia

Phase 2: Actions as military tribune, quaestor, tribune of Plebs; Catiline conspiracy (8–23) 8- Joins Gellius against Spartacus 9- Military tribune under Rubrius 10- Visits Athenodorus in Pergamum 11- Brother’s death and funeral 12–16- In Asia; Pompey; Deiotarus 20- To Lucania with philosophers

16–18- Quaestorship

19- Conduct as senator

20–21- Tribune of Plebs; trial of Murena

22–23- Catiline debate; opposition to Caesar’s view

Phase 3: Rise of Pompey; rejection of alliance with Pompey (24–30) 24–25- Women in family; marriages

26- Grain distribution; opposes Metellus 28–29- Opposes Caesar 30- Rejects alliance with Pompey

Phase 4: Efforts to combat Caesar and Pompey (31–46) 31–32- Relents on land distribution 33–34- Opposes Caesar and Pompey

400

Chapter 9

table 9.2 Episodes in the Life of Cato Minor (cont.) Private life and public roles

Performing duties in office

Relations with allies and rivals

34–36- “Mission” to Cyprus 37- Breaks, reconciles with Munatius

42- Failed bid for praetorship 44- Cato as praetor

38–39- Honored on return from Cyprus 40- Breaks, reconciles with Cicero 41- Opposes Pompey/Crassus 43- Opposes assigning provinces 45- Opposes Pompey

46- Helps Favonius in aedileship Phase 5: Supports Pompey; loses consulship; rejects deal with Caesar; Pharsalus (47–55) 47- Supports Pompey for consul 48- Rejects second overture from Pompey for an alliance 49–50- Failed bid for consulship 51- Cato’s foresight about Caesar 52- Cato leaves Rome with Pompey 53–54- Advises Pompey not to fight; to Sicily 55- In Dyrrachium; Pharsalus Phase 6: Actions in Africa; suicide in Utica; burial (56–73) 56–57- Joins Scipio, Varus in Africa 58- To Utica; advice to Scipio 67- Dines and discusses philosophy 68–73- Suicide, burial and descendants

59–66- Sends senators to Rome 72- Caesar’s reaction to death

Phocion-cato Minor

401

Determining when to Avoid Office However, Cato also supplies a deterrent paradigm when he fails to pursue office when he could have helped his state by doing so. In the first case, Cato refuses to run for consul a second time because he had concluded that his first loss was due to his manner (τρόπον), which “no man of sense would change to please others” (Cato Min. 50.3). The criticism of Cato’s decision and the principles at issue are voiced by Cicero, who, unlike Cato, kept his eye on the practical concessions that expediency required: But Cicero blames him because, with public affairs in need of such a leader (τοιούτου δεομένων), he neither made an effort nor engaged in kind relations with the people, but even regarding the future had grown weary and given up. Cato Min. 50.2

Cato’s behavior in this episode is reminiscent of Xenocrates refusing to compromise in negotiations with Antipater in the paired Life (Phoc. 27.1–3) and later choosing to withdraw from Athenian life rather than participate on less than ideal terms (Phoc. 29.4). Cato’s reasoning also violates Plutarch’s principle that a statesman must accommodate the character of the people to gain office (Pol. Prec. 799B–800A). In a debased environment, the path to office often requires a man to use bribery and mirror the priorities of the people that he might not share—the precise challenges addressed in Quintus Cicero’s booklet on electioneering (e.g. at Comm. 44), as discussed in Chapter 2. Cato makes a similar error in judgment when he rejects the proffered command in Africa, despite the fact that everyone believed he should be the leader and Scipio and Varus had resigned their posts in his favor (Cato Min. 57.1). In this case, Cato’s reason is different: he defers to Scipio, on the grounds that the command by law should go to a proconsul, not a propraetor like himself:71 He said that he would not break the laws concerning which they were waging war against a man who was breaking them; nor would he, being a propraetor, put himself in command (προτάξειν) when a proconsul was present. Cato Min. 57.2

71  Cato also attempted to turn over his command to Cicero after Pharsalus (Cato Min. 55.3) on the grounds that he had consular rank, but Cicero refused.

402

Chapter 9

Plutarch presents this decision as a deterrent example of blind adherence to the letter of the law72 in a situation where expediency required that the law be ignored:73 he reports that Cato was later “distressed” (ἀχθόμενος) at his decision, being convinced “that Scipio would neither conduct the war well, nor, in case he should have unexpected good fortune, would he behave with moderation” (Cato Min. 58.5).74 By reporting Cato’s regret, Plutarch underscores the failure inherent in ignoring considerations of expediency when the common interests are at stake—not unlike Phocion’s failure to take command of the army and to carefully assess the threat posed by Nicanor. Political and Military Offices In Cato, as in Aemilius, Plutarch portrays a statesman performing the functions of military and political offices that continued to be held by the educated elite in Plutarch’s day—including military tribune, quaestor, praetor and senator. Plutarch designs his account of Cato’s career to look at the effectiveness of officeholders from a wider perspective: rather than concentrating only on how the hero’s actions in office benefitted (or harmed) the state, Plutarch also examines the impact of Cato’s conduct on those under his authority. Plutarch uses the relations between Cato and his subordinates to illustrate two key principles of governance that apply more broadly to any “ruler” who exercises authority over others: (1) a ruler sets a pattern for others to follow and (2) the impartial administration of justice (in punishing or rewarding) inspires goodwill and confidence in the ruler. By using this approach, Plutarch expands the relevance of the principles articulated in To an Uneducated Ruler and Philosophers and Men in Power beyond the conduct of the Emperor or provincial governors to also include men holding lesser magistracies in imperial and provincial administration. Plutarch crafts his presentation of Cato’s conduct to supply both positive and deterrent paradigms for leaders. On the one hand, Plutarch constructs the incidents describing Cato’s conduct in preparing for office and exercising au72  Cato’s error here parallels that of Brutus (in not murdering Antony along with Caesar and later allowing Antony to read the will), as well as Dion’s error in not killing Heracleides immediately after taking Syracuse. 73  Caesar, for this reason, did not punish Antony, Dolabella or Ahenobarbus, although their actions were unjust and were creating resentment among the Romans: the times demanded that he depend on such men. 74  Cato’s misjudgment is reinforced by Scipio’s earlier quarrels with Varus, which induced him to act like a “satrap” to King Juba. Cato had to step in to reconcile the Romans and impose restraint on Juba (Cato Min. 57.1–3).

Phocion-cato Minor

403

thority to provide positive paradigms for how to produce results that benefit the state. In particular, he demonstrates how to inspire subordinates with one’s example in office, as well as how to effectively perform the duties of that office. The principles at issue are discussed in Political Precepts (800B), where the statesman who has acquired power and enjoys the confidence of the people is instructed to “try to train them” (πειρᾶσθαι ῥυθμίζειν), leading them “gently” (ἀτρέμα … ὑπάγοντα) toward what is better and “managing them with mildness” (πράως μεταχειριζόμενον).75 Plutarch also revisits the challenge of distinguishing when moral and legal rectitude enhances effectiveness and when it is harmful—areas in which Cato offers both positive and deterrent lessons. Inspiring Subordinates with One’s Example in Office Although Cato held few military positions, Plutarch presents him as a positive model of military leadership. His actions as military tribune illustrate how a statesman can educate those under his authority and inspire them to virtue. Plutarch explains Cato’s method: He considered the display of his own virtue, being that of one man, was a trivial task and not efficacious (οὐ ἀνύσιμον), but, being ambitious most of all to make those under his authority like himself, he did not take fear from the authority of his office, but added reason: using reason, he persuaded and instructed (πείθων … καὶ διδάσκων) them about everything, with honor and punishment following. Cato Min. 9.2–3

In this conduct, Cato not only demonstrates that anyone in the imperial or provincial hierarchy can apply the principle that a ruler sets a pattern for others to imitate (Philosophers and Men in Power 780D), but also shows how to supplement one’s own example with a deliberate effort to train those under one’s authority. In addition, Plutarch reports that Cato lived on a par with his soldiers and shared their tasks—not unlike Antony’s soldierliness—and thereby won “reputation, favor, surpassing honor and friendliness from his soldiers” (Cato Min. 9.4). This goodwill was the key to his effectiveness in inspiring his soldiers to pursue virtue:

75  At Old Men in Politics 790E, the old man should stay in public life to educate and instruct the young, which he accomplishes “not only by making suggestions from outside but also by administering public affairs. The young man’s character “is molded and formed” by both the words and actions of an old man.

404

Chapter 9

Genuine zeal for virtue only arises through the highest goodwill and esteem (εὐνοίας καὶ τιμῆς) for the man imparting it: and those who praise good men without loving them have respect (αἰδοῦνται) for the reputation of those men, but do not admire their virtue or imitate it (οὐ θαυμάζουσι … οὐδὲ μιμοῦνται). Cato Min. 9.5

Again, the admiration for virtue that sparks the desire to imitate it, which is described in the Prologue to Per-Fab (Per. 2.2–4) and illustrated in Aemilius as well, is used to explain the dynamics of a hero’s success in training younger men. Later, on Cato’s departure, his soldiers showered him with tears and embraces (Cato Min. 12.1)76—a reflection of the success of Cato’s initiatives. Cato’s ability to inspire soldiers is repeatedly on display. The commanders and soldiers found hope and inspiration in Cato’s speeches ahead of Pharsalus (Cato Min. 54.6) and, after Thapsus (59.4–7), they were encouraged by Cato’s speech about fighting on behalf of freedom, virtue, death and fame. Moreover, after Pharsalus, the army did not think it worthwhile even to listen to any other commander when Cato was present (Cato Min. 56.2) and after Thapsus it stayed with Cato believing that “it was better to die as his willing followers than to save their lives by betraying such virtue” (60.1). Performing Duties as a Quaestor: Managing Subordinates Plutarch designs his account of Cato’s actions as quaestor and senator to illustrate the specific skills needed to manage the practical duties of office. In the case of the quaestorship, Cato decided not to stand for the office immediately when he became eligible, but instead to take time to study the law and talk to men who had experience. He believed that such preparation would enable him to manage the permanent staff that would be under him when he took office instead of having to rely on their judgments, as generally happened to young men who became quaestor without any experience: When [the permanent staff in the treasury] received young magistrates who, because of their inexperience and ignorance, really needed others as instructors and tutors, they did not yield the authority of office to those men (οὐχ ὑφίεντο τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐκείνοις), but were themselves the ones who held authority (ἄρχοντες αὐτοί). Cato Min. 16.1

76  Cato’s rapport with soldiers is similar to Antony’s, but Cato uses it to inspire them towards virtue.

Phocion-cato Minor

405

In contrast, when Cato took office as quaestor, having prepared himself beforehand, he quickly took charge of his subordinates.77 The contemporary resonance of Cato’s concern about his inexperience is evident in Frontinus’ description of his own concerns about having to depend on subordinates when he became water commissioner under Nerva (De Aquis 2.1–2), as discussed in Chapter 2. Plutarch traces Cato’s success as quaestor to three key initiatives. First, despite the resistance of his subordinates and colleagues, Cato imposed strict standards and cleaned-up the corrupt practices related to borrowing, lending and false decrees that had become routine (Cato Min. 17.2–3), sometimes punishing his subordinates and sometimes “instructing them if they erred from inexperience” (ἁμαρτάνοντας ἀπειρίᾳ διδάσκων) (16.2). Secondly, by preventing the senate and assembly from gratifying the people with “remissions of debts or taxes or gifts” (Cato Min. 18.1), he increased the treasury coffers and “instructed (ἐδίδασκεν) [the Romans] that a nation can be rich without wronging its citizens” (18.2). Finally, Cato won colleagues to unpopular measures by taking the opprobrium onto himself alone:78 Although he appeared odious and harsh to some of his colleagues in the beginning, he was later loved, since, when people made demands and pressed them hard, he gave them leeway to defend themselves (παρέχων ἀπολογεῖσθαι) by saying “It is impossible, since Cato is not willing.” Cato Min. 18.2

By handling his quaestorship in this way, Cato enhanced his reputation among the senators and the people, who paid him the special honor of escorting him home at the end of his office (Cato 18.3).79 By reporting Cato’s preparation before taking up the position, his forceful implementation of new practices despite resistance and the positive response of the Romans after they saw the results, Plutarch makes Cato a role model for the politikoi in his audience who themselves expected to be appointed to positions for which they had little experience. Marcellus is presented as a counter-example: 77  He did not simply have the “name and honor of a superior official, but also intelligence and rational judgment” (οὐκ ὄνομα καὶ τιμὴν ἔχων ἄρχοντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνημα καὶ λόγον, Cato Min. 16.3). 78  Plutarch recommends a similar strategy to old men helping accustom the young to participating in the public arena in Old Men in Politics. 79  Cato is also escorted by crowds in Rome after his quaestorship (Cato Min. 18.3), his candidacy for military tribune (21.2) and his bid for the praetorship (42.5).

406

Chapter 9

while he was an excellent magistrate when Cato was present, in Cato’s absence he became compliant towards his superiors and inclined to curry favor (Cato Min. 18.3). The importance of this lesson is underscored by the absence of detailed accounts of Cato’s quaestorship in other writers, raising the possibility that it is an instructive embellishment purposefully inserted by Plutarch. Performing Duties as a Senator Cato is also a positive paradigm of handling the duties of a senator, in which capacity Cato opposed policies that would constrain liberty and made a concerted effort to keep public affairs free of corruption—areas in which senators in Plutarch’s audience could still exercise some influence. After his quaestorship ended, the treasury continued to receive Cato’s “watchful care” (Cato Min. 18.5), and he deliberately deferred all other business so he could attend every session of the senate, being the first to arrive and last to leave (Cato Min. 19.1). Moreover, he tracked the decrees, trials and affairs in the provinces by having his friends and connections send him information (Cato Min. 19.2). Such actions illustrate in practice the principle stated in Old Men in Politics that the man who is truly statesmanlike, even when he is not in office, is always encouraging and correcting those in power, assisting in deliberations and keeping himself informed through inquiry (Old Men in Politics 796F). In the Life, such conduct reinforced Cato’s reputation for virtue and justice and strengthened his influence. Determining Whether to Command or Advise Although Cato is repeatedly shown to be a reluctant commander—seeking to relinquish the forces under his command in Dyrrachium to a proconsul as soon as possible after Pharsalus80—his competence as a general is displayed in a variety of contexts. Cato’s military acumen is recognized by Pompey, who initially placed the fleet under the command of Cato until talked out of it by others (54.3–4) and later placed him in charge of his supplies in Dyrrachium (Cato Min. 55.1). Moreover, the advice Cato gave to both Pompey and Scipio reflected his competency in military strategy—which perhaps could have worked to the benefit of Rome had Cato taken command. The advice that he had given to Pompey earlier and to Scipio at that time—not to wage war against a man who was experienced in war and 80  After Pharsalus, Cato retained command over the forces in Dyrrachium only until he could place them under the authority of someone of pro-consular rank, which happened only after he led them to Africa and put them under Scipio (Cato Min. 57.3), Cicero having refused to accept the army earlier (55.3).

Phocion-cato Minor

407

formidable, but to make use of time, which withers every bloom by which tyranny is made strong—was disdained by Scipio out of self-will (ὑπ’ αὐθαδείας). Cato Min. 58.4

Subsequently, after Scipio responds by calling Cato a coward, Cato offers to take his legions back to Italy and force Caesar to leave Africa to fight in Italy (Cato Min. 58.5)—a strategic recommendation that echoed the suggestion of Scipio Africanus over 150 years earlier. This strategic option was never put to the test, however, because Cato’s earlier refusal of command of the army left him in the position of advisor. Plutarch’s attribution to Cato of these military strategies highlights the missed opportunity implied by Cato’s rigid adherence to the legal precedent that a proconsul should be general. Relations with Allies and Rivals As a statesman who rarely held executive office, Cato exercises his influence as one of “the ruled” by advising men in power and by forming alliances with the leading men—prominent activities of the educated elite in Plutarch’s day as well. Cato’s career thus provided Plutarch with scope for pragmatic lessons in how to establish and manage alliances in the best interests of one’s city. Cato’s actions in managing relations with friends and colleagues—who are the “living and thinking tools of the statesman” (ὄργανα … ζῶντα καὶ φρονοῦντα) (Pol. Prec. 807D)—provide both positive and deterrent paradigms for leaders. However, with regard to alliances and rivalries, Cato largely supplies deterrent paradigms in how rigid adherence to philosophical precepts and legal precedent can harm the common welfare in a diseased state. Indeed, Cato’s refusal to compromise principles of personal moral integrity or legal precedent is shown to undermine relations with Caesar, Cicero and Pompey. Managing Relations with Friends and Colleagues In his relations with friends and colleagues, Plutarch often portrays Cato as a role model for men advising colleagues to adopt actions conducive to concord and the common welfare, including episodes in which Cato advises Cicero (Cato Min. 35.1), Ptolemy (35.4–5), Pompey (48.3–4; 53.3–4), the younger Pompey (55) and Scipio (58.1).81 However, Cato is also a negative paradigm of a 81  For instance, when he convinces Pompey not to plunder cities under Rome or to kill Romans except in battle, Pompey acquires a reputation for “fairness and gentleness” (τὴν ἐπιείκειαν … καὶ τὸ ἥμερον) which attracted more allies to his cause (Cato Min. 53.4). In the case of the younger Pompey, Plutarch shows Cato applying techniques recommended

408

Chapter 9

statesman who undermined his political effectiveness by unnecessarily offending and alienating friends and colleagues.82 Cato is shown abruptly refusing a request from his friend Catulus,83 who departed in silence “either from anger or from shame”(Cato Min. 16.4). Later, when Cato offensively ignores the consul and praetors lined up to greet him on his return from Cyprus, he makes himself seem “ungracious and self-willed” (σκαιὸν … καὶ αὔθαδες, Cato Min. 39.1–2). In one of his most egregious actions, he enrages Munatius, his most intimate friend and frequent ally in the Life (Cato Min. 9.1–2, 25.2, 27.5, 30.2–4, 53.3), when he refuses to trust him in handling the property left by Ptolemy in Cyprus (36.2–3).84 Plutarch attributes Cato’s conduct to his exactitude (ἐξακριβοῦν), his desire to attend to everything himself and his inclination to suspect all equally (Cato Min. 36.2). The negative impact is clearly spelled out: For this reason, [Cato] offended the rest of his friends (προσέκρουσε), who thought he distrusted them, and threw Munatius, his most intimate friend of all, into an anger that was almost incurable. Cato 36.3

All of these incidents reflect Cato’s indifference to cultivating relations with potential allies if it meant relaxing standards—an attitude that violates the principles of cooperation advanced in Political Precepts (807D–808E). The

in Old Men in Politics (795B–D) when the younger Pompey wants to punish those who (like Cicero) went back to Italy: Cato “admonished him in private and calmed him down” (ἐνουθέτησεν ἰδίᾳ καὶ κατεπράϋνεν), thereby securing the safety of Cicero and the others without any public confrontation (Cato Min. 55.3). 82  Friends are tools of the statesman that must be carefully managed (Pol. Prec. 806F–809B). 83  When Plutarch mentions this example in Political Precepts (808E–F), he does not challenge Cato’s decision not to grant Catulus’ request, but criticizes the manner of the rejection as “oppressive and self-willed” (βαρέως καὶ αὐθάδως) when Cato instead should have “avoided harshness and bitterness of speech (ἀφελεῖν τοῦ λόγου τὴν τραχύτητα καὶ πικρίαν), by producing the impression that the offensive quality of his action was not due to his own will, but was forced upon him by law and justice”. 84  Although Munatius claims his anger was caused by Cato’s inconsiderate conduct (ὀλιγωρίᾳ πρὸς αὑτόν) and jealousy towards Canidius (Cato Min. 37.1), a concerted effort is required before they reconcile (Cato Min. 37.3). The resulting rift with Munatius was only mended through the mediation of Cato’s wife (37.5).

Phocion-cato Minor

409

importance of this lesson for statesmen is suggested by the absence of the break with Munatius in other accounts.85 Managing Rivalry: Cato and Caesar Caesar, as a politician, is characterized by Plutarch as Cato’s opposite in key respects. First, Caesar is constantly seeking out compromises that will gratify all parties to an alliance, whereas Cato is never shown trying to find a mutually acceptable middle ground. Secondly, in order to accomplish his purpose, Caesar is willing to adopt the corrupt practices of the time—including manipulation of the tribuneship and consulship to get his policies adopted (Cato Min. 31.3–4), bribery and violence (42.2–4) and blatant flattery of the people with land (32–33)—while Cato, apart from the corn distribution (26.1), will only use methods that adhere to strictest legal precedent and persuasive eloquence. The sharp contrast between the political practices of Cato and Caesar enables Plutarch to portray Cato largely as a man on the defensive in his relations with Caesar, not because Cato is trying to protect the state, but because he is adhering to personal standards of moral integrity. As a result, most of Cato’s public actions are acts of defiant opposition to Caesar’s initiatives, rather than initiatives of his own. Cato first thwarts Metellus’ effort to bring Pompey back at the time of Catiline (Cato Min. 27.6), and then repeatedly opposes legislation offered by partisans of Caesar or Pompey (29.3, 30.2, 31.1, 31.2, 31.3, 32.3 and 33.1). This pattern continues through the final efforts of Cato to prevent Caesar from returning to Rome with his imperium intact (Cato Min. 51), while making no effort to negotiate a settlement that could satisfy all parties. Cato slows down the process, but he does not avert the outcome: Caesar simply tries different tactics until he finds one that works. Ultimately, Cato’s rigidity and incorruptibility are overwhelmed by Caesar’s flexibility and willingness to use bribery and violence. Managing Alliances: Cato and Cicero Cicero serves as a second foil to Cato, offering a positive counter-example of a flexible approach that blends expediency with the highest standard of moral virtue each situation will allow. Cicero repeatedly seeks out compromises with opponents in the hope of preventing factional violence and reducing the 85  In Brutus (3.1–4), Plutarch uses this episode to highlight Brutus’ resentment at having to perform administrative tasks formerly handled by Canidius, a close associate of Cato who had been abruptly displaced. In Cato, Cato’s relations with Munatius and Canidius illustrate the negative effects of the rigid application of narrow principles.

410

Chapter 9

need for bribery. The different stances of the two men are on display in the arguments Cicero uses to convince Cato to take the oath on land distribution, which was required by the legislation passed only after a long battle in the Senate. First, Cicero argues that Cato’s refusal was unjust and impractical: Cicero … exhorted and instructed him, that it was perhaps not just to think that he alone was in duty bound to refuse to comply with the general will, and, when making any change in what had been done was impossible, to be careless about himself (ἀφειδεῖν ἑαυτοῦ) was entirely foolish and mad. Cato Min. 32.4

Cicero then turns to the larger philosophical argument that Cato’s refusal to sign the oath was essentially an abandonment of his state: It would be the greatest of evils, if he abandoned the city, for the sake of which he had done everything, and delivered her over to those plotting against her (προέμενος τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσιν), as if glad to free himself from the contests on her behalf (ἀπαλλάξεται τῶν … ἀγώνων). For even if Cato did not need Rome, Rome needed Cato and so did all his friends. Cato Min. 32.5

Here, Cicero keeps the focus on the practical goal of serving the interests of Rome to the greatest extent possible, even in violation of a personal moral code. In a word, Cato’s inflexibility was inappropriate for a statesman in troubled times. These arguments anticipate Cicero’s later criticism of Cato’s lack of effort in his bid for the consulship (Cato Min. 49.2), mentioned earlier. Choosing Alliances: Cato and Pompey Plutarch crafts his account of Cato’s rejection of a marriage alliance with Pompey to illustrate another aspect in which Cato’s rigidity harmed Rome. In this case, Plutarch criticizes Cato in an authorial comment. The fact that Pompey was acting out of self-interest—and seeking the alliance because he thought Cato would be a “great stumbling block” (οὐ μικρὰ προσπταίσειν) to his plans (Cato Min. 30.2)—does not excuse Cato’s dismissal of the proposal without careful deliberation: Cato, without holding back or deliberating (οὔτ’ ἐπισχὼν οὔτε βουλευσάμενος), but stunned, immediately said: “Go Munatius, go and tell

Phocion-cato Minor

411

Pompey that Cato is not a man easily captured (ἁλώσιμος) through the women’s quarters, but he values Pompey’s goodwill and will offer him, when he acts justly, a friendship that is more trustworthy than any family connection, but will not give up hostages for the fame of Pompey to the detriment of his country. Cato Min. 30.3–4

Here, Plutarch depicts Cato guiding his decision by a desire to protect his own incorruptibility86—a private concern—when the issue is one of public policy: by accepting the lesser evil of “slight transgressions of Pompey” (Cato Min. 30.6), Cato could have averted the greater evil of the alliance of Pompey and Caesar. Cato’s refusal to compromise is failed leadership,87 as noted in an authorial comment. First, Plutarch analyzes the results that flowed from Cato’s decision to reject the alliance: However, if we must judge according to the results (πρὸς τὰ συμβάντα κρίνειν), it seems that Cato erred in everything, when he did not accept the marriage alliance, but allowed [Pompey] to turn toward Caesar and contract a marriage, which, by uniting the power of Pompey and Caesar on the same side, in a short time overturned the affairs of the Romans and destroyed the commonwealth. Cato Min. 30.6

Plutarch then distills a more general principle that readers could apply to their deliberations when making choices in their own careers: Of which things none perhaps would have happened if Cato, because he feared the trivial error of Pompey, had not allowed the greatest error of all, that Pompey add his power to that of another. Cato Min. 30.6

86  In Pompey (44.3), Cato’s motives are more explicitly expressed: Cato thought Pompey, through the marriage alliance, wanted to corrupt him and was in a manner bribing him. Similar concerns prompt Cato to reject Pompey’s invitation, when he is sole consul, to be an advisor and associate (Pomp. 48.1). 87  Brutus’ alliance with Pompey in Brutus marks an instructive contrast: Plutarch praises Brutus for making an alliance with Pompey, his father’s murderer, because “he thought it his duty to put the public good above his own” (Brut. 3.1) and in the synkrisis applauds him for determining both hatred and friendship by justice alone (Dion-Brut 3.8).

412

Chapter 9

Again, as often, Plutarch is not criticizing what Cato did, but the reason why he did it. In assessing Cato’s refusal to accept Pompey’s offer of an alliance, Plutarch touches on an issue raised by Cicero in Ad Atticum (2.1), where he explained his own alliance with Pompey as an effort to moderate Pompey’s conduct: I should not wish you to think that I have drawn close to [Pompey] for my own protection. The position was, however, that any dissension that might arise between us would inevitably bring major political conflicts in its train. If I have foreseen and provided against this danger, that does not mean that I have abandoned my own constitutionalist policy, but that he has become more constitutionally minded and less inclined to popularity with the masses at the expense of principle. Cicero, Ad. Att. 2.1.6

The alliance Cicero describes as a means of influencing Pompey is precisely the type of choice that Cato rejected.88 The different attitudes of the two men towards political compromises are also reflected in their reactions to Caesar’s victory: Cicero adapts to the new situation—much like Phocion did—and continues to work to promote the common welfare of Romans, while Cato, in his suicide, remains uncompromising in his rejection of what he viewed as a tyranny. In describing the effects of Cato’s subsequent opposition to Pompey’s policies (Cato Min. 31.1–2), Plutarch establishes the principle that a statesman must exercise foresight about the consequences of thwarting a powerful rival and, therefore, is to some extent responsible for the destructive effects of the alternative alliances that rival subsequently forms elsewhere: With Pompey being worsted in the Senate (ἐλαττούμενος) and becoming a demagogue, he called the soldiers to a distribution of land. But when Cato then stood up and thrust out the law, Pompey then went over to Clodius, the most reckless of the demagogues at that time, and won over Caesar (Καίσαρα προσήγετο), with Cato in some way furnishing a beginning (παρασχόντος ἀρχήν). Cato Min. 31.1–2

88  A similar mistake in judgment is criticized in Nicias, when Nicias defers command to Cleon out of a desire to preserve his own safety (Nic-Cras 3.1–3).

Phocion-cato Minor

413

Similarly, Cato’s opposition to Caesar places harmful dynamics in motion: when Cato stands against Caesar’s canvass for the consulship in absentia— a request many senators were willing to grant—Caesar forges a closer alliance with Pompey (Cato Min. 31.3–4). It is only after Caesar and Pompey have formed their alliance that Cato starts to prophecy the deadly effects for the Republic. Plutarch’s comments, however, suggest that Cato would have served Rome better had he acted to prevent this alliance in the first place. Summary: Lessons in Ruling and Being Ruled in Cato Minor In addition to providing a range of paradigms for men carrying out the duties of specific offices in the cursus, Cato Minor expands the treatment of issues tied to forging alliances and outmaneuvering powerful opponents in corrupt political environments. The positive lessons in these areas illustrate the power of the alliance of philosophy (and moral virtue) combined with practical competencies and diligence in handling the duties of office, while the deterrent lessons are tied to areas where too rigorous an adherence to principles of personal moral virtue and “the letter of the law” can blind a statesman to critical opportunities to benefit his state by being willing to compromise. The deterrent lessons in Cato are linked primarily to three incidents where Cato needed to relax his standards of moral virtue to promote the common welfare: (1) his refusal of a marriage alliance with a man who was corrupt, (2) his refusal to modify his behavior to attract the support of the populace in his bid for the consulship, and (3) his refusal to bend the rules and take command of forces in Africa rather than deferring to a less competent general (Scipio). Plutarch flags the importance of these scenes by adding critical commentary: from himself in the first instance (Cato Min. 30.6), from Cicero in the second (49.2) and from Cato himself in the third (58.5). In none of these instances did Cato make his decision based on a careful assessment of which course would best serve Rome; instead, he took action, at times impulsively, to maintain his reputation for moral integrity and incorruptibility. Cato’s conduct echoes that of Xenocrates in Phocion: in both cases, the rigidity of the “philosopher” places him on the sidelines while the men willing to do what is expedient for the common welfare are empowered to determine policy. Plutarch shows that such conduct curtailed Cato’s influence at critical moments, while opening the door for less capable or corrupt men to gain power. In a political environment where bribery and corruption are routine, the statesman who wants to help steer policies in a positive direction must be willing to enter into alliances with men involved in corrupt practices. Cato provides new perspectives on a number of issues raised in other Lives. Like Pericles, Cato combines a reputation for virtue with eloquence and is shown

414

Chapter 9

repeatedly winning debates over key issues, but Cato’s career demonstrates the limitations of this combination of strengths in the presence of widespread bribery and corruption. Like Coriolanus and Aemilius Paullus, Cato loses his bid for the consulship, but instead of responding with anger and resentment (as Coriolanus) or with equanimity and withdrawal into private life (as Aemilius), Cato shifts his attention to his role as senator and advisor. Also, like Coriolanus, Cato is inflexible and severe in his relations with others and he alienates the people and his colleagues when he will not make concessions. Finally, in choosing to commit suicide rather than acquiesce to a conqueror or more powerful men, Cato joins many others in the Lives—including Antony, Brutus, Themistocles, Demosthenes and Cleomenes—in choosing death over “captivity”; however, Cato’s reasons are more directly tied to a life-long love of liberty. 9.4

Insights from Analyzing Differences

Although, as noted earlier, the synkrisis to Phoc-Cato, if it ever existed, has not survived, instructive differences between the careers of the two heroes can be identified. First, with regard to military life, Phocion was prominent as a general and his military accomplishments illustrate a range of effective techniques for managing subordinates and military strategies in a variety of situations. In contrast, Cato’s military record, while successful, is narrower, and his “battles” are largely fought in Rome. While he excelled in subordinate military roles both as a young man and as a leader after Pharsalus, he never assumed direct command in major battles. In addition, unlike Phocion, Cato was repeatedly willing to hand over command to less competent generals (Cicero and Scipio). In the political arena, fewer differences emerge. On the one hand, Cato is a positive exemplum of the power of oratory to win people over in troubled times, while Phocion’s abbreviated style is shown to be ineffective in deterring Athenians from war against Philip and Alexander. On the other hand, they both display proficiency in office, although in different posts: while Phocion is an effective mediator with the Macedonians, Cato demonstrates how to be effective as a military tribune, quaestor and senator. With regard to the inflexibility that undercut the effectiveness of both men in office, Phocion’s uncompromising rejection of the views of the people, combined with his inappropriate trust of the Macedonian legate, cause him to leave Athens open to attack at a critical moment, while Cato’s refusal to compromise his own moral integrity to make an alliance with Pompey as well as his adherence to the “letter of the law” in determining military commands placed his country in even greater jeopardy. The greatest difference, however, lies in their reactions to the loss of liberty in their

Phocion-cato Minor

415

states.89 Phocion serves as a mediator between his state and the overlord and negotiates compromises to benefit his city—illustrating various techniques for interacting effectively with a provincial governor or Emperor. In contrast, Cato commits suicide rather than mediate with a power he viewed as a tyranny.90 In Cato, it is Cicero who echoes Phocion’s conduct in continuing to try to serve the interests of his state under “tyranny”, while Cato parallels Xenocrates, who rejected Athens when its liberty was curtailed. Echoes of Socrates can be found in the deaths of both men, but in different ways. Phocion acts like Socrates in calmly accepting death although he had been unjustly condemned, while Cato reads about Socrates’ death but commits suicide when it was possible for him to receive clemency. Phocion’s death, like Socrates’, reflects an acceptance of what Athens had become, while Cato’s suicide is a rejection of a Rome without liberty. This difference helps clarify the distinction between the philosophos and the politikos in Plutarch’s Lives: Phocion died a statesman still dedicated to the well-being of his state, while Cato’s death is the act of a philosopher.91 Although the image of Socrates hovers in the background, Phoc-Cato dispels the notion that Plutarch envisioned a “philosopher-king” as the ideal ruler in the world of practical politics: there, to achieve the best possible outcomes for his state, the politikos had to be willing to make concessions to expediency when the situation required it.

89   Dtr-Ant also paired two men who made different decisions about life and death when they faced captivity. 90  Cato’s suicide is mentioned in Brutus’ discussion with Cassius about when suicide is appropriate in Brutus (40.7–9): Brutus says that he no longer considered suicide to be “a sign of not fearlessly accepting whatever happened and of running away”, while Cassius notes that they will either be victorious or not need to fear the victors. 91  Cato similarly advises the men in Utica to choose the course that best serves their own interests (Cato Min. 59.7).

chapter 10

Conclusion The men who administer public affairs … clearly do not write or speak about these sorts of things.… But it would have been reasonable for them to have done so, if they had been able to do it. For they could have left behind nothing better for the citizens, nor have chosen anything better for themselves, than this sort of capacity. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9.18–19

⸪ 10.1

Plutarch’s Project in the Parallel Lives

This book has revisited two persistent questions regarding Plutarch’s Parallel Lives: “What was the purpose of presenting Lives in pairs?” and “How were readers expected to imitate the paradigms Plutarch promised to provide?” In answer to these questions, the dominant views are that Plutarch designed the paired Lives to be catalysts for deeper exploration of issues of virtue and vice and that readers were expected to distil from their own analysis and reflection the paradigms to guide their own conduct. In this book, I have adopted a new interpretive framework—which I call “pragmatic biography”—that integrates Plutarch’s treatment of issues of virtue and vice with his presentation of the practical skills and strategic know-how that, together with moral character, determine the political and military effectiveness of leaders of any era. Through the analysis of six sets of Parallel Lives, I have attempted to demonstrate how Plutarch designed each pair of Lives to examine issues of leadership from a different perspective, with their combined insights supplying a range of paradigms to assist leaders in meeting the practical challenges of their public roles. The paradigm of pragmatic biography unites the traditional focus on issues of moral character with a systematic analysis of the principles of effective leadership in political, military and diplomatic positions, as they were identified and analyzed in Plutarch’s treatises in the Moralia. Consistent with Plutarch’s approach to portraying statesmen and generals in the Moralia—as men who each blended virtue and vice in his moral character and exhibited © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi ��.��63/9789004276611_014

Conclusion

417

strengths and deficiencies in his judgments as a leader—each subject of a Life is shown to be a positive paradigm in handling some challenges of a political or military career and a deterrent paradigm of behavior to avoid in handling others. The examination of the Lives in this book has displayed the techniques employed by Plutarch to create paradigms covering a wide range of practical challenges faced by men in his audience who held positions in the provincial cities, Roman military apparatus or the imperial bureaucracy in Rome or the provinces. When the pragmatic lessons for statesmen and generals are recognized, Plutarch emerges as an example of “an old man in politics” carrying out the role designated for him in the Moralia: The perfect statesman engages in public affairs, first while still a learner and a neophyte and finally as a teacher and initiator.… He who trains a young man in affairs of the community and political struggles and prepares him for the service of his country “a speaker of speeches and doer of deeds to be” is useful to the State in no small or mean degree. Old Men in Politics 795E

As noted in Chapter 2, Plutarch’s intention to train young men to become “speakers” and “doers” is also expressed in Political Precepts where Plutarch provides precepts on how to manage political affairs along with exempla. The men presented as role models are often the same statesmen who are subjects of the Lives. Indeed, it is the correspondence between the political treatises and the Lives in both the statesmen who are subjects and the principles they illustrate that provides the strongest evidence that Plutarch’s Lives supplied practical as well as ethical lessons and were, in fact, pragmatic biographies. Within pragmatic biography designed to provide lessons in leadership, the isolation of particular virtues and vices in the hero is only the beginning of the project, which focuses on two larger questions. First, how do particular qualities of character contribute to, or impede, the ability of a statesman to achieve beneficial outcomes for his city? Secondly, how do they interact with the other factors at work—namely, a man’s practical judgment, persuasiveness, and good or bad fortune—to strengthen or undermine his achievements as a leader? The analysis of the six sets of Lives in this book suggests that pragmatic biography is a more powerful paradigm than one centered primarily on issues of moral virtue and vice for distilling definitive lessons in conduct politically-active readers should imitate or avoid. Plutarch, in effect, has filled the gap noted in the quotation from Aristotle at the start of this chapter: he has provided training in the capacity for managing public affairs.

418

chapter 10

Several aspects of the six pairs we have examined support this conclusion. First, each set of Lives centers on a few major challenges of political or military life, while incorporating the same broad set of major virtues and vices. Even in our small sample of twelve Lives, there is significant overlap in the moral qualities on display across the heroes, but minimal overlap in the central lessons in statesmanship and generalship derived from their careers. Thus, Pericles and Aemilius are exemplary models of moderation and superiority to money; Antony, Demetrius and Alcibiades are wanton in private life; Agesilaus and Coriolanus both exhibit excessive anger and contentiousness; and Phocion, Cato and Coriolanus are severe and inflexible in political relations. However, the principles of statesmanship at the core of each pair are different. Among the Lives which highlight principles of effectiveness in political and military leadership in Part 2, Per-Fab demonstrates how to stand by one’s best policy in the face of public ridicule and win the support of the people at critical moments; Cor-Alc deters readers from excessive hostility and unyielding resentment in the face of rejection and demonstrates how to handle exile and reconciliation in ways that benefit one’s state; and Ages-Pomp illustrates how to manage political alliances and rivalries, to ignore protests about strategies and to recognize the perils of long-lived goodwill which can cause statesmen to become overconfident and blind them to threats. Similarly, the Lives in Part 3 examine a variety of issues connected with ruling and being ruled: Aem-Tim gives guidance on how to attract the goodwill of subject peoples and how to deal with good and bad fortune; Dtr-Ant deters rulers from accepting excessive honors from the ruled and alerts them to the dangers of flattery, while also demonstrating the consequences of ignoring justice and the well-being of subjects; and Phoc-Cato Min highlights the need to balance moral principle and considerations of expediency in order to achieve the best possible outcomes for one’s city, especially in negotiating with an overlord or forming alliances in corrupted environments. This variety of perspectives on a wide array of different issues suggests that Plutarch added new pairs to his Parallel Lives series to provide guidance on new challenges of leadership, rather than simply to provide another treatment of the core set of moral virtues and vices needed by statesmen. Secondly, Plutarch’s manipulation of sources is similarly targeted to amplify specific principles of statesmanship—incorporating both a moral component (e.g. the role of anger or justice) and practical insight based on the strategy or tactic chosen by the hero to handle a particular situation. Indeed, it is through ignoring, embellishing or combining various versions of an event that Plutarch molds his characterizations to serve the special didactic objective of each pair of Lives. Thus, for instance, Plutarch includes details that cast Pompey as a

Conclusion

419

distracted general caught unaware by Caesar (rather than the fully-engaged competitor for power found in some accounts) because this characterization isolates “a desire for good repute” as a detrimental force that undermines Pompey’s effectiveness in managing his political alliances and implementing the best strategies for Rome. Similarly, although Dionysius explained Coriolanus’ actions as a rational reaction to the Roman people, Plutarch pre­ sents Coriolanus as consistently motivated by anger and resentment in order to emphasize the destructive impact of such passions on one’s judgment as a political or military leader. Conversely, Plutarch’s portrait of Antony incorporates an unrealized potential for excellent leadership—all but absent from other accounts—because this “lost potential” as a statesman magnifies Plutarch’s lesson in the Life. Pericles, in turn, includes an expansive treatment of the benefits of the construction on the Acropolis, which amplifies the practical lessons for provincial leaders who also faced the challenges of maintaining city services, overseeing construction projects and providing employment opportunities in their cities. Third, Plutarch exercises a similar purposeful selectivity in the incidents he embellishes, glosses over or omits altogether. Thus, for instance, the characterization of Alcibiades first highlights incidents of unrestrained private behavior ahead of the Sicilian Expedition and then concentrates on incidents of military excellence and service to Athens after his recall. In the process, Alcibiades’ actions during his first exile become little more than an inconsequential interlude between his youthful and mature statesmanship. Clearly, the portrait is contrived and places one of the most censured periods of Alcibiades’ career far in the background. In Timoleon, Plutarch goes beyond other extant accounts in describing Timoleon’s early devotion to his brother in order to amplify the principle that serving the common welfare requires a statesman to place the common interest ahead of any private concern. Plutarch’s intention to provide training in managing public affairs is further reflected in the supplementary comments inserted into the Lives to direct the reader to the intended lessons for statesmen and generals. Such comments rarely isolate a particular moral virtue or vice from its consequences for the statesman’s potential to benefit or harm his state. Thus, the discussions of selfindulgent behavior on the part of Demetrius, Antony or Alcibiades are linked to the detrimental effects on their reputation and subsequent inability to retain office or avoid exile. Similarly, Coriolanus’ anger is not censured as a personal vice, but as a hindrance to his practice of statesmanship in Rome, since he is unable to compromise in dealing with the people and unwilling to reconcile with his state. Plutarch also often uses his authorial commentary to pinpoint for his reader the general principle of statesmanship that is being illustrated.

420

chapter 10

For instance, he pauses to clarify Demetrius’ violation of the principle that excessive honors must be rejected, while directly criticizing Cato’s error in refusing to relax his moral principles in a small matter to form an alliance that could have helped the Roman Republic survive. Finally, Plutarch adapts his presentation of particular incidents to facilitate comparison to the pragmatic lessons in leadership contained in the companion Life. Agesilaus and Pompey provide the clearest example of this technique in the Lives we have covered. Plutarch’s account of Agesilaus’ military actions after Leuctra is fashioned to present him as a positive counter-example to Pompey’s flawed statesmanship in abandoning Rome and fighting at Pharsalus. Agesilaus is twice shown as the object of ridicule and scorn—both in Sparta and Egypt—yet he stands by his own judgment and saves the day. This description of events is not found in other accounts, suggesting that Plutarch composed an embellished version designed to set the stage for Pompey’s deterrent lesson. Clearly, Plutarch is not connecting the incidents across the Lives to deliver a lesson in moral virtue or vice: the narrative itself is supplemented by pointed commentary that is critical of Pompey’s generalship and his failure to perform his duty to defend the interests of his state. 10.2

Applying the Exempla

In the six pairs of Lives examined in this study, Plutarch demonstrates how the exempla supplied by the Lives are to be integrated into the readers’ own decisions as statesmen. First, past leaders are evoked as exempla when the hero is trying to resolve an immediate threat to the safety or well-being of those under his care. Thus, for example, Alexander and Philip appear as positive exempla in Demetrius (as good generals, leaders of the Greeks, and administrators of justice), Themistocles and Aristides are mentioned in Alcibiades (as men who served their states while in exile) and Aristides and Epaminondas are cited in Coriolanus (as men who calmly endured injury from their states). Cato Minor looks to Cato Maior (as a model for virtue in public life) and Phocion emulates Solon, Aristides and Pericles (as men who excelled both as generals and orators). Cato Minor even sees himself as an exemplum, or “a Cato”, representing moral rectitude in private life and strict adherence to law in public life. He conducts himself as military tribune and quaestor, not so much to show men how to live in private, but as a model for men who want to act honorably as soldiers or statesmen serving the common good. Among the Lives included in this book, the most detailed illustration of how exempla should be used is included in the synkrisis to Agesilaus-Pompey.

Conclusion

421

Plutarch criticizes Pompey’s failure to properly employ the exempla of “Maximus or Marius or Lucullus or Agesilaus himself” (Ages-Pomp 4.4–6) to guide his decision at Pharsalus. Here, Plutarch groups four generals from different stages of Greek and Roman history (all of whom are subjects of their own Lives) facing similar challenges in warfare. Pompey was not expected to look to these men as models of moral virtue, but rather as exempla of sound practical judgment that resolved crises of generalship and warfare. Indeed, in their own Lives they display a wide array of different virtues and vices. Cicero’s comment in Ad Att. 7.11, cited at Pomp. 63.1, that Pompey, in abandoning Rome, had adopted the strategy of Themistocles when he should have acted like Pericles, speaks to the same point: historical statesmen are cited as exempla to help political and military leaders of a later era address challenges they share in managing political and military matters for their states. Several pairs of Lives reveal how Plutarch delivers the exempla promised in the Prologues: he demonstrates a particular principle of leadership by using one hero as a positive model and his pair as the negative model of the same principle. For example, in Pompey, the inclusion of Agesilaus as one of the models Pompey should have followed suggests that Plutarch designed the pair to illustrate both positive (Agesilaus) and deterrent (Pompey) exempla of the same principle of generalship: a general must act on his best judgment even in the face of withering criticism and mockery of others. The portraits of Phocion and Cato Minor suggest a similar integrated illustration of positive (Phocion) and deterrent (Cato Minor) exempla of a central precept: effective statesmanship requires a willingness to compromise principles of moral virtue when concessions to expediency are unavoidable in pursuit of the greater good for one’s state. Alcibiades, in turn, provides the positive paradigms—reinforced by references to Themistocles and Aristides—of proper reactions to banishment and to offers of reconciliation which are balanced by the deterrent examples provided by both Coriolanus and Alcibiades himself in the first half of his own Life. While the specific issues of successful or failed generalship treated in the Lives may have been relevant primarily to readers who served as generals (such as Sosius Senecio), the challenges of persuading assemblies, winning over colleagues or superiors, forming constructive alliances or behaving nobly in the face of banishment or rejection would have been faced by most Greek and Roman politicians in Plutarch’s day. Similarly, Phocion’s role as mediator—between a local population and an overlord who determined the degree of autonomy his state could enjoy—or the efforts by Aemilius and Timoleon in settling the affairs in subject cities would resonate among readers on both sides of the interactions between Greek cities

422

chapter 10

and Roman magistrates. Thus, the exempla in the Lives could help guide decisions of Plutarch’s readers. 10.3

Reception of the Lives as Pragmatic Biography in the Western Classical Tradition

After largely disappearing from the Western Empire over the millennium that separated the fall of Rome and the fall of Constantinople, Plutarch’s Parallel Lives re-surfaced in the West during the late 14th and early 15th centuries, first in Spain (where Juan Fernandez de Heredia had several Lives translated into Aragonese1) and then in Italy, now dominated by local republics and independent city-states. Earlier, awareness of Plutarch as a respected philosopher and author of ancient times was preserved largely through references to various treatises, including De Cohibenda Ira2 and the spurious Letter to Trajan first “cited” in the work of John of Salisbury in 11923 and then subsequently widely used in other works, especially the “mirrors for princes” literature.4 The reception of Plutarch’s treatises in the West embraced both moral and pragmatic dimensions. In Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince (1516), for instance, How to Tell a Flatterer was used to advise the prince not only on moral virtues but on the practical problems that would result from allowing flatterers to undermine the efficacy of his rule.5

1  On the reception of Plutarch before the Renaissance, see Pade (2007: 37–87) and Pade (2014: 531–537). On the Aragonese Lives, see Pade (2007: 76–87). In 1380, the Lives were translated for the first time in the West—into Aragonese for Juan Fernandez de Heredia, the Grand Master of the Knights Hospitaller (Pade (2014: 538); Pérez Jiménez (2014: 557)). In Florence, Salutati procured a copy of the Lives and had them translated into Tuscan in the 1390s (Pade 2014: 538). 2  De Cohibenda Ira was known from Gellius’ references to it in Attic Nights 1.26–27 and was the first of Plutarch’s works translated in the West (Pade 2014: 538). For a fuller discussion, see Pade (2007: 71–76). 3  On the history and reception of this spurious work, see Nederman (1990: xviii–xxvi) and Pade (2007: 62–66). Pérez Jiménez (2014: 557) notes that Plutarch first become known in Spain through Salisbury’s Policraticus. 4  On the “mirrors for princes” genre see Nederman and Forhan (1993), Budra (2000). On Christine of Pizan’s work in this genre, see Forhan (1994). 5  On Erasmus’ use of Plutarch’s work on flatterers in Education of a Christian Prince (1516), see Jardine (1997).

Conclusion

423

As the Parallel Lives initially became widely known, they were also interpreted as blending moral and pragmatic guidance. As described by Pade (2007), the independent, republic-centered political milieu in Florence and Venice during the 14th century contributed to an enthusiastic reception of the Lives depicting the political careers of leaders active in the Roman Republic and Greek city-states.6 Plutarch was a favorite author of the most prominent of the Greek teachers, Chrysoloras of Constantinople, who taught in Florence in the waning years of the 14th century, and his influence, combined with the parallelism Florentines saw between the republican experiences of Plutarch’s statesmen and their own political arena, led to a steady stream of new translations of Plutarch’s Lives.7 This trend was extended by the intense interest of the Venetians in the Greek Lives,8 with the result that the entire corpus was available in Latin by the mid-15th century. The interpretation of the Lives as pragmatic biography, offering practical guidance in how to manage political and military affairs, resonated in the political environments that incorporated a direct role for citizens in the operation of their government. A pragmatic reading was evident especially among three groups: men active in the political arena of the Italian republics (such as Salutati, Bruni and Machiavelli);9 European thinkers (such as Erasmus and Montaigne) in works or essays addressing the role of rulers and citizens in monarchies that included input from advisory councils and parliaments;10 and America’s Founding Fathers, who sought in Plutarch inspiration to fight

6  The pace of translation accelerated as interest in Greek texts and accessibility to Greek teachers expanded with rising migration to Italy from the Eastern Empire in the face of the threat from the Turks. See Pade (2007: 89–91). 7  For a fuller discussion of Chrysoloras’ career and the work of his pupils, see Pade (2007: 89–104). 8  Pade (2007: 179–183). 9  This reception of the Lives by men active in politics was termed “civic humanism” by Hans Baron, a label that captured the influence of political involvement on the interpretation and use of Plutarch and other classical writings. See Baron (1955/1966), Hankins (2000), Pade (2007: 104–106) and Ianziti (2012). Jardine (1997: vi) notes that both Erasmus and Machiavelli wrote their works advising rulers during periods of political instability. 10  The range of topics included in Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince included careful selection of subordinates and administrators, as well as the oversight of their work. See Jardine (1997). Montaigne touches on these themes as a man who had long been involved in managing affairs in his area, but focused in his essays on topics that were more farreaching. On Montaigne, see Frame (1958).

424

chapter 10

tyranny for the sake of liberty11 and practical guidance about both the institutions that could maximize liberty and security in a federation of states and the practices that could dilute or eliminate factional disputes that caused the decline and fall of republics.12 For politically-active readers, the Lives served a variety of purposes, providing a source of historical precedent in support of political arguments, supplying models of particular virtues in action on the political stage and presenting practical tactics and strategies to meet the challenges of leadership. In this context, the Lives were seen as a form of history that complemented the traditional histories of men like Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Polybius or Thucydides.13 This pragmatic reading of the Lives emerged in the 16th century, when examples from Plutarch were often incorporated to illustrate the efficacy of the practical advice offered to political leaders. Erasmus (1466–1536), Machiavelli (1469–1527) and Montaigne (1533–1592), for instance, all used Plutarch’s heroes to exemplify both moral traits and the practical strategies for exercising authority to best effect for one’s state. Indeed, in the first chapter of Education of a Christian Prince (hereafter, ECP), Erasmus explicitly states the essential roles of both ethical and pragmatic strengths in a good prince: The first obligation of the good prince is to have the best possible intention; and the next is to be on the look-out for ways of avoiding or removing evils, and, on the other, of achieving, increasing and reinforcing what 11  In particular, the Founding Fathers looked to the late Republican Lives, including Brutus, Antony, Cicero and Marius, as the source of helpful insights into how best to respond to tyranny. Cato Minor quickly became an inspirational model of a man who was willing not only to fight for liberty to the bitter end, but to choose death rather than a life without liberty (Richard (2008: 151); Richard (2014: 603)). 12  After securing independence, the founders sought in Plutarch practical guidance in how to design the institutional foundation of their confederation to promote security and stability. The story of the fall of Greece to the Macedonians and Rome as told in the Lives provided insights into the dynamics of federations (Richard (2014: 85–96)), while the Lives also became a source of role models for creating laws and constitutions—with LycurgusNuma, Theseus-Romulus and Solon-Publicola being central in this area (Richard 2014: 559; 602). On the Founding Fathers’ enthusiasm for Plutarch and their use of Classical sources, see Richard (1994; 2008). 13  Major historical sources of the 15th to 18th centuries are discussed in Reinhold (1975: 39–64; 81–112), Richard (1994: 19–38; 2008: 1–23). Pérez Jiménez (2014: 557) notes that beginning in the 15th century in Spain, as elsewhere, Plutarch’s Lives were viewed as an historical source beside Thucydides, Livy, Sallust and Cicero, with writers such as Baltasar Gracian (1501–1658) citing him enthusiastically throughout his works (Pérez Jiménez (2014: 568)).

Conclusion

425

is good. It is perhaps for a private individual to be well intentioned, since he is guided by the law and magistrates prescribe what is to be done. But in the prince, it is not enough to be well-meaning and have the best intentions, unless they are accompanied by wisdom, which demonstrates by what means he may achieve what he desires. ERASMUS, ECP 114

Because it is good judgment (about actions that will benefit a state) that distinguishes the good man from the good statesman, Erasmus asserts that “it is quite possible to find a good man who would not make a good prince, yet one cannot be a good prince without at the same time being a good man” (ECP 1).15 In order to acquire the qualities and skills to be a good prince, Erasmus recommends the reading of Plutarch’s work—including the Apophthegms, the Moralia and the Lives—as second in importance only to the key books of the Bible that illustrate good kingship (ECP 2).16 Erasmus’ Education of a Christian Prince addressed both the moral and pragmatic elements of leadership and included two sets of precepts: first, guidance on how to educate a young prince and, secondly, instruction on how a prince should model himself for divine rule.17 Erasmus emphasized ethical lessons centered on the ruler’s duty to practice moderation in all aspects of his life as an example for his people to emulate—quoting Plutarch’s comment (at 780E) that a beneficent prince is a living likeness of God18—and the duty to place the interests of his country before his own.19 Erasmus instructs his pupil that “When once you have dedicated yourself to the state, you are no longer at liberty to live in your own way; you must maintain and cultivate the role you have 14  Jardine (1997: 50). 15  Jardine (1997: 51). Erasmus advises his reader that if he finds it impossible to be both a good man and a good prince at the same time, he must give up being a prince. 16  Jardine (1997: 61–62). The books of the Bible recommended by Erasmus are Proverbs of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, the Book of Wisdom and the Gospels. 17  As described by Jardine (1997: vii–xii), Erasmus’ work confronted the issue of “how to ensure that those born to rule are educated so as to govern justly and benevolently and so that the prince’s rule never degenerates into oppression”, with the goal of being able to make the right decisions to benefit his people; by contrast, Machiavelli’s The Prince, composed three years earlier, focused on how a ruler could remain in power. 18  E CP 1, Jardine (1997: 21–22). 19  E CP 1, Jardine (1997: 32–37; 46). Erasmus later adds “Let it be the prince’s constant principle to harm nobody, to be of help to everybody, especially his own people, and either to tolerate such faults as there are or to put them right according to his assessment of what is expedient for the common good” (Jardine (1997: 52)).

426

chapter 10

undertaken”.20 In addition, Erasmus underscores the importance of the young prince acquiring the practical skills of administration beginning in childhood, first by learning the principles of administration and then by observing political deliberation, courts of law, the creation of magistrates and demands made by kings, never deciding anything without the approval of more experienced men “until his age and experience have made his own judgment more reliable”.21 Practical advice on persuading the people, managing magistrates and diplomatic relations is also delivered, often using themes from the Moralia or incidents from the Lives to illustrate key principles.22 The pragmatic insights overlap themes in How to Tell a Flatterer, To an Uneducated Ruler, Philosophers and Men in Power, Old Men in Politics and Political Precepts. Like Erasmus, Machiavelli also repeatedly incorporates events described in the Lives to illustrate his principles of cause and effect in the political arena, deriving pragmatic lessons in leadership. In both Art of War and Discourses on Livy, the Lives are repeatedly tapped to illustrate principles of military and political effectiveness.23 In the Art of War, Machiavelli used Plutarch, as he used other historians including Livy, Xenophon, Polybius and Tacitus, “as compendia of facts about ancient politics and war”24 and believed that studying the experiences of past princes should enable modern princes to take warning and alter course.25 For instance, Machiavelli points to Plutarch’s description of Lucullus’ defeat of Tigranes to illustrate principles of effective deployment of cavalry or infantry (Art of War 2)26 and refers the reader to the Life of Alexander for illustrations of the importance of a general being an orator in order to inspire 20  E CP 1, Jardine (1997: 44). 21  E CP 1, Jardine (1997: 46). 22  The advice on persuading the people in different circumstances—provided in ECP 3, dedicated to the “arts of peace”—incorporated Plutarch “flavoring” in Erasmus’ use of a wine analogy (like Plutarch’s in Political Precepts 799C) to describe the process of first accommodating the desires of the people and then gradually winning them over to one’s plans—“in the same way, as when wine is drunk, it yields to the drinker at first until it permeates his veins by degrees and takes the whole person into his power” (Jardine 1997: 73). Precepts for magistrates and their duties are presented in ECP 7, while issues of diplomacy (treaties and marriage alliances) are addressed in ECP 8 and 9. 23  On Machiavelli’s Art of War and Discourses on Livy, see Wood (1965), Bondanella and Bondanella (1997), Constantine (2007). The Prince also incorporates issues and themes raised in Plutarch’s work, but his direct influence is less prominent. On The Prince, see Skinner and Price (1988). 24  Wood (1965: xvii). 25  Wood (1965: 211). 26  Wood (1965: 52).

Conclusion

427

his army to follow him at critical moments (Art of War 4).27 In his Preface to the Autograph Manuscript of the Discourses on Livy,28 Machiavelli’s states his objective of extracting pragmatic lessons from Livy so that leaders of his own day could more easily extract “practical knowledge” from the examples of the ancients. Machiavelli’s general precepts about how to manage the dynamics of the political and military arenas are often illustrated, not only by incidents described by Livy, but also by accounts in Plutarch and others. For instance, Machiavelli refers to Plutarch’s Crassus when he illustrates the precept that a general must impose on his troops the absolute necessity to fight (Discourses 3.12) and draws on Lycurgus, Solon, Agis and Cleomenes to support his view that a man must be alone if he wishes to organize a new republic or reform ancient institutions (Discourses 1.9).29 Montaigne, whose famous respect for Plutarch30 largely centered on the ethical themes and Plutarch’s ability to present statesmen and their accomplishments “with a luster that lights our way to virtue” (Essays 1.21),31 also incorporated Plutarch’s pragmatic insights about political and military effectiveness into his essays. For instance, in Essay 1.23 on “Of custom, and not easily changing an existing law”, Montaigne discusses the need in some situations to let the laws give way, citing criticism of Octavius (against Sulla) and Cato Minor (against Caesar) for refusing to rescue their countries at the expense of the laws, in contrast to Agesilaus who allowed the laws to sleep.32 Later in the essay, Montaigne further cites Plutarch’s praise for Philopoemen for knowing “not only how to command according to the laws, but how to command the

27  Wood (1965: 128). Machiavelli says: “Read the Life of Alexander the Great and you will see how often he was obliged to harangue his troops.… Many things may prove the ruin of an army, if the general does not frequently harangue his men; for by so doing (haranguing his men), the general may dispel their fears, inflame their courage, confirm their resolution, point out the snares laid for them, promise the rewards, inform them of danger and of the way to escape it.” 28  Bondanella and Bondanella (1997: 16 and 361). 29  Generally, Machiavelli reports incidents without referencing a specific source, so in many cases his accounts could come from Plutarch or others. 30  Montaigne worked from Amyot’s 1559 translation of the Lives into French and cites Plutarch over 500 times (Guerrier 2014: 547). Later French admirers of Plutarch included Abbot Mably (1709–1785), Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Rousseau (1712–1778) (Frazier 2014b: 551–552). Rousseau, in particular, found Plutarch’s portraits of the Roman Republic and Sparta to be a spur to his own revolutionary thinking (Highet (1949: 393–395)). 31  Frame (1958: 76). 32  Frame (1958: 89).

428

chapter 10

laws themselves, when the public necessity required it”.33 The assessments of statesmen and generals incorporate both ethical qualities and practical (political and moral) virtues, as reflected in his comparison of Alexander and Caesar (Essays 2.3).34 Elsewhere, Montaigne draws on Plutarch with regard to the lesson that a statesman must not, to suit his own convenience, delay in reading messages, pointing to the examples of Caesar and Archias (in Pelopidas) as men who did not read messages that could have saved their lives (Essays 2.4). In these cases, the appropriate conduct of a wise man—who might defer reading a message out of consideration for others—is different than that of a man holding public office, for whom delay is inexcusable.35 Perhaps the clearest application of Plutarch’s practical insights to managing political affairs is found in the use of the Lives by America’s Founding Fathers in the late 18th century. The founding fathers not only utilized figures from Plutarch as pseudonyms, but routinely referred to the Lives as illustrative of the dynamics of the competing systems being considered when the United States Constitution was being designed.36 Plutarch featured prominently in the discussions both of how to combat tyranny (during the Revolutionary War) and of how to construct a confederacy of independent states that could defend itself from outside threats through united action guided by a central authority. Alexander Hamilton, among others, used Plutarch to support his arguments for standing up to monarchy in pursuit of liberty during the war for independence and later incorporated Plutarch’s depiction of the dynamics of Greek confederacies to illustrate the differences between federations of independent states and a single unified state in which a central government exerts significant control.37 Thus, Plutarch’s Lives played a role in identifying and resolving key pragmatic issues of establishing institutions that would promote internal stability and foster liberty in their newly-independent country. 33  Frame (1958: 90). 34  Montaigne in assessing Alexander distinguishes between the virtues of civic life—including justice, temperance, liberality, fidelity to one’s word, love of his people and humanity toward the vanquished—and military virtues, such as diligence, foresight, patience, discipline, subtlety, magnanimity and resolution, while recognizing that Plutarch’s comparisons in the Lives cover both moral virtues and the abilities of the two leaders to produce beneficial outcomes in varied circumstances. (Frame (1958: 371; 549)). 35  Frame (1958: 262–263). 36  On the use of Plutarch by America’s Founding Fathers to help them grapple with contemporary issues, see Richard (1994; 2008; 2014: 600–602). 37  See Richard (1994) on how Plutarch’s Lives influenced the discussion of federalism. On Hamilton’s common-place book with notes on Theseus-Romulus and Lycurgus-Numa, see Stadter (2011c) and Richard (2014: 559).

Conclusion

429

These examples of the reception of Plutarch’s Lives as pragmatic biography, which are a subset of a much larger group, demonstrate that politically-active readers from the Renaissance through the 18th century recognized both the moral and pragmatic dimensions of Plutarch’s lessons for statesmen in the Lives. Among Americans, Emerson was one of the last prominent enthusiasts about Plutarch, and in his works the emphasis, like that of Montaigne, was heavily concentrated on the ethical lessons in the Lives.38 The shift away from studying the pragmatic advice for statesmen became more pronounced after the shortcomings of the Lives as a source of reliable historical information came under increased scrutiny during the 19th century.39 By the 20th century, the ethical dimensions of Plutarch’s paradigms held center stage, with the scholarly interpretations of the Lives evolving from the assumption that Plutarch was creating definitive portraits to inspire virtue to the more nuanced treatment of issues of virtue and vice that is now the central paradigm in Plutarch scholarship, as discussed in the Introduction. The analysis presented in this book suggests that the displacement of the pragmatic component of Plutarch’s paradigms after the 18th century was unwarranted. To the extent that Plutarch’s objective in the Lives was to use the careers of historical statesmen to create paradigms his readers could imitate in contemporary political roles, Plutarch necessarily had to deviate from an exact historical rendering of each career and re-work traditional historical accounts to emphasize the parallels across the varied political environments in which the historical and contemporary statesmen operated. When the departures from historical “accuracy” criticized by 19th century scholars are recognized as an unavoidable consequence of Plutarch’s project and method of pairing Lives, the pragmatic lessons in statesmanship and generalship embedded in the narratives can regain their validity as an essential component of the paradigms for imitation and avoidance promised by Plutarch in the Lives. 10.4

“Pragmatic Biography” versus “Explorations of Issues of Virtue and Vice”

This book has been designed to revitalize the appreciation of the pragmatic lessons in effective leadership that were recognized by writers of earlier centuries, while also clarifying the broad scope of the tactical and strategic insights Plutarch wanted to convey. The widely-accepted analysis of Plutarch’s desire 38  For a discussion of Emerson’s use of Plutarch, see Berry (1961). 39  On the critiques of 19th century historians, see Berry (1961: 3–4) and Duff (1999b: 5–6).

430

chapter 10

to stimulate his readers to cultivate their moral character and reflect more deeply on ethical matters has been integrated, largely intact, into a broader framework that brings his treatment of practical challenges of leadership into focus as well. The importance of the practical lessons for leaders is reflected in Plutarch’s careful design of the narratives of specific events to facilitate the comparison of the leadership of two statesmen of different eras. In addition, Plutarch’s authorial comments help readers identify the general principles and specific pragmatic actions each pair was designed to highlight. While all of the Lives overlap substantially in their treatment of moral virtues and vices and the types of political and military incidents that are emphasized, each pair in the series places the spotlight on a different set of challenges. To recognize the pragmatic lessons in leadership—which combine the moral and practical components which enable a statesman to correctly judge the actions required in each situation—it is necessary to examine each Life at the disaggregated level of individual incidents and to analyze the roles of moral qualities, oratorical and diplomatic skills, and practical judgment in producing the outcomes. The analysis of Lives in this book was structured to break out the individual incidents and highlight the particular principles of effective action that are being illustrated. When interpreted as pragmatic biography, each Life presents numerous positive and deterrent paradigms in how to handle specific practical problems (or conversely, strategies or tactics to avoid). The principles of statesmanship articulated in the political treatises—especially Political Precepts and Old Men in Politics—provide a common context joining the depictions of statesmen in the Lives to Plutarch’s use of statesmen as exempla in the Moralia. Taking the precepts in the political and practical-ethical treatises as a backdrop, it is clear that the twelve Lives in this book have dealt only with a subset of the important principles. The other sixteen sets of Lives offer both new perspectives on these principles, while also supplying definitive paradigms in other areas. Ultimately, for each of his heroes, Plutarch has crafted a narrative that transforms the historical account of his career into paradigms in how to handle challenges that confront political and military leaders of every era, including our own.

Bibliography Aalders, G.J.D. 1982. Plutarch’s Political Thought. Amsterdam. Almagor, Eran. 2009. “Characterization through Animals: The Case of Plutarch’s Artaxerxes, Part I.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 7 (2009/2010): 3–22. Almagor, Eran. 2014a. “Hold Your Horses: Characterization through Animals in Plutarch’s Artaxerxes, Part II.” In Ploutarchos, n.s., 11 (2014): 3–18. Almagor, Eran. 2014b. “The Aratus and Artaxerxes.” In Beck (ed.): 278–291. Anderson, Graham. 1993. The Second Sophistic. New York. Andrewes, A. 1978. “The Opposition to Perikles.” JHS 98: 1–8. Ash, Rhiannon. 1997. “Severed Head: Individual Portraits and Irrational Forces in Plutarch’s Galba and Otho.” In Mossman (ed.): 189–214. Asirvathan, Sulochana R. 2005. “Classicism and Romanitas in Plutarch’s De Alexandri Fortuna Aut Virtute.” AJP 126: 107–125. Atkins, E.M. 2005. “Cicero.” In Rowe and Schofield (eds.): 477–516. Austin, R.G. (ed.). 1948. Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber XII. Oxford. Azoulay, Vincent. 2014. Pericles of Athens. Princeton. [trans. Janet Lloyd]. Babut, Daniel. 1969. Plutarque: de la Vertu Éthique. Paris. Balsdon, J.P.V.D. 1963. “The Commentariolum Petitionis.” CQ 13, 2: 242–250. Baraz, Yelena. 2012. A Written Republic: Cicero’s Philosophical Politics. Princeton. Barchiesi, Alessandro. 2009. “Exemplarity: Between Practice and Text.” In Maes et al. (eds.): 41–62. Barnes, J and M. Griffin (eds.). 1997. Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome. Oxford. Baron, Hans. 1955/1966. The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny. Princeton. [revised in 1966 with added epilogue]. Bartsch, S. and A. Schiesaro (eds.). 2015. The Cambridge Companion to Seneca. Cambridge. Bastomsky, S.J. 1985. “The not-so-perfect man: some ambiguities in Tacitus’ picture of Agricola.” Latomus 44: 388–93. Becchi, Francesco. 2014. “Plutarch, Aristotle, and the Peripatetics.” In Beck (ed.): 73–87. Beck, Mark. 1999. “Plato, Plutarch and the Use and Manipulation of Anecdotes in the Lives of Lycurgus and Agesilaus. History of the Laconic Apophthegm.” In Pérez Jiménez et al. (eds.): 173–188. Beck, Mark. 2002. “Plutarch to Trajan: The Dedicatory Letter and the Apophthegmata Collection.” In Stadter and Van der Stockt (eds.): 163–173. Beck, Mark. 2004. “Plutarch on the Statesman’s Independence of Action.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 105–114.

432

Bibliography

Beck, Mark. 2014. “The Socratic Paradigm.” In Beck (ed.): 463–478. Beck, Mark. 2016. “The Serio-Comic Life of Antony.” In Opsomer et al. (eds.): 137–146. Beck, Mark (ed.). 2014. Companion to Plutarch. Chichester. Beneker, Jeffrey. 2005a. “Thematic correspondences in Plutarch’s Lives of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 315–326. Beneker, Jeffrey. 2005b. “Plutarch on the Rise and Fall of Pompey.” In Pérez Jiménez and Titchener (eds.): 69–82. Beneker, Jeffrey. 2009. “Nepos’ Biographical Method in the Lives of Foreign Generals.” CJ 105, 2: 109–121. Beneker, Jeffrey. 2012. The Passionate Statesman. Oxford. Beneker, Jeffrey. 2014. “Sex, Eroticism, and Politics.” In Beck (ed.): 503–515. Bennett, Charles E. 1925. Frontinus: The Stratagems, The Aqueducts of Rome. (LCL 174). Cambridge. Berry, Edmund G. 1961. Emerson’s Plutarch. Cambridge, MA. Billault, Alain. 2005. “Plutarque et la question du caractère: le cas d’Antoine.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 3 (2004/2005): 19–30. Bloomer, W. Martin. 1992. Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility. Chapel Hill. Bondanella, Julia Conaway and Peter Bondanella. 1997. Niccolo Machiavelli: Discourses on Livy. Oxford. Bonner, Stanley F. 1977. Education in Ancient Rome. London. Boulet, Bernard. 2014. “The Philosopher-King.” In Beck (ed.): 449–462. Bowersock, G.W. 1969. Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire. Oxford. Bowersock, G. 2002. “Philosophy in the Second Sophistic.” In Clark and Rajak (eds.): 157–170. Bowie, E.L. 1970. “The Greeks and the Past in the Second Sophistic.” Past and Present 46: 3–41. Bradley, K.R. 1998. “Introduction.” In Rolfe (ed.): 1–34. Braund, David. 1989. “Function and dysfunction: personal patronage in Roman imperialism.” In Wallace-Hadrill (ed.): 137–152. Braund, David (ed.). 1988. The Administration of the Roman Empire 214BC–AD193. Exeter. Braund, Susanna. 2009. Seneca: De Clementia. Oxford. Breebart, A.B. 1971. “Plutarch and the Political Development of Pericles.” In Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, 24.3: 260–272. Bremer, Jan Maarten. 2005. “Plutarch and the ‘Liberation of Greece’.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 257–267. Brenk, F.E. 1992a. “Antony-Osiris, Cleopatra-Isis: The end of Plutarch’s Antony.” In Stadter (ed.): 159–182.

Bibliography

433

Brenk, F.E. 1992b. “Plutarch’s Life of Markos Antonius: A Literary and Cultural Study.” In ANRW 2.33.6: 4347–4469. Brenk, F.E. 1995. “Heroic Anti-Heroes, Ruler Cult and Divine Assimilations in Plutarch’s Lives of Demetrios and Antonius.” In Gallo and Scardigli (eds.): 65–82. Brenk, F.E. 2008. “Setting a Good Exemplum. Case Studies in the Moralia, the Lives as Case Studies.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 237–254. Brenk, F.E. and I. Gallo (eds.). 1986. Miscellanea Plutarchea. Ferrara. Brunt, P. 1977. “From Epictetus to Arrian.” Athenaeum 65: 19–48. Budra, Paul. 2000. A Mirror for Magistrates and the de casibus Tradition. Toronto. Buszard, Bradley. 2005. “The Decline of the Roman Republic in Pyrrhus-Marius.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 281–296. Cairns, Douglas. 2014. “Exemplarity and Narrative in the Greek Tradition.” In Cairns and Scodel (eds.): 103–136. Cairns, Douglas and Ruth Scodel (eds.). 2014. Defining Greek Narrative. Edinburgh. Campbell, Brian. 1987. “Teach yourself how to be a general.” JRS 77: 13–29. Campbell, Brian. 2002. War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 BC–AD 284. London and Boston. Carlier, Pierre. 2010. “The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia.” In Gray (ed.): 327–366. Centrone, Bruno. 2005. “Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the early empire.” In Rowe and Schofield (eds.): 559–584. Chaplin, Jane D. 2000. Livy’s Exemplary History. Oxford. Chlup, J.T. 2014. “Just War in Onasander’s ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΟΣ.” Journal of Ancient History 2(1): 37–63. Clark, Gillian and Tessa Rajak (eds). 2002. Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World. Oxford. Clark, M.L. 1971. Higher Education in the Ancient World. London. Clarke, K. 2001. “An Island Nation: Re-reading Tacitus’ Agricola.” JRS 91: 94–112. Cohoon, J.W. 1926. “Index to the Lives.” In Perrin (trans.) (LCL 103): 321–493. Constantine, Peter. 2007. The Essential Writings of Machiavelli. New York. Conte, Gian Biagio. 1994. Latin Literature: A History. (Trans. Joseph B. Solodow). Baltimore. Cooper, C. 2008. “The Moral Interplay Between Plutarch’s Political Precepts and Demosthenes.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 67–83. Cooper, John M. and J.F. Procopé. 1995. Seneca: Moral and Political Essays. Cambridge. Cortés Copete, J.M. 2015. “Hellas, Roman Province.” In Cortés Copete et al. (eds.): 43–65. Cortés Copete, J.M., E. Muñiz Grijalvo and F. Lozano Gómez (eds.). 2015. Ruling the Greek World: Approaches to the Roman Empire in the East. Stuttgart. Corvisier, Jean-Nicolas. 1994. “Médecine et biographie: l’exemple de Plutarque.” Revue des Ėtudes Grecques 107: 129–157.

434

Bibliography

Cotton, Hannah H. and Werner Eck. 2005. “Josephus’ Roman Audience: Josephus and the Roman Elites.” In Edmondson et al. (eds.): 37–52. De Blois, L. 1997. “Political Concepts in Plutarch’s Dion and Timoleon.” Anc. Soc. 28: 209–224. De Blois, L. 1999. “Plutarch’s Perception of Plato’s Political Activities in Syracuse.” In Pérez Jiménez et al. (eds.): 299–304. De Blois, L. 2000. “Traditional Commonplaces in Plutarch’s Image of Timoleon.” In Van der Stockt (ed.): 131–139. De Blois, L. 2004. “Classical and Contemporary Statesmen In Plutarch’s Political Precepts.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 57–66. De Blois, L. 2014. “Plutarch’s Galba and Otho.” In Beck (ed.): 267–277. De Blois, L. and Jeroen Bons Ton Kessels. 1995. “Platonic and Isocratean Political Concepts in Plutarch’s Lycurgus.” In Gallo and Scardigli (eds.): 99–106. De Blois, Lukas and Jeroen Bons Ton Kessels and Dirk M. Schenkeveld (eds.). 2004. The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works Vol. I: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International Plutarch Society, Nijmegen/Castle Hernen, May 1–5, 2002. Leiden. De Blois, Lukas and Jeroen Bons Ton Kessels and Dirk M. 2005. The Statesman in Plutarch’s Works Vol. II: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International Conference of the International Plutarch Society, Nijmegen/Castle Hernen, May 1–5, 2002. Leiden. De Lacy, Phillip. 1952. “Biography and Tragedy in Plutarch.” AJP 73, 2: 159–171. Delgado, J.A.F. and F.P. Pardo (eds.). 1996. Estudios Sobre Plutarco: Aspectos Formales (Actas del IV Simposio Espanol Sobre Plutarco: Salamanca 26–28 de Mayo de 1994). Salamanca. Deroux, C. (ed.). 2000. Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History X. Collection Latomus 254. Brussels. Desideri, Paolo. 2000. “City and Country in Dio.” In Swain (ed.): 93–107. Desideri, Paolo. 2011. “Greek Poleis and the Roman Empire: Nature and Features of Political Virtues in an Autocratic System.” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 83–98. Dihle, Albrecht. 1994. Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire. (Tr. M. Malzahn). London. Dillon, John. 1996. Middle Platonists 80 B.C. to A.D. 220. Ithaca. Dillon, John. 2008. “Dion and Brutus: Philosopher Kings Adrift in a Hostile World.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 351–364. Dillon, John. 2010. “Dion and Brutus: philosopher kings adrift in a hostile world.” In Humble (ed.): 87–102. Dillon, John. 2014. “Plutarch and Platonism.” In Beck (ed.): 61–72. Dillon, John. 2016. “Plutarch the Philosopher and Plutarch the Historian on Apatheia.” In Opsomer et al. (eds.): 9–15.

Bibliography

435

Dionisotti, A.C. 1988. “Nepos and the Generals.” JRS 78: 35–49. Dorey, T.A. (ed.). 1967. Latin Biography. London. Dueck, Daniela. 1999. “The Date and Method of Composition in Strabo’s Geography.” Hermes 127, 4: 478–78. Dueck, Daniela. 2000. Strabo of Amasia. London. Duff, T. 1996. “The Structure of the Coriolanus-Alcibiades.” In Delgado and Pardo (eds.): 333–349. Duff, T. 1999a. “Plutarch, Plato and ‘Great Natures’.” In Pérez Jiménez et al (eds.): 313–332. Duff, T. 1999b. Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice. Oxford. Duff, T. 2000. “Plutarchean Synkrisis: Comparisons and Contradictions.” In Van der Stockt (ed.): 141–162. Duff, T. 2001. “The Prologue to the Lives of Pericles and Fabius (Per. 1–2).” In Pérez Jiménez and Bordoy (eds.): 351–363. Duff, T. 2003. The Greek and Roman Historians. London. Duff, T. 2004. “Plato, Tragedy, the Ideal Reader and Plutarch’s Demetrius and Antony.” Hermes 132: 271–291. Duff, T. 2005. “The First Five Anecdotes of Plutarch’s Life of Alkibiades.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 157–166. Duff, T. 2007. “Plutarch’s readers and the moralism of the Lives.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 5 (2007/2008): 3–18. Duff, T. 2008. “How Lives Begin.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 187–208. Duff, T. 2011a. “Plutarch’s Lives and the Critical Reader.” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 59–82. Duff, T. 2011b. “The Structure of the Plutarchan Book.” Cl. Ant. 30, No. 2: 213–278. Duff, T. 2014. “The Prologues.” In Beck (ed.): 333–349. Duncan-Jones, Richard. 2016. Power and Privilege in Roman Society. Cambridge. Dyke, Andrew R. 1996. A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor. Easterling, P.E. and B.M.W. Knox (eds.). 1985. The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, Vol I. Cambridge. Eckstein, Arthur M. 1995. Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius. Berkeley. Edmondson, Jonathon, Steve Mason and James Rives (eds.). 2005. Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome. Oxford. Erbse, H. 1956. “Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs.” Hermes 84: 398–424. Evans, J.A.S. (ed.). 1974. Polis and Imperium. Toronto. Fialhoa, Maria do Ceu. 2010. “The Interplay of Textual References in Plutarch’s Life of Phocion.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 8 (2010/2011): 91–102. Fillion-Lahille, J. 1984. Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoicienne des passions (Études et commentaires 94). Paris.

436

Bibliography

Fillion-Lahille, J. 1989. “La Production littéraire de Sénèque sous les règnes de Caligula et de Claude, sens philosophique et portée politique: les ‘Consolationes’ et le ‘De Ira’.” ANRW 2.36.3: 1606–38. Forhan, Kate Langdon. 1994. Christine de Pizan: The Book of the Body Politic. Cambridge. Formisano, Marco. 2011. “The Strategikos of Onasander: Taking Military Texts Seriously.” Technai 2.2011: 39–52. Formisano, Marco. 2017. “Fragile Expertise and the Authority of the Past: The ‘Roman Art of War’.” In König and Woolf (eds.): 39–52. Fornara, C.W. 1983. The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome. Berkeley. Fox, Matthew. 1993. “History and Rhetoric in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.” JRS 83: 31–47. Frame, Donald M. 1958. The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Stanford. Frazier, Francoise. 1995. “Principes et décisions dans le domaine politique d’après les Vies de Plutarque.” In Gallo and Scardigli (eds.): 147–172. Frazier, Francoise. 1996. Histoire et Morale Dans Les Vies Parallèles de Plutarque. Paris. Frazier, Francoise. 2011. “Autour du miroir. Les miroitements d’une image dans l’oeuvre de Plutarque.” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 297–326. Frazier, Francoise. 2014a. “The Perils of Ambition.” In Beck (ed.): 488–502. Frazier, Francoise. 2014b. “The Reception of Plutarch in France after the Renaissance.” In Beck (ed.): 549–555. Frost, F. 1964. “Pericles, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War.” Historia 13: 385–99. Fuhrmann, F. 1964. Les Images de Plutarque. Paris. Fulkerson, Laurel. 2012. “Plutarch on the Statesman, Stability, Change and Regret.” ICS 37: 51–74. Gabba, E. 1991. Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome. Berkeley and Los Angeles. Gallo, I. and B. Scardigli (eds.). 1995. Teoria e Prassi Politica Nelle Opere di Plutarco: Atti del V Convegno Plutarcheo, Certosa di Pontignano, 7–9 giugno 1993. Naples. Garnsey, Peter and Richard Saller. 1982. The Early Principate. Oxford. Garnsey, Peter and Richard Saller. 1987. The Roman Empire: Economy, Society, Culture. Berkeley. Geiger, Joseph. 1979a. “Cornelius Nepos: De Regibus Exterarum Gentium.” Latomus 38: 662–669. Geiger, Joseph. 1979b. “Munatius Rufus and Thrasea Paetus on Cato the Younger.” Athenaeum 57: 48–72. Geiger, Joseph. 1981/1995. “Plutarch’s Parallel Lives: The Choice of Heroes.” Hermes 109: 85–104. [Reprinted in Scardigli (ed.) (1995): 164–190]. Geiger, Joseph. 1985. Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography. Stuttgart. Geiger, Joseph. 1988. “Nepos and Plutarch: From Latin to Greek Political Biography.” ICS 13.2: 245–256.

Bibliography

437

Geiger, Joseph. 1996. “Giambettino Cignaroli’s Deaths of Cato and Socrates.” Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 59: 270–278. Geiger, Joseph. 1999. “Plato, Plutarch and the death of Socrates and of Cato.” In Pérez Jimènez et al. (eds): 357–364. Geiger, Joseph. 2002. “Felicitas Temporum and Plutarch’s Choice of Heroes.” In Stadter and Van der Stockt (eds.): 93–102. Geiger, Joseph. 2005. “Plutarch’s Choice of Roman Heroes: Further Considerations.” In Pérez Jimènez and Titchener (eds.): 219–230. Geiger, Joseph. 2014. “The Project of the Parallel Lives: Plutarch’s Conception of Biography.” In Beck (ed.): 292–303. Georgiadou, Aristoula. 1988. “The Lives of the Caesars and Plutarch’s Other Lives.” ICS 13.2: 349–356. Georgiadou, Aristoula. 2014. “The Lives of the Caesars.” In Beck (ed.): 251–266. Gibson, Bruce. 2011. “Contemporary Contexts.” In Roche (ed.): 104–124. Gibson, Roy K. 2014. “Suetonius and the uiri illustres of Pliny the Younger.” In Power and Gibson (eds.): 1999–230. Gill, Christopher. 2005. “Stoic Writers of the Imperial Era.” In Rowe and Schofield (eds.): 597–615. Goldhill, Simon (ed.). 2001. Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire. Cambridge. Goldsworthy, Adrian. 2003. The Complete Roman Army. London. Gomme, A.W. 1945. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 1. Oxford. Goodman, Martin. 2012. The Roman World 44 BC–AD 180, 2nd Edition. London and New York. Gray, Vivienne J. 2011. Xenophon's Mirror of Princes. Oxford. Gray, Vivienne J. (ed.) 2010. Xenophon. Oxford. Gribble, David. 1999. Alcibiades and Athens. Oxford. Griffin, Miriam. 1976. Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics. Oxford. Griffin, Miriam. 2003. “De Beneficiis and Roman Society.” JRS 93: 92–113. Griffin, Miriam. 2005. “Seneca and Pliny.” In Rowe and Schofield (eds.): 532–558. Griffin, Miriam. 2013. Seneca on Society: A Guide to De Beneficiis. Oxford. Griffin, Miriam and E.M. Atkins (eds.). 1991. Cicero: On Duties. Cambridge. Griffin, Miriam and Jonathan Barnes (eds). 1989. Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society. Oxford. Gruen, Erich S. 1984. The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. Berkeley. Guerrier, Olivier. 2014. “The Renaissance in France: Amyot and Montaigne.” In Beck (ed.): 544–548. Hägg, Tomas. 2012. The Art of Biography in Antiquity. Cambridge. Hamilton, C.D. 1992. “Plutarch’s ‘Life of Agesilaus’.” ANRW 2.33.6: 4201–21. Hamilton, J.R. 1969. Plutarch: Alexander. A Commentary. Oxford.

438

Bibliography

Hammer, Dean. 2014. Roman Political Thought. Cambridge. Hammond, Mason. 1938. “Pliny the Younger’s Views on Government.” In Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 49: 115–140. Hammond, Mason. 1957. “Composition of the Senate, A.D. 68–235.” JRS 47, 1/2: 74–81. Hankins, James (ed.). 2000. Renaissance Civic Humanism. Cambridge. Harris, William V. 2001. Restraining Rage. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Harrison, George W.M. 2005. “Plutarch the Dramaturg: Statecraft as Stagecraft in the Lives.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 53–60. Hau, Lisa Irene. 2014. “Stock Situations, Topoi and the Greekness of Greek Historiography.” In Cairns and Scodel (eds.): 241–259. Helmbold, W.C. and E.N. O’Neil. 1959. Plutarch’s Quotations. Baltimore. Herbert, Kevin. 1957. “The Identity of Plutarch’s Lost Scipio.” AJP 78: 83–88. Hershbell, J.P. 2004. “Plutarch’s Political Philosophy.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 151–162. Highet, Gilbert. 1949. The Classical Tradition. Oxford. Hillman, Thomas P. 1994. “Authorial Statements, Narrative, and Character in Plutarch’s Agesilaus-Pompeius.” GRBS, 35:3 Autumn: 255–280. Hoffer, Stanley E. 1999. The Anxieties of Pliny the Younger. Atlanta. Holland, Lora. 2005. “Plutarch’s Aemilius Paullus and the Model of the Philosopher Statesman.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 269–280. Humble, Noreen (ed.). 2010. Plutarch’s Lives: Parallelism and Purpose. Swansea. Hunter, Richard and Donald Russell. 2011. Plutarch: How to Study Poetry. Cambridge. Ianziti, Gary. 2012. Writing History in Renaissance Italy. Cambridge. Illinois Greek Club. 1928. Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander. (LCL 156). Cambridge. Ingenkamp, H.G. 2004. “How to Present a Statesman?” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 67–86. Innes, D.C., H.M. Hine and C.B.R. Pelling (eds.). 1995. Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday. Oxford. Jacobs, Susan. 2013. “Plutarch’s Parallel Lives: Case-Studies in Statesmanship.” In Pace and Cacciatore (eds.): 237–244. Jacobs, Susan. (upcoming 2017a). “Creating Paradigms for the Politikos Under Rome.” In Aristoula Georgiadou and Katerina Oikonomoulou (eds.). upcoming. Space, Time and Language in Plutarch, Proceedings of the 10th International Plutarch Conference, Delphi, May 14–18, 2014. Jacobs, Susan. (upcoming, 2017b). “Plutarch’s Augustus” in Cristina Pimentel, Rodrigo Furtado, Nuno S. Rodrigues and Ana Lóio (eds.). upcoming. Saeculum Augustum: New approaches to the Age of Augustus on the bimillennium of his death. Proceedings of The Age of Augustus International Conference, Lisbon, 24–26 September 2014. Jacobs, Susan. (upcoming, 2017c). “Plutarch’s Statesmen: Mirrors of Political Effec­ tiveness.” In Mirrors for Princes in Antiquity and their Reception, Proceedings of Lectio Conference, Leuven, Dec. 2–4 2015.

Bibliography

439

Jardine, Lisa. 1997. Erasmus: The Education of a Christian Prince. Cambridge. Jenkinson, Edna. 1967. “Nepos—An Introduction to Latin Biography.” In Dorey (ed.): 1–15. Jones, A.H.M. 1940. The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian. Oxford. Jones, C.P. 1966/1995. “Towards a Chronology of Plutarch’s Works.” JRS 56, 61–74 [reprinted in Scardigli (ed.) (1995): 95–123]. Jones, C.P. 1971. Plutarch and Rome. Oxford. Jones, C.P. 1978. The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom. Cambridge, MA. Jones, Roger Miller. 1916. The Platonism of Plutarch. Menasha. Jufresa Muñoz, M. (ed.). 2005. Plutarc a la seva època: Paidia i societat. Barcelona. Kennedy, George A. 1962. “An Estimate of Quintilian.” AJP 83: 130–146. Kennedy, George A. 2003. Progymnasmata. Atlanta. Klotz, Frieda and Katerina Oikonomopoulou (eds.). 2011. The Philosopher’s Banquet. Oxford. König, Alice. 2017. “Conflicting Models of Authority and Expertise in Frontinus’ Strategemata.” In König and Woolf (eds.): 153–181. König, J. and G. Woolf (eds.). 2017. Authority and Expertise in Ancient Scientific Culture. Cambridge. Kraus, C. 2005. “From Exempla to Exemplar?” in Edmondson et al. (eds.): 181–200. Krentz, Peter. 1984. “The Ostracism of Thoukydides, Son of Melesias.” Historia 33: 499–504. Lang, Mabel L. 1972. “Cleon as the Anti-Pericles.” Classical Philology 67, No. 3: 159–169. Langlands, Rebecca. 2011. “Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero de Officiis.” JRS 101: 100–122. Langlands, Rebecca. 2014. “Exemplary Influences and Augustus’ Pernicious Moral Legacy.” In Power and Gibson (eds.): 111–129. Langlands, Rebecca. 2015. “Roman exemplarity: mediating between general and particular.” In Lowrie and Lüdemann (eds.): 68–80. Larmour, David H.J. 2014. “The Synkrisis.” In Beck (ed.): 405–416. Lehman, A.D. 1952. “The Coriolanus Story in Antiquity.” CJ 47: 329–336. Lendon, J.E. 1997. Empire of Honor: The Art of Government in the Roman World. Oxford. Leo, Frederick. 1901. Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer litterarischen Form. Leipzig [reprinted Hildesheim 1965]. Levene, D.S. 2011. “Roman Historiography in the Late Republic.” In Marincola (ed.): 275–289. Liebert, Hugh. 2016. Plutarch’s Politics: Between City and Empire. Cambridge. Lintott, Andrew. 2013. Plutarch: Demosthenes and Cicero. Oxford. Lowrie, Michèle and Susanne Lüdemann (eds.). 2015. Exemplarity and Singularity. London. MacMullen, Ramsay. 1974. Roman Social Relations 50 BC to AD 284. New Haven.

440

Bibliography

Madsen, Jesper Majbom. 2009. Eager to Be Roman: Greek Response to Roman Rule in Pontus and Bithynia. London. Madsen, Jesper Majbom. 2014. “Patriotism and Ambitions: Intellectual Response to Roman Rule in the High Empire.” In Madsen and Rees (eds.): 16–38. Madsen, Jesper Majbom and Roger Rees. 2014. “Introduction: A Roman Greek.” In Madsen and Rees (eds.): 1–15. Madsen, Jesper Majbom and Roger Rees (eds.). 2014. Roman Rule in Greek and Latin Writing. Leiden. Maes, Yanick, Jan Papy and Wim Verbaal (eds). 2009. Latinitas Perennis, II: Appropriation and Latin Literature. Leiden. Marincola, John. 2010. “Plutarch, “parallelism” and the Persian-War Lives.” In Humble (ed.): 121–143. Marincola, John. 2011a. “Speeches in Classical Historiography.” In Marincola (ed.): 118–132. Marincola, John. 2011b. “Universal History from Ephorus to Diodorus.” In Marincola (ed.): 171–179. Marincola, John (ed.). 2011. A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography. Oxford. Marrou, H.I. 1956. A History of Education in Antiquity. New York. Martin, H.M. 1960. “The Concept of Praotes in Plutarch’s Lives.” GRBS 3: 65–73. Martin, H.M. 1961. “The Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch’s Lives.” AJP 82: 164–75. Martin, H.M. 1995. “Moral Failure without Vice in Plutarch’s Athenian Lives.” Ploutarchos, 12.1: 13–18. Martin, H.M. 2011. “Arete, Tyche, and Non-Consequentialism.” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 133–150. McCarty, Thomas G. 1974. “The Content of Cornelius Nepos ‘De viris illustribus’.” The Classical World 67: 383–391. McGing, B.C. 1982. “Synkrisis in Tacitus’ Agricola.” Hermathena, 132: 15–25. McGing, B.C and Judith Mossman (eds.). 2006. Limits of Ancient Biography. Swansea. Méthy, Nicole. 1994. “Dion Chrysostome et la domination romaine.” L’Antiquité Classique 63: 173–192. Millar, Fergus. 1966. “Epictetus and the Imperial Court.” JRS 55: 141–8. Millar, Fergus. 1993. The Roman Near East 31BC–AD 337. Cambridge, MA. Millar, Fergus. 1997. The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC–AD 337). London. Millar, Fergus. 2004. Government, Society and Culture in the Roman Empire, Vol. 2. Chapel Hill. Moles, J.L. 1983. “The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom.” Cl. Ant. 2: 251–78. Moles, J.L. 1984. “The Addressee of the Third Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom.” Prometheus 10: 65–9. Moles, J.L. 1989. “Review: Nepos and Biography.” CR 39: 229–233.

Bibliography

441

Moles, J.L. 1990. “The Kingship Orations of Dio Chrysostom.” Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar, 6: 297–375. Möller, Melanie. 2015. “Exemplum and Exceptio: building blocks for a rhetorical theory of the exceptional case.” In Lowrie and Lüdemann (eds.): 96–110. Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1944. “Review: The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. X.” JRS 34: 109–116. Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1971/1993. The Development of Greek Biography. Cambridge, MA, and London. [Revised and updated in 1993]. Monaco, M. 2011. “Folly and Dark Humor in the Life of Demetrius.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 9 (2011/2012): 49–60. Moreno, Luis A. García. 1992. “Paradoxography and Political Ideals in Plutarch’s Life of Sertorius.” In Stadter (ed.): 132–158. Morford, M. 1992. “Iubes Esse Liberos: Pliny’s Panegyricus and Liberty.” AJP 113.4: 575–593. Morgan, Teresa. 1998. Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds. Cambridge. Morgan, Teresa. 2007. Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire. Cambridge. Morstein-Marx, R. 1998. “Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the ‘Commentariolum Petitionis.’ ” Cl. Ant. 17.2: 259–288. Mossman, Judith. 1988. “Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch’s Alexander.” JHS, 108: 83–93. Mossman, Judith. 2010. “A life unparalleled: Artaxerxes.” In Humble (ed.): 145–168. Mossman, Judith. 2014. “The Post-Renaissance Reception of Plutarch in England.” In Beck (ed.): 592–597. Mossman, Judith (ed.) 1997. Plutarch and his Intellectual World. London. Moxon, I.S., J.D. Smart and A.J. Woodman (eds.). 1986. Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing. Cambridge. Mueller, Hans-Friedrich. 1995. “Visual Rhetoric and Political Behavior.” In Gallo and Scardigli (eds.): 287–300. Nederman, Cary J. 1990. John of Salisbury: Policraticus. Cambridge. Nederman, Cary J. and Kate Langdon Forhan. 1993. Medieval Political Theory—A Reader: The Quest for the Body Politic, 1100–1400. London and New York. Nikolaidis, A.G. 1995. “Plutarch’s Heroes in Action: Does the End justify the Means?” In Gallo and Scardigli (eds.): 301–312. Nikolaidis, A.G. 2005. “Plutarch’s Methods: His Cross-references and the Sequences of the Parallel Lives.” In Pérez Jiménez and Titchener (eds.): 283–323. Nikolaidis, A.G. 2011. “Plutarch’s ‘Minor’ Ethics: Some Remarks on De garrulitate, De curiositate, and De vitioso pudore.” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 205–222. Nikolaidis, A.G. 2012. “Aspects of Plutarch’s Notion of Philotimia.” In Roskam et al. (eds.): 31–53. Nikolaidis, A.G. (ed.). 2008. The Unity of Plutarch’s Work. Berlin.

442

Bibliography

Noreña, Carlos F. 2007. “The Social Economy of Pliny’s Correspondence with Trajan.” AJP 128.2: 239–277. Oldfather, W.A. 1925. Epictetus. Cambridge. Oldfather, W.A. 1928. “ ‘Introduction’ to Onasander.” In Illinois Classical Club (eds.): 343–367. O’Neil, Edward N. 2004. Moralia Index. (LCL 499). Cambridge. Opsomer, Jan, Geert Roskam and Frances B. Titchener (eds.). 2016. A Versatile Gentleman. Leuven. Ostenfeld, Erik Nis (ed.). 2002. Greek Romans and Roman Greeks: Studies in Cultural Interaction. Aarhus. Pace, G. and P. Volpe Cacciatore (eds.). 2013. Gli scritti di Plutarco: Tradizione, Traduzione, Ricezione, Commento. Atti del IX convegno Internazionale della International Plutarch Society. Naples. Pade, Marianne. 2007. The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives. 2 Vols. Copenhagen. Pade, Marianne. 2014. “The Reception of Plutarch from Antiquity to the Italian Renaissance.” In Beck (ed.): 531–543. Papadi, Diotima. 2008. “Moralia in the Lives: Tragedy and Theatrical Imagery in Plutarch’s Pompey.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 111–124. Pausch, Dennis. 2014. “Livy reading Polybius: Adapting Greek narrative to Roman history.” In Cairns and Scodel (eds.): 279–297. Pelling, C.B.R. 1979/2002. “Plutarch’s method of work in the Roman Lives.” JHS 99: 74–96 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 1–44]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1980/2002. “Plutarch’s adaptation of his source material.” JHS 100: 127–40 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 91–116]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1985/2002. “Plutarch and Catiline.” Hermes 113: 311–29 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 45–64]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1986a/2002. “Plutarch and Roman Politics.” In Moxon et al. (eds.): 156– 187 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 207–236]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1986b/2002. “Synkrisis in Plutarch’s Lives.” In Brenk and Gallo (eds.): 83–96 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 349–364]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1988a/2002. “Aspects of Plutarch’s Characterization.” ICS 13.2: 257–274 [reprinted inPelling (2002): 283–300]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1988b. Plutarch: Life of Antony. Cambridge. Pelling, C.B.R. 1989. “Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture.” In Griffin and Barnes (eds.): 199–232. Pelling, C. 1995/2002. “The Moralism of Plutarch’s Lives.” In Innes et al. (eds.): 205–220 [reprintedin Pelling (2002): 237–252]. Pelling, C.B.R. 1997/2002. “Is death the end? Closure in Plutarch’s Lives.” In Roberts et al. (eds.): 228–50 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 365–386].

Bibliography

443

Pelling, C.B.R. 2000/2002. “Rhetoric, paideia and psychology in Plutarch’s Lives.” In Van der Stockt (ed.): 331–339 [reprinted in Pelling (2002): 339–348]. Pelling, C.B.R. 2002. Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies. London. Pelling, C.B.R. 2004. “Do Plutarch’s Politicians Never Learn?” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 87–104. Pelling, C.B.R. 2005a. “Synkrisis revisited.” In Pérez Jiménez and Titchener (eds.): 325–340. Pelling, C.B.R. 2005b. “Plutarch’s Socrates.” Hermathena 179: 105–139. Pelling, C.B.R. 2010a. “Plutarch’s ‘tale of two cities’: do the Parallel Lives combine as global histories.” In Humble (ed.): 217–236. Pelling, C.B.R. 2010b. Rome in Crisis. New York. Pelling, C.B.R. 2011a. “The Greek Historians of Rome.” In Marincola (ed.): 244–258. Pelling, C.B.R. 2011b. “What is Popular about Plutarch’s ‘Popular Philosophy’?” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 41–58. Pelling, C.B.R. 2011c. Plutarch Caesar. Oxford. Pelling, C.B.R. 2012. “Plutarch on Roman Philotimia.” In Roskam et al. (eds.): 55–67. Pelling, C.B.R. 2014. “Political Philosophy.” In Beck (ed.): 149–162. Pelling, C.B.R. 2016. “Tragic Colouring in Plutarch.” In Opsomer et al. (eds.): 113–133. Pérez Jiménez, A. 2004. “Los Héroes de Plutarco y su elección entre la judicia y la utilidad.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 127–136. Pérez Jiménez, A. 2014. “The Reception of Plutarch in Spain.” In Beck (ed.): 592–597. Pérez Jiménez, A. and F.C. Bordoy (eds.). 2001. Estudios Sobre Plutarco: Misticismo y Religiones Mistéricas en la Obra de Plutarco: Actas del VII Simposio Español sobre Plutarco, Palma de Mallorca, 2–4 de noviembre de 2000. Madrid-Malaga. Pérez Jiménez, A., J.G. López, and R.Ma Aguilar (eds.). 1999. Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles: Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S.: Madrid-Cuenca, 4–7 de Mayo de 1999. Madrid. Pérez Jiménez, A. and F. Titchener (eds.). 2005. Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch’s Works: Studies devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by the International Plutarch Society. Malaga/Logan. Pernot, Laurent. 1993. La Rhétorique de L’Éloge dans le Monde Gréco-Romain. Paris. Perrin, Bernadotte. 1926. Plutarch’s Lives: Aratus, Artaxerxes, Galba and Otho. (LCL 103). Cambridge. Peters, F.E. 1967. Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon. New York. Pitcher, Luke. 2009. Writing Ancient History. London/New York. Pitcher, Luke. 2011. “Characterization in Ancient Historiography.” In Marincola (ed.): 102–118. Podlecki, A. 1987. Plutarch: Life of Pericles. London. Podlecki, A. 1998. Perikles and his Circle. London. Power, Tristan and Roy K. Gibson (eds.). 2014. Suetonius the Biographer. Oxford.

444

Bibliography

Preston, Rebecca. 2001. “Roman Questions, Greek Answers: Plutarch and the construction of identity.” In Goldhill (ed.): 86–122. Price, A.W. 2011. Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford. Pryzwansky, Molly M. 2007. “Cornelius Nepos: Key Issues and Critical Approaches.” CJ 105: 97–108. Puech, B. 1992. “Prosopographie des Amis de Plutarque.” ANRW 2.33.6: 4831–93. Radice, Betty. 1968. ‘Pliny and the ‘Panegyricus’.” G&R 15.2: 166–172. Radice, Betty. 1969a. Pliny: Letters and Panegyricus. Cambridge. Radice, Betty. 1969b. The Letters of Pliny the Younger. London. Rees, Roger. 2014. “Adopting the Emperor: Pliny’s Praise-giving as Cultural Appropriation.” In Madsen and Rees (eds.): 105–123. Reinhold, Meyer. 1975. The Classick Pages. University Park. Reynolds, Joyce. 1988. “Cities.” In Braund (ed.): 15–51. Richard, Carl J. 1994. The Founders and the Classics. Cambridge, MA. Richard, Carl J. 2008. Greeks and Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the Founding Fathers. Lanham. Richard, Carl J. 2014. “Plutarch and the Early American Republic.” In Beck (ed.): 598–610. Roberts, D.H., F.M. Dunn and D. Fowler (eds.). 1997. Classical Closure: Endings in Ancient Literature. Princeton. Roche, Paul (ed.). 2011. Pliny’s Praise: The Panegyricus in the Roman World. Cambridge. Rolfe, J.C. (ed.). 1998. Suetonius, I. (LCL 37). Cambridge. Roller, M. 2004. “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia.” CPhil 99.1: 1–56. Roller, M. 2015. “Between unique and typical: Senecan exempla in a list.” In Lowrie and Lüdemann (eds.): 81–95. Roller, M. 2016. “Precept(or) and Example in Seneca.” In Williams and Volk (eds.): 129–156. Romilly, J. de. 1988. “Plutarch and Thucydides or the Free Use of Quotations.” Phoenix 42: 22–34. Roskam, G. 2008. “Two Roads to Politics. Plutarch on the Statesman’s Entry in Political Life.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 325–338. Roskam, G. 2009. Plutarch’s Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum: An Interpretation with Commentary. Leuven. Roskam, G., M. De Pourcq and L. Van der Stockt (eds.). 2012. The Lash of Ambition. Louvain. Roskam, G. and L. Van der Stockt (eds.). 2011. Virtues for the People. Leuven. Roskam, G. and S. Verdegem. 2016. “ ‘This Topic Belongs to Another Kind of Writing’: The Digressions in Plutarch’s Life of Coriolanus.” In Opsomer et al. (eds.): 161–195. Rowe, Christopher and Malcolm Schofield (eds.). 2005. Greek and Roman Political Thought. Cambridge.

Bibliography

445

Russell, D.A. 1963/1995. “Plutarch’s Life of Coriolanus.” JRS 53:21–8. [Reprinted in Scardigli (ed.) (1995): 357–72]. Russell, D.A. 1966a/1995. “On reading Plutarch’s Lives.” G&R NS 13: 139–154. [Reprinted in Scardigli (ed.) (1995): 75–94]. Russell, D.A. 1966b/1995. “Plutarch, ‘Alcibiades’ 1–16’.” PCPS 192: 37–47. [Reprinted in Scardigli (ed.)(1995): 191–207]. Russell, D.A. 1973/2001. Plutarch. London. [2nd Edition with forward and bibliography by J. Mossman in 2001]. Russell, D.A. 1982. “Plutarch and the Antique Hero.” The Yearbook of English Studies 12 (Heroes and the Heroic: Special Number): 24–34. Russell, D.A. and N.G. Wilson. 1981. Menander Rhetor. Oxford. Sacks, Kenneth S. 1981. Polybius on the Writing of History. Berkeley. Sacks, Kenneth S. 1990. Diodorus Siculus and the First Century. Princeton. Said, Suzanne. 2004. “Plutarch and the People in the Parallel Lives.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 7–25. Sailor, Dylan. 2008. Writing and Empire in Tacitus. Cambridge. Salmeri, Giovanni. 2000. “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor.” In Swain (ed.): 53–92. Sartre, Maurice. 2015. “Strabon et Plutarque: regards croisés sur l’Hégémonia tôn Rhômaiôn.” In Cortés Copete et al. (eds.): 161–170. Scardigli, B. (ed.). 1995. Essays on Plutarch’s Lives. Oxford. Schepens, G. 1990. “Polemic and Methodology in Polybius’ Book XII.” In Verdin et al. (eds.): 39–61. Schofield, Malcolm. 2015. “Seneca on Monarchy and the Political Life: De Clementia, De Tranquillitate Animi, De Otio.” In Bartsch and Schiesaro (eds.): 68–81. Schrader, Carlos, Vicente Ramón and José Vela (eds.). 1997. Plutarco y la Historia: Actas del V Simposio Español Sobre Plutarcho, Zaragoza, 20–22 de Junio de 1996. Zaragoza. Schultze, C.E. 1986. “Dionysius of Halicarnassus and his audience.” In Moxon et al. (eds.): 121–141. Sellars, John. 2003. The Art of Living. Aldershot. Shackleton Bailey, D.R. 2002. Cicero: Letters to Quintus and Brutus, Letter Fragments, Letter to Octavian, Invectives, Handbook of Electioneering. (LCL 462). Cambridge. Sherman, Nancy. 1989. The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue. Oxford. Sherwin-White, A.N. 1969. Fifty Letters of Pliny. Oxford. Shipley, D.R. 1997. A Commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Agesilaus. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sidebottom, Henry. 2006. “Dio Chrysostom and the Development of On Kingship Literature.” In Spencer and Theodorakopoulos (eds.): 117–157. Sihler, E.G. 1923. “Strabo of Amaseia: His Personality and His Works.” AJP 44: 134–44. Skidmore, Clive. 1989. Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen. Exeter.

446

Bibliography

Skinner, Quentin and Russell Price. 1988. Machiavelli: The Prince. Cambridge. Smail, William M. 1938. Quintilian on Education. Oxford. Smith, C.J. 1998. “Onasander on how to be a general.” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement 71: 151–166. Smith, C.J. and Ralph Covino (eds.). 2011. Praise and Blame in Roman Republican Rhetoric. Swansea. Spencer, D. and E. Theodorakopoulos (eds.). 2006. Advice and its Rhetoric in Greece and Rome. Bari. Stadter, Ph. A. 1965. Plutarch’s Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes. Cambridge, MA Stadter, Ph. A. 1975/1995. “Plutarch’s Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus.” GRBS 16: 77–85 [reprinted in Scardigli (ed.) (1995): 155–164]. Stadter, Ph. A. 1987. “The Rhetoric of Plutarch’s Pericles.” Anc. Soc. 18: 251–69. Stadter, Ph. A. 1988. “The Proems of Plutarch’s Lives.” ICS 13, 2: 275–295. Stadter, Ph. A. 1989. A Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles. Chapel Hill. Stadter, Ph. A. 1995. “ ‘Subject to the Erotic’: Male Sexual Behaviour in Plutarch.” In Innes et al. (eds.): 221–236. Stadter, Ph. A. 1997/2015. “Plutarch’s Lives: the Statesman as Moral Actor.” In Schrader et al. (eds.): 65–84 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 215–230]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2000/2015. “The Rhetoric of Virtue in Plutarch’s Lives.” In Van der Stockt (ed.): 493–510 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 231–245]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2002a.”Introduction, Setting Plutarch in his Context.” In Stadter and Van der Stockt (eds.): 1–26. Stadter, Ph. A. 2002b/2015. “Plutarch’s Lives and their Roman Readers.” In Ostenfeld (ed.): 123–135 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 45–55]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2003. “Mirroring Virtue and Plutarch’s Lives.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 1 (2003/2004): 89–95. Stadter, Ph. A. 2004/2015 “Plutarch: Diplomat for Delphi?” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 19–32 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 70–81]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2005/2015. “Revisiting Plutarch’s Lives of the Caesars.” In Pérez Jiménez and Titchener (eds.): 419–435. [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 56–69]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2010a. “Fictional Narrative in the Cyropaedia.” In Gray (ed.): 367–400. Stadter, Ph. A. 2010b/2015. “Parallels in three dimensions.” In Humble (ed.): 197–216 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 286–302]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2011a. “Biography and History.” In Marincola (ed.): 528–540. Stadter, Ph. A. 2011b/2015. “Competition and its Costs: φιλονικία in Plutarch’s Society and Heroes.” In Roskam and Van der Stockt (eds.): 237–255 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 270–285]. Stadter, Ph. A. 2011c/2015. “Alexander Hamilton’s Notes on Plutarch in his Pay Book.” Review of Politics 73/2: 1–19 [reprinted in Stadter (2015): 270–286].

Bibliography

447

Stadter, Ph. A. 2015. Plutarch and His Roman Readers. Oxford. Stadter, Ph. A. (ed.). 1992. Plutarch and the Historical Tradition. London. Stadter, Ph. A. and L. Van der Stockt (eds.). 2002. Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (97–117 AD). Leuven. Stem, Rex. 2012. The Political Biographies of Cornelius Nepos. Ann Arbor. Swain, S.C.R. 1989. “Plutarch’s Aemilius and Timoleon.” Historia (3rd Qtr, 1989): 314–334. Swain, S.C.R. 1990a/1995. “Hellenic culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch.” JHS 110: 126–145 [reprinted in Scardigli (ed.)(1995): 229–264]. Swain, S.C.R. 1990b. “Plutarch’s Lives of Cicero, Cato and Brutus.” Hermes 118.2: 192–203. Swain, S.C.R. 1992a. “Novel and Pantomime in Plutarch’s “Antony.” Hermes 120: 76–82. Swain, S.C.R. 1992b. “Plutarchan Synkrisis.” Eranos 90: 101–111. Swain, S.C.R. 1996. Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World, AD 50–250. Oxford. Swain, S.C.R. 1997. “Plutarch, Plato, Athens, and Rome.” In Barnes and Griffin (eds.): 165–187. Swain, S.C.R. (ed.). 2000. Dio Chrysostom. Politics, Letters and Philosophy. Oxford. Syme, Ronald. 1958. Tacitus. 2 vols. Oxford. Talbert, R.J.A. 1996. “The senate and senatorial and equestrian posts.” In Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. X. Cambridge. Tatum, W. Jeffrey. 2010a. “Why Parallel Lives?” In Humble (ed.): 1–22. Tatum, W. Jeffrey. 2010b. “Another Look at ‘Tyche’ in Plutarch’s ‘Aemilius PaullusTimoleon’.” In Historia 59.4: 448–461 Taylor, Lily Ross. 1949. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. Berkeley. Tellegen-Couperus, Olga (ed.). 2003. Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics. Leuven. Teodorsson, Sven-Tage. 2005a. “Timoleon, The Fortunate General.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 215–226. Teodorsson, Sven-Tage. 2005b. “Plutarch, Amalgamator of Greece and Rome” in Pérez Jiménez and Titchener (eds.): 433–440. Teodorsson, Sven-Tage. 2008. “The Education of Rulers in Theory (Mor.) and Practice (Vitae).” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 339–350. Titchener, Frances. 2003. “Cornelius Nepos and the Biographical Tradition.” G&R 50, No. 1: 85–99. Titchener, Frances. 2011. “Plutarch’s Table Talk: Sampling a Rich Blend: A Survey of Scholarly Appraisal.” In Klotz and Oikonomopoulou (eds.): 35–48. Townend, G.B. 1967. “Suetonius and his Influence.” In Dorey (ed.): 79–111. Trapp, Michael B. 1999. “Socrates, the Phaedo, and the Lives of Phocion and Cato the Younger.” In Pérez Jiménez et al. (eds.): 487–499. Trapp, Michael B. 2004. “Statesmanship in a Minor Key?” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 189–200.

448

Bibliography

Trapp, Michael B. 2007. Philosophy in the Roman Empire: Ethics, Politics and Society. Aldershot. Trapp, Michael B. 2014. “The Role of Philosophy and Philosophers in the Imperial Period.” In Beck (ed.): 43–57. Trapp, Michael B. 2017. “Philosophical Authority in the Imperial Period.” In König and Woolf (eds.): 27–57. Trego, K.N. 2012. “Competition in Context: philonikia in Agesilaus-Pompey.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 10 (2012/2013): 63–74. Tritle, L.A. 1988. Phocion The Good. New York. Tritle, L.A. 1992. “Plutarch’s ‘Life of Phocion’: An Analysis and Critical Report.” ANRW 2.33.6: 4258–4297. Tuplin, Christopher. 2000. “Nepos and the Origin of Political Biography.” In Deroux (ed.): 124–161. Turner, A.J. 1997. “Approaches to Tacitus’ ‘Agricola’.” Latomus 56: 582–593. Ussani, V.S. 2003. “Romanus sapiens and civilis vir: Quintilian’s theory of the orator acting for the benefit of the imperial power.” In Tellegen-Couperus (ed.): 287–301. Valgiglio, E. 1992. “Dagli “Ethica” ai “Bioi” in Plutarco.” ANRW 2.33.6: 3963–4051. Van der Blom. 2011. “Historical Exempla as Tools of Praise and Blame in Ciceronian Oratory.” In Smith and Covino (eds.): 49–67. Van der Stockt, L. 2002. “Καρπὸς ἐκ φιλίας ἡγεμονικῆς (Mor. 814C): Plutarch’s Observations on the ‘Old-Boy Network’.” In Stadter and Van der Stockt (eds.): 115–140. Van der Stockt, L. 2008. “Self-esteem and Image-building. On Anger in De cohibenda ira and in Some Lives.” In Nikolaidis (ed.): 285–295. Van der Stockt, L. (ed.). 1996. Plutarchea Lovaniensia: A Miscellany of Essays on Plutarch. Leuven. Van der Stockt, L. (ed.). 2000. Rhetorical Theory and Praxis in Plutarch: Acta of the IVth International Congress of the IPS, Leuven, July 3–6 1996. Leuven. Van Hoof, Lieve. 2005. “The Reader Makes the Text: Model Readers on the Move.” Ploutarchos, n.s., 3 (2004/2005): 141–154. Van Hoof, Lieve. 2007. “Strategic Differences: Seneca and Plutarch On Control of Anger.” Mnemosyne 60: 59–86. Van Hoof, Lieve. 2010. Plutarch’s Practical Ethics. Oxford. Van Hoof, Lieve. 2014. “Practical Ethics.” In Beck (ed.): 135–148. Van Raalte, Marlein. 2005. “More Philosophico: Political Virtue and Philosophy in Plutarch’s Lives.” In De Blois et al. (eds.): 75–112. Verdegem, S. 2005a. “Envy at Work: Phthonos in Plutarch’s Lives of Fifth C. Athenian Statesmen.” In Jufresa Muñoz (ed.): 673–678. Verdegem, S. 2005b. “An Intriguing Beginning. The Proemial Functions of Plu., Alc. 1.” In Pérez Jiménez and Titchener: 479–486.

Bibliography

449

Verdegem, S. 2005c. “De Gloria Alcibiadis. Alcibiades’ Military Value and its Relation to his Doxa in Plutarch’s Alcibiades.” In De Blois et. al. (eds.): 167–178. Verdegem, S. 2010a. “Parallels and contrasts: Plutarch’s Comparison of Coriolanus and Alcibiades.” In Humble (ed.): 23–44. Verdegem, S. 2010b. Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades: Story, Text and Moralism. Leuven. Verdin, H., G. Schepens and F. de Keyser (eds.). 1990. Purposes of History: Studies in Greek Historiography from the Fourth to the Second centuries B.C. Louvain. Walbank, F.W. 1972. Polybius. Berkeley. Walbank, F.W. 2002. Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World. Cambridge. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. 1982. “Civilis Princeps: between citizen and king.” JRS 72: 32–48. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. 1983/1995. Suetonius The Scholar and his Caesars. London. [Second edition in 1995]. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. 2008. Rome’s Cultural Revolution. Cambridge. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew (ed.). 1989. Patronage in Ancient Society. London and New York. Walsh, P.G. 2000. Cicero: On Obligations. Oxford. Wardman, A.E. 1971. “Plutarch’s Methods in the Lives.” CQ 21: 254–61. Wardman, A.E. 1974. Plutarch’s Lives. London. Waters, K.H. 1974. “Trajan’s Character in the Literary Tradition.” In Evans (ed.): 233–252. Weil, R. 1988. “La composition de l’Histoire de Polybe.” Journal des savants 3.1: 185–206. Whitmarsh, Tim. 2001. “ ‘Greece is the World’. Exile and Identity in the Second Sophistic.” In Goldhill (ed.): 269–305. Whitmarsh, Tim. 2005. The Second Sophistic. Cambridge. Whitmarsh, Tim. 2006. “ ‘This In-between Book’: Language, Politics and Genre in the Agricola.” In McGing and Mossman (eds.): 305–333. Williams, Gareth D. and Katharina Volk (eds.). 2016. Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy. Oxford. Wiseman, T.P. 1979a. Clio’s Cosmetics. Bristol. Wiseman, T.P. 1987. “Review of J. Geiger’s Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography.” JRS 77: 250. Wolfe, G. 1996. “Becoming Roman, Staying Greek. Culture, Identity and the Civilizing Process in the Roman East.” PCPS 40: 116–43. Wood, Neal. 1965. Niccolo Machiavelli: The Art of War. Cambridge. Xenophontos, Sophia. 2012a. “Comedy in Plutarch’s Parallel Lives.” GRBS 52: 603–631. Xenophontos, Sophia. 2012b. “Plutarch’s Fabius Maximus and the Ethics of Generalship.” Hermes 140.2: 160–183. Xenophontos, Sophia. 2016. Ethical Education in Plutarch. Berlin. Zadorojnyi, Alexei V. 2007. “Cato’s Suicide in Plutarch.” CQ 57: 216–230.

450

Bibliography

Zadorojnyi, Alexei V. 2010. “ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ: the rhetoric and philosophy of Plutarch’s mirrors.” In Humble (ed.): 169–196. Zecchini, G. 2005. “Polibio in Plutarco.” In Pérez Jiménez and Titchener (eds.): 513–522. Zuiderhoeck, A. 2009. The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire. Cambridge.

Index Roman names are listed either by their family name or cognomina, depending on which form is most familiar or commonly used by Plutarch. Thus, for instance, Aemilius Paullus and Fabius Maximus are listed by their family names, while Coriolanus and Cato Minor are listed by their cognomina. Abydos, battle of 219 accessibility, as trait of good ruler 57, 337–338, 376 Achilles. See Phoenix Acropolis, rebuilding of 145–146 Actium, battle of 64, 346, 349, 357n63, 362–364 addressees of Cicero 43 of Onasander 63n98 of Pliny 41 of Plutarch 8, 26, 32, 77 of Quintilian 44n17 of Seneca 41, 52n44, 395n67 administration, city administrative roles 34–36 advice regarding 64–72 requirements for office 35 See also: paradigms for political leaders; policies to promote prosperity administration, imperial 32–33 imperial legates 33, 354, 375 provincial governors 33, 279 Roman vs. Greek office holders 31n88 See also: paradigms for Emperors/ provincial governors advice for public life 43, 76–77 balancing virtue and expediency 65, 47–50 cultivating moral character 43–47 managing relations with others 51–54 prioritizing duties 50–52 advice literature chapter 2 passim for city administrators 64–72 for Emperors 54–59 for envoys to Rome 73–76 for military leaders 61–64, 276 for orators 49, 72–73 for provincial governors 59–61, 75n145, 86n175, 281, 302

Aegospotami, battle of 87, 205, 212, 219–223 passim, 261n68 Aelius Aristides 134n11, 318 Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 182, 168 BC)  chapter 7 passim; also 47, 61n9, 63n102, 64n104, 98, 99, 110n41, 112, 177n97, 187n20, 329, 394, 414, 418, 421 Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 219, 216 BC) 162, 168, 172–173, 285, 288 Aemilius Paullus (Life of ) chapter 7 passim; also 64, 70n126, 167n73, 272n90, 281, 337, 402, 404 Aemilius-Timoleon (Aem-Tim) chapter 7 passim; also 10, 181, 282, 325, 418, 419 Prologue 2, 28n77, 46n28, 96–100 synkrisis 48n33, 109, 110n41, 112, 116, 288n14, 323 affability, as trait of ruler 57, 63, 86, 118, 180, 253 Agesilaus chapter 6 passim; also 9n33, 43n14, 46, 71n134, 72, 84n166, 127, 128n2, 191, 289, 309, 334n25, 379n31, 418, 427 as general 63n102, 64n104, 117, 118, 172n82, 300n33, 308n47, 316n56, 317, 322, 421 bent justice for friends 19, 72, 373n18 let laws sleep after Leuctra 3n12, 7, 50, 107, 113, 369n3, 420, 427 Agesilaus (Life of ) chapter 6 passim; also 188n25, 208, 318n57, 420 Agesilaus-Pompey (Ages-Pomp) chapter 6 passim; also 10, 60n89, 183n10, 226, 418, 420 synkrisis 3n12, 7, 19, 50, 109, 113, 132, 157, 172n83, 175n91, 242, 245, 271, 273, 421 Agis 105 Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi (Ag-Cl-Gracchi) Prologue 28, 102, 104–105, 107 synkrisis 109, 112, 115, 119 Agricola, Cn. Julius 54n53, 59n85, 84, 229

452 agricultural metaphors. See great natures; imagery Alcibiades chapter 5 passim; also 43n14, 71n134, 86–87, 100, 106–107, 110, 111, 118, 119n50, 235, 261n68, 331, 350, 359n67, 374n21, 418, 419, 421 and Athenians 72, 115, 127, 152, 227n4, 228, 254, 276, 289, 334n25 and Socrates 21n52, 105n33, 306n45, 348n45, 373n14 as general 63n102, 64n104, 116, 316n54 Alcibiades (Life of ) chapter 5 passim; also 64, 139n35, 228, 328, 420 Alexander (“the Great”) of Macedon 21n51, 375, 384–385, 393n61 as model of kingship 55n60, 56, 71n132, 97n15, 282, 301n35, 303n38, 330, 337, 365, 420 as model of generalship 64, 111, 233, 227, 309n49, 340–341, 365, 420, 426–428 in Moralia 9n33, 43n14, 47, 58, 62n100, 72, 97n15, 128n1, 207n52 Alexander-Caesar (Alex-Caes) Prologue 2, 29–30, 95–96 alliance of philosophy with leadership 8, 14–15, 20–21, 24–25, 135, 137, 166, 187, 191, 208–210, 347–348, 369–371 alliances. See managing alliances; paradigms for political leaders ambition (φιλοτιμία) 119n50 159, 166–167, 178, 188–190, 198, 210, 212, 224, chapter 6 passim catalyst in the young 69–70, 110–111, 168–169 need to restrain 102, 104–106, 148, 164–165, 181–183 Ammonius 13n3 Anaxagoras 21, 23, 44, 134, 135–136 Antalcidas 246, 247 Peace of 230, 236 anger, as obstacle to effectiveness control of 25, 45–47, 59, 65n108, 120, 156, 368n2 endurance of 68, 138, 159n68, 170 provocation of 196–199, 240–241 in Ages-Pomp 127, 235, 240–241, 247, 248–249, 418 in Cor-Alc 180–203 passim; also 111, 221, 223, 225–226, 418

Index in Dtr-Ant 340–341, 342–344 in Phoc-Cato 396, 407–408 in synkriseis 109 animal metaphors. See imagery Antigonus Gonatas 329n12, 330, 341 Antigonus I Monophthalmos (“the OneEyed”) 101, 103, 282, 296n23, 329–343 passim, 365 Antipater of Macedon 16, 233, 282, 329n13, 344, 372, 374n25, 376, 379, 380, 384–387, 401 Antipater the Tyrian 21n52, 394 Antony, Mark (Antonius, M.) chapter 8  passim; also 53, 63n102, 100, 196n32, 252, 267, 290, 306n43, 402n72, 402n73, 418, 419 like Alcibiades 210n59, 210n61, 210n63, 213n69 like Cato Minor 403, 404n76, 414 Antony (Life of ) chapter 8 passim; also 64, 111, 208, 214n71, 252, 313n51, 391, 424n11 apatheia (ἀπάθεια) 160, 185, 196, 396 Apollonides the Stoic 21n52, 394, 396 Appian 155–156, 251, 285n4, 303n38, 346n40, 390 vs. Aemilius 299 vs. Antony 346n41, 355, 390 vs. Fabius 176n95, 177 vs. Pompey 256n61, 274 Aratus of Sicyon 87n178, 88n180 Aratus (Life of ) 1, 88–89 Aristides 107, 112, 133, 331, 372, 373n15, 393n59 emulated by Phocion 374, 420 in exile 182n9, 187, 201, 212, 222, 224, 226, 420, 421 in Moralia 47, 70, 71n134, 72, 391n53 managing allies 375n28, 382n38 quelling rebellion 242n33 Aristides (Life of ) 5n21, 134, 187, 208, 242n33, 311, 375n28, 382n38 Aristides-Cato Maior (Arist-Cato Mai) synkrisis 109, 112, 114n48, 115, 117 aristocracy, role of 6n24, 31–37 See also: audience Aristotle 133, 110n41, 206n47, 387n44 and Alexander 21n52, 207n52 and political virtue 17–19, 18, 19, 232n21, 416, 417

Index army key posts in 32–34 roles for elites in 6–7n24, 31–32 provisioning of 35 Arrian 36–37 Artaxerxes II 216, 222, 357n62 Artaxerxes (Life of ) 1, 13, 14n10, 85, 87, 89–90, 231 Athens, Athenian empire as free state 114, 143n39, 178, 181, 197n35 as subject state 106, 114n49, 341–344, 368, 378–380, 383–388 model of internal order 61n92, 69, 75, 151 model of liberty 332 model of ruinous rivalry 75, 151, 152, 178 athletes, athletics. See imagery audience chapter 1 passim; also 4n19 age range of 45n22, 52 educated in philosophy 4n19, 6, 8, 25, 27, 40 expected to engage with text 2–5, 8–9, 17n25, 27–29, 46, 50, 55–56, 77, 93, 96–100, 102, 105, 107, 283 Greek and Roman 26n71, 32, 37 politically-active 6, 15, 25–26, 29, 39, 65n105, 92 Augustus, as role model. See Octavian authorial comments function of 5, 6, 84–86, 87, 91–92, 126, 132, 310, 419, 430 in Aem-Tim 299, 309 in Ages-Pomp 240, 243n35, 254, 262, 267n80, 273 in Aratus 89 in Artaxerxes 90 in Cim-Luc 148 in Cor-Alc 186–187, 204, 224 in Dtr-Ant 322, 333, 338–339, 343, 344, 345, 348, 358–359 in Phoc-Cato 388, 411, 412 See also: narrative techniques avarice (φιλοχρηματία), as cause of bad rule 42n10, 63, 109, 255, 267, 286, 318, 333, 382n38 banquets, political purpose of 286–287, 302 benefactions, political use of 42, 52–53, 69n119, 212n68, 303

453 bios, biography (Lives) compared to encomium 84 compared to history 29–30, 91–92, 95 moral biography 1–5 pragmatic biography 5–10, 118 bravery (ἀνδρεία), as a political virtue 73, 88, 106–107, 113, 119, 132n9, 254n54, 257, 363 in Aem-Tim 284, 288, 294, 299–301, 397 in Cor-Alc 116, 185, 187, 194, 208–209 in Phoc-Cato 369, 373–374, 393 See also: “cardinal virtues” of a leader bribery, political uses of by Caesar 256, 409–410 by Pericles 153–154 by Themistocles 119 presence of, in degenerate states 47, 65n106, 114, 181, 197n35, 401, 413–414 rejection of 136–137, 393–394 theme in synkriseis 109 See also: deception, flattery, incorruptibility Brutus, M. Junius 117, 306n43, 402n72, 411n87 Byzantium 219–220, 371, 372, 375n28, 382 Cadmeia, occupation of 230, 247–248, 249 Caesar, C. Julius 43n14, 64, 96, 114, 117, 157, 188n24, 214n71, 227n4, 252n50, 255–256, 262, 313n51, 333n21, 390, 392, 394n65, 395, 419 alliance with Pompey 7, 127, 168n27, 263–266, 274, 411–412 relations with Antony 333n19, 345, 350, 351, 357, 363, 402n73 rivalry with Cato 120, 389–390, 393n62, 397–8, 407, 409, 413 rivalry with Pompey 127, 172n83, 177n98, 228, 249–272 passim calmness (πρᾳότης). See mildness Camillus, M. Furius deterrent model for Flaminius 171 equanimity in exile 182n9, 187, 226 Cannae, battle of 64, 155, 158, 161–177 passim, 195, 300 “cardinal virtues” of a leader 16, 18, 21–23, 42–44, 51, 56, 73, 76, 99–100, 280 See also: bravery; justice; practical judgment; temperance

454 career paths equestrian 34 provincial 34–37 senatorial 32–34 Cassius Dio as source 251, 346nn40 and 41, 389 vs. Antony 355 vs. Pompey 255, 269n84, 274 Cassius Longinus, C. 355, 359n68, 415n90 Cato Maior (M. Porcius Cato Censorius) (cos. 195 BC) 43n14 and n47, 69n122, 70, 72, 115, 117, 128n2, 132n9 as model for Cato Minor 420 as protégé of Fabius 156–157 Cato Maior (Life of ) 132n9, 135, 157, 287, 294 Cato Minor (M. Porcius Cato Uticensis)  chapter 9 passim; also 21n52, 22, 67n113, 72, 91, 101n26, 106, 160n70, 180, 185n16, 250–252, 256, 264–267, 290, 327n7, 359n68, 424n11 as exemplum in the Moralia 9, 43n14, 47, 58, 69n122, 71n134, 72 as model for Otho 91n188 like Coriolanus 186n18, 187n20, 190n28, 418 placing virtue over expediency 7, 50, 113n46, 114, 120, 242n34, 421, 427 training the young 128n3, 294n17, 297n25 420 Cato Minor (Life of ) chapter 9 passim; also 59n85, 70n126, 71n133, 252, 256n59, 264n74, 281, 282, 294n18, 418 caution/focus on safety (εὐλάβεια, ἀσφάλεια) attribute of old men 70n125, 170, 174 lacking in Coriolanus 200 of Agesilaus 235 of Aratus 88 of Fabius 156, 158–159, 160, 164, 168–169 of Nicias 115 of Pericles 153–154 of Phocion and Cato 134, 369 of Pompey 177n98, 270 Chaeronea, battle of 367, 371–372, 374n24, 379, 381 Chalcedon, battle of 219 chance (τύχη). See Fortune chronology of the Lives 3n11, 252n49 Cicero, M. Tullius (cos. 63) 14, 132n9, 156, 201, 392

Index advice of, exemplified by statesmen 40, 134, 156, 184, 251, 252n50, 286, 330 advice of, for leaders 42, 43, 47, 50–51, 59–60, 283, 304, 307 and Antony 346, 349, 350n54, 356 and Cato 392, 395, 397, 401, 406n80, 407, 409–413, 415 and Octavian 257n65, 263, 350n53, 356, 361n72 and Pompey 250, 265, 271 as exemplum in Moralia 43n14, 44, 47–48 role in Catilinarian conspiracy 50, 119, 242n33 Cicero (Life of ) 15, 50, 111, 242n33, 252, 256n50, 257n65, 262n69, 263, 267, 347, 350n52, 357, 360, 361n72 Cicero, Q. Tullius. See Quintus Cicero Cimon 58, 71n134, 147, 201 and Aristides 382n38 as blend of virtue and vice 96, 100n22, 111, 115, 207 rivalry with Pericles esp. 147–149; also 133, 139, 142, 151n51, 155, 157, 165, 169, 179 Cimon-Lucullus (Cim-Luc) Prologue 95–96 synkrisis 109, 111, 114, 115, 118, 334n23 cities, provincial administration of 34–37 finances of 35–36, 74n140 statuses of 36n117, 74n142 civil war 151n52, 243, 256, 267n80, 332, 346, 355, 364 clemency 56, 361, 415 See also: fairness; kindness; mildness Cleomenes III of Sparta 105 Cleopatra VII of Egypt 347, 349, 351, 354n58, 357–364 passim Clodius Pulcher, P. 210n61 250, 261, 264, 269n82, 394n65, 412, 414 common good, as goal of politikos dimensions of 23n55, 58n75 priority of 18, 45, 48–54, 395 compliancy (δυσωπία) 25, 53, 406 exempla of 43n14, 77, 391nn53 and 55 in Ages-Pomp 127, 229, 234, 250, 252–266 passim, 273–274 in Per-Fab (absence of) 137n29, 155, 166–168 See also: On Being Compliant

Index compromise/flexibility, political use of in balancing virtue and expediency 120, 368–370, 389, 392, 401–402 in negotiating with ruler 281, 386–387, 388 in solving disputes 184, 196–199, 200, 204, 273, 409 See also: inflexibility concord/harmony (ὁμόνοια) aim of politikos 18, 19n34, 58n75, 89, 96, 104–107 advice on 23, 60, 67–72, 72–76 in Aemilius 302–303 in Agesilaus 231, 247–248 in Aratus 89 in Coriolanus 189, 196, 197–198, 200 in Timoleon 307, 310, 317–321 conspiracy/rebellion 246, 394n65 contemporary resonance of the Lives 10, 30–31, 71, 96, 132, 417, 420–422 in Aem-Tim 300n34, 319 in Ages-Pomp 249, 266 in Cor-Alc 183, 184–185, 204, 210, 229 in Dtr-Ant 325, 365 in Per-Fab 136, 146–147, 151, 157, 161, 179 in Phoc-Cato 367, 388–389, 405, 406 contentiousness (φιλονικία) component of ambition 69, 104n31, 340, 342, 368n2 Fabius vs. Scipio 164–165 Pericles vs. Cimon 148 in Ages-Pomp 228–236 passim, 247, 249n45, 250, 252, 267 in Cor-Alc 111, 186, 202, 207, 209, 227n4, 418 See also: ambition cooperation (κοινωνία), techniques for securing as aid to effectiveness 51, 89, 147, 149n47, 152 in military contexts 166, 168–169, 175 in political contexts 51, 197–198, 229, 250, 408 in provinces 74–75 in relations with subject states 276, 281, 382, 388 theme in Aem-Tim 285, 287–288, 301–303, 310, 317–321 See also: managing alliances; managing rivalries

455 Corinth, as beneficent partner 317–318 Coriolanus, C. Marcius chapter 5 passim; also 46n26, 105n33, 116, 119n50, 120, 127, 158n66, 160, 227n4, 235n29, 248, 249n45, 276, 331, 342n37, 374n21, 375, 396, 414, 418, 419 flawed motives of 7, 110–111, 308n47 relations with Romans 115, 118, 289n15, 380n36 Coriolanus (Life of ) chapter 5 passim; also 45n25, 71n133, 228n6, 223n25, 294n18, 420 Coriolanus-Alcibiades (Cor-Alc) chapter 5 passim; also 10, 227 synkrisis 109, 110–111, 115, 116, 119n50 Corioli, battle of 193–194, 199, 204 Cornelius Nepos. See Nepos corruption flattery as source of 338–339, 341–342, 347 importance of avoiding 24, 44 of political environment 106, 112, 262n70, 288n14, 405–406, 409, 413–414, 418 of the young 91, 209n58, 210, 306 See also: bribery, deception, flattery, incorruptibility counter-examples, use of 118 Agesilaus vs. Pompey 117, 272, 275–276 Cicero vs. Cato Minor 401, 409–410, 412 Fabius vs. Pompey 157, 172, 275, 421 Lucullus, Marius vs. Pompey 275, 421 Octavian vs. Antony 282, 360–361 Pericles vs. Pompey 132n9, 271 Perseus vs. Aemilius 282, 303 Perseus vs. Philip 301n38 Philip vs. Demetrius 337–338, 420 Philip vs. Perseus 301n38 Phocion vs. Agesilaus 373n18 Timoleon vs. Dionysius II 282, 318–319 vs. Coriolanus 196 Alcibiades 212, 221, 223, 226 consuls 199–200 Menenius Agrippa 197, 204 See also: narrative techniques Crannon, battle of 374n24, 379, 381 Crassus, M. Licinius (cos. 70, 55 BC) 43n14, 111, 229, 250, 252, 263n71, 264–265, 394 Crimesus, battle of 64, 300n33, 305, 306, 316–317

456 cross-references to other Lives 252n49 to subjects of other Lives 420–421 cultural identity 37, 61n92 Cyzicus, battle of 219 death honorable vs. dishonorable 103, 118, 119 303, 333–334, 365 of a relative, response to 130, 286, 290, 309–310, 323n61, 393n60 theme in synkriseis 109 See also: suicide deception (ἀπάτη, δόλος), as tool of effectiveness avoidance of 65, 55n62, 65, 110–111, 224–225, 256 military uses of 173, 175–176, 178, 206n51, 220, 178, 300, 315–316, 327 political uses of 47, 275, 301, 327, 344n38, 360, 368 deliberations/reasoning (λογισμός) as key to best policy 90, 115, 163nn71 and 72, 235, 268–271, 275–276, 309, 314, 410–411 as role of politikos 5, 22, 55n61, 64, 69, 80, 85–87, 92, 406, 426 in Aem-Tim 297, 299, 315, 321 in Ages-Pomp 111, 244, 272–274 in Per-Fab 145, 159, 160, 171–174, 174–175 in Phoc-Cato 381, 404–405, 406–407 Delphi 13, 152n53, 287 Demades 368n1, 374n24, 384, 385–387 Demetrius I of Macedon (“Poliorcetes”, “City-besieger”) chapter 8 passim; also 47, 85n172, 100, 118, 100n36, 203n43, 210n63, 213n69, 253n52, 296n23, 298n29, 303, 418, 419, 420 Demetrius (Life of ) 5, 59n85, 384n40, 421 Demetrius-Antony (Dtr-Ant) chapter 8 passim; also 10, 281, 324, 367 Prologue 2–3, 99–100 synkrisis 109, 110n41, 118 demos (δῆμος). See people, the Demosthenes 43n14, 44, 72, 119, 201, 386, 414 as admirer of Pericles 130, 132n9, 134 as opponent of Phocion 371–372, 374n24, 376, 386n41

Index Demosthenes-Cicero (Dem-Cic) Prologue 252n49 synkrisis 109, 119 descriptive moralism. See moralism Diadochi 23n69, 329n13 Dio Chrysostom 31n89, 36n116, 39, 42, 97n15, 230, 247, 280, 282, 320, 326n4, 328n11, 372 advice for cities (City Orations) 36n117, 43, 59, 67–69, 71n132, 74–75, 102, 104, 321 advice for rulers (Kingship Orations)  54–56, 307, 308, 310 on keeping Rome at bay 281, 321, 373, 384 on limiting inter-city rivalry 147, 151–152, 190, 231, 243 overlaps with Lives 134, 142, 146, 167, 336–337, 347 Diodorus Siculus 77–78, 81–82 as source 133, 205, 230, 285n4, 305, 330n14, 372 vs. Aemilius 294, 299, 304 vs. Agesilaus 232n23, 234n26, 236, 241–249 passim vs. Alcibiades 211, 212n68, 214, 220, 222 vs. Demetrius 337n27, 340, 344 vs. Pericles 144, 149, 153 vs. Phocion 374n23, 381, 385–386 vs. Timoleon 313, 317, 320, 321, 322 Dion 43n14, 186n19, 320n60, 368n2, 402n72 as deterrent model for Timoleon 319 as general 115, 117 Dion-Brutus (Dion-Brut) Prologue 15, 100–101, 252n49 synkrisis 109, 112, 115, 117, 411n87 Dionysius I of Syracuse (the Elder) 58, 213n69, 310, 319 Dionysius II of Syracuse (the Younger) 282, 283, 300n34, 306–307, 323, 325 neglect of justice by 318, 325 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 77–78, 80, 82–83 as source 184, 185n17 vs. Coriolanus 187–188, 190, 194, 196, 197–203 passim, 419 Dionysus, as role model 337n27, 349–350 diplomacy, challenges for subject states engaging with envoys 387–388 minimizing ruler involvement 74–76, 321

Index moderating honors for the ruler  343–344 winning concessions 384–387 See also: paradigms for ambassadors diplomacy, challenges for rulers accepting honors 342–343 attracting goodwill 301–303, 304, 318–319, 360–361 fostering prosperity 73, 319–320 See also: paradigms for Emperors/ provincial governors direct speech, use of 126, 310 in historians 83, 165, 205, 268 in Aem-Tim 290, 295, 296n24, 297–299, 304–305, 308 in Ages-Pomp 243n35, 265 in Cor-Alc 189–190, 197–198 in Dtr-Ant 332, 341 in Per-Fab 145, 150, 161, 167, 170, 172, 176–177 in Phoc-Cato 372, 374–375, 382, 385, 388, 395–396, 398, 410, 411 See also: narrative techniques doctors/physicians. See imagery drama/tragedy. See theatrical imagery duties (τὰ καθήκοντα) 17, 50, 51–54, 239 prioritizing 50–51 Coriolanus’ neglect of 188–189, 196 Phocion’s neglect of 387–388 Pompey’s neglect of 271 Dyrrachium, battle of 177n98, 195n31 eclipses 134n13, 136n26, 245, 286 educated elite. See aristocracy education (παιδεία). See paideia effectiveness, criteria for assessing military 116–118 political 115–116 See also: paradigms for generals; paradigms for political leaders election loss, response to 125, 179, 182, 187n20 of Aemilius 294 of Cato Minor 390, 401 of Coriolanus 186–187, 201, 204, 276 embassies 35n112, 36, 38, 281 Phocion as ambassador 386–388 See also: paradigms for ambassadors

457 Emperor 6n24, 32–34, 36 advice for 42, 54–59 See also: paradigms for Emperors/ provincial governors encomium. See bios envy (φθόνος), as obstacle to effectiveness caused by success 150, 165, 194, 188n22, 274 impact on reputation 165, 269, 274 methods for averting 59n84, 60, 194, 260–261, 310 of Agesilaus towards Lysander 231, 235n30 of Pompey towards other generals 268 Epaminondas 64, 75n147, 248n44 as adversary of Agesilaus 234, 248–249 emulated by Timoleon 322 exemplum in the Moralia 21, 43n14, 46–47, 58, 69n122, 72 model of equanimity 119–120, 187, 201, 226, 421 model of generalship 106, 231, 317, 322 Epaminondas-Scipio (Epam-Scip) 1, 231, 248n44 Epictetus 41, 43, 44–45, 46 equanimity, as aid to effectiveness 23n55, 68, 286 in face of reversals/rejection 25, 30, 47, 100, 102, 182, 201 models of 76–77 of Stilpo 330, 331 See also: Epaminondas; Fortune equestrians. See career paths Erasmus 10n38, 422, 424–426 erotic passion (ἔρως), impact on effectiveness of Alcibiades 208, 209, 213 of Antony 326, 347, 358, 364 of Demetrius 326, 337n28 of Pompey 228, 261–262 Eumenes of Cardia 101, 112, 329, 331 ethics. See moral character euergetism 27, 31, 35, 92, 147 See also: benefactions Euphanes, addressee of Old Men in Politics 26 exempla, subjects of the Lives as 43, 47, 72, 420–422 positive and deterrent models 71

458 exempla, subjects of the Lives as (cont.) in Aem-Tim 286–287, 306 in Ages-Pomp 230–231, 250–252 in Cor-Alc 184, 205–209 in Dtr-Ant 330, 346–347 in Per-Fab 128–131, 133–135, 156–157 in Phoc-Cato 372, 390–391 See also: exemplarity; paradigms exemplarity 40, 49–50, 83 exile and recall 47, 76–77, 118–119, 101–102 advice on 20, 25, 30, 102, 125, 200–201 assessing cause of 199–200, 207–209, 213–214, 218–219, 225 assessing response to 201–202, 221–223, 225–226 negotiating terms of 89, 202–204, 223, 226, 318–319, 385 See also: ostracism; paradigms for exiles expediency, balancing morality with. See “political necessity” exploratory moralism. See moralism expository moralism. See moralism Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, Q. 285, 294, 300, 304, 305n41 Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, Q. (“Cunctator”, “delayer”) chapter 4 passim; also 98, 127, 180, 182, 185n16, 187, 188n25, 199n37, 220, 228, 233, 254, 296, 297, 308n47, 309, 379n31 as general 3n12, 45, 63n102, 64n104, 117, 118, 120, 195, 268n81, 273, 275, 298n30, 301n36, 334n25 death of sons 285, 290 Fabius (Life of ) chapter 4 passim; also 5, 45, 59n85, 64, 71n133, 204, 227, 245, 249n45, 272, 276, 285, 288, 304, 328 fairness (ἐπιείκεια) 58n75, 63n101, 186, 201, 248n44, 186, 331, 382n38 key to civic harmony 106, 149, 198, 203 key to relations with allies 375n28, 382n38, 407n81 fame (δόξα). See reputation fate. See Fortune (τύχη) filial duty 159–160, 188–190, 196 Flamininus, Titus Quinctius (cos. 198 BC)  110n41, 114, 116, 119, 287, 296 flatterers (κόλαξ), as threat to good rule

Index detection of 25, 44n19, 53, 209n58, 326, 328, 347–348, 418, 422 methods used by 347, 358–360 vulnerability to 201–210, 281, 328, 349–351, 354 See also: flattery flattery (κολακεία), political effects of 57n73, 59, 65, 91, 256, 347, 409, 357, 372, 396, 418, 422 of army by generals 90, 296–7, 304 of the people by leaders 45, 55n62, 57n73, 119, 172, 289, 291, 295, 304, 327, 367, 375 of the ruler by subject states 325–330 passim, 367–368 in Cor-Alc 115, 182, 197, 207, 209–210, 225 in Dtr-Ant 334, 338–339, 341–344 in Phoc-Cato 374–375, 384, 388, 396 See also: flatterers flexibility. See compromise foresight (πρόνοια) component of pragmatic lessons 40n3, 63 in military contexts 87, 116, 219, 248n44, 274, 383 in political contexts 69, 100n21, 412 in Aem-Tim 301, 314, 316, 322–323 in Per-Fab 118, 126, 152, 153, 163, 168, 169, 173, 178–179 Fortune (τύχη) 45, 47, 87, 100–102, 184, 202, 251–252, 254n43, 347, 351n55, 357n63, 372, 402 adversary of Cato 106, 390, 394, 395–396 cause of overconfidence or caution 153n57, 165, 171, 174 distinct from merit 4–25, 40n3, 62–63, 79–80, 98–99, 108–110, 153, 163n71, 174, 177, 233, 417, 418 manifested in circumstances 102, 284, 314, 321–322 reversals of, response to 78, 100, 209, 306, 325, 348, 350n54 Founding Fathers, American use of Lives 10n38, 423–424, 428 frankness (παρρησία), in degenerate states  106 friends, political role of as partners 59, 65, 90, 299, 407–409

459

Index proper management of 24, 50, 53, 69, 72, 76, 125, 387–388, 407 resisting requests of 137, 184–185, 228, 234–235, 241, 272, 276 Frontinus 61, 63–64, 67–68, 81n159, 102, 116, 166, 170n78, 299, 405 Hannibal as exemplum 175n94, 176n95 Plutarch’s subjects as exempla 134, 156–157, 184, 206, 219–220, 230, 251, 286, 347 Galba 90–91 Galba (Life of ) 1n1, 13, 85, 87, 89n182, 90–91, 95 Aemilius Paullus as exemplum in 287 early career of Otho in 111n44 Gellius, Aulus 42, 48n35, 64, 67n113, 241n32, 422n2 generalship. See paradigms for generals gentleness (πρᾳότης). See mildness glory, love of (φιλοδοξία) 183n10 component of ambition 69, 104n31, 228 gives opening to corrupters 210 in Ages-Pomp 210, 228–229, 250–276 passim See also: ambition Good, the (τὸ καλὸν) 97, 332n17, 333 good counsel. See deliberations/reasoning good man vs. effective statesman 6–7, 369–370, 424–425 good repute, love of (φιλοδοξία). See glory, love of good ruler, the characteristics of 15–19, 20–21, 54–61, 280–281 deterrent models in Dtr-Ant 334, 336–337, 345 See also: “cardinal virtues” of a leader goodwill (εὔνοια), as political tool 55n61, 115, 323, 332, 342–343, 404 cultivated by rulers 44n16, 51n42, 54–56, 60n89 cultivated by subject states 36, 74n14 of Agesilaus 233, 250 of Antony 362 of Pompey 254–255 of Scipio 174n90

governors, provincial advice for esp. 59–61; also 54–58 powers and duties of 33 See also: paradigms for Emperors/ provincial governors Gracchi, the (Gracchus, C. Sempronius and T. Sempronius) as exempla in the Moralia 47 as too compliant 104–105 compared to Agis and Cleomenes 112 great natures 46n26, 100, 185, 207, 209–210, 232, 331, 348, 351, 354 greed (πλεονεξία). See avarice habit, virtue as 9n32, 17, 27n75, 53 Hamilton, Alexander 10n38, 428 Hannibal esp. 174–178, 155–173 passim; also 45, 72, 85, 132 compared with later generals 101, 195, 233, 268, 299–301 happiness (εὐδαιμονία) 19–20, 47 harmony (ὁμόνοια). See concord Hellenistic kings, characterization of 333, 340n35 Herodotus 85–86 History, as distinct from Lives 29, 91–92 See also: pragmatic history Homer, as source of exempla 55n60, 56n64, 76–77, 97n15 Iliad 40, 70n127, 71n132, 244n38 honors, political effects of as spur to ambition 188, 193 benefits of rejecting 194, 199, 226, 375 perils of accepting 5, 59–60, 328, 331, 334, 336, 338–339, 341–343 perils of offering 57, 328, 343–344 in Dtr-Ant 328–344 passim horse-training metaphor. See imagery How to Profit from Enemies. See under Moralia How to Tell a Flatterer. See under Moralia humanity (φιλανθρωπία). See kindness humor, as tool of effectiveness 176 ideal ruler. See good ruler identity (Greek or Roman). See cultural identity imagery, political agricultural 46n26, 185n15, 209n58

460 imagery, political (cont.) athletic, wrestling 52, 71, 135n23, 150, 178, 244, 266n78 bull 55n61 contests 23n55, 395 disease, physician 69n120, 71, 75, 99, 114, 143, 159, 256n59, 261, 273, 333n20, 373, 389, 407 father 55, 57, 60 helmsman, ships, shipwreck 69n120, 71n131, 106, 114n49, 143, 368 horse-trainer, charioteer 69n120, 143, 298n30 master-builder, craftsman 320 musical harmony/chorus 69n120, 99, 143 shepherd, herdsman 55 sun 55, 105 wild beast 366, 156n63, 365 wine 426n22 See also: theatrical imagery imitation and avoidance 2–5, 8–10, 28–30, 47, 55, 80–82, chapter 3 passim, 348, 404 incorruptibility, as basis of trust in Aem-Tim 110n41, 288n14, 323–324 in Per-Fab 132n9, 136–139, 154 in Phoc-Cato 390, 391–392, 405–406, 411 See also: superiority to money inflexibility (ἄτρεπτος), as obstacle to effectiveness 120, 191, 396 in Cor-Alc 184, 203–204 in Phoc-Cato 256, 378, 380, 386–387, 389, 390, 392, 396–397, 409–410, 414–415 influence (δύναμις), as essential to greatness 101 insensibility. See apatheia insolence (ὕβρις), as detrimental to reputation of Agesilaus 248 of Alcibiades 206–207, 213 of Antony 326, 349, 350, 355–357 of Demetrius 326, 337–338, 344 of Pompey 269 intelligence (σύνεσις) 81, 101, 248n44 Ipsus, battle of 329–334 passim, 339, 342 Isocrates 14n10, 84, 88n180, 133, 206, 230, 248

Index Julius Caesar, C. See Caesar justice (δικαιοσύνη) as a political virtue 99–100, 128, 139n34, 280, 325, 334, 374, 379n33, 388 as means of building reputation 44n16, 138n34, 288–289, 355, 394, 398, 402 in a provincial governor 35n108 of Aristides 393n59 of Cato 393–394 of Dion 368n2 of Numa 20n31, 107, 113, 231 of Pericles and Fabius 98, 180 See also: “cardinal virtues” of a leader; pragmatic justice justice, administration of 324–338 passim, 354, 364 as key concern of ruler 20n41, 21–22, 55, 58–59, 73, 239, 280, 282 as means of securing goodwill 287–288, 302, 322–323, 345 as neglected by “bad rulers” 283, 288, 318–319, 337–338 by Aristides 382n38 by Flamininus 287–288 by Philip 338, 420 by Timoleon 319 in Ages-Pomp 19, 107, 109, 127, 226, 229, 231, 233n24, 234n27, 247–248, 274–275 in Phoc-Cato 136n34, 369–375 passim, 392, 393–394 See also: pragmatic justice kindness (φιλανθρωπία) as a political virtue 22, 374 blended with severity 60n91, 63, 106n34, 143–144 source of goodwill 203, 232, 233, 373, 375n28, 376 laughter. See humor leadership. See political leadership leniency (ἐπιείκεια). See fairness lessons for generals. See paradigms for generals lessons for statesmen. See paradigms for political leaders Leuctra, battle of 3n12, 7, 19, 50, 227–233 passim, 243–249 passim, 261n68, 275, 369n3, 420 Agesilaus as cause of 235–236

Index liberty/autonomy, as essential for virtue  58n75, 280 granting, as source of goodwill 199, 254, 256, 302 preserving, as role of politikos 18, 19, 23n55, 24, 273, 366, 367, 371, 406 in Aem-Tim 302–303, 307, 310, 317–319, 320–321 in Phoc-Cato 282, 367, 370, 384, 395–396, 398, 406, 414 in synkriseis 109 licentiousness. See erotic passion liturgies. See euergetism Lives of the Caesars 1, 13, 85, 90 Livy 78n148, 83, 268, 424, 426 as source 155, 184, 285, 346n40 vs. Aemilius 294, 295n21, 297nn26 and 28, 298–299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304 vs. Coriolanus 187–188, 190, 194, 196, 197nn33 and 34, 198, 200, 202 vs. Fabius 164, 165–166, 168, 171, 172, 176n95 Lucilius (addressee of Seneca) 41 Lucullus, L. Licinius (cos. 74 BC) 58, 111, 114, 251, 253n52, 334n23 as general 118, 120, 275, 421, 426 as rival of Pompey 250, 252, 257, 269, 274 Lycurgus of Sparta 16, 43n16, 46, 113, 230–232, 246 Lycurgus-Numa (Lyc-Numa) synkrisis 109, 113, 114n48 Lysander 43n14, 119, 211n65 and Agesilaus 231, 239–241 Lysander (Life of ) 208, 211n65, 231, 235n30 Lysander-Sulla (Lys-Sulla) 183n10, 252n49 synkrisis 109, 112, 114, 119 Machiavelli 10n38, 423, 424, 426–427 magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία) as a political virtue 18, 44n16 of Aemilius 289 of Aratus 88 of Epaminondas 248n44 of Fabius 158 of Pericles 150 magistracies. See administration managing alliances, paradigms in 262–263 Aristides and Cimon 382n38 Cato and Cicero 409–410

461 Cato and Pompey 410–412 Octavian and Cicero 257n65, 350n53, 265 Pompey and Caesar 264–266 See also: paradigms for generals; paradigms for political leaders managing rivalry, paradigms in 75, 147, 151, 166 Agesilaus and Lysander 239–241 Aristides and Themistocles 222 Athens and Sparta 151–153 Cato and Caesar 409, 413 Fabius and Scipio 164–166 Pericles and Cimon 147–149 Pericles and Thucydides, son of Melesias 149–151 Pompey and Caesar 266–267 Pompey and Lucullus 257, 269 See also: paradigms for generals; paradigms for political leaders manipulation of sources, purpose of 85, 132n8, 418–419 in Aem-Tim 294, 299, 304, 313, 320–322 in Ages-Pomp 228n7, 232–245 passim, 248nn43 and 44, 249, 255, 273 in Cor-Alc 144, 187–188, 190, 194, 196, 197–203 passim, 211–214 passim, 219, 220, 222, 419 in Dtr-Ant 337n27, 340, 344, 365 in Per-Fab 143n39, 144, 149, 152, 153 in Phoc-Cato 372, 374n23, 381, 385–386, 389, 418–419 Marcellus, C. Claudius (cos. 50 BC) 405–406 Marcellus, M. Claudius (cos. 222, 215, 214, 210, 208 BC) 103n29, 104, 118, 176n96 cooperation with Fabius 132, 149, 166, esp. 168–169, 175, 177–178 Marius, C. 47, 64, 118, 120, 275, 421 marriage alliances criteria for choosing 410–413 political function of 263–264 medical metaphors. See imagery Menander Rhetor 35n108, 54n55, 72–73, 230, 372 Menemachus (addressee of Political Precepts) 19n34, 26, 41 Menenius Lanatus, Agrippa 186, 197, 199, 203, 204

462 mentors, old men as 2, 24–25, 39, 70–71 advice on treatment of 231, 239 Fabius to Cato Maior 157 Lysander to Agesilaus 231, 239–241, 275 Pompey to Caesar 262–263, 264–266 Sulla to Pompey 250, 262, 275 metaphors. See imagery Metellus, Q. Caecilius (Numidicus) 182n9, 187, 226 Metellus Nepos, Q. Caecilius 398 Metellus Pius Scipio, Q. Caecilius (cos. 52)  242n34, 250, 263–264, 401–402, 406–407, 413, 414 Middle Platonism 17–18 mildness (πρᾳότης) as a political virtue 22, 23, 59n83, 96, 100, 166, 182n9, 186, 233n25, 374n403 as theme in Per-Fab 98, 128, 149, 158, 159n68, 169–170 lacking in Coriolanus 201 of Aemilius 288 of Agesilaus 232 of Aristides 375n28 of Caesar 390 of Cimon and Lucullus 96 of Flamininus 287 of Galba 90 of Sertorius 101 of Timoleon 307 military achievements, criteria for judging 7, 116–118 military leadership, paradigms in Aem-Tim 291, 296, 304, 310, 314, 315–317, 323 Ages-Pomp 236, 243, 249, 257, 267, 274, 275–276 Cor-Alc 191, 191–193, 204, 214, 219, 223–224 Dtr-Ant 334, 339–340, 345, 351, 362–364 Per-Fab 151, 162, 170–171, 177–178, 178–179 Phoc-Cato Min 376, 381, 406–407, 414 See also: paradigms for generals Miltiades 85–86, 100n21, 138n33, 227n4 Minucius Rufus, M. 167–168, 170 mirrors, public figures as history as 28n77, 44, 46n28, 98, 305n41 Lives as 4, 28, 30–31, 44, 283 philosophers and statesmen as 46, 76–77, 230

Index portraits of good kings as 54, 55 reflected in “Mirrors for Princes” 422 mirroring, political uses of as method of flatterers 359–360 as method to gain office 401 See also flattery Mithridates VI of Pontus 13n1, 112, 250, 251n47, 255n56 moderation (μετριότης) as means to win goodwill 125 as a political virtue 19, 47, 82, 148, 182n9, 290, 194, 201, 280, 283, 338n29, 418, 424 lack of in Coriolanus 186–187, 194, 201 of Alcibiades 198, 223 of Aratus 89 of Cato 393n60 of Fabius 156–157, 180 of Octavian 361 of Philip 338 of Phocion 374 monarchy, in Rome after Pharsalus as exercised by Antony 349–350 as exercised by Octavian 360–361 devolution into tyranny 113n47 required for Rome 114, 256n59, 326n3, 361n74 Montaigne, Michel de 10n38, 423, 424, 427–428, 429 moral ambiguity 3, 7, 327n8 moral character (ἦθος) treated as blend of virtue and vice 3, 40, 79–80, 88, 91, 127 moral improvement (ἐπανόρθωσις) cultivation of 2–3, 46, 93, 95–97, 284 in the citizens 18, 22, 55, 280–281, 326n4 in oneself 19n34, 25, 17n28, 27–28, 43–47, 72 in private vs. public contexts 18n31, 22, 76, 188 in the ruler 21–22, 326n4 through training and practice 27n75, 42, 42n11, 62n99 Moralia, political and practical-ethical treatises How to Profit from Enemies esp. 46–47; also 8n25, 20, 26, 43, 77, 251n48, 391n53 How to Tell a Flatterer esp. 53; also 20, 25, 26, 43, 77, 207, 280, 347, 357n62, 359, 360n69, 422

Index Old Men in Politics esp. 24–25, 69–70; also 9, 20, 22, 30–31, 37, 77, 104 On Being Compliant esp. 53; also 8n25, 20, 25, 37, 125, 129, 131, 260, 267, 281 On Control of Anger esp. 46–47; also 14, 20, 77, 125, 182, 280 On Exile esp. 47, 76–77; also 20, 25, 30, 102, 182, 201 On Inoffensive Self-Praise esp. 37; also 20, 25, 26, 27n72, 43, 53, 77, 125 On Tranquility of Mind esp. 47, 76–77; also 20, 25, 100, 102, 182, 201, 286, 330 Philosophers and Men in Power esp. 20–22, 58; also 25, 42, 130, 239, 280, 291, 347, 402, 403 Political Precepts esp. 23–25, 70–72, 75–77; also 9, 14, 20, 30–31, 37, 39, 42, 53, 89, 90, 279–280 To an Uneducated Ruler esp. 21–22, 58; also 20, 25, 42, 239, 280–281, 291, 310, 328, 337, 391, 402, 426 moralism descriptive/exploratory moralism 3–5 prescriptive/expository moralism 3–4 motive, as criterion for judging an action  108–112, 309 musical metaphors. See imagery Mutina, battle of 347, 349 narrative techniques, uses of to clarify pragmatic lessons 118–120, 132 See also: authorial comments; counter-examples; direct speech negative examples, value of 99–100 Nepos (Cornelius Nepos) 14n11, 40n4, 83–87 as author of Lives, not History 91 as source 313, 372 Life of Agesilaus 230 Life of Alcibiades 86–87, 206 Life of Dion 86 Life of Miltiades 85–86 Life of Pelopidas 248 vs. Agesilaus 232, 234n26, 236, 241, 242, 243, 245n39, 249 vs. Alcibiades 211n67, 212n68, 219, 222 vs. Phocion 372, 374n23, 381, 385–386 vs. Timoleon 313, 320, 321, 322

463 Nero 41, 313 addressee of Seneca’s De Clementia  54n56 intimate of Otho 91 Nicanor 376–402 passim; also 3n12, 23 Nicias 72, 115 as Alcibiades’ rival 209n57, 227n4 as compliant toward Cleon 115–116, 119, 398n70, 412n88 Peace of 104, 224n78, 225, 227n4 Nicias-Crassus (Nic-Cras) Prologue 2, 95–96 synkrisis 109, 115, 309n48, 412n88 Numa as ideal king 16 justice of 107, 231 obedience (πειθαρχία) aim of rulers 5, 10, 54, 196–197 based on goodwill, not force 19, 105–106, 115 inspired by virtue in ruler 6, 21, 54–56, 58–60 part of ruling and being ruled 279–282 in Aem-Tim 291, 295–296, 308, 323 in Ages-Pomp 230, 232–233, 274 in Cor-Alc 199–200 in Dtr-Ant 327–328, 336–338, 342, 348, 351, 354, 362 in Galba 90 in Otho 91 in Per-Fab 142–144, 163–164, 199n37 Octavia 351, 357, 359–360 Octavian behavior in early career 111, 214n71, 257n65, 263, 347–357 passim conduct as Augustus 56, 111n44, 254n54, 346n54, 361n72 good ruler after Actium 282, 329, 348, 358, 360–361, 365 Old Men in Politics. See under Moralia On Being Compliant. See under Moralia On Control of Anger. See under Moralia On Exile. See under Moralia On Inoffensive Self-Praise. See under Moralia On Tranquility of Mind. See under Moralia Onasander 61 distinguish fortune from merit 99, 100, 174n88, 314

464 Onasander (cont.) Strategikos 62–63, 64, 81n159, 102, 116, 166, 299 oratory advice literature on 44, 49, 52–53, 71n132, 72–73, 375n25 function of, in public roles 6, 36, 38, 54n55, 71, 197n34 in Alcibiades 209, 221 in Cato 391, 393–394 in Nic-Cras 115 in Pericles 133–134, 135, 136, 150 in Phoc-Cato 373, 414 order of the Lives within a pair 181, 284–5 ostracism, political effects of appropriate response to 201 Pericles’ fear of 142, 151n51 of Cimon 142, 147, 148 of Hyperbolus 208, 209n57 of Thucydides son of Melesias 139, 142, 151 See also: exile and recall Otho 91, 111n44 Otho (Life of ) 1n1, 13, 85, 87, 91 paideia (παιδεία) 37, 39, 126, 396 Dionysius and Plato 236–237 Spartan agoge training 232 theme in Cor-Alc 105n33, 181–182, 185–186, 224, 239n29 See also: philosophers pairings in the Lives, choice of 14 criteria for, in Prologues 94, 96, 101, 102, 105, 429 of Aemilius and Timoleon 98–99, 283 of Agesilaus and Pomp 227 of Alexander and Caesar 96, 333n21 of Coriolanus and Alcibiades 180 of Crassus and Nicias 96, 227n3 of Demetrius and Antony 100 of Lucullus and Cimon 96 of Pericles and Fabius 97–98, 157, 227 of Phocion and Cato Minor 106–107 Panaetius 43n15, 47n32, 51, 52n43 paradigms 2–5, 7, 15, 118, 120–121 historical statesmen as 30–31, 46, 78n148, 108 in pragmatic history 79–82 juxtaposition of opposite 118–119

Index pragmatic vs. ethical 6, 43, 80, 93, 98–100, 107, 110 protreptic and deterrent 2–5, 8–10, 28–30, 47, 94–97 paradigms for ambassadors adapting to ruler’s character 384–386 balancing trust and wariness 387–388 balancing virtue and expediency  386–387 fostering peace 248–249 managing flattery 343–344, 374 respecting agreements 247–248 See also: diplomacy, challenges for subject states paradigms for Emperors/provincial governors eliciting obedience 303, 337–338, 356–357 establishing rapport with subject states 301–303, 318–321, 360–361 resisting flattery/honors 338–339, 342–343, 358–360 upholding treaties 248 See also: diplomacy, challenges for rulers paradigms for exiles fostering reconciliation 202–204, 223 responding to rejection 186–188, 201–202, 221–223 paradigms for generals in developing strategies adapting to the situation 171–173, 173–174, 219–220, 243–245, 299–301, 314–317, 363–364 anticipating threats 383 avoiding unnecessary risks 153–154, 172–173, 296–297, 340–341 guarding against overconfidence  171–172, 172–173, 269–270 placing public interests first 194–196, 340 withstanding objections 159–160, 223–224, 271, 272–273 in relating to other generals dispelling rebellion 246, 316 managing rivalries 166–169, 268–269 restraining urge for battle 154, 168, 172–173, 297–298 winning support 193–194, 220–221, 362–363

Index in relating to soldiers controlling desire to plunder 193, 220n74, 301 inspiring 176–177, 245–246, 299–300, 316, 381–382 training/disciplining 169–170, 294–5, 296–99, 403 paradigms for political leaders in advancing the common good administering justice 241–243 balancing private/public duty  261–262, 398, 401–402 resolving disputes 197–199 responding to fortune 290 restoring order 163–164, 255–256 spending funds to benefit all 144–145 withstanding criticism 137–138, 379–380 in managing relations with the people building/sustaining trust 138–139, 199–200, 212–214, 232–233, 260–261, 288–289, 337–338, 355–357 engaging in give-and-take 142–144 mirroring the people to gain power 142 responding to honors 338–339 securing office without flattery 295–296 in working with colleagues engaging rivals 147–151, 164–165, 266–267, 409 managing alliances 264–266, 409–412 respecting mentors 239–241 using friends 234–235, 407–408 Parallel Lives, purpose of 1–10, 416–420, 429–430 Parthia 96, 111, 267, 347, 349, 360, 362–365 partnerships. See managing alliances patronage as means to advance 32n90, 34n116, 36–37, 38 lessons in the Lives 229, 257, 266, 398 patron-client relations 41n9, 45n106, 66, 52 Pelopidas 104 Pelopidas-Marcellus (Pel-Marc) Prologue 104 synkrisis 109, 118

465 people, the (δῆμος) character of 16, 18, 20, 106, 114, 218, 223, 373–374 guided by example 18, 20, 46, 326n4 to be led to what is better 10, 19, 46, 51 See also: paradigms for political leaders Pericles chapter 4 passim; also 14, 69n120, 98, 117, 120, 127, 180, 182, 187, 206n49, 276, 290, 413, 418, 421 and Anaxagoras 12, 23, 44 as exemplum in Moralia 9, 43n14, 69n122, 70–72 as general 64n104, 117, 208, 271, 273, 420 enduring slander 187, 220, 228, 233–234, 254, 273, 308n47, 309 managing reputation 199n37, 212–214, 261n67 model for Phocion 132n9, 136n27, 374 Pericles (Life of ) chapter 4 passim; also 5n21, 22n54, 23, 59n79, 120, 196, 199, 204, 208, 212, 214n71, 227, 245, 272n90, 327, 328, 367, 419 Pericles-Fabius (Per-Fab) chapter 4 passim; also 10, 180, 182 Prologue 2–3, 96–98, 100 synkrisis 109, 131, 148 Perseus of Macedon 213n69, 282, 283, 300n34, 323, 325 avarice of 292, 300–301, 303 neglect of justice by 288, 328 persuasion. See oratory Pharnabazus 205 Pharsalus, battle of esp. 251–252, 265–276 passim; also 64, 111, 117, 127, 132n9, 137n29, 138n31, 153n57, 171n80, 172, 229, 243n35, 245, 348, 354, 356, 363–364, 404, 406, 420 Philip II of Macedon 13n1, 55n60 and Phocion 374n25, 381–382, 384–385 as model of generalship 64, 101, 420 as model of good kingship 56, 282, 301n35, 303n38, 337–338, 365, 420 Philip V of Macedon 296n23, 303n39 Philippi, battle of 64, 252, 346, 347, 355–366 passim Philopappus, C. Julius Antiochus Epiphanes  26–27, 77 Philopoemen 21n52, 71, 110n41, 113, 114, 116, 119, 372n12, 427–428

466 Philopoemen-Flamininus (Phil-Flam) synkrisis 109, 110n41, 113, 114n48, 116, 119 philosopher-king in Plato 15n16, 20–21 in Plutarch 15, 20–21, 369–370, 415 philosophers not the best statesmen 16, 371, 413–415 Philosophers and Men in Power. See under Moralia philosophers as advisors to statesmen 21–22, 100n23, 280 compared to physicians, helmsmen, trainers 71n131, 101n25 contrasted to statesmen 22–23, 29, 77–77 in the Lives 16, 21n5, 306, 313n51 in Aem-Tim 309 in Cor-Alc 180, 186–187, 191, 208–210, 224 in Dtr-Ant 328, 331, 334, 361 in Per-Fab 22–23, 135–136, 158n57, 159 in Phoc-Cato 367–376 passim; 386–398 passim; also 407, 410, 413, 414–415 See also: alliance of philosophy with leadership philosophy, as poor guide to action  368–369, 388 Phocion chapter 9 passim; also 7, 21n52, 29n82, 106, 114n49, 134n21, 180, 187n21, 282, 296n22, 309, 322, 418 as exemplum 9n33, 43n14, 47, 69n122, 70–72, 128n2, 316n55 as mediator with overlord 3n12, 19, 23, 269n83, 282, 421 emulates Pericles 132n9, 136n27, 420 Phocion (Life of ) chapter 9 passim; also 5n21, 22n54, 23, 74n142, 90n186, 134, 153n57, 188n25, 208, 218, 231, 310n49, 344 Phocion-Cato Minor (Phoc-Cato Min) 10, 50, 60n91, 76, 105n33, 108, 282, 334n25, 366 Prologue 17n25, 102, 105–107, 114 Phoebidas 3n12, 234, 235n28, 247–248, 250 Phoenix, as model 40, 64, 127, 132, 238, 275 phronesis (φρόνησις). See practical judgment plant metaphors. See imagery Plato 16, 21, 113n47, 185n15, 306, 326n2, 333n21, 338n31, 349n48, 368n2 and Alcibiades 205–206, 207n54

Index and Phocion 373, 389 and Cato Minor 393n66, 397n69 Platonic philosophy 15–19 Pliny the Younger 32n90, 39, 43 addressees 41 advice for emperor 57, 73–74 advice for provincial governors 60–61 advice for statesmen 66–67 overlap with Lives 132, 134, 146, 183, 229, 257, 280, 283, 302, 307, 310, 318, 320, 384, 390 Plutarch as Platonist 13, 14, 15–19, 22–24 citations of Plato 16, 47n29, 101, 359 departure from philosopher-king 16, 19–24, 369 use of statesmen as paradigms 30, 70n128, 128, 131, 251n48, 286, 372n11, 391, 420–422 See also: Moralia policies to promote prosperity assize courts 36n117, 74, 146 construction projects 73–74, 144–146 land distribution 319 finances 319–320 See also: euergetism political achievements, assessment of 7, 115–116 political leadership, lessons in in Ages-Pomp 236, 250, 257–274 in Cor-Alc 191–204, 214–224 in Per-Fab 139–155, 161–178 in Phoc-Cato 407–412 See also: paradigms for political leaders “political necessity” 48, 50, 95, 110, 112–114 in Aem-Tim 314 in Ages-Pomp 239, 242 in Per-Fab 142 in Phoc-Cato 370, 387, 391–392 political philosophy 19–23 Political Precepts. See under Moralia Political Precepts and Lives, common themes of Aem-Tim 286, 287, 288, 289, 291, 306, 310, 321, 322 Ages-Pomp 229, 231, 233, 234, 239, 250, 253, 261n67, 267 Cor-Alc 189, 194, 196, 197, 200, 207, 212–213, 214, 217, 218, 225

Index Dtr-Ant 326n4, 327nn6 and 7, 327n10, 328n11, 330, 336, 342, 356n60 Per-Fab 128, 131, 136, 138, 141, 142, 147, 149, 150, 161, 169 Phoc-Cato 367, 369n4, 371, 372, 373, 379, 383, 391, 395, 398, 403, 408 Prologues 100, 102, 104, 106 synkriseis 115–116 See also: Moralia political virtue (πολιτικὴ ἀρετή) 186, 233, 274, 369 blend of virtues 2, 18–19 highest form of virtue 99n20, 387n44 vs. personal virtue 22–23 See also: “cardinal virtues” of a leader politikos, key roles 21–23 Polybius and pragmatic history 6n23, 39–40, 77–78, 80–81, 424, 426 and transformation of constitutions  113n47, 326n3 as source 156, 285n4 on generalship 99n19, 103n29, 171, 172, 173nn84 and 86, 268 vs. Aemilius 294, 295n21, 297n28, 301n35, 302n37, 303n38, 304 vs. Agesilaus 248 vs. Aratus 88 vs. Fabius 163n71, 168, 177 Polycrates (addressee of Life of Aratus) 26, 89n182 Pompey (Pompeius Magnus, Cn.) chapter 6 passim; also 21n52, 43n14, 71n134, 72, 112, 127, 177n98, 191n30, 356, 361n72, 421 alliance with Caesar 168n76, 418–419 as general 63n102, 64, 101, 117, 134n14, 167–168, 171n80, 172n83, 177n98, 195n31, 420 decision of, at Pharsalus 111, 117–118, 132n9, 137n29, 138n31, 157, 172, 271, 297n27, 309, 421 relations with Cato 7, 50, 114, 190n28, 389–414 passim Pompey (Life of ) chapter 6 passim; also 5, 21n52, 90n186, 135, 157, 297, 304, 313, 347, 391, 392, 421 poverty. See superiority to money

467 practical ethics, Plutarch’s treatises on 7–10, 20, 92, 137, 257, 267, 280, 369 audience for 25–26, 28, 39, 41–42 See also: Moralia practical judgment (φρόνησις) as a political virtue 24, 44, 51, 55–56, 62, 68, 82, 95, 101, 119, 127, 417, 421, 430 acquired through experience 9n36, 24–25, 66, 99n21 distinct from fortune 98, 63n71, 283–284, 288, 323 in synkriseis 109 key to balancing virtue and expediency 51, 368 of Agesilaus 236 of Dion (lack of) 115, 386n2 of Fabius 16 of Phocion 379 of Themistocles and Aristides 107 See also: “cardinal virtues” of a leader pragmatic biography, as interpretive framework 5–7, 14–15, 43, 50, 79–80, 92, 120, 135, 416–422, 429–430 compared with practical ethics 7–10 concerns of 80, 90n184, 309n48 for Aem-Tim 284–285 for Ages-Pomp 229 for Cor-Alc 180, 182–183 for Dtr-Ant 328–329 for Per-Fab 128–132 for Phoc-Cato 371–372 for synkriseis 108–110, 118–120 See also: alliance of philosophy with leadership; reception of the Lives pragmatic geography 62 pragmatic history, as backdrop to “pragmatic biography” 77–78 audience targeted by 6n23, 39–40, 77–84 passim purpose of 77–79, 83 pragmatic justice 239, 241–243, 427–428 prescriptive moralism. See moralism programmatic statements 1–3, 79n53, 94n5, 96n12 Prologues, themes of exempla and their reception 96–100 principles of effectiveness in public roles 102–107

468 Prologues, themes of (cont.) promised paradigms in 3, 421–422 relation to synkriseis 10, 28, 93, 108–110, 120–121 revelation of character as goal 95–96 role of Fortune 100–102 statesmanship in 107 protreptic moralism. See moralism provinces, administration of. See administration public spending, political uses of advice about 327 to calm unrest 143–144, 409 to foster prosperity 144–146 to glorify city 146–147 to win support 142, 207, 409 in Aem-Tim 319–320 in Cor-Alc 217–218 in Per-Fab 142, 143–146 See also: euergetism Publicola (Valerius Poplicola, P.) 112 Pyrrhus of Epirus esp. 329–341 passim; also 64, 282 Pydna, battle of esp. 299–301, 303; also 64, 177n97, 285–289 passim, 296, 297–298, 303, 315n53, 316n56 Quintilian Fabius as model of caution 156 moral virtue of orator 44, 49, 52–53 Quintus Cicero addressee of Cicero’s Ad Quintum 190 Commentariolum Petitionis 65–66, 401 rapacity (πλεονεξία). See avarice rashness (θρασύτης) as cause of failure 208, 172 as flaw in the people/army 143, 157, 197 as flaw in the young 153n57, 167–168, 170 engendered by inexperience 118 reasoning (λογισμός). See deliberations rebellion. See conspiracy reception of the Lives as historical sources 10, 423–424 heroes as models of effective/ineffective leadership 102–107, 424–428 heroes as moral exemplars 1–4, 96–99

Index reciprocity (give-and-take), as means to restore harmony in relations with the people 105–106, 141, 197–199, 371 reputation, as tool of effectiveness cultivation of 60, 63, 66 moral integrity 6, 43–44, 46–47, 51, 53n48 in Aem-Tim 288–289 in Cor-Alc 127, 212–214, 218–219, 276 in Per-Fab 135–136, 138–139, 154, 160 in Phoc-Cato 373 See also: goodwill; reputation, moral foundation and reputation, moral foundation and in Aem-Tim 288–290, 307–310 in Ages-Pomp 231–236, 252–257 in Cor-Alc 185–191, 208–214 in Dtr-Ant 331–334, 348–351 in Per-Fab 135–139, 158–161 in Phoc-Cato 373–376, 393–397 rivalry. See managing rivalry Rome, preservation of city and traditions by Aemilius 288–289, 294–295 by Cato Minor 402–407 by Coriolanus 184, 189–190 by Fabius 156, 168–169 lost by Pompey 251, 254, 263n71, 264, 266, 271, 275 violated by Antony 356–357 Romulus 103, 110, 397n69 ruler, ideal. See good ruler ruling and being ruled, pragmatic lessons in in Aem-Tim 291, 304–305, 310, 321–322 in Ages-Pomp 232–233 in Dtr-Ant 334, 345, 351, 364–365 in Phoc-Cato 376, 388–389, 397, 402–407, 413–414 resonance for Plutarch’s day 10, 279–282 See also: paradigms for ambassadors; paradigms for Emperors/provincial governors Sallust 40, 346n40, 389, 390, 424 Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, P. Cornelius (cos. 147, 134 BC) 1n4, 45, 58, 157, 285–295 passim, 304, 305n41

Index Scipio Africanus, P. Cornelius (cos. 205, 194 BC) 1n4, 43n14, 45, 64, 131, 157, 184n13, 254n54 opposed by Fabius 117, 118, 154, 159, 164–165, 171, 173–174, 177–179, 195, 260n66 Scipio Nasica, P. Cornelius (Corculum) (cos. 162, 155 BC) 285n4, 294, 300 Secession of the Plebs 183, 186, 191, 197 Seleucus I Nicator 282, 329, 333 self-control (ἐγκράτεια). See temperance self-will (αὐθάδεια) 16, 186n19, 187n20 in Cato Minor 408 in Coriolanus 45n25, 186–187, 200, 226 in Dion 186n19 in Metellus Scipio 406–407 self-indulgence (ἀκολασία). See wantonness self-praise 25, 53 in synkriseis 109 See also: On Inoffensive Self-Praise self-restraint (σωφροσύνη). See temperance Selymbria, battle of 219–220 Sempronius Gracchus, C. See Gracchi Sempronius Gracchus, Tiberius. See Gracchi Seneca 14, 39, 58, 100, 132, 184, 201, 251, 286n7, 330, 346 addressees 41 advice for statesmen (De Benef., Epist. Mor.) 44–46, 52, 156 advice for rulers (De Clem.) 24n61, 54, 56–57, 280, 283, 291, 308, 310, 326n4 Cato as exemplum of virtue 390–391 need for practical advice 25n62, 41–42 Sertorius, Q. as exemplum of generalship 101 attacked by Pompey 167–168, 202, 268 Sertorius-Eumenes (Sert-Eum) Greek Life is second 181, 285 Prologue 101–102 synkrisis 109, 112 ship imagery. See imagery Sicily 305–324 passim Sicilian Expedition 96, 115, 152, 207, 208, 209n57, 218, 223, 227n3 Socrates and Alcibiades esp. 208–210, 212; also 21n52, 22, 180, 182, 205, 206, 207, 224 as exemplum of equanimity 187n21, 390 in Phoc-Cato 374, 394n66, 415

469 soldierliness 327, 331, 362, 403 Solon emulated by Phocion 374 theatrics of 380n35 Solon-Publicola (Sol-Pub) synkrisis 109, 112–113, 114 Sosius Senecio, Q. (Senecio) 8, 26, 27, 33, 38, 77, 157, 230, 421 Sparta and Spartan practices 16, 231–232, 246, 373n19, 375n28, 382n38 as enemy/ally in Cor-Alc 180, 201, 204–212 passim, 222–224 as hegemon in decline 227–250 passim, 271, 273, 275–276 as rival to Athens 87, 148–149, 153–154 as role model 62n93, 69, 75, 151, 279–280 speeches. See direct speech spending. See public spending Sphodrias 234, 235n28, 238, 241, 250, 275 statesmanship. See political leadership statesmanship, as art 99–100 Stilpo 330, 331 Stoicism 13n3, 17–18, 160n70, 370, 394 Strabo 62 strife, love of (φιλονικία). See contentiousness submissiveness in Ages-Pomp 252, 256–257 in Dtr-Ant 350–351 Suetonius 14n11, 34n106, 83n163, 84, 346, 365, 389 suicide, as political act after citizens are safe 22, 91, 391, 393 as escape from captivity 414, 415 as escape from tyranny 394–396, 412 of Antony 346n41, 365 of Cleopatra 303, 360n70, 364 of Otho 91 theme in Phoc-Cato 22, 370, 390, 391, 393 Sulla, L. Cornelius (Felix) 13n1, 101, 112, 114, 427 as exemplum in Moralia 43n14 as general 64n104, 119 as oppressive ruler 260, 275, 394n65 as Pompey’s mentor 241, 250, 251, 252, 253n53, 262, 263n72, 264, 275 superiority to money (χρημάτων ἐγκράτεια), as means to build trust of Aemilius 289, 418

470 superiority to money (cont.) of Agesilaus 250 of Cato Minor 393 of Coriolanus 50, 127, 185–186 of Pericles 136–37, 418 of Phocion 373, 384n40 of Pompey 253 of Timoleon 308 See also: bribery superstition (δεισιδαιμονία) dispelling effects of 136n25, 245, 316 synkriseis, themes in age differences 111 common over private interests 110–111 degrees of virtue and vice 106n35, 110 function of 4, 14, 108 juxtaposition of heroes in 118–120 motives for actions 110–112 political and military effectiveness  114–118, 120 pressures of circumstances 112–114 resonance of 120–121 Tacitus 424, 426 Agricola 84, 229 Tanagra, battle of 147–149, 155, 165 Tarentum, battle of 155, 165–166, 170, 171, 173, 175, 178 Tegyra, battle of 230, 236, 248 temperance (σωφροσύνη) as a political virtue 16, 18, 22, 23, 44n16, 56–57, 73, 76, 99, 100, 280, 283, 325 basis of good-repute 63, 125 lacking in “bad kings” 283, 303–304 of subjects of the Lives 101, 109, 112, 250, 356, 374 in Ages-Pomp 232, 250 in Dtr-Ant 109, 325 in Cor-Alc 105n33, 109, 119n50, 180–181, 186, 208 in Phoc-Cato 373, 384n40, 393 in synkriseis 109 See also: “cardinal virtues” of a leader Thapsus, battle of 395, 401–402 theatrical imagery, as counterfeit rule  327–328, 336, 339, 341n36, 344n38, 345–350 passim theatrics, as political skill 64–66, 75, 245n40, 327–328, 380n35

Index in Aem-Tim 299–300, 315–317 in Per-Fab 138–139, 163–164, 176–177 Themistocles 100n22, 133, 201, 207, 414 as exemplum in Moralia 43n14, 47, 71, 72 as exemplum in other Lives 107, 119, 420 as general 64, 271, 421 emulated by Alcibiades 222 emulates Miltiades 138n33, 227n4 tactics of persuasion 380n35, 386n43 Theseus 75n147, 103, 110 Theseus-Romulus (Thes-Rom) Prologue 102–103 synkrisis 108n39, 109 Thucydides and pragmatic history 79, 424, 426 admirer of Pericles 131, 136 as source 133, 205 vs. Alcibiades 211n67, 214, 220 vs. Pericles 143n39, 144, 149, 152, 153 Thucydides, son of Melesias 133, 142, 147, 149–151 Timoleon chapter 7 passim; also 7, 48n33, 72, 98, 99, 110n41, 112, 372, 379n31, 419, 421 as exemplum in Moralia 43n14, 72 as general 117n97, 245n40, 381n37 Timoleon (Life of ) chapter 7 passim; also 64, 272n90, 188n25, 231, 419 Tissaphernes 205, 211–212, 222, 229, 243–244 To an Uneducated Ruler. See under Moralia Trajan 33n100 tranquility. See equanimity Trasimene, battle of Lake 155, 158, 163, 164, 167n74, 171, 172 Trebia, battle of 155, 158n65, 171, 175, 177 tyrant 56n66, 75, 113n47, 218 Alcibiades as “would be” 87, 205, 213–214, 219, 223 Caesar as “would be” 256n59, 313n51, 395–396, 412 counter-example to good ruler 282, 306, 325 dangers of friendship with 89 negotiations with 384–386, 414–415 Pompey dispels suspicion 255–256, 260–261

471

Index Timoleon dispels suspicion 7, 319, 322, 324 in Dtr-Ant 326, 344, 346, 347, 349–350, 356–357, 366 tyranny, fighting against as justified killing 48 by Demosthenes and Cicero 102 by Dion 86, 306n44 by Pericles 152 by Sulla and Pompey 275 by Timoleon 7, 290, 306n43, 307–309, 313–314 in synkriseis 109 Varro, C. Terentius 158, 168, 172–173, 177–178 Velleius Paterculus as source 251, 346n40, 389 vs. Aemilius 290n16 vs. Antony 346n41 vs. Cato Minor 390 vs. Pompey 251, 255, 266n79, 269n84, 274 vice as shortcoming or deficiency 95, 325–326, 331 blended with virtue in leaders 3, 40, 79, 84, 88, 95–96, 206, 348, 416–417 elimination or curtailment of 25, 44n19, 46–47, 99–100

virtue. See moral character Volscians 180–196 passim, 201–202, 214, 224, 226 wantonness 127, 142, 180, 183, 359, 418 wealth. See superiority to money wine metaphor. See imagery wrestling metaphor. See imagery Xenocrates 16, 21n52, 373, 385, 386–387, 388, 401, 413, 415 Xenophon 61, 133, 426 as character in Agesilaus 232n21 as source 205, 230 Cyropaideia as blueprint 54, 59, 82n161, 84 vs. Agesilaus 228n7, 232n20 and n21 and n23, 234n26, 236, 239n31, 241, 242, 243, 245, 248, 249 vs. Alcibiades 212n68, 219n12 young men character vs. old men 69–70 judged by different standards 111 training of 169–170 See also: mentors